[Midnightbsd-cvs] src [9222] vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1: tag 7.3p1
laffer1 at midnightbsd.org
laffer1 at midnightbsd.org
Sat Nov 5 16:33:16 EDT 2016
Revision: 9222
http://svnweb.midnightbsd.org/src/?rev=9222
Author: laffer1
Date: 2016-11-05 16:33:10 -0400 (Sat, 05 Nov 2016)
Log Message:
-----------
tag 7.3p1
Added Paths:
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vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/.skipped-commit-ids
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ChangeLog
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/INSTALL
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/Makefile.in
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/OVERVIEW
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.agent
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.certkeys
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.krl
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.mux
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/README
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/README.platform
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/addrmatch.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/atomicio.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/audit-linux.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-bsdauth.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-chall.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-krb5.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-options.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-options.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-pam.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-pam.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-passwd.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-rh-rsa.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-rhosts.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-rsa.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth1.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-chall.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-gss.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-kbdint.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-none.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-passwd.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfd.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfd.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfile.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfile.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bitmap.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bitmap.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bufaux.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bufbn.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bufec.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/buffer.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/buffer.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/canohost.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/canohost.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/chacha.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/channels.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/channels.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-3des1.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-aesctr.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-aesctr.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-bf1.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-chachapoly.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-chachapoly.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-ctr.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/clientloop.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/clientloop.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/compat.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/compat.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/config.guess
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/config.h.in
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/configure
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/configure.ac
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/Makefile
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/README
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/cygwin/README
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/deattack.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/deattack.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/defines.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dh.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dh.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/digest-libc.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/digest-openssl.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/digest.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dispatch.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dispatch.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dns.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dns.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/entropy.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ge25519.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/groupaccess.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/gss-genr.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/gss-serv.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hmac.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hmac.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hostfile.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hostfile.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/includes.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kex.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kex.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexc25519.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexc25519c.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexc25519s.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexdh.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexdhc.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexdhs.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexecdh.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexecdhc.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexecdhs.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexgex.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexgexc.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexgexs.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/key.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/key.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/krl.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/krl.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/log.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/log.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/loginrec.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/mac.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/mac.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/match.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/match.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/misc.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/misc.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/moduli
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/moduli.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/moduli.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_fdpass.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_mm.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_wrap.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_wrap.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/msg.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/msg.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/mux.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/myproposal.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/opacket.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/opacket.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/blowfish.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-err.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/glob.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/glob.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/md5.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/md5.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/reallocarray.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/realpath.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/rmd160.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha1.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha1.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha2.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha2.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/vis.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/vis.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/opensshd.init.in
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/packet.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/packet.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/pathnames.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform-pledge.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform-tracing.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/poly1305.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/progressmeter.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/progressmeter.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/readconf.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/readconf.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/readpass.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/Makefile
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/README.regress
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-ptrace.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-timeout.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/broken-pipe.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cert-file.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cfginclude.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cfgmatch.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cfgparse.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/check-perm.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cipher-speed.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/connect-privsep.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/connect.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/dhgex.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/dynamic-forward.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/exit-status.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/forcecommand.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/forward-control.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/forwarding.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/host-expand.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/integrity.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/kextype.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/key-options.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keygen-change.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keygen-knownhosts.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keys-command.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keyscan.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keytype.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/krl.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/limit-keytype.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/localcommand.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/login-timeout.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/misc/
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/modpipe.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/multiplex.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/multipubkey.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/netcat.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/principals-command.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/proto-mismatch.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/proto-version.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/proxy-connect.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/reconfigure.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/reexec.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/rekey.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/setuid-allowed.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/sftp-chroot.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/ssh-com.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/ssh2putty.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/sshcfgparse.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/stderr-data.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/t11.ok
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/t4.ok
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/test-exec.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/transfer.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/try-ciphers.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/unittests/
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/valgrind-unit.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/yes-head.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rijndael.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rijndael.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rsa.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rsa.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-pledge.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-solaris.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-systrace.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scp.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scp.1
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scp.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/servconf.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/servconf.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/serverloop.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/session.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/session.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-client.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-client.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-common.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-common.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-glob.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server-main.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server.8
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp.1
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-add.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-add.1
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-add.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-agent.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-agent.1
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-agent.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-dss.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-ecdsa.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-ed25519.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keygen.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keygen.1
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keygen.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keyscan.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keyscan.1
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keyscan.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keysign.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keysign.8
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keysign.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-rsa.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.1
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh1.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh2.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_api.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_api.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_config
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_config.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_config.5
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshbuf-misc.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshbuf.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshbuf.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect1.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect2.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd.8
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd_config
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd_config.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd_config.5
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssherr.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssherr.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshkey.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshkey.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshlogin.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshpty.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ttymodes.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ttymodes.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/uidswap.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/umac.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/utf8.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/utf8.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/uuencode.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/version.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/xmalloc.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/xmalloc.h
Removed Paths:
-------------
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ChangeLog
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/INSTALL
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/Makefile.in
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/OVERVIEW
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.agent
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.certkeys
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.krl
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.mux
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/README
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/README.platform
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/addrmatch.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/atomicio.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/audit-linux.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-bsdauth.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-chall.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-krb5.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-options.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-options.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-pam.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-pam.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-passwd.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-rh-rsa.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-rhosts.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-rsa.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth1.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-chall.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-gss.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-kbdint.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-none.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-passwd.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfd.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfd.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfile.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfile.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bufaux.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bufbn.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bufec.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/buffer.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/buffer.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/canohost.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/canohost.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/chacha.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/channels.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/channels.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-3des1.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-bf1.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-chachapoly.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-chachapoly.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-ctr.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/clientloop.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/clientloop.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/compat.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/compat.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/compress.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/compress.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/config.guess
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/config.h.in
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/configure
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/configure.ac
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/Makefile
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/README
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/caldera/
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/cygwin/README
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/deattack.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/deattack.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/defines.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dh.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dh.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/digest-libc.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/digest-openssl.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/digest.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dispatch.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dispatch.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dns.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dns.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/entropy.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ge25519.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/groupaccess.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/gss-genr.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/gss-serv.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hmac.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hmac.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hostfile.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hostfile.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/includes.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kex.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kex.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexc25519.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexc25519c.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexc25519s.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexdh.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexdhc.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexdhs.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexecdh.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexecdhc.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexecdhs.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexgex.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexgexc.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexgexs.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/key.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/key.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/krl.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/krl.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/log.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/log.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/loginrec.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/mac.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/mac.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/match.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/match.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/misc.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/misc.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/moduli
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/moduli.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/moduli.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_fdpass.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_mm.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_wrap.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_wrap.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/msg.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/msg.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/mux.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/myproposal.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/blowfish.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/glob.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/glob.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/realpath.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha2.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha2.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/vis.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/vis.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/opensshd.init.in
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/packet.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/packet.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/pathnames.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/poly1305.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/progressmeter.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/progressmeter.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/readconf.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/readconf.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/readpass.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/Makefile
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/README.regress
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-ptrace.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-timeout.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/broken-pipe.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cfgmatch.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cipher-speed.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/connect-privsep.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/connect.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/dhgex.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/dynamic-forward.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/exit-status.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/forcecommand.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/forward-control.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/forwarding.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/host-expand.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/integrity.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/kextype.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/key-options.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keygen-change.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keys-command.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keyscan.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keytype.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/krl.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/localcommand.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/login-timeout.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/modpipe.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/multiplex.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/proto-mismatch.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/proto-version.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/proxy-connect.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/reconfigure.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/reexec.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/rekey.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/setuid-allowed.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/sftp-chroot.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/ssh-com.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/ssh2putty.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/stderr-data.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/t4.ok
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/test-exec.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/transfer.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/try-ciphers.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/yes-head.sh
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rijndael.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rijndael.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/roaming.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/roaming_client.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/roaming_common.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/roaming_dummy.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/roaming_serv.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rsa.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rsa.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-systrace.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scard/
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scp.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scp.1
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scp.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/servconf.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/servconf.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/serverloop.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/session.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/session.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-client.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-client.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-common.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-common.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-glob.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server-main.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server.8
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp.1
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-add.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-add.1
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-add.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-agent.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-agent.1
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-agent.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-dss.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-ecdsa.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-ed25519.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keygen.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keygen.1
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keygen.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keyscan.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keyscan.1
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keyscan.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keysign.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keysign.8
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keysign.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-rsa.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.1
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh1.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh2.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_config
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_config.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_config.5
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect1.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect2.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd.8
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd_config
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd_config.0
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd_config.5
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshlogin.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshpty.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ttymodes.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ttymodes.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/uidswap.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/umac.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/uuencode.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/version.h
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/xmalloc.c
vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/xmalloc.h
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/.skipped-commit-ids (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/.skipped-commit-ids)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/.skipped-commit-ids (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/.skipped-commit-ids 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+321065a95a7ccebdd5fd08482a1e19afbf524e35 Update DH groups
+d4f699a421504df35254cf1c6f1a7c304fb907ca Remove 1k bit groups
+aafe246655b53b52bc32c8a24002bc262f4230f7 Remove intermediate moduli
+8fa9cd1dee3c3339ae329cf20fb591db6d605120 put back SSH1 for 6.9
+f31327a48dd4103333cc53315ec53fe65ed8a17a Generate new moduli
+edbfde98c40007b7752a4ac106095e060c25c1ef Regen moduli
+052fd565e3ff2d8cec3bc957d1788f50c827f8e2 Switch to tame-based sandbox
+7cf73737f357492776223da1c09179fa6ba74660 Remove moduli <2k
+180d84674be1344e45a63990d60349988187c1ae Update moduli
+f6ae971186ba68d066cd102e57d5b0b2c211a5ee systrace is dead.
+96c5054e3e1f170c6276902d5bc65bb3b87a2603 remove DEBUGLIBS from Makefile
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ChangeLog
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ChangeLog 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ChangeLog 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,2887 +0,0 @@
-20140313
- - (djm) Release OpenSSH 6.6
-
-20140304
- - OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/03 22:22:30
- [session.c]
- ignore enviornment variables with embedded '=' or '\0' characters;
- spotted by Jann Horn; ok deraadt@
-
-20140301
- - (djm) [regress/Makefile] Disable dhgex regress test; it breaks when
- no moduli file exists at the expected location.
-
-20140228
- - OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 00:41:49
- [bufbn.c]
- fix unsigned overflow that could lead to reading a short ssh protocol
- 1 bignum value; found by Ben Hawkes; ok deraadt@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 08:25:09
- [bufbn.c]
- off by one in range check
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 22:47:07
- [sshd_config.5]
- bz#2184 clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple
- matching Match blocks; ok dtucker@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 22:57:40
- [version.h]
- openssh-6.6
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/19 23:43:02
- [regress/sftp-chroot.sh]
- Don't use -q on sftp as it suppresses logging, instead redirect the
- output to the regress logfile.
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/20 00:00:30
- [sregress/ftp-chroot.sh]
- append to rather than truncating the log file
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/25 04:35:32
- [regress/Makefile regress/dhgex.sh]
- Add a test for DH GEX sizes
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/26 10:22:10
- [regress/cert-hostkey.sh]
- automatically generate revoked keys from listed keys rather than
- manually specifying each type; from portable
- (Id sync only)
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/26 10:49:17
- [scp-ssh-wrapper.sh scp.sh]
- make sure $SCP is tested on the remote end rather than whichever one
- happens to be in $PATH; from portable
- (Id sync only)
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 20:04:16
- [login-timeout.sh]
- remove any existing LoginGraceTime from sshd_config before adding
- a specific one for the test back in
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 21:21:25
- [agent-ptrace.sh agent.sh]
- keep return values that are printed in error messages;
- from portable
- (Id sync only)
- - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
- [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank version numbers
- - (djm) [regress/host-expand.sh] Add RCS Id
-
-20140227
- - OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 20:18:37
- [ssh.c]
- bz#2205: avoid early hostname lookups unless canonicalisation is enabled;
- ok dtucker@ markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 20:28:44
- [auth2-gss.c gss-serv.c ssh-gss.h sshd.c]
- bz#2107 - cache OIDs of supported GSSAPI mechanisms before privsep
- sandboxing, as running this code in the sandbox can cause violations;
- ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 20:29:29
- [channels.c]
- don't assume that the socks4 username is \0 terminated;
- spotted by Ben Hawkes; ok markus@
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 21:53:37
- [sshd.c]
- ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids needs GSSAPI
-
-20140224
- - OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/07 06:55:54
- [cipher.c mac.c]
- remove some logging that makes ssh debugging output very verbose;
- ok markus
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/15 23:05:36
- [channels.c]
- avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" errors in ssh -W;
- bz#2200, debian#738692 via Colin Watson; ok dtucker@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/22 01:32:19
- [readconf.c]
- when processing Match blocks, skip 'exec' clauses if previous predicates
- failed to match; ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/23 20:03:42
- [ssh-ed25519.c]
- check for unsigned overflow; not reachable in OpenSSH but others might
- copy our code...
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/23 20:11:36
- [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.c ssh_config.5]
- reparse ssh_config and ~/.ssh/config if hostname canonicalisation changes
- the hostname. This allows users to write configurations that always
- refer to canonical hostnames, e.g.
-
- CanonicalizeHostname yes
- CanonicalDomains int.example.org example.org
- CanonicalizeFallbackLocal no
-
- Host *.int.example.org
- Compression off
- Host *.example.org
- User djm
-
- ok markus@
-
-20140213
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.{c,h}] Add compat
- code for older OpenSSL versions that don't have EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex.
-
-20140207
- - OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - naddy at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/05 20:13:25
- [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
- tweak synopsis: calling ssh-keygen without any arguments is fine; ok jmc@
- while here, fix ordering in usage(); requested by jmc@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/06 22:21:01
- [sshconnect.c]
- in ssh_create_socket(), only do the getaddrinfo for BindAddress when
- BindAddress is actually specified. Fixes regression in 6.5 for
- UsePrivilegedPort=yes; patch from Corinna Vinschen
-
-20140206
- - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c] Don't bother checking for non-NULL
- before freeing since free(NULL) is a no-op. ok djm.
- - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Not all Linux architectures define
- __NR_shutdown; some go via the socketcall(2) multiplexer.
-
-20140205
- - (djm) [sandbox-capsicum.c] Don't fatal if Capsicum is offered by
- headers/libc but not supported by the kernel. Patch from Loganaden
- Velvindron @ AfriNIC
-
-20140204
- - OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/27 18:58:14
- [Makefile.in digest.c digest.h hostfile.c kex.h mac.c hmac.c hmac.h]
- replace openssl HMAC with an implementation based on our ssh_digest_*
- ok and feedback djm@
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/27 19:18:54
- [auth-rsa.c cipher.c ssh-agent.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c]
- replace openssl MD5 with our ssh_digest_*; ok djm@
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/27 20:13:46
- [digest.c digest-openssl.c digest-libc.c Makefile.in]
- rename digest.c to digest-openssl.c and add libc variant; ok djm@
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/28 14:13:39
- [ssh-keyscan.1]
- kill some bad Pa;
- From: Jan Stary
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/29 00:19:26
- [sshd.c]
- use kill(0, ...) instead of killpg(0, ...); on most operating systems
- they are equivalent, but SUSv2 describes the latter as having undefined
- behaviour; from portable; ok dtucker
- (Id sync only; change is already in portable)
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/29 06:18:35
- [Makefile.in auth.h auth2-jpake.c auth2.c jpake.c jpake.h monitor.c]
- [monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h readconf.c readconf.h]
- [schnorr.c schnorr.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c]
- remove experimental, never-enabled JPAKE code; ok markus@
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/29 14:04:51
- [sshd_config.5]
- document kbdinteractiveauthentication;
- requested From: Ross L Richardson
-
- dtucker/markus helped explain its workings;
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/30 22:26:14
- [sandbox-systrace.c]
- allow shutdown(2) syscall in sandbox - it may be called by packet_close()
- from portable
- (Id sync only; change is already in portable)
- - tedu at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/31 16:39:19
- [auth2-chall.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufec.c canohost.c]
- [channels.c cipher-chachapoly.c clientloop.c configure.ac hostfile.c]
- [kexc25519.c krl.c monitor.c sandbox-systrace.c session.c]
- [sftp-client.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c]
- [openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h]
- replace most bzero with explicit_bzero, except a few that cna be memset
- ok djm dtucker
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/02 03:44:32
- [auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-passwd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c]
- [buffer.c cipher-3des1.c cipher.c clientloop.c gss-serv.c kex.c]
- [kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexecdhc.c kexgexc.c kexecdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c]
- [monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c readpass.c rsa.c serverloop.c]
- [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c]
- [ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c]
- [sshd.c]
- convert memset of potentially-private data to explicit_bzero()
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/03 23:28:00
- [ssh-ecdsa.c]
- fix memory leak; ECDSA_SIG_new() allocates 'r' and 's' for us, unlike
- DSA_SIG_new. Reported by Batz Spear; ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/02 03:44:31
- [digest-libc.c digest-openssl.c]
- convert memset of potentially-private data to explicit_bzero()
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/04 00:24:29
- [ssh.c]
- delay lowercasing of hostname until right before hostname
- canonicalisation to unbreak case-sensitive matching of ssh_config;
- reported by Ike Devolder; ok markus@
- - (djm) [openbsd-compat/Makefile.in] Add missing explicit_bzero.o
- - (djm) [regress/setuid-allowed.c] Missing string.h for strerror()
-
-20140131
- - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c sandbox-systrace.c] Allow shutdown(2)
- syscall from sandboxes; it may be called by packet_close.
- - (dtucker) [readconf.c] Include <arpa/inet.h> for the hton macros. Fixes
- build with HP-UX's compiler. Patch from Kevin Brott.
- - (tim) [Makefile.in] build regress/setuid-allow.
-
-20140130
- - (djm) [configure.ac] Only check for width-specified integer types
- in headers that actually exist. patch from Tom G. Christensen;
- ok dtucker@
- - (djm) [configure.ac atomicio.c] Kludge around NetBSD offering
- different symbols for 'read' when various compiler flags are
- in use, causing atomicio.c comparisons against it to break and
- read/write operations to hang; ok dtucker
- - (djm) Release openssh-6.5p1
-
-20140129
- - (djm) [configure.ac] Fix broken shell test '==' vs '='; patch from
- Tom G. Christensen
-
-20140128
- - (djm) [configure.ac] Search for inet_ntop in libnsl and libresovl;
- ok dtucker
- - (djm) [sshd.c] Use kill(0, ...) instead of killpg(0, ...); the
- latter being specified to have undefined behaviour in SUSv3;
- ok dtucker
- - (tim) [regress/agent.sh regress/agent-ptrace.sh] Assign $? to a variable
- when used as an error message inside an if statement so we display the
- correct into. agent.sh patch from Petr Lautrbach.
-
-20140127
- - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Remove trailing backslash which some make
- implementations (eg older Solaris) do not cope with.
-
-20140126
- - OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/25 10:12:50
- [cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h kexgexc.c]
- Add a special case for the DH group size for 3des-cbc, which has an
- effective strength much lower than the key size. This causes problems
- with some cryptlib implementations, which don't support group sizes larger
- than 4k but also don't use the largest group size it does support as
- specified in the RFC. Based on a patch from Petr Lautrbach at Redhat,
- reduced by me with input from Markus. ok djm@ markus@
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/25 20:35:37
- [kex.c]
- dh_need needs to be set to max(seclen, blocksize, ivlen, mac_len)
- ok dtucker@, noted by mancha
- - (djm) [configure.ac sandbox-capsicum.c sandbox-rlimit.c] Disable
- RLIMIT_NOFILE pseudo-sandbox on FreeBSD. In some configurations,
- libc will attempt to open additional file descriptors for crypto
- offload and crash if they cannot be opened.
- - (djm) [configure.ac] correct AC_DEFINE for previous.
-
-20140125
- - (djm) [configure.ac] Fix detection of capsicum sandbox on FreeBSD
- - (djm) [configure.ac] Do not attempt to use capsicum sandbox unless
- sys/capability.h exists and cap_rights_limit is in libc. Fixes
- build on FreeBSD9x which provides the header but not the libc
- support.
- - (djm) [configure.ac] autoconf sets finds to 'yes' not '1', so test
- against the correct thing.
-
-20140124
- - (djm) [Makefile.in regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh regress/scp.sh] Make
- the scp regress test actually test the built scp rather than the one
- in $PATH. ok dtucker@
-
-20140123
- - (tim) [session.c] Improve error reporting on set_id().
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] NetBSD's (and FreeBSD's) strnvis is gratuitously
- incompatible with OpenBSD's despite post-dating it by more than a decade.
- Declare it as broken, and document FreeBSD's as the same. ok djm@
-
-20140122
- - (djm) [openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c] Don't fail to compile if a
- platform that is expected to use the reuse-argv style setproctitle
- hack surprises us by providing a setproctitle in libc; ok dtucker
- - (djm) [configure.ac] Unless specifically requested, only attempt
- to build Position Independent Executables on gcc >= 4.x; ok dtucker
- - (djm) [configure.ac aclocal.m4] More tests to detect fallout from
- platform hardening options: include some long long int arithmatic
- to detect missing support functions for -ftrapv in libgcc and
- equivalents, actually test linking when -ftrapv is supplied and
- set either both -pie/-fPIE or neither. feedback and ok dtucker@
-
-20140121
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Make PIE a configure-time option which defaults
- to on platforms where it's known to be reliably detected and off elsewhere.
- Works around platforms such as FreeBSD 9.1 where it does not interop with
- -ftrapv (it seems to work but fails when trying to link ssh). ok djm@
- - (dtucker) [aclocal.m4] Differentiate between compile-time and link-time
- tests in the configure output. ok djm.
- - (tim) [platform.c session.c] Fix bug affecting SVR5 platforms introduced
- with sftp chroot support. Move set_id call after chroot.
- - (djm) [aclocal.m4] Flesh out the code run in the OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE
- and OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK tests to give them a better chance of
- detecting toolchain-related problems; ok dtucker
-
-20140120
- - (dtucker) [gss-serv-krb5.c] Fall back to krb5_cc_gen_new if the Kerberos
- implementation does not have krb5_cc_new_unique, similar to what we do
- in auth-krb5.c.
- - (djm) [regress/cert-hostkey.sh] Fix regress failure on platforms that
- skip one or more key types (e.g. RHEL/CentOS 6.5); ok dtucker@
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/20 00:08:48
- [digest.c]
- memleak; found by Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC; ok markus@
-
-20140119
- - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/17 06:23:24
- [sftp-server.c]
- fix log message statvfs. ok djm
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/18 09:36:26
- [session.c]
- explicitly define USE_PIPES to 1 to prevent redefinition warnings in
- portable on platforms that use pipes for everything. From vinschen at
- redhat.
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/19 04:17:29
- [canohost.c addrmatch.c]
- Cast socklen_t when comparing to size_t and use socklen_t to iterate over
- the ip options, both to prevent signed/unsigned comparison warnings.
- Patch from vinschen at redhat via portable openssh, begrudging ok deraadt.
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/19 04:48:08
- [ssh_config.5]
- fix inverted meaning of 'no' and 'yes' for CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/19 11:21:51
- [addrmatch.c]
- Cast the sizeof to socklen_t so it'll work even if the supplied len is
- negative. Suggested by and ok djm, ok deraadt.
-
-20140118
- - (dtucker) [uidswap.c] Prevent unused variable warnings on Cygwin. Patch
- from vinschen at redhat.com
- - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h] Add missing function
- declarations that stopped being included when we stopped including
- <windows.h> from openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h. Patch from vinschen at
- redhat.com.
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] On Cygwin the getopt variables (like optargs,
- optind) are defined in getopt.h already. Unfortunately they are defined as
- "declspec(dllimport)" for historical reasons, because the GNU linker didn't
- allow auto-import on PE/COFF targets way back when. The problem is the
- dllexport attributes collide with the definitions in the various source
- files in OpenSSH, which obviousy define the variables without
- declspec(dllimport). The least intrusive way to get rid of these warnings
- is to disable warnings for GCC compiler attributes when building on Cygwin.
- Patch from vinschen at redhat.com.
- - (dtucker) [sandbox-capsicum.c] Correct some error messages and make the
- return value check for cap_enter() consistent with the other uses in
- FreeBSD. From by Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC via bz#2140.
-
-20140117
- - (dtucker) [aclocal.m4 configure.ac] Add some additional compiler/toolchain
- hardening flags including -fstack-protector-strong. These default to on
- if the toolchain supports them, but there is a configure-time knob
- (--without-hardening) to disable them if necessary. ok djm@
- - (djm) [sftp-client.c] signed/unsigned comparison fix
- - (dtucker) [loginrec.c] Cast to the types specfied in the format
- specification to prevent warnings.
- - (dtucker) [crypto_api.h] Wrap stdlib.h include inside #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
- - (dtucker) [poly1305.c] Wrap stdlib.h include inside #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
- - (dtucker) [blocks.c fe25519.c ge25519.c hash.c sc25519.c verify.c] Include
- includes.h to pull in all of the compatibility stuff.
- - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c] Wrap stdlib.h include inside
- #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
- - (dtucker) [defines.h] Add typedefs for uintXX_t types for platforms that
- don't have them.
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Split AC_CHECK_FUNCS for OpenSSL functions into
- separate lines and alphabetize for easier diffing of changes.
- - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/17 00:21:06
- [sftp-client.c]
- signed/unsigned comparison warning fix; from portable (Id sync only)
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/17 05:26:41
- [digest.c]
- remove unused includes. ok djm@
- - (djm) [Makefile.in configure.ac sandbox-capsicum.c sandbox-darwin.c]
- [sandbox-null.c sandbox-rlimit.c sandbox-seccomp-filter.c]
- [sandbox-systrace.c ssh-sandbox.h sshd.c] Support preauth sandboxing
- using the Capsicum API introduced in FreeBSD 10. Patch by Dag-Erling
- Smorgrav, updated by Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC; ok dtucker@
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac digest.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
- openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Add compatibility layer for older
- openssl versions. ok djm@
- - (dtucker) Fix typo in #ifndef.
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c
- openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h] Implement enough of statvfs on top of statfs
- to be useful (and for the regression tests to pass) on platforms that
- have statfs and fstatfs. ok djm@
- - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h] Only start including headers if we
- need them to cut down on the name collisions.
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Also look in inttypes.h for uintXX_t types.
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Have --without-hardening not turn off
- stack-protector since that has a separate flag that's been around a while.
- - (dtucker) [readconf.c] Wrap paths.h inside an ifdef. Allows building on
- Solaris.
- - (dtucker) [defines.h] Move our definitions of uintXX_t types down to after
- they're defined if we have to define them ourselves. Fixes builds on old
- AIX.
-
-20140118
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/16 07:31:09
- [sftp-client.c]
- needless and incorrect cast to size_t can break resumption of
- large download; patch from tobias@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/16 07:32:00
- [version.h]
- openssh-6.5
- - (djm) [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
- [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank RPM spec version numbers.
- - (djm) [README] update release notes URL.
-
-20140112
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/10 05:59:19
- [sshd_config]
- the /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key is loaded by default too
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/12 08:13:13
- [bufaux.c buffer.h kex.c kex.h kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c kexc25519s.c]
- [kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c]
- avoid use of OpenSSL BIGNUM type and functions for KEX with
- Curve25519 by adding a buffer_put_bignum2_from_string() that stores
- a string using the bignum encoding rules. Will make it easier to
- build a reduced-feature OpenSSH without OpenSSL in the future;
- ok markus@
-
-20140110
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - tedu at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/04 17:50:55
- [mac.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h xmalloc.c]
- use standard types and formats for size_t like variables. ok dtucker
- - guenther at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/09 03:26:00
- [sftp-common.c]
- When formating the time for "ls -l"-style output, show dates in the future
- with the year, and rearrange a comparison to avoid a potentional signed
- arithmetic overflow that would give the wrong result.
- ok djm@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/09 23:20:00
- [digest.c digest.h hostfile.c kex.c kex.h kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c]
- [kexc25519s.c kexdh.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c]
- [kexgexs.c key.c key.h roaming_client.c roaming_common.c schnorr.c]
- [schnorr.h ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect2.c]
- Introduce digest API and use it to perform all hashing operations
- rather than calling OpenSSL EVP_Digest* directly. Will make it easier
- to build a reduced-feature OpenSSH without OpenSSL in future;
- feedback, ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/09 23:26:48
- [sshconnect.c sshd.c]
- ban clients/servers that suffer from SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY, they are ancient,
- deranged and might make some attacks on KEX easier; ok markus@
-
-20140108
- - (djm) [regress/.cvsignore] Ignore regress test droppings; ok dtucker@
-
-20131231
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/30 23:52:28
- [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c compat.c compat.h ssh-rsa.c]
- [sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
- refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients/servers that use the
- obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme. it will still be possible to connect
- with these clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and we'll
- deprecate them entirely in a future release. ok markus@
-
-20131229
- - (djm) [loginrec.c] Check for username truncation when looking up lastlog
- entries
- - (djm) [regress/Makefile] Add some generated files for cleaning
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 00:10:30
- [ssh-add.c]
- skip requesting smartcard PIN when removing keys from agent; bz#2187
- patch from jay AT slushpupie.com; ok dtucker
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 00:19:12
- [serverloop.c]
- Cast client_alive_interval to u_int64_t before assinging to
- max_time_milliseconds to avoid potential integer overflow in the timeout.
- bz#2170, patch from Loganaden Velvindron, ok djm@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 00:27:57
- [auth-options.c]
- simplify freeing of source-address certificate restriction
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 01:04:36
- [channels.c]
- bz#2147: fix multiple remote forwardings with dynamically assigned
- listen ports. In the s->c message to open the channel we were sending
- zero (the magic number to request a dynamic port) instead of the actual
- listen port. The client therefore had no way of discriminating between
- them.
-
- Diagnosis and fix by ronf AT timeheart.net
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 01:19:41
- [ssh-agent.c]
- bz#2186: don't crash (NULL deref) when deleting PKCS#11 keys from an agent
- that has a mix of normal and PKCS#11 keys; fix from jay AT slushpupie.com;
- ok dtucker
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 22:57:13
- [poly1305.c poly1305.h]
- use full name for author, with his permission
- - tedu at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/21 07:10:47
- [ssh-keygen.1]
- small typo
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/27 22:30:17
- [ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-rsa.c]
- make the original RSA and DSA signing/verification code look more like
- the ECDSA/Ed25519 ones: use key_type_plain() when checking the key type
- rather than tediously listing all variants, use __func__ for debug/
- error messages
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/27 22:37:18
- [ssh-rsa.c]
- correct comment
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 02:28:10
- [key.c]
- allow ed25519 keys to appear as certificate authorities
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 02:37:04
- [key.c]
- correct comment for key_to_certified()
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 02:49:52
- [key.c]
- correct comment for key_drop_cert()
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 04:20:04
- [key.c]
- to make sure we don't omit any key types as valid CA keys again,
- factor the valid key type check into a key_type_is_valid_ca()
- function
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 04:29:25
- [authfd.c]
- allow deletion of ed25519 keys from the agent
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 04:35:50
- [authfile.c]
- don't refuse to load Ed25519 certificates
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 05:42:16
- [ssh.c]
- don't forget to load Ed25519 certs too
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 05:57:02
- [sshconnect.c]
- when showing other hostkeys, don't forget Ed25519 keys
-
-20131221
- - (dtucker) [regress/keytype.sh] Actually test ecdsa key types.
-
-20131219
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] bz#2178: Don't try to use BSM on Solaris versions
- greater than 11 either rather than just 11. Patch from Tomas Kuthan.
- - (dtucker) [auth-pam.c] bz#2163: check return value from pam_get_item().
- Patch from Loganaden Velvindron.
-
-20131218
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/07 08:08:26
- [ssh-keygen.1]
- document -a and -o wrt new key format
- - naddy at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/07 11:58:46
- [ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1]
- [ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd_config.5]
- add missing mentions of ed25519; ok djm@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/08 09:53:27
- [sshd_config.5]
- Use a literal for the default value of KEXAlgorithms. ok deraadt jmc
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/09 11:03:45
- [blocks.c ed25519.c fe25519.c fe25519.h ge25519.c ge25519.h]
- [ge25519_base.data hash.c sc25519.c sc25519.h verify.c]
- Add Authors for the public domain ed25519/nacl code.
- see also http://nacl.cr.yp.to/features.html
- All of the NaCl software is in the public domain.
- and http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/software.html
- The Ed25519 software is in the public domain.
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/09 11:08:17
- [crypto_api.h]
- remove unused defines
- - pascal at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/15 18:17:26
- [ssh-add.c]
- Make ssh-add also add .ssh/id_ed25519; fixes lie in manual page.
- ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/15 21:42:35
- [cipher-chachapoly.c]
- add some comments and constify a constant
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/17 10:36:38
- [crypto_api.h]
- I've assempled the header file by cut&pasting from generated headers
- and the source files.
-
-20131208
- - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c] Missing header; from Corinna
- Vinschen
- - (djm) [Makefile.in regress/Makefile regress/agent-ptrace.sh]
- [regress/setuid-allowed.c] Check that ssh-agent is not on a no-setuid
- filesystem before running agent-ptrace.sh; ok dtucker
-
-20131207
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/05 22:59:45
- [sftp-client.c]
- fix memory leak in error path in do_readdir(); pointed out by
- Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC in bz#2163
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 03:40:51
- [ssh-keygen.c]
- remove duplicated character ('g') in getopt() string;
- document the (few) remaining option characters so we don't have to
- rummage next time.
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:30:08
- [authfd.c key.c key.h ssh-agent.c]
- move private key (de)serialization to key.c; ok djm
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:34:54
- [authfile.c authfile.h cipher.c cipher.h key.c packet.c ssh-agent.c]
- [ssh-keygen.c PROTOCOL.key] new private key format, bcrypt as KDF by
- default; details in PROTOCOL.key; feedback and lots help from djm;
- ok djm@
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:39:49
- [authfd.c authfile.c key.c key.h myproposal.h pathnames.h readconf.c]
- [servconf.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c]
- [ssh-keysign.c ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd.c verify.c ssh-ed25519.c]
- [sc25519.h sc25519.c hash.c ge25519_base.data ge25519.h ge25519.c]
- [fe25519.h fe25519.c ed25519.c crypto_api.h blocks.c]
- support ed25519 keys (hostkeys and user identities) using the public
- domain ed25519 reference code from SUPERCOP, see
- http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/software.html
- feedback, help & ok djm@
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 15:29:07
- [sshd.8]
- missing comma;
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/07 00:19:15
- [key.c]
- set k->cert = NULL after freeing it
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:52:46
- [regress/Makefile regress/agent.sh regress/cert-hostkey.sh]
- [regress/cert-userkey.sh regress/keytype.sh]
- test ed25519 support; from djm@
- - (djm) [blocks.c ed25519.c fe25519.c fe25519.h ge25519.c ge25519.h]
- [ge25519_base.data hash.c sc25519.c sc25519.h verify.c] Fix RCS idents
- - (djm) [Makefile.in] Add ed25519 sources
- - (djm) [authfile.c] Conditionalise inclusion of util.h
- - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c]
- [openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/blowfish.c]
- [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Start at supporting bcrypt_pbkdf in
- portable.
- - (djm) [ed25519.c ssh-ed25519.c openbsd-compat/Makefile.in]
- [openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c] Make ed25519/new key format compile on
- Linux
- - (djm) [regress/cert-hostkey.sh] Fix merge botch
- - (djm) [Makefile.in] PATHSUBS and keygen bits for Ed25519; from
- Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC in bz#2179
-
-20131205
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 08:05:09
- [ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
- no need for .Pp before displays;
- - deraadt at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/25 18:04:21
- [ssh.1 ssh.c]
- improve -Q usage and such. One usage change is that the option is now
- case-sensitive
- ok dtucker markus djm
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/26 12:14:54
- [ssh.1 ssh.c]
- - put -Q in the right place
- - Ar was a poor choice for the arguments to -Q. i've chosen an
- admittedly equally poor Cm, at least consistent with the rest
- of the docs. also no need for multiple instances
- - zap a now redundant Nm
- - usage() sync
- - deraadt at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/26 19:15:09
- [pkcs11.h]
- cleanup 1 << 31 idioms. Resurrection of this issue pointed out by
- Eitan Adler ok markus for ssh, implies same change in kerberosV
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/01 23:19:05
- [PROTOCOL]
- mention curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org key exchange algorithm
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/02 02:50:27
- [PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305]
- typo; from Jon Cave
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/02 02:56:17
- [ssh-pkcs11-helper.c]
- use-after-free; bz#2175 patch from Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/02 03:09:22
- [key.c]
- make key_to_blob() return a NULL blob on failure; part of
- bz#2175 from Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/02 03:13:14
- [cipher.c]
- correct bzero of chacha20+poly1305 key context. bz#2177 from
- Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC
-
- Also make it a memset for consistency with the rest of cipher.c
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/04 04:20:01
- [sftp-client.c]
- bz#2171: don't leak local_fd on error; from Loganaden Velvindron @
- AfriNIC
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/05 01:16:41
- [servconf.c servconf.h]
- bz#2161 - fix AuthorizedKeysCommand inside a Match block and
- rearrange things so the same error is harder to make next time;
- with and ok dtucker@
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] bz#2173: use pkg-config --libs to include correct
- -L location for libedit. Patch from Serge van den Boom.
-
-20131121
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/08 11:15:19
- [bufaux.c bufbn.c buffer.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c]
- [uidswap.c] Include stdlib.h for free() as per the man page.
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/13 13:48:20
- [ssh-pkcs11.c]
- add missing braces found by pedro
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/20 02:19:01
- [sshd.c]
- delay closure of in/out fds until after "Bad protocol version
- identification..." message, as get_remote_ipaddr/get_remote_port
- require them open.
- - deraadt at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/20 20:53:10
- [scp.c]
- unsigned casts for ctype macros where neccessary
- ok guenther millert markus
- - deraadt at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/20 20:54:10
- [canohost.c clientloop.c match.c readconf.c sftp.c]
- unsigned casts for ctype macros where neccessary
- ok guenther millert markus
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 00:45:44
- [Makefile.in PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 authfile.c chacha.c]
- [chacha.h cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h]
- [dh.c myproposal.h packet.c poly1305.c poly1305.h servconf.c ssh.1]
- [ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] Add a new protocol 2 transport
- cipher "chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com" that combines Daniel
- Bernstein's ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an
- authenticated encryption mode.
-
- Inspired by and similar to Adam Langley's proposal for TLS:
- http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03
- but differs in layout used for the MAC calculation and the use of a
- second ChaCha20 instance to separately encrypt packet lengths.
- Details are in the PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 file.
-
- Feedback markus@, naddy@; manpage bits Loganden Velvindron @ AfriNIC
- ok markus@ naddy@
- - naddy at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/18 05:09:32
- [regress/forward-control.sh]
- bump timeout to 10 seconds to allow slow machines (e.g. Alpha PC164)
- to successfully run this; ok djm@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 03:15:46
- [regress/krl.sh]
- add some reminders for additional tests that I'd like to implement
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 03:16:47
- [regress/modpipe.c]
- use unsigned long long instead of u_int64_t here to avoid warnings
- on some systems portable OpenSSH is built on.
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 03:18:51
- [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/integrity.sh regress/rekey.sh]
- [regress/try-ciphers.sh]
- use new "ssh -Q cipher-auth" query to obtain lists of authenticated
- encryption ciphers instead of specifying them manually; ensures that
- the new chacha20poly1305 at openssh.com mode is tested;
-
- ok markus@ and naddy@ as part of the diff to add
- chacha20poly1305 at openssh.com
-
-20131110
- - (dtucker) [regress/keytype.sh] Populate ECDSA key types to be tested by
- querying the ones that are compiled in.
-
-20131109
- - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/09 05:41:34
- [regress/test-exec.sh regress/rekey.sh]
- Use smaller test data files to speed up tests. Grow test datafiles
- where necessary for a specific test.
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac kex.c key.c myproposal.h] Test for the presence of
- NID_X9_62_prime256v1, NID_secp384r1 and NID_secp521r1 and test that the
- latter actually works before using it. Fedora (at least) has NID_secp521r1
- that doesn't work (see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1021897).
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Fix brackets in NID_secp521r1 test.
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Add missing "test".
- - (dtucker) [key.c] Check for the correct defines for NID_secp521r1.
-
-20131108
- - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/08 01:06:14
- [regress/rekey.sh]
- Rekey less frequently during tests to speed them up
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 11:58:27
- [cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h mac.c mac.h servconf.c ssh.c]
- Output the effective values of Ciphers, MACs and KexAlgorithms when
- the default has not been overridden. ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/08 00:39:15
- [auth-options.c auth2-chall.c authfd.c channels.c cipher-3des1.c]
- [clientloop.c gss-genr.c monitor_mm.c packet.c schnorr.c umac.c]
- [sftp-client.c sftp-glob.c]
- use calloc for all structure allocations; from markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/08 01:38:11
- [version.h]
- openssh-6.4
- - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
- [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update version numbers following release.
- - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Add null implementation of
- arc4random_stir for platforms that have arc4random but don't have
- arc4random_stir (right now this is only OpenBSD -current).
- - (dtucker) [kex.c] Only enable CURVE25519_SHA256 if we actually have
- EVP_sha256.
- - (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Conditionally enable CURVE25519_SHA256.
- - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c] Add headers to prevent compile
- warnings.
- - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac] Set MALLOC_OPTIONS per platform
- and pass in TEST_ENV. use stderr to get polluted
- and the stderr-data test to fail.
- - (dtucker) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Simplify host key generation:
- rather than testing and generating each key, call ssh-keygen -A.
- Patch from vinschen at redhat.com.
- - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/09 05:41:34
- [regress/test-exec.sh regress/rekey.sh]
- Use smaller test data files to speed up tests. Grow test datafiles
- where necessary for a specific test.
-
-20131107
- - (djm) [ssh-pkcs11.c] Bring back "non-constant initialiser" fix (rev 1.5)
- that got lost in recent merge.
- - (djm) [Makefile.in monitor.c] Missed chunks of curve25519 KEX diff
- - (djm) [regress/modpipe.c regress/rekey.sh] Never intended to commit these
- - (djm) [configure.ac defines.h] Skip arc4random_stir() calls on platforms
- that lack it but have arc4random_uniform()
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/04 11:51:16
- [monitor.c]
- fix rekeying for KEX_C25519_SHA256; noted by dtucker@
- RCSID sync only; I thought this was a merge botch and fixed it already
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/06 16:52:11
- [monitor_wrap.c]
- fix rekeying for AES-GCM modes; ok deraadt
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/06 23:05:59
- [ssh-pkcs11.c]
- from portable: s/true/true_val/ to avoid name collisions on dump platforms
- RCSID sync only
- - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/09 23:44:14
- [regress/Makefile] (ID sync only)
- regression test for sftp request white/blacklisting and readonly mode.
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 22:39:53
- [regress/kextype.sh]
- add curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/04 12:27:42
- [regress/rekey.sh]
- Test rekeying with all KexAlgorithms.
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 00:12:05
- [regress/rekey.sh]
- Test rekeying for every Cipher, MAC and KEX, plus test every KEX with
- the GCM ciphers.
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 01:12:51
- [regress/rekey.sh]
- Factor out the data transfer rekey tests
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 02:48:38
- [regress/integrity.sh regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh]
- Use ssh -Q instead of hardcoding lists of ciphers or MACs.
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 03:55:41
- [regress/kextype.sh]
- Use ssh -Q to get kex types instead of a static list.
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 04:26:56
- [regress/kextype.sh]
- trailing space
- - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac] Remove TEST_SSH_SHA256 environment
- variable. It's no longer used now that we get the supported MACs from
- ssh -Q.
-
-20131104
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 20:03:54
- [ssh-pkcs11.c]
- support pkcs#11 tokes that only provide x509 zerts instead of raw pubkeys;
- fixes bz#1908; based on patch from Laurent Barbe; ok djm
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 21:59:15
- [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
- use curve25519 for default key exchange (curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org);
- initial patch from Aris Adamantiadis; ok djm@
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 22:10:15
- [kexdhs.c kexecdhs.c]
- no need to include monitor_wrap.h
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 22:24:24
- [kexdhs.c kexecdhs.c]
- no need to include ssh-gss.h
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 22:34:01
- [auth-options.c]
- no need to include monitor_wrap.h and ssh-gss.h
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 22:39:19
- [ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
- the default kex is now curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/03 10:37:19
- [roaming_common.c]
- fix a couple of function definitions foo() -> foo(void)
- (-Wold-style-definition)
- - (djm) [kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c kexc25519s.c] Import missed files from
- KEX/curve25519 change
-
-20131103
- - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c] Include time.h for nanosleep.
- From OpenSMTPD where it prevents "implicit declaration" warnings (it's
- a no-op in OpenSSH). From chl at openbsd.
- - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c] Handle error case form the 2nd
- vsnprintf. From eric at openbsd via chl at .
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac defines.h] Add typedefs for intmax_t and uintmax_t
- for platforms that don't have them.
-
-20131030
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/29 09:42:11
- [key.c key.h]
- fix potential stack exhaustion caused by nested certificates;
- report by Mateusz Kocielski; ok dtucker@ markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/29 09:48:02
- [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd_config sshd_config.5]
- shd_config PermitTTY to disallow TTY allocation, mirroring the
- longstanding no-pty authorized_keys option;
- bz#2070, patch from Teran McKinney; ok markus@
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/29 18:49:32
- [sshd_config.5]
- pty(4), not pty(7);
-
-20131026
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/25 23:04:51
- [ssh.c]
- fix crash when using ProxyCommand caused by previous commit - was calling
- freeaddrinfo(NULL); spotted by sthen@ and Tim Ruehsen, patch by sthen@
-
-20131025
- - (djm) [ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c] Remove
- unnecessary arc4random_stir() calls. The only ones left are to ensure
- that the PRNG gets a different state after fork() for platforms that
- have broken the API.
-
-20131024
- - (djm) [auth-krb5.c] bz#2032 - use local username in krb5_kuserok check
- rather than full client name which may be of form user at REALM;
- patch from Miguel Sanders; ok dtucker@
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/23 05:40:58
- [servconf.c]
- fix comment
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/23 23:35:32
- [sshd.c]
- include local address and port in "Connection from ..." message (only
- shown at loglevel>=verbose)
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/24 00:49:49
- [moduli.c]
- Periodically print progress and, if possible, expected time to completion
- when screening moduli for DH groups. ok deraadt djm
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/24 00:51:48
- [readconf.c servconf.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
- Disallow empty Match statements and add "Match all" which matches
- everything. ok djm, man page help jmc@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/24 08:19:36
- [ssh.c]
- fix bug introduced in hostname canonicalisation commit: don't try to
- resolve hostnames when a ProxyCommand is set unless the user has forced
- canonicalisation; spotted by Iain Morgan
- - (tim) [regress/sftp-perm.sh] We need a shell that understands "! somecmd"
-
-20131023
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/20 04:39:28
- [ssh_config.5]
- document % expansions performed by "Match command ..."
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/20 06:19:28
- [readconf.c ssh_config.5]
- rename "command" subclause of the recently-added "Match" keyword to
- "exec"; it's shorter, clearer in intent and we might want to add the
- ability to match against the command being executed at the remote end in
- the future.
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/20 09:51:26
- [scp.1 sftp.1]
- add canonicalisation options to -o lists
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/20 18:00:13
- [ssh_config.5]
- tweak the "exec" description, as worded by djm;
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/23 03:03:07
- [readconf.c]
- Hostname may have %h sequences that should be expanded prior to Match
- evaluation; spotted by Iain Morgan
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/23 03:05:19
- [readconf.c ssh.c]
- comment
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/23 04:16:22
- [ssh-keygen.c]
- Make code match documentation: relative-specified certificate expiry time
- should be relative to current time and not the validity start time.
- Reported by Petr Lautrbach; ok deraadt@
-
-20131018
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/09 23:44:14
- [regress/Makefile regress/sftp-perm.sh]
- regression test for sftp request white/blacklisting and readonly mode.
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/17 07:35:48
- [sftp.1 sftp.c]
- tweak previous;
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/17 22:08:04
- [sshd.c]
- include remote port in bad banner message; bz#2162
-
-20131017
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/15 14:10:25
- [ssh.1 ssh_config.5]
- tweak previous;
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/16 02:31:47
- [readconf.c readconf.h roaming_client.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh_config.5]
- [sshconnect.c sshconnect.h]
- Implement client-side hostname canonicalisation to allow an explicit
- search path of domain suffixes to use to convert unqualified host names
- to fully-qualified ones for host key matching.
- This is particularly useful for host certificates, which would otherwise
- need to list unqualified names alongside fully-qualified ones (and this
- causes a number of problems).
- "looks fine" markus@
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/16 06:42:25
- [ssh_config.5]
- tweak previous;
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/16 22:49:39
- [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 ssh.c ssh_config.5]
- s/canonicalise/canonicalize/ for consistency with existing spelling,
- e.g. authorized_keys; pointed out by naddy@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/16 22:58:01
- [ssh.c ssh_config.5]
- one I missed in previous: s/isation/ization/
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/17 00:30:13
- [PROTOCOL sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp-server.c sftp.1 sftp.c]
- fsync at openssh.com protocol extension for sftp-server
- client support to allow calling fsync() faster successful transfer
- patch mostly by imorgan AT nas.nasa.gov; bz#1798
- "fine" markus@ "grumble OK" deraadt@ "doesn't sound bad to me" millert@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/17 00:46:49
- [ssh.c]
- rearrange check to reduce diff against -portable
- (Id sync only)
-
-20131015
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/09 23:42:17
- [sftp-server.8 sftp-server.c]
- Add ability to whitelist and/or blacklist sftp protocol requests by name.
- Refactor dispatch loop and consolidate read-only mode checks.
- Make global variables static, since sftp-server is linked into sshd(8).
- ok dtucker@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/10 00:53:25
- [sftp-server.c]
- add -Q, -P and -p to usage() before jmc@ catches me
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/10 01:43:03
- [sshd.c]
- bz#2139: fix re-exec fallback by ensuring that startup_pipe is correctly
- updated; ok dtucker@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/11 02:45:36
- [sftp-client.c]
- rename flag arguments to be more clear and consistent.
- reorder some internal function arguments to make adding additional flags
- easier.
- no functional change
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/11 02:52:23
- [sftp-client.c]
- missed one arg reorder
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/11 02:53:45
- [sftp-client.h]
- obsolete comment
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/14 14:18:56
- [sftp-server.8 sftp-server.c]
- tweak previous;
- ok djm
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/14 21:20:52
- [session.c session.h]
- Add logging of session starts in a useful format; ok markus@ feedback and
- ok dtucker@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/14 22:22:05
- [readconf.c readconf.h ssh-keysign.c ssh.c ssh_config.5]
- add a "Match" keyword to ssh_config that allows matching on hostname,
- user and result of arbitrary commands. "nice work" markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/14 23:28:23
- [canohost.c misc.c misc.h readconf.c sftp-server.c ssh.c]
- refactor client config code a little:
- add multistate option partsing to readconf.c, similar to servconf.c's
- existing code.
- move checking of options that accept "none" as an argument to readconf.c
- add a lowercase() function and use it instead of explicit tolower() in
- loops
- part of a larger diff that was ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/14 23:31:01
- [ssh.c]
- whitespace at EOL; pointed out by markus@
- - [ssh.c] g/c unused variable.
-
-20131010
- - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - sthen at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/16 11:35:43
- [ssh_config]
- Remove gssapi config parts from ssh_config, as was already done for
- sshd_config. Req by/ok ajacoutot@
- ID SYNC ONLY for portable; kerberos/gssapi is still pretty popular
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/19 00:24:52
- [progressmeter.c]
- store the initial file offset so the progress meter doesn't freak out
- when resuming sftp transfers. bz#2137; patch from Iain Morgan; ok dtucker@`
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/19 00:49:12
- [sftp-client.c]
- fix swapped pflag and printflag in sftp upload_dir; from Iain Morgan
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/19 01:24:46
- [channels.c]
- bz#1297 - tell the client (via packet_send_debug) when their preferred
- listen address has been overridden by the server's GatewayPorts;
- ok dtucker@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/19 01:26:29
- [sshconnect.c]
- bz#1211: make BindAddress work with UsePrivilegedPort=yes; patch from
- swp AT swp.pp.ru; ok dtucker@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/08 11:42:13
- [dh.c dh.h]
- Increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups requested for a each
- symmetric key size. New values from NIST Special Publication 800-57 with
- the upper limit specified by RFC4419. Pointed out by Peter Backes, ok
- djm at .
-
-20131009
- - (djm) [openbsd-compat/arc4random.c openbsd-compat/chacha_private.h] Pull
- in OpenBSD implementation of arc4random, shortly to replace the existing
- bsd-arc4random.c
- - (djm) [openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/arc4random.c]
- [openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c] Replace old RC4-based arc4random
- implementation with recent OpenBSD's ChaCha-based PRNG. ok dtucker@,
- tested tim@
-
-20130922
- - (dtucker) [platform.c platform.h sshd.c] bz#2156: restore Linux oom_adj
- setting when handling SIGHUP to maintain behaviour over retart. Patch
- from Matthew Ife.
-
-20130918
- - (dtucker) [sshd_config] Trailing whitespace; from jstjohn at purdue edu.
-
-20130914
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/22 19:02:21
- [sshd.c]
- Stir PRNG after post-accept fork. The child gets a different PRNG state
- anyway via rexec and explicit privsep reseeds, but it's good to be sure.
- ok markus@
- - mikeb at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/28 12:34:27
- [ssh-keygen.c]
- improve batch processing a bit by making use of the quite flag a bit
- more often and exit with a non zero code if asked to find a hostname
- in a known_hosts file and it wasn't there;
- originally from reyk@, ok djm
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/31 00:13:54
- [sftp.c]
- make ^w match ksh behaviour (delete previous word instead of entire line)
- - deraadt at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/02 22:00:34
- [ssh-keygen.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c]
- All the instances of arc4random_stir() are bogus, since arc4random()
- does this itself, inside itself, and has for a very long time.. Actually,
- this was probably reducing the entropy available.
- ok djm
- ID SYNC ONLY for portable; we don't trust other arc4random implementations
- to do this right.
- - sthen at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/07 13:53:11
- [sshd_config]
- Remove commented-out kerberos/gssapi config options from sample config,
- kerberos support is currently not enabled in ssh in OpenBSD. Discussed with
- various people; ok deraadt@
- ID SYNC ONLY for portable; kerberos/gssapi is still pretty popular
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/12 01:41:12
- [clientloop.c]
- fix connection crash when sending break (~B) on ControlPersist'd session;
- ok dtucker@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/13 06:54:34
- [channels.c]
- avoid unaligned access in code that reused a buffer to send a
- struct in_addr in a reply; simpler just use use buffer_put_int();
- from portable; spotted by and ok dtucker@
-
-20130828
- - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c] teach our local snprintf code the
- 'j' (intmax_t/uintmax_t) and 'z' (size_t/ssize_t) conversions in case we
- start to use them in the future.
- - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c] #ifdef noytet for intmax_t bits
- until we have configure support.
-
-20130821
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/06 23:03:49
- [sftp.c]
- fix some whitespace at EOL
- make list of commands an enum rather than a long list of defines
- add -a to usage()
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/06 23:05:01
- [sftp.1]
- document top-level -a option (the -a option to 'get' was already
- documented)
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/06 23:06:01
- [servconf.c]
- add cast to avoid format warning; from portable
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/07 06:24:51
- [sftp.1 sftp.c]
- sort -a;
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/08 04:52:04
- [sftp.c]
- fix two year old regression: symlinking a file would incorrectly
- canonicalise the target path. bz#2129 report from delphij AT freebsd.org
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/08 05:04:03
- [sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp.c]
- add a "-l" flag for the rename command to force it to use the silly
- standard SSH_FXP_RENAME command instead of the POSIX-rename- like
- posix-rename at openssh.com extension.
-
- intended for use in regress tests, so no documentation.
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/09 03:37:25
- [sftp.c]
- do getopt parsing for all sftp commands (with an empty optstring for
- commands without arguments) to ensure consistent behaviour
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/09 03:39:13
- [sftp-client.c]
- two problems found by a to-be-committed regress test: 1) msg_id was not
- being initialised so was starting at a random value from the heap
- (harmless, but confusing). 2) some error conditions were not being
- propagated back to the caller
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/09 03:56:42
- [sftp.c]
- enable ctrl-left-arrow and ctrl-right-arrow to move forward/back a word;
- matching ksh's relatively recent change.
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/13 18:32:08
- [ssh-keygen.c]
- typo in error message; from Stephan Rickauer
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/13 18:33:08
- [ssh-keygen.c]
- another of the same typo
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/14 08:39:27
- [scp.1 ssh.1]
- some Bx/Ox conversion;
- From: Jan Stary
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/20 00:11:38
- [readconf.c readconf.h ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c]
- Add a ssh_config ProxyUseFDPass option that supports the use of
- ProxyCommands that establish a connection and then pass a connected
- file descriptor back to ssh(1). This allows the ProxyCommand to exit
- rather than have to shuffle data back and forth and enables ssh to use
- getpeername, etc. to obtain address information just like it does with
- regular directly-connected sockets. ok markus@
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/20 06:56:07
- [ssh.1 ssh_config.5]
- some proxyusefdpass tweaks;
-
-20130808
- - (dtucker) [regress/Makefile regress/test-exec.sh] Don't try to use test -nt
- since some platforms (eg really old FreeBSD) don't have it. Instead,
- run "make clean" before a complete regress run. ok djm.
- - (dtucker) [misc.c] Fall back to time(2) at runtime if clock_gettime(
- CLOCK_MONOTONIC...) fails. Some older versions of RHEL have the
- CLOCK_MONOTONIC define but don't actually support it. Found and tested
- by Kevin Brott, ok djm.
- - (dtucker) [misc.c] Remove define added for fallback testing that was
- mistakenly included in the previous commit.
- - (dtucker) [regress/Makefile regress/test-exec.sh] Roll back the -nt
- removal. The "make clean" removes modpipe which is built by the top-level
- directory before running the tests. Spotted by tim@
- - (djm) Release 6.3p1
-
-20130804
- - (dtucker) [auth-krb5.c configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h] Add support
- for building with older Heimdal versions. ok djm.
-
-20130801
- - (djm) [channels.c channels.h] bz#2135: On Solaris, isatty() on a non-
- blocking connecting socket will clear any stored errno that might
- otherwise have been retrievable via getsockopt(). A hack to limit writes
- to TTYs on AIX was triggering this. Since only AIX needs the hack, wrap
- it in an #ifdef. Diagnosis and patch from Ivo Raisr.
- - (djm) [sshlogin.h] Fix prototype merge botch from 2006; bz#2134
-
-20130725
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/20 22:20:42
- [krl.c]
- fix verification error in (as-yet usused) KRL signature checking path
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/22 05:00:17
- [umac.c]
- make MAC key, data to be hashed and nonce for final hash const;
- checked with -Wcast-qual
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/22 12:20:02
- [umac.h]
- oops, forgot to commit corresponding header change;
- spotted by jsg and jasper
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/25 00:29:10
- [ssh.c]
- daemonise backgrounded (ControlPersist'ed) multiplexing master to ensure
- it is fully detached from its controlling terminal. based on debugging
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/25 00:56:52
- [sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp.1 sftp.c]
- sftp support for resuming partial downloads; patch mostly by Loganaden
- Velvindron/AfriNIC with some tweaks by me; feedback and ok dtucker@
- "Just be careful" deraadt@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/25 00:57:37
- [version.h]
- openssh-6.3 for release
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/30 20:12:32
- [regress/test-exec.sh]
- use ssh and sshd as testdata since it needs to be >256k for the rekey test
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/10 21:56:43
- [regress/forwarding.sh]
- Add test for forward config parsing
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/21 02:26:26
- [regress/sftp-cmds.sh regress/test-exec.sh]
- unbreak sftp-cmds for renamed test data (s/ls/data/)
- - (tim) [sftp-client.c] Use of a gcc extension trips up native compilers on
- Solaris and UnixWare. Feedback and OK djm@
- - (tim) [regress/forwarding.sh] Fix for building outside source tree.
-
-20130720
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/19 07:37:48
- [auth.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexecdhs.c kexgexs.c monitor.c servconf.c]
- [servconf.h session.c sshd.c sshd_config.5]
- add ssh-agent(1) support to sshd(8); allows encrypted hostkeys,
- or hostkeys on smartcards; most of the work by Zev Weiss; bz #1974
- ok djm@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/20 01:43:46
- [umac.c]
- use a union to ensure correct alignment; ok deraadt
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/20 01:44:37
- [ssh-keygen.c ssh.c]
- More useful error message on missing current user in /etc/passwd
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/20 01:50:20
- [ssh-agent.c]
- call cleanup_handler on SIGINT when in debug mode to ensure sockets
- are cleaned up on manual exit; bz#2120
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/20 01:55:13
- [auth-krb5.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c]
- fix kerberos/GSSAPI deprecation warnings and linking; "looks okay" millert@
-
-20130718
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/10 19:19:44
- [readconf.c]
- revert 1.203 while we investigate crashes reported by okan@
- - guenther at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/17 04:48:42
- [scp.c]
- Handle time_t values as long long's when formatting them and when
- parsing them from remote servers.
- Improve error checking in parsing of 'T' lines.
- ok dtucker@ deraadt@
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/20 19:15:06
- [krl.c]
- don't leak the rdata blob on errors; ok djm@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/21 00:34:49
- [auth-rsa.c auth.h auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c monitor.c]
- for hostbased authentication, print the client host and user on
- the auth success/failure line; bz#2064, ok dtucker@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/21 00:37:49
- [ssh_config.5]
- explicitly mention that IdentitiesOnly can be used with IdentityFile
- to control which keys are offered from an agent.
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/21 05:42:32
- [dh.c]
- sprinkle in some error() to explain moduli(5) parse failures
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/21 05:43:10
- [scp.c]
- make this -Wsign-compare clean after time_t conversion
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/22 06:31:57
- [scp.c]
- improved time_t overflow check suggested by guenther@
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/27 14:05:37
- [ssh-keygen.1 ssh.1 ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd_config.5]
- do not use Sx for sections outwith the man page - ingo informs me that
- stuff like html will render with broken links;
- issue reported by Eric S. Raymond, via djm
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/02 12:31:43
- [dh.c]
- remove extra whitespace
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/12 00:19:59
- [auth-options.c auth-rsa.c bufaux.c buffer.h channels.c hostfile.c]
- [hostfile.h mux.c packet.c packet.h roaming_common.c serverloop.c]
- fix pointer-signedness warnings from clang/llvm-3.3; "seems nice" deraadt@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/12 00:20:00
- [sftp.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-pkcs11.c]
- fix pointer-signedness warnings from clang/llvm-3.3; "seems nice" deraadt@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/12 00:43:50
- [misc.c]
- in ssh_gai_strerror() don't fallback to strerror for EAI_SYSTEM when
- errno == 0. Avoids confusing error message in some broken resolver
- cases. bz#2122 patch from plautrba AT redhat.com; ok dtucker
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/12 05:42:03
- [ssh-keygen.c]
- do_print_resource_record() can never be called with a NULL filename, so
- don't attempt (and bungle) asking for one if it has not been specified
- bz#2127 ok dtucker@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/12 05:48:55
- [ssh.c]
- set TCP nodelay for connections started with -N; bz#2124 ok dtucker@
- - schwarze at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/16 00:07:52
- [scp.1 sftp-server.8 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8]
- use .Mt for email addresses; from Jan Stary <hans at stare dot cz>; ok jmc@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/18 01:12:26
- [ssh.1]
- be more exact wrt perms for ~/.ssh/config; bz#2078
-
-20130702
- - (dtucker) [contrib/cygwin/README contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config
- contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config] Modernizes and improve readability of
- the Cygwin README file (which hasn't been updated for ages), drop
- unsupported OSes from the ssh-host-config help text, and drop an
- unneeded option from ssh-user-config. Patch from vinschen at redhat com.
-
-20130610
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/07 15:37:52
- [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c]
- Add an "ABANDONED" channel state and use for mux sessions that are
- disconnected via the ~. escape sequence. Channels in this state will
- be able to close if the server responds, but do not count as active channels.
- This means that if you ~. all of the mux clients when using ControlPersist
- on a broken network, the backgrounded mux master will exit when the
- Control Persist time expires rather than hanging around indefinitely.
- bz#1917, also reported and tested by tedu at . ok djm@ markus at .
- - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac fixalgorithms] Remove unsupported
- algorithms (Ciphers, MACs and HostKeyAlgorithms) from man pages.
- - (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Do not advertise AES GSM ciphers if we don't have
- the required OpenSSL support. Patch from naddy at freebsd.
- - (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Make the conditional algorithm support consistent
- and add some comments so it's clear what goes where.
-
-20130605
- - (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Enable sha256 kex methods based on the presence of
- the necessary functions, not from the openssl version.
- - (dtucker) [contrib/ssh-copy-id] bz#2117: Use portable operator in test.
- Patch from cjwatson at debian.
- - (dtucker) [regress/forwarding.sh] For (as yet unknown) reason, the
- forwarding test is extremely slow copying data on some machines so switch
- back to copying the much smaller ls binary until we can figure out why
- this is.
- - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] append $CFLAGS to compiler options when building
- modpipe in case there's anything in there we need.
- - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/02 21:01:51
- [channels.h]
- typo in comment
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/02 23:36:29
- [clientloop.h clientloop.c mux.c]
- No need for the mux cleanup callback to be visible so restore it to static
- and call it through the detach_user function pointer. ok djm@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/03 00:03:18
- [mac.c]
- force the MAC output to be 64-bit aligned so umac won't see unaligned
- accesses on strict-alignment architectures. bz#2101, patch from
- tomas.kuthan at oracle.com, ok djm@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/04 19:12:23
- [scp.c]
- use MAXPATHLEN for buffer size instead of fixed value. ok markus
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/04 20:42:36
- [sftp.c]
- Make sftp's libedit interface marginally multibyte aware by building up
- the quoted string by character instead of by byte. Prevents failures
- when linked against a libedit built with wide character support (bz#1990).
- "looks ok" djm
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/05 02:07:29
- [mux.c]
- fix leaks in mux error paths, from Zhenbo Xu, found by Melton. bz#1967,
- ok djm
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/05 02:27:50
- [sshd.c]
- When running sshd -D, close stderr unless we have explicitly requesting
- logging to stderr. From james.hunt at ubuntu.com via bz#1976, djm's patch
- so, err, ok dtucker.
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/05 12:52:38
- [sshconnect2.c]
- Fix memory leaks found by Zhenbo Xu and the Melton tool. bz#1967, ok djm
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/05 22:00:28
- [readconf.c]
- plug another memleak. bz#1967, from Zhenbo Xu, detected by Melton, ok djm
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac sftp.c openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Cater for
- platforms that don't have multibyte character support (specifically,
- mblen).
-
-20130602
- - (tim) [Makefile.in] Make Solaris, UnixWare, & OpenServer linkers happy
- linking regress/modpipe.
- - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/02 13:33:05
- [progressmeter.c]
- Add misc.h for monotime prototype. (ID sync only).
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/02 13:35:58
- [ssh-agent.c]
- Make parent_alive_interval time_t to avoid signed/unsigned comparison
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] sys/un.h needs sys/socket.h on some platforms
- to prevent noise from configure. Patch from Nathan Osman. (bz#2114).
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] bz#2111: don't try to use lastlog on Android.
- Patch from Nathan Osman.
- - (tim) [configure.ac regress/Makefile] With rev 1.47 of test-exec.sh we
- need a shell that can handle "[ file1 -nt file2 ]". Rather than keep
- dealing with shell portability issues in regression tests, we let
- configure find us a capable shell on those platforms with an old /bin/sh.
- - (tim) [aclocal.m4] Enhance OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE to check stderr.
- feedback and ok dtucker
- - (tim) [regress/sftp-chroot.sh] skip if no sudo. ok dtucker
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Some platforms need sys/types.h before sys/un.h.
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Some other platforms need sys/types.h before
- sys/socket.h.
-
-20130601
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c] bz#2112: fall back to
- using openssl's DES_crypt function on platorms that don't have a native
- one, eg Android. Based on a patch from Nathan Osman.
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac defines.h] Test for fd_mask, howmany and NFDBITS
- rather than trying to enumerate the plaforms that don't have them.
- Based on a patch from Nathan Osman, with help from tim at .
- - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 00:13:13
- [xmalloc.h cipher.c sftp-glob.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sftp-common.c
- ssh-ecdsa.c auth2-chall.c compat.c readconf.c kexgexs.c monitor.c
- gss-genr.c cipher-3des1.c kex.c monitor_wrap.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c
- auth-options.c rsa.c auth2-pubkey.c sftp.c hostfile.c auth2.c
- servconf.c auth.c authfile.c xmalloc.c uuencode.c sftp-client.c
- auth2-gss.c sftp-server.c bufaux.c mac.c session.c jpake.c kexgexc.c
- sshconnect.c auth-chall.c auth2-passwd.c sshconnect1.c buffer.c
- kexecdhs.c kexdhs.c ssh-rsa.c auth1.c ssh-pkcs11.c auth2-kbdint.c
- kexdhc.c sshd.c umac.c ssh-dss.c auth2-jpake.c bufbn.c clientloop.c
- monitor_mm.c scp.c roaming_client.c serverloop.c key.c auth-rsa.c
- ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-keygen.c match.c channels.c
- sshconnect2.c addrmatch.c mux.c canohost.c kexecdhc.c schnorr.c
- ssh-add.c misc.c auth2-hostbased.c ssh-agent.c bufec.c groupaccess.c
- dns.c packet.c readpass.c authfd.c moduli.c]
- bye, bye xfree(); ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/19 02:38:28
- [auth2-pubkey.c]
- fix failure to recognise cert-authority keys if a key of a different type
- appeared in authorized_keys before it; ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/19 02:42:42
- [auth.h auth.c key.c monitor.c auth-rsa.c auth2.c auth1.c key.h]
- Standardise logging of supplemental information during userauth. Keys
- and ruser is now logged in the auth success/failure message alongside
- the local username, remote host/port and protocol in use. Certificates
- contents and CA are logged too.
- Pushing all logging onto a single line simplifies log analysis as it is
- no longer necessary to relate information scattered across multiple log
- entries. "I like it" markus@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/31 12:28:10
- [ssh-agent.c]
- Use time_t where appropriate. ok djm
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/01 13:15:52
- [ssh-agent.c clientloop.c misc.h packet.c progressmeter.c misc.c
- channels.c sandbox-systrace.c]
- Use clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC ...) for ssh timers so that things like
- keepalives and rekeying will work properly over clock steps. Suggested by
- markus@, "looks good" djm at .
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/01 20:59:25
- [scp.c sftp-client.c]
- Replace S_IWRITE, which isn't standardized, with S_IWUSR, which is. Patch
- from Nathan Osman via bz#2085. ok deraadt.
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/01 22:34:50
- [sftp-client.c]
- Update progressmeter when data is acked, not when it's sent. bz#2108, from
- Debian via Colin Watson, ok djm@
- - (dtucker) [M auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c auth-pam.c cipher-aes.c cipher-ctr.c
- groupaccess.c loginrec.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c session.c sshd.c
- sshlogin.c uidswap.c openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c
- openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
- openbsd-compat/port-linux.c] Replace portable-specific instances of xfree
- with the equivalent calls to free.
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac misc.c] Look for clock_gettime in librt and fall
- back to time(NULL) if we can't find it anywhere.
- - (dtucker) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Allow clock_gettimeofday.
-
-20130529
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h] bz#2087: Add a null
- implementation of endgrent for platforms that don't have it (eg Android).
- Loosely based on a patch from Nathan Osman, ok djm
-
- 20130517
- - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/07 00:20:34
- [regress/proxy-connect.sh]
- repeat test with a style appended to the username
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/23 11:09:43
- [regress/test-exec.sh]
- Only regenerate host keys if they don't exist or if ssh-keygen has changed
- since they were. Reduces test runtime by 5-30% depending on machine
- speed.
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/06 06:00:22
- [regress/rekey.sh regress/test-exec.sh regress/integrity.sh
- regress/multiplex.sh Makefile regress/cfgmatch.sh]
- Split the regress log into 3 parts: the debug output from ssh, the debug
- log from sshd and the output from the client command (ssh, scp or sftp).
- Somewhat functional now, will become more useful when ssh/sshd -E is added.
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/07 02:16:03
- [regress/Makefile regress/rekey.sh regress/integrity.sh
- regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh regress/forwarding.sh regress/test-exec.sh]
- use -E option for ssh and sshd to write debuging logs to ssh{,d}.log and
- save the output from any failing tests. If a test fails the debug output
- from ssh and sshd for the failing tests (and only the failing tests) should
- be available in failed-ssh{,d}.log.
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/18 02:46:12
- [regress/Makefile regress/sftp-chroot.sh]
- test sshd ChrootDirectory+internal-sftp; feedback & ok dtucker@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/22 07:23:08
- [regress/multiplex.sh]
- Write mux master logs to regress.log instead of ssh.log to keep separate
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/10 03:46:14
- [regress/modpipe.c]
- sync some portability changes from portable OpenSSH (id sync only)
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 02:10:35
- [regress/rekey.sh]
- Add test for time-based rekeying
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 03:33:30
- [regress/rekey.sh]
- test rekeying when there's no data being transferred
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 04:26:10
- [regress/rekey.sh]
- add server-side rekey test
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 05:48:31
- [regress/rekey.sh]
- add tests for RekeyLimit parsing
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 00:37:40
- [regress/agent.sh regress/keytype.sh regress/cfgmatch.sh
- regress/forcecommand.sh regress/proto-version.sh regress/test-exec.sh
- regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/cert-hostkey.sh regress/cert-userkey.sh
- regress/ssh-com.sh]
- replace 'echo -n' with 'printf' since it's more portable
- also remove "echon" hack.
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 01:16:09
- [regress/agent-timeout.sh]
- Pull back some portability changes from -portable:
- - TIMEOUT is a read-only variable in some shells
- - not all greps have -q so redirect to /dev/null instead.
- (ID sync only)
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 01:32:11
- [regress/integrity.sh]
- don't print output from ssh before getting it (it's available in ssh.log)
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 04:29:14
- [regress/sftp.sh regress/putty-ciphers.sh regress/cipher-speed.sh
- regress/test-exec.sh regress/sftp-batch.sh regress/dynamic-forward.sh
- regress/putty-transfer.sh regress/conch-ciphers.sh regress/sftp-cmds.sh
- regress/scp.sh regress/ssh-com-sftp.sh regress/rekey.sh
- regress/putty-kex.sh regress/stderr-data.sh regress/stderr-after-eof.sh
- regress/sftp-badcmds.sh regress/reexec.sh regress/ssh-com-client.sh
- regress/sftp-chroot.sh regress/forwarding.sh regress/transfer.sh
- regress/multiplex.sh]
- Move the setting of DATA and COPY into test-exec.sh
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:16:26
- [regress/try-ciphers.sh]
- use expr for math to keep diffs vs portable down
- (id sync only)
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:23:52
- [regress/login-timeout.sh regress/reexec.sh regress/test-exec.sh]
- Use SUDO when cat'ing pid files and running the sshd log wrapper so that
- it works with a restrictive umask and the pid files are not world readable.
- Changes from -portable. (id sync only)
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:24:48
- [regress/localcommand.sh]
- use backticks for portability. (id sync only)
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:26:26
- [regress/sftp-badcmds.sh]
- remove unused BATCH variable. (id sync only)
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:28:11
- [regress/sftp.sh]
- only compare copied data if sftp succeeds. from portable (id sync only)
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:30:07
- [regress/test-exec.sh]
- wait a bit longer for startup and use case for absolute path.
- from portable (id sync only)
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:33:09
- [regress/agent-getpeereid.sh]
- don't redirect stdout from sudo. from portable (id sync only)
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:34:30
- [regress/portnum.sh]
- use a more portable negated if structure. from portable (id sync only)
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:35:43
- [regress/scp.sh]
- use a file extention that's not special on some platforms. from portable
- (id sync only)
- - (dtucker) [regress/bsd.regress.mk] Remove unused file. We've never used it
- in portable and it's long gone in openbsd.
- - (dtucker) [regress/integrity.sh]. Force fixed Diffie-Hellman key exchange
- methods. When the openssl version doesn't support ECDH then next one on
- the list is DH group exchange, but that causes a bit more traffic which can
- mean that the tests flip bits in the initial exchange rather than the MACed
- traffic and we get different errors to what the tests look for.
- - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getopt.h] Remove unneeded bits.
- - (dtucker) [regress/cfgmatch.sh] Resync config file setup with openbsd.
- - (dtucker) [regress/agent-getpeereid.sh] Resync spaces with openbsd.
- - (dtucker) [regress/integrity.sh regress/krl.sh regress/test-exec.sh]
- Move the jot helper function to portable-specific part of test-exec.sh.
- - (dtucker) [regress/test-exec.sh] Move the portable-specific functions
- together and add a couple of missing lines from openbsd.
- - (dtucker) [regress/stderr-after-eof.sh regress/test-exec.sh] Move the md5
- helper function to the portable part of test-exec.sh.
- - (dtucker) [regress/runtests.sh] Remove obsolete test driver script.
- - (dtucker) [regress/cfgmatch.sh] Remove unneeded sleep renderd obsolete by
- rev 1.6 which calls wait.
-
-20130516
- - (djm) [contrib/ssh-copy-id] Fix bug that could cause "rm *" to be
- executed if mktemp failed; bz#2105 ok dtucker@
- - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - tedu at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/23 17:49:45
- [misc.c]
- use xasprintf instead of a series of strlcats and strdup. ok djm
- - tedu at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/24 16:01:46
- [misc.c]
- remove extra parens noticed by nicm
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/06 07:35:12
- [sftp-server.8]
- Reference the version of the sftp draft we actually implement. ok djm@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/10 03:40:07
- [sshconnect2.c]
- fix bzero(ptr_to_struct, sizeof(ptr_to_struct)); bz#2100 from
- Colin Watson
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/10 04:08:01
- [key.c]
- memleak in cert_free(), wasn't actually freeing the struct;
- bz#2096 from shm AT digitalsun.pl
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/10 10:13:50
- [ssh-pkcs11-helper.c]
- remove unused extern optarg. ok markus@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 02:00:34
- [ssh_config sshconnect2.c packet.c readconf.h readconf.c clientloop.c
- ssh_config.5 packet.h]
- Add an optional second argument to RekeyLimit in the client to allow
- rekeying based on elapsed time in addition to amount of traffic.
- with djm@ jmc@, ok djm
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 04:09:14
- [sshd_config.5 servconf.c servconf.h packet.c serverloop.c monitor.c sshd_config
- sshd.c] Add RekeyLimit to sshd with the same syntax as the client allowing
- rekeying based on traffic volume or time. ok djm@, help & ok jmc@ for the man
- page.
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 04:27:50
- [ssh_config.5 readconf.h readconf.c]
- add the ability to ignore specific unrecognised ssh_config options;
- bz#866; ok markus@
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 06:28:45
- [ssh_config.5]
- put IgnoreUnknown in the right place;
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 06:30:06
- [sshd_config.5]
- oops! avoid Xr to self;
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 09:08:41
- [log.c scp.c sshd.c serverloop.c schnorr.c sftp.c]
- Fix some "unused result" warnings found via clang and -portable.
- ok markus@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 09:12:31
- [readconf.c servconf.c]
- switch RekeyLimit traffic volume parsing to scan_scaled. ok djm@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 10:43:34
- [servconf.c readconf.c]
- remove now-unused variables
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 10:44:06
- [servconf.c]
- remove another now-unused variable
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac readconf.c servconf.c
- openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Add compat bits for scan_scaled.
-
-20130510
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Enable -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess if the compiler
- supports it. Mentioned by Colin Watson in bz#2100, ok djm.
- - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getopt.c] Factor out portibility changes to
- getopt.c. Preprocessed source is identical other than line numbers.
- - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c] Import from OpenBSD. No
- portability changes yet.
- - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/getopt.c
- openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c regress/modpipe.c] Remove getopt.c, add
- portability code to getopt_long.c and switch over Makefile and the ugly
- hack in modpipe.c. Fixes bz#1448.
- - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c
- openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] pull in getopt.h from openbsd and plumb
- in to use it when we're using our own getopt.
- - (dtucker) [kex.c] Only include sha256 and ECC key exchange methods when the
- underlying libraries support them.
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Add -Werror to the -Qunused-arguments test so
- we don't get a warning on compilers that *don't* support it. Add
- -Wno-unknown-warning-option. Move both to the start of the list for
- maximum noise suppression. Tested with gcc 4.6.3, gcc 2.95.4 and clang 2.9.
-
-20130423
- - (djm) [auth.c configure.ac misc.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c] Support
- platforms, such as Android, that lack struct passwd.pw_gecos. Report
- and initial patch from Nathan Osman bz#2086; feedback tim@ ok dtucker@
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/05 20:16:09
- [sshconnect2.c]
- reset pubkey order on partial success; ok djm@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/06 23:35:23
- [session.c]
- fatal() when ChrootDirectory specified by running without root privileges;
- ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/06 23:36:53
- [readconf.c]
- g/c unused variable (-Wunused)
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/07 00:19:59
- [auth2-pubkey.c monitor.c]
- reconstruct the original username that was sent by the client, which may
- have included a style (e.g. "root:skey") when checking public key
- signatures. Fixes public key and hostbased auth when the client specified
- a style; ok markus@
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/07 19:27:25
- [auth.h auth2-chall.c auth2.c monitor.c sshd_config.5]
- add submethod support to AuthenticationMethods; ok and freedback djm@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/08 06:32:58
- [ssh.c]
- allow "ssh -f none ..." ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/05 00:14:00
- [auth2-gss.c krl.c sshconnect2.c]
- hush some {unused, printf type} warnings
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/05 00:31:49
- [pathnames.h]
- use the existing _PATH_SSH_USER_RC define to construct the other
- pathnames; bz#2077, ok dtucker@ (no binary change)
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/05 00:58:51
- [mux.c]
- cleanup mux-created channels that are in SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING state too
- (in addition to ones already in OPEN); bz#2079, ok dtucker@
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/06 16:07:00
- [channels.c sshd.c]
- handle ECONNABORTED for accept(); ok deraadt some time ago...
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/07 02:10:33
- [log.c log.h ssh.1 ssh.c sshd.8 sshd.c]
- Add -E option to ssh and sshd to append debugging logs to a specified file
- instead of stderr or syslog. ok markus@, man page help jmc@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/07 09:40:27
- [sshd.8]
- clarify -e text. suggested by & ok jmc@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/11 02:27:50
- [packet.c]
- quiet disconnect notifications on the server from error() back to logit()
- if it is a normal client closure; bz#2057 ok+feedback dtucker@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/17 09:04:09
- [session.c]
- revert rev 1.262; it fails because uid is already set here. ok djm@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/18 02:16:07
- [sftp.c]
- make "sftp -q" do what it says on the sticker: hush everything but errors;
- ok dtucker@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 01:00:10
- [sshd_config.5]
- document the requirment that the AuthorizedKeysCommand be owned by root;
- ok dtucker@ markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 01:01:00
- [ssh-keygen.c]
- fix some memory leaks; bz#2088 ok dtucker@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 01:03:01
- [session.c]
- reintroduce 1.262 without the connection-killing bug:
- fatal() when ChrootDirectory specified by running without root privileges;
- ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 01:06:50
- [authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c]
- [key.c key.h mac.c mac.h packet.c ssh.1 ssh.c]
- add the ability to query supported ciphers, MACs, key type and KEX
- algorithms to ssh. Includes some refactoring of KEX and key type handling
- to be table-driven; ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 11:10:18
- [ssh.c]
- add -Q to usage; reminded by jmc@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 12:07:08
- [kex.c]
- remove duplicated list entry pointed out by naddy@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/22 01:17:18
- [mux.c]
- typo in debug output: evitval->exitval
-
-20130418
- - (djm) [config.guess config.sub] Update to last versions before they switch
- to GPL3. ok dtucker@
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Use -Qunused-arguments to suppress warnings from
- unused argument warnings (in particular, -fno-builtin-memset) from clang.
-
-20130404
- - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/17 23:16:57
- [readconf.c ssh.c readconf.h sshconnect2.c]
- Keep track of which IndentityFile options were manually supplied and which
- were default options, and don't warn if the latter are missing.
- ok markus@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/19 02:12:47
- [krl.c]
- Remove bogus include. ok djm
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/22 04:45:09
- [ssh.c readconf.c readconf.h]
- Don't complain if IdentityFiles specified in system-wide configs are
- missing. ok djm, deraadt.
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/22 19:13:56
- [sshconnect.c]
- support ProxyCommand=- (stdin/out already point to the proxy); ok djm@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/22 22:09:01
- [ssh.c]
- Allow IdenityFile=none; ok markus deraadt (and dtucker for an earlier
- version)
-
-20130401
- - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.{c,h}] Don't include windows.h
- to avoid conflicting definitions of __int64, adding the required bits.
- Patch from Corinna Vinschen.
-
-20130323
- - (tim) [Makefile.in] remove some duplication introduced in 20130220 commit.
-
-20130322
- - (djm) [contrib/ssh-copy-id contrib/ssh-copy-id.1] Updated to Phil
- Hands' greatly revised version.
- - (djm) Release 6.2p1
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Add stdlib.h to zlib check for exit() prototype.
- - (dtucker) [includes.h] Check if _GNU_SOURCE is already defined before
- defining it again. Prevents warnings if someone, eg, sets it in CFLAGS.
-
-20130318
- - (djm) [configure.ac log.c scp.c sshconnect2.c openbsd-compat/vis.c]
- [openbsd-compat/vis.h] FreeBSD's strnvis isn't compatible with OpenBSD's
- so mark it as broken. Patch from des AT des.no
-
-20130317
- - (tim) [configure.ac] OpenServer 5 wants lastlog even though it has none
- of the bits the configure test looks for.
-
-20130316
- - (djm) [configure.ac] Disable utmp, wtmp and/or lastlog if the platform
- is unable to successfully compile them. Based on patch from des AT
- des.no
- - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h]
- Add a usleep replacement for platforms that lack it; ok dtucker
- - (djm) [session.c] FreeBSD needs setusercontext(..., LOGIN_SETUMASK) to
- occur after UID switch; patch from John Marshall via des AT des.no;
- ok dtucker@
-
-20130312
- - (dtucker) [regress/Makefile regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/test-exec.sh]
- Improve portability of cipher-speed test, based mostly on a patch from
- Iain Morgan.
- - (dtucker) [auth.c configure.ac platform.c platform.h] Accept uid 2 ("bin")
- in addition to root as an owner of system directories on AIX and HP-UX.
- ok djm@
-
-20130307
- - (dtucker) [INSTALL] Bump documented autoconf version to what we're
- currently using.
- - (dtucker) [defines.h] Remove SIZEOF_CHAR bits since the test for it
- was removed in configure.ac rev 1.481 as it was redundant.
- - (tim) [Makefile.in] Add another missing $(EXEEXT) I should have seen 3 days
- ago.
- - (djm) [configure.ac] Add a timeout to the select/rlimit test to give it a
- chance to complete on broken systems; ok dtucker@
-
-20130306
- - (dtucker) [regress/forward-control.sh] Wait longer for the forwarding
- connection to start so that the test works on slower machines.
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] test that we can set number of file descriptors
- to zero with setrlimit before enabling the rlimit sandbox. This affects
- (at least) HPUX 11.11.
-
-20130305
- - (djm) [regress/modpipe.c] Compilation fix for AIX and parsing fix for
- HP/UX. Spotted by Kevin Brott
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] use "=" for shell test and not "==". Spotted by
- Amit Kulkarni and Kevin Brott.
- - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Remove trailing "\" on PATHS, which caused obscure
- build breakage on (at least) HP-UX 11.11. Found by Amit Kulkarni and Kevin
- Brott.
- - (tim) [Makefile.in] Add missing $(EXEEXT). Found by Roumen Petrov.
-
-20130227
- - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
- [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank version numbers
- - (tim) [regress/forward-control.sh] use sh in case login shell is csh.
- - (tim) [regress/integrity.sh] shell portability fix.
- - (tim) [regress/integrity.sh] keep old solaris awk from hanging.
- - (tim) [regress/krl.sh] keep old solaris awk from hanging.
-
-20130226
- - OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/20 08:27:50
- [integrity.sh]
- Add an option to modpipe that warns if the modification offset it not
- reached in it's stream and turn it on for t-integrity. This should catch
- cases where the session is not fuzzed for being too short (cf. my last
- "oops" commit)
- - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] Run sshd via $SUDO; fixes tinderbox breakage
- for UsePAM=yes configuration
-
-20130225
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac ssh-gss.h] bz#2073: additional #includes needed
- to use Solaris native GSS libs. Patch from Pierre Ossman.
-
-20130223
- - (djm) [configure.ac includes.h loginrec.c mux.c sftp.c] Prefer
- bsd/libutil.h to libutil.h to avoid deprecation warnings on Ubuntu.
- ok tim
-
-20130222
- - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac] bz#2072: don't link krb5 libs to
- ssh(1) since they're not needed. Patch from Pierre Ossman, ok djm.
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] bz#2073: look for Solaris' differently-named
- libgss too. Patch from Pierre Ossman, ok djm.
- - (djm) [configure.ac sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Support for Linux
- seccomp-bpf sandbox on ARM. Patch from shawnlandden AT gmail.com;
- ok dtucker
-
-20130221
- - (tim) [regress/forward-control.sh] shell portability fix.
-
-20130220
- - (tim) [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh] shell portability fix.
- - (tim) [krl.c Makefile.in regress/Makefile regress/modpipe.c] remove unneeded
- err.h include from krl.c. Additional portability fixes for modpipe. OK djm
- - OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/20 08:27:50
- [regress/integrity.sh regress/modpipe.c]
- Add an option to modpipe that warns if the modification offset it not
- reached in it's stream and turn it on for t-integrity. This should catch
- cases where the session is not fuzzed for being too short (cf. my last
- "oops" commit)
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/20 08:29:27
- [regress/modpipe.c]
- s/Id/OpenBSD/ in RCS tag
-
-20130219
- - OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/18 22:26:47
- [integrity.sh]
- crank the offset yet again; it was still fuzzing KEX one of Darren's
- portable test hosts at 2800
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/19 02:14:09
- [integrity.sh]
- oops, forgot to increase the output of the ssh command to ensure that
- we actually reach $offset
- - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] Skip SHA2-based MACs on configurations that
- lack support for SHA2.
- - (djm) [regress/modpipe.c] Add local err, and errx functions for platforms
- that do not have them.
-
-20130217
- - OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/17 23:16:55
- [integrity.sh]
- make the ssh command generates some output to ensure that there are at
- least offset+tries bytes in the stream.
-
-20130216
- - OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/16 06:08:45
- [integrity.sh]
- make sure the fuzz offset is actually past the end of KEX for all KEX
- types. diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 requires an offset around
- 2700. Noticed via test failures in portable OpenSSH on platforms that
- lack ECC and this the more byte-frugal ECDH KEX algorithms.
-
-20130215
- - (djm) [contrib/suse/rc.sshd] Use SSHD_BIN consistently; bz#2056 from
- Iain Morgan
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h]
- Use getpgrp() if we don't have getpgid() (old BSDs, maybe others).
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/strtoull.c
- openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Add strtoull to compat library for
- platforms that don't have it.
- - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Add prototype for strtoul,
- group strto* function prototypes together.
- - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c] Handle the case where setpgrp() takes
- an argument. Pointed out by djm.
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/14 21:35:59
- [auth2-pubkey.c]
- Correct error message that had a typo and was logging the wrong thing;
- patch from Petr Lautrbach
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/15 00:21:01
- [sshconnect2.c]
- Warn more loudly if an IdentityFile provided by the user cannot be read.
- bz #1981, ok djm@
-
-20130214
- - (djm) [regress/krl.sh] Don't use ecdsa keys in environment that lack ECC.
- - (djm) [regress/krl.sh] typo; found by Iain Morgan
- - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] Start fuzzing from offset 2500 (instead
- of 2300) to avoid clobbering the end of (non-MAC'd) KEX. Verified by
- Iain Morgan
-
-20130212
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/24 21:45:37
- [krl.c]
- fix handling of (unused) KRL signatures; skip string in correct buffer
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/24 22:08:56
- [krl.c]
- skip serial lookup when cert's serial number is zero
- - krw at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/25 05:00:27
- [krl.c]
- Revert last. Breaks due to likely typo. Let djm@ fix later.
- ok djm@ via dlg@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/25 10:22:19
- [krl.c]
- redo last commit without the vi-vomit that snuck in:
- skip serial lookup when cert's serial number is zero
- (now with 100% better comment)
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/26 06:11:05
- [Makefile.in acss.c acss.h cipher-acss.c cipher.c]
- [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]
- remove ACSS, now that it is gone from libcrypto too
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/27 10:06:12
- [krl.c]
- actually use the xrealloc() return value; spotted by xi.wang AT gmail.com
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/06 00:20:42
- [servconf.c sshd_config sshd_config.5]
- Change default of MaxStartups to 10:30:100 to start doing random early
- drop at 10 connections up to 100 connections. This will make it harder
- to DoS as CPUs have come a long way since the original value was set
- back in 2000. Prompted by nion at debian org, ok markus@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/06 00:22:21
- [auth.c]
- Fix comment, from jfree.e1 at gmail
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/08 00:41:12
- [sftp.c]
- fix NULL deref when built without libedit and control characters
- entered as command; debugging and patch from Iain Morgan an
- Loganaden Velvindron in bz#1956
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/10 21:19:34
- [version.h]
- openssh 6.2
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/10 23:32:10
- [ssh-keygen.c]
- append to moduli file when screening candidates rather than overwriting.
- allows resumption of interrupted screen; patch from Christophe Garault
- in bz#1957; ok dtucker@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/10 23:35:24
- [packet.c]
- record "Received disconnect" messages at ERROR rather than INFO priority,
- since they are abnormal and result in a non-zero ssh exit status; patch
- from Iain Morgan in bz#2057; ok dtucker@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/11 21:21:58
- [sshd.c]
- Add openssl version to debug output similar to the client. ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/11 23:58:51
- [regress/try-ciphers.sh]
- remove acss here too
- - (djm) [regress/try-ciphers.sh] clean up CVS merge botch
-
-20130211
- - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Repair build on old
- libcrypto that lacks EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl
-
-20130208
- - (djm) [contrib/redhat/sshd.init] treat RETVAL as an integer;
- patch from Iain Morgan in bz#2059
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h] Test if compiler allows
- __attribute__ on return values and work around if necessary. ok djm@
-
-20130207
- - (djm) [configure.ac] Don't probe seccomp capability of running kernel
- at configure time; the seccomp sandbox will fall back to rlimit at
- runtime anyway. Patch from plautrba AT redhat.com in bz#2011
-
-20130120
- - (djm) [cipher-aes.c cipher-ctr.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]
- Move prototypes for replacement ciphers to openssl-compat.h; fix EVP
- prototypes for openssl-1.0.0-fips.
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 07:57:47
- [ssh-keygen.1]
- tweak previous;
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 07:59:46
- [ssh-keygen.c]
- -u before -V in usage();
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 08:00:49
- [sshd_config.5]
- tweak previous;
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 08:39:04
- [ssh-keygen.1]
- add -Q to the options list; ok djm
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 21:48:43
- [ssh-keygen.1]
- command-line (adj.) -> command line (n.);
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/19 07:13:25
- [ssh-keygen.1]
- fix some formatting; ok djm
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/19 12:34:55
- [krl.c]
- RB_INSERT does not remove existing elments; ok djm@
- - (djm) [openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h] Sync with OpenBSD. krl.c needs newer
- version.
- - (djm) [regress/krl.sh] replacement for jot; most platforms lack it
-
-20130118
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/17 23:00:01
- [auth.c key.c key.h ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c sshd_config.5]
- [krl.c krl.h PROTOCOL.krl]
- add support for Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). These are a compact way to
- represent lists of revoked keys and certificates, taking as little as
- a single bit of incremental cost to revoke a certificate by serial number.
- KRLs are loaded via the existing RevokedKeys sshd_config option.
- feedback and ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 00:45:29
- [regress/Makefile regress/cert-userkey.sh regress/krl.sh]
- Tests for Key Revocation Lists (KRLs)
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 03:00:32
- [krl.c]
- fix KRL generation bug for list sections
-
-20130117
- - (djm) [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/integrity.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh]
- check for GCM support before testing GCM ciphers.
-
-20130112
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/12 11:22:04
- [cipher.c]
- improve error message for integrity failure in AES-GCM modes; ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/12 11:23:53
- [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/integrity.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh]
- test AES-GCM modes; feedback markus@
- - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] repair botched merge
-
-20130109
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/14 05:26:43
- [auth.c]
- use correct string in error message; from rustybsd at gmx.fr
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/02 00:32:07
- [clientloop.c mux.c]
- channel_setup_local_fwd_listener() returns 0 on failure, not -ve
- bz#2055 reported by mathieu.lacage AT gmail.com
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/02 00:33:49
- [PROTOCOL.agent]
- correct format description for SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED
- bz#2051 from david AT lechnology.com
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/03 05:49:36
- [servconf.h]
- add a couple of ServerOptions members that should be copied to the privsep
- child (for consistency, in this case they happen only to be accessed in
- the monitor); ok dtucker@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/03 12:49:01
- [PROTOCOL]
- fix description of MAC calculation for EtM modes; ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/03 12:54:49
- [sftp-server.8 sftp-server.c]
- allow specification of an alternate start directory for sftp-server(8)
- "I like this" markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/03 23:22:58
- [ssh-keygen.c]
- allow fingerprinting of keys hosted in PKCS#11 tokens: ssh-keygen -lD ...
- ok markus@
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/04 19:26:38
- [sftp-server.8 sftp-server.c]
- sftp-server.8: add argument name to -d
- sftp-server.c: add -d to usage()
- ok djm
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/08 18:49:04
- [PROTOCOL authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h monitor_wrap.c]
- [myproposal.h packet.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
- support AES-GCM as defined in RFC 5647 (but with simpler KEX handling)
- ok and feedback djm@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/09 05:40:17
- [ssh-keygen.c]
- correctly initialise fingerprint type for fingerprinting PKCS#11 keys
- - (djm) [cipher.c configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]
- Fix merge botch, automatically detect AES-GCM in OpenSSL, move a little
- cipher compat code to openssl-compat.h
-
-20121217
- - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Add some scaffolding so that the new regress
- tests will work with VPATH directories.
-
-20121213
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/12 16:45:52
- [packet.c]
- reset incoming_packet buffer for each new packet in EtM-case, too;
- this happens if packets are parsed only parially (e.g. ignore
- messages sent when su/sudo turn off echo); noted by sthen/millert
- - naddy at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/12 16:46:10
- [cipher.c]
- use OpenSSL's EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_ctr() API and remove our hand-rolled
- counter mode code; ok djm@
- - (djm) [configure.ac cipher-ctr.c] Adapt EVP AES CTR change to retain our
- compat code for older OpenSSL
- - (djm) [cipher.c] Fix missing prototype for compat code
-
-20121212
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:16:21
- [monitor.c]
- drain the log messages after receiving the keystate from the unpriv
- child. otherwise it might block while sending. ok djm@
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:31:18
- [PROTOCOL authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.h mac.c myproposal.h]
- [packet.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
- add encrypt-then-mac (EtM) modes to openssh by defining new mac algorithms
- that change the packet format and compute the MAC over the encrypted
- message (including the packet size) instead of the plaintext data;
- these EtM modes are considered more secure and used by default.
- feedback and ok djm@
- - sthen at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:51:45
- [mac.c]
- fix typo, s/tem/etm in hmac-ripemd160-tem. ok markus@
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:32:56
- [regress/try-ciphers.sh]
- add etm modes
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:42:11
- [regress/Makefile regress/modpipe.c regress/integrity.sh]
- test the integrity of the packets; with djm@
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 23:12:13
- [try-ciphers.sh]
- add hmac-ripemd160-etm at openssh.com
- - (djm) [mac.c] fix merge botch
- - (djm) [regress/Makefile regress/integrity.sh] Make the integrity.sh test
- work on platforms without 'jot'
- - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] Fix awk quoting, packet length skip
- - (djm) [regress/Makefile] fix t-exec rule
-
-20121207
- - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/06 06:06:54
- [regress/keys-command.sh]
- Fix some problems with the keys-command test:
- - use string comparison rather than numeric comparison
- - check for existing KEY_COMMAND file and don't clobber if it exists
- - clean up KEY_COMMAND file if we do create it.
- - check that KEY_COMMAND is executable (which it won't be if eg /var/run
- is mounted noexec).
- ok djm.
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/03 08:33:03
- [ssh-add.1 sshd_config.5]
- tweak previous;
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/05 15:42:52
- [ssh-add.c]
- prevent double-free of comment; ok djm@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/07 01:51:35
- [serverloop.c]
- Cast signal to int for logging. A no-op on openbsd (they're always ints)
- but will prevent warnings in portable. ok djm@
-
-20121205
- - (tim) [defines.h] Some platforms are missing ULLONG_MAX. Feedback djm at .
-
-20121203
- - (djm) [openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h] Sync with OpenBSD to get
- TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE needed for upcoming changes.
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/02 20:26:11
- [ssh_config.5 sshconnect2.c]
- Make IdentitiesOnly apply to keys obtained from a PKCS11Provider.
- This allows control of which keys are offered from tokens using
- IdentityFile. ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/02 20:42:15
- [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c]
- make deleting explicit keys "ssh-add -d" symmetric with adding keys -
- try to delete the corresponding certificate too and respect the -k option
- to allow deleting of the key only; feedback and ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/02 20:46:11
- [auth-options.c channels.c servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c session.c]
- [sshd_config.5]
- make AllowTcpForwarding accept "local" and "remote" in addition to its
- current "yes"/"no" to allow the server to specify whether just local or
- remote TCP forwarding is enabled. ok markus@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/05 02:20:48
- [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh]
- Add umac-128 at openssh.com to the list of MACs to be tested
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/19 05:10:42
- [regress/cert-userkey.sh]
- include a serial number when generating certs
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/22 22:49:30
- [regress/Makefile regress/keys-command.sh]
- regress for AuthorizedKeysCommand; hints from markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/02 20:47:48
- [Makefile regress/forward-control.sh]
- regress for AllowTcpForwarding local/remote; ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/03 00:14:06
- [auth2-chall.c ssh-keygen.c]
- Fix compilation with -Wall -Werror (trivial type fixes)
- - (djm) [configure.ac] Turn on -g for gcc compilers. Helps pre-installation
- debugging. ok dtucker@
- - (djm) [configure.ac] Revert previous. configure.ac already does this
- for us.
-
-20121114
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/14 02:24:27
- [auth2-pubkey.c]
- fix username passed to helper program
- prepare stdio fds before closefrom()
- spotted by landry@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/14 02:32:15
- [ssh-keygen.c]
- allow the full range of unsigned serial numbers; 'fine' deraadt@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/02 20:34:10
- [auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c auth2-jpake.c auth2.c]
- [monitor.c monitor.h]
- Fixes logging of partial authentication when privsep is enabled
- Previously, we recorded "Failed xxx" since we reset authenticated before
- calling auth_log() in auth2.c. This adds an explcit "Partial" state.
-
- Add a "submethod" to auth_log() to report which submethod is used
- for keyboard-interactive.
-
- Fix multiple authentication when one of the methods is
- keyboard-interactive.
-
- ok markus@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/05 02:05:30
- [regress/multiplex.sh]
- Use 'kill -0' to test for the presence of a pid since it's more portable
-
-20121107
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - eric at cvs.openbsd.org 2011/11/28 08:46:27
- [moduli.5]
- fix formula
- ok djm@
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/26 17:34:38
- [moduli.5]
- last stage of rfc changes, using consistent Rs/Re blocks, and moving the
- references into a STANDARDS section;
-
-20121105
- - (dtucker) [uidswap.c openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
- openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h
- openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Move the fallback code for setting uids
- and gids from uidswap.c to the compat library, which allows it to work with
- the new setresuid calls in auth2-pubkey. with tim@, ok djm@
- - (dtucker) [auth2-pubkey.c] wrap paths.h in an ifdef for platforms that
- don't have it. Spotted by tim at .
-
-20121104
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/31 08:04:50
- [sshd_config.5]
- tweak previous;
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/04 10:38:43
- [auth2-pubkey.c sshd.c sshd_config.5]
- Remove default of AuthorizedCommandUser. Administrators are now expected
- to explicitly specify a user. feedback and ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/04 11:09:15
- [auth.h auth1.c auth2.c monitor.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c]
- [sshd_config.5]
- Support multiple required authentication via an AuthenticationMethods
- option. This option lists one or more comma-separated lists of
- authentication method names. Successful completion of all the methods in
- any list is required for authentication to complete;
- feedback and ok markus@
-
-20121030
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/05 12:34:39
- [sftp.c]
- fix signed vs unsigned warning; feedback & ok: djm@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/30 21:29:55
- [auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth2-pubkey.c servconf.c servconf.h]
- [sshd.c sshd_config sshd_config.5]
- new sshd_config option AuthorizedKeysCommand to support fetching
- authorized_keys from a command in addition to (or instead of) from
- the filesystem. The command is run as the target server user unless
- another specified via a new AuthorizedKeysCommandUser option.
-
- patch originally by jchadima AT redhat.com, reworked by me; feedback
- and ok markus@
-
-20121019
- - (tim) [buildpkg.sh.in] Double up on some backslashes so they end up in
- the generated file as intended.
-
-20121005
- - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/17 09:54:44
- [sftp.c]
- an XXX for later
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/17 13:04:11
- [packet.c]
- clear old keys on rekeing; ok djm
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/18 10:36:12
- [sftp.c]
- Add bounds check on sftp tab-completion. Part of a patch from from
- Jean-Marc Robert via tech@, ok djm
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/21 10:53:07
- [sftp.c]
- Fix improper handling of absolute paths when PWD is part of the completed
- path. Patch from Jean-Marc Robert via tech@, ok djm.
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/21 10:55:04
- [sftp.c]
- Fix handling of filenames containing escaped globbing characters and
- escape "#" and "*". Patch from Jean-Marc Robert via tech@, ok djm.
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/26 16:12:13
- [ssh.1]
- last stage of rfc changes, using consistent Rs/Re blocks, and moving the
- references into a STANDARDS section;
- - naddy at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/01 13:59:51
- [monitor_wrap.c]
- pasto; ok djm@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/02 07:07:45
- [ssh-keygen.c]
- fix -z option, broken in revision 1.215
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/04 13:21:50
- [myproposal.h ssh_config.5 umac.h sshd_config.5 ssh.1 sshd.8 mac.c]
- add umac128 variant; ok djm@ at n2k12
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 04:11:07
- [regress/try-ciphers.sh]
- Restore missing space. (Id sync only).
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/09 11:51:25
- [regress/multiplex.sh]
- Add test for ssh -Ostop
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/10 00:49:21
- [regress/multiplex.sh]
- Log -O cmd output to the log file and make logging consistent with the
- other tests. Test clean shutdown of an existing channel when testing
- "stop".
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/10 01:51:19
- [regress/multiplex.sh]
- use -Ocheck and waiting for completions by PID to make multiplexing test
- less racy and (hopefully) more reliable on slow hardware.
- - [Makefile umac.c] Add special-case target to build umac128.o.
- - [umac.c] Enforce allowed umac output sizes. From djm at .
- - [Makefile.in] "Using $< in a non-suffix rule context is a GNUmake idiom".
-
-20120917
- - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/13 23:37:36
- [servconf.c]
- Fix comment line length
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/14 16:51:34
- [sshconnect.c]
- remove unused variable
-
-20120907
- - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 09:50:13
- [clientloop.c]
- Make the escape command help (~?) context sensitive so that only commands
- that will work in the current session are shown. ok markus@
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 13:57:42
- [ssh.1]
- missing letter in previous;
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/07 00:30:19
- [clientloop.c]
- Print '^Z' instead of a raw ^Z when the sequence is not supported. ok djm@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/07 01:10:21
- [clientloop.c]
- Merge escape help text for ~v and ~V; ok djm@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/07 06:34:21
- [clientloop.c]
- when muxmaster is run with -N, make it shut down gracefully when a client
- sends it "-O stop" rather than hanging around (bz#1985). ok djm@
-
-20120906
- - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/08/15 18:25:50
- [ssh-keygen.1]
- a little more info on certificate validity;
- requested by Ross L Richardson, and provided by djm
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/08/17 00:45:45
- [clientloop.c clientloop.h mux.c]
- Force a clean shutdown of ControlMaster client sessions when the ~. escape
- sequence is used. This means that ~. should now work in mux clients even
- if the server is no longer responding. Found by tedu, ok djm.
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/08/17 01:22:56
- [kex.c]
- add some comments about better handling first-KEX-follows notifications
- from the server. Nothing uses these right now. No binary change
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/08/17 01:25:58
- [ssh-keygen.c]
- print details of which host lines were deleted when using
- "ssh-keygen -R host"; ok markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/08/17 01:30:00
- [compat.c sshconnect.c]
- Send client banner immediately, rather than waiting for the server to
- move first for SSH protocol 2 connections (the default). Patch based on
- one in bz#1999 by tls AT panix.com, feedback dtucker@ ok markus@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 04:37:39
- [clientloop.c log.c ssh.1 log.h]
- Add ~v and ~V escape sequences to raise and lower the logging level
- respectively. Man page help from jmc, ok deraadt jmc
-
-20120830
- - (dtucker) [moduli] Import new moduli file.
-
-20120828
- - (djm) Release openssh-6.1
-
-20120828
- - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h] define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN
- for compatibility with future mingw-w64 headers. Patch from vinschen at
- redhat com.
-
-20120822
- - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
- [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update version numbers
-
-20120731
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/07/06 06:38:03
- [ssh-keygen.c]
- missing full stop in usage();
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/07/10 02:19:15
- [servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c sshd_config]
- Turn on systrace sandboxing of pre-auth sshd by default for new installs
- by shipping a config that overrides the current UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes
- default. Make it easier to flip the default in the future by adding too.
- prodded markus@ feedback dtucker@ "get it in" deraadt@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/07/13 01:35:21
- [servconf.c]
- handle long comments in config files better. bz#2025, ok markus
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/07/22 18:19:21
- [version.h]
- openssh 6.1
-
-20120720
- - (dtucker) Import regened moduli file.
-
-20120706
- - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] fallback to rlimit if seccomp filter is
- not available. Allows use of sshd compiled on host with a filter-capable
- kernel on hosts that lack the support. bz#2011 ok dtucker@
- - (djm) [configure.ac] Recursively expand $(bindir) to ensure it has no
- unexpanded $(prefix) embedded. bz#2007 patch from nix-corp AT
- esperi.org.uk; ok dtucker@
-- (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/07/06 00:41:59
- [moduli.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
- Add options to specify starting line number and number of lines to process
- when screening moduli candidates. This allows processing of different
- parts of a candidate moduli file in parallel. man page help jmc@, ok djm@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/07/06 01:37:21
- [mux.c]
- fix memory leak of passed-in environment variables and connection
- context when new session message is malformed; bz#2003 from Bert.Wesarg
- AT googlemail.com
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/07/06 01:47:38
- [ssh.c]
- move setting of tty_flag to after config parsing so RequestTTY options
- are correctly picked up. bz#1995 patch from przemoc AT gmail.com;
- ok dtucker@
-
-20120704
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h] Add setlinebuf for
- platforms that don't have it. "looks good" tim@
-
-20120703
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Detect platforms that can't use select(2) with
- setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, rl_zero) and disable the rlimit sandbox on those.
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac sandbox-rlimit.c] Test whether or not
- setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, rl_zero) and skip it if it's not supported. Its
- benefit is minor, so it's not worth disabling the sandbox if it doesn't
- work.
-
-20120702
-- (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - naddy at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/29 13:57:25
- [ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
- match the documented MAC order of preference to the actual one;
- ok dtucker@
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/30 14:35:09
- [sandbox-systrace.c sshd.c]
- fix a during the load of the sandbox policies (child can still make
- the read-syscall and wait forever for systrace-answers) by replacing
- the read/write synchronisation with SIGSTOP/SIGCONT;
- report and help hshoexer@; ok djm@, dtucker@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/07/02 08:50:03
- [ssh.c]
- set interactive ToS for forwarded X11 sessions. ok djm@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/07/02 12:13:26
- [ssh-pkcs11-helper.c sftp-client.c]
- fix a couple of "assigned but not used" warnings. ok markus@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/07/02 14:37:06
- [regress/connect-privsep.sh]
- remove exit from end of test since it prevents reporting failure
- - (dtucker) [regress/reexec.sh regress/sftp-cmds.sh regress/test-exec.sh]
- Move cygwin detection to test-exec and use to skip reexec test on cygwin.
- - (dtucker) [regress/test-exec.sh] Correct uname for cygwin/w2k.
-
-20120629
- - OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/21 00:16:07
- [addrmatch.c]
- fix strlcpy truncation check. from carsten at debian org, ok markus
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/22 12:30:26
- [monitor.c sshconnect2.c]
- remove dead code following 'for (;;)' loops.
- From Steve.McClellan at radisys com, ok markus@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/22 14:36:33
- [sftp.c]
- Remove unused variable leftover from tab-completion changes.
- From Steve.McClellan at radisys com, ok markus@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/26 11:02:30
- [sandbox-systrace.c]
- Add mquery to the list of allowed syscalls for "UsePrivilegeSeparation
- sandbox" since malloc now uses it. From johnw.mail at gmail com.
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/28 05:07:45
- [mac.c myproposal.h ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
- Remove hmac-sha2-256-96 and hmac-sha2-512-96 MACs since they were removed
- from draft6 of the spec and will not be in the RFC when published. Patch
- from mdb at juniper net via bz#2023, ok markus.
- - naddy at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/29 13:57:25
- [ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
- match the documented MAC order of preference to the actual one; ok dtucker@
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/05/13 01:42:32
- [regress/addrmatch.sh]
- Add "Match LocalAddress" and "Match LocalPort" to sshd and adjust tests
- to match. Feedback and ok djm@ markus at .
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/01 00:47:35
- [regress/multiplex.sh regress/forwarding.sh]
- append to rather than truncate test log; bz#2013 from openssh AT
- roumenpetrov.info
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/01 00:52:52
- [regress/sftp-cmds.sh]
- don't delete .* on cleanup due to unintended env expansion; pointed out in
- bz#2014 by openssh AT roumenpetrov.info
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/26 12:06:59
- [regress/connect-privsep.sh]
- test sandbox with every malloc option
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/28 05:07:45
- [regress/try-ciphers.sh regress/cipher-speed.sh]
- Remove hmac-sha2-256-96 and hmac-sha2-512-96 MACs since they were removed
- from draft6 of the spec and will not be in the RFC when published. Patch
- from mdb at juniper net via bz#2023, ok markus.
- - (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Remove trailing backslash to fix compile error.
- - (dtucker) [key.c] ifdef out sha256 key types on platforms that don't have
- the required functions in libcrypto.
-
-20120628
- - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c] bz #2022: prevent null
- pointer deref in the client when built with LDNS and using DNSSEC with a
- CNAME. Patch from gregdlg+mr at hochet info.
-
-20120622
- - (dtucker) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Ensure that user sshd runs as
- can logon as a service. Patch from vinschen at redhat com.
-
-20120620
- - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2011/12/02 00:41:56
- [mux.c]
- fix bz#1948: ssh -f doesn't fork for multiplexed connection.
- ok dtucker@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2011/12/04 23:16:12
- [mux.c]
- revert:
- > revision 1.32
- > date: 2011/12/02 00:41:56; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +4 -1
- > fix bz#1948: ssh -f doesn't fork for multiplexed connection.
- > ok dtucker@
- it interacts badly with ControlPersist
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/01/07 21:11:36
- [mux.c]
- fix double-free in new session handler
- NB. Id sync only
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/05/23 03:28:28
- [dns.c dns.h key.c key.h ssh-keygen.c]
- add support for RFC6594 SSHFP DNS records for ECDSA key types.
- patch from bugzilla-m67 AT nulld.me in bz#1978; ok + tweak markus@
- (Original authors Ondřej Surý, Ondřej Caletka and Daniel Black)
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/01 00:49:35
- [PROTOCOL.mux]
- correct types of port numbers (integers, not strings); bz#2004 from
- bert.wesarg AT googlemail.com
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/01 01:01:22
- [mux.c]
- fix memory leak when mux socket creation fails; bz#2002 from bert.wesarg
- AT googlemail.com
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/18 11:43:53
- [jpake.c]
- correct sizeof usage. patch from saw at online.de, ok deraadt
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/18 11:49:58
- [ssh_config.5]
- RSA instead of DSA twice. From Steve.McClellan at radisys com
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/18 12:07:07
- [ssh.1 sshd.8]
- Remove mention of 'three' key files since there are now four. From
- Steve.McClellan at radisys com.
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/18 12:17:18
- [ssh.1]
- Clarify description of -W. Noted by Steve.McClellan at radisys com,
- ok jmc
- - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/19 18:25:28
- [servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config.5]
- sshd_config: extend Match to allow AcceptEnv and {Allow,Deny}{Users,Groups}
- this allows 'Match LocalPort 1022' combined with 'AllowUser bauer'
- ok djm@ (back in March)
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/19 21:35:54
- [sshd_config.5]
- tweak previous; ok markus
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/20 04:42:58
- [clientloop.c serverloop.c]
- initialise accept() backoff timer to avoid EINVAL from select(2) in
- rekeying
-
-20120519
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] bz#2010: fix non-portable shell construct. Patch
- from cjwatson at debian org.
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac contrib/Makefile] bz#1996: use AC_PATH_TOOL to find
- pkg-config so it does the right thing when cross-compiling. Patch from
- cjwatson at debian org.
-- (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/05/13 01:42:32
- [servconf.h servconf.c sshd.8 sshd.c auth.c sshd_config.5]
- Add "Match LocalAddress" and "Match LocalPort" to sshd and adjust tests
- to match. Feedback and ok djm@ markus at .
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/05/19 06:30:30
- [sshd_config.5]
- Document PermitOpen none. bz#2001, patch from Loganaden Velvindron
-
-20120504
- - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Include <sys/param.h> rather than <sys/types.h>
- to fix building on some plaforms. Fom bowman at math utah edu and
- des at des no.
-
-20120427
- - (dtucker) [regress/addrmatch.sh] skip tests when running on a non-ipv6
- platform rather than exiting early, so that we still clean up and return
- success or failure to test-exec.sh
-
-20120426
- - (djm) [auth-passwd.c] Handle crypt() returning NULL; from Paul Wouters
- via Niels
- - (djm) [auth-krb5.c] Save errno across calls that might modify it;
- ok dtucker@
-
-20120423
- - OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/04/23 08:18:17
- [channels.c]
- fix function proto/source mismatch
-
-20120422
- - OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/02/29 11:21:26
- [ssh-keygen.c]
- allow conversion of RSA1 keys to public PEM and PKCS8; "nice" markus@
- - guenther at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/03/15 03:10:27
- [session.c]
- root should always be excluded from the test for /etc/nologin instead
- of having it always enforced even when marked as ignorenologin. This
- regressed when the logic was incompletely flipped around in rev 1.251
- ok halex@ millert@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/03/28 07:23:22
- [PROTOCOL.certkeys]
- explain certificate extensions/crit split rationale. Mention requirement
- that each appear at most once per cert.
- - dtucker at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/03/29 23:54:36
- [channels.c channels.h servconf.c]
- Add PermitOpen none option based on patch from Loganaden Velvindron
- (bz #1949). ok djm@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/04/11 13:16:19
- [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c]
- don't spin in accept() when out of fds (ENFILE/ENFILE) - back off for a
- while; ok deraadt@ markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/04/11 13:17:54
- [auth.c]
- Support "none" as an argument for AuthorizedPrincipalsFile to indicate
- no file should be read.
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/04/11 13:26:40
- [sshd.c]
- don't spin in accept() when out of fds (ENFILE/ENFILE) - back off for a
- while; ok deraadt@ markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/04/11 13:34:17
- [ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c]
- now that sshd defaults to offering ECDSA keys, ssh-keyscan should also
- look for them by default; bz#1971
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/04/12 02:42:32
- [servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c sshd_config sshd_config.5]
- VersionAddendum option to allow server operators to append some arbitrary
- text to the SSH-... banner; ok deraadt@ "don't care" markus@
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/04/12 02:43:55
- [sshd_config sshd_config.5]
- mention AuthorizedPrincipalsFile=none default
- - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/04/20 03:24:23
- [sftp.c]
- setlinebuf(3) is more readable than setvbuf(.., _IOLBF, ...)
- - jmc at cvs.openbsd.org 2012/04/20 16:26:22
- [ssh.1]
- use "brackets" instead of "braces", for consistency;
-
-20120420
- - (djm) [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
- [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update for release 6.0
- - (djm) [README] Update URL to release notes.
- - (djm) Release openssh-6.0
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ChangeLog (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ChangeLog)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ChangeLog (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ChangeLog 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,9202 @@
+commit 99522ba7ec6963a05c04a156bf20e3ba3605987c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 28 08:54:27 2016 +1000
+
+ define _OPENBSD_SOURCE for reallocarray on NetBSD
+
+ Report by and debugged with Hisashi T Fujinaka, dtucker nailed
+ the problem (lack of prototype causing return type confusion).
+
+commit 3e1e076550c27c6bbdddf36d8f42bd79fbaaa187
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 27 08:25:42 2016 +1000
+
+ KNF
+
+commit d99ee9c4e5e217e7d05eeec84e9ce641f4675331
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 27 08:25:23 2016 +1000
+
+ Linux auditing also needs packet.h
+
+commit 393bd381a45884b589baa9aed4394f1d250255ca
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 27 08:18:05 2016 +1000
+
+ fix auditing on Linux
+
+ get_remote_ipaddr() was replaced with ssh_remote_ipaddr()
+
+commit 80e766fb089de4f3c92b1600eb99e9495e37c992
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Sun Jul 24 21:50:13 2016 +1000
+
+ crank version numbers
+
+commit b1a478792d458f2e938a302e64bab2b520edc1b3
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jul 24 11:45:36 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ openssh-7.3
+
+ Upstream-ID: af106a7eb665f642648cf1993e162c899f358718
+
+commit 353766e0881f069aeca30275ab706cd60a1a8fdd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Sat Jul 23 16:14:42 2016 +1000
+
+ Move Cygwin IPPORT_RESERVED overrride to defines.h
+
+ Patch from vinschen at redhat.com.
+
+commit 368dd977ae07afb93f4ecea23615128c95ab2b32
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jul 23 02:54:08 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix pledge violation with ssh -f; reported by Valentin
+ Kozamernik ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: a61db7988db88d9dac3c4dd70e18876a8edf84aa
+
+commit f00211e3c6d24d6ea2b64b4b1209f671f6c1d42e
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 22 07:00:46 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ improve wording; suggested by jmc@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 55cb0a24c8e0618b3ceec80998dc82c85db2d2f8
+
+commit 83cbca693c3b0719270e6a0f2efe3f9ee93a65b8
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 22 05:46:11 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Lower loglevel for "Authenticated with partial success"
+ message similar to other similar level. bz#2599, patch from cgallek at
+ gmail.com, ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 3faab814e947dc7b2e292edede23e94c608cb4dd
+
+commit 10358abd087ab228b7ce2048efc4f3854a9ab9a6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 22 14:06:36 2016 +1000
+
+ retry waitpid on EINTR failure
+
+ patch from Jakub Jelen on bz#2581; ok dtucker@
+
+commit da88a70a89c800e74ea8e5661ffa127a3cc79a92
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 22 03:47:36 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ constify a few functions' arguments; patch from Jakub
+ Jelen bz#2581
+
+ Upstream-ID: f2043f51454ea37830ff6ad60c8b32b4220f448d
+
+commit c36d91bd4ebf767f310f7cea88d61d1c15f53ddf
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 22 03:39:13 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ move debug("%p", key) to before key is free'd; probable
+ undefined behaviour on strict compilers; reported by Jakub Jelen bz#2581
+
+ Upstream-ID: 767f323e1f5819508a0e35e388ec241bac2f953a
+
+commit 286f5a77c3bfec1e8892ca268087ac885ac871bf
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 22 03:35:11 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ reverse the order in which -J/JumpHost proxies are visited to
+ be more intuitive and document
+
+ reported by and manpage bits naddy@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 3a68fd6a841fd6cf8cedf6552a9607ba99df179a
+
+commit fcd135c9df440bcd2d5870405ad3311743d78d97
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 21 01:39:35 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Skip passwords longer than 1k in length so clients can't
+ easily DoS sshd by sending very long passwords, causing it to spend CPU
+ hashing them. feedback djm@, ok markus at .
+
+ Brought to our attention by tomas.kuthan at oracle.com, shilei-c at
+ 360.cn and coredump at autistici.org
+
+ Upstream-ID: d0af7d4a2190b63ba1d38eec502bc4be0be9e333
+
+commit 324583e8fb3935690be58790425793df619c6d4d
+Author: naddy at openbsd.org <naddy at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 20 10:45:27 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Do not clobber the global jump_host variables when
+ parsing an inactive configuration. ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 5362210944d91417d5976346d41ac0b244350d31
+
+commit 32d921c323b989d28405e78d0a8923d12913d737
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 19 12:59:16 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ tweak previous;
+
+ Upstream-ID: f3c1a5b3f05dff366f60c028728a2b43f15ff534
+
+commit d7eabc86fa049a12ba2c3fb198bd1d51b37f7025
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 19 11:38:53 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Allow wildcard for PermitOpen hosts as well as ports.
+ bz#2582, patch from openssh at mzpqnxow.com and jjelen at redhat.com. ok
+ markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: af0294e9b9394c4e16e991424ca0a47a7cc605f2
+
+commit b98a2a8348e907b3d71caafd80f0be8fdd075943
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 18 11:35:33 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Reduce timing attack against obsolete CBC modes by always
+ computing the MAC over a fixed size of data. Reported by Jean Paul
+ Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin Albrecht. ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: f20a13279b00ba0afbacbcc1f04e62e9d41c2912
+
+commit dbf788b4d9d9490a5fff08a7b09888272bb10fcc
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Thu Jul 21 14:17:31 2016 +1000
+
+ Search users for one with a valid salt.
+
+ If the root account is locked (eg password "!!" or "*LK*") keep looking
+ until we find a user with a valid salt to use for crypting passwords of
+ invalid users. ok djm@
+
+commit e8b58f48fbb1b524fb4f0d4865fa0005d6a4b782
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Mon Jul 18 17:22:49 2016 +1000
+
+ Explicitly specify source files for regress tools.
+
+ Since adding $(REGRESSLIBS), $? is wrong because it includes only the
+ changed source files. $< seems like it'd be right however it doesn't
+ seem to work on some non-GNU makes, so do what works everywhere.
+
+commit eac1bbd06872c273f16ac0f9976b0aef026b701b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Mon Jul 18 17:12:22 2016 +1000
+
+ Conditionally include err.h.
+
+commit 0a454147568746c503f669e1ba861f76a2e7a585
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Mon Jul 18 16:26:26 2016 +1000
+
+ Remove local implementation of err, errx.
+
+ We now have a shared implementation in libopenbsd-compat.
+
+commit eb999a4590846ba4d56ddc90bd07c23abfbab7b1
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 18 06:08:01 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Add some unsigned overflow checks for extra_pad. None of
+ these are reachable with the amount of padding that we use internally.
+ bz#2566, pointed out by Torben Hansen. ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 4d4be8450ab2fc1b852d5884339f8e8c31c3fd76
+
+commit c71ba790c304545464bb494de974cdf0f4b5cf1e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Mon Jul 18 15:43:25 2016 +1000
+
+ Add dependency on libs for unit tests.
+
+ Makes "./configure && make tests" work again. ok djm@
+
+commit 8199d0311aea3e6fd0284c9025e7a83f4ece79e8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Mon Jul 18 13:47:39 2016 +1000
+
+ Correct location for kexfuzz in clean target.
+
+commit 01558b7b07af43da774d3a11a5c51fa9c310849d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Mon Jul 18 09:33:25 2016 +1000
+
+ Handle PAM_MAXTRIES from modules.
+
+ bz#2249: handle the case where PAM returns PAM_MAXTRIES by ceasing to offer
+ password and keyboard-interative authentication methods. Should prevent
+ "sshd ignoring max retries" warnings in the log. ok djm@
+
+ It probably won't trigger with keyboard-interactive in the default
+ configuration because the retry counter is stored in module-private
+ storage which goes away with the sshd PAM process (see bz#688). On the
+ other hand, those cases probably won't log a warning either.
+
+commit 65c6c6b567ab5ab12945a5ad8e0ab3a8c26119cc
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jul 17 04:20:16 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ support UTF-8 characters in ssh(1) banners using
+ schwarze@'s safe fmprintf printer; bz#2058
+
+ feedback schwarze@ ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: a72ce4e3644c957643c9524eea2959e41b91eea7
+
+commit e4eb7d910976fbfc7ce3e90c95c11b07b483d0d7
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jul 16 06:57:55 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ - add proxyjump to the options list - formatting fixes -
+ update usage()
+
+ ok djm
+
+ Upstream-ID: 43d318e14ce677a2eec8f21ef5ba2f9f68a59457
+
+commit af1f084857621f14bd9391aba8033d35886c2455
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 15 05:01:58 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Reduce the syslog level of some relatively common protocol
+ events from LOG_CRIT by replacing fatal() calls with logdie(). Part of
+ bz#2585, ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 9005805227c94edf6ac02a160f0e199638d288e5
+
+commit bd5f2b78b69cf38d6049a0de445a79c8595e4a1f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 15 19:14:48 2016 +1000
+
+ missing openssl/dh.h
+
+commit 4a984fd342effe5f0aad874a0d538c4322d973c0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 15 18:47:07 2016 +1000
+
+ cast to avoid type warning in error message
+
+commit 5abfb15ced985c340359ae7fb65a625ed3692b3e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Fri Jul 15 14:48:30 2016 +1000
+
+ Move VA_COPY macro into compat header.
+
+ Some AIX compilers unconditionally undefine va_copy but don't set it back
+ to an internal function, causing link errors. In some compat code we
+ already use VA_COPY instead so move the two existing instances into the
+ shared header and use for sshbuf-getput-basic.c too. Should fix building
+ with at lease some versions of AIX's compiler. bz#2589, ok djm@
+
+commit 832b7443b7a8e181c95898bc5d73497b7190decd
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 15 14:45:34 2016 +1000
+
+ disable ciphers not supported by OpenSSL
+
+ bz#2466 ok dtucker@
+
+commit 5fbe93fc6fbb2fe211e035703dec759d095e3dd8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 15 13:54:31 2016 +1000
+
+ add a --disable-pkcs11 knob
+
+commit 679ce88ec2a8e2fe6515261c489e8c1449bb9da9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 15 13:44:38 2016 +1000
+
+ fix newline escaping for unsupported_algorithms
+
+ The hmac-ripemd160 was incorrect and could lead to broken
+ Makefiles on systems that lacked support for it, but I made
+ all the others consistent too.
+
+commit ed877ef653847d056bb433975d731b7a1132a979
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 15 00:24:30 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Add a ProxyJump ssh_config(5) option and corresponding -J
+ ssh(1) command-line flag to allow simplified indirection through a SSH
+ bastion or "jump host".
+
+ These options construct a proxy command that connects to the
+ specified jump host(s) (more than one may be specified) and uses
+ port-forwarding to establish a connection to the next destination.
+
+ This codifies the safest way of indirecting connections through SSH
+ servers and makes it easy to use.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: fa899cb8b26d889da8f142eb9774c1ea36b04397
+
+commit 5c02dd126206a26785379e80f2d3848e4470b711
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Fri Jul 15 12:56:39 2016 +1000
+
+ Map umac_ctx struct name too.
+
+ Prevents size mismatch linker warnings on Solaris 11.
+
+commit 283b97ff33ea2c641161950849931bd578de6946
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Fri Jul 15 13:49:44 2016 +1000
+
+ Mitigate timing of disallowed users PAM logins.
+
+ When sshd decides to not allow a login (eg PermitRootLogin=no) and
+ it's using PAM, it sends a fake password to PAM so that the timing for
+ the failure is not noticeably different whether or not the password
+ is correct. This behaviour can be detected by sending a very long
+ password string which is slower to hash than the fake password.
+
+ Mitigate by constructing an invalid password that is the same length
+ as the one from the client and thus takes the same time to hash.
+ Diff from djm@
+
+commit 9286875a73b2de7736b5e50692739d314cd8d9dc
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Fri Jul 15 13:32:45 2016 +1000
+
+ Determine appropriate salt for invalid users.
+
+ When sshd is processing a non-PAM login for a non-existent user it uses
+ the string from the fakepw structure as the salt for crypt(3)ing the
+ password supplied by the client. That string has a Blowfish prefix, so on
+ systems that don't understand that crypt will fail fast due to an invalid
+ salt, and even on those that do it may have significantly different timing
+ from the hash methods used for real accounts (eg sha512). This allows
+ user enumeration by, eg, sending large password strings. This was noted
+ by EddieEzra.Harari at verint.com (CVE-2016-6210).
+
+ To mitigate, use the same hash algorithm that root uses for hashing
+ passwords for users that do not exist on the system. ok djm@
+
+commit a162dd5e58ca5b224d7500abe35e1ef32b5de071
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Thu Jul 14 21:19:59 2016 +1000
+
+ OpenSSL 1.1.x not currently supported.
+
+commit 7df91b01fc558a33941c5c5f31abbcdc53a729fb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Thu Jul 14 12:25:24 2016 +1000
+
+ Check for VIS_ALL.
+
+ If we don't have it, set BROKEN_STRNVIS to activate the compat replacement.
+
+commit ee67716f61f1042d5e67f91c23707cca5dcdd7d0
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 14 01:24:21 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Correct equal in test.
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 4e32f7a5c57a619c4e8766cb193be2a1327ec37a
+
+commit 372807c2065c8572fdc6478b25cc5ac363743073
+Author: tb at openbsd.org <tb at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 11 21:38:13 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Add missing "recvfd" pledge promise: Raf Czlonka reported
+ ssh coredumps when Control* keywords were set in ssh_config. This patch also
+ fixes similar problems with scp and sftp.
+
+ ok deraadt, looks good to millert
+
+ Upstream-ID: ca2099eade1ef3e87a79614fefa26a0297ad8a3b
+
+commit e0453f3df64bf485c61c7eb6bd12893eee9fe2cd
+Author: tedu at openbsd.org <tedu at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 11 03:19:44 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ obsolete note about fascistloggin is obsolete. ok djm
+ dtucker
+
+ Upstream-ID: dae60df23b2bb0e89f42661ddd96a7b0d1b7215a
+
+commit a2333584170a565adf4f209586772ef8053b10b8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Thu Jul 14 10:59:09 2016 +1000
+
+ Add compat code for missing wcwidth.
+
+ If we don't have wcwidth force fallback implementations of nl_langinfo
+ and mbtowc. Based on advice from Ingo Schwarze.
+
+commit 8aaec7050614494014c47510b7e94daf6e644c62
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 14 09:48:48 2016 +1000
+
+ fix missing include for systems with err.h
+
+commit 6310ef27a2567cda66d6cf0c1ad290ee1167f243
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Wed Jul 13 14:42:35 2016 +1000
+
+ Move err.h replacements into compat lib.
+
+ Move implementations of err.h replacement functions into their own file
+ in the libopenbsd-compat so we can use them in kexfuzz.c too. ok djm@
+
+commit f3f2cc8386868f51440c45210098f65f9787449a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Mon Jul 11 17:23:38 2016 +1000
+
+ Check for wchar.h and langinfo.h
+
+ Wrap includes in the appropriate #ifdefs.
+
+commit b9c50614eba9d90939b2b119b6e1b7e03b462278
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 8 13:59:13 2016 +1000
+
+ whitelist more architectures for seccomp-bpf
+
+ bz#2590 - testing and patch from Jakub Jelen
+
+commit 18813a32b6fd964037e0f5e1893cb4468ac6a758
+Author: guenther at openbsd.org <guenther at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 4 18:01:44 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ DEBUGLIBS has been broken since the gcc4 switch, so delete
+ it. CFLAGS contains -g by default anyway
+
+ problem noted by Edgar Pettijohn (edgar (at) pettijohn-web.com)
+ ok millert@ kettenis@ deraadt@
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 4a0bb72f95c63f2ae9daa8a040ac23914bddb542
+
+commit 6d31193d0baa3da339c196ac49625b7ba1c2ecc7
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 8 03:44:42 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Improve crypto ordering for Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) mode
+ MAC algorithms.
+
+ Previously we were computing the MAC, decrypting the packet and then
+ checking the MAC. This gave rise to the possibility of creating a
+ side-channel oracle in the decryption step, though no such oracle has
+ been identified.
+
+ This adds a mac_check() function that computes and checks the MAC in
+ one pass, and uses it to advance MAC checking for EtM algorithms to
+ before payload decryption.
+
+ Reported by Jean Paul Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and
+ Martin Albrecht. feedback and ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 1999bb67cab47dda5b10b80d8155fe83d4a1867b
+
+commit 71f5598f06941f645a451948c4a5125c83828e1c
+Author: guenther at openbsd.org <guenther at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 4 18:01:44 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ DEBUGLIBS has been broken since the gcc4 switch, so
+ delete it. CFLAGS contains -g by default anyway
+
+ problem noted by Edgar Pettijohn (edgar (at) pettijohn-web.com)
+ ok millert@ kettenis@ deraadt@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 96c5054e3e1f170c6276902d5bc65bb3b87a2603
+
+commit e683fc6f1c8c7295648dbda679df8307786ec1ce
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jun 30 05:17:05 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Explicitly check for 100% completion to avoid potential
+ floating point rounding error, which could cause progressmeter to report 99%
+ on completion. While there invert the test so the 100% case is clearer. with
+ & ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: a166870c5878e422f3c71ff802e2ccd7032f715d
+
+commit 772e6cec0ed740fc7db618dc30b4134f5a358b43
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 29 17:14:28 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ sort the -o list;
+
+ Upstream-ID: 1a97465ede8790b4d47cb618269978e07f41f8ac
+
+commit 46ecd19e554ccca15a7309cd1b6b44bc8e6b84af
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jun 23 05:17:51 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix AuthenticationMethods during configuration re-parse;
+ reported by Juan Francisco Cantero Hurtado
+
+ Upstream-ID: 8ffa1dac25c7577eca8238e825317ab20848f9b4
+
+commit 3147e7595d0f2f842a666c844ac53e6c7a253d7e
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jun 19 07:48:02 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ revert 1.34; causes problems loading public keys
+
+ reported by semarie@
+
+ Upstream-ID: b393794f8935c8b15d98a407fe7721c62d2ed179
+
+commit ad23a75509f4320d43f628c50f0817e3ad12bfa7
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 17 06:33:30 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ grammar fix;
+
+ Upstream-ID: 5d5b21c80f1e81db367333ce0bb3e5874fb3e463
+
+commit 5e28b1a2a3757548b40018cc2493540a17c82e27
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 17 05:06:23 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ translate OpenSSL error codes to something more
+ meaninful; bz#2522 reported by Jakub Jelen, ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 4cb0795a366381724314e6515d57790c5930ffe5
+
+commit b64faeb5eda7eff8210c754d00464f9fe9d23de5
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 17 05:03:40 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ ban AuthenticationMethods="" and accept
+ AuthenticationMethods=any for the default behaviour of not requiring multiple
+ authentication
+
+ bz#2398 from Jakub Jelen; ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: fabd7f44d59e4518d241d0d01e226435cc23cf27
+
+commit 9816fc5daee5ca924dd5c4781825afbaab728877
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jun 16 11:00:17 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Include stdarg.h for va_copy as per man page.
+
+ Upstream-ID: 105d6b2f1af2fbd9d91c893c436ab121434470bd
+
+commit b6cf84b51bc0f5889db48bf29a0c771954ade283
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jun 16 06:10:45 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ keys stored in openssh format can have comments too; diff
+ from yonas yanfa, tweaked a bit;
+
+ ok djm
+
+ Upstream-ID: 03d48536da6e51510d73ade6fcd44ace731ceb27
+
+commit aa37768f17d01974b6bfa481e5e83841b6c76f86
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Mon Jun 20 15:55:34 2016 +1000
+
+ get_remote_name_or_ip inside LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+
+ Apply the same get_remote_name_or_ip -> session_get_remote_name_or_ip
+ change as commit 95767262 to the code inside #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX.
+ Fixes build on AIX.
+
+commit 009891afc8df37bc2101e15d1e0b6433cfb90549
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Fri Jun 17 14:34:09 2016 +1000
+
+ Remove duplicate code from PAM. ok djm@
+
+commit e690fe85750e93fca1fb7c7c8587d4130a4f7aba
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 15 00:40:40 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Remove "POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!" from log message
+ about forward and reverse DNS not matching. We haven't supported IP-based
+ auth methods for a very long time so it's now misleading. part of bz#2585,
+ ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 5565ef0ee0599b27f0bd1d3bb1f8a323d8274e29
+
+commit 57b4ee04cad0d3e0fec1194753b0c4d31e39a1cd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Wed Jun 15 11:22:38 2016 +1000
+
+ Move platform_disable_tracing into its own file.
+
+ Prevents link errors resolving the extern "options" when platform.o
+ gets linked into ssh-agent when building --with-pam.
+
+commit 78dc8e3724e30ee3e1983ce013e80277dc6ca070
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Tue Jun 14 13:55:12 2016 +1000
+
+ Track skipped upstream commit IDs.
+
+ There are a small number of "upstream" commits that do not correspond to
+ a file in -portable. This file tracks those so that we can reconcile
+ OpenBSD and Portable to ensure that no commits are accidentally missed.
+
+ If you add something to .skipped-commit-ids please also add an upstream
+ ID line in the following format when you commit it.
+
+ Upstream-ID: 321065a95a7ccebdd5fd08482a1e19afbf524e35
+ Upstream-ID: d4f699a421504df35254cf1c6f1a7c304fb907ca
+ Upstream-ID: aafe246655b53b52bc32c8a24002bc262f4230f7
+ Upstream-ID: 8fa9cd1dee3c3339ae329cf20fb591db6d605120
+ Upstream-ID: f31327a48dd4103333cc53315ec53fe65ed8a17a
+ Upstream-ID: edbfde98c40007b7752a4ac106095e060c25c1ef
+ Upstream-ID: 052fd565e3ff2d8cec3bc957d1788f50c827f8e2
+ Upstream-ID: 7cf73737f357492776223da1c09179fa6ba74660
+ Upstream-ID: 180d84674be1344e45a63990d60349988187c1ae
+ Upstream-ID: f6ae971186ba68d066cd102e57d5b0b2c211a5ee
+
+commit 9f919d1a3219d476d6a662d18df058e1c4f36a6f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Tue Jun 14 13:51:01 2016 +1000
+
+ Remove now-defunct .cvsignore files. ok djm
+
+commit 68777faf271efb2713960605c748f6c8a4b26d55
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 8 02:13:01 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Back out rev 1.28 "Check min and max sizes sent by the
+ client" change. It caused "key_verify failed for server_host_key" in clients
+ that send a DH-GEX min value less that DH_GRP_MIN, eg old OpenSSH and PuTTY.
+ ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 452979d3ca5c1e9dff063287ea0a5314dd091f65
+
+commit a86ec4d0737ac5879223e7cd9d68c448df46e169
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Tue Jun 14 10:48:27 2016 +1000
+
+ Use Solaris setpflags(__PROC_PROTECT, ...).
+
+ Where possible, use Solaris setpflags to disable process tracing on
+ ssh-agent and sftp-server. bz#2584, based on a patch from huieying.lee
+ at oracle.com, ok djm.
+
+commit 0f916d39b039fdc0b5baf9b5ab0754c0f11ec573
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Tue Jun 14 10:43:53 2016 +1000
+
+ Shorten prctl code a tiny bit.
+
+commit 0fb7f5985351fbbcd2613d8485482c538e5123be
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Thu Jun 9 16:23:07 2016 +1000
+
+ Move prctl PR_SET_DUMPABLE into platform.c.
+
+ This should make it easier to add additional platform support such as
+ Solaris (bz#2584).
+
+commit e6508898c3cd838324ecfe1abd0eb8cf802e7106
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 3 04:10:41 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Add a test for ssh(1)'s config file parsing.
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 558b7f4dc45cc3761cc3d3e889b9f3c5bc91e601
+
+commit ab0a536066dfa32def0bd7272c096ebb5eb25b11
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 3 03:47:59 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Add 'sshd' to the test ID as I'm about to add a similar
+ set for ssh.
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: aea7a9c3bac638530165c801ce836875b228ae7a
+
+commit a5577c1ed3ecdfe4b7b1107c526cae886fc91afb
+Author: schwarze at openbsd.org <schwarze at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 30 12:14:08 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ stricter malloc.conf(5) options for utf8 tests
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 111efe20a0fb692fa1a987f6e823310f9b25abf6
+
+commit 75f0844b4f29d62ec3a5e166d2ee94b02df819fc
+Author: schwarze at openbsd.org <schwarze at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 30 12:05:56 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Fix two rare edge cases: 1. If vasprintf() returns < 0,
+ do not access a NULL pointer in snmprintf(), and do not free() the pointer
+ returned from vasprintf() because on some systems other than OpenBSD, it
+ might be a bogus pointer. 2. If vasprintf() returns == 0, return 0 and ""
+ rather than -1 and NULL.
+
+ Besides, free(dst) is pointless after failure (not a bug).
+
+ One half OK martijn@, the other half OK deraadt@;
+ committing quickly before people get hurt.
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: b164f20923812c9bac69856dbc1385eb1522cba4
+
+commit 016881eb33a7948028848c90f4c7ac42e3af0e87
+Author: schwarze at openbsd.org <schwarze at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu May 26 19:14:25 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ test the new utf8 module
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: c923d05a20e84e4ef152cbec947fdc4ce6eabbe3
+
+commit d4219028bdef448e089376f3afe81ef6079da264
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 3 15:30:46 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Set umask to prevent "Bad owner or permissions" errors.
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 8fdf2fc4eb595ccd80c443f474d639f851145417
+
+commit 07d5608bb237e9b3fe86a2aeaa429392230faebf
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 3 14:41:04 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ support doas
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 8d5572b27ea810394eeda432d8b4e9e1064a7c38
+
+commit 01cabf10adc7676cba5f40536a34d3b246edb73f
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 3 13:48:33 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ unit tests for sshbuf_dup_string()
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 7521ff150dc7f20511d1c2c48fd3318e5850a96d
+
+commit 6915f1698e3d1dd4e22eac20f435e1dfc1d46372
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 3 06:44:12 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ tweak previous;
+
+ Upstream-ID: 92979f1a0b63e041a0e5b08c9ed0ba9b683a3698
+
+commit 0cb2f4c2494b115d0f346ed2d8b603ab3ba643f4
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 3 04:09:38 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Allow ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings to be
+ overridden when using ssh -W (but still default to yes in that case).
+ bz#2577, ok djm at .
+
+ Upstream-ID: 4b20c419e93ca11a861c81c284090cfabc8c54d4
+
+commit 8543ff3f5020fe659839b15f05b8c522bde6cee5
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 3 03:14:41 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Move the host and port used by ssh -W into the Options
+ struct. This will make future changes a bit easier. ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 151bce5ecab2fbedf0d836250a27968d30389382
+
+commit 6b87311d3acdc460f926b2c40f4c4f3fd345f368
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 1 04:19:49 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Check min and max sizes sent by the client against what
+ we support before passing them to the monitor. ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 750627e8117084215412bff00a25b1586ab17ece
+
+commit 564cd2a8926ccb1dca43a535073540935b5e0373
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 31 23:46:14 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Ensure that the client's proposed DH-GEX max value is at
+ least as big as the minimum the server will accept. ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: b4b84fa04aab2de7e79a6fee4a6e1c189c0fe775
+
+commit df820722e40309c9b3f360ea4ed47a584ed74333
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Mon Jun 6 11:36:13 2016 +1000
+
+ Add compat bits to utf8.c.
+
+commit 05c6574652571becfe9d924226c967a3f4b3f879
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Mon Jun 6 11:33:43 2016 +1000
+
+ Fix utf->utf8 typo.
+
+commit 6c1717190b4d5ddd729cd9e24e8ed71ed4f087ce
+Author: schwarze at openbsd.org <schwarze at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 30 18:34:41 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Backout rev. 1.43 for now.
+
+ The function update_progress_meter() calls refresh_progress_meter()
+ which calls snmprintf() which calls malloc(); but update_progress_meter()
+ acts as the SIGALRM signal handler.
+
+ "malloc(): error: recursive call" reported by sobrado at .
+
+ Upstream-ID: aaae57989431e5239c101f8310f74ccc83aeb93e
+
+commit cd9e1eabeb4137182200035ab6fa4522f8d24044
+Author: schwarze at openbsd.org <schwarze at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 30 12:57:21 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Even when only writing an unescaped character, the dst
+ buffer may need to grow, or it would be overrun; issue found by tb@ with
+ malloc.conf(5) 'C'.
+
+ While here, reserve an additional byte for the terminating NUL
+ up front such that we don't have to realloc() later just for that.
+
+ OK tb@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 30ebcc0c097c4571b16f0a78b44969f170db0cff
+
+commit ac284a355f8065eaef2a16f446f3c44cdd17371d
+Author: schwarze at openbsd.org <schwarze at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 30 12:05:56 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Fix two rare edge cases: 1. If vasprintf() returns < 0,
+ do not access a NULL pointer in snmprintf(), and do not free() the pointer
+ returned from vasprintf() because on some systems other than OpenBSD, it
+ might be a bogus pointer. 2. If vasprintf() returns == 0, return 0 and ""
+ rather than -1 and NULL.
+
+ Besides, free(dst) is pointless after failure (not a bug).
+
+ One half OK martijn@, the other half OK deraadt@;
+ committing quickly before people get hurt.
+
+ Upstream-ID: b7bcd2e82fc168a8eff94e41f5db336ed986fed0
+
+commit 0e059cdf5fd86297546c63fa8607c24059118832
+Author: schwarze at openbsd.org <schwarze at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 25 23:48:45 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ To prevent screwing up terminal settings when printing to
+ the terminal, for ASCII and UTF-8, escape bytes not forming characters and
+ bytes forming non-printable characters with vis(3) VIS_OCTAL. For other
+ character sets, abort printing of the current string in these cases. In
+ particular, * let scp(1) respect the local user's LC_CTYPE locale(1); *
+ sanitize data received from the remote host; * sanitize filenames, usernames,
+ and similar data even locally; * take character display widths into account
+ for the progressmeter.
+
+ This is believed to be sufficient to keep the local terminal safe
+ on OpenBSD, but bad things can still happen on other systems with
+ state-dependent locales because many places in the code print
+ unencoded ASCII characters into the output stream.
+
+ Using feedback from djm@ and martijn@,
+ various aspects discussed with many others.
+
+ deraadt@ says it should go in now, i probably already hesitated too long
+
+ Upstream-ID: e66afbc94ee396ddcaffd433b9a3b80f387647e0
+
+commit 8c02e3639acefe1e447e293dbe23a0917abd3734
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 24 04:43:45 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ KNF compression proposal and simplify the client side a
+ little. ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: aa814b694efe9e5af8a26e4c80a05526ae6d6605
+
+commit 7ec4946fb686813eb5f8c57397e465f5485159f4
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 24 02:31:57 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Back out 'plug memleak'.
+
+ Upstream-ID: 4faacdde136c24a961e24538de373660f869dbc0
+
+commit 82f24c3ddc52053aeb7beb3332fa94c92014b0c5
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 23 23:30:50 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ prefer agent-hosted keys to keys from PKCS#11; ok markus
+
+ Upstream-ID: 7417f7653d58d6306d9f8c08d0263d050e2fd8f4
+
+commit a0cb7778fbc9b43458f7072eb68dd858766384d1
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 23 00:17:27 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Plug mem leak in filter_proposal. ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: bf968da7cfcea2a41902832e7d548356a4e2af34
+
+commit ae9c0d4d5c581b3040d1f16b5c5f4b1cd1616743
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Fri Jun 3 16:03:44 2016 +1000
+
+ Update vis.h and vis.c from OpenBSD.
+
+ This will be needed for the upcoming utf8 changes.
+
+commit e1d93705f8f48f519433d6ca9fc3d0abe92a1b77
+Author: Tim Rice <tim at multitalents.net>
+Date: Tue May 31 11:13:22 2016 -0700
+
+ modified: configure.ac
+ whitspace clean up. No code changes.
+
+commit 604a037d84e41e31f0aec9075df0b8740c130200
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue May 31 16:45:28 2016 +1000
+
+ whitespace at EOL
+
+commit 18424200160ff5c923113e0a37ebe21ab7bcd17c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Mon May 30 19:35:28 2016 +1000
+
+ Add missing ssh-host-config --name option
+
+ Patch from vinschen at redhat.com.
+
+commit 39c0cecaa188a37a2e134795caa68e03f3ced592
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Fri May 20 10:01:58 2016 +1000
+
+ Fix comment about sshpam_const and AIX.
+
+ From mschwager via github.
+
+commit f64062b1f74ad5ee20a8a49aab2732efd0f7ce30
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri May 20 09:56:53 2016 +1000
+
+ Deny lstat syscalls in seccomp sandbox
+
+ Avoids sandbox violations for some krb/gssapi libraries.
+
+commit 531c135409b8d8810795b1f3692a4ebfd5c9cae0
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu May 19 07:45:32 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix type of ed25519 values
+
+ Upstream-ID: b32d0cb372bbe918ca2de56906901eae225a59b0
+
+commit 75e21688f523799c9e0cc6601d76a9c5ca79f787
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 4 14:32:26 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add IdentityAgent; noticed & ok jmc@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 4ba9034b00a4cf1beae627f0728da897802df88a
+
+commit 1a75d14daf4b60db903e6103cf50e74e0cd0a76b
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 4 14:29:58 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ allow setting IdentityAgent to SSH_AUTH_SOCK; ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 20c508480d8db3eef18942c0fc39b1fcf25652ac
+
+commit 0516454151ae722fc8256c3c56115c6baf24c5b0
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 4 14:22:33 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ move SSH_MSG_NONE, so we don't have to include ssh1.h;
+ ok deraadt@
+
+ Upstream-ID: c2f97502efc761a41b18c17ddf460e138ca7994e
+
+commit 332ff3d770631e7513fea38cf0d3689f673f0e3f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue May 10 09:51:06 2016 +1000
+
+ initialise salen in binresvport_sa
+
+ avoids failures with UsePrivilegedPort=yes
+
+ patch from Juan Gallego
+
+commit c5c1d5d2f04ce00d2ddd6647e61b32f28be39804
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 4 14:04:40 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ missing const in prototypes (ssh1)
+
+ Upstream-ID: 789c6ad4928b5fa557369b88c3a6a34926082c05
+
+commit 9faae50e2e82ba42eb0cb2726bf6830fe7948f28
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 4 14:00:09 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Fix inverted logic for updating StreamLocalBindMask which
+ would cause the server to set an invalid mask. ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 8a4404c8307a5ef9e07ee2169fc6d8106b527587
+
+commit b02ad1ce9105bfa7394ac7590c0729dd52e26a81
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 4 12:21:53 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ IdentityAgent for specifying specific agent sockets; ok
+ djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 3e6a15eb89ea0fd406f108826b7dc7dec4fbfac1
+
+commit 910e59bba09ac309d78ce61e356da35292212935
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 4 12:16:39 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix junk characters after quotes
+
+ Upstream-ID: cc4d0cd32cb6b55a2ef98975d2f7ae857d0dc578
+
+commit 9283884e647b8be50ccd2997537af0065672107d
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 3 18:38:12 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ correct article;
+
+ Upstream-ID: 1fbd5b7ab16d2d9834ec79c3cedd4738fa42a168
+
+commit cfefbcea1057c2623e76c579174a4107a0b6e6cd
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 3 15:57:39 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix overriding of StreamLocalBindMask and
+ StreamLocalBindUnlink in Match blocks; found the hard way Rogan Dawes
+
+ Upstream-ID: 940bc69ec0249ab428d24ccd0722ce35cb932ee2
+
+commit 771c2f51ffc0c9a2877b7892fada0c77bd1f6549
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 3 15:25:06 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ don't forget to include StreamLocalBindUnlink in the
+ config dump output
+
+ Upstream-ID: 14a6d970b3b45c8e94272e3c661e9a0b2a0ee7cb
+
+commit cdcd941994dc430f50d0a4e6a712d32b66e6199e
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 3 14:54:08 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ make nethack^wrandomart fingerprint flag more readily
+ searchable pointed out by Matt Johnston
+
+ Upstream-ID: cb40d0235dc153c478c1aad3bc60b195422a54fb
+
+commit 05855bf2ce7d5cd0a6db18bc0b4214ed5ef7516d
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 3 13:10:24 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ clarify ordering of subkeys; pointed out by ietf-ssh AT
+ stbuehler.de
+
+ Upstream-ID: 05ebe9f949449a555ebce8e0aad7c8c9acaf8463
+
+commit cca3b4395807bfb7aaeb83d2838f5c062ce30566
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 3 12:15:49 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Use a subshell for constructing key types to work around
+ different sed behaviours for -portable.
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 0f6eb673162df229eda9a134a0f10da16151552d
+
+commit fa58208c6502dcce3e0daac0ca991ee657daf1f5
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 3 10:27:59 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ correct some typos and remove a long-stale XXX note.
+
+ add specification for ed25519 certificates
+
+ mention no host certificate options/extensions are currently defined
+
+ pointed out by Simon Tatham
+
+ Upstream-ID: 7b535ab7dba3340b7d8210ede6791fdaefdf839a
+
+commit b466f956c32cbaff4200bfcd5db6739fe4bc7d04
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 3 10:24:27 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add ed25519 keys that are supported but missing from this
+ documents; from Peter Moody
+
+ Upstream-ID: 8caac2d8e8cfd2fca6dc304877346e0a064b014b
+
+commit 7f3d76319a69dab2efe3a520a8fef5b97e923636
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 3 09:03:49 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Implement IUTF8 as per draft-sgtatham-secsh-iutf8-00. Patch
+ from Simon Tatham, ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 58268ebdf37d9d467f78216c681705a5e10c58e8
+
+commit 31bc01c05d9f51bee3ebe33dc57c4fafb059fb62
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 2 14:10:58 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ unbreak config parsing on reexec from previous commit
+
+ Upstream-ID: bc69932638a291770955bd05ca55a32660a613ab
+
+commit 67f1459efd2e85bf03d032539283fa8107218936
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 2 09:52:00 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ unit and regress tests for SHA256/512; ok markus
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: a0cd1a92dc824067076a5fcef83c18df9b0bf2c6
+
+commit 0e8eeec8e75f6d0eaf33317376f773160018a9c7
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 2 10:26:04 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add support for additional fixed DH groups from
+ draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03
+
+ diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 (2K group)
+ diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 (4K group)
+ diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 (8K group)
+
+ based on patch from Mark D. Baushke and Darren Tucker
+ ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: ac00406ada4f0dfec41585ca0839f039545bc46f
+
+commit 57464e3934ba53ad8590ee3ccd840f693407fc1e
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 2 09:36:42 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ support SHA256 and SHA512 RSA signatures in certificates;
+ ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: b45be2f2ce8cacd794dc5730edaabc90e5eb434a
+
+commit 1a31d02b2411c4718de58ce796dbb7b5e14db93e
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 2 08:49:03 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix signed/unsigned errors reported by clang-3.7; add
+ sshbuf_dup_string() to replace a common idiom of strdup(sshbuf_ptr()) with
+ better safety checking; feedback and ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 71f926d9bb3f1efed51319a6daf37e93d57c8820
+
+commit d2d6bf864e52af8491a60dd507f85b74361f5da3
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 29 08:07:53 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ close ControlPersist background process stderr when not
+ in debug mode or when logging to a file or syslog. bz#1988 ok dtucker
+
+ Upstream-ID: 4fb726f0fdcb155ad419913cea10dc4afd409d24
+
+commit 9ee692fa1146e887e008a2b9a3d3ea81770c9fc8
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 28 14:30:21 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix comment
+
+ Upstream-ID: 313a385bd7b69a82f8e28ecbaf5789c774457b15
+
+commit ee1e0a16ff2ba41a4d203c7670b54644b6c57fa6
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Apr 27 13:53:48 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ cidr permitted for {allow,deny}users; from lars nooden ok djm
+
+ Upstream-ID: 13e7327fe85f6c63f3f7f069e0fdc8c351515d11
+
+commit b6e0140a5aa883c27b98415bd8aa9f65fc04ee22
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 21 06:08:02 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ make argument == NULL tests more consistent
+
+ Upstream-ID: dc4816678704aa5cbda3a702e0fa2033ff04581d
+
+commit 6aaabc2b610e44bae473457ad9556ffb43d90ee3
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Apr 17 14:34:46 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ tweak previous;
+
+ Upstream-ID: 46c1bab91c164078edbccd5f7d06b9058edd814f
+
+commit 0f839e5969efa3bda615991be8a9d9311554c573
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 15 02:57:10 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ missing bit of Include regress
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 1063595f7f40f8489a1b7a27230b9e8acccea34f
+
+commit 12e4ac46aed681da55c2bba3cd11dfcab23591be
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 15 02:55:53 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ remove redundant CLEANFILES section
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 29ef1b267fa56daa60a1463396635e7d53afb587
+
+commit b1d05aa653ae560c44baf8e8a9756e33f98ea75c
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 15 00:48:01 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ sync CLEANFILES with portable, sort
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: cb782f4f1ab3e079efbc335c6b64942f790766ed
+
+commit 35f22dad263cce5c61d933ae439998cb965b8748
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 15 00:31:10 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ regression test for ssh_config Include directive
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 46a38c8101f635461c506d1aac2d96af80f97f1e
+
+commit 6b8a1a87005818d4700ce8b42faef746e82c1f51
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 14 23:57:17 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ unbreak test for recent ssh de-duplicated forwarding
+ change
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 6b2b115d99acd7cff13986e6739ea214cf2a3da3
+
+commit 076787702418985a2cc6808212dc28ce7afc01f0
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 14 23:21:42 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add test knob and warning for StrictModes
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 8cd10952ce7898655ee58945904f2a0a3bdf7682
+
+commit dc7990be865450574c7940c9880567f5d2555b37
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 15 00:30:19 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Include directive for ssh_config(5); feedback & ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: ae3b76e2e343322b9f74acde6f1e1c5f027d5fff
+
+commit 85bdcd7c92fe7ff133bbc4e10a65c91810f88755
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Apr 13 10:39:57 2016 +1000
+
+ ignore PAM environment vars when UseLogin=yes
+
+ If PAM is configured to read user-specified environment variables
+ and UseLogin=yes in sshd_config, then a hostile local user may
+ attack /bin/login via LD_PRELOAD or similar environment variables
+ set via PAM.
+
+ CVE-2015-8325, found by Shayan Sadigh, via Colin Watson
+
+commit dce19bf6e4a2a3d0b13a81224de63fc316461ab9
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Apr 9 12:39:30 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ make private key loading functions consistently handle NULL
+ key pointer arguments; ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 92038726ef4a338169c35dacc9c5a07fcc7fa761
+
+commit 5f41f030e2feb5295657285aa8c6602c7810bc4b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Fri Apr 8 21:14:13 2016 +1000
+
+ Remove NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT
+
+ Replace by defining IPPORT_RESERVED to zero on Cygwin, which should have
+ the same effect without causing problems syncing patches with OpenBSD.
+ Resync the two affected functions with OpenBSD. ok djm, sanity checked
+ by Corinna.
+
+commit 34a01b2cf737d946ddb140618e28c3048ab7a229
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 8 08:19:17 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ whitespace at EOL
+
+ Upstream-ID: 5beffd4e001515da12851b974e2323ae4aa313b6
+
+commit 90ee563fa6b54c59896c6c332c5188f866c5e75f
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 8 06:35:54 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ We accidentally send an empty string and a zero uint32 with
+ every direct-streamlocal at openssh.com channel open, in contravention of our
+ own spec.
+
+ Fixing this is too hard wrt existing versions that expect these
+ fields to be present and fatal() if they aren't, so document them
+ as "reserved" fields in the PROTOCOL spec as though we always
+ intended this and let us never speak of it again.
+
+ bz#2529, reported by Ron Frederick
+
+ Upstream-ID: 34cd326a4d236ca6e39084c4ff796bd97ab833e7
+
+commit 0ccbd5eca0f0dd78e71a4b69c66f03a66908d558
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Apr 6 06:42:17 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ don't record duplicate LocalForward and RemoteForward
+ entries; fixes failure with ExitOnForwardFailure+hostname canonicalisation
+ where the same forwards are added on the second pass through the
+ configuration file. bz#2562; ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 40a51d68b6300f1cc61deecdb7d4847b8b7b0de1
+
+commit 574def0eb493cd6efeffd4ff2e9257abcffee0c8
+Author: krw at openbsd.org <krw at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Apr 2 14:37:42 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Another use for fcntl() and thus of the superfluous 3rd
+ parameter is when sanitising standard fd's before calling daemon().
+
+ Use a tweaked version of the ssh(1) function in all three places
+ found using fcntl() this way.
+
+ ok jca@ beck@
+
+ Upstream-ID: f16811ffa19a1c5f4ef383c5f0fecb843c84e218
+
+commit b3413534aa9d71a941005df2760d1eec2c2b0854
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Mon Apr 4 11:09:21 2016 +1000
+
+ Tidy up openssl header test.
+
+commit 815bcac0b94bb448de5acdd6ba925b8725240b4f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Mon Apr 4 11:07:59 2016 +1000
+
+ Fix configure-time warnings for openssl test.
+
+commit 95687f5831ae680f7959446d8ae4b52452ee05dd
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 1 02:34:10 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ whitespace at EOL
+
+ Upstream-ID: 40ae2203d07cb14e0a89e1a0d4c6120ee8fd8c3a
+
+commit fdfbf4580de09d84a974211715e14f88a5704b8e
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Mar 31 05:24:06 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Remove fallback from moduli to "primes" file that was
+ deprecated in 2001 and fix log messages referring to primes file. Based on
+ patch from xnox at ubuntu.com via bz#2559. "kill it" deraadt@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 0d4f8c70e2fa7431a83b95f8ca81033147ba8713
+
+commit 0235a5fa67fcac51adb564cba69011a535f86f6b
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Mar 17 17:19:43 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ UseDNS affects ssh hostname processing in authorized_keys,
+ not known_hosts; bz#2554 reported by jjelen AT redhat.com
+
+ Upstream-ID: c1c1bb895dde46095fc6d81d8653703928437591
+
+commit 8c4739338f5e379d05b19d6e544540114965f07e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Tue Mar 15 09:24:43 2016 +1100
+
+ Don't call Solaris setproject() with UsePAM=yes.
+
+ When Solaris Projects are enabled along with PAM setting the project
+ is PAM's responsiblity. bz#2425, based on patch from
+ brent.paulson at gmail.com.
+
+commit cff26f373c58457a32cb263e212cfff53fca987b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 15 04:30:21 2016 +1100
+
+ remove slogin from *.spec
+
+commit c38905ba391434834da86abfc988a2b8b9b62477
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Mar 14 16:20:54 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ unbreak authentication using lone certificate keys in
+ ssh-agent: when attempting pubkey auth with a certificate, if no separate
+ private key is found among the keys then try with the certificate key itself.
+
+ bz#2550 reported by Peter Moody
+
+ Upstream-ID: f939cd76d68e6a9a3d1711b5a943d6ed1e623966
+
+commit 4b4bfb01cd40b9ddb948e6026ddd287cc303d871
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Mar 10 11:47:57 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ sanitise characters destined for xauth reported by
+ github.com/tintinweb feedback and ok deraadt and markus
+
+ Upstream-ID: 18ad8d0d74cbd2ea3306a16595a306ee356aa261
+
+commit 732b463d37221722b1206f43aa59563766a6a968
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Mon Mar 14 16:04:23 2016 +1100
+
+ Pass supported malloc options to connect-privsep.
+
+ This allows us to activate only the supported options during the malloc
+ option portion of the connect-privsep test.
+
+commit d29c5b9b3e9f27394ca97a364ed4bb4a55a59744
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Mon Mar 14 09:30:58 2016 +1100
+
+ Remove leftover roaming.h file.
+
+ Pointed out by des at des.no.
+
+commit 8ff20ec95f4377021ed5e9b2331320f5c5a34cea
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Mon Mar 14 09:24:03 2016 +1100
+
+ Quote variables that may contain whitespace.
+
+ The variable $L_TMP_ID_FILE needs to be surrounded by quotes in order to
+ survive paths containing whitespace. bz#2551, from Corinna Vinschen via
+ Philip Hands.
+
+commit 627824480c01f0b24541842c7206ab9009644d02
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Fri Mar 11 14:47:41 2016 +1100
+
+ Include priv.h for priv_set_t.
+
+ From alex at cooperi.net.
+
+commit e960051f9a264f682c4d2fefbeecffcfc66b0ddf
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Wed Mar 9 13:14:18 2016 +1100
+
+ Wrap stdint.h inside #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
+
+commit 2c48bd344d2c4b5e08dae9aea5ff44fc19a5e363
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Wed Mar 9 12:46:50 2016 +1100
+
+ Add compat to monotime_double().
+
+ Apply all of the portability changes in monotime() to monotime() double.
+ Fixes build on at least older FreeBSD systems.
+
+commit 7b40ef6c2eef40c339f6ea8920cb8a44838e10c9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 8 14:12:58 2016 -0800
+
+ make a regress-binaries target
+
+ Easier to build all the regression/unit test binaries in one pass
+ than going through all of ${REGRESS_BINARIES}
+
+commit c425494d6b6181beb54a1b3763ef9e944fd3c214
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 8 14:03:54 2016 -0800
+
+ unbreak kexfuzz for -Werror without __bounded__
+
+commit 3ed9218c336607846563daea5d5ab4f701f4e042
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 8 14:01:29 2016 -0800
+
+ unbreak PAM after canohost refactor
+
+commit 885fb2a44ff694f01e4f6470f803629e11f62961
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Tue Mar 8 11:58:43 2016 +1100
+
+ auth_get_canonical_hostname in portable code.
+
+ "refactor canohost.c" replaced get_canonical_hostname, this makes the
+ same change to some portable-specific code.
+
+commit 95767262caa6692eff1e1565be1f5cb297949a89
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Mar 7 19:02:43 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ refactor canohost.c: move functions that cache results closer
+ to the places that use them (authn and session code). After this, no state is
+ cached in canohost.c
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 5f2e4df88d4803fc8ec59ec53629105e23ce625e
+
+commit af0bb38ffd1f2c4f9f43b0029be2efe922815255
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 4 15:11:55 2016 +1100
+
+ hook unittests/misc/kexfuzz into build
+
+commit 331b8e07ee5bcbdca12c11cc8f51a7e8de09b248
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 4 02:48:06 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Filter debug messages out of log before picking the last
+ two lines. Should prevent problems if any more debug output is added late in
+ the connection.
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 345d0a9589c381e7d640a4ead06cfaadf4db1363
+
+commit 0892edaa3ce623381d3a7635544cbc69b31cf9cb
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 4 02:30:36 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add KEX fuzzer harness; ok deraadt@
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 3df5242d30551b12b828aa9ba4a4cec0846be8d1
+
+commit ae2562c47d41b68dbb00240fd6dd60bed205367a
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Mar 3 00:46:53 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Look back 3 lines for possible error messages. Changes
+ to the code mean that "Bad packet length" errors are 3 lines back instead of
+ the previous two, which meant we didn't skip some offsets that we intended
+ to.
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 24f36912740a634d509a3144ebc8eb7c09b9c684
+
+commit 988e429d903acfb298bfddfd75e7994327adfed0
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 4 03:35:44 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix ClientAliveInterval when a time-based RekeyLimit is
+ set; previously keepalive packets were not being sent. bz#2252 report and
+ analysis by Christian Wittenhorst and Garrett Lee feedback and ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: d48f9deadd35fdacdd5106b41bb07630ddd4aa81
+
+commit 8ef04d7a94bcdb8b0085fdd2a79a844b7d40792d
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 2 22:43:52 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Improve accuracy of reported transfer speeds by waiting
+ for the ack from the other end. Pointed out by mmcc@, ok deraadt@ markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 99f1cf15c9a8f161086b814d414d862795ae153d
+
+commit b8d4eafe29684fe4f5bb587f7eab948e6ed62723
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 2 22:42:40 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Improve precision of progressmeter for sftp and scp by
+ storing sub-second timestamps. Pointed out by mmcc@, ok deraadt@ markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 38fd83a3d83dbf81c8ff7b5d1302382fe54970ab
+
+commit 18f64b969c70ed00e74b9d8e50359dbe698ce4c0
+Author: jca at openbsd.org <jca at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 29 20:22:36 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Print ssize_t with %zd; ok deraadt@ mmcc@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 0590313bbb013ff6692298c98f7e0be349d124bd
+
+commit 6e7f68ce38130c794ec1fb8d2a6091fbe982628d
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Feb 28 22:27:00 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ rearrange DH public value tests to be a little more clear
+
+ rearrange DH private value generation to explain rationale more
+ clearly and include an extra sanity check.
+
+ ok deraadt
+
+ Upstream-ID: 9ad8a07e1a12684e1b329f9bd88941b249d4b2ad
+
+commit 2ed17aa34008bdfc8db674315adc425a0712be11
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Tue Mar 1 15:24:20 2016 +1100
+
+ Import updated moduli file from OpenBSD.
+
+ Note that 1.5k bit groups have been removed.
+
+commit 72b061d4ba0f909501c595d709ea76e06b01e5c9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Fri Feb 26 14:40:04 2016 +1100
+
+ Add a note about using xlc on AIX.
+
+commit fd4e4f2416baa2e6565ea49d52aade296bad3e28
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Wed Feb 24 10:44:25 2016 +1100
+
+ Skip PrintLastLog in config dump mode.
+
+ When DISABLE_LASTLOG is set, do not try to include PrintLastLog in the
+ config dump since it'll be reported as UNKNOWN.
+
+commit 99135c764fa250801da5ec3b8d06cbd0111caae8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 23 20:17:23 2016 +1100
+
+ update spec/README versions ahead of release
+
+commit b86a334aaaa4d1e643eb1fd71f718573d6d948b5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 23 20:16:53 2016 +1100
+
+ put back portable patchlevel to p1
+
+commit 555dd35ff176847e3c6bd068ba2e8db4022eb24f
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 23 09:14:34 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ openssh-7.2
+
+ Upstream-ID: 9db776b26014147fc907ece8460ef2bcb0f11e78
+
+commit 1acc058d0a7913838c830ed998a1a1fb5b7864bf
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 23 16:12:13 2016 +1100
+
+ Disable tests where fs perms are incorrect
+
+ Some tests have strict requirements on the filesystem permissions
+ for certain files and directories. This adds a regress/check-perm
+ tool that copies the relevant logic from sshd to exactly test
+ the paths in question. This lets us skip tests when the local
+ filesystem doesn't conform to our expectations rather than
+ continuing and failing the test run.
+
+ ok dtucker@
+
+commit 39f303b1f36d934d8410b05625f25c7bcb75db4d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 23 12:56:59 2016 +1100
+
+ fix sandbox on OSX Lion
+
+ sshd was failing with:
+
+ ssh_sandbox_child: sandbox_init: dlopen(/usr/lib/libsandbox.1.dylib, 261):cw
+ image not found [preauth]
+
+ caused by chroot before sandboxing. Avoid by explicitly linking libsandbox
+ to sshd. Spotted by Darren.
+
+commit 0d1451a32c7436e6d3d482351e776bc5e7824ce4
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 23 01:34:14 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix spurious error message when incorrect passphrase
+ entered for keys; reported by espie@ ok deraadt@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 58b2e46e63ed6912ed1ee780bd3bd8560f9a5899
+
+commit 09d87d79741beb85768b5e788d7dfdf4bc3543dc
+Author: sobrado at openbsd.org <sobrado at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Feb 20 23:06:23 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ set ssh(1) protocol version to 2 only.
+
+ ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: e168daf9d27d7e392e3c9923826bd8e87b2b3a10
+
+commit 9262e07826ba5eebf8423f7ac9e47ec488c47869
+Author: sobrado at openbsd.org <sobrado at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Feb 20 23:02:39 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add missing ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa and ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 to
+ IdentityFile.
+
+ ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 6ce99466312e4ae7708017c3665e3edb976f70cf
+
+commit c12f0fdce8f985fca8d71829fd64c5b89dc777f5
+Author: sobrado at openbsd.org <sobrado at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Feb 20 23:01:46 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ AddressFamily defaults to any.
+
+ ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 0d94aa06a4b889bf57a7f631c45ba36d24c13e0c
+
+commit 907091acb188b1057d50c2158f74c3ecf1c2302b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Fri Feb 19 09:05:39 2016 +1100
+
+ Make Solaris privs code build on older systems.
+
+ Not all systems with Solaris privs have priv_basicset so factor that
+ out and provide backward compatibility code. Similarly, not all have
+ PRIV_NET_ACCESS so wrap that in #ifdef. Based on code from
+ alex at cooperi.net and djm@ with help from carson at taltos.org and
+ wieland at purdue.edu.
+
+commit 292a8dee14e5e67dcd1b49ba5c7b9023e8420d59
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Feb 17 22:20:14 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ rekey refactor broke SSH1; spotted by Tom G. Christensen
+
+ Upstream-ID: 43f0d57928cc077c949af0bfa71ef574dcb58243
+
+commit 3a13cb543df9919aec2fc6b75f3dd3802facaeca
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Feb 17 08:57:34 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 cannot be selected explicitly
+ in *KeyTypes options yet. Remove them from the lists of algorithms for now.
+ committing on behalf of markus@ ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: c6e8820eb8e610ac21551832c0c89684a9a51bb7
+
+commit a685ae8d1c24fb7c712c55a4f3280ee76f5f1e4b
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Feb 17 07:38:19 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ since these pages now clearly tell folks to avoid v1,
+ normalise the docs from a v2 perspective (i.e. stop pointing out which bits
+ are v2 only);
+
+ ok/tweaks djm ok markus
+
+ Upstream-ID: eb474f8c36fb6a532dc05c282f7965e38dcfa129
+
+commit c5c3f3279a0e4044b8de71b70d3570d692d0f29d
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Feb 17 05:29:04 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ make sandboxed privilege separation the default, not just
+ for new installs; "absolutely" deraadt@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 5221ef3b927d2df044e9aa3f5db74ae91743f69b
+
+commit eb3f7337a651aa01d5dec019025e6cdc124ed081
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 16 07:47:54 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ no need to state that protocol 2 is the default twice;
+
+ Upstream-ID: b1e4c36b0c2e12e338e5b66e2978f2ac953b95eb
+
+commit e7901efa9b24e5b0c7e74f2c5520d47eead4d005
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 16 05:11:04 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Replace list of ciphers and MACs adjacent to -1/-2 flag
+ descriptions in ssh(1) with a strong recommendation not to use protocol 1.
+ Add a similar warning to the Protocol option descriptions in ssh_config(5)
+ and sshd_config(5);
+
+ prompted by and ok mmcc@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 961f99e5437d50e636feca023978950a232ead5e
+
+commit 5a0fcb77287342e2fc2ba1cee79b6af108973dc2
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 16 03:37:48 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add a "Close session" log entry (at loglevel=verbose) to
+ correspond to the existing "Starting session" one. Also include the session
+ id number to make multiplexed sessions more apparent.
+
+ feedback and ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: e72d2ac080e02774376325136e532cb24c2e617c
+
+commit 624fd395b559820705171f460dd33d67743d13d6
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Feb 17 02:24:17 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ include bad $SSH_CONNECTION in failure output
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: b22d72edfde78c403aaec2b9c9753ef633cc0529
+
+commit 60d860e54b4f199e5e89963b1c086981309753cb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Wed Feb 17 13:37:09 2016 +1100
+
+ Rollback addition of va_start.
+
+ va_start was added in 0f754e29dd3760fc0b172c1220f18b753fb0957e, however
+ it has the wrong number of args and it's not usable in non-variadic
+ functions anyway so it breaks things (for example Solaris 2.6 as
+ reported by Tom G. Christensen).i ok djm@
+
+commit 2fee909c3cee2472a98b26eb82696297b81e0d38
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Wed Feb 17 09:48:15 2016 +1100
+
+ Look for gethostbyname in libresolv and libnsl.
+
+ Should fix build problem on Solaris 2.6 reported by Tom G. Christensen.
+
+commit 5ac712d81a84396aab441a272ec429af5b738302
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 16 10:45:02 2016 +1100
+
+ make existing ssh_malloc_init only for __OpenBSD__
+
+commit 24c9bded569d9f2449ded73f92fb6d12db7a9eec
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 15 23:32:37 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ memleak of algorithm name in mm_answer_sign; reported by
+ Jakub Jelen
+
+ Upstream-ID: ccd742cd25952240ebd23d7d4d6b605862584d08
+
+commit ffb1e7e896139a42ceb78676f637658f44612411
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 15 09:47:49 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Add a function to enable security-related malloc_options.
+ With and ok deraadt@, something similar has been in the snaps for a while.
+
+ Upstream-ID: 43a95523b832b7f3b943d2908662191110c380ed
+
+commit ef39e8c0497ff0564990a4f9e8b7338b3ba3507c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 16 10:34:39 2016 +1100
+
+ sync ssh-copy-id with upstream 783ef08b0a75
+
+commit d2d772f55b19bb0e8d03c2fe1b9bb176d9779efd
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 12 00:20:30 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ avoid fatal() for PKCS11 tokens that present empty key IDs
+ bz#1773, ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 044a764fee526f2c4a9d530bd10695422d01fc54
+
+commit e4c918a6c721410792b287c9fd21356a1bed5805
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 11 02:56:32 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ sync crypto algorithm lists in ssh_config(5) and
+ sshd_config(5) with current reality. bz#2527
+
+ Upstream-ID: d7fd1b6c1ed848d866236bcb1d7049d2bb9b2ff6
+
+commit e30cabfa4ab456a30b3224f7f545f1bdfc4a2517
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 11 02:21:34 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix regression in openssh-6.8 sftp client: existing
+ destination directories would incorrectly terminate recursive uploads;
+ bz#2528
+
+ Upstream-ID: 3306be469f41f26758e3d447987ac6d662623e18
+
+commit 714e367226ded4dc3897078be48b961637350b05
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 9 05:30:04 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ turn off more old crypto in the client: hmac-md5, ripemd,
+ truncated HMACs, RC4, blowfish. ok markus@ dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 96aa11c2c082be45267a690c12f1d2aae6acd46e
+
+commit 5a622844ff7f78dcb75e223399f9ef0977e8d0a3
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 8 23:40:12 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ don't attempt to percent_expand() already-canonicalised
+ addresses, avoiding unnecessary failures when attempting to connect to scoped
+ IPv6 addresses (that naturally contain '%' characters)
+
+ Upstream-ID: f24569cffa1a7cbde5f08dc739a72f4d78aa5c6a
+
+commit 19bcf2ea2d17413f2d9730dd2a19575ff86b9b6a
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 8 10:57:07 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ refactor activation of rekeying
+
+ This makes automatic rekeying internal to the packet code (previously
+ the server and client loops needed to assist). In doing to it makes
+ application of rekey limits more accurate by accounting for packets
+ about to be sent as well as packets queued during rekeying events
+ themselves.
+
+ Based on a patch from dtucker@ which was in turn based on a patch
+ Aleksander Adamowski in bz#2521; ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: a441227fd64f9739850ca97b4cf794202860fcd8
+
+commit 603ba41179e4b53951c7b90ee95b6ef3faa3f15d
+Author: naddy at openbsd.org <naddy at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 5 13:28:19 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Only check errno if read() has returned an error. EOF is
+ not an error. This fixes a problem where the mux master would sporadically
+ fail to notice that the client had exited. ok mikeb@ djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 3c2dadc21fac6ef64665688aac8a75fffd57ae53
+
+commit 56d7dac790693ce420d225119283bc355cff9185
+Author: jsg at openbsd.org <jsg at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 5 04:31:21 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ avoid an uninitialised value when NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+ is 0 ok markus@ djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 11b068d83c2865343aeb46acf1e9eec00f829b6b
+
+commit deae7d52d59c5019c528f977360d87fdda15d20b
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 5 03:07:06 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ mention internal DH-GEX fallback groups; bz#2302
+
+ Upstream-ID: e7b395fcca3122cd825515f45a2e41c9a157e09e
+
+commit cac3b6665f884d46192c0dc98a64112e8b11a766
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 5 02:37:56 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ better description for MaxSessions; bz#2531
+
+ Upstream-ID: e2c0d74ee185cd1a3e9d4ca1f1b939b745b354da
+
+commit 5ef4b0fdcc7a239577a754829b50022b91ab4712
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 27 17:45:56 2016 +1100
+
+ avoid FreeBSD RCS Id in comment
+
+ Change old $FreeBSD version string in comment so it doesn't
+ become an RCS ident downstream; requested by des AT des.no
+
+commit 696d12683c90d20a0a9c5f4275fc916b7011fb04
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 4 23:43:48 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ printf argument casts to avoid warnings on strict
+ compilers
+
+ Upstream-ID: 7b9f6712cef01865ad29070262d366cf13587c9c
+
+commit 5658ef2501e785fbbdf5de2dc33b1ff7a4dca73a
+Author: millert at openbsd.org <millert at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 1 21:18:17 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Avoid ugly "DISPLAY "(null)" invalid; disabling X11
+ forwarding" message when DISPLAY is not set. This could also result in a
+ crash on systems with a printf that doesn't handle NULL. OK djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 20ee0cfbda678a247264c20ed75362042b90b412
+
+commit 537f88ec7bcf40bd444ac5584c707c5588c55c43
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 29 05:18:15 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Add regression test for RekeyLimit parsing of >32bit values
+ (4G and 8G).
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 548390350c62747b6234f522a99c319eee401328
+
+commit 4c6cb8330460f94e6c7ae28a364236d4188156a3
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 29 23:04:46 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Remove leftover roaming dead code. ok djm markus.
+
+ Upstream-ID: 13d1f9c8b65a5109756bcfd3b74df949d53615be
+
+commit 28136471809806d6246ef41e4341467a39fe2f91
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 29 05:46:01 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ include packet type of non-data packets in debug3 output;
+ ok markus dtucker
+
+ Upstream-ID: 034eaf639acc96459b9c5ce782db9fcd8bd02d41
+
+commit 6fd6e28daccafaa35f02741036abe64534c361a1
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 29 03:31:03 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Revert "account for packets buffered but not yet
+ processed" change as it breaks for very small RekeyLimit values due to
+ continuous rekeying. ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 7e03f636cb45ab60db18850236ccf19079182a19
+
+commit 921ff00b0ac429666fb361d2d6cb1c8fff0006cb
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 29 02:54:45 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Allow RekeyLimits in excess of 4G up to 2**63 bits
+ (limited by the return type of scan_scaled). Part of bz#2521, ok djm.
+
+ Upstream-ID: 13bea82be566b9704821b1ea05bf7804335c7979
+
+commit c0060a65296f01d4634f274eee184c0e93ba0f23
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 29 02:42:46 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Account for packets buffered but not yet processed when
+ computing whether or not it is time to perform rekeying. bz#2521, based
+ loosely on a patch from olo at fb.com, ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 67e268b547f990ed220f3cb70a5624d9bda12b8c
+
+commit 44cf930e670488c85c9efeb373fa5f4b455692ac
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 27 06:44:58 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ change old $FreeBSD version string in comment so it doesn't
+ become an RCS ident downstream; requested by des AT des.no
+
+ Upstream-ID: 8ca558c01f184e596b45e4fc8885534b2c864722
+
+commit ebacd377769ac07d1bf3c75169644336056b7060
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 27 00:53:12 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ make the debug messages a bit more useful here
+
+ Upstream-ID: 478ccd4e897e0af8486b294aa63aa3f90ab78d64
+
+commit 458abc2934e82034c5c281336d8dc0f910aecad3
+Author: jsg at openbsd.org <jsg at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 23 05:31:35 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Zero a stack buffer with explicit_bzero() instead of
+ memset() when returning from client_loop() for consistency with
+ buffer_free()/sshbuf_free().
+
+ ok dtucker@ deraadt@ djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: bc9975b2095339811c3b954694d7d15ea5c58f66
+
+commit 65a3c0dacbc7dbb75ddb6a70ebe22d8de084d0b0
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 20 09:22:39 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Include sys/time.h for gettimeofday. From sortie at
+ maxsi.org.
+
+ Upstream-ID: 6ed0c33b836d9de0a664cd091e86523ecaa2fb3b
+
+commit fc77ccdc2ce6d5d06628b8da5048a6a5f6ffca5a
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 14 22:56:56 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fd leaks; report Qualys Security Advisory team; ok
+ deraadt@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 4ec0f12b9d8fa202293c9effa115464185aa071d
+
+commit a306863831c57ec5fad918687cc5d289ee8e2635
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 14 16:17:39 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ remove roaming support; ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 2cab8f4b197bc95776fb1c8dc2859dad0c64dc56
+
+commit 6ef49e83e30688504552ac10875feabd5521565f
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 14 14:34:34 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Disable experimental client-side roaming support. Server
+ side was disabled/gutted for years already, but this aspect was surprisingly
+ forgotten. Thanks for report from Qualys
+
+ Upstream-ID: 2328004b58f431a554d4c1bf67f5407eae3389df
+
+commit 8d7b523b96d3be180572d9d338cedaafc0570f60
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 14 11:08:19 2016 +1100
+
+ bump version numbers
+
+commit 8c3d512a1fac8b9c83b4d0c9c3f2376290bd84ca
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 14 11:04:04 2016 +1100
+
+ openssh-7.1p2
+
+commit e6c85f8889c5c9eb04796fdb76d2807636b9eef5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 15 01:30:36 2016 +1100
+
+ forcibly disable roaming support in the client
+
+commit ed4ce82dbfa8a3a3c8ea6fa0db113c71e234416c
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 13 23:04:47 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ eliminate fallback from untrusted X11 forwarding to trusted
+ forwarding when the X server disables the SECURITY extension; Reported by
+ Thomas Hoger; ok deraadt@
+
+ Upstream-ID: f76195bd2064615a63ef9674a0e4096b0713f938
+
+commit 9a728cc918fad67c8a9a71201088b1e150340ba4
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 12 23:42:54 2016 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ use explicit_bzero() more liberally in the buffer code; ok
+ deraadt
+
+ Upstream-ID: 0ece37069fd66bc6e4f55eb1321f93df372b65bf
+
+commit 4626cbaf78767fc8e9c86dd04785386c59ae0839
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 8 14:24:56 2016 +1100
+
+ Support Illumos/Solaris fine-grained privileges
+
+ Includes a pre-auth privsep sandbox and several pledge()
+ emulations. bz#2511, patch by Alex Wilson.
+
+ ok dtucker@
+
+commit 422d1b3ee977ff4c724b597fb2e437d38fc8de9d
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 31 00:33:52 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix three bugs in KRL code related to (unused) signature
+ support: verification length was being incorrectly calculated, multiple
+ signatures were being incorrectly processed and a NULL dereference that
+ occurred when signatures were verified. Reported by Carl Jackson
+
+ Upstream-ID: e705e97ad3ccce84291eaa651708dd1b9692576b
+
+commit 6074c84bf95d00f29cc7d5d3cd3798737851aa1a
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Dec 30 23:46:14 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ unused prototype
+
+ Upstream-ID: f3eef4389d53ed6c0d5c77dcdcca3060c745da97
+
+commit 6213f0e180e54122bb1ba928e11c784e2b4e5380
+Author: guenther at openbsd.org <guenther at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 26 20:51:35 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Use pread/pwrite instead separate lseek+read/write for
+ lastlog. Cast to off_t before multiplication to avoid truncation on ILP32
+
+ ok kettenis@ mmcc@
+
+ Upstream-ID: fc40092568cd195719ddf1a00aa0742340d616cf
+
+commit d7d2bc95045a43dd56ea696cc1d030ac9d77e81f
+Author: semarie at openbsd.org <semarie at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 26 07:46:03 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ adjust pledge promises for ControlMaster: when using
+ "ask" or "autoask", the process will use ssh-askpass for asking confirmation.
+
+ problem found by halex@
+
+ ok halex@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 38a58b30ae3eef85051c74d3c247216ec0735f80
+
+commit 271df8185d9689b3fb0523f58514481b858f6843
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Dec 13 22:42:23 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ unbreak connections with peers that set
+ first_kex_follows; fix from Matt Johnston va bz#2515
+
+ Upstream-ID: decc88ec4fc7515594fdb42b04aa03189a44184b
+
+commit 43849a47c5f8687699eafbcb5604f6b9c395179f
+Author: doug at openbsd.org <doug at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 11 17:41:37 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Add "id" to ssh-agent pledge for subprocess support.
+
+ Found the hard way by Jan Johansson when using ssh-agent with X. Also,
+ rearranged proc/exec and retval to match other pledge calls in the tree.
+
+ ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 914255f6850e5e7fa830a2de6c38605333b584db
+
+commit 52d7078421844b2f88329f5be3de370b0a938636
+Author: mmcc at openbsd.org <mmcc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 11 04:21:11 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Remove NULL-checks before sshbuf_free().
+
+ ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 5ebed00ed5f9f03b119a345085e8774565466917
+
+commit a4b9e0f4e4a6980a0eb8072f76ea611cab5b77e7
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 11 03:24:25 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ include remote port number in a few more messages; makes
+ tying log messages together into a session a bit easier; bz#2503 ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 9300dc354015f7a7368d94a8ff4a4266a69d237e
+
+commit 6091c362e89079397e68744ae30df121b0a72c07
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 11 03:20:09 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ don't try to load SSHv1 private key when compiled without
+ SSHv1 support. From Iain Morgan bz#2505
+
+ Upstream-ID: 8b8e7b02a448cf5e5635979df2d83028f58868a7
+
+commit cce6a36bb95e81fa8bfb46daf22eabcf13afc352
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 11 03:19:09 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ use SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES consistently as buffer size when
+ reading key files. Increase it to match the size of the buffers already being
+ used.
+
+ Upstream-ID: 1b60586b484b55a947d99a0b32bd25e0ced56fae
+
+commit 89540b6de025b80404a0cb8418c06377f3f98848
+Author: mmcc at openbsd.org <mmcc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 11 02:31:47 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Remove NULL-checks before sshkey_free().
+
+ ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 3e35afe8a25e021216696b5d6cde7f5d2e5e3f52
+
+commit 79394ed6d74572c2d2643d73937dad33727fc240
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 11 02:29:03 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fflush stdout so that output is seen even when running in
+ debug mode when output may otherwise not be flushed. Patch from dustin at
+ null-ptr.net.
+
+ Upstream-ID: b0c6b4cd2cdb01d7e9eefbffdc522e35b5bc4acc
+
+commit ee607cccb6636eb543282ba90e0677b0604d8b7a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Tue Dec 15 15:23:49 2015 +1100
+
+ Increase robustness of redhat/openssh.spec
+
+ - remove configure --with-rsh, because this option isn't supported anymore
+ - replace last occurrence of BuildPreReq by BuildRequires
+ - update grep statement to query the krb5 include directory
+
+ Patch from CarstenGrohmann via github, ok djm.
+
+commit b5fa0cd73555b991a543145603658d7088ec6b60
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Tue Dec 15 15:10:32 2015 +1100
+
+ Allow --without-ssl-engine with --without-openssl
+
+ Patch from Mike Frysinger via github.
+
+commit c1d7e546f6029024f3257cc25c92f2bddf163125
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Tue Dec 15 14:27:09 2015 +1100
+
+ Include openssl crypto.h for SSLeay.
+
+ Patch from doughdemon via github.
+
+commit c6f5f01651526e88c00d988ce59d71f481ebac62
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Tue Dec 15 13:59:12 2015 +1100
+
+ Add sys/time.h for gettimeofday.
+
+ Should allow it it compile with MUSL libc. Based on patch from
+ doughdemon via github.
+
+commit 39736be06c7498ef57d6970f2d85cf066ae57c82
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 11 02:20:28 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ correct error messages; from Tomas Kuthan bz#2507
+
+ Upstream-ID: 7454a0affeab772398052954c79300aa82077093
+
+commit 94141b7ade24afceeb6762a3f99e09e47a6c42b6
+Author: mmcc at openbsd.org <mmcc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 11 00:20:04 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Pass (char *)NULL rather than (char *)0 to execl and
+ execlp.
+
+ ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 56c955106cbddba86c3dd9bbf786ac0d1b361492
+
+commit d59ce08811bf94111c2f442184cf7d1257ffae24
+Author: mmcc at openbsd.org <mmcc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 10 17:08:40 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Remove NULL-checks before free().
+
+ ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: e3d3cb1ce900179906af36517b5eea0fb15e6ef8
+
+commit 8e56dd46cb37879c73bce2d6032cf5e7f82d5a71
+Author: mmcc at openbsd.org <mmcc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 10 07:01:35 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Fix a couple "the the" typos. ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: ec364c5af32031f013001fd28d1bd3dfacfe9a72
+
+commit 6262a0522ddc2c0f2e9358dcb68d59b46e9c533e
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 7 20:04:09 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ stricter encoding type checks for ssh-rsa; ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 8cca7c787599a5e8391e184d0b4f36fdc3665650
+
+commit d86a3ba7af160c13496102aed861ae48a4297072
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Dec 9 09:18:45 2015 +1100
+
+ Don't set IPV6_V6ONLY on OpenBSD
+
+ It isn't necessary and runs afoul of pledge(2) restrictions.
+
+commit da98c11d03d819a15429d8fff9688acd7505439f
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 7 02:20:46 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ basic unit tests for rsa-sha2-* signature types
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 7dc4b9db809d578ff104d591b4d86560c3598d3c
+
+commit 3da893fdec9936dd2c23739cdb3c0c9d4c59fca0
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 5 20:53:21 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ prefer rsa-sha2-512 over -256 for hostkeys, too; noticed
+ by naddy@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 685f55f7ec566a8caca587750672723a0faf3ffe
+
+commit 8b56e59714d87181505e4678f0d6d39955caf10e
+Author: tobias at openbsd.org <tobias at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 4 21:51:06 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Properly handle invalid %-format by calling fatal.
+
+ ok deraadt, djm
+
+ Upstream-ID: 5692bce7d9f6eaa9c488cb93d3b55e758bef1eac
+
+commit 76c9fbbe35aabc1db977fb78e827644345e9442e
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 4 16:41:28 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ implement SHA2-{256,512} for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signatures
+ (user and host auth) based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and
+ draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt; with & ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: cf82ce532b2733e5c4b34bb7b7c94835632db309
+
+commit 6064a8b8295cb5a17b5ebcfade53053377714f40
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 4 00:24:55 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ clean up agent_fd handling; properly initialise it to -1
+ and make tests consistent
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: ac9554323d5065745caf17b5e37cb0f0d4825707
+
+commit b91926a97620f3e51761c271ba57aa5db790f48d
+Author: semarie at openbsd.org <semarie at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 3 17:00:18 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ pledges ssh client: - mux client: which is used when
+ ControlMaster is in use. will end with "stdio proc tty" (proc is to
+ permit sending SIGWINCH to mux master on window resize)
+
+ - client loop: several levels of pledging depending of your used options
+
+ ok deraadt@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 21676155a700e51f2ce911e33538e92a2cd1d94b
+
+commit bcce47466bbc974636f588b5e4a9a18ae386f64a
+Author: doug at openbsd.org <doug at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Dec 2 08:30:50 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Add "cpath" to the ssh-agent pledge so the cleanup
+ handler can unlink().
+
+ ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 9e632991d48241d56db645602d381253a3d8c29d
+
+commit a90d001543f46716b6590c6dcc681d5f5322f8cf
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Dec 2 08:00:58 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ ssh-agent pledge needs proc for askpass; spotted by todd@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 349aa261b29cc0e7de47ef56167769c432630b2a
+
+commit d952162b3c158a8f23220587bb6c8fcda75da551
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Dec 1 23:29:24 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ basic pledge() for ssh-agent, more refinement needed
+
+ Upstream-ID: 5b5b03c88162fce549e45e1b6dd833f20bbb5e13
+
+commit f0191d7c8e76e30551084b79341886d9bb38e453
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 30 10:53:25 2015 +1100
+
+ Revert "stub for pledge(2) for systems that lack it"
+
+ This reverts commit 14c887c8393adde2d9fd437d498be30f8c98535c.
+
+ dtucker beat me to it :/
+
+commit 6283cc72eb0e49a3470d30e07ca99a1ba9e89676
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 30 10:37:03 2015 +1100
+
+ revert 7d4c7513: bring back S/Key prototypes
+
+ (but leave RCSID changes)
+
+commit 14c887c8393adde2d9fd437d498be30f8c98535c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 30 09:45:29 2015 +1100
+
+ stub for pledge(2) for systems that lack it
+
+commit 452c0b6af5d14c37553e30059bf74456012493f3
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Nov 29 22:18:37 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ pledge, better fatal() messages; feedback deraadt@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 3e00f6ccfe2b9a7a2d1dbba5409586180801488f
+
+commit 6da413c085dba37127687b2617a415602505729b
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Nov 28 06:50:52 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ do not leak temp file if there is no known_hosts file
+ from craig leres, ok djm
+
+ Upstream-ID: c820497fd5574844c782e79405c55860f170e426
+
+commit 3ddd15e1b63a4d4f06c8ab16fbdd8a5a61764f16
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Mon Nov 30 07:23:53 2015 +1100
+
+ Add a null implementation of pledge.
+
+ Fixes builds on almost everything.
+
+commit b1d6b3971ef256a08692efc409fc9ada719111cc
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Nov 28 06:41:03 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ don't include port number in tcpip-forward replies for
+ requests that don't allocate a port; bz#2509 diagnosed by Ron Frederick ok
+ markus
+
+ Upstream-ID: 77efad818addb61ec638b5a2362f1554e21a970a
+
+commit 9080bd0b9cf10d0f13b1f642f20cb84285cb8d65
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 27 00:49:31 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ pledge "stdio rpath wpath cpath fattr tty proc exec"
+ except for the -p option (which sadly has insane semantics...) ok semarie
+ dtucker
+
+ Upstream-ID: 8854bbd58279abe00f6c33f8094bdc02c8c65059
+
+commit 4d90625b229cf6b3551d81550a9861897509a65f
+Author: halex at openbsd.org <halex at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 20 23:04:01 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ allow comment change for all supported formats
+
+ ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 5fc477cf2f119b2d44aa9c683af16cb00bb3744b
+
+commit 8ca915fc761519dd1f7766a550ec597a81db5646
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 20 01:45:29 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add cast to make -Werror clean
+
+ Upstream-ID: 288db4f8f810bd475be01320c198250a04ff064d
+
+commit ac9473580dcd401f8281305af98635cdaae9bf96
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 20 12:35:41 2015 +1100
+
+ fix multiple authentication using S/Key w/ privsep
+
+ bz#2502, patch from Kevin Korb and feandil_
+
+commit 88b6fcdeb87a2fb76767854d9eb15006662dca57
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 19 08:23:27 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ ban ConnectionAttempts=0, it makes no sense and would cause
+ ssh_connect_direct() to print an uninitialised stack variable; bz#2500
+ reported by dvw AT phas.ubc.ca
+
+ Upstream-ID: 32b5134c608270583a90b93a07b3feb3cbd5f7d5
+
+commit 964ab3ee7a8f96bdbc963d5b5a91933d6045ebe7
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 19 01:12:32 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ trailing whitespace
+
+ Upstream-ID: 31fe0ad7c4d08e87f1d69c79372f5e3c5cd79051
+
+commit f96516d052dbe38561f6b92b0e4365d8e24bb686
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 19 01:09:38 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ print host certificate contents at debug level
+
+ Upstream-ID: 39354cdd8a2b32b308fd03f98645f877f540f00d
+
+commit 499cf36fecd6040e30e2912dd25655bc574739a7
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 19 01:08:55 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ move the certificate validity formatting code to
+ sshkey.[ch]
+
+ Upstream-ID: f05f7c78fab20d02ff1d5ceeda533ef52e8fe523
+
+commit bcb7bc77bbb1535d1008c7714085556f3065d99d
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 18 08:37:28 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix "ssh-keygen -l" of private key, broken in support for
+ multiple plain keys on stdin
+
+ Upstream-ID: 6b3132d2c62d03d0bad6f2bcd7e2d8b7dab5cd9d
+
+commit 259adb6179e23195c8f6913635ea71040d1ccd63
+Author: millert at openbsd.org <millert at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 16 23:47:52 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Replace remaining calls to index(3) with strchr(3). OK
+ jca@ krw@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 33837d767a0cf1db1489b96055f9e330bc0bab6d
+
+commit c56a255162c2166884539c0a1f7511575325b477
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 16 22:53:07 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Allow fingerprinting from standard input "ssh-keygen -lf
+ -"
+
+ Support fingerprinting multiple plain keys in a file and authorized_keys
+ files too (bz#1319)
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 903f8b4502929d6ccf53509e4e07eae084574b77
+
+commit 5b4010d9b923cf1b46c9c7b1887c013c2967e204
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 16 22:51:05 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ always call privsep_preauth_child() regardless of whether
+ sshd was started by root; it does important priming before sandboxing and
+ failing to call it could result in sandbox violations later; ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: c8a6d0d56c42f3faab38460dc917ca0d1705d383
+
+commit 3a9f84b58b0534bbb485f1eeab75665e2d03371f
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 16 22:50:01 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ improve sshkey_read() semantics; only update *cpp when a
+ key is successfully read; ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: f371e78e8f4fab366cf69a42bdecedaed5d1b089
+
+commit db6f8dc5dd5655b59368efd074994d4568bc3556
+Author: logan at openbsd.org <logan at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 16 06:13:04 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ 1) Use xcalloc() instead of xmalloc() to check for
+ potential overflow. (Feedback from both mmcc@ and djm@) 2) move set_size
+ just before the for loop. (suggested by djm@)
+
+ OK djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 013534c308187284756c3141f11d2c0f33c47213
+
+commit 383f10fb84a0fee3c01f9d97594f3e22aa3cd5e0
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 16 00:30:02 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Add a new authorized_keys option "restrict" that
+ includes all current and future key restrictions (no-*-forwarding, etc). Also
+ add permissive versions of the existing restrictions, e.g. "no-pty" -> "pty".
+ This simplifies the task of setting up restricted keys and ensures they are
+ maximally-restricted, regardless of any permissions we might implement in the
+ future.
+
+ Example:
+
+ restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1...
+
+ Idea from Jann Horn; ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 04ceb9d448e46e67e13887a7ae5ea45b4f1719d0
+
+commit e41a071f7bda6af1fb3f081bed0151235fa61f15
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Nov 15 23:58:04 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ correct section number for ssh-agent;
+
+ Upstream-ID: 44be72fd8bcc167635c49b357b1beea8d5674bd6
+
+commit 1a11670286acddcc19f5eff0966c380831fc4638
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Nov 15 23:54:15 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ do not confuse mandoc by presenting "Dd";
+
+ Upstream-ID: 1470fce171c47b60bbc7ecd0fc717a442c2cfe65
+
+commit f361df474c49a097bfcf16d1b7b5c36fcd844b4b
+Author: jcs at openbsd.org <jcs at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Nov 15 22:26:49 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Add an AddKeysToAgent client option which can be set to
+ 'yes', 'no', 'ask', or 'confirm', and defaults to 'no'. When enabled, a
+ private key that is used during authentication will be added to ssh-agent if
+ it is running (with confirmation enabled if set to 'confirm').
+
+ Initial version from Joachim Schipper many years ago.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: a680db2248e8064ec55f8be72d539458c987d5f4
+
+commit d87063d9baf5479b6e813d47dfb694a97df6f6f5
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 13 04:39:35 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ send SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED replies to unexpected
+ messages during KEX; bz#2949, ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 2b3abdff344d53c8d505f45c83a7b12e84935786
+
+commit 9fd04681a1e9b0af21e08ff82eb674cf0a499bfc
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 13 04:38:06 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Support "none" as an argument for sshd_config
+ ForceCommand and ChrootDirectory. Useful inside Match blocks to override a
+ global default. bz#2486 ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 7ef478d6592bc7db5c7376fc33b4443e63dccfa5
+
+commit 94bc0b72c29e511cbbc5772190d43282e5acfdfe
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 13 04:34:15 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ support multiple certificates (one per line) and
+ reading from standard input (using "-f -") for "ssh-keygen -L"; ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: ecbadeeef3926e5be6281689b7250a32a80e88db
+
+commit b6b9108f5b561c83612cb97ece4134eb59fde071
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 13 02:57:46 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ list a couple more options usable in Match blocks;
+ bz#2489
+
+ Upstream-ID: e4d03f39d254db4c0cc54101921bb89fbda19879
+
+commit a7994b3f5a5a5a33b52b0a6065d08e888f0a99fb
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 11 04:56:39 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ improve PEEK/POKE macros: better casts, don't multiply
+ evaluate arguments; ok deraadt@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 9a1889e19647615ededbbabab89064843ba92d3e
+
+commit 7d4c7513a7f209cb303a608ac6e46b3f1dfc11ec
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 11 01:48:01 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ remove prototypes for long-gone s/key support; ok
+ dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: db5bed3c57118af986490ab23d399df807359a79
+
+commit 07889c75926c040b8e095949c724e66af26441cb
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Nov 14 18:44:49 2015 +1100
+
+ read back from libcrypto RAND when privdropping
+
+ makes certain libcrypto implementations cache a /dev/urandom fd
+ in preparation of sandboxing. Based on patch by Greg Hartman.
+
+commit 1560596f44c01bb0cef977816410950ed17b8ecd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Tue Nov 10 11:14:47 2015 +1100
+
+ Fix compiler warnings in the openssl header check.
+
+ Noted by Austin English.
+
+commit e72a8575ffe1d8adff42c9abe9ca36938acc036b
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Nov 8 23:24:03 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ -c before -H, in SYNOPSIS and usage();
+
+ Upstream-ID: 25e8c58a69e1f37fcd54ac2cd1699370acb5e404
+
+commit 3a424cdd21db08c7b0ded902f97b8f02af5aa485
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Nov 8 22:30:20 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Add "ssh-keyscan -c ..." flag to allow fetching
+ certificates instead of plain keys; ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 0947e2177dba92339eced9e49d3c5bf7dda69f82
+
+commit 69fead5d7cdaa73bdece9fcba80f8e8e70b90346
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Nov 8 22:08:38 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ remove slogin links; ok deraadt markus djm
+
+ Upstream-ID: 39ba08548acde4c54f2d4520c202c2a863a3c730
+
+commit 2fecfd486bdba9f51b3a789277bb0733ca36e1c0
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Nov 8 21:59:11 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix OOB read in packet code caused by missing return
+ statement found by Ben Hawkes; ok markus@ deraadt@
+
+ Upstream-ID: a3e3a85434ebfa0690d4879091959591f30efc62
+
+commit 5e288923a303ca672b686908320bc5368ebec6e6
+Author: mmcc at openbsd.org <mmcc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 6 00:31:41 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ 1. rlogin and rsh are long gone 2. protocol version isn't
+ of core relevance here, and v1 is going away
+
+ ok markus@, deraadt@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 8b46bc94cf1ca7c8c1a75b1c958b2bb38d7579c8
+
+commit 8b29008bbe97f33381d9b4b93fcfa304168d0286
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 5 09:48:05 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ "commandline" -> "command line", since there are so few
+ examples of the former in the pages, so many of the latter, and in some of
+ these pages we had multiple spellings;
+
+ prompted by tj
+
+ Upstream-ID: 78459d59bff74223f8139d9001ccd56fc4310659
+
+commit 996b24cebf20077fbe5db07b3a2c20c2d9db736e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Thu Oct 29 20:57:34 2015 +1100
+
+ (re)wrap SYS_sendsyslog in ifdef.
+
+ Replace ifdef that went missing in commit
+ c61b42f2678f21f05653ac2d3d241b48ab5d59ac. Fixes build on older
+ OpenBSDs.
+
+commit b67e2e76fcf1ae7c802eb27ca927e16c91a513ff
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 29 08:05:17 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ regress test for "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +..." inside a
+ Match block
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 246c37ed64a2e5704d4c158ccdca1ff700e10647
+
+commit abd9dbc3c0d8c8c7561347cfa22166156e78c077
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Oct 26 02:50:58 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Fix typo certopt->certopts in shell variable. This would
+ cause the test to hang at a host key prompt if you have an A or CNAME for
+ "proxy" in your local domain.
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 6ea03bcd39443a83c89e2c5606392ceb9585836a
+
+commit ed08510d38aef930a061ae30d10f2a9cf233bafa
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 29 08:05:01 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Fix "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +..." inside a Match block;
+ ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 853662c4036730b966aab77684390c47b9738c69
+
+commit a4aef3ed29071719b2af82fdf1ac3c2514f82bc5
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 27 08:54:52 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix execv arguments in a way less likely to cause grief
+ for -portable; ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 5902bf0ea0371f39f1300698dc3b8e4105fc0fc5
+
+commit 63d188175accea83305e89fafa011136ff3d96ad
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 27 01:44:45 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ log certificate serial in verbose() messages to match the
+ main auth success/fail message; ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: dfc48b417c320b97c36ff351d303c142f2186288
+
+commit 2aaba0cfd560ecfe92aa50c00750e6143842cf1f
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 27 00:49:53 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ avoid de-const warning & shrink; ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 69a85ef94832378952a22c172009cbf52aaa11db
+
+commit 03239c18312b9bab7d1c3b03062c61e8bbc1ca6e
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Oct 25 23:42:00 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Expand tildes in filenames passed to -i before checking
+ whether or not the identity file exists. This means that if the shell
+ doesn't do the expansion (eg because the option and filename were given as a
+ single argument) then we'll still add the key. bz#2481, ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: db1757178a14ac519e9a3e1a2dbd21113cb3bfc6
+
+commit 97e184e508dd33c37860c732c0eca3fc57698b40
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Oct 25 23:14:03 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Do not prepend "exec" to the shell command run by "Match
+ exec" in a config file. It's an unnecessary optimization from repurposed
+ ProxyCommand code and prevents some things working with some shells.
+ bz#2471, pointed out by res at qoxp.net. ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: a1ead25ae336bfa15fb58d8c6b5589f85b4c33a3
+
+commit 8db134e7f457bcb069ec72bc4ee722e2af557c69
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Thu Oct 29 10:48:23 2015 +1100
+
+ Prevent name collisions with system glob (bz#2463)
+
+ Move glob.h from includes.h to the only caller (sftp) and override the
+ names for the symbols. This prevents name collisions with the system glob
+ in the case where something other than ssh uses it (eg kerberos). With
+ jjelen at redhat.com, ok djm@
+
+commit 86c10dbbef6a5800d2431a66cf7f41a954bb62b5
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 23 02:22:01 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Update expected group sizes to match recent code changes.
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 0004f0ea93428969fe75bcfff0d521c553977794
+
+commit 9ada37d36003a77902e90a3214981e417457cf13
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Oct 24 22:56:19 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix keyscan output for multiple hosts/addrs on one line
+ when host hashing or a non standard port is in use; bz#2479 ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 5321dabfaeceba343da3c8a8b5754c6f4a0a307b
+
+commit 44fc7cd7dcef6c52c6b7e9ff830dfa32879bd319
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Oct 24 22:52:22 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ skip "Could not chdir to home directory" message when
+ chrooted
+
+ patch from Christian Hesse in bz#2485 ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 86783c1953da426dff5b03b03ce46e699d9e5431
+
+commit a820a8618ec44735dabc688fab96fba38ad66bb2
+Author: sthen at openbsd.org <sthen at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Oct 24 08:34:09 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Handle the split of tun(4) "link0" into tap(4) in ssh
+ tun-forwarding. Adapted from portable (using separate devices for this is the
+ normal case in most OS). ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 90facf4c59ce73d6741db1bc926e578ef465cd39
+
+commit 66d2e229baa9fe57b868c373b05f7ff3bb20055b
+Author: gsoares at openbsd.org <gsoares at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 21 11:33:03 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix memory leak in error path ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: dd2f402b0a0029b755df029fc7f0679e1365ce35
+
+commit 7d6c0362039ceacdc1366b5df29ad5d2693c13e5
+Author: mmcc at openbsd.org <mmcc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 20 23:24:25 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Compare pointers to NULL rather than 0.
+
+ ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 21616cfea27eda65a06e772cc887530b9a1a27f8
+
+commit f98a09cacff7baad8748c9aa217afd155a4d493f
+Author: mmcc at openbsd.org <mmcc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 20 03:36:35 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Replace a function-local allocation with stack memory.
+
+ ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: c09fbbab637053a2ab9f33ca142b4e20a4c5a17e
+
+commit ac908c1eeacccfa85659594d92428659320fd57e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 22 09:35:24 2015 +1100
+
+ turn off PrintLastLog when --disable-lastlog
+
+ bz#2278 from Brent Paulson
+
+commit b56deb847f4a0115a8bf488bf6ee8524658162fd
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 16 22:32:22 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ increase the minimum modulus that we will send or accept in
+ diffie-hellman-group-exchange to 2048 bits; ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 06dce7a24c17b999a0f5fadfe95de1ed6a1a9b6a
+
+commit 5ee0063f024bf5b3f3ffb275b8cd20055d62b4b9
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 16 18:40:49 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ better handle anchored FQDNs (e.g. 'cvs.openbsd.org.') in
+ hostname canonicalisation - treat them as already canonical and remove the
+ trailing '.' before matching ssh_config; ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: f7619652e074ac3febe8363f19622aa4853b679a
+
+commit e92c499a75477ecfe94dd7b4aed89f20b1fac5a7
+Author: mmcc at openbsd.org <mmcc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 16 17:07:24 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ 0 -> NULL when comparing with a char*.
+
+ ok dtucker@, djm at .
+
+ Upstream-ID: a928e9c21c0a9020727d99738ff64027c1272300
+
+commit b1d38a3cc6fe349feb8d16a5f520ef12d1de7cb2
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 15 23:51:40 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix some signed/unsigned integer type mismatches in
+ format strings; reported by Nicholas Lemonias
+
+ Upstream-ID: 78cd55420a0eef68c4095bdfddd1af84afe5f95c
+
+commit 1a2663a15d356bb188196b6414b4c50dc12fd42b
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 15 23:08:23 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ argument to sshkey_from_private() and sshkey_demote()
+ can't be NULL
+
+ Upstream-ID: 0111245b1641d387977a9b38da15916820a5fd1f
+
+commit 0f754e29dd3760fc0b172c1220f18b753fb0957e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 16 10:53:14 2015 +1100
+
+ need va_copy before va_start
+
+ reported by Nicholas Lemonias
+
+commit eb6c50d82aa1f0d3fc95f5630ea69761e918bfcd
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 15 15:48:28 2015 -0700
+
+ fix compilation on systems without SYMLOOP_MAX
+
+commit fafe1d84a210fb3dae7744f268059cc583db8c12
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 14 09:22:15 2015 -0700
+
+ s/SANDBOX_TAME/SANDBOX_PLEDGE/g
+
+commit 8f22911027ff6c17d7226d232ccd20727f389310
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 14 08:28:19 2015 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ revision 1.20
+ date: 2015/10/13 20:55:37; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +2 -2; commitid: X39sl5ay1czgFIgp;
+ In rev 1.15 the sizeof argument was fixed in a strlcat() call but
+ the truncation check immediately following it was not updated to
+ match. Not an issue in practice since the buffers are the same
+ size. OK deraadt@
+
+commit 23fa695bb735f54f04d46123662609edb6c76767
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 14 08:27:51 2015 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ revision 1.19
+ date: 2015/01/16 16:48:51; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +3 -3; commitid: 0DYulI8hhujBHMcR;
+ Move to the <limits.h> universe.
+ review by millert, binary checking process with doug, concept with guenther
+
+commit c71be375a69af00c2d0a0c24d8752bec12d8fd1b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 14 08:27:08 2015 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ revision 1.18
+ date: 2014/10/19 03:56:28; author: doug; state: Exp; lines: +9 -9; commitid: U6QxmtbXrGoc02S5;
+ Revert last commit due to changed semantics found by make release.
+
+commit c39ad23b06e9aecc3ff788e92f787a08472905b1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 14 08:26:24 2015 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ revision 1.17
+ date: 2014/10/18 20:43:52; author: doug; state: Exp; lines: +10 -10; commitid: I74hI1tVZtsspKEt;
+ Better POSIX compliance in realpath(3).
+
+ millert@ made changes to realpath.c based on FreeBSD's version. I merged
+ Todd's changes into dl_realpath.c.
+
+ ok millert@, guenther@
+
+commit e929a43f957dbd1254aca2aaf85c8c00cbfc25f4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 14 08:25:55 2015 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ revision 1.16
+ date: 2013/04/05 12:59:54; author: kurt; state: Exp; lines: +3 -1;
+ - Add comments regarding copies of these files also in libexec/ld.so
+ okay guenther@
+
+commit 5225db68e58a1048cb17f0e36e0d33bc4a8fc410
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 14 08:25:32 2015 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ revision 1.15
+ date: 2012/09/13 15:39:05; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +2 -2;
+ specify the bounds of the dst to strlcat (both values were static and
+ equal, but it is more correct)
+ from Michal Mazurek
+
+commit 7365fe5b4859de2305e40ea132da3823830fa710
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 14 08:25:09 2015 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ revision 1.14
+ date: 2011/07/24 21:03:00; author: miod; state: Exp; lines: +35 -13;
+ Recent Single Unix will malloc memory if the second argument of realpath()
+ is NULL, and third-party software is starting to rely upon this.
+ Adapted from FreeBSD via Jona Joachim (jaj ; hcl-club , .lu), with minor
+ tweaks from nicm@ and yours truly.
+
+commit e679c09cd1951f963793aa3d9748d1c3fdcf808f
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 13 16:15:21 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ apply PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes filtering earlier, so all
+ skipped keys are noted before pubkey authentication starts. ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: ba4f52f54268a421a2a5f98bb375403f4cb044b8
+
+commit 179c353f564ec7ada64b87730b25fb41107babd7
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 13 00:21:27 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ free the correct IV length, don't assume it's always the
+ cipher blocksize; ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: c260d9e5ec73628d9ff4b067fbb060eff5a7d298
+
+commit 2539dce2a049a8f6bb0d44cac51f07ad48e691d3
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 9 01:37:08 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Change all tame callers to namechange to pledge(2).
+
+ Upstream-ID: 17e654fc27ceaf523c60f4ffd9ec7ae4e7efc7f2
+
+commit 9846a2f4067383bb76b4e31a9d2303e0a9c13a73
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 8 04:30:48 2015 +1100
+
+ hook tame(2) sandbox up to build
+
+ OpenBSD only for now
+
+commit 0c46bbe68b70bdf0d6d20588e5847e71f3739fe6
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 7 15:59:12 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ include PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes in ssh -G config dump
+
+ Upstream-ID: 6c097ce6ffebf6fe393fb7988b5d152a5d6b36bb
+
+commit bdcb73fb7641b1cf73c0065d1a0dd57b1e8b778e
+Author: sobrado at openbsd.org <sobrado at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 7 14:45:30 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ UsePrivilegeSeparation defaults to sandbox now.
+
+ ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: bff136c38bcae89df82e044d2f42de21e1ad914f
+
+commit 2905d6f99c837bb699b6ebc61711b19acd030709
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 7 00:54:06 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ don't try to change tun device flags if they are already
+ what we need; makes it possible to use tun/tap networking as non- root user
+ if device permissions and interface flags are pre-established; based on patch
+ by Ossi Herrala
+
+ Upstream-ID: 89099ac4634cd477b066865acf54cb230780fd21
+
+commit 0dc74512bdb105b048883f07de538b37e5e024d4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Oct 5 18:33:05 2015 -0700
+
+ unbreak merge botch
+
+commit fdd020e86439afa7f537e2429d29d4b744c94331
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 6 01:20:59 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ adapt to recent sshkey_parse_private_fileblob() API
+ change
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 5c0d818da511e33e0abf6a92a31bd7163b7ad988
+
+commit 21ae8ee3b630b0925f973db647a1b9aa5fcdd4c5
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 24 07:15:39 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix command-line option to match what was actually
+ committed
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 3e8c24a2044e8afd37e7ce17b69002ca817ac699
+
+commit e14ac43b75e68f1ffbd3e1a5e44143c8ae578dcd
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 24 06:16:53 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ regress test for CertificateFile; patch from Meghana Bhat
+ via bz#2436
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: e7a6e980cbe0f8081ba2e83de40d06c17be8bd25
+
+commit 905b054ed24e0d5b4ef226ebf2c8bfc02ae6d4ad
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Oct 5 17:11:21 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ some more bzero->explicit_bzero, from Michael McConville
+
+ Upstream-ID: 17f19545685c33327db2efdc357c1c9225ff00d0
+
+commit b007159a0acdbcf65814b3ee05dbe2cf4ea46011
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 2 15:52:55 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix email
+
+ Upstream-ID: 72150f2d54b94de14ebef1ea054ef974281bf834
+
+commit b19e1b4ab11884c4f62aee9f8ab53127a4732658
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 2 01:39:52 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ a sandbox using tame ok djm
+
+ Upstream-ID: 4ca24e47895e72f5daaa02f3e3d3e5ca2d820fa3
+
+commit c61b42f2678f21f05653ac2d3d241b48ab5d59ac
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 2 01:39:26 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ re-order system calls in order of risk, ok i'll be
+ honest, ordered this way they look like tame... ok djm
+
+ Upstream-ID: 42a1e6d251fd8be13c8262bee026059ae6328813
+
+commit c5f7c0843cb6e6074a93c8ac34e49ce33a6f5546
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 25 18:19:54 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ some certificatefile tweaks; ok djm
+
+ Upstream-ID: 0e5a7852c28c05fc193419cc7e50e64c1c535af0
+
+commit 4e44a79a07d4b88b6a4e5e8c1bed5f58c841b1b8
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 24 06:15:11 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add ssh_config CertificateFile option to explicitly list
+ a certificate; patch from Meghana Bhat on bz#2436; ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 58648ec53c510b41c1f46d8fe293aadc87229ab8
+
+commit e3cbb06ade83c72b640a53728d362bbefa0008e2
+Author: sobrado at openbsd.org <sobrado at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 22 08:33:23 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix two typos.
+
+ Upstream-ID: 424402c0d8863a11b51749bacd7f8d932083b709
+
+commit 8408218c1ca88cb17d15278174a24a94a6f65fe1
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Sep 21 04:31:00 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix possible hang on closed output; bz#2469 reported by Tomas
+ Kuthan ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: f7afd41810f8540f524284f1be6b970859f94fe3
+
+commit 0097248f90a00865082e8c146b905a6555cc146f
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 11 04:55:01 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ skip if running as root; many systems (inc OpenBSD) allow
+ root to ptrace arbitrary processes
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: be2b925df89360dff36f972951fa0fa793769038
+
+commit 9c06c814aff925e11a5cc592c06929c258a014f6
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 11 03:44:21 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ try all supported key types here; bz#2455 reported by
+ Jakub Jelen
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 188cb7d9031cdbac3a0fa58b428b8fa2b2482bba
+
+commit 3c019a936b43f3e2773f3edbde7c114d73caaa4c
+Author: tim at openbsd.org <tim at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Sep 13 14:39:16 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ - Fix error message: passphrase needs to be at least 5
+ characters, not 4. - Remove unused function argument. - Remove two
+ unnecessary variables.
+
+ OK djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 13010c05bfa8b523da1c0dc19e81dd180662bc30
+
+commit 2681cdb6e0de7c1af549dac37a9531af202b4434
+Author: tim at openbsd.org <tim at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Sep 13 13:48:19 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ When adding keys to the agent, don't ignore the comment
+ of keys for which the user is prompted for a passphrase.
+
+ Tweak and OK djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: dc737c620a5a8d282cc4f66e3b9b624e9abefbec
+
+commit 14692f7b8251cdda847e648a82735eef8a4d2a33
+Author: guenther at openbsd.org <guenther at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 11 08:50:04 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Use explicit_bzero() when zeroing before free()
+
+ from Michael McConville (mmcconv1 (at) sccs.swarthmore.edu)
+ ok millert@ djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 2e3337db046c3fe70c7369ee31515ac73ec00f50
+
+commit 846f6fa4cfa8483a9195971dbdd162220f199d85
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 11 06:55:46 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ sync -Q in usage() to SYNOPSIS; since it's drastically
+ shorter, i've reformatted the block to sync with the man (80 cols) and saved
+ a line;
+
+ Upstream-ID: 86e2c65c3989a0777a6258a77e589b9f6f354abd
+
+commit 95923e0520a8647417ee6dcdff44694703dfeef0
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 11 06:51:39 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ tweak previous;
+
+ Upstream-ID: f29b3cfcfd9aa31fa140c393e7bd48c1c74139d6
+
+commit 86ac462f833b05d8ed9de9c50ccb295d7faa79ff
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 11 05:27:02 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Update usage to match man page.
+
+ Upstream-ID: 9e85aefaecfb6aaf34c7cfd0700cd21783a35675
+
+commit 674b3b68c1d36b2562324927cd03857b565e05e8
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 11 03:47:28 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ expand %i in ControlPath to UID; bz#2449
+
+ patch from Christian Hesse w/ feedback from dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 2ba8d303e555a84e2f2165ab4b324b41e80ab925
+
+commit c0f55db7ee00c8202b05cb4b9ad4ce72cc45df41
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 11 03:42:32 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ mention -Q key-plain and -Q key-cert; bz#2455 pointed out
+ by Jakub Jelen
+
+ Upstream-ID: c8f1f8169332e4fa73ac96b0043e3b84e01d4896
+
+commit cfffbdb10fdf0f02d3f4232232eef7ec3876c383
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Mon Sep 14 16:24:21 2015 +1000
+
+ Use ssh-keygen -A when generating host keys.
+
+ Use ssh-keygen -A instead of per-keytype invocations when generating host
+ keys. Add tests when doing host-key-force since we can't use ssh-keygen -A
+ since it can't specify alternate locations. bz#2459, ok djm@
+
+commit 366bada1e9e124654aac55b72b6ccf878755b0dc
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Fri Sep 11 13:29:22 2015 +1000
+
+ Correct default value for --with-ssh1.
+
+ bz#2457, from konto-mindrot.org at walimnieto.com.
+
+commit 2bca8a43e7dd9b04d7070824ffebb823c72587b2
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 11 03:13:36 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ more clarity on what AuthorizedKeysFile=none does; based
+ on diff by Thiebaud Weksteen
+
+ Upstream-ID: 78ab87f069080f0cc3bc353bb04eddd9e8ad3704
+
+commit 61942ea4a01e6db4fdf37ad61de81312ffe310e9
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 9 00:52:44 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ openssh_RSA_verify return type is int, so don't make it
+ size_t within the function itself with only negative numbers or zero assigned
+ to it. bz#2460
+
+ Upstream-ID: b6e794b0c7fc4f9f329509263c8668d35f83ea55
+
+commit 4f7cc2f8cc861a21e6dbd7f6c25652afb38b9b96
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 4 08:21:47 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Plug minor memory leaks when options are used more than
+ once. bz#2182, patch from Tiago Cunha, ok deraadt djm
+
+ Upstream-ID: 5b84d0401e27fe1614c10997010cc55933adb48e
+
+commit 7ad8b287c8453a3e61dbc0d34d467632b8b06fc8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Fri Sep 11 13:11:02 2015 +1000
+
+ Force resolution of _res for correct detection.
+
+ bz#2259, from sconeu at yahoo.com.
+
+commit 26ad18247213ff72b4438abe7fc660c958810fa2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 10 10:57:41 2015 +1000
+
+ allow getrandom syscall; from Felix von Leitner
+
+commit 5245bc1e6b129a10a928f73f11c3aa32656c44b4
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 4 06:40:45 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ full stop belongs outside the brackets, not inside;
+
+ Upstream-ID: 99d098287767799ac33d2442a05b5053fa5a551a
+
+commit a85768a9321d74b41219eeb3c9be9f1702cbf6a5
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 4 04:56:09 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add a debug2() right before DNS resolution; it's a place
+ where ssh could previously silently hang for a while. bz#2433
+
+ Upstream-ID: 52a1a3e0748db66518e7598352c427145692a6a0
+
+commit 46152af8d27aa34d5d26ed1c371dc8aa142d4730
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 4 04:55:24 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ correct function name in error messages
+
+ Upstream-ID: 92fb2798617ad9561370897f4ab60adef2ff4c0e
+
+commit a954cdb799a4d83c2d40fbf3e7b9f187fbfd72fc
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 4 04:47:50 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ better document ExitOnForwardFailure; bz#2444, ok
+ dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: a126209b5a6d9cb3117ac7ab5bc63d284538bfc2
+
+commit f54d8ac2474b6fc3afa081cf759b48a6c89d3319
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 4 04:44:08 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ don't record hostbased authentication hostkeys as user
+ keys in test for multiple authentication with the same key
+
+ Upstream-ID: 26b368fa2cff481f47f37e01b8da1ae5b57b1adc
+
+commit ac3451dd65f27ecf85dc045c46d49e2bbcb8dddd
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 4 03:57:38 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ remove extra newline in nethack-mode hostkey; from
+ Christian Hesse bz#2686
+
+ Upstream-ID: 4f56368b1cc47baeea0531912186f66007fd5b92
+
+commit 9e3ed9ebb1a7e47c155c28399ddf09b306ea05df
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 4 04:23:10 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ trim junk from end of file; bz#2455 from Jakub Jelen
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: a4e64e8931e40d23874b047074444eff919cdfe6
+
+commit f3a3ea180afff080bab82087ee0b60db9fd84f6c
+Author: jsg at openbsd.org <jsg at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 2 07:51:12 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Fix occurrences of "r = func() != 0" which result in the
+ wrong error codes being returned due to != having higher precedence than =.
+
+ ok deraadt@ markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 5fc35c9fc0319cc6fca243632662d2f06b5fd840
+
+commit f498a98cf83feeb7ea01c15cd1c98b3111361f3a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 3 09:11:22 2015 +1000
+
+ don't check for yp_match; ok tim@
+
+commit 9690b78b7848b0b376980a61d51b1613e187ddb5
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 21 23:57:48 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Improve printing of KEX offers and decisions
+
+ The debug output now labels the client and server offers and the
+ negotiated options. ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 8db921b3f92a4565271b1c1fbce6e7f508e1a2cb
+
+commit 60a92470e21340e1a3fc10f9c7140d8e1519dc55
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 21 23:53:08 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Fix printing (ssh -G ...) of HostKeyAlgorithms=+...
+ Reported by Bryan Drewery
+
+ Upstream-ID: 19ad20c41bd5971e006289b6f9af829dd46c1293
+
+commit 6310f60fffca2d1e464168e7d1f7e3b6b0268897
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 21 23:52:30 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Fix expansion of HostkeyAlgorithms=+...
+
+ Reported by Bryan Drewery
+
+ Upstream-ID: 70ca1deea39d758ba36d36428ae832e28566f78d
+
+commit e774e5ea56237fd626a8161f9005023dff3e76c9
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 21 23:29:31 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Improve size == 0, count == 0 checking in mm_zalloc,
+ which is "array" like. Discussed with tedu, millert, otto.... and ok djm
+
+ Upstream-ID: 899b021be43b913fad3eca1aef44efe710c53e29
+
+commit 189de02d9ad6f3645417c0ddf359b923aae5f926
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 21 15:45:02 2015 +1000
+
+ expose POLLHUP and POLLNVAL for netcat.c
+
+commit e91346dc2bbf460246df2ab591b7613908c1b0ad
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 21 14:49:03 2015 +1000
+
+ we don't use Github for issues/pull-requests
+
+commit a4f5b507c708cc3dc2c8dd2d02e4416d7514dc23
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 21 14:43:55 2015 +1000
+
+ fix URL for connect.c
+
+commit d026a8d3da0f8186598442997c7d0a28e7275414
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 21 13:47:10 2015 +1000
+
+ update version numbers for 7.1
+
+commit 78f8f589f0ca1c9f41e5a9bae3cda5ce8a6b42ed
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 21 03:45:26 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ openssh-7.1
+
+ Upstream-ID: ff7b1ef4b06caddfb45e08ba998128c88be3d73f
+
+commit 32a181980c62fce94f7f9ffaf6a79d90f0c309cf
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 21 03:42:19 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix inverted logic that broke PermitRootLogin; reported
+ by Mantas Mikulenas; ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 260dd6a904c1bb7e43267e394b1c9cf70bdd5ea5
+
+commit ce445b0ed927e45bd5bdce8f836eb353998dd65c
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 20 22:32:42 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Do not cast result of malloc/calloc/realloc* if stdlib.h
+ is in scope ok krw millert
+
+ Upstream-ID: 5e50ded78cadf3841556649a16cc4b1cb6c58667
+
+commit 05291e5288704d1a98bacda269eb5a0153599146
+Author: naddy at openbsd.org <naddy at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 20 19:20:06 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ In the certificates section, be consistent about using
+ "host_key" and "user_key" for the respective key types. ok sthen@ deraadt@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 9e037ea3b15577b238604c5533e082a3947f13cb
+
+commit 8543d4ef6f2e9f98c3e6b77c894ceec30c5e4ae4
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Aug 19 23:21:42 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Better compat matching for WinSCP, add compat matching
+ for FuTTY (fork of PuTTY); ok markus@ deraadt@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 24001d1ac115fa3260fbdc329a4b9aeb283c5389
+
+commit ec6eda16ebab771aa3dfc90629b41953b999cb1e
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Aug 19 23:19:01 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix double-free() in error path of DSA key generation
+ reported by Mateusz Kocielski; ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 4735d8f888b10599a935fa1b374787089116713c
+
+commit 45b0eb752c94954a6de046bfaaf129e518ad4b5b
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Aug 19 23:18:26 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix free() of uninitialised pointer reported by Mateusz
+ Kocielski; ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 519552b050618501a06b7b023de5cb104e2c5663
+
+commit c837643b93509a3ef538cb6624b678c5fe32ff79
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Aug 19 23:17:51 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fixed unlink([uninitialised memory]) reported by Mateusz
+ Kocielski; ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 14a0c4e7d891f5a8dabc4b89d4f6b7c0d5a20109
+
+commit 1f8d3d629cd553031021068eb9c646a5f1e50994
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 14 15:32:41 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ match myproposal.h order; from brian conway (i snuck in a
+ tweak while here)
+
+ ok dtucker
+
+ Upstream-ID: 35174a19b5237ea36aa3798f042bf5933b772c67
+
+commit 1dc8d93ce69d6565747eb44446ed117187621b26
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 6 14:53:21 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add prohibit-password as a synonymn for without-password,
+ since the without-password is causing too many questions. Harden it to ban
+ all but pubkey, hostbased, and GSSAPI auth (when the latter is enabled) from
+ djm, ok markus
+
+ Upstream-ID: d53317d7b28942153e6236d3fd6e12ceb482db7a
+
+commit 90a95a4745a531b62b81ce3b025e892bdc434de5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 11 13:53:41 2015 +1000
+
+ update version in README
+
+commit 318c37743534b58124f1bab37a8a0087a3a9bd2f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 11 13:53:09 2015 +1000
+
+ update versions in *.spec
+
+commit 5e75f5198769056089fb06c4d738ab0e5abc66f7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 11 13:34:12 2015 +1000
+
+ set sshpam_ctxt to NULL after free
+
+ Avoids use-after-free in monitor when privsep child is compromised.
+ Reported by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
+
+commit d4697fe9a28dab7255c60433e4dd23cf7fce8a8b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 11 13:33:24 2015 +1000
+
+ Don't resend username to PAM; it already has it.
+
+ Pointed out by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
+
+commit 88763a6c893bf3dfe951ba9271bf09715e8d91ca
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Mon Jul 27 12:14:25 2015 +1000
+
+ Import updated moduli file from OpenBSD.
+
+commit 55b263fb7cfeacb81aaf1c2036e0394c881637da
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Aug 10 11:13:44 2015 +1000
+
+ let principals-command.sh work for noexec /var/run
+
+commit 2651e34cd11b1aac3a0fe23b86d8c2ff35c07897
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 6 11:43:42 2015 +1000
+
+ work around echo -n / sed behaviour in tests
+
+commit d85dad81778c1aa8106acd46930b25fdf0d15b2a
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Aug 5 05:27:33 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ adjust for RSA minimum modulus switch; ok deraadt@
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 5a72c83431b96224d583c573ca281cd3a3ebfdae
+
+commit 57e8e229bad5fe6056b5f1199665f5f7008192c6
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 4 05:23:06 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ backout SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE increase for this
+ release; problems spotted by sthen@ ok deraadt@ markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: d0bd60dde9e8c3cd7030007680371894c1499822
+
+commit f097d0ea1e0889ca0fa2e53a00214e43ab7fa22a
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Aug 2 09:56:42 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ openssh 7.0; ok deraadt@
+
+ Upstream-ID: c63afdef537f57f28ae84145c5a8e29e9250221f
+
+commit 3d5728a0f6874ce4efb16913a12963595070f3a9
+Author: chris at openbsd.org <chris at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 31 15:38:09 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Allow PermitRootLogin to be overridden by config
+
+ ok markus@ deeradt@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 5cf3e26ed702888de84e2dc9d0054ccf4d9125b4
+
+commit 6f941396b6835ad18018845f515b0c4fe20be21a
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 30 23:09:15 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix pty permissions; patch from Nikolay Edigaryev; ok
+ deraadt
+
+ Upstream-ID: 40ff076d2878b916fbfd8e4f45dbe5bec019e550
+
+commit f4373ed1e8fbc7c8ce3fc4ea97d0ba2e0c1d7ef0
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 30 19:23:02 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ change default: PermitRootLogin without-password matching
+ install script changes coming as well ok djm markus
+
+ Upstream-ID: 0e2a6c4441daf5498b47a61767382bead5eb8ea6
+
+commit 0c30ba91f87fcda7e975e6ff8a057f624e87ea1c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 30 12:31:39 2015 +1000
+
+ downgrade OOM adjustment logging: verbose -> debug
+
+commit f9eca249d4961f28ae4b09186d7dc91de74b5895
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 30 00:01:34 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Allow ssh_config and sshd_config kex parameters options be
+ prefixed by a '+' to indicate that the specified items be appended to the
+ default rather than replacing it.
+
+ approach suggested by dtucker@, feedback dlg@, ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 0f901137298fc17095d5756ff1561a7028e8882a
+
+commit 5cefe769105a2a2e3ca7479d28d9a325d5ef0163
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 29 08:34:54 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix bug in previous; was printing incorrect string for
+ failed host key algorithms negotiation
+
+ Upstream-ID: 22c0dc6bc61930513065d92e11f0753adc4c6e6e
+
+commit f319912b0d0e1675b8bb051ed8213792c788bcb2
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 29 04:43:06 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ include the peer's offer when logging a failure to
+ negotiate a mutual set of algorithms (kex, pubkey, ciphers, etc.) ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: bbb8caabf5c01790bb845f5ce135565248d7c796
+
+commit b6ea0e573042eb85d84defb19227c89eb74cf05a
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 28 23:20:42 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add Cisco to the list of clients that choke on the
+ hostkeys update extension. Pointed out by Howard Kash
+
+ Upstream-ID: c9eadde28ecec056c73d09ee10ba4570dfba7e84
+
+commit 3f628c7b537291c1019ce86af90756fb4e66d0fd
+Author: guenther at openbsd.org <guenther at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 27 16:29:23 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Permit kbind(2) use in the sandbox now, to ease testing
+ of ld.so work using it
+
+ reminded by miod@, ok deraadt@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 523922e4d1ba7a091e3824e77a8a3c818ee97413
+
+commit ebe27ebe520098bbc0fe58945a87ce8490121edb
+Author: millert at openbsd.org <millert at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 20 18:44:12 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Move .Pp before .Bl, not after to quiet mandoc -Tlint.
+ Noticed by jmc@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 59fadbf8407cec4e6931e50c53cfa0214a848e23
+
+commit d5d91d0da819611167782c66ab629159169d94d4
+Author: millert at openbsd.org <millert at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 20 18:42:35 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Sync usage with SYNOPSIS
+
+ Upstream-ID: 7a321a170181a54f6450deabaccb6ef60cf3f0b7
+
+commit 79ec2142fbc68dd2ed9688608da355fc0b1ed743
+Author: millert at openbsd.org <millert at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 20 15:39:52 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Better desciption of Unix domain socket forwarding.
+ bz#2423; ok jmc@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 85e28874726897e3f26ae50dfa2e8d2de683805d
+
+commit d56fd1828074a4031b18b8faa0bf949669eb18a0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 20 11:19:51 2015 +1000
+
+ make realpath.c compile -Wsign-compare clean
+
+commit c63c9a691dca26bb7648827f5a13668832948929
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 20 00:30:01 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ mention that the default of UseDNS=no implies that
+ hostnames cannot be used for host matching in sshd_config and
+ authorized_keys; bz#2045, ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 0812705d5f2dfa59aab01f2764ee800b1741c4e1
+
+commit 63ebcd0005e9894fcd6871b7b80aeea1fec0ff76
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jul 18 08:02:17 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ don't ignore PKCS#11 hosted keys that return empty
+ CKA_ID; patch by Jakub Jelen via bz#2429; ok markus
+
+ Upstream-ID: 2f7c94744eb0342f8ee8bf97b2351d4e00116485
+
+commit b15fd989c8c62074397160147a8d5bc34b3f3c63
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jul 18 08:00:21 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ skip uninitialised PKCS#11 slots; patch from Jakub Jelen
+ in bz#2427 ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 744c1e7796e237ad32992d0d02148e8a18f27d29
+
+commit 5b64f85bb811246c59ebab70aed331f26ba37b18
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jul 18 07:57:14 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ only query each keyboard-interactive device once per
+ authentication request regardless of how many times it is listed; ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: d73fafba6e86030436ff673656ec1f33d9ffeda1
+
+commit cd7324d0667794eb5c236d8a4e0f236251babc2d
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 17 03:34:27 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ remove -u flag to diff (only used for error output) to make
+ things easier for -portable
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: a5d6777d2909540d87afec3039d9bb2414ade548
+
+commit deb8d99ecba70b67f4af7880b11ca8768df9ec3a
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 17 03:09:19 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ direct-streamlocal at openssh.com Unix domain foward
+ messages do not contain a "reserved for future use" field and in fact,
+ serverloop.c checks that there isn't one. Remove erroneous mention from
+ PROTOCOL description. bz#2421 from Daniel Black
+
+ Upstream-ID: 3d51a19e64f72f764682f1b08f35a8aa810a43ac
+
+commit 356b61f365405b5257f5b2ab446e5d7bd33a7b52
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 17 03:04:27 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ describe magic for setting up Unix domain socket fowards
+ via the mux channel; bz#2422 patch from Daniel Black
+
+ Upstream-ID: 943080fe3864715c423bdeb7c920bb30c4eee861
+
+commit d3e2aee41487d55b8d7d40f538b84ff1db7989bc
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Fri Jul 17 12:52:34 2015 +1000
+
+ Check if realpath works on nonexistent files.
+
+ On some platforms the native realpath doesn't work with non-existent
+ files (this is actually specified in some versions of POSIX), however
+ the sftp spec says its realpath with "canonicalize any given path name".
+ On those platforms, use realpath from the compat library.
+
+ In addition, when compiling with -DFORTIFY_SOURCE, glibc redefines
+ the realpath symbol to the checked version, so redefine ours to
+ something else so we pick up the compat version we want.
+
+ bz#2428, ok djm@
+
+commit 25b14610dab655646a109db5ef8cb4c4bf2a48a0
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 17 02:47:45 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix incorrect test for SSH1 keys when compiled without SSH1
+ support
+
+ Upstream-ID: 6004d720345b8e481c405e8ad05ce2271726e451
+
+commit df56a8035d429b2184ee94aaa7e580c1ff67f73a
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 15 08:00:11 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix NULL-deref when SSH1 reenabled
+
+ Upstream-ID: f22fd805288c92b3e9646782d15b48894b2d5295
+
+commit 41e38c4d49dd60908484e6703316651333f16b93
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 15 07:19:50 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ regen RSA1 test keys; the last batch was missing their
+ private parts
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 7ccf437305dd63ff0b48dd50c5fd0f4d4230c10a
+
+commit 5bf0933184cb622ca3f96d224bf3299fd2285acc
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 10 06:23:25 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Adapt tests, now that DSA if off by default; use
+ PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes to test DSA.
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 0ff2a3ff5ac1ce5f92321d27aa07b98656efcc5c
+
+commit 7a6e3fd7b41dbd3756b6bf9acd67954c0b1564cc
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 7 14:54:16 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ regen test data after mktestdata.sh changes
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 3495ecb082b9a7c048a2d7c5c845d3bf181d25a4
+
+commit 7c8c174c69f681d4910fa41c37646763692b28e2
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 7 14:53:30 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ adapt tests to new minimum RSA size and default FP format
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: a4b30afd174ce82b96df14eb49fb0b81398ffd0e
+
+commit 6a977a4b68747ade189e43d302f33403fd4a47ac
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 3 04:39:23 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ legacy v00 certificates are gone; adapt and don't try to
+ test them; "sure" markus@ dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: c57321e69b3cd4a3b3396dfcc43f0803d047da12
+
+commit 0c4123ad5e93fb90fee9c6635b13a6cdabaac385
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 1 23:11:18 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ don't expect SSH v.1 in unittests
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: f8812b16668ba78e6a698646b2a652b90b653397
+
+commit 3c099845798a817cdde513c39074ec2063781f18
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jun 15 06:38:50 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ turn SSH1 back on to match src/usr.bin/ssh being tested
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 6c4f763a2f0cc6893bf33983919e9030ae638333
+
+commit b1dc2b33689668c75e95f873a42d5aea1f4af1db
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 13 04:57:14 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Add "PuTTY_Local:" to the clients to which we do not
+ offer DH-GEX. This was the string that was used for development versions
+ prior to September 2014 and they don't do RFC4419 DH-GEX, but unfortunately
+ there are some extant products based on those versions. bx2424 from Jay
+ Rouman, ok markus@ djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: be34d41e18b966832fe09ca243d275b81882e1d5
+
+commit 3a1638dda19bbc73d0ae02b4c251ce08e564b4b9
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 10 06:21:53 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Turn off DSA by default; add HostKeyAlgorithms to the
+ server and PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes to the client side, so it still can be
+ tested or turned back on; feedback and ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 8450a9e6d83f80c9bfed864ff061dfc9323cec21
+
+commit 16db0a7ee9a87945cc594d13863cfcb86038db59
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 9 09:49:46 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ re-enable ed25519-certs if compiled w/o openssl; ok djm
+
+ Upstream-ID: e10c90808b001fd2c7a93778418e9b318f5c4c49
+
+commit c355bf306ac33de6545ce9dac22b84a194601e2f
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 8 20:24:02 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ no need to include the old buffer/key API
+
+ Upstream-ID: fb13c9f7c0bba2545f3eb0a0e69cb0030819f52b
+
+commit a3cc48cdf9853f1e832d78cb29bedfab7adce1ee
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 8 19:09:25 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ typedefs for Cipher&CipherContext are unused
+
+ Upstream-ID: 50e6a18ee92221d23ad173a96d5b6c42207cf9a7
+
+commit a635bd06b5c427a57c3ae760d3a2730bb2c863c0
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 8 19:04:21 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ xmalloc.h is unused
+
+ Upstream-ID: afb532355b7fa7135a60d944ca1e644d1d63cb58
+
+commit 2521cf0e36c7f3f6b19f206da0af134f535e4a31
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 8 19:01:15 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ compress.c is gone
+
+ Upstream-ID: 174fa7faa9b9643cba06164b5e498591356fbced
+
+commit c65a7aa6c43aa7a308ee1ab8a96f216169ae9615
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 3 04:05:54 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ another SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE that needed
+ cranking
+
+ Upstream-ID: 9d8826cafe96aab4ae8e2f6fd22800874b7ffef1
+
+commit b1f383da5cd3cb921fc7776f17a14f44b8a31757
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 3 03:56:25 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add an XXX reminder for getting correct key paths from
+ sshd_config
+
+ Upstream-ID: feae52b209d7782ad742df04a4260e9fe41741db
+
+commit 933935ce8d093996c34d7efa4d59113163080680
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 3 03:49:45 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ refuse to generate or accept RSA keys smaller than 1024
+ bits; feedback and ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 7ea3d31271366ba264f06e34a3539bf1ac30f0ba
+
+commit bdfd29f60b74f3e678297269dc6247a5699583c1
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 3 03:47:00 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ turn off 1024 bit diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key
+ exchange method (already off in server, this turns it off in the client by
+ default too) ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: f59b88f449210ab7acf7d9d88f20f1daee97a4fa
+
+commit c28fc62d789d860c75e23a9fa9fb250eb2beca57
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 3 03:43:18 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ delete support for legacy v00 certificates; "sure"
+ markus@ dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: b5b9bb5f9202d09e88f912989d74928601b6636f
+
+commit 564d63e1b4a9637a209d42a9d49646781fc9caef
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 1 23:10:47 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Compile-time disable SSH v.1 again
+
+ Upstream-ID: 1d4b513a3a06232f02650b73bad25100d1b800af
+
+commit 868109b650504dd9bcccdb1f51d0906f967c20ff
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 1 02:39:06 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ twiddle PermitRootLogin back
+
+ Upstream-ID: 2bd23976305d0512e9f84d054e1fc23cd70b89f2
+
+commit 7de4b03a6e4071d454b72927ffaf52949fa34545
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 1 02:32:17 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ twiddle; (this commit marks the openssh-6.9 release)
+
+ Upstream-ID: 78500582819f61dd8adee36ec5cc9b9ac9351234
+
+commit 1bf477d3cdf1a864646d59820878783d42357a1d
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 1 02:26:31 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ better refuse ForwardX11Trusted=no connections attempted
+ after ForwardX11Timeout expires; reported by Jann Horn
+
+ Upstream-ID: bf0fddadc1b46a0334e26c080038313b4b6dea21
+
+commit 47aa7a0f8551b471fcae0447c1d78464f6dba869
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 1 01:56:13 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ put back default PermitRootLogin=no
+
+ Upstream-ID: 7bdedd5cead99c57ed5571f3b6b7840922d5f728
+
+commit 984b064fe2a23733733262f88d2e1b2a1a501662
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 1 01:55:13 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ openssh-6.9
+
+ Upstream-ID: 6cfe8e1904812531080e6ab6e752d7001b5b2d45
+
+commit d921082ed670f516652eeba50705e1e9f6325346
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 1 01:55:00 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ reset default PermitRootLogin to 'yes' (momentarily, for
+ release)
+
+ Upstream-ID: cad8513527066e65dd7a1c16363d6903e8cefa24
+
+commit 66295e0e1ba860e527f191b6325d2d77dec4dbce
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 1 11:49:12 2015 +1000
+
+ crank version numbers for release
+
+commit 37035c07d4f26bb1fbe000d2acf78efdb008681d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 1 10:49:37 2015 +1000
+
+ s/--with-ssh1/--without-ssh1/
+
+commit 629df770dbadc2accfbe1c81b3f31f876d0acd84
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jun 30 05:25:07 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fatal() when a remote window update causes the window
+ value to overflow. Reported by Georg Wicherski, ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: ead397a9aceb3bf74ebfa5fcaf259d72e569f351
+
+commit f715afebe735d61df3fd30ad72d9ac1c8bd3b5f2
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jun 30 05:23:25 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Fix math error in remote window calculations that causes
+ eventual stalls for datagram channels. Reported by Georg Wicherski, ok
+ markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: be54059d11bf64e0d85061f7257f53067842e2ab
+
+commit 52fb6b9b034fcfd24bf88cc7be313e9c31de9889
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jun 30 16:05:40 2015 +1000
+
+ skip IPv6-related portions on hosts without IPv6
+
+ with Tim Rice
+
+commit 512caddf590857af6aa12218461b5c0441028cf5
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jun 29 22:35:12 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add getpid to sandbox, reachable by grace_alarm_handler
+
+ reported by Jakub Jelen; bz#2419
+
+ Upstream-ID: d0da1117c16d4c223954995d35b0f47c8f684cd8
+
+commit 78c2a4f883ea9aba866358e2acd9793a7f42ca93
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 26 05:13:20 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Fix \-escaping bug that caused forward path parsing to skip
+ two characters and skip past the end of the string.
+
+ Based on patch by Salvador Fandino; ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 7b879dc446335677cbe4cb549495636a0535f3bd
+
+commit bc20205c91c9920361d12b15d253d4997dba494a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jun 25 09:51:39 2015 +1000
+
+ add missing pselect6
+
+ patch from Jakub Jelen
+
+commit 9d27fb73b4a4e5e99cb880af790d5b1ce44f720a
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 24 23:47:23 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ correct test to sshkey_sign(); spotted by Albert S.
+
+ Upstream-ID: 5f7347f40f0ca6abdaca2edb3bd62f4776518933
+
+commit 7ed01a96a1911d8b4a9ef4f3d064e1923bfad7e3
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 24 01:49:19 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Revert previous commit. We still want to call setgroups
+ in the case where there are zero groups to remove any that we might otherwise
+ inherit (as pointed out by grawity at gmail.com) and since the 2nd argument
+ to setgroups is always a static global it's always valid to dereference in
+ this case. ok deraadt@ djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 895b5ac560a10befc6b82afa778641315725fd01
+
+commit 882f8bf94f79528caa65b0ba71c185d705bb7195
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 24 01:49:19 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Revert previous commit. We still want to call setgroups in
+ the case where there are zero groups to remove any that we might otherwise
+ inherit (as pointed out by grawity at gmail.com) and since the 2nd argument
+ to setgroups is always a static global it's always valid to dereference in
+ this case. ok deraadt@ djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 895b5ac560a10befc6b82afa778641315725fd01
+
+commit 9488538a726951e82b3a4374f3c558d72c80a89b
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jun 22 23:42:16 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Don't count successful partial authentication as failures
+ in monitor; this may have caused the monitor to refuse multiple
+ authentications that would otherwise have successfully completed; ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: eb74b8e506714d0f649bd5c300f762a527af04a3
+
+commit 63b78d003bd8ca111a736e6cea6333da50f5f09b
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jun 22 12:29:57 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Don't call setgroups if we have zero groups; there's no
+ guarantee that it won't try to deref the pointer. Based on a patch from mail
+ at quitesimple.org, ok djm deraadt
+
+ Upstream-ID: 2fff85e11d7a9a387ef7fddf41fbfaf566708ab1
+
+commit 5c15e22c691c79a47747bcf5490126656f97cecd
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jun 18 15:07:56 2015 +1000
+
+ fix syntax error
+
+commit 596dbca82f3f567fb3d2d69af4b4e1d3ba1e6403
+Author: jsing at openbsd.org <jsing at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jun 15 18:44:22 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ If AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is specified, however
+ AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is not (or is set to "none"), authentication will
+ potentially fail due to key_cert_check_authority() failing to locate a
+ principal that matches the username, even though an authorized principal has
+ already been matched in the output of the subprocess. Fix this by using the
+ same logic to determine if pw->pw_name should be passed, as is used to
+ determine if a authorized principal must be matched earlier on.
+
+ ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 43b42302ec846b0ea68aceb40677245391b9409d
+
+commit aff3e94c0d75d0d0fa84ea392b50ab04f8c57905
+Author: jsing at openbsd.org <jsing at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jun 15 18:42:19 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Make the arguments to match_principals_command() similar
+ to match_principals_file(), by changing the last argument a struct
+ sshkey_cert * and dereferencing key->cert in the caller.
+
+ No functional change.
+
+ ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 533f99b844b21b47342b32b62e198dfffcf8651c
+
+commit 97e2e1596c202a4693468378b16b2353fd2d6c5e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 17 14:36:54 2015 +1000
+
+ trivial optimisation for seccomp-bpf
+
+ When doing arg inspection and the syscall doesn't match, skip
+ past the instruction that reloads the syscall into the accumulator,
+ since the accumulator hasn't been modified at this point.
+
+commit 99f33d7304893bd9fa04d227cb6e870171cded19
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 17 10:50:51 2015 +1000
+
+ aarch64 support for seccomp-bpf sandbox
+
+ Also resort and tidy syscall list. Based on patches by Jakub Jelen
+ bz#2361; ok dtucker@
+
+commit 4ef702e1244633c1025ec7cfe044b9ab267097bf
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jun 15 01:32:50 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ return failure on RSA signature error; reported by Albert S
+
+ Upstream-ID: e61bb93dbe0349625807b0810bc213a6822121fa
+
+commit a170f22baf18af0b1acf2788b8b715605f41a1f9
+Author: Tim Rice <tim at multitalents.net>
+Date: Tue Jun 9 22:41:13 2015 -0700
+
+ Fix t12 rules for out of tree builds.
+
+commit ec04dc4a5515c913121bc04ed261857e68fa5c18
+Author: millert at openbsd.org <millert at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 5 15:13:13 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ For "ssh -L 12345:/tmp/sock" don't fail with "No forward host
+ name." (we have a path, not a host name). Based on a diff from Jared
+ Yanovich. OK djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 2846b0a8c7de037e33657f95afbd282837fc213f
+
+commit 732d61f417a6aea0aa5308b59cb0f563bcd6edd6
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 5 03:44:14 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ typo: accidental repetition; bz#2386
+
+ Upstream-ID: 45e620d99f6bc301e5949d34a54027374991c88b
+
+commit adfb24c69d1b6f5e758db200866c711e25a2ba73
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Fri Jun 5 14:51:40 2015 +1000
+
+ Add Linux powerpc64le and powerpcle entries.
+
+ Stopgap to resolve bz#2409 because we are so close to release and will
+ update config.guess and friends shortly after the release. ok djm@
+
+commit a1195a0fdc9eddddb04d3e9e44c4775431cb77da
+Merge: 6397eed d2480bc
+Author: Tim Rice <tim at multitalents.net>
+Date: Wed Jun 3 21:43:13 2015 -0700
+
+ Merge branch 'master' of git.mindrot.org:/var/git/openssh
+
+commit 6397eedf953b2b973d2d7cbb504ab501a07f8ddc
+Author: Tim Rice <tim at multitalents.net>
+Date: Wed Jun 3 21:41:11 2015 -0700
+
+ Remove unneeded backslashes. Patch from Ángel González
+
+commit d2480bcac1caf31b03068de877a47d6e1027bf6d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Thu Jun 4 14:10:55 2015 +1000
+
+ Remove redundant include of stdarg.h. bz#2410
+
+commit 5e67859a623826ccdf2df284cbb37e2d8e2787eb
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jun 2 09:10:40 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ mention CheckHostIP adding addresses to known_hosts;
+ bz#1993; ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: fd44b68440fd0dc29abf9f2d3f703d74a2396cb7
+
+commit d7a58bbac6583e33fd5eca8e2c2cc70c57617818
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Tue Jun 2 20:15:26 2015 +1000
+
+ Replace strcpy with strlcpy.
+
+ ok djm, sanity check by Corinna Vinschen.
+
+commit 51a1c2115265c6e80ede8a5c9dccada9aeed7143
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri May 29 18:27:21 2015 +1000
+
+ skip, rather than fatal when run without SUDO set
+
+commit 599f01142a376645b15cbc9349d7e8975e1cf245
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri May 29 18:03:15 2015 +1000
+
+ fix merge botch that left ",," in KEX algs
+
+commit 0c2a81dfc21822f2423edd30751e5ec53467b347
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri May 29 17:08:28 2015 +1000
+
+ re-enable SSH protocol 1 at compile time
+
+commit db438f9285d64282d3ac9e8c0944f59f037c0151
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 29 03:05:13 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ make this work without SUDO set; ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: bca88217b70bce2fe52b23b8e06bdeb82d98c715
+
+commit 1d9a2e2849c9864fe75daabf433436341c968e14
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu May 28 07:37:31 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ wrap all moduli-related code in #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL.
+ based on patch from Reuben Hawkins; bz#2388 feedback and ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: d80cfc8be3e6ec65b3fac9e87c4466533b31b7cf
+
+commit 496aeb25bc2d6c434171292e4714771b594bd00e
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu May 28 05:41:29 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Increase the allowed length of the known host file name
+ in the log message to be consistent with other cases. Part of bz#1993, ok
+ deraadt.
+
+ Upstream-ID: a9e97567be49f25daf286721450968251ff78397
+
+commit dd2cfeb586c646ff8d70eb93567b2e559ace5b14
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu May 28 05:09:45 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Fix typo (keywork->keyword)
+
+ Upstream-ID: 8aacd0f4089c0a244cf43417f4f9045dfaeab534
+
+commit 9cc6842493fbf23025ccc1edab064869640d3bec
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu May 28 04:50:53 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add error message on ftruncate failure; bz#2176
+
+ Upstream-ID: cbcc606e0b748520c74a210d8f3cc9718d3148cf
+
+commit d1958793a0072c22be26d136dbda5ae263e717a0
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu May 28 04:40:13 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ make ssh-keygen default to ed25519 keys when compiled
+ without OpenSSL; bz#2388, ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 85a471fa6d3fa57a7b8e882d22cfbfc1d84cdc71
+
+commit 3ecde664c9fc5fb3667aedf9e6671462600f6496
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 27 23:51:10 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Reorder client proposal to prefer
+ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 over diffie-hellman-group14-sha1. ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 552c08d47347c3ee1a9a57d88441ab50abe17058
+
+commit 40f64292b907afd0a674fdbf3e4c2356d17a7d68
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 27 23:39:18 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Add a stronger (4k bit) fallback group that sshd can use
+ when the moduli file is missing or broken, sourced from RFC3526. bz#2302, ok
+ markus@ (earlier version), djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: b635215746a25a829d117673d5e5a76d4baee7f4
+
+commit 5ab7d5fa03ad55bc438fab45dfb3aeb30a3c237a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Thu May 28 10:03:40 2015 +1000
+
+ New moduli file from OpenBSD, removing 1k groups.
+
+ Remove 1k bit groups. ok deraadt@, markus@
+
+commit a71ba58adf34e599f30cdda6e9b93ae6e3937eea
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 27 05:15:02 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ support PKCS#11 devices with external PIN entry devices
+ bz#2240, based on patch from Dirk-Willem van Gulik; feedback and ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 504568992b55a8fc984375242b1bd505ced61b0d
+
+commit b282fec1aa05246ed3482270eb70fc3ec5f39a00
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 26 23:23:40 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Cap DH-GEX group size at 4kbits for Cisco implementations.
+ Some of them will choke when asked for preferred sizes >4k instead of
+ returning the 4k group that they do have. bz#2209, ok djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 54b863a19713446b7431f9d06ad0532b4fcfef8d
+
+commit 3e91b4e8b0dc2b4b7e7d42cf6e8994a32e4cb55e
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun May 24 23:39:16 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add missing 'c' option to getopt(), case statement was
+ already there; from Felix Bolte
+
+ Upstream-ID: 9b19b4e2e0b54d6fefa0dfac707c51cf4bae3081
+
+commit 64a89ec07660abba4d0da7c0095b7371c98bab62
+Author: jsg at openbsd.org <jsg at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat May 23 14:28:37 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix a memory leak in an error path ok markus@ dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: bc1da0f205494944918533d8780fde65dff6c598
+
+commit f948737449257d2cb83ffcfe7275eb79b677fd4a
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 22 05:28:45 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ mention ssh-keygen -E for comparing legacy MD5
+ fingerprints; bz#2332
+
+ Upstream-ID: 079a3669549041dbf10dbc072d9563f0dc3b2859
+
+commit 0882332616e4f0272c31cc47bf2018f9cb258a4e
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 22 04:45:52 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Reorder EscapeChar option parsing to avoid a single-byte
+ out- of-bounds read. bz#2396 from Jaak Ristioja; ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 1dc6b5b63d1c8d9a88619da0b27ade461d79b060
+
+commit d7c31da4d42c115843edee2074d7d501f8804420
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 22 03:50:02 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add knob to relax GSSAPI host credential check for
+ multihomed hosts bz#928, patch by Simon Wilkinson; ok dtucker
+ (kerberos/GSSAPI is not compiled by default on OpenBSD)
+
+ Upstream-ID: 15ddf1c6f7fd9d98eea9962f480079ae3637285d
+
+commit aa72196a00be6e0b666215edcffbc10af234cb0e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Fri May 22 17:49:46 2015 +1000
+
+ Include signal.h for sig_atomic_t, used by kex.h.
+
+ bz#2402, from tomas.kuthan at oracle com.
+
+commit 8b02481143d75e91c49d1bfae0876ac1fbf9511a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Fri May 22 12:47:24 2015 +1000
+
+ Import updated moduli file from OpenBSD.
+
+commit 4739e8d5e1c0be49624082bd9f6b077e9e758db9
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu May 21 12:01:19 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Support "ssh-keygen -lF hostname" to find search known_hosts
+ and print key hashes. Already advertised by ssh-keygen(1), but not delivered
+ by code; ok dtucker@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 459e0e2bf39825e41b0811c336db2d56a1c23387
+
+commit e97201feca10b5196da35819ae516d0b87cf3a50
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu May 21 17:55:15 2015 +1000
+
+ conditionalise util.h inclusion
+
+commit 13640798c7dd011ece0a7d02841fe48e94cfa0e0
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu May 21 06:44:25 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ regress test for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: c658fbf1ab6b6011dc83b73402322e396f1e1219
+
+commit 84452c5d03c21f9bfb28c234e0dc1dc67dd817b1
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu May 21 06:40:02 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ regress test for AuthorizedKeysCommand arguments
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: bbd65c13c6b3be9a442ec115800bff9625898f12
+
+commit bcc50d816187fa9a03907ac1f3a52f04a52e10d1
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu May 21 06:43:30 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand that allows getting
+ authorized_principals from a subprocess rather than a file, which is quite
+ useful in deployments with large userbases
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: aa1bdac7b16fc6d2fa3524ef08f04c7258d247f6
+
+commit 24232a3e5ab467678a86aa67968bbb915caffed4
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu May 21 06:38:35 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ support arguments to AuthorizedKeysCommand
+
+ bz#2081 loosely based on patch by Sami Hartikainen
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: b080387a14aa67dddd8ece67c00f268d626541f7
+
+commit d80fbe41a57c72420c87a628444da16d09d66ca7
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu May 21 04:55:51 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ refactor: split base64 encoding of pubkey into its own
+ sshkey_to_base64() function and out of sshkey_write(); ok markus@
+
+ Upstream-ID: 54fc38f5832e9b91028900819bda46c3959a0c1a
+
+commit 7cc44ef74133a473734bbcbd3484f24d6a7328c5
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 18 15:06:05 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ getentropy() and sendsyslog() have been around long
+ enough. openssh-portable may want the #ifdef's but not base. discussed with
+ djm few weeks back
+
+ Upstream-ID: 0506a4334de108e3fb6c66f8d6e0f9c112866926
+
+commit 9173d0fbe44de7ebcad8a15618e13a8b8d78902e
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 15 05:44:21 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Use a salted hash of the lock passphrase instead of plain
+ text and do constant-time comparisons of it. Should prevent leaking any
+ information about it via timing, pointed out by Ryan Castellucci. Add a 0.1s
+ incrementing delay for each failed unlock attempt up to 10s. ok markus@
+ (earlier version), djm@
+
+ Upstream-ID: c599fcc325aa1cc65496b25220b622d22208c85f
+
+commit d028d5d3a697c71b21e4066d8672cacab3caa0a8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue May 5 19:10:58 2015 +1000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ - tedu at cvs.openbsd.org 2015/01/12 03:20:04
+ [bcrypt_pbkdf.c]
+ rename blocks to words. bcrypt "blocks" are unrelated to blowfish blocks,
+ nor are they the same size.
+
+commit f6391d4e59b058984163ab28f4e317e7a72478f1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue May 5 19:10:23 2015 +1000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ - deraadt at cvs.openbsd.org 2015/01/08 00:30:07
+ [bcrypt_pbkdf.c]
+ declare a local version of MIN(), call it MINIMUM()
+
+commit 8ac6b13cc9113eb47cd9e86c97d7b26b4b71b77f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue May 5 19:09:46 2015 +1000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ - djm at cvs.openbsd.org 2014/12/30 01:41:43
+ [bcrypt_pbkdf.c]
+ typo in comment: ouput => output
+
+commit 1f792489d5cf86a4f4e3003e6e9177654033f0f2
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 4 06:10:48 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Remove pattern length argument from match_pattern_list(), we
+ only ever use it for strlen(pattern).
+
+ Prompted by hanno AT hboeck.de pointing an out-of-bound read
+ error caused by an incorrect pattern length found using AFL
+ and his own tools.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+commit 639d6bc57b1942393ed12fb48f00bc05d4e093e4
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 07:10:01 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ refactor ssh_dispatch_run_fatal() to use sshpkt_fatal()
+ to better report error conditions. Teach sshpkt_fatal() about ECONNRESET.
+
+ Improves error messages on TCP connection resets. bz#2257
+
+ ok dtucker@
+
+commit 9559d7de34c572d4d3fd990ca211f8ec99f62c4d
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 07:08:08 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ a couple of parse targets were missing activep checks,
+ causing them to be misapplied in match context; bz#2272 diagnosis and
+ original patch from Sami Hartikainen ok dtucker@
+
+commit 7e8528cad04b2775c3b7db08abf8fb42e47e6b2a
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 04:17:51 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ make handling of AuthorizedPrincipalsFile=none more
+ consistent with other =none options; bz#2288 from Jakub Jelen; ok dtucker@
+
+commit ca430d4d9cc0f62eca3b1fb1e2928395b7ce80f7
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 04:03:20 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ remove failed remote forwards established by muliplexing
+ from the list of active forwards; bz#2363, patch mostly by Yoann Ricordel; ok
+ dtucker@
+
+commit 8312cfb8ad88657517b3e23ac8c56c8e38eb9792
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 04:01:58 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ reduce stderr spam when using ssh -S /path/mux -O forward
+ -R 0:... ok dtucker@
+
+commit 179be0f5e62f1f492462571944e45a3da660d82b
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 03:23:51 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ prevent authorized_keys options picked up on public key
+ tests without a corresponding private key authentication being applied to
+ other authentication methods. Reported by halex@, ok markus@
+
+commit a42d67be65b719a430b7fcaba2a4e4118382723a
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 03:20:54 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Don't make parsing of authorized_keys' environment=
+ option conditional on PermitUserEnv - always parse it, but only use the
+ result if the option is enabled. This prevents the syntax of authorized_keys
+ changing depending on which sshd_config options were enabled.
+
+ bz#2329; based on patch from coladict AT gmail.com, ok dtucker@
+
+commit e661a86353e11592c7ed6a847e19a83609f49e77
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 4 06:10:48 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Remove pattern length argument from match_pattern_list(), we
+ only ever use it for strlen(pattern).
+
+ Prompted by hanno AT hboeck.de pointing an out-of-bound read
+ error caused by an incorrect pattern length found using AFL
+ and his own tools.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+commit 0ef1de742be2ee4b10381193fe90730925b7f027
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 23 05:01:19 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Add a simple regression test for sshd's configuration
+ parser. Right now, all it does is run the output of sshd -T back through
+ itself and ensure the output is valid and invariant.
+
+commit 368f83c793275faa2c52f60eaa9bdac155c4254b
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Apr 22 01:38:36 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ use correct key for nested certificate test
+
+commit 8d4d1bfddbbd7d21f545dc6997081d1ea1fbc99a
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 07:11:47 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ mention that the user's shell from /etc/passwd is used
+ for commands too; bz#1459 ok dtucker@
+
+commit 5ab283d0016bbc9d4d71e8e5284d011bc5a930cf
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 8 07:29:00 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ whitespace
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 6b708a3e709d5b7fd37890f874bafdff1f597519
+
+commit 8377d5008ad260048192e1e56ad7d15a56d103dd
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 8 07:26:13 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ whitespace at EOL
+
+ Upstream-Regress-ID: 9c48911643d5b05173b36a012041bed4080b8554
+
+commit c28a3436fa8737709ea88e4437f8f23a6ab50359
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 8 06:45:13 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ moar whitespace at eol
+
+ Upstream-ID: 64eaf872a3ba52ed41e494287e80d40aaba4b515
+
+commit 2b64c490468fd4ca35ac8d5cc31c0520dc1508bb
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 8 06:41:56 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ whitespace at EOL
+
+ Upstream-ID: 57bcf67d666c6fc1ad798aee448fdc3f70f7ec2c
+
+commit 4e636cf201ce6e7e3b9088568218f9d4e2c51712
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 8 03:56:51 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ whitespace at EOL
+
+commit 38b8272f823dc1dd4e29dbcee83943ed48bb12fa
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 4 01:47:53 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Use diff w/out -u for better portability
+
+commit 297060f42d5189a4065ea1b6f0afdf6371fb0507
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 8 03:25:07 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Use xcalloc for permitted_adm_opens instead of xmalloc to
+ ensure it's zeroed. Fixes post-auth crash with permitopen=none. bz#2355, ok
+ djm@
+
+commit 63ebf019be863b2d90492a85e248cf55a6e87403
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 8 03:17:49 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ don't choke on new-format private keys encrypted with an
+ AEAD cipher; bz#2366, patch from Ron Frederick; ok markus@
+
+commit f8484dac678ab3098ae522a5f03bb2530f822987
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 6 05:45:17 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Clarify pseudo-terminal request behaviour and use
+ "pseudo-terminal" consistently. bz#1716, ok jmc@ "I like it" deraadt at .
+
+commit ea139507bef8bad26e86ed99a42c7233ad115c38
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 6 04:07:18 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Blacklist DH-GEX for specific PuTTY versions known to
+ send non-RFC4419 DH-GEX messages rather than all versions of PuTTY.
+ According to Simon Tatham, 0.65 and newer versions will send RFC4419 DH-GEX
+ messages. ok djm@
+
+commit b58234f00ee3872eb84f6e9e572a9a34e902e36e
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 5 10:17:49 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ WinSCP doesn't implement RFC4419 DH-GEX so flag it so we
+ don't offer that KEX method. ok markus@
+
+commit d5b1507a207253b39e810e91e68f9598691b7a29
+Author: jsg at openbsd.org <jsg at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 5 02:48:17 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ use the sizeof the struct not the sizeof a pointer to the
+ struct in ssh_digest_start()
+
+ This file is only used if ssh is built with OPENSSL=no
+
+ ok markus@
+
+commit a647b9b8e616c231594b2710c925d31b1b8afea3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Fri May 8 11:07:27 2015 +1000
+
+ Put brackets around mblen() compat constant.
+
+ This might help with the reported problem cross compiling for Android
+ ("error: expected identifier or '(' before numeric constant") but
+ shouldn't hurt in any case.
+
+commit d1680d36e17244d9af3843aeb5025cb8e40d6c07
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Thu Apr 30 09:18:11 2015 +1000
+
+ xrealloc -> xreallocarray in portable code too.
+
+commit 531a57a3893f9fcd4aaaba8c312b612bbbcc021e
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Apr 29 03:48:56 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Allow ListenAddress, Port and AddressFamily in any
+ order. bz#68, ok djm@, jmc@ (for the man page bit).
+
+commit c1d5bcf1aaf1209af02f79e48ba1cbc76a87b56f
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Apr 28 13:47:38 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ enviroment -> environment: apologies to darren for not
+ spotting that first time round...
+
+commit 43beea053db191cac47c2cd8d3dc1930158aff1a
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Apr 28 10:25:15 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Fix typo in previous
+
+commit 85b96ef41374f3ddc9139581f87da09b2cd9199e
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Apr 28 10:17:58 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Document that the TERM environment variable is not
+ subject to SendEnv and AcceptEnv. bz#2386, based loosely on a patch from
+ jjelen at redhat, help and ok jmc@
+
+commit 88a7c598a94ff53f76df228eeaae238d2d467565
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Apr 27 21:42:48 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Make sshd default to PermitRootLogin=no; ok deraadt@
+ rpe@
+
+commit 734226b4480a6c736096c729fcf6f391400599c7
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Apr 27 01:52:30 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix compilation with OPENSSL=no; ok dtucker@
+
+commit a4b9d2ce1eb7703eaf0809b0c8a82ded8aa4f1c6
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Apr 27 00:37:53 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Include stdio.h for FILE (used in sshkey.h) so it
+ compiles with OPENSSL=no.
+
+commit dbcc652f4ca11fe04e5930c7ef18a219318c6cda
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Apr 27 00:21:21 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ allow "sshd -f none" to skip reading the config file,
+ much like "ssh -F none" does. ok dtucker
+
+commit b7ca276fca316c952f0b90f5adb1448c8481eedc
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 24 06:26:49 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ combine -Dd onto one line and update usage();
+
+commit 2ea974630d7017e4c7666d14d9dc939707613e96
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 24 05:26:44 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add ssh-agent -D to leave ssh-agent in foreground
+ without enabling debug mode; bz#2381 ok dtucker@
+
+commit 8ac2ffd7aa06042f6b924c87139f2fea5c5682f7
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 24 01:36:24 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ 2*len -> use xreallocarray() ok djm
+
+commit 657a5fbc0d0aff309079ff8fb386f17e964963c2
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 24 01:36:00 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ rename xrealloc() to xreallocarray() since it follows
+ that form. ok djm
+
+commit 1108ae242fdd2c304307b68ddf46aebe43ebffaa
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 23 04:59:10 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Two small fixes for sshd -T: ListenAddress'es are added
+ to a list head so reverse the order when printing them to ensure the
+ behaviour remains the same, and print StreamLocalBindMask as octal with
+ leading zero. ok deraadt@
+
+commit bd902b8473e1168f19378d5d0ae68d0c203525df
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 23 04:53:53 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Check for and reject missing arguments for
+ VersionAddendum and ForceCommand. bz#2281, patch from plautrba at redhat com,
+ ok djm@
+
+commit ca42c1758575e592239de1d5755140e054b91a0d
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Apr 22 01:24:01 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ unknown certificate extensions are non-fatal, so don't
+ fatal when they are encountered; bz#2387 reported by Bob Van Zant; ok
+ dtucker@
+
+commit 39bfbf7caad231cc4bda6909fb1af0705bca04d8
+Author: jsg at openbsd.org <jsg at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Apr 21 07:01:00 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Add back a backslash removed in rev 1.42 so
+ KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT will include aes again.
+
+ ok deraadt@
+
+commit 6b0d576bb87eca3efd2b309fcfe4edfefc289f9c
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 17 13:32:09 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ s/recommended/required/ that private keys be og-r this
+ wording change was made a while ago but got accidentally reverted
+
+commit 44a8e7ce6f3ab4c2eb1ae49115c210b98e53c4df
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 17 13:25:52 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ don't try to cleanup NULL KEX proposals in
+ kex_prop_free(); found by Jukka Taimisto and Markus Hietava
+
+commit 3038a191872d2882052306098c1810d14835e704
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 17 13:19:22 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ use error/logit/fatal instead of fprintf(stderr, ...)
+ and exit(0), fix a few errors that were being printed to stdout instead of
+ stderr and a few non-errors that were going to stderr instead of stdout
+ bz#2325; ok dtucker
+
+commit a58be33cb6cd24441fa7e634db0e5babdd56f07f
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 17 13:16:48 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ debug log missing DISPLAY environment when X11
+ forwarding requested; bz#1682 ok dtucker@
+
+commit 17d4d9d9fbc8fb80e322f94d95eecc604588a474
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 17 04:32:31 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ don't call record_login() in monitor when UseLogin is
+ enabled; bz#278 reported by drk AT sgi.com; ok dtucker
+
+commit 40132ff87b6cbc3dc05fb5df2e9d8e3afa06aafd
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 17 04:12:35 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Add some missing options to sshd -T and fix the output
+ of VersionAddendum HostCertificate. bz#2346, patch from jjelen at redhat
+ com, ok djm.
+
+commit 6cc7cfa936afde2d829e56ee6528c7ea47a42441
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 16 23:25:50 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Document "none" for PidFile XAuthLocation
+ TrustedUserCAKeys and RevokedKeys. bz#2382, feedback from jmc@, ok djm@
+
+commit 15fdfc9b1c6808b26bc54d4d61a38b54541763ed
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Apr 15 23:23:25 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Plug leak of address passed to logging. bz#2373, patch
+ from jjelen at redhat, ok markus@
+
+commit bb2289e2a47d465eaaaeff3dee2a6b7777b4c291
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Apr 14 04:17:03 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Output remote username in debug output since with Host
+ and Match it's not always obvious what it will be. bz#2368, ok djm@
+
+commit 70860b6d07461906730632f9758ff1b7c98c695a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Fri Apr 17 10:56:13 2015 +1000
+
+ Format UsePAM setting when using sshd -T.
+
+ Part of bz#2346, patch from jjelen at redhat com.
+
+commit ee15d9c9f0720f5a8b0b34e4b10ecf21f9824814
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Fri Apr 17 10:40:23 2015 +1000
+
+ Wrap endian.h include inside ifdef (bz#2370).
+
+commit 408f4c2ad4a4c41baa7b9b2b7423d875abbfa70b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Fri Apr 17 09:39:58 2015 +1000
+
+ Look for '${host}-ar' before 'ar'.
+
+ This changes configure.ac to look for '${host}-ar' as set by
+ AC_CANONICAL_HOST before looking for the unprefixed 'ar'.
+ Useful when cross-compiling when all your binutils are prefixed.
+
+ Patch from moben at exherbo org via astrand at lysator liu se and
+ bz#2352.
+
+commit 673a1c16ad078d41558247ce739fe812c960acc8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at google.com>
+Date: Thu Apr 16 11:40:20 2015 +1000
+
+ remove dependency on arpa/telnet.h
+
+commit 202d443eeda1829d336595a3cfc07827e49f45ed
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Wed Apr 15 15:59:49 2015 +1000
+
+ Remove duplicate include of pwd.h. bz#2337, patch from Mordy Ovits.
+
+commit 597986493412c499f2bc2209420cb195f97b3668
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at google.com>
+Date: Thu Apr 9 10:14:48 2015 +1000
+
+ platform's with openpty don't need pty_release
+
+commit 318be28cda1fd9108f2e6f2f86b0b7589ba2aed0
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Apr 13 02:04:08 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ deprecate ancient, pre-RFC4419 and undocumented
+ SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD message; ok markus@ deraadt@ "seems
+ reasonable" dtucker@
+
+commit d8f391caef62378463a0e6b36f940170dadfe605
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 10 05:16:50 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Don't send hostkey advertisments
+ (hostkeys-00 at openssh.com) to current versions of Tera Term as they can't
+ handle them. Newer versions should be OK. Patch from Bryan Drewery and
+ IWAMOTO Kouichi, ok djm@
+
+commit 2c2cfe1a1c97eb9a08cc9817fd0678209680c636
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 10 00:08:55 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ include port number if a non-default one has been
+ specified; based on patch from Michael Handler
+
+commit 4492a4f222da4cf1e8eab12689196322e27b08c4
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Apr 7 23:00:42 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ treat Protocol=1,2|2,1 as Protocol=2 when compiled
+ without SSH1 support; ok dtucker@ millert@
+
+commit c265e2e6e932efc6d86f6cc885dea33637a67564
+Author: miod at openbsd.org <miod at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Apr 5 15:43:43 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Do not use int for sig_atomic_t; spotted by
+ christos at netbsd; ok markus@
+
+commit e7bf3a5eda6a1b02bef6096fed78527ee11e54cc
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Tue Apr 7 10:48:04 2015 +1000
+
+ Use do{}while(0) for no-op functions.
+
+ From FreeBSD.
+
+commit bb99844abae2b6447272f79e7fa84134802eb4df
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Tue Apr 7 10:47:15 2015 +1000
+
+ Wrap blf.h include in ifdef. From FreeBSD.
+
+commit d9b9b43656091cf0ad55c122f08fadb07dad0abd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Tue Apr 7 09:10:00 2015 +1000
+
+ Fix misspellings of regress CONFOPTS env variables.
+
+ Patch from Bryan Drewery.
+
+commit 3f4ea3c9ab1d32d43c9222c4351f58ca11144156
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 3 22:17:27 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ correct return value in pubkey parsing, spotted by Ben Hawkes
+ ok markus@
+
+commit 7da2be0cb9601ed25460c83aa4d44052b967ba0f
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 31 22:59:01 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ adapt to recent hostfile.c change: when parsing
+ known_hosts without fully parsing the keys therein, hostkeys_foreach() will
+ now correctly identify KEY_RSA1 keys; ok markus@ miod@
+
+commit 9e1777a0d1c706714b055811c12ab8cc21033e4a
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 24 20:19:15 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ use ${SSH} for -Q instead of installed ssh
+
+commit ce1b358ea414a2cc88e4430cd5a2ea7fecd9de57
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Mar 16 22:46:14 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ make CLEANFILES clean up more of the tests' droppings
+
+commit 398f9ef192d820b67beba01ec234d66faca65775
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 31 22:57:06 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ downgrade error() for known_hosts parse errors to debug()
+ to quiet warnings from ssh1 keys present when compiled !ssh1.
+
+ also identify ssh1 keys when scanning, even when compiled !ssh1
+
+ ok markus@ miod@
+
+commit 9a47ab80030a31f2d122b8fd95bd48c408b9fcd9
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 31 22:55:50 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fd leak for !ssh1 case; found by unittests; ok markus@
+
+commit c9a0805a6280681901c270755a7cd630d7c5280e
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 31 22:55:24 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ don't fatal when a !ssh1 sshd is reexeced from a w/ssh1
+ listener; reported by miod@; ok miod@ markus@
+
+commit 704d8c88988cae38fb755a6243b119731d223222
+Author: tobias at openbsd.org <tobias at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 31 11:06:49 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Comments are only supported for RSA1 keys. If a user
+ tried to add one and entered his passphrase, explicitly clear it before exit.
+ This is done in all other error paths, too.
+
+ ok djm
+
+commit 78de1673c05ea2c33e0d4a4b64ecb5186b6ea2e9
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Mar 30 18:28:37 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ ssh-askpass(1) is the default, overridden by SSH_ASKPASS;
+ diff originally from jiri b;
+
+commit 26e0bcf766fadb4a44fb6199386fb1dcab65ad00
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Mar 30 00:00:29 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix uninitialised memory read when parsing a config file
+ consisting of a single nul byte. Found by hanno AT hboeck.de using AFL; ok
+ dtucker
+
+commit fecede00a76fbb33a349f5121c0b2f9fbc04a777
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Mar 26 19:32:19 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ sigp and lenp are not optional in ssh_agent_sign(); ok
+ djm@
+
+commit 1b0ef3813244c78669e6d4d54c624f600945327d
+Author: naddy at openbsd.org <naddy at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Mar 26 12:32:38 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ don't try to load .ssh/identity by default if SSH1 is
+ disabled; ok markus@
+
+commit f9b78852379b74a2d14e6fc94fe52af30b7e9c31
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Mar 26 07:00:04 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ ban all-zero curve25519 keys as recommended by latest
+ CFRG curves draft; ok markus
+
+commit b8afbe2c1aaf573565e4da775261dfafc8b1ba9c
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Mar 26 06:59:28 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ relax bits needed check to allow
+ diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange to complete for chacha20-poly1305 was
+ selected as symmetric cipher; ok markus
+
+commit 47842f71e31da130555353c1d57a1e5a8937f1c0
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 25 19:29:58 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ ignore v1 errors on ssh-add -D; only try v2 keys on
+ -l/-L (unless WITH_SSH1) ok djm@
+
+commit 5f57e77f91bf2230c09eca96eb5ecec39e5f2da6
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 25 19:21:48 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ unbreak ssh_agent_sign (lenp vs *lenp)
+
+commit 4daeb67181054f2a377677fac919ee8f9ed3490e
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 24 20:10:08 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ don't leak 'setp' on error; noted by Nicholas Lemonias;
+ ok djm@
+
+commit 7d4f96f9de2a18af0d9fa75ea89a4990de0344f5
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 24 20:09:11 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ consistent check for NULL as noted by Nicholas
+ Lemonias; ok djm@
+
+commit df100be51354e447d9345cf1ec22e6013c0eed50
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 24 20:03:44 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ correct fmt-string for size_t as noted by Nicholas
+ Lemonias; ok djm@
+
+commit a22b9ef21285e81775732436f7c84a27bd3f71e0
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 24 09:17:21 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ promote chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com to be the default
+ cipher; ok markus
+
+commit 2aa9da1a3b360cf7b13e96fe1521534b91501fb5
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 24 01:29:19 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Compile-time disable SSH protocol 1. You can turn it
+ back on using the Makefile.inc knob if you need it to talk to ancient
+ devices.
+
+commit 53097b2022154edf96b4e8526af5666f979503f7
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 24 01:11:12 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix double-negative error message "ssh1 is not
+ unsupported"
+
+commit 5c27e3b6ec2db711dfcd40e6359c0bcdd0b62ea9
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Mar 23 06:06:38 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ for ssh-keygen -A, don't try (and fail) to generate ssh
+ v.1 keys when compiled without SSH1 support RSA/DSA/ECDSA keys when compiled
+ without OpenSSL based on patch by Mike Frysinger; bz#2369
+
+commit 725fd22a8c41db7de73a638539a5157b7e4424ae
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 18 01:44:21 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ KRL support doesn't need OpenSSL anymore, remove #ifdefs
+ from around call
+
+commit b07011c18e0b2e172c5fd09d21fb159a0bf5fcc7
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Mar 16 11:09:52 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ #if 0 some more arrays used only for decrypting (we don't
+ use since we only need encrypt for AES-CTR)
+
+commit 1cb3016635898d287e9d58b50c430995652d5358
+Author: jsg at openbsd.org <jsg at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 11 00:48:39 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add back the changes from rev 1.206, djm reverted this by
+ mistake in rev 1.207
+
+commit 4d24b3b6a4a6383e05e7da26d183b79fa8663697
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 20 09:11:59 2015 +1100
+
+ remove error() accidentally inserted for debugging
+
+ pointed out by Christian Hesse
+
+commit 9f82e5a9042f2d872e98f48a876fcab3e25dd9bb
+Author: Tim Rice <tim at multitalents.net>
+Date: Mon Mar 16 22:49:20 2015 -0700
+
+ portability fix: Solaris systems may not have a grep that understands -q
+
+commit 8ef691f7d9ef500257a549d0906d78187490668f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at google.com>
+Date: Wed Mar 11 10:35:26 2015 +1100
+
+ fix compile with clang
+
+commit 4df590cf8dc799e8986268d62019b487a8ed63ad
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at google.com>
+Date: Wed Mar 11 10:02:39 2015 +1100
+
+ make unit tests work for !OPENSSH_HAS_ECC
+
+commit 307bb40277ca2c32e97e61d70d1ed74b571fd6ba
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Mar 7 04:41:48 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ unbreak for w/SSH1 (default) case; ok markus@ deraadt@
+
+commit b44ee0c998fb4c5f3c3281f2398af5ce42840b6f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Mar 5 18:39:20 2015 -0800
+
+ unbreak hostkeys test for w/ SSH1 case
+
+commit 55e5bdeb519cb60cc18b7ba0545be581fb8598b4
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 01:40:56 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix sshkey_certify() return value for unsupported key types;
+ ok markus@ deraadt@
+
+commit be8f658e550a434eac04256bfbc4289457a24e99
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 4 15:38:03 2015 -0800
+
+ update version numbers to match version.h
+
+commit ac5e8acefa253eb5e5ba186e34236c0e8007afdc
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 4 23:22:35 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ make these work with !SSH1; ok markus@ deraadt@
+
+commit 2f04af92f036b0c87a23efb259c37da98cd81fe6
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 4 21:12:59 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ make ssh-add -D work with !SSH1 agent
+
+commit a05adf95d2af6abb2b7826ddaa7a0ec0cdc1726b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 4 00:55:48 2015 -0800
+
+ netcat needs poll.h portability goop
+
+commit dad2b1892b4c1b7e58df483a8c5b983c4454e099
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 3 22:35:19 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ make it possible to run tests w/o ssh1 support; ok djm@
+
+commit d48a22601bdd3eec054794c535f4ae8d8ae4c6e2
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 4 18:53:53 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ crank; ok markus, deraadt
+
+commit bbffb23daa0b002dd9f296e396a9ab8a5866b339
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 3 13:50:27 2015 -0800
+
+ more --without-ssh1 fixes
+
+commit 6c2039286f503e2012a58a1d109e389016e7a99b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 3 13:48:48 2015 -0800
+
+ fix merge both that broke --without-ssh1 compile
+
+commit 111dfb225478a76f89ecbcd31e96eaf1311b59d3
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 3 21:21:13 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add SSH1 Makefile knob to make it easier to build without
+ SSH1 support; ok markus@
+
+commit 3f7f5e6c5d2aa3f6710289c1a30119e534e56c5c
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 3 20:42:49 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ expand __unused to full __attribute__ for better portability
+
+commit 2fab9b0f8720baf990c931e3f68babb0bf9949c6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 4 07:41:27 2015 +1100
+
+ avoid warning
+
+commit d1bc844322461f882b4fd2277ba9a8d4966573d2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 4 06:31:45 2015 +1100
+
+ Revert "define __unused to nothing if not already defined"
+
+ This reverts commit 1598419e38afbaa8aa5df8dd6b0af98301e2c908.
+
+ Some system headers have objects named __unused
+
+commit 00797e86b2d98334d1bb808f65fa1fd47f328ff1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 4 05:02:45 2015 +1100
+
+ check for crypt and DES_crypt in openssl block
+
+ fixes builds on systems that use DES_crypt; based on patch
+ from Roumen Petrov
+
+commit 1598419e38afbaa8aa5df8dd6b0af98301e2c908
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 4 04:59:13 2015 +1100
+
+ define __unused to nothing if not already defined
+
+ fixes builds on BSD/OS
+
+commit d608a51daad4f14ad6ab43d7cf74ef4801cc3fe9
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 3 17:53:40 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ reorder logic for better portability; patch from Roumen
+ Petrov
+
+commit 68d2dfc464fbcdf8d6387884260f9801f4352393
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 3 06:48:58 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Allow "ssh -Q protocol-version" to list supported SSH
+ protocol versions. Useful for detecting builds without SSH v.1 support; idea
+ and ok markus@
+
+commit 39e2f1229562e1195169905607bc12290d21f021
+Author: millert at openbsd.org <millert at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Mar 1 15:44:40 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Make sure we only call getnameinfo() for AF_INET or AF_INET6
+ sockets. getpeername() of a Unix domain socket may return without error on
+ some systems without actually setting ss_family so getnameinfo() was getting
+ called with ss_family set to AF_UNSPEC. OK djm@
+
+commit e47536ba9692d271b8ad89078abdecf0a1c11707
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Feb 28 08:20:11 2015 -0800
+
+ portability fixes for regress/netcat.c
+
+ Mostly avoiding "err(1, NULL)"
+
+commit 02973ad5f6f49d8420e50a392331432b0396c100
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Feb 28 08:05:27 2015 -0800
+
+ twiddle another test for portability
+
+ from Tom G. Christensen
+
+commit f7f3116abf2a6e2f309ab096b08c58d19613e5d0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 27 15:52:49 2015 -0800
+
+ twiddle test for portability
+
+commit 1ad3a77cc9d5568f5437ff99d377aa7a41859b83
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 26 20:33:22 2015 -0800
+
+ make regress/netcat.c fd passing (more) portable
+
+commit 9e1cfca7e1fe9cf8edb634fc894e43993e4da1ea
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 26 20:32:58 2015 -0800
+
+ create OBJ/valgrind-out before running unittests
+
+commit bd58853102cee739f0e115e6d4b5334332ab1442
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Feb 25 16:58:22 2015 -0800
+
+ valgrind support
+
+commit f43d17269194761eded9e89f17456332f4c83824
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 26 20:45:47 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ don't printf NULL key comments; reported by Tom Christensen
+
+commit 6e6458b476ec854db33e3e68ebf4f489d0ab3df8
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Feb 25 23:05:47 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ zero cmsgbuf before use; we initialise the bits we use
+ but valgrind still spams warning on it
+
+commit a63cfa26864b93ab6afefad0b630e5358ed8edfa
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Feb 25 19:54:02 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix small memory leak when UpdateHostkeys=no
+
+commit e6b950341dd75baa8526f1862bca39e52f5b879b
+Author: Tim Rice <tim at multitalents.net>
+Date: Wed Feb 25 09:56:48 2015 -0800
+
+ Revert "Work around finicky USL linker so netcat will build."
+
+ This reverts commit d1db656021d0cd8c001a6692f772f1de29b67c8b.
+
+ No longer needed with commit 678e473e2af2e4802f24dd913985864d9ead7fb3
+
+commit 6f621603f9cff2a5d6016a404c96cb2f8ac2dec0
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Feb 25 17:29:38 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ don't leak validity of user in "too many authentication
+ failures" disconnect message; reported by Sebastian Reitenbach
+
+commit 6288e3a935494df12519164f52ca5c8c65fc3ca5
+Author: naddy at openbsd.org <naddy at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 24 15:24:05 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add -v (show ASCII art) to -l's synopsis; ok djm@
+
+commit 678e473e2af2e4802f24dd913985864d9ead7fb3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Thu Feb 26 04:12:58 2015 +1100
+
+ Remove dependency on xmalloc.
+
+ Remove ssh_get_progname's dependency on xmalloc, which should reduce
+ link order problems. ok djm@
+
+commit 5d5ec165c5b614b03678afdad881f10e25832e46
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Wed Feb 25 15:32:49 2015 +1100
+
+ Restrict ECDSA and ECDH tests.
+
+ ifdef out some more ECDSA and ECDH tests when built against an OpenSSL
+ that does not have eliptic curve functionality.
+
+commit 1734e276d99b17e92d4233fac7aef3a3180aaca7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Wed Feb 25 13:40:45 2015 +1100
+
+ Move definition of _NSIG.
+
+ _NSIG is only unsed in one file, so move it there prevent redefinition
+ warnings reported by Kevin Brott.
+
+commit a47ead7c95cfbeb72721066c4da2312e5b1b9f3d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Wed Feb 25 13:17:40 2015 +1100
+
+ Add includes.h for compatibility stuff.
+
+commit 38806bda6d2e48ad32812b461eebe17672ada771
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 24 16:50:06 2015 -0800
+
+ include netdb.h to look for MAXHOSTNAMELEN; ok tim
+
+commit d1db656021d0cd8c001a6692f772f1de29b67c8b
+Author: Tim Rice <tim at multitalents.net>
+Date: Tue Feb 24 10:42:08 2015 -0800
+
+ Work around finicky USL linker so netcat will build.
+
+commit cb030ce25f555737e8ba97bdd7883ac43f3ff2a3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 24 09:23:04 2015 -0800
+
+ include includes.h to avoid build failure on AIX
+
+commit 13af342458f5064144abbb07e5ac9bbd4eb42567
+Author: Tim Rice <tim at multitalents.net>
+Date: Tue Feb 24 07:56:47 2015 -0800
+
+ Original portability patch from djm@ for platforms missing err.h.
+ Fix name space clash on Solaris 10. Still more to do for Solaris 10
+ to deal with msghdr structure differences. ok djm@
+
+commit 910209203d0cd60c5083901cbcc0b7b44d9f48d2
+Author: Tim Rice <tim at multitalents.net>
+Date: Mon Feb 23 22:06:56 2015 -0800
+
+ cleaner way fix dispatch.h portion of commit
+ a88dd1da119052870bb2654c1a32c51971eade16
+ (some systems have sig_atomic_t in signal.h, some in sys/signal.h)
+ Sounds good to me djm@
+
+commit 676c38d7cbe65b76bbfff796861bb6615cc6a596
+Author: Tim Rice <tim at multitalents.net>
+Date: Mon Feb 23 21:51:33 2015 -0800
+
+ portability fix: if we can't dind a better define for HOST_NAME_MAX, use 255
+
+commit 1221b22023dce38cbc90ba77eae4c5d78c77a5e6
+Author: Tim Rice <tim at multitalents.net>
+Date: Mon Feb 23 21:50:34 2015 -0800
+
+ portablity fix: s/__inline__/inline/
+
+commit 4c356308a88d309c796325bb75dce90ca16591d5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Tue Feb 24 13:49:31 2015 +1100
+
+ Wrap stdint.h includes in HAVE_STDINT_H.
+
+commit c9c88355c6a27a908e7d1e5003a2b35ea99c1614
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Tue Feb 24 13:43:57 2015 +1100
+
+ Add AI_NUMERICSERV to fake-rfc2553.
+
+ Our getaddrinfo implementation always returns numeric values already.
+
+commit ef342ab1ce6fb9a4b30186c89c309d0ae9d0eeb4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Tue Feb 24 13:39:57 2015 +1100
+
+ Include OpenSSL's objects.h before bn.h.
+
+ Prevents compile errors on some platforms (at least old GCCs and AIX's
+ XLC compilers).
+
+commit dcc8997d116f615195aa7c9ec019fb36c28c6228
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Tue Feb 24 12:30:59 2015 +1100
+
+ Convert two macros into functions.
+
+ Convert packet_send_debug and packet_disconnect from macros to
+ functions. Some older GCCs (2.7.x, 2.95.x) see to have problems with
+ variadic macros with only one argument so we convert these two into
+ functions. ok djm@
+
+commit 2285c30d51b7e2052c6526445abe7e7cc7e170a1
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 23 22:21:21 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ further silence spurious error message even when -v is
+ specified (e.g. to get visual host keys); reported by naddy@
+
+commit 9af21979c00652029e160295e988dea40758ece2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 24 09:04:32 2015 +1100
+
+ don't include stdint.h unless HAVE_STDINT_H set
+
+commit 62f678dd51660d6f8aee1da33d3222c5de10a89e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 24 09:02:54 2015 +1100
+
+ nother sys/queue.h -> sys-queue.h fix
+
+ spotted by Tom Christensen
+
+commit b3c19151cba2c0ed01b27f55de0d723ad07ca98f
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 23 20:32:15 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix a race condition by using a mux socket rather than an
+ ineffectual wait statement
+
+commit a88dd1da119052870bb2654c1a32c51971eade16
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 24 06:30:29 2015 +1100
+
+ various include fixes for portable
+
+commit 5248429b5ec524d0a65507cff0cdd6e0cb99effd
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 23 16:55:51 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add an XXX to remind me to improve sshkey_load_public
+
+commit e94e4b07ef2eaead38b085a60535df9981cdbcdb
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 23 16:55:31 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ silence a spurious error message when listing
+ fingerprints for known_hosts; bz#2342
+
+commit f2293a65392b54ac721f66bc0b44462e8d1d81f8
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 23 16:33:25 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix setting/clearing of TTY raw mode around
+ UpdateHostKeys=ask confirmation question; reported by Herb Goldman
+
+commit f2004cd1adf34492eae0a44b1ef84e0e31b06088
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Mon Feb 23 05:04:21 2015 +1100
+
+ Repair for non-ECC OpenSSL.
+
+ Ifdef out the ECC parts when building with an OpenSSL that doesn't have
+ it.
+
+commit 37f9220db8d1a52c75894c3de1e5f2ae5bd71b6f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Mon Feb 23 03:07:24 2015 +1100
+
+ Wrap stdint.h includes in ifdefs.
+
+commit f81f1bbc5b892c8614ea740b1f92735652eb43f0
+Author: Tim Rice <tim at multitalents.net>
+Date: Sat Feb 21 18:12:10 2015 -0800
+
+ out of tree build fix
+
+commit 2e13a1e4d22f3b503c3bfc878562cc7386a1d1ae
+Author: Tim Rice <tim at multitalents.net>
+Date: Sat Feb 21 18:08:51 2015 -0800
+
+ mkdir kex unit test directory so testing out of tree builds works
+
+commit 1797f49b1ba31e8700231cd6b1d512d80bb50d2c
+Author: halex at openbsd.org <halex at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Feb 21 21:46:57 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ make "ssh-add -d" properly remove a corresponding
+ certificate, and also not whine and fail if there is none
+
+ ok djm@
+
+commit 7faaa32da83a609059d95dbfcb0649fdb04caaf6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Sun Feb 22 07:57:27 2015 +1100
+
+ mkdir hostkey and bitmap unit test directories
+
+commit bd49da2ef197efac5e38f5399263a8b47990c538
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 20 23:46:01 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ sort options useable under Match case-insensitively; prodded
+ jmc@
+
+commit 1a779a0dd6cd8b4a1a40ea33b5415ab8408128ac
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Feb 21 20:51:02 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ correct paths to configuration files being written/updated;
+ they live in $OBJ not cwd; some by Roumen Petrov
+
+commit 28ba006c1acddff992ae946d0bc0b500b531ba6b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Sat Feb 21 15:41:07 2015 +1100
+
+ More correct checking of HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV.
+
+commit e50e8c97a9cecae1f28febccaa6ca5ab3bc10f54
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Sat Feb 21 15:10:33 2015 +1100
+
+ Add null declaration of AI_NUMERICINFO.
+
+ Some platforms (older FreeBSD and DragonFly versions) do have
+ getaddrinfo() but do not have AI_NUMERICINFO. so define it to zero
+ in those cases.
+
+commit 18a208d6a460d707a45916db63a571e805f5db46
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 20 22:40:32 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ more options that are available under Match; bz#2353 reported
+ by calestyo AT scientia.net
+
+commit 44732de06884238049f285f1455b2181baa7dc82
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 20 22:17:21 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ UpdateHostKeys fixes:
+
+ I accidentally changed the format of the hostkeys at openssh.com messages
+ last week without changing the extension name, and this has been causing
+ connection failures for people who are running -current. First reported
+ by sthen@
+
+ s/hostkeys at openssh.com/hostkeys-00 at openssh.com/
+ Change the name of the proof message too, and reorder it a little.
+
+ Also, UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with ControlPersist (no TTY
+ available to read the response) so disable UpdateHostKeys if it is in
+ ask mode and ControlPersist is active (and document this)
+
+commit 13a39414d25646f93e6d355521d832a03aaaffe2
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 17 00:14:05 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Regression: I broke logging of public key fingerprints in
+ 1.46. Pointed out by Pontus Lundkvist
+
+commit 773dda25e828c4c9a52f7bdce6e1e5924157beab
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 30 23:10:17 2015 +1100
+
+ repair --without-openssl; broken in refactor
+
+commit e89c780886b23600de1e1c8d74aabd1ff61f43f0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at google.com>
+Date: Tue Feb 17 10:04:55 2015 +1100
+
+ hook up hostkeys unittest to portable Makefiles
+
+commit 0abf41f99aa16ff09b263bead242d6cb2dbbcf99
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 16 22:21:03 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ enable hostkeys unit tests
+
+commit 68a5d647ccf0fb6782b2f749433a1eee5bc9044b
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 16 22:20:50 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ check string/memory compare arguments aren't NULL
+
+commit ef575ef20d09f20722e26b45dab80b3620469687
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 16 22:18:34 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ unit tests for hostfile.c code, just hostkeys_foreach so
+ far
+
+commit 8ea3365e6aa2759ccf5c76eaea62cbc8a280b0e7
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Feb 14 12:43:16 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ test server rekey limit
+
+commit ce63c4b063c39b2b22d4ada449c9e3fbde788cb3
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 16 22:30:03 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ partial backout of:
+
+ revision 1.441
+ date: 2015/01/31 20:30:05; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +17 -10; commitid
+ : x8klYPZMJSrVlt3O;
+ Let sshd load public host keys even when private keys are missing.
+ Allows sshd to advertise additional keys for future key rotation.
+ Also log fingerprint of hostkeys loaded; ok markus@
+
+ hostkey updates now require access to the private key, so we can't
+ load public keys only. The improved log messages (fingerprints of keys
+ loaded) are kept.
+
+commit 523463a3a2a9bfc6cfc5afa01bae9147f76a37cc
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 16 22:13:32 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Revise hostkeys at openssh.com hostkey learning extension.
+
+ The client will not ask the server to prove ownership of the private
+ halves of any hitherto-unseen hostkeys it offers to the client.
+
+ Allow UpdateHostKeys option to take an 'ask' argument to let the
+ user manually review keys offered.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+commit 6c5c949782d86a6e7d58006599c7685bfcd01685
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 16 22:08:57 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Refactor hostkeys_foreach() and dependent code Deal with
+ IP addresses (i.e. CheckHostIP) Don't clobber known_hosts when nothing
+ changed ok markus@ as part of larger commit
+
+commit 51b082ccbe633dc970df1d1f4c9c0497115fe721
+Author: miod at openbsd.org <miod at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 16 18:26:26 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Declare ge25519_base as extern, to prevent it from
+ becoming a common. Gets us rid of ``lignment 4 of symbol
+ `crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_ge25519_base' in mod_ge25519.o is smaller than 16 in
+ mod_ed25519.o'' warnings at link time.
+
+commit 02db468bf7e3281a8e3c058ced571b38b6407c34
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 13 18:57:00 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ make rekey_limit for sshd w/privsep work; ok djm@
+ dtucker@
+
+commit 8ec67d505bd23c8bf9e17b7a364b563a07a58ec8
+Author: dtucker at openbsd.org <dtucker at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 12 20:34:19 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Prevent sshd spamming syslog with
+ "ssh_dispatch_run_fatal: disconnected". ok markus@
+
+commit d4c0295d1afc342057ba358237acad6be8af480b
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Feb 11 01:20:38 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Some packet error messages show the address of the peer,
+ but might be generated after the socket to the peer has suffered a TCP reset.
+ In these cases, getpeername() won't work so cache the address earlier.
+
+ spotted in the wild via deraadt@ and tedu@
+
+commit 4af1709cf774475ce5d1bc3ddcc165f6c222897d
+Author: jsg at openbsd.org <jsg at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 9 23:22:37 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix some leaks in error paths ok markus@
+
+commit fd36834871d06a03e1ff8d69e41992efa1bbf85f
+Author: millert at openbsd.org <millert at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 6 23:21:59 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ SIZE_MAX is standard, we should be using it in preference to
+ the obsolete SIZE_T_MAX. OK miod@ beck@
+
+commit 1910a286d7771eab84c0b047f31c0a17505236fa
+Author: millert at openbsd.org <millert at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 5 12:59:57 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Include stdint.h, not limits.h to get SIZE_MAX. OK guenther@
+
+commit ce4f59b2405845584f45e0b3214760eb0008c06c
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 3 08:07:20 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ missing ; djm and mlarkin really having great
+ interactions recently
+
+commit 5d34aa94938abb12b877a25be51862757f25d54b
+Author: halex at openbsd.org <halex at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 3 00:34:14 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ slightly extend the passphrase prompt if running with -c
+ in order to give the user a chance to notice if unintentionally running
+ without it
+
+ wording tweak and ok djm@
+
+commit cb3bde373e80902c7d5d0db429f85068d19b2918
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 2 22:48:53 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ handle PKCS#11 C_Login returning
+ CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN; based on patch from Yuri Samoilenko; ok markus@
+
+commit 15ad750e5ec3cc69765b7eba1ce90060e7083399
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 2 07:41:40 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ turn UpdateHostkeys off by default until I figure out
+ mlarkin@'s warning message; requested by deraadt@
+
+commit 3cd5103c1e1aaa59bd66f7f52f6ebbcd5deb12f9
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 2 01:57:44 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ increasing encounters with difficult DNS setups in
+ darknets has convinced me UseDNS off by default is better ok djm
+
+commit 6049a548a8a68ff0bbe581ab1748ea6a59ecdc38
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 31 20:30:05 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Let sshd load public host keys even when private keys are
+ missing. Allows sshd to advertise additional keys for future key rotation.
+ Also log fingerprint of hostkeys loaded; ok markus@
+
+commit 46347ed5968f582661e8a70a45f448e0179ca0ab
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 30 11:43:14 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Add a ssh_config HostbasedKeyType option to control which
+ host public key types are tried during hostbased authentication.
+
+ This may be used to prevent too many keys being sent to the server,
+ and blowing past its MaxAuthTries limit.
+
+ bz#2211 based on patch by Iain Morgan; ok markus@
+
+commit 802660cb70453fa4d230cb0233bc1bbdf8328de1
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 30 10:44:49 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ set a timeout to prevent hangs when talking to busted
+ servers; ok markus@
+
+commit 86936ec245a15c7abe71a0722610998b0a28b194
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 30 01:11:39 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ regression test for 'wildcard CA' serial/key ID revocations
+
+commit 4509b5d4a4fa645a022635bfa7e86d09b285001f
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 30 01:13:33 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ avoid more fatal/exit in the packet.c paths that
+ ssh-keyscan uses; feedback and "looks good" markus@
+
+commit 669aee994348468af8b4b2ebd29b602cf2860b22
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 30 01:10:33 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ permit KRLs that revoke certificates by serial number or
+ key ID without scoping to a particular CA; ok markus@
+
+commit 7a2c368477e26575d0866247d3313da4256cb2b5
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 30 00:59:19 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ missing parentheses after if in do_convert_from() broke
+ private key conversion from other formats some time in 2010; bz#2345 reported
+ by jjelen AT redhat.com
+
+commit 25f5f78d8bf5c22d9cea8b49de24ebeee648a355
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 30 00:22:25 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix ssh protocol 1, spotted by miod@
+
+commit 9ce86c926dfa6e0635161b035e3944e611cbccf0
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 28 22:36:00 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ update to new API (key_fingerprint => sshkey_fingerprint)
+ check sshkey_fingerprint return values; ok markus
+
+commit 9125525c37bf73ad3ee4025520889d2ce9d10f29
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 28 22:05:31 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ avoid fatal() calls in packet code makes ssh-keyscan more
+ reliable against server failures ok dtucker@ markus@
+
+commit fae7bbe544cba7a9e5e4ab47ff6faa3d978646eb
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 28 21:15:47 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ avoid fatal() calls in packet code makes ssh-keyscan more
+ reliable against server failures ok dtucker@ markus@
+
+commit 1a3d14f6b44a494037c7deab485abe6496bf2c60
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 28 11:07:25 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ remove obsolete comment
+
+commit 80c25b7bc0a71d75c43a4575d9a1336f589eb639
+Author: okan at openbsd.org <okan at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 27 12:54:06 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Since r1.2 removed the use of PRI* macros, inttypes.h is
+ no longer required.
+
+ ok djm@
+
+commit 69ff64f69615c2a21c97cb5878a0996c21423257
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 27 23:07:43 2015 +1100
+
+ compile on systems without TCP_MD5SIG (e.g. OSX)
+
+commit 358964f3082fb90b2ae15bcab07b6105cfad5a43
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 27 23:07:25 2015 +1100
+
+ use ssh-keygen under test rather than system's
+
+commit a2c95c1bf33ea53038324d1fdd774bc953f98236
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 27 23:06:59 2015 +1100
+
+ OSX lacks HOST_NAME_MAX, has _POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX
+
+commit ade31d7b6f608a19b85bee29a7a00b1e636a2919
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 27 23:06:23 2015 +1100
+
+ these need active_state defined to link on OSX
+
+ temporary measure until active_state goes away entirely
+
+commit e56aa87502f22c5844918c10190e8b4f785f067b
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 27 12:01:36 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ use printf instead of echo -n to reduce diff against
+ -portable
+
+commit 9f7637f56eddfaf62ce3c0af89c25480f2cf1068
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 26 13:55:29 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ sort previous;
+
+commit 3076ee7d530d5b16842fac7a6229706c7e5acd26
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 26 13:36:53 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ properly restore umask
+
+commit d411d395556b73ba1b9e451516a0bd6697c4b03d
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 26 06:12:18 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ regression test for host key rotation
+
+commit fe8a3a51699afbc6407a8fae59b73349d01e49f8
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 26 06:11:28 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ adapt to sshkey API tweaks
+
+commit 7dd355fb1f0038a3d5cdca57ebab4356c7a5b434
+Author: miod at openbsd.org <miod at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 24 10:39:21 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Move -lz late in the linker commandline for things to
+ build on static arches.
+
+commit 0dad3b806fddb93c475b30853b9be1a25d673a33
+Author: miod at openbsd.org <miod at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 23 21:21:23 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ -Wpointer-sign is supported by gcc 4 only.
+
+commit 2b3b1c1e4bd9577b6e780c255c278542ea66c098
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 20 22:58:57 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ use SUBDIR to recuse into unit tests; makes "make obj"
+ actually work
+
+commit 1d1092bff8db27080155541212b420703f8b9c92
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 26 12:16:36 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ correct description of UpdateHostKeys in ssh_config.5 and
+ add it to -o lists for ssh, scp and sftp; pointed out by jmc@
+
+commit 5104db7cbd6cdd9c5971f4358e74414862fc1022
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 26 06:10:03 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ correctly match ECDSA subtype (== curve) for
+ offered/recevied host keys. Fixes connection-killing host key mismatches when
+ a server offers multiple ECDSA keys with different curve type (an extremely
+ unlikely configuration).
+
+ ok markus, "looks mechanical" deraadt@
+
+commit 8d4f87258f31cb6def9b3b55b6a7321d84728ff2
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 26 03:04:45 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Host key rotation support.
+
+ Add a hostkeys at openssh.com protocol extension (global request) for
+ a server to inform a client of all its available host key after
+ authentication has completed. The client may record the keys in
+ known_hosts, allowing it to upgrade to better host key algorithms
+ and a server to gracefully rotate its keys.
+
+ The client side of this is controlled by a UpdateHostkeys config
+ option (default on).
+
+ ok markus@
+
+commit 60b1825262b1f1e24fc72050b907189c92daf18e
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 26 02:59:11 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ small refactor and add some convenience functions; ok
+ markus
+
+commit a5a3e3328ddce91e76f71ff479022d53e35c60c9
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 22 21:00:42 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ heirarchy -> hierarchy;
+
+commit dcff5810a11195c57e1b3343c0d6b6f2b9974c11
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 22 20:24:41 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Provide a warning about chroot misuses (which sadly, seem
+ to have become quite popular because shiny). sshd cannot detect/manage/do
+ anything about these cases, best we can do is warn in the right spot in the
+ man page. ok markus
+
+commit 087266ec33c76fc8d54ac5a19efacf2f4a4ca076
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 20 23:14:00 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Reduce use of <sys/param.h> and transition to <limits.h>
+ throughout. ok djm markus
+
+commit 57e783c8ba2c0797f93977e83b2a8644a03065d8
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 20 20:16:21 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ kex_setup errors are fatal()
+
+commit 1d6424a6ff94633c221297ae8f42d54e12a20912
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 20 08:02:33 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ this test would accidentally delete agent.sh if run without
+ obj/
+
+commit 12b5f50777203e12575f1b08568281e447249ed3
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 20 07:56:44 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ make this compile with KERBEROS5 enabled
+
+commit e2cc6bef08941256817d44d146115b3478586ad4
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 20 07:55:33 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix hostkeys in agent; ok markus@
+
+commit 1ca3e2155aa5d3801a7ae050f85c71f41fcb95b1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 20 10:11:31 2015 +1100
+
+ fix kex test
+
+commit c78a578107c7e6dcf5d30a2f34cb6581bef14029
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 19 20:45:25 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ finally enable the KEX tests I wrote some years ago...
+
+commit 31821d7217e686667d04935aeec99e1fc4a46e7e
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 19 20:42:31 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ adapt to new error message (SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
+
+commit d3716ca19e510e95d956ae14d5b367e364bff7f1
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 19 17:31:13 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ this test was broken in at least two ways, such that it
+ wasn't checking that a KRL was not excluding valid keys
+
+commit 3f797653748e7c2b037dacb57574c01d9ef3b4d3
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 19 20:32:39 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ switch ssh-keyscan from setjmp to multiple ssh transport
+ layer instances ok djm@
+
+commit f582f0e917bb0017b00944783cd5f408bf4b0b5e
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 19 20:30:23 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add experimental api for packet layer; ok djm@
+
+commit 48b3b2ba75181f11fca7f327058a591f4426cade
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 19 20:20:20 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ store compat flags in struct ssh; ok djm@
+
+commit 57d10cbe861a235dd269c74fb2fe248469ecee9d
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 19 20:16:15 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ adapt kex to sshbuf and struct ssh; ok djm@
+
+commit 3fdc88a0def4f86aa88a5846ac079dc964c0546a
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 19 20:07:45 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ move dispatch to struct ssh; ok djm@
+
+commit 091c302829210c41e7f57c3f094c7b9c054306f0
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 19 19:52:16 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ update packet.c & isolate, introduce struct ssh a) switch
+ packet.c to buffer api and isolate per-connection info into struct ssh b)
+ (de)serialization of the state is moved from monitor to packet.c c) the old
+ packet.c API is implemented in opacket.[ch] d) compress.c/h is removed and
+ integrated into packet.c with and ok djm@
+
+commit 4e62cc68ce4ba20245d208b252e74e91d3785b74
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 19 17:35:48 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix format strings in (disabled) debugging
+
+commit d85e06245907d49a2cd0cfa0abf59150ad616f42
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 19 06:01:32 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ be a bit more careful in these tests to ensure that
+ known_hosts is clean
+
+commit 7947810eab5fe0ad311f32a48f4d4eb1f71be6cf
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 18 22:00:18 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ regression test for known_host file editing using
+ ssh-keygen (-H / -R / -F) after hostkeys_foreach() change; feedback and ok
+ markus@
+
+commit 3a2b09d147a565d8a47edf37491e149a02c0d3a3
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 18 19:54:46 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ more and better key tests
+
+ test signatures and verification
+ test certificate generation
+ flesh out nested cert test
+
+ removes most of the XXX todo markers
+
+commit 589e69fd82724cfc9738f128e4771da2e6405d0d
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 18 19:53:58 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ make the signature fuzzing test much more rigorous:
+ ensure that the fuzzed input cases do not match the original (using new
+ fuzz_matches_original() function) and check that the verification fails in
+ each case
+
+commit 80603c0daa2538c349c1c152405580b164d5475f
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 18 19:52:44 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add a fuzz_matches_original() function to the fuzzer to
+ detect fuzz cases that are identical to the original data. Hacky
+ implementation, but very useful when you need the fuzz to be different, e.g.
+ when verifying signature
+
+commit 87d5495bd337e358ad69c524fcb9495208c0750b
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 18 19:50:55 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ better dumps from the fuzzer (shown on errors) -
+ include the original data as well as the fuzzed copy.
+
+commit d59ec478c453a3fff05badbbfd96aa856364f2c2
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 18 19:47:55 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ enable hostkey-agent.sh test
+
+commit 26b3425170bf840e4b095e1c10bf25a0a3e3a105
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 17 18:54:30 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ unit test for hostkeys in ssh-agent
+
+commit 9e06a0fb23ec55d9223b26a45bb63c7649e2f2f2
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 15 23:41:29 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add kex unit tests
+
+commit d2099dec6da21ae627f6289aedae6bc1d41a22ce
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 19 00:32:54 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ djm, your /usr/include tree is old
+
+commit 2b3c3c76c30dc5076fe09d590f5b26880f148a54
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 18 21:51:19 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ some feedback from markus@: comment hostkeys_foreach()
+ context and avoid a member in it.
+
+commit cecb30bc2ba6d594366e657d664d5c494b6c8a7f
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 18 21:49:42 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ make ssh-keygen use hostkeys_foreach(). Removes some
+ horrendous code; ok markus@
+
+commit ec3d065df3a9557ea96b02d061fd821a18c1a0b9
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 18 21:48:09 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ convert load_hostkeys() (hostkey ordering and
+ known_host matching) to use the new hostkey_foreach() iterator; ok markus
+
+commit c29811cc480a260e42fd88849fc86a80c1e91038
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 18 21:40:23 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ introduce hostkeys_foreach() to allow iteration over a
+ known_hosts file or controlled subset thereof. This will allow us to pull out
+ some ugly and duplicated code, and will be used to implement hostkey rotation
+ later.
+
+ feedback and ok markus
+
+commit f101d8291da01bbbfd6fb8c569cfd0cc61c0d346
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 18 14:01:00 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ string truncation due to sizeof(size) ok djm markus
+
+commit 35d6022b55b7969fc10c261cb6aa78cc4a5fcc41
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 18 13:33:34 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ avoid trailing ',' in host key algorithms
+
+commit 7efb455789a0cb76bdcdee91c6060a3dc8f5c007
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 18 13:22:28 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ infer key length correctly when user specified a fully-
+ qualified key name instead of using the -b bits option; ok markus@
+
+commit 83f8ffa6a55ccd0ce9d8a205e3e7439ec18fedf5
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 17 18:53:34 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix hostkeys on ssh agent; found by unit test I'm about
+ to commit
+
+commit 369d61f17657b814124268f99c033e4dc6e436c1
+Author: schwarze at openbsd.org <schwarze at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 16 16:20:23 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ garbage collect empty .No macros mandoc warns about
+
+commit bb8b442d32dbdb8521d610e10d8b248d938bd747
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 16 15:55:07 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ regression: incorrect error message on
+ otherwise-successful ssh-keygen -A. Reported by Dmitry Orlov, via deraadt@
+
+commit 9010902954a40b59d0bf3df3ccbc3140a653e2bc
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 16 07:19:48 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ when hostname canonicalisation is enabled, try to parse
+ hostnames as addresses before looking them up for canonicalisation. fixes
+ bz#2074 and avoids needless DNS lookups in some cases; ok markus
+
+commit 2ae4f337b2a5fb2841b6b0053b49496fef844d1c
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 16 06:40:12 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Replace <sys/param.h> with <limits.h> and other less
+ dirty headers where possible. Annotate <sys/param.h> lines with their
+ current reasons. Switch to PATH_MAX, NGROUPS_MAX, HOST_NAME_MAX+1,
+ LOGIN_NAME_MAX, etc. Change MIN() and MAX() to local definitions of
+ MINIMUM() and MAXIMUM() where sensible to avoid pulling in the pollution.
+ These are the files confirmed through binary verification. ok guenther,
+ millert, doug (helped with the verification protocol)
+
+commit 3c4726f4c24118e8f1bb80bf75f1456c76df072c
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 15 21:38:50 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ remove xmalloc, switch to sshbuf
+
+commit e17ac01f8b763e4b83976b9e521e90a280acc097
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 15 21:37:14 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ switch to sshbuf
+
+commit ddef9995a1fa6c7a8ff3b38bfe6cf724bebf13d0
+Author: naddy at openbsd.org <naddy at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 15 18:32:54 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ handle UMAC128 initialization like UMAC; ok djm@ markus@
+
+commit f14564c1f7792446bca143580aef0e7ac25dcdae
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 15 11:04:36 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix regression reported by brad@ for passworded keys without
+ agent present
+
+commit 45c0fd70bb2a88061319dfff20cb12ef7b1bc47e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 15 22:08:23 2015 +1100
+
+ make bitmap test compile
+
+commit d333f89abf7179021e5c3f28673f469abe032062
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 15 07:36:28 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ unit tests for KRL bitmap
+
+commit 7613f828f49c55ff356007ae9645038ab6682556
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 14 09:58:21 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ re-add comment about full path
+
+commit 6c43b48b307c41cd656b415621a644074579a578
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 14 09:54:38 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ don't reset to the installed sshd; connect before
+ reconfigure, too
+
+commit 771bb47a1df8b69061f09462e78aa0b66cd594bf
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 13 14:51:51 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ implement a SIGINFO handler so we can discern a stuck
+ fuzz test from a merely glacial one; prompted by and ok markus
+
+commit cfaa57962f8536f3cf0fd7daf4d6a55d6f6de45f
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 13 08:23:26 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ use $SSH instead of installed ssh to allow override;
+ spotted by markus@
+
+commit 0920553d0aee117a596b03ed5b49b280d34a32c5
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 13 07:49:49 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ regress test for PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes; ok markus@
+
+commit 27ca1a5c0095eda151934bca39a77e391f875d17
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 12 20:13:27 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ unbreak parsing of pubkey comments; with gerhard; ok
+ djm/deraadt
+
+commit 55358f0b4e0b83bc0df81c5f854c91b11e0bb4dc
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 12 11:46:32 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fatal if soft-PKCS11 library is missing rather (rather
+ than continue and fail with a more cryptic error)
+
+commit c3554cdd2a1a62434b8161017aa76fa09718a003
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 12 11:12:38 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ let this test all supporte key types; pointed out/ok
+ markus@
+
+commit 1129dcfc5a3e508635004bcc05a3574cb7687167
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 15 09:40:00 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ sync ssh-keysign, ssh-keygen and some dependencies to the
+ new buffer/key API; mostly mechanical, ok markus@
+
+commit e4ebf5586452bf512da662ac277aaf6ecf0efe7c
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 15 07:57:08 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ remove commented-out test code now that it has moved to a
+ proper unit test
+
+commit e81cba066c1e9eb70aba0f6e7c0ff220611b370f
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 14 20:54:29 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ whitespace
+
+commit 141efe49542f7156cdbc2e4cd0a041d8b1aab622
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 14 20:05:27 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ move authfd.c and its tentacles to the new buffer/key
+ API; ok markus@
+
+commit 0088c57af302cda278bd26d8c3ae81d5b6f7c289
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 14 19:33:41 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix small regression: ssh-agent would return a success
+ message but an empty signature if asked to sign using an unknown key; ok
+ markus@
+
+commit b03ebe2c22b8166e4f64c37737f4278676e3488d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 15 03:08:58 2015 +1100
+
+ more --without-openssl
+
+ fix some regressions caused by upstream merges
+
+ enable KRLs now that they no longer require BIGNUMs
+
+commit bc42cc6fe784f36df225c44c93b74830027cb5a2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 15 03:08:29 2015 +1100
+
+ kludge around tun API mismatch betterer
+
+commit c332110291089b624fa0951fbf2d1ee6de525b9f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 15 02:59:51 2015 +1100
+
+ some systems lack SO_REUSEPORT
+
+commit 83b9678a62cbdc74eb2031cf1e1e4ffd58e233ae
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 15 02:35:50 2015 +1100
+
+ fix merge botch
+
+commit 0cdc5a3eb6fb383569a4da2a30705d9b90428d6b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 15 02:35:33 2015 +1100
+
+ unbreak across API change
+
+commit 6e2549ac2b5e7f96cbc2d83a6e0784b120444b47
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 15 02:30:18 2015 +1100
+
+ need includes.h for portable OpenSSH
+
+commit 72ef7c148c42db7d5632a29f137f8b87b579f2d9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 15 02:21:31 2015 +1100
+
+ support --without-openssl at configure time
+
+ Disables and removes dependency on OpenSSL. Many features don't
+ work and the set of crypto options is greatly restricted. This
+ will only work on system with native arc4random or /dev/urandom.
+
+ Considered highly experimental for now.
+
+commit 4f38c61c68ae7e3f9ee4b3c38bc86cd39f65ece9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 15 02:28:00 2015 +1100
+
+ add files missed in last commit
+
+commit a165bab605f7be55940bb8fae977398e8c96a46d
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 14 15:02:39 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ avoid BIGNUM in KRL code by using a simple bitmap;
+ feedback and ok markus
+
+commit 7d845f4a0b7ec97887be204c3760e44de8bf1f32
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 14 13:54:13 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ update sftp client and server to new buffer API. pretty
+ much just mechanical changes; with & ok markus
+
+commit 139ca81866ec1b219c717d17061e5e7ad1059e2a
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 14 13:09:09 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ switch to sshbuf/sshkey; with & ok djm@
+
+commit 81bfbd0bd35683de5d7f2238b985e5f8150a9180
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 14 21:48:18 2015 +1100
+
+ support --without-openssl at configure time
+
+ Disables and removes dependency on OpenSSL. Many features don't
+ work and the set of crypto options is greatly restricted. This
+ will only work on system with native arc4random or /dev/urandom.
+
+ Considered highly experimental for now.
+
+commit 54924b53af15ccdcbb9f89984512b5efef641a31
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 14 10:46:28 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ avoid an warning for the !OPENSSL case
+
+commit ae8b463217f7c9b66655bfc3945c050ffdaeb861
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 14 10:30:34 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ swith auth-options to new sshbuf/sshkey; ok djm@
+
+commit 540e891191b98b89ee90aacf5b14a4a68635e763
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 14 10:29:45 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ make non-OpenSSL aes-ctr work on sshd w/ privsep; ok
+ markus@
+
+commit 60c2c4ea5e1ad0ddfe8b2877b78ed5143be79c53
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 14 10:24:42 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ remove unneeded includes, sync my copyright across files
+ & whitespace; ok djm@
+
+commit 128343bcdb0b60fc826f2733df8cf979ec1627b4
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 13 19:31:40 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ adapt mac.c to ssherr.h return codes (de-fatal) and
+ simplify dependencies ok djm@
+
+commit e7fd952f4ea01f09ceb068721a5431ac2fd416ed
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 13 19:04:35 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ sync changes from libopenssh; prepared by markus@ mostly
+ debug output tweaks, a couple of error return value changes and some other
+ minor stuff
+
+commit 76c0480a85675f03a1376167cb686abed01a3583
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 13 19:38:18 2015 +1100
+
+ add --without-ssh1 option to configure
+
+ Allows disabling support for SSH protocol 1.
+
+commit 1f729f0614d1376c3332fa1edb6a5e5cec7e9e03
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 13 07:39:19 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add sshd_config HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes and
+ PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes options to allow sshd to control what public key types
+ will be accepted. Currently defaults to all. Feedback & ok markus@
+
+commit 816d1538c24209a93ba0560b27c4fda57c3fff65
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 12 20:13:27 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ unbreak parsing of pubkey comments; with gerhard; ok
+ djm/deraadt
+
+commit 0097565f849851812df610b7b6b3c4bd414f6c62
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 12 19:22:46 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ missing error assigment on sshbuf_put_string()
+
+commit a7f49dcb527dd17877fcb8d5c3a9a6f550e0bba5
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 12 15:18:07 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ apparently memcpy(x, NULL, 0) is undefined behaviour
+ according to C99 (cf. sections 7.21.1 and 7.1.4), so check skip memcpy calls
+ when length==0; ok markus@
+
+commit 905fe30fca82f38213763616d0d26eb6790bde33
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 12 14:05:19 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ free->sshkey_free; ok djm@
+
+commit f067cca2bc20c86b110174c3fef04086a7f57b13
+Author: markus at openbsd.org <markus at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 12 13:29:27 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ allow WITH_OPENSSL w/o WITH_SSH1; ok djm@
+
+commit c4bfafcc2a9300d9cfb3c15e75572d3a7d74670d
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 8 13:10:58 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ adjust for sshkey_load_file() API change
+
+commit e752c6d547036c602b89e9e704851463bd160e32
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 8 13:44:36 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix ssh_config FingerprintHash evaluation order; from Petr
+ Lautrbach
+
+commit ab24ab847b0fc94c8d5e419feecff0bcb6d6d1bf
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 8 10:15:45 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ reorder hostbased key attempts to better match the
+ default hostkey algorithms order in myproposal.h; ok markus@
+
+commit 1195f4cb07ef4b0405c839293c38600b3e9bdb46
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 8 10:14:08 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ deprecate key_load_private_pem() and
+ sshkey_load_private_pem() interfaces. Refactor the generic key loading API to
+ not require pathnames to be specified (they weren't really used).
+
+ Fixes a few other things en passant:
+
+ Makes ed25519 keys work for hostbased authentication (ssh-keysign
+ previously used the PEM-only routines).
+
+ Fixes key comment regression bz#2306: key pathnames were being lost as
+ comment fields.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+commit febbe09e4e9aff579b0c5cc1623f756862e4757d
+Author: tedu at openbsd.org <tedu at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 7 18:15:07 2015 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ workaround for the Meyer, et al, Bleichenbacher Side
+ Channel Attack. fake up a bignum key before RSA decryption. discussed/ok djm
+ markus
+
+commit 5191df927db282d3123ca2f34a04d8d96153911a
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Dec 23 22:42:48 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ KNF and add a little more debug()
+
+commit 8abd80315d3419b20e6938f74d37e2e2b547f0b7
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 22 09:26:31 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add fingerprinthash to the options list;
+
+commit 296ef0560f60980da01d83b9f0e1a5257826536f
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 22 09:24:59 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ tweak previous;
+
+commit 462082eacbd37778a173afb6b84c6f4d898a18b5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at google.com>
+Date: Tue Dec 30 08:16:11 2014 +1100
+
+ avoid uninitialised free of ldns_res
+
+ If an invalid rdclass was passed to getrrsetbyname() then
+ this would execute a free on an uninitialised pointer.
+ OpenSSH only ever calls this with a fixed and valid rdclass.
+
+ Reported by Joshua Rogers
+
+commit 01b63498801053f131a0740eb9d13faf35d636c8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at google.com>
+Date: Mon Dec 29 18:10:18 2014 +1100
+
+ pull updated OpenBSD BCrypt PBKDF implementation
+
+ Includes fix for 1 byte output overflow for large key length
+ requests (not reachable in OpenSSH).
+
+ Pointed out by Joshua Rogers
+
+commit c528c1b4af2f06712177b3de9b30705752f7cbcb
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at google.com>
+Date: Tue Dec 23 15:26:13 2014 +1100
+
+ fix variable name for IPv6 case in construct_utmpx
+
+ patch from writeonce AT midipix.org via bz#2296
+
+commit 293cac52dcda123244b2e594d15592e5e481c55e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at google.com>
+Date: Mon Dec 22 16:30:42 2014 +1100
+
+ include and use OpenBSD netcat in regress/
+
+commit 8f6784f0cb56dc4fd00af3e81a10050a5785228d
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 22 09:05:17 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ mention ssh -Q feature to list supported { MAC, cipher,
+ KEX, key } algorithms in more places and include the query string used to
+ list the relevant information; bz#2288
+
+commit 449e11b4d7847079bd0a2daa6e3e7ea03d8ef700
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 22 08:24:17 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ tweak previous;
+
+commit 4bea0ab3290c0b9dd2aa199e932de8e7e18062d6
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 22 08:06:03 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ regression test for multiple required pubkey authentication;
+ ok markus@
+
+commit f1c4d8ec52158b6f57834b8cd839605b0a33e7f2
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 22 08:04:23 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ correct description of what will happen when a
+ AuthorizedKeysCommand is specified but AuthorizedKeysCommandUser is not (sshd
+ will refuse to start)
+
+commit 161cf419f412446635013ac49e8c660cadc36080
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 22 07:55:51 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ make internal handling of filename arguments of "none"
+ more consistent with ssh. "none" arguments are now replaced with NULL when
+ the configuration is finalised.
+
+ Simplifies checking later on (just need to test not-NULL rather than
+ that + strcmp) and cleans up some inconsistencies. ok markus@
+
+commit f69b69b8625be447b8826b21d87713874dac25a6
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 22 07:51:30 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ remember which public keys have been used for
+ authentication and refuse to accept previously-used keys.
+
+ This allows AuthenticationMethods=publickey,publickey to require
+ that users authenticate using two _different_ pubkeys.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+commit 46ac2ed4677968224c4ca825bc98fc68dae183f0
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 22 07:24:11 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix passing of wildcard forward bind addresses when
+ connection multiplexing is in use; patch from Sami Hartikainen via bz#2324;
+ ok dtucker@
+
+commit 0d1b241a262e4d0a6bbfdd595489ab1b853c43a1
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 22 06:14:29 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ make this slightly easier to diff against portable
+
+commit 0715bcdddbf68953964058f17255bf54734b8737
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 22 13:47:07 2014 +1100
+
+ add missing regress output file
+
+commit 1e30483c8ad2c2f39445d4a4b6ab20c241e40593
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 22 02:15:52 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ adjust for new SHA256 key fingerprints and
+ slightly-different MD5 hex fingerprint format
+
+commit 6b40567ed722df98593ad8e6a2d2448fc2b4b151
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 22 01:14:49 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ poll changes to netcat (usr.bin/netcat.c r1.125) broke
+ this test; fix it by ensuring more stdio fds are sent to devnull
+
+commit a5375ccb970f49dddf7d0ef63c9b713ede9e7260
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Dec 21 23:35:14 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ tweak previous;
+
+commit b79efde5c3badf5ce4312fe608d8307eade533c5
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Dec 21 23:12:42 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ document FingerprintHash here too
+
+commit d16bdd8027dd116afa01324bb071a4016cdc1a75
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 22 10:18:09 2014 +1100
+
+ missing include for base64 encoding
+
+commit 56d1c83cdd1ac76f1c6bd41e01e80dad834f3994
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Dec 21 22:27:55 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Add FingerprintHash option to control algorithm used for
+ key fingerprints. Default changes from MD5 to SHA256 and format from hex to
+ base64.
+
+ Feedback and ok naddy@ markus@
+
+commit 058f839fe15c51be8b3a844a76ab9a8db550be4f
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 18 23:58:04 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ don't count partial authentication success as a failure
+ against MaxAuthTries; ok deraadt@
+
+commit c7219f4f54d64d6dde66dbcf7a2699daa782d2a1
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 12 00:02:17 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ revert chunk I didn't mean to commit yet; via jmc@
+
+commit 7de5991aa3997e2981440f39c1ea01273a0a2c7b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 18 11:44:06 2014 +1100
+
+ upstream libc change
+
+ revision 1.2
+ date: 2014/12/08 03:45:00; author: bcook; state: Exp; lines: +2 -2; commitid: 7zWEBgJJOCZ2hvTV;
+ avoid left shift overflow in reallocarray.
+
+ Some 64-bit platforms (e.g. Windows 64) have a 32-bit long. So, shifting
+ 1UL 32-bits to the left causes an overflow. This replaces the constant 1UL with
+ (size_t)1 so that we get the correct constant size for the platform.
+
+ discussed with tedu@ & deraadt@
+
+commit 2048f85a5e6da8bc6e0532efe02ecfd4e63c978c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 18 10:15:49 2014 +1100
+
+ include CFLAGS in gnome askpass targets
+
+ from Fedora
+
+commit 48b68ce19ca42fa488960028048dec023f7899bb
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 11 08:20:09 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ explicitly include sys/param.h in files that use the
+ howmany() macro; from portable
+
+commit d663bea30a294d440fef4398e5cd816317bd4518
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 11 05:25:06 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ mention AuthorizedKeysCommandUser must be set for
+ AuthorizedKeysCommand to be run; bz#2287
+
+commit 17bf3d81e00f2abb414a4fd271118cf4913f049f
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 11 05:13:28 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ show in debug output which hostkeys are being tried when
+ attempting hostbased auth; patch from Iain Morgan
+
+commit da0277e3717eadf5b15e03379fc29db133487e94
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 11 04:16:14 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Make manual reflect reality: sftp-server's -d option
+ accepts a "%d" option, not a "%h" one.
+
+ bz#2316; reported by Kirk Wolf
+
+commit 4cf87f4b81fa9380bce5fcff7b0f8382ae3ad996
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Dec 10 01:24:09 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ better error value for invalid signature length
+
+commit 4bfad14ca56f8ae04f418997816b4ba84e2cfc3c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Wed Dec 10 02:12:51 2014 +1100
+
+ Resync more with OpenBSD's rijndael.c, in particular "#if 0"-ing out some
+ unused code. Should fix compile error reported by plautrba at redhat.
+
+commit 642652d280499691c8212ec6b79724b50008ce09
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Wed Dec 10 01:32:23 2014 +1100
+
+ Add reallocarray to compat library
+
+commit 3dfd8d93dfcc69261f5af99df56f3ff598581979
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 4 22:31:50 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add tests for new client RevokedHostKeys option; refactor
+ to make it a bit more readable
+
+commit a31046cad1aed16a0b55171192faa6d02665ccec
+Author: krw at openbsd.org <krw at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 19 13:35:37 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Nuke yet more obvious #include duplications.
+
+ ok deraadt@
+
+commit a7c762e5b2c1093542c0bc1df25ccec0b4cf479f
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 4 20:47:36 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ key_in_file() wrapper is no longer used
+
+commit 5e39a49930d885aac9c76af3129332b6e772cd75
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 4 02:24:32 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ add RevokedHostKeys option for the client
+
+ Allow textfile or KRL-based revocation of hostkeys.
+
+commit 74de254bb92c684cf53461da97f52d5ba34ded80
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 4 01:49:59 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ convert KRL code to new buffer API
+
+ ok markus@
+
+commit db995f2eed5fc432598626fa3e30654503bf7151
+Author: millert at openbsd.org <millert at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 26 18:34:51 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Prefer setvbuf() to setlinebuf() for portability; ok
+ deraadt@
+
+commit 72bba3d179ced8b425272efe6956a309202a91f3
+Author: jsg at openbsd.org <jsg at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 24 03:39:22 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Fix crashes in the handling of the sshd config file found
+ with the afl fuzzer.
+
+ ok deraadt@ djm@
+
+commit 867f49c666adcfe92bf539d9c37c1accdea08bf6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 26 13:22:41 2014 +1100
+
+ Avoid Cygwin ssh-host-config reading /etc/group
+
+ Patch from Corinna Vinschen
+
+commit 8b66f36291a721b1ba7c44f24a07fdf39235593e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 26 13:20:35 2014 +1100
+
+ allow custom service name for sshd on Cygwin
+
+ Permits the use of multiple sshd running with different service names.
+
+ Patch by Florian Friesdorf via Corinna Vinschen
+
+commit 08c0eebf55d70a9ae1964399e609288ae3186a0c
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Nov 22 19:21:03 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ restore word zapped in previous, and remove some useless
+ "No" macros;
+
+commit a1418a0033fba43f061513e992e1cbcc3343e563
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Nov 22 18:15:41 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ /dev/random has created the same effect as /dev/arandom
+ (and /dev/urandom) for quite some time. Mop up the last few, by using
+ /dev/random where we actually want it, or not even mentioning arandom where
+ it is irrelevant.
+
+commit b6de5ac9ed421362f479d1ad4fa433d2e25dad5b
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 21 01:00:38 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix NULL pointer dereference crash on invalid timestamp
+
+ found using Michal Zalewski's afl fuzzer
+
+commit a1f8110cd5ed818d59b3a2964fab7de76e92c18e
+Author: mikeb at openbsd.org <mikeb at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 18 22:38:48 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Sync AES code to the one shipped in OpenSSL/LibreSSL.
+
+ This includes a commit made by Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl ! org>
+ to the OpenSSL source tree on Wed, 28 Jun 2006 with the following
+ message: "Mitigate cache-collision timing attack on last round."
+
+ OK naddy, miod, djm
+
+commit 335c83d5f35d8620e16b8aa26592d4f836e09ad2
+Author: krw at openbsd.org <krw at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 18 20:54:28 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Nuke more obvious #include duplications.
+
+ ok deraadt@ millert@ tedu@
+
+commit 51b64e44121194ae4bf153dee391228dada2abcb
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 17 00:21:40 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix KRL generation when multiple CAs are in use
+
+ We would generate an invalid KRL when revoking certs by serial
+ number for multiple CA keys due to a section being written out
+ twice.
+
+ Also extend the regress test to catch this case by having it
+ produce a multi-CA KRL.
+
+ Reported by peter AT pean.org
+
+commit d2d51003a623e21fb2b25567c4878d915e90aa2a
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 18 01:02:25 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix NULL pointer dereference crash in key loading
+
+ found by Michal Zalewski's AFL fuzzer
+
+commit 9f9fad0191028edc43d100d0ded39419b6895fdf
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 17 00:21:40 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix KRL generation when multiple CAs are in use
+
+ We would generate an invalid KRL when revoking certs by serial
+ number for multiple CA keys due to a section being written out
+ twice.
+
+ Also extend the regress test to catch this case by having it
+ produce a multi-CA KRL.
+
+ Reported by peter AT pean.org
+
+commit da8af83d3f7ec00099963e455010e0ed1d7d0140
+Author: bentley at openbsd.org <bentley at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Nov 15 14:41:03 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Reduce instances of `` '' in manuals.
+
+ troff displays these as typographic quotes, but nroff implementations
+ almost always print them literally, which rarely has the intended effect
+ with modern fonts, even in stock xterm.
+
+ These uses of `` '' can be replaced either with more semantic alternatives
+ or with Dq, which prints typographic quotes in a UTF-8 locale (but will
+ automatically fall back to `` '' in an ASCII locale).
+
+ improvements and ok schwarze@
+
+commit fc302561369483bb755b17f671f70fb894aec01d
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 10 22:25:49 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ mux-related manual tweaks
+
+ mention ControlPersist=0 is the same as ControlPersist=yes
+
+ recommend that ControlPath sockets be placed in a og-w directory
+
+commit 0e4cff5f35ed11102fe3783779960ef07e0cd381
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at google.com>
+Date: Wed Nov 5 11:01:31 2014 +1100
+
+ Prepare scripts for next Cygwin release
+
+ Makes the Cygwin-specific ssh-user-config script independent of the
+ existence of /etc/passwd. The next Cygwin release will allow to
+ generate passwd and group entries from the Windows account DBs, so the
+ scripts have to adapt.
+
+ from Corinna Vinschen
+
+commit 7d0ba5336651731949762eb8877ce9e3b52df436
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 30 10:45:41 2014 +1100
+
+ include version number in OpenSSL-too-old error
+
+commit 3bcb92e04d9207e9f78d82f7918c6d3422054ce9
+Author: lteo at openbsd.org <lteo at openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 24 02:01:20 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Remove unnecessary include: netinet/in_systm.h is not needed
+ by these programs.
+
+ NB. skipped for portable
+
+ ok deraadt@ millert@
+
+commit 6fdcaeb99532e28a69f1a1599fbd540bb15b70a0
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Oct 20 03:43:01 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ whitespace
+
+commit 165bc8786299e261706ed60342985f9de93a7461
+Author: daniel at openbsd.org <daniel at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 14 03:09:59 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ plug a memory leak; from Maxime Villard.
+
+ ok djm@
+
+commit b1ba15f3885947c245c2dbfaad0a04ba050abea0
+Author: jmc at openbsd.org <jmc at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 9 06:21:31 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ tweak previous;
+
+commit 259a02ebdf74ad90b41d116ecf70aa823fa4c6e7
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Oct 13 00:38:35 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ whitespace
+
+commit 957fbceb0f3166e41b76fdb54075ab3b9cc84cba
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 8 22:20:25 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Tweak config reparsing with host canonicalisation
+
+ Make the second pass through the config files always run when
+ hostname canonicalisation is enabled.
+
+ Add a "Match canonical" criteria that allows ssh_config Match
+ blocks to trigger only in the second config pass.
+
+ Add a -G option to ssh that causes it to parse its configuration
+ and dump the result to stdout, similar to "sshd -T"
+
+ Allow ssh_config Port options set in the second config parse
+ phase to be applied (they were being ignored).
+
+ bz#2267 bz#2286; ok markus
+
+commit 5c0dafd38bf66feeeb45fa0741a5baf5ad8039ba
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 8 22:15:27 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ another -Wpointer-sign from clang
+
+commit bb005dc815ebda9af3ae4b39ca101c4da918f835
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 8 22:15:06 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ fix a few -Wpointer-sign warnings from clang
+
+commit 3cc1fbb4fb0e804bfb873fd363cea91b27fc8188
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 8 21:45:48 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ parse cert sections using nested buffers to reduce
+ copies; ok markus
+
+commit 4a45922aebf99164e2fc83d34fe55b11ae1866ef
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Oct 6 00:47:15 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ correct options in usage(); from mancha1 AT zoho.com
+
+commit 48dffd5bebae6fed0556dc5c36cece0370690618
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 9 09:45:36 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ mention permissions on tun(4) devices in PermitTunnel
+ documentation; bz#2273
+
+commit a5883d4eccb94b16c355987f58f86a7dee17a0c2
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 3 18:55:07 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ tighten permissions on pty when the "tty" group does
+ not exist; pointed out by Corinna Vinschen; ok markus
+
+commit 180bcb406b58bf30723c01a6b010e48ee626dda8
+Author: sobrado at openbsd.org <sobrado at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Aug 30 16:32:25 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ typo.
+
+commit f70b22bcdd52f6bf127047b3584371e6e5d45627
+Author: sobrado at openbsd.org <sobrado at openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Aug 30 15:33:50 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ improve capitalization for the Ed25519 public-key
+ signature system.
+
+ ok djm@
+
+commit 7df8818409c752cf3f0c3f8044fe9aebed8647bd
+Author: doug at openbsd.org <doug at openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 21 01:08:52 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Free resources on error in mkstemp and fdopen
+
+ ok djm@
+
+commit 40ba4c9733aaed08304714faeb61529f18da144b
+Author: deraadt at openbsd.org <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Aug 20 01:28:55 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ djm how did you make a typo like that...
+
+commit 57d378ec9278ba417a726f615daad67d157de666
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 19 23:58:28 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ When dumping the server configuration (sshd -T), print
+ correct KEX, MAC and cipher defaults. Spotted by Iain Morgan
+
+commit 7ff880ede5195d0b17e7f1e3b6cfbc4cb6f85240
+Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 19 23:57:18 2014 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ ~-expand lcd paths
+
+commit 4460a7ad0c78d4cd67c467f6e9f4254d0404ed59
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Sun Oct 12 12:35:48 2014 +1100
+
+ remove duplicated KEX_DH1 entry
+
+commit c9b8426a616138d0d762176c94f51aff3faad5ff
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 9 10:34:06 2014 +1100
+
+ remove ChangeLog file
+
+ Commit logs will be generated from git at release time.
+
+commit 81d18ff7c93a04affbf3903e0963859763219aed
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at google.com>
+Date: Tue Oct 7 21:24:25 2014 +1100
+
+ delete contrib/caldera directory
+
+commit 0ec9e87d3638206456968202f05bb5123670607a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at google.com>
+Date: Tue Oct 7 19:57:27 2014 +1100
+
+ test commit
+
+commit 8fb65a44568701b779f3d77326bceae63412d28d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 7 09:21:49 2014 +1100
+
+ - (djm) Release OpenSSH-6.7
+
+commit e8c9f2602c46f6781df5e52e6cd8413dab4602a3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 3 09:24:56 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [sshd_config.5] typo; from Iain Morgan
+
+commit 703b98a26706f5083801d11059486d77491342ae
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 1 09:43:07 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c]
+ [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Kludge around bad glibc
+ _FORTIFY_SOURCE check that doesn't grok heap-allocated fd_sets;
+ ok dtucker@
+
+commit 0fa0ed061bbfedb0daa705e220748154a84c3413
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 10 08:15:34 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Allow mremap and exit for DietLibc;
+ patch from Felix von Leitner; ok dtucker
+
+commit ad7d23d461c3b7e1dcb15db13aee5f4b94dc1a95
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+Date: Tue Sep 9 12:23:10 2014 +1000
+
+ 20140908
+ - (dtucker) [INSTALL] Update info about egd. ok djm@
+
+commit 2a8699f37cc2515e3bc60e0c677ba060f4d48191
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 4 03:46:05 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/arc4random.c] Zero seed after keying PRNG
+
+commit 44988defb1f5e3afe576d86000365e1f07a1b494
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 3 05:35:32 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Fix old code leading to
+ permissions/ACLs; from Corinna Vinschen
+
+commit 23f269562b7537b2f6f5014e50a25e5dcc55a837
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 3 05:33:25 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [defines.h sshbuf.c] Move __predict_true|false to defines.h and
+ conditionalise to avoid duplicate definition.
+
+commit 41c8de2c0031cf59e7cf0c06b5bcfbf4852c1fda
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Aug 30 16:23:06 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [Makefile.in] Make TEST_SHELL a variable; "good idea" tim@
+
+commit d7c81e216a7bd9eed6e239c970d9261bb1651947
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Aug 30 04:18:28 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] add include guard
+
+commit 4687802dda57365b984b897fc3c8e2867ea09b22
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Aug 30 03:29:19 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [misc.c] Missing newline between functions
+
+commit 51c77e29220dee87c53be2dc47092934acab26fe
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Aug 30 02:30:30 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] add
+ OPENSSL_[RD]SA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS defines for OpenSSL that lacks them
+
+commit 3d673d103bad35afaec6e7ef73e5277216ce33a3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Aug 27 06:32:01 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c] implement explicit_bzero()
+ using memset_s() where possible; improve fallback to indirect bzero
+ via a volatile pointer to give it more of a chance to avoid being
+ optimised away.
+
+commit 146218ac11a1eb0dcade6f793d7acdef163b5ddc
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Aug 27 04:11:55 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [monitor.c sshd.c] SIGXFSZ needs to be ignored in postauth
+ monitor, not preauth; bz#2263
+
+commit 1b215c098b3b37e38aa4e4c91bb908eee41183b1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Aug 27 04:04:40 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c]
+ [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c]
+ [regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c]
+ [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c]
+ [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c]
+ [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c] Don't include openssl/ec.h
+ on !ECC OpenSSL systems
+
+commit ad013944af0a19e3f612089d0099bb397cf6502d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 26 09:27:28 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [INSTALL] Recommend libcrypto be built -fPIC, mention LibreSSL,
+ update OpenSSL version requirement.
+
+commit ed126de8ee04c66640a0ea2697c4aaf36801f100
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 26 08:37:47 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [bufec.c] Skip this file on !ECC OpenSSL
+
+commit 9c1dede005746864a4fdb36a7cdf6c51296ca909
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Sun Aug 24 03:01:06 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [sftp-server.c] Some systems (e.g. Irix) have prctl() but not
+ PR_SET_DUMPABLE, so adjust ifdef; reported by Tom Christensen
+
+commit d244a5816fd1312a33404b436e4dd83594f1119e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Aug 23 17:06:49 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [configure.ac] We now require a working vsnprintf everywhere (not
+ just for systems that lack asprintf); check for it always and extend
+ test to catch more brokenness. Fixes builds on Solaris <= 9
+
+commit 4cec036362a358e398e6a2e6d19d8e5780558634
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Aug 23 03:11:09 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [sshd.c] Ignore SIGXFSZ in preauth monitor child; can explode on
+ lastlog writing on platforms with high UIDs; bz#2263
+
+commit 394a60f2598d28b670d934b93942a3370b779b39
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 22 18:06:20 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [configure.ac] double braces to appease autoconf
+
+commit 4d69aeabd6e60afcdc7cca177ca751708ab79a9d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 22 17:48:27 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c] Fix compilation failure (prototype/
+ definition mismatch) and warning for broken/missing snprintf case.
+
+commit 0c11f1ac369d2c0aeb0ab0458a7cd04c72fe5e9e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 22 17:36:56 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [sshbuf-getput-crypto.c] Fix compilation when OpenSSL lacks ECC
+
+commit 6d62784b8973340b251fea6b04890f471adf28db
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 22 17:36:19 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [configure.ac] include leading zero characters in OpenSSL version
+ number; fixes test for unsupported versions
+
+commit 4f1ff1ed782117f5d5204d4e91156ed5da07cbb7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 21 15:54:50 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c] Fix for systems that
+ don't set __progname. Diagnosed by Tom Christensen.
+
+commit 005a64da0f457410045ef0bfa93c863c2450447d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 21 10:48:41 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [key.h] Fix ifdefs for no-ECC OpenSSL
+
+commit aa6598ebb3343c7380e918388e10e8ca5852b613
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 21 10:47:54 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [Makefile.in] fix reference to libtest_helper.a in sshkey test too.
+
+commit 54703e3cf63f0c80d4157e5ad7dbc2b363ee2c56
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Aug 20 11:10:51 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [contrib/cygwin/README] Correct build instructions; from Corinna
+
+commit f0935698f0461f24d8d1f1107b476ee5fd4db1cb
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Aug 20 11:06:50 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [sshkey.h] Fix compilation when OpenSSL lacks ECC
+
+commit c5089ecaec3b2c02f014f4e67518390702a4ba14
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Aug 20 11:06:20 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [Makefile.in] refer to libtest_helper.a by explicit path rather than
+ -L/-l; fixes linking problems on some platforms
+
+commit 2195847e503a382f83ee969b0a8bd3dfe0e55c18
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Aug 20 11:05:03 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [configure.ac] Check OpenSSL version is supported at configure time;
+ suggested by Kevin Brott
+
+commit a75aca1bbc989aa9f8b1b08489d37855f3d24d1a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 19 11:36:07 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [INSTALL contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/cygwin/README]
+ [contrib/redhat/openssh.spec contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Remove mentions
+ of TCP wrappers.
+
+commit 3f022b5a9477abceeb1bbeab04b055f3cc7ca8f6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 19 11:32:34 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [ssh-dss.c] Include openssl/dsa.h for DSA_SIG
+
+commit 88137902632aceb923990e98cf5dc923bb3ef2f5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 19 11:28:11 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [sshbuf.h] Fix compilation on systems without OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
+
+commit 2f3d1e7fb2eabd3cfbfd8d0f7bdd2f9a1888690b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 19 11:14:36 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [myproposal.h] Make curve25519 KEX dependent on
+ HAVE_EVP_SHA256 instead of OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
+
+commit d4e7d59d01a6c7f59e8c1f94a83c086e9a33d8aa
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 19 11:14:17 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [serverloop.c] Fix syntax error on Cygwin; from Corinna Vinschen
+
+commit 9eaeea2cf2b6af5f166cfa9ad3c7a90711a147a9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Sun Aug 10 11:35:05 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec]
+ [contrib/redhat/openssh.spec contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update versions
+
+commit f8988fbef0c9801d19fa2f8f4f041690412bec37
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 1 13:31:52 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Use -d (detach stdin) flag to disassociate
+ nc from stdin, it's more portable
+
+commit 5b3879fd4b7a4e3d43bab8f40addda39bc1169d0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 1 12:28:31 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Instruct nc not to quit as soon as stdin
+ is closed; avoid regress failures when stdin is /dev/null
+
+commit a9c46746d266f8a1b092a72b2150682d1af8ebfc
+Author: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 1 12:26:49 2014 +1000
+
+ - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Skip test for non-OpenBSD netcat. We need
+ a better solution, but this will have to do for now.
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/INSTALL
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/INSTALL 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/INSTALL 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,269 +0,0 @@
-1. Prerequisites
-----------------
-
-You will need working installations of Zlib and OpenSSL.
-
-Zlib 1.1.4 or 1.2.1.2 or greater (ealier 1.2.x versions have problems):
-http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
-
-OpenSSL 0.9.6 or greater:
-http://www.openssl.org/
-
-(OpenSSL 0.9.5a is partially supported, but some ciphers (SSH protocol 1
-Blowfish) do not work correctly.)
-
-The remaining items are optional.
-
-NB. If you operating system supports /dev/random, you should configure
-OpenSSL to use it. OpenSSH relies on OpenSSL's direct support of
-/dev/random, or failing that, either prngd or egd
-
-PRNGD:
-
-If your system lacks kernel-based random collection, the use of Lutz
-Jaenicke's PRNGd is recommended.
-
-http://prngd.sourceforge.net/
-
-EGD:
-
-The Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is supported if you have a system which
-lacks /dev/random and don't want to use OpenSSH's internal entropy collection.
-
-http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/
-
-PAM:
-
-OpenSSH can utilise Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) if your
-system supports it. PAM is standard most Linux distributions, Solaris,
-HP-UX 11, AIX >= 5.2, FreeBSD and NetBSD.
-
-Information about the various PAM implementations are available:
-
-Solaris PAM: http://www.sun.com/software/solaris/pam/
-Linux PAM: http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/
-OpenPAM: http://www.openpam.org/
-
-If you wish to build the GNOME passphrase requester, you will need the GNOME
-libraries and headers.
-
-GNOME:
-http://www.gnome.org/
-
-Alternatively, Jim Knoble <jmknoble at pobox.com> has written an excellent X11
-passphrase requester. This is maintained separately at:
-
-http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/
-
-TCP Wrappers:
-
-If you wish to use the TCP wrappers functionality you will need at least
-tcpd.h and libwrap.a, either in the standard include and library paths,
-or in the directory specified by --with-tcp-wrappers. Version 7.6 is
-known to work.
-
-http://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/index.html
-
-S/Key Libraries:
-
-If you wish to use --with-skey then you will need the library below
-installed. No other S/Key library is currently known to be supported.
-
-http://www.sparc.spb.su/solaris/skey/
-
-LibEdit:
-
-sftp supports command-line editing via NetBSD's libedit. If your platform
-has it available natively you can use that, alternatively you might try
-these multi-platform ports:
-
-http://www.thrysoee.dk/editline/
-http://sourceforge.net/projects/libedit/
-
-LDNS:
-
-LDNS is a DNS BSD-licensed resolver library which supports DNSSEC.
-
-http://nlnetlabs.nl/projects/ldns/
-
-Autoconf:
-
-If you modify configure.ac or configure doesn't exist (eg if you checked
-the code out of CVS yourself) then you will need autoconf-2.68 to rebuild
-the automatically generated files by running "autoreconf". Earlier
-versions may also work but this is not guaranteed.
-
-http://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/
-
-Basic Security Module (BSM):
-
-Native BSM support is know to exist in Solaris from at least 2.5.1,
-FreeBSD 6.1 and OS X. Alternatively, you may use the OpenBSM
-implementation (http://www.openbsm.org).
-
-
-2. Building / Installation
---------------------------
-
-To install OpenSSH with default options:
-
-./configure
-make
-make install
-
-This will install the OpenSSH binaries in /usr/local/bin, configuration files
-in /usr/local/etc, the server in /usr/local/sbin, etc. To specify a different
-installation prefix, use the --prefix option to configure:
-
-./configure --prefix=/opt
-make
-make install
-
-Will install OpenSSH in /opt/{bin,etc,lib,sbin}. You can also override
-specific paths, for example:
-
-./configure --prefix=/opt --sysconfdir=/etc/ssh
-make
-make install
-
-This will install the binaries in /opt/{bin,lib,sbin}, but will place the
-configuration files in /etc/ssh.
-
-If you are using Privilege Separation (which is enabled by default)
-then you will also need to create the user, group and directory used by
-sshd for privilege separation. See README.privsep for details.
-
-If you are using PAM, you may need to manually install a PAM control
-file as "/etc/pam.d/sshd" (or wherever your system prefers to keep
-them). Note that the service name used to start PAM is __progname,
-which is the basename of the path of your sshd (e.g., the service name
-for /usr/sbin/osshd will be osshd). If you have renamed your sshd
-executable, your PAM configuration may need to be modified.
-
-A generic PAM configuration is included as "contrib/sshd.pam.generic",
-you may need to edit it before using it on your system. If you are
-using a recent version of Red Hat Linux, the config file in
-contrib/redhat/sshd.pam should be more useful. Failure to install a
-valid PAM file may result in an inability to use password
-authentication. On HP-UX 11 and Solaris, the standard /etc/pam.conf
-configuration will work with sshd (sshd will match the other service
-name).
-
-There are a few other options to the configure script:
-
---with-audit=[module] enable additional auditing via the specified module.
-Currently, drivers for "debug" (additional info via syslog) and "bsm"
-(Sun's Basic Security Module) are supported.
-
---with-pam enables PAM support. If PAM support is compiled in, it must
-also be enabled in sshd_config (refer to the UsePAM directive).
-
---with-prngd-socket=/some/file allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD
-support and to specify a PRNGd socket. Use this if your Unix lacks
-/dev/random and you don't want to use OpenSSH's builtin entropy
-collection support.
-
---with-prngd-port=portnum allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD support
-and to specify a EGD localhost TCP port. Use this if your Unix lacks
-/dev/random and you don't want to use OpenSSH's builtin entropy
-collection support.
-
---with-lastlog=FILE will specify the location of the lastlog file.
-./configure searches a few locations for lastlog, but may not find
-it if lastlog is installed in a different place.
-
---without-lastlog will disable lastlog support entirely.
-
---with-osfsia, --without-osfsia will enable or disable OSF1's Security
-Integration Architecture. The default for OSF1 machines is enable.
-
---with-skey=PATH will enable S/Key one time password support. You will
-need the S/Key libraries and header files installed for this to work.
-
---with-tcp-wrappers will enable TCP Wrappers (/etc/hosts.allow|deny)
-support.
-
---with-md5-passwords will enable the use of MD5 passwords. Enable this
-if your operating system uses MD5 passwords and the system crypt() does
-not support them directly (see the crypt(3/3c) man page). If enabled, the
-resulting binary will support both MD5 and traditional crypt passwords.
-
---with-utmpx enables utmpx support. utmpx support is automatic for
-some platforms.
-
---without-shadow disables shadow password support.
-
---with-ipaddr-display forces the use of a numeric IP address in the
-$DISPLAY environment variable. Some broken systems need this.
-
---with-default-path=PATH allows you to specify a default $PATH for sessions
-started by sshd. This replaces the standard path entirely.
-
---with-pid-dir=PATH specifies the directory in which the sshd.pid file is
-created.
-
---with-xauth=PATH specifies the location of the xauth binary
-
---with-ssl-dir=DIR allows you to specify where your OpenSSL libraries
-are installed.
-
---with-ssl-engine enables OpenSSL's (hardware) ENGINE support
-
---with-4in6 Check for IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and convert them to
-real (AF_INET) IPv4 addresses. Works around some quirks on Linux.
-
-If you need to pass special options to the compiler or linker, you
-can specify these as environment variables before running ./configure.
-For example:
-
-CFLAGS="-O -m486" LDFLAGS="-s" LIBS="-lrubbish" LD="/usr/foo/ld" ./configure
-
-3. Configuration
-----------------
-
-The runtime configuration files are installed by in ${prefix}/etc or
-whatever you specified as your --sysconfdir (/usr/local/etc by default).
-
-The default configuration should be instantly usable, though you should
-review it to ensure that it matches your security requirements.
-
-To generate a host key, run "make host-key". Alternately you can do so
-manually using the following commands:
-
- ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N ""
- ssh-keygen -t rsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -N ""
- ssh-keygen -t dsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key -N ""
-
-Replacing /etc/ssh with the correct path to the configuration directory.
-(${prefix}/etc or whatever you specified with --sysconfdir during
-configuration)
-
-If you have configured OpenSSH with EGD support, ensure that EGD is
-running and has collected some Entropy.
-
-For more information on configuration, please refer to the manual pages
-for sshd, ssh and ssh-agent.
-
-4. (Optional) Send survey
--------------------------
-
-$ make survey
-[check the contents of the file "survey" to ensure there's no information
-that you consider sensitive]
-$ make send-survey
-
-This will send configuration information for the currently configured
-host to a survey address. This will help determine which configurations
-are actually in use, and what valid combinations of configure options
-exist. The raw data is available only to the OpenSSH developers, however
-summary data may be published.
-
-5. Problems?
-------------
-
-If you experience problems compiling, installing or running OpenSSH.
-Please refer to the "reporting bugs" section of the webpage at
-http://www.openssh.com/
-
-
-$Id: INSTALL,v 1.88 2013/03/07 01:33:35 dtucker Exp $
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/INSTALL (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/INSTALL)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/INSTALL (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/INSTALL 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+1. Prerequisites
+----------------
+
+You will need working installations of Zlib and libcrypto (LibreSSL /
+OpenSSL)
+
+Zlib 1.1.4 or 1.2.1.2 or greater (ealier 1.2.x versions have problems):
+http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
+
+libcrypto (LibreSSL or OpenSSL >= 0.9.8f < 1.1.0)
+LibreSSL http://www.libressl.org/ ; or
+OpenSSL http://www.openssl.org/
+
+LibreSSL/OpenSSL should be compiled as a position-independent library
+(i.e. with -fPIC) otherwise OpenSSH will not be able to link with it.
+If you must use a non-position-independent libcrypto, then you may need
+to configure OpenSSH --without-pie. Note that because of API changes,
+OpenSSL 1.1.x is not currently supported.
+
+The remaining items are optional.
+
+NB. If you operating system supports /dev/random, you should configure
+libcrypto (LibreSSL/OpenSSL) to use it. OpenSSH relies on libcrypto's
+direct support of /dev/random, or failing that, either prngd or egd
+
+PRNGD:
+
+If your system lacks kernel-based random collection, the use of Lutz
+Jaenicke's PRNGd is recommended.
+
+http://prngd.sourceforge.net/
+
+EGD:
+
+If the kernel lacks /dev/random the Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is
+supported only if libcrypto supports it.
+
+http://egd.sourceforge.net/
+
+PAM:
+
+OpenSSH can utilise Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) if your
+system supports it. PAM is standard most Linux distributions, Solaris,
+HP-UX 11, AIX >= 5.2, FreeBSD and NetBSD.
+
+Information about the various PAM implementations are available:
+
+Solaris PAM: http://www.sun.com/software/solaris/pam/
+Linux PAM: http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/
+OpenPAM: http://www.openpam.org/
+
+If you wish to build the GNOME passphrase requester, you will need the GNOME
+libraries and headers.
+
+GNOME:
+http://www.gnome.org/
+
+Alternatively, Jim Knoble <jmknoble at pobox.com> has written an excellent X11
+passphrase requester. This is maintained separately at:
+
+http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/
+
+S/Key Libraries:
+
+If you wish to use --with-skey then you will need the library below
+installed. No other S/Key library is currently known to be supported.
+
+http://www.sparc.spb.su/solaris/skey/
+
+LibEdit:
+
+sftp supports command-line editing via NetBSD's libedit. If your platform
+has it available natively you can use that, alternatively you might try
+these multi-platform ports:
+
+http://www.thrysoee.dk/editline/
+http://sourceforge.net/projects/libedit/
+
+LDNS:
+
+LDNS is a DNS BSD-licensed resolver library which supports DNSSEC.
+
+http://nlnetlabs.nl/projects/ldns/
+
+Autoconf:
+
+If you modify configure.ac or configure doesn't exist (eg if you checked
+the code out of CVS yourself) then you will need autoconf-2.68 to rebuild
+the automatically generated files by running "autoreconf". Earlier
+versions may also work but this is not guaranteed.
+
+http://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/
+
+Basic Security Module (BSM):
+
+Native BSM support is know to exist in Solaris from at least 2.5.1,
+FreeBSD 6.1 and OS X. Alternatively, you may use the OpenBSM
+implementation (http://www.openbsm.org).
+
+
+2. Building / Installation
+--------------------------
+
+To install OpenSSH with default options:
+
+./configure
+make
+make install
+
+This will install the OpenSSH binaries in /usr/local/bin, configuration files
+in /usr/local/etc, the server in /usr/local/sbin, etc. To specify a different
+installation prefix, use the --prefix option to configure:
+
+./configure --prefix=/opt
+make
+make install
+
+Will install OpenSSH in /opt/{bin,etc,lib,sbin}. You can also override
+specific paths, for example:
+
+./configure --prefix=/opt --sysconfdir=/etc/ssh
+make
+make install
+
+This will install the binaries in /opt/{bin,lib,sbin}, but will place the
+configuration files in /etc/ssh.
+
+If you are using Privilege Separation (which is enabled by default)
+then you will also need to create the user, group and directory used by
+sshd for privilege separation. See README.privsep for details.
+
+If you are using PAM, you may need to manually install a PAM control
+file as "/etc/pam.d/sshd" (or wherever your system prefers to keep
+them). Note that the service name used to start PAM is __progname,
+which is the basename of the path of your sshd (e.g., the service name
+for /usr/sbin/osshd will be osshd). If you have renamed your sshd
+executable, your PAM configuration may need to be modified.
+
+A generic PAM configuration is included as "contrib/sshd.pam.generic",
+you may need to edit it before using it on your system. If you are
+using a recent version of Red Hat Linux, the config file in
+contrib/redhat/sshd.pam should be more useful. Failure to install a
+valid PAM file may result in an inability to use password
+authentication. On HP-UX 11 and Solaris, the standard /etc/pam.conf
+configuration will work with sshd (sshd will match the other service
+name).
+
+There are a few other options to the configure script:
+
+--with-audit=[module] enable additional auditing via the specified module.
+Currently, drivers for "debug" (additional info via syslog) and "bsm"
+(Sun's Basic Security Module) are supported.
+
+--with-pam enables PAM support. If PAM support is compiled in, it must
+also be enabled in sshd_config (refer to the UsePAM directive).
+
+--with-prngd-socket=/some/file allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD
+support and to specify a PRNGd socket. Use this if your Unix lacks
+/dev/random and you don't want to use OpenSSH's builtin entropy
+collection support.
+
+--with-prngd-port=portnum allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD support
+and to specify a EGD localhost TCP port. Use this if your Unix lacks
+/dev/random and you don't want to use OpenSSH's builtin entropy
+collection support.
+
+--with-lastlog=FILE will specify the location of the lastlog file.
+./configure searches a few locations for lastlog, but may not find
+it if lastlog is installed in a different place.
+
+--without-lastlog will disable lastlog support entirely.
+
+--with-osfsia, --without-osfsia will enable or disable OSF1's Security
+Integration Architecture. The default for OSF1 machines is enable.
+
+--with-skey=PATH will enable S/Key one time password support. You will
+need the S/Key libraries and header files installed for this to work.
+
+--with-md5-passwords will enable the use of MD5 passwords. Enable this
+if your operating system uses MD5 passwords and the system crypt() does
+not support them directly (see the crypt(3/3c) man page). If enabled, the
+resulting binary will support both MD5 and traditional crypt passwords.
+
+--with-utmpx enables utmpx support. utmpx support is automatic for
+some platforms.
+
+--without-shadow disables shadow password support.
+
+--with-ipaddr-display forces the use of a numeric IP address in the
+$DISPLAY environment variable. Some broken systems need this.
+
+--with-default-path=PATH allows you to specify a default $PATH for sessions
+started by sshd. This replaces the standard path entirely.
+
+--with-pid-dir=PATH specifies the directory in which the sshd.pid file is
+created.
+
+--with-xauth=PATH specifies the location of the xauth binary
+
+--with-ssl-dir=DIR allows you to specify where your Libre/OpenSSL
+libraries
+are installed.
+
+--with-ssl-engine enables Libre/OpenSSL's (hardware) ENGINE support
+
+--with-4in6 Check for IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and convert them to
+real (AF_INET) IPv4 addresses. Works around some quirks on Linux.
+
+If you need to pass special options to the compiler or linker, you
+can specify these as environment variables before running ./configure.
+For example:
+
+CFLAGS="-O -m486" LDFLAGS="-s" LIBS="-lrubbish" LD="/usr/foo/ld" ./configure
+
+3. Configuration
+----------------
+
+The runtime configuration files are installed by in ${prefix}/etc or
+whatever you specified as your --sysconfdir (/usr/local/etc by default).
+
+The default configuration should be instantly usable, though you should
+review it to ensure that it matches your security requirements.
+
+To generate a host key, run "make host-key". Alternately you can do so
+manually using the following commands:
+
+ ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N ""
+ ssh-keygen -t rsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -N ""
+ ssh-keygen -t dsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key -N ""
+
+Replacing /etc/ssh with the correct path to the configuration directory.
+(${prefix}/etc or whatever you specified with --sysconfdir during
+configuration)
+
+If you have configured OpenSSH with EGD support, ensure that EGD is
+running and has collected some Entropy.
+
+For more information on configuration, please refer to the manual pages
+for sshd, ssh and ssh-agent.
+
+4. (Optional) Send survey
+-------------------------
+
+$ make survey
+[check the contents of the file "survey" to ensure there's no information
+that you consider sensitive]
+$ make send-survey
+
+This will send configuration information for the currently configured
+host to a survey address. This will help determine which configurations
+are actually in use, and what valid combinations of configure options
+exist. The raw data is available only to the OpenSSH developers, however
+summary data may be published.
+
+5. Problems?
+------------
+
+If you experience problems compiling, installing or running OpenSSH.
+Please refer to the "reporting bugs" section of the webpage at
+http://www.openssh.com/
+
+
+$Id: INSTALL,v 1.91 2014/09/09 02:23:11 dtucker Exp $
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/Makefile.in
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/Makefile.in 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/Makefile.in 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,476 +0,0 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.356 2014/02/04 00:12:56 djm Exp $
-
-# uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
-#SHELL = @SH@
-
-AUTORECONF=autoreconf
-
-prefix=@prefix@
-exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@
-bindir=@bindir@
-sbindir=@sbindir@
-libexecdir=@libexecdir@
-datadir=@datadir@
-datarootdir=@datarootdir@
-mandir=@mandir@
-mansubdir=@mansubdir@
-sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
-piddir=@piddir@
-srcdir=@srcdir@
-top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
-
-DESTDIR=
-VPATH=@srcdir@
-SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
-ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
-SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
-SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
-SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
-PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
-SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
-STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
-
-PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
- -D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
- -D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \
- -D_PATH_SFTP_SERVER=\"$(SFTP_SERVER)\" \
- -D_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN=\"$(SSH_KEYSIGN)\" \
- -D_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=\"$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)\" \
- -D_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR=\"$(piddir)\" \
- -D_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR=\"$(PRIVSEP_PATH)\"
-
-CC=@CC@
-LD=@LD@
-CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
-CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
-LIBS=@LIBS@
-K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
-GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
-SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@
-SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
-LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
-AR=@AR@
-AWK=@AWK@
-RANLIB=@RANLIB@
-INSTALL=@INSTALL@
-PERL=@PERL@
-SED=@SED@
-ENT=@ENT@
-XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
-LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
-EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
-MANFMT=@MANFMT@
-
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
-
-LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
- canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \
- cipher-bf1.o cipher-ctr.o cipher-3des1.o cleanup.o \
- compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
- log.o match.o md-sha256.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
- readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \
- atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
- monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
- kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
- msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
- ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
- kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
- ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o hmac.o \
- sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o
-
-SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
- sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \
- roaming_common.o roaming_client.o
-
-SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
- audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \
- sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \
- auth.o auth1.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o \
- auth-chall.o auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \
- auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
- auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
- monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o \
- kexc25519s.o auth-krb5.o \
- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
- loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
- sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
- roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \
- sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o
-
-MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
-MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
-MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@
-
-CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out
-CONFIGFILES_IN=sshd_config ssh_config moduli
-
-PATHSUBS = \
- -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_config|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config|g' \
- -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_known_hosts|g' \
- -e 's|/etc/ssh/sshd_config|$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config|g' \
- -e 's|/usr/libexec|$(libexecdir)|g' \
- -e 's|/etc/shosts.equiv|$(sysconfdir)/shosts.equiv|g' \
- -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key|g' \
- -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|g' \
- -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key|g' \
- -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key|g' \
- -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key|g' \
- -e 's|/var/run/sshd.pid|$(piddir)/sshd.pid|g' \
- -e 's|/etc/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \
- -e 's|/etc/ssh/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \
- -e 's|/etc/ssh/sshrc|$(sysconfdir)/sshrc|g' \
- -e 's|/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth|$(XAUTH_PATH)|g' \
- -e 's|/var/empty|$(PRIVSEP_PATH)|g' \
- -e 's|/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin|@user_path@|g'
-
-FIXPATHSCMD = $(SED) $(PATHSUBS)
-FIXALGORITHMSCMD= $(SHELL) $(srcdir)/fixalgorithms $(SED) \
- @UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS@
-
-all: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
-
-$(LIBSSH_OBJS): Makefile.in config.h
-$(SSHOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
-$(SSHDOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
-
-.c.o:
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
-
-LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
-$(LIBCOMPAT): always
- (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE))
-always:
-
-libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
- $(AR) rv $@ $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
- $(RANLIB) $@
-
-ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS)
- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
-
-sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
-
-scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
- $(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-
-ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-
-ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-
-ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-
-ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o roaming_dummy.o readconf.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-
-ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-
-ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-
-sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
- $(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-
-sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
- $(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
-
-# test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
-logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
- $(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-
-$(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
- if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \
- manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \
- else \
- manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.out$$//'`; \
- fi; \
- if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "man"; then \
- $(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) | \
- $(AWK) -f $(srcdir)/mdoc2man.awk > $@; \
- else \
- $(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) > $@; \
- fi
-
-$(CONFIGFILES): $(CONFIGFILES_IN)
- conffile=`echo $@ | sed 's/.out$$//'`; \
- $(FIXPATHSCMD) $(srcdir)/$${conffile} > $@
-
-# fake rule to stop make trying to compile moduli.o into a binary "moduli.o"
-moduli:
- echo
-
-# special case target for umac128
-umac128.o: umac.c
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o umac128.o -c $(srcdir)/umac.c \
- -DUMAC_OUTPUT_LEN=16 -Dumac_new=umac128_new \
- -Dumac_update=umac128_update -Dumac_final=umac128_final \
- -Dumac_delete=umac128_delete
-
-clean: regressclean
- rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
- rm -f *.out core survey
- (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) clean)
-
-distclean: regressclean
- rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
- rm -f *.out core opensshd.init openssh.xml
- rm -f Makefile buildpkg.sh config.h config.status
- rm -f survey.sh openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile *~
- rm -rf autom4te.cache
- (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean)
- if test -d pkg ; then \
- rm -fr pkg ; \
- fi
-
-veryclean: distclean
- rm -f configure config.h.in *.0
-
-cleandir: veryclean
-
-mrproper: veryclean
-
-realclean: veryclean
-
-catman-do:
- @for f in $(MANPAGES_IN) ; do \
- base=`echo $$f | sed 's/\..*$$//'` ; \
- echo "$$f -> $$base.0" ; \
- $(MANFMT) $$f | cat -v | sed -e 's/.\^H//g' \
- >$$base.0 ; \
- done
-
-distprep: catman-do
- $(AUTORECONF)
- -rm -rf autom4te.cache
-
-install: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf host-key check-config
-install-nokeys: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf
-install-nosysconf: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files
-
-check-config:
- -$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd -t -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config
-
-install-files:
- $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
- $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)
- $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)
- $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1
- $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5
- $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8
- $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
- (umask 022 ; $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH))
- $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT)
- $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) scp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT)
- $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT)
- $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
- $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
- $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
- $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
- $(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
- $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
- $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
- $(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
- $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
- $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
- $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
- $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
- $(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5
- $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
- $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5
- $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
- $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
- $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
- $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
- $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
- ln -s ./ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
- ln -s ./ssh.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
-
-install-sysconf:
- if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) ]; then \
- $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir); \
- fi
- @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config ]; then \
- $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config; \
- else \
- echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
- fi
- @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config ]; then \
- $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config; \
- else \
- echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
- fi
- @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli ]; then \
- if [ -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes ]; then \
- echo "moving $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes to $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \
- mv "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes" "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \
- else \
- $(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli; \
- fi ; \
- else \
- echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
- fi
-
-host-key: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
- @if [ -z "$(DESTDIR)" ] ; then \
- if [ -f "$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key" ] ; then \
- echo "$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key already exists, skipping." ; \
- else \
- ./ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key -N "" ; \
- fi ; \
- if [ -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key ] ; then \
- echo "$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key already exists, skipping." ; \
- else \
- ./ssh-keygen -t dsa -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key -N "" ; \
- fi ; \
- if [ -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key ] ; then \
- echo "$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key already exists, skipping." ; \
- else \
- ./ssh-keygen -t rsa -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key -N "" ; \
- fi ; \
- if [ -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key ] ; then \
- echo "$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key already exists, skipping." ; \
- else \
- ./ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key -N "" ; \
- fi ; \
- if [ -z "@COMMENT_OUT_ECC@" ] ; then \
- if [ -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ] ; then \
- echo "$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key already exists, skipping." ; \
- else \
- ./ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -N "" ; \
- fi ; \
- fi ; \
- fi ;
-
-host-key-force: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
- ./ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key -N ""
- ./ssh-keygen -t dsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key -N ""
- ./ssh-keygen -t rsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key -N ""
- ./ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key -N ""
- test -z "@COMMENT_OUT_ECC@" && ./ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -N ""
-
-uninstallall: uninstall
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config
- -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)
- -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
- -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)
- -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1
- -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8
- -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)
- -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
-
-uninstall:
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT)
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT)
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT)
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
- -rm -r $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
-
-regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c
- [ -d `pwd`/regress ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress
- [ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \
- ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $? \
- $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-
-regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c
- [ -d `pwd`/regress ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress
- [ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \
- ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $? \
- $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-
-tests interop-tests: $(TARGETS) regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT)
- BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \
- TEST_SHELL="@TEST_SHELL@"; \
- TEST_SSH_SCP="$${BUILDDIR}/scp"; \
- TEST_SSH_SSH="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh"; \
- TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${BUILDDIR}/sshd"; \
- TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-agent"; \
- TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-add"; \
- TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keygen"; \
- TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-pkcs11-helper"; \
- TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keyscan"; \
- TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp"; \
- TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp-server"; \
- TEST_SSH_PLINK="plink"; \
- TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="puttygen"; \
- TEST_SSH_CONCH="conch"; \
- TEST_SSH_IPV6="@TEST_SSH_IPV6@" ; \
- TEST_SSH_ECC="@TEST_SSH_ECC@" ; \
- cd $(srcdir)/regress || exit $$?; \
- $(MAKE) \
- .OBJDIR="$${BUILDDIR}/regress" \
- .CURDIR="`pwd`" \
- BUILDDIR="$${BUILDDIR}" \
- OBJ="$${BUILDDIR}/regress/" \
- PATH="$${BUILDDIR}:$${PATH}" \
- TEST_ENV=MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \
- TEST_SHELL="$${TEST_SHELL}" \
- TEST_SSH_SCP="$${TEST_SSH_SCP}" \
- TEST_SSH_SSH="$${TEST_SSH_SSH}" \
- TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${TEST_SSH_SSHD}" \
- TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}" \
- TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}" \
- TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}" \
- TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER}" \
- TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}" \
- TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${TEST_SSH_SFTP}" \
- TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}" \
- TEST_SSH_PLINK="$${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" \
- TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="$${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" \
- TEST_SSH_CONCH="$${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" \
- TEST_SSH_IPV6="$${TEST_SSH_IPV6}" \
- TEST_SSH_ECC="$${TEST_SSH_ECC}" \
- EXEEXT="$(EXEEXT)" \
- $@ && echo all tests passed
-
-compat-tests: $(LIBCOMPAT)
- (cd openbsd-compat/regress && $(MAKE))
-
-regressclean:
- if [ -f regress/Makefile ] && [ -r regress/Makefile ]; then \
- (cd regress && $(MAKE) clean) \
- fi
-
-survey: survey.sh ssh
- @$(SHELL) ./survey.sh > survey
- @echo 'The survey results have been placed in the file "survey" in the'
- @echo 'current directory. Please review the file then send with'
- @echo '"make send-survey".'
-
-send-survey: survey
- mail portable-survey at mindrot.org <survey
-
-package: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
- if [ "@MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED@" = yes ]; then \
- sh buildpkg.sh; \
- fi
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/Makefile.in (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/Makefile.in)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/Makefile.in (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/Makefile.in 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,598 @@
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.365 2014/08/30 06:23:07 djm Exp $
+
+# uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
+#SHELL = @SH@
+
+AUTORECONF=autoreconf
+
+prefix=@prefix@
+exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@
+bindir=@bindir@
+sbindir=@sbindir@
+libexecdir=@libexecdir@
+datadir=@datadir@
+datarootdir=@datarootdir@
+mandir=@mandir@
+mansubdir=@mansubdir@
+sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
+piddir=@piddir@
+srcdir=@srcdir@
+top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
+
+DESTDIR=
+VPATH=@srcdir@
+SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
+ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
+SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
+TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@
+
+PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
+ -D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
+ -D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \
+ -D_PATH_SFTP_SERVER=\"$(SFTP_SERVER)\" \
+ -D_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN=\"$(SSH_KEYSIGN)\" \
+ -D_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=\"$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)\" \
+ -D_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR=\"$(piddir)\" \
+ -D_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR=\"$(PRIVSEP_PATH)\"
+
+CC=@CC@
+LD=@LD@
+CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
+LIBS=@LIBS@
+K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
+SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@
+SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
+LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
+AR=@AR@
+AWK=@AWK@
+RANLIB=@RANLIB@
+INSTALL=@INSTALL@
+PERL=@PERL@
+SED=@SED@
+ENT=@ENT@
+XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
+LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
+EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+MANFMT=@MANFMT@
+
+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
+
+LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
+ ssh_api.o \
+ ssherr.o \
+ sshbuf.o \
+ sshkey.o \
+ sshbuf-getput-basic.o \
+ sshbuf-misc.o \
+ sshbuf-getput-crypto.o \
+ krl.o \
+ bitmap.o
+
+LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+ authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o bufec.o buffer.o \
+ canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o cipher-aesctr.o \
+ cipher-bf1.o cipher-ctr.o cipher-3des1.o cleanup.o \
+ compat.o crc32.o deattack.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
+ log.o match.o md-sha256.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o opacket.o \
+ readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \
+ atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o utf8.o \
+ monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
+ msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
+ ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
+ poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
+ ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o hmac.o \
+ sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \
+ kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
+ kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \
+ kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \
+ platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o
+
+SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
+ sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o
+
+SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
+ audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \
+ sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \
+ auth.o auth1.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o \
+ auth-chall.o auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \
+ auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
+ auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
+ monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
+ loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-pledge.o \
+ sandbox-solaris.o
+
+MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
+MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
+MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@
+
+CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out
+CONFIGFILES_IN=sshd_config ssh_config moduli
+
+PATHSUBS = \
+ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_config|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_known_hosts|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/ssh/sshd_config|$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config|g' \
+ -e 's|/usr/libexec|$(libexecdir)|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/shosts.equiv|$(sysconfdir)/shosts.equiv|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key|g' \
+ -e 's|/var/run/sshd.pid|$(piddir)/sshd.pid|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/ssh/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/ssh/sshrc|$(sysconfdir)/sshrc|g' \
+ -e 's|/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth|$(XAUTH_PATH)|g' \
+ -e 's|/var/empty|$(PRIVSEP_PATH)|g' \
+ -e 's|/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin|@user_path@|g'
+
+FIXPATHSCMD = $(SED) $(PATHSUBS)
+FIXALGORITHMSCMD= $(SHELL) $(srcdir)/fixalgorithms $(SED) \
+ @UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS@
+
+all: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
+
+$(LIBSSH_OBJS): Makefile.in config.h
+$(SSHOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
+$(SSHDOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
+
+.c.o:
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
+
+LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
+$(LIBCOMPAT): always
+ (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE))
+always:
+
+libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
+ $(AR) rv $@ $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
+ $(RANLIB) $@
+
+ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
+
+sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
+
+scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o readconf.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+
+sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
+
+# test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
+logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+
+$(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
+ if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \
+ manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \
+ else \
+ manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.out$$//'`; \
+ fi; \
+ if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "man"; then \
+ $(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) | \
+ $(AWK) -f $(srcdir)/mdoc2man.awk > $@; \
+ else \
+ $(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) > $@; \
+ fi
+
+$(CONFIGFILES): $(CONFIGFILES_IN)
+ conffile=`echo $@ | sed 's/.out$$//'`; \
+ $(FIXPATHSCMD) $(srcdir)/$${conffile} > $@
+
+# fake rule to stop make trying to compile moduli.o into a binary "moduli.o"
+moduli:
+ echo
+
+# special case target for umac128
+umac128.o: umac.c
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o umac128.o -c $(srcdir)/umac.c \
+ -DUMAC_OUTPUT_LEN=16 -Dumac_new=umac128_new \
+ -Dumac_update=umac128_update -Dumac_final=umac128_final \
+ -Dumac_delete=umac128_delete -Dumac_ctx=umac128_ctx
+
+clean: regressclean
+ rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
+ rm -f *.out core survey
+ rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a
+ rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey
+ rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap
+ rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys
+ rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex
+ rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o
+ rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz
+ (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) clean)
+
+distclean: regressclean
+ rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
+ rm -f *.out core opensshd.init openssh.xml
+ rm -f Makefile buildpkg.sh config.h config.status
+ rm -f survey.sh openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile *~
+ rm -rf autom4te.cache
+ rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a
+ rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey
+ rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap
+ rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys
+ rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex
+ rm -f regress/unittests/misc/kexfuzz
+ (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean)
+ if test -d pkg ; then \
+ rm -fr pkg ; \
+ fi
+
+veryclean: distclean
+ rm -f configure config.h.in *.0
+
+cleandir: veryclean
+
+mrproper: veryclean
+
+realclean: veryclean
+
+catman-do:
+ @for f in $(MANPAGES_IN) ; do \
+ base=`echo $$f | sed 's/\..*$$//'` ; \
+ echo "$$f -> $$base.0" ; \
+ $(MANFMT) $$f | cat -v | sed -e 's/.\^H//g' \
+ >$$base.0 ; \
+ done
+
+distprep: catman-do
+ $(AUTORECONF)
+ -rm -rf autom4te.cache
+
+install: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf host-key check-config
+install-nokeys: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf
+install-nosysconf: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files
+
+check-config:
+ -$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd -t -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config
+
+install-files:
+ $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
+ $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)
+ $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)
+ $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1
+ $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5
+ $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8
+ $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
+ (umask 022 ; $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH))
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) scp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
+
+install-sysconf:
+ if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) ]; then \
+ $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir); \
+ fi
+ @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config ]; then \
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config; \
+ else \
+ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
+ fi
+ @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config ]; then \
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config; \
+ else \
+ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
+ fi
+ @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli ]; then \
+ if [ -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes ]; then \
+ echo "moving $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes to $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \
+ mv "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes" "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \
+ else \
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli; \
+ fi ; \
+ else \
+ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
+ fi
+
+host-key: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
+ @if [ -z "$(DESTDIR)" ] ; then \
+ ./ssh-keygen -A; \
+ fi
+
+host-key-force: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh$(EXEEXT)
+ if ./ssh -Q protocol-version | grep '^1$$' >/dev/null; then \
+ ./ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key -N ""; \
+ fi
+ ./ssh-keygen -t dsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key -N ""
+ ./ssh-keygen -t rsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key -N ""
+ ./ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key -N ""
+ if ./ssh -Q key | grep ecdsa >/dev/null ; then \
+ ./ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -N ""; \
+ fi
+
+uninstallall: uninstall
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config
+ -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)
+ -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
+ -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)
+ -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1
+ -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8
+ -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)
+ -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
+
+uninstall:
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -r $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
+
+regress-prep:
+ [ -d `pwd`/regress ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress
+ [ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests
+ [ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper ] || \
+ mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper
+ [ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf ] || \
+ mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf
+ [ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey ] || \
+ mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey
+ [ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/bitmap ] || \
+ mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/bitmap
+ [ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/hostkeys ] || \
+ mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/hostkeys
+ [ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/kex ] || \
+ mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/kex
+ [ -d `pwd`/regress/misc/kexfuzz ] || \
+ mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/misc/kexfuzz
+ [ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \
+ ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
+
+REGRESSLIBS=libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT)
+
+regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c \
+ $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c \
+ $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+regress/netcat$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c \
+ $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c \
+ $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS=\
+ regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.o \
+ regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.o
+
+regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a: ${UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS}
+ $(AR) rv $@ $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS)
+ $(RANLIB) $@
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS=\
+ regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.o \
+ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.o \
+ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.o \
+ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.o \
+ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.o \
+ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.o \
+ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.o \
+ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.o
+
+regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS} \
+ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS) \
+ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS=\
+ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.o \
+ regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.o \
+ regress/unittests/sshkey/common.o \
+ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.o \
+ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.o
+
+regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS} \
+ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS) \
+ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS=\
+ regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.o
+
+regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS} \
+ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS) \
+ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS=\
+ regress/unittests/kex/tests.o \
+ regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.o
+
+regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS} \
+ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS) \
+ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS=\
+ regress/unittests/hostkeys/tests.o \
+ regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.o
+
+regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT): \
+ ${UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS} \
+ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS) \
+ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS=\
+ regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.o
+
+regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT): ${MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS} libssh.a
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS) \
+ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+regress-binaries: regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \
+ regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT) \
+ regress/netcat$(EXEEXT) \
+ regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT) \
+ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \
+ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \
+ regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT) \
+ regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT) \
+ regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT) \
+ regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT)
+
+tests interop-tests t-exec: regress-prep regress-binaries $(TARGETS)
+ BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \
+ TEST_SSH_SCP="$${BUILDDIR}/scp"; \
+ TEST_SSH_SSH="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh"; \
+ TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${BUILDDIR}/sshd"; \
+ TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-agent"; \
+ TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-add"; \
+ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keygen"; \
+ TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-pkcs11-helper"; \
+ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keyscan"; \
+ TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp"; \
+ TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp-server"; \
+ TEST_SSH_PLINK="plink"; \
+ TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="puttygen"; \
+ TEST_SSH_CONCH="conch"; \
+ TEST_SSH_IPV6="@TEST_SSH_IPV6@" ; \
+ TEST_SSH_ECC="@TEST_SSH_ECC@" ; \
+ cd $(srcdir)/regress || exit $$?; \
+ $(MAKE) \
+ .OBJDIR="$${BUILDDIR}/regress" \
+ .CURDIR="`pwd`" \
+ BUILDDIR="$${BUILDDIR}" \
+ OBJ="$${BUILDDIR}/regress/" \
+ PATH="$${BUILDDIR}:$${PATH}" \
+ TEST_ENV=MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \
+ TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \
+ TEST_SSH_SCP="$${TEST_SSH_SCP}" \
+ TEST_SSH_SSH="$${TEST_SSH_SSH}" \
+ TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${TEST_SSH_SSHD}" \
+ TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}" \
+ TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}" \
+ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}" \
+ TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER}" \
+ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}" \
+ TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${TEST_SSH_SFTP}" \
+ TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}" \
+ TEST_SSH_PLINK="$${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" \
+ TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="$${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" \
+ TEST_SSH_CONCH="$${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" \
+ TEST_SSH_IPV6="$${TEST_SSH_IPV6}" \
+ TEST_SSH_ECC="$${TEST_SSH_ECC}" \
+ TEST_SHELL="${TEST_SHELL}" \
+ EXEEXT="$(EXEEXT)" \
+ $@ && echo all tests passed
+
+compat-tests: $(LIBCOMPAT)
+ (cd openbsd-compat/regress && $(MAKE))
+
+regressclean:
+ if [ -f regress/Makefile ] && [ -r regress/Makefile ]; then \
+ (cd regress && $(MAKE) clean) \
+ fi
+
+survey: survey.sh ssh
+ @$(SHELL) ./survey.sh > survey
+ @echo 'The survey results have been placed in the file "survey" in the'
+ @echo 'current directory. Please review the file then send with'
+ @echo '"make send-survey".'
+
+send-survey: survey
+ mail portable-survey at mindrot.org <survey
+
+package: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
+ if [ "@MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED@" = yes ]; then \
+ sh buildpkg.sh; \
+ fi
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/OVERVIEW
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/OVERVIEW 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/OVERVIEW 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
-[Note: This file has not been updated for OpenSSH versions after
-OpenSSH-1.2 and should be considered OBSOLETE. It has been left in
-the distribution because some of its information may still be useful
-to developers.]
-
-This document is intended for those who wish to read the ssh source
-code. This tries to give an overview of the structure of the code.
-
-Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
-Updated 17 Nov 1995.
-Updated 19 Oct 1999 for OpenSSH-1.2
-Updated 20 May 2001 note obsolete for > OpenSSH-1.2
-
-The software consists of ssh (client), sshd (server), scp, sdist, and
-the auxiliary programs ssh-keygen, ssh-agent, ssh-add, and
-make-ssh-known-hosts. The main program for each of these is in a .c
-file with the same name.
-
-There are some subsystems/abstractions that are used by a number of
-these programs.
-
- Buffer manipulation routines
-
- - These provide an arbitrary size buffer, where data can be appended.
- Data can be consumed from either end. The code is used heavily
- throughout ssh. The basic buffer manipulation functions are in
- buffer.c (header buffer.h), and additional code to manipulate specific
- data types is in bufaux.c.
-
- Compression Library
-
- - Ssh uses the GNU GZIP compression library (ZLIB).
-
- Encryption/Decryption
-
- - Ssh contains several encryption algorithms. These are all
- accessed through the cipher.h interface. The interface code is
- in cipher.c, and the implementations are in libc.
-
- Multiple Precision Integer Library
-
- - Uses the SSLeay BIGNUM sublibrary.
-
- Random Numbers
-
- - Uses arc4random() and such.
-
- RSA key generation, encryption, decryption
-
- - Ssh uses the RSA routines in libssl.
-
- RSA key files
-
- - RSA keys are stored in files with a special format. The code to
- read/write these files is in authfile.c. The files are normally
- encrypted with a passphrase. The functions to read passphrases
- are in readpass.c (the same code is used to read passwords).
-
- Binary packet protocol
-
- - The ssh binary packet protocol is implemented in packet.c. The
- code in packet.c does not concern itself with packet types or their
- execution; it contains code to build packets, to receive them and
- extract data from them, and the code to compress and/or encrypt
- packets. CRC code comes from crc32.c.
-
- - The code in packet.c calls the buffer manipulation routines
- (buffer.c, bufaux.c), compression routines (compress.c, zlib),
- and the encryption routines.
-
- X11, TCP/IP, and Agent forwarding
-
- - Code for various types of channel forwarding is in channels.c.
- The file defines a generic framework for arbitrary communication
- channels inside the secure channel, and uses this framework to
- implement X11 forwarding, TCP/IP forwarding, and authentication
- agent forwarding.
- The new, Protocol 1.5, channel close implementation is in nchan.c
-
- Authentication agent
-
- - Code to communicate with the authentication agent is in authfd.c.
-
- Authentication methods
-
- - Code for various authentication methods resides in auth-*.c
- (auth-passwd.c, auth-rh-rsa.c, auth-rhosts.c, auth-rsa.c). This
- code is linked into the server. The routines also manipulate
- known hosts files using code in hostfile.c. Code in canohost.c
- is used to retrieve the canonical host name of the remote host.
- Code in match.c is used to match host names.
-
- - In the client end, authentication code is in sshconnect.c. It
- reads Passwords/passphrases using code in readpass.c. It reads
- RSA key files with authfile.c. It communicates the
- authentication agent using authfd.c.
-
- The ssh client
-
- - The client main program is in ssh.c. It first parses arguments
- and reads configuration (readconf.c), then calls ssh_connect (in
- sshconnect.c) to open a connection to the server (possibly via a
- proxy), and performs authentication (ssh_login in sshconnect.c).
- It then makes any pty, forwarding, etc. requests. It may call
- code in ttymodes.c to encode current tty modes. Finally it
- calls client_loop in clientloop.c. This does the real work for
- the session.
-
- - The client is suid root. It tries to temporarily give up this
- rights while reading the configuration data. The root
- privileges are only used to make the connection (from a
- privileged socket). Any extra privileges are dropped before
- calling ssh_login.
-
- Pseudo-tty manipulation and tty modes
-
- - Code to allocate and use a pseudo tty is in pty.c. Code to
- encode and set terminal modes is in ttymodes.c.
-
- Logging in (updating utmp, lastlog, etc.)
-
- - The code to do things that are done when a user logs in are in
- login.c. This includes things such as updating the utmp, wtmp,
- and lastlog files. Some of the code is in sshd.c.
-
- Writing to the system log and terminal
-
- - The programs use the functions fatal(), log(), debug(), error()
- in many places to write messages to system log or user's
- terminal. The implementation that logs to system log is in
- log-server.c; it is used in the server program. The other
- programs use an implementation that sends output to stderr; it
- is in log-client.c. The definitions are in ssh.h.
-
- The sshd server (daemon)
-
- - The sshd daemon starts by processing arguments and reading the
- configuration file (servconf.c). It then reads the host key,
- starts listening for connections, and generates the server key.
- The server key will be regenerated every hour by an alarm.
-
- - When the server receives a connection, it forks, disables the
- regeneration alarm, and starts communicating with the client.
- They first perform identification string exchange, then
- negotiate encryption, then perform authentication, preparatory
- operations, and finally the server enters the normal session
- mode by calling server_loop in serverloop.c. This does the real
- work, calling functions in other modules.
-
- - The code for the server is in sshd.c. It contains a lot of
- stuff, including:
- - server main program
- - waiting for connections
- - processing new connection
- - authentication
- - preparatory operations
- - building up the execution environment for the user program
- - starting the user program.
-
- Auxiliary files
-
- - There are several other files in the distribution that contain
- various auxiliary routines:
- ssh.h the main header file for ssh (various definitions)
- uidswap.c uid-swapping
- xmalloc.c "safe" malloc routines
-
-$OpenBSD: OVERVIEW,v 1.11 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/OVERVIEW (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/OVERVIEW)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/OVERVIEW (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/OVERVIEW 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+[Note: This file has not been updated for OpenSSH versions after
+OpenSSH-1.2 and should be considered OBSOLETE. It has been left in
+the distribution because some of its information may still be useful
+to developers.]
+
+This document is intended for those who wish to read the ssh source
+code. This tries to give an overview of the structure of the code.
+
+Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+Updated 17 Nov 1995.
+Updated 19 Oct 1999 for OpenSSH-1.2
+Updated 20 May 2001 note obsolete for > OpenSSH-1.2
+
+The software consists of ssh (client), sshd (server), scp, sdist, and
+the auxiliary programs ssh-keygen, ssh-agent, ssh-add, and
+make-ssh-known-hosts. The main program for each of these is in a .c
+file with the same name.
+
+There are some subsystems/abstractions that are used by a number of
+these programs.
+
+ Buffer manipulation routines
+
+ - These provide an arbitrary size buffer, where data can be appended.
+ Data can be consumed from either end. The code is used heavily
+ throughout ssh. The basic buffer manipulation functions are in
+ buffer.c (header buffer.h), and additional code to manipulate specific
+ data types is in bufaux.c.
+
+ Compression Library
+
+ - Ssh uses the GNU GZIP compression library (ZLIB).
+
+ Encryption/Decryption
+
+ - Ssh contains several encryption algorithms. These are all
+ accessed through the cipher.h interface. The interface code is
+ in cipher.c, and the implementations are in libc.
+
+ Multiple Precision Integer Library
+
+ - Uses the SSLeay BIGNUM sublibrary.
+
+ Random Numbers
+
+ - Uses arc4random() and such.
+
+ RSA key generation, encryption, decryption
+
+ - Ssh uses the RSA routines in libssl.
+
+ RSA key files
+
+ - RSA keys are stored in files with a special format. The code to
+ read/write these files is in authfile.c. The files are normally
+ encrypted with a passphrase. The functions to read passphrases
+ are in readpass.c (the same code is used to read passwords).
+
+ Binary packet protocol
+
+ - The ssh binary packet protocol is implemented in packet.c. The
+ code in packet.c does not concern itself with packet types or their
+ execution; it contains code to build packets, to receive them and
+ extract data from them, and the code to compress and/or encrypt
+ packets. CRC code comes from crc32.c.
+
+ - The code in packet.c calls the buffer manipulation routines
+ (buffer.c, bufaux.c), compression routines (zlib), and the
+ encryption routines.
+
+ X11, TCP/IP, and Agent forwarding
+
+ - Code for various types of channel forwarding is in channels.c.
+ The file defines a generic framework for arbitrary communication
+ channels inside the secure channel, and uses this framework to
+ implement X11 forwarding, TCP/IP forwarding, and authentication
+ agent forwarding.
+ The new, Protocol 1.5, channel close implementation is in nchan.c
+
+ Authentication agent
+
+ - Code to communicate with the authentication agent is in authfd.c.
+
+ Authentication methods
+
+ - Code for various authentication methods resides in auth-*.c
+ (auth-passwd.c, auth-rh-rsa.c, auth-rhosts.c, auth-rsa.c). This
+ code is linked into the server. The routines also manipulate
+ known hosts files using code in hostfile.c. Code in canohost.c
+ is used to retrieve the canonical host name of the remote host.
+ Code in match.c is used to match host names.
+
+ - In the client end, authentication code is in sshconnect.c. It
+ reads Passwords/passphrases using code in readpass.c. It reads
+ RSA key files with authfile.c. It communicates the
+ authentication agent using authfd.c.
+
+ The ssh client
+
+ - The client main program is in ssh.c. It first parses arguments
+ and reads configuration (readconf.c), then calls ssh_connect (in
+ sshconnect.c) to open a connection to the server (possibly via a
+ proxy), and performs authentication (ssh_login in sshconnect.c).
+ It then makes any pty, forwarding, etc. requests. It may call
+ code in ttymodes.c to encode current tty modes. Finally it
+ calls client_loop in clientloop.c. This does the real work for
+ the session.
+
+ - The client is suid root. It tries to temporarily give up this
+ rights while reading the configuration data. The root
+ privileges are only used to make the connection (from a
+ privileged socket). Any extra privileges are dropped before
+ calling ssh_login.
+
+ Pseudo-tty manipulation and tty modes
+
+ - Code to allocate and use a pseudo tty is in pty.c. Code to
+ encode and set terminal modes is in ttymodes.c.
+
+ Logging in (updating utmp, lastlog, etc.)
+
+ - The code to do things that are done when a user logs in are in
+ login.c. This includes things such as updating the utmp, wtmp,
+ and lastlog files. Some of the code is in sshd.c.
+
+ Writing to the system log and terminal
+
+ - The programs use the functions fatal(), log(), debug(), error()
+ in many places to write messages to system log or user's
+ terminal. The implementation that logs to system log is in
+ log-server.c; it is used in the server program. The other
+ programs use an implementation that sends output to stderr; it
+ is in log-client.c. The definitions are in ssh.h.
+
+ The sshd server (daemon)
+
+ - The sshd daemon starts by processing arguments and reading the
+ configuration file (servconf.c). It then reads the host key,
+ starts listening for connections, and generates the server key.
+ The server key will be regenerated every hour by an alarm.
+
+ - When the server receives a connection, it forks, disables the
+ regeneration alarm, and starts communicating with the client.
+ They first perform identification string exchange, then
+ negotiate encryption, then perform authentication, preparatory
+ operations, and finally the server enters the normal session
+ mode by calling server_loop in serverloop.c. This does the real
+ work, calling functions in other modules.
+
+ - The code for the server is in sshd.c. It contains a lot of
+ stuff, including:
+ - server main program
+ - waiting for connections
+ - processing new connection
+ - authentication
+ - preparatory operations
+ - building up the execution environment for the user program
+ - starting the user program.
+
+ Auxiliary files
+
+ - There are several other files in the distribution that contain
+ various auxiliary routines:
+ ssh.h the main header file for ssh (various definitions)
+ uidswap.c uid-swapping
+ xmalloc.c "safe" malloc routines
+
+$OpenBSD: OVERVIEW,v 1.12 2015/07/08 19:01:15 markus Exp $
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,359 +0,0 @@
-This documents OpenSSH's deviations and extensions to the published SSH
-protocol.
-
-Note that OpenSSH's sftp and sftp-server implement revision 3 of the SSH
-filexfer protocol described in:
-
-http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt
-
-Newer versions of the draft will not be supported, though some features
-are individually implemented as extensions described below.
-
-The protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent is described in the file
-PROTOCOL.agent
-
-1. Transport protocol changes
-
-1.1. transport: Protocol 2 MAC algorithm "umac-64 at openssh.com"
-
-This is a new transport-layer MAC method using the UMAC algorithm
-(rfc4418). This method is identical to the "umac-64" method documented
-in:
-
-http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-umac-01.txt
-
-1.2. transport: Protocol 2 compression algorithm "zlib at openssh.com"
-
-This transport-layer compression method uses the zlib compression
-algorithm (identical to the "zlib" method in rfc4253), but delays the
-start of compression until after authentication has completed. This
-avoids exposing compression code to attacks from unauthenticated users.
-
-The method is documented in:
-
-http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00.txt
-
-1.3. transport: New public key algorithms "ssh-rsa-cert-v00 at openssh.com",
- "ssh-dsa-cert-v00 at openssh.com",
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com",
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com" and
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
-
-OpenSSH introduces new public key algorithms to support certificate
-authentication for users and hostkeys. These methods are documented in
-the file PROTOCOL.certkeys
-
-1.4. transport: Elliptic Curve cryptography
-
-OpenSSH supports ECC key exchange and public key authentication as
-specified in RFC5656. Only the ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
-and ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 curves over GF(p) are supported. Elliptic
-curve points encoded using point compression are NOT accepted or
-generated.
-
-1.5 transport: Protocol 2 Encrypt-then-MAC MAC algorithms
-
-OpenSSH supports MAC algorithms, whose names contain "-etm", that
-perform the calculations in a different order to that defined in RFC
-4253. These variants use the so-called "encrypt then MAC" ordering,
-calculating the MAC over the packet ciphertext rather than the
-plaintext. This ordering closes a security flaw in the SSH transport
-protocol, where decryption of unauthenticated ciphertext provided a
-"decryption oracle" that could, in conjunction with cipher flaws, reveal
-session plaintext.
-
-Specifically, the "-etm" MAC algorithms modify the transport protocol
-to calculate the MAC over the packet ciphertext and to send the packet
-length unencrypted. This is necessary for the transport to obtain the
-length of the packet and location of the MAC tag so that it may be
-verified without decrypting unauthenticated data.
-
-As such, the MAC covers:
-
- mac = MAC(key, sequence_number || packet_length || encrypted_packet)
-
-where "packet_length" is encoded as a uint32 and "encrypted_packet"
-contains:
-
- byte padding_length
- byte[n1] payload; n1 = packet_length - padding_length - 1
- byte[n2] random padding; n2 = padding_length
-
-1.6 transport: AES-GCM
-
-OpenSSH supports the AES-GCM algorithm as specified in RFC 5647.
-Because of problems with the specification of the key exchange
-the behaviour of OpenSSH differs from the RFC as follows:
-
-AES-GCM is only negotiated as the cipher algorithms
-"aes128-gcm at openssh.com" or "aes256-gcm at openssh.com" and never as
-an MAC algorithm. Additionally, if AES-GCM is selected as the cipher
-the exchanged MAC algorithms are ignored and there doesn't have to be
-a matching MAC.
-
-1.7 transport: chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com authenticated encryption
-
-OpenSSH supports authenticated encryption using ChaCha20 and Poly1305
-as described in PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305.
-
-1.8 transport: curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org key exchange algorithm
-
-OpenSSH supports the use of ECDH in Curve25519 for key exchange as
-described at:
-http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519
-
-2. Connection protocol changes
-
-2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow at openssh.com"
-
-The SSH connection protocol (rfc4254) provides the SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
-message to allow an endpoint to signal its peer that it will send no
-more data over a channel. Unfortunately, there is no symmetric way for
-an endpoint to request that its peer should cease sending data to it
-while still keeping the channel open for the endpoint to send data to
-the peer.
-
-This is desirable, since it saves the transmission of data that would
-otherwise need to be discarded and it allows an endpoint to signal local
-processes of the condition, e.g. by closing the corresponding file
-descriptor.
-
-OpenSSH implements a channel extension message to perform this
-signalling: "eow at openssh.com" (End Of Write). This message is sent by
-an endpoint when the local output of a session channel is closed or
-experiences a write error. The message is formatted as follows:
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
- uint32 recipient channel
- string "eow at openssh.com"
- boolean FALSE
-
-On receiving this message, the peer SHOULD cease sending data of
-the channel and MAY signal the process from which the channel data
-originates (e.g. by closing its read file descriptor).
-
-As with the symmetric SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF message, the channel does
-remain open after a "eow at openssh.com" has been sent and more data may
-still be sent in the other direction. This message does not consume
-window space and may be sent even if no window space is available.
-
-NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
-of this message (in contravention of RFC4254 section 5.4), this
-message is only sent to OpenSSH peers (identified by banner).
-Other SSH implementations may be whitelisted to receive this message
-upon request.
-
-2.2. connection: disallow additional sessions extension
- "no-more-sessions at openssh.com"
-
-Most SSH connections will only ever request a single session, but a
-attacker may abuse a running ssh client to surreptitiously open
-additional sessions under their control. OpenSSH provides a global
-request "no-more-sessions at openssh.com" to mitigate this attack.
-
-When an OpenSSH client expects that it will never open another session
-(i.e. it has been started with connection multiplexing disabled), it
-will send the following global request:
-
- byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
- string "no-more-sessions at openssh.com"
- char want-reply
-
-On receipt of such a message, an OpenSSH server will refuse to open
-future channels of type "session" and instead immediately abort the
-connection.
-
-Note that this is not a general defence against compromised clients
-(that is impossible), but it thwarts a simple attack.
-
-NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
-of this message, the no-more-sessions request is only sent to OpenSSH
-servers (identified by banner). Other SSH implementations may be
-whitelisted to receive this message upon request.
-
-2.3. connection: Tunnel forward extension "tun at openssh.com"
-
-OpenSSH supports layer 2 and layer 3 tunnelling via the "tun at openssh.com"
-channel type. This channel type supports forwarding of network packets
-with datagram boundaries intact between endpoints equipped with
-interfaces like the BSD tun(4) device. Tunnel forwarding channels are
-requested by the client with the following packet:
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
- string "tun at openssh.com"
- uint32 sender channel
- uint32 initial window size
- uint32 maximum packet size
- uint32 tunnel mode
- uint32 remote unit number
-
-The "tunnel mode" parameter specifies whether the tunnel should forward
-layer 2 frames or layer 3 packets. It may take one of the following values:
-
- SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT 1 /* layer 3 packets */
- SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET 2 /* layer 2 frames */
-
-The "tunnel unit number" specifies the remote interface number, or may
-be 0x7fffffff to allow the server to automatically chose an interface. A
-server that is not willing to open a client-specified unit should refuse
-the request with a SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE error. On successful
-open, the server should reply with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_SUCCESS.
-
-Once established the client and server may exchange packet or frames
-over the tunnel channel by encapsulating them in SSH protocol strings
-and sending them as channel data. This ensures that packet boundaries
-are kept intact. Specifically, packets are transmitted using normal
-SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA packets:
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
- uint32 recipient channel
- string data
-
-The contents of the "data" field for layer 3 packets is:
-
- uint32 packet length
- uint32 address family
- byte[packet length - 4] packet data
-
-The "address family" field identifies the type of packet in the message.
-It may be one of:
-
- SSH_TUN_AF_INET 2 /* IPv4 */
- SSH_TUN_AF_INET6 24 /* IPv6 */
-
-The "packet data" field consists of the IPv4/IPv6 datagram itself
-without any link layer header.
-
-The contents of the "data" field for layer 2 packets is:
-
- uint32 packet length
- byte[packet length] frame
-
-The "frame" field contains an IEEE 802.3 Ethernet frame, including
-header.
-
-3. SFTP protocol changes
-
-3.1. sftp: Reversal of arguments to SSH_FXP_SYMLINK
-
-When OpenSSH's sftp-server was implemented, the order of the arguments
-to the SSH_FXP_SYMLINK method was inadvertently reversed. Unfortunately,
-the reversal was not noticed until the server was widely deployed. Since
-fixing this to follow the specification would cause incompatibility, the
-current order was retained. For correct operation, clients should send
-SSH_FXP_SYMLINK as follows:
-
- uint32 id
- string targetpath
- string linkpath
-
-3.2. sftp: Server extension announcement in SSH_FXP_VERSION
-
-OpenSSH's sftp-server lists the extensions it supports using the
-standard extension announcement mechanism in the SSH_FXP_VERSION server
-hello packet:
-
- uint32 3 /* protocol version */
- string ext1-name
- string ext1-version
- string ext2-name
- string ext2-version
- ...
- string extN-name
- string extN-version
-
-Each extension reports its integer version number as an ASCII encoded
-string, e.g. "1". The version will be incremented if the extension is
-ever changed in an incompatible way. The server MAY advertise the same
-extension with multiple versions (though this is unlikely). Clients MUST
-check the version number before attempting to use the extension.
-
-3.3. sftp: Extension request "posix-rename at openssh.com"
-
-This operation provides a rename operation with POSIX semantics, which
-are different to those provided by the standard SSH_FXP_RENAME in
-draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt. This request is implemented as a
-SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string "posix-rename at openssh.com"
- string oldpath
- string newpath
-
-On receiving this request the server will perform the POSIX operation
-rename(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
-This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
-"1".
-
-3.4. sftp: Extension requests "statvfs at openssh.com" and
- "fstatvfs at openssh.com"
-
-These requests correspond to the statvfs and fstatvfs POSIX system
-interfaces. The "statvfs at openssh.com" request operates on an explicit
-pathname, and is formatted as follows:
-
- uint32 id
- string "statvfs at openssh.com"
- string path
-
-The "fstatvfs at openssh.com" operates on an open file handle:
-
- uint32 id
- string "fstatvfs at openssh.com"
- string handle
-
-These requests return a SSH_FXP_STATUS reply on failure. On success they
-return the following SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY reply:
-
- uint32 id
- uint64 f_bsize /* file system block size */
- uint64 f_frsize /* fundamental fs block size */
- uint64 f_blocks /* number of blocks (unit f_frsize) */
- uint64 f_bfree /* free blocks in file system */
- uint64 f_bavail /* free blocks for non-root */
- uint64 f_files /* total file inodes */
- uint64 f_ffree /* free file inodes */
- uint64 f_favail /* free file inodes for to non-root */
- uint64 f_fsid /* file system id */
- uint64 f_flag /* bit mask of f_flag values */
- uint64 f_namemax /* maximum filename length */
-
-The values of the f_flag bitmask are as follows:
-
- #define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY 0x1 /* read-only */
- #define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID 0x2 /* no setuid */
-
-Both the "statvfs at openssh.com" and "fstatvfs at openssh.com" extensions are
-advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "2".
-
-10. sftp: Extension request "hardlink at openssh.com"
-
-This request is for creating a hard link to a regular file. This
-request is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the
-following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string "hardlink at openssh.com"
- string oldpath
- string newpath
-
-On receiving this request the server will perform the operation
-link(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
-This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
-"1".
-
-10. sftp: Extension request "fsync at openssh.com"
-
-This request asks the server to call fsync(2) on an open file handle.
-
- uint32 id
- string "fsync at openssh.com"
- string handle
-
-One receiving this request, a server will call fsync(handle_fd) and will
-respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
-
-This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
-"1".
-
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.23 2013/12/01 23:19:05 djm Exp $
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
+This documents OpenSSH's deviations and extensions to the published SSH
+protocol.
+
+Note that OpenSSH's sftp and sftp-server implement revision 3 of the SSH
+filexfer protocol described in:
+
+http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt
+
+Newer versions of the draft will not be supported, though some features
+are individually implemented as extensions described below.
+
+The protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent is described in the file
+PROTOCOL.agent
+
+1. Transport protocol changes
+
+1.1. transport: Protocol 2 MAC algorithm "umac-64 at openssh.com"
+
+This is a new transport-layer MAC method using the UMAC algorithm
+(rfc4418). This method is identical to the "umac-64" method documented
+in:
+
+http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-umac-01.txt
+
+1.2. transport: Protocol 2 compression algorithm "zlib at openssh.com"
+
+This transport-layer compression method uses the zlib compression
+algorithm (identical to the "zlib" method in rfc4253), but delays the
+start of compression until after authentication has completed. This
+avoids exposing compression code to attacks from unauthenticated users.
+
+The method is documented in:
+
+http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00.txt
+
+1.3. transport: New public key algorithms "ssh-rsa-cert-v00 at openssh.com",
+ "ssh-dsa-cert-v00 at openssh.com",
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com",
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com" and
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
+
+OpenSSH introduces new public key algorithms to support certificate
+authentication for users and host keys. These methods are documented
+in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys
+
+1.4. transport: Elliptic Curve cryptography
+
+OpenSSH supports ECC key exchange and public key authentication as
+specified in RFC5656. Only the ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
+and ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 curves over GF(p) are supported. Elliptic
+curve points encoded using point compression are NOT accepted or
+generated.
+
+1.5 transport: Protocol 2 Encrypt-then-MAC MAC algorithms
+
+OpenSSH supports MAC algorithms, whose names contain "-etm", that
+perform the calculations in a different order to that defined in RFC
+4253. These variants use the so-called "encrypt then MAC" ordering,
+calculating the MAC over the packet ciphertext rather than the
+plaintext. This ordering closes a security flaw in the SSH transport
+protocol, where decryption of unauthenticated ciphertext provided a
+"decryption oracle" that could, in conjunction with cipher flaws, reveal
+session plaintext.
+
+Specifically, the "-etm" MAC algorithms modify the transport protocol
+to calculate the MAC over the packet ciphertext and to send the packet
+length unencrypted. This is necessary for the transport to obtain the
+length of the packet and location of the MAC tag so that it may be
+verified without decrypting unauthenticated data.
+
+As such, the MAC covers:
+
+ mac = MAC(key, sequence_number || packet_length || encrypted_packet)
+
+where "packet_length" is encoded as a uint32 and "encrypted_packet"
+contains:
+
+ byte padding_length
+ byte[n1] payload; n1 = packet_length - padding_length - 1
+ byte[n2] random padding; n2 = padding_length
+
+1.6 transport: AES-GCM
+
+OpenSSH supports the AES-GCM algorithm as specified in RFC 5647.
+Because of problems with the specification of the key exchange
+the behaviour of OpenSSH differs from the RFC as follows:
+
+AES-GCM is only negotiated as the cipher algorithms
+"aes128-gcm at openssh.com" or "aes256-gcm at openssh.com" and never as
+an MAC algorithm. Additionally, if AES-GCM is selected as the cipher
+the exchanged MAC algorithms are ignored and there doesn't have to be
+a matching MAC.
+
+1.7 transport: chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com authenticated encryption
+
+OpenSSH supports authenticated encryption using ChaCha20 and Poly1305
+as described in PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305.
+
+1.8 transport: curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org key exchange algorithm
+
+OpenSSH supports the use of ECDH in Curve25519 for key exchange as
+described at:
+http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519
+
+2. Connection protocol changes
+
+2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow at openssh.com"
+
+The SSH connection protocol (rfc4254) provides the SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
+message to allow an endpoint to signal its peer that it will send no
+more data over a channel. Unfortunately, there is no symmetric way for
+an endpoint to request that its peer should cease sending data to it
+while still keeping the channel open for the endpoint to send data to
+the peer.
+
+This is desirable, since it saves the transmission of data that would
+otherwise need to be discarded and it allows an endpoint to signal local
+processes of the condition, e.g. by closing the corresponding file
+descriptor.
+
+OpenSSH implements a channel extension message to perform this
+signalling: "eow at openssh.com" (End Of Write). This message is sent by
+an endpoint when the local output of a session channel is closed or
+experiences a write error. The message is formatted as follows:
+
+ byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
+ uint32 recipient channel
+ string "eow at openssh.com"
+ boolean FALSE
+
+On receiving this message, the peer SHOULD cease sending data of
+the channel and MAY signal the process from which the channel data
+originates (e.g. by closing its read file descriptor).
+
+As with the symmetric SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF message, the channel does
+remain open after a "eow at openssh.com" has been sent and more data may
+still be sent in the other direction. This message does not consume
+window space and may be sent even if no window space is available.
+
+NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
+of this message (in contravention of RFC4254 section 5.4), this
+message is only sent to OpenSSH peers (identified by banner).
+Other SSH implementations may be whitelisted to receive this message
+upon request.
+
+2.2. connection: disallow additional sessions extension
+ "no-more-sessions at openssh.com"
+
+Most SSH connections will only ever request a single session, but a
+attacker may abuse a running ssh client to surreptitiously open
+additional sessions under their control. OpenSSH provides a global
+request "no-more-sessions at openssh.com" to mitigate this attack.
+
+When an OpenSSH client expects that it will never open another session
+(i.e. it has been started with connection multiplexing disabled), it
+will send the following global request:
+
+ byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
+ string "no-more-sessions at openssh.com"
+ char want-reply
+
+On receipt of such a message, an OpenSSH server will refuse to open
+future channels of type "session" and instead immediately abort the
+connection.
+
+Note that this is not a general defence against compromised clients
+(that is impossible), but it thwarts a simple attack.
+
+NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
+of this message, the no-more-sessions request is only sent to OpenSSH
+servers (identified by banner). Other SSH implementations may be
+whitelisted to receive this message upon request.
+
+2.3. connection: Tunnel forward extension "tun at openssh.com"
+
+OpenSSH supports layer 2 and layer 3 tunnelling via the "tun at openssh.com"
+channel type. This channel type supports forwarding of network packets
+with datagram boundaries intact between endpoints equipped with
+interfaces like the BSD tun(4) device. Tunnel forwarding channels are
+requested by the client with the following packet:
+
+ byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
+ string "tun at openssh.com"
+ uint32 sender channel
+ uint32 initial window size
+ uint32 maximum packet size
+ uint32 tunnel mode
+ uint32 remote unit number
+
+The "tunnel mode" parameter specifies whether the tunnel should forward
+layer 2 frames or layer 3 packets. It may take one of the following values:
+
+ SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT 1 /* layer 3 packets */
+ SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET 2 /* layer 2 frames */
+
+The "tunnel unit number" specifies the remote interface number, or may
+be 0x7fffffff to allow the server to automatically chose an interface. A
+server that is not willing to open a client-specified unit should refuse
+the request with a SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE error. On successful
+open, the server should reply with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_SUCCESS.
+
+Once established the client and server may exchange packet or frames
+over the tunnel channel by encapsulating them in SSH protocol strings
+and sending them as channel data. This ensures that packet boundaries
+are kept intact. Specifically, packets are transmitted using normal
+SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA packets:
+
+ byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
+ uint32 recipient channel
+ string data
+
+The contents of the "data" field for layer 3 packets is:
+
+ uint32 packet length
+ uint32 address family
+ byte[packet length - 4] packet data
+
+The "address family" field identifies the type of packet in the message.
+It may be one of:
+
+ SSH_TUN_AF_INET 2 /* IPv4 */
+ SSH_TUN_AF_INET6 24 /* IPv6 */
+
+The "packet data" field consists of the IPv4/IPv6 datagram itself
+without any link layer header.
+
+The contents of the "data" field for layer 2 packets is:
+
+ uint32 packet length
+ byte[packet length] frame
+
+The "frame" field contains an IEEE 802.3 Ethernet frame, including
+header.
+
+2.4. connection: Unix domain socket forwarding
+
+OpenSSH supports local and remote Unix domain socket forwarding
+using the "streamlocal" extension. Forwarding is initiated as per
+TCP sockets but with a single path instead of a host and port.
+
+Similar to direct-tcpip, direct-streamlocal is sent by the client
+to request that the server make a connection to a Unix domain socket.
+
+ byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
+ string "direct-streamlocal at openssh.com"
+ uint32 sender channel
+ uint32 initial window size
+ uint32 maximum packet size
+ string socket path
+ string reserved
+ uint32 reserved
+
+Similar to forwarded-tcpip, forwarded-streamlocal is sent by the
+server when the client has previously send the server a streamlocal-forward
+GLOBAL_REQUEST.
+
+ byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
+ string "forwarded-streamlocal at openssh.com"
+ uint32 sender channel
+ uint32 initial window size
+ uint32 maximum packet size
+ string socket path
+ string reserved for future use
+
+The reserved field is not currently defined and is ignored on the
+remote end. It is intended to be used in the future to pass
+information about the socket file, such as ownership and mode.
+The client currently sends the empty string for this field.
+
+Similar to tcpip-forward, streamlocal-forward is sent by the client
+to request remote forwarding of a Unix domain socket.
+
+ byte SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
+ string "streamlocal-forward at openssh.com"
+ boolean TRUE
+ string socket path
+
+Similar to cancel-tcpip-forward, cancel-streamlocal-forward is sent
+by the client cancel the forwarding of a Unix domain socket.
+
+ byte SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
+ string "cancel-streamlocal-forward at openssh.com"
+ boolean FALSE
+ string socket path
+
+2.5. connection: hostkey update and rotation "hostkeys-00 at openssh.com"
+and "hostkeys-prove-00 at openssh.com"
+
+OpenSSH supports a protocol extension allowing a server to inform
+a client of all its protocol v.2 host keys after user-authentication
+has completed.
+
+ byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
+ string "hostkeys-00 at openssh.com"
+ string[] hostkeys
+
+Upon receiving this message, a client should check which of the
+supplied host keys are present in known_hosts. For keys that are
+not present, it should send a "hostkeys-prove at openssh.com" message
+to request the server prove ownership of the private half of the
+key.
+
+ byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
+ string "hostkeys-prove-00 at openssh.com"
+ char 1 /* want-reply */
+ string[] hostkeys
+
+When a server receives this message, it should generate a signature
+using each requested key over the following:
+
+ string "hostkeys-prove-00 at openssh.com"
+ string session identifier
+ string hostkey
+
+These signatures should be included in the reply, in the order matching
+the hostkeys in the request:
+
+ byte SSH_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
+ string[] signatures
+
+When the client receives this reply (and not a failure), it should
+validate the signatures and may update its known_hosts file, adding keys
+that it has not seen before and deleting keys for the server host that
+are no longer offered.
+
+These extensions let a client learn key types that it had not previously
+encountered, thereby allowing it to potentially upgrade from weaker
+key algorithms to better ones. It also supports graceful key rotation:
+a server may offer multiple keys of the same type for a period (to
+give clients an opportunity to learn them using this extension) before
+removing the deprecated key from those offered.
+
+3. SFTP protocol changes
+
+3.1. sftp: Reversal of arguments to SSH_FXP_SYMLINK
+
+When OpenSSH's sftp-server was implemented, the order of the arguments
+to the SSH_FXP_SYMLINK method was inadvertently reversed. Unfortunately,
+the reversal was not noticed until the server was widely deployed. Since
+fixing this to follow the specification would cause incompatibility, the
+current order was retained. For correct operation, clients should send
+SSH_FXP_SYMLINK as follows:
+
+ uint32 id
+ string targetpath
+ string linkpath
+
+3.2. sftp: Server extension announcement in SSH_FXP_VERSION
+
+OpenSSH's sftp-server lists the extensions it supports using the
+standard extension announcement mechanism in the SSH_FXP_VERSION server
+hello packet:
+
+ uint32 3 /* protocol version */
+ string ext1-name
+ string ext1-version
+ string ext2-name
+ string ext2-version
+ ...
+ string extN-name
+ string extN-version
+
+Each extension reports its integer version number as an ASCII encoded
+string, e.g. "1". The version will be incremented if the extension is
+ever changed in an incompatible way. The server MAY advertise the same
+extension with multiple versions (though this is unlikely). Clients MUST
+check the version number before attempting to use the extension.
+
+3.3. sftp: Extension request "posix-rename at openssh.com"
+
+This operation provides a rename operation with POSIX semantics, which
+are different to those provided by the standard SSH_FXP_RENAME in
+draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt. This request is implemented as a
+SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the following format:
+
+ uint32 id
+ string "posix-rename at openssh.com"
+ string oldpath
+ string newpath
+
+On receiving this request the server will perform the POSIX operation
+rename(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+3.4. sftp: Extension requests "statvfs at openssh.com" and
+ "fstatvfs at openssh.com"
+
+These requests correspond to the statvfs and fstatvfs POSIX system
+interfaces. The "statvfs at openssh.com" request operates on an explicit
+pathname, and is formatted as follows:
+
+ uint32 id
+ string "statvfs at openssh.com"
+ string path
+
+The "fstatvfs at openssh.com" operates on an open file handle:
+
+ uint32 id
+ string "fstatvfs at openssh.com"
+ string handle
+
+These requests return a SSH_FXP_STATUS reply on failure. On success they
+return the following SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY reply:
+
+ uint32 id
+ uint64 f_bsize /* file system block size */
+ uint64 f_frsize /* fundamental fs block size */
+ uint64 f_blocks /* number of blocks (unit f_frsize) */
+ uint64 f_bfree /* free blocks in file system */
+ uint64 f_bavail /* free blocks for non-root */
+ uint64 f_files /* total file inodes */
+ uint64 f_ffree /* free file inodes */
+ uint64 f_favail /* free file inodes for to non-root */
+ uint64 f_fsid /* file system id */
+ uint64 f_flag /* bit mask of f_flag values */
+ uint64 f_namemax /* maximum filename length */
+
+The values of the f_flag bitmask are as follows:
+
+ #define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY 0x1 /* read-only */
+ #define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID 0x2 /* no setuid */
+
+Both the "statvfs at openssh.com" and "fstatvfs at openssh.com" extensions are
+advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "2".
+
+10. sftp: Extension request "hardlink at openssh.com"
+
+This request is for creating a hard link to a regular file. This
+request is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the
+following format:
+
+ uint32 id
+ string "hardlink at openssh.com"
+ string oldpath
+ string newpath
+
+On receiving this request the server will perform the operation
+link(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+10. sftp: Extension request "fsync at openssh.com"
+
+This request asks the server to call fsync(2) on an open file handle.
+
+ uint32 id
+ string "fsync at openssh.com"
+ string handle
+
+One receiving this request, a server will call fsync(handle_fd) and will
+respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
+
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.30 2016/04/08 06:35:54 djm Exp $
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.agent
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.agent 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.agent 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,560 +0,0 @@
-This describes the protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent.
-
-OpenSSH's agent supports managing keys for the standard SSH protocol
-2 as well as the legacy SSH protocol 1. Support for these key types
-is almost completely disjoint - in all but a few cases, operations on
-protocol 2 keys cannot see or affect protocol 1 keys and vice-versa.
-
-Protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys are separated because of the differing
-cryptographic usage: protocol 1 private RSA keys are used to decrypt
-challenges that were encrypted with the corresponding public key,
-whereas protocol 2 RSA private keys are used to sign challenges with
-a private key for verification with the corresponding public key. It
-is considered unsound practice to use the same key for signing and
-encryption.
-
-With a couple of exceptions, the protocol message names used in this
-document indicate which type of key the message relates to. SSH_*
-messages refer to protocol 1 keys only. SSH2_* messages refer to
-protocol 2 keys. Furthermore, the names also indicate whether the
-message is a request to the agent (*_AGENTC_*) or a reply from the
-agent (*_AGENT_*). Section 3 below contains the mapping of the
-protocol message names to their integer values.
-
-1. Data types
-
-Because of support for legacy SSH protocol 1 keys, OpenSSH's agent
-protocol makes use of some data types not defined in RFC 4251.
-
-1.1 uint16
-
-The "uint16" data type is a simple MSB-first 16 bit unsigned integer
-encoded in two bytes.
-
-1.2 mpint1
-
-The "mpint1" type represents an arbitrary precision integer (bignum).
-Its format is as follows:
-
- uint16 bits
- byte[(bits + 7) / 8] bignum
-
-"bignum" contains an unsigned arbitrary precision integer encoded as
-eight bits per byte in big-endian (MSB first) format.
-
-Note the difference between the "mpint1" encoding and the "mpint"
-encoding defined in RFC 4251. Also note that the length of the encoded
-integer is specified in bits, not bytes and that the byte length of
-the integer must be calculated by rounding up the number of bits to the
-nearest eight.
-
-2. Protocol Messages
-
-All protocol messages are prefixed with their length in bytes, encoded
-as a 32 bit unsigned integer. Specifically:
-
- uint32 message_length
- byte[message_length] message
-
-The following message descriptions refer only to the content the
-"message" field.
-
-2.1 Generic server responses
-
-The following generic messages may be sent by the server in response to
-requests from the client. On success the agent may reply either with:
-
- byte SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS
-
-or a request-specific success message.
-
-On failure, the agent may reply with:
-
- byte SSH_AGENT_FAILURE
-
-SSH_AGENT_FAILURE messages are also sent in reply to unknown request
-types.
-
-2.2 Adding keys to the agent
-
-Keys are added to the agent using the SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY and
-SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY requests for protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys
-respectively.
-
-Two variants of these requests are SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED
-and SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED - these add keys with optional
-"constraints" on their usage.
-
-OpenSSH may be built with support for keys hosted on a smartcard
-or other hardware security module. These keys may be added
-to the agent using the SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY and
-SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED requests.
-
-2.2.1 Key constraints
-
-The OpenSSH agent supports some basic optional constraints on key usage.
-At present there are two constraints defined.
-
-The first constraint limits the validity duration of a key. It is
-encoded as:
-
- byte SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME
- uint32 seconds
-
-Where "seconds" contains the number of seconds that the key shall remain
-valid measured from the moment that the agent receives it. After the
-validity period has expired, OpenSSH's agent will erase these keys from
-memory.
-
-The second constraint requires the agent to seek explicit user
-confirmation before performing private key operations with the loaded
-key. This constraint is encoded as:
-
- byte SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM
-
-Zero or more constraints may be specified when adding a key with one
-of the *_CONSTRAINED requests. Multiple constraints are appended
-consecutively to the end of the request:
-
- byte constraint1_type
- .... constraint1_data
- byte constraint2_type
- .... constraint2_data
- ....
- byte constraintN_type
- .... constraintN_data
-
-Such a sequence of zero or more constraints will be referred to below
-as "constraint[]". Agents may determine whether there are constraints
-by checking whether additional data exists in the "add key" request
-after the key data itself. OpenSSH will refuse to add a key if it
-contains unknown constraints.
-
-2.2.2 Add protocol 1 key
-
-A client may add a protocol 1 key to an agent with the following
-request:
-
- byte SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY or
- SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED
- uint32 ignored
- mpint1 rsa_n
- mpint1 rsa_e
- mpint1 rsa_d
- mpint1 rsa_iqmp
- mpint1 rsa_q
- mpint1 rsa_p
- string key_comment
- constraint[] key_constraints
-
-Note that there is some redundancy in the key parameters; a key could be
-fully specified using just rsa_q, rsa_p and rsa_e at the cost of extra
-computation.
-
-"key_constraints" may only be present if the request type is
-SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED.
-
-The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key has been
-successfully added or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred.
-
-2.2.3 Add protocol 2 key
-
-The OpenSSH agent supports DSA, ECDSA and RSA keys for protocol 2. DSA
-keys may be added using the following request
-
- byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
- SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
- string "ssh-dss"
- mpint dsa_p
- mpint dsa_q
- mpint dsa_g
- mpint dsa_public_key
- mpint dsa_private_key
- string key_comment
- constraint[] key_constraints
-
-DSA certificates may be added with:
- byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
- SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
- string "ssh-dss-cert-v00 at openssh.com"
- string certificate
- mpint dsa_private_key
- string key_comment
- constraint[] key_constraints
-
-ECDSA keys may be added using the following request
-
- byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
- SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
- string "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256" |
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384" |
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521"
- string ecdsa_curve_name
- string ecdsa_public_key
- mpint ecdsa_private
- string key_comment
- constraint[] key_constraints
-
-ECDSA certificates may be added with:
- byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
- SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
- string "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com" |
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com" |
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
- string certificate
- mpint ecdsa_private_key
- string key_comment
- constraint[] key_constraints
-
-RSA keys may be added with this request:
-
- byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
- SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
- string "ssh-rsa"
- mpint rsa_n
- mpint rsa_e
- mpint rsa_d
- mpint rsa_iqmp
- mpint rsa_p
- mpint rsa_q
- string key_comment
- constraint[] key_constraints
-
-RSA certificates may be added with this request:
-
- byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
- SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
- string "ssh-rsa-cert-v00 at openssh.com"
- string certificate
- mpint rsa_d
- mpint rsa_iqmp
- mpint rsa_p
- mpint rsa_q
- string key_comment
- constraint[] key_constraints
-
-Note that the 'rsa_p' and 'rsa_q' parameters are sent in the reverse
-order to the protocol 1 add keys message. As with the corresponding
-protocol 1 "add key" request, the private key is overspecified to avoid
-redundant processing.
-
-For DSA, ECDSA and RSA key add requests, "key_constraints" may only be
-present if the request type is SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED.
-
-The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key has been
-successfully added or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred.
-
-2.2.4 Loading keys from a smartcard
-
-The OpenSSH agent may have optional smartcard support built in to it. If
-so, it supports an operation to load keys from a smartcard. Technically,
-only the public components of the keys are loaded into the agent so
-this operation really arranges for future private key operations to be
-delegated to the smartcard.
-
- byte SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY or
- SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED
- string reader_id
- string pin
- constraint[] key_constraints
-
-"reader_id" is an identifier to a smartcard reader and "pin"
-is a PIN or passphrase used to unlock the private key(s) on the
-device. "key_constraints" may only be present if the request type is
-SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED.
-
-This operation may load all SSH keys that are unlocked using the
-"pin" on the specified reader. The type of key loaded (protocol 1
-or protocol 2) will be specified by the smartcard itself, it is not
-client-specified.
-
-The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if one or more keys have
-been successfully loaded or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred.
-The agent will also return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if it does not support
-smartcards.
-
-2.3 Removing multiple keys
-
-A client may request that an agent delete all protocol 1 keys using the
-following request:
-
- byte SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES
-
-This message requests the deletion of all protocol 2 keys:
-
- byte SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES
-
-On success, the agent will delete all keys of the requested type and
-reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS message. If an error occurred, the agent
-will reply with SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
-
-Note that, to delete all keys (both protocol 1 and 2), a client
-must send both a SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES and a
-SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES request.
-
-2.4 Removing specific keys
-
-2.4.1 Removing a protocol 1 key
-
-Removal of a protocol 1 key may be requested with the following message:
-
- byte SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY
- uint32 key_bits
- mpint1 rsa_e
- mpint1 rsa_n
-
-Note that key_bits is strictly redundant, as it may be inferred by the
-length of rsa_n.
-
-The agent will delete any private key matching the specified public key
-and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If no such key was found, the agent will
-return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
-
-2.4.2 Removing a protocol 2 key
-
-Protocol 2 keys may be removed with the following request:
-
- byte SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY
- string key_blob
-
-Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key
-Algorithms" for any of the supported protocol 2 key types.
-
-The agent will delete any private key matching the specified public key
-and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If no such key was found, the agent will
-return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
-
-2.4.3 Removing keys loaded from a smartcard
-
-A client may request that a server remove one or more smartcard-hosted
-keys using this message:
-
- byte SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY
- string reader_id
- string pin
-
-"reader_id" the an identifier to a smartcard reader and "pin" is a PIN
-or passphrase used to unlock the private key(s) on the device.
-
-When this message is received, and if the agent supports
-smartcard-hosted keys, it will delete all keys that are hosted on the
-specified smartcard that may be accessed with the given "pin".
-
-The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if one or more keys have
-been successfully removed or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred.
-The agent will also return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if it does not support
-smartcards.
-
-2.5 Requesting a list of known keys
-
-An agent may be requested to list which keys it holds. Different
-requests exist for protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys.
-
-2.5.1 Requesting a list of protocol 1 keys
-
-To request a list of protocol 1 keys that are held in the agent, a
-client may send the following message:
-
- byte SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES
-
-The agent will reply with the following message:
-
- byte SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
- uint32 num_keys
-
-Followed by zero or more consecutive keys, encoded as:
-
- uint32 bits
- mpint1 rsa_e
- mpint1 rsa_n
- string key_comment
-
-2.5.2 Requesting a list of protocol 2 keys
-
-A client may send the following message to request a list of
-protocol 2 keys that are stored in the agent:
-
- byte SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES
-
-The agent will reply with the following message header:
-
- byte SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
- uint32 num_keys
-
-Followed by zero or more consecutive keys, encoded as:
-
- string key_blob
- string key_comment
-
-Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key
-Algorithms" for any of the supported protocol 2 key types.
-
-2.6 Private key operations
-
-The purpose of the agent is to perform private key operations, such as
-signing and encryption without requiring a passphrase to unlock the
-key and without allowing the private key itself to be exposed. There
-are separate requests for the protocol 1 and protocol 2 private key
-operations.
-
-2.6.1 Protocol 1 private key challenge
-
-The private key operation used in version 1 of the SSH protocol is
-decrypting a challenge that has been encrypted with a public key.
-It may be requested using this message:
-
- byte SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE
- uint32 ignored
- mpint1 rsa_e
- mpint1 rsa_n
- mpint1 encrypted_challenge
- byte[16] session_id
- uint32 response_type /* must be 1 */
-
-"rsa_e" and "rsa_n" are used to identify which private key to use.
-"encrypted_challenge" is a challenge blob that has (presumably)
-been encrypted with the public key and must be in the range
-1 <= encrypted_challenge < 2^256. "session_id" is the SSH protocol 1
-session ID (computed from the server host key, the server semi-ephemeral
-key and the session cookie).
-
-"ignored" and "response_type" exist for compatibility with legacy
-implementations. "response_type" must be equal to 1; other response
-types are not supported.
-
-On receiving this request, the server decrypts the "encrypted_challenge"
-using the private key matching the supplied (rsa_e, rsa_n) values. For
-the response derivation, the decrypted challenge is represented as an
-unsigned, big-endian integer encoded in a 32 byte buffer (i.e. values
-smaller than 2^248 will have leading 0 bytes).
-
-The response value is then calculated as:
-
- response = MD5(decrypted_challenge || session_id)
-
-and returned in the following message
-
- byte SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE
- byte[16] response
-
-If the agent cannot find the key specified by the supplied (rsa_e,
-rsa_n) then it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
-
-2.6.2 Protocol 2 private key signature request
-
-A client may use the following message to request signing of data using
-a protocol 2 key:
-
- byte SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST
- string key_blob
- string data
- uint32 flags
-
-Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key
-Algorithms" for any of the supported protocol 2 key types. "flags" is
-a bit-mask, but at present only one possible value is defined (see below
-for its meaning):
-
- SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE 1
-
-Upon receiving this request, the agent will look up the private key that
-corresponds to the public key contained in key_blob. It will use this
-private key to sign the "data" and produce a signature blob using the
-key type-specific method described in RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key
-Algorithms".
-
-An exception to this is for "ssh-dss" keys where the "flags" word
-contains the value SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE. In this case, a legacy
-signature encoding is used in lieu of the standard one. In this case,
-the DSA signature blob is encoded as:
-
- byte[40] signature
-
-The signature will be returned in the response message:
-
- byte SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE
- string signature_blob
-
-If the agent cannot find the key specified by the supplied key_blob then
-it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
-
-2.7 Locking or unlocking an agent
-
-The agent supports temporary locking with a passphrase to suspend
-processing of sensitive operations until it has been unlocked with the
-same passphrase. To lock an agent, a client send the following request:
-
- byte SSH_AGENTC_LOCK
- string passphrase
-
-Upon receipt of this message and if the agent is not already locked,
-it will suspend processing requests and return a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS
-reply. If the agent is already locked, it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
-
-While locked, the agent will refuse all requests except
-SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK, SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES and
-SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES. The "request identities" requests are
-treated specially by a locked agent: it will always return an empty list
-of keys.
-
-To unlock an agent, a client may request:
-
- byte SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK
- string passphrase
-
-If the passphrase matches and the agent is locked, then it will resume
-processing all requests and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If the agent
-is not locked or the passphrase does not match then it will return
-SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
-
-Locking and unlocking affects both protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys.
-
-3. Protocol message numbers
-
-3.1 Requests from client to agent for protocol 1 key operations
-
- SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES 1
- SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE 3
- SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY 7
- SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY 8
- SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES 9
- SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED 24
-
-3.2 Requests from client to agent for protocol 2 key operations
-
- SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES 11
- SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST 13
- SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY 17
- SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18
- SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19
- SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25
-
-3.3 Key-type independent requests from client to agent
-
- SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY 20
- SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY 21
- SSH_AGENTC_LOCK 22
- SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK 23
- SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26
-
-3.4 Generic replies from agent to client
-
- SSH_AGENT_FAILURE 5
- SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS 6
-
-3.5 Replies from agent to client for protocol 1 key operations
-
- SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 2
- SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE 4
-
-3.6 Replies from agent to client for protocol 2 key operations
-
- SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12
- SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE 14
-
-3.7 Key constraint identifiers
-
- SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1
- SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2
-
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.7 2013/01/02 00:33:49 djm Exp $
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.agent (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.agent)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.agent (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.agent 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,582 @@
+This describes the protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent.
+
+OpenSSH's agent supports managing keys for the standard SSH protocol
+2 as well as the legacy SSH protocol 1. Support for these key types
+is almost completely disjoint - in all but a few cases, operations on
+protocol 2 keys cannot see or affect protocol 1 keys and vice-versa.
+
+Protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys are separated because of the differing
+cryptographic usage: protocol 1 private RSA keys are used to decrypt
+challenges that were encrypted with the corresponding public key,
+whereas protocol 2 RSA private keys are used to sign challenges with
+a private key for verification with the corresponding public key. It
+is considered unsound practice to use the same key for signing and
+encryption.
+
+With a couple of exceptions, the protocol message names used in this
+document indicate which type of key the message relates to. SSH_*
+messages refer to protocol 1 keys only. SSH2_* messages refer to
+protocol 2 keys. Furthermore, the names also indicate whether the
+message is a request to the agent (*_AGENTC_*) or a reply from the
+agent (*_AGENT_*). Section 3 below contains the mapping of the
+protocol message names to their integer values.
+
+1. Data types
+
+Because of support for legacy SSH protocol 1 keys, OpenSSH's agent
+protocol makes use of some data types not defined in RFC 4251.
+
+1.1 uint16
+
+The "uint16" data type is a simple MSB-first 16 bit unsigned integer
+encoded in two bytes.
+
+1.2 mpint1
+
+The "mpint1" type represents an arbitrary precision integer (bignum).
+Its format is as follows:
+
+ uint16 bits
+ byte[(bits + 7) / 8] bignum
+
+"bignum" contains an unsigned arbitrary precision integer encoded as
+eight bits per byte in big-endian (MSB first) format.
+
+Note the difference between the "mpint1" encoding and the "mpint"
+encoding defined in RFC 4251. Also note that the length of the encoded
+integer is specified in bits, not bytes and that the byte length of
+the integer must be calculated by rounding up the number of bits to the
+nearest eight.
+
+2. Protocol Messages
+
+All protocol messages are prefixed with their length in bytes, encoded
+as a 32 bit unsigned integer. Specifically:
+
+ uint32 message_length
+ byte[message_length] message
+
+The following message descriptions refer only to the content the
+"message" field.
+
+2.1 Generic server responses
+
+The following generic messages may be sent by the server in response to
+requests from the client. On success the agent may reply either with:
+
+ byte SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS
+
+or a request-specific success message.
+
+On failure, the agent may reply with:
+
+ byte SSH_AGENT_FAILURE
+
+SSH_AGENT_FAILURE messages are also sent in reply to unknown request
+types.
+
+2.2 Adding keys to the agent
+
+Keys are added to the agent using the SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY and
+SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY requests for protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys
+respectively.
+
+Two variants of these requests are SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED
+and SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED - these add keys with optional
+"constraints" on their usage.
+
+OpenSSH may be built with support for keys hosted on a smartcard
+or other hardware security module. These keys may be added
+to the agent using the SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY and
+SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED requests.
+
+2.2.1 Key constraints
+
+The OpenSSH agent supports some basic optional constraints on key usage.
+At present there are two constraints defined.
+
+The first constraint limits the validity duration of a key. It is
+encoded as:
+
+ byte SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME
+ uint32 seconds
+
+Where "seconds" contains the number of seconds that the key shall remain
+valid measured from the moment that the agent receives it. After the
+validity period has expired, OpenSSH's agent will erase these keys from
+memory.
+
+The second constraint requires the agent to seek explicit user
+confirmation before performing private key operations with the loaded
+key. This constraint is encoded as:
+
+ byte SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM
+
+Zero or more constraints may be specified when adding a key with one
+of the *_CONSTRAINED requests. Multiple constraints are appended
+consecutively to the end of the request:
+
+ byte constraint1_type
+ .... constraint1_data
+ byte constraint2_type
+ .... constraint2_data
+ ....
+ byte constraintN_type
+ .... constraintN_data
+
+Such a sequence of zero or more constraints will be referred to below
+as "constraint[]". Agents may determine whether there are constraints
+by checking whether additional data exists in the "add key" request
+after the key data itself. OpenSSH will refuse to add a key if it
+contains unknown constraints.
+
+2.2.2 Add protocol 1 key
+
+A client may add a protocol 1 key to an agent with the following
+request:
+
+ byte SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY or
+ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED
+ uint32 ignored
+ mpint1 rsa_n
+ mpint1 rsa_e
+ mpint1 rsa_d
+ mpint1 rsa_iqmp
+ mpint1 rsa_q
+ mpint1 rsa_p
+ string key_comment
+ constraint[] key_constraints
+
+Note that there is some redundancy in the key parameters; a key could be
+fully specified using just rsa_q, rsa_p and rsa_e at the cost of extra
+computation.
+
+"key_constraints" may only be present if the request type is
+SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED.
+
+The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key has been
+successfully added or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred.
+
+2.2.3 Add protocol 2 key
+
+The OpenSSH agent supports DSA, ECDSA and RSA keys for protocol 2. DSA
+keys may be added using the following request
+
+ byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
+ SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
+ string "ssh-dss"
+ mpint dsa_p
+ mpint dsa_q
+ mpint dsa_g
+ mpint dsa_public_key
+ mpint dsa_private_key
+ string key_comment
+ constraint[] key_constraints
+
+DSA certificates may be added with:
+ byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
+ SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
+ string "ssh-dss-cert-v00 at openssh.com"
+ string certificate
+ mpint dsa_private_key
+ string key_comment
+ constraint[] key_constraints
+
+ECDSA keys may be added using the following request
+
+ byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
+ SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
+ string "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256" |
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384" |
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521"
+ string ecdsa_curve_name
+ string ecdsa_public_key
+ mpint ecdsa_private
+ string key_comment
+ constraint[] key_constraints
+
+ECDSA certificates may be added with:
+ byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
+ SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
+ string "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com" |
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com" |
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
+ string certificate
+ mpint ecdsa_private_key
+ string key_comment
+ constraint[] key_constraints
+
+ED25519 keys may be added using the following request
+ byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
+ SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
+ string "ssh-ed25519"
+ string ed25519_public_key
+ string ed25519_private_key || ed25519_public_key
+ string key_comment
+ constraint[] key_constraints
+
+ED25519 certificates may be added with:
+ byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
+ SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
+ string "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
+ string certificate
+ string ed25519_public_key
+ string ed25519_private_key || ed25519_public_key
+ string key_comment
+ constraint[] key_constraints
+
+For both ssh-ed25519 and ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com keys, the private
+key has the public key appended (for historical reasons).
+
+RSA keys may be added with this request:
+
+ byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
+ SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
+ string "ssh-rsa"
+ mpint rsa_n
+ mpint rsa_e
+ mpint rsa_d
+ mpint rsa_iqmp
+ mpint rsa_p
+ mpint rsa_q
+ string key_comment
+ constraint[] key_constraints
+
+RSA certificates may be added with this request:
+
+ byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
+ SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
+ string "ssh-rsa-cert-v00 at openssh.com"
+ string certificate
+ mpint rsa_d
+ mpint rsa_iqmp
+ mpint rsa_p
+ mpint rsa_q
+ string key_comment
+ constraint[] key_constraints
+
+Note that the 'rsa_p' and 'rsa_q' parameters are sent in the reverse
+order to the protocol 1 add keys message. As with the corresponding
+protocol 1 "add key" request, the private key is overspecified to avoid
+redundant processing.
+
+For DSA, ECDSA and RSA key add requests, "key_constraints" may only be
+present if the request type is SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED.
+
+The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key has been
+successfully added or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred.
+
+2.2.4 Loading keys from a smartcard
+
+The OpenSSH agent may have optional smartcard support built in to it. If
+so, it supports an operation to load keys from a smartcard. Technically,
+only the public components of the keys are loaded into the agent so
+this operation really arranges for future private key operations to be
+delegated to the smartcard.
+
+ byte SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY or
+ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED
+ string reader_id
+ string pin
+ constraint[] key_constraints
+
+"reader_id" is an identifier to a smartcard reader and "pin"
+is a PIN or passphrase used to unlock the private key(s) on the
+device. "key_constraints" may only be present if the request type is
+SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED.
+
+This operation may load all SSH keys that are unlocked using the
+"pin" on the specified reader. The type of key loaded (protocol 1
+or protocol 2) will be specified by the smartcard itself, it is not
+client-specified.
+
+The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if one or more keys have
+been successfully loaded or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred.
+The agent will also return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if it does not support
+smartcards.
+
+2.3 Removing multiple keys
+
+A client may request that an agent delete all protocol 1 keys using the
+following request:
+
+ byte SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES
+
+This message requests the deletion of all protocol 2 keys:
+
+ byte SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES
+
+On success, the agent will delete all keys of the requested type and
+reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS message. If an error occurred, the agent
+will reply with SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
+
+Note that, to delete all keys (both protocol 1 and 2), a client
+must send both a SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES and a
+SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES request.
+
+2.4 Removing specific keys
+
+2.4.1 Removing a protocol 1 key
+
+Removal of a protocol 1 key may be requested with the following message:
+
+ byte SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY
+ uint32 key_bits
+ mpint1 rsa_e
+ mpint1 rsa_n
+
+Note that key_bits is strictly redundant, as it may be inferred by the
+length of rsa_n.
+
+The agent will delete any private key matching the specified public key
+and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If no such key was found, the agent will
+return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
+
+2.4.2 Removing a protocol 2 key
+
+Protocol 2 keys may be removed with the following request:
+
+ byte SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY
+ string key_blob
+
+Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key
+Algorithms" for any of the supported protocol 2 key types.
+
+The agent will delete any private key matching the specified public key
+and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If no such key was found, the agent will
+return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
+
+2.4.3 Removing keys loaded from a smartcard
+
+A client may request that a server remove one or more smartcard-hosted
+keys using this message:
+
+ byte SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY
+ string reader_id
+ string pin
+
+"reader_id" the an identifier to a smartcard reader and "pin" is a PIN
+or passphrase used to unlock the private key(s) on the device.
+
+When this message is received, and if the agent supports
+smartcard-hosted keys, it will delete all keys that are hosted on the
+specified smartcard that may be accessed with the given "pin".
+
+The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if one or more keys have
+been successfully removed or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred.
+The agent will also return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if it does not support
+smartcards.
+
+2.5 Requesting a list of known keys
+
+An agent may be requested to list which keys it holds. Different
+requests exist for protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys.
+
+2.5.1 Requesting a list of protocol 1 keys
+
+To request a list of protocol 1 keys that are held in the agent, a
+client may send the following message:
+
+ byte SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES
+
+The agent will reply with the following message:
+
+ byte SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
+ uint32 num_keys
+
+Followed by zero or more consecutive keys, encoded as:
+
+ uint32 bits
+ mpint1 rsa_e
+ mpint1 rsa_n
+ string key_comment
+
+2.5.2 Requesting a list of protocol 2 keys
+
+A client may send the following message to request a list of
+protocol 2 keys that are stored in the agent:
+
+ byte SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES
+
+The agent will reply with the following message header:
+
+ byte SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
+ uint32 num_keys
+
+Followed by zero or more consecutive keys, encoded as:
+
+ string key_blob
+ string key_comment
+
+Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key
+Algorithms" for any of the supported protocol 2 key types.
+
+2.6 Private key operations
+
+The purpose of the agent is to perform private key operations, such as
+signing and encryption without requiring a passphrase to unlock the
+key and without allowing the private key itself to be exposed. There
+are separate requests for the protocol 1 and protocol 2 private key
+operations.
+
+2.6.1 Protocol 1 private key challenge
+
+The private key operation used in version 1 of the SSH protocol is
+decrypting a challenge that has been encrypted with a public key.
+It may be requested using this message:
+
+ byte SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE
+ uint32 ignored
+ mpint1 rsa_e
+ mpint1 rsa_n
+ mpint1 encrypted_challenge
+ byte[16] session_id
+ uint32 response_type /* must be 1 */
+
+"rsa_e" and "rsa_n" are used to identify which private key to use.
+"encrypted_challenge" is a challenge blob that has (presumably)
+been encrypted with the public key and must be in the range
+1 <= encrypted_challenge < 2^256. "session_id" is the SSH protocol 1
+session ID (computed from the server host key, the server semi-ephemeral
+key and the session cookie).
+
+"ignored" and "response_type" exist for compatibility with legacy
+implementations. "response_type" must be equal to 1; other response
+types are not supported.
+
+On receiving this request, the server decrypts the "encrypted_challenge"
+using the private key matching the supplied (rsa_e, rsa_n) values. For
+the response derivation, the decrypted challenge is represented as an
+unsigned, big-endian integer encoded in a 32 byte buffer (i.e. values
+smaller than 2^248 will have leading 0 bytes).
+
+The response value is then calculated as:
+
+ response = MD5(decrypted_challenge || session_id)
+
+and returned in the following message
+
+ byte SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE
+ byte[16] response
+
+If the agent cannot find the key specified by the supplied (rsa_e,
+rsa_n) then it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
+
+2.6.2 Protocol 2 private key signature request
+
+A client may use the following message to request signing of data using
+a protocol 2 key:
+
+ byte SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST
+ string key_blob
+ string data
+ uint32 flags
+
+Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key
+Algorithms" for any of the supported protocol 2 key types. "flags" is
+a bit-mask, but at present only one possible value is defined (see below
+for its meaning):
+
+ SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE 1
+
+Upon receiving this request, the agent will look up the private key that
+corresponds to the public key contained in key_blob. It will use this
+private key to sign the "data" and produce a signature blob using the
+key type-specific method described in RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key
+Algorithms".
+
+An exception to this is for "ssh-dss" keys where the "flags" word
+contains the value SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE. In this case, a legacy
+signature encoding is used in lieu of the standard one. In this case,
+the DSA signature blob is encoded as:
+
+ byte[40] signature
+
+The signature will be returned in the response message:
+
+ byte SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE
+ string signature_blob
+
+If the agent cannot find the key specified by the supplied key_blob then
+it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
+
+2.7 Locking or unlocking an agent
+
+The agent supports temporary locking with a passphrase to suspend
+processing of sensitive operations until it has been unlocked with the
+same passphrase. To lock an agent, a client send the following request:
+
+ byte SSH_AGENTC_LOCK
+ string passphrase
+
+Upon receipt of this message and if the agent is not already locked,
+it will suspend processing requests and return a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS
+reply. If the agent is already locked, it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
+
+While locked, the agent will refuse all requests except
+SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK, SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES and
+SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES. The "request identities" requests are
+treated specially by a locked agent: it will always return an empty list
+of keys.
+
+To unlock an agent, a client may request:
+
+ byte SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK
+ string passphrase
+
+If the passphrase matches and the agent is locked, then it will resume
+processing all requests and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If the agent
+is not locked or the passphrase does not match then it will return
+SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
+
+Locking and unlocking affects both protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys.
+
+3. Protocol message numbers
+
+3.1 Requests from client to agent for protocol 1 key operations
+
+ SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES 1
+ SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE 3
+ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY 7
+ SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY 8
+ SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES 9
+ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED 24
+
+3.2 Requests from client to agent for protocol 2 key operations
+
+ SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES 11
+ SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST 13
+ SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY 17
+ SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18
+ SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19
+ SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25
+
+3.3 Key-type independent requests from client to agent
+
+ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY 20
+ SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY 21
+ SSH_AGENTC_LOCK 22
+ SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK 23
+ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26
+
+3.4 Generic replies from agent to client
+
+ SSH_AGENT_FAILURE 5
+ SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS 6
+
+3.5 Replies from agent to client for protocol 1 key operations
+
+ SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 2
+ SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE 4
+
+3.6 Replies from agent to client for protocol 2 key operations
+
+ SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12
+ SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE 14
+
+3.7 Key constraint identifiers
+
+ SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1
+ SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.11 2016/05/19 07:45:32 djm Exp $
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.certkeys
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.certkeys 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.certkeys 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,265 +0,0 @@
-This document describes a simple public-key certificate authentication
-system for use by SSH.
-
-Background
-----------
-
-The SSH protocol currently supports a simple public key authentication
-mechanism. Unlike other public key implementations, SSH eschews the use
-of X.509 certificates and uses raw keys. This approach has some benefits
-relating to simplicity of configuration and minimisation of attack
-surface, but it does not support the important use-cases of centrally
-managed, passwordless authentication and centrally certified host keys.
-
-These protocol extensions build on the simple public key authentication
-system already in SSH to allow certificate-based authentication. The
-certificates used are not traditional X.509 certificates, with numerous
-options and complex encoding rules, but something rather more minimal: a
-key, some identity information and usage options that have been signed
-with some other trusted key.
-
-A sshd server may be configured to allow authentication via certified
-keys, by extending the existing ~/.ssh/authorized_keys mechanism to
-allow specification of certification authority keys in addition to
-raw user keys. The ssh client will support automatic verification of
-acceptance of certified host keys, by adding a similar ability to
-specify CA keys in ~/.ssh/known_hosts.
-
-Certified keys are represented using new key types:
-
- ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com
- ssh-dss-cert-v01 at openssh.com
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com
-
-These include certification information along with the public key
-that is used to sign challenges. ssh-keygen performs the CA signing
-operation.
-
-Protocol extensions
--------------------
-
-The SSH wire protocol includes several extensibility mechanisms.
-These modifications shall take advantage of namespaced public key
-algorithm names to add support for certificate authentication without
-breaking the protocol - implementations that do not support the
-extensions will simply ignore them.
-
-Authentication using the new key formats described below proceeds
-using the existing SSH "publickey" authentication method described
-in RFC4252 section 7.
-
-New public key formats
-----------------------
-
-The certificate key types take a similar high-level format (note: data
-types and encoding are as per RFC4251 section 5). The serialised wire
-encoding of these certificates is also used for storing them on disk.
-
-#define SSH_CERT_TYPE_USER 1
-#define SSH_CERT_TYPE_HOST 2
-
-RSA certificate
-
- string "ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
- string nonce
- mpint e
- mpint n
- uint64 serial
- uint32 type
- string key id
- string valid principals
- uint64 valid after
- uint64 valid before
- string critical options
- string extensions
- string reserved
- string signature key
- string signature
-
-DSA certificate
-
- string "ssh-dss-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
- string nonce
- mpint p
- mpint q
- mpint g
- mpint y
- uint64 serial
- uint32 type
- string key id
- string valid principals
- uint64 valid after
- uint64 valid before
- string critical options
- string extensions
- string reserved
- string signature key
- string signature
-
-ECDSA certificate
-
- string "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 at openssh.com" |
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 at openssh.com" |
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 at openssh.com"
- string nonce
- string curve
- string public_key
- uint64 serial
- uint32 type
- string key id
- string valid principals
- uint64 valid after
- uint64 valid before
- string critical options
- string extensions
- string reserved
- string signature key
- string signature
-
-The nonce field is a CA-provided random bitstring of arbitrary length
-(but typically 16 or 32 bytes) included to make attacks that depend on
-inducing collisions in the signature hash infeasible.
-
-e and n are the RSA exponent and public modulus respectively.
-
-p, q, g, y are the DSA parameters as described in FIPS-186-2.
-
-curve and public key are respectively the ECDSA "[identifier]" and "Q"
-defined in section 3.1 of RFC5656.
-
-serial is an optional certificate serial number set by the CA to
-provide an abbreviated way to refer to certificates from that CA.
-If a CA does not wish to number its certificates it must set this
-field to zero.
-
-type specifies whether this certificate is for identification of a user
-or a host using a SSH_CERT_TYPE_... value.
-
-key id is a free-form text field that is filled in by the CA at the time
-of signing; the intention is that the contents of this field are used to
-identify the identity principal in log messages.
-
-"valid principals" is a string containing zero or more principals as
-strings packed inside it. These principals list the names for which this
-certificate is valid; hostnames for SSH_CERT_TYPE_HOST certificates and
-usernames for SSH_CERT_TYPE_USER certificates. As a special case, a
-zero-length "valid principals" field means the certificate is valid for
-any principal of the specified type. XXX DNS wildcards?
-
-"valid after" and "valid before" specify a validity period for the
-certificate. Each represents a time in seconds since 1970-01-01
-00:00:00. A certificate is considered valid if:
-
- valid after <= current time < valid before
-
-criticial options is a set of zero or more key options encoded as
-below. All such options are "critical" in the sense that an implementation
-must refuse to authorise a key that has an unrecognised option.
-
-extensions is a set of zero or more optional extensions. These extensions
-are not critical, and an implementation that encounters one that it does
-not recognise may safely ignore it.
-
-Generally, critical options are used to control features that restrict
-access where extensions are used to enable features that grant access.
-This ensures that certificates containing unknown restrictions do not
-inadvertently grant access while allowing new protocol features to be
-enabled via extensions without breaking certificates' backwards
-compatibility.
-
-The reserved field is currently unused and is ignored in this version of
-the protocol.
-
-signature key contains the CA key used to sign the certificate.
-The valid key types for CA keys are ssh-rsa, ssh-dss and the ECDSA types
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521. "Chained"
-certificates, where the signature key type is a certificate type itself
-are NOT supported. Note that it is possible for a RSA certificate key to
-be signed by a DSS or ECDSA CA key and vice-versa.
-
-signature is computed over all preceding fields from the initial string
-up to, and including the signature key. Signatures are computed and
-encoded according to the rules defined for the CA's public key algorithm
-(RFC4253 section 6.6 for ssh-rsa and ssh-dss, RFC5656 for the ECDSA
-types).
-
-Critical options
-----------------
-
-The critical options section of the certificate specifies zero or more
-options on the certificates validity. The format of this field
-is a sequence of zero or more tuples:
-
- string name
- string data
-
-Options must be lexically ordered by "name" if they appear in the
-sequence. Each named option may only appear once in a certificate.
-
-The name field identifies the option and the data field encodes
-option-specific information (see below). All options are
-"critical", if an implementation does not recognise a option
-then the validating party should refuse to accept the certificate.
-
-The supported options and the contents and structure of their
-data fields are:
-
-Name Format Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-force-command string Specifies a command that is executed
- (replacing any the user specified on the
- ssh command-line) whenever this key is
- used for authentication.
-
-source-address string Comma-separated list of source addresses
- from which this certificate is accepted
- for authentication. Addresses are
- specified in CIDR format (nn.nn.nn.nn/nn
- or hhhh::hhhh/nn).
- If this option is not present then
- certificates may be presented from any
- source address.
-
-Extensions
-----------
-
-The extensions section of the certificate specifies zero or more
-non-critical certificate extensions. The encoding and ordering of
-extensions in this field is identical to that of the critical options,
-as is the requirement that each name appear only once.
-
-If an implementation does not recognise an extension, then it should
-ignore it.
-
-The supported extensions and the contents and structure of their data
-fields are:
-
-Name Format Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-permit-X11-forwarding empty Flag indicating that X11 forwarding
- should be permitted. X11 forwarding will
- be refused if this option is absent.
-
-permit-agent-forwarding empty Flag indicating that agent forwarding
- should be allowed. Agent forwarding
- must not be permitted unless this
- option is present.
-
-permit-port-forwarding empty Flag indicating that port-forwarding
- should be allowed. If this option is
- not present then no port forwarding will
- be allowed.
-
-permit-pty empty Flag indicating that PTY allocation
- should be permitted. In the absence of
- this option PTY allocation will be
- disabled.
-
-permit-user-rc empty Flag indicating that execution of
- ~/.ssh/rc should be permitted. Execution
- of this script will not be permitted if
- this option is not present.
-
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.9 2012/03/28 07:23:22 djm Exp $
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.certkeys (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.certkeys)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.certkeys (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.certkeys 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+This document describes a simple public-key certificate authentication
+system for use by SSH.
+
+Background
+----------
+
+The SSH protocol currently supports a simple public key authentication
+mechanism. Unlike other public key implementations, SSH eschews the use
+of X.509 certificates and uses raw keys. This approach has some benefits
+relating to simplicity of configuration and minimisation of attack
+surface, but it does not support the important use-cases of centrally
+managed, passwordless authentication and centrally certified host keys.
+
+These protocol extensions build on the simple public key authentication
+system already in SSH to allow certificate-based authentication. The
+certificates used are not traditional X.509 certificates, with numerous
+options and complex encoding rules, but something rather more minimal: a
+key, some identity information and usage options that have been signed
+with some other trusted key.
+
+A sshd server may be configured to allow authentication via certified
+keys, by extending the existing ~/.ssh/authorized_keys mechanism to
+allow specification of certification authority keys in addition to
+raw user keys. The ssh client will support automatic verification of
+acceptance of certified host keys, by adding a similar ability to
+specify CA keys in ~/.ssh/known_hosts.
+
+Certified keys are represented using new key types:
+
+ ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com
+ ssh-dss-cert-v01 at openssh.com
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com
+
+These include certification information along with the public key
+that is used to sign challenges. ssh-keygen performs the CA signing
+operation.
+
+Protocol extensions
+-------------------
+
+The SSH wire protocol includes several extensibility mechanisms.
+These modifications shall take advantage of namespaced public key
+algorithm names to add support for certificate authentication without
+breaking the protocol - implementations that do not support the
+extensions will simply ignore them.
+
+Authentication using the new key formats described below proceeds
+using the existing SSH "publickey" authentication method described
+in RFC4252 section 7.
+
+New public key formats
+----------------------
+
+The certificate key types take a similar high-level format (note: data
+types and encoding are as per RFC4251 section 5). The serialised wire
+encoding of these certificates is also used for storing them on disk.
+
+#define SSH_CERT_TYPE_USER 1
+#define SSH_CERT_TYPE_HOST 2
+
+RSA certificate
+
+ string "ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
+ string nonce
+ mpint e
+ mpint n
+ uint64 serial
+ uint32 type
+ string key id
+ string valid principals
+ uint64 valid after
+ uint64 valid before
+ string critical options
+ string extensions
+ string reserved
+ string signature key
+ string signature
+
+DSA certificate
+
+ string "ssh-dss-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
+ string nonce
+ mpint p
+ mpint q
+ mpint g
+ mpint y
+ uint64 serial
+ uint32 type
+ string key id
+ string valid principals
+ uint64 valid after
+ uint64 valid before
+ string critical options
+ string extensions
+ string reserved
+ string signature key
+ string signature
+
+ECDSA certificate
+
+ string "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-v01 at openssh.com" |
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-v01 at openssh.com" |
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-v01 at openssh.com"
+ string nonce
+ string curve
+ string public_key
+ uint64 serial
+ uint32 type
+ string key id
+ string valid principals
+ uint64 valid after
+ uint64 valid before
+ string critical options
+ string extensions
+ string reserved
+ string signature key
+ string signature
+
+ED25519 certificate
+
+ string "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
+ string nonce
+ string pk
+ uint64 serial
+ uint32 type
+ string key id
+ string valid principals
+ uint64 valid after
+ uint64 valid before
+ string critical options
+ string extensions
+ string reserved
+ string signature key
+ string signature
+
+The nonce field is a CA-provided random bitstring of arbitrary length
+(but typically 16 or 32 bytes) included to make attacks that depend on
+inducing collisions in the signature hash infeasible.
+
+e and n are the RSA exponent and public modulus respectively.
+
+p, q, g, y are the DSA parameters as described in FIPS-186-2.
+
+curve and public key are respectively the ECDSA "[identifier]" and "Q"
+defined in section 3.1 of RFC5656.
+
+pk is the encoded Ed25519 public key as defined by
+draft-josefsson-eddsa-ed25519-03.
+
+serial is an optional certificate serial number set by the CA to
+provide an abbreviated way to refer to certificates from that CA.
+If a CA does not wish to number its certificates it must set this
+field to zero.
+
+type specifies whether this certificate is for identification of a user
+or a host using a SSH_CERT_TYPE_... value.
+
+key id is a free-form text field that is filled in by the CA at the time
+of signing; the intention is that the contents of this field are used to
+identify the identity principal in log messages.
+
+"valid principals" is a string containing zero or more principals as
+strings packed inside it. These principals list the names for which this
+certificate is valid; hostnames for SSH_CERT_TYPE_HOST certificates and
+usernames for SSH_CERT_TYPE_USER certificates. As a special case, a
+zero-length "valid principals" field means the certificate is valid for
+any principal of the specified type.
+
+"valid after" and "valid before" specify a validity period for the
+certificate. Each represents a time in seconds since 1970-01-01
+00:00:00. A certificate is considered valid if:
+
+ valid after <= current time < valid before
+
+criticial options is a set of zero or more key options encoded as
+below. All such options are "critical" in the sense that an implementation
+must refuse to authorise a key that has an unrecognised option.
+
+extensions is a set of zero or more optional extensions. These extensions
+are not critical, and an implementation that encounters one that it does
+not recognise may safely ignore it.
+
+Generally, critical options are used to control features that restrict
+access where extensions are used to enable features that grant access.
+This ensures that certificates containing unknown restrictions do not
+inadvertently grant access while allowing new protocol features to be
+enabled via extensions without breaking certificates' backwards
+compatibility.
+
+The reserved field is currently unused and is ignored in this version of
+the protocol.
+
+signature key contains the CA key used to sign the certificate.
+The valid key types for CA keys are ssh-rsa, ssh-dss and the ECDSA types
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521. "Chained"
+certificates, where the signature key type is a certificate type itself
+are NOT supported. Note that it is possible for a RSA certificate key to
+be signed by a DSS or ECDSA CA key and vice-versa.
+
+signature is computed over all preceding fields from the initial string
+up to, and including the signature key. Signatures are computed and
+encoded according to the rules defined for the CA's public key algorithm
+(RFC4253 section 6.6 for ssh-rsa and ssh-dss, RFC5656 for the ECDSA
+types), and draft-josefsson-eddsa-ed25519-03 for Ed25519.
+
+Critical options
+----------------
+
+The critical options section of the certificate specifies zero or more
+options on the certificates validity. The format of this field
+is a sequence of zero or more tuples:
+
+ string name
+ string data
+
+Options must be lexically ordered by "name" if they appear in the
+sequence. Each named option may only appear once in a certificate.
+
+The name field identifies the option and the data field encodes
+option-specific information (see below). All options are
+"critical", if an implementation does not recognise a option
+then the validating party should refuse to accept the certificate.
+
+No critical options are defined for host certificates at present. The
+supported user certificate options and the contents and structure of
+their data fields are:
+
+Name Format Description
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+force-command string Specifies a command that is executed
+ (replacing any the user specified on the
+ ssh command-line) whenever this key is
+ used for authentication.
+
+source-address string Comma-separated list of source addresses
+ from which this certificate is accepted
+ for authentication. Addresses are
+ specified in CIDR format (nn.nn.nn.nn/nn
+ or hhhh::hhhh/nn).
+ If this option is not present then
+ certificates may be presented from any
+ source address.
+
+Extensions
+----------
+
+The extensions section of the certificate specifies zero or more
+non-critical certificate extensions. The encoding and ordering of
+extensions in this field is identical to that of the critical options,
+as is the requirement that each name appear only once.
+
+If an implementation does not recognise an extension, then it should
+ignore it.
+
+No extensions are defined for host certificates at present. The
+supported user certificate extensions and the contents and structure of
+their data fields are:
+
+Name Format Description
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+permit-X11-forwarding empty Flag indicating that X11 forwarding
+ should be permitted. X11 forwarding will
+ be refused if this option is absent.
+
+permit-agent-forwarding empty Flag indicating that agent forwarding
+ should be allowed. Agent forwarding
+ must not be permitted unless this
+ option is present.
+
+permit-port-forwarding empty Flag indicating that port-forwarding
+ should be allowed. If this option is
+ not present then no port forwarding will
+ be allowed.
+
+permit-pty empty Flag indicating that PTY allocation
+ should be permitted. In the absence of
+ this option PTY allocation will be
+ disabled.
+
+permit-user-rc empty Flag indicating that execution of
+ ~/.ssh/rc should be permitted. Execution
+ of this script will not be permitted if
+ this option is not present.
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.10 2016/05/03 10:27:59 djm Exp $
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-This document describes the chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com authenticated
-encryption cipher supported by OpenSSH.
-
-Background
-----------
-
-ChaCha20 is a stream cipher designed by Daniel Bernstein and described
-in [1]. It operates by permuting 128 fixed bits, 128 or 256 bits of key,
-a 64 bit nonce and a 64 bit counter into 64 bytes of output. This output
-is used as a keystream, with any unused bytes simply discarded.
-
-Poly1305[2], also by Daniel Bernstein, is a one-time Carter-Wegman MAC
-that computes a 128 bit integrity tag given a message and a single-use
-256 bit secret key.
-
-The chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com combines these two primitives into an
-authenticated encryption mode. The construction used is based on that
-proposed for TLS by Adam Langley in [3], but differs in the layout of
-data passed to the MAC and in the addition of encyption of the packet
-lengths.
-
-Negotiation
------------
-
-The chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com offers both encryption and
-authentication. As such, no separate MAC is required. If the
-chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com cipher is selected in key exchange,
-the offered MAC algorithms are ignored and no MAC is required to be
-negotiated.
-
-Detailed Construction
----------------------
-
-The chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com cipher requires 512 bits of key
-material as output from the SSH key exchange. This forms two 256 bit
-keys (K_1 and K_2), used by two separate instances of chacha20.
-
-The instance keyed by K_1 is a stream cipher that is used only
-to encrypt the 4 byte packet length field. The second instance,
-keyed by K_2, is used in conjunction with poly1305 to build an AEAD
-(Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) that is used to encrypt
-and authenticate the entire packet.
-
-Two separate cipher instances are used here so as to keep the packet
-lengths confidential but not create an oracle for the packet payload
-cipher by decrypting and using the packet length prior to checking
-the MAC. By using an independently-keyed cipher instance to encrypt the
-length, an active attacker seeking to exploit the packet input handling
-as a decryption oracle can learn nothing about the payload contents or
-its MAC (assuming key derivation, ChaCha20 and Poly1305 are secure).
-
-The AEAD is constructed as follows: for each packet, generate a Poly1305
-key by taking the first 256 bits of ChaCha20 stream output generated
-using K_2, an IV consisting of the packet sequence number encoded as an
-uint64 under the SSH wire encoding rules and a ChaCha20 block counter of
-zero. The K_2 ChaCha20 block counter is then set to the little-endian
-encoding of 1 (i.e. {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}) and this instance is used
-for encryption of the packet payload.
-
-Packet Handling
----------------
-
-When receiving a packet, the length must be decrypted first. When 4
-bytes of ciphertext length have been received, they may be decrypted
-using the K_1 key, a nonce consisting of the packet sequence number
-encoded as a uint64 under the usual SSH wire encoding and a zero block
-counter to obtain the plaintext length.
-
-Once the entire packet has been received, the MAC MUST be checked
-before decryption. A per-packet Poly1305 key is generated as described
-above and the MAC tag calculated using Poly1305 with this key over the
-ciphertext of the packet length and the payload together. The calculated
-MAC is then compared in constant time with the one appended to the
-packet and the packet decrypted using ChaCha20 as described above (with
-K_2, the packet sequence number as nonce and a starting block counter of
-1).
-
-To send a packet, first encode the 4 byte length and encrypt it using
-K_1. Encrypt the packet payload (using K_2) and append it to the
-encrypted length. Finally, calculate a MAC tag and append it.
-
-Rekeying
---------
-
-ChaCha20 must never reuse a {key, nonce} for encryption nor may it be
-used to encrypt more than 2^70 bytes under the same {key, nonce}. The
-SSH Transport protocol (RFC4253) recommends a far more conservative
-rekeying every 1GB of data sent or received. If this recommendation
-is followed, then chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com requires no special
-handling in this area.
-
-References
-----------
-
-[1] "ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20", Daniel Bernstein
- http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf
-
-[2] "The Poly1305-AES message-authentication code", Daniel Bernstein
- http://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf
-
-[3] "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 based Cipher Suites for TLS", Adam Langley
- http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03
-
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305,v 1.2 2013/12/02 02:50:27 djm Exp $
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+This document describes the chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com authenticated
+encryption cipher supported by OpenSSH.
+
+Background
+----------
+
+ChaCha20 is a stream cipher designed by Daniel Bernstein and described
+in [1]. It operates by permuting 128 fixed bits, 128 or 256 bits of key,
+a 64 bit nonce and a 64 bit counter into 64 bytes of output. This output
+is used as a keystream, with any unused bytes simply discarded.
+
+Poly1305[2], also by Daniel Bernstein, is a one-time Carter-Wegman MAC
+that computes a 128 bit integrity tag given a message and a single-use
+256 bit secret key.
+
+The chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com combines these two primitives into an
+authenticated encryption mode. The construction used is based on that
+proposed for TLS by Adam Langley in [3], but differs in the layout of
+data passed to the MAC and in the addition of encyption of the packet
+lengths.
+
+Negotiation
+-----------
+
+The chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com offers both encryption and
+authentication. As such, no separate MAC is required. If the
+chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com cipher is selected in key exchange,
+the offered MAC algorithms are ignored and no MAC is required to be
+negotiated.
+
+Detailed Construction
+---------------------
+
+The chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com cipher requires 512 bits of key
+material as output from the SSH key exchange. This forms two 256 bit
+keys (K_1 and K_2), used by two separate instances of chacha20.
+The first 256 bits consitute K_2 and the second 256 bits become
+K_1.
+
+The instance keyed by K_1 is a stream cipher that is used only
+to encrypt the 4 byte packet length field. The second instance,
+keyed by K_2, is used in conjunction with poly1305 to build an AEAD
+(Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) that is used to encrypt
+and authenticate the entire packet.
+
+Two separate cipher instances are used here so as to keep the packet
+lengths confidential but not create an oracle for the packet payload
+cipher by decrypting and using the packet length prior to checking
+the MAC. By using an independently-keyed cipher instance to encrypt the
+length, an active attacker seeking to exploit the packet input handling
+as a decryption oracle can learn nothing about the payload contents or
+its MAC (assuming key derivation, ChaCha20 and Poly1305 are secure).
+
+The AEAD is constructed as follows: for each packet, generate a Poly1305
+key by taking the first 256 bits of ChaCha20 stream output generated
+using K_2, an IV consisting of the packet sequence number encoded as an
+uint64 under the SSH wire encoding rules and a ChaCha20 block counter of
+zero. The K_2 ChaCha20 block counter is then set to the little-endian
+encoding of 1 (i.e. {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}) and this instance is used
+for encryption of the packet payload.
+
+Packet Handling
+---------------
+
+When receiving a packet, the length must be decrypted first. When 4
+bytes of ciphertext length have been received, they may be decrypted
+using the K_1 key, a nonce consisting of the packet sequence number
+encoded as a uint64 under the usual SSH wire encoding and a zero block
+counter to obtain the plaintext length.
+
+Once the entire packet has been received, the MAC MUST be checked
+before decryption. A per-packet Poly1305 key is generated as described
+above and the MAC tag calculated using Poly1305 with this key over the
+ciphertext of the packet length and the payload together. The calculated
+MAC is then compared in constant time with the one appended to the
+packet and the packet decrypted using ChaCha20 as described above (with
+K_2, the packet sequence number as nonce and a starting block counter of
+1).
+
+To send a packet, first encode the 4 byte length and encrypt it using
+K_1. Encrypt the packet payload (using K_2) and append it to the
+encrypted length. Finally, calculate a MAC tag and append it.
+
+Rekeying
+--------
+
+ChaCha20 must never reuse a {key, nonce} for encryption nor may it be
+used to encrypt more than 2^70 bytes under the same {key, nonce}. The
+SSH Transport protocol (RFC4253) recommends a far more conservative
+rekeying every 1GB of data sent or received. If this recommendation
+is followed, then chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com requires no special
+handling in this area.
+
+References
+----------
+
+[1] "ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20", Daniel Bernstein
+ http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf
+
+[2] "The Poly1305-AES message-authentication code", Daniel Bernstein
+ http://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf
+
+[3] "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 based Cipher Suites for TLS", Adam Langley
+ http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305,v 1.3 2016/05/03 13:10:24 djm Exp $
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.krl
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.krl 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.krl 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,164 +0,0 @@
-This describes the key/certificate revocation list format for OpenSSH.
-
-1. Overall format
-
-The KRL consists of a header and zero or more sections. The header is:
-
-#define KRL_MAGIC 0x5353484b524c0a00ULL /* "SSHKRL\n\0" */
-#define KRL_FORMAT_VERSION 1
-
- uint64 KRL_MAGIC
- uint32 KRL_FORMAT_VERSION
- uint64 krl_version
- uint64 generated_date
- uint64 flags
- string reserved
- string comment
-
-Where "krl_version" is a version number that increases each time the KRL
-is modified, "generated_date" is the time in seconds since 1970-01-01
-00:00:00 UTC that the KRL was generated, "comment" is an optional comment
-and "reserved" an extension field whose contents are currently ignored.
-No "flags" are currently defined.
-
-Following the header are zero or more sections, each consisting of:
-
- byte section_type
- string section_data
-
-Where "section_type" indicates the type of the "section_data". An exception
-to this is the KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE section, that has a slightly different
-format (see below).
-
-The available section types are:
-
-#define KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES 1
-#define KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY 2
-#define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 3
-#define KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE 4
-
-3. Certificate serial section
-
-These sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES to revoke certificates by
-serial number or key ID. The consist of the CA key that issued the
-certificates to be revoked and a reserved field whose contents is currently
-ignored.
-
- string ca_key
- string reserved
-
-Followed by one or more sections:
-
- byte cert_section_type
- string cert_section_data
-
-The certificate section types are:
-
-#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST 0x20
-#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE 0x21
-#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP 0x22
-#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID 0x23
-
-2.1 Certificate serial list section
-
-This section is identified as KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST. It revokes
-certificates by listing their serial numbers. The cert_section_data in this
-case contains:
-
- uint64 revoked_cert_serial
- uint64 ...
-
-This section may appear multiple times.
-
-2.2. Certificate serial range section
-
-These sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE and hold
-a range of serial numbers of certificates:
-
- uint64 serial_min
- uint64 serial_max
-
-All certificates in the range serial_min <= serial <= serial_max are
-revoked.
-
-This section may appear multiple times.
-
-2.3. Certificate serial bitmap section
-
-Bitmap sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP and revoke keys
-by listing their serial number in a bitmap.
-
- uint64 serial_offset
- mpint revoked_keys_bitmap
-
-A bit set at index N in the bitmap corresponds to revocation of a keys with
-serial number (serial_offset + N).
-
-This section may appear multiple times.
-
-2.4. Revoked key ID sections
-
-KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID sections revoke particular certificate "key
-ID" strings. This may be useful in revoking all certificates
-associated with a particular identity, e.g. a host or a user.
-
- string key_id[0]
- ...
-
-This section must contain at least one "key_id". This section may appear
-multiple times.
-
-3. Explicit key sections
-
-These sections, identified as KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY, revoke keys
-(not certificates). They are less space efficient than serial numbers,
-but are able to revoke plain keys.
-
- string public_key_blob[0]
- ....
-
-This section must contain at least one "public_key_blob". The blob
-must be a raw key (i.e. not a certificate).
-
-This section may appear multiple times.
-
-4. SHA1 fingerprint sections
-
-These sections, identified as KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1, revoke
-plain keys (i.e. not certificates) by listing their SHA1 hashes:
-
- string public_key_hash[0]
- ....
-
-This section must contain at least one "public_key_hash". The hash blob
-is obtained by taking the SHA1 hash of the public key blob. Hashes in
-this section must appear in numeric order, treating each hash as a big-
-endian integer.
-
-This section may appear multiple times.
-
-5. KRL signature sections
-
-The KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE section serves a different purpose to the
-preceeding ones: to provide cryptographic authentication of a KRL that
-is retrieved over a channel that does not provide integrity protection.
-Its format is slightly different to the previously-described sections:
-in order to simplify the signature generation, it includes as a "body"
-two string components instead of one.
-
- byte KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE
- string signature_key
- string signature
-
-The signature is calculated over the entire KRL from the KRL_MAGIC
-to this subsection's "signature_key", including both and using the
-signature generation rules appropriate for the type of "signature_key".
-
-This section must appear last in the KRL. If multiple signature sections
-appear, they must appear consecutively at the end of the KRL file.
-
-Implementations that retrieve KRLs over untrusted channels must verify
-signatures. Signature sections are optional for KRLs distributed by
-trusted means.
-
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.krl,v 1.2 2013/01/18 00:24:58 djm Exp $
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.krl (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.krl)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.krl (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.krl 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+This describes the key/certificate revocation list format for OpenSSH.
+
+1. Overall format
+
+The KRL consists of a header and zero or more sections. The header is:
+
+#define KRL_MAGIC 0x5353484b524c0a00ULL /* "SSHKRL\n\0" */
+#define KRL_FORMAT_VERSION 1
+
+ uint64 KRL_MAGIC
+ uint32 KRL_FORMAT_VERSION
+ uint64 krl_version
+ uint64 generated_date
+ uint64 flags
+ string reserved
+ string comment
+
+Where "krl_version" is a version number that increases each time the KRL
+is modified, "generated_date" is the time in seconds since 1970-01-01
+00:00:00 UTC that the KRL was generated, "comment" is an optional comment
+and "reserved" an extension field whose contents are currently ignored.
+No "flags" are currently defined.
+
+Following the header are zero or more sections, each consisting of:
+
+ byte section_type
+ string section_data
+
+Where "section_type" indicates the type of the "section_data". An exception
+to this is the KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE section, that has a slightly different
+format (see below).
+
+The available section types are:
+
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES 1
+#define KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY 2
+#define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 3
+#define KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE 4
+
+2. Certificate section
+
+These sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES to revoke certificates by
+serial number or key ID. The consist of the CA key that issued the
+certificates to be revoked and a reserved field whose contents is currently
+ignored.
+
+ string ca_key
+ string reserved
+
+Where "ca_key" is the standard SSH wire serialisation of the CA's
+public key. Alternately, "ca_key" may be an empty string to indicate
+the certificate section applies to all CAs (this is most useful when
+revoking key IDs).
+
+Followed by one or more sections:
+
+ byte cert_section_type
+ string cert_section_data
+
+The certificate section types are:
+
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST 0x20
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE 0x21
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP 0x22
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID 0x23
+
+2.1 Certificate serial list section
+
+This section is identified as KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST. It revokes
+certificates by listing their serial numbers. The cert_section_data in this
+case contains:
+
+ uint64 revoked_cert_serial
+ uint64 ...
+
+This section may appear multiple times.
+
+2.2. Certificate serial range section
+
+These sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE and hold
+a range of serial numbers of certificates:
+
+ uint64 serial_min
+ uint64 serial_max
+
+All certificates in the range serial_min <= serial <= serial_max are
+revoked.
+
+This section may appear multiple times.
+
+2.3. Certificate serial bitmap section
+
+Bitmap sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP and revoke keys
+by listing their serial number in a bitmap.
+
+ uint64 serial_offset
+ mpint revoked_keys_bitmap
+
+A bit set at index N in the bitmap corresponds to revocation of a keys with
+serial number (serial_offset + N).
+
+This section may appear multiple times.
+
+2.4. Revoked key ID sections
+
+KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID sections revoke particular certificate "key
+ID" strings. This may be useful in revoking all certificates
+associated with a particular identity, e.g. a host or a user.
+
+ string key_id[0]
+ ...
+
+This section must contain at least one "key_id". This section may appear
+multiple times.
+
+3. Explicit key sections
+
+These sections, identified as KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY, revoke keys
+(not certificates). They are less space efficient than serial numbers,
+but are able to revoke plain keys.
+
+ string public_key_blob[0]
+ ....
+
+This section must contain at least one "public_key_blob". The blob
+must be a raw key (i.e. not a certificate).
+
+This section may appear multiple times.
+
+4. SHA1 fingerprint sections
+
+These sections, identified as KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1, revoke
+plain keys (i.e. not certificates) by listing their SHA1 hashes:
+
+ string public_key_hash[0]
+ ....
+
+This section must contain at least one "public_key_hash". The hash blob
+is obtained by taking the SHA1 hash of the public key blob. Hashes in
+this section must appear in numeric order, treating each hash as a big-
+endian integer.
+
+This section may appear multiple times.
+
+5. KRL signature sections
+
+The KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE section serves a different purpose to the
+preceeding ones: to provide cryptographic authentication of a KRL that
+is retrieved over a channel that does not provide integrity protection.
+Its format is slightly different to the previously-described sections:
+in order to simplify the signature generation, it includes as a "body"
+two string components instead of one.
+
+ byte KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE
+ string signature_key
+ string signature
+
+The signature is calculated over the entire KRL from the KRL_MAGIC
+to this subsection's "signature_key", including both and using the
+signature generation rules appropriate for the type of "signature_key".
+
+This section must appear last in the KRL. If multiple signature sections
+appear, they must appear consecutively at the end of the KRL file.
+
+Implementations that retrieve KRLs over untrusted channels must verify
+signatures. Signature sections are optional for KRLs distributed by
+trusted means.
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.krl,v 1.3 2015/01/30 01:10:33 djm Exp $
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.mux
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.mux 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.mux 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,222 +0,0 @@
-This document describes the multiplexing protocol used by ssh(1)'s
-ControlMaster connection-sharing.
-
-Most messages from the client to the server contain a "request id" field.
-This field is returned in replies as "client request id" to facilitate
-matching of responses to requests.
-
-1. Connection setup
-
-When a multiplexing connection is made to a ssh(1) operating as a
-ControlMaster from a ssh(1) in multiplex slave mode, the first
-action of each is to exchange hello messages:
-
- uint32 MUX_MSG_HELLO
- uint32 protocol version
- string extension name [optional]
- string extension value [optional]
- ...
-
-The current version of the mux protocol is 4. A slave should refuse
-to connect to a master that speaks an unsupported protocol version.
-Following the version identifier are zero or more extensions
-represented as a name/value pair. No extensions are currently
-defined.
-
-2. Opening sessions
-
-To open a new multiplexed session, a client may send the following
-request:
-
- uint32 MUX_C_NEW_SESSION
- uint32 request id
- string reserved
- bool want tty flag
- bool want X11 forwarding flag
- bool want agent flag
- bool subsystem flag
- uint32 escape char
- string terminal type
- string command
- string environment string 0 [optional]
- ...
-
-To disable the use of an escape character, "escape char" may be set
-to 0xffffffff. "terminal type" is generally set to the value of
-$TERM. zero or more environment strings may follow the command.
-
-The client then sends its standard input, output and error file
-descriptors (in that order) using Unix domain socket control messages.
-
-The contents of "reserved" are currently ignored.
-
-If successful, the server will reply with MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED
-
- uint32 MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED
- uint32 client request id
- uint32 session id
-
-Otherwise it will reply with an error: MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or
-MUX_S_FAILURE.
-
-Once the server has received the fds, it will respond with MUX_S_OK
-indicating that the session is up. The client now waits for the
-session to end. When it does, the server will send an exit status
-message:
-
- uint32 MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE
- uint32 session id
- uint32 exit value
-
-The client should exit with this value to mimic the behaviour of a
-non-multiplexed ssh(1) connection. Two additional cases that the
-client must cope with are it receiving a signal itself and the
-server disconnecting without sending an exit message.
-
-A master may also send a MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL before MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE
-if remote TTY allocation was unsuccessful. The client may use this to
-return its local tty to "cooked" mode.
-
- uint32 MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL
- uint32 session id
-
-3. Health checks
-
-The client may request a health check/PID report from a server:
-
- uint32 MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK
- uint32 request id
-
-The server replies with:
-
- uint32 MUX_S_ALIVE
- uint32 client request id
- uint32 server pid
-
-4. Remotely terminating a master
-
-A client may request that a master terminate immediately:
-
- uint32 MUX_C_TERMINATE
- uint32 request id
-
-The server will reply with one of MUX_S_OK or MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED.
-
-5. Requesting establishment of port forwards
-
-A client may request the master to establish a port forward:
-
- uint32 MUX_C_OPEN_FWD
- uint32 request id
- uint32 forwarding type
- string listen host
- uint32 listen port
- string connect host
- uint32 connect port
-
-forwarding type may be MUX_FWD_LOCAL, MUX_FWD_REMOTE, MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC.
-
-A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT, a
-MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a MUX_S_FAILURE.
-
-For dynamically allocated listen port the server replies with
-
- uint32 MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT
- uint32 client request id
- uint32 allocated remote listen port
-
-6. Requesting closure of port forwards
-
-Note: currently unimplemented (server will always reply with MUX_S_FAILURE).
-
-A client may request the master to close a port forward:
-
- uint32 MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD
- uint32 request id
- uint32 forwarding type
- string listen host
- uint32 listen port
- string connect host
- uint32 connect port
-
-A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a
-MUX_S_FAILURE.
-
-7. Requesting stdio forwarding
-
-A client may request the master to establish a stdio forwarding:
-
- uint32 MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD
- uint32 request id
- string reserved
- string connect host
- string connect port
-
-The client then sends its standard input and output file descriptors
-(in that order) using Unix domain socket control messages.
-
-The contents of "reserved" are currently ignored.
-
-A server may reply with a MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED
-or a MUX_S_FAILURE.
-
-8. Requesting shutdown of mux listener
-
-A client may request the master to stop accepting new multiplexing requests
-and remove its listener socket.
-
- uint32 MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING
- uint32 request id
-
-A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a
-MUX_S_FAILURE.
-
-9. Status messages
-
-The MUX_S_OK message is empty:
-
- uint32 MUX_S_OK
- uint32 client request id
-
-The MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED and MUX_S_FAILURE include a reason:
-
- uint32 MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED
- uint32 client request id
- string reason
-
- uint32 MUX_S_FAILURE
- uint32 client request id
- string reason
-
-10. Protocol numbers
-
-#define MUX_MSG_HELLO 0x00000001
-#define MUX_C_NEW_SESSION 0x10000002
-#define MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK 0x10000004
-#define MUX_C_TERMINATE 0x10000005
-#define MUX_C_OPEN_FWD 0x10000006
-#define MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD 0x10000007
-#define MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD 0x10000008
-#define MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING 0x10000009
-#define MUX_S_OK 0x80000001
-#define MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED 0x80000002
-#define MUX_S_FAILURE 0x80000003
-#define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE 0x80000004
-#define MUX_S_ALIVE 0x80000005
-#define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED 0x80000006
-#define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT 0x80000007
-#define MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL 0x80000008
-
-#define MUX_FWD_LOCAL 1
-#define MUX_FWD_REMOTE 2
-#define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC 3
-
-XXX TODO
-XXX extended status (e.g. report open channels / forwards)
-XXX lock (maybe)
-XXX watch in/out traffic (pre/post crypto)
-XXX inject packet (what about replies)
-XXX server->client error/warning notifications
-XXX send signals via mux
-
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.mux,v 1.9 2012/06/01 00:49:35 djm Exp $
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.mux (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.mux)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.mux (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/PROTOCOL.mux 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+This document describes the multiplexing protocol used by ssh(1)'s
+ControlMaster connection-sharing.
+
+Most messages from the client to the server contain a "request id" field.
+This field is returned in replies as "client request id" to facilitate
+matching of responses to requests.
+
+1. Connection setup
+
+When a multiplexing connection is made to a ssh(1) operating as a
+ControlMaster from a ssh(1) in multiplex slave mode, the first
+action of each is to exchange hello messages:
+
+ uint32 MUX_MSG_HELLO
+ uint32 protocol version
+ string extension name [optional]
+ string extension value [optional]
+ ...
+
+The current version of the mux protocol is 4. A slave should refuse
+to connect to a master that speaks an unsupported protocol version.
+Following the version identifier are zero or more extensions
+represented as a name/value pair. No extensions are currently
+defined.
+
+2. Opening sessions
+
+To open a new multiplexed session, a client may send the following
+request:
+
+ uint32 MUX_C_NEW_SESSION
+ uint32 request id
+ string reserved
+ bool want tty flag
+ bool want X11 forwarding flag
+ bool want agent flag
+ bool subsystem flag
+ uint32 escape char
+ string terminal type
+ string command
+ string environment string 0 [optional]
+ ...
+
+To disable the use of an escape character, "escape char" may be set
+to 0xffffffff. "terminal type" is generally set to the value of
+$TERM. zero or more environment strings may follow the command.
+
+The client then sends its standard input, output and error file
+descriptors (in that order) using Unix domain socket control messages.
+
+The contents of "reserved" are currently ignored.
+
+If successful, the server will reply with MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED
+
+ uint32 MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED
+ uint32 client request id
+ uint32 session id
+
+Otherwise it will reply with an error: MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or
+MUX_S_FAILURE.
+
+Once the server has received the fds, it will respond with MUX_S_OK
+indicating that the session is up. The client now waits for the
+session to end. When it does, the server will send an exit status
+message:
+
+ uint32 MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE
+ uint32 session id
+ uint32 exit value
+
+The client should exit with this value to mimic the behaviour of a
+non-multiplexed ssh(1) connection. Two additional cases that the
+client must cope with are it receiving a signal itself and the
+server disconnecting without sending an exit message.
+
+A master may also send a MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL before MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE
+if remote TTY allocation was unsuccessful. The client may use this to
+return its local tty to "cooked" mode.
+
+ uint32 MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL
+ uint32 session id
+
+3. Health checks
+
+The client may request a health check/PID report from a server:
+
+ uint32 MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK
+ uint32 request id
+
+The server replies with:
+
+ uint32 MUX_S_ALIVE
+ uint32 client request id
+ uint32 server pid
+
+4. Remotely terminating a master
+
+A client may request that a master terminate immediately:
+
+ uint32 MUX_C_TERMINATE
+ uint32 request id
+
+The server will reply with one of MUX_S_OK or MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED.
+
+5. Requesting establishment of port forwards
+
+A client may request the master to establish a port forward:
+
+ uint32 MUX_C_OPEN_FWD
+ uint32 request id
+ uint32 forwarding type
+ string listen host
+ uint32 listen port
+ string connect host
+ uint32 connect port
+
+forwarding type may be MUX_FWD_LOCAL, MUX_FWD_REMOTE, MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC.
+
+If listen port is (unsigned int) -2, then the listen host is treated as
+a unix socket path name.
+
+If connect port is (unsigned int) -2, then the connect host is treated
+as a unix socket path name.
+
+A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT, a
+MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a MUX_S_FAILURE.
+
+For dynamically allocated listen port the server replies with
+
+ uint32 MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT
+ uint32 client request id
+ uint32 allocated remote listen port
+
+6. Requesting closure of port forwards
+
+Note: currently unimplemented (server will always reply with MUX_S_FAILURE).
+
+A client may request the master to close a port forward:
+
+ uint32 MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD
+ uint32 request id
+ uint32 forwarding type
+ string listen host
+ uint32 listen port
+ string connect host
+ uint32 connect port
+
+A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a
+MUX_S_FAILURE.
+
+7. Requesting stdio forwarding
+
+A client may request the master to establish a stdio forwarding:
+
+ uint32 MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD
+ uint32 request id
+ string reserved
+ string connect host
+ string connect port
+
+The client then sends its standard input and output file descriptors
+(in that order) using Unix domain socket control messages.
+
+The contents of "reserved" are currently ignored.
+
+A server may reply with a MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED
+or a MUX_S_FAILURE.
+
+8. Requesting shutdown of mux listener
+
+A client may request the master to stop accepting new multiplexing requests
+and remove its listener socket.
+
+ uint32 MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING
+ uint32 request id
+
+A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a
+MUX_S_FAILURE.
+
+9. Status messages
+
+The MUX_S_OK message is empty:
+
+ uint32 MUX_S_OK
+ uint32 client request id
+
+The MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED and MUX_S_FAILURE include a reason:
+
+ uint32 MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED
+ uint32 client request id
+ string reason
+
+ uint32 MUX_S_FAILURE
+ uint32 client request id
+ string reason
+
+10. Protocol numbers
+
+#define MUX_MSG_HELLO 0x00000001
+#define MUX_C_NEW_SESSION 0x10000002
+#define MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK 0x10000004
+#define MUX_C_TERMINATE 0x10000005
+#define MUX_C_OPEN_FWD 0x10000006
+#define MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD 0x10000007
+#define MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD 0x10000008
+#define MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING 0x10000009
+#define MUX_S_OK 0x80000001
+#define MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED 0x80000002
+#define MUX_S_FAILURE 0x80000003
+#define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE 0x80000004
+#define MUX_S_ALIVE 0x80000005
+#define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED 0x80000006
+#define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT 0x80000007
+#define MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL 0x80000008
+
+#define MUX_FWD_LOCAL 1
+#define MUX_FWD_REMOTE 2
+#define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC 3
+
+XXX TODO
+XXX extended status (e.g. report open channels / forwards)
+XXX lock (maybe)
+XXX watch in/out traffic (pre/post crypto)
+XXX inject packet (what about replies)
+XXX server->client error/warning notifications
+XXX send signals via mux
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.mux,v 1.10 2015/07/17 03:04:27 djm Exp $
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/README
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/README 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/README 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.6 for the release notes.
-
-- A Japanese translation of this document and of the OpenSSH FAQ is
-- available at http://www.unixuser.org/~haruyama/security/openssh/index.html
-- Thanks to HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama at unixuser.org>
-
-This is the port of OpenBSD's excellent OpenSSH[0] to Linux and other
-Unices.
-
-OpenSSH is based on the last free version of Tatu Ylonen's sample
-implementation with all patent-encumbered algorithms removed (to
-external libraries), all known security bugs fixed, new features
-reintroduced and many other clean-ups. OpenSSH has been created by
-Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt,
-and Dug Song. It has a homepage at http://www.openssh.com/
-
-This port consists of the re-introduction of autoconf support, PAM
-support, EGD[1]/PRNGD[2] support and replacements for OpenBSD library
-functions that are (regrettably) absent from other unices. This port
-has been best tested on AIX, Cygwin, HP-UX, Linux, MacOS/X,
-NetBSD, OpenBSD, OpenServer, Solaris, Unicos, and UnixWare.
-
-This version actively tracks changes in the OpenBSD CVS repository.
-
-The PAM support is now more functional than the popular packages of
-commercial ssh-1.2.x. It checks "account" and "session" modules for
-all logins, not just when using password authentication.
-
-OpenSSH depends on Zlib[3], OpenSSL[4] and optionally PAM[5].
-
-There is now several mailing lists for this port of OpenSSH. Please
-refer to http://www.openssh.com/list.html for details on how to join.
-
-Please send bug reports and patches to the mailing list
-openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org. The list is open to posting by
-unsubscribed users.Code contribution are welcomed, but please follow the
-OpenBSD style guidelines[6].
-
-Please refer to the INSTALL document for information on how to install
-OpenSSH on your system. There are a number of differences between this
-port of OpenSSH and F-Secure SSH 1.x, please refer to the OpenSSH FAQ[7]
-for details and general tips.
-
-Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
-
-Miscellania -
-
-This version of OpenSSH is based upon code retrieved from the OpenBSD
-CVS repository which in turn was based on the last free sample
-implementation released by Tatu Ylonen.
-
-References -
-
-[0] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
-[1] http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/
-[2] http://www.aet.tu-cottbus.de/personen/jaenicke/postfix_tls/prngd.html
-[3] http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
-[4] http://www.openssl.org/
-[5] http://www.openpam.org
- http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/
- (PAM also is standard on Solaris and HP-UX 11)
-[6] http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=style&sektion=9
-[7] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
-
-$Id: README,v 1.86 2014/02/27 23:03:53 djm Exp $
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/README (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/README)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/README (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/README 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-7.3p1 for the release notes.
+
+Please read http://www.openssh.com/report.html for bug reporting
+instructions and note that we do not use Github for bug reporting or
+patch/pull-request management.
+
+- A Japanese translation of this document and of the OpenSSH FAQ is
+- available at http://www.unixuser.org/~haruyama/security/openssh/index.html
+- Thanks to HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama at unixuser.org>
+
+This is the port of OpenBSD's excellent OpenSSH[0] to Linux and other
+Unices.
+
+OpenSSH is based on the last free version of Tatu Ylonen's sample
+implementation with all patent-encumbered algorithms removed (to
+external libraries), all known security bugs fixed, new features
+reintroduced and many other clean-ups. OpenSSH has been created by
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt,
+and Dug Song. It has a homepage at http://www.openssh.com/
+
+This port consists of the re-introduction of autoconf support, PAM
+support, EGD[1]/PRNGD[2] support and replacements for OpenBSD library
+functions that are (regrettably) absent from other unices. This port
+has been best tested on AIX, Cygwin, HP-UX, Linux, MacOS/X,
+NetBSD, OpenBSD, OpenServer, Solaris, Unicos, and UnixWare.
+
+This version actively tracks changes in the OpenBSD CVS repository.
+
+The PAM support is now more functional than the popular packages of
+commercial ssh-1.2.x. It checks "account" and "session" modules for
+all logins, not just when using password authentication.
+
+OpenSSH depends on Zlib[3], OpenSSL[4] and optionally PAM[5].
+
+There is now several mailing lists for this port of OpenSSH. Please
+refer to http://www.openssh.com/list.html for details on how to join.
+
+Please send bug reports and patches to the mailing list
+openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org. The list is open to posting by
+unsubscribed users.Code contribution are welcomed, but please follow the
+OpenBSD style guidelines[6].
+
+Please refer to the INSTALL document for information on how to install
+OpenSSH on your system. There are a number of differences between this
+port of OpenSSH and F-Secure SSH 1.x, please refer to the OpenSSH FAQ[7]
+for details and general tips.
+
+Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+
+Miscellania -
+
+This version of OpenSSH is based upon code retrieved from the OpenBSD
+CVS repository which in turn was based on the last free sample
+implementation released by Tatu Ylonen.
+
+References -
+
+[0] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
+[1] http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/
+[2] http://www.aet.tu-cottbus.de/personen/jaenicke/postfix_tls/prngd.html
+[3] http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
+[4] http://www.openssl.org/
+[5] http://www.openpam.org
+ http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/
+ (PAM also is standard on Solaris and HP-UX 11)
+[6] http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=style&sektion=9
+[7] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
+
+$Id: README,v 1.87 2014/08/10 01:35:06 djm Exp $
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/README.platform
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/README.platform 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/README.platform 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
-This file contains notes about OpenSSH on specific platforms.
-
-AIX
----
-As of OpenSSH 3.8p1, sshd will now honour an accounts password expiry
-settings, where previously it did not. Because of this, it's possible for
-sites that have used OpenSSH's sshd exclusively to have accounts which
-have passwords expired longer than the inactive time (ie the "Weeks between
-password EXPIRATION and LOCKOUT" setting in SMIT or the maxexpired
-chuser attribute).
-
-Accounts in this state must have their passwords reset manually by the
-administrator. As a precaution, it is recommended that the administrative
-passwords be reset before upgrading from OpenSSH <3.8.
-
-As of OpenSSH 4.0, configure will attempt to detect if your version
-and maintenance level of AIX has a working getaddrinfo, and will use it
-if found. This will enable IPv6 support. If for some reason configure
-gets it wrong, or if you want to build binaries to work on earlier MLs
-than the build host then you can add "-DBROKEN_GETADDRINFO" to CFLAGS
-to force the previous IPv4-only behaviour.
-
-IPv6 known to work: 5.1ML7 5.2ML2 5.2ML5
-IPv6 known broken: 4.3.3ML11 5.1ML4
-
-If you wish to use dynamic libraries that aren't in the normal system
-locations (eg IBM's OpenSSL and zlib packages) then you will need to
-define the environment variable blibpath before running configure, eg
-
-blibpath=/lib:/usr/lib:/opt/freeware/lib ./configure \
- --with-ssl-dir=/opt/freeware --with-zlib=/opt/freeware
-
-If sshd is built with the WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE option (which is enabled
-by default) then sshd checks that users are permitted via the
-loginrestrictions() function, in particular that the user has the
-"rlogin" attribute set. This check is not done for the root account,
-instead the PermitRootLogin setting in sshd_config is used.
-
-
-Cygwin
-------
-To build on Cygwin, OpenSSH requires the following packages:
-gcc, gcc-mingw-core, mingw-runtime, binutils, make, openssl,
-openssl-devel, zlib, minres, minires-devel.
-
-
-Darwin and MacOS X
-------------------
-Darwin does not provide a tun(4) driver required for OpenSSH-based
-virtual private networks. The BSD manpage still exists, but the driver
-has been removed in recent releases of Darwin and MacOS X.
-
-Nevertheless, tunnel support is known to work with Darwin 8 and
-MacOS X 10.4 in Point-to-Point (Layer 3) and Ethernet (Layer 2) mode
-using a third party driver. More information is available at:
- http://www-user.rhrk.uni-kl.de/~nissler/tuntap/
-
-
-Linux
------
-
-Some Linux distributions (including Red Hat/Fedora/CentOS) include
-headers and library links in the -devel RPMs rather than the main
-binary RPMs. If you get an error about headers, or complaining about a
-missing prerequisite then you may need to install the equivalent
-development packages. On Redhat based distros these may be openssl-devel,
-zlib-devel and pam-devel, on Debian based distros these may be
-libssl-dev, libz-dev and libpam-dev.
-
-
-Solaris
--------
-If you enable BSM auditing on Solaris, you need to update audit_event(4)
-for praudit(1m) to give sensible output. The following line needs to be
-added to /etc/security/audit_event:
-
- 32800:AUE_openssh:OpenSSH login:lo
-
-The BSM audit event range available for third party TCB applications is
-32768 - 65535. Event number 32800 has been choosen for AUE_openssh.
-There is no official registry of 3rd party event numbers, so if this
-number is already in use on your system, you may change it at build time
-by configure'ing --with-cflags=-DAUE_openssh=32801 then rebuilding.
-
-
-Platforms using PAM
--------------------
-As of OpenSSH 4.3p1, sshd will no longer check /etc/nologin itself when
-PAM is enabled. To maintain existing behaviour, pam_nologin should be
-added to sshd's session stack which will prevent users from starting shell
-sessions. Alternatively, pam_nologin can be added to either the auth or
-account stacks which will prevent authentication entirely, but will still
-return the output from pam_nologin to the client.
-
-
-$Id: README.platform,v 1.10 2009/08/28 23:14:48 dtucker Exp $
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/README.platform (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/README.platform)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/README.platform (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/README.platform 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+This file contains notes about OpenSSH on specific platforms.
+
+AIX
+---
+As of OpenSSH 3.8p1, sshd will now honour an accounts password expiry
+settings, where previously it did not. Because of this, it's possible for
+sites that have used OpenSSH's sshd exclusively to have accounts which
+have passwords expired longer than the inactive time (ie the "Weeks between
+password EXPIRATION and LOCKOUT" setting in SMIT or the maxexpired
+chuser attribute).
+
+Accounts in this state must have their passwords reset manually by the
+administrator. As a precaution, it is recommended that the administrative
+passwords be reset before upgrading from OpenSSH <3.8.
+
+As of OpenSSH 4.0, configure will attempt to detect if your version
+and maintenance level of AIX has a working getaddrinfo, and will use it
+if found. This will enable IPv6 support. If for some reason configure
+gets it wrong, or if you want to build binaries to work on earlier MLs
+than the build host then you can add "-DBROKEN_GETADDRINFO" to CFLAGS
+to force the previous IPv4-only behaviour.
+
+IPv6 known to work: 5.1ML7 5.2ML2 5.2ML5
+IPv6 known broken: 4.3.3ML11 5.1ML4
+
+If you wish to use dynamic libraries that aren't in the normal system
+locations (eg IBM's OpenSSL and zlib packages) then you will need to
+define the environment variable blibpath before running configure, eg
+
+blibpath=/lib:/usr/lib:/opt/freeware/lib ./configure \
+ --with-ssl-dir=/opt/freeware --with-zlib=/opt/freeware
+
+If sshd is built with the WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE option (which is enabled
+by default) then sshd checks that users are permitted via the
+loginrestrictions() function, in particular that the user has the
+"rlogin" attribute set. This check is not done for the root account,
+instead the PermitRootLogin setting in sshd_config is used.
+
+If you are using the IBM compiler you probably want to use CC=xlc rather
+than the default of cc.
+
+
+Cygwin
+------
+To build on Cygwin, OpenSSH requires the following packages:
+gcc, gcc-mingw-core, mingw-runtime, binutils, make, openssl,
+openssl-devel, zlib, minres, minires-devel.
+
+
+Darwin and MacOS X
+------------------
+Darwin does not provide a tun(4) driver required for OpenSSH-based
+virtual private networks. The BSD manpage still exists, but the driver
+has been removed in recent releases of Darwin and MacOS X.
+
+Nevertheless, tunnel support is known to work with Darwin 8 and
+MacOS X 10.4 in Point-to-Point (Layer 3) and Ethernet (Layer 2) mode
+using a third party driver. More information is available at:
+ http://www-user.rhrk.uni-kl.de/~nissler/tuntap/
+
+
+Linux
+-----
+
+Some Linux distributions (including Red Hat/Fedora/CentOS) include
+headers and library links in the -devel RPMs rather than the main
+binary RPMs. If you get an error about headers, or complaining about a
+missing prerequisite then you may need to install the equivalent
+development packages. On Redhat based distros these may be openssl-devel,
+zlib-devel and pam-devel, on Debian based distros these may be
+libssl-dev, libz-dev and libpam-dev.
+
+
+Solaris
+-------
+If you enable BSM auditing on Solaris, you need to update audit_event(4)
+for praudit(1m) to give sensible output. The following line needs to be
+added to /etc/security/audit_event:
+
+ 32800:AUE_openssh:OpenSSH login:lo
+
+The BSM audit event range available for third party TCB applications is
+32768 - 65535. Event number 32800 has been choosen for AUE_openssh.
+There is no official registry of 3rd party event numbers, so if this
+number is already in use on your system, you may change it at build time
+by configure'ing --with-cflags=-DAUE_openssh=32801 then rebuilding.
+
+
+Platforms using PAM
+-------------------
+As of OpenSSH 4.3p1, sshd will no longer check /etc/nologin itself when
+PAM is enabled. To maintain existing behaviour, pam_nologin should be
+added to sshd's session stack which will prevent users from starting shell
+sessions. Alternatively, pam_nologin can be added to either the auth or
+account stacks which will prevent authentication entirely, but will still
+return the output from pam_nologin to the client.
+
+
+$Id: README.platform,v 1.10 2009/08/28 23:14:48 dtucker Exp $
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/addrmatch.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/addrmatch.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/addrmatch.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,500 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: addrmatch.c,v 1.9 2014/01/19 11:21:51 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2008 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-
-#include <netdb.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "match.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-
-struct xaddr {
- sa_family_t af;
- union {
- struct in_addr v4;
- struct in6_addr v6;
- u_int8_t addr8[16];
- u_int32_t addr32[4];
- } xa; /* 128-bit address */
- u_int32_t scope_id; /* iface scope id for v6 */
-#define v4 xa.v4
-#define v6 xa.v6
-#define addr8 xa.addr8
-#define addr32 xa.addr32
-};
-
-static int
-addr_unicast_masklen(int af)
-{
- switch (af) {
- case AF_INET:
- return 32;
- case AF_INET6:
- return 128;
- default:
- return -1;
- }
-}
-
-static inline int
-masklen_valid(int af, u_int masklen)
-{
- switch (af) {
- case AF_INET:
- return masklen <= 32 ? 0 : -1;
- case AF_INET6:
- return masklen <= 128 ? 0 : -1;
- default:
- return -1;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Convert struct sockaddr to struct xaddr
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_sa_to_xaddr(struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t slen, struct xaddr *xa)
-{
- struct sockaddr_in *in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
- struct sockaddr_in6 *in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
-
- memset(xa, '\0', sizeof(*xa));
-
- switch (sa->sa_family) {
- case AF_INET:
- if (slen < (socklen_t)sizeof(*in4))
- return -1;
- xa->af = AF_INET;
- memcpy(&xa->v4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof(xa->v4));
- break;
- case AF_INET6:
- if (slen < (socklen_t)sizeof(*in6))
- return -1;
- xa->af = AF_INET6;
- memcpy(&xa->v6, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof(xa->v6));
-#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID
- xa->scope_id = in6->sin6_scope_id;
-#endif
- break;
- default:
- return -1;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Calculate a netmask of length 'l' for address family 'af' and
- * store it in 'n'.
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_netmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (masklen_valid(af, l) != 0 || n == NULL)
- return -1;
-
- memset(n, '\0', sizeof(*n));
- switch (af) {
- case AF_INET:
- n->af = AF_INET;
- if (l == 0)
- return 0;
- n->v4.s_addr = htonl((0xffffffff << (32 - l)) & 0xffffffff);
- return 0;
- case AF_INET6:
- n->af = AF_INET6;
- for (i = 0; i < 4 && l >= 32; i++, l -= 32)
- n->addr32[i] = 0xffffffffU;
- if (i < 4 && l != 0)
- n->addr32[i] = htonl((0xffffffff << (32 - l)) &
- 0xffffffff);
- return 0;
- default:
- return -1;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Perform logical AND of addresses 'a' and 'b', storing result in 'dst'.
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_and(struct xaddr *dst, const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (dst == NULL || a == NULL || b == NULL || a->af != b->af)
- return -1;
-
- memcpy(dst, a, sizeof(*dst));
- switch (a->af) {
- case AF_INET:
- dst->v4.s_addr &= b->v4.s_addr;
- return 0;
- case AF_INET6:
- dst->scope_id = a->scope_id;
- for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
- dst->addr32[i] &= b->addr32[i];
- return 0;
- default:
- return -1;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Compare addresses 'a' and 'b'
- * Return 0 if addresses are identical, -1 if (a < b) or 1 if (a > b)
- */
-static int
-addr_cmp(const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (a->af != b->af)
- return a->af == AF_INET6 ? 1 : -1;
-
- switch (a->af) {
- case AF_INET:
- if (a->v4.s_addr == b->v4.s_addr)
- return 0;
- return ntohl(a->v4.s_addr) > ntohl(b->v4.s_addr) ? 1 : -1;
- case AF_INET6:
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- if (a->addr8[i] - b->addr8[i] != 0)
- return a->addr8[i] > b->addr8[i] ? 1 : -1;
- if (a->scope_id == b->scope_id)
- return 0;
- return a->scope_id > b->scope_id ? 1 : -1;
- default:
- return -1;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse string address 'p' into 'n'
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_pton(const char *p, struct xaddr *n)
-{
- struct addrinfo hints, *ai;
-
- memset(&hints, '\0', sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
-
- if (p == NULL || getaddrinfo(p, NULL, &hints, &ai) != 0)
- return -1;
-
- if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
- return -1;
-
- if (n != NULL &&
- addr_sa_to_xaddr(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, n) == -1) {
- freeaddrinfo(ai);
- return -1;
- }
-
- freeaddrinfo(ai);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Perform bitwise negation of address
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_invert(struct xaddr *n)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (n == NULL)
- return (-1);
-
- switch (n->af) {
- case AF_INET:
- n->v4.s_addr = ~n->v4.s_addr;
- return (0);
- case AF_INET6:
- for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
- n->addr32[i] = ~n->addr32[i];
- return (0);
- default:
- return (-1);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Calculate a netmask of length 'l' for address family 'af' and
- * store it in 'n'.
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_hostmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n)
-{
- if (addr_netmask(af, l, n) == -1 || addr_invert(n) == -1)
- return (-1);
- return (0);
-}
-
-/*
- * Test whether address 'a' is all zeros (i.e. 0.0.0.0 or ::)
- * Returns 0 on if address is all-zeros, -1 if not all zeros or on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *a)
-{
- int i;
-
- switch (a->af) {
- case AF_INET:
- return (a->v4.s_addr == 0 ? 0 : -1);
- case AF_INET6:;
- for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
- if (a->addr32[i] != 0)
- return (-1);
- return (0);
- default:
- return (-1);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Test whether host portion of address 'a', as determined by 'masklen'
- * is all zeros.
- * Returns 0 on if host portion of address is all-zeros,
- * -1 if not all zeros or on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_host_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *a, u_int masklen)
-{
- struct xaddr tmp_addr, tmp_mask, tmp_result;
-
- memcpy(&tmp_addr, a, sizeof(tmp_addr));
- if (addr_hostmask(a->af, masklen, &tmp_mask) == -1)
- return (-1);
- if (addr_and(&tmp_result, &tmp_addr, &tmp_mask) == -1)
- return (-1);
- return (addr_is_all0s(&tmp_result));
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse a CIDR address (x.x.x.x/y or xxxx:yyyy::/z).
- * Return -1 on parse error, -2 on inconsistency or 0 on success.
- */
-static int
-addr_pton_cidr(const char *p, struct xaddr *n, u_int *l)
-{
- struct xaddr tmp;
- long unsigned int masklen = 999;
- char addrbuf[64], *mp, *cp;
-
- /* Don't modify argument */
- if (p == NULL || strlcpy(addrbuf, p, sizeof(addrbuf)) >= sizeof(addrbuf))
- return -1;
-
- if ((mp = strchr(addrbuf, '/')) != NULL) {
- *mp = '\0';
- mp++;
- masklen = strtoul(mp, &cp, 10);
- if (*mp == '\0' || *cp != '\0' || masklen > 128)
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (addr_pton(addrbuf, &tmp) == -1)
- return -1;
-
- if (mp == NULL)
- masklen = addr_unicast_masklen(tmp.af);
- if (masklen_valid(tmp.af, masklen) == -1)
- return -2;
- if (addr_host_is_all0s(&tmp, masklen) != 0)
- return -2;
-
- if (n != NULL)
- memcpy(n, &tmp, sizeof(*n));
- if (l != NULL)
- *l = masklen;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-addr_netmatch(const struct xaddr *host, const struct xaddr *net, u_int masklen)
-{
- struct xaddr tmp_mask, tmp_result;
-
- if (host->af != net->af)
- return -1;
-
- if (addr_netmask(host->af, masklen, &tmp_mask) == -1)
- return -1;
- if (addr_and(&tmp_result, host, &tmp_mask) == -1)
- return -1;
- return addr_cmp(&tmp_result, net);
-}
-
-/*
- * Match "addr" against list pattern list "_list", which may contain a
- * mix of CIDR addresses and old-school wildcards.
- *
- * If addr is NULL, then no matching is performed, but _list is parsed
- * and checked for well-formedness.
- *
- * Returns 1 on match found (never returned when addr == NULL).
- * Returns 0 on if no match found, or no errors found when addr == NULL.
- * Returns -1 on negated match found (never returned when addr == NULL).
- * Returns -2 on invalid list entry.
- */
-int
-addr_match_list(const char *addr, const char *_list)
-{
- char *list, *cp, *o;
- struct xaddr try_addr, match_addr;
- u_int masklen, neg;
- int ret = 0, r;
-
- if (addr != NULL && addr_pton(addr, &try_addr) != 0) {
- debug2("%s: couldn't parse address %.100s", __func__, addr);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((o = list = strdup(_list)) == NULL)
- return -1;
- while ((cp = strsep(&list, ",")) != NULL) {
- neg = *cp == '!';
- if (neg)
- cp++;
- if (*cp == '\0') {
- ret = -2;
- break;
- }
- /* Prefer CIDR address matching */
- r = addr_pton_cidr(cp, &match_addr, &masklen);
- if (r == -2) {
- error("Inconsistent mask length for "
- "network \"%.100s\"", cp);
- ret = -2;
- break;
- } else if (r == 0) {
- if (addr != NULL && addr_netmatch(&try_addr,
- &match_addr, masklen) == 0) {
- foundit:
- if (neg) {
- ret = -1;
- break;
- }
- ret = 1;
- }
- continue;
- } else {
- /* If CIDR parse failed, try wildcard string match */
- if (addr != NULL && match_pattern(addr, cp) == 1)
- goto foundit;
- }
- }
- free(o);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Match "addr" against list CIDR list "_list". Lexical wildcards and
- * negation are not supported. If "addr" == NULL, will verify structure
- * of "_list".
- *
- * Returns 1 on match found (never returned when addr == NULL).
- * Returns 0 on if no match found, or no errors found when addr == NULL.
- * Returns -1 on error
- */
-int
-addr_match_cidr_list(const char *addr, const char *_list)
-{
- char *list, *cp, *o;
- struct xaddr try_addr, match_addr;
- u_int masklen;
- int ret = 0, r;
-
- if (addr != NULL && addr_pton(addr, &try_addr) != 0) {
- debug2("%s: couldn't parse address %.100s", __func__, addr);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((o = list = strdup(_list)) == NULL)
- return -1;
- while ((cp = strsep(&list, ",")) != NULL) {
- if (*cp == '\0') {
- error("%s: empty entry in list \"%.100s\"",
- __func__, o);
- ret = -1;
- break;
- }
-
- /*
- * NB. This function is called in pre-auth with untrusted data,
- * so be extra paranoid about junk reaching getaddrino (via
- * addr_pton_cidr).
- */
-
- /* Stop junk from reaching getaddrinfo. +3 is for masklen */
- if (strlen(cp) > INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + 3) {
- error("%s: list entry \"%.100s\" too long",
- __func__, cp);
- ret = -1;
- break;
- }
-#define VALID_CIDR_CHARS "0123456789abcdefABCDEF.:/"
- if (strspn(cp, VALID_CIDR_CHARS) != strlen(cp)) {
- error("%s: list entry \"%.100s\" contains invalid "
- "characters", __func__, cp);
- ret = -1;
- }
-
- /* Prefer CIDR address matching */
- r = addr_pton_cidr(cp, &match_addr, &masklen);
- if (r == -1) {
- error("Invalid network entry \"%.100s\"", cp);
- ret = -1;
- break;
- } else if (r == -2) {
- error("Inconsistent mask length for "
- "network \"%.100s\"", cp);
- ret = -1;
- break;
- } else if (r == 0 && addr != NULL) {
- if (addr_netmatch(&try_addr, &match_addr,
- masklen) == 0)
- ret = 1;
- continue;
- }
- }
- free(o);
-
- return ret;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/addrmatch.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/addrmatch.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/addrmatch.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/addrmatch.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,499 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: addrmatch.c,v 1.10 2015/07/08 19:04:21 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2008 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "match.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+struct xaddr {
+ sa_family_t af;
+ union {
+ struct in_addr v4;
+ struct in6_addr v6;
+ u_int8_t addr8[16];
+ u_int32_t addr32[4];
+ } xa; /* 128-bit address */
+ u_int32_t scope_id; /* iface scope id for v6 */
+#define v4 xa.v4
+#define v6 xa.v6
+#define addr8 xa.addr8
+#define addr32 xa.addr32
+};
+
+static int
+addr_unicast_masklen(int af)
+{
+ switch (af) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ return 32;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ return 128;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+static inline int
+masklen_valid(int af, u_int masklen)
+{
+ switch (af) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ return masklen <= 32 ? 0 : -1;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ return masklen <= 128 ? 0 : -1;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert struct sockaddr to struct xaddr
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+addr_sa_to_xaddr(struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t slen, struct xaddr *xa)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_in *in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
+
+ memset(xa, '\0', sizeof(*xa));
+
+ switch (sa->sa_family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ if (slen < (socklen_t)sizeof(*in4))
+ return -1;
+ xa->af = AF_INET;
+ memcpy(&xa->v4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof(xa->v4));
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ if (slen < (socklen_t)sizeof(*in6))
+ return -1;
+ xa->af = AF_INET6;
+ memcpy(&xa->v6, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof(xa->v6));
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID
+ xa->scope_id = in6->sin6_scope_id;
+#endif
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate a netmask of length 'l' for address family 'af' and
+ * store it in 'n'.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+addr_netmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (masklen_valid(af, l) != 0 || n == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ memset(n, '\0', sizeof(*n));
+ switch (af) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ n->af = AF_INET;
+ if (l == 0)
+ return 0;
+ n->v4.s_addr = htonl((0xffffffff << (32 - l)) & 0xffffffff);
+ return 0;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ n->af = AF_INET6;
+ for (i = 0; i < 4 && l >= 32; i++, l -= 32)
+ n->addr32[i] = 0xffffffffU;
+ if (i < 4 && l != 0)
+ n->addr32[i] = htonl((0xffffffff << (32 - l)) &
+ 0xffffffff);
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform logical AND of addresses 'a' and 'b', storing result in 'dst'.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+addr_and(struct xaddr *dst, const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (dst == NULL || a == NULL || b == NULL || a->af != b->af)
+ return -1;
+
+ memcpy(dst, a, sizeof(*dst));
+ switch (a->af) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ dst->v4.s_addr &= b->v4.s_addr;
+ return 0;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ dst->scope_id = a->scope_id;
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ dst->addr32[i] &= b->addr32[i];
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare addresses 'a' and 'b'
+ * Return 0 if addresses are identical, -1 if (a < b) or 1 if (a > b)
+ */
+static int
+addr_cmp(const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (a->af != b->af)
+ return a->af == AF_INET6 ? 1 : -1;
+
+ switch (a->af) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ if (a->v4.s_addr == b->v4.s_addr)
+ return 0;
+ return ntohl(a->v4.s_addr) > ntohl(b->v4.s_addr) ? 1 : -1;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ if (a->addr8[i] - b->addr8[i] != 0)
+ return a->addr8[i] > b->addr8[i] ? 1 : -1;
+ if (a->scope_id == b->scope_id)
+ return 0;
+ return a->scope_id > b->scope_id ? 1 : -1;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse string address 'p' into 'n'
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+addr_pton(const char *p, struct xaddr *n)
+{
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai;
+
+ memset(&hints, '\0', sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+
+ if (p == NULL || getaddrinfo(p, NULL, &hints, &ai) != 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (n != NULL &&
+ addr_sa_to_xaddr(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, n) == -1) {
+ freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform bitwise negation of address
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+addr_invert(struct xaddr *n)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (n == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+
+ switch (n->af) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ n->v4.s_addr = ~n->v4.s_addr;
+ return (0);
+ case AF_INET6:
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ n->addr32[i] = ~n->addr32[i];
+ return (0);
+ default:
+ return (-1);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate a netmask of length 'l' for address family 'af' and
+ * store it in 'n'.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+addr_hostmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n)
+{
+ if (addr_netmask(af, l, n) == -1 || addr_invert(n) == -1)
+ return (-1);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test whether address 'a' is all zeros (i.e. 0.0.0.0 or ::)
+ * Returns 0 on if address is all-zeros, -1 if not all zeros or on failure.
+ */
+static int
+addr_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *a)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ switch (a->af) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ return (a->v4.s_addr == 0 ? 0 : -1);
+ case AF_INET6:;
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ if (a->addr32[i] != 0)
+ return (-1);
+ return (0);
+ default:
+ return (-1);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test whether host portion of address 'a', as determined by 'masklen'
+ * is all zeros.
+ * Returns 0 on if host portion of address is all-zeros,
+ * -1 if not all zeros or on failure.
+ */
+static int
+addr_host_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *a, u_int masklen)
+{
+ struct xaddr tmp_addr, tmp_mask, tmp_result;
+
+ memcpy(&tmp_addr, a, sizeof(tmp_addr));
+ if (addr_hostmask(a->af, masklen, &tmp_mask) == -1)
+ return (-1);
+ if (addr_and(&tmp_result, &tmp_addr, &tmp_mask) == -1)
+ return (-1);
+ return (addr_is_all0s(&tmp_result));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a CIDR address (x.x.x.x/y or xxxx:yyyy::/z).
+ * Return -1 on parse error, -2 on inconsistency or 0 on success.
+ */
+static int
+addr_pton_cidr(const char *p, struct xaddr *n, u_int *l)
+{
+ struct xaddr tmp;
+ long unsigned int masklen = 999;
+ char addrbuf[64], *mp, *cp;
+
+ /* Don't modify argument */
+ if (p == NULL || strlcpy(addrbuf, p, sizeof(addrbuf)) >= sizeof(addrbuf))
+ return -1;
+
+ if ((mp = strchr(addrbuf, '/')) != NULL) {
+ *mp = '\0';
+ mp++;
+ masklen = strtoul(mp, &cp, 10);
+ if (*mp == '\0' || *cp != '\0' || masklen > 128)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (addr_pton(addrbuf, &tmp) == -1)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (mp == NULL)
+ masklen = addr_unicast_masklen(tmp.af);
+ if (masklen_valid(tmp.af, masklen) == -1)
+ return -2;
+ if (addr_host_is_all0s(&tmp, masklen) != 0)
+ return -2;
+
+ if (n != NULL)
+ memcpy(n, &tmp, sizeof(*n));
+ if (l != NULL)
+ *l = masklen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+addr_netmatch(const struct xaddr *host, const struct xaddr *net, u_int masklen)
+{
+ struct xaddr tmp_mask, tmp_result;
+
+ if (host->af != net->af)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (addr_netmask(host->af, masklen, &tmp_mask) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ if (addr_and(&tmp_result, host, &tmp_mask) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ return addr_cmp(&tmp_result, net);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Match "addr" against list pattern list "_list", which may contain a
+ * mix of CIDR addresses and old-school wildcards.
+ *
+ * If addr is NULL, then no matching is performed, but _list is parsed
+ * and checked for well-formedness.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on match found (never returned when addr == NULL).
+ * Returns 0 on if no match found, or no errors found when addr == NULL.
+ * Returns -1 on negated match found (never returned when addr == NULL).
+ * Returns -2 on invalid list entry.
+ */
+int
+addr_match_list(const char *addr, const char *_list)
+{
+ char *list, *cp, *o;
+ struct xaddr try_addr, match_addr;
+ u_int masklen, neg;
+ int ret = 0, r;
+
+ if (addr != NULL && addr_pton(addr, &try_addr) != 0) {
+ debug2("%s: couldn't parse address %.100s", __func__, addr);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((o = list = strdup(_list)) == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ while ((cp = strsep(&list, ",")) != NULL) {
+ neg = *cp == '!';
+ if (neg)
+ cp++;
+ if (*cp == '\0') {
+ ret = -2;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Prefer CIDR address matching */
+ r = addr_pton_cidr(cp, &match_addr, &masklen);
+ if (r == -2) {
+ error("Inconsistent mask length for "
+ "network \"%.100s\"", cp);
+ ret = -2;
+ break;
+ } else if (r == 0) {
+ if (addr != NULL && addr_netmatch(&try_addr,
+ &match_addr, masklen) == 0) {
+ foundit:
+ if (neg) {
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ /* If CIDR parse failed, try wildcard string match */
+ if (addr != NULL && match_pattern(addr, cp) == 1)
+ goto foundit;
+ }
+ }
+ free(o);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Match "addr" against list CIDR list "_list". Lexical wildcards and
+ * negation are not supported. If "addr" == NULL, will verify structure
+ * of "_list".
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on match found (never returned when addr == NULL).
+ * Returns 0 on if no match found, or no errors found when addr == NULL.
+ * Returns -1 on error
+ */
+int
+addr_match_cidr_list(const char *addr, const char *_list)
+{
+ char *list, *cp, *o;
+ struct xaddr try_addr, match_addr;
+ u_int masklen;
+ int ret = 0, r;
+
+ if (addr != NULL && addr_pton(addr, &try_addr) != 0) {
+ debug2("%s: couldn't parse address %.100s", __func__, addr);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((o = list = strdup(_list)) == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ while ((cp = strsep(&list, ",")) != NULL) {
+ if (*cp == '\0') {
+ error("%s: empty entry in list \"%.100s\"",
+ __func__, o);
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NB. This function is called in pre-auth with untrusted data,
+ * so be extra paranoid about junk reaching getaddrino (via
+ * addr_pton_cidr).
+ */
+
+ /* Stop junk from reaching getaddrinfo. +3 is for masklen */
+ if (strlen(cp) > INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + 3) {
+ error("%s: list entry \"%.100s\" too long",
+ __func__, cp);
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+#define VALID_CIDR_CHARS "0123456789abcdefABCDEF.:/"
+ if (strspn(cp, VALID_CIDR_CHARS) != strlen(cp)) {
+ error("%s: list entry \"%.100s\" contains invalid "
+ "characters", __func__, cp);
+ ret = -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Prefer CIDR address matching */
+ r = addr_pton_cidr(cp, &match_addr, &masklen);
+ if (r == -1) {
+ error("Invalid network entry \"%.100s\"", cp);
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+ } else if (r == -2) {
+ error("Inconsistent mask length for "
+ "network \"%.100s\"", cp);
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+ } else if (r == 0 && addr != NULL) {
+ if (addr_netmatch(&try_addr, &match_addr,
+ masklen) == 0)
+ ret = 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ free(o);
+
+ return ret;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/atomicio.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/atomicio.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/atomicio.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.26 2010/09/22 22:58:51 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2005 Anil Madhavapeddy. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
-#include <poll.h>
-#else
-# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
-# include <sys/poll.h>
-# endif
-#endif
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "atomicio.h"
-
-/*
- * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==vwrite
- */
-size_t
-atomicio6(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n,
- int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *cb_arg)
-{
- char *s = _s;
- size_t pos = 0;
- ssize_t res;
- struct pollfd pfd;
-
-#ifndef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON
- pfd.fd = fd;
- pfd.events = f == read ? POLLIN : POLLOUT;
-#endif
- while (n > pos) {
- res = (f) (fd, s + pos, n - pos);
- switch (res) {
- case -1:
- if (errno == EINTR)
- continue;
- if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
-#ifndef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON
- (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
-#endif
- continue;
- }
- return 0;
- case 0:
- errno = EPIPE;
- return pos;
- default:
- pos += (size_t)res;
- if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, (size_t)res) == -1) {
- errno = EINTR;
- return pos;
- }
- }
- }
- return pos;
-}
-
-size_t
-atomicio(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n)
-{
- return atomicio6(f, fd, _s, n, NULL, NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==readv || f==writev
- */
-size_t
-atomiciov6(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd,
- const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt,
- int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *cb_arg)
-{
- size_t pos = 0, rem;
- ssize_t res;
- struct iovec iov_array[IOV_MAX], *iov = iov_array;
- struct pollfd pfd;
-
- if (iovcnt > IOV_MAX) {
- errno = EINVAL;
- return 0;
- }
- /* Make a copy of the iov array because we may modify it below */
- memcpy(iov, _iov, iovcnt * sizeof(*_iov));
-
-#ifndef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
- pfd.fd = fd;
- pfd.events = f == readv ? POLLIN : POLLOUT;
-#endif
- for (; iovcnt > 0 && iov[0].iov_len > 0;) {
- res = (f) (fd, iov, iovcnt);
- switch (res) {
- case -1:
- if (errno == EINTR)
- continue;
- if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
-#ifndef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
- (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
-#endif
- continue;
- }
- return 0;
- case 0:
- errno = EPIPE;
- return pos;
- default:
- rem = (size_t)res;
- pos += rem;
- /* skip completed iov entries */
- while (iovcnt > 0 && rem >= iov[0].iov_len) {
- rem -= iov[0].iov_len;
- iov++;
- iovcnt--;
- }
- /* This shouldn't happen... */
- if (rem > 0 && (iovcnt <= 0 || rem > iov[0].iov_len)) {
- errno = EFAULT;
- return 0;
- }
- if (iovcnt == 0)
- break;
- /* update pointer in partially complete iov */
- iov[0].iov_base = ((char *)iov[0].iov_base) + rem;
- iov[0].iov_len -= rem;
- }
- if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, (size_t)res) == -1) {
- errno = EINTR;
- return pos;
- }
- }
- return pos;
-}
-
-size_t
-atomiciov(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd,
- const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt)
-{
- return atomiciov6(f, fd, _iov, iovcnt, NULL, NULL);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/atomicio.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/atomicio.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/atomicio.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/atomicio.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.27 2015/01/16 06:40:12 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Anil Madhavapeddy. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+# include <sys/poll.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+/*
+ * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==vwrite
+ */
+size_t
+atomicio6(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n,
+ int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *cb_arg)
+{
+ char *s = _s;
+ size_t pos = 0;
+ ssize_t res;
+ struct pollfd pfd;
+
+#ifndef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON
+ pfd.fd = fd;
+ pfd.events = f == read ? POLLIN : POLLOUT;
+#endif
+ while (n > pos) {
+ res = (f) (fd, s + pos, n - pos);
+ switch (res) {
+ case -1:
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
+#ifndef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON
+ (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
+#endif
+ continue;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ case 0:
+ errno = EPIPE;
+ return pos;
+ default:
+ pos += (size_t)res;
+ if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, (size_t)res) == -1) {
+ errno = EINTR;
+ return pos;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return pos;
+}
+
+size_t
+atomicio(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n)
+{
+ return atomicio6(f, fd, _s, n, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==readv || f==writev
+ */
+size_t
+atomiciov6(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd,
+ const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt,
+ int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *cb_arg)
+{
+ size_t pos = 0, rem;
+ ssize_t res;
+ struct iovec iov_array[IOV_MAX], *iov = iov_array;
+ struct pollfd pfd;
+
+ if (iovcnt > IOV_MAX) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Make a copy of the iov array because we may modify it below */
+ memcpy(iov, _iov, iovcnt * sizeof(*_iov));
+
+#ifndef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
+ pfd.fd = fd;
+ pfd.events = f == readv ? POLLIN : POLLOUT;
+#endif
+ for (; iovcnt > 0 && iov[0].iov_len > 0;) {
+ res = (f) (fd, iov, iovcnt);
+ switch (res) {
+ case -1:
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
+#ifndef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
+ (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
+#endif
+ continue;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ case 0:
+ errno = EPIPE;
+ return pos;
+ default:
+ rem = (size_t)res;
+ pos += rem;
+ /* skip completed iov entries */
+ while (iovcnt > 0 && rem >= iov[0].iov_len) {
+ rem -= iov[0].iov_len;
+ iov++;
+ iovcnt--;
+ }
+ /* This shouldn't happen... */
+ if (rem > 0 && (iovcnt <= 0 || rem > iov[0].iov_len)) {
+ errno = EFAULT;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (iovcnt == 0)
+ break;
+ /* update pointer in partially complete iov */
+ iov[0].iov_base = ((char *)iov[0].iov_base) + rem;
+ iov[0].iov_len -= rem;
+ }
+ if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, (size_t)res) == -1) {
+ errno = EINTR;
+ return pos;
+ }
+ }
+ return pos;
+}
+
+size_t
+atomiciov(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd,
+ const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt)
+{
+ return atomiciov6(f, fd, _iov, iovcnt, NULL, NULL);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/audit-linux.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/audit-linux.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/audit-linux.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: audit-linux.c,v 1.1 2011/01/17 10:15:30 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Use is subject to license terms.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima at redhat.com>
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-#if defined(USE_LINUX_AUDIT)
-#include <libaudit.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "log.h"
-#include "audit.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-
-const char* audit_username(void);
-
-int
-linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
- const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
-{
- int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
-
- audit_fd = audit_open();
- if (audit_fd < 0) {
- if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
- errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
- return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
- else
- return 0; /* Must prevent login */
- }
- rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
- NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
- username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
- saved_errno = errno;
- close(audit_fd);
- /*
- * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
- * root user.
- */
- if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
- rc = 0;
- errno = saved_errno;
- return (rc >= 0);
-}
-
-/* Below is the sshd audit API code */
-
-void
-audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
-{
-}
- /* not implemented */
-
-void
-audit_run_command(const char *command)
-{
- /* not implemented */
-}
-
-void
-audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
- NULL, li->line, 1) == 0)
- fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-}
-
-void
-audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- /* not implemented */
-}
-
-void
-audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
-{
- switch(event) {
- case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
- case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
- case SSH_NOLOGIN:
- case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
- case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
- break;
-
- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
- case SSH_INVALID_USER:
- linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
- get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0);
- break;
-
- default:
- debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
- }
-}
-
-#endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/audit-linux.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/audit-linux.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/audit-linux.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/audit-linux.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+/* $Id: audit-linux.c,v 1.1 2011/01/17 10:15:30 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Use is subject to license terms.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima at redhat.com>
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if defined(USE_LINUX_AUDIT)
+#include <libaudit.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+
+const char *audit_username(void);
+
+int
+linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname,
+ const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
+{
+ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
+
+ if ((audit_fd = audit_open()) < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
+ else
+ return 0; /* Must prevent login */
+ }
+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
+ NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
+ username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ close(audit_fd);
+
+ /*
+ * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
+ * root user.
+ */
+ if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
+ rc = 0;
+ errno = saved_errno;
+
+ return rc >= 0;
+}
+
+/* Below is the sshd audit API code */
+
+void
+audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_run_command(const char *command)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, NULL,
+ li->line, 1) == 0)
+ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+
+ switch(event) {
+ case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
+ case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+ case SSH_NOLOGIN:
+ case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+ case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+ break;
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
+ case SSH_INVALID_USER:
+ linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "sshd", 0);
+ break;
+ default:
+ debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-bsdauth.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-bsdauth.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-bsdauth.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.11 2007/09/21 08:15:29 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
-static void *
-bsdauth_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- return authctxt;
-}
-
-int
-bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
- u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
- char *challenge = NULL;
-
- if (authctxt->as != NULL) {
- debug2("bsdauth_query: try reuse session");
- challenge = auth_getitem(authctxt->as, AUTHV_CHALLENGE);
- if (challenge == NULL) {
- auth_close(authctxt->as);
- authctxt->as = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- if (challenge == NULL) {
- debug2("bsdauth_query: new bsd auth session");
- debug3("bsdauth_query: style %s",
- authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "<default>");
- authctxt->as = auth_userchallenge(authctxt->user,
- authctxt->style, "auth-ssh", &challenge);
- if (authctxt->as == NULL)
- challenge = NULL;
- debug2("bsdauth_query: <%s>", challenge ? challenge : "empty");
- }
-
- if (challenge == NULL)
- return -1;
-
- *name = xstrdup("");
- *infotxt = xstrdup("");
- *numprompts = 1;
- *prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
- *echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
- (*prompts)[0] = xstrdup(challenge);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
- int authok;
-
- if (!authctxt->valid)
- return -1;
-
- if (authctxt->as == 0)
- error("bsdauth_respond: no bsd auth session");
-
- if (numresponses != 1)
- return -1;
-
- authok = auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, responses[0], 0);
- authctxt->as = NULL;
- debug3("bsdauth_respond: <%s> = <%d>", responses[0], authok);
-
- return (authok == 0) ? -1 : 0;
-}
-
-static void
-bsdauth_free_ctx(void *ctx)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
-
- if (authctxt && authctxt->as) {
- auth_close(authctxt->as);
- authctxt->as = NULL;
- }
-}
-
-KbdintDevice bsdauth_device = {
- "bsdauth",
- bsdauth_init_ctx,
- bsdauth_query,
- bsdauth_respond,
- bsdauth_free_ctx
-};
-
-KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device = {
- "bsdauth",
- bsdauth_init_ctx,
- mm_bsdauth_query,
- mm_bsdauth_respond,
- bsdauth_free_ctx
-};
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-bsdauth.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-bsdauth.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-bsdauth.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-bsdauth.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.14 2015/10/20 23:24:25 mmcc Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+static void *
+bsdauth_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ return authctxt;
+}
+
+int
+bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
+ u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
+ char *challenge = NULL;
+
+ *infotxt = NULL;
+ *numprompts = 0;
+ *prompts = NULL;
+ *echo_on = NULL;
+
+ if (authctxt->as != NULL) {
+ debug2("bsdauth_query: try reuse session");
+ challenge = auth_getitem(authctxt->as, AUTHV_CHALLENGE);
+ if (challenge == NULL) {
+ auth_close(authctxt->as);
+ authctxt->as = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (challenge == NULL) {
+ debug2("bsdauth_query: new bsd auth session");
+ debug3("bsdauth_query: style %s",
+ authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "<default>");
+ authctxt->as = auth_userchallenge(authctxt->user,
+ authctxt->style, "auth-ssh", &challenge);
+ if (authctxt->as == NULL)
+ challenge = NULL;
+ debug2("bsdauth_query: <%s>", challenge ? challenge : "empty");
+ }
+
+ if (challenge == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ *name = xstrdup("");
+ *infotxt = xstrdup("");
+ *numprompts = 1;
+ *prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
+ *echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
+ (*prompts)[0] = xstrdup(challenge);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
+ int authok;
+
+ if (!authctxt->valid)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (authctxt->as == NULL)
+ error("bsdauth_respond: no bsd auth session");
+
+ if (numresponses != 1)
+ return -1;
+
+ authok = auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, responses[0], 0);
+ authctxt->as = NULL;
+ debug3("bsdauth_respond: <%s> = <%d>", responses[0], authok);
+
+ return (authok == 0) ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+static void
+bsdauth_free_ctx(void *ctx)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
+
+ if (authctxt && authctxt->as) {
+ auth_close(authctxt->as);
+ authctxt->as = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+KbdintDevice bsdauth_device = {
+ "bsdauth",
+ bsdauth_init_ctx,
+ bsdauth_query,
+ bsdauth_respond,
+ bsdauth_free_ctx
+};
+
+KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device = {
+ "bsdauth",
+ bsdauth_init_ctx,
+ mm_bsdauth_query,
+ mm_bsdauth_respond,
+ bsdauth_free_ctx
+};
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-chall.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-chall.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-chall.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-chall.c,v 1.13 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-
-/* limited protocol v1 interface to kbd-interactive authentication */
-
-extern KbdintDevice *devices[];
-static KbdintDevice *device;
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-char *
-get_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- char *challenge, *name, *info, **prompts;
- u_int i, numprompts;
- u_int *echo_on;
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (!options.use_pam)
- remove_kbdint_device("pam");
-#endif
-
- device = devices[0]; /* we always use the 1st device for protocol 1 */
- if (device == NULL)
- return NULL;
- if ((authctxt->kbdintctxt = device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL)
- return NULL;
- if (device->query(authctxt->kbdintctxt, &name, &info,
- &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on)) {
- device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
- authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
- return NULL;
- }
- if (numprompts < 1)
- fatal("get_challenge: numprompts < 1");
- challenge = xstrdup(prompts[0]);
- for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++)
- free(prompts[i]);
- free(prompts);
- free(name);
- free(echo_on);
- free(info);
-
- return (challenge);
-}
-int
-verify_response(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *response)
-{
- char *resp[1], *name, *info, **prompts;
- u_int i, numprompts, *echo_on;
- int authenticated = 0;
-
- if (device == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL)
- return 0;
- resp[0] = (char *)response;
- switch (device->respond(authctxt->kbdintctxt, 1, resp)) {
- case 0: /* Success */
- authenticated = 1;
- break;
- case 1: /* Postponed - retry with empty query for PAM */
- if ((device->query(authctxt->kbdintctxt, &name, &info,
- &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on)) != 0)
- break;
- if (numprompts == 0 &&
- device->respond(authctxt->kbdintctxt, 0, resp) == 0)
- authenticated = 1;
-
- for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++)
- free(prompts[i]);
- free(prompts);
- free(name);
- free(echo_on);
- free(info);
- break;
- }
- device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
- authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
- return authenticated;
-}
-void
-abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- if (authctxt->kbdintctxt != NULL) {
- device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
- authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
- }
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-chall.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-chall.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-chall.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-chall.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-chall.c,v 1.14 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+/* limited protocol v1 interface to kbd-interactive authentication */
+
+extern KbdintDevice *devices[];
+static KbdintDevice *device;
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+char *
+get_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ char *challenge, *name, *info, **prompts;
+ u_int i, numprompts;
+ u_int *echo_on;
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (!options.use_pam)
+ remove_kbdint_device("pam");
+#endif
+
+ device = devices[0]; /* we always use the 1st device for protocol 1 */
+ if (device == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if ((authctxt->kbdintctxt = device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (device->query(authctxt->kbdintctxt, &name, &info,
+ &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on)) {
+ device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
+ authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (numprompts < 1)
+ fatal("get_challenge: numprompts < 1");
+ challenge = xstrdup(prompts[0]);
+ for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++)
+ free(prompts[i]);
+ free(prompts);
+ free(name);
+ free(echo_on);
+ free(info);
+
+ return (challenge);
+}
+int
+verify_response(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *response)
+{
+ char *resp[1], *name, *info, **prompts;
+ u_int i, numprompts, *echo_on;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+
+ if (device == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ resp[0] = (char *)response;
+ switch (device->respond(authctxt->kbdintctxt, 1, resp)) {
+ case 0: /* Success */
+ authenticated = 1;
+ break;
+ case 1: /* Postponed - retry with empty query for PAM */
+ if ((device->query(authctxt->kbdintctxt, &name, &info,
+ &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on)) != 0)
+ break;
+ if (numprompts == 0 &&
+ device->respond(authctxt->kbdintctxt, 0, resp) == 0)
+ authenticated = 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++)
+ free(prompts[i]);
+ free(prompts);
+ free(name);
+ free(echo_on);
+ free(info);
+ break;
+ }
+ device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
+ authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
+ return authenticated;
+}
+void
+abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ if (authctxt->kbdintctxt != NULL) {
+ device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
+ authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
+ }
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-krb5.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-krb5.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-krb5.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,272 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.20 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Kerberos v5 authentication and ticket-passing routines.
- *
- * $FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c,v 1.6 2001/02/13 16:58:04 assar Exp $
- */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2002 Daniel Kouril. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-
-#ifdef KRB5
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <krb5.h>
-
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-static int
-krb5_init(void *context)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context;
- krb5_error_code problem;
-
- if (authctxt->krb5_ctx == NULL) {
- problem = krb5_init_context(&authctxt->krb5_ctx);
- if (problem)
- return (problem);
- }
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
-{
-#ifndef HEIMDAL
- krb5_creds creds;
- krb5_principal server;
-#endif
- krb5_error_code problem;
- krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
- int len;
- char *client, *platform_client;
- const char *errmsg;
-
- /* get platform-specific kerberos client principal name (if it exists) */
- platform_client = platform_krb5_get_principal_name(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
- client = platform_client ? platform_client : authctxt->pw->pw_name;
-
- temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
-
- problem = krb5_init(authctxt);
- if (problem)
- goto out;
-
- problem = krb5_parse_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, client,
- &authctxt->krb5_user);
- if (problem)
- goto out;
-
-#ifdef HEIMDAL
-# ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
- problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
- krb5_mcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &ccache);
-# else
- problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_mcc_ops, &ccache);
-# endif
- if (problem)
- goto out;
-
- problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache,
- authctxt->krb5_user);
- if (problem)
- goto out;
-
- restore_uid();
-
- problem = krb5_verify_user(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
- ccache, password, 1, NULL);
-
- temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
-
- if (problem)
- goto out;
-
-# ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
- problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
- krb5_fcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
-# else
- problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_fcc_ops,
- &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
-# endif
- if (problem)
- goto out;
-
- problem = krb5_cc_copy_cache(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache,
- authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
- krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache);
- ccache = NULL;
- if (problem)
- goto out;
-
-#else
- problem = krb5_get_init_creds_password(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds,
- authctxt->krb5_user, (char *)password, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
- if (problem)
- goto out;
-
- problem = krb5_sname_to_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, NULL, NULL,
- KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server);
- if (problem)
- goto out;
-
- restore_uid();
- problem = krb5_verify_init_creds(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds, server,
- NULL, NULL, NULL);
- krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, server);
- temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
- if (problem)
- goto out;
-
- if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
- authctxt->pw->pw_name)) {
- problem = -1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
- if (problem)
- goto out;
-
- problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
- authctxt->krb5_user);
- if (problem)
- goto out;
-
- problem= krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
- &creds);
- if (problem)
- goto out;
-#endif
-
- authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
-
- len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
- authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
- snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
- authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
- do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
-#endif
-
- out:
- restore_uid();
-
- free(platform_client);
-
- if (problem) {
- if (ccache)
- krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache);
-
- if (authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL && problem!=-1) {
- errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
- problem);
- debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %s",
- errmsg);
- krb5_free_error_message(authctxt->krb5_ctx, errmsg);
- } else
- debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %d",
- problem);
-
- krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
-
- if (options.kerberos_or_local_passwd)
- return (-1);
- else
- return (0);
- }
- return (authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0);
-}
-
-void
-krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called");
- if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) {
- krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
- authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL;
- }
- if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
- krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
- authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
- }
- if (authctxt->krb5_ctx) {
- krb5_free_context(authctxt->krb5_ctx);
- authctxt->krb5_ctx = NULL;
- }
-}
-
-#ifndef HEIMDAL
-krb5_error_code
-ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
- int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
- char ccname[40];
- mode_t old_umask;
-
- ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
- if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
- return ENOMEM;
-
- old_umask = umask(0177);
- tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
- oerrno = errno;
- umask(old_umask);
- if (tmpfd == -1) {
- logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
- return oerrno;
- }
-
- if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
- oerrno = errno;
- logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
- close(tmpfd);
- return oerrno;
- }
- close(tmpfd);
-
- return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
-}
-#endif /* !HEIMDAL */
-#endif /* KRB5 */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-krb5.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-krb5.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-krb5.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-krb5.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.22 2016/05/04 14:22:33 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Kerberos v5 authentication and ticket-passing routines.
+ *
+ * From: FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c,v 1.6 2001/02/13 16:58:04 assar
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Daniel Kouril. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <krb5.h>
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+static int
+krb5_init(void *context)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context;
+ krb5_error_code problem;
+
+ if (authctxt->krb5_ctx == NULL) {
+ problem = krb5_init_context(&authctxt->krb5_ctx);
+ if (problem)
+ return (problem);
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+{
+#ifndef HEIMDAL
+ krb5_creds creds;
+ krb5_principal server;
+#endif
+ krb5_error_code problem;
+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+ int len;
+ char *client, *platform_client;
+ const char *errmsg;
+
+ /* get platform-specific kerberos client principal name (if it exists) */
+ platform_client = platform_krb5_get_principal_name(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
+ client = platform_client ? platform_client : authctxt->pw->pw_name;
+
+ temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+
+ problem = krb5_init(authctxt);
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+ problem = krb5_parse_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, client,
+ &authctxt->krb5_user);
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+#ifdef HEIMDAL
+# ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
+ problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+ krb5_mcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &ccache);
+# else
+ problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_mcc_ops, &ccache);
+# endif
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+ problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache,
+ authctxt->krb5_user);
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+ restore_uid();
+
+ problem = krb5_verify_user(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
+ ccache, password, 1, NULL);
+
+ temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+# ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
+ problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+ krb5_fcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+# else
+ problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_fcc_ops,
+ &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+# endif
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+ problem = krb5_cc_copy_cache(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache,
+ authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+ krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache);
+ ccache = NULL;
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+#else
+ problem = krb5_get_init_creds_password(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds,
+ authctxt->krb5_user, (char *)password, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+ problem = krb5_sname_to_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, NULL, NULL,
+ KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server);
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+ restore_uid();
+ problem = krb5_verify_init_creds(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds, server,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, server);
+ temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
+ authctxt->pw->pw_name)) {
+ problem = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+ problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
+ authctxt->krb5_user);
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+ problem= krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
+ &creds);
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+#endif
+
+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+
+ len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
+ authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
+ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+ do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
+#endif
+
+ out:
+ restore_uid();
+
+ free(platform_client);
+
+ if (problem) {
+ if (ccache)
+ krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache);
+
+ if (authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL && problem!=-1) {
+ errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+ problem);
+ debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %s",
+ errmsg);
+ krb5_free_error_message(authctxt->krb5_ctx, errmsg);
+ } else
+ debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %d",
+ problem);
+
+ krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
+
+ if (options.kerberos_or_local_passwd)
+ return (-1);
+ else
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+void
+krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called");
+ if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) {
+ krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+ authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL;
+ }
+ if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
+ krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
+ authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
+ }
+ if (authctxt->krb5_ctx) {
+ krb5_free_context(authctxt->krb5_ctx);
+ authctxt->krb5_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifndef HEIMDAL
+krb5_error_code
+ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+ int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
+ char ccname[40];
+ mode_t old_umask;
+
+ ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+ "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
+ if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+ return ENOMEM;
+
+ old_umask = umask(0177);
+ tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+ oerrno = errno;
+ umask(old_umask);
+ if (tmpfd == -1) {
+ logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+ return oerrno;
+ }
+
+ if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+ close(tmpfd);
+ return oerrno;
+ }
+ close(tmpfd);
+
+ return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+}
+#endif /* !HEIMDAL */
+#endif /* KRB5 */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-options.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-options.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-options.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,633 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.62 2013/12/19 00:27:57 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <netdb.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-
-/* Flags set authorized_keys flags */
-int no_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
-int no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
-int no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
-int no_pty_flag = 0;
-int no_user_rc = 0;
-int key_is_cert_authority = 0;
-
-/* "command=" option. */
-char *forced_command = NULL;
-
-/* "environment=" options. */
-struct envstring *custom_environment = NULL;
-
-/* "tunnel=" option. */
-int forced_tun_device = -1;
-
-/* "principals=" option. */
-char *authorized_principals = NULL;
-
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-void
-auth_clear_options(void)
-{
- no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
- no_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
- no_pty_flag = 0;
- no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
- no_user_rc = 0;
- key_is_cert_authority = 0;
- while (custom_environment) {
- struct envstring *ce = custom_environment;
- custom_environment = ce->next;
- free(ce->s);
- free(ce);
- }
- if (forced_command) {
- free(forced_command);
- forced_command = NULL;
- }
- if (authorized_principals) {
- free(authorized_principals);
- authorized_principals = NULL;
- }
- forced_tun_device = -1;
- channel_clear_permitted_opens();
-}
-
-/*
- * return 1 if access is granted, 0 if not.
- * side effect: sets key option flags
- */
-int
-auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
-{
- const char *cp;
- int i;
-
- /* reset options */
- auth_clear_options();
-
- if (!opts)
- return 1;
-
- while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') {
- cp = "cert-authority";
- if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
- key_is_cert_authority = 1;
- opts += strlen(cp);
- goto next_option;
- }
- cp = "no-port-forwarding";
- if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
- auth_debug_add("Port forwarding disabled.");
- no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
- opts += strlen(cp);
- goto next_option;
- }
- cp = "no-agent-forwarding";
- if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
- auth_debug_add("Agent forwarding disabled.");
- no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
- opts += strlen(cp);
- goto next_option;
- }
- cp = "no-X11-forwarding";
- if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
- auth_debug_add("X11 forwarding disabled.");
- no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
- opts += strlen(cp);
- goto next_option;
- }
- cp = "no-pty";
- if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
- auth_debug_add("Pty allocation disabled.");
- no_pty_flag = 1;
- opts += strlen(cp);
- goto next_option;
- }
- cp = "no-user-rc";
- if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
- auth_debug_add("User rc file execution disabled.");
- no_user_rc = 1;
- opts += strlen(cp);
- goto next_option;
- }
- cp = "command=\"";
- if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
- opts += strlen(cp);
- if (forced_command != NULL)
- free(forced_command);
- forced_command = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
- i = 0;
- while (*opts) {
- if (*opts == '"')
- break;
- if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
- opts += 2;
- forced_command[i++] = '"';
- continue;
- }
- forced_command[i++] = *opts++;
- }
- if (!*opts) {
- debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
- file, linenum);
- auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
- file, linenum);
- free(forced_command);
- forced_command = NULL;
- goto bad_option;
- }
- forced_command[i] = '\0';
- auth_debug_add("Forced command.");
- opts++;
- goto next_option;
- }
- cp = "principals=\"";
- if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
- opts += strlen(cp);
- if (authorized_principals != NULL)
- free(authorized_principals);
- authorized_principals = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
- i = 0;
- while (*opts) {
- if (*opts == '"')
- break;
- if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
- opts += 2;
- authorized_principals[i++] = '"';
- continue;
- }
- authorized_principals[i++] = *opts++;
- }
- if (!*opts) {
- debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
- file, linenum);
- auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
- file, linenum);
- free(authorized_principals);
- authorized_principals = NULL;
- goto bad_option;
- }
- authorized_principals[i] = '\0';
- auth_debug_add("principals: %.900s",
- authorized_principals);
- opts++;
- goto next_option;
- }
- cp = "environment=\"";
- if (options.permit_user_env &&
- strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
- char *s;
- struct envstring *new_envstring;
-
- opts += strlen(cp);
- s = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
- i = 0;
- while (*opts) {
- if (*opts == '"')
- break;
- if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
- opts += 2;
- s[i++] = '"';
- continue;
- }
- s[i++] = *opts++;
- }
- if (!*opts) {
- debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
- file, linenum);
- auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
- file, linenum);
- free(s);
- goto bad_option;
- }
- s[i] = '\0';
- auth_debug_add("Adding to environment: %.900s", s);
- debug("Adding to environment: %.900s", s);
- opts++;
- new_envstring = xcalloc(1, sizeof(struct envstring));
- new_envstring->s = s;
- new_envstring->next = custom_environment;
- custom_environment = new_envstring;
- goto next_option;
- }
- cp = "from=\"";
- if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
- const char *remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
- const char *remote_host = get_canonical_hostname(
- options.use_dns);
- char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
-
- opts += strlen(cp);
- i = 0;
- while (*opts) {
- if (*opts == '"')
- break;
- if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
- opts += 2;
- patterns[i++] = '"';
- continue;
- }
- patterns[i++] = *opts++;
- }
- if (!*opts) {
- debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
- file, linenum);
- auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
- file, linenum);
- free(patterns);
- goto bad_option;
- }
- patterns[i] = '\0';
- opts++;
- switch (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip,
- patterns)) {
- case 1:
- free(patterns);
- /* Host name matches. */
- goto next_option;
- case -1:
- debug("%.100s, line %lu: invalid criteria",
- file, linenum);
- auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: "
- "invalid criteria", file, linenum);
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case 0:
- free(patterns);
- logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with "
- "correct key but not from a permitted "
- "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).",
- pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip);
- auth_debug_add("Your host '%.200s' is not "
- "permitted to use this key for login.",
- remote_host);
- break;
- }
- /* deny access */
- return 0;
- }
- cp = "permitopen=\"";
- if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
- char *host, *p;
- int port;
- char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
-
- opts += strlen(cp);
- i = 0;
- while (*opts) {
- if (*opts == '"')
- break;
- if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
- opts += 2;
- patterns[i++] = '"';
- continue;
- }
- patterns[i++] = *opts++;
- }
- if (!*opts) {
- debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
- file, linenum);
- auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing "
- "end quote", file, linenum);
- free(patterns);
- goto bad_option;
- }
- patterns[i] = '\0';
- opts++;
- p = patterns;
- host = hpdelim(&p);
- if (host == NULL || strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
- debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen "
- "specification <%.100s>", file, linenum,
- patterns);
- auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: "
- "Bad permitopen specification", file,
- linenum);
- free(patterns);
- goto bad_option;
- }
- host = cleanhostname(host);
- if (p == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(p)) < 0) {
- debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen port "
- "<%.100s>", file, linenum, p ? p : "");
- auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: "
- "Bad permitopen port", file, linenum);
- free(patterns);
- goto bad_option;
- }
- if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0)
- channel_add_permitted_opens(host, port);
- free(patterns);
- goto next_option;
- }
- cp = "tunnel=\"";
- if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
- char *tun = NULL;
- opts += strlen(cp);
- tun = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
- i = 0;
- while (*opts) {
- if (*opts == '"')
- break;
- tun[i++] = *opts++;
- }
- if (!*opts) {
- debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
- file, linenum);
- auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
- file, linenum);
- free(tun);
- forced_tun_device = -1;
- goto bad_option;
- }
- tun[i] = '\0';
- forced_tun_device = a2tun(tun, NULL);
- free(tun);
- if (forced_tun_device == SSH_TUNID_ERR) {
- debug("%.100s, line %lu: invalid tun device",
- file, linenum);
- auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: invalid tun device",
- file, linenum);
- forced_tun_device = -1;
- goto bad_option;
- }
- auth_debug_add("Forced tun device: %d", forced_tun_device);
- opts++;
- goto next_option;
- }
-next_option:
- /*
- * Skip the comma, and move to the next option
- * (or break out if there are no more).
- */
- if (!*opts)
- fatal("Bugs in auth-options.c option processing.");
- if (*opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t')
- break; /* End of options. */
- if (*opts != ',')
- goto bad_option;
- opts++;
- /* Process the next option. */
- }
-
- /* grant access */
- return 1;
-
-bad_option:
- logit("Bad options in %.100s file, line %lu: %.50s",
- file, linenum, opts);
- auth_debug_add("Bad options in %.100s file, line %lu: %.50s",
- file, linenum, opts);
-
- /* deny access */
- return 0;
-}
-
-#define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1
-#define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2
-static int
-parse_option_list(u_char *optblob, size_t optblob_len, struct passwd *pw,
- u_int which, int crit,
- int *cert_no_port_forwarding_flag,
- int *cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag,
- int *cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag,
- int *cert_no_pty_flag,
- int *cert_no_user_rc,
- char **cert_forced_command,
- int *cert_source_address_done)
-{
- char *command, *allowed;
- const char *remote_ip;
- char *name = NULL;
- u_char *data_blob = NULL;
- u_int nlen, dlen, clen;
- Buffer c, data;
- int ret = -1, result, found;
-
- buffer_init(&data);
-
- /* Make copy to avoid altering original */
- buffer_init(&c);
- buffer_append(&c, optblob, optblob_len);
-
- while (buffer_len(&c) > 0) {
- if ((name = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&c, &nlen)) == NULL ||
- (data_blob = buffer_get_string_ret(&c, &dlen)) == NULL) {
- error("Certificate options corrupt");
- goto out;
- }
- buffer_append(&data, data_blob, dlen);
- debug3("found certificate option \"%.100s\" len %u",
- name, dlen);
- found = 0;
- if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0) {
- if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0) {
- *cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
- found = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(name,
- "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) {
- *cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
- found = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(name,
- "permit-port-forwarding") == 0) {
- *cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
- found = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0) {
- *cert_no_pty_flag = 0;
- found = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0) {
- *cert_no_user_rc = 0;
- found = 1;
- }
- }
- if (!found && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0) {
- if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0) {
- if ((command = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&data,
- &clen)) == NULL) {
- error("Certificate constraint \"%s\" "
- "corrupt", name);
- goto out;
- }
- if (*cert_forced_command != NULL) {
- error("Certificate has multiple "
- "force-command options");
- free(command);
- goto out;
- }
- *cert_forced_command = command;
- found = 1;
- }
- if (strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) {
- if ((allowed = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&data,
- &clen)) == NULL) {
- error("Certificate constraint "
- "\"%s\" corrupt", name);
- goto out;
- }
- if ((*cert_source_address_done)++) {
- error("Certificate has multiple "
- "source-address options");
- free(allowed);
- goto out;
- }
- remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
- result = addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip,
- allowed);
- free(allowed);
- switch (result) {
- case 1:
- /* accepted */
- break;
- case 0:
- /* no match */
- logit("Authentication tried for %.100s "
- "with valid certificate but not "
- "from a permitted host "
- "(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name,
- remote_ip);
- auth_debug_add("Your address '%.200s' "
- "is not permitted to use this "
- "certificate for login.",
- remote_ip);
- goto out;
- case -1:
- default:
- error("Certificate source-address "
- "contents invalid");
- goto out;
- }
- found = 1;
- }
- }
-
- if (!found) {
- if (crit) {
- error("Certificate critical option \"%s\" "
- "is not supported", name);
- goto out;
- } else {
- logit("Certificate extension \"%s\" "
- "is not supported", name);
- }
- } else if (buffer_len(&data) != 0) {
- error("Certificate option \"%s\" corrupt "
- "(extra data)", name);
- goto out;
- }
- buffer_clear(&data);
- free(name);
- free(data_blob);
- name = NULL;
- data_blob = NULL;
- }
- /* successfully parsed all options */
- ret = 0;
-
- out:
- if (ret != 0 &&
- cert_forced_command != NULL &&
- *cert_forced_command != NULL) {
- free(*cert_forced_command);
- *cert_forced_command = NULL;
- }
- if (name != NULL)
- free(name);
- if (data_blob != NULL)
- free(data_blob);
- buffer_free(&data);
- buffer_free(&c);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Set options from critical certificate options. These supersede user key
- * options so this must be called after auth_parse_options().
- */
-int
-auth_cert_options(Key *k, struct passwd *pw)
-{
- int cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
- int cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
- int cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
- int cert_no_pty_flag = 1;
- int cert_no_user_rc = 1;
- char *cert_forced_command = NULL;
- int cert_source_address_done = 0;
-
- if (key_cert_is_legacy(k)) {
- /* All options are in the one field for v00 certs */
- if (parse_option_list(buffer_ptr(&k->cert->critical),
- buffer_len(&k->cert->critical), pw,
- OPTIONS_CRITICAL|OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 1,
- &cert_no_port_forwarding_flag,
- &cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag,
- &cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag,
- &cert_no_pty_flag,
- &cert_no_user_rc,
- &cert_forced_command,
- &cert_source_address_done) == -1)
- return -1;
- } else {
- /* Separate options and extensions for v01 certs */
- if (parse_option_list(buffer_ptr(&k->cert->critical),
- buffer_len(&k->cert->critical), pw,
- OPTIONS_CRITICAL, 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
- &cert_forced_command,
- &cert_source_address_done) == -1)
- return -1;
- if (parse_option_list(buffer_ptr(&k->cert->extensions),
- buffer_len(&k->cert->extensions), pw,
- OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 1,
- &cert_no_port_forwarding_flag,
- &cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag,
- &cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag,
- &cert_no_pty_flag,
- &cert_no_user_rc,
- NULL, NULL) == -1)
- return -1;
- }
-
- no_port_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_port_forwarding_flag;
- no_agent_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag;
- no_x11_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag;
- no_pty_flag |= cert_no_pty_flag;
- no_user_rc |= cert_no_user_rc;
- /* CA-specified forced command supersedes key option */
- if (cert_forced_command != NULL) {
- if (forced_command != NULL)
- free(forced_command);
- forced_command = cert_forced_command;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-options.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-options.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-options.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-options.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,642 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.71 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+#include "key.h" /* XXX for typedef */
+#include "buffer.h" /* XXX for typedef */
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+/* Flags set authorized_keys flags */
+int no_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
+int no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
+int no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
+int no_pty_flag = 0;
+int no_user_rc = 0;
+int key_is_cert_authority = 0;
+
+/* "command=" option. */
+char *forced_command = NULL;
+
+/* "environment=" options. */
+struct envstring *custom_environment = NULL;
+
+/* "tunnel=" option. */
+int forced_tun_device = -1;
+
+/* "principals=" option. */
+char *authorized_principals = NULL;
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+void
+auth_clear_options(void)
+{
+ no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
+ no_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
+ no_pty_flag = 0;
+ no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
+ no_user_rc = 0;
+ key_is_cert_authority = 0;
+ while (custom_environment) {
+ struct envstring *ce = custom_environment;
+ custom_environment = ce->next;
+ free(ce->s);
+ free(ce);
+ }
+ free(forced_command);
+ forced_command = NULL;
+ free(authorized_principals);
+ authorized_principals = NULL;
+ forced_tun_device = -1;
+ channel_clear_permitted_opens();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Match flag 'opt' in *optsp, and if allow_negate is set then also match
+ * 'no-opt'. Returns -1 if option not matched, 1 if option matches or 0
+ * if negated option matches.
+ * If the option or negated option matches, then *optsp is updated to
+ * point to the first character after the option and, if 'msg' is not NULL
+ * then a message based on it added via auth_debug_add().
+ */
+static int
+match_flag(const char *opt, int allow_negate, char **optsp, const char *msg)
+{
+ size_t opt_len = strlen(opt);
+ char *opts = *optsp;
+ int negate = 0;
+
+ if (allow_negate && strncasecmp(opts, "no-", 3) == 0) {
+ opts += 3;
+ negate = 1;
+ }
+ if (strncasecmp(opts, opt, opt_len) == 0) {
+ *optsp = opts + opt_len;
+ if (msg != NULL) {
+ auth_debug_add("%s %s.", msg,
+ negate ? "disabled" : "enabled");
+ }
+ return negate ? 0 : 1;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * return 1 if access is granted, 0 if not.
+ * side effect: sets key option flags
+ */
+int
+auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ const char *cp;
+ int i, r;
+
+ /* reset options */
+ auth_clear_options();
+
+ if (!opts)
+ return 1;
+
+ while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') {
+ if ((r = match_flag("cert-authority", 0, &opts, NULL)) != -1) {
+ key_is_cert_authority = r;
+ goto next_option;
+ }
+ if ((r = match_flag("restrict", 0, &opts, NULL)) != -1) {
+ auth_debug_add("Key is restricted.");
+ no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
+ no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
+ no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
+ no_pty_flag = 1;
+ no_user_rc = 1;
+ goto next_option;
+ }
+ if ((r = match_flag("port-forwarding", 1, &opts,
+ "Port forwarding")) != -1) {
+ no_port_forwarding_flag = r != 1;
+ goto next_option;
+ }
+ if ((r = match_flag("agent-forwarding", 1, &opts,
+ "Agent forwarding")) != -1) {
+ no_agent_forwarding_flag = r != 1;
+ goto next_option;
+ }
+ if ((r = match_flag("x11-forwarding", 1, &opts,
+ "X11 forwarding")) != -1) {
+ no_x11_forwarding_flag = r != 1;
+ goto next_option;
+ }
+ if ((r = match_flag("pty", 1, &opts,
+ "PTY allocation")) != -1) {
+ no_pty_flag = r != 1;
+ goto next_option;
+ }
+ if ((r = match_flag("user-rc", 1, &opts,
+ "User rc execution")) != -1) {
+ no_user_rc = r != 1;
+ goto next_option;
+ }
+ cp = "command=\"";
+ if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+ opts += strlen(cp);
+ free(forced_command);
+ forced_command = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
+ i = 0;
+ while (*opts) {
+ if (*opts == '"')
+ break;
+ if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
+ opts += 2;
+ forced_command[i++] = '"';
+ continue;
+ }
+ forced_command[i++] = *opts++;
+ }
+ if (!*opts) {
+ debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+ file, linenum);
+ auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+ file, linenum);
+ free(forced_command);
+ forced_command = NULL;
+ goto bad_option;
+ }
+ forced_command[i] = '\0';
+ auth_debug_add("Forced command.");
+ opts++;
+ goto next_option;
+ }
+ cp = "principals=\"";
+ if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+ opts += strlen(cp);
+ free(authorized_principals);
+ authorized_principals = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
+ i = 0;
+ while (*opts) {
+ if (*opts == '"')
+ break;
+ if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
+ opts += 2;
+ authorized_principals[i++] = '"';
+ continue;
+ }
+ authorized_principals[i++] = *opts++;
+ }
+ if (!*opts) {
+ debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+ file, linenum);
+ auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+ file, linenum);
+ free(authorized_principals);
+ authorized_principals = NULL;
+ goto bad_option;
+ }
+ authorized_principals[i] = '\0';
+ auth_debug_add("principals: %.900s",
+ authorized_principals);
+ opts++;
+ goto next_option;
+ }
+ cp = "environment=\"";
+ if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+ char *s;
+ struct envstring *new_envstring;
+
+ opts += strlen(cp);
+ s = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
+ i = 0;
+ while (*opts) {
+ if (*opts == '"')
+ break;
+ if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
+ opts += 2;
+ s[i++] = '"';
+ continue;
+ }
+ s[i++] = *opts++;
+ }
+ if (!*opts) {
+ debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+ file, linenum);
+ auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+ file, linenum);
+ free(s);
+ goto bad_option;
+ }
+ s[i] = '\0';
+ opts++;
+ if (options.permit_user_env) {
+ auth_debug_add("Adding to environment: "
+ "%.900s", s);
+ debug("Adding to environment: %.900s", s);
+ new_envstring = xcalloc(1,
+ sizeof(*new_envstring));
+ new_envstring->s = s;
+ new_envstring->next = custom_environment;
+ custom_environment = new_envstring;
+ s = NULL;
+ }
+ free(s);
+ goto next_option;
+ }
+ cp = "from=\"";
+ if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+ const char *remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ const char *remote_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(
+ ssh, options.use_dns);
+ char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
+
+ opts += strlen(cp);
+ i = 0;
+ while (*opts) {
+ if (*opts == '"')
+ break;
+ if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
+ opts += 2;
+ patterns[i++] = '"';
+ continue;
+ }
+ patterns[i++] = *opts++;
+ }
+ if (!*opts) {
+ debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+ file, linenum);
+ auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+ file, linenum);
+ free(patterns);
+ goto bad_option;
+ }
+ patterns[i] = '\0';
+ opts++;
+ switch (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip,
+ patterns)) {
+ case 1:
+ free(patterns);
+ /* Host name matches. */
+ goto next_option;
+ case -1:
+ debug("%.100s, line %lu: invalid criteria",
+ file, linenum);
+ auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: "
+ "invalid criteria", file, linenum);
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case 0:
+ free(patterns);
+ logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with "
+ "correct key but not from a permitted "
+ "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).",
+ pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip);
+ auth_debug_add("Your host '%.200s' is not "
+ "permitted to use this key for login.",
+ remote_host);
+ break;
+ }
+ /* deny access */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ cp = "permitopen=\"";
+ if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+ char *host, *p;
+ int port;
+ char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
+
+ opts += strlen(cp);
+ i = 0;
+ while (*opts) {
+ if (*opts == '"')
+ break;
+ if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
+ opts += 2;
+ patterns[i++] = '"';
+ continue;
+ }
+ patterns[i++] = *opts++;
+ }
+ if (!*opts) {
+ debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+ file, linenum);
+ auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing "
+ "end quote", file, linenum);
+ free(patterns);
+ goto bad_option;
+ }
+ patterns[i] = '\0';
+ opts++;
+ p = patterns;
+ /* XXX - add streamlocal support */
+ host = hpdelim(&p);
+ if (host == NULL || strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
+ debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen "
+ "specification <%.100s>", file, linenum,
+ patterns);
+ auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: "
+ "Bad permitopen specification", file,
+ linenum);
+ free(patterns);
+ goto bad_option;
+ }
+ host = cleanhostname(host);
+ if (p == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(p)) < 0) {
+ debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen port "
+ "<%.100s>", file, linenum, p ? p : "");
+ auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: "
+ "Bad permitopen port", file, linenum);
+ free(patterns);
+ goto bad_option;
+ }
+ if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0)
+ channel_add_permitted_opens(host, port);
+ free(patterns);
+ goto next_option;
+ }
+ cp = "tunnel=\"";
+ if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+ char *tun = NULL;
+ opts += strlen(cp);
+ tun = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
+ i = 0;
+ while (*opts) {
+ if (*opts == '"')
+ break;
+ tun[i++] = *opts++;
+ }
+ if (!*opts) {
+ debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+ file, linenum);
+ auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+ file, linenum);
+ free(tun);
+ forced_tun_device = -1;
+ goto bad_option;
+ }
+ tun[i] = '\0';
+ forced_tun_device = a2tun(tun, NULL);
+ free(tun);
+ if (forced_tun_device == SSH_TUNID_ERR) {
+ debug("%.100s, line %lu: invalid tun device",
+ file, linenum);
+ auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: invalid tun device",
+ file, linenum);
+ forced_tun_device = -1;
+ goto bad_option;
+ }
+ auth_debug_add("Forced tun device: %d", forced_tun_device);
+ opts++;
+ goto next_option;
+ }
+next_option:
+ /*
+ * Skip the comma, and move to the next option
+ * (or break out if there are no more).
+ */
+ if (!*opts)
+ fatal("Bugs in auth-options.c option processing.");
+ if (*opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t')
+ break; /* End of options. */
+ if (*opts != ',')
+ goto bad_option;
+ opts++;
+ /* Process the next option. */
+ }
+
+ /* grant access */
+ return 1;
+
+bad_option:
+ logit("Bad options in %.100s file, line %lu: %.50s",
+ file, linenum, opts);
+ auth_debug_add("Bad options in %.100s file, line %lu: %.50s",
+ file, linenum, opts);
+
+ /* deny access */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1
+#define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2
+static int
+parse_option_list(struct sshbuf *oblob, struct passwd *pw,
+ u_int which, int crit,
+ int *cert_no_port_forwarding_flag,
+ int *cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag,
+ int *cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag,
+ int *cert_no_pty_flag,
+ int *cert_no_user_rc,
+ char **cert_forced_command,
+ int *cert_source_address_done)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ char *command, *allowed;
+ const char *remote_ip;
+ char *name = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *c = NULL, *data = NULL;
+ int r, ret = -1, result, found;
+
+ if ((c = sshbuf_fromb(oblob)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ while (sshbuf_len(c) > 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(data);
+ data = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(c, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_froms(c, &data)) != 0) {
+ error("Unable to parse certificate options: %s",
+ ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ debug3("found certificate option \"%.100s\" len %zu",
+ name, sshbuf_len(data));
+ found = 0;
+ if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0) {
+ if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0) {
+ *cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
+ found = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(name,
+ "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) {
+ *cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
+ found = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(name,
+ "permit-port-forwarding") == 0) {
+ *cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
+ found = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0) {
+ *cert_no_pty_flag = 0;
+ found = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0) {
+ *cert_no_user_rc = 0;
+ found = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0) {
+ if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &command,
+ NULL)) != 0) {
+ error("Unable to parse \"%s\" "
+ "section: %s", name, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (*cert_forced_command != NULL) {
+ error("Certificate has multiple "
+ "force-command options");
+ free(command);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *cert_forced_command = command;
+ found = 1;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &allowed,
+ NULL)) != 0) {
+ error("Unable to parse \"%s\" "
+ "section: %s", name, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((*cert_source_address_done)++) {
+ error("Certificate has multiple "
+ "source-address options");
+ free(allowed);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ result = addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip,
+ allowed);
+ free(allowed);
+ switch (result) {
+ case 1:
+ /* accepted */
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ /* no match */
+ logit("Authentication tried for %.100s "
+ "with valid certificate but not "
+ "from a permitted host "
+ "(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name,
+ remote_ip);
+ auth_debug_add("Your address '%.200s' "
+ "is not permitted to use this "
+ "certificate for login.",
+ remote_ip);
+ goto out;
+ case -1:
+ default:
+ error("Certificate source-address "
+ "contents invalid");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ found = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found) {
+ if (crit) {
+ error("Certificate critical option \"%s\" "
+ "is not supported", name);
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ logit("Certificate extension \"%s\" "
+ "is not supported", name);
+ }
+ } else if (sshbuf_len(data) != 0) {
+ error("Certificate option \"%s\" corrupt "
+ "(extra data)", name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ free(name);
+ name = NULL;
+ }
+ /* successfully parsed all options */
+ ret = 0;
+
+ out:
+ if (ret != 0 &&
+ cert_forced_command != NULL &&
+ *cert_forced_command != NULL) {
+ free(*cert_forced_command);
+ *cert_forced_command = NULL;
+ }
+ free(name);
+ sshbuf_free(data);
+ sshbuf_free(c);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set options from critical certificate options. These supersede user key
+ * options so this must be called after auth_parse_options().
+ */
+int
+auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *k, struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ int cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
+ int cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
+ int cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
+ int cert_no_pty_flag = 1;
+ int cert_no_user_rc = 1;
+ char *cert_forced_command = NULL;
+ int cert_source_address_done = 0;
+
+ /* Separate options and extensions for v01 certs */
+ if (parse_option_list(k->cert->critical, pw,
+ OPTIONS_CRITICAL, 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ &cert_forced_command,
+ &cert_source_address_done) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ if (parse_option_list(k->cert->extensions, pw,
+ OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 0,
+ &cert_no_port_forwarding_flag,
+ &cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag,
+ &cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag,
+ &cert_no_pty_flag,
+ &cert_no_user_rc,
+ NULL, NULL) == -1)
+ return -1;
+
+ no_port_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_port_forwarding_flag;
+ no_agent_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag;
+ no_x11_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag;
+ no_pty_flag |= cert_no_pty_flag;
+ no_user_rc |= cert_no_user_rc;
+ /* CA-specified forced command supersedes key option */
+ if (cert_forced_command != NULL) {
+ free(forced_command);
+ forced_command = cert_forced_command;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-options.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-options.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-options.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.20 2010/05/07 11:30:29 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#ifndef AUTH_OPTIONS_H
-#define AUTH_OPTIONS_H
-
-/* Linked list of custom environment strings */
-struct envstring {
- struct envstring *next;
- char *s;
-};
-
-/* Flags that may be set in authorized_keys options. */
-extern int no_port_forwarding_flag;
-extern int no_agent_forwarding_flag;
-extern int no_x11_forwarding_flag;
-extern int no_pty_flag;
-extern int no_user_rc;
-extern char *forced_command;
-extern struct envstring *custom_environment;
-extern int forced_tun_device;
-extern int key_is_cert_authority;
-extern char *authorized_principals;
-
-int auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, char *, u_long);
-void auth_clear_options(void);
-int auth_cert_options(Key *, struct passwd *);
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-options.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-options.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-options.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-options.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.21 2015/01/14 10:30:34 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef AUTH_OPTIONS_H
+#define AUTH_OPTIONS_H
+
+/* Linked list of custom environment strings */
+struct envstring {
+ struct envstring *next;
+ char *s;
+};
+
+/* Flags that may be set in authorized_keys options. */
+extern int no_port_forwarding_flag;
+extern int no_agent_forwarding_flag;
+extern int no_x11_forwarding_flag;
+extern int no_pty_flag;
+extern int no_user_rc;
+extern char *forced_command;
+extern struct envstring *custom_environment;
+extern int forced_tun_device;
+extern int key_is_cert_authority;
+extern char *authorized_principals;
+
+int auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, char *, u_long);
+void auth_clear_options(void);
+int auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *, struct passwd *);
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-pam.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-pam.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-pam.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1219 +0,0 @@
-/*-
- * Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
- * NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc.
- * under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
- * DARPA CHATS research program.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
- * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-/* Based on $FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c,v 1.11 2003/03/31 13:48:18 des Exp $ */
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
-#include <security/pam_appl.h>
-#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
-#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
-#endif
-
-/* OpenGroup RFC86.0 and XSSO specify no "const" on arguments */
-#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
-# define sshpam_const /* Solaris, HP-UX, AIX */
-#else
-# define sshpam_const const /* LinuxPAM, OpenPAM */
-#endif
-
-/* Ambiguity in spec: is it an array of pointers or a pointer to an array? */
-#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
-# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((*(msg))[(n)].member)
-#else
-# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((msg)[(n)]->member)
-#endif
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "auth-pam.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "msg.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern Buffer loginmsg;
-extern int compat20;
-extern u_int utmp_len;
-
-/* so we don't silently change behaviour */
-#ifdef USE_POSIX_THREADS
-# error "USE_POSIX_THREADS replaced by UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK"
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Formerly known as USE_POSIX_THREADS, using this is completely unsupported
- * and generally a bad idea. Use at own risk and do not expect support if
- * this breaks.
- */
-#ifdef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
-#include <pthread.h>
-/*
- * Avoid namespace clash when *not* using pthreads for systems *with*
- * pthreads, which unconditionally define pthread_t via sys/types.h
- * (e.g. Linux)
- */
-typedef pthread_t sp_pthread_t;
-#else
-typedef pid_t sp_pthread_t;
-#endif
-
-struct pam_ctxt {
- sp_pthread_t pam_thread;
- int pam_psock;
- int pam_csock;
- int pam_done;
-};
-
-static void sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
-static struct pam_ctxt *cleanup_ctxt;
-
-#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
-/*
- * Simulate threads with processes.
- */
-
-static int sshpam_thread_status = -1;
-static mysig_t sshpam_oldsig;
-
-static void
-sshpam_sigchld_handler(int sig)
-{
- signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
- if (cleanup_ctxt == NULL)
- return; /* handler called after PAM cleanup, shouldn't happen */
- if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, WNOHANG)
- <= 0) {
- /* PAM thread has not exitted, privsep slave must have */
- kill(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, SIGTERM);
- if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, 0)
- <= 0)
- return; /* could not wait */
- }
- if (WIFSIGNALED(sshpam_thread_status) &&
- WTERMSIG(sshpam_thread_status) == SIGTERM)
- return; /* terminated by pthread_cancel */
- if (!WIFEXITED(sshpam_thread_status))
- sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited unexpectedly");
- if (WEXITSTATUS(sshpam_thread_status) != 0)
- sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited uncleanly");
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void
-pthread_exit(void *value)
-{
- _exit(0);
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int
-pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr,
- void *(*thread_start)(void *), void *arg)
-{
- pid_t pid;
- struct pam_ctxt *ctx = arg;
-
- sshpam_thread_status = -1;
- switch ((pid = fork())) {
- case -1:
- error("fork(): %s", strerror(errno));
- return (-1);
- case 0:
- close(ctx->pam_psock);
- ctx->pam_psock = -1;
- thread_start(arg);
- _exit(1);
- default:
- *thread = pid;
- close(ctx->pam_csock);
- ctx->pam_csock = -1;
- sshpam_oldsig = signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_sigchld_handler);
- return (0);
- }
-}
-
-static int
-pthread_cancel(sp_pthread_t thread)
-{
- signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
- return (kill(thread, SIGTERM));
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int
-pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value)
-{
- int status;
-
- if (sshpam_thread_status != -1)
- return (sshpam_thread_status);
- signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
- waitpid(thread, &status, 0);
- return (status);
-}
-#endif
-
-
-static pam_handle_t *sshpam_handle = NULL;
-static int sshpam_err = 0;
-static int sshpam_authenticated = 0;
-static int sshpam_session_open = 0;
-static int sshpam_cred_established = 0;
-static int sshpam_account_status = -1;
-static char **sshpam_env = NULL;
-static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL;
-static const char *sshpam_password = NULL;
-static char badpw[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
-
-/* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */
-#ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
-static char **
-pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh)
-{
- /*
- * XXX - If necessary, we can still support envrionment passing
- * for platforms without pam_getenvlist by searching for known
- * env vars (e.g. KRB5CCNAME) from the PAM environment.
- */
- return NULL;
-}
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Some platforms, notably Solaris, do not enforce password complexity
- * rules during pam_chauthtok() if the real uid of the calling process
- * is 0, on the assumption that it's being called by "passwd" run by root.
- * This wraps pam_chauthtok and sets/restore the real uid so PAM will do
- * the right thing.
- */
-#ifdef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID
-static int
-sshpam_chauthtok_ruid(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags)
-{
- int result;
-
- if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("PAM: sshpam_authctxt not initialized");
- if (setreuid(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, -1) == -1)
- fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- result = pam_chauthtok(pamh, flags);
- if (setreuid(0, -1) == -1)
- fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- return result;
-}
-# define pam_chauthtok(a,b) (sshpam_chauthtok_ruid((a), (b)))
-#endif
-
-void
-sshpam_password_change_required(int reqd)
-{
- debug3("%s %d", __func__, reqd);
- if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__);
- sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange = reqd;
- if (reqd) {
- no_port_forwarding_flag |= 2;
- no_agent_forwarding_flag |= 2;
- no_x11_forwarding_flag |= 2;
- } else {
- no_port_forwarding_flag &= ~2;
- no_agent_forwarding_flag &= ~2;
- no_x11_forwarding_flag &= ~2;
- }
-}
-
-/* Import regular and PAM environment from subprocess */
-static void
-import_environments(Buffer *b)
-{
- char *env;
- u_int i, num_env;
- int err;
-
- debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
-
-#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
- /* Import variables set by do_pam_account */
- sshpam_account_status = buffer_get_int(b);
- sshpam_password_change_required(buffer_get_int(b));
-
- /* Import environment from subprocess */
- num_env = buffer_get_int(b);
- if (num_env > 1024)
- fatal("%s: received %u environment variables, expected <= 1024",
- __func__, num_env);
- sshpam_env = xcalloc(num_env + 1, sizeof(*sshpam_env));
- debug3("PAM: num env strings %d", num_env);
- for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++)
- sshpam_env[i] = buffer_get_string(b, NULL);
-
- sshpam_env[num_env] = NULL;
-
- /* Import PAM environment from subprocess */
- num_env = buffer_get_int(b);
- debug("PAM: num PAM env strings %d", num_env);
- for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++) {
- env = buffer_get_string(b, NULL);
-
-#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
- /* Errors are not fatal here */
- if ((err = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, env)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
- error("PAM: pam_putenv: %s",
- pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
- }
-#endif
- }
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * Conversation function for authentication thread.
- */
-static int
-sshpam_thread_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
- struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
-{
- Buffer buffer;
- struct pam_ctxt *ctxt;
- struct pam_response *reply;
- int i;
-
- debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n);
- *resp = NULL;
-
- if (data == NULL) {
- error("PAM: conversation function passed a null context");
- return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
- }
- ctxt = data;
- if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
- return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-
- if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
- return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-
- buffer_init(&buffer);
- for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
- switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
- case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
- buffer_put_cstring(&buffer,
- PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
- if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock,
- PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer) == -1)
- goto fail;
- if (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, &buffer) == -1)
- goto fail;
- if (buffer_get_char(&buffer) != PAM_AUTHTOK)
- goto fail;
- reply[i].resp = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL);
- break;
- case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
- buffer_put_cstring(&buffer,
- PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
- if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock,
- PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer) == -1)
- goto fail;
- if (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, &buffer) == -1)
- goto fail;
- if (buffer_get_char(&buffer) != PAM_AUTHTOK)
- goto fail;
- reply[i].resp = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL);
- break;
- case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
- buffer_put_cstring(&buffer,
- PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
- if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock,
- PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer) == -1)
- goto fail;
- break;
- case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
- buffer_put_cstring(&buffer,
- PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
- if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock,
- PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer) == -1)
- goto fail;
- break;
- default:
- goto fail;
- }
- buffer_clear(&buffer);
- }
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- *resp = reply;
- return (PAM_SUCCESS);
-
- fail:
- for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- free(reply[i].resp);
- }
- free(reply);
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-}
-
-/*
- * Authentication thread.
- */
-static void *
-sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
-{
- struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
- Buffer buffer;
- struct pam_conv sshpam_conv;
- int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
- PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
-#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
- extern char **environ;
- char **env_from_pam;
- u_int i;
- const char *pam_user;
- const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
- char *tz = getenv("TZ");
-
- sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER,
- (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
- if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
- goto auth_fail;
-
- environ[0] = NULL;
- if (tz != NULL)
- if (setenv("TZ", tz, 1) == -1)
- error("PAM: could not set TZ environment: %s",
- strerror(errno));
-
- if (sshpam_authctxt != NULL) {
- setproctitle("%s [pam]",
- sshpam_authctxt->valid ? pam_user : "unknown");
- }
-#endif
-
- sshpam_conv.conv = sshpam_thread_conv;
- sshpam_conv.appdata_ptr = ctxt;
-
- if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&buffer);
- sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
- (const void *)&sshpam_conv);
- if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
- goto auth_fail;
- sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
- if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
- goto auth_fail;
-
- if (compat20) {
- if (!do_pam_account()) {
- sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
- goto auth_fail;
- }
- if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) {
- sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle,
- PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
- if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
- goto auth_fail;
- sshpam_password_change_required(0);
- }
- }
-
- buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, "OK");
-
-#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
- /* Export variables set by do_pam_account */
- buffer_put_int(&buffer, sshpam_account_status);
- buffer_put_int(&buffer, sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange);
-
- /* Export any environment strings set in child */
- for(i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++)
- ; /* Count */
- buffer_put_int(&buffer, i);
- for(i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++)
- buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, environ[i]);
-
- /* Export any environment strings set by PAM in child */
- env_from_pam = pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle);
- for(i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++)
- ; /* Count */
- buffer_put_int(&buffer, i);
- for(i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++)
- buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, env_from_pam[i]);
-#endif /* UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK */
-
- /* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
- ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, &buffer);
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- pthread_exit(NULL);
-
- auth_fail:
- buffer_put_cstring(&buffer,
- pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
- /* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
- if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
- ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, &buffer);
- else
- ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_AUTH_ERR, &buffer);
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- pthread_exit(NULL);
-
- return (NULL); /* Avoid warning for non-pthread case */
-}
-
-void
-sshpam_thread_cleanup(void)
-{
- struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = cleanup_ctxt;
-
- debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
- if (ctxt != NULL && ctxt->pam_thread != 0) {
- pthread_cancel(ctxt->pam_thread);
- pthread_join(ctxt->pam_thread, NULL);
- close(ctxt->pam_psock);
- close(ctxt->pam_csock);
- memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(*ctxt));
- cleanup_ctxt = NULL;
- }
-}
-
-static int
-sshpam_null_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
- struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
-{
- debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n);
- return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-}
-
-static struct pam_conv null_conv = { sshpam_null_conv, NULL };
-
-static int
-sshpam_store_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
- struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
-{
- struct pam_response *reply;
- int i;
- size_t len;
-
- debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
- *resp = NULL;
-
- if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
- return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-
- if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
- return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-
- for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
- switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
- case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
- case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
- len = strlen(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
- buffer_append(&loginmsg, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg), len);
- buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\n", 1 );
- reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
- break;
- default:
- goto fail;
- }
- }
- *resp = reply;
- return (PAM_SUCCESS);
-
- fail:
- for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- free(reply[i].resp);
- }
- free(reply);
- return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-}
-
-static struct pam_conv store_conv = { sshpam_store_conv, NULL };
-
-void
-sshpam_cleanup(void)
-{
- if (sshpam_handle == NULL || (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor()))
- return;
- debug("PAM: cleanup");
- pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv);
- if (sshpam_session_open) {
- debug("PAM: closing session");
- pam_close_session(sshpam_handle, PAM_SILENT);
- sshpam_session_open = 0;
- }
- if (sshpam_cred_established) {
- debug("PAM: deleting credentials");
- pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
- sshpam_cred_established = 0;
- }
- sshpam_authenticated = 0;
- pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
- sshpam_handle = NULL;
-}
-
-static int
-sshpam_init(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- extern char *__progname;
- const char *pam_rhost, *pam_user, *user = authctxt->user;
- const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
-
- if (sshpam_handle != NULL) {
- /* We already have a PAM context; check if the user matches */
- sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle,
- PAM_USER, (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
- if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && strcmp(user, pam_user) == 0)
- return (0);
- pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
- sshpam_handle = NULL;
- }
- debug("PAM: initializing for \"%s\"", user);
- sshpam_err =
- pam_start(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE, user, &store_conv, &sshpam_handle);
- sshpam_authctxt = authctxt;
-
- if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
- pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
- sshpam_handle = NULL;
- return (-1);
- }
- pam_rhost = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns);
- debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", pam_rhost);
- sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST, pam_rhost);
- if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
- pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
- sshpam_handle = NULL;
- return (-1);
- }
-#ifdef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE
- /*
- * Some silly PAM modules (e.g. pam_time) require a TTY to operate.
- * sshd doesn't set the tty until too late in the auth process and
- * may not even set one (for tty-less connections)
- */
- debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"ssh\"");
- sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_TTY, "ssh");
- if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
- pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
- sshpam_handle = NULL;
- return (-1);
- }
-#endif
- return (0);
-}
-
-static void *
-sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- struct pam_ctxt *ctxt;
- int socks[2];
-
- debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
- /*
- * Refuse to start if we don't have PAM enabled or do_pam_account
- * has previously failed.
- */
- if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_account_status == 0)
- return NULL;
-
- /* Initialize PAM */
- if (sshpam_init(authctxt) == -1) {
- error("PAM: initialization failed");
- return (NULL);
- }
-
- ctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof *ctxt);
-
- /* Start the authentication thread */
- if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, PF_UNSPEC, socks) == -1) {
- error("PAM: failed create sockets: %s", strerror(errno));
- free(ctxt);
- return (NULL);
- }
- ctxt->pam_psock = socks[0];
- ctxt->pam_csock = socks[1];
- if (pthread_create(&ctxt->pam_thread, NULL, sshpam_thread, ctxt) == -1) {
- error("PAM: failed to start authentication thread: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- close(socks[0]);
- close(socks[1]);
- free(ctxt);
- return (NULL);
- }
- cleanup_ctxt = ctxt;
- return (ctxt);
-}
-
-static int
-sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
- u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
-{
- Buffer buffer;
- struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
- size_t plen;
- u_char type;
- char *msg;
- size_t len, mlen;
-
- debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
- buffer_init(&buffer);
- *name = xstrdup("");
- *info = xstrdup("");
- *prompts = xmalloc(sizeof(char *));
- **prompts = NULL;
- plen = 0;
- *echo_on = xmalloc(sizeof(u_int));
- while (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_psock, &buffer) == 0) {
- type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
- msg = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL);
- mlen = strlen(msg);
- switch (type) {
- case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
- case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
- *num = 1;
- len = plen + mlen + 1;
- **prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, 1, len);
- strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
- plen += mlen;
- **echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON);
- free(msg);
- return (0);
- case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
- case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
- /* accumulate messages */
- len = plen + mlen + 2;
- **prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, 1, len);
- strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
- plen += mlen;
- strlcat(**prompts + plen, "\n", len - plen);
- plen++;
- free(msg);
- break;
- case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
- sshpam_account_status = 0;
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case PAM_AUTH_ERR:
- debug3("PAM: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, type));
- if (**prompts != NULL && strlen(**prompts) != 0) {
- *info = **prompts;
- **prompts = NULL;
- *num = 0;
- **echo_on = 0;
- ctxt->pam_done = -1;
- free(msg);
- return 0;
- }
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case PAM_SUCCESS:
- if (**prompts != NULL) {
- /* drain any accumulated messages */
- debug("PAM: %s", **prompts);
- buffer_append(&loginmsg, **prompts,
- strlen(**prompts));
- free(**prompts);
- **prompts = NULL;
- }
- if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) {
- if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid ||
- (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
- options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
- fatal("Internal error: PAM auth "
- "succeeded when it should have "
- "failed");
- import_environments(&buffer);
- *num = 0;
- **echo_on = 0;
- ctxt->pam_done = 1;
- free(msg);
- return (0);
- }
- error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg,
- sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ",
- sshpam_authctxt->user,
- get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns));
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- default:
- *num = 0;
- **echo_on = 0;
- free(msg);
- ctxt->pam_done = -1;
- return (-1);
- }
- }
- return (-1);
-}
-
-/* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */
-static int
-sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
-{
- Buffer buffer;
- struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
-
- debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num);
- switch (ctxt->pam_done) {
- case 1:
- sshpam_authenticated = 1;
- return (0);
- case 0:
- break;
- default:
- return (-1);
- }
- if (num != 1) {
- error("PAM: expected one response, got %u", num);
- return (-1);
- }
- buffer_init(&buffer);
- if (sshpam_authctxt->valid &&
- (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 ||
- options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES))
- buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, *resp);
- else
- buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, badpw);
- if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, &buffer) == -1) {
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- return (-1);
- }
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- return (1);
-}
-
-static void
-sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp)
-{
- struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
-
- debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
- sshpam_thread_cleanup();
- free(ctxt);
- /*
- * We don't call sshpam_cleanup() here because we may need the PAM
- * handle at a later stage, e.g. when setting up a session. It's
- * still on the cleanup list, so pam_end() *will* be called before
- * the server process terminates.
- */
-}
-
-KbdintDevice sshpam_device = {
- "pam",
- sshpam_init_ctx,
- sshpam_query,
- sshpam_respond,
- sshpam_free_ctx
-};
-
-KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device = {
- "pam",
- mm_sshpam_init_ctx,
- mm_sshpam_query,
- mm_sshpam_respond,
- mm_sshpam_free_ctx
-};
-
-/*
- * This replaces auth-pam.c
- */
-void
-start_pam(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- if (!options.use_pam)
- fatal("PAM: initialisation requested when UsePAM=no");
-
- if (sshpam_init(authctxt) == -1)
- fatal("PAM: initialisation failed");
-}
-
-void
-finish_pam(void)
-{
- sshpam_cleanup();
-}
-
-u_int
-do_pam_account(void)
-{
- debug("%s: called", __func__);
- if (sshpam_account_status != -1)
- return (sshpam_account_status);
-
- sshpam_err = pam_acct_mgmt(sshpam_handle, 0);
- debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err,
- pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
-
- if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
- sshpam_account_status = 0;
- return (sshpam_account_status);
- }
-
- if (sshpam_err == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD)
- sshpam_password_change_required(1);
-
- sshpam_account_status = 1;
- return (sshpam_account_status);
-}
-
-void
-do_pam_set_tty(const char *tty)
-{
- if (tty != NULL) {
- debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"%s\"", tty);
- sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_TTY, tty);
- if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
- fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_TTY: %s",
- pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
- }
-}
-
-void
-do_pam_setcred(int init)
-{
- sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
- (const void *)&store_conv);
- if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
- fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
- pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
- if (init) {
- debug("PAM: establishing credentials");
- sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
- } else {
- debug("PAM: reinitializing credentials");
- sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
- }
- if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) {
- sshpam_cred_established = 1;
- return;
- }
- if (sshpam_authenticated)
- fatal("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s",
- pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
- else
- debug("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s",
- pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
-}
-
-static int
-sshpam_tty_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
- struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
-{
- char input[PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE];
- struct pam_response *reply;
- int i;
-
- debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
-
- *resp = NULL;
-
- if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG || !isatty(STDIN_FILENO))
- return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-
- if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
- return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-
- for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
- switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
- case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
- reply[i].resp =
- read_passphrase(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg),
- RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
- reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
- break;
- case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
- fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
- if (fgets(input, sizeof input, stdin) == NULL)
- input[0] = '\0';
- if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(input)) == NULL)
- goto fail;
- reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
- break;
- case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
- case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
- fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
- reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
- break;
- default:
- goto fail;
- }
- }
- *resp = reply;
- return (PAM_SUCCESS);
-
- fail:
- for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- free(reply[i].resp);
- }
- free(reply);
- return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-}
-
-static struct pam_conv tty_conv = { sshpam_tty_conv, NULL };
-
-/*
- * XXX this should be done in the authentication phase, but ssh1 doesn't
- * support that
- */
-void
-do_pam_chauthtok(void)
-{
- if (use_privsep)
- fatal("Password expired (unable to change with privsep)");
- sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
- (const void *)&tty_conv);
- if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
- fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
- pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
- debug("PAM: changing password");
- sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
- if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
- fatal("PAM: pam_chauthtok(): %s",
- pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
-}
-
-void
-do_pam_session(void)
-{
- debug3("PAM: opening session");
- sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
- (const void *)&store_conv);
- if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
- fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
- pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
- sshpam_err = pam_open_session(sshpam_handle, 0);
- if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS)
- sshpam_session_open = 1;
- else {
- sshpam_session_open = 0;
- disable_forwarding();
- error("PAM: pam_open_session(): %s",
- pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
- }
-
-}
-
-int
-is_pam_session_open(void)
-{
- return sshpam_session_open;
-}
-
-/*
- * Set a PAM environment string. We need to do this so that the session
- * modules can handle things like Kerberos/GSI credentials that appear
- * during the ssh authentication process.
- */
-int
-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
-{
- int ret = 1;
-#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
- char *compound;
- size_t len;
-
- len = strlen(name) + strlen(value) + 2;
- compound = xmalloc(len);
-
- snprintf(compound, len, "%s=%s", name, value);
- ret = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, compound);
- free(compound);
-#endif
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-char **
-fetch_pam_child_environment(void)
-{
- return sshpam_env;
-}
-
-char **
-fetch_pam_environment(void)
-{
- return (pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle));
-}
-
-void
-free_pam_environment(char **env)
-{
- char **envp;
-
- if (env == NULL)
- return;
-
- for (envp = env; *envp; envp++)
- free(*envp);
- free(env);
-}
-
-/*
- * "Blind" conversation function for password authentication. Assumes that
- * echo-off prompts are for the password and stores messages for later
- * display.
- */
-static int
-sshpam_passwd_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
- struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
-{
- struct pam_response *reply;
- int i;
- size_t len;
-
- debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
-
- *resp = NULL;
-
- if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
- return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-
- if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
- return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-
- for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
- switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
- case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
- if (sshpam_password == NULL)
- goto fail;
- if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(sshpam_password)) == NULL)
- goto fail;
- reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
- break;
- case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
- case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
- len = strlen(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
- if (len > 0) {
- buffer_append(&loginmsg,
- PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg), len);
- buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\n", 1);
- }
- if ((reply[i].resp = strdup("")) == NULL)
- goto fail;
- reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
- break;
- default:
- goto fail;
- }
- }
- *resp = reply;
- return (PAM_SUCCESS);
-
- fail:
- for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- free(reply[i].resp);
- }
- free(reply);
- return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-}
-
-static struct pam_conv passwd_conv = { sshpam_passwd_conv, NULL };
-
-/*
- * Attempt password authentication via PAM
- */
-int
-sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
-{
- int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
- PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
-
- if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL)
- fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to "
- "initialise.", __func__);
-
- sshpam_password = password;
- sshpam_authctxt = authctxt;
-
- /*
- * If the user logging in is invalid, or is root but is not permitted
- * by PermitRootLogin, use an invalid password to prevent leaking
- * information via timing (eg if the PAM config has a delay on fail).
- */
- if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
- options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
- sshpam_password = badpw;
-
- sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
- (const void *)&passwd_conv);
- if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
- fatal("PAM: %s: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", __func__,
- pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
-
- sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
- sshpam_password = NULL;
- if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) {
- debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s",
- authctxt->user);
- return 1;
- } else {
- debug("PAM: password authentication failed for %.100s: %s",
- authctxt->valid ? authctxt->user : "an illegal user",
- pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
- return 0;
- }
-}
-#endif /* USE_PAM */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-pam.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-pam.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-pam.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-pam.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1267 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
+ * NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc.
+ * under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
+ * DARPA CHATS research program.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Based on FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c,v 1.11 2003/03/31 13:48:18 des */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
+#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
+#endif
+
+/* OpenGroup RFC86.0 and XSSO specify no "const" on arguments */
+#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
+# define sshpam_const /* Solaris, HP-UX, SunOS */
+#else
+# define sshpam_const const /* LinuxPAM, OpenPAM, AIX */
+#endif
+
+/* Ambiguity in spec: is it an array of pointers or a pointer to an array? */
+#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
+# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((*(msg))[(n)].member)
+#else
+# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((msg)[(n)]->member)
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-pam.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+extern int compat20;
+extern u_int utmp_len;
+
+/* so we don't silently change behaviour */
+#ifdef USE_POSIX_THREADS
+# error "USE_POSIX_THREADS replaced by UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Formerly known as USE_POSIX_THREADS, using this is completely unsupported
+ * and generally a bad idea. Use at own risk and do not expect support if
+ * this breaks.
+ */
+#ifdef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+#include <pthread.h>
+/*
+ * Avoid namespace clash when *not* using pthreads for systems *with*
+ * pthreads, which unconditionally define pthread_t via sys/types.h
+ * (e.g. Linux)
+ */
+typedef pthread_t sp_pthread_t;
+#else
+typedef pid_t sp_pthread_t;
+#endif
+
+struct pam_ctxt {
+ sp_pthread_t pam_thread;
+ int pam_psock;
+ int pam_csock;
+ int pam_done;
+};
+
+static void sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
+static struct pam_ctxt *cleanup_ctxt;
+
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+/*
+ * Simulate threads with processes.
+ */
+
+static int sshpam_thread_status = -1;
+static mysig_t sshpam_oldsig;
+
+static void
+sshpam_sigchld_handler(int sig)
+{
+ signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ if (cleanup_ctxt == NULL)
+ return; /* handler called after PAM cleanup, shouldn't happen */
+ if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, WNOHANG)
+ <= 0) {
+ /* PAM thread has not exitted, privsep slave must have */
+ kill(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, SIGTERM);
+ while (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread,
+ &sshpam_thread_status, 0) == -1) {
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ if (WIFSIGNALED(sshpam_thread_status) &&
+ WTERMSIG(sshpam_thread_status) == SIGTERM)
+ return; /* terminated by pthread_cancel */
+ if (!WIFEXITED(sshpam_thread_status))
+ sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited unexpectedly");
+ if (WEXITSTATUS(sshpam_thread_status) != 0)
+ sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited uncleanly");
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+pthread_exit(void *value)
+{
+ _exit(0);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr,
+ void *(*thread_start)(void *), void *arg)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ struct pam_ctxt *ctx = arg;
+
+ sshpam_thread_status = -1;
+ switch ((pid = fork())) {
+ case -1:
+ error("fork(): %s", strerror(errno));
+ return (-1);
+ case 0:
+ close(ctx->pam_psock);
+ ctx->pam_psock = -1;
+ thread_start(arg);
+ _exit(1);
+ default:
+ *thread = pid;
+ close(ctx->pam_csock);
+ ctx->pam_csock = -1;
+ sshpam_oldsig = signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_sigchld_handler);
+ return (0);
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+pthread_cancel(sp_pthread_t thread)
+{
+ signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
+ return (kill(thread, SIGTERM));
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value)
+{
+ int status;
+
+ if (sshpam_thread_status != -1)
+ return (sshpam_thread_status);
+ signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
+ while (waitpid(thread, &status, 0) == -1) {
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ return (status);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+static pam_handle_t *sshpam_handle = NULL;
+static int sshpam_err = 0;
+static int sshpam_authenticated = 0;
+static int sshpam_session_open = 0;
+static int sshpam_cred_established = 0;
+static int sshpam_account_status = -1;
+static int sshpam_maxtries_reached = 0;
+static char **sshpam_env = NULL;
+static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL;
+static const char *sshpam_password = NULL;
+
+/* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */
+#ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
+static char **
+pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh)
+{
+ /*
+ * XXX - If necessary, we can still support envrionment passing
+ * for platforms without pam_getenvlist by searching for known
+ * env vars (e.g. KRB5CCNAME) from the PAM environment.
+ */
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Some platforms, notably Solaris, do not enforce password complexity
+ * rules during pam_chauthtok() if the real uid of the calling process
+ * is 0, on the assumption that it's being called by "passwd" run by root.
+ * This wraps pam_chauthtok and sets/restore the real uid so PAM will do
+ * the right thing.
+ */
+#ifdef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID
+static int
+sshpam_chauthtok_ruid(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags)
+{
+ int result;
+
+ if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("PAM: sshpam_authctxt not initialized");
+ if (setreuid(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, -1) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ result = pam_chauthtok(pamh, flags);
+ if (setreuid(0, -1) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ return result;
+}
+# define pam_chauthtok(a,b) (sshpam_chauthtok_ruid((a), (b)))
+#endif
+
+void
+sshpam_password_change_required(int reqd)
+{
+ debug3("%s %d", __func__, reqd);
+ if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__);
+ sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange = reqd;
+ if (reqd) {
+ no_port_forwarding_flag |= 2;
+ no_agent_forwarding_flag |= 2;
+ no_x11_forwarding_flag |= 2;
+ } else {
+ no_port_forwarding_flag &= ~2;
+ no_agent_forwarding_flag &= ~2;
+ no_x11_forwarding_flag &= ~2;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Import regular and PAM environment from subprocess */
+static void
+import_environments(Buffer *b)
+{
+ char *env;
+ u_int i, num_env;
+ int err;
+
+ debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
+
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+ /* Import variables set by do_pam_account */
+ sshpam_account_status = buffer_get_int(b);
+ sshpam_password_change_required(buffer_get_int(b));
+
+ /* Import environment from subprocess */
+ num_env = buffer_get_int(b);
+ if (num_env > 1024)
+ fatal("%s: received %u environment variables, expected <= 1024",
+ __func__, num_env);
+ sshpam_env = xcalloc(num_env + 1, sizeof(*sshpam_env));
+ debug3("PAM: num env strings %d", num_env);
+ for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++)
+ sshpam_env[i] = buffer_get_string(b, NULL);
+
+ sshpam_env[num_env] = NULL;
+
+ /* Import PAM environment from subprocess */
+ num_env = buffer_get_int(b);
+ debug("PAM: num PAM env strings %d", num_env);
+ for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++) {
+ env = buffer_get_string(b, NULL);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
+ /* Errors are not fatal here */
+ if ((err = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, env)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ error("PAM: pam_putenv: %s",
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Conversation function for authentication thread.
+ */
+static int
+sshpam_thread_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+ Buffer buffer;
+ struct pam_ctxt *ctxt;
+ struct pam_response *reply;
+ int i;
+
+ debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n);
+ *resp = NULL;
+
+ if (data == NULL) {
+ error("PAM: conversation function passed a null context");
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+ }
+ ctxt = data;
+ if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+ if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+ buffer_init(&buffer);
+ for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+ switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+ buffer_put_cstring(&buffer,
+ PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+ if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock,
+ PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer) == -1)
+ goto fail;
+ if (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, &buffer) == -1)
+ goto fail;
+ if (buffer_get_char(&buffer) != PAM_AUTHTOK)
+ goto fail;
+ reply[i].resp = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL);
+ break;
+ case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+ case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+ buffer_put_cstring(&buffer,
+ PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+ if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock,
+ PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer) == -1)
+ goto fail;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ buffer_clear(&buffer);
+ }
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+ *resp = reply;
+ return (PAM_SUCCESS);
+
+ fail:
+ for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ free(reply[i].resp);
+ }
+ free(reply);
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authentication thread.
+ */
+static void *
+sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
+{
+ struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
+ Buffer buffer;
+ struct pam_conv sshpam_conv;
+ int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
+ PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+ extern char **environ;
+ char **env_from_pam;
+ u_int i;
+ const char *pam_user;
+ const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
+ char *tz = getenv("TZ");
+
+ sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER,
+ (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ goto auth_fail;
+
+ environ[0] = NULL;
+ if (tz != NULL)
+ if (setenv("TZ", tz, 1) == -1)
+ error("PAM: could not set TZ environment: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+
+ if (sshpam_authctxt != NULL) {
+ setproctitle("%s [pam]",
+ sshpam_authctxt->valid ? pam_user : "unknown");
+ }
+#endif
+
+ sshpam_conv.conv = sshpam_thread_conv;
+ sshpam_conv.appdata_ptr = ctxt;
+
+ if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__);
+
+ buffer_init(&buffer);
+ sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+ (const void *)&sshpam_conv);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ goto auth_fail;
+ sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
+ if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES)
+ sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ goto auth_fail;
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ if (!do_pam_account()) {
+ sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
+ goto auth_fail;
+ }
+ if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+ sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle,
+ PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ goto auth_fail;
+ sshpam_password_change_required(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, "OK");
+
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+ /* Export variables set by do_pam_account */
+ buffer_put_int(&buffer, sshpam_account_status);
+ buffer_put_int(&buffer, sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange);
+
+ /* Export any environment strings set in child */
+ for(i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++)
+ ; /* Count */
+ buffer_put_int(&buffer, i);
+ for(i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++)
+ buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, environ[i]);
+
+ /* Export any environment strings set by PAM in child */
+ env_from_pam = pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle);
+ for(i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++)
+ ; /* Count */
+ buffer_put_int(&buffer, i);
+ for(i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++)
+ buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, env_from_pam[i]);
+#endif /* UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK */
+
+ /* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
+ ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, &buffer);
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+ pthread_exit(NULL);
+
+ auth_fail:
+ buffer_put_cstring(&buffer,
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+ /* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
+ if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
+ ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, &buffer);
+ else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached)
+ ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, &buffer);
+ else
+ ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_AUTH_ERR, &buffer);
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+ pthread_exit(NULL);
+
+ return (NULL); /* Avoid warning for non-pthread case */
+}
+
+void
+sshpam_thread_cleanup(void)
+{
+ struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = cleanup_ctxt;
+
+ debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
+ if (ctxt != NULL && ctxt->pam_thread != 0) {
+ pthread_cancel(ctxt->pam_thread);
+ pthread_join(ctxt->pam_thread, NULL);
+ close(ctxt->pam_psock);
+ close(ctxt->pam_csock);
+ memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(*ctxt));
+ cleanup_ctxt = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+sshpam_null_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+ debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n);
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+
+static struct pam_conv null_conv = { sshpam_null_conv, NULL };
+
+static int
+sshpam_store_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+ struct pam_response *reply;
+ int i;
+ size_t len;
+
+ debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
+ *resp = NULL;
+
+ if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+ if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+ switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
+ case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+ case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+ len = strlen(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+ buffer_append(&loginmsg, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg), len);
+ buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\n", 1 );
+ reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ *resp = reply;
+ return (PAM_SUCCESS);
+
+ fail:
+ for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ free(reply[i].resp);
+ }
+ free(reply);
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+
+static struct pam_conv store_conv = { sshpam_store_conv, NULL };
+
+void
+sshpam_cleanup(void)
+{
+ if (sshpam_handle == NULL || (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor()))
+ return;
+ debug("PAM: cleanup");
+ pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv);
+ if (sshpam_session_open) {
+ debug("PAM: closing session");
+ pam_close_session(sshpam_handle, PAM_SILENT);
+ sshpam_session_open = 0;
+ }
+ if (sshpam_cred_established) {
+ debug("PAM: deleting credentials");
+ pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
+ sshpam_cred_established = 0;
+ }
+ sshpam_authenticated = 0;
+ pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+ sshpam_handle = NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+sshpam_init(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ extern char *__progname;
+ const char *pam_rhost, *pam_user, *user = authctxt->user;
+ const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+
+ if (sshpam_handle != NULL) {
+ /* We already have a PAM context; check if the user matches */
+ sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle,
+ PAM_USER, (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
+ if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && strcmp(user, pam_user) == 0)
+ return (0);
+ pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+ sshpam_handle = NULL;
+ }
+ debug("PAM: initializing for \"%s\"", user);
+ sshpam_err =
+ pam_start(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE, user, &store_conv, &sshpam_handle);
+ sshpam_authctxt = authctxt;
+
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+ sshpam_handle = NULL;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ pam_rhost = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
+ debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", pam_rhost);
+ sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST, pam_rhost);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+ sshpam_handle = NULL;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+#ifdef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE
+ /*
+ * Some silly PAM modules (e.g. pam_time) require a TTY to operate.
+ * sshd doesn't set the tty until too late in the auth process and
+ * may not even set one (for tty-less connections)
+ */
+ debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"ssh\"");
+ sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_TTY, "ssh");
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+ sshpam_handle = NULL;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+#endif
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static void *
+sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ struct pam_ctxt *ctxt;
+ int socks[2];
+
+ debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
+ /*
+ * Refuse to start if we don't have PAM enabled or do_pam_account
+ * has previously failed.
+ */
+ if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_account_status == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Initialize PAM */
+ if (sshpam_init(authctxt) == -1) {
+ error("PAM: initialization failed");
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ ctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof *ctxt);
+
+ /* Start the authentication thread */
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, PF_UNSPEC, socks) == -1) {
+ error("PAM: failed create sockets: %s", strerror(errno));
+ free(ctxt);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ ctxt->pam_psock = socks[0];
+ ctxt->pam_csock = socks[1];
+ if (pthread_create(&ctxt->pam_thread, NULL, sshpam_thread, ctxt) == -1) {
+ error("PAM: failed to start authentication thread: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ close(socks[0]);
+ close(socks[1]);
+ free(ctxt);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ cleanup_ctxt = ctxt;
+ return (ctxt);
+}
+
+static int
+sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
+ u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ Buffer buffer;
+ struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
+ size_t plen;
+ u_char type;
+ char *msg;
+ size_t len, mlen;
+
+ debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
+ buffer_init(&buffer);
+ *name = xstrdup("");
+ *info = xstrdup("");
+ *prompts = xmalloc(sizeof(char *));
+ **prompts = NULL;
+ plen = 0;
+ *echo_on = xmalloc(sizeof(u_int));
+ while (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_psock, &buffer) == 0) {
+ type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
+ msg = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL);
+ mlen = strlen(msg);
+ switch (type) {
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+ *num = 1;
+ len = plen + mlen + 1;
+ **prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len);
+ strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
+ plen += mlen;
+ **echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON);
+ free(msg);
+ return (0);
+ case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+ case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+ /* accumulate messages */
+ len = plen + mlen + 2;
+ **prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len);
+ strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
+ plen += mlen;
+ strlcat(**prompts + plen, "\n", len - plen);
+ plen++;
+ free(msg);
+ break;
+ case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
+ case PAM_MAXTRIES:
+ if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
+ sshpam_account_status = 0;
+ if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES)
+ sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case PAM_AUTH_ERR:
+ debug3("PAM: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, type));
+ if (**prompts != NULL && strlen(**prompts) != 0) {
+ *info = **prompts;
+ **prompts = NULL;
+ *num = 0;
+ **echo_on = 0;
+ ctxt->pam_done = -1;
+ free(msg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case PAM_SUCCESS:
+ if (**prompts != NULL) {
+ /* drain any accumulated messages */
+ debug("PAM: %s", **prompts);
+ buffer_append(&loginmsg, **prompts,
+ strlen(**prompts));
+ free(**prompts);
+ **prompts = NULL;
+ }
+ if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid ||
+ (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+ options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
+ fatal("Internal error: PAM auth "
+ "succeeded when it should have "
+ "failed");
+ import_environments(&buffer);
+ *num = 0;
+ **echo_on = 0;
+ ctxt->pam_done = 1;
+ free(msg);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg,
+ sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ",
+ sshpam_authctxt->user,
+ auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns));
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ *num = 0;
+ **echo_on = 0;
+ free(msg);
+ ctxt->pam_done = -1;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a junk password of identical length to that the user supplied.
+ * Used to mitigate timing attacks against crypt(3)/PAM stacks that
+ * vary processing time in proportion to password length.
+ */
+static char *
+fake_password(const char *wire_password)
+{
+ const char junk[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
+ char *ret = NULL;
+ size_t i, l = wire_password != NULL ? strlen(wire_password) : 0;
+
+ if (l >= INT_MAX)
+ fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l);
+
+ ret = malloc(l + 1);
+ for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
+ ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)];
+ ret[i] = '\0';
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */
+static int
+sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
+{
+ Buffer buffer;
+ struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
+ char *fake;
+
+ debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num);
+ switch (ctxt->pam_done) {
+ case 1:
+ sshpam_authenticated = 1;
+ return (0);
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (num != 1) {
+ error("PAM: expected one response, got %u", num);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ buffer_init(&buffer);
+ if (sshpam_authctxt->valid &&
+ (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 ||
+ options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES))
+ buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, *resp);
+ else {
+ fake = fake_password(*resp);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, fake);
+ free(fake);
+ }
+ if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, &buffer) == -1) {
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static void
+sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp)
+{
+ struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
+
+ debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
+ sshpam_thread_cleanup();
+ free(ctxt);
+ /*
+ * We don't call sshpam_cleanup() here because we may need the PAM
+ * handle at a later stage, e.g. when setting up a session. It's
+ * still on the cleanup list, so pam_end() *will* be called before
+ * the server process terminates.
+ */
+}
+
+KbdintDevice sshpam_device = {
+ "pam",
+ sshpam_init_ctx,
+ sshpam_query,
+ sshpam_respond,
+ sshpam_free_ctx
+};
+
+KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device = {
+ "pam",
+ mm_sshpam_init_ctx,
+ mm_sshpam_query,
+ mm_sshpam_respond,
+ mm_sshpam_free_ctx
+};
+
+/*
+ * This replaces auth-pam.c
+ */
+void
+start_pam(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ if (!options.use_pam)
+ fatal("PAM: initialisation requested when UsePAM=no");
+
+ if (sshpam_init(authctxt) == -1)
+ fatal("PAM: initialisation failed");
+}
+
+void
+finish_pam(void)
+{
+ sshpam_cleanup();
+}
+
+u_int
+do_pam_account(void)
+{
+ debug("%s: called", __func__);
+ if (sshpam_account_status != -1)
+ return (sshpam_account_status);
+
+ sshpam_err = pam_acct_mgmt(sshpam_handle, 0);
+ debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err,
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
+ sshpam_account_status = 0;
+ return (sshpam_account_status);
+ }
+
+ if (sshpam_err == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD)
+ sshpam_password_change_required(1);
+
+ sshpam_account_status = 1;
+ return (sshpam_account_status);
+}
+
+void
+do_pam_set_tty(const char *tty)
+{
+ if (tty != NULL) {
+ debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"%s\"", tty);
+ sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_TTY, tty);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_TTY: %s",
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+ }
+}
+
+void
+do_pam_setcred(int init)
+{
+ sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+ (const void *)&store_conv);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+ if (init) {
+ debug("PAM: establishing credentials");
+ sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
+ } else {
+ debug("PAM: reinitializing credentials");
+ sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
+ }
+ if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ sshpam_cred_established = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+ if (sshpam_authenticated)
+ fatal("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s",
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+ else
+ debug("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s",
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+}
+
+static int
+sshpam_tty_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+ char input[PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE];
+ struct pam_response *reply;
+ int i;
+
+ debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
+
+ *resp = NULL;
+
+ if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG || !isatty(STDIN_FILENO))
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+ if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+ switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+ reply[i].resp =
+ read_passphrase(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg),
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+ if (fgets(input, sizeof input, stdin) == NULL)
+ input[0] = '\0';
+ if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(input)) == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+ reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+ case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+ reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ *resp = reply;
+ return (PAM_SUCCESS);
+
+ fail:
+ for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ free(reply[i].resp);
+ }
+ free(reply);
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+
+static struct pam_conv tty_conv = { sshpam_tty_conv, NULL };
+
+/*
+ * XXX this should be done in the authentication phase, but ssh1 doesn't
+ * support that
+ */
+void
+do_pam_chauthtok(void)
+{
+ if (use_privsep)
+ fatal("Password expired (unable to change with privsep)");
+ sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+ (const void *)&tty_conv);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+ debug("PAM: changing password");
+ sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ fatal("PAM: pam_chauthtok(): %s",
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+}
+
+void
+do_pam_session(void)
+{
+ debug3("PAM: opening session");
+ sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+ (const void *)&store_conv);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+ sshpam_err = pam_open_session(sshpam_handle, 0);
+ if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS)
+ sshpam_session_open = 1;
+ else {
+ sshpam_session_open = 0;
+ disable_forwarding();
+ error("PAM: pam_open_session(): %s",
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+ }
+
+}
+
+int
+is_pam_session_open(void)
+{
+ return sshpam_session_open;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set a PAM environment string. We need to do this so that the session
+ * modules can handle things like Kerberos/GSI credentials that appear
+ * during the ssh authentication process.
+ */
+int
+do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
+{
+ int ret = 1;
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
+ char *compound;
+ size_t len;
+
+ len = strlen(name) + strlen(value) + 2;
+ compound = xmalloc(len);
+
+ snprintf(compound, len, "%s=%s", name, value);
+ ret = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, compound);
+ free(compound);
+#endif
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+char **
+fetch_pam_child_environment(void)
+{
+ return sshpam_env;
+}
+
+char **
+fetch_pam_environment(void)
+{
+ return (pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle));
+}
+
+void
+free_pam_environment(char **env)
+{
+ char **envp;
+
+ if (env == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ for (envp = env; *envp; envp++)
+ free(*envp);
+ free(env);
+}
+
+/*
+ * "Blind" conversation function for password authentication. Assumes that
+ * echo-off prompts are for the password and stores messages for later
+ * display.
+ */
+static int
+sshpam_passwd_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+ struct pam_response *reply;
+ int i;
+ size_t len;
+
+ debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
+
+ *resp = NULL;
+
+ if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+ if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+ switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+ if (sshpam_password == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+ if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(sshpam_password)) == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+ reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+ case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+ len = strlen(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+ if (len > 0) {
+ buffer_append(&loginmsg,
+ PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg), len);
+ buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\n", 1);
+ }
+ if ((reply[i].resp = strdup("")) == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+ reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ *resp = reply;
+ return (PAM_SUCCESS);
+
+ fail:
+ for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ free(reply[i].resp);
+ }
+ free(reply);
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+
+static struct pam_conv passwd_conv = { sshpam_passwd_conv, NULL };
+
+/*
+ * Attempt password authentication via PAM
+ */
+int
+sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+{
+ int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
+ PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
+ char *fake = NULL;
+
+ if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL)
+ fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to "
+ "initialise.", __func__);
+
+ sshpam_password = password;
+ sshpam_authctxt = authctxt;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user logging in is invalid, or is root but is not permitted
+ * by PermitRootLogin, use an invalid password to prevent leaking
+ * information via timing (eg if the PAM config has a delay on fail).
+ */
+ if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+ options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
+ sshpam_password = fake = fake_password(password);
+
+ sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+ (const void *)&passwd_conv);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ fatal("PAM: %s: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", __func__,
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+
+ sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
+ sshpam_password = NULL;
+ free(fake);
+ if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES)
+ sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
+ if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) {
+ debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s",
+ authctxt->user);
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ debug("PAM: password authentication failed for %.100s: %s",
+ authctxt->valid ? authctxt->user : "an illegal user",
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+int
+sshpam_get_maxtries_reached(void)
+{
+ return sshpam_maxtries_reached;
+}
+
+void
+sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(int reached)
+{
+ if (reached == 0 || sshpam_maxtries_reached)
+ return;
+ sshpam_maxtries_reached = 1;
+ options.password_authentication = 0;
+ options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
+ options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
+}
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-pam.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-pam.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-pam.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: auth-pam.h,v 1.27 2004/09/11 12:17:26 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-
-#if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE)
-# define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE __progname
-#endif
-
-void start_pam(Authctxt *);
-void finish_pam(void);
-u_int do_pam_account(void);
-void do_pam_session(void);
-void do_pam_set_tty(const char *);
-void do_pam_setcred(int );
-void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
-char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
-char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
-void free_pam_environment(char **);
-void sshpam_thread_cleanup(void);
-void sshpam_cleanup(void);
-int sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
-int is_pam_session_open(void);
-
-#endif /* USE_PAM */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-pam.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-pam.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-pam.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-pam.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/* $Id: auth-pam.h,v 1.27 2004/09/11 12:17:26 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+
+#if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE)
+# define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE __progname
+#endif
+
+void start_pam(Authctxt *);
+void finish_pam(void);
+u_int do_pam_account(void);
+void do_pam_session(void);
+void do_pam_set_tty(const char *);
+void do_pam_setcred(int );
+void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
+int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
+char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
+char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
+void free_pam_environment(char **);
+void sshpam_thread_cleanup(void);
+void sshpam_cleanup(void);
+int sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
+int sshpam_get_maxtries_reached(void);
+void sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(int);
+int is_pam_session_open(void);
+
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-passwd.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-passwd.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-passwd.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,215 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.43 2007/09/21 08:15:29 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Password authentication. This file contains the functions to check whether
- * the password is valid for the user.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-
-extern Buffer loginmsg;
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
-extern login_cap_t *lc;
-#endif
-
-
-#define DAY (24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
-#define TWO_WEEKS (2L * 7 * DAY) /* 2 weeks in seconds */
-
-void
-disable_forwarding(void)
-{
- no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
- no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
- no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Tries to authenticate the user using password. Returns true if
- * authentication succeeds.
- */
-int
-auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
-{
- struct passwd * pw = authctxt->pw;
- int result, ok = authctxt->valid;
-#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
- static int expire_checked = 0;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
- if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)
- ok = 0;
-#endif
- if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0)
- return 0;
-
-#ifdef KRB5
- if (options.kerberos_authentication == 1) {
- int ret = auth_krb5_password(authctxt, password);
- if (ret == 1 || ret == 0)
- return ret && ok;
- /* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
- }
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- {
- HANDLE hToken = cygwin_logon_user(pw, password);
-
- if (hToken == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
- return 0;
- cygwin_set_impersonation_token(hToken);
- return ok;
- }
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
- return (sshpam_auth_passwd(authctxt, password) && ok);
-#endif
-#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
- if (!expire_checked) {
- expire_checked = 1;
- if (auth_shadow_pwexpired(authctxt))
- authctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
- }
-#endif
- result = sys_auth_passwd(authctxt, password);
- if (authctxt->force_pwchange)
- disable_forwarding();
- return (result && ok);
-}
-
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-static void
-warn_expiry(Authctxt *authctxt, auth_session_t *as)
-{
- char buf[256];
- quad_t pwtimeleft, actimeleft, daysleft, pwwarntime, acwarntime;
-
- pwwarntime = acwarntime = TWO_WEEKS;
-
- pwtimeleft = auth_check_change(as);
- actimeleft = auth_check_expire(as);
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- if (authctxt->valid) {
- pwwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "password-warn", TWO_WEEKS,
- TWO_WEEKS);
- acwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "expire-warn", TWO_WEEKS,
- TWO_WEEKS);
- }
-#endif
- if (pwtimeleft != 0 && pwtimeleft < pwwarntime) {
- daysleft = pwtimeleft / DAY + 1;
- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
- "Your password will expire in %lld day%s.\n",
- daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
- buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
- }
- if (actimeleft != 0 && actimeleft < acwarntime) {
- daysleft = actimeleft / DAY + 1;
- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
- "Your account will expire in %lld day%s.\n",
- daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
- buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
- }
-}
-
-int
-sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
-{
- struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
- auth_session_t *as;
- static int expire_checked = 0;
-
- as = auth_usercheck(pw->pw_name, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh",
- (char *)password);
- if (as == NULL)
- return (0);
- if (auth_getstate(as) & AUTH_PWEXPIRED) {
- auth_close(as);
- disable_forwarding();
- authctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
- return (1);
- } else {
- if (!expire_checked) {
- expire_checked = 1;
- warn_expiry(authctxt, as);
- }
- return (auth_close(as));
- }
-}
-#elif !defined(CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD)
-int
-sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
-{
- struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
- char *encrypted_password;
-
- /* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */
- char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
-
- /* Check for users with no password. */
- if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0)
- return (1);
-
- /* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */
- encrypted_password = xcrypt(password,
- (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx");
-
- /*
- * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
- * are identical.
- */
- return encrypted_password != NULL &&
- strcmp(encrypted_password, pw_password) == 0;
-}
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-passwd.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-passwd.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-passwd.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-passwd.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.45 2016/07/21 01:39:35 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Password authentication. This file contains the functions to check whether
+ * the password is valid for the user.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+extern login_cap_t *lc;
+#endif
+
+
+#define DAY (24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
+#define TWO_WEEKS (2L * 7 * DAY) /* 2 weeks in seconds */
+
+#define MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 1024
+
+void
+disable_forwarding(void)
+{
+ no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
+ no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
+ no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to authenticate the user using password. Returns true if
+ * authentication succeeds.
+ */
+int
+auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+{
+ struct passwd * pw = authctxt->pw;
+ int result, ok = authctxt->valid;
+#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+ static int expire_checked = 0;
+#endif
+
+ if (strlen(password) > MAX_PASSWORD_LEN)
+ return 0;
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)
+ ok = 0;
+#endif
+ if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+ if (options.kerberos_authentication == 1) {
+ int ret = auth_krb5_password(authctxt, password);
+ if (ret == 1 || ret == 0)
+ return ret && ok;
+ /* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
+ }
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ {
+ HANDLE hToken = cygwin_logon_user(pw, password);
+
+ if (hToken == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
+ return 0;
+ cygwin_set_impersonation_token(hToken);
+ return ok;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+ return (sshpam_auth_passwd(authctxt, password) && ok);
+#endif
+#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+ if (!expire_checked) {
+ expire_checked = 1;
+ if (auth_shadow_pwexpired(authctxt))
+ authctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+ result = sys_auth_passwd(authctxt, password);
+ if (authctxt->force_pwchange)
+ disable_forwarding();
+ return (result && ok);
+}
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+static void
+warn_expiry(Authctxt *authctxt, auth_session_t *as)
+{
+ char buf[256];
+ quad_t pwtimeleft, actimeleft, daysleft, pwwarntime, acwarntime;
+
+ pwwarntime = acwarntime = TWO_WEEKS;
+
+ pwtimeleft = auth_check_change(as);
+ actimeleft = auth_check_expire(as);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if (authctxt->valid) {
+ pwwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "password-warn", TWO_WEEKS,
+ TWO_WEEKS);
+ acwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "expire-warn", TWO_WEEKS,
+ TWO_WEEKS);
+ }
+#endif
+ if (pwtimeleft != 0 && pwtimeleft < pwwarntime) {
+ daysleft = pwtimeleft / DAY + 1;
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+ "Your password will expire in %lld day%s.\n",
+ daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
+ buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
+ }
+ if (actimeleft != 0 && actimeleft < acwarntime) {
+ daysleft = actimeleft / DAY + 1;
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+ "Your account will expire in %lld day%s.\n",
+ daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
+ buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
+ }
+}
+
+int
+sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+{
+ struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
+ auth_session_t *as;
+ static int expire_checked = 0;
+
+ as = auth_usercheck(pw->pw_name, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh",
+ (char *)password);
+ if (as == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ if (auth_getstate(as) & AUTH_PWEXPIRED) {
+ auth_close(as);
+ disable_forwarding();
+ authctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
+ return (1);
+ } else {
+ if (!expire_checked) {
+ expire_checked = 1;
+ warn_expiry(authctxt, as);
+ }
+ return (auth_close(as));
+ }
+}
+#elif !defined(CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD)
+int
+sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+{
+ struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
+ char *encrypted_password, *salt = NULL;
+
+ /* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */
+ char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
+
+ /* Check for users with no password. */
+ if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0)
+ return (1);
+
+ /*
+ * Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt, or pass a
+ * NULL and let xcrypt pick one.
+ */
+ if (authctxt->valid && pw_password[0] && pw_password[1])
+ salt = pw_password;
+ encrypted_password = xcrypt(password, salt);
+
+ /*
+ * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
+ * are identical.
+ */
+ return encrypted_password != NULL &&
+ strcmp(encrypted_password, pw_password) == 0;
+}
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-rh-rsa.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-rh-rsa.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-rh-rsa.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.43 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication combined with RSA host
- * authentication.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-int
-auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *cuser, char *chost,
- Key *client_host_key)
-{
- HostStatus host_status;
-
- if (auth_key_is_revoked(client_host_key))
- return 0;
-
- /* Check if we would accept it using rhosts authentication. */
- if (!auth_rhosts(pw, cuser))
- return 0;
-
- host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, client_host_key,
- chost, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
- options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
-
- return (host_status == HOST_OK);
-}
-
-/*
- * Tries to authenticate the user using the .rhosts file and the host using
- * its host key. Returns true if authentication succeeds.
- */
-int
-auth_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *cuser, Key *client_host_key)
-{
- char *chost;
- struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
-
- debug("Trying rhosts with RSA host authentication for client user %.100s",
- cuser);
-
- if (!authctxt->valid || client_host_key == NULL ||
- client_host_key->rsa == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- chost = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
- debug("Rhosts RSA authentication: canonical host %.900s", chost);
-
- if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(pw, cuser, chost, client_host_key))) {
- debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication denied: unknown or invalid host key");
- packet_send_debug("Your host key cannot be verified: unknown or invalid host key.");
- return 0;
- }
- /* A matching host key was found and is known. */
-
- /* Perform the challenge-response dialog with the client for the host key. */
- if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(client_host_key)) {
- logit("Client on %.800s failed to respond correctly to host authentication.",
- chost);
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * We have authenticated the user using .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv,
- * and the host using RSA. We accept the authentication.
- */
-
- verbose("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted for %.100s, %.100s on %.700s.",
- pw->pw_name, cuser, chost);
- packet_send_debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted.");
- return 1;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-rh-rsa.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-rh-rsa.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-rh-rsa.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-rh-rsa.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.45 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication combined with RSA host
+ * authentication.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+int
+auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser,
+ const char *chost, Key *client_host_key)
+{
+ HostStatus host_status;
+
+ if (auth_key_is_revoked(client_host_key))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check if we would accept it using rhosts authentication. */
+ if (!auth_rhosts(pw, cuser))
+ return 0;
+
+ host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, client_host_key,
+ chost, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
+ options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
+
+ return (host_status == HOST_OK);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to authenticate the user using the .rhosts file and the host using
+ * its host key. Returns true if authentication succeeds.
+ */
+int
+auth_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *cuser, Key *client_host_key)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ const char *chost;
+ struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
+
+ debug("Trying rhosts with RSA host authentication for client user %.100s",
+ cuser);
+
+ if (!authctxt->valid || client_host_key == NULL ||
+ client_host_key->rsa == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ chost = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
+ debug("Rhosts RSA authentication: canonical host %.900s", chost);
+
+ if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(pw, cuser, chost, client_host_key))) {
+ debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication denied: unknown or invalid host key");
+ packet_send_debug("Your host key cannot be verified: unknown or invalid host key.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* A matching host key was found and is known. */
+
+ /* Perform the challenge-response dialog with the client for the host key. */
+ if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(client_host_key)) {
+ logit("Client on %.800s failed to respond correctly to host authentication.",
+ chost);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * We have authenticated the user using .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv,
+ * and the host using RSA. We accept the authentication.
+ */
+
+ verbose("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted for %.100s, %.100s on %.700s.",
+ pw->pw_name, cuser, chost);
+ packet_send_debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted.");
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-rhosts.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-rhosts.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-rhosts.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,321 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.44 2010/03/07 11:57:13 dtucker Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Rhosts authentication. This file contains code to check whether to admit
- * the login based on rhosts authentication. This file also processes
- * /etc/hosts.equiv.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-
-#ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP_H
-# include <netgroup.h>
-#endif
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern int use_privsep;
-
-/*
- * This function processes an rhosts-style file (.rhosts, .shosts, or
- * /etc/hosts.equiv). This returns true if authentication can be granted
- * based on the file, and returns zero otherwise.
- */
-
-static int
-check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
- const char *ipaddr, const char *client_user,
- const char *server_user)
-{
- FILE *f;
- char buf[1024]; /* Must not be larger than host, user, dummy below. */
- int fd;
- struct stat st;
-
- /* Open the .rhosts file, deny if unreadable */
- if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1)
- return 0;
- if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
- close(fd);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
- logit("User %s hosts file %s is not a regular file",
- server_user, filename);
- close(fd);
- return 0;
- }
- unset_nonblock(fd);
- if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
- close(fd);
- return 0;
- }
- while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
- /* All three must be at least as big as buf to avoid overflows. */
- char hostbuf[1024], userbuf[1024], dummy[1024], *host, *user, *cp;
- int negated;
-
- for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
- ;
- if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\n' || !*cp)
- continue;
-
- /*
- * NO_PLUS is supported at least on OSF/1. We skip it (we
- * don't ever support the plus syntax).
- */
- if (strncmp(cp, "NO_PLUS", 7) == 0)
- continue;
-
- /*
- * This should be safe because each buffer is as big as the
- * whole string, and thus cannot be overwritten.
- */
- switch (sscanf(buf, "%1023s %1023s %1023s", hostbuf, userbuf,
- dummy)) {
- case 0:
- auth_debug_add("Found empty line in %.100s.", filename);
- continue;
- case 1:
- /* Host name only. */
- strlcpy(userbuf, server_user, sizeof(userbuf));
- break;
- case 2:
- /* Got both host and user name. */
- break;
- case 3:
- auth_debug_add("Found garbage in %.100s.", filename);
- continue;
- default:
- /* Weird... */
- continue;
- }
-
- host = hostbuf;
- user = userbuf;
- negated = 0;
-
- /* Process negated host names, or positive netgroups. */
- if (host[0] == '-') {
- negated = 1;
- host++;
- } else if (host[0] == '+')
- host++;
-
- if (user[0] == '-') {
- negated = 1;
- user++;
- } else if (user[0] == '+')
- user++;
-
- /* Check for empty host/user names (particularly '+'). */
- if (!host[0] || !user[0]) {
- /* We come here if either was '+' or '-'. */
- auth_debug_add("Ignoring wild host/user names in %.100s.",
- filename);
- continue;
- }
- /* Verify that host name matches. */
- if (host[0] == '@') {
- if (!innetgr(host + 1, hostname, NULL, NULL) &&
- !innetgr(host + 1, ipaddr, NULL, NULL))
- continue;
- } else if (strcasecmp(host, hostname) && strcmp(host, ipaddr) != 0)
- continue; /* Different hostname. */
-
- /* Verify that user name matches. */
- if (user[0] == '@') {
- if (!innetgr(user + 1, NULL, client_user, NULL))
- continue;
- } else if (strcmp(user, client_user) != 0)
- continue; /* Different username. */
-
- /* Found the user and host. */
- fclose(f);
-
- /* If the entry was negated, deny access. */
- if (negated) {
- auth_debug_add("Matched negative entry in %.100s.",
- filename);
- return 0;
- }
- /* Accept authentication. */
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* Authentication using this file denied. */
- fclose(f);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Tries to authenticate the user using the .shosts or .rhosts file. Returns
- * true if authentication succeeds. If ignore_rhosts is true, only
- * /etc/hosts.equiv will be considered (.rhosts and .shosts are ignored).
- */
-
-int
-auth_rhosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user)
-{
- const char *hostname, *ipaddr;
-
- hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
- ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
- return auth_rhosts2(pw, client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
-}
-
-static int
-auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
- const char *ipaddr)
-{
- char buf[1024];
- struct stat st;
- static const char *rhosts_files[] = {".shosts", ".rhosts", NULL};
- u_int rhosts_file_index;
-
- debug2("auth_rhosts2: clientuser %s hostname %s ipaddr %s",
- client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
-
- /* Switch to the user's uid. */
- temporarily_use_uid(pw);
- /*
- * Quick check: if the user has no .shosts or .rhosts files, return
- * failure immediately without doing costly lookups from name
- * servers.
- */
- for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
- rhosts_file_index++) {
- /* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s",
- pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
- if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
- break;
- }
- /* Switch back to privileged uid. */
- restore_uid();
-
- /* Deny if The user has no .shosts or .rhosts file and there are no system-wide files. */
- if (!rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index] &&
- stat(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0 &&
- stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0)
- return 0;
-
- /* If not logging in as superuser, try /etc/hosts.equiv and shosts.equiv. */
- if (pw->pw_uid != 0) {
- if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
- client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
- auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by /etc/hosts.equiv.",
- hostname, ipaddr);
- return 1;
- }
- if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
- client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
- auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by %.100s.",
- hostname, ipaddr, _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV);
- return 1;
- }
- }
- /*
- * Check that the home directory is owned by root or the user, and is
- * not group or world writable.
- */
- if (stat(pw->pw_dir, &st) < 0) {
- logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
- "no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir);
- auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
- "no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir);
- return 0;
- }
- if (options.strict_modes &&
- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
- logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
- "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
- auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
- "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
- return 0;
- }
- /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
- temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-
- /* Check all .rhosts files (currently .shosts and .rhosts). */
- for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
- rhosts_file_index++) {
- /* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s",
- pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
- if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
- continue;
-
- /*
- * Make sure that the file is either owned by the user or by
- * root, and make sure it is not writable by anyone but the
- * owner. This is to help avoid novices accidentally
- * allowing access to their account by anyone.
- */
- if (options.strict_modes &&
- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
- logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s",
- pw->pw_name, buf);
- auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf);
- continue;
- }
- /* Check if we have been configured to ignore .rhosts and .shosts files. */
- if (options.ignore_rhosts) {
- auth_debug_add("Server has been configured to ignore %.100s.",
- rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
- continue;
- }
- /* Check if authentication is permitted by the file. */
- if (check_rhosts_file(buf, hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
- auth_debug_add("Accepted by %.100s.",
- rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
- /* Restore the privileged uid. */
- restore_uid();
- auth_debug_add("Accepted host %s ip %s client_user %s server_user %s",
- hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name);
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- /* Restore the privileged uid. */
- restore_uid();
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
- const char *ipaddr)
-{
- return auth_rhosts2_raw(pw, client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-rhosts.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-rhosts.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-rhosts.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-rhosts.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,343 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.47 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Rhosts authentication. This file contains code to check whether to admit
+ * the login based on rhosts authentication. This file also processes
+ * /etc/hosts.equiv.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP_H
+# include <netgroup.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "buffer.h" /* XXX */
+#include "key.h" /* XXX */
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern int use_privsep;
+
+/*
+ * This function processes an rhosts-style file (.rhosts, .shosts, or
+ * /etc/hosts.equiv). This returns true if authentication can be granted
+ * based on the file, and returns zero otherwise.
+ */
+
+static int
+check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
+ const char *ipaddr, const char *client_user,
+ const char *server_user)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+#define RBUFLN 1024
+ char buf[RBUFLN];/* Must not be larger than host, user, dummy below. */
+ int fd;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ /* Open the .rhosts file, deny if unreadable */
+ if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1)
+ return 0;
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
+ close(fd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+ logit("User %s hosts file %s is not a regular file",
+ server_user, filename);
+ close(fd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ unset_nonblock(fd);
+ if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
+ close(fd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
+ /* All three must have length >= buf to avoid overflows. */
+ char hostbuf[RBUFLN], userbuf[RBUFLN], dummy[RBUFLN];
+ char *host, *user, *cp;
+ int negated;
+
+ for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\n' || !*cp)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * NO_PLUS is supported at least on OSF/1. We skip it (we
+ * don't ever support the plus syntax).
+ */
+ if (strncmp(cp, "NO_PLUS", 7) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * This should be safe because each buffer is as big as the
+ * whole string, and thus cannot be overwritten.
+ */
+ switch (sscanf(buf, "%1023s %1023s %1023s", hostbuf, userbuf,
+ dummy)) {
+ case 0:
+ auth_debug_add("Found empty line in %.100s.", filename);
+ continue;
+ case 1:
+ /* Host name only. */
+ strlcpy(userbuf, server_user, sizeof(userbuf));
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ /* Got both host and user name. */
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ auth_debug_add("Found garbage in %.100s.", filename);
+ continue;
+ default:
+ /* Weird... */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ host = hostbuf;
+ user = userbuf;
+ negated = 0;
+
+ /* Process negated host names, or positive netgroups. */
+ if (host[0] == '-') {
+ negated = 1;
+ host++;
+ } else if (host[0] == '+')
+ host++;
+
+ if (user[0] == '-') {
+ negated = 1;
+ user++;
+ } else if (user[0] == '+')
+ user++;
+
+ /* Check for empty host/user names (particularly '+'). */
+ if (!host[0] || !user[0]) {
+ /* We come here if either was '+' or '-'. */
+ auth_debug_add("Ignoring wild host/user names "
+ "in %.100s.", filename);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Verify that host name matches. */
+ if (host[0] == '@') {
+ if (!innetgr(host + 1, hostname, NULL, NULL) &&
+ !innetgr(host + 1, ipaddr, NULL, NULL))
+ continue;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(host, hostname) &&
+ strcmp(host, ipaddr) != 0)
+ continue; /* Different hostname. */
+
+ /* Verify that user name matches. */
+ if (user[0] == '@') {
+ if (!innetgr(user + 1, NULL, client_user, NULL))
+ continue;
+ } else if (strcmp(user, client_user) != 0)
+ continue; /* Different username. */
+
+ /* Found the user and host. */
+ fclose(f);
+
+ /* If the entry was negated, deny access. */
+ if (negated) {
+ auth_debug_add("Matched negative entry in %.100s.",
+ filename);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Accept authentication. */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Authentication using this file denied. */
+ fclose(f);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to authenticate the user using the .shosts or .rhosts file. Returns
+ * true if authentication succeeds. If ignore_rhosts is true, only
+ * /etc/hosts.equiv will be considered (.rhosts and .shosts are ignored).
+ */
+
+int
+auth_rhosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ const char *hostname, *ipaddr;
+
+ hostname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
+ ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ return auth_rhosts2(pw, client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
+}
+
+static int
+auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
+ const char *ipaddr)
+{
+ char buf[1024];
+ struct stat st;
+ static const char *rhosts_files[] = {".shosts", ".rhosts", NULL};
+ u_int rhosts_file_index;
+
+ debug2("auth_rhosts2: clientuser %s hostname %s ipaddr %s",
+ client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
+
+ /* Switch to the user's uid. */
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ /*
+ * Quick check: if the user has no .shosts or .rhosts files and
+ * no system hosts.equiv/shosts.equiv files exist then return
+ * failure immediately without doing costly lookups from name
+ * servers.
+ */
+ for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
+ rhosts_file_index++) {
+ /* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s",
+ pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
+ if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Switch back to privileged uid. */
+ restore_uid();
+
+ /*
+ * Deny if The user has no .shosts or .rhosts file and there
+ * are no system-wide files.
+ */
+ if (!rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index] &&
+ stat(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0 &&
+ stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0) {
+ debug3("%s: no hosts access files exist", __func__);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If not logging in as superuser, try /etc/hosts.equiv and
+ * shosts.equiv.
+ */
+ if (pw->pw_uid == 0)
+ debug3("%s: root user, ignoring system hosts files", __func__);
+ else {
+ if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
+ client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
+ auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by "
+ "/etc/hosts.equiv.", hostname, ipaddr);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
+ client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
+ auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by "
+ "%.100s.", hostname, ipaddr, _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the home directory is owned by root or the user, and is
+ * not group or world writable.
+ */
+ if (stat(pw->pw_dir, &st) < 0) {
+ logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
+ "no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir);
+ auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
+ "no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (options.strict_modes &&
+ ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
+ (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+ logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
+ "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
+ auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
+ "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+ /* Check all .rhosts files (currently .shosts and .rhosts). */
+ for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
+ rhosts_file_index++) {
+ /* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s",
+ pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
+ if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure that the file is either owned by the user or by
+ * root, and make sure it is not writable by anyone but the
+ * owner. This is to help avoid novices accidentally
+ * allowing access to their account by anyone.
+ */
+ if (options.strict_modes &&
+ ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
+ (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+ logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s",
+ pw->pw_name, buf);
+ auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Check if we have been configured to ignore .rhosts
+ * and .shosts files.
+ */
+ if (options.ignore_rhosts) {
+ auth_debug_add("Server has been configured to "
+ "ignore %.100s.", rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Check if authentication is permitted by the file. */
+ if (check_rhosts_file(buf, hostname, ipaddr,
+ client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
+ auth_debug_add("Accepted by %.100s.",
+ rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
+ /* Restore the privileged uid. */
+ restore_uid();
+ auth_debug_add("Accepted host %s ip %s client_user "
+ "%s server_user %s", hostname, ipaddr,
+ client_user, pw->pw_name);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Restore the privileged uid. */
+ restore_uid();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
+ const char *ipaddr)
+{
+ return auth_rhosts2_raw(pw, client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-rsa.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-rsa.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-rsa.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,342 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.86 2014/01/27 19:18:54 markus Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * RSA-based authentication. This code determines whether to admit a login
- * based on RSA authentication. This file also contains functions to check
- * validity of the host key.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-
-#include "digest.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-/*
- * Session identifier that is used to bind key exchange and authentication
- * responses to a particular session.
- */
-extern u_char session_id[16];
-
-/*
- * The .ssh/authorized_keys file contains public keys, one per line, in the
- * following format:
- * options bits e n comment
- * where bits, e and n are decimal numbers,
- * and comment is any string of characters up to newline. The maximum
- * length of a line is SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES characters. See sshd(8) for a
- * description of the options.
- */
-
-BIGNUM *
-auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key)
-{
- BIGNUM *challenge;
- BN_CTX *ctx;
-
- if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_new() failed");
- /* Generate a random challenge. */
- if (BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0) == 0)
- fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_rand failed");
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_CTX_new failed");
- if (BN_mod(challenge, challenge, key->rsa->n, ctx) == 0)
- fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_mod failed");
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-
- return challenge;
-}
-
-int
-auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
-{
- u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16];
- struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
- int len;
-
- /* don't allow short keys */
- if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
- error("%s: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
- __func__,
- BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
- return (0);
- }
-
- /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
- len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
- if (len <= 0 || len > 32)
- fatal("%s: bad challenge length %d", __func__, len);
- memset(buf, 0, 32);
- BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
- if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
- ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 ||
- ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 ||
- ssh_digest_final(md, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf)) < 0)
- fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
- ssh_digest_free(md);
-
- /* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
- if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
- /* Wrong answer. */
- return (0);
- }
- /* Correct answer. */
- return (1);
-}
-
-/*
- * Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client,
- * and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to
- * our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer.
- */
-
-int
-auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *key)
-{
- BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge;
- u_char response[16];
- int i, success;
-
- if ((encrypted_challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: BN_new() failed");
-
- challenge = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key));
-
- /* Encrypt the challenge with the public key. */
- rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, key->rsa);
-
- /* Send the encrypted challenge to the client. */
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
- packet_put_bignum(encrypted_challenge);
- packet_send();
- BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge);
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Wait for a response. */
- packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- response[i] = (u_char)packet_get_char();
- packet_check_eom();
-
- success = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_verify_response(key, challenge, response));
- BN_clear_free(challenge);
- return (success);
-}
-
-static int
-rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
- const BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
-{
- char *fp, line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
- int allowed = 0, bits;
- FILE *f;
- u_long linenum = 0;
- Key *key;
-
- debug("trying public RSA key file %s", file);
- if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * Go though the accepted keys, looking for the current key. If
- * found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the
- * user really has the corresponding private key.
- */
- key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
- while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
- char *cp;
- char *key_options;
- int keybits;
-
- /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
- for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
- ;
- if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
- continue;
-
- /*
- * Check if there are options for this key, and if so,
- * save their starting address and skip the option part
- * for now. If there are no options, set the starting
- * address to NULL.
- */
- if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9') {
- int quoted = 0;
- key_options = cp;
- for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
- if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
- cp++; /* Skip both */
- else if (*cp == '"')
- quoted = !quoted;
- }
- } else
- key_options = NULL;
-
- /* Parse the key from the line. */
- if (hostfile_read_key(&cp, &bits, key) == 0) {
- debug("%.100s, line %lu: non ssh1 key syntax",
- file, linenum);
- continue;
- }
- /* cp now points to the comment part. */
-
- /*
- * Check if the we have found the desired key (identified
- * by its modulus).
- */
- if (BN_cmp(key->rsa->n, client_n) != 0)
- continue;
-
- /* check the real bits */
- keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
- if (keybits < 0 || bits != keybits)
- logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: "
- "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
- file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
-
- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
- file, linenum, key_type(key), fp);
- free(fp);
-
- /* Never accept a revoked key */
- if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
- break;
-
- /* We have found the desired key. */
- /*
- * If our options do not allow this key to be used,
- * do not send challenge.
- */
- if (!auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum))
- continue;
- if (key_is_cert_authority)
- continue;
- /* break out, this key is allowed */
- allowed = 1;
- break;
- }
-
- /* Close the file. */
- fclose(f);
-
- /* return key if allowed */
- if (allowed && rkey != NULL)
- *rkey = key;
- else
- key_free(key);
-
- return allowed;
-}
-
-/*
- * check if there's user key matching client_n,
- * return key if login is allowed, NULL otherwise
- */
-
-int
-auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
-{
- char *file;
- u_int i, allowed = 0;
-
- temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-
- for (i = 0; !allowed && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
- if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
- continue;
- file = expand_authorized_keys(
- options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
- allowed = rsa_key_allowed_in_file(pw, file, client_n, rkey);
- free(file);
- }
-
- restore_uid();
-
- return allowed;
-}
-
-/*
- * Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client. This returns
- * 0 if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was
- * successful. This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation.
- */
-int
-auth_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM *client_n)
-{
- Key *key;
- struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
-
- /* no user given */
- if (!authctxt->valid)
- return 0;
-
- if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_key_allowed(pw, client_n, &key))) {
- auth_clear_options();
- return (0);
- }
-
- /* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */
- if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(key)) {
- /* Wrong response. */
- verbose("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
- packet_send_debug("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
- /*
- * Break out of the loop. Otherwise we might send
- * another challenge and break the protocol.
- */
- key_free(key);
- return (0);
- }
- /*
- * Correct response. The client has been successfully
- * authenticated. Note that we have not yet processed the
- * options; this will be reset if the options cause the
- * authentication to be rejected.
- */
- pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
-
- packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted.");
- return (1);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-rsa.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-rsa.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-rsa.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth-rsa.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.90 2015/01/28 22:36:00 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * RSA-based authentication. This code determines whether to admit a login
+ * based on RSA authentication. This file also contains functions to check
+ * validity of the host key.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+#include "digest.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+/*
+ * Session identifier that is used to bind key exchange and authentication
+ * responses to a particular session.
+ */
+extern u_char session_id[16];
+
+/*
+ * The .ssh/authorized_keys file contains public keys, one per line, in the
+ * following format:
+ * options bits e n comment
+ * where bits, e and n are decimal numbers,
+ * and comment is any string of characters up to newline. The maximum
+ * length of a line is SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES characters. See sshd(8) for a
+ * description of the options.
+ */
+
+BIGNUM *
+auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key)
+{
+ BIGNUM *challenge;
+ BN_CTX *ctx;
+
+ if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_new() failed");
+ /* Generate a random challenge. */
+ if (BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0) == 0)
+ fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_rand failed");
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_CTX_new failed");
+ if (BN_mod(challenge, challenge, key->rsa->n, ctx) == 0)
+ fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_mod failed");
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ return challenge;
+}
+
+int
+auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
+{
+ u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16];
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
+ int len;
+
+ /* don't allow short keys */
+ if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
+ error("%s: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
+ __func__,
+ BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
+ len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
+ if (len <= 0 || len > 32)
+ fatal("%s: bad challenge length %d", __func__, len);
+ memset(buf, 0, 32);
+ BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
+ if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
+ ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_final(md, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf)) < 0)
+ fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
+ ssh_digest_free(md);
+
+ /* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
+ if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
+ /* Wrong answer. */
+ return (0);
+ }
+ /* Correct answer. */
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client,
+ * and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to
+ * our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer.
+ */
+
+int
+auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *key)
+{
+ BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge;
+ u_char response[16];
+ int i, success;
+
+ if ((encrypted_challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: BN_new() failed");
+
+ challenge = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key));
+
+ /* Encrypt the challenge with the public key. */
+ if (rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, key->rsa) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt failed", __func__);
+
+ /* Send the encrypted challenge to the client. */
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
+ packet_put_bignum(encrypted_challenge);
+ packet_send();
+ BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge);
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Wait for a response. */
+ packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ response[i] = (u_char)packet_get_char();
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ success = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_verify_response(key, challenge, response));
+ BN_clear_free(challenge);
+ return (success);
+}
+
+static int
+rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
+ const BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
+{
+ char *fp, line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
+ int allowed = 0, bits;
+ FILE *f;
+ u_long linenum = 0;
+ Key *key;
+
+ debug("trying public RSA key file %s", file);
+ if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Go though the accepted keys, looking for the current key. If
+ * found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the
+ * user really has the corresponding private key.
+ */
+ key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+ while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
+ char *cp;
+ char *key_options;
+ int keybits;
+
+ /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
+ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Check if there are options for this key, and if so,
+ * save their starting address and skip the option part
+ * for now. If there are no options, set the starting
+ * address to NULL.
+ */
+ if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9') {
+ int quoted = 0;
+ key_options = cp;
+ for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+ if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+ cp++; /* Skip both */
+ else if (*cp == '"')
+ quoted = !quoted;
+ }
+ } else
+ key_options = NULL;
+
+ /* Parse the key from the line. */
+ if (hostfile_read_key(&cp, &bits, key) == 0) {
+ debug("%.100s, line %lu: non ssh1 key syntax",
+ file, linenum);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* cp now points to the comment part. */
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the we have found the desired key (identified
+ * by its modulus).
+ */
+ if (BN_cmp(key->rsa->n, client_n) != 0)
+ continue;
+
+ /* check the real bits */
+ keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
+ if (keybits < 0 || bits != keybits)
+ logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: "
+ "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
+ file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
+
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ continue;
+ debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
+ file, linenum, key_type(key), fp);
+ free(fp);
+
+ /* Never accept a revoked key */
+ if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
+ break;
+
+ /* We have found the desired key. */
+ /*
+ * If our options do not allow this key to be used,
+ * do not send challenge.
+ */
+ if (!auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum))
+ continue;
+ if (key_is_cert_authority)
+ continue;
+ /* break out, this key is allowed */
+ allowed = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Close the file. */
+ fclose(f);
+
+ /* return key if allowed */
+ if (allowed && rkey != NULL)
+ *rkey = key;
+ else
+ key_free(key);
+
+ return allowed;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check if there's user key matching client_n,
+ * return key if login is allowed, NULL otherwise
+ */
+
+int
+auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
+{
+ char *file;
+ u_int i, allowed = 0;
+
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+ for (i = 0; !allowed && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
+ if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
+ continue;
+ file = expand_authorized_keys(
+ options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
+ allowed = rsa_key_allowed_in_file(pw, file, client_n, rkey);
+ free(file);
+ }
+
+ restore_uid();
+
+ return allowed;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client. This returns
+ * 0 if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was
+ * successful. This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation.
+ */
+int
+auth_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM *client_n)
+{
+ Key *key;
+ struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
+
+ /* no user given */
+ if (!authctxt->valid)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_key_allowed(pw, client_n, &key))) {
+ auth_clear_options();
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ /* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */
+ if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(key)) {
+ /* Wrong response. */
+ verbose("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
+ packet_send_debug("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
+ /*
+ * Break out of the loop. Otherwise we might send
+ * another challenge and break the protocol.
+ */
+ key_free(key);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Correct response. The client has been successfully
+ * authenticated. Note that we have not yet processed the
+ * options; this will be reset if the options cause the
+ * authentication to be rejected.
+ */
+ pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
+
+ packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted.");
+ return (1);
+}
+
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,758 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.103 2013/05/19 02:42:42 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#include <pwd.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
-#include <login.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_SHADOW
-#include <shadow.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
-#include <libgen.h>
-#endif
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "groupaccess.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "loginrec.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "authfile.h"
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "krl.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern int use_privsep;
-extern Buffer loginmsg;
-extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
-
-/* Debugging messages */
-Buffer auth_debug;
-int auth_debug_init;
-
-/*
- * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
- * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
- * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
- * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
- * listed there, false will be returned.
- * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
- * Otherwise true is returned.
- */
-int
-allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
-{
- struct stat st;
- const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
- u_int i;
-#ifdef USE_SHADOW
- struct spwd *spw = NULL;
-#endif
-
- /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
- if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
- return 0;
-
-#ifdef USE_SHADOW
- if (!options.use_pam)
- spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
-#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
- if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
- return 0;
-#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
-#endif /* USE_SHADOW */
-
- /* grab passwd field for locked account check */
- passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
-#ifdef USE_SHADOW
- if (spw != NULL)
-#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
- passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
-#else
- passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
-#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
-#endif
-
- /* check for locked account */
- if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
- int locked = 0;
-
-#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
- if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
- locked = 1;
-#endif
-#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
- if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
- strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0)
- locked = 1;
-#endif
-#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
- if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
- locked = 1;
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
- free((void *) passwd);
-#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
- if (locked) {
- logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
- pw->pw_name);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we
- * are chrooting.
- */
- if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
- strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
- char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ?
- _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */
-
- if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
- logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
- "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell);
- free(shell);
- return 0;
- }
- if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
- (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
- logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
- "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell);
- free(shell);
- return 0;
- }
- free(shell);
- }
-
- if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
- options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
- hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
- ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
- }
-
- /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
- if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
- if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
- options.deny_users[i])) {
- logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
- "because listed in DenyUsers",
- pw->pw_name, hostname);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
- if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
- if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
- options.allow_users[i]))
- break;
- /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
- if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
- logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
- "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
- /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
- if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
- logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
- "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
- if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
- if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
- options.num_deny_groups)) {
- ga_free();
- logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
- "because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
- pw->pw_name, hostname);
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
- * isn't listed there
- */
- if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
- if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
- options.num_allow_groups)) {
- ga_free();
- logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
- "because none of user's groups are listed "
- "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
- return 0;
- }
- ga_free();
- }
-
-#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
- if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg))
- return 0;
-#endif
-
- /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
- return 1;
-}
-
-void
-auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *fmt, ...)
-{
- va_list ap;
- int i;
-
- free(authctxt->info);
- authctxt->info = NULL;
-
- va_start(ap, fmt);
- i = vasprintf(&authctxt->info, fmt, ap);
- va_end(ap);
-
- if (i < 0 || authctxt->info == NULL)
- fatal("vasprintf failed");
-}
-
-void
-auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
- const char *method, const char *submethod)
-{
- void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
- char *authmsg;
-
- if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
- return;
-
- /* Raise logging level */
- if (authenticated == 1 ||
- !authctxt->valid ||
- authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
- strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
- authlog = logit;
-
- if (authctxt->postponed)
- authmsg = "Postponed";
- else if (partial)
- authmsg = "Partial";
- else
- authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
-
- authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s%s%s",
- authmsg,
- method,
- submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
- authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
- authctxt->user,
- get_remote_ipaddr(),
- get_remote_port(),
- compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1",
- authctxt->info != NULL ? ": " : "",
- authctxt->info != NULL ? authctxt->info : "");
- free(authctxt->info);
- authctxt->info = NULL;
-
-#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
- if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed &&
- (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
- strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
- strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0))
- record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
- get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
-# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
- if (authenticated)
- sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user,
- get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg);
-# endif
-#endif
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
- audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method));
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
- */
-int
-auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
-{
- switch (options.permit_root_login) {
- case PERMIT_YES:
- return 1;
- case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
- if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
- return 1;
- break;
- case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
- if (forced_command) {
- logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
- return 1;
- }
- break;
- }
- logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
- return 0;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
- * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
- * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
- *
- * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
- */
-char *
-expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
-{
- char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN];
- int i;
-
- file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
- "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
-
- /*
- * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
- * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
- */
- if (*file == '/')
- return (file);
-
- i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
- if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
- fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
- free(file);
- return (xstrdup(ret));
-}
-
-char *
-authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
-{
- if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL ||
- strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_file, "none") == 0)
- return NULL;
- return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw);
-}
-
-/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
-HostStatus
-check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
- const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
-{
- char *user_hostfile;
- struct stat st;
- HostStatus host_status;
- struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
- const struct hostkey_entry *found;
-
- hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
- load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile);
- if (userfile != NULL) {
- user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
- if (options.strict_modes &&
- (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
- logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
- "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
- pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
- auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes",
- user_hostfile);
- } else {
- temporarily_use_uid(pw);
- load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile);
- restore_uid();
- }
- free(user_hostfile);
- }
- host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found);
- if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED)
- error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication",
- found->host);
- else if (host_status == HOST_OK)
- debug("%s: key for %s found at %s:%ld", __func__,
- found->host, found->file, found->line);
- else
- debug("%s: key for host %s not found", __func__, host);
-
- free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
-
- return host_status;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components
- * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
- * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
- *
- * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
- *
- * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to
- * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an
- * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
- *
- * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
- */
-int
-auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
- uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
-{
- char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
- char *cp;
- int comparehome = 0;
- struct stat st;
-
- if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
- snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
- strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
- comparehome = 1;
-
- if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
- snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
- return -1;
- }
- if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
- (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
- snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
- buf);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
- for (;;) {
- if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
- snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
- return -1;
- }
- strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
-
- if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
- (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
- snprintf(err, errlen,
- "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
- if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
- break;
-
- /*
- * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
- * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
- */
- if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
- break;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to
- * avoid races.
- *
- * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
- */
-static int
-secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
- char *err, size_t errlen)
-{
- struct stat st;
-
- /* check the open file to avoid races */
- if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) {
- snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s",
- file, strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen);
-}
-
-static FILE *
-auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
- int log_missing, char *file_type)
-{
- char line[1024];
- struct stat st;
- int fd;
- FILE *f;
-
- if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
- if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT)
- debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file,
- strerror(errno));
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
- close(fd);
- return NULL;
- }
- if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
- logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file",
- pw->pw_name, file_type, file);
- close(fd);
- return NULL;
- }
- unset_nonblock(fd);
- if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
- close(fd);
- return NULL;
- }
- if (strict_modes &&
- secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
- fclose(f);
- logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
- auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- return f;
-}
-
-
-FILE *
-auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
-{
- return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys");
-}
-
-FILE *
-auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
-{
- return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0,
- "authorized principals");
-}
-
-struct passwd *
-getpwnamallow(const char *user)
-{
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- extern login_cap_t *lc;
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
- auth_session_t *as;
-#endif
-#endif
- struct passwd *pw;
- struct connection_info *ci = get_connection_info(1, options.use_dns);
-
- ci->user = user;
- parse_server_match_config(&options, ci);
-
-#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
- aix_setauthdb(user);
-#endif
-
- pw = getpwnam(user);
-
-#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
- aix_restoreauthdb();
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- /*
- * Windows usernames are case-insensitive. To avoid later problems
- * when trying to match the username, the user is only allowed to
- * login if the username is given in the same case as stored in the
- * user database.
- */
- if (pw != NULL && strcmp(user, pw->pw_name) != 0) {
- logit("Login name %.100s does not match stored username %.100s",
- user, pw->pw_name);
- pw = NULL;
- }
-#endif
- if (pw == NULL) {
- logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
- user, get_remote_ipaddr());
-#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
- record_failed_login(user,
- get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
-#endif
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
-#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- return (NULL);
- }
- if (!allowed_user(pw))
- return (NULL);
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
- debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
- return (NULL);
- }
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
- if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
- auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
- debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
- pw = NULL;
- }
- if (as != NULL)
- auth_close(as);
-#endif
-#endif
- if (pw != NULL)
- return (pwcopy(pw));
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-/* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */
-int
-auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
-{
- char *key_fp;
-
- if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL)
- return 0;
- switch (ssh_krl_file_contains_key(options.revoked_keys_file, key)) {
- case 0:
- return 0; /* Not revoked */
- case -2:
- break; /* Not a KRL */
- default:
- goto revoked;
- }
- debug3("%s: treating %s as a key list", __func__,
- options.revoked_keys_file);
- switch (key_in_file(key, options.revoked_keys_file, 0)) {
- case 0:
- /* key not revoked */
- return 0;
- case -1:
- /* Error opening revoked_keys_file: refuse all keys */
- error("Revoked keys file is unreadable: refusing public key "
- "authentication");
- return 1;
- case 1:
- revoked:
- /* Key revoked */
- key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "
- "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);
- free(key_fp);
- return 1;
- }
- fatal("key_in_file returned junk");
-}
-
-void
-auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
-{
- char buf[1024];
- va_list args;
-
- if (!auth_debug_init)
- return;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
- buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf);
-}
-
-void
-auth_debug_send(void)
-{
- char *msg;
-
- if (!auth_debug_init)
- return;
- while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
- msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL);
- packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
- free(msg);
- }
-}
-
-void
-auth_debug_reset(void)
-{
- if (auth_debug_init)
- buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
- else {
- buffer_init(&auth_debug);
- auth_debug_init = 1;
- }
-}
-
-struct passwd *
-fakepw(void)
-{
- static struct passwd fake;
-
- memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
- fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
- fake.pw_passwd =
- "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
-#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
- fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
-#endif
- fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid;
- fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid;
-#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
- fake.pw_class = "";
-#endif
- fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
- fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
-
- return (&fake);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,900 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.115 2016/06/15 00:40:40 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
+#include <login.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_SHADOW
+#include <shadow.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
+#include <libgen.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "groupaccess.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "loginrec.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern int use_privsep;
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
+
+/* Debugging messages */
+Buffer auth_debug;
+int auth_debug_init;
+
+/*
+ * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
+ * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
+ * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
+ * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
+ * listed there, false will be returned.
+ * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
+ * Otherwise true is returned.
+ */
+int
+allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ struct stat st;
+ const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
+ u_int i;
+#ifdef USE_SHADOW
+ struct spwd *spw = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
+ if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
+ return 0;
+
+#ifdef USE_SHADOW
+ if (!options.use_pam)
+ spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
+#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
+ if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
+ return 0;
+#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
+#endif /* USE_SHADOW */
+
+ /* grab passwd field for locked account check */
+ passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
+#ifdef USE_SHADOW
+ if (spw != NULL)
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+ passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
+#else
+ passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
+#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
+#endif
+
+ /* check for locked account */
+ if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
+ int locked = 0;
+
+#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
+ if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
+ locked = 1;
+#endif
+#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
+ if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
+ strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0)
+ locked = 1;
+#endif
+#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
+ if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
+ locked = 1;
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+ free((void *) passwd);
+#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
+ if (locked) {
+ logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
+ pw->pw_name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we
+ * are chrooting.
+ */
+ if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
+ strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
+ char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ?
+ _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */
+
+ if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
+ logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
+ "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell);
+ free(shell);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
+ (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
+ logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
+ "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell);
+ free(shell);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ free(shell);
+ }
+
+ if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
+ options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
+ hostname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
+ ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ }
+
+ /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
+ if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
+ if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
+ options.deny_users[i])) {
+ logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
+ "because listed in DenyUsers",
+ pw->pw_name, hostname);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
+ if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
+ if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
+ options.allow_users[i]))
+ break;
+ /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
+ if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
+ logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
+ "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
+ /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
+ if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
+ logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
+ "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
+ if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
+ if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
+ options.num_deny_groups)) {
+ ga_free();
+ logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
+ "because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
+ pw->pw_name, hostname);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
+ * isn't listed there
+ */
+ if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
+ if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
+ options.num_allow_groups)) {
+ ga_free();
+ logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
+ "because none of user's groups are listed "
+ "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ga_free();
+ }
+
+#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
+ if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg))
+ return 0;
+#endif
+
+ /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void
+auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ int i;
+
+ free(authctxt->info);
+ authctxt->info = NULL;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ i = vasprintf(&authctxt->info, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ if (i < 0 || authctxt->info == NULL)
+ fatal("vasprintf failed");
+}
+
+void
+auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
+ const char *method, const char *submethod)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
+ char *authmsg;
+
+ if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
+ return;
+
+ /* Raise logging level */
+ if (authenticated == 1 ||
+ !authctxt->valid ||
+ authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
+ strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
+ authlog = logit;
+
+ if (authctxt->postponed)
+ authmsg = "Postponed";
+ else if (partial)
+ authmsg = "Partial";
+ else
+ authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
+
+ authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s%s%s",
+ authmsg,
+ method,
+ submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
+ authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
+ authctxt->user,
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1",
+ authctxt->info != NULL ? ": " : "",
+ authctxt->info != NULL ? authctxt->info : "");
+ free(authctxt->info);
+ authctxt->info = NULL;
+
+#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
+ if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed &&
+ (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
+ strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0))
+ record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
+ auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
+# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+ if (authenticated)
+ sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user,
+ auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh",
+ &loginmsg);
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
+ audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method));
+#endif
+}
+
+
+void
+auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+
+ error("maximum authentication attempts exceeded for "
+ "%s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s",
+ authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
+ authctxt->user,
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1");
+ packet_disconnect("Too many authentication failures");
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
+ */
+int
+auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+
+ switch (options.permit_root_login) {
+ case PERMIT_YES:
+ return 1;
+ case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
+ if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
+ return 1;
+ break;
+ case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
+ if (forced_command) {
+ logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s port %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
+ * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
+ * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
+ *
+ * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
+ */
+char *
+expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ char *file, ret[PATH_MAX];
+ int i;
+
+ file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+ "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
+ * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
+ */
+ if (*file == '/')
+ return (file);
+
+ i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
+ if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
+ fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
+ free(file);
+ return (xstrdup(ret));
+}
+
+char *
+authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw);
+}
+
+/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
+HostStatus
+check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
+ const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
+{
+ char *user_hostfile;
+ struct stat st;
+ HostStatus host_status;
+ struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
+ const struct hostkey_entry *found;
+
+ hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
+ load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile);
+ if (userfile != NULL) {
+ user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
+ if (options.strict_modes &&
+ (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
+ ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
+ (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+ logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
+ "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
+ pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
+ auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes",
+ user_hostfile);
+ } else {
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile);
+ restore_uid();
+ }
+ free(user_hostfile);
+ }
+ host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found);
+ if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED)
+ error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication",
+ found->host);
+ else if (host_status == HOST_OK)
+ debug("%s: key for %s found at %s:%ld", __func__,
+ found->host, found->file, found->line);
+ else
+ debug("%s: key for host %s not found", __func__, host);
+
+ free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
+
+ return host_status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components
+ * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
+ * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
+ *
+ * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
+ *
+ * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to
+ * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an
+ * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
+ */
+int
+auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
+ uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
+{
+ char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX];
+ char *cp;
+ int comparehome = 0;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
+ snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
+ comparehome = 1;
+
+ if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
+ snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
+ (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+ snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
+ buf);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
+ for (;;) {
+ if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
+ snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
+
+ if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
+ (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
+ (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+ snprintf(err, errlen,
+ "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
+ if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
+ * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
+ */
+ if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
+ break;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to
+ * avoid races.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
+ */
+static int
+secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
+ char *err, size_t errlen)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+
+ /* check the open file to avoid races */
+ if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) {
+ snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s",
+ file, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen);
+}
+
+static FILE *
+auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
+ int log_missing, char *file_type)
+{
+ char line[1024];
+ struct stat st;
+ int fd;
+ FILE *f;
+
+ if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
+ if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT)
+ debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
+ close(fd);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+ logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file",
+ pw->pw_name, file_type, file);
+ close(fd);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ unset_nonblock(fd);
+ if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
+ close(fd);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (strict_modes &&
+ secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
+ fclose(f);
+ logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
+ auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return f;
+}
+
+
+FILE *
+auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
+{
+ return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys");
+}
+
+FILE *
+auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
+{
+ return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0,
+ "authorized principals");
+}
+
+struct passwd *
+getpwnamallow(const char *user)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ extern login_cap_t *lc;
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ auth_session_t *as;
+#endif
+#endif
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ struct connection_info *ci = get_connection_info(1, options.use_dns);
+
+ ci->user = user;
+ parse_server_match_config(&options, ci);
+
+#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
+ aix_setauthdb(user);
+#endif
+
+ pw = getpwnam(user);
+
+#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
+ aix_restoreauthdb();
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ /*
+ * Windows usernames are case-insensitive. To avoid later problems
+ * when trying to match the username, the user is only allowed to
+ * login if the username is given in the same case as stored in the
+ * user database.
+ */
+ if (pw != NULL && strcmp(user, pw->pw_name) != 0) {
+ logit("Login name %.100s does not match stored username %.100s",
+ user, pw->pw_name);
+ pw = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (pw == NULL) {
+ logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s port %d",
+ user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
+ record_failed_login(user,
+ auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ if (!allowed_user(pw))
+ return (NULL);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
+ debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
+ auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
+ debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
+ pw = NULL;
+ }
+ if (as != NULL)
+ auth_close(as);
+#endif
+#endif
+ if (pw != NULL)
+ return (pwcopy(pw));
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+/* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */
+int
+auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
+{
+ char *fp = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ error("%s: fingerprint key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = sshkey_check_revoked(key, options.revoked_keys_file);
+ switch (r) {
+ case 0:
+ break; /* not revoked */
+ case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED:
+ error("Authentication key %s %s revoked by file %s",
+ sshkey_type(key), fp, options.revoked_keys_file);
+ goto out;
+ default:
+ error("Error checking authentication key %s %s in "
+ "revoked keys file %s: %s", sshkey_type(key), fp,
+ options.revoked_keys_file, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Success */
+ r = 0;
+
+ out:
+ free(fp);
+ return r == 0 ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+void
+auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ char buf[1024];
+ va_list args;
+
+ if (!auth_debug_init)
+ return;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf);
+}
+
+void
+auth_debug_send(void)
+{
+ char *msg;
+
+ if (!auth_debug_init)
+ return;
+ while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
+ msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL);
+ packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
+ free(msg);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+auth_debug_reset(void)
+{
+ if (auth_debug_init)
+ buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
+ else {
+ buffer_init(&auth_debug);
+ auth_debug_init = 1;
+ }
+}
+
+struct passwd *
+fakepw(void)
+{
+ static struct passwd fake;
+
+ memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
+ fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
+ fake.pw_passwd =
+ "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
+ fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
+#endif
+ fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid;
+ fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid;
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
+ fake.pw_class = "";
+#endif
+ fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
+ fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
+
+ return (&fake);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
+ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
+ * called.
+ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
+ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
+ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
+ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
+ */
+
+static char *
+remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ socklen_t fromlen;
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+ char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
+ const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+
+ /* Get IP address of client. */
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return strdup(ntop);
+ }
+
+ ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+ fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+
+ debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+ /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
+ NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
+ /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
+ return strdup(ntop);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
+ * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
+ * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
+ */
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+ logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
+ name, ntop);
+ freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ return strdup(ntop);
+ }
+
+ /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
+ lowercase(name);
+
+ /*
+ * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+ * address actually is an address of this host. This is
+ * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
+ * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
+ * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
+ * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
+ * the domain).
+ */
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
+ logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+ "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
+ return strdup(ntop);
+ }
+ /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
+ sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
+ (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
+ break;
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
+ if (ai == NULL) {
+ /* Address not found for the host name. */
+ logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+ "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
+ return strdup(ntop);
+ }
+ return strdup(name);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
+ * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
+ * several times.
+ */
+
+const char *
+auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
+{
+ static char *dnsname;
+
+ if (!use_dns)
+ return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ else if (dnsname != NULL)
+ return dnsname;
+ else {
+ dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
+ return dnsname;
+ }
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,221 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.77 2014/01/29 06:18:35 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef AUTH_H
-#define AUTH_H
-
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
-#include <login_cap.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-#include <bsd_auth.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef KRB5
-#include <krb5.h>
-#endif
-
-typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt;
-typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod;
-typedef struct KbdintDevice KbdintDevice;
-
-struct Authctxt {
- sig_atomic_t success;
- int authenticated; /* authenticated and alarms cancelled */
- int postponed; /* authentication needs another step */
- int valid; /* user exists and is allowed to login */
- int attempt;
- int failures;
- int server_caused_failure;
- int force_pwchange;
- char *user; /* username sent by the client */
- char *service;
- struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */
- char *style;
- void *kbdintctxt;
- char *info; /* Extra info for next auth_log */
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
- auth_session_t *as;
-#endif
- char **auth_methods; /* modified from server config */
- u_int num_auth_methods;
-#ifdef KRB5
- krb5_context krb5_ctx;
- krb5_ccache krb5_fwd_ccache;
- krb5_principal krb5_user;
- char *krb5_ticket_file;
- char *krb5_ccname;
-#endif
- Buffer *loginmsg;
- void *methoddata;
-};
-/*
- * Every authentication method has to handle authentication requests for
- * non-existing users, or for users that are not allowed to login. In this
- * case 'valid' is set to 0, but 'user' points to the username requested by
- * the client.
- */
-
-struct Authmethod {
- char *name;
- int (*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt);
- int *enabled;
-};
-
-/*
- * Keyboard interactive device:
- * init_ctx returns: non NULL upon success
- * query returns: 0 - success, otherwise failure
- * respond returns: 0 - success, 1 - need further interaction,
- * otherwise - failure
- */
-struct KbdintDevice
-{
- const char *name;
- void* (*init_ctx)(Authctxt*);
- int (*query)(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
- u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on);
- int (*respond)(void *ctx, u_int numresp, char **responses);
- void (*free_ctx)(void *ctx);
-};
-
-int auth_rhosts(struct passwd *, const char *);
-int
-auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
-
-int auth_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *, char *, Key *);
-int auth_password(Authctxt *, const char *);
-int auth_rsa(Authctxt *, BIGNUM *);
-int auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *);
-BIGNUM *auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
-int auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char[]);
-int auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
-
-int auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
-int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
-int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
-void pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *, const Key *, const char *, ...)
- __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 3, 4)));
-
-struct stat;
-int auth_secure_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t,
- char *, size_t);
-
-#ifdef KRB5
-int auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *);
-int auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt);
-int auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password);
-void krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt);
-#endif /* KRB5 */
-
-#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
-#include <shadow.h>
-int auth_shadow_acctexpired(struct spwd *);
-int auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *);
-#endif
-
-#include "auth-pam.h"
-#include "audit.h"
-void remove_kbdint_device(const char *);
-
-void disable_forwarding(void);
-
-void do_authentication(Authctxt *);
-void do_authentication2(Authctxt *);
-
-void auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *, ...)
- __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)))
- __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
-void auth_log(Authctxt *, int, int, const char *, const char *);
-void userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, const char *, const char *);
-int auth_root_allowed(const char *);
-
-void userauth_send_banner(const char *);
-
-char *auth2_read_banner(void);
-int auth2_methods_valid(const char *, int);
-int auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *);
-int auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *);
-int auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *);
-
-void privsep_challenge_enable(void);
-
-int auth2_challenge(Authctxt *, char *);
-void auth2_challenge_stop(Authctxt *);
-int bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
-int bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
-int skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
-int skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
-
-int allowed_user(struct passwd *);
-struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user);
-
-char *get_challenge(Authctxt *);
-int verify_response(Authctxt *, const char *);
-void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *);
-
-char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
-char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
-
-FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
-FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
-int auth_key_is_revoked(Key *);
-
-HostStatus
-check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *, const char *,
- const char *, const char *);
-
-/* hostkey handling */
-Key *get_hostkey_by_index(int);
-Key *get_hostkey_public_by_index(int);
-Key *get_hostkey_public_by_type(int);
-Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int);
-int get_hostkey_index(Key *);
-int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
-void sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
-
-/* debug messages during authentication */
-void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-void auth_debug_send(void);
-void auth_debug_reset(void);
-
-struct passwd *fakepw(void);
-
-int sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
-
-#define AUTH_FAIL_MSG "Too many authentication failures for %.100s"
-
-#define SKEY_PROMPT "\nS/Key Password: "
-
-#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
-#include <krb5.h>
-krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
-#endif
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.88 2016/05/04 14:04:40 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef AUTH_H
+#define AUTH_H
+
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+#include <login_cap.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+#include <bsd_auth.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB5
+#include <krb5.h>
+#endif
+
+struct ssh;
+struct sshkey;
+
+typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt;
+typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod;
+typedef struct KbdintDevice KbdintDevice;
+
+struct Authctxt {
+ sig_atomic_t success;
+ int authenticated; /* authenticated and alarms cancelled */
+ int postponed; /* authentication needs another step */
+ int valid; /* user exists and is allowed to login */
+ int attempt;
+ int failures;
+ int server_caused_failure;
+ int force_pwchange;
+ char *user; /* username sent by the client */
+ char *service;
+ struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */
+ char *style;
+ void *kbdintctxt;
+ char *info; /* Extra info for next auth_log */
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ auth_session_t *as;
+#endif
+ char **auth_methods; /* modified from server config */
+ u_int num_auth_methods;
+#ifdef KRB5
+ krb5_context krb5_ctx;
+ krb5_ccache krb5_fwd_ccache;
+ krb5_principal krb5_user;
+ char *krb5_ticket_file;
+ char *krb5_ccname;
+#endif
+ Buffer *loginmsg;
+ void *methoddata;
+
+ struct sshkey **prev_userkeys;
+ u_int nprev_userkeys;
+};
+/*
+ * Every authentication method has to handle authentication requests for
+ * non-existing users, or for users that are not allowed to login. In this
+ * case 'valid' is set to 0, but 'user' points to the username requested by
+ * the client.
+ */
+
+struct Authmethod {
+ char *name;
+ int (*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt);
+ int *enabled;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Keyboard interactive device:
+ * init_ctx returns: non NULL upon success
+ * query returns: 0 - success, otherwise failure
+ * respond returns: 0 - success, 1 - need further interaction,
+ * otherwise - failure
+ */
+struct KbdintDevice
+{
+ const char *name;
+ void* (*init_ctx)(Authctxt*);
+ int (*query)(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
+ u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on);
+ int (*respond)(void *ctx, u_int numresp, char **responses);
+ void (*free_ctx)(void *ctx);
+};
+
+int auth_rhosts(struct passwd *, const char *);
+int
+auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+
+int auth_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *, char *, Key *);
+int auth_password(Authctxt *, const char *);
+int auth_rsa(Authctxt *, BIGNUM *);
+int auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *);
+BIGNUM *auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
+int auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char[]);
+int auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
+
+int auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *,
+ const char *, Key *);
+int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
+int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *, int);
+void pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *, const Key *, const char *, ...)
+ __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 3, 4)));
+void auth2_record_userkey(Authctxt *, struct sshkey *);
+int auth2_userkey_already_used(Authctxt *, struct sshkey *);
+
+struct stat;
+int auth_secure_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t,
+ char *, size_t);
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+int auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *);
+int auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt);
+int auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password);
+void krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt);
+#endif /* KRB5 */
+
+#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+#include <shadow.h>
+int auth_shadow_acctexpired(struct spwd *);
+int auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *);
+#endif
+
+#include "auth-pam.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+void remove_kbdint_device(const char *);
+
+void disable_forwarding(void);
+
+void do_authentication(Authctxt *);
+void do_authentication2(Authctxt *);
+
+void auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *, ...)
+ __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)))
+ __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
+void auth_log(Authctxt *, int, int, const char *, const char *);
+void auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *) __attribute__((noreturn));
+void userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, const char *, const char *);
+int auth_root_allowed(const char *);
+
+void userauth_send_banner(const char *);
+
+char *auth2_read_banner(void);
+int auth2_methods_valid(const char *, int);
+int auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *);
+int auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *);
+int auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *);
+
+void privsep_challenge_enable(void);
+
+int auth2_challenge(Authctxt *, char *);
+void auth2_challenge_stop(Authctxt *);
+int bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
+int bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
+int skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
+int skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
+
+int allowed_user(struct passwd *);
+struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user);
+
+char *get_challenge(Authctxt *);
+int verify_response(Authctxt *, const char *);
+void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *);
+
+char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
+char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
+
+FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+int auth_key_is_revoked(Key *);
+
+const char *auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *, int);
+
+HostStatus
+check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *, const char *,
+ const char *, const char *);
+
+/* hostkey handling */
+Key *get_hostkey_by_index(int);
+Key *get_hostkey_public_by_index(int, struct ssh *);
+Key *get_hostkey_public_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *);
+Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *);
+int get_hostkey_index(Key *, int, struct ssh *);
+int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
+int sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, size_t *,
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
+
+/* debug messages during authentication */
+void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void auth_debug_send(void);
+void auth_debug_reset(void);
+
+struct passwd *fakepw(void);
+
+int sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
+
+#define SKEY_PROMPT "\nS/Key Password: "
+
+#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+#include <krb5.h>
+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
+#endif
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth1.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth1.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth1.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,439 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.80 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "session.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern Buffer loginmsg;
-
-static int auth1_process_password(Authctxt *);
-static int auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *);
-static int auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *);
-static int auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *);
-static int auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *);
-
-static char *client_user = NULL; /* Used to fill in remote user for PAM */
-
-struct AuthMethod1 {
- int type;
- char *name;
- int *enabled;
- int (*method)(Authctxt *);
-};
-
-const struct AuthMethod1 auth1_methods[] = {
- {
- SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD, "password",
- &options.password_authentication, auth1_process_password
- },
- {
- SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA, "rsa",
- &options.rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rsa
- },
- {
- SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA, "rhosts-rsa",
- &options.rhosts_rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rhosts_rsa
- },
- {
- SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, "challenge-response",
- &options.challenge_response_authentication,
- auth1_process_tis_challenge
- },
- {
- SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE, "challenge-response",
- &options.challenge_response_authentication,
- auth1_process_tis_response
- },
- { -1, NULL, NULL, NULL}
-};
-
-static const struct AuthMethod1
-*lookup_authmethod1(int type)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; auth1_methods[i].name != NULL; i++)
- if (auth1_methods[i].type == type)
- return (&(auth1_methods[i]));
-
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-static char *
-get_authname(int type)
-{
- const struct AuthMethod1 *a;
- static char buf[64];
-
- if ((a = lookup_authmethod1(type)) != NULL)
- return (a->name);
- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "bad-auth-msg-%d", type);
- return (buf);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_password(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- int authenticated = 0;
- char *password;
- u_int dlen;
-
- /*
- * Read user password. It is in plain text, but was
- * transmitted over the encrypted channel so it is
- * not visible to an outside observer.
- */
- password = packet_get_string(&dlen);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- /* Try authentication with the password. */
- authenticated = PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password));
-
- explicit_bzero(password, dlen);
- free(password);
-
- return (authenticated);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- int authenticated = 0;
- BIGNUM *n;
-
- /* RSA authentication requested. */
- if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("do_authloop: BN_new failed");
- packet_get_bignum(n);
- packet_check_eom();
- authenticated = auth_rsa(authctxt, n);
- BN_clear_free(n);
-
- return (authenticated);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- int keybits, authenticated = 0;
- u_int bits;
- Key *client_host_key;
- u_int ulen;
-
- /*
- * Get client user name. Note that we just have to
- * trust the client; root on the client machine can
- * claim to be any user.
- */
- client_user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
-
- /* Get the client host key. */
- client_host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
- bits = packet_get_int();
- packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->e);
- packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->n);
-
- keybits = BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n);
- if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits) {
- verbose("Warning: keysize mismatch for client_host_key: "
- "actual %d, announced %d",
- BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n), bits);
- }
- packet_check_eom();
-
- authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(authctxt, client_user,
- client_host_key);
- key_free(client_host_key);
-
- auth_info(authctxt, "ruser %.100s", client_user);
-
- return (authenticated);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- char *challenge;
-
- if ((challenge = get_challenge(authctxt)) == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- debug("sending challenge '%s'", challenge);
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
- packet_put_cstring(challenge);
- free(challenge);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- return (-1);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- int authenticated = 0;
- char *response;
- u_int dlen;
-
- response = packet_get_string(&dlen);
- packet_check_eom();
- authenticated = verify_response(authctxt, response);
- explicit_bzero(response, dlen);
- free(response);
-
- return (authenticated);
-}
-
-/*
- * read packets, try to authenticate the user and
- * return only if authentication is successful
- */
-static void
-do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- int authenticated = 0;
- int prev = 0, type = 0;
- const struct AuthMethod1 *meth;
-
- debug("Attempting authentication for %s%.100s.",
- authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user);
-
- /* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */
- if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication &&
-#ifdef KRB5
- (!options.kerberos_authentication || options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) &&
-#endif
- PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, ""))) {
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam && (PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())))
-#endif
- {
- auth_log(authctxt, 1, 0, "without authentication",
- NULL);
- return;
- }
- }
-
- /* Indicate that authentication is needed. */
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- for (;;) {
- /* default to fail */
- authenticated = 0;
-
-
- /* Get a packet from the client. */
- prev = type;
- type = packet_read();
-
- /*
- * If we started challenge-response authentication but the
- * next packet is not a response to our challenge, release
- * the resources allocated by get_challenge() (which would
- * normally have been released by verify_response() had we
- * received such a response)
- */
- if (prev == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS &&
- type != SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE)
- abandon_challenge_response(authctxt);
-
- if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries)
- goto skip;
- if ((meth = lookup_authmethod1(type)) == NULL) {
- logit("Unknown message during authentication: "
- "type %d", type);
- goto skip;
- }
-
- if (!*(meth->enabled)) {
- verbose("%s authentication disabled.", meth->name);
- goto skip;
- }
-
- authenticated = meth->method(authctxt);
- if (authenticated == -1)
- continue; /* "postponed" */
-
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
- if (authctxt->as) {
- auth_close(authctxt->as);
- authctxt->as = NULL;
- }
-#endif
- if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
- fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
- authctxt->user);
-
-#ifdef _UNICOS
- if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) {
- authenticated = 0;
- fatal("Access denied for user %s.",authctxt->user);
- }
-#endif /* _UNICOS */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
- /* Special handling for root */
- if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
- !auth_root_allowed(meth->name)) {
- authenticated = 0;
-# ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
-# endif
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam && authenticated &&
- !PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
- char *msg;
- size_t len;
-
- error("Access denied for user %s by PAM account "
- "configuration", authctxt->user);
- len = buffer_len(&loginmsg);
- buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
- msg = buffer_ptr(&loginmsg);
- /* strip trailing newlines */
- if (len > 0)
- while (len > 0 && msg[--len] == '\n')
- msg[len] = '\0';
- else
- msg = "Access denied.";
- packet_disconnect("%s", msg);
- }
-#endif
-
- skip:
- /* Log before sending the reply */
- auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, 0, get_authname(type), NULL);
-
- free(client_user);
- client_user = NULL;
-
- if (authenticated)
- return;
-
- if (++authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
-#endif
- packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
- }
-
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Performs authentication of an incoming connection. Session key has already
- * been exchanged and encryption is enabled.
- */
-void
-do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- u_int ulen;
- char *user, *style = NULL;
-
- /* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
- packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER);
-
- /* Get the user name. */
- user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
- *style++ = '\0';
-
- authctxt->user = user;
- authctxt->style = style;
-
- /* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
- if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
- authctxt->valid = 1;
- else {
- debug("do_authentication: invalid user %s", user);
- authctxt->pw = fakepw();
- }
-
- /* Configuration may have changed as a result of Match */
- if (options.num_auth_methods != 0)
- fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with SSH "
- "protocol 1");
-
- setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
- use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
- PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
-#endif
-
- /*
- * If we are not running as root, the user must have the same uid as
- * the server.
- */
-#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
- if (!use_privsep && getuid() != 0 && authctxt->pw &&
- authctxt->pw->pw_uid != getuid())
- packet_disconnect("Cannot change user when server not running as root.");
-#endif
-
- /*
- * Loop until the user has been authenticated or the connection is
- * closed, do_authloop() returns only if authentication is successful
- */
- do_authloop(authctxt);
-
- /* The user has been authenticated and accepted. */
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth1.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth1.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth1.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth1.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,444 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.82 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+
+static int auth1_process_password(Authctxt *);
+static int auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *);
+static int auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *);
+static int auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *);
+static int auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *);
+
+static char *client_user = NULL; /* Used to fill in remote user for PAM */
+
+struct AuthMethod1 {
+ int type;
+ char *name;
+ int *enabled;
+ int (*method)(Authctxt *);
+};
+
+const struct AuthMethod1 auth1_methods[] = {
+ {
+ SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD, "password",
+ &options.password_authentication, auth1_process_password
+ },
+ {
+ SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA, "rsa",
+ &options.rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rsa
+ },
+ {
+ SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA, "rhosts-rsa",
+ &options.rhosts_rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rhosts_rsa
+ },
+ {
+ SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, "challenge-response",
+ &options.challenge_response_authentication,
+ auth1_process_tis_challenge
+ },
+ {
+ SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE, "challenge-response",
+ &options.challenge_response_authentication,
+ auth1_process_tis_response
+ },
+ { -1, NULL, NULL, NULL}
+};
+
+static const struct AuthMethod1
+*lookup_authmethod1(int type)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; auth1_methods[i].name != NULL; i++)
+ if (auth1_methods[i].type == type)
+ return (&(auth1_methods[i]));
+
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+static char *
+get_authname(int type)
+{
+ const struct AuthMethod1 *a;
+ static char buf[64];
+
+ if ((a = lookup_authmethod1(type)) != NULL)
+ return (a->name);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "bad-auth-msg-%d", type);
+ return (buf);
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static int
+auth1_process_password(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ int authenticated = 0;
+ char *password;
+ u_int dlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Read user password. It is in plain text, but was
+ * transmitted over the encrypted channel so it is
+ * not visible to an outside observer.
+ */
+ password = packet_get_string(&dlen);
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ /* Try authentication with the password. */
+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password));
+
+ explicit_bzero(password, dlen);
+ free(password);
+
+ return (authenticated);
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static int
+auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ int authenticated = 0;
+ BIGNUM *n;
+
+ /* RSA authentication requested. */
+ if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("do_authloop: BN_new failed");
+ packet_get_bignum(n);
+ packet_check_eom();
+ authenticated = auth_rsa(authctxt, n);
+ BN_clear_free(n);
+
+ return (authenticated);
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static int
+auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ int keybits, authenticated = 0;
+ u_int bits;
+ Key *client_host_key;
+ u_int ulen;
+
+ /*
+ * Get client user name. Note that we just have to
+ * trust the client; root on the client machine can
+ * claim to be any user.
+ */
+ client_user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
+
+ /* Get the client host key. */
+ client_host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+ bits = packet_get_int();
+ packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->e);
+ packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->n);
+
+ keybits = BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n);
+ if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits) {
+ verbose("Warning: keysize mismatch for client_host_key: "
+ "actual %d, announced %d",
+ BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n), bits);
+ }
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(authctxt, client_user,
+ client_host_key);
+ key_free(client_host_key);
+
+ auth_info(authctxt, "ruser %.100s", client_user);
+
+ return (authenticated);
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static int
+auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ char *challenge;
+
+ if ((challenge = get_challenge(authctxt)) == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ debug("sending challenge '%s'", challenge);
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
+ packet_put_cstring(challenge);
+ free(challenge);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static int
+auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ int authenticated = 0;
+ char *response;
+ u_int dlen;
+
+ response = packet_get_string(&dlen);
+ packet_check_eom();
+ authenticated = verify_response(authctxt, response);
+ explicit_bzero(response, dlen);
+ free(response);
+
+ return (authenticated);
+}
+
+/*
+ * read packets, try to authenticate the user and
+ * return only if authentication is successful
+ */
+static void
+do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ int authenticated = 0;
+ int prev = 0, type = 0;
+ const struct AuthMethod1 *meth;
+
+ debug("Attempting authentication for %s%.100s.",
+ authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user);
+
+ /* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */
+ if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication &&
+#ifdef KRB5
+ (!options.kerberos_authentication || options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) &&
+#endif
+ PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, ""))) {
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam && (PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())))
+#endif
+ {
+ auth_log(authctxt, 1, 0, "without authentication",
+ NULL);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Indicate that authentication is needed. */
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ for (;;) {
+ /* default to fail */
+ authenticated = 0;
+
+
+ /* Get a packet from the client. */
+ prev = type;
+ type = packet_read();
+
+ /*
+ * If we started challenge-response authentication but the
+ * next packet is not a response to our challenge, release
+ * the resources allocated by get_challenge() (which would
+ * normally have been released by verify_response() had we
+ * received such a response)
+ */
+ if (prev == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS &&
+ type != SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE)
+ abandon_challenge_response(authctxt);
+
+ if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries)
+ goto skip;
+ if ((meth = lookup_authmethod1(type)) == NULL) {
+ logit("Unknown message during authentication: "
+ "type %d", type);
+ goto skip;
+ }
+
+ if (!*(meth->enabled)) {
+ verbose("%s authentication disabled.", meth->name);
+ goto skip;
+ }
+
+ authenticated = meth->method(authctxt);
+ if (authenticated == -1)
+ continue; /* "postponed" */
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ if (authctxt->as) {
+ auth_close(authctxt->as);
+ authctxt->as = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
+ fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
+ authctxt->user);
+
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+ if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) {
+ authenticated = 0;
+ fatal("Access denied for user %s.",authctxt->user);
+ }
+#endif /* _UNICOS */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ /* Special handling for root */
+ if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+ !auth_root_allowed(meth->name)) {
+ authenticated = 0;
+# ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
+# endif
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam && authenticated &&
+ !PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
+ char *msg;
+ size_t len;
+
+ error("Access denied for user %s by PAM account "
+ "configuration", authctxt->user);
+ len = buffer_len(&loginmsg);
+ buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
+ msg = buffer_ptr(&loginmsg);
+ /* strip trailing newlines */
+ if (len > 0)
+ while (len > 0 && msg[--len] == '\n')
+ msg[len] = '\0';
+ else
+ msg = "Access denied.";
+ packet_disconnect("%s", msg);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ skip:
+ /* Log before sending the reply */
+ auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, 0, get_authname(type), NULL);
+
+ free(client_user);
+ client_user = NULL;
+
+ if (authenticated)
+ return;
+
+ if (++authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
+#endif
+ auth_maxtries_exceeded(authctxt);
+ }
+
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Performs authentication of an incoming connection. Session key has already
+ * been exchanged and encryption is enabled.
+ */
+void
+do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ u_int ulen;
+ char *user, *style = NULL;
+
+ /* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
+ packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER);
+
+ /* Get the user name. */
+ user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+ *style++ = '\0';
+
+ authctxt->user = user;
+ authctxt->style = style;
+
+ /* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
+ if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
+ authctxt->valid = 1;
+ else {
+ debug("do_authentication: invalid user %s", user);
+ authctxt->pw = fakepw();
+ }
+
+ /* Configuration may have changed as a result of Match */
+ if (options.num_auth_methods != 0)
+ fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with SSH "
+ "protocol 1");
+
+ setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
+ use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+ PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * If we are not running as root, the user must have the same uid as
+ * the server.
+ */
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (!use_privsep && getuid() != 0 && authctxt->pw &&
+ authctxt->pw->pw_uid != getuid())
+ packet_disconnect("Cannot change user when server not running as root.");
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Loop until the user has been authenticated or the connection is
+ * closed, do_authloop() returns only if authentication is successful
+ */
+ do_authloop(authctxt);
+
+ /* The user has been authenticated and accepted. */
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+}
+
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-chall.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-chall.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-chall.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,374 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.41 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Per Allansson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-static int auth2_challenge_start(Authctxt *);
-static int send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *);
-static void input_userauth_info_response(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-extern KbdintDevice bsdauth_device;
-#else
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
-#endif
-#ifdef SKEY
-extern KbdintDevice skey_device;
-#endif
-#endif
-
-KbdintDevice *devices[] = {
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
- &bsdauth_device,
-#else
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- &sshpam_device,
-#endif
-#ifdef SKEY
- &skey_device,
-#endif
-#endif
- NULL
-};
-
-typedef struct KbdintAuthctxt KbdintAuthctxt;
-struct KbdintAuthctxt
-{
- char *devices;
- void *ctxt;
- KbdintDevice *device;
- u_int nreq;
-};
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-void
-remove_kbdint_device(const char *devname)
-{
- int i, j;
-
- for (i = 0; devices[i] != NULL; i++)
- if (strcmp(devices[i]->name, devname) == 0) {
- for (j = i; devices[j] != NULL; j++)
- devices[j] = devices[j+1];
- i--;
- }
-}
-#endif
-
-static KbdintAuthctxt *
-kbdint_alloc(const char *devs)
-{
- KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
- Buffer b;
- int i;
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (!options.use_pam)
- remove_kbdint_device("pam");
-#endif
-
- kbdintctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(KbdintAuthctxt));
- if (strcmp(devs, "") == 0) {
- buffer_init(&b);
- for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) {
- if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
- buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
- buffer_append(&b, devices[i]->name,
- strlen(devices[i]->name));
- }
- buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
- kbdintctxt->devices = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
- buffer_free(&b);
- } else {
- kbdintctxt->devices = xstrdup(devs);
- }
- debug("kbdint_alloc: devices '%s'", kbdintctxt->devices);
- kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL;
- kbdintctxt->device = NULL;
- kbdintctxt->nreq = 0;
-
- return kbdintctxt;
-}
-static void
-kbdint_reset_device(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
-{
- if (kbdintctxt->ctxt) {
- kbdintctxt->device->free_ctx(kbdintctxt->ctxt);
- kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL;
- }
- kbdintctxt->device = NULL;
-}
-static void
-kbdint_free(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
-{
- if (kbdintctxt->device)
- kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt);
- free(kbdintctxt->devices);
- explicit_bzero(kbdintctxt, sizeof(*kbdintctxt));
- free(kbdintctxt);
-}
-/* get next device */
-static int
-kbdint_next_device(Authctxt *authctxt, KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
-{
- size_t len;
- char *t;
- int i;
-
- if (kbdintctxt->device)
- kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt);
- do {
- len = kbdintctxt->devices ?
- strcspn(kbdintctxt->devices, ",") : 0;
-
- if (len == 0)
- break;
- for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) {
- if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt,
- "keyboard-interactive", devices[i]->name))
- continue;
- if (strncmp(kbdintctxt->devices, devices[i]->name, len) == 0)
- kbdintctxt->device = devices[i];
- }
- t = kbdintctxt->devices;
- kbdintctxt->devices = t[len] ? xstrdup(t+len+1) : NULL;
- free(t);
- debug2("kbdint_next_device: devices %s", kbdintctxt->devices ?
- kbdintctxt->devices : "<empty>");
- } while (kbdintctxt->devices && !kbdintctxt->device);
-
- return kbdintctxt->device ? 1 : 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * try challenge-response, set authctxt->postponed if we have to
- * wait for the response.
- */
-int
-auth2_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt, char *devs)
-{
- debug("auth2_challenge: user=%s devs=%s",
- authctxt->user ? authctxt->user : "<nouser>",
- devs ? devs : "<no devs>");
-
- if (authctxt->user == NULL || !devs)
- return 0;
- if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL)
- authctxt->kbdintctxt = kbdint_alloc(devs);
- return auth2_challenge_start(authctxt);
-}
-
-/* unregister kbd-int callbacks and context */
-void
-auth2_challenge_stop(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- /* unregister callback */
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, NULL);
- if (authctxt->kbdintctxt != NULL) {
- kbdint_free(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
- authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
- }
-}
-
-/* side effect: sets authctxt->postponed if a reply was sent*/
-static int
-auth2_challenge_start(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
-
- debug2("auth2_challenge_start: devices %s",
- kbdintctxt->devices ? kbdintctxt->devices : "<empty>");
-
- if (kbdint_next_device(authctxt, kbdintctxt) == 0) {
- auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
- return 0;
- }
- debug("auth2_challenge_start: trying authentication method '%s'",
- kbdintctxt->device->name);
-
- if ((kbdintctxt->ctxt = kbdintctxt->device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL) {
- auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
- return 0;
- }
- if (send_userauth_info_request(authctxt) == 0) {
- auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
- return 0;
- }
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE,
- &input_userauth_info_response);
-
- authctxt->postponed = 1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
- char *name, *instr, **prompts;
- u_int i, *echo_on;
-
- kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
- if (kbdintctxt->device->query(kbdintctxt->ctxt,
- &name, &instr, &kbdintctxt->nreq, &prompts, &echo_on))
- return 0;
-
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring(name);
- packet_put_cstring(instr);
- packet_put_cstring(""); /* language not used */
- packet_put_int(kbdintctxt->nreq);
- for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++) {
- packet_put_cstring(prompts[i]);
- packet_put_char(echo_on[i]);
- }
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++)
- free(prompts[i]);
- free(prompts);
- free(echo_on);
- free(name);
- free(instr);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void
-input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
- int authenticated = 0, res;
- u_int i, nresp;
- const char *devicename = NULL;
- char **response = NULL;
-
- if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no authctxt");
- kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
- if (kbdintctxt == NULL || kbdintctxt->ctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no kbdintctxt");
- if (kbdintctxt->device == NULL)
- fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no device");
-
- authctxt->postponed = 0; /* reset */
- nresp = packet_get_int();
- if (nresp != kbdintctxt->nreq)
- fatal("input_userauth_info_response: wrong number of replies");
- if (nresp > 100)
- fatal("input_userauth_info_response: too many replies");
- if (nresp > 0) {
- response = xcalloc(nresp, sizeof(char *));
- for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++)
- response[i] = packet_get_string(NULL);
- }
- packet_check_eom();
-
- res = kbdintctxt->device->respond(kbdintctxt->ctxt, nresp, response);
-
- for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) {
- explicit_bzero(response[i], strlen(response[i]));
- free(response[i]);
- }
- free(response);
-
- switch (res) {
- case 0:
- /* Success! */
- authenticated = authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0;
- break;
- case 1:
- /* Authentication needs further interaction */
- if (send_userauth_info_request(authctxt) == 1)
- authctxt->postponed = 1;
- break;
- default:
- /* Failure! */
- break;
- }
- devicename = kbdintctxt->device->name;
- if (!authctxt->postponed) {
- if (authenticated) {
- auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
- } else {
- /* start next device */
- /* may set authctxt->postponed */
- auth2_challenge_start(authctxt);
- }
- }
- userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "keyboard-interactive",
- devicename);
-}
-
-void
-privsep_challenge_enable(void)
-{
-#if defined(BSD_AUTH) || defined(USE_PAM) || defined(SKEY)
- int n = 0;
-#endif
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
- extern KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device;
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- extern KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device;
-#endif
-#ifdef SKEY
- extern KbdintDevice mm_skey_device;
-#endif
-
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
- devices[n++] = &mm_bsdauth_device;
-#else
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- devices[n++] = &mm_sshpam_device;
-#endif
-#ifdef SKEY
- devices[n++] = &mm_skey_device;
-#endif
-#endif
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-chall.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-chall.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-chall.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-chall.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.44 2016/05/02 08:49:03 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Per Allansson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+static int auth2_challenge_start(Authctxt *);
+static int send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *);
+static int input_userauth_info_response(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+extern KbdintDevice bsdauth_device;
+#else
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
+#endif
+#ifdef SKEY
+extern KbdintDevice skey_device;
+#endif
+#endif
+
+KbdintDevice *devices[] = {
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ &bsdauth_device,
+#else
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ &sshpam_device,
+#endif
+#ifdef SKEY
+ &skey_device,
+#endif
+#endif
+ NULL
+};
+
+typedef struct KbdintAuthctxt KbdintAuthctxt;
+struct KbdintAuthctxt
+{
+ char *devices;
+ void *ctxt;
+ KbdintDevice *device;
+ u_int nreq;
+ u_int devices_done;
+};
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+void
+remove_kbdint_device(const char *devname)
+{
+ int i, j;
+
+ for (i = 0; devices[i] != NULL; i++)
+ if (strcmp(devices[i]->name, devname) == 0) {
+ for (j = i; devices[j] != NULL; j++)
+ devices[j] = devices[j+1];
+ i--;
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+static KbdintAuthctxt *
+kbdint_alloc(const char *devs)
+{
+ KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
+ Buffer b;
+ int i;
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (!options.use_pam)
+ remove_kbdint_device("pam");
+#endif
+
+ kbdintctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(KbdintAuthctxt));
+ if (strcmp(devs, "") == 0) {
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) {
+ if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
+ buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
+ buffer_append(&b, devices[i]->name,
+ strlen(devices[i]->name));
+ }
+ if ((kbdintctxt->devices = sshbuf_dup_string(&b)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ } else {
+ kbdintctxt->devices = xstrdup(devs);
+ }
+ debug("kbdint_alloc: devices '%s'", kbdintctxt->devices);
+ kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL;
+ kbdintctxt->device = NULL;
+ kbdintctxt->nreq = 0;
+
+ return kbdintctxt;
+}
+static void
+kbdint_reset_device(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
+{
+ if (kbdintctxt->ctxt) {
+ kbdintctxt->device->free_ctx(kbdintctxt->ctxt);
+ kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL;
+ }
+ kbdintctxt->device = NULL;
+}
+static void
+kbdint_free(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
+{
+ if (kbdintctxt->device)
+ kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt);
+ free(kbdintctxt->devices);
+ explicit_bzero(kbdintctxt, sizeof(*kbdintctxt));
+ free(kbdintctxt);
+}
+/* get next device */
+static int
+kbdint_next_device(Authctxt *authctxt, KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ char *t;
+ int i;
+
+ if (kbdintctxt->device)
+ kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt);
+ do {
+ len = kbdintctxt->devices ?
+ strcspn(kbdintctxt->devices, ",") : 0;
+
+ if (len == 0)
+ break;
+ for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) {
+ if ((kbdintctxt->devices_done & (1 << i)) != 0 ||
+ !auth2_method_allowed(authctxt,
+ "keyboard-interactive", devices[i]->name))
+ continue;
+ if (strncmp(kbdintctxt->devices, devices[i]->name,
+ len) == 0) {
+ kbdintctxt->device = devices[i];
+ kbdintctxt->devices_done |= 1 << i;
+ }
+ }
+ t = kbdintctxt->devices;
+ kbdintctxt->devices = t[len] ? xstrdup(t+len+1) : NULL;
+ free(t);
+ debug2("kbdint_next_device: devices %s", kbdintctxt->devices ?
+ kbdintctxt->devices : "<empty>");
+ } while (kbdintctxt->devices && !kbdintctxt->device);
+
+ return kbdintctxt->device ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * try challenge-response, set authctxt->postponed if we have to
+ * wait for the response.
+ */
+int
+auth2_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt, char *devs)
+{
+ debug("auth2_challenge: user=%s devs=%s",
+ authctxt->user ? authctxt->user : "<nouser>",
+ devs ? devs : "<no devs>");
+
+ if (authctxt->user == NULL || !devs)
+ return 0;
+ if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL)
+ authctxt->kbdintctxt = kbdint_alloc(devs);
+ return auth2_challenge_start(authctxt);
+}
+
+/* unregister kbd-int callbacks and context */
+void
+auth2_challenge_stop(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ /* unregister callback */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, NULL);
+ if (authctxt->kbdintctxt != NULL) {
+ kbdint_free(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
+ authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/* side effect: sets authctxt->postponed if a reply was sent*/
+static int
+auth2_challenge_start(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
+
+ debug2("auth2_challenge_start: devices %s",
+ kbdintctxt->devices ? kbdintctxt->devices : "<empty>");
+
+ if (kbdint_next_device(authctxt, kbdintctxt) == 0) {
+ auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ debug("auth2_challenge_start: trying authentication method '%s'",
+ kbdintctxt->device->name);
+
+ if ((kbdintctxt->ctxt = kbdintctxt->device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL) {
+ auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (send_userauth_info_request(authctxt) == 0) {
+ auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE,
+ &input_userauth_info_response);
+
+ authctxt->postponed = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
+ char *name, *instr, **prompts;
+ u_int i, *echo_on;
+
+ kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
+ if (kbdintctxt->device->query(kbdintctxt->ctxt,
+ &name, &instr, &kbdintctxt->nreq, &prompts, &echo_on))
+ return 0;
+
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring(name);
+ packet_put_cstring(instr);
+ packet_put_cstring(""); /* language not used */
+ packet_put_int(kbdintctxt->nreq);
+ for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++) {
+ packet_put_cstring(prompts[i]);
+ packet_put_char(echo_on[i]);
+ }
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++)
+ free(prompts[i]);
+ free(prompts);
+ free(echo_on);
+ free(name);
+ free(instr);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
+ int authenticated = 0, res;
+ u_int i, nresp;
+ const char *devicename = NULL;
+ char **response = NULL;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no authctxt");
+ kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
+ if (kbdintctxt == NULL || kbdintctxt->ctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no kbdintctxt");
+ if (kbdintctxt->device == NULL)
+ fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no device");
+
+ authctxt->postponed = 0; /* reset */
+ nresp = packet_get_int();
+ if (nresp != kbdintctxt->nreq)
+ fatal("input_userauth_info_response: wrong number of replies");
+ if (nresp > 100)
+ fatal("input_userauth_info_response: too many replies");
+ if (nresp > 0) {
+ response = xcalloc(nresp, sizeof(char *));
+ for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++)
+ response[i] = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ }
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ res = kbdintctxt->device->respond(kbdintctxt->ctxt, nresp, response);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) {
+ explicit_bzero(response[i], strlen(response[i]));
+ free(response[i]);
+ }
+ free(response);
+
+ switch (res) {
+ case 0:
+ /* Success! */
+ authenticated = authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0;
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ /* Authentication needs further interaction */
+ if (send_userauth_info_request(authctxt) == 1)
+ authctxt->postponed = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Failure! */
+ break;
+ }
+ devicename = kbdintctxt->device->name;
+ if (!authctxt->postponed) {
+ if (authenticated) {
+ auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
+ } else {
+ /* start next device */
+ /* may set authctxt->postponed */
+ auth2_challenge_start(authctxt);
+ }
+ }
+ userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "keyboard-interactive",
+ devicename);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+privsep_challenge_enable(void)
+{
+#if defined(BSD_AUTH) || defined(USE_PAM) || defined(SKEY)
+ int n = 0;
+#endif
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ extern KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device;
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ extern KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device;
+#endif
+#ifdef SKEY
+ extern KbdintDevice mm_skey_device;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ devices[n++] = &mm_bsdauth_device;
+#else
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ devices[n++] = &mm_sshpam_device;
+#endif
+#ifdef SKEY
+ devices[n++] = &mm_skey_device;
+#endif
+#endif
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-gss.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-gss.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-gss.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,294 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.21 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-static void input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
-static void input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
-static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
-static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-
-/*
- * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
- * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
- */
-static int
-userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- gss_OID_desc goid = {0, NULL};
- Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
- int mechs;
- int present;
- OM_uint32 ms;
- u_int len;
- u_char *doid = NULL;
-
- if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- mechs = packet_get_int();
- if (mechs == 0) {
- debug("Mechanism negotiation is not supported");
- return (0);
- }
-
- do {
- mechs--;
-
- free(doid);
-
- present = 0;
- doid = packet_get_string(&len);
-
- if (len > 2 && doid[0] == SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE &&
- doid[1] == len - 2) {
- goid.elements = doid + 2;
- goid.length = len - 2;
- ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(&ms, &goid, &present);
- } else {
- logit("Badly formed OID received");
- }
- } while (mechs > 0 && !present);
-
- if (!present) {
- free(doid);
- authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
- return (0);
- }
-
- if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid)))) {
- if (ctxt != NULL)
- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
- free(doid);
- authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
- return (0);
- }
-
- authctxt->methoddata = (void *)ctxt;
-
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE);
-
- /* Return the OID that we received */
- packet_put_string(doid, len);
-
- packet_send();
- free(doid);
-
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok);
- authctxt->postponed = 1;
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-static void
-input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- Gssctxt *gssctxt;
- gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
- OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, flags;
- u_int len;
-
- if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
- fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
-
- gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
- recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&len);
- recv_tok.length = len; /* u_int vs. size_t */
-
- packet_check_eom();
-
- maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
- &send_tok, &flags));
-
- free(recv_tok.value);
-
- if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
- if (send_tok.length != 0) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK);
- packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
- packet_send();
- }
- authctxt->postponed = 0;
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
- userauth_finish(authctxt, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
- } else {
- if (send_tok.length != 0) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
- packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
- packet_send();
- }
- if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
- if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC,
- &input_gssapi_mic);
- else
- dispatch_set(
- SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,
- &input_gssapi_exchange_complete);
- }
- }
-
- gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-}
-
-static void
-input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- Gssctxt *gssctxt;
- gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
- OM_uint32 maj_status;
- u_int len;
-
- if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
- fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
-
- gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
- recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&len);
- recv_tok.length = len;
-
- packet_check_eom();
-
- /* Push the error token into GSSAPI to see what it says */
- maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
- &send_tok, NULL));
-
- free(recv_tok.value);
-
- /* We can't return anything to the client, even if we wanted to */
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
-
- /* The client will have already moved on to the next auth */
-
- gss_release_buffer(&maj_status, &send_tok);
-}
-
-/*
- * This is called when the client thinks we've completed authentication.
- * It should only be enabled in the dispatch handler by the function above,
- * which only enables it once the GSSAPI exchange is complete.
- */
-
-static void
-input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- int authenticated;
-
- if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
- fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
-
- /*
- * We don't need to check the status, because we're only enabled in
- * the dispatcher once the exchange is complete
- */
-
- packet_check_eom();
-
- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-
- authctxt->postponed = 0;
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
- userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
-}
-
-static void
-input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- Gssctxt *gssctxt;
- int authenticated = 0;
- Buffer b;
- gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
- u_int len;
-
- if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
- fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
-
- gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
-
- mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
- mic.length = len;
-
- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
- "gssapi-with-mic");
-
- gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
- gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-
- if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
- else
- logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
-
- buffer_free(&b);
- free(mic.value);
-
- authctxt->postponed = 0;
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
- userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
-}
-
-Authmethod method_gssapi = {
- "gssapi-with-mic",
- userauth_gssapi,
- &options.gss_authentication
-};
-
-#endif /* GSSAPI */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-gss.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-gss.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-gss.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-gss.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.22 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
+static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
+static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
+static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+/*
+ * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
+ * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
+ */
+static int
+userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ gss_OID_desc goid = {0, NULL};
+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
+ int mechs;
+ int present;
+ OM_uint32 ms;
+ u_int len;
+ u_char *doid = NULL;
+
+ if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ mechs = packet_get_int();
+ if (mechs == 0) {
+ debug("Mechanism negotiation is not supported");
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ do {
+ mechs--;
+
+ free(doid);
+
+ present = 0;
+ doid = packet_get_string(&len);
+
+ if (len > 2 && doid[0] == SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE &&
+ doid[1] == len - 2) {
+ goid.elements = doid + 2;
+ goid.length = len - 2;
+ ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(&ms, &goid, &present);
+ } else {
+ logit("Badly formed OID received");
+ }
+ } while (mechs > 0 && !present);
+
+ if (!present) {
+ free(doid);
+ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid)))) {
+ if (ctxt != NULL)
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+ free(doid);
+ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ authctxt->methoddata = (void *)ctxt;
+
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE);
+
+ /* Return the OID that we received */
+ packet_put_string(doid, len);
+
+ packet_send();
+ free(doid);
+
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok);
+ authctxt->postponed = 1;
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, flags;
+ u_int len;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+ fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+
+ gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&len);
+ recv_tok.length = len; /* u_int vs. size_t */
+
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
+ &send_tok, &flags));
+
+ free(recv_tok.value);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK);
+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+ userauth_finish(authctxt, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
+ } else {
+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+ if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC,
+ &input_gssapi_mic);
+ else
+ dispatch_set(
+ SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,
+ &input_gssapi_exchange_complete);
+ }
+ }
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
+ OM_uint32 maj_status;
+ u_int len;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+ fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+
+ gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&len);
+ recv_tok.length = len;
+
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ /* Push the error token into GSSAPI to see what it says */
+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
+ &send_tok, NULL));
+
+ free(recv_tok.value);
+
+ /* We can't return anything to the client, even if we wanted to */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
+
+ /* The client will have already moved on to the next auth */
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&maj_status, &send_tok);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called when the client thinks we've completed authentication.
+ * It should only be enabled in the dispatch handler by the function above,
+ * which only enables it once the GSSAPI exchange is complete.
+ */
+
+static int
+input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ int authenticated;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+ fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+
+ /*
+ * We don't need to check the status, because we're only enabled in
+ * the dispatcher once the exchange is complete
+ */
+
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+
+ authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
+ userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+ Buffer b;
+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
+ u_int len;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+ fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+
+ gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+
+ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
+ mic.length = len;
+
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
+ "gssapi-with-mic");
+
+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+ else
+ logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ free(mic.value);
+
+ authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
+ userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+Authmethod method_gssapi = {
+ "gssapi-with-mic",
+ userauth_gssapi,
+ &options.gss_authentication
+};
+
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-hostbased.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,230 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.17 2013/12/30 23:52:27 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern u_char *session_id2;
-extern u_int session_id2_len;
-
-static int
-userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- Buffer b;
- Key *key = NULL;
- char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost, *service;
- u_char *pkblob, *sig;
- u_int alen, blen, slen;
- int pktype;
- int authenticated = 0;
-
- if (!authctxt->valid) {
- debug2("userauth_hostbased: disabled because of invalid user");
- return 0;
- }
- pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
- pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
- chost = packet_get_string(NULL);
- cuser = packet_get_string(NULL);
- sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
-
- debug("userauth_hostbased: cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %d",
- cuser, chost, pkalg, slen);
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
- debug("signature:");
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, sig, slen);
- buffer_dump(&b);
- buffer_free(&b);
-#endif
- pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
- if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
- /* this is perfectly legal */
- logit("userauth_hostbased: unsupported "
- "public key algorithm: %s", pkalg);
- goto done;
- }
- key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
- if (key == NULL) {
- error("userauth_hostbased: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
- goto done;
- }
- if (key->type != pktype) {
- error("userauth_hostbased: type mismatch for decoded key "
- "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
- goto done;
- }
- if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
- (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
- error("Refusing RSA key because peer uses unsafe "
- "signature format");
- goto done;
- }
- service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" :
- authctxt->service;
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
- /* reconstruct packet */
- buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, service);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased");
- buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen);
- buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, chost);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, cuser);
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
- buffer_dump(&b);
-#endif
-
- pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
- "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost);
-
- /* test for allowed key and correct signature */
- authenticated = 0;
- if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
- buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
- authenticated = 1;
-
- buffer_free(&b);
-done:
- debug2("userauth_hostbased: authenticated %d", authenticated);
- if (key != NULL)
- key_free(key);
- free(pkalg);
- free(pkblob);
- free(cuser);
- free(chost);
- free(sig);
- return authenticated;
-}
-
-/* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
-int
-hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
- Key *key)
-{
- const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup, *reason;
- HostStatus host_status;
- int len;
- char *fp;
-
- if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
- return 0;
-
- resolvedname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
- ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
-
- debug2("userauth_hostbased: chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s",
- chost, resolvedname, ipaddr);
-
- if (((len = strlen(chost)) > 0) && chost[len - 1] == '.') {
- debug2("stripping trailing dot from chost %s", chost);
- chost[len - 1] = '\0';
- }
-
- if (options.hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only) {
- if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0)
- return 0;
- lookup = chost;
- } else {
- if (strcasecmp(resolvedname, chost) != 0)
- logit("userauth_hostbased mismatch: "
- "client sends %s, but we resolve %s to %s",
- chost, ipaddr, resolvedname);
- if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0)
- return 0;
- lookup = resolvedname;
- }
- debug2("userauth_hostbased: access allowed by auth_rhosts2");
-
- if (key_is_cert(key) &&
- key_cert_check_authority(key, 1, 0, lookup, &reason)) {
- error("%s", reason);
- auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
- return 0;
- }
-
- host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
- _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
- options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
-
- /* backward compat if no key has been found. */
- if (host_status == HOST_NEW) {
- host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
- _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2,
- options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL :
- _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
- }
-
- if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
- if (key_is_cert(key)) {
- fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "
- "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
- key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
- cuser, lookup);
- } else {
- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",
- key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);
- }
- free(fp);
- }
-
- return (host_status == HOST_OK);
-}
-
-Authmethod method_hostbased = {
- "hostbased",
- userauth_hostbased,
- &options.hostbased_authentication
-};
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-hostbased.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.26 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "match.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern u_char *session_id2;
+extern u_int session_id2_len;
+
+static int
+userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ Key *key = NULL;
+ char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost, *service;
+ u_char *pkblob, *sig;
+ u_int alen, blen, slen;
+ int pktype;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+
+ if (!authctxt->valid) {
+ debug2("userauth_hostbased: disabled because of invalid user");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
+ pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
+ chost = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ cuser = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
+
+ debug("userauth_hostbased: cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %d",
+ cuser, chost, pkalg, slen);
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ debug("signature:");
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, sig, slen);
+ buffer_dump(&b);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+#endif
+ pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
+ if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+ /* this is perfectly legal */
+ logit("userauth_hostbased: unsupported "
+ "public key algorithm: %s", pkalg);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ error("userauth_hostbased: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (key->type != pktype) {
+ error("userauth_hostbased: type mismatch for decoded key "
+ "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
+ (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
+ error("Refusing RSA key because peer uses unsafe "
+ "signature format");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+ options.hostbased_key_types, 0) != 1) {
+ logit("%s: key type %s not in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes",
+ __func__, sshkey_type(key));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" :
+ authctxt->service;
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+ /* reconstruct packet */
+ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, service);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased");
+ buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen);
+ buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, chost);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, cuser);
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ buffer_dump(&b);
+#endif
+
+ pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
+ "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost);
+
+ /* test for allowed key and correct signature */
+ authenticated = 0;
+ if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
+ PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
+ authenticated = 1;
+
+ buffer_free(&b);
+done:
+ debug2("userauth_hostbased: authenticated %d", authenticated);
+ if (key != NULL)
+ key_free(key);
+ free(pkalg);
+ free(pkblob);
+ free(cuser);
+ free(chost);
+ free(sig);
+ return authenticated;
+}
+
+/* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
+int
+hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
+ Key *key)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup, *reason;
+ HostStatus host_status;
+ int len;
+ char *fp;
+
+ if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
+ return 0;
+
+ resolvedname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
+ ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+
+ debug2("%s: chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s", __func__,
+ chost, resolvedname, ipaddr);
+
+ if (((len = strlen(chost)) > 0) && chost[len - 1] == '.') {
+ debug2("stripping trailing dot from chost %s", chost);
+ chost[len - 1] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ if (options.hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only) {
+ if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0) {
+ debug2("%s: auth_rhosts2 refused "
+ "user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" (from packet)",
+ __func__, cuser, chost);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ lookup = chost;
+ } else {
+ if (strcasecmp(resolvedname, chost) != 0)
+ logit("userauth_hostbased mismatch: "
+ "client sends %s, but we resolve %s to %s",
+ chost, ipaddr, resolvedname);
+ if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0) {
+ debug2("%s: auth_rhosts2 refused "
+ "user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" addr \"%.100s\"",
+ __func__, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ lookup = resolvedname;
+ }
+ debug2("%s: access allowed by auth_rhosts2", __func__);
+
+ if (key_is_cert(key) &&
+ key_cert_check_authority(key, 1, 0, lookup, &reason)) {
+ error("%s", reason);
+ auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
+ _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
+ options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
+
+ /* backward compat if no key has been found. */
+ if (host_status == HOST_NEW) {
+ host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
+ _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2,
+ options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL :
+ _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
+ }
+
+ if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
+ if (key_is_cert(key)) {
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+ options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "
+ "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
+ key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
+ cuser, lookup);
+ } else {
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
+ options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",
+ key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);
+ }
+ free(fp);
+ }
+
+ return (host_status == HOST_OK);
+}
+
+Authmethod method_hostbased = {
+ "hostbased",
+ userauth_hostbased,
+ &options.hostbased_authentication
+};
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-kbdint.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-kbdint.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-kbdint.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.6 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-static int
-userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- int authenticated = 0;
- char *lang, *devs;
-
- lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
- devs = packet_get_string(NULL);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- debug("keyboard-interactive devs %s", devs);
-
- if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
- authenticated = auth2_challenge(authctxt, devs);
-
- free(devs);
- free(lang);
- return authenticated;
-}
-
-Authmethod method_kbdint = {
- "keyboard-interactive",
- userauth_kbdint,
- &options.kbd_interactive_authentication
-};
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-kbdint.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-kbdint.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-kbdint.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-kbdint.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.7 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+static int
+userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ int authenticated = 0;
+ char *lang, *devs;
+
+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ devs = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ debug("keyboard-interactive devs %s", devs);
+
+ if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
+ authenticated = auth2_challenge(authctxt, devs);
+
+ free(devs);
+ free(lang);
+ return authenticated;
+}
+
+Authmethod method_kbdint = {
+ "keyboard-interactive",
+ userauth_kbdint,
+ &options.kbd_interactive_authentication
+};
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-none.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-none.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-none.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.16 2010/06/25 08:46:17 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
-
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-/* "none" is allowed only one time */
-static int none_enabled = 1;
-
-static int
-userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- none_enabled = 0;
- packet_check_eom();
- if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication)
- return (PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, "")));
- return (0);
-}
-
-Authmethod method_none = {
- "none",
- userauth_none,
- &none_enabled
-};
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-none.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-none.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-none.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-none.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.18 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+/* "none" is allowed only one time */
+static int none_enabled = 1;
+
+static int
+userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ none_enabled = 0;
+ packet_check_eom();
+ if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication)
+ return (PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, "")));
+ return (0);
+}
+
+Authmethod method_none = {
+ "none",
+ userauth_none,
+ &none_enabled
+};
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-passwd.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-passwd.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-passwd.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.11 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-static int
-userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- char *password, *newpass;
- int authenticated = 0;
- int change;
- u_int len, newlen;
-
- change = packet_get_char();
- password = packet_get_string(&len);
- if (change) {
- /* discard new password from packet */
- newpass = packet_get_string(&newlen);
- explicit_bzero(newpass, newlen);
- free(newpass);
- }
- packet_check_eom();
-
- if (change)
- logit("password change not supported");
- else if (PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password)) == 1)
- authenticated = 1;
- explicit_bzero(password, len);
- free(password);
- return authenticated;
-}
-
-Authmethod method_passwd = {
- "password",
- userauth_passwd,
- &options.password_authentication
-};
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-passwd.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-passwd.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-passwd.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-passwd.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.12 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+static int
+userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ char *password, *newpass;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+ int change;
+ u_int len, newlen;
+
+ change = packet_get_char();
+ password = packet_get_string(&len);
+ if (change) {
+ /* discard new password from packet */
+ newpass = packet_get_string(&newlen);
+ explicit_bzero(newpass, newlen);
+ free(newpass);
+ }
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ if (change)
+ logit("password change not supported");
+ else if (PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password)) == 1)
+ authenticated = 1;
+ explicit_bzero(password, len);
+ free(password);
+ return authenticated;
+}
+
+Authmethod method_passwd = {
+ "password",
+ userauth_passwd,
+ &options.password_authentication
+};
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-pubkey.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,687 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.39 2013/12/30 23:52:27 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "authfile.h"
-#include "match.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern u_char *session_id2;
-extern u_int session_id2_len;
-
-static int
-userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- Buffer b;
- Key *key = NULL;
- char *pkalg, *userstyle;
- u_char *pkblob, *sig;
- u_int alen, blen, slen;
- int have_sig, pktype;
- int authenticated = 0;
-
- if (!authctxt->valid) {
- debug2("userauth_pubkey: disabled because of invalid user");
- return 0;
- }
- have_sig = packet_get_char();
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
- debug2("userauth_pubkey: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH");
- /* no explicit pkalg given */
- pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
- /* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */
- pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
- buffer_free(&b);
- } else {
- pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
- pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
- }
- pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
- if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
- /* this is perfectly legal */
- logit("userauth_pubkey: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
- pkalg);
- goto done;
- }
- key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
- if (key == NULL) {
- error("userauth_pubkey: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
- goto done;
- }
- if (key->type != pktype) {
- error("userauth_pubkey: type mismatch for decoded key "
- "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
- goto done;
- }
- if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
- (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
- logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe "
- "signature scheme");
- goto done;
- }
- if (have_sig) {
- sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
- packet_check_eom();
- buffer_init(&b);
- if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
- buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
- } else {
- buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
- }
- /* reconstruct packet */
- buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
- authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
- authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle);
- free(userstyle);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b,
- datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
- "ssh-userauth" :
- authctxt->service);
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
- buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
- } else {
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
- buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
- }
- buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
- buffer_dump(&b);
-#endif
- pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
-
- /* test for correct signature */
- authenticated = 0;
- if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) &&
- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
- buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
- authenticated = 1;
- buffer_free(&b);
- free(sig);
- } else {
- debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable");
- packet_check_eom();
-
- /* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
- /*
- * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
- * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
- * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
- * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
- * issue? -markus
- */
- if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key))) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK);
- packet_put_string(pkalg, alen);
- packet_put_string(pkblob, blen);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- authctxt->postponed = 1;
- }
- }
- if (authenticated != 1)
- auth_clear_options();
-done:
- debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg);
- if (key != NULL)
- key_free(key);
- free(pkalg);
- free(pkblob);
- return authenticated;
-}
-
-void
-pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
-{
- char *fp, *extra;
- va_list ap;
- int i;
-
- extra = NULL;
- if (fmt != NULL) {
- va_start(ap, fmt);
- i = vasprintf(&extra, fmt, ap);
- va_end(ap);
- if (i < 0 || extra == NULL)
- fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
- }
-
- if (key_is_cert(key)) {
- fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s",
- key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
- (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
- key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
- extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
- free(fp);
- } else {
- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key), fp,
- extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
- free(fp);
- }
- free(extra);
-}
-
-static int
-match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct KeyCert *cert)
-{
- char *result;
- u_int i;
-
- /* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */
-
- for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
- if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i],
- principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) {
- debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"",
- result);
- free(result);
- return 1;
- }
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct KeyCert *cert)
-{
- FILE *f;
- char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts;
- u_long linenum = 0;
- u_int i;
-
- temporarily_use_uid(pw);
- debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
- if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
- restore_uid();
- return 0;
- }
- while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
- /* Skip leading whitespace. */
- for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
- ;
- /* Skip blank and comment lines. */
- if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL)
- *ep = '\0';
- if (!*cp || *cp == '\n')
- continue;
- /* Trim trailing whitespace. */
- ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1;
- while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'))
- *ep-- = '\0';
- /*
- * If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has
- * key options.
- */
- line_opts = NULL;
- if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL ||
- (ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) {
- for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++)
- ;
- line_opts = cp;
- cp = ep;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
- if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
- debug3("matched principal \"%.100s\" "
- "from file \"%s\" on line %lu",
- cert->principals[i], file, linenum);
- if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
- file, linenum) != 1)
- continue;
- fclose(f);
- restore_uid();
- return 1;
- }
- }
- }
- fclose(f);
- restore_uid();
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
- * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
- */
-static int
-check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
-{
- char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
- const char *reason;
- int found_key = 0;
- u_long linenum = 0;
- Key *found;
- char *fp;
-
- found_key = 0;
-
- found = NULL;
- while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
- char *cp, *key_options = NULL;
- if (found != NULL)
- key_free(found);
- found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
- auth_clear_options();
-
- /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
- for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
- ;
- if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
- continue;
-
- if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
- /* no key? check if there are options for this key */
- int quoted = 0;
- debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
- key_options = cp;
- for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
- if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
- cp++; /* Skip both */
- else if (*cp == '"')
- quoted = !quoted;
- }
- /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
- for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
- ;
- if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
- debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
- /* still no key? advance to next line*/
- continue;
- }
- }
- if (key_is_cert(key)) {
- if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key))
- continue;
- if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
- linenum) != 1)
- continue;
- if (!key_is_cert_authority)
- continue;
- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5,
- SSH_FP_HEX);
- debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
- file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
- /*
- * If the user has specified a list of principals as
- * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
- * their username in the certificate principals list.
- */
- if (authorized_principals != NULL &&
- !match_principals_option(authorized_principals,
- key->cert)) {
- reason = "Certificate does not contain an "
- "authorized principal";
- fail_reason:
- free(fp);
- error("%s", reason);
- auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
- continue;
- }
- if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0,
- authorized_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL,
- &reason) != 0)
- goto fail_reason;
- if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0) {
- free(fp);
- continue;
- }
- verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" "
- "signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
- key_type(found), fp, file);
- free(fp);
- found_key = 1;
- break;
- } else if (key_equal(found, key)) {
- if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
- linenum) != 1)
- continue;
- if (key_is_cert_authority)
- continue;
- found_key = 1;
- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
- file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
- free(fp);
- break;
- }
- }
- if (found != NULL)
- key_free(found);
- if (!found_key)
- debug2("key not found");
- return found_key;
-}
-
-/* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */
-static int
-user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
-{
- char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
- const char *reason;
- int ret = 0;
-
- if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-
- if (key_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
- options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1) != 1) {
- debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
- key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
- options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
- goto out;
- }
- /*
- * If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate
- * principals against the names in that file rather than matching
- * against the username.
- */
- if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) {
- if (!match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert)) {
- reason = "Certificate does not contain an "
- "authorized principal";
- fail_reason:
- error("%s", reason);
- auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
- goto out;
- }
- }
- if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
- principals_file == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0)
- goto fail_reason;
- if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0)
- goto out;
-
- verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by %s CA %s via %s",
- key->cert->key_id, key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
- options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
- ret = 1;
-
- out:
- free(principals_file);
- free(ca_fp);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Checks whether key is allowed in file.
- * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
- */
-static int
-user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
-{
- FILE *f;
- int found_key = 0;
-
- /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
- temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-
- debug("trying public key file %s", file);
- if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) {
- found_key = check_authkeys_file(f, file, key, pw);
- fclose(f);
- }
-
- restore_uid();
- return found_key;
-}
-
-/*
- * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command.
- * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
- */
-static int
-user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
-{
- FILE *f;
- int ok, found_key = 0;
- struct passwd *pw;
- struct stat st;
- int status, devnull, p[2], i;
- pid_t pid;
- char *username, errmsg[512];
-
- if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL ||
- options.authorized_keys_command[0] != '/')
- return 0;
-
- if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
- error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping");
- return 0;
- }
-
- username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
- "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
- pw = getpwnam(username);
- if (pw == NULL) {
- error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
- username, strerror(errno));
- free(username);
- return 0;
- }
- free(username);
-
- temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-
- if (stat(options.authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
- error("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
- options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
- goto out;
- }
- if (auth_secure_path(options.authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0,
- errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
- error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (pipe(p) != 0) {
- error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- goto out;
- }
-
- debug3("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s %s\" as \"%s\"",
- options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, pw->pw_name);
-
- /*
- * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
- * run cleanup_exit() code.
- */
- restore_uid();
-
- switch ((pid = fork())) {
- case -1: /* error */
- error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- close(p[0]);
- close(p[1]);
- return 0;
- case 0: /* child */
- for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
- signal(i, SIG_DFL);
-
- if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
- error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
- strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
- /* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
- if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
- dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
- error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
-
- /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
- if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
- error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
- strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
- if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
- error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
- strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
- /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
- if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
- error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
-
- execl(options.authorized_keys_command,
- options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL);
-
- error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
- options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
- _exit(127);
- default: /* parent */
- break;
- }
-
- temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-
- close(p[1]);
- if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
- error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- close(p[0]);
- /* Don't leave zombie child */
- kill(pid, SIGTERM);
- while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
- ;
- goto out;
- }
- ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
- fclose(f);
-
- while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
- if (errno != EINTR) {
- error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- goto out;
- }
- }
- if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
- error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
- options.authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
- goto out;
- } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
- error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
- options.authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
- goto out;
- }
- found_key = ok;
- out:
- restore_uid();
- return found_key;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
- */
-int
-user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
-{
- u_int success, i;
- char *file;
-
- if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
- return 0;
- if (key_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
- return 0;
-
- success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key);
- if (success)
- return success;
-
- success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key);
- if (success > 0)
- return success;
-
- for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
-
- if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
- continue;
- file = expand_authorized_keys(
- options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
-
- success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file);
- free(file);
- }
-
- return success;
-}
-
-Authmethod method_pubkey = {
- "publickey",
- userauth_pubkey,
- &options.pubkey_authentication
-};
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-pubkey.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1110 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.55 2016/01/27 00:53:12 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */
+#include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern u_char *session_id2;
+extern u_int session_id2_len;
+
+static int
+userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ Key *key = NULL;
+ char *pkalg, *userstyle, *fp = NULL;
+ u_char *pkblob, *sig;
+ u_int alen, blen, slen;
+ int have_sig, pktype;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+
+ if (!authctxt->valid) {
+ debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ have_sig = packet_get_char();
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
+ debug2("%s: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH", __func__);
+ /* no explicit pkalg given */
+ pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
+ /* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */
+ pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ } else {
+ pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
+ pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
+ }
+ pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
+ if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+ /* this is perfectly legal */
+ logit("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
+ __func__, pkalg);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (key->type != pktype) {
+ error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key "
+ "(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
+ (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
+ logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe "
+ "signature scheme");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ if (auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key)) {
+ logit("refusing previously-used %s key", key_type(key));
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+ options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) {
+ logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes",
+ __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (have_sig) {
+ debug3("%s: have signature for %s %s",
+ __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp);
+ sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
+ packet_check_eom();
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
+ buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+ } else {
+ buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+ }
+ /* reconstruct packet */
+ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+ authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle);
+ free(userstyle);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b,
+ datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
+ "ssh-userauth" :
+ authctxt->service);
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
+ buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
+ } else {
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
+ buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
+ }
+ buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ buffer_dump(&b);
+#endif
+ pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
+
+ /* test for correct signature */
+ authenticated = 0;
+ if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 1)) &&
+ PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ buffer_len(&b))) == 1) {
+ authenticated = 1;
+ /* Record the successful key to prevent reuse */
+ auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
+ key = NULL; /* Don't free below */
+ }
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ free(sig);
+ } else {
+ debug("%s: test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable for %s %s",
+ __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp);
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ /* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
+ /*
+ * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
+ * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
+ * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
+ * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
+ * issue? -markus
+ */
+ if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 0))) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK);
+ packet_put_string(pkalg, alen);
+ packet_put_string(pkblob, blen);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ authctxt->postponed = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (authenticated != 1)
+ auth_clear_options();
+done:
+ debug2("%s: authenticated %d pkalg %s", __func__, authenticated, pkalg);
+ if (key != NULL)
+ key_free(key);
+ free(pkalg);
+ free(pkblob);
+ free(fp);
+ return authenticated;
+}
+
+void
+pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ char *fp, *extra;
+ va_list ap;
+ int i;
+
+ extra = NULL;
+ if (fmt != NULL) {
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ i = vasprintf(&extra, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ if (i < 0 || extra == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
+ }
+
+ if (key_is_cert(key)) {
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+ options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s",
+ key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
+ (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
+ key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
+ fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
+ extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
+ free(fp);
+ } else {
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key),
+ fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
+ extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
+ free(fp);
+ }
+ free(extra);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic
+ * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector
+ * and its members.
+ */
+static int
+split_argv(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ int argc = 0, quote, i, j;
+ char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv));
+
+ *argvp = NULL;
+ *argcp = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+ /* Skip leading whitespace */
+ if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')
+ continue;
+
+ /* Start of a token */
+ quote = 0;
+ if (s[i] == '\\' &&
+ (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\'))
+ i++;
+ else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"')
+ quote = s[i++];
+
+ argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv));
+ arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1);
+ argv[argc] = NULL;
+
+ /* Copy the token in, removing escapes */
+ for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+ if (s[i] == '\\') {
+ if (s[i + 1] == '\'' ||
+ s[i + 1] == '\"' ||
+ s[i + 1] == '\\') {
+ i++; /* Skip '\' */
+ arg[j++] = s[i];
+ } else {
+ /* Unrecognised escape */
+ arg[j++] = s[i];
+ }
+ } else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t'))
+ break; /* done */
+ else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote)
+ break; /* done */
+ else
+ arg[j++] = s[i];
+ }
+ if (s[i] == '\0') {
+ if (quote != 0) {
+ /* Ran out of string looking for close quote */
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Success */
+ *argcp = argc;
+ *argvp = argv;
+ argc = 0;
+ argv = NULL;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
+ free(argv[i]);
+ free(argv);
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as
+ * necessary. Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+static char *
+assemble_argv(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ int i, j, ws, r;
+ char c, *ret;
+ struct sshbuf *buf, *arg;
+
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+ ws = 0;
+ sshbuf_reset(arg);
+ for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) {
+ r = 0;
+ c = argv[i][j];
+ switch (c) {
+ case ' ':
+ case '\t':
+ ws = 1;
+ r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
+ break;
+ case '\\':
+ case '\'':
+ case '"':
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0)
+ break;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (r != 0)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) ||
+ (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) ||
+ (r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 ||
+ (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0))
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: malloc failed", __func__);
+ memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+ ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0';
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ sshbuf_free(arg);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Runs command in a subprocess. Returns pid on success and a FILE* to the
+ * subprocess' stdout or 0 on failure.
+ * NB. "command" is only used for logging.
+ */
+static pid_t
+subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
+ int ac, char **av, FILE **child)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ struct stat st;
+ int devnull, p[2], i;
+ pid_t pid;
+ char *cp, errmsg[512];
+ u_int envsize;
+ char **child_env;
+
+ *child = NULL;
+
+ debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s", __func__,
+ tag, command, pw->pw_name);
+
+ /* Verify the path exists and is safe-ish to execute */
+ if (*av[0] != '/') {
+ error("%s path is not absolute", tag);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ if (stat(av[0], &st) < 0) {
+ error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag,
+ av[0], strerror(errno));
+ restore_uid();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (auth_secure_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0,
+ errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
+ error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg);
+ restore_uid();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Run the command; stderr is left in place, stdout is the
+ * authorized_keys output.
+ */
+ if (pipe(p) != 0) {
+ error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+ restore_uid();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
+ * run cleanup_exit() code.
+ */
+ restore_uid();
+
+ switch ((pid = fork())) {
+ case -1: /* error */
+ error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+ close(p[0]);
+ close(p[1]);
+ return 0;
+ case 0: /* child */
+ /* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */
+ envsize = 5;
+ child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize);
+ child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
+ child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
+ child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
+ child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
+ if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL)
+ child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
+ signal(i, SIG_DFL);
+
+ if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+ error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL,
+ strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
+ if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
+ dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
+ error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
+ /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
+ if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+ error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
+ strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
+ error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
+ strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
+ if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
+ error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+
+ execve(av[0], av, child_env);
+ error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
+ _exit(127);
+ default: /* parent */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ close(p[1]);
+ if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+ close(p[0]);
+ /* Don't leave zombie child */
+ kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+ while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+ ;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Success */
+ debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid);
+ *child = f;
+ return pid;
+}
+
+/* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */
+static int
+exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd)
+{
+ int status;
+
+ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+ if (errno != EINTR) {
+ error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+ error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status));
+ return -1;
+ } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+ error("%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
+{
+ char *result;
+ u_int i;
+
+ /* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
+ if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i],
+ principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) {
+ debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"",
+ result);
+ free(result);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw,
+ struct sshkey_cert *cert)
+{
+ char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts;
+ u_long linenum = 0;
+ u_int i;
+
+ while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
+ /* Skip leading whitespace. */
+ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ /* Skip blank and comment lines. */
+ if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL)
+ *ep = '\0';
+ if (!*cp || *cp == '\n')
+ continue;
+ /* Trim trailing whitespace. */
+ ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1;
+ while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'))
+ *ep-- = '\0';
+ /*
+ * If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has
+ * key options.
+ */
+ line_opts = NULL;
+ if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL ||
+ (ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) {
+ for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++)
+ ;
+ line_opts = cp;
+ cp = ep;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
+ debug3("%s:%lu: matched principal \"%.100s\"",
+ file == NULL ? "(command)" : file,
+ linenum, cert->principals[i]);
+ if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
+ file, linenum) != 1)
+ continue;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ int success;
+
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
+ if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
+ restore_uid();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ success = process_principals(f, file, pw, cert);
+ fclose(f);
+ restore_uid();
+ return success;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether principal is allowed in output of command.
+ * returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
+{
+ FILE *f = NULL;
+ int ok, found_principal = 0;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0;
+ pid_t pid;
+ char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
+ void (*osigchld)(int);
+
+ if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) {
+ error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, "
+ "skipping");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
+ * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
+ */
+ osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+
+ /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
+ username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user,
+ "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+ pw = getpwnam(username);
+ if (pw == NULL) {
+ error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
+ username, strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Turn the command into an argument vector */
+ if (split_argv(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
+ error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains "
+ "invalid quotes", command);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (ac == 0) {
+ error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
+ command);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
+ tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
+ "u", user_pw->pw_name,
+ "h", user_pw->pw_dir,
+ (char *)NULL);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__);
+ free(av[i]);
+ av[i] = tmp;
+ }
+ /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
+ command = assemble_argv(ac, av);
+
+ if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", pw, command,
+ ac, av, &f)) == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ uid_swapped = 1;
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+ ok = process_principals(f, NULL, pw, cert);
+
+ if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Read completed successfully */
+ found_principal = ok;
+ out:
+ if (f != NULL)
+ fclose(f);
+ signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+ free(av[i]);
+ free(av);
+ if (uid_swapped)
+ restore_uid();
+ free(command);
+ free(username);
+ return found_principal;
+}
+/*
+ * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
+ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
+ const char *reason;
+ int found_key = 0;
+ u_long linenum = 0;
+ Key *found;
+ char *fp;
+
+ found_key = 0;
+
+ found = NULL;
+ while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
+ char *cp, *key_options = NULL;
+ if (found != NULL)
+ key_free(found);
+ found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
+ auth_clear_options();
+
+ /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
+ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+ continue;
+
+ if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
+ /* no key? check if there are options for this key */
+ int quoted = 0;
+ debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
+ key_options = cp;
+ for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+ if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+ cp++; /* Skip both */
+ else if (*cp == '"')
+ quoted = !quoted;
+ }
+ /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
+ for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
+ debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
+ /* still no key? advance to next line*/
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ if (key_is_cert(key)) {
+ if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key))
+ continue;
+ if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
+ linenum) != 1)
+ continue;
+ if (!key_is_cert_authority)
+ continue;
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
+ options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ continue;
+ debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
+ file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a list of principals as
+ * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
+ * their username in the certificate principals list.
+ */
+ if (authorized_principals != NULL &&
+ !match_principals_option(authorized_principals,
+ key->cert)) {
+ reason = "Certificate does not contain an "
+ "authorized principal";
+ fail_reason:
+ free(fp);
+ error("%s", reason);
+ auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0,
+ authorized_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL,
+ &reason) != 0)
+ goto fail_reason;
+ if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0) {
+ free(fp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) "
+ "signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
+ (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
+ key_type(found), fp, file);
+ free(fp);
+ found_key = 1;
+ break;
+ } else if (key_equal(found, key)) {
+ if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
+ linenum) != 1)
+ continue;
+ if (key_is_cert_authority)
+ continue;
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
+ options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ continue;
+ debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
+ file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
+ free(fp);
+ found_key = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (found != NULL)
+ key_free(found);
+ if (!found_key)
+ debug2("key not found");
+ return found_key;
+}
+
+/* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */
+static int
+user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
+{
+ char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
+ const char *reason;
+ int ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals;
+
+ if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+ options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
+ options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0) != 0) {
+ debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
+ key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
+ options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate
+ * principals against the names in that file rather than matching
+ * against the username.
+ */
+ if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) {
+ if (match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert))
+ found_principal = 1;
+ }
+ /* Try querying command if specified */
+ if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(pw, key->cert))
+ found_principal = 1;
+ /* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */
+ use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL ||
+ options.authorized_principals_command != NULL;
+ if (!found_principal && use_authorized_principals) {
+ reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
+ fail_reason:
+ error("%s", reason);
+ auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
+ use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0)
+ goto fail_reason;
+ if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) signed by "
+ "%s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
+ (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
+ key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
+ options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
+ ret = 1;
+
+ out:
+ free(principals_file);
+ free(ca_fp);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether key is allowed in file.
+ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ int found_key = 0;
+
+ /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+ debug("trying public key file %s", file);
+ if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) {
+ found_key = check_authkeys_file(f, file, key, pw);
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+
+ restore_uid();
+ return found_key;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command.
+ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
+{
+ FILE *f = NULL;
+ int r, ok, found_key = 0;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0;
+ pid_t pid;
+ char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
+ char *tmp, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
+ void (*osigchld)(int);
+
+ if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
+ error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
+ * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
+ */
+ osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+
+ /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
+ username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
+ "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+ pw = getpwnam(username);
+ if (pw == NULL) {
+ error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
+ username, strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */
+ if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Turn the command into an argument vector */
+ if (split_argv(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
+ error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes",
+ command);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (ac == 0) {
+ error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
+ command);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
+ tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
+ "u", user_pw->pw_name,
+ "h", user_pw->pw_dir,
+ "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+ "f", key_fp,
+ "k", keytext,
+ (char *)NULL);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__);
+ free(av[i]);
+ av[i] = tmp;
+ }
+ /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
+ command = assemble_argv(ac, av);
+
+ /*
+ * If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments
+ * then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the
+ * target username as a single argument.
+ */
+ if (ac == 1) {
+ av = xreallocarray(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av));
+ av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name);
+ av[2] = NULL;
+ /* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */
+ free(command);
+ xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]);
+ }
+
+ if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", pw, command,
+ ac, av, &f)) == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ uid_swapped = 1;
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+ ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
+
+ if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Read completed successfully */
+ found_key = ok;
+ out:
+ if (f != NULL)
+ fclose(f);
+ signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+ free(av[i]);
+ free(av);
+ if (uid_swapped)
+ restore_uid();
+ free(command);
+ free(username);
+ free(key_fp);
+ free(keytext);
+ return found_key;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
+ */
+int
+user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, int auth_attempt)
+{
+ u_int success, i;
+ char *file;
+
+ if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
+ return 0;
+ if (key_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
+ return 0;
+
+ success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key);
+ if (success)
+ return success;
+
+ success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key);
+ if (success > 0)
+ return success;
+
+ for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
+
+ if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
+ continue;
+ file = expand_authorized_keys(
+ options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
+
+ success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file);
+ free(file);
+ }
+
+ return success;
+}
+
+/* Records a public key in the list of previously-successful keys */
+void
+auth2_record_userkey(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key)
+{
+ struct sshkey **tmp;
+
+ if (authctxt->nprev_userkeys >= INT_MAX ||
+ (tmp = reallocarray(authctxt->prev_userkeys,
+ authctxt->nprev_userkeys + 1, sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: reallocarray failed", __func__);
+ authctxt->prev_userkeys = tmp;
+ authctxt->prev_userkeys[authctxt->nprev_userkeys] = key;
+ authctxt->nprev_userkeys++;
+}
+
+/* Checks whether a key has already been used successfully for authentication */
+int
+auth2_userkey_already_used(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nprev_userkeys; i++) {
+ if (sshkey_equal_public(key, authctxt->prev_userkeys[i])) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+Authmethod method_pubkey = {
+ "publickey",
+ userauth_pubkey,
+ &options.pubkey_authentication
+};
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,618 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.130 2014/01/29 06:18:35 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
-
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern u_char *session_id2;
-extern u_int session_id2_len;
-extern Buffer loginmsg;
-
-/* methods */
-
-extern Authmethod method_none;
-extern Authmethod method_pubkey;
-extern Authmethod method_passwd;
-extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
-extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
-#endif
-
-Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
- &method_none,
- &method_pubkey,
-#ifdef GSSAPI
- &method_gssapi,
-#endif
- &method_passwd,
- &method_kbdint,
- &method_hostbased,
- NULL
-};
-
-/* protocol */
-
-static void input_service_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-static void input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-
-/* helper */
-static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *, const char *);
-static char *authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt);
-
-#define MATCH_NONE 0 /* method or submethod mismatch */
-#define MATCH_METHOD 1 /* method matches (no submethod specified) */
-#define MATCH_BOTH 2 /* method and submethod match */
-#define MATCH_PARTIAL 3 /* method matches, submethod can't be checked */
-static int list_starts_with(const char *, const char *, const char *);
-
-char *
-auth2_read_banner(void)
-{
- struct stat st;
- char *banner = NULL;
- size_t len, n;
- int fd;
-
- if ((fd = open(options.banner, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
- return (NULL);
- if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
- close(fd);
- return (NULL);
- }
- if (st.st_size <= 0 || st.st_size > 1*1024*1024) {
- close(fd);
- return (NULL);
- }
-
- len = (size_t)st.st_size; /* truncate */
- banner = xmalloc(len + 1);
- n = atomicio(read, fd, banner, len);
- close(fd);
-
- if (n != len) {
- free(banner);
- return (NULL);
- }
- banner[n] = '\0';
-
- return (banner);
-}
-
-void
-userauth_send_banner(const char *msg)
-{
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_BANNER)
- return;
-
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
- packet_put_cstring(msg);
- packet_put_cstring(""); /* language, unused */
- packet_send();
- debug("%s: sent", __func__);
-}
-
-static void
-userauth_banner(void)
-{
- char *banner = NULL;
-
- if (options.banner == NULL ||
- strcasecmp(options.banner, "none") == 0 ||
- (datafellows & SSH_BUG_BANNER) != 0)
- return;
-
- if ((banner = PRIVSEP(auth2_read_banner())) == NULL)
- goto done;
- userauth_send_banner(banner);
-
-done:
- free(banner);
-}
-
-/*
- * loop until authctxt->success == TRUE
- */
-void
-do_authentication2(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, &input_service_request);
- dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt->success, authctxt);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static void
-input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- u_int len;
- int acceptit = 0;
- char *service = packet_get_cstring(&len);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_service_request: no authctxt");
-
- if (strcmp(service, "ssh-userauth") == 0) {
- if (!authctxt->success) {
- acceptit = 1;
- /* now we can handle user-auth requests */
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &input_userauth_request);
- }
- }
- /* XXX all other service requests are denied */
-
- if (acceptit) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT);
- packet_put_cstring(service);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- } else {
- debug("bad service request %s", service);
- packet_disconnect("bad service request %s", service);
- }
- free(service);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static void
-input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- Authmethod *m = NULL;
- char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
- int authenticated = 0;
-
- if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_userauth_request: no authctxt");
-
- user = packet_get_cstring(NULL);
- service = packet_get_cstring(NULL);
- method = packet_get_cstring(NULL);
- debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
- debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
-
- if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
- *style++ = 0;
-
- if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
- /* setup auth context */
- authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user));
- authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
- if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
- authctxt->valid = 1;
- debug2("input_userauth_request: setting up authctxt for %s", user);
- } else {
- logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user);
- authctxt->pw = fakepw();
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
-#endif
- }
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
- PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
-#endif
- setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
- use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
- authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
- authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
- if (use_privsep)
- mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
- userauth_banner();
- if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
- packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
- } else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 ||
- strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
- packet_disconnect("Change of username or service not allowed: "
- "(%s,%s) -> (%s,%s)",
- authctxt->user, authctxt->service, user, service);
- }
- /* reset state */
- auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
- /* XXX move to auth2_gssapi_stop() */
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
-#endif
-
- authctxt->postponed = 0;
- authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0;
-
- /* try to authenticate user */
- m = authmethod_lookup(authctxt, method);
- if (m != NULL && authctxt->failures < options.max_authtries) {
- debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
- authenticated = m->userauth(authctxt);
- }
- userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method, NULL);
-
- free(service);
- free(user);
- free(method);
-}
-
-void
-userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method,
- const char *submethod)
-{
- char *methods;
- int partial = 0;
-
- if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
- fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
- authctxt->user);
- if (authenticated && authctxt->postponed)
- fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated and postponed");
-
- /* Special handling for root */
- if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
- !auth_root_allowed(method)) {
- authenticated = 0;
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
-#endif
- }
-
- if (authenticated && options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
- if (!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, method, submethod)) {
- authenticated = 0;
- partial = 1;
- }
- }
-
- /* Log before sending the reply */
- auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial, method, submethod);
-
- if (authctxt->postponed)
- return;
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
- if (!PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
- /* if PAM returned a message, send it to the user */
- if (buffer_len(&loginmsg) > 0) {
- buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
- userauth_send_banner(buffer_ptr(&loginmsg));
- packet_write_wait();
- }
- fatal("Access denied for user %s by PAM account "
- "configuration", authctxt->user);
- }
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifdef _UNICOS
- if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) {
- authenticated = 0;
- fatal("Access denied for user %s.", authctxt->user);
- }
-#endif /* _UNICOS */
-
- if (authenticated == 1) {
- /* turn off userauth */
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &dispatch_protocol_ignore);
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- /* now we can break out */
- authctxt->success = 1;
- } else {
-
- /* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
- if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
- (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0))
- authctxt->failures++;
- if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
-#endif
- packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
- }
- methods = authmethods_get(authctxt);
- debug3("%s: failure partial=%d next methods=\"%s\"", __func__,
- partial, methods);
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
- packet_put_cstring(methods);
- packet_put_char(partial);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- free(methods);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Checks whether method is allowed by at least one AuthenticationMethods
- * methods list. Returns 1 if allowed, or no methods lists configured.
- * 0 otherwise.
- */
-int
-auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method,
- const char *submethod)
-{
- u_int i;
-
- /*
- * NB. authctxt->num_auth_methods might be zero as a result of
- * auth2_setup_methods_lists(), so check the configuration.
- */
- if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
- return 1;
- for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
- if (list_starts_with(authctxt->auth_methods[i], method,
- submethod) != MATCH_NONE)
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static char *
-authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- Buffer b;
- char *list;
- u_int i;
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
- if (strcmp(authmethods[i]->name, "none") == 0)
- continue;
- if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
- *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0)
- continue;
- if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name,
- NULL))
- continue;
- if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
- buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
- buffer_append(&b, authmethods[i]->name,
- strlen(authmethods[i]->name));
- }
- buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
- list = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
- buffer_free(&b);
- return list;
-}
-
-static Authmethod *
-authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *name)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (name != NULL)
- for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++)
- if (authmethods[i]->enabled != NULL &&
- *(authmethods[i]->enabled) != 0 &&
- strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0 &&
- auth2_method_allowed(authctxt,
- authmethods[i]->name, NULL))
- return authmethods[i];
- debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s",
- name ? name : "NULL");
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check a comma-separated list of methods for validity. Is need_enable is
- * non-zero, then also require that the methods are enabled.
- * Returns 0 on success or -1 if the methods list is invalid.
- */
-int
-auth2_methods_valid(const char *_methods, int need_enable)
-{
- char *methods, *omethods, *method, *p;
- u_int i, found;
- int ret = -1;
-
- if (*_methods == '\0') {
- error("empty authentication method list");
- return -1;
- }
- omethods = methods = xstrdup(_methods);
- while ((method = strsep(&methods, ",")) != NULL) {
- for (found = i = 0; !found && authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
- if ((p = strchr(method, ':')) != NULL)
- *p = '\0';
- if (strcmp(method, authmethods[i]->name) != 0)
- continue;
- if (need_enable) {
- if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
- *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0) {
- error("Disabled method \"%s\" in "
- "AuthenticationMethods list \"%s\"",
- method, _methods);
- goto out;
- }
- }
- found = 1;
- break;
- }
- if (!found) {
- error("Unknown authentication method \"%s\" in list",
- method);
- goto out;
- }
- }
- ret = 0;
- out:
- free(omethods);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Prune the AuthenticationMethods supplied in the configuration, removing
- * any methods lists that include disabled methods. Note that this might
- * leave authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0, even when multiple required auth
- * has been requested. For this reason, all tests for whether multiple is
- * enabled should consult options.num_auth_methods directly.
- */
-int
-auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- u_int i;
-
- if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
- return 0;
- debug3("%s: checking methods", __func__);
- authctxt->auth_methods = xcalloc(options.num_auth_methods,
- sizeof(*authctxt->auth_methods));
- authctxt->num_auth_methods = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) {
- if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i], 1) != 0) {
- logit("Authentication methods list \"%s\" contains "
- "disabled method, skipping",
- options.auth_methods[i]);
- continue;
- }
- debug("authentication methods list %d: %s",
- authctxt->num_auth_methods, options.auth_methods[i]);
- authctxt->auth_methods[authctxt->num_auth_methods++] =
- xstrdup(options.auth_methods[i]);
- }
- if (authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0) {
- error("No AuthenticationMethods left after eliminating "
- "disabled methods");
- return -1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-list_starts_with(const char *methods, const char *method,
- const char *submethod)
-{
- size_t l = strlen(method);
- int match;
- const char *p;
-
- if (strncmp(methods, method, l) != 0)
- return MATCH_NONE;
- p = methods + l;
- match = MATCH_METHOD;
- if (*p == ':') {
- if (!submethod)
- return MATCH_PARTIAL;
- l = strlen(submethod);
- p += 1;
- if (strncmp(submethod, p, l))
- return MATCH_NONE;
- p += l;
- match = MATCH_BOTH;
- }
- if (*p != ',' && *p != '\0')
- return MATCH_NONE;
- return match;
-}
-
-/*
- * Remove method from the start of a comma-separated list of methods.
- * Returns 0 if the list of methods did not start with that method or 1
- * if it did.
- */
-static int
-remove_method(char **methods, const char *method, const char *submethod)
-{
- char *omethods = *methods, *p;
- size_t l = strlen(method);
- int match;
-
- match = list_starts_with(omethods, method, submethod);
- if (match != MATCH_METHOD && match != MATCH_BOTH)
- return 0;
- p = omethods + l;
- if (submethod && match == MATCH_BOTH)
- p += 1 + strlen(submethod); /* include colon */
- if (*p == ',')
- p++;
- *methods = xstrdup(p);
- free(omethods);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Called after successful authentication. Will remove the successful method
- * from the start of each list in which it occurs. If it was the last method
- * in any list, then authentication is deemed successful.
- * Returns 1 if the method completed any authentication list or 0 otherwise.
- */
-int
-auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method,
- const char *submethod)
-{
- u_int i, found = 0;
-
- debug3("%s: updating methods list after \"%s\"", __func__, method);
- for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
- if (!remove_method(&(authctxt->auth_methods[i]), method,
- submethod))
- continue;
- found = 1;
- if (*authctxt->auth_methods[i] == '\0') {
- debug2("authentication methods list %d complete", i);
- return 1;
- }
- debug3("authentication methods list %d remaining: \"%s\"",
- i, authctxt->auth_methods[i]);
- }
- /* This should not happen, but would be bad if it did */
- if (!found)
- fatal("%s: method not in AuthenticationMethods", __func__);
- return 0;
-}
-
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/auth2.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,619 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.136 2016/05/02 08:49:03 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern u_char *session_id2;
+extern u_int session_id2_len;
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+
+/* methods */
+
+extern Authmethod method_none;
+extern Authmethod method_pubkey;
+extern Authmethod method_passwd;
+extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
+extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
+#endif
+
+Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
+ &method_none,
+ &method_pubkey,
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ &method_gssapi,
+#endif
+ &method_passwd,
+ &method_kbdint,
+ &method_hostbased,
+ NULL
+};
+
+/* protocol */
+
+static int input_service_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+static int input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+/* helper */
+static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *, const char *);
+static char *authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt);
+
+#define MATCH_NONE 0 /* method or submethod mismatch */
+#define MATCH_METHOD 1 /* method matches (no submethod specified) */
+#define MATCH_BOTH 2 /* method and submethod match */
+#define MATCH_PARTIAL 3 /* method matches, submethod can't be checked */
+static int list_starts_with(const char *, const char *, const char *);
+
+char *
+auth2_read_banner(void)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+ char *banner = NULL;
+ size_t len, n;
+ int fd;
+
+ if ((fd = open(options.banner, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+ return (NULL);
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
+ close(fd);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ if (st.st_size <= 0 || st.st_size > 1*1024*1024) {
+ close(fd);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ len = (size_t)st.st_size; /* truncate */
+ banner = xmalloc(len + 1);
+ n = atomicio(read, fd, banner, len);
+ close(fd);
+
+ if (n != len) {
+ free(banner);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ banner[n] = '\0';
+
+ return (banner);
+}
+
+void
+userauth_send_banner(const char *msg)
+{
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_BANNER)
+ return;
+
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
+ packet_put_cstring(msg);
+ packet_put_cstring(""); /* language, unused */
+ packet_send();
+ debug("%s: sent", __func__);
+}
+
+static void
+userauth_banner(void)
+{
+ char *banner = NULL;
+
+ if (options.banner == NULL || (datafellows & SSH_BUG_BANNER) != 0)
+ return;
+
+ if ((banner = PRIVSEP(auth2_read_banner())) == NULL)
+ goto done;
+ userauth_send_banner(banner);
+
+done:
+ free(banner);
+}
+
+/*
+ * loop until authctxt->success == TRUE
+ */
+void
+do_authentication2(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, &input_service_request);
+ dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt->success, authctxt);
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static int
+input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ u_int len;
+ int acceptit = 0;
+ char *service = packet_get_cstring(&len);
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_service_request: no authctxt");
+
+ if (strcmp(service, "ssh-userauth") == 0) {
+ if (!authctxt->success) {
+ acceptit = 1;
+ /* now we can handle user-auth requests */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &input_userauth_request);
+ }
+ }
+ /* XXX all other service requests are denied */
+
+ if (acceptit) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT);
+ packet_put_cstring(service);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ } else {
+ debug("bad service request %s", service);
+ packet_disconnect("bad service request %s", service);
+ }
+ free(service);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static int
+input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ Authmethod *m = NULL;
+ char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_userauth_request: no authctxt");
+
+ user = packet_get_cstring(NULL);
+ service = packet_get_cstring(NULL);
+ method = packet_get_cstring(NULL);
+ debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
+ debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+
+ if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+ *style++ = 0;
+
+ if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
+ /* setup auth context */
+ authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user));
+ authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
+ if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
+ authctxt->valid = 1;
+ debug2("input_userauth_request: setting up authctxt for %s", user);
+ } else {
+ logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user);
+ authctxt->pw = fakepw();
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
+#endif
+ }
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+ PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
+#endif
+ setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
+ use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+ authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
+ authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+ if (use_privsep)
+ mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
+ userauth_banner();
+ if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
+ packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
+ } else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 ||
+ strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
+ packet_disconnect("Change of username or service not allowed: "
+ "(%s,%s) -> (%s,%s)",
+ authctxt->user, authctxt->service, user, service);
+ }
+ /* reset state */
+ auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ /* XXX move to auth2_gssapi_stop() */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
+#endif
+
+ authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0;
+
+ /* try to authenticate user */
+ m = authmethod_lookup(authctxt, method);
+ if (m != NULL && authctxt->failures < options.max_authtries) {
+ debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
+ authenticated = m->userauth(authctxt);
+ }
+ userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method, NULL);
+
+ free(service);
+ free(user);
+ free(method);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method,
+ const char *submethod)
+{
+ char *methods;
+ int partial = 0;
+
+ if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
+ fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
+ authctxt->user);
+ if (authenticated && authctxt->postponed)
+ fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated and postponed");
+
+ /* Special handling for root */
+ if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+ !auth_root_allowed(method)) {
+ authenticated = 0;
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (authenticated && options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
+ if (!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, method, submethod)) {
+ authenticated = 0;
+ partial = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Log before sending the reply */
+ auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial, method, submethod);
+
+ if (authctxt->postponed)
+ return;
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
+ if (!PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
+ /* if PAM returned a message, send it to the user */
+ if (buffer_len(&loginmsg) > 0) {
+ buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
+ userauth_send_banner(buffer_ptr(&loginmsg));
+ packet_write_wait();
+ }
+ fatal("Access denied for user %s by PAM account "
+ "configuration", authctxt->user);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+ if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) {
+ authenticated = 0;
+ fatal("Access denied for user %s.", authctxt->user);
+ }
+#endif /* _UNICOS */
+
+ if (authenticated == 1) {
+ /* turn off userauth */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &dispatch_protocol_ignore);
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ /* now we can break out */
+ authctxt->success = 1;
+ } else {
+
+ /* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
+ if (!partial && !authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
+ (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0))
+ authctxt->failures++;
+ if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
+#endif
+ auth_maxtries_exceeded(authctxt);
+ }
+ methods = authmethods_get(authctxt);
+ debug3("%s: failure partial=%d next methods=\"%s\"", __func__,
+ partial, methods);
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_cstring(methods);
+ packet_put_char(partial);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ free(methods);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether method is allowed by at least one AuthenticationMethods
+ * methods list. Returns 1 if allowed, or no methods lists configured.
+ * 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int
+auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method,
+ const char *submethod)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ /*
+ * NB. authctxt->num_auth_methods might be zero as a result of
+ * auth2_setup_methods_lists(), so check the configuration.
+ */
+ if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
+ return 1;
+ for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
+ if (list_starts_with(authctxt->auth_methods[i], method,
+ submethod) != MATCH_NONE)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static char *
+authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ char *list;
+ u_int i;
+
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(authmethods[i]->name, "none") == 0)
+ continue;
+ if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
+ *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0)
+ continue;
+ if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name,
+ NULL))
+ continue;
+ if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
+ buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
+ buffer_append(&b, authmethods[i]->name,
+ strlen(authmethods[i]->name));
+ }
+ if ((list = sshbuf_dup_string(&b)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ return list;
+}
+
+static Authmethod *
+authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *name)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (name != NULL)
+ for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++)
+ if (authmethods[i]->enabled != NULL &&
+ *(authmethods[i]->enabled) != 0 &&
+ strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0 &&
+ auth2_method_allowed(authctxt,
+ authmethods[i]->name, NULL))
+ return authmethods[i];
+ debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s",
+ name ? name : "NULL");
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check a comma-separated list of methods for validity. Is need_enable is
+ * non-zero, then also require that the methods are enabled.
+ * Returns 0 on success or -1 if the methods list is invalid.
+ */
+int
+auth2_methods_valid(const char *_methods, int need_enable)
+{
+ char *methods, *omethods, *method, *p;
+ u_int i, found;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (*_methods == '\0') {
+ error("empty authentication method list");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ omethods = methods = xstrdup(_methods);
+ while ((method = strsep(&methods, ",")) != NULL) {
+ for (found = i = 0; !found && authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ if ((p = strchr(method, ':')) != NULL)
+ *p = '\0';
+ if (strcmp(method, authmethods[i]->name) != 0)
+ continue;
+ if (need_enable) {
+ if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
+ *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0) {
+ error("Disabled method \"%s\" in "
+ "AuthenticationMethods list \"%s\"",
+ method, _methods);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!found) {
+ error("Unknown authentication method \"%s\" in list",
+ method);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ free(omethods);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prune the AuthenticationMethods supplied in the configuration, removing
+ * any methods lists that include disabled methods. Note that this might
+ * leave authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0, even when multiple required auth
+ * has been requested. For this reason, all tests for whether multiple is
+ * enabled should consult options.num_auth_methods directly.
+ */
+int
+auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
+ return 0;
+ debug3("%s: checking methods", __func__);
+ authctxt->auth_methods = xcalloc(options.num_auth_methods,
+ sizeof(*authctxt->auth_methods));
+ authctxt->num_auth_methods = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) {
+ if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i], 1) != 0) {
+ logit("Authentication methods list \"%s\" contains "
+ "disabled method, skipping",
+ options.auth_methods[i]);
+ continue;
+ }
+ debug("authentication methods list %d: %s",
+ authctxt->num_auth_methods, options.auth_methods[i]);
+ authctxt->auth_methods[authctxt->num_auth_methods++] =
+ xstrdup(options.auth_methods[i]);
+ }
+ if (authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0) {
+ error("No AuthenticationMethods left after eliminating "
+ "disabled methods");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+list_starts_with(const char *methods, const char *method,
+ const char *submethod)
+{
+ size_t l = strlen(method);
+ int match;
+ const char *p;
+
+ if (strncmp(methods, method, l) != 0)
+ return MATCH_NONE;
+ p = methods + l;
+ match = MATCH_METHOD;
+ if (*p == ':') {
+ if (!submethod)
+ return MATCH_PARTIAL;
+ l = strlen(submethod);
+ p += 1;
+ if (strncmp(submethod, p, l))
+ return MATCH_NONE;
+ p += l;
+ match = MATCH_BOTH;
+ }
+ if (*p != ',' && *p != '\0')
+ return MATCH_NONE;
+ return match;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remove method from the start of a comma-separated list of methods.
+ * Returns 0 if the list of methods did not start with that method or 1
+ * if it did.
+ */
+static int
+remove_method(char **methods, const char *method, const char *submethod)
+{
+ char *omethods = *methods, *p;
+ size_t l = strlen(method);
+ int match;
+
+ match = list_starts_with(omethods, method, submethod);
+ if (match != MATCH_METHOD && match != MATCH_BOTH)
+ return 0;
+ p = omethods + l;
+ if (submethod && match == MATCH_BOTH)
+ p += 1 + strlen(submethod); /* include colon */
+ if (*p == ',')
+ p++;
+ *methods = xstrdup(p);
+ free(omethods);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called after successful authentication. Will remove the successful method
+ * from the start of each list in which it occurs. If it was the last method
+ * in any list, then authentication is deemed successful.
+ * Returns 1 if the method completed any authentication list or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int
+auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method,
+ const char *submethod)
+{
+ u_int i, found = 0;
+
+ debug3("%s: updating methods list after \"%s\"", __func__, method);
+ for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
+ if (!remove_method(&(authctxt->auth_methods[i]), method,
+ submethod))
+ continue;
+ found = 1;
+ if (*authctxt->auth_methods[i] == '\0') {
+ debug2("authentication methods list %d complete", i);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ debug3("authentication methods list %d remaining: \"%s\"",
+ i, authctxt->auth_methods[i]);
+ }
+ /* This should not happen, but would be bad if it did */
+ if (!found)
+ fatal("%s: method not in AuthenticationMethods", __func__);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfd.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/authfd.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfd.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,657 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.92 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Functions for connecting the local authentication agent.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- * SSH2 implementation,
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/un.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "authfd.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-
-static int agent_present = 0;
-
-/* helper */
-int decode_reply(int type);
-
-/* macro to check for "agent failure" message */
-#define agent_failed(x) \
- ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \
- (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE))
-
-int
-ssh_agent_present(void)
-{
- int authfd;
-
- if (agent_present)
- return 1;
- if ((authfd = ssh_get_authentication_socket()) == -1)
- return 0;
- else {
- ssh_close_authentication_socket(authfd);
- return 1;
- }
-}
-
-/* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */
-
-int
-ssh_get_authentication_socket(void)
-{
- const char *authsocket;
- int sock;
- struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
-
- authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
- if (!authsocket)
- return -1;
-
- memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
- sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
- strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
-
- sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- if (sock < 0)
- return -1;
-
- /* close on exec */
- if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) {
- close(sock);
- return -1;
- }
- if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
- close(sock);
- return -1;
- }
- agent_present = 1;
- return sock;
-}
-
-static int
-ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply)
-{
- u_int l, len;
- char buf[1024];
-
- /* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
- len = buffer_len(request);
- put_u32(buf, len);
-
- /* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */
- if (atomicio(vwrite, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
- atomicio(vwrite, auth->fd, buffer_ptr(request),
- buffer_len(request)) != buffer_len(request)) {
- error("Error writing to authentication socket.");
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * Wait for response from the agent. First read the length of the
- * response packet.
- */
- if (atomicio(read, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4) {
- error("Error reading response length from authentication socket.");
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
- len = get_u32(buf);
- if (len > 256 * 1024)
- fatal("Authentication response too long: %u", len);
-
- /* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */
- buffer_clear(reply);
- while (len > 0) {
- l = len;
- if (l > sizeof(buf))
- l = sizeof(buf);
- if (atomicio(read, auth->fd, buf, l) != l) {
- error("Error reading response from authentication socket.");
- return 0;
- }
- buffer_append(reply, buf, l);
- len -= l;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Closes the agent socket if it should be closed (depends on how it was
- * obtained). The argument must have been returned by
- * ssh_get_authentication_socket().
- */
-
-void
-ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock)
-{
- if (getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
- close(sock);
-}
-
-/*
- * Opens and connects a private socket for communication with the
- * authentication agent. Returns the file descriptor (which must be
- * shut down and closed by the caller when no longer needed).
- * Returns NULL if an error occurred and the connection could not be
- * opened.
- */
-
-AuthenticationConnection *
-ssh_get_authentication_connection(void)
-{
- AuthenticationConnection *auth;
- int sock;
-
- sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket();
-
- /*
- * Fail if we couldn't obtain a connection. This happens if we
- * exited due to a timeout.
- */
- if (sock < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- auth = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*auth));
- auth->fd = sock;
- buffer_init(&auth->identities);
- auth->howmany = 0;
-
- return auth;
-}
-
-/*
- * Closes the connection to the authentication agent and frees any associated
- * memory.
- */
-
-void
-ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *auth)
-{
- buffer_free(&auth->identities);
- close(auth->fd);
- free(auth);
-}
-
-/* Lock/unlock agent */
-int
-ssh_lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int lock, const char *password)
-{
- int type;
- Buffer msg;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, password);
-
- if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return 0;
- }
- type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return decode_reply(type);
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent.
- */
-
-int
-ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
-{
- int type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0;
- Buffer request;
-
- switch (version) {
- case 1:
- code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
- code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
- break;
- case 2:
- code1 = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
- code2 = SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
- break;
- default:
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the
- * identities it can represent.
- */
- buffer_init(&request);
- buffer_put_char(&request, code1);
-
- buffer_clear(&auth->identities);
- if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &request, &auth->identities) == 0) {
- buffer_free(&request);
- return 0;
- }
- buffer_free(&request);
-
- /* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */
- type = buffer_get_char(&auth->identities);
- if (agent_failed(type)) {
- return 0;
- } else if (type != code2) {
- fatal("Bad authentication reply message type: %d", type);
- }
-
- /* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */
- auth->howmany = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
- if ((u_int)auth->howmany > 1024)
- fatal("Too many identities in authentication reply: %d",
- auth->howmany);
-
- return auth->howmany;
-}
-
-Key *
-ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
-{
- /* get number of identities and return the first entry (if any). */
- if (ssh_get_num_identities(auth, version) > 0)
- return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, comment, version);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-Key *
-ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
-{
- int keybits;
- u_int bits;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int blen;
- Key *key = NULL;
-
- /* Return failure if no more entries. */
- if (auth->howmany <= 0)
- return NULL;
-
- /*
- * Get the next entry from the packet. These will abort with a fatal
- * error if the packet is too short or contains corrupt data.
- */
- switch (version) {
- case 1:
- key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
- bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
- buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->e);
- buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n);
- *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
- keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
- if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits)
- logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
- BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
- break;
- case 2:
- blob = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, &blen);
- *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
- key = key_from_blob(blob, blen);
- free(blob);
- break;
- default:
- return NULL;
- }
- /* Decrement the number of remaining entries. */
- auth->howmany--;
- return key;
-}
-
-/*
- * Generates a random challenge, sends it to the agent, and waits for
- * response from the agent. Returns true (non-zero) if the agent gave the
- * correct answer, zero otherwise. Response type selects the style of
- * response desired, with 0 corresponding to protocol version 1.0 (no longer
- * supported) and 1 corresponding to protocol version 1.1.
- */
-
-int
-ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
- Key* key, BIGNUM *challenge,
- u_char session_id[16],
- u_int response_type,
- u_char response[16])
-{
- Buffer buffer;
- int success = 0;
- int i;
- int type;
-
- if (key->type != KEY_RSA1)
- return 0;
- if (response_type == 0) {
- logit("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported.");
- return 0;
- }
- buffer_init(&buffer);
- buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE);
- buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->e);
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->n);
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, challenge);
- buffer_append(&buffer, session_id, 16);
- buffer_put_int(&buffer, response_type);
-
- if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) {
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- return 0;
- }
- type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
-
- if (agent_failed(type)) {
- logit("Agent admitted failure to authenticate using the key.");
- } else if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
- fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
- } else {
- success = 1;
- /*
- * Get the response from the packet. This will abort with a
- * fatal error if the packet is corrupt.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- response[i] = (u_char)buffer_get_char(&buffer);
- }
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- return success;
-}
-
-/* ask agent to sign data, returns -1 on error, 0 on success */
-int
-ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
- Key *key,
- u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
- u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
- extern int datafellows;
- Buffer msg;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int blen;
- int type, flags = 0;
- int ret = -1;
-
- if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
- return -1;
-
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB)
- flags = SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST);
- buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
- buffer_put_string(&msg, data, datalen);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, flags);
- free(blob);
-
- if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return -1;
- }
- type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
- if (agent_failed(type)) {
- logit("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key.");
- } else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
- fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
- } else {
- ret = 0;
- *sigp = buffer_get_string(&msg, lenp);
- }
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/* Encode key for a message to the agent. */
-
-static void
-ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
-{
- buffer_put_int(b, BN_num_bits(key->n));
- buffer_put_bignum(b, key->n);
- buffer_put_bignum(b, key->e);
- buffer_put_bignum(b, key->d);
- /* To keep within the protocol: p < q for ssh. in SSL p > q */
- buffer_put_bignum(b, key->iqmp); /* ssh key->u */
- buffer_put_bignum(b, key->q); /* ssh key->p, SSL key->q */
- buffer_put_bignum(b, key->p); /* ssh key->q, SSL key->p */
- buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
-}
-
-static void
-ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
-{
- key_private_serialize(key, b);
- buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
-}
-
-/*
- * Adds an identity to the authentication server. This call is not meant to
- * be used by normal applications.
- */
-
-int
-ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key,
- const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm)
-{
- Buffer msg;
- int type, constrained = (life || confirm);
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
-
- switch (key->type) {
- case KEY_RSA1:
- type = constrained ?
- SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED :
- SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY;
- buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
- ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(&msg, key->rsa, comment);
- break;
- case KEY_RSA:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ED25519:
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- type = constrained ?
- SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED :
- SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY;
- buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
- ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(&msg, key, comment);
- break;
- default:
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return 0;
- }
- if (constrained) {
- if (life != 0) {
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, life);
- }
- if (confirm != 0)
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM);
- }
- if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return 0;
- }
- type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return decode_reply(type);
-}
-
-/*
- * Removes an identity from the authentication server. This call is not
- * meant to be used by normal applications.
- */
-
-int
-ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key)
-{
- Buffer msg;
- int type;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int blen;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
-
- if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
- buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->e);
- buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->n);
- } else if (key->type != KEY_UNSPEC) {
- key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY);
- buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
- free(blob);
- } else {
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return 0;
- }
- if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return 0;
- }
- type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return decode_reply(type);
-}
-
-int
-ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int add,
- const char *reader_id, const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm)
-{
- Buffer msg;
- int type, constrained = (life || confirm);
-
- if (add) {
- type = constrained ?
- SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED :
- SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY;
- } else
- type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, reader_id);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, pin);
-
- if (constrained) {
- if (life != 0) {
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, life);
- }
- if (confirm != 0)
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM);
- }
-
- if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return 0;
- }
- type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return decode_reply(type);
-}
-
-/*
- * Removes all identities from the agent. This call is not meant to be used
- * by normal applications.
- */
-
-int
-ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
-{
- Buffer msg;
- int type;
- int code = (version==1) ?
- SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES :
- SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, code);
-
- if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return 0;
- }
- type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return decode_reply(type);
-}
-
-int
-decode_reply(int type)
-{
- switch (type) {
- case SSH_AGENT_FAILURE:
- case SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE:
- case SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE:
- logit("SSH_AGENT_FAILURE");
- return 0;
- case SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS:
- return 1;
- default:
- fatal("Bad response from authentication agent: %d", type);
- }
- /* NOTREACHED */
- return 0;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfd.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/authfd.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfd.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfd.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,721 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.100 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Functions for connecting the local authentication agent.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 implementation,
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+#define MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES 2048 /* Max keys in agent reply */
+#define MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN (256 * 1024) /* Max bytes in agent reply */
+
+/* macro to check for "agent failure" message */
+#define agent_failed(x) \
+ ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || \
+ (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \
+ (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE))
+
+/* Convert success/failure response from agent to a err.h status */
+static int
+decode_reply(u_char type)
+{
+ if (agent_failed(type))
+ return SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
+ else if (type == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS)
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+}
+
+/* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */
+int
+ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp)
+{
+ const char *authsocket;
+ int sock, oerrno;
+ struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+
+ if (fdp != NULL)
+ *fdp = -1;
+
+ authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+ if (!authsocket)
+ return SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT;
+
+ memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
+ sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
+
+ if ((sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+
+ /* close on exec */
+ if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1 ||
+ connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ close(sock);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (fdp != NULL)
+ *fdp = sock;
+ else
+ close(sock);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Communicate with agent: send request and read reply */
+static int
+ssh_request_reply(int sock, struct sshbuf *request, struct sshbuf *reply)
+{
+ int r;
+ size_t l, len;
+ char buf[1024];
+
+ /* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
+ len = sshbuf_len(request);
+ put_u32(buf, len);
+
+ /* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, 4) != 4 ||
+ atomicio(vwrite, sock, (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(request),
+ sshbuf_len(request)) != sshbuf_len(request))
+ return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION;
+ /*
+ * Wait for response from the agent. First read the length of the
+ * response packet.
+ */
+ if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, 4) != 4)
+ return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION;
+
+ /* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
+ len = get_u32(buf);
+ if (len > MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+
+ /* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */
+ sshbuf_reset(reply);
+ while (len > 0) {
+ l = len;
+ if (l > sizeof(buf))
+ l = sizeof(buf);
+ if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, l) != l)
+ return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(reply, buf, l)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ len -= l;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Closes the agent socket if it should be closed (depends on how it was
+ * obtained). The argument must have been returned by
+ * ssh_get_authentication_socket().
+ */
+void
+ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock)
+{
+ if (getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
+ close(sock);
+}
+
+/* Lock/unlock agent */
+int
+ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password)
+{
+ int r;
+ u_char type = lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK;
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, password)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = decode_reply(type);
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return r;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+static int
+deserialise_identity1(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+ struct sshkey *key;
+ int r, keybits;
+ u_int32_t bits;
+ char *comment = NULL;
+
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(ids, &bits)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
+ /* XXX previously we just warned here. I think we should be strict */
+ if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (keyp != NULL) {
+ *keyp = key;
+ key = NULL;
+ }
+ if (commentp != NULL) {
+ *commentp = comment;
+ comment = NULL;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ free(comment);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int
+deserialise_identity2(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+ int r;
+ char *comment = NULL;
+ const u_char *blob;
+ size_t blen;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(ids, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, keyp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (commentp != NULL) {
+ *commentp = comment;
+ comment = NULL;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ free(comment);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fetch list of identities held by the agent.
+ */
+int
+ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, int version, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp)
+{
+ u_char type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0;
+ u_int32_t num, i;
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ struct ssh_identitylist *idl = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ /* Determine request and expected response types */
+ switch (version) {
+ case 1:
+ code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
+ code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ code1 = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
+ code2 = SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the
+ * identities it can represent.
+ */
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code1)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (agent_failed(type)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
+ goto out;
+ } else if (type != code2) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &num)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (num > MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (num == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Deserialise the response into a list of keys/comments */
+ if ((idl = calloc(1, sizeof(*idl))) == NULL ||
+ (idl->keys = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->keys))) == NULL ||
+ (idl->comments = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->comments))) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < num;) {
+ switch (version) {
+ case 1:
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ if ((r = deserialise_identity1(msg,
+ &(idl->keys[i]), &(idl->comments[i]))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#endif
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ if ((r = deserialise_identity2(msg,
+ &(idl->keys[i]), &(idl->comments[i]))) != 0) {
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
+ /* Gracefully skip unknown key types */
+ num--;
+ continue;
+ } else
+ goto out;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ i++;
+ }
+ idl->nkeys = num;
+ *idlp = idl;
+ idl = NULL;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ if (idl != NULL)
+ ssh_free_identitylist(idl);
+ return r;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (idl == NULL)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < idl->nkeys; i++) {
+ if (idl->keys != NULL)
+ sshkey_free(idl->keys[i]);
+ if (idl->comments != NULL)
+ free(idl->comments[i]);
+ }
+ free(idl);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sends a challenge (typically from a server via ssh(1)) to the agent,
+ * and waits for a response from the agent.
+ * Returns true (non-zero) if the agent gave the correct answer, zero
+ * otherwise.
+ */
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+int
+ssh_decrypt_challenge(int sock, struct sshkey* key, BIGNUM *challenge,
+ u_char session_id[16], u_char response[16])
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r;
+ u_char type;
+
+ if (key->type != KEY_RSA1)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, challenge)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(msg, session_id, 16)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 1)) != 0) /* Response type for proto 1.1 */
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (agent_failed(type)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
+ goto out;
+ } else if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get(msg, response, 16)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* encode signature algoritm in flag bits, so we can keep the msg format */
+static u_int
+agent_encode_alg(struct sshkey *key, const char *alg)
+{
+ if (alg != NULL && key->type == KEY_RSA) {
+ if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256") == 0)
+ return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256;
+ else if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512") == 0)
+ return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ask agent to sign data, returns err.h code on error, 0 on success */
+int
+ssh_agent_sign(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
+ u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_char *blob = NULL, type;
+ size_t blen = 0, len = 0;
+ u_int flags = 0;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ *sigp = NULL;
+ *lenp = 0;
+
+ if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (compat & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB)
+ flags |= SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE;
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ flags |= agent_encode_alg(key, alg);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, flags)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (agent_failed(type)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
+ goto out;
+ } else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, sigp, &len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ *lenp = len;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ if (blob != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(blob, blen);
+ free(blob);
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* Encode key for a message to the agent. */
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+static int
+ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(struct sshbuf *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ /* To keep within the protocol: p < q for ssh. in SSL p > q */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, BN_num_bits(key->n))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->d)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->iqmp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->q)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comment)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int
+ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key,
+ const char *comment)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, b)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comment)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+encode_constraints(struct sshbuf *m, u_int life, u_int confirm)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (life != 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, life)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (confirm != 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Adds an identity to the authentication server.
+ * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
+ */
+int
+ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key, const char *comment,
+ u_int life, u_int confirm)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r, constrained = (life || confirm);
+ u_char type;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+ switch (key->type) {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ type = constrained ?
+ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED :
+ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(msg, key->rsa, comment)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+#endif
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ type = constrained ?
+ SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED :
+ SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(msg, key, comment)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ default:
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (constrained &&
+ (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = decode_reply(type);
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Removes an identity from the authentication server.
+ * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
+ */
+int
+ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r;
+ u_char type, *blob = NULL;
+ size_t blen;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg,
+ SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->n)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ } else
+#endif
+ if (key->type != KEY_UNSPEC) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg,
+ SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = decode_reply(type);
+ out:
+ if (blob != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(blob, blen);
+ free(blob);
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add/remove an token-based identity from the authentication server.
+ * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
+ */
+int
+ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id, const char *pin,
+ u_int life, u_int confirm)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r, constrained = (life || confirm);
+ u_char type;
+
+ if (add) {
+ type = constrained ?
+ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED :
+ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY;
+ } else
+ type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, reader_id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, pin)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (constrained &&
+ (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = decode_reply(type);
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Removes all identities from the agent.
+ * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
+ */
+int
+ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_char type = (version == 1) ?
+ SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES :
+ SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = decode_reply(type);
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return r;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfd.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/authfd.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfd.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.37 2009/08/27 17:44:52 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Functions to interface with the SSH_AUTHENTICATION_FD socket.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#ifndef AUTHFD_H
-#define AUTHFD_H
-
-/* Messages for the authentication agent connection. */
-#define SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES 1
-#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 2
-#define SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE 3
-#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE 4
-#define SSH_AGENT_FAILURE 5
-#define SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS 6
-#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY 7
-#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY 8
-#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES 9
-
-/* private OpenSSH extensions for SSH2 */
-#define SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES 11
-#define SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12
-#define SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST 13
-#define SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE 14
-#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY 17
-#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18
-#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19
-
-/* smartcard */
-#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY 20
-#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY 21
-
-/* lock/unlock the agent */
-#define SSH_AGENTC_LOCK 22
-#define SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK 23
-
-/* add key with constraints */
-#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED 24
-#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25
-#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26
-
-#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1
-#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2
-
-/* extended failure messages */
-#define SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE 30
-
-/* additional error code for ssh.com's ssh-agent2 */
-#define SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE 102
-
-#define SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE 0x01
-
-typedef struct {
- int fd;
- Buffer identities;
- int howmany;
-} AuthenticationConnection;
-
-int ssh_agent_present(void);
-int ssh_get_authentication_socket(void);
-void ssh_close_authentication_socket(int);
-
-AuthenticationConnection *ssh_get_authentication_connection(void);
-void ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *);
-int ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *, int);
-Key *ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, char **, int);
-Key *ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, char **, int);
-int ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *,
- const char *, u_int, u_int);
-int ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *);
-int ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *, int);
-int ssh_lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *, int, const char *);
-int ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *, int, const char *,
- const char *, u_int, u_int);
-
-int
-ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char[16],
- u_int, u_char[16]);
-
-int
-ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *,
- u_int);
-
-#endif /* AUTHFD_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfd.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/authfd.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfd.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfd.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.39 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Functions to interface with the SSH_AUTHENTICATION_FD socket.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef AUTHFD_H
+#define AUTHFD_H
+
+/* List of identities returned by ssh_fetch_identitylist() */
+struct ssh_identitylist {
+ size_t nkeys;
+ struct sshkey **keys;
+ char **comments;
+};
+
+int ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp);
+void ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock);
+
+int ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password);
+int ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, int version,
+ struct ssh_identitylist **idlp);
+void ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl);
+int ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
+ const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm);
+int ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key);
+int ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id,
+ const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm);
+int ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version);
+
+int ssh_decrypt_challenge(int sock, struct sshkey* key, BIGNUM *challenge,
+ u_char session_id[16], u_char response[16]);
+int ssh_agent_sign(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
+ u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat);
+
+/* Messages for the authentication agent connection. */
+#define SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES 1
+#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 2
+#define SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE 3
+#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE 4
+#define SSH_AGENT_FAILURE 5
+#define SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS 6
+#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY 7
+#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY 8
+#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES 9
+
+/* private OpenSSH extensions for SSH2 */
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES 11
+#define SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST 13
+#define SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE 14
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY 17
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19
+
+/* smartcard */
+#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY 20
+#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY 21
+
+/* lock/unlock the agent */
+#define SSH_AGENTC_LOCK 22
+#define SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK 23
+
+/* add key with constraints */
+#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED 24
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25
+#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26
+
+#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1
+#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2
+
+/* extended failure messages */
+#define SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE 30
+
+/* additional error code for ssh.com's ssh-agent2 */
+#define SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE 102
+
+#define SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE 0x01
+#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256 0x02
+#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512 0x04
+
+#endif /* AUTHFD_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfile.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/authfile.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfile.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1308 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.103 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * This file contains functions for reading and writing identity files, and
- * for reading the passphrase from the user.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- *
- * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
-
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-
-/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
-#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-
-#include "crypto_api.h"
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
-#include <util.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "authfile.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "uuencode.h"
-
-/* openssh private key file format */
-#define MARK_BEGIN "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
-#define MARK_END "-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
-#define KDFNAME "bcrypt"
-#define AUTH_MAGIC "openssh-key-v1"
-#define SALT_LEN 16
-#define DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME "aes256-cbc"
-#define DEFAULT_ROUNDS 16
-
-#define MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE (1024 * 1024)
-
-/* Version identification string for SSH v1 identity files. */
-static const char authfile_id_string[] =
- "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE FORMAT 1.1\n";
-
-static int
-key_private_to_blob2(Key *prv, Buffer *blob, const char *passphrase,
- const char *comment, const char *ciphername, int rounds)
-{
- u_char *key, *cp, salt[SALT_LEN];
- size_t keylen, ivlen, blocksize, authlen;
- u_int len, check;
- int i, n;
- const Cipher *c;
- Buffer encoded, b, kdf;
- CipherContext ctx;
- const char *kdfname = KDFNAME;
-
- if (rounds <= 0)
- rounds = DEFAULT_ROUNDS;
- if (passphrase == NULL || !strlen(passphrase)) {
- ciphername = "none";
- kdfname = "none";
- } else if (ciphername == NULL)
- ciphername = DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME;
- else if (cipher_number(ciphername) != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2)
- fatal("invalid cipher");
-
- if ((c = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL)
- fatal("unknown cipher name");
- buffer_init(&kdf);
- blocksize = cipher_blocksize(c);
- keylen = cipher_keylen(c);
- ivlen = cipher_ivlen(c);
- authlen = cipher_authlen(c);
- key = xcalloc(1, keylen + ivlen);
- if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0) {
- arc4random_buf(salt, SALT_LEN);
- if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase),
- salt, SALT_LEN, key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0)
- fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf failed");
- buffer_put_string(&kdf, salt, SALT_LEN);
- buffer_put_int(&kdf, rounds);
- }
- cipher_init(&ctx, c, key, keylen, key + keylen , ivlen, 1);
- explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen);
- free(key);
-
- buffer_init(&encoded);
- buffer_append(&encoded, AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC));
- buffer_put_cstring(&encoded, ciphername);
- buffer_put_cstring(&encoded, kdfname);
- buffer_put_string(&encoded, buffer_ptr(&kdf), buffer_len(&kdf));
- buffer_put_int(&encoded, 1); /* number of keys */
- key_to_blob(prv, &cp, &len); /* public key */
- buffer_put_string(&encoded, cp, len);
-
- explicit_bzero(cp, len);
- free(cp);
-
- buffer_free(&kdf);
-
- /* set up the buffer that will be encrypted */
- buffer_init(&b);
-
- /* Random check bytes */
- check = arc4random();
- buffer_put_int(&b, check);
- buffer_put_int(&b, check);
-
- /* append private key and comment*/
- key_private_serialize(prv, &b);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, comment);
-
- /* padding */
- i = 0;
- while (buffer_len(&b) % blocksize)
- buffer_put_char(&b, ++i & 0xff);
-
- /* length */
- buffer_put_int(&encoded, buffer_len(&b));
-
- /* encrypt */
- cp = buffer_append_space(&encoded, buffer_len(&b) + authlen);
- if (cipher_crypt(&ctx, 0, cp, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), 0,
- authlen) != 0)
- fatal("%s: cipher_crypt failed", __func__);
- buffer_free(&b);
- cipher_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- /* uuencode */
- len = 2 * buffer_len(&encoded);
- cp = xmalloc(len);
- n = uuencode(buffer_ptr(&encoded), buffer_len(&encoded),
- (char *)cp, len);
- if (n < 0)
- fatal("%s: uuencode", __func__);
-
- buffer_clear(blob);
- buffer_append(blob, MARK_BEGIN, sizeof(MARK_BEGIN) - 1);
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- buffer_put_char(blob, cp[i]);
- if (i % 70 == 69)
- buffer_put_char(blob, '\n');
- }
- if (i % 70 != 69)
- buffer_put_char(blob, '\n');
- buffer_append(blob, MARK_END, sizeof(MARK_END) - 1);
- free(cp);
-
- return buffer_len(blob);
-}
-
-static Key *
-key_parse_private2(Buffer *blob, int type, const char *passphrase,
- char **commentp)
-{
- u_char *key = NULL, *cp, *salt = NULL, pad, last;
- char *comment = NULL, *ciphername = NULL, *kdfname = NULL, *kdfp;
- u_int keylen = 0, ivlen, blocksize, slen, klen, len, rounds, nkeys;
- u_int check1, check2, m1len, m2len;
- size_t authlen;
- const Cipher *c;
- Buffer b, encoded, copy, kdf;
- CipherContext ctx;
- Key *k = NULL;
- int dlen, ret, i;
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_init(&kdf);
- buffer_init(&encoded);
- buffer_init(©);
-
- /* uudecode */
- m1len = sizeof(MARK_BEGIN) - 1;
- m2len = sizeof(MARK_END) - 1;
- cp = buffer_ptr(blob);
- len = buffer_len(blob);
- if (len < m1len || memcmp(cp, MARK_BEGIN, m1len)) {
- debug("%s: missing begin marker", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- cp += m1len;
- len -= m1len;
- while (len) {
- if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r')
- buffer_put_char(&encoded, *cp);
- last = *cp;
- len--;
- cp++;
- if (last == '\n') {
- if (len >= m2len && !memcmp(cp, MARK_END, m2len)) {
- buffer_put_char(&encoded, '\0');
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- if (!len) {
- debug("%s: no end marker", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- len = buffer_len(&encoded);
- if ((cp = buffer_append_space(©, len)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: buffer_append_space", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if ((dlen = uudecode(buffer_ptr(&encoded), cp, len)) < 0) {
- error("%s: uudecode failed", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if ((u_int)dlen > len) {
- error("%s: crazy uudecode length %d > %u", __func__, dlen, len);
- goto out;
- }
- buffer_consume_end(©, len - dlen);
- if (buffer_len(©) < sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC) ||
- memcmp(buffer_ptr(©), AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) {
- error("%s: bad magic", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- buffer_consume(©, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC));
-
- ciphername = buffer_get_cstring_ret(©, NULL);
- if (ciphername == NULL ||
- (c = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: unknown cipher name", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if ((passphrase == NULL || !strlen(passphrase)) &&
- strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) {
- /* passphrase required */
- goto out;
- }
- kdfname = buffer_get_cstring_ret(©, NULL);
- if (kdfname == NULL ||
- (!strcmp(kdfname, "none") && !strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt"))) {
- error("%s: unknown kdf name", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if (!strcmp(kdfname, "none") && strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) {
- error("%s: cipher %s requires kdf", __func__, ciphername);
- goto out;
- }
- /* kdf options */
- kdfp = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(©, &klen);
- if (kdfp == NULL) {
- error("%s: kdf options not set", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if (klen > 0) {
- if ((cp = buffer_append_space(&kdf, klen)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: kdf alloc failed", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- memcpy(cp, kdfp, klen);
- }
- /* number of keys */
- if (buffer_get_int_ret(&nkeys, ©) < 0) {
- error("%s: key counter missing", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if (nkeys != 1) {
- error("%s: only one key supported", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- /* pubkey */
- if ((cp = buffer_get_string_ret(©, &len)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: pubkey not found", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- free(cp); /* XXX check pubkey against decrypted private key */
-
- /* size of encrypted key blob */
- len = buffer_get_int(©);
- blocksize = cipher_blocksize(c);
- authlen = cipher_authlen(c);
- if (len < blocksize) {
- error("%s: encrypted data too small", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if (len % blocksize) {
- error("%s: length not multiple of blocksize", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* setup key */
- keylen = cipher_keylen(c);
- ivlen = cipher_ivlen(c);
- key = xcalloc(1, keylen + ivlen);
- if (!strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt")) {
- if ((salt = buffer_get_string_ret(&kdf, &slen)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: salt not set", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if (buffer_get_int_ret(&rounds, &kdf) < 0) {
- error("%s: rounds not set", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), salt, slen,
- key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) {
- error("%s: bcrypt_pbkdf failed", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- cp = buffer_append_space(&b, len);
- cipher_init(&ctx, c, key, keylen, key + keylen, ivlen, 0);
- ret = cipher_crypt(&ctx, 0, cp, buffer_ptr(©), len, 0, authlen);
- cipher_cleanup(&ctx);
- buffer_consume(©, len);
-
- /* fail silently on decryption errors */
- if (ret != 0) {
- debug("%s: decrypt failed", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (buffer_len(©) != 0) {
- error("%s: key blob has trailing data (len = %u)", __func__,
- buffer_len(©));
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* check bytes */
- if (buffer_get_int_ret(&check1, &b) < 0 ||
- buffer_get_int_ret(&check2, &b) < 0) {
- error("check bytes missing");
- goto out;
- }
- if (check1 != check2) {
- debug("%s: decrypt failed: 0x%08x != 0x%08x", __func__,
- check1, check2);
- goto out;
- }
-
- k = key_private_deserialize(&b);
-
- /* comment */
- comment = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&b, NULL);
-
- i = 0;
- while (buffer_len(&b)) {
- if (buffer_get_char_ret(&pad, &b) == -1 ||
- pad != (++i & 0xff)) {
- error("%s: bad padding", __func__);
- key_free(k);
- k = NULL;
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- if (k && commentp) {
- *commentp = comment;
- comment = NULL;
- }
-
- /* XXX decode pubkey and check against private */
- out:
- free(ciphername);
- free(kdfname);
- free(salt);
- free(comment);
- if (key)
- explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen);
- free(key);
- buffer_free(&encoded);
- buffer_free(©);
- buffer_free(&kdf);
- buffer_free(&b);
- return k;
-}
-
-/*
- * Serialises the authentication (private) key to a blob, encrypting it with
- * passphrase. The identification of the blob (lowest 64 bits of n) will
- * precede the key to provide identification of the key without needing a
- * passphrase.
- */
-static int
-key_private_rsa1_to_blob(Key *key, Buffer *blob, const char *passphrase,
- const char *comment)
-{
- Buffer buffer, encrypted;
- u_char buf[100], *cp;
- int i, cipher_num;
- CipherContext ciphercontext;
- const Cipher *cipher;
- u_int32_t rnd;
-
- /*
- * If the passphrase is empty, use SSH_CIPHER_NONE to ease converting
- * to another cipher; otherwise use SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER.
- */
- cipher_num = (strcmp(passphrase, "") == 0) ?
- SSH_CIPHER_NONE : SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER;
- if ((cipher = cipher_by_number(cipher_num)) == NULL)
- fatal("save_private_key_rsa: bad cipher");
-
- /* This buffer is used to built the secret part of the private key. */
- buffer_init(&buffer);
-
- /* Put checkbytes for checking passphrase validity. */
- rnd = arc4random();
- buf[0] = rnd & 0xff;
- buf[1] = (rnd >> 8) & 0xff;
- buf[2] = buf[0];
- buf[3] = buf[1];
- buffer_append(&buffer, buf, 4);
-
- /*
- * Store the private key (n and e will not be stored because they
- * will be stored in plain text, and storing them also in encrypted
- * format would just give known plaintext).
- */
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->d);
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->iqmp);
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->q); /* reverse from SSL p */
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->p); /* reverse from SSL q */
-
- /* Pad the part to be encrypted until its size is a multiple of 8. */
- while (buffer_len(&buffer) % 8 != 0)
- buffer_put_char(&buffer, 0);
-
- /* This buffer will be used to contain the data in the file. */
- buffer_init(&encrypted);
-
- /* First store keyfile id string. */
- for (i = 0; authfile_id_string[i]; i++)
- buffer_put_char(&encrypted, authfile_id_string[i]);
- buffer_put_char(&encrypted, 0);
-
- /* Store cipher type. */
- buffer_put_char(&encrypted, cipher_num);
- buffer_put_int(&encrypted, 0); /* For future extension */
-
- /* Store public key. This will be in plain text. */
- buffer_put_int(&encrypted, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
- buffer_put_bignum(&encrypted, key->rsa->n);
- buffer_put_bignum(&encrypted, key->rsa->e);
- buffer_put_cstring(&encrypted, comment);
-
- /* Allocate space for the private part of the key in the buffer. */
- cp = buffer_append_space(&encrypted, buffer_len(&buffer));
-
- cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
- CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
- if (cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp,
- buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer), 0, 0) != 0)
- fatal("%s: cipher_crypt failed", __func__);
- cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
- explicit_bzero(&ciphercontext, sizeof(ciphercontext));
-
- /* Destroy temporary data. */
- explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
- buffer_free(&buffer);
-
- buffer_append(blob, buffer_ptr(&encrypted), buffer_len(&encrypted));
- buffer_free(&encrypted);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* convert SSH v2 key in OpenSSL PEM format */
-static int
-key_private_pem_to_blob(Key *key, Buffer *blob, const char *_passphrase,
- const char *comment)
-{
- int success = 0;
- int blen, len = strlen(_passphrase);
- u_char *passphrase = (len > 0) ? (u_char *)_passphrase : NULL;
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L)
- const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_des_ede3_cbc() : NULL;
-#else
- const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_aes_128_cbc() : NULL;
-#endif
- const u_char *bptr;
- BIO *bio;
-
- if (len > 0 && len <= 4) {
- error("passphrase too short: have %d bytes, need > 4", len);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) {
- error("%s: BIO_new failed", __func__);
- return 0;
- }
- switch (key->type) {
- case KEY_DSA:
- success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa,
- cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
- break;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa,
- cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
- break;
-#endif
- case KEY_RSA:
- success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa,
- cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
- break;
- }
- if (success) {
- if ((blen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &bptr)) <= 0)
- success = 0;
- else
- buffer_append(blob, bptr, blen);
- }
- BIO_free(bio);
- return success;
-}
-
-/* Save a key blob to a file */
-static int
-key_save_private_blob(Buffer *keybuf, const char *filename)
-{
- int fd;
-
- if ((fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600)) < 0) {
- error("open %s failed: %s.", filename, strerror(errno));
- return 0;
- }
- if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buffer_ptr(keybuf),
- buffer_len(keybuf)) != buffer_len(keybuf)) {
- error("write to key file %s failed: %s", filename,
- strerror(errno));
- close(fd);
- unlink(filename);
- return 0;
- }
- close(fd);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* Serialise "key" to buffer "blob" */
-static int
-key_private_to_blob(Key *key, Buffer *blob, const char *passphrase,
- const char *comment, int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher,
- int new_format_rounds)
-{
- switch (key->type) {
- case KEY_RSA1:
- return key_private_rsa1_to_blob(key, blob, passphrase, comment);
- case KEY_DSA:
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- case KEY_RSA:
- if (force_new_format) {
- return key_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
- comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds);
- }
- return key_private_pem_to_blob(key, blob, passphrase, comment);
- case KEY_ED25519:
- return key_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
- comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds);
- default:
- error("%s: cannot save key type %d", __func__, key->type);
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
-int
-key_save_private(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
- const char *comment, int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher,
- int new_format_rounds)
-{
- Buffer keyblob;
- int success = 0;
-
- buffer_init(&keyblob);
- if (!key_private_to_blob(key, &keyblob, passphrase, comment,
- force_new_format, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds))
- goto out;
- if (!key_save_private_blob(&keyblob, filename))
- goto out;
- success = 1;
- out:
- buffer_free(&keyblob);
- return success;
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse the public, unencrypted portion of a RSA1 key.
- */
-static Key *
-key_parse_public_rsa1(Buffer *blob, char **commentp)
-{
- Key *pub;
- Buffer copy;
-
- /* Check that it is at least big enough to contain the ID string. */
- if (buffer_len(blob) < sizeof(authfile_id_string)) {
- debug3("Truncated RSA1 identifier");
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /*
- * Make sure it begins with the id string. Consume the id string
- * from the buffer.
- */
- if (memcmp(buffer_ptr(blob), authfile_id_string,
- sizeof(authfile_id_string)) != 0) {
- debug3("Incorrect RSA1 identifier");
- return NULL;
- }
- buffer_init(©);
- buffer_append(©, buffer_ptr(blob), buffer_len(blob));
- buffer_consume(©, sizeof(authfile_id_string));
-
- /* Skip cipher type and reserved data. */
- (void) buffer_get_char(©); /* cipher type */
- (void) buffer_get_int(©); /* reserved */
-
- /* Read the public key from the buffer. */
- (void) buffer_get_int(©);
- pub = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
- buffer_get_bignum(©, pub->rsa->n);
- buffer_get_bignum(©, pub->rsa->e);
- if (commentp)
- *commentp = buffer_get_string(©, NULL);
- /* The encrypted private part is not parsed by this function. */
- buffer_free(©);
-
- return pub;
-}
-
-/* Load a key from a fd into a buffer */
-int
-key_load_file(int fd, const char *filename, Buffer *blob)
-{
- u_char buf[1024];
- size_t len;
- struct stat st;
-
- if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
- error("%s: fstat of key file %.200s%sfailed: %.100s", __func__,
- filename == NULL ? "" : filename,
- filename == NULL ? "" : " ",
- strerror(errno));
- return 0;
- }
- if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
- st.st_size > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) {
- toobig:
- error("%s: key file %.200s%stoo large", __func__,
- filename == NULL ? "" : filename,
- filename == NULL ? "" : " ");
- return 0;
- }
- buffer_clear(blob);
- for (;;) {
- if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) {
- if (errno == EPIPE)
- break;
- debug("%s: read from key file %.200s%sfailed: %.100s",
- __func__, filename == NULL ? "" : filename,
- filename == NULL ? "" : " ", strerror(errno));
- buffer_clear(blob);
- explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
- return 0;
- }
- buffer_append(blob, buf, len);
- if (buffer_len(blob) > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) {
- buffer_clear(blob);
- explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
- goto toobig;
- }
- }
- explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
- if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
- st.st_size != buffer_len(blob)) {
- debug("%s: key file %.200s%schanged size while reading",
- __func__, filename == NULL ? "" : filename,
- filename == NULL ? "" : " ");
- buffer_clear(blob);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Loads the public part of the ssh v1 key file. Returns NULL if an error was
- * encountered (the file does not exist or is not readable), and the key
- * otherwise.
- */
-static Key *
-key_load_public_rsa1(int fd, const char *filename, char **commentp)
-{
- Buffer buffer;
- Key *pub;
-
- buffer_init(&buffer);
- if (!key_load_file(fd, filename, &buffer)) {
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- pub = key_parse_public_rsa1(&buffer, commentp);
- if (pub == NULL)
- debug3("Could not load \"%s\" as a RSA1 public key", filename);
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- return pub;
-}
-
-/* load public key from private-key file, works only for SSH v1 */
-Key *
-key_load_public_type(int type, const char *filename, char **commentp)
-{
- Key *pub;
- int fd;
-
- if (type == KEY_RSA1) {
- fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
- if (fd < 0)
- return NULL;
- pub = key_load_public_rsa1(fd, filename, commentp);
- close(fd);
- return pub;
- }
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static Key *
-key_parse_private_rsa1(Buffer *blob, const char *passphrase, char **commentp)
-{
- int check1, check2, cipher_type;
- Buffer decrypted;
- u_char *cp;
- CipherContext ciphercontext;
- const Cipher *cipher;
- Key *prv = NULL;
- Buffer copy;
-
- /* Check that it is at least big enough to contain the ID string. */
- if (buffer_len(blob) < sizeof(authfile_id_string)) {
- debug3("Truncated RSA1 identifier");
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /*
- * Make sure it begins with the id string. Consume the id string
- * from the buffer.
- */
- if (memcmp(buffer_ptr(blob), authfile_id_string,
- sizeof(authfile_id_string)) != 0) {
- debug3("Incorrect RSA1 identifier");
- return NULL;
- }
- buffer_init(©);
- buffer_append(©, buffer_ptr(blob), buffer_len(blob));
- buffer_consume(©, sizeof(authfile_id_string));
-
- /* Read cipher type. */
- cipher_type = buffer_get_char(©);
- (void) buffer_get_int(©); /* Reserved data. */
-
- /* Read the public key from the buffer. */
- (void) buffer_get_int(©);
- prv = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
-
- buffer_get_bignum(©, prv->rsa->n);
- buffer_get_bignum(©, prv->rsa->e);
- if (commentp)
- *commentp = buffer_get_string(©, NULL);
- else
- (void)buffer_get_string_ptr(©, NULL);
-
- /* Check that it is a supported cipher. */
- cipher = cipher_by_number(cipher_type);
- if (cipher == NULL) {
- debug("Unsupported RSA1 cipher %d", cipher_type);
- buffer_free(©);
- goto fail;
- }
- /* Initialize space for decrypted data. */
- buffer_init(&decrypted);
- cp = buffer_append_space(&decrypted, buffer_len(©));
-
- /* Rest of the buffer is encrypted. Decrypt it using the passphrase. */
- cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
- CIPHER_DECRYPT);
- if (cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp,
- buffer_ptr(©), buffer_len(©), 0, 0) != 0)
- fatal("%s: cipher_crypt failed", __func__);
- cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
- explicit_bzero(&ciphercontext, sizeof(ciphercontext));
- buffer_free(©);
-
- check1 = buffer_get_char(&decrypted);
- check2 = buffer_get_char(&decrypted);
- if (check1 != buffer_get_char(&decrypted) ||
- check2 != buffer_get_char(&decrypted)) {
- if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0)
- debug("Bad passphrase supplied for RSA1 key");
- /* Bad passphrase. */
- buffer_free(&decrypted);
- goto fail;
- }
- /* Read the rest of the private key. */
- buffer_get_bignum(&decrypted, prv->rsa->d);
- buffer_get_bignum(&decrypted, prv->rsa->iqmp); /* u */
- /* in SSL and SSH v1 p and q are exchanged */
- buffer_get_bignum(&decrypted, prv->rsa->q); /* p */
- buffer_get_bignum(&decrypted, prv->rsa->p); /* q */
-
- /* calculate p-1 and q-1 */
- rsa_generate_additional_parameters(prv->rsa);
-
- buffer_free(&decrypted);
-
- /* enable blinding */
- if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
- error("%s: RSA_blinding_on failed", __func__);
- goto fail;
- }
- return prv;
-
-fail:
- if (commentp != NULL)
- free(*commentp);
- key_free(prv);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static Key *
-key_parse_private_pem(Buffer *blob, int type, const char *passphrase,
- char **commentp)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
- Key *prv = NULL;
- char *name = "<no key>";
- BIO *bio;
-
- if ((bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(buffer_ptr(blob),
- buffer_len(blob))) == NULL) {
- error("%s: BIO_new_mem_buf failed", __func__);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL, (char *)passphrase);
- BIO_free(bio);
- if (pk == NULL) {
- debug("%s: PEM_read_PrivateKey failed", __func__);
- (void)ERR_get_error();
- } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA &&
- (type == KEY_UNSPEC||type==KEY_RSA)) {
- prv = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
- prv->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pk);
- prv->type = KEY_RSA;
- name = "rsa w/o comment";
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
- RSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->rsa, 8);
-#endif
- if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
- error("%s: RSA_blinding_on failed", __func__);
- key_free(prv);
- prv = NULL;
- }
- } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA &&
- (type == KEY_UNSPEC||type==KEY_DSA)) {
- prv = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
- prv->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pk);
- prv->type = KEY_DSA;
- name = "dsa w/o comment";
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
- DSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->dsa, 8);
-#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_EC &&
- (type == KEY_UNSPEC||type==KEY_ECDSA)) {
- prv = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
- prv->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pk);
- prv->type = KEY_ECDSA;
- if ((prv->ecdsa_nid = key_ecdsa_key_to_nid(prv->ecdsa)) == -1 ||
- key_curve_nid_to_name(prv->ecdsa_nid) == NULL ||
- key_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(prv->ecdsa),
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(prv->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
- key_ec_validate_private(prv->ecdsa) != 0) {
- error("%s: bad ECDSA key", __func__);
- key_free(prv);
- prv = NULL;
- }
- name = "ecdsa w/o comment";
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
- if (prv != NULL && prv->ecdsa != NULL)
- key_dump_ec_key(prv->ecdsa);
-#endif
-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
- } else {
- error("%s: PEM_read_PrivateKey: mismatch or "
- "unknown EVP_PKEY save_type %d", __func__, pk->save_type);
- }
- if (pk != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
- if (prv != NULL && commentp)
- *commentp = xstrdup(name);
- debug("read PEM private key done: type %s",
- prv ? key_type(prv) : "<unknown>");
- return prv;
-}
-
-Key *
-key_load_private_pem(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
- char **commentp)
-{
- Buffer buffer;
- Key *prv;
-
- buffer_init(&buffer);
- if (!key_load_file(fd, NULL, &buffer)) {
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- return NULL;
- }
- prv = key_parse_private_pem(&buffer, type, passphrase, commentp);
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- return prv;
-}
-
-int
-key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
-{
- struct stat st;
-
- if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
- return 0;
- /*
- * if a key owned by the user is accessed, then we check the
- * permissions of the file. if the key owned by a different user,
- * then we don't care.
- */
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- if (check_ntsec(filename))
-#endif
- if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
- error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- error("@ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @");
- error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- error("Permissions 0%3.3o for '%s' are too open.",
- (u_int)st.st_mode & 0777, filename);
- error("It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.");
- error("This private key will be ignored.");
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static Key *
-key_parse_private_type(Buffer *blob, int type, const char *passphrase,
- char **commentp)
-{
- Key *k;
-
- switch (type) {
- case KEY_RSA1:
- return key_parse_private_rsa1(blob, passphrase, commentp);
- case KEY_DSA:
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- case KEY_RSA:
- return key_parse_private_pem(blob, type, passphrase, commentp);
- case KEY_ED25519:
- return key_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, commentp);
- case KEY_UNSPEC:
- if ((k = key_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, commentp)))
- return k;
- return key_parse_private_pem(blob, type, passphrase, commentp);
- default:
- error("%s: cannot parse key type %d", __func__, type);
- break;
- }
- return NULL;
-}
-
-Key *
-key_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
- char **commentp, int *perm_ok)
-{
- int fd;
- Key *ret;
- Buffer buffer;
-
- fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
- if (fd < 0) {
- debug("could not open key file '%s': %s", filename,
- strerror(errno));
- if (perm_ok != NULL)
- *perm_ok = 0;
- return NULL;
- }
- if (!key_perm_ok(fd, filename)) {
- if (perm_ok != NULL)
- *perm_ok = 0;
- error("bad permissions: ignore key: %s", filename);
- close(fd);
- return NULL;
- }
- if (perm_ok != NULL)
- *perm_ok = 1;
-
- buffer_init(&buffer);
- if (!key_load_file(fd, filename, &buffer)) {
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- close(fd);
- return NULL;
- }
- close(fd);
- ret = key_parse_private_type(&buffer, type, passphrase, commentp);
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- return ret;
-}
-
-Key *
-key_parse_private(Buffer *buffer, const char *filename,
- const char *passphrase, char **commentp)
-{
- Key *pub, *prv;
-
- /* it's a SSH v1 key if the public key part is readable */
- pub = key_parse_public_rsa1(buffer, commentp);
- if (pub == NULL) {
- prv = key_parse_private_type(buffer, KEY_UNSPEC,
- passphrase, NULL);
- /* use the filename as a comment for PEM */
- if (commentp && prv)
- *commentp = xstrdup(filename);
- } else {
- key_free(pub);
- /* key_parse_public_rsa1() has already loaded the comment */
- prv = key_parse_private_type(buffer, KEY_RSA1, passphrase,
- NULL);
- }
- return prv;
-}
-
-Key *
-key_load_private(const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
- char **commentp)
-{
- Key *prv;
- Buffer buffer;
- int fd;
-
- fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
- if (fd < 0) {
- debug("could not open key file '%s': %s", filename,
- strerror(errno));
- return NULL;
- }
- if (!key_perm_ok(fd, filename)) {
- error("bad permissions: ignore key: %s", filename);
- close(fd);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- buffer_init(&buffer);
- if (!key_load_file(fd, filename, &buffer)) {
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- close(fd);
- return NULL;
- }
- close(fd);
-
- prv = key_parse_private(&buffer, filename, passphrase, commentp);
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- return prv;
-}
-
-static int
-key_try_load_public(Key *k, const char *filename, char **commentp)
-{
- FILE *f;
- char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
- char *cp;
- u_long linenum = 0;
-
- f = fopen(filename, "r");
- if (f != NULL) {
- while (read_keyfile_line(f, filename, line, sizeof(line),
- &linenum) != -1) {
- cp = line;
- switch (*cp) {
- case '#':
- case '\n':
- case '\0':
- continue;
- }
- /* Abort loading if this looks like a private key */
- if (strncmp(cp, "-----BEGIN", 10) == 0)
- break;
- /* Skip leading whitespace. */
- for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++)
- ;
- if (*cp) {
- if (key_read(k, &cp) == 1) {
- cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0';
- if (commentp) {
- *commentp = xstrdup(*cp ?
- cp : filename);
- }
- fclose(f);
- return 1;
- }
- }
- }
- fclose(f);
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* load public key from ssh v1 private or any pubkey file */
-Key *
-key_load_public(const char *filename, char **commentp)
-{
- Key *pub;
- char file[MAXPATHLEN];
-
- /* try rsa1 private key */
- pub = key_load_public_type(KEY_RSA1, filename, commentp);
- if (pub != NULL)
- return pub;
-
- /* try rsa1 public key */
- pub = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
- if (key_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp) == 1)
- return pub;
- key_free(pub);
-
- /* try ssh2 public key */
- pub = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
- if (key_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp) == 1)
- return pub;
- if ((strlcpy(file, filename, sizeof file) < sizeof(file)) &&
- (strlcat(file, ".pub", sizeof file) < sizeof(file)) &&
- (key_try_load_public(pub, file, commentp) == 1))
- return pub;
- key_free(pub);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/* Load the certificate associated with the named private key */
-Key *
-key_load_cert(const char *filename)
-{
- Key *pub;
- char *file;
-
- pub = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
- xasprintf(&file, "%s-cert.pub", filename);
- if (key_try_load_public(pub, file, NULL) == 1) {
- free(file);
- return pub;
- }
- free(file);
- key_free(pub);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/* Load private key and certificate */
-Key *
-key_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
- int *perm_ok)
-{
- Key *key, *pub;
-
- switch (type) {
- case KEY_RSA:
- case KEY_DSA:
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- case KEY_ED25519:
- break;
- default:
- error("%s: unsupported key type", __func__);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if ((key = key_load_private_type(type, filename,
- passphrase, NULL, perm_ok)) == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- if ((pub = key_load_cert(filename)) == NULL) {
- key_free(key);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /* Make sure the private key matches the certificate */
- if (key_equal_public(key, pub) == 0) {
- error("%s: certificate does not match private key %s",
- __func__, filename);
- } else if (key_to_certified(key, key_cert_is_legacy(pub)) != 0) {
- error("%s: key_to_certified failed", __func__);
- } else {
- key_cert_copy(pub, key);
- key_free(pub);
- return key;
- }
-
- key_free(key);
- key_free(pub);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns 1 if the specified "key" is listed in the file "filename",
- * 0 if the key is not listed or -1 on error.
- * If strict_type is set then the key type must match exactly,
- * otherwise a comparison that ignores certficiate data is performed.
- */
-int
-key_in_file(Key *key, const char *filename, int strict_type)
-{
- FILE *f;
- char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
- char *cp;
- u_long linenum = 0;
- int ret = 0;
- Key *pub;
- int (*key_compare)(const Key *, const Key *) = strict_type ?
- key_equal : key_equal_public;
-
- if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) {
- if (errno == ENOENT) {
- debug("%s: keyfile \"%s\" missing", __func__, filename);
- return 0;
- } else {
- error("%s: could not open keyfile \"%s\": %s", __func__,
- filename, strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- while (read_keyfile_line(f, filename, line, sizeof(line),
- &linenum) != -1) {
- cp = line;
-
- /* Skip leading whitespace. */
- for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++)
- ;
-
- /* Skip comments and empty lines */
- switch (*cp) {
- case '#':
- case '\n':
- case '\0':
- continue;
- }
-
- pub = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
- if (key_read(pub, &cp) != 1) {
- key_free(pub);
- continue;
- }
- if (key_compare(key, pub)) {
- ret = 1;
- key_free(pub);
- break;
- }
- key_free(pub);
- }
- fclose(f);
- return ret;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfile.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/authfile.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfile.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfile.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,583 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.121 2016/04/09 12:39:30 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "krl.h"
+
+#define MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE (1024 * 1024)
+
+/* Save a key blob to a file */
+static int
+sshkey_save_private_blob(struct sshbuf *keybuf, const char *filename)
+{
+ int fd, oerrno;
+
+ if ((fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600)) < 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(keybuf),
+ sshbuf_len(keybuf)) != sshbuf_len(keybuf)) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ close(fd);
+ unlink(filename);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ }
+ close(fd);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename,
+ const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
+ int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *keyblob = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_to_fileblob(key, keyblob, passphrase, comment,
+ force_new_format, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_private_blob(keyblob, filename)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(keyblob);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* Load a key from a fd into a buffer */
+int
+sshkey_load_file(int fd, struct sshbuf *blob)
+{
+ u_char buf[1024];
+ size_t len;
+ struct stat st;
+ int r;
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
+ st.st_size > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ for (;;) {
+ if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) {
+ if (errno == EPIPE)
+ break;
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, buf, len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (sshbuf_len(blob) > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
+ st.st_size != (off_t)sshbuf_len(blob)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (r != 0)
+ sshbuf_reset(blob);
+ return r;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+/*
+ * Loads the public part of the ssh v1 key file. Returns NULL if an error was
+ * encountered (the file does not exist or is not readable), and the key
+ * otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+sshkey_load_public_rsa1(int fd, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if (commentp != NULL)
+ *commentp = NULL;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, b)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(b, keyp, commentp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+
+/* XXX remove error() calls from here? */
+int
+sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ /*
+ * if a key owned by the user is accessed, then we check the
+ * permissions of the file. if the key owned by a different user,
+ * then we don't care.
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (check_ntsec(filename))
+#endif
+ if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
+ error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ error("@ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @");
+ error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ error("Permissions 0%3.3o for '%s' are too open.",
+ (u_int)st.st_mode & 0777, filename);
+ error("It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.");
+ error("This private key will be ignored.");
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* XXX kill perm_ok now that we have SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS? */
+int
+sshkey_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp, int *perm_ok)
+{
+ int fd, r;
+
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if (commentp != NULL)
+ *commentp = NULL;
+
+ if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+ if (perm_ok != NULL)
+ *perm_ok = 0;
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) {
+ if (perm_ok != NULL)
+ *perm_ok = 0;
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (perm_ok != NULL)
+ *perm_ok = 1;
+
+ r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(fd, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp);
+ out:
+ close(fd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_load_private_type_fd(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, buffer)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, type,
+ passphrase, keyp, commentp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(buffer);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* XXX this is almost identical to sshkey_load_private_type() */
+int
+sshkey_load_private(const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
+ int r, fd;
+
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if (commentp != NULL)
+ *commentp = NULL;
+
+ if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, buffer)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buffer, passphrase, keyp,
+ commentp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ close(fd);
+ sshbuf_free(buffer);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sshkey_try_load_public(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename, char **commentp)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
+ char *cp;
+ u_long linenum = 0;
+ int r;
+
+ if (commentp != NULL)
+ *commentp = NULL;
+ if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ while (read_keyfile_line(f, filename, line, sizeof(line),
+ &linenum) != -1) {
+ cp = line;
+ switch (*cp) {
+ case '#':
+ case '\n':
+ case '\0':
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Abort loading if this looks like a private key */
+ if (strncmp(cp, "-----BEGIN", 10) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(cp, "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE") == 0)
+ break;
+ /* Skip leading whitespace. */
+ for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++)
+ ;
+ if (*cp) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_read(k, &cp)) == 0) {
+ cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0';
+ if (commentp) {
+ *commentp = strdup(*cp ?
+ cp : filename);
+ if (*commentp == NULL)
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+}
+
+/* load public key from ssh v1 private or any pubkey file */
+int
+sshkey_load_public(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+ struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
+ char file[PATH_MAX];
+ int r, fd;
+
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if (commentp != NULL)
+ *commentp = NULL;
+
+ /* XXX should load file once and attempt to parse each format */
+
+ if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
+ goto skip;
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ /* try rsa1 private key */
+ r = sshkey_load_public_rsa1(fd, keyp, commentp);
+ close(fd);
+ switch (r) {
+ case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+ case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL:
+ case SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:
+ case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
+ case 0:
+ return r;
+ }
+#else /* WITH_SSH1 */
+ close(fd);
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+
+ /* try ssh2 public key */
+ if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp)) == 0) {
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = pub;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sshkey_free(pub);
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ /* try rsa1 public key */
+ if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp)) == 0) {
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = pub;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sshkey_free(pub);
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+
+ skip:
+ /* try .pub suffix */
+ if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* in case strlcpy or strlcat fail */
+ if ((strlcpy(file, filename, sizeof file) < sizeof(file)) &&
+ (strlcat(file, ".pub", sizeof file) < sizeof(file)) &&
+ (r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, file, commentp)) == 0) {
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = pub;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sshkey_free(pub);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* Load the certificate associated with the named private key */
+int
+sshkey_load_cert(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+ struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
+ char *file = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+
+ if (asprintf(&file, "%s-cert.pub", filename) == -1)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+ if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, file, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* success */
+ if (keyp != NULL) {
+ *keyp = pub;
+ pub = NULL;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ free(file);
+ sshkey_free(pub);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* Load private key and certificate */
+int
+sshkey_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, int *perm_ok)
+{
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL, *cert = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+
+ switch (type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_UNSPEC:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(type, filename,
+ passphrase, &key, NULL, perm_ok)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_load_cert(filename, &cert)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Make sure the private key matches the certificate */
+ if (sshkey_equal_public(key, cert) == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(key)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = 0;
+ if (keyp != NULL) {
+ *keyp = key;
+ key = NULL;
+ }
+ out:
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ sshkey_free(cert);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns success if the specified "key" is listed in the file "filename",
+ * SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: if the key is not listed or another error.
+ * If "strict_type" is set then the key type must match exactly,
+ * otherwise a comparison that ignores certficiate data is performed.
+ * If "check_ca" is set and "key" is a certificate, then its CA key is
+ * also checked and sshkey_in_file() will return success if either is found.
+ */
+int
+sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type,
+ int check_ca)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
+ char *cp;
+ u_long linenum = 0;
+ int r = 0;
+ struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
+ int (*sshkey_compare)(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *) =
+ strict_type ? sshkey_equal : sshkey_equal_public;
+
+ if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+
+ while (read_keyfile_line(f, filename, line, sizeof(line),
+ &linenum) != -1) {
+ cp = line;
+
+ /* Skip leading whitespace. */
+ for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++)
+ ;
+
+ /* Skip comments and empty lines */
+ switch (*cp) {
+ case '#':
+ case '\n':
+ case '\0':
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_read(pub, &cp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (sshkey_compare(key, pub) ||
+ (check_ca && sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
+ sshkey_compare(key->cert->signature_key, pub))) {
+ r = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sshkey_free(pub);
+ pub = NULL;
+ }
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+ out:
+ sshkey_free(pub);
+ fclose(f);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether the specified key is revoked, returning 0 if not,
+ * SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED if it is or another error code if something
+ * unexpected happened.
+ * This will check both the key and, if it is a certificate, its CA key too.
+ * "revoked_keys_file" may be a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys.
+ */
+int
+sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ r = ssh_krl_file_contains_key(revoked_keys_file, key);
+ /* If this was not a KRL to begin with then continue below */
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC)
+ return r;
+
+ /*
+ * If the file is not a KRL or we can't handle KRLs then attempt to
+ * parse the file as a flat list of keys.
+ */
+ switch ((r = sshkey_in_file(key, revoked_keys_file, 0, 1))) {
+ case 0:
+ /* Key found => revoked */
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+ case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND:
+ /* Key not found => not revoked */
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ /* Some other error occurred */
+ return r;
+ }
+}
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfile.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/authfile.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfile.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.17 2013/12/06 13:34:54 markus Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#ifndef AUTHFILE_H
-#define AUTHFILE_H
-
-int key_save_private(Key *, const char *, const char *, const char *,
- int, const char *, int);
-int key_load_file(int, const char *, Buffer *);
-Key *key_load_cert(const char *);
-Key *key_load_public(const char *, char **);
-Key *key_load_public_type(int, const char *, char **);
-Key *key_parse_private(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, char **);
-Key *key_load_private(const char *, const char *, char **);
-Key *key_load_private_cert(int, const char *, const char *, int *);
-Key *key_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *, char **, int *);
-Key *key_load_private_pem(int, int, const char *, char **);
-int key_perm_ok(int, const char *);
-int key_in_file(Key *, const char *, int);
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfile.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/authfile.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfile.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/authfile.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.21 2015/01/08 10:14:08 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef AUTHFILE_H
+#define AUTHFILE_H
+
+struct sshbuf;
+struct sshkey;
+
+/* XXX document these */
+/* XXX some of these could probably be merged/retired */
+
+int sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *, const char *,
+ const char *, const char *, int, const char *, int);
+int sshkey_load_file(int, struct sshbuf *);
+int sshkey_load_cert(const char *, struct sshkey **);
+int sshkey_load_public(const char *, struct sshkey **, char **);
+int sshkey_load_private(const char *, const char *, struct sshkey **, char **);
+int sshkey_load_private_cert(int, const char *, const char *,
+ struct sshkey **, int *);
+int sshkey_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *,
+ struct sshkey **, char **, int *);
+int sshkey_load_private_type_fd(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
+int sshkey_perm_ok(int, const char *);
+int sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *, const char *, int, int);
+int sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file);
+
+#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bitmap.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/bitmap.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bitmap.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bitmap.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "bitmap.h"
+
+#define BITMAP_WTYPE u_int
+#define BITMAP_MAX (1<<24)
+#define BITMAP_BYTES (sizeof(BITMAP_WTYPE))
+#define BITMAP_BITS (sizeof(BITMAP_WTYPE) * 8)
+#define BITMAP_WMASK ((BITMAP_WTYPE)BITMAP_BITS - 1)
+struct bitmap {
+ BITMAP_WTYPE *d;
+ size_t len; /* number of words allocated */
+ size_t top; /* index of top word allocated */
+};
+
+struct bitmap *
+bitmap_new(void)
+{
+ struct bitmap *ret;
+
+ if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if ((ret->d = calloc(1, BITMAP_BYTES)) == NULL) {
+ free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret->len = 1;
+ ret->top = 0;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void
+bitmap_free(struct bitmap *b)
+{
+ if (b != NULL && b->d != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(b->d, b->len);
+ free(b->d);
+ }
+ free(b);
+}
+
+void
+bitmap_zero(struct bitmap *b)
+{
+ memset(b->d, 0, b->len * BITMAP_BYTES);
+ b->top = 0;
+}
+
+int
+bitmap_test_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n)
+{
+ if (b->top >= b->len)
+ return 0; /* invalid */
+ if (b->len == 0 || (n / BITMAP_BITS) > b->top)
+ return 0;
+ return (b->d[n / BITMAP_BITS] >> (n & BITMAP_WMASK)) & 1;
+}
+
+static int
+reserve(struct bitmap *b, u_int n)
+{
+ BITMAP_WTYPE *tmp;
+ size_t nlen;
+
+ if (b->top >= b->len || n > BITMAP_MAX)
+ return -1; /* invalid */
+ nlen = (n / BITMAP_BITS) + 1;
+ if (b->len < nlen) {
+ if ((tmp = reallocarray(b->d, nlen, BITMAP_BYTES)) == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ b->d = tmp;
+ memset(b->d + b->len, 0, (nlen - b->len) * BITMAP_BYTES);
+ b->len = nlen;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+bitmap_set_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n)
+{
+ int r;
+ size_t offset;
+
+ if ((r = reserve(b, n)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ offset = n / BITMAP_BITS;
+ if (offset > b->top)
+ b->top = offset;
+ b->d[offset] |= (BITMAP_WTYPE)1 << (n & BITMAP_WMASK);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Resets b->top to point to the most significant bit set in b->d */
+static void
+retop(struct bitmap *b)
+{
+ if (b->top >= b->len)
+ return;
+ while (b->top > 0 && b->d[b->top] == 0)
+ b->top--;
+}
+
+void
+bitmap_clear_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n)
+{
+ size_t offset;
+
+ if (b->top >= b->len || n > BITMAP_MAX)
+ return; /* invalid */
+ offset = n / BITMAP_BITS;
+ if (offset > b->top)
+ return;
+ b->d[offset] &= ~((BITMAP_WTYPE)1 << (n & BITMAP_WMASK));
+ /* The top may have changed as a result of the clear */
+ retop(b);
+}
+
+size_t
+bitmap_nbits(struct bitmap *b)
+{
+ size_t bits;
+ BITMAP_WTYPE w;
+
+ retop(b);
+ if (b->top >= b->len)
+ return 0; /* invalid */
+ if (b->len == 0 || (b->top == 0 && b->d[0] == 0))
+ return 0;
+ /* Find MSB set */
+ w = b->d[b->top];
+ bits = (b->top + 1) * BITMAP_BITS;
+ while (!(w & ((BITMAP_WTYPE)1 << (BITMAP_BITS - 1)))) {
+ w <<= 1;
+ bits--;
+ }
+ return bits;
+}
+
+size_t
+bitmap_nbytes(struct bitmap *b)
+{
+ return (bitmap_nbits(b) + 7) / 8;
+}
+
+int
+bitmap_to_string(struct bitmap *b, void *p, size_t l)
+{
+ u_char *s = (u_char *)p;
+ size_t i, j, k, need = bitmap_nbytes(b);
+
+ if (l < need || b->top >= b->len)
+ return -1;
+ if (l > need)
+ l = need;
+ /* Put the bytes from LSB backwards */
+ for (i = k = 0; i < b->top + 1; i++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < BITMAP_BYTES; j++) {
+ if (k >= l)
+ break;
+ s[need - 1 - k++] = (b->d[i] >> (j * 8)) & 0xff;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+bitmap_from_string(struct bitmap *b, const void *p, size_t l)
+{
+ int r;
+ size_t i, offset, shift;
+ u_char *s = (u_char *)p;
+
+ if (l > BITMAP_MAX / 8)
+ return -1;
+ if ((r = reserve(b, l * 8)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ bitmap_zero(b);
+ if (l == 0)
+ return 0;
+ b->top = offset = ((l + (BITMAP_BYTES - 1)) / BITMAP_BYTES) - 1;
+ shift = ((l + (BITMAP_BYTES - 1)) % BITMAP_BYTES) * 8;
+ for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
+ b->d[offset] |= (BITMAP_WTYPE)s[i] << shift;
+ if (shift == 0) {
+ offset--;
+ shift = BITMAP_BITS - 8;
+ } else
+ shift -= 8;
+ }
+ retop(b);
+ return 0;
+}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bitmap.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/bitmap.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bitmap.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bitmap.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BITMAP_H
+#define _BITMAP_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+/* Simple bit vector routines */
+
+struct bitmap;
+
+/* Allocate a new bitmap. Returns NULL on allocation failure. */
+struct bitmap *bitmap_new(void);
+
+/* Free a bitmap */
+void bitmap_free(struct bitmap *b);
+
+/* Zero an existing bitmap */
+void bitmap_zero(struct bitmap *b);
+
+/* Test whether a bit is set in a bitmap. */
+int bitmap_test_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n);
+
+/* Set a bit in a bitmap. Returns 0 on success or -1 on error */
+int bitmap_set_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n);
+
+/* Clear a bit in a bitmap */
+void bitmap_clear_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n);
+
+/* Return the number of bits in a bitmap (i.e. the position of the MSB) */
+size_t bitmap_nbits(struct bitmap *b);
+
+/* Return the number of bytes needed to represent a bitmap */
+size_t bitmap_nbytes(struct bitmap *b);
+
+/* Convert a bitmap to a big endian byte string */
+int bitmap_to_string(struct bitmap *b, void *p, size_t l);
+
+/* Convert a big endian byte string to a bitmap */
+int bitmap_from_string(struct bitmap *b, const void *p, size_t l);
+
+#endif /* _BITMAP_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bufaux.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/bufaux.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bufaux.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,390 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.56 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Auxiliary functions for storing and retrieving various data types to/from
- * Buffers.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- *
- * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-
-/*
- * Returns integers from the buffer (msb first).
- */
-
-int
-buffer_get_short_ret(u_short *ret, Buffer *buffer)
-{
- u_char buf[2];
-
- if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 2) == -1)
- return (-1);
- *ret = get_u16(buf);
- return (0);
-}
-
-u_short
-buffer_get_short(Buffer *buffer)
-{
- u_short ret;
-
- if (buffer_get_short_ret(&ret, buffer) == -1)
- fatal("buffer_get_short: buffer error");
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int
-buffer_get_int_ret(u_int *ret, Buffer *buffer)
-{
- u_char buf[4];
-
- if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 4) == -1)
- return (-1);
- if (ret != NULL)
- *ret = get_u32(buf);
- return (0);
-}
-
-u_int
-buffer_get_int(Buffer *buffer)
-{
- u_int ret;
-
- if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ret, buffer) == -1)
- fatal("buffer_get_int: buffer error");
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int
-buffer_get_int64_ret(u_int64_t *ret, Buffer *buffer)
-{
- u_char buf[8];
-
- if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 8) == -1)
- return (-1);
- if (ret != NULL)
- *ret = get_u64(buf);
- return (0);
-}
-
-u_int64_t
-buffer_get_int64(Buffer *buffer)
-{
- u_int64_t ret;
-
- if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&ret, buffer) == -1)
- fatal("buffer_get_int: buffer error");
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-/*
- * Stores integers in the buffer, msb first.
- */
-void
-buffer_put_short(Buffer *buffer, u_short value)
-{
- char buf[2];
-
- put_u16(buf, value);
- buffer_append(buffer, buf, 2);
-}
-
-void
-buffer_put_int(Buffer *buffer, u_int value)
-{
- char buf[4];
-
- put_u32(buf, value);
- buffer_append(buffer, buf, 4);
-}
-
-void
-buffer_put_int64(Buffer *buffer, u_int64_t value)
-{
- char buf[8];
-
- put_u64(buf, value);
- buffer_append(buffer, buf, 8);
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns an arbitrary binary string from the buffer. The string cannot
- * be longer than 256k. The returned value points to memory allocated
- * with xmalloc; it is the responsibility of the calling function to free
- * the data. If length_ptr is non-NULL, the length of the returned data
- * will be stored there. A null character will be automatically appended
- * to the returned string, and is not counted in length.
- */
-void *
-buffer_get_string_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
-{
- u_char *value;
- u_int len;
-
- /* Get the length. */
- if (buffer_get_int_ret(&len, buffer) != 0) {
- error("buffer_get_string_ret: cannot extract length");
- return (NULL);
- }
- if (len > 256 * 1024) {
- error("buffer_get_string_ret: bad string length %u", len);
- return (NULL);
- }
- /* Allocate space for the string. Add one byte for a null character. */
- value = xmalloc(len + 1);
- /* Get the string. */
- if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, value, len) == -1) {
- error("buffer_get_string_ret: buffer_get failed");
- free(value);
- return (NULL);
- }
- /* Append a null character to make processing easier. */
- value[len] = '\0';
- /* Optionally return the length of the string. */
- if (length_ptr)
- *length_ptr = len;
- return (value);
-}
-
-void *
-buffer_get_string(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
-{
- void *ret;
-
- if ((ret = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, length_ptr)) == NULL)
- fatal("buffer_get_string: buffer error");
- return (ret);
-}
-
-char *
-buffer_get_cstring_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
-{
- u_int length;
- char *cp, *ret = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, &length);
-
- if (ret == NULL)
- return NULL;
- if ((cp = memchr(ret, '\0', length)) != NULL) {
- /* XXX allow \0 at end-of-string for a while, remove later */
- if (cp == ret + length - 1)
- error("buffer_get_cstring_ret: string contains \\0");
- else {
- explicit_bzero(ret, length);
- free(ret);
- return NULL;
- }
- }
- if (length_ptr != NULL)
- *length_ptr = length;
- return ret;
-}
-
-char *
-buffer_get_cstring(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
-{
- char *ret;
-
- if ((ret = buffer_get_cstring_ret(buffer, length_ptr)) == NULL)
- fatal("buffer_get_cstring: buffer error");
- return ret;
-}
-
-void *
-buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
-{
- void *ptr;
- u_int len;
-
- if (buffer_get_int_ret(&len, buffer) != 0)
- return NULL;
- if (len > 256 * 1024) {
- error("buffer_get_string_ptr: bad string length %u", len);
- return NULL;
- }
- ptr = buffer_ptr(buffer);
- buffer_consume(buffer, len);
- if (length_ptr)
- *length_ptr = len;
- return (ptr);
-}
-
-void *
-buffer_get_string_ptr(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
-{
- void *ret;
-
- if ((ret = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(buffer, length_ptr)) == NULL)
- fatal("buffer_get_string_ptr: buffer error");
- return (ret);
-}
-
-/*
- * Stores and arbitrary binary string in the buffer.
- */
-void
-buffer_put_string(Buffer *buffer, const void *buf, u_int len)
-{
- buffer_put_int(buffer, len);
- buffer_append(buffer, buf, len);
-}
-void
-buffer_put_cstring(Buffer *buffer, const char *s)
-{
- if (s == NULL)
- fatal("buffer_put_cstring: s == NULL");
- buffer_put_string(buffer, s, strlen(s));
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns a character from the buffer (0 - 255).
- */
-int
-buffer_get_char_ret(u_char *ret, Buffer *buffer)
-{
- if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, ret, 1) == -1) {
- error("buffer_get_char_ret: buffer_get_ret failed");
- return (-1);
- }
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-buffer_get_char(Buffer *buffer)
-{
- u_char ch;
-
- if (buffer_get_char_ret(&ch, buffer) == -1)
- fatal("buffer_get_char: buffer error");
- return ch;
-}
-
-/*
- * Stores a character in the buffer.
- */
-void
-buffer_put_char(Buffer *buffer, int value)
-{
- char ch = value;
-
- buffer_append(buffer, &ch, 1);
-}
-
-/* Pseudo bignum functions */
-
-void *
-buffer_get_bignum2_as_string_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
-{
- u_int len;
- u_char *bin, *p, *ret;
-
- if ((p = bin = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, &len)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: invalid bignum", __func__);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (len > 0 && (bin[0] & 0x80)) {
- error("%s: negative numbers not supported", __func__);
- free(bin);
- return NULL;
- }
- if (len > 8 * 1024) {
- error("%s: cannot handle BN of size %d", __func__, len);
- free(bin);
- return NULL;
- }
- /* Skip zero prefix on numbers with the MSB set */
- if (len > 1 && bin[0] == 0x00 && (bin[1] & 0x80) != 0) {
- p++;
- len--;
- }
- ret = xmalloc(len);
- memcpy(ret, p, len);
- explicit_bzero(p, len);
- free(bin);
- return ret;
-}
-
-void *
-buffer_get_bignum2_as_string(Buffer *buffer, u_int *l)
-{
- void *ret = buffer_get_bignum2_as_string_ret(buffer, l);
-
- if (ret == NULL)
- fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Stores a string using the bignum encoding rules (\0 pad if MSB set).
- */
-void
-buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(Buffer *buffer, const u_char *s, u_int l)
-{
- u_char *buf, *p;
- int pad = 0;
-
- if (l > 8 * 1024)
- fatal("%s: length %u too long", __func__, l);
- p = buf = xmalloc(l + 1);
- /*
- * If most significant bit is set then prepend a zero byte to
- * avoid interpretation as a negative number.
- */
- if (l > 0 && (s[0] & 0x80) != 0) {
- *p++ = '\0';
- pad = 1;
- }
- memcpy(p, s, l);
- buffer_put_string(buffer, buf, l + pad);
- explicit_bzero(buf, l + pad);
- free(buf);
-}
-
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bufaux.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/bufaux.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bufaux.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bufaux.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.60 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Emulation wrappers for legacy OpenSSH buffer API atop sshbuf */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+int
+buffer_get_short_ret(u_short *v, Buffer *buffer)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_u16(buffer, v)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+u_short
+buffer_get_short(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+ u_short ret;
+
+ if (buffer_get_short_ret(&ret, buffer) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int
+buffer_get_int_ret(u_int *v, Buffer *buffer)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_u32(buffer, v)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+u_int
+buffer_get_int(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+ u_int ret;
+
+ if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ret, buffer) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int
+buffer_get_int64_ret(u_int64_t *v, Buffer *buffer)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_u64(buffer, v)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+u_int64_t
+buffer_get_int64(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+ u_int64_t ret;
+
+ if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&ret, buffer) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+void
+buffer_put_short(Buffer *buffer, u_short value)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u16(buffer, value)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+}
+
+void
+buffer_put_int(Buffer *buffer, u_int value)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, value)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+}
+
+void
+buffer_put_int64(Buffer *buffer, u_int64_t value)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u64(buffer, value)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+}
+
+void *
+buffer_get_string_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ int ret;
+ u_char *value;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(buffer, &value, &len)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (length_ptr != NULL)
+ *length_ptr = len; /* Safe: sshbuf never stores len > 2^31 */
+ return value;
+}
+
+void *
+buffer_get_string(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
+{
+ void *ret;
+
+ if ((ret = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, length_ptr)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+char *
+buffer_get_cstring_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ int ret;
+ char *value;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(buffer, &value, &len)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (length_ptr != NULL)
+ *length_ptr = len; /* Safe: sshbuf never stores len > 2^31 */
+ return value;
+}
+
+char *
+buffer_get_cstring(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
+{
+ char *ret;
+
+ if ((ret = buffer_get_cstring_ret(buffer, length_ptr)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+const void *
+buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ int ret;
+ const u_char *value;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buffer, &value, &len)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (length_ptr != NULL)
+ *length_ptr = len; /* Safe: sshbuf never stores len > 2^31 */
+ return value;
+}
+
+const void *
+buffer_get_string_ptr(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
+{
+ const void *ret;
+
+ if ((ret = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(buffer, length_ptr)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+void
+buffer_put_string(Buffer *buffer, const void *buf, u_int len)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(buffer, buf, len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+}
+
+void
+buffer_put_cstring(Buffer *buffer, const char *s)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, s)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+}
+
+int
+buffer_get_char_ret(char *v, Buffer *buffer)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_u8(buffer, (u_char *)v)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+buffer_get_char(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+ char ch;
+
+ if (buffer_get_char_ret(&ch, buffer) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+ return (u_char) ch;
+}
+
+void
+buffer_put_char(Buffer *buffer, int value)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u8(buffer, value)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+}
+
+void
+buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(Buffer *buffer, const u_char *s, u_int l)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(buffer, s, l)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+}
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bufbn.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/bufbn.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bufbn.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,229 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: bufbn.c,v 1.11 2014/02/27 08:25:09 djm Exp $*/
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Auxiliary functions for storing and retrieving various data types to/from
- * Buffers.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- *
- * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-
-/*
- * Stores an BIGNUM in the buffer with a 2-byte msb first bit count, followed
- * by (bits+7)/8 bytes of binary data, msb first.
- */
-int
-buffer_put_bignum_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
-{
- int bits = BN_num_bits(value);
- int bin_size = (bits + 7) / 8;
- u_char *buf = xmalloc(bin_size);
- int oi;
- char msg[2];
-
- /* Get the value of in binary */
- oi = BN_bn2bin(value, buf);
- if (oi != bin_size) {
- error("buffer_put_bignum_ret: BN_bn2bin() failed: oi %d != bin_size %d",
- oi, bin_size);
- free(buf);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- /* Store the number of bits in the buffer in two bytes, msb first. */
- put_u16(msg, bits);
- buffer_append(buffer, msg, 2);
- /* Store the binary data. */
- buffer_append(buffer, buf, oi);
-
- explicit_bzero(buf, bin_size);
- free(buf);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-void
-buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
-{
- if (buffer_put_bignum_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
- fatal("buffer_put_bignum: buffer error");
-}
-
-/*
- * Retrieves a BIGNUM from the buffer.
- */
-int
-buffer_get_bignum_ret(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
-{
- u_int bits, bytes;
- u_char buf[2], *bin;
-
- /* Get the number of bits. */
- if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 2) == -1) {
- error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: invalid length");
- return (-1);
- }
- bits = get_u16(buf);
- if (bits > 65535-7) {
- error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d",
- bits);
- return (-1);
- }
- /* Compute the number of binary bytes that follow. */
- bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
- if (bytes > 8 * 1024) {
- error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d", bytes);
- return (-1);
- }
- if (buffer_len(buffer) < bytes) {
- error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: input buffer too small");
- return (-1);
- }
- bin = buffer_ptr(buffer);
- if (BN_bin2bn(bin, bytes, value) == NULL) {
- error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: BN_bin2bn failed");
- return (-1);
- }
- if (buffer_consume_ret(buffer, bytes) == -1) {
- error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: buffer_consume failed");
- return (-1);
- }
- return (0);
-}
-
-void
-buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
-{
- if (buffer_get_bignum_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
- fatal("buffer_get_bignum: buffer error");
-}
-
-/*
- * Stores a BIGNUM in the buffer in SSH2 format.
- */
-int
-buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
-{
- u_int bytes;
- u_char *buf;
- int oi;
- u_int hasnohigh = 0;
-
- if (BN_is_zero(value)) {
- buffer_put_int(buffer, 0);
- return 0;
- }
- if (value->neg) {
- error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: negative numbers not supported");
- return (-1);
- }
- bytes = BN_num_bytes(value) + 1; /* extra padding byte */
- if (bytes < 2) {
- error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: BN too small");
- return (-1);
- }
- buf = xmalloc(bytes);
- buf[0] = 0x00;
- /* Get the value of in binary */
- oi = BN_bn2bin(value, buf+1);
- if (oi < 0 || (u_int)oi != bytes - 1) {
- error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: BN_bn2bin() failed: "
- "oi %d != bin_size %d", oi, bytes);
- free(buf);
- return (-1);
- }
- hasnohigh = (buf[1] & 0x80) ? 0 : 1;
- buffer_put_string(buffer, buf+hasnohigh, bytes-hasnohigh);
- explicit_bzero(buf, bytes);
- free(buf);
- return (0);
-}
-
-void
-buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
-{
- if (buffer_put_bignum2_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
- fatal("buffer_put_bignum2: buffer error");
-}
-
-int
-buffer_get_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
-{
- u_int len;
- u_char *bin;
-
- if ((bin = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, &len)) == NULL) {
- error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: invalid bignum");
- return (-1);
- }
-
- if (len > 0 && (bin[0] & 0x80)) {
- error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: negative numbers not supported");
- free(bin);
- return (-1);
- }
- if (len > 8 * 1024) {
- error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d",
- len);
- free(bin);
- return (-1);
- }
- if (BN_bin2bn(bin, len, value) == NULL) {
- error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: BN_bin2bn failed");
- free(bin);
- return (-1);
- }
- free(bin);
- return (0);
-}
-
-void
-buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
-{
- if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
- fatal("buffer_get_bignum2: buffer error");
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bufbn.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/bufbn.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bufbn.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bufbn.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: bufbn.c,v 1.12 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Emulation wrappers for legacy OpenSSH buffer API atop sshbuf */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+int
+buffer_put_bignum_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, value)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
+{
+ if (buffer_put_bignum_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+}
+
+int
+buffer_get_bignum_ret(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_bignum1(buffer, value)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+ if (buffer_get_bignum_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+
+int
+buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buffer, value)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
+{
+ if (buffer_put_bignum2_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+}
+
+int
+buffer_get_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buffer, value)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+ if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+}
+
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bufec.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/bufec.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bufec.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,146 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: bufec.c,v 1.3 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-
-/*
- * Maximum supported EC GFp field length is 528 bits. SEC1 uncompressed
- * encoding represents this as two bitstring points that should each
- * be no longer than the field length, SEC1 specifies a 1 byte
- * point type header.
- * Being paranoid here may insulate us to parsing problems in
- * EC_POINT_oct2point.
- */
-#define BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN ((528*2 / 8) + 1)
-
-/*
- * Append an EC_POINT to the buffer as a string containing a SEC1 encoded
- * uncompressed point. Fortunately OpenSSL handles the gory details for us.
- */
-int
-buffer_put_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve,
- const EC_POINT *point)
-{
- u_char *buf = NULL;
- size_t len;
- BN_CTX *bnctx;
- int ret = -1;
-
- /* Determine length */
- if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__);
- len = EC_POINT_point2oct(curve, point, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- NULL, 0, bnctx);
- if (len > BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN) {
- error("%s: giant EC point: len = %lu (max %u)",
- __func__, (u_long)len, BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN);
- goto out;
- }
- /* Convert */
- buf = xmalloc(len);
- if (EC_POINT_point2oct(curve, point, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- buf, len, bnctx) != len) {
- error("%s: EC_POINT_point2oct length mismatch", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- /* Append */
- buffer_put_string(buffer, buf, len);
- ret = 0;
- out:
- if (buf != NULL) {
- explicit_bzero(buf, len);
- free(buf);
- }
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
- return ret;
-}
-
-void
-buffer_put_ecpoint(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve,
- const EC_POINT *point)
-{
- if (buffer_put_ecpoint_ret(buffer, curve, point) == -1)
- fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
-}
-
-int
-buffer_get_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve,
- EC_POINT *point)
-{
- u_char *buf;
- u_int len;
- BN_CTX *bnctx;
- int ret = -1;
-
- if ((buf = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, &len)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: invalid point", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
- if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__);
- if (len > BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN) {
- error("%s: EC_POINT too long: %u > max %u", __func__,
- len, BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN);
- goto out;
- }
- if (len == 0) {
- error("%s: EC_POINT buffer is empty", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if (buf[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
- error("%s: EC_POINT is in an incorrect form: "
- "0x%02x (want 0x%02x)", __func__, buf[0],
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED);
- goto out;
- }
- if (EC_POINT_oct2point(curve, point, buf, len, bnctx) != 1) {
- error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: BN_bin2bn failed");
- goto out;
- }
- /* EC_POINT_oct2point verifies that the point is on the curve for us */
- ret = 0;
- out:
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
- explicit_bzero(buf, len);
- free(buf);
- return ret;
-}
-
-void
-buffer_get_ecpoint(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve,
- EC_POINT *point)
-{
- if (buffer_get_ecpoint_ret(buffer, curve, point) == -1)
- fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
-}
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bufec.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/bufec.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bufec.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/bufec.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: bufec.c,v 1.4 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Emulation wrappers for legacy OpenSSH buffer API atop sshbuf */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+
+int
+buffer_put_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve,
+ const EC_POINT *point)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_ec(buffer, point, curve)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+buffer_put_ecpoint(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve,
+ const EC_POINT *point)
+{
+ if (buffer_put_ecpoint_ret(buffer, curve, point) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+}
+
+int
+buffer_get_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve,
+ EC_POINT *point)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_ec(buffer, point, curve)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+buffer_get_ecpoint(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve,
+ EC_POINT *point)
+{
+ if (buffer_get_ecpoint_ret(buffer, curve, point) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+}
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/buffer.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/buffer.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/buffer.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,253 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: buffer.c,v 1.35 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Functions for manipulating fifo buffers (that can grow if needed).
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/param.h>
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-#define BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK 0x100000
-#define BUFFER_MAX_LEN 0xa00000
-#define BUFFER_ALLOCSZ 0x008000
-
-/* Initializes the buffer structure. */
-
-void
-buffer_init(Buffer *buffer)
-{
- const u_int len = 4096;
-
- buffer->alloc = 0;
- buffer->buf = xmalloc(len);
- buffer->alloc = len;
- buffer->offset = 0;
- buffer->end = 0;
-}
-
-/* Frees any memory used for the buffer. */
-
-void
-buffer_free(Buffer *buffer)
-{
- if (buffer->alloc > 0) {
- explicit_bzero(buffer->buf, buffer->alloc);
- buffer->alloc = 0;
- free(buffer->buf);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Clears any data from the buffer, making it empty. This does not actually
- * zero the memory.
- */
-
-void
-buffer_clear(Buffer *buffer)
-{
- buffer->offset = 0;
- buffer->end = 0;
-}
-
-/* Appends data to the buffer, expanding it if necessary. */
-
-void
-buffer_append(Buffer *buffer, const void *data, u_int len)
-{
- void *p;
- p = buffer_append_space(buffer, len);
- memcpy(p, data, len);
-}
-
-static int
-buffer_compact(Buffer *buffer)
-{
- /*
- * If the buffer is quite empty, but all data is at the end, move the
- * data to the beginning.
- */
- if (buffer->offset > MIN(buffer->alloc, BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK)) {
- memmove(buffer->buf, buffer->buf + buffer->offset,
- buffer->end - buffer->offset);
- buffer->end -= buffer->offset;
- buffer->offset = 0;
- return (1);
- }
- return (0);
-}
-
-/*
- * Appends space to the buffer, expanding the buffer if necessary. This does
- * not actually copy the data into the buffer, but instead returns a pointer
- * to the allocated region.
- */
-
-void *
-buffer_append_space(Buffer *buffer, u_int len)
-{
- u_int newlen;
- void *p;
-
- if (len > BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK)
- fatal("buffer_append_space: len %u not supported", len);
-
- /* If the buffer is empty, start using it from the beginning. */
- if (buffer->offset == buffer->end) {
- buffer->offset = 0;
- buffer->end = 0;
- }
-restart:
- /* If there is enough space to store all data, store it now. */
- if (buffer->end + len < buffer->alloc) {
- p = buffer->buf + buffer->end;
- buffer->end += len;
- return p;
- }
-
- /* Compact data back to the start of the buffer if necessary */
- if (buffer_compact(buffer))
- goto restart;
-
- /* Increase the size of the buffer and retry. */
- newlen = roundup(buffer->alloc + len, BUFFER_ALLOCSZ);
- if (newlen > BUFFER_MAX_LEN)
- fatal("buffer_append_space: alloc %u not supported",
- newlen);
- buffer->buf = xrealloc(buffer->buf, 1, newlen);
- buffer->alloc = newlen;
- goto restart;
- /* NOTREACHED */
-}
-
-/*
- * Check whether an allocation of 'len' will fit in the buffer
- * This must follow the same math as buffer_append_space
- */
-int
-buffer_check_alloc(Buffer *buffer, u_int len)
-{
- if (buffer->offset == buffer->end) {
- buffer->offset = 0;
- buffer->end = 0;
- }
- restart:
- if (buffer->end + len < buffer->alloc)
- return (1);
- if (buffer_compact(buffer))
- goto restart;
- if (roundup(buffer->alloc + len, BUFFER_ALLOCSZ) <= BUFFER_MAX_LEN)
- return (1);
- return (0);
-}
-
-/* Returns the number of bytes of data in the buffer. */
-
-u_int
-buffer_len(const Buffer *buffer)
-{
- return buffer->end - buffer->offset;
-}
-
-/* Gets data from the beginning of the buffer. */
-
-int
-buffer_get_ret(Buffer *buffer, void *buf, u_int len)
-{
- if (len > buffer->end - buffer->offset) {
- error("buffer_get_ret: trying to get more bytes %d than in buffer %d",
- len, buffer->end - buffer->offset);
- return (-1);
- }
- memcpy(buf, buffer->buf + buffer->offset, len);
- buffer->offset += len;
- return (0);
-}
-
-void
-buffer_get(Buffer *buffer, void *buf, u_int len)
-{
- if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, buf, len) == -1)
- fatal("buffer_get: buffer error");
-}
-
-/* Consumes the given number of bytes from the beginning of the buffer. */
-
-int
-buffer_consume_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes)
-{
- if (bytes > buffer->end - buffer->offset) {
- error("buffer_consume_ret: trying to get more bytes than in buffer");
- return (-1);
- }
- buffer->offset += bytes;
- return (0);
-}
-
-void
-buffer_consume(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes)
-{
- if (buffer_consume_ret(buffer, bytes) == -1)
- fatal("buffer_consume: buffer error");
-}
-
-/* Consumes the given number of bytes from the end of the buffer. */
-
-int
-buffer_consume_end_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes)
-{
- if (bytes > buffer->end - buffer->offset)
- return (-1);
- buffer->end -= bytes;
- return (0);
-}
-
-void
-buffer_consume_end(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes)
-{
- if (buffer_consume_end_ret(buffer, bytes) == -1)
- fatal("buffer_consume_end: trying to get more bytes than in buffer");
-}
-
-/* Returns a pointer to the first used byte in the buffer. */
-
-void *
-buffer_ptr(const Buffer *buffer)
-{
- return buffer->buf + buffer->offset;
-}
-
-/* Dumps the contents of the buffer to stderr. */
-
-void
-buffer_dump(const Buffer *buffer)
-{
- u_int i;
- u_char *ucp = buffer->buf;
-
- for (i = buffer->offset; i < buffer->end; i++) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%02x", ucp[i]);
- if ((i-buffer->offset)%16==15)
- fprintf(stderr, "\r\n");
- else if ((i-buffer->offset)%2==1)
- fprintf(stderr, " ");
- }
- fprintf(stderr, "\r\n");
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/buffer.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/buffer.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/buffer.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/buffer.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: buffer.c,v 1.36 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Emulation wrappers for legacy OpenSSH buffer API atop sshbuf */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+void
+buffer_append(Buffer *buffer, const void *data, u_int len)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put(buffer, data, len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+}
+
+void *
+buffer_append_space(Buffer *buffer, u_int len)
+{
+ int ret;
+ u_char *p;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_reserve(buffer, len, &p)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+ return p;
+}
+
+int
+buffer_check_alloc(Buffer *buffer, u_int len)
+{
+ int ret = sshbuf_check_reserve(buffer, len);
+
+ if (ret == 0)
+ return 1;
+ if (ret == SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE)
+ return 0;
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+}
+
+int
+buffer_get_ret(Buffer *buffer, void *buf, u_int len)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get(buffer, buf, len)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+buffer_get(Buffer *buffer, void *buf, u_int len)
+{
+ if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, buf, len) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+}
+
+int
+buffer_consume_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes)
+{
+ int ret = sshbuf_consume(buffer, bytes);
+
+ if (ret == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (ret == SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE)
+ return -1;
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+}
+
+void
+buffer_consume(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes)
+{
+ if (buffer_consume_ret(buffer, bytes) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+}
+
+int
+buffer_consume_end_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes)
+{
+ int ret = sshbuf_consume_end(buffer, bytes);
+
+ if (ret == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (ret == SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE)
+ return -1;
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+}
+
+void
+buffer_consume_end(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes)
+{
+ if (buffer_consume_end_ret(buffer, bytes) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+}
+
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/buffer.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/buffer.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/buffer.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: buffer.h,v 1.23 2014/01/12 08:13:13 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Code for manipulating FIFO buffers.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#ifndef BUFFER_H
-#define BUFFER_H
-
-typedef struct {
- u_char *buf; /* Buffer for data. */
- u_int alloc; /* Number of bytes allocated for data. */
- u_int offset; /* Offset of first byte containing data. */
- u_int end; /* Offset of last byte containing data. */
-} Buffer;
-
-void buffer_init(Buffer *);
-void buffer_clear(Buffer *);
-void buffer_free(Buffer *);
-
-u_int buffer_len(const Buffer *);
-void *buffer_ptr(const Buffer *);
-
-void buffer_append(Buffer *, const void *, u_int);
-void *buffer_append_space(Buffer *, u_int);
-
-int buffer_check_alloc(Buffer *, u_int);
-
-void buffer_get(Buffer *, void *, u_int);
-
-void buffer_consume(Buffer *, u_int);
-void buffer_consume_end(Buffer *, u_int);
-
-void buffer_dump(const Buffer *);
-
-int buffer_get_ret(Buffer *, void *, u_int);
-int buffer_consume_ret(Buffer *, u_int);
-int buffer_consume_end_ret(Buffer *, u_int);
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-
-void buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
-void buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
-void buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
-void buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
-
-u_short buffer_get_short(Buffer *);
-void buffer_put_short(Buffer *, u_short);
-
-u_int buffer_get_int(Buffer *);
-void buffer_put_int(Buffer *, u_int);
-
-u_int64_t buffer_get_int64(Buffer *);
-void buffer_put_int64(Buffer *, u_int64_t);
-
-int buffer_get_char(Buffer *);
-void buffer_put_char(Buffer *, int);
-
-void *buffer_get_string(Buffer *, u_int *);
-void *buffer_get_string_ptr(Buffer *, u_int *);
-void buffer_put_string(Buffer *, const void *, u_int);
-char *buffer_get_cstring(Buffer *, u_int *);
-void buffer_put_cstring(Buffer *, const char *);
-
-#define buffer_skip_string(b) \
- do { u_int l = buffer_get_int(b); buffer_consume(b, l); } while (0)
-
-int buffer_put_bignum_ret(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
-int buffer_get_bignum_ret(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
-int buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
-int buffer_get_bignum2_ret(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
-int buffer_get_short_ret(u_short *, Buffer *);
-int buffer_get_int_ret(u_int *, Buffer *);
-int buffer_get_int64_ret(u_int64_t *, Buffer *);
-void *buffer_get_string_ret(Buffer *, u_int *);
-char *buffer_get_cstring_ret(Buffer *, u_int *);
-void *buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(Buffer *, u_int *);
-int buffer_get_char_ret(u_char *, Buffer *);
-
-void *buffer_get_bignum2_as_string_ret(Buffer *, u_int *);
-void *buffer_get_bignum2_as_string(Buffer *, u_int *);
-void buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(Buffer *, const u_char *, u_int);
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-
-int buffer_put_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *, const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
-void buffer_put_ecpoint(Buffer *, const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
-int buffer_get_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *, const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *);
-void buffer_get_ecpoint(Buffer *, const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *);
-#endif
-
-#endif /* BUFFER_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/buffer.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/buffer.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/buffer.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/buffer.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: buffer.h,v 1.25 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Emulation wrappers for legacy OpenSSH buffer API atop sshbuf */
+
+#ifndef BUFFER_H
+#define BUFFER_H
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+typedef struct sshbuf Buffer;
+
+#define buffer_init(b) sshbuf_init(b)
+#define buffer_clear(b) sshbuf_reset(b)
+#define buffer_free(b) sshbuf_free(b)
+#define buffer_dump(b) sshbuf_dump(b, stderr)
+
+/* XXX cast is safe: sshbuf never stores more than len 2^31 */
+#define buffer_len(b) ((u_int) sshbuf_len(b))
+#define buffer_ptr(b) sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)
+
+void buffer_append(Buffer *, const void *, u_int);
+void *buffer_append_space(Buffer *, u_int);
+int buffer_check_alloc(Buffer *, u_int);
+void buffer_get(Buffer *, void *, u_int);
+
+void buffer_consume(Buffer *, u_int);
+void buffer_consume_end(Buffer *, u_int);
+
+
+int buffer_get_ret(Buffer *, void *, u_int);
+int buffer_consume_ret(Buffer *, u_int);
+int buffer_consume_end_ret(Buffer *, u_int);
+
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+void buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
+void buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
+void buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
+void buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
+void buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(Buffer *, const u_char *, u_int);
+
+u_short buffer_get_short(Buffer *);
+void buffer_put_short(Buffer *, u_short);
+
+u_int buffer_get_int(Buffer *);
+void buffer_put_int(Buffer *, u_int);
+
+u_int64_t buffer_get_int64(Buffer *);
+void buffer_put_int64(Buffer *, u_int64_t);
+
+int buffer_get_char(Buffer *);
+void buffer_put_char(Buffer *, int);
+
+void *buffer_get_string(Buffer *, u_int *);
+const void *buffer_get_string_ptr(Buffer *, u_int *);
+void buffer_put_string(Buffer *, const void *, u_int);
+char *buffer_get_cstring(Buffer *, u_int *);
+void buffer_put_cstring(Buffer *, const char *);
+
+#define buffer_skip_string(b) (void)buffer_get_string_ptr(b, NULL);
+
+int buffer_put_bignum_ret(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
+int buffer_get_bignum_ret(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
+int buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
+int buffer_get_bignum2_ret(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
+int buffer_get_short_ret(u_short *, Buffer *);
+int buffer_get_int_ret(u_int *, Buffer *);
+int buffer_get_int64_ret(u_int64_t *, Buffer *);
+void *buffer_get_string_ret(Buffer *, u_int *);
+char *buffer_get_cstring_ret(Buffer *, u_int *);
+const void *buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(Buffer *, u_int *);
+int buffer_get_char_ret(char *, Buffer *);
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+int buffer_put_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *, const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
+void buffer_put_ecpoint(Buffer *, const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
+int buffer_get_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *, const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *);
+void buffer_get_ecpoint(Buffer *, const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* BUFFER_H */
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/canohost.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/canohost.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/canohost.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,431 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.70 2014/01/19 04:17:29 dtucker Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Functions for returning the canonical host name of the remote site.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-
-static void check_ip_options(int, char *);
-static char *canonical_host_ip = NULL;
-static int cached_port = -1;
-
-/*
- * Return the canonical name of the host at the other end of the socket. The
- * caller should free the returned string.
- */
-
-static char *
-get_remote_hostname(int sock, int use_dns)
-{
- struct sockaddr_storage from;
- socklen_t fromlen;
- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
- char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
-
- /* Get IP address of client. */
- fromlen = sizeof(from);
- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
- debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
-
- if (from.ss_family == AF_INET)
- check_ip_options(sock, ntop);
-
- ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
-
- if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
- fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
-
- if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
- NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
- fatal("get_remote_hostname: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICHOST failed");
-
- if (!use_dns)
- return xstrdup(ntop);
-
- debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
- /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
- if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
- NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
- /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
- return xstrdup(ntop);
- }
-
- /*
- * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
- * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
- * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
- */
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
- logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
- name, ntop);
- freeaddrinfo(ai);
- return xstrdup(ntop);
- }
-
- /* Names are stores in lowercase. */
- lowercase(name);
-
- /*
- * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
- * address actually is an address of this host. This is
- * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
- * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
- * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
- * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
- * the domain).
- */
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
- logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
- "[%s] failed - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!", name, ntop);
- return xstrdup(ntop);
- }
- /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
- for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
- sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
- (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
- break;
- }
- freeaddrinfo(aitop);
- /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
- if (!ai) {
- /* Address not found for the host name. */
- logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
- "map back to the address - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!",
- ntop, name);
- return xstrdup(ntop);
- }
- return xstrdup(name);
-}
-
-/*
- * If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and
- * disconnect them if any are found). Basically we are worried about
- * source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody
- * (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable"
- * under certain circumstances, but rhosts autentication is useless
- * if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped
- * source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do
- * rest of the interaction and could still bypass security. So we
- * exit here if we detect any IP options.
- */
-/* IPv4 only */
-static void
-check_ip_options(int sock, char *ipaddr)
-{
-#ifdef IP_OPTIONS
- u_char options[200];
- char text[sizeof(options) * 3 + 1];
- socklen_t option_size, i;
- int ipproto;
- struct protoent *ip;
-
- if ((ip = getprotobyname("ip")) != NULL)
- ipproto = ip->p_proto;
- else
- ipproto = IPPROTO_IP;
- option_size = sizeof(options);
- if (getsockopt(sock, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, options,
- &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
- text[0] = '\0';
- for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
- snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
- " %2.2x", options[i]);
- fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
- ipaddr, text);
- }
-#endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
-}
-
-void
-ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
-{
- struct sockaddr_in6 *a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr;
- struct sockaddr_in *a4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr;
- struct in_addr inaddr;
- u_int16_t port;
-
- if (addr->ss_family != AF_INET6 ||
- !IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&a6->sin6_addr))
- return;
-
- debug3("Normalising mapped IPv4 in IPv6 address");
-
- memcpy(&inaddr, ((char *)&a6->sin6_addr) + 12, sizeof(inaddr));
- port = a6->sin6_port;
-
- memset(a4, 0, sizeof(*a4));
-
- a4->sin_family = AF_INET;
- *len = sizeof(*a4);
- memcpy(&a4->sin_addr, &inaddr, sizeof(inaddr));
- a4->sin_port = port;
-}
-
-/*
- * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
- * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
- * several times.
- */
-
-const char *
-get_canonical_hostname(int use_dns)
-{
- char *host;
- static char *canonical_host_name = NULL;
- static char *remote_ip = NULL;
-
- /* Check if we have previously retrieved name with same option. */
- if (use_dns && canonical_host_name != NULL)
- return canonical_host_name;
- if (!use_dns && remote_ip != NULL)
- return remote_ip;
-
- /* Get the real hostname if socket; otherwise return UNKNOWN. */
- if (packet_connection_is_on_socket())
- host = get_remote_hostname(packet_get_connection_in(), use_dns);
- else
- host = "UNKNOWN";
-
- if (use_dns)
- canonical_host_name = host;
- else
- remote_ip = host;
- return host;
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns the local/remote IP-address/hostname of socket as a string.
- * The returned string must be freed.
- */
-static char *
-get_socket_address(int sock, int remote, int flags)
-{
- struct sockaddr_storage addr;
- socklen_t addrlen;
- char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
- int r;
-
- /* Get IP address of client. */
- addrlen = sizeof(addr);
- memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
-
- if (remote) {
- if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen)
- < 0)
- return NULL;
- } else {
- if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen)
- < 0)
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /* Work around Linux IPv6 weirdness */
- if (addr.ss_family == AF_INET6)
- addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
-
- ipv64_normalise_mapped(&addr, &addrlen);
-
- /* Get the address in ascii. */
- if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen, ntop,
- sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, flags)) != 0) {
- error("get_socket_address: getnameinfo %d failed: %s", flags,
- ssh_gai_strerror(r));
- return NULL;
- }
- return xstrdup(ntop);
-}
-
-char *
-get_peer_ipaddr(int sock)
-{
- char *p;
-
- if ((p = get_socket_address(sock, 1, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL)
- return p;
- return xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
-}
-
-char *
-get_local_ipaddr(int sock)
-{
- char *p;
-
- if ((p = get_socket_address(sock, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL)
- return p;
- return xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
-}
-
-char *
-get_local_name(int fd)
-{
- char *host, myname[NI_MAXHOST];
-
- /* Assume we were passed a socket */
- if ((host = get_socket_address(fd, 0, NI_NAMEREQD)) != NULL)
- return host;
-
- /* Handle the case where we were passed a pipe */
- if (gethostname(myname, sizeof(myname)) == -1) {
- verbose("get_local_name: gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
- } else {
- host = xstrdup(myname);
- }
-
- return host;
-}
-
-void
-clear_cached_addr(void)
-{
- free(canonical_host_ip);
- canonical_host_ip = NULL;
- cached_port = -1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned
- * string must not be freed.
- */
-
-const char *
-get_remote_ipaddr(void)
-{
- /* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */
- if (canonical_host_ip == NULL) {
- if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
- canonical_host_ip =
- get_peer_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in());
- if (canonical_host_ip == NULL)
- cleanup_exit(255);
- } else {
- /* If not on socket, return UNKNOWN. */
- canonical_host_ip = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
- }
- }
- return canonical_host_ip;
-}
-
-const char *
-get_remote_name_or_ip(u_int utmp_len, int use_dns)
-{
- static const char *remote = "";
- if (utmp_len > 0)
- remote = get_canonical_hostname(use_dns);
- if (utmp_len == 0 || strlen(remote) > utmp_len)
- remote = get_remote_ipaddr();
- return remote;
-}
-
-/* Returns the local/remote port for the socket. */
-
-int
-get_sock_port(int sock, int local)
-{
- struct sockaddr_storage from;
- socklen_t fromlen;
- char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
- int r;
-
- /* Get IP address of client. */
- fromlen = sizeof(from);
- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- if (local) {
- if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
- error("getsockname failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- return 0;
- }
- } else {
- if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
- debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- /* Work around Linux IPv6 weirdness */
- if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
- fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
-
- /* Return port number. */
- if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, NULL, 0,
- strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0)
- fatal("get_sock_port: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICSERV failed: %s",
- ssh_gai_strerror(r));
- return atoi(strport);
-}
-
-/* Returns remote/local port number for the current connection. */
-
-static int
-get_port(int local)
-{
- /*
- * If the connection is not a socket, return 65535. This is
- * intentionally chosen to be an unprivileged port number.
- */
- if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket())
- return 65535;
-
- /* Get socket and return the port number. */
- return get_sock_port(packet_get_connection_in(), local);
-}
-
-int
-get_peer_port(int sock)
-{
- return get_sock_port(sock, 0);
-}
-
-int
-get_remote_port(void)
-{
- /* Cache to avoid getpeername() on a dead connection */
- if (cached_port == -1)
- cached_port = get_port(0);
-
- return cached_port;
-}
-
-int
-get_local_port(void)
-{
- return get_port(1);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/canohost.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/canohost.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/canohost.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/canohost.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.73 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Functions for returning the canonical host name of the remote site.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+void
+ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr;
+ struct sockaddr_in *a4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr;
+ struct in_addr inaddr;
+ u_int16_t port;
+
+ if (addr->ss_family != AF_INET6 ||
+ !IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&a6->sin6_addr))
+ return;
+
+ debug3("Normalising mapped IPv4 in IPv6 address");
+
+ memcpy(&inaddr, ((char *)&a6->sin6_addr) + 12, sizeof(inaddr));
+ port = a6->sin6_port;
+
+ memset(a4, 0, sizeof(*a4));
+
+ a4->sin_family = AF_INET;
+ *len = sizeof(*a4);
+ memcpy(&a4->sin_addr, &inaddr, sizeof(inaddr));
+ a4->sin_port = port;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the local/remote IP-address/hostname of socket as a string.
+ * The returned string must be freed.
+ */
+static char *
+get_socket_address(int sock, int remote, int flags)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+ socklen_t addrlen;
+ char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
+ int r;
+
+ /* Get IP address of client. */
+ addrlen = sizeof(addr);
+ memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+
+ if (remote) {
+ if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen) != 0)
+ return NULL;
+ } else {
+ if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen) != 0)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Work around Linux IPv6 weirdness */
+ if (addr.ss_family == AF_INET6) {
+ addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+ ipv64_normalise_mapped(&addr, &addrlen);
+ }
+
+ switch (addr.ss_family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ case AF_INET6:
+ /* Get the address in ascii. */
+ if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen, ntop,
+ sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, flags)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: getnameinfo %d failed: %s", __func__,
+ flags, ssh_gai_strerror(r));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
+ case AF_UNIX:
+ /* Get the Unix domain socket path. */
+ return xstrdup(((struct sockaddr_un *)&addr)->sun_path);
+ default:
+ /* We can't look up remote Unix domain sockets. */
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+char *
+get_peer_ipaddr(int sock)
+{
+ char *p;
+
+ if ((p = get_socket_address(sock, 1, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL)
+ return p;
+ return xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
+}
+
+char *
+get_local_ipaddr(int sock)
+{
+ char *p;
+
+ if ((p = get_socket_address(sock, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL)
+ return p;
+ return xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
+}
+
+char *
+get_local_name(int fd)
+{
+ char *host, myname[NI_MAXHOST];
+
+ /* Assume we were passed a socket */
+ if ((host = get_socket_address(fd, 0, NI_NAMEREQD)) != NULL)
+ return host;
+
+ /* Handle the case where we were passed a pipe */
+ if (gethostname(myname, sizeof(myname)) == -1) {
+ verbose("%s: gethostname: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ host = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
+ } else {
+ host = xstrdup(myname);
+ }
+
+ return host;
+}
+
+/* Returns the local/remote port for the socket. */
+
+static int
+get_sock_port(int sock, int local)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ socklen_t fromlen;
+ char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+ int r;
+
+ /* Get IP address of client. */
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ if (local) {
+ if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ error("getsockname failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Work around Linux IPv6 weirdness */
+ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+ fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+
+ /* Non-inet sockets don't have a port number. */
+ if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Return port number. */
+ if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, NULL, 0,
+ strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICSERV failed: %s", __func__,
+ ssh_gai_strerror(r));
+ return atoi(strport);
+}
+
+int
+get_peer_port(int sock)
+{
+ return get_sock_port(sock, 0);
+}
+
+int
+get_local_port(int sock)
+{
+ return get_sock_port(sock, 1);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/canohost.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/canohost.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/canohost.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: canohost.h,v 1.11 2009/05/27 06:31:25 andreas Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-const char *get_canonical_hostname(int);
-const char *get_remote_ipaddr(void);
-const char *get_remote_name_or_ip(u_int, int);
-
-char *get_peer_ipaddr(int);
-int get_peer_port(int);
-char *get_local_ipaddr(int);
-char *get_local_name(int);
-
-int get_remote_port(void);
-int get_local_port(void);
-int get_sock_port(int, int);
-void clear_cached_addr(void);
-
-void ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *, socklen_t *);
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/canohost.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/canohost.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/canohost.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/canohost.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: canohost.h,v 1.12 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CANOHOST_H
+#define _CANOHOST_H
+
+char *get_peer_ipaddr(int);
+int get_peer_port(int);
+char *get_local_ipaddr(int);
+char *get_local_name(int);
+int get_local_port(int);
+
+#endif /* _CANOHOST_H */
+
+void ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *, socklen_t *);
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/chacha.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/chacha.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/chacha.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: chacha.h,v 1.1 2013/11/21 00:45:44 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
-chacha-merged.c version 20080118
-D. J. Bernstein
-Public domain.
-*/
-
-#ifndef CHACHA_H
-#define CHACHA_H
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-struct chacha_ctx {
- u_int input[16];
-};
-
-#define CHACHA_MINKEYLEN 16
-#define CHACHA_NONCELEN 8
-#define CHACHA_CTRLEN 8
-#define CHACHA_STATELEN (CHACHA_NONCELEN+CHACHA_CTRLEN)
-#define CHACHA_BLOCKLEN 64
-
-void chacha_keysetup(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *k, u_int kbits)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CHACHA_MINKEYLEN)));
-void chacha_ivsetup(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *iv, const u_char *ctr)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CHACHA_NONCELEN)))
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 3, CHACHA_CTRLEN)));
-void chacha_encrypt_bytes(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *m,
- u_char *c, u_int bytes)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 4)))
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 3, 4)));
-
-#endif /* CHACHA_H */
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/chacha.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/chacha.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/chacha.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/chacha.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: chacha.h,v 1.3 2014/05/02 03:27:54 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+chacha-merged.c version 20080118
+D. J. Bernstein
+Public domain.
+*/
+
+#ifndef CHACHA_H
+#define CHACHA_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+struct chacha_ctx {
+ u_int input[16];
+};
+
+#define CHACHA_MINKEYLEN 16
+#define CHACHA_NONCELEN 8
+#define CHACHA_CTRLEN 8
+#define CHACHA_STATELEN (CHACHA_NONCELEN+CHACHA_CTRLEN)
+#define CHACHA_BLOCKLEN 64
+
+void chacha_keysetup(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *k, u_int kbits)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CHACHA_MINKEYLEN)));
+void chacha_ivsetup(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *iv, const u_char *ctr)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CHACHA_NONCELEN)))
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 3, CHACHA_CTRLEN)));
+void chacha_encrypt_bytes(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *m,
+ u_char *c, u_int bytes)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 4)))
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 3, 4)));
+
+#endif /* CHACHA_H */
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/channels.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/channels.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/channels.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,3822 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.331 2014/02/26 20:29:29 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * This file contains functions for generic socket connection forwarding.
- * There is also code for initiating connection forwarding for X11 connections,
- * arbitrary tcp/ip connections, and the authentication agent connection.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl.
- * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/ioctl.h>
-#include <sys/un.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <termios.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "authfd.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-
-/* -- channel core */
-
-/*
- * Pointer to an array containing all allocated channels. The array is
- * dynamically extended as needed.
- */
-static Channel **channels = NULL;
-
-/*
- * Size of the channel array. All slots of the array must always be
- * initialized (at least the type field); unused slots set to NULL
- */
-static u_int channels_alloc = 0;
-
-/*
- * Maximum file descriptor value used in any of the channels. This is
- * updated in channel_new.
- */
-static int channel_max_fd = 0;
-
-
-/* -- tcp forwarding */
-
-/*
- * Data structure for storing which hosts are permitted for forward requests.
- * The local sides of any remote forwards are stored in this array to prevent
- * a corrupt remote server from accessing arbitrary TCP/IP ports on our local
- * network (which might be behind a firewall).
- */
-typedef struct {
- char *host_to_connect; /* Connect to 'host'. */
- u_short port_to_connect; /* Connect to 'port'. */
- u_short listen_port; /* Remote side should listen port number. */
-} ForwardPermission;
-
-/* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the user. */
-static ForwardPermission *permitted_opens = NULL;
-
-/* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the admin. */
-static ForwardPermission *permitted_adm_opens = NULL;
-
-/* Number of permitted host/port pairs in the array permitted by the user. */
-static int num_permitted_opens = 0;
-
-/* Number of permitted host/port pair in the array permitted by the admin. */
-static int num_adm_permitted_opens = 0;
-
-/* special-case port number meaning allow any port */
-#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT 0
-
-/*
- * If this is true, all opens are permitted. This is the case on the server
- * on which we have to trust the client anyway, and the user could do
- * anything after logging in anyway.
- */
-static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
-
-
-/* -- X11 forwarding */
-
-/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
-#define MAX_DISPLAYS 1000
-
-/* Saved X11 local (client) display. */
-static char *x11_saved_display = NULL;
-
-/* Saved X11 authentication protocol name. */
-static char *x11_saved_proto = NULL;
-
-/* Saved X11 authentication data. This is the real data. */
-static char *x11_saved_data = NULL;
-static u_int x11_saved_data_len = 0;
-
-/*
- * Fake X11 authentication data. This is what the server will be sending us;
- * we should replace any occurrences of this by the real data.
- */
-static u_char *x11_fake_data = NULL;
-static u_int x11_fake_data_len;
-
-
-/* -- agent forwarding */
-
-#define NUM_SOCKS 10
-
-/* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */
-static int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
-
-/* helper */
-static void port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype);
-
-/* non-blocking connect helpers */
-static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *);
-static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *);
-
-/* -- channel core */
-
-Channel *
-channel_by_id(int id)
-{
- Channel *c;
-
- if (id < 0 || (u_int)id >= channels_alloc) {
- logit("channel_by_id: %d: bad id", id);
- return NULL;
- }
- c = channels[id];
- if (c == NULL) {
- logit("channel_by_id: %d: bad id: channel free", id);
- return NULL;
- }
- return c;
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns the channel if it is allowed to receive protocol messages.
- * Private channels, like listening sockets, may not receive messages.
- */
-Channel *
-channel_lookup(int id)
-{
- Channel *c;
-
- if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL)
- return (NULL);
-
- switch (c->type) {
- case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
- return (c);
- }
- logit("Non-public channel %d, type %d.", id, c->type);
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * Register filedescriptors for a channel, used when allocating a channel or
- * when the channel consumer/producer is ready, e.g. shell exec'd
- */
-static void
-channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
- int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty)
-{
- /* Update the maximum file descriptor value. */
- channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, rfd);
- channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, wfd);
- channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, efd);
-
- if (rfd != -1)
- fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
- if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd)
- fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
- if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
- fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
-
- c->rfd = rfd;
- c->wfd = wfd;
- c->sock = (rfd == wfd) ? rfd : -1;
- c->efd = efd;
- c->extended_usage = extusage;
-
- if ((c->isatty = is_tty) != 0)
- debug2("channel %d: rfd %d isatty", c->self, c->rfd);
-#ifdef _AIX
- /* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */
- c->wfd_isatty = is_tty || isatty(c->wfd);
-#endif
-
- /* enable nonblocking mode */
- if (nonblock) {
- if (rfd != -1)
- set_nonblock(rfd);
- if (wfd != -1)
- set_nonblock(wfd);
- if (efd != -1)
- set_nonblock(efd);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Allocate a new channel object and set its type and socket. This will cause
- * remote_name to be freed.
- */
-Channel *
-channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
- u_int window, u_int maxpack, int extusage, char *remote_name, int nonblock)
-{
- int found;
- u_int i;
- Channel *c;
-
- /* Do initial allocation if this is the first call. */
- if (channels_alloc == 0) {
- channels_alloc = 10;
- channels = xcalloc(channels_alloc, sizeof(Channel *));
- for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
- channels[i] = NULL;
- }
- /* Try to find a free slot where to put the new channel. */
- for (found = -1, i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
- if (channels[i] == NULL) {
- /* Found a free slot. */
- found = (int)i;
- break;
- }
- if (found < 0) {
- /* There are no free slots. Take last+1 slot and expand the array. */
- found = channels_alloc;
- if (channels_alloc > 10000)
- fatal("channel_new: internal error: channels_alloc %d "
- "too big.", channels_alloc);
- channels = xrealloc(channels, channels_alloc + 10,
- sizeof(Channel *));
- channels_alloc += 10;
- debug2("channel: expanding %d", channels_alloc);
- for (i = found; i < channels_alloc; i++)
- channels[i] = NULL;
- }
- /* Initialize and return new channel. */
- c = channels[found] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Channel));
- buffer_init(&c->input);
- buffer_init(&c->output);
- buffer_init(&c->extended);
- c->path = NULL;
- c->listening_addr = NULL;
- c->listening_port = 0;
- c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN;
- c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN;
- c->flags = 0;
- channel_register_fds(c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, 0);
- c->notbefore = 0;
- c->self = found;
- c->type = type;
- c->ctype = ctype;
- c->local_window = window;
- c->local_window_max = window;
- c->local_consumed = 0;
- c->local_maxpacket = maxpack;
- c->remote_id = -1;
- c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name);
- c->remote_window = 0;
- c->remote_maxpacket = 0;
- c->force_drain = 0;
- c->single_connection = 0;
- c->detach_user = NULL;
- c->detach_close = 0;
- c->open_confirm = NULL;
- c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL;
- c->input_filter = NULL;
- c->output_filter = NULL;
- c->filter_ctx = NULL;
- c->filter_cleanup = NULL;
- c->ctl_chan = -1;
- c->mux_rcb = NULL;
- c->mux_ctx = NULL;
- c->mux_pause = 0;
- c->delayed = 1; /* prevent call to channel_post handler */
- TAILQ_INIT(&c->status_confirms);
- debug("channel %d: new [%s]", found, remote_name);
- return c;
-}
-
-static int
-channel_find_maxfd(void)
-{
- u_int i;
- int max = 0;
- Channel *c;
-
- for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
- c = channels[i];
- if (c != NULL) {
- max = MAX(max, c->rfd);
- max = MAX(max, c->wfd);
- max = MAX(max, c->efd);
- }
- }
- return max;
-}
-
-int
-channel_close_fd(int *fdp)
-{
- int ret = 0, fd = *fdp;
-
- if (fd != -1) {
- ret = close(fd);
- *fdp = -1;
- if (fd == channel_max_fd)
- channel_max_fd = channel_find_maxfd();
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-/* Close all channel fd/socket. */
-static void
-channel_close_fds(Channel *c)
-{
- channel_close_fd(&c->sock);
- channel_close_fd(&c->rfd);
- channel_close_fd(&c->wfd);
- channel_close_fd(&c->efd);
-}
-
-/* Free the channel and close its fd/socket. */
-void
-channel_free(Channel *c)
-{
- char *s;
- u_int i, n;
- struct channel_confirm *cc;
-
- for (n = 0, i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
- if (channels[i])
- n++;
- debug("channel %d: free: %s, nchannels %u", c->self,
- c->remote_name ? c->remote_name : "???", n);
-
- s = channel_open_message();
- debug3("channel %d: status: %s", c->self, s);
- free(s);
-
- if (c->sock != -1)
- shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_RDWR);
- channel_close_fds(c);
- buffer_free(&c->input);
- buffer_free(&c->output);
- buffer_free(&c->extended);
- free(c->remote_name);
- c->remote_name = NULL;
- free(c->path);
- c->path = NULL;
- free(c->listening_addr);
- c->listening_addr = NULL;
- while ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) != NULL) {
- if (cc->abandon_cb != NULL)
- cc->abandon_cb(c, cc->ctx);
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
- explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
- free(cc);
- }
- if (c->filter_cleanup != NULL && c->filter_ctx != NULL)
- c->filter_cleanup(c->self, c->filter_ctx);
- channels[c->self] = NULL;
- free(c);
-}
-
-void
-channel_free_all(void)
-{
- u_int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
- if (channels[i] != NULL)
- channel_free(channels[i]);
-}
-
-/*
- * Closes the sockets/fds of all channels. This is used to close extra file
- * descriptors after a fork.
- */
-void
-channel_close_all(void)
-{
- u_int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
- if (channels[i] != NULL)
- channel_close_fds(channels[i]);
-}
-
-/*
- * Stop listening to channels.
- */
-void
-channel_stop_listening(void)
-{
- u_int i;
- Channel *c;
-
- for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
- c = channels[i];
- if (c != NULL) {
- switch (c->type) {
- case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
- channel_close_fd(&c->sock);
- channel_free(c);
- break;
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns true if no channel has too much buffered data, and false if one or
- * more channel is overfull.
- */
-int
-channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(void)
-{
- u_int i;
- Channel *c;
-
- for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
- c = channels[i];
- if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
-#if 0
- if (!compat20 &&
- buffer_len(&c->input) > packet_get_maxsize()) {
- debug2("channel %d: big input buffer %d",
- c->self, buffer_len(&c->input));
- return 0;
- }
-#endif
- if (buffer_len(&c->output) > packet_get_maxsize()) {
- debug2("channel %d: big output buffer %u > %u",
- c->self, buffer_len(&c->output),
- packet_get_maxsize());
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* Returns true if any channel is still open. */
-int
-channel_still_open(void)
-{
- u_int i;
- Channel *c;
-
- for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
- c = channels[i];
- if (c == NULL)
- continue;
- switch (c->type) {
- case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
- continue;
- case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
- if (!compat20)
- fatal("cannot happen: SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL");
- continue;
- case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT:
- return 1;
- case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING:
- if (!compat13)
- fatal("cannot happen: OUT_DRAIN");
- return 1;
- default:
- fatal("channel_still_open: bad channel type %d", c->type);
- /* NOTREACHED */
- }
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Returns the id of an open channel suitable for keepaliving */
-int
-channel_find_open(void)
-{
- u_int i;
- Channel *c;
-
- for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
- c = channels[i];
- if (c == NULL || c->remote_id < 0)
- continue;
- switch (c->type) {
- case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
- continue;
- case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
- return i;
- case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING:
- if (!compat13)
- fatal("cannot happen: OUT_DRAIN");
- return i;
- default:
- fatal("channel_find_open: bad channel type %d", c->type);
- /* NOTREACHED */
- }
- }
- return -1;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Returns a message describing the currently open forwarded connections,
- * suitable for sending to the client. The message contains crlf pairs for
- * newlines.
- */
-char *
-channel_open_message(void)
-{
- Buffer buffer;
- Channel *c;
- char buf[1024], *cp;
- u_int i;
-
- buffer_init(&buffer);
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "The following connections are open:\r\n");
- buffer_append(&buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
- for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
- c = channels[i];
- if (c == NULL)
- continue;
- switch (c->type) {
- case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER:
- continue;
- case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING:
- case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING:
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
- " #%d %.300s (t%d r%d i%d/%d o%d/%d fd %d/%d cc %d)\r\n",
- c->self, c->remote_name,
- c->type, c->remote_id,
- c->istate, buffer_len(&c->input),
- c->ostate, buffer_len(&c->output),
- c->rfd, c->wfd, c->ctl_chan);
- buffer_append(&buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
- continue;
- default:
- fatal("channel_open_message: bad channel type %d", c->type);
- /* NOTREACHED */
- }
- }
- buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1);
- cp = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&buffer));
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- return cp;
-}
-
-void
-channel_send_open(int id)
-{
- Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
-
- if (c == NULL) {
- logit("channel_send_open: %d: bad id", id);
- return;
- }
- debug2("channel %d: send open", id);
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
- packet_put_cstring(c->ctype);
- packet_put_int(c->self);
- packet_put_int(c->local_window);
- packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
- packet_send();
-}
-
-void
-channel_request_start(int id, char *service, int wantconfirm)
-{
- Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
-
- if (c == NULL) {
- logit("channel_request_start: %d: unknown channel id", id);
- return;
- }
- debug2("channel %d: request %s confirm %d", id, service, wantconfirm);
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
- packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
- packet_put_cstring(service);
- packet_put_char(wantconfirm);
-}
-
-void
-channel_register_status_confirm(int id, channel_confirm_cb *cb,
- channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb, void *ctx)
-{
- struct channel_confirm *cc;
- Channel *c;
-
- if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL)
- fatal("channel_register_expect: %d: bad id", id);
-
- cc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cc));
- cc->cb = cb;
- cc->abandon_cb = abandon_cb;
- cc->ctx = ctx;
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
-}
-
-void
-channel_register_open_confirm(int id, channel_open_fn *fn, void *ctx)
-{
- Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
-
- if (c == NULL) {
- logit("channel_register_open_confirm: %d: bad id", id);
- return;
- }
- c->open_confirm = fn;
- c->open_confirm_ctx = ctx;
-}
-
-void
-channel_register_cleanup(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn, int do_close)
-{
- Channel *c = channel_by_id(id);
-
- if (c == NULL) {
- logit("channel_register_cleanup: %d: bad id", id);
- return;
- }
- c->detach_user = fn;
- c->detach_close = do_close;
-}
-
-void
-channel_cancel_cleanup(int id)
-{
- Channel *c = channel_by_id(id);
-
- if (c == NULL) {
- logit("channel_cancel_cleanup: %d: bad id", id);
- return;
- }
- c->detach_user = NULL;
- c->detach_close = 0;
-}
-
-void
-channel_register_filter(int id, channel_infilter_fn *ifn,
- channel_outfilter_fn *ofn, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *cfn, void *ctx)
-{
- Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
-
- if (c == NULL) {
- logit("channel_register_filter: %d: bad id", id);
- return;
- }
- c->input_filter = ifn;
- c->output_filter = ofn;
- c->filter_ctx = ctx;
- c->filter_cleanup = cfn;
-}
-
-void
-channel_set_fds(int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
- int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty, u_int window_max)
-{
- Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
-
- if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL)
- fatal("channel_activate for non-larval channel %d.", id);
- channel_register_fds(c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, is_tty);
- c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
- c->local_window = c->local_window_max = window_max;
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
- packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
- packet_put_int(c->local_window);
- packet_send();
-}
-
-/*
- * 'channel_pre*' are called just before select() to add any bits relevant to
- * channels in the select bitmasks.
- */
-/*
- * 'channel_post*': perform any appropriate operations for channels which
- * have events pending.
- */
-typedef void chan_fn(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset);
-chan_fn *channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE];
-chan_fn *channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE];
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void
-channel_pre_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void
-channel_pre_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- debug3("channel %d: waiting for connection", c->self);
- FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
-}
-
-static void
-channel_pre_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- if (buffer_len(&c->input) < packet_get_maxsize())
- FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
- if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0)
- FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
-}
-
-static void
-channel_pre_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- u_int limit = compat20 ? c->remote_window : packet_get_maxsize();
-
- if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN &&
- limit > 0 &&
- buffer_len(&c->input) < limit &&
- buffer_check_alloc(&c->input, CHAN_RBUF))
- FD_SET(c->rfd, readset);
- if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN ||
- c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
- if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) {
- FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset);
- } else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
- if (CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c))
- debug2("channel %d: obuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%d)",
- c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended));
- else
- chan_obuf_empty(c);
- }
- }
- /** XXX check close conditions, too */
- if (compat20 && c->efd != -1 &&
- !(c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED && c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)) {
- if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE &&
- buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0)
- FD_SET(c->efd, writeset);
- else if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) &&
- (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ ||
- c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) &&
- buffer_len(&c->extended) < c->remote_window)
- FD_SET(c->efd, readset);
- }
- /* XXX: What about efd? races? */
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void
-channel_pre_input_draining(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- if (buffer_len(&c->input) == 0) {
- packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
- packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
- packet_send();
- c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED;
- debug2("channel %d: closing after input drain.", c->self);
- }
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void
-channel_pre_output_draining(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- if (buffer_len(&c->output) == 0)
- chan_mark_dead(c);
- else
- FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
-}
-
-/*
- * This is a special state for X11 authentication spoofing. An opened X11
- * connection (when authentication spoofing is being done) remains in this
- * state until the first packet has been completely read. The authentication
- * data in that packet is then substituted by the real data if it matches the
- * fake data, and the channel is put into normal mode.
- * XXX All this happens at the client side.
- * Returns: 0 = need more data, -1 = wrong cookie, 1 = ok
- */
-static int
-x11_open_helper(Buffer *b)
-{
- u_char *ucp;
- u_int proto_len, data_len;
-
- /* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
- if (buffer_len(b) < 12)
- return 0;
-
- /* Parse the lengths of variable-length fields. */
- ucp = buffer_ptr(b);
- if (ucp[0] == 0x42) { /* Byte order MSB first. */
- proto_len = 256 * ucp[6] + ucp[7];
- data_len = 256 * ucp[8] + ucp[9];
- } else if (ucp[0] == 0x6c) { /* Byte order LSB first. */
- proto_len = ucp[6] + 256 * ucp[7];
- data_len = ucp[8] + 256 * ucp[9];
- } else {
- debug2("Initial X11 packet contains bad byte order byte: 0x%x",
- ucp[0]);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Check if the whole packet is in buffer. */
- if (buffer_len(b) <
- 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3) + ((data_len + 3) & ~3))
- return 0;
-
- /* Check if authentication protocol matches. */
- if (proto_len != strlen(x11_saved_proto) ||
- memcmp(ucp + 12, x11_saved_proto, proto_len) != 0) {
- debug2("X11 connection uses different authentication protocol.");
- return -1;
- }
- /* Check if authentication data matches our fake data. */
- if (data_len != x11_fake_data_len ||
- timingsafe_bcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
- x11_fake_data, x11_fake_data_len) != 0) {
- debug2("X11 auth data does not match fake data.");
- return -1;
- }
- /* Check fake data length */
- if (x11_fake_data_len != x11_saved_data_len) {
- error("X11 fake_data_len %d != saved_data_len %d",
- x11_fake_data_len, x11_saved_data_len);
- return -1;
- }
- /*
- * Received authentication protocol and data match
- * our fake data. Substitute the fake data with real
- * data.
- */
- memcpy(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
- x11_saved_data, x11_saved_data_len);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void
-channel_pre_x11_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output);
-
- if (ret == 1) {
- /* Start normal processing for the channel. */
- c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
- channel_pre_open_13(c, readset, writeset);
- } else if (ret == -1) {
- /*
- * We have received an X11 connection that has bad
- * authentication information.
- */
- logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication.");
- buffer_clear(&c->input);
- buffer_clear(&c->output);
- channel_close_fd(&c->sock);
- c->sock = -1;
- c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED;
- packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
- packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
- packet_send();
- }
-}
-
-static void
-channel_pre_x11_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output);
-
- /* c->force_drain = 1; */
-
- if (ret == 1) {
- c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
- channel_pre_open(c, readset, writeset);
- } else if (ret == -1) {
- logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication.");
- debug2("X11 rejected %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate);
- chan_read_failed(c);
- buffer_clear(&c->input);
- chan_ibuf_empty(c);
- buffer_clear(&c->output);
- /* for proto v1, the peer will send an IEOF */
- if (compat20)
- chan_write_failed(c);
- else
- c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
- debug2("X11 closed %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate);
- }
-}
-
-static void
-channel_pre_mux_client(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && !c->mux_pause &&
- buffer_check_alloc(&c->input, CHAN_RBUF))
- FD_SET(c->rfd, readset);
- if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
- /* clear buffer immediately (discard any partial packet) */
- buffer_clear(&c->input);
- chan_ibuf_empty(c);
- /* Start output drain. XXX just kill chan? */
- chan_rcvd_oclose(c);
- }
- if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN ||
- c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
- if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0)
- FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset);
- else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN)
- chan_obuf_empty(c);
- }
-}
-
-/* try to decode a socks4 header */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int
-channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- char *p, *host;
- u_int len, have, i, found, need;
- char username[256];
- struct {
- u_int8_t version;
- u_int8_t command;
- u_int16_t dest_port;
- struct in_addr dest_addr;
- } s4_req, s4_rsp;
-
- debug2("channel %d: decode socks4", c->self);
-
- have = buffer_len(&c->input);
- len = sizeof(s4_req);
- if (have < len)
- return 0;
- p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
-
- need = 1;
- /* SOCKS4A uses an invalid IP address 0.0.0.x */
- if (p[4] == 0 && p[5] == 0 && p[6] == 0 && p[7] != 0) {
- debug2("channel %d: socks4a request", c->self);
- /* ... and needs an extra string (the hostname) */
- need = 2;
- }
- /* Check for terminating NUL on the string(s) */
- for (found = 0, i = len; i < have; i++) {
- if (p[i] == '\0') {
- found++;
- if (found == need)
- break;
- }
- if (i > 1024) {
- /* the peer is probably sending garbage */
- debug("channel %d: decode socks4: too long",
- c->self);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- if (found < need)
- return 0;
- buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.version, 1);
- buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.command, 1);
- buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.dest_port, 2);
- buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.dest_addr, 4);
- have = buffer_len(&c->input);
- p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
- if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL)
- fatal("channel %d: decode socks4: user not nul terminated",
- c->self);
- len = strlen(p);
- debug2("channel %d: decode socks4: user %s/%d", c->self, p, len);
- len++; /* trailing '\0' */
- if (len > have)
- fatal("channel %d: decode socks4: len %d > have %d",
- c->self, len, have);
- strlcpy(username, p, sizeof(username));
- buffer_consume(&c->input, len);
-
- free(c->path);
- c->path = NULL;
- if (need == 1) { /* SOCKS4: one string */
- host = inet_ntoa(s4_req.dest_addr);
- c->path = xstrdup(host);
- } else { /* SOCKS4A: two strings */
- have = buffer_len(&c->input);
- p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
- len = strlen(p);
- debug2("channel %d: decode socks4a: host %s/%d",
- c->self, p, len);
- len++; /* trailing '\0' */
- if (len > have)
- fatal("channel %d: decode socks4a: len %d > have %d",
- c->self, len, have);
- if (len > NI_MAXHOST) {
- error("channel %d: hostname \"%.100s\" too long",
- c->self, p);
- return -1;
- }
- c->path = xstrdup(p);
- buffer_consume(&c->input, len);
- }
- c->host_port = ntohs(s4_req.dest_port);
-
- debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks4 host %s port %u command %u",
- c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s4_req.command);
-
- if (s4_req.command != 1) {
- debug("channel %d: cannot handle: %s cn %d",
- c->self, need == 1 ? "SOCKS4" : "SOCKS4A", s4_req.command);
- return -1;
- }
- s4_rsp.version = 0; /* vn: 0 for reply */
- s4_rsp.command = 90; /* cd: req granted */
- s4_rsp.dest_port = 0; /* ignored */
- s4_rsp.dest_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; /* ignored */
- buffer_append(&c->output, &s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp));
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* try to decode a socks5 header */
-#define SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE 0x1000
-#define SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH 0x00
-#define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4 0x01
-#define SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN 0x03
-#define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6 0x04
-#define SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT 0x01
-#define SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS 0x00
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int
-channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- struct {
- u_int8_t version;
- u_int8_t command;
- u_int8_t reserved;
- u_int8_t atyp;
- } s5_req, s5_rsp;
- u_int16_t dest_port;
- char dest_addr[255+1], ntop[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
- u_char *p;
- u_int have, need, i, found, nmethods, addrlen, af;
-
- debug2("channel %d: decode socks5", c->self);
- p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
- if (p[0] != 0x05)
- return -1;
- have = buffer_len(&c->input);
- if (!(c->flags & SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE)) {
- /* format: ver | nmethods | methods */
- if (have < 2)
- return 0;
- nmethods = p[1];
- if (have < nmethods + 2)
- return 0;
- /* look for method: "NO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED" */
- for (found = 0, i = 2; i < nmethods + 2; i++) {
- if (p[i] == SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH) {
- found = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!found) {
- debug("channel %d: method SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH not found",
- c->self);
- return -1;
- }
- buffer_consume(&c->input, nmethods + 2);
- buffer_put_char(&c->output, 0x05); /* version */
- buffer_put_char(&c->output, SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH); /* method */
- FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
- c->flags |= SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE;
- debug2("channel %d: socks5 auth done", c->self);
- return 0; /* need more */
- }
- debug2("channel %d: socks5 post auth", c->self);
- if (have < sizeof(s5_req)+1)
- return 0; /* need more */
- memcpy(&s5_req, p, sizeof(s5_req));
- if (s5_req.version != 0x05 ||
- s5_req.command != SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT ||
- s5_req.reserved != 0x00) {
- debug2("channel %d: only socks5 connect supported", c->self);
- return -1;
- }
- switch (s5_req.atyp){
- case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4:
- addrlen = 4;
- af = AF_INET;
- break;
- case SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN:
- addrlen = p[sizeof(s5_req)];
- af = -1;
- break;
- case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6:
- addrlen = 16;
- af = AF_INET6;
- break;
- default:
- debug2("channel %d: bad socks5 atyp %d", c->self, s5_req.atyp);
- return -1;
- }
- need = sizeof(s5_req) + addrlen + 2;
- if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN)
- need++;
- if (have < need)
- return 0;
- buffer_consume(&c->input, sizeof(s5_req));
- if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN)
- buffer_consume(&c->input, 1); /* host string length */
- buffer_get(&c->input, &dest_addr, addrlen);
- buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&dest_port, 2);
- dest_addr[addrlen] = '\0';
- free(c->path);
- c->path = NULL;
- if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) {
- if (addrlen >= NI_MAXHOST) {
- error("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 hostname "
- "\"%.100s\" too long", c->self, dest_addr);
- return -1;
- }
- c->path = xstrdup(dest_addr);
- } else {
- if (inet_ntop(af, dest_addr, ntop, sizeof(ntop)) == NULL)
- return -1;
- c->path = xstrdup(ntop);
- }
- c->host_port = ntohs(dest_port);
-
- debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 host %s port %u command %u",
- c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s5_req.command);
-
- s5_rsp.version = 0x05;
- s5_rsp.command = SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS;
- s5_rsp.reserved = 0; /* ignored */
- s5_rsp.atyp = SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4;
- dest_port = 0; /* ignored */
-
- buffer_append(&c->output, &s5_rsp, sizeof(s5_rsp));
- buffer_put_int(&c->output, ntohl(INADDR_ANY)); /* bind address */
- buffer_append(&c->output, &dest_port, sizeof(dest_port));
- return 1;
-}
-
-Channel *
-channel_connect_stdio_fwd(const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect,
- int in, int out)
-{
- Channel *c;
-
- debug("channel_connect_stdio_fwd %s:%d", host_to_connect,
- port_to_connect);
-
- c = channel_new("stdio-forward", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out,
- -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
- 0, "stdio-forward", /*nonblock*/0);
-
- c->path = xstrdup(host_to_connect);
- c->host_port = port_to_connect;
- c->listening_port = 0;
- c->force_drain = 1;
-
- channel_register_fds(c, in, out, -1, 0, 1, 0);
- port_open_helper(c, "direct-tcpip");
-
- return c;
-}
-
-/* dynamic port forwarding */
-static void
-channel_pre_dynamic(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- u_char *p;
- u_int have;
- int ret;
-
- have = buffer_len(&c->input);
- debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: have %d", c->self, have);
- /* buffer_dump(&c->input); */
- /* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
- if (have < 3) {
- /* need more */
- FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
- return;
- }
- /* try to guess the protocol */
- p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
- switch (p[0]) {
- case 0x04:
- ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, readset, writeset);
- break;
- case 0x05:
- ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, readset, writeset);
- break;
- default:
- ret = -1;
- break;
- }
- if (ret < 0) {
- chan_mark_dead(c);
- } else if (ret == 0) {
- debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: need more", c->self);
- /* need more */
- FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
- } else {
- /* switch to the next state */
- c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
- port_open_helper(c, "direct-tcpip");
- }
-}
-
-/* This is our fake X11 server socket. */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void
-channel_post_x11_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- Channel *nc;
- struct sockaddr_storage addr;
- int newsock, oerrno;
- socklen_t addrlen;
- char buf[16384], *remote_ipaddr;
- int remote_port;
-
- if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) {
- debug("X11 connection requested.");
- addrlen = sizeof(addr);
- newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
- if (c->single_connection) {
- oerrno = errno;
- debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener.");
- channel_close_fd(&c->sock);
- chan_mark_dead(c);
- errno = oerrno;
- }
- if (newsock < 0) {
- if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK &&
- errno != ECONNABORTED)
- error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
- c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
- return;
- }
- set_nodelay(newsock);
- remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(newsock);
- remote_port = get_peer_port(newsock);
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "X11 connection from %.200s port %d",
- remote_ipaddr, remote_port);
-
- nc = channel_new("accepted x11 socket",
- SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1,
- c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, buf, 1);
- if (compat20) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
- packet_put_cstring("x11");
- packet_put_int(nc->self);
- packet_put_int(nc->local_window_max);
- packet_put_int(nc->local_maxpacket);
- /* originator ipaddr and port */
- packet_put_cstring(remote_ipaddr);
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_X11FWD) {
- debug2("ssh2 x11 bug compat mode");
- } else {
- packet_put_int(remote_port);
- }
- packet_send();
- } else {
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN);
- packet_put_int(nc->self);
- if (packet_get_protocol_flags() &
- SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN)
- packet_put_cstring(buf);
- packet_send();
- }
- free(remote_ipaddr);
- }
-}
-
-static void
-port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype)
-{
- int direct;
- char buf[1024];
- char *local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(c->sock);
- int local_port = c->sock == -1 ? 65536 : get_sock_port(c->sock, 1);
- char *remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(c->sock);
- int remote_port = get_peer_port(c->sock);
-
- if (remote_port == -1) {
- /* Fake addr/port to appease peers that validate it (Tectia) */
- free(remote_ipaddr);
- remote_ipaddr = xstrdup("127.0.0.1");
- remote_port = 65535;
- }
-
- direct = (strcmp(rtype, "direct-tcpip") == 0);
-
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
- "%s: listening port %d for %.100s port %d, "
- "connect from %.200s port %d to %.100s port %d",
- rtype, c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port,
- remote_ipaddr, remote_port, local_ipaddr, local_port);
-
- free(c->remote_name);
- c->remote_name = xstrdup(buf);
-
- if (compat20) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
- packet_put_cstring(rtype);
- packet_put_int(c->self);
- packet_put_int(c->local_window_max);
- packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
- if (direct) {
- /* target host, port */
- packet_put_cstring(c->path);
- packet_put_int(c->host_port);
- } else {
- /* listen address, port */
- packet_put_cstring(c->path);
- packet_put_int(local_port);
- }
- /* originator host and port */
- packet_put_cstring(remote_ipaddr);
- packet_put_int((u_int)remote_port);
- packet_send();
- } else {
- packet_start(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN);
- packet_put_int(c->self);
- packet_put_cstring(c->path);
- packet_put_int(c->host_port);
- if (packet_get_protocol_flags() &
- SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN)
- packet_put_cstring(c->remote_name);
- packet_send();
- }
- free(remote_ipaddr);
- free(local_ipaddr);
-}
-
-static void
-channel_set_reuseaddr(int fd)
-{
- int on = 1;
-
- /*
- * Set socket options.
- * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
- */
- if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
- error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR fd %d: %s", fd, strerror(errno));
-}
-
-/*
- * This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port.
- */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void
-channel_post_port_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- Channel *nc;
- struct sockaddr_storage addr;
- int newsock, nextstate;
- socklen_t addrlen;
- char *rtype;
-
- if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) {
- debug("Connection to port %d forwarding "
- "to %.100s port %d requested.",
- c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port);
-
- if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) {
- nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
- rtype = "forwarded-tcpip";
- } else {
- if (c->host_port == 0) {
- nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC;
- rtype = "dynamic-tcpip";
- } else {
- nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
- rtype = "direct-tcpip";
- }
- }
-
- addrlen = sizeof(addr);
- newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
- if (newsock < 0) {
- if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK &&
- errno != ECONNABORTED)
- error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
- c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
- return;
- }
- set_nodelay(newsock);
- nc = channel_new(rtype, nextstate, newsock, newsock, -1,
- c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, rtype, 1);
- nc->listening_port = c->listening_port;
- nc->host_port = c->host_port;
- if (c->path != NULL)
- nc->path = xstrdup(c->path);
-
- if (nextstate != SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC)
- port_open_helper(nc, rtype);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * This is the authentication agent socket listening for connections from
- * clients.
- */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void
-channel_post_auth_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- Channel *nc;
- int newsock;
- struct sockaddr_storage addr;
- socklen_t addrlen;
-
- if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) {
- addrlen = sizeof(addr);
- newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
- if (newsock < 0) {
- error("accept from auth socket: %.100s",
- strerror(errno));
- if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
- c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
- return;
- }
- nc = channel_new("accepted auth socket",
- SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1,
- c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket,
- 0, "accepted auth socket", 1);
- if (compat20) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
- packet_put_cstring("auth-agent at openssh.com");
- packet_put_int(nc->self);
- packet_put_int(c->local_window_max);
- packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
- } else {
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN);
- packet_put_int(nc->self);
- }
- packet_send();
- }
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void
-channel_post_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- int err = 0, sock;
- socklen_t sz = sizeof(err);
-
- if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset)) {
- if (getsockopt(c->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &err, &sz) < 0) {
- err = errno;
- error("getsockopt SO_ERROR failed");
- }
- if (err == 0) {
- debug("channel %d: connected to %s port %d",
- c->self, c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port);
- channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx);
- c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
- if (compat20) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
- packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
- packet_put_int(c->self);
- packet_put_int(c->local_window);
- packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
- } else {
- packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
- packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
- packet_put_int(c->self);
- }
- } else {
- debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s",
- c->self, strerror(err));
- /* Try next address, if any */
- if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) {
- close(c->sock);
- c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock;
- channel_max_fd = channel_find_maxfd();
- return;
- }
- /* Exhausted all addresses */
- error("connect_to %.100s port %d: failed.",
- c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port);
- channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx);
- if (compat20) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
- packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
- packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED);
- if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) {
- packet_put_cstring(strerror(err));
- packet_put_cstring("");
- }
- } else {
- packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
- packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
- }
- chan_mark_dead(c);
- }
- packet_send();
- }
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int
-channel_handle_rfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
- int len, force;
-
- force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
- if (c->rfd != -1 && (force || FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset))) {
- errno = 0;
- len = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR ||
- ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force)))
- return 1;
-#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD
- if (len <= 0) {
-#else
- if ((!c->isatty && len <= 0) ||
- (c->isatty && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) {
-#endif
- debug2("channel %d: read<=0 rfd %d len %d",
- c->self, c->rfd, len);
- if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
- debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self);
- chan_mark_dead(c);
- return -1;
- } else if (compat13) {
- buffer_clear(&c->output);
- c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING;
- debug2("channel %d: input draining.", c->self);
- } else {
- chan_read_failed(c);
- }
- return -1;
- }
- if (c->input_filter != NULL) {
- if (c->input_filter(c, buf, len) == -1) {
- debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self);
- chan_read_failed(c);
- }
- } else if (c->datagram) {
- buffer_put_string(&c->input, buf, len);
- } else {
- buffer_append(&c->input, buf, len);
- }
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int
-channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- struct termios tio;
- u_char *data = NULL, *buf;
- u_int dlen, olen = 0;
- int len;
-
- /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */
- if (c->wfd != -1 &&
- FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) &&
- buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) {
- olen = buffer_len(&c->output);
- if (c->output_filter != NULL) {
- if ((buf = c->output_filter(c, &data, &dlen)) == NULL) {
- debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self);
- if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
- chan_mark_dead(c);
- else
- chan_write_failed(c);
- return -1;
- }
- } else if (c->datagram) {
- buf = data = buffer_get_string(&c->output, &dlen);
- } else {
- buf = data = buffer_ptr(&c->output);
- dlen = buffer_len(&c->output);
- }
-
- if (c->datagram) {
- /* ignore truncated writes, datagrams might get lost */
- len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen);
- free(data);
- if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
- errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
- return 1;
- if (len <= 0) {
- if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
- chan_mark_dead(c);
- else
- chan_write_failed(c);
- return -1;
- }
- goto out;
- }
-#ifdef _AIX
- /* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */
- if (compat20 && c->wfd_isatty)
- dlen = MIN(dlen, 8*1024);
-#endif
-
- len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen);
- if (len < 0 &&
- (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
- return 1;
- if (len <= 0) {
- if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
- debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self);
- chan_mark_dead(c);
- return -1;
- } else if (compat13) {
- buffer_clear(&c->output);
- debug2("channel %d: input draining.", c->self);
- c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING;
- } else {
- chan_write_failed(c);
- }
- return -1;
- }
-#ifndef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON
- if (compat20 && c->isatty && dlen >= 1 && buf[0] != '\r') {
- if (tcgetattr(c->wfd, &tio) == 0 &&
- !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) {
- /*
- * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of
- * traffic analysis. We need to match the
- * size of a SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA message
- * (4 byte channel id + buf)
- */
- packet_send_ignore(4 + len);
- packet_send();
- }
- }
-#endif
- buffer_consume(&c->output, len);
- }
- out:
- if (compat20 && olen > 0)
- c->local_consumed += olen - buffer_len(&c->output);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int
-channel_handle_efd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
- int len;
-
-/** XXX handle drain efd, too */
- if (c->efd != -1) {
- if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE &&
- FD_ISSET(c->efd, writeset) &&
- buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0) {
- len = write(c->efd, buffer_ptr(&c->extended),
- buffer_len(&c->extended));
- debug2("channel %d: written %d to efd %d",
- c->self, len, c->efd);
- if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
- errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
- return 1;
- if (len <= 0) {
- debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d",
- c->self, c->efd);
- channel_close_fd(&c->efd);
- } else {
- buffer_consume(&c->extended, len);
- c->local_consumed += len;
- }
- } else if (c->efd != -1 &&
- (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ ||
- c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) &&
- (c->detach_close || FD_ISSET(c->efd, readset))) {
- len = read(c->efd, buf, sizeof(buf));
- debug2("channel %d: read %d from efd %d",
- c->self, len, c->efd);
- if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN ||
- errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !c->detach_close)))
- return 1;
- if (len <= 0) {
- debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d",
- c->self, c->efd);
- channel_close_fd(&c->efd);
- } else {
- if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) {
- debug3("channel %d: discard efd",
- c->self);
- } else
- buffer_append(&c->extended, buf, len);
- }
- }
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int
-channel_check_window(Channel *c)
-{
- if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
- !(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) &&
- ((c->local_window_max - c->local_window >
- c->local_maxpacket*3) ||
- c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) &&
- c->local_consumed > 0) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
- packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
- packet_put_int(c->local_consumed);
- packet_send();
- debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d",
- c->self, c->local_window,
- c->local_consumed);
- c->local_window += c->local_consumed;
- c->local_consumed = 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void
-channel_post_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- channel_handle_rfd(c, readset, writeset);
- channel_handle_wfd(c, readset, writeset);
- if (!compat20)
- return;
- channel_handle_efd(c, readset, writeset);
- channel_check_window(c);
-}
-
-static u_int
-read_mux(Channel *c, u_int need)
-{
- char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
- int len;
- u_int rlen;
-
- if (buffer_len(&c->input) < need) {
- rlen = need - buffer_len(&c->input);
- len = read(c->rfd, buf, MIN(rlen, CHAN_RBUF));
- if (len <= 0) {
- if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN) {
- debug2("channel %d: ctl read<=0 rfd %d len %d",
- c->self, c->rfd, len);
- chan_read_failed(c);
- return 0;
- }
- } else
- buffer_append(&c->input, buf, len);
- }
- return buffer_len(&c->input);
-}
-
-static void
-channel_post_mux_client(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- u_int need;
- ssize_t len;
-
- if (!compat20)
- fatal("%s: entered with !compat20", __func__);
-
- if (c->rfd != -1 && !c->mux_pause && FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset) &&
- (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN ||
- c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN)) {
- /*
- * Don't not read past the precise end of packets to
- * avoid disrupting fd passing.
- */
- if (read_mux(c, 4) < 4) /* read header */
- return;
- need = get_u32(buffer_ptr(&c->input));
-#define CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET (256 * 1024)
- if (need > CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET) {
- debug2("channel %d: packet too big %u > %u",
- c->self, CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET, need);
- chan_rcvd_oclose(c);
- return;
- }
- if (read_mux(c, need + 4) < need + 4) /* read body */
- return;
- if (c->mux_rcb(c) != 0) {
- debug("channel %d: mux_rcb failed", c->self);
- chan_mark_dead(c);
- return;
- }
- }
-
- if (c->wfd != -1 && FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) &&
- buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) {
- len = write(c->wfd, buffer_ptr(&c->output),
- buffer_len(&c->output));
- if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN))
- return;
- if (len <= 0) {
- chan_mark_dead(c);
- return;
- }
- buffer_consume(&c->output, len);
- }
-}
-
-static void
-channel_post_mux_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- Channel *nc;
- struct sockaddr_storage addr;
- socklen_t addrlen;
- int newsock;
- uid_t euid;
- gid_t egid;
-
- if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset))
- return;
-
- debug("multiplexing control connection");
-
- /*
- * Accept connection on control socket
- */
- memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
- addrlen = sizeof(addr);
- if ((newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr*)&addr,
- &addrlen)) == -1) {
- error("%s accept: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
- c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
- return;
- }
-
- if (getpeereid(newsock, &euid, &egid) < 0) {
- error("%s getpeereid failed: %s", __func__,
- strerror(errno));
- close(newsock);
- return;
- }
- if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) {
- error("multiplex uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u",
- (u_int)euid, (u_int)getuid());
- close(newsock);
- return;
- }
- nc = channel_new("multiplex client", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT,
- newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max,
- c->local_maxpacket, 0, "mux-control", 1);
- nc->mux_rcb = c->mux_rcb;
- debug3("%s: new mux channel %d fd %d", __func__,
- nc->self, nc->sock);
- /* establish state */
- nc->mux_rcb(nc);
- /* mux state transitions must not elicit protocol messages */
- nc->flags |= CHAN_LOCAL;
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void
-channel_post_output_drain_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- int len;
-
- /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */
- if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset) && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) {
- len = write(c->sock, buffer_ptr(&c->output),
- buffer_len(&c->output));
- if (len <= 0)
- buffer_clear(&c->output);
- else
- buffer_consume(&c->output, len);
- }
-}
-
-static void
-channel_handler_init_20(void)
-{
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_pre_mux_client;
-
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open;
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener;
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener;
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting;
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open;
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_mux_listener;
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_post_mux_client;
-}
-
-static void
-channel_handler_init_13(void)
-{
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open_13;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open_13;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_pre_input_draining;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_pre_output_draining;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic;
-
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open;
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener;
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener;
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_post_output_drain_13;
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting;
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open;
-}
-
-static void
-channel_handler_init_15(void)
-{
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting;
- channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic;
-
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener;
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener;
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open;
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting;
- channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open;
-}
-
-static void
-channel_handler_init(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE; i++) {
- channel_pre[i] = NULL;
- channel_post[i] = NULL;
- }
- if (compat20)
- channel_handler_init_20();
- else if (compat13)
- channel_handler_init_13();
- else
- channel_handler_init_15();
-}
-
-/* gc dead channels */
-static void
-channel_garbage_collect(Channel *c)
-{
- if (c == NULL)
- return;
- if (c->detach_user != NULL) {
- if (!chan_is_dead(c, c->detach_close))
- return;
- debug2("channel %d: gc: notify user", c->self);
- c->detach_user(c->self, NULL);
- /* if we still have a callback */
- if (c->detach_user != NULL)
- return;
- debug2("channel %d: gc: user detached", c->self);
- }
- if (!chan_is_dead(c, 1))
- return;
- debug2("channel %d: garbage collecting", c->self);
- channel_free(c);
-}
-
-static void
-channel_handler(chan_fn *ftab[], fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset,
- time_t *unpause_secs)
-{
- static int did_init = 0;
- u_int i, oalloc;
- Channel *c;
- time_t now;
-
- if (!did_init) {
- channel_handler_init();
- did_init = 1;
- }
- now = monotime();
- if (unpause_secs != NULL)
- *unpause_secs = 0;
- for (i = 0, oalloc = channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) {
- c = channels[i];
- if (c == NULL)
- continue;
- if (c->delayed) {
- if (ftab == channel_pre)
- c->delayed = 0;
- else
- continue;
- }
- if (ftab[c->type] != NULL) {
- /*
- * Run handlers that are not paused.
- */
- if (c->notbefore <= now)
- (*ftab[c->type])(c, readset, writeset);
- else if (unpause_secs != NULL) {
- /*
- * Collect the time that the earliest
- * channel comes off pause.
- */
- debug3("%s: chan %d: skip for %d more seconds",
- __func__, c->self,
- (int)(c->notbefore - now));
- if (*unpause_secs == 0 ||
- (c->notbefore - now) < *unpause_secs)
- *unpause_secs = c->notbefore - now;
- }
- }
- channel_garbage_collect(c);
- }
- if (unpause_secs != NULL && *unpause_secs != 0)
- debug3("%s: first channel unpauses in %d seconds",
- __func__, (int)*unpause_secs);
-}
-
-/*
- * Allocate/update select bitmasks and add any bits relevant to channels in
- * select bitmasks.
- */
-void
-channel_prepare_select(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
- u_int *nallocp, time_t *minwait_secs, int rekeying)
-{
- u_int n, sz, nfdset;
-
- n = MAX(*maxfdp, channel_max_fd);
-
- nfdset = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS);
- /* Explicitly test here, because xrealloc isn't always called */
- if (nfdset && SIZE_T_MAX / nfdset < sizeof(fd_mask))
- fatal("channel_prepare_select: max_fd (%d) is too large", n);
- sz = nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask);
-
- /* perhaps check sz < nalloc/2 and shrink? */
- if (*readsetp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) {
- *readsetp = xrealloc(*readsetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
- *writesetp = xrealloc(*writesetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
- *nallocp = sz;
- }
- *maxfdp = n;
- memset(*readsetp, 0, sz);
- memset(*writesetp, 0, sz);
-
- if (!rekeying)
- channel_handler(channel_pre, *readsetp, *writesetp,
- minwait_secs);
-}
-
-/*
- * After select, perform any appropriate operations for channels which have
- * events pending.
- */
-void
-channel_after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- channel_handler(channel_post, readset, writeset, NULL);
-}
-
-
-/* If there is data to send to the connection, enqueue some of it now. */
-void
-channel_output_poll(void)
-{
- Channel *c;
- u_int i, len;
-
- for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
- c = channels[i];
- if (c == NULL)
- continue;
-
- /*
- * We are only interested in channels that can have buffered
- * incoming data.
- */
- if (compat13) {
- if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
- c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING)
- continue;
- } else {
- if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
- continue;
- }
- if (compat20 &&
- (c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD))) {
- /* XXX is this true? */
- debug3("channel %d: will not send data after close", c->self);
- continue;
- }
-
- /* Get the amount of buffered data for this channel. */
- if ((c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN ||
- c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) &&
- (len = buffer_len(&c->input)) > 0) {
- if (c->datagram) {
- if (len > 0) {
- u_char *data;
- u_int dlen;
-
- data = buffer_get_string(&c->input,
- &dlen);
- if (dlen > c->remote_window ||
- dlen > c->remote_maxpacket) {
- debug("channel %d: datagram "
- "too big for channel",
- c->self);
- free(data);
- continue;
- }
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
- packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
- packet_put_string(data, dlen);
- packet_send();
- c->remote_window -= dlen + 4;
- free(data);
- }
- continue;
- }
- /*
- * Send some data for the other side over the secure
- * connection.
- */
- if (compat20) {
- if (len > c->remote_window)
- len = c->remote_window;
- if (len > c->remote_maxpacket)
- len = c->remote_maxpacket;
- } else {
- if (packet_is_interactive()) {
- if (len > 1024)
- len = 512;
- } else {
- /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */
- if (len > packet_get_maxsize()/2)
- len = packet_get_maxsize()/2;
- }
- }
- if (len > 0) {
- packet_start(compat20 ?
- SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA : SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
- packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
- packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&c->input), len);
- packet_send();
- buffer_consume(&c->input, len);
- c->remote_window -= len;
- }
- } else if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
- if (compat13)
- fatal("cannot happen: istate == INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN for proto 1.3");
- /*
- * input-buffer is empty and read-socket shutdown:
- * tell peer, that we will not send more data: send IEOF.
- * hack for extended data: delay EOF if EFD still in use.
- */
- if (CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c))
- debug2("channel %d: ibuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%d)",
- c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended));
- else
- chan_ibuf_empty(c);
- }
- /* Send extended data, i.e. stderr */
- if (compat20 &&
- !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) &&
- c->remote_window > 0 &&
- (len = buffer_len(&c->extended)) > 0 &&
- c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ) {
- debug2("channel %d: rwin %u elen %u euse %d",
- c->self, c->remote_window, buffer_len(&c->extended),
- c->extended_usage);
- if (len > c->remote_window)
- len = c->remote_window;
- if (len > c->remote_maxpacket)
- len = c->remote_maxpacket;
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA);
- packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
- packet_put_int(SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR);
- packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&c->extended), len);
- packet_send();
- buffer_consume(&c->extended, len);
- c->remote_window -= len;
- debug2("channel %d: sent ext data %d", c->self, len);
- }
- }
-}
-
-
-/* -- protocol input */
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- int id;
- char *data;
- u_int data_len, win_len;
- Channel *c;
-
- /* Get the channel number and verify it. */
- id = packet_get_int();
- c = channel_lookup(id);
- if (c == NULL)
- packet_disconnect("Received data for nonexistent channel %d.", id);
-
- /* Ignore any data for non-open channels (might happen on close) */
- if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
- c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN)
- return;
-
- /* Get the data. */
- data = packet_get_string_ptr(&data_len);
- win_len = data_len;
- if (c->datagram)
- win_len += 4; /* string length header */
-
- /*
- * Ignore data for protocol > 1.3 if output end is no longer open.
- * For protocol 2 the sending side is reducing its window as it sends
- * data, so we must 'fake' consumption of the data in order to ensure
- * that window updates are sent back. Otherwise the connection might
- * deadlock.
- */
- if (!compat13 && c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) {
- if (compat20) {
- c->local_window -= win_len;
- c->local_consumed += win_len;
- }
- return;
- }
-
- if (compat20) {
- if (win_len > c->local_maxpacket) {
- logit("channel %d: rcvd big packet %d, maxpack %d",
- c->self, win_len, c->local_maxpacket);
- }
- if (win_len > c->local_window) {
- logit("channel %d: rcvd too much data %d, win %d",
- c->self, win_len, c->local_window);
- return;
- }
- c->local_window -= win_len;
- }
- if (c->datagram)
- buffer_put_string(&c->output, data, data_len);
- else
- buffer_append(&c->output, data, data_len);
- packet_check_eom();
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- int id;
- char *data;
- u_int data_len, tcode;
- Channel *c;
-
- /* Get the channel number and verify it. */
- id = packet_get_int();
- c = channel_lookup(id);
-
- if (c == NULL)
- packet_disconnect("Received extended_data for bad channel %d.", id);
- if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
- logit("channel %d: ext data for non open", id);
- return;
- }
- if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) {
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF)
- debug("channel %d: accepting ext data after eof", id);
- else
- packet_disconnect("Received extended_data after EOF "
- "on channel %d.", id);
- }
- tcode = packet_get_int();
- if (c->efd == -1 ||
- c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE ||
- tcode != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR) {
- logit("channel %d: bad ext data", c->self);
- return;
- }
- data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
- packet_check_eom();
- if (data_len > c->local_window) {
- logit("channel %d: rcvd too much extended_data %d, win %d",
- c->self, data_len, c->local_window);
- free(data);
- return;
- }
- debug2("channel %d: rcvd ext data %d", c->self, data_len);
- c->local_window -= data_len;
- buffer_append(&c->extended, data, data_len);
- free(data);
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-channel_input_ieof(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- int id;
- Channel *c;
-
- id = packet_get_int();
- packet_check_eom();
- c = channel_lookup(id);
- if (c == NULL)
- packet_disconnect("Received ieof for nonexistent channel %d.", id);
- chan_rcvd_ieof(c);
-
- /* XXX force input close */
- if (c->force_drain && c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) {
- debug("channel %d: FORCE input drain", c->self);
- c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN;
- if (buffer_len(&c->input) == 0)
- chan_ibuf_empty(c);
- }
-
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-channel_input_close(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- int id;
- Channel *c;
-
- id = packet_get_int();
- packet_check_eom();
- c = channel_lookup(id);
- if (c == NULL)
- packet_disconnect("Received close for nonexistent channel %d.", id);
-
- /*
- * Send a confirmation that we have closed the channel and no more
- * data is coming for it.
- */
- packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION);
- packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
- packet_send();
-
- /*
- * If the channel is in closed state, we have sent a close request,
- * and the other side will eventually respond with a confirmation.
- * Thus, we cannot free the channel here, because then there would be
- * no-one to receive the confirmation. The channel gets freed when
- * the confirmation arrives.
- */
- if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED) {
- /*
- * Not a closed channel - mark it as draining, which will
- * cause it to be freed later.
- */
- buffer_clear(&c->input);
- c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING;
- }
-}
-
-/* proto version 1.5 overloads CLOSE_CONFIRMATION with OCLOSE */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-channel_input_oclose(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- int id = packet_get_int();
- Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
-
- packet_check_eom();
- if (c == NULL)
- packet_disconnect("Received oclose for nonexistent channel %d.", id);
- chan_rcvd_oclose(c);
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-channel_input_close_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- int id = packet_get_int();
- Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
-
- packet_check_eom();
- if (c == NULL)
- packet_disconnect("Received close confirmation for "
- "out-of-range channel %d.", id);
- if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED)
- packet_disconnect("Received close confirmation for "
- "non-closed channel %d (type %d).", id, c->type);
- channel_free(c);
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- int id, remote_id;
- Channel *c;
-
- id = packet_get_int();
- c = channel_lookup(id);
-
- if (c==NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING)
- packet_disconnect("Received open confirmation for "
- "non-opening channel %d.", id);
- remote_id = packet_get_int();
- /* Record the remote channel number and mark that the channel is now open. */
- c->remote_id = remote_id;
- c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
-
- if (compat20) {
- c->remote_window = packet_get_int();
- c->remote_maxpacket = packet_get_int();
- if (c->open_confirm) {
- debug2("callback start");
- c->open_confirm(c->self, 1, c->open_confirm_ctx);
- debug2("callback done");
- }
- debug2("channel %d: open confirm rwindow %u rmax %u", c->self,
- c->remote_window, c->remote_maxpacket);
- }
- packet_check_eom();
-}
-
-static char *
-reason2txt(int reason)
-{
- switch (reason) {
- case SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED:
- return "administratively prohibited";
- case SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED:
- return "connect failed";
- case SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE:
- return "unknown channel type";
- case SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE:
- return "resource shortage";
- }
- return "unknown reason";
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- int id, reason;
- char *msg = NULL, *lang = NULL;
- Channel *c;
-
- id = packet_get_int();
- c = channel_lookup(id);
-
- if (c==NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING)
- packet_disconnect("Received open failure for "
- "non-opening channel %d.", id);
- if (compat20) {
- reason = packet_get_int();
- if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) {
- msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
- lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
- }
- logit("channel %d: open failed: %s%s%s", id,
- reason2txt(reason), msg ? ": ": "", msg ? msg : "");
- free(msg);
- free(lang);
- if (c->open_confirm) {
- debug2("callback start");
- c->open_confirm(c->self, 0, c->open_confirm_ctx);
- debug2("callback done");
- }
- }
- packet_check_eom();
- /* Schedule the channel for cleanup/deletion. */
- chan_mark_dead(c);
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- Channel *c;
- int id;
- u_int adjust;
-
- if (!compat20)
- return;
-
- /* Get the channel number and verify it. */
- id = packet_get_int();
- c = channel_lookup(id);
-
- if (c == NULL) {
- logit("Received window adjust for non-open channel %d.", id);
- return;
- }
- adjust = packet_get_int();
- packet_check_eom();
- debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", id, adjust);
- c->remote_window += adjust;
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-channel_input_port_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- Channel *c = NULL;
- u_short host_port;
- char *host, *originator_string;
- int remote_id;
-
- remote_id = packet_get_int();
- host = packet_get_string(NULL);
- host_port = packet_get_int();
-
- if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) {
- originator_string = packet_get_string(NULL);
- } else {
- originator_string = xstrdup("unknown (remote did not supply name)");
- }
- packet_check_eom();
- c = channel_connect_to(host, host_port,
- "connected socket", originator_string);
- free(originator_string);
- free(host);
- if (c == NULL) {
- packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
- packet_put_int(remote_id);
- packet_send();
- } else
- c->remote_id = remote_id;
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- Channel *c;
- struct channel_confirm *cc;
- int id;
-
- /* Reset keepalive timeout */
- packet_set_alive_timeouts(0);
-
- id = packet_get_int();
- packet_check_eom();
-
- debug2("channel_input_status_confirm: type %d id %d", type, id);
-
- if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) {
- logit("channel_input_status_confirm: %d: unknown", id);
- return;
- }
- ;
- if ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) == NULL)
- return;
- cc->cb(type, c, cc->ctx);
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
- explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
- free(cc);
-}
-
-/* -- tcp forwarding */
-
-void
-channel_set_af(int af)
-{
- IPv4or6 = af;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Determine whether or not a port forward listens to loopback, the
- * specified address or wildcard. On the client, a specified bind
- * address will always override gateway_ports. On the server, a
- * gateway_ports of 1 (``yes'') will override the client's specification
- * and force a wildcard bind, whereas a value of 2 (``clientspecified'')
- * will bind to whatever address the client asked for.
- *
- * Special-case listen_addrs are:
- *
- * "0.0.0.0" -> wildcard v4/v6 if SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR
- * "" (empty string), "*" -> wildcard v4/v6
- * "localhost" -> loopback v4/v6
- */
-static const char *
-channel_fwd_bind_addr(const char *listen_addr, int *wildcardp,
- int is_client, int gateway_ports)
-{
- const char *addr = NULL;
- int wildcard = 0;
-
- if (listen_addr == NULL) {
- /* No address specified: default to gateway_ports setting */
- if (gateway_ports)
- wildcard = 1;
- } else if (gateway_ports || is_client) {
- if (((datafellows & SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR) &&
- strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") == 0 && is_client == 0) ||
- *listen_addr == '\0' || strcmp(listen_addr, "*") == 0 ||
- (!is_client && gateway_ports == 1)) {
- wildcard = 1;
- /*
- * Notify client if they requested a specific listen
- * address and it was overridden.
- */
- if (*listen_addr != '\0' &&
- strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") != 0 &&
- strcmp(listen_addr, "*") != 0) {
- packet_send_debug("Forwarding listen address "
- "\"%s\" overridden by server "
- "GatewayPorts", listen_addr);
- }
- }
- else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "localhost") != 0)
- addr = listen_addr;
- }
- if (wildcardp != NULL)
- *wildcardp = wildcard;
- return addr;
-}
-
-static int
-channel_setup_fwd_listener(int type, const char *listen_addr,
- u_short listen_port, int *allocated_listen_port,
- const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int gateway_ports)
-{
- Channel *c;
- int sock, r, success = 0, wildcard = 0, is_client;
- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
- const char *host, *addr;
- char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
- in_port_t *lport_p;
-
- host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ?
- listen_addr : host_to_connect;
- is_client = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER);
-
- if (host == NULL) {
- error("No forward host name.");
- return 0;
- }
- if (strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
- error("Forward host name too long.");
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Determine the bind address, cf. channel_fwd_bind_addr() comment */
- addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(listen_addr, &wildcard,
- is_client, gateway_ports);
- debug3("channel_setup_fwd_listener: type %d wildcard %d addr %s",
- type, wildcard, (addr == NULL) ? "NULL" : addr);
-
- /*
- * getaddrinfo returns a loopback address if the hostname is
- * set to NULL and hints.ai_flags is not AI_PASSIVE
- */
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
- hints.ai_flags = wildcard ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", listen_port);
- if ((r = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
- if (addr == NULL) {
- /* This really shouldn't happen */
- packet_disconnect("getaddrinfo: fatal error: %s",
- ssh_gai_strerror(r));
- } else {
- error("channel_setup_fwd_listener: "
- "getaddrinfo(%.64s): %s", addr,
- ssh_gai_strerror(r));
- }
- return 0;
- }
- if (allocated_listen_port != NULL)
- *allocated_listen_port = 0;
- for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- switch (ai->ai_family) {
- case AF_INET:
- lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr)->
- sin_port;
- break;
- case AF_INET6:
- lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr)->
- sin6_port;
- break;
- default:
- continue;
- }
- /*
- * If allocating a port for -R forwards, then use the
- * same port for all address families.
- */
- if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && listen_port == 0 &&
- allocated_listen_port != NULL && *allocated_listen_port > 0)
- *lport_p = htons(*allocated_listen_port);
-
- if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
- strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
- error("channel_setup_fwd_listener: getnameinfo failed");
- continue;
- }
- /* Create a port to listen for the host. */
- sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
- if (sock < 0) {
- /* this is no error since kernel may not support ipv6 */
- verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- continue;
- }
-
- channel_set_reuseaddr(sock);
- if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
- sock_set_v6only(sock);
-
- debug("Local forwarding listening on %s port %s.",
- ntop, strport);
-
- /* Bind the socket to the address. */
- if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
- /* address can be in use ipv6 address is already bound */
- if (!ai->ai_next)
- error("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- else
- verbose("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-
- close(sock);
- continue;
- }
- /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */
- if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) {
- error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- close(sock);
- continue;
- }
-
- /*
- * listen_port == 0 requests a dynamically allocated port -
- * record what we got.
- */
- if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && listen_port == 0 &&
- allocated_listen_port != NULL &&
- *allocated_listen_port == 0) {
- *allocated_listen_port = get_sock_port(sock, 1);
- debug("Allocated listen port %d",
- *allocated_listen_port);
- }
-
- /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */
- c = channel_new("port listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
- CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
- 0, "port listener", 1);
- c->path = xstrdup(host);
- c->host_port = port_to_connect;
- c->listening_addr = addr == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(addr);
- if (listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL &&
- !(datafellows & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT))
- c->listening_port = *allocated_listen_port;
- else
- c->listening_port = listen_port;
- success = 1;
- }
- if (success == 0)
- error("channel_setup_fwd_listener: cannot listen to port: %d",
- listen_port);
- freeaddrinfo(aitop);
- return success;
-}
-
-int
-channel_cancel_rport_listener(const char *host, u_short port)
-{
- u_int i;
- int found = 0;
-
- for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
- Channel *c = channels[i];
- if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER)
- continue;
- if (strcmp(c->path, host) == 0 && c->listening_port == port) {
- debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i);
- channel_free(c);
- found = 1;
- }
- }
-
- return (found);
-}
-
-int
-channel_cancel_lport_listener(const char *lhost, u_short lport,
- int cport, int gateway_ports)
-{
- u_int i;
- int found = 0;
- const char *addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(lhost, NULL, 1, gateway_ports);
-
- for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
- Channel *c = channels[i];
- if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER)
- continue;
- if (c->listening_port != lport)
- continue;
- if (cport == CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC) {
- /* skip dynamic forwardings */
- if (c->host_port == 0)
- continue;
- } else {
- if (c->host_port != cport)
- continue;
- }
- if ((c->listening_addr == NULL && addr != NULL) ||
- (c->listening_addr != NULL && addr == NULL))
- continue;
- if (addr == NULL || strcmp(c->listening_addr, addr) == 0) {
- debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i);
- channel_free(c);
- found = 1;
- }
- }
-
- return (found);
-}
-
-/* protocol local port fwd, used by ssh (and sshd in v1) */
-int
-channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(const char *listen_host, u_short listen_port,
- const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int gateway_ports)
-{
- return channel_setup_fwd_listener(SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER,
- listen_host, listen_port, NULL, host_to_connect, port_to_connect,
- gateway_ports);
-}
-
-/* protocol v2 remote port fwd, used by sshd */
-int
-channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(const char *listen_address,
- u_short listen_port, int *allocated_listen_port, int gateway_ports)
-{
- return channel_setup_fwd_listener(SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER,
- listen_address, listen_port, allocated_listen_port,
- NULL, 0, gateway_ports);
-}
-
-/*
- * Translate the requested rfwd listen host to something usable for
- * this server.
- */
-static const char *
-channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host)
-{
- if (listen_host == NULL) {
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR)
- return "127.0.0.1";
- else
- return "localhost";
- } else if (*listen_host == '\0' || strcmp(listen_host, "*") == 0) {
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR)
- return "0.0.0.0";
- else
- return "";
- } else
- return listen_host;
-}
-
-/*
- * Initiate forwarding of connections to port "port" on remote host through
- * the secure channel to host:port from local side.
- * Returns handle (index) for updating the dynamic listen port with
- * channel_update_permitted_opens().
- */
-int
-channel_request_remote_forwarding(const char *listen_host, u_short listen_port,
- const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect)
-{
- int type, success = 0, idx = -1;
-
- /* Send the forward request to the remote side. */
- if (compat20) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring("tcpip-forward");
- packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */
- packet_put_cstring(channel_rfwd_bind_host(listen_host));
- packet_put_int(listen_port);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- /* Assume that server accepts the request */
- success = 1;
- } else {
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST);
- packet_put_int(listen_port);
- packet_put_cstring(host_to_connect);
- packet_put_int(port_to_connect);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Wait for response from the remote side. */
- type = packet_read();
- switch (type) {
- case SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS:
- success = 1;
- break;
- case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE:
- break;
- default:
- /* Unknown packet */
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error for port forward request:"
- "received packet type %d.", type);
- }
- }
- if (success) {
- /* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
- permitted_opens = xrealloc(permitted_opens,
- num_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_opens));
- idx = num_permitted_opens++;
- permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host_to_connect);
- permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect = port_to_connect;
- permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = listen_port;
- }
- return (idx);
-}
-
-/*
- * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of connection host:port from
- * local side.
- */
-int
-channel_request_rforward_cancel(const char *host, u_short port)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (!compat20)
- return -1;
-
- for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) {
- if (permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL &&
- permitted_opens[i].listen_port == port)
- break;
- }
- if (i >= num_permitted_opens) {
- debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring("cancel-tcpip-forward");
- packet_put_char(0);
- packet_put_cstring(channel_rfwd_bind_host(host));
- packet_put_int(port);
- packet_send();
-
- permitted_opens[i].listen_port = 0;
- permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect = 0;
- free(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect);
- permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect = NULL;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * This is called after receiving CHANNEL_FORWARDING_REQUEST. This initates
- * listening for the port, and sends back a success reply (or disconnect
- * message if there was an error).
- */
-int
-channel_input_port_forward_request(int is_root, int gateway_ports)
-{
- u_short port, host_port;
- int success = 0;
- char *hostname;
-
- /* Get arguments from the packet. */
- port = packet_get_int();
- hostname = packet_get_string(NULL);
- host_port = packet_get_int();
-
-#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
- /*
- * Check that an unprivileged user is not trying to forward a
- * privileged port.
- */
- if (port < IPPORT_RESERVED && !is_root)
- packet_disconnect(
- "Requested forwarding of port %d but user is not root.",
- port);
- if (host_port == 0)
- packet_disconnect("Dynamic forwarding denied.");
-#endif
-
- /* Initiate forwarding */
- success = channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(NULL, port, hostname,
- host_port, gateway_ports);
-
- /* Free the argument string. */
- free(hostname);
-
- return (success ? 0 : -1);
-}
-
-/*
- * Permits opening to any host/port if permitted_opens[] is empty. This is
- * usually called by the server, because the user could connect to any port
- * anyway, and the server has no way to know but to trust the client anyway.
- */
-void
-channel_permit_all_opens(void)
-{
- if (num_permitted_opens == 0)
- all_opens_permitted = 1;
-}
-
-void
-channel_add_permitted_opens(char *host, int port)
-{
- debug("allow port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port);
-
- permitted_opens = xrealloc(permitted_opens,
- num_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_opens));
- permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host);
- permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port;
- num_permitted_opens++;
-
- all_opens_permitted = 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Update the listen port for a dynamic remote forward, after
- * the actual 'newport' has been allocated. If 'newport' < 0 is
- * passed then they entry will be invalidated.
- */
-void
-channel_update_permitted_opens(int idx, int newport)
-{
- if (idx < 0 || idx >= num_permitted_opens) {
- debug("channel_update_permitted_opens: index out of range:"
- " %d num_permitted_opens %d", idx, num_permitted_opens);
- return;
- }
- debug("%s allowed port %d for forwarding to host %s port %d",
- newport > 0 ? "Updating" : "Removing",
- newport,
- permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect,
- permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect);
- if (newport >= 0) {
- permitted_opens[idx].listen_port =
- (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT) ? 0 : newport;
- } else {
- permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = 0;
- permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect = 0;
- free(permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect);
- permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect = NULL;
- }
-}
-
-int
-channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(char *host, int port)
-{
- debug("config allows port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port);
-
- permitted_adm_opens = xrealloc(permitted_adm_opens,
- num_adm_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens));
- permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect
- = xstrdup(host);
- permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port;
- return ++num_adm_permitted_opens;
-}
-
-void
-channel_disable_adm_local_opens(void)
-{
- channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens();
- permitted_adm_opens = xmalloc(sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens));
- permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = NULL;
- num_adm_permitted_opens = 1;
-}
-
-void
-channel_clear_permitted_opens(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++)
- free(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect);
- free(permitted_opens);
- permitted_opens = NULL;
- num_permitted_opens = 0;
-}
-
-void
-channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++)
- free(permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect);
- free(permitted_adm_opens);
- permitted_adm_opens = NULL;
- num_adm_permitted_opens = 0;
-}
-
-void
-channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- printf("permitopen");
- if (num_adm_permitted_opens == 0) {
- printf(" any\n");
- return;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++)
- if (permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect == NULL)
- printf(" none");
- else
- printf(" %s:%d", permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect,
- permitted_adm_opens[i].port_to_connect);
- printf("\n");
-}
-
-/* returns port number, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT or -1 on error */
-int
-permitopen_port(const char *p)
-{
- int port;
-
- if (strcmp(p, "*") == 0)
- return FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT;
- if ((port = a2port(p)) > 0)
- return port;
- return -1;
-}
-
-static int
-port_match(u_short allowedport, u_short requestedport)
-{
- if (allowedport == FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT ||
- allowedport == requestedport)
- return 1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Try to start non-blocking connect to next host in cctx list */
-static int
-connect_next(struct channel_connect *cctx)
-{
- int sock, saved_errno;
- char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
-
- for (; cctx->ai; cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next) {
- if (cctx->ai->ai_family != AF_INET &&
- cctx->ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
- continue;
- if (getnameinfo(cctx->ai->ai_addr, cctx->ai->ai_addrlen,
- ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
- NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
- error("connect_next: getnameinfo failed");
- continue;
- }
- if ((sock = socket(cctx->ai->ai_family, cctx->ai->ai_socktype,
- cctx->ai->ai_protocol)) == -1) {
- if (cctx->ai->ai_next == NULL)
- error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- else
- verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- continue;
- }
- if (set_nonblock(sock) == -1)
- fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, sock);
- if (connect(sock, cctx->ai->ai_addr,
- cctx->ai->ai_addrlen) == -1 && errno != EINPROGRESS) {
- debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s): "
- "%.100s", cctx->host, ntop, strport,
- strerror(errno));
- saved_errno = errno;
- close(sock);
- errno = saved_errno;
- continue; /* fail -- try next */
- }
- debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s) "
- "in progress, fd=%d", cctx->host, ntop, strport, sock);
- cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next;
- set_nodelay(sock);
- return sock;
- }
- return -1;
-}
-
-static void
-channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *cctx)
-{
- free(cctx->host);
- if (cctx->aitop)
- freeaddrinfo(cctx->aitop);
- memset(cctx, 0, sizeof(*cctx));
-}
-
-/* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host, port */
-static Channel *
-connect_to(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, char *rname)
-{
- struct addrinfo hints;
- int gaierr;
- int sock = -1;
- char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
- struct channel_connect cctx;
- Channel *c;
-
- memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx));
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
- if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &cctx.aitop)) != 0) {
- error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", host,
- ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
- return NULL;
- }
-
- cctx.host = xstrdup(host);
- cctx.port = port;
- cctx.ai = cctx.aitop;
-
- if ((sock = connect_next(&cctx)) == -1) {
- error("connect to %.100s port %d failed: %s",
- host, port, strerror(errno));
- channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx);
- return NULL;
- }
- c = channel_new(ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1,
- CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1);
- c->connect_ctx = cctx;
- return c;
-}
-
-Channel *
-channel_connect_by_listen_address(u_short listen_port, char *ctype, char *rname)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) {
- if (permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL &&
- port_match(permitted_opens[i].listen_port, listen_port)) {
- return connect_to(
- permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect,
- permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect, ctype, rname);
- }
- }
- error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown listen_port %d",
- listen_port);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/* Check if connecting to that port is permitted and connect. */
-Channel *
-channel_connect_to(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, char *rname)
-{
- int i, permit, permit_adm = 1;
-
- permit = all_opens_permitted;
- if (!permit) {
- for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++)
- if (permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL &&
- port_match(permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect, port) &&
- strcmp(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect, host) == 0)
- permit = 1;
- }
-
- if (num_adm_permitted_opens > 0) {
- permit_adm = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++)
- if (permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL &&
- port_match(permitted_adm_opens[i].port_to_connect, port) &&
- strcmp(permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect, host)
- == 0)
- permit_adm = 1;
- }
-
- if (!permit || !permit_adm) {
- logit("Received request to connect to host %.100s port %d, "
- "but the request was denied.", host, port);
- return NULL;
- }
- return connect_to(host, port, ctype, rname);
-}
-
-void
-channel_send_window_changes(void)
-{
- u_int i;
- struct winsize ws;
-
- for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
- if (channels[i] == NULL || !channels[i]->client_tty ||
- channels[i]->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
- continue;
- if (ioctl(channels[i]->rfd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
- continue;
- channel_request_start(i, "window-change", 0);
- packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
- packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
- packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
- packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
- packet_send();
- }
-}
-
-/* -- X11 forwarding */
-
-/*
- * Creates an internet domain socket for listening for X11 connections.
- * Returns 0 and a suitable display number for the DISPLAY variable
- * stored in display_numberp , or -1 if an error occurs.
- */
-int
-x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost,
- int single_connection, u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
-{
- Channel *nc = NULL;
- int display_number, sock;
- u_short port;
- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
- char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
- int gaierr, n, num_socks = 0, socks[NUM_SOCKS];
-
- if (chanids == NULL)
- return -1;
-
- for (display_number = x11_display_offset;
- display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
- display_number++) {
- port = 6000 + display_number;
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
- hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
- if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
- error("getaddrinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
- return -1;
- }
- for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
- continue;
- sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
- ai->ai_protocol);
- if (sock < 0) {
- if ((errno != EINVAL) && (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
-#ifdef EPFNOSUPPORT
- && (errno != EPFNOSUPPORT)
-#endif
- ) {
- error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- freeaddrinfo(aitop);
- return -1;
- } else {
- debug("x11_create_display_inet: Socket family %d not supported",
- ai->ai_family);
- continue;
- }
- }
- if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
- sock_set_v6only(sock);
- if (x11_use_localhost)
- channel_set_reuseaddr(sock);
- if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
- debug2("bind port %d: %.100s", port, strerror(errno));
- close(sock);
-
- for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
- close(socks[n]);
- }
- num_socks = 0;
- break;
- }
- socks[num_socks++] = sock;
- if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
- break;
- }
- freeaddrinfo(aitop);
- if (num_socks > 0)
- break;
- }
- if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
- error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
- return -1;
- }
- /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */
- for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
- sock = socks[n];
- if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) {
- error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- close(sock);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- /* Allocate a channel for each socket. */
- *chanids = xcalloc(num_socks + 1, sizeof(**chanids));
- for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
- sock = socks[n];
- nc = channel_new("x11 listener",
- SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1,
- CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
- 0, "X11 inet listener", 1);
- nc->single_connection = single_connection;
- (*chanids)[n] = nc->self;
- }
- (*chanids)[n] = -1;
-
- /* Return the display number for the DISPLAY environment variable. */
- *display_numberp = display_number;
- return (0);
-}
-
-static int
-connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
-{
- int sock;
- struct sockaddr_un addr;
-
- sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- if (sock < 0)
- error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
- addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
- strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
- if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
- return sock;
- close(sock);
- error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno));
- return -1;
-}
-
-static int
-connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
-{
- char buf[1024];
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
- return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf);
-}
-
-int
-x11_connect_display(void)
-{
- u_int display_number;
- const char *display;
- char buf[1024], *cp;
- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
- char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
- int gaierr, sock = 0;
-
- /* Try to open a socket for the local X server. */
- display = getenv("DISPLAY");
- if (!display) {
- error("DISPLAY not set.");
- return -1;
- }
- /*
- * Now we decode the value of the DISPLAY variable and make a
- * connection to the real X server.
- */
-
- /* Check if the display is from launchd. */
-#ifdef __APPLE__
- if (strncmp(display, "/tmp/launch", 11) == 0) {
- sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(display);
- if (sock < 0)
- return -1;
-
- /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
- return sock;
- }
-#endif
- /*
- * Check if it is a unix domain socket. Unix domain displays are in
- * one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s]
- */
- if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 ||
- display[0] == ':') {
- /* Connect to the unix domain socket. */
- if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
- error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
- display);
- return -1;
- }
- /* Create a socket. */
- sock = connect_local_xsocket(display_number);
- if (sock < 0)
- return -1;
-
- /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
- return sock;
- }
- /*
- * Connect to an inet socket. The DISPLAY value is supposedly
- * hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address.
- */
- strlcpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf));
- cp = strchr(buf, ':');
- if (!cp) {
- error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display);
- return -1;
- }
- *cp = 0;
- /* buf now contains the host name. But first we parse the display number. */
- if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
- error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
- display);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Look up the host address */
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
- if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
- error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
- ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
- return -1;
- }
- for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- /* Create a socket. */
- sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
- if (sock < 0) {
- debug2("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- continue;
- }
- /* Connect it to the display. */
- if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
- debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
- 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
- close(sock);
- continue;
- }
- /* Success */
- break;
- }
- freeaddrinfo(aitop);
- if (!ai) {
- error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number,
- strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- set_nodelay(sock);
- return sock;
-}
-
-/*
- * This is called when SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN is received. The packet contains
- * the remote channel number. We should do whatever we want, and respond
- * with either SSH_MSG_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or SSH_MSG_OPEN_FAILURE.
- */
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-x11_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- Channel *c = NULL;
- int remote_id, sock = 0;
- char *remote_host;
-
- debug("Received X11 open request.");
-
- remote_id = packet_get_int();
-
- if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) {
- remote_host = packet_get_string(NULL);
- } else {
- remote_host = xstrdup("unknown (remote did not supply name)");
- }
- packet_check_eom();
-
- /* Obtain a connection to the real X display. */
- sock = x11_connect_display();
- if (sock != -1) {
- /* Allocate a channel for this connection. */
- c = channel_new("connected x11 socket",
- SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, 0, 0, 0,
- remote_host, 1);
- c->remote_id = remote_id;
- c->force_drain = 1;
- }
- free(remote_host);
- if (c == NULL) {
- /* Send refusal to the remote host. */
- packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
- packet_put_int(remote_id);
- } else {
- /* Send a confirmation to the remote host. */
- packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
- packet_put_int(remote_id);
- packet_put_int(c->self);
- }
- packet_send();
-}
-
-/* dummy protocol handler that denies SSH-1 requests (agent/x11) */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-deny_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- int rchan = packet_get_int();
-
- switch (type) {
- case SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN:
- error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding.");
- break;
- case SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN:
- error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding.");
- break;
- default:
- error("deny_input_open: type %d", type);
- break;
- }
- error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a malicious server.");
- packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
- packet_put_int(rchan);
- packet_send();
-}
-
-/*
- * Requests forwarding of X11 connections, generates fake authentication
- * data, and enables authentication spoofing.
- * This should be called in the client only.
- */
-void
-x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int client_session_id, const char *disp,
- const char *proto, const char *data, int want_reply)
-{
- u_int data_len = (u_int) strlen(data) / 2;
- u_int i, value;
- char *new_data;
- int screen_number;
- const char *cp;
- u_int32_t rnd = 0;
-
- if (x11_saved_display == NULL)
- x11_saved_display = xstrdup(disp);
- else if (strcmp(disp, x11_saved_display) != 0) {
- error("x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing: different "
- "$DISPLAY already forwarded");
- return;
- }
-
- cp = strchr(disp, ':');
- if (cp)
- cp = strchr(cp, '.');
- if (cp)
- screen_number = (u_int)strtonum(cp + 1, 0, 400, NULL);
- else
- screen_number = 0;
-
- if (x11_saved_proto == NULL) {
- /* Save protocol name. */
- x11_saved_proto = xstrdup(proto);
- /*
- * Extract real authentication data and generate fake data
- * of the same length.
- */
- x11_saved_data = xmalloc(data_len);
- x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len);
- for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
- if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1)
- fatal("x11_request_forwarding: bad "
- "authentication data: %.100s", data);
- if (i % 4 == 0)
- rnd = arc4random();
- x11_saved_data[i] = value;
- x11_fake_data[i] = rnd & 0xff;
- rnd >>= 8;
- }
- x11_saved_data_len = data_len;
- x11_fake_data_len = data_len;
- }
-
- /* Convert the fake data into hex. */
- new_data = tohex(x11_fake_data, data_len);
-
- /* Send the request packet. */
- if (compat20) {
- channel_request_start(client_session_id, "x11-req", want_reply);
- packet_put_char(0); /* XXX bool single connection */
- } else {
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
- }
- packet_put_cstring(proto);
- packet_put_cstring(new_data);
- packet_put_int(screen_number);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- free(new_data);
-}
-
-
-/* -- agent forwarding */
-
-/* Sends a message to the server to request authentication fd forwarding. */
-
-void
-auth_request_forwarding(void)
-{
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/channels.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/channels.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/channels.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/channels.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,4289 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.351 2016/07/19 11:38:53 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * This file contains functions for generic socket connection forwarding.
+ * There is also code for initiating connection forwarding for X11 connections,
+ * arbitrary tcp/ip connections, and the authentication agent connection.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h> /* MIN MAX */
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+
+/* -- channel core */
+
+/*
+ * Pointer to an array containing all allocated channels. The array is
+ * dynamically extended as needed.
+ */
+static Channel **channels = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Size of the channel array. All slots of the array must always be
+ * initialized (at least the type field); unused slots set to NULL
+ */
+static u_int channels_alloc = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Maximum file descriptor value used in any of the channels. This is
+ * updated in channel_new.
+ */
+static int channel_max_fd = 0;
+
+
+/* -- tcp forwarding */
+
+/*
+ * Data structure for storing which hosts are permitted for forward requests.
+ * The local sides of any remote forwards are stored in this array to prevent
+ * a corrupt remote server from accessing arbitrary TCP/IP ports on our local
+ * network (which might be behind a firewall).
+ */
+/* XXX: streamlocal wants a path instead of host:port */
+/* Overload host_to_connect; we could just make this match Forward */
+/* XXX - can we use listen_host instead of listen_path? */
+typedef struct {
+ char *host_to_connect; /* Connect to 'host'. */
+ int port_to_connect; /* Connect to 'port'. */
+ char *listen_host; /* Remote side should listen address. */
+ char *listen_path; /* Remote side should listen path. */
+ int listen_port; /* Remote side should listen port. */
+} ForwardPermission;
+
+/* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the user. */
+static ForwardPermission *permitted_opens = NULL;
+
+/* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the admin. */
+static ForwardPermission *permitted_adm_opens = NULL;
+
+/* Number of permitted host/port pairs in the array permitted by the user. */
+static int num_permitted_opens = 0;
+
+/* Number of permitted host/port pair in the array permitted by the admin. */
+static int num_adm_permitted_opens = 0;
+
+/* special-case port number meaning allow any port */
+#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT 0
+
+/* special-case wildcard meaning allow any host */
+#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST "*"
+
+/*
+ * If this is true, all opens are permitted. This is the case on the server
+ * on which we have to trust the client anyway, and the user could do
+ * anything after logging in anyway.
+ */
+static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
+
+
+/* -- X11 forwarding */
+
+/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
+#define MAX_DISPLAYS 1000
+
+/* Saved X11 local (client) display. */
+static char *x11_saved_display = NULL;
+
+/* Saved X11 authentication protocol name. */
+static char *x11_saved_proto = NULL;
+
+/* Saved X11 authentication data. This is the real data. */
+static char *x11_saved_data = NULL;
+static u_int x11_saved_data_len = 0;
+
+/* Deadline after which all X11 connections are refused */
+static u_int x11_refuse_time;
+
+/*
+ * Fake X11 authentication data. This is what the server will be sending us;
+ * we should replace any occurrences of this by the real data.
+ */
+static u_char *x11_fake_data = NULL;
+static u_int x11_fake_data_len;
+
+
+/* -- agent forwarding */
+
+#define NUM_SOCKS 10
+
+/* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */
+static int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
+
+/* helper */
+static void port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype);
+
+/* non-blocking connect helpers */
+static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *);
+static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *);
+
+/* -- channel core */
+
+Channel *
+channel_by_id(int id)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+
+ if (id < 0 || (u_int)id >= channels_alloc) {
+ logit("channel_by_id: %d: bad id", id);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ c = channels[id];
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ logit("channel_by_id: %d: bad id: channel free", id);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return c;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the channel if it is allowed to receive protocol messages.
+ * Private channels, like listening sockets, may not receive messages.
+ */
+Channel *
+channel_lookup(int id)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+
+ if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
+ return (c);
+ }
+ logit("Non-public channel %d, type %d.", id, c->type);
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Register filedescriptors for a channel, used when allocating a channel or
+ * when the channel consumer/producer is ready, e.g. shell exec'd
+ */
+static void
+channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
+ int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty)
+{
+ /* Update the maximum file descriptor value. */
+ channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, rfd);
+ channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, wfd);
+ channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, efd);
+
+ if (rfd != -1)
+ fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+ if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd)
+ fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+ if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
+ fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+
+ c->rfd = rfd;
+ c->wfd = wfd;
+ c->sock = (rfd == wfd) ? rfd : -1;
+ c->efd = efd;
+ c->extended_usage = extusage;
+
+ if ((c->isatty = is_tty) != 0)
+ debug2("channel %d: rfd %d isatty", c->self, c->rfd);
+#ifdef _AIX
+ /* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */
+ c->wfd_isatty = is_tty || isatty(c->wfd);
+#endif
+
+ /* enable nonblocking mode */
+ if (nonblock) {
+ if (rfd != -1)
+ set_nonblock(rfd);
+ if (wfd != -1)
+ set_nonblock(wfd);
+ if (efd != -1)
+ set_nonblock(efd);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate a new channel object and set its type and socket. This will cause
+ * remote_name to be freed.
+ */
+Channel *
+channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
+ u_int window, u_int maxpack, int extusage, char *remote_name, int nonblock)
+{
+ int found;
+ u_int i;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ /* Do initial allocation if this is the first call. */
+ if (channels_alloc == 0) {
+ channels_alloc = 10;
+ channels = xcalloc(channels_alloc, sizeof(Channel *));
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
+ channels[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ /* Try to find a free slot where to put the new channel. */
+ for (found = -1, i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
+ if (channels[i] == NULL) {
+ /* Found a free slot. */
+ found = (int)i;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (found < 0) {
+ /* There are no free slots. Take last+1 slot and expand the array. */
+ found = channels_alloc;
+ if (channels_alloc > 10000)
+ fatal("channel_new: internal error: channels_alloc %d "
+ "too big.", channels_alloc);
+ channels = xreallocarray(channels, channels_alloc + 10,
+ sizeof(Channel *));
+ channels_alloc += 10;
+ debug2("channel: expanding %d", channels_alloc);
+ for (i = found; i < channels_alloc; i++)
+ channels[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ /* Initialize and return new channel. */
+ c = channels[found] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Channel));
+ buffer_init(&c->input);
+ buffer_init(&c->output);
+ buffer_init(&c->extended);
+ c->path = NULL;
+ c->listening_addr = NULL;
+ c->listening_port = 0;
+ c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN;
+ c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN;
+ c->flags = 0;
+ channel_register_fds(c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, 0);
+ c->notbefore = 0;
+ c->self = found;
+ c->type = type;
+ c->ctype = ctype;
+ c->local_window = window;
+ c->local_window_max = window;
+ c->local_consumed = 0;
+ c->local_maxpacket = maxpack;
+ c->remote_id = -1;
+ c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name);
+ c->remote_window = 0;
+ c->remote_maxpacket = 0;
+ c->force_drain = 0;
+ c->single_connection = 0;
+ c->detach_user = NULL;
+ c->detach_close = 0;
+ c->open_confirm = NULL;
+ c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL;
+ c->input_filter = NULL;
+ c->output_filter = NULL;
+ c->filter_ctx = NULL;
+ c->filter_cleanup = NULL;
+ c->ctl_chan = -1;
+ c->mux_rcb = NULL;
+ c->mux_ctx = NULL;
+ c->mux_pause = 0;
+ c->delayed = 1; /* prevent call to channel_post handler */
+ TAILQ_INIT(&c->status_confirms);
+ debug("channel %d: new [%s]", found, remote_name);
+ return c;
+}
+
+static int
+channel_find_maxfd(void)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ int max = 0;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+ c = channels[i];
+ if (c != NULL) {
+ max = MAX(max, c->rfd);
+ max = MAX(max, c->wfd);
+ max = MAX(max, c->efd);
+ }
+ }
+ return max;
+}
+
+int
+channel_close_fd(int *fdp)
+{
+ int ret = 0, fd = *fdp;
+
+ if (fd != -1) {
+ ret = close(fd);
+ *fdp = -1;
+ if (fd == channel_max_fd)
+ channel_max_fd = channel_find_maxfd();
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Close all channel fd/socket. */
+static void
+channel_close_fds(Channel *c)
+{
+ channel_close_fd(&c->sock);
+ channel_close_fd(&c->rfd);
+ channel_close_fd(&c->wfd);
+ channel_close_fd(&c->efd);
+}
+
+/* Free the channel and close its fd/socket. */
+void
+channel_free(Channel *c)
+{
+ char *s;
+ u_int i, n;
+ struct channel_confirm *cc;
+
+ for (n = 0, i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
+ if (channels[i])
+ n++;
+ debug("channel %d: free: %s, nchannels %u", c->self,
+ c->remote_name ? c->remote_name : "???", n);
+
+ s = channel_open_message();
+ debug3("channel %d: status: %s", c->self, s);
+ free(s);
+
+ if (c->sock != -1)
+ shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_RDWR);
+ channel_close_fds(c);
+ buffer_free(&c->input);
+ buffer_free(&c->output);
+ buffer_free(&c->extended);
+ free(c->remote_name);
+ c->remote_name = NULL;
+ free(c->path);
+ c->path = NULL;
+ free(c->listening_addr);
+ c->listening_addr = NULL;
+ while ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) != NULL) {
+ if (cc->abandon_cb != NULL)
+ cc->abandon_cb(c, cc->ctx);
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
+ explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
+ free(cc);
+ }
+ if (c->filter_cleanup != NULL && c->filter_ctx != NULL)
+ c->filter_cleanup(c->self, c->filter_ctx);
+ channels[c->self] = NULL;
+ free(c);
+}
+
+void
+channel_free_all(void)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
+ if (channels[i] != NULL)
+ channel_free(channels[i]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Closes the sockets/fds of all channels. This is used to close extra file
+ * descriptors after a fork.
+ */
+void
+channel_close_all(void)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
+ if (channels[i] != NULL)
+ channel_close_fds(channels[i]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Stop listening to channels.
+ */
+void
+channel_stop_listening(void)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+ c = channels[i];
+ if (c != NULL) {
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
+ channel_close_fd(&c->sock);
+ channel_free(c);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if no channel has too much buffered data, and false if one or
+ * more channel is overfull.
+ */
+int
+channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(void)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+ c = channels[i];
+ if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
+#if 0
+ if (!compat20 &&
+ buffer_len(&c->input) > packet_get_maxsize()) {
+ debug2("channel %d: big input buffer %d",
+ c->self, buffer_len(&c->input));
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (buffer_len(&c->output) > packet_get_maxsize()) {
+ debug2("channel %d: big output buffer %u > %u",
+ c->self, buffer_len(&c->output),
+ packet_get_maxsize());
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Returns true if any channel is still open. */
+int
+channel_still_open(void)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+ c = channels[i];
+ if (c == NULL)
+ continue;
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
+ continue;
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
+ if (!compat20)
+ fatal("cannot happen: SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL");
+ continue;
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT:
+ return 1;
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING:
+ if (!compat13)
+ fatal("cannot happen: OUT_DRAIN");
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ fatal("channel_still_open: bad channel type %d", c->type);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Returns the id of an open channel suitable for keepaliving */
+int
+channel_find_open(void)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+ c = channels[i];
+ if (c == NULL || c->remote_id < 0)
+ continue;
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
+ continue;
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
+ return i;
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING:
+ if (!compat13)
+ fatal("cannot happen: OUT_DRAIN");
+ return i;
+ default:
+ fatal("channel_find_open: bad channel type %d", c->type);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ }
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Returns a message describing the currently open forwarded connections,
+ * suitable for sending to the client. The message contains crlf pairs for
+ * newlines.
+ */
+char *
+channel_open_message(void)
+{
+ Buffer buffer;
+ Channel *c;
+ char buf[1024], *cp;
+ u_int i;
+
+ buffer_init(&buffer);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "The following connections are open:\r\n");
+ buffer_append(&buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+ c = channels[i];
+ if (c == NULL)
+ continue;
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
+ continue;
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING:
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
+ " #%d %.300s (t%d r%d i%u/%d o%u/%d fd %d/%d cc %d)\r\n",
+ c->self, c->remote_name,
+ c->type, c->remote_id,
+ c->istate, buffer_len(&c->input),
+ c->ostate, buffer_len(&c->output),
+ c->rfd, c->wfd, c->ctl_chan);
+ buffer_append(&buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+ continue;
+ default:
+ fatal("channel_open_message: bad channel type %d", c->type);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ }
+ }
+ buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1);
+ cp = xstrdup((char *)buffer_ptr(&buffer));
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+ return cp;
+}
+
+void
+channel_send_open(int id)
+{
+ Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ logit("channel_send_open: %d: bad id", id);
+ return;
+ }
+ debug2("channel %d: send open", id);
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
+ packet_put_cstring(c->ctype);
+ packet_put_int(c->self);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_window);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+ packet_send();
+}
+
+void
+channel_request_start(int id, char *service, int wantconfirm)
+{
+ Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ logit("channel_request_start: %d: unknown channel id", id);
+ return;
+ }
+ debug2("channel %d: request %s confirm %d", id, service, wantconfirm);
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_cstring(service);
+ packet_put_char(wantconfirm);
+}
+
+void
+channel_register_status_confirm(int id, channel_confirm_cb *cb,
+ channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb, void *ctx)
+{
+ struct channel_confirm *cc;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL)
+ fatal("channel_register_expect: %d: bad id", id);
+
+ cc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cc));
+ cc->cb = cb;
+ cc->abandon_cb = abandon_cb;
+ cc->ctx = ctx;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
+}
+
+void
+channel_register_open_confirm(int id, channel_open_fn *fn, void *ctx)
+{
+ Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ logit("channel_register_open_confirm: %d: bad id", id);
+ return;
+ }
+ c->open_confirm = fn;
+ c->open_confirm_ctx = ctx;
+}
+
+void
+channel_register_cleanup(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn, int do_close)
+{
+ Channel *c = channel_by_id(id);
+
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ logit("channel_register_cleanup: %d: bad id", id);
+ return;
+ }
+ c->detach_user = fn;
+ c->detach_close = do_close;
+}
+
+void
+channel_cancel_cleanup(int id)
+{
+ Channel *c = channel_by_id(id);
+
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ logit("channel_cancel_cleanup: %d: bad id", id);
+ return;
+ }
+ c->detach_user = NULL;
+ c->detach_close = 0;
+}
+
+void
+channel_register_filter(int id, channel_infilter_fn *ifn,
+ channel_outfilter_fn *ofn, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *cfn, void *ctx)
+{
+ Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ logit("channel_register_filter: %d: bad id", id);
+ return;
+ }
+ c->input_filter = ifn;
+ c->output_filter = ofn;
+ c->filter_ctx = ctx;
+ c->filter_cleanup = cfn;
+}
+
+void
+channel_set_fds(int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
+ int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty, u_int window_max)
+{
+ Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+ if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL)
+ fatal("channel_activate for non-larval channel %d.", id);
+ channel_register_fds(c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, is_tty);
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+ c->local_window = c->local_window_max = window_max;
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_window);
+ packet_send();
+}
+
+/*
+ * 'channel_pre*' are called just before select() to add any bits relevant to
+ * channels in the select bitmasks.
+ */
+/*
+ * 'channel_post*': perform any appropriate operations for channels which
+ * have events pending.
+ */
+typedef void chan_fn(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset);
+chan_fn *channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE];
+chan_fn *channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE];
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+channel_pre_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+channel_pre_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ debug3("channel %d: waiting for connection", c->self);
+ FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ if (buffer_len(&c->input) < packet_get_maxsize())
+ FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
+ if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0)
+ FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ u_int limit = compat20 ? c->remote_window : packet_get_maxsize();
+
+ if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN &&
+ limit > 0 &&
+ buffer_len(&c->input) < limit &&
+ buffer_check_alloc(&c->input, CHAN_RBUF))
+ FD_SET(c->rfd, readset);
+ if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN ||
+ c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
+ if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) {
+ FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset);
+ } else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
+ if (CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c))
+ debug2("channel %d: obuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%d)",
+ c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended));
+ else
+ chan_obuf_empty(c);
+ }
+ }
+ /** XXX check close conditions, too */
+ if (compat20 && c->efd != -1 &&
+ !(c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED && c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)) {
+ if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE &&
+ buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0)
+ FD_SET(c->efd, writeset);
+ else if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) &&
+ (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ ||
+ c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) &&
+ buffer_len(&c->extended) < c->remote_window)
+ FD_SET(c->efd, readset);
+ }
+ /* XXX: What about efd? races? */
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+channel_pre_input_draining(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ if (buffer_len(&c->input) == 0) {
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_send();
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED;
+ debug2("channel %d: closing after input drain.", c->self);
+ }
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+channel_pre_output_draining(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ if (buffer_len(&c->output) == 0)
+ chan_mark_dead(c);
+ else
+ FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is a special state for X11 authentication spoofing. An opened X11
+ * connection (when authentication spoofing is being done) remains in this
+ * state until the first packet has been completely read. The authentication
+ * data in that packet is then substituted by the real data if it matches the
+ * fake data, and the channel is put into normal mode.
+ * XXX All this happens at the client side.
+ * Returns: 0 = need more data, -1 = wrong cookie, 1 = ok
+ */
+static int
+x11_open_helper(Buffer *b)
+{
+ u_char *ucp;
+ u_int proto_len, data_len;
+
+ /* Is this being called after the refusal deadline? */
+ if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) {
+ verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout "
+ "expired");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
+ if (buffer_len(b) < 12)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Parse the lengths of variable-length fields. */
+ ucp = buffer_ptr(b);
+ if (ucp[0] == 0x42) { /* Byte order MSB first. */
+ proto_len = 256 * ucp[6] + ucp[7];
+ data_len = 256 * ucp[8] + ucp[9];
+ } else if (ucp[0] == 0x6c) { /* Byte order LSB first. */
+ proto_len = ucp[6] + 256 * ucp[7];
+ data_len = ucp[8] + 256 * ucp[9];
+ } else {
+ debug2("Initial X11 packet contains bad byte order byte: 0x%x",
+ ucp[0]);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the whole packet is in buffer. */
+ if (buffer_len(b) <
+ 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3) + ((data_len + 3) & ~3))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check if authentication protocol matches. */
+ if (proto_len != strlen(x11_saved_proto) ||
+ memcmp(ucp + 12, x11_saved_proto, proto_len) != 0) {
+ debug2("X11 connection uses different authentication protocol.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Check if authentication data matches our fake data. */
+ if (data_len != x11_fake_data_len ||
+ timingsafe_bcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
+ x11_fake_data, x11_fake_data_len) != 0) {
+ debug2("X11 auth data does not match fake data.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Check fake data length */
+ if (x11_fake_data_len != x11_saved_data_len) {
+ error("X11 fake_data_len %d != saved_data_len %d",
+ x11_fake_data_len, x11_saved_data_len);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Received authentication protocol and data match
+ * our fake data. Substitute the fake data with real
+ * data.
+ */
+ memcpy(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
+ x11_saved_data, x11_saved_data_len);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_x11_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output);
+
+ if (ret == 1) {
+ /* Start normal processing for the channel. */
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+ channel_pre_open_13(c, readset, writeset);
+ } else if (ret == -1) {
+ /*
+ * We have received an X11 connection that has bad
+ * authentication information.
+ */
+ logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication.");
+ buffer_clear(&c->input);
+ buffer_clear(&c->output);
+ channel_close_fd(&c->sock);
+ c->sock = -1;
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED;
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_x11_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output);
+
+ /* c->force_drain = 1; */
+
+ if (ret == 1) {
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+ channel_pre_open(c, readset, writeset);
+ } else if (ret == -1) {
+ logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication.");
+ debug2("X11 rejected %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate);
+ chan_read_failed(c);
+ buffer_clear(&c->input);
+ chan_ibuf_empty(c);
+ buffer_clear(&c->output);
+ /* for proto v1, the peer will send an IEOF */
+ if (compat20)
+ chan_write_failed(c);
+ else
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+ debug2("X11 closed %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_mux_client(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && !c->mux_pause &&
+ buffer_check_alloc(&c->input, CHAN_RBUF))
+ FD_SET(c->rfd, readset);
+ if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
+ /* clear buffer immediately (discard any partial packet) */
+ buffer_clear(&c->input);
+ chan_ibuf_empty(c);
+ /* Start output drain. XXX just kill chan? */
+ chan_rcvd_oclose(c);
+ }
+ if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN ||
+ c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
+ if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0)
+ FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset);
+ else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN)
+ chan_obuf_empty(c);
+ }
+}
+
+/* try to decode a socks4 header */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ char *p, *host;
+ u_int len, have, i, found, need;
+ char username[256];
+ struct {
+ u_int8_t version;
+ u_int8_t command;
+ u_int16_t dest_port;
+ struct in_addr dest_addr;
+ } s4_req, s4_rsp;
+
+ debug2("channel %d: decode socks4", c->self);
+
+ have = buffer_len(&c->input);
+ len = sizeof(s4_req);
+ if (have < len)
+ return 0;
+ p = (char *)buffer_ptr(&c->input);
+
+ need = 1;
+ /* SOCKS4A uses an invalid IP address 0.0.0.x */
+ if (p[4] == 0 && p[5] == 0 && p[6] == 0 && p[7] != 0) {
+ debug2("channel %d: socks4a request", c->self);
+ /* ... and needs an extra string (the hostname) */
+ need = 2;
+ }
+ /* Check for terminating NUL on the string(s) */
+ for (found = 0, i = len; i < have; i++) {
+ if (p[i] == '\0') {
+ found++;
+ if (found == need)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i > 1024) {
+ /* the peer is probably sending garbage */
+ debug("channel %d: decode socks4: too long",
+ c->self);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (found < need)
+ return 0;
+ buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.version, 1);
+ buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.command, 1);
+ buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.dest_port, 2);
+ buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.dest_addr, 4);
+ have = buffer_len(&c->input);
+ p = (char *)buffer_ptr(&c->input);
+ if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL)
+ fatal("channel %d: decode socks4: user not nul terminated",
+ c->self);
+ len = strlen(p);
+ debug2("channel %d: decode socks4: user %s/%d", c->self, p, len);
+ len++; /* trailing '\0' */
+ if (len > have)
+ fatal("channel %d: decode socks4: len %d > have %d",
+ c->self, len, have);
+ strlcpy(username, p, sizeof(username));
+ buffer_consume(&c->input, len);
+
+ free(c->path);
+ c->path = NULL;
+ if (need == 1) { /* SOCKS4: one string */
+ host = inet_ntoa(s4_req.dest_addr);
+ c->path = xstrdup(host);
+ } else { /* SOCKS4A: two strings */
+ have = buffer_len(&c->input);
+ p = (char *)buffer_ptr(&c->input);
+ len = strlen(p);
+ debug2("channel %d: decode socks4a: host %s/%d",
+ c->self, p, len);
+ len++; /* trailing '\0' */
+ if (len > have)
+ fatal("channel %d: decode socks4a: len %d > have %d",
+ c->self, len, have);
+ if (len > NI_MAXHOST) {
+ error("channel %d: hostname \"%.100s\" too long",
+ c->self, p);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ c->path = xstrdup(p);
+ buffer_consume(&c->input, len);
+ }
+ c->host_port = ntohs(s4_req.dest_port);
+
+ debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks4 host %s port %u command %u",
+ c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s4_req.command);
+
+ if (s4_req.command != 1) {
+ debug("channel %d: cannot handle: %s cn %d",
+ c->self, need == 1 ? "SOCKS4" : "SOCKS4A", s4_req.command);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s4_rsp.version = 0; /* vn: 0 for reply */
+ s4_rsp.command = 90; /* cd: req granted */
+ s4_rsp.dest_port = 0; /* ignored */
+ s4_rsp.dest_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; /* ignored */
+ buffer_append(&c->output, &s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp));
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* try to decode a socks5 header */
+#define SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE 0x1000
+#define SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH 0x00
+#define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4 0x01
+#define SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN 0x03
+#define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6 0x04
+#define SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT 0x01
+#define SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS 0x00
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ struct {
+ u_int8_t version;
+ u_int8_t command;
+ u_int8_t reserved;
+ u_int8_t atyp;
+ } s5_req, s5_rsp;
+ u_int16_t dest_port;
+ char dest_addr[255+1], ntop[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+ u_char *p;
+ u_int have, need, i, found, nmethods, addrlen, af;
+
+ debug2("channel %d: decode socks5", c->self);
+ p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
+ if (p[0] != 0x05)
+ return -1;
+ have = buffer_len(&c->input);
+ if (!(c->flags & SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE)) {
+ /* format: ver | nmethods | methods */
+ if (have < 2)
+ return 0;
+ nmethods = p[1];
+ if (have < nmethods + 2)
+ return 0;
+ /* look for method: "NO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED" */
+ for (found = 0, i = 2; i < nmethods + 2; i++) {
+ if (p[i] == SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH) {
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found) {
+ debug("channel %d: method SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH not found",
+ c->self);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ buffer_consume(&c->input, nmethods + 2);
+ buffer_put_char(&c->output, 0x05); /* version */
+ buffer_put_char(&c->output, SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH); /* method */
+ FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
+ c->flags |= SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE;
+ debug2("channel %d: socks5 auth done", c->self);
+ return 0; /* need more */
+ }
+ debug2("channel %d: socks5 post auth", c->self);
+ if (have < sizeof(s5_req)+1)
+ return 0; /* need more */
+ memcpy(&s5_req, p, sizeof(s5_req));
+ if (s5_req.version != 0x05 ||
+ s5_req.command != SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT ||
+ s5_req.reserved != 0x00) {
+ debug2("channel %d: only socks5 connect supported", c->self);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ switch (s5_req.atyp){
+ case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4:
+ addrlen = 4;
+ af = AF_INET;
+ break;
+ case SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN:
+ addrlen = p[sizeof(s5_req)];
+ af = -1;
+ break;
+ case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6:
+ addrlen = 16;
+ af = AF_INET6;
+ break;
+ default:
+ debug2("channel %d: bad socks5 atyp %d", c->self, s5_req.atyp);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ need = sizeof(s5_req) + addrlen + 2;
+ if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN)
+ need++;
+ if (have < need)
+ return 0;
+ buffer_consume(&c->input, sizeof(s5_req));
+ if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN)
+ buffer_consume(&c->input, 1); /* host string length */
+ buffer_get(&c->input, &dest_addr, addrlen);
+ buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&dest_port, 2);
+ dest_addr[addrlen] = '\0';
+ free(c->path);
+ c->path = NULL;
+ if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) {
+ if (addrlen >= NI_MAXHOST) {
+ error("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 hostname "
+ "\"%.100s\" too long", c->self, dest_addr);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ c->path = xstrdup(dest_addr);
+ } else {
+ if (inet_ntop(af, dest_addr, ntop, sizeof(ntop)) == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ c->path = xstrdup(ntop);
+ }
+ c->host_port = ntohs(dest_port);
+
+ debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 host %s port %u command %u",
+ c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s5_req.command);
+
+ s5_rsp.version = 0x05;
+ s5_rsp.command = SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS;
+ s5_rsp.reserved = 0; /* ignored */
+ s5_rsp.atyp = SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4;
+ dest_port = 0; /* ignored */
+
+ buffer_append(&c->output, &s5_rsp, sizeof(s5_rsp));
+ buffer_put_int(&c->output, ntohl(INADDR_ANY)); /* bind address */
+ buffer_append(&c->output, &dest_port, sizeof(dest_port));
+ return 1;
+}
+
+Channel *
+channel_connect_stdio_fwd(const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect,
+ int in, int out)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+
+ debug("channel_connect_stdio_fwd %s:%d", host_to_connect,
+ port_to_connect);
+
+ c = channel_new("stdio-forward", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out,
+ -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+ 0, "stdio-forward", /*nonblock*/0);
+
+ c->path = xstrdup(host_to_connect);
+ c->host_port = port_to_connect;
+ c->listening_port = 0;
+ c->force_drain = 1;
+
+ channel_register_fds(c, in, out, -1, 0, 1, 0);
+ port_open_helper(c, "direct-tcpip");
+
+ return c;
+}
+
+/* dynamic port forwarding */
+static void
+channel_pre_dynamic(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ u_char *p;
+ u_int have;
+ int ret;
+
+ have = buffer_len(&c->input);
+ debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: have %d", c->self, have);
+ /* buffer_dump(&c->input); */
+ /* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
+ if (have < 3) {
+ /* need more */
+ FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
+ return;
+ }
+ /* try to guess the protocol */
+ p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
+ switch (p[0]) {
+ case 0x04:
+ ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, readset, writeset);
+ break;
+ case 0x05:
+ ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, readset, writeset);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ chan_mark_dead(c);
+ } else if (ret == 0) {
+ debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: need more", c->self);
+ /* need more */
+ FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
+ } else {
+ /* switch to the next state */
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
+ port_open_helper(c, "direct-tcpip");
+ }
+}
+
+/* This is our fake X11 server socket. */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+channel_post_x11_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ Channel *nc;
+ struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+ int newsock, oerrno;
+ socklen_t addrlen;
+ char buf[16384], *remote_ipaddr;
+ int remote_port;
+
+ if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) {
+ debug("X11 connection requested.");
+ addrlen = sizeof(addr);
+ newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
+ if (c->single_connection) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener.");
+ channel_close_fd(&c->sock);
+ chan_mark_dead(c);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ }
+ if (newsock < 0) {
+ if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK &&
+ errno != ECONNABORTED)
+ error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
+ c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
+ return;
+ }
+ set_nodelay(newsock);
+ remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(newsock);
+ remote_port = get_peer_port(newsock);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "X11 connection from %.200s port %d",
+ remote_ipaddr, remote_port);
+
+ nc = channel_new("accepted x11 socket",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1,
+ c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, buf, 1);
+ if (compat20) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
+ packet_put_cstring("x11");
+ packet_put_int(nc->self);
+ packet_put_int(nc->local_window_max);
+ packet_put_int(nc->local_maxpacket);
+ /* originator ipaddr and port */
+ packet_put_cstring(remote_ipaddr);
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_X11FWD) {
+ debug2("ssh2 x11 bug compat mode");
+ } else {
+ packet_put_int(remote_port);
+ }
+ packet_send();
+ } else {
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN);
+ packet_put_int(nc->self);
+ if (packet_get_protocol_flags() &
+ SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN)
+ packet_put_cstring(buf);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ free(remote_ipaddr);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype)
+{
+ char buf[1024];
+ char *local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(c->sock);
+ int local_port = c->sock == -1 ? 65536 : get_local_port(c->sock);
+ char *remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(c->sock);
+ int remote_port = get_peer_port(c->sock);
+
+ if (remote_port == -1) {
+ /* Fake addr/port to appease peers that validate it (Tectia) */
+ free(remote_ipaddr);
+ remote_ipaddr = xstrdup("127.0.0.1");
+ remote_port = 65535;
+ }
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
+ "%s: listening port %d for %.100s port %d, "
+ "connect from %.200s port %d to %.100s port %d",
+ rtype, c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port,
+ remote_ipaddr, remote_port, local_ipaddr, local_port);
+
+ free(c->remote_name);
+ c->remote_name = xstrdup(buf);
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
+ packet_put_cstring(rtype);
+ packet_put_int(c->self);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_window_max);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+ if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) {
+ /* target host, port */
+ packet_put_cstring(c->path);
+ packet_put_int(c->host_port);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-streamlocal at openssh.com") == 0) {
+ /* target path */
+ packet_put_cstring(c->path);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal at openssh.com") == 0) {
+ /* listen path */
+ packet_put_cstring(c->path);
+ } else {
+ /* listen address, port */
+ packet_put_cstring(c->path);
+ packet_put_int(local_port);
+ }
+ if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal at openssh.com") == 0) {
+ /* reserved for future owner/mode info */
+ packet_put_cstring("");
+ } else {
+ /* originator host and port */
+ packet_put_cstring(remote_ipaddr);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)remote_port);
+ }
+ packet_send();
+ } else {
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN);
+ packet_put_int(c->self);
+ packet_put_cstring(c->path);
+ packet_put_int(c->host_port);
+ if (packet_get_protocol_flags() &
+ SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN)
+ packet_put_cstring(c->remote_name);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ free(remote_ipaddr);
+ free(local_ipaddr);
+}
+
+static void
+channel_set_reuseaddr(int fd)
+{
+ int on = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Set socket options.
+ * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
+ */
+ if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
+ error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR fd %d: %s", fd, strerror(errno));
+}
+
+void
+channel_set_x11_refuse_time(u_int refuse_time)
+{
+ x11_refuse_time = refuse_time;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+channel_post_port_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ Channel *nc;
+ struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+ int newsock, nextstate;
+ socklen_t addrlen;
+ char *rtype;
+
+ if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) {
+ debug("Connection to port %d forwarding "
+ "to %.100s port %d requested.",
+ c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port);
+
+ if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) {
+ nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
+ rtype = "forwarded-tcpip";
+ } else if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) {
+ nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
+ rtype = "forwarded-streamlocal at openssh.com";
+ } else if (c->host_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) {
+ nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
+ rtype = "direct-streamlocal at openssh.com";
+ } else if (c->host_port == 0) {
+ nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC;
+ rtype = "dynamic-tcpip";
+ } else {
+ nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
+ rtype = "direct-tcpip";
+ }
+
+ addrlen = sizeof(addr);
+ newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
+ if (newsock < 0) {
+ if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK &&
+ errno != ECONNABORTED)
+ error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
+ c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
+ return;
+ }
+ if (c->host_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
+ set_nodelay(newsock);
+ nc = channel_new(rtype, nextstate, newsock, newsock, -1,
+ c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, rtype, 1);
+ nc->listening_port = c->listening_port;
+ nc->host_port = c->host_port;
+ if (c->path != NULL)
+ nc->path = xstrdup(c->path);
+
+ if (nextstate != SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC)
+ port_open_helper(nc, rtype);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the authentication agent socket listening for connections from
+ * clients.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+channel_post_auth_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ Channel *nc;
+ int newsock;
+ struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+ socklen_t addrlen;
+
+ if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) {
+ addrlen = sizeof(addr);
+ newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
+ if (newsock < 0) {
+ error("accept from auth socket: %.100s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
+ c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
+ return;
+ }
+ nc = channel_new("accepted auth socket",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1,
+ c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket,
+ 0, "accepted auth socket", 1);
+ if (compat20) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
+ packet_put_cstring("auth-agent at openssh.com");
+ packet_put_int(nc->self);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_window_max);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+ } else {
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN);
+ packet_put_int(nc->self);
+ }
+ packet_send();
+ }
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+channel_post_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ int err = 0, sock;
+ socklen_t sz = sizeof(err);
+
+ if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset)) {
+ if (getsockopt(c->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &err, &sz) < 0) {
+ err = errno;
+ error("getsockopt SO_ERROR failed");
+ }
+ if (err == 0) {
+ debug("channel %d: connected to %s port %d",
+ c->self, c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port);
+ channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx);
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+ if (compat20) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(c->self);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_window);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+ } else {
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(c->self);
+ }
+ } else {
+ debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s",
+ c->self, strerror(err));
+ /* Try next address, if any */
+ if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) {
+ close(c->sock);
+ c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock;
+ channel_max_fd = channel_find_maxfd();
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Exhausted all addresses */
+ error("connect_to %.100s port %d: failed.",
+ c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port);
+ channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx);
+ if (compat20) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED);
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) {
+ packet_put_cstring(strerror(err));
+ packet_put_cstring("");
+ }
+ } else {
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ }
+ chan_mark_dead(c);
+ }
+ packet_send();
+ }
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+channel_handle_rfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
+ int len, force;
+
+ force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
+ if (c->rfd != -1 && (force || FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset))) {
+ errno = 0;
+ len = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR ||
+ ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force)))
+ return 1;
+#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD
+ if (len <= 0) {
+#else
+ if ((!c->isatty && len <= 0) ||
+ (c->isatty && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) {
+#endif
+ debug2("channel %d: read<=0 rfd %d len %d",
+ c->self, c->rfd, len);
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
+ debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self);
+ chan_mark_dead(c);
+ return -1;
+ } else if (compat13) {
+ buffer_clear(&c->output);
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING;
+ debug2("channel %d: input draining.", c->self);
+ } else {
+ chan_read_failed(c);
+ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (c->input_filter != NULL) {
+ if (c->input_filter(c, buf, len) == -1) {
+ debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self);
+ chan_read_failed(c);
+ }
+ } else if (c->datagram) {
+ buffer_put_string(&c->input, buf, len);
+ } else {
+ buffer_append(&c->input, buf, len);
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ struct termios tio;
+ u_char *data = NULL, *buf;
+ u_int dlen, olen = 0;
+ int len;
+
+ /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */
+ if (c->wfd != -1 &&
+ FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) &&
+ buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) {
+ olen = buffer_len(&c->output);
+ if (c->output_filter != NULL) {
+ if ((buf = c->output_filter(c, &data, &dlen)) == NULL) {
+ debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self);
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
+ chan_mark_dead(c);
+ else
+ chan_write_failed(c);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else if (c->datagram) {
+ buf = data = buffer_get_string(&c->output, &dlen);
+ } else {
+ buf = data = buffer_ptr(&c->output);
+ dlen = buffer_len(&c->output);
+ }
+
+ if (c->datagram) {
+ /* ignore truncated writes, datagrams might get lost */
+ len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen);
+ free(data);
+ if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
+ errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
+ return 1;
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
+ chan_mark_dead(c);
+ else
+ chan_write_failed(c);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef _AIX
+ /* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */
+ if (compat20 && c->wfd_isatty)
+ dlen = MIN(dlen, 8*1024);
+#endif
+
+ len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen);
+ if (len < 0 &&
+ (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
+ return 1;
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
+ debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self);
+ chan_mark_dead(c);
+ return -1;
+ } else if (compat13) {
+ buffer_clear(&c->output);
+ debug2("channel %d: input draining.", c->self);
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING;
+ } else {
+ chan_write_failed(c);
+ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+#ifndef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON
+ if (compat20 && c->isatty && dlen >= 1 && buf[0] != '\r') {
+ if (tcgetattr(c->wfd, &tio) == 0 &&
+ !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) {
+ /*
+ * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of
+ * traffic analysis. We need to match the
+ * size of a SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA message
+ * (4 byte channel id + buf)
+ */
+ packet_send_ignore(4 + len);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ buffer_consume(&c->output, len);
+ }
+ out:
+ if (compat20 && olen > 0)
+ c->local_consumed += olen - buffer_len(&c->output);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+channel_handle_efd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
+ int len;
+
+/** XXX handle drain efd, too */
+ if (c->efd != -1) {
+ if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE &&
+ FD_ISSET(c->efd, writeset) &&
+ buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0) {
+ len = write(c->efd, buffer_ptr(&c->extended),
+ buffer_len(&c->extended));
+ debug2("channel %d: written %d to efd %d",
+ c->self, len, c->efd);
+ if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
+ errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
+ return 1;
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d",
+ c->self, c->efd);
+ channel_close_fd(&c->efd);
+ } else {
+ buffer_consume(&c->extended, len);
+ c->local_consumed += len;
+ }
+ } else if (c->efd != -1 &&
+ (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ ||
+ c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) &&
+ (c->detach_close || FD_ISSET(c->efd, readset))) {
+ len = read(c->efd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ debug2("channel %d: read %d from efd %d",
+ c->self, len, c->efd);
+ if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN ||
+ errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !c->detach_close)))
+ return 1;
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d",
+ c->self, c->efd);
+ channel_close_fd(&c->efd);
+ } else {
+ if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) {
+ debug3("channel %d: discard efd",
+ c->self);
+ } else
+ buffer_append(&c->extended, buf, len);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+channel_check_window(Channel *c)
+{
+ if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
+ !(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) &&
+ ((c->local_window_max - c->local_window >
+ c->local_maxpacket*3) ||
+ c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) &&
+ c->local_consumed > 0) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_consumed);
+ packet_send();
+ debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d",
+ c->self, c->local_window,
+ c->local_consumed);
+ c->local_window += c->local_consumed;
+ c->local_consumed = 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_post_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ channel_handle_rfd(c, readset, writeset);
+ channel_handle_wfd(c, readset, writeset);
+ if (!compat20)
+ return;
+ channel_handle_efd(c, readset, writeset);
+ channel_check_window(c);
+}
+
+static u_int
+read_mux(Channel *c, u_int need)
+{
+ char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
+ int len;
+ u_int rlen;
+
+ if (buffer_len(&c->input) < need) {
+ rlen = need - buffer_len(&c->input);
+ len = read(c->rfd, buf, MIN(rlen, CHAN_RBUF));
+ if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN))
+ return buffer_len(&c->input);
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ debug2("channel %d: ctl read<=0 rfd %d len %d",
+ c->self, c->rfd, len);
+ chan_read_failed(c);
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ buffer_append(&c->input, buf, len);
+ }
+ return buffer_len(&c->input);
+}
+
+static void
+channel_post_mux_client(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ u_int need;
+ ssize_t len;
+
+ if (!compat20)
+ fatal("%s: entered with !compat20", __func__);
+
+ if (c->rfd != -1 && !c->mux_pause && FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset) &&
+ (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN ||
+ c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN)) {
+ /*
+ * Don't not read past the precise end of packets to
+ * avoid disrupting fd passing.
+ */
+ if (read_mux(c, 4) < 4) /* read header */
+ return;
+ need = get_u32(buffer_ptr(&c->input));
+#define CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET (256 * 1024)
+ if (need > CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET) {
+ debug2("channel %d: packet too big %u > %u",
+ c->self, CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET, need);
+ chan_rcvd_oclose(c);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (read_mux(c, need + 4) < need + 4) /* read body */
+ return;
+ if (c->mux_rcb(c) != 0) {
+ debug("channel %d: mux_rcb failed", c->self);
+ chan_mark_dead(c);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (c->wfd != -1 && FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) &&
+ buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) {
+ len = write(c->wfd, buffer_ptr(&c->output),
+ buffer_len(&c->output));
+ if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN))
+ return;
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ chan_mark_dead(c);
+ return;
+ }
+ buffer_consume(&c->output, len);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+channel_post_mux_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ Channel *nc;
+ struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+ socklen_t addrlen;
+ int newsock;
+ uid_t euid;
+ gid_t egid;
+
+ if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset))
+ return;
+
+ debug("multiplexing control connection");
+
+ /*
+ * Accept connection on control socket
+ */
+ memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+ addrlen = sizeof(addr);
+ if ((newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr*)&addr,
+ &addrlen)) == -1) {
+ error("%s accept: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
+ c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (getpeereid(newsock, &euid, &egid) < 0) {
+ error("%s getpeereid failed: %s", __func__,
+ strerror(errno));
+ close(newsock);
+ return;
+ }
+ if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) {
+ error("multiplex uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u",
+ (u_int)euid, (u_int)getuid());
+ close(newsock);
+ return;
+ }
+ nc = channel_new("multiplex client", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT,
+ newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max,
+ c->local_maxpacket, 0, "mux-control", 1);
+ nc->mux_rcb = c->mux_rcb;
+ debug3("%s: new mux channel %d fd %d", __func__,
+ nc->self, nc->sock);
+ /* establish state */
+ nc->mux_rcb(nc);
+ /* mux state transitions must not elicit protocol messages */
+ nc->flags |= CHAN_LOCAL;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+channel_post_output_drain_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ int len;
+
+ /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */
+ if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset) && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) {
+ len = write(c->sock, buffer_ptr(&c->output),
+ buffer_len(&c->output));
+ if (len <= 0)
+ buffer_clear(&c->output);
+ else
+ buffer_consume(&c->output, len);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+channel_handler_init_20(void)
+{
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_pre_mux_client;
+
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_mux_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_post_mux_client;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_handler_init_13(void)
+{
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open_13;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open_13;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_pre_input_draining;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_pre_output_draining;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic;
+
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_post_output_drain_13;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_handler_init_15(void)
+{
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic;
+
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_handler_init(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE; i++) {
+ channel_pre[i] = NULL;
+ channel_post[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ if (compat20)
+ channel_handler_init_20();
+ else if (compat13)
+ channel_handler_init_13();
+ else
+ channel_handler_init_15();
+}
+
+/* gc dead channels */
+static void
+channel_garbage_collect(Channel *c)
+{
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return;
+ if (c->detach_user != NULL) {
+ if (!chan_is_dead(c, c->detach_close))
+ return;
+ debug2("channel %d: gc: notify user", c->self);
+ c->detach_user(c->self, NULL);
+ /* if we still have a callback */
+ if (c->detach_user != NULL)
+ return;
+ debug2("channel %d: gc: user detached", c->self);
+ }
+ if (!chan_is_dead(c, 1))
+ return;
+ debug2("channel %d: garbage collecting", c->self);
+ channel_free(c);
+}
+
+static void
+channel_handler(chan_fn *ftab[], fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset,
+ time_t *unpause_secs)
+{
+ static int did_init = 0;
+ u_int i, oalloc;
+ Channel *c;
+ time_t now;
+
+ if (!did_init) {
+ channel_handler_init();
+ did_init = 1;
+ }
+ now = monotime();
+ if (unpause_secs != NULL)
+ *unpause_secs = 0;
+ for (i = 0, oalloc = channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) {
+ c = channels[i];
+ if (c == NULL)
+ continue;
+ if (c->delayed) {
+ if (ftab == channel_pre)
+ c->delayed = 0;
+ else
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (ftab[c->type] != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Run handlers that are not paused.
+ */
+ if (c->notbefore <= now)
+ (*ftab[c->type])(c, readset, writeset);
+ else if (unpause_secs != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Collect the time that the earliest
+ * channel comes off pause.
+ */
+ debug3("%s: chan %d: skip for %d more seconds",
+ __func__, c->self,
+ (int)(c->notbefore - now));
+ if (*unpause_secs == 0 ||
+ (c->notbefore - now) < *unpause_secs)
+ *unpause_secs = c->notbefore - now;
+ }
+ }
+ channel_garbage_collect(c);
+ }
+ if (unpause_secs != NULL && *unpause_secs != 0)
+ debug3("%s: first channel unpauses in %d seconds",
+ __func__, (int)*unpause_secs);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate/update select bitmasks and add any bits relevant to channels in
+ * select bitmasks.
+ */
+void
+channel_prepare_select(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
+ u_int *nallocp, time_t *minwait_secs, int rekeying)
+{
+ u_int n, sz, nfdset;
+
+ n = MAX(*maxfdp, channel_max_fd);
+
+ nfdset = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS);
+ /* Explicitly test here, because xrealloc isn't always called */
+ if (nfdset && SIZE_MAX / nfdset < sizeof(fd_mask))
+ fatal("channel_prepare_select: max_fd (%d) is too large", n);
+ sz = nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask);
+
+ /* perhaps check sz < nalloc/2 and shrink? */
+ if (*readsetp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) {
+ *readsetp = xreallocarray(*readsetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+ *writesetp = xreallocarray(*writesetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+ *nallocp = sz;
+ }
+ *maxfdp = n;
+ memset(*readsetp, 0, sz);
+ memset(*writesetp, 0, sz);
+
+ if (!rekeying)
+ channel_handler(channel_pre, *readsetp, *writesetp,
+ minwait_secs);
+}
+
+/*
+ * After select, perform any appropriate operations for channels which have
+ * events pending.
+ */
+void
+channel_after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ channel_handler(channel_post, readset, writeset, NULL);
+}
+
+
+/* If there is data to send to the connection, enqueue some of it now. */
+void
+channel_output_poll(void)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+ u_int i, len;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+ c = channels[i];
+ if (c == NULL)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * We are only interested in channels that can have buffered
+ * incoming data.
+ */
+ if (compat13) {
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
+ c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING)
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (compat20 &&
+ (c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD))) {
+ /* XXX is this true? */
+ debug3("channel %d: will not send data after close", c->self);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the amount of buffered data for this channel. */
+ if ((c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN ||
+ c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) &&
+ (len = buffer_len(&c->input)) > 0) {
+ if (c->datagram) {
+ if (len > 0) {
+ u_char *data;
+ u_int dlen;
+
+ data = buffer_get_string(&c->input,
+ &dlen);
+ if (dlen > c->remote_window ||
+ dlen > c->remote_maxpacket) {
+ debug("channel %d: datagram "
+ "too big for channel",
+ c->self);
+ free(data);
+ continue;
+ }
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_string(data, dlen);
+ packet_send();
+ c->remote_window -= dlen;
+ free(data);
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Send some data for the other side over the secure
+ * connection.
+ */
+ if (compat20) {
+ if (len > c->remote_window)
+ len = c->remote_window;
+ if (len > c->remote_maxpacket)
+ len = c->remote_maxpacket;
+ } else {
+ if (packet_is_interactive()) {
+ if (len > 1024)
+ len = 512;
+ } else {
+ /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */
+ if (len > packet_get_maxsize()/2)
+ len = packet_get_maxsize()/2;
+ }
+ }
+ if (len > 0) {
+ packet_start(compat20 ?
+ SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA : SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&c->input), len);
+ packet_send();
+ buffer_consume(&c->input, len);
+ c->remote_window -= len;
+ }
+ } else if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
+ if (compat13)
+ fatal("cannot happen: istate == INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN for proto 1.3");
+ /*
+ * input-buffer is empty and read-socket shutdown:
+ * tell peer, that we will not send more data: send IEOF.
+ * hack for extended data: delay EOF if EFD still in use.
+ */
+ if (CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c))
+ debug2("channel %d: ibuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%d)",
+ c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended));
+ else
+ chan_ibuf_empty(c);
+ }
+ /* Send extended data, i.e. stderr */
+ if (compat20 &&
+ !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) &&
+ c->remote_window > 0 &&
+ (len = buffer_len(&c->extended)) > 0 &&
+ c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ) {
+ debug2("channel %d: rwin %u elen %u euse %d",
+ c->self, c->remote_window, buffer_len(&c->extended),
+ c->extended_usage);
+ if (len > c->remote_window)
+ len = c->remote_window;
+ if (len > c->remote_maxpacket)
+ len = c->remote_maxpacket;
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR);
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&c->extended), len);
+ packet_send();
+ buffer_consume(&c->extended, len);
+ c->remote_window -= len;
+ debug2("channel %d: sent ext data %d", c->self, len);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+/* -- protocol input */
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int id;
+ const u_char *data;
+ u_int data_len, win_len;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ /* Get the channel number and verify it. */
+ id = packet_get_int();
+ c = channel_lookup(id);
+ if (c == NULL)
+ packet_disconnect("Received data for nonexistent channel %d.", id);
+
+ /* Ignore any data for non-open channels (might happen on close) */
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
+ c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Get the data. */
+ data = packet_get_string_ptr(&data_len);
+ win_len = data_len;
+ if (c->datagram)
+ win_len += 4; /* string length header */
+
+ /*
+ * Ignore data for protocol > 1.3 if output end is no longer open.
+ * For protocol 2 the sending side is reducing its window as it sends
+ * data, so we must 'fake' consumption of the data in order to ensure
+ * that window updates are sent back. Otherwise the connection might
+ * deadlock.
+ */
+ if (!compat13 && c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) {
+ if (compat20) {
+ c->local_window -= win_len;
+ c->local_consumed += win_len;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ if (win_len > c->local_maxpacket) {
+ logit("channel %d: rcvd big packet %d, maxpack %d",
+ c->self, win_len, c->local_maxpacket);
+ }
+ if (win_len > c->local_window) {
+ logit("channel %d: rcvd too much data %d, win %d",
+ c->self, win_len, c->local_window);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ c->local_window -= win_len;
+ }
+ if (c->datagram)
+ buffer_put_string(&c->output, data, data_len);
+ else
+ buffer_append(&c->output, data, data_len);
+ packet_check_eom();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int id;
+ char *data;
+ u_int data_len, tcode;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ /* Get the channel number and verify it. */
+ id = packet_get_int();
+ c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+ if (c == NULL)
+ packet_disconnect("Received extended_data for bad channel %d.", id);
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
+ logit("channel %d: ext data for non open", id);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) {
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF)
+ debug("channel %d: accepting ext data after eof", id);
+ else
+ packet_disconnect("Received extended_data after EOF "
+ "on channel %d.", id);
+ }
+ tcode = packet_get_int();
+ if (c->efd == -1 ||
+ c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE ||
+ tcode != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR) {
+ logit("channel %d: bad ext data", c->self);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
+ packet_check_eom();
+ if (data_len > c->local_window) {
+ logit("channel %d: rcvd too much extended_data %d, win %d",
+ c->self, data_len, c->local_window);
+ free(data);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ debug2("channel %d: rcvd ext data %d", c->self, data_len);
+ c->local_window -= data_len;
+ buffer_append(&c->extended, data, data_len);
+ free(data);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+channel_input_ieof(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int id;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ id = packet_get_int();
+ packet_check_eom();
+ c = channel_lookup(id);
+ if (c == NULL)
+ packet_disconnect("Received ieof for nonexistent channel %d.", id);
+ chan_rcvd_ieof(c);
+
+ /* XXX force input close */
+ if (c->force_drain && c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) {
+ debug("channel %d: FORCE input drain", c->self);
+ c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN;
+ if (buffer_len(&c->input) == 0)
+ chan_ibuf_empty(c);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+channel_input_close(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int id;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ id = packet_get_int();
+ packet_check_eom();
+ c = channel_lookup(id);
+ if (c == NULL)
+ packet_disconnect("Received close for nonexistent channel %d.", id);
+
+ /*
+ * Send a confirmation that we have closed the channel and no more
+ * data is coming for it.
+ */
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_send();
+
+ /*
+ * If the channel is in closed state, we have sent a close request,
+ * and the other side will eventually respond with a confirmation.
+ * Thus, we cannot free the channel here, because then there would be
+ * no-one to receive the confirmation. The channel gets freed when
+ * the confirmation arrives.
+ */
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED) {
+ /*
+ * Not a closed channel - mark it as draining, which will
+ * cause it to be freed later.
+ */
+ buffer_clear(&c->input);
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* proto version 1.5 overloads CLOSE_CONFIRMATION with OCLOSE */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+channel_input_oclose(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int id = packet_get_int();
+ Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+ packet_check_eom();
+ if (c == NULL)
+ packet_disconnect("Received oclose for nonexistent channel %d.", id);
+ chan_rcvd_oclose(c);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+channel_input_close_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int id = packet_get_int();
+ Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+ packet_check_eom();
+ if (c == NULL)
+ packet_disconnect("Received close confirmation for "
+ "out-of-range channel %d.", id);
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED)
+ packet_disconnect("Received close confirmation for "
+ "non-closed channel %d (type %d).", id, c->type);
+ channel_free(c);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int id, remote_id;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ id = packet_get_int();
+ c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+ if (c==NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING)
+ packet_disconnect("Received open confirmation for "
+ "non-opening channel %d.", id);
+ remote_id = packet_get_int();
+ /* Record the remote channel number and mark that the channel is now open. */
+ c->remote_id = remote_id;
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ c->remote_window = packet_get_int();
+ c->remote_maxpacket = packet_get_int();
+ if (c->open_confirm) {
+ debug2("callback start");
+ c->open_confirm(c->self, 1, c->open_confirm_ctx);
+ debug2("callback done");
+ }
+ debug2("channel %d: open confirm rwindow %u rmax %u", c->self,
+ c->remote_window, c->remote_maxpacket);
+ }
+ packet_check_eom();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static char *
+reason2txt(int reason)
+{
+ switch (reason) {
+ case SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED:
+ return "administratively prohibited";
+ case SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED:
+ return "connect failed";
+ case SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE:
+ return "unknown channel type";
+ case SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE:
+ return "resource shortage";
+ }
+ return "unknown reason";
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int id, reason;
+ char *msg = NULL, *lang = NULL;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ id = packet_get_int();
+ c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+ if (c==NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING)
+ packet_disconnect("Received open failure for "
+ "non-opening channel %d.", id);
+ if (compat20) {
+ reason = packet_get_int();
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) {
+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ }
+ logit("channel %d: open failed: %s%s%s", id,
+ reason2txt(reason), msg ? ": ": "", msg ? msg : "");
+ free(msg);
+ free(lang);
+ if (c->open_confirm) {
+ debug2("callback start");
+ c->open_confirm(c->self, 0, c->open_confirm_ctx);
+ debug2("callback done");
+ }
+ }
+ packet_check_eom();
+ /* Schedule the channel for cleanup/deletion. */
+ chan_mark_dead(c);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+ int id;
+ u_int adjust, tmp;
+
+ if (!compat20)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Get the channel number and verify it. */
+ id = packet_get_int();
+ c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ logit("Received window adjust for non-open channel %d.", id);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ adjust = packet_get_int();
+ packet_check_eom();
+ debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", id, adjust);
+ if ((tmp = c->remote_window + adjust) < c->remote_window)
+ fatal("channel %d: adjust %u overflows remote window %u",
+ id, adjust, c->remote_window);
+ c->remote_window = tmp;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+channel_input_port_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+ u_short host_port;
+ char *host, *originator_string;
+ int remote_id;
+
+ remote_id = packet_get_int();
+ host = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ host_port = packet_get_int();
+
+ if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) {
+ originator_string = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ } else {
+ originator_string = xstrdup("unknown (remote did not supply name)");
+ }
+ packet_check_eom();
+ c = channel_connect_to_port(host, host_port,
+ "connected socket", originator_string);
+ free(originator_string);
+ free(host);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_int(remote_id);
+ packet_send();
+ } else
+ c->remote_id = remote_id;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+ struct channel_confirm *cc;
+ int id;
+
+ /* Reset keepalive timeout */
+ packet_set_alive_timeouts(0);
+
+ id = packet_get_int();
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ debug2("channel_input_status_confirm: type %d id %d", type, id);
+
+ if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) {
+ logit("channel_input_status_confirm: %d: unknown", id);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ cc->cb(type, c, cc->ctx);
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
+ explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
+ free(cc);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* -- tcp forwarding */
+
+void
+channel_set_af(int af)
+{
+ IPv4or6 = af;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether or not a port forward listens to loopback, the
+ * specified address or wildcard. On the client, a specified bind
+ * address will always override gateway_ports. On the server, a
+ * gateway_ports of 1 (``yes'') will override the client's specification
+ * and force a wildcard bind, whereas a value of 2 (``clientspecified'')
+ * will bind to whatever address the client asked for.
+ *
+ * Special-case listen_addrs are:
+ *
+ * "0.0.0.0" -> wildcard v4/v6 if SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR
+ * "" (empty string), "*" -> wildcard v4/v6
+ * "localhost" -> loopback v4/v6
+ * "127.0.0.1" / "::1" -> accepted even if gateway_ports isn't set
+ */
+static const char *
+channel_fwd_bind_addr(const char *listen_addr, int *wildcardp,
+ int is_client, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
+{
+ const char *addr = NULL;
+ int wildcard = 0;
+
+ if (listen_addr == NULL) {
+ /* No address specified: default to gateway_ports setting */
+ if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports)
+ wildcard = 1;
+ } else if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports || is_client) {
+ if (((datafellows & SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR) &&
+ strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") == 0 && is_client == 0) ||
+ *listen_addr == '\0' || strcmp(listen_addr, "*") == 0 ||
+ (!is_client && fwd_opts->gateway_ports == 1)) {
+ wildcard = 1;
+ /*
+ * Notify client if they requested a specific listen
+ * address and it was overridden.
+ */
+ if (*listen_addr != '\0' &&
+ strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") != 0 &&
+ strcmp(listen_addr, "*") != 0) {
+ packet_send_debug("Forwarding listen address "
+ "\"%s\" overridden by server "
+ "GatewayPorts", listen_addr);
+ }
+ } else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "localhost") != 0 ||
+ strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) {
+ /* Accept localhost address when GatewayPorts=yes */
+ addr = listen_addr;
+ }
+ } else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) {
+ /*
+ * If a specific IPv4/IPv6 localhost address has been
+ * requested then accept it even if gateway_ports is in
+ * effect. This allows the client to prefer IPv4 or IPv6.
+ */
+ addr = listen_addr;
+ }
+ if (wildcardp != NULL)
+ *wildcardp = wildcard;
+ return addr;
+}
+
+static int
+channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(int type, struct Forward *fwd,
+ int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+ int sock, r, success = 0, wildcard = 0, is_client;
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+ const char *host, *addr;
+ char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+ in_port_t *lport_p;
+
+ is_client = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER);
+
+ if (is_client && fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
+ host = fwd->connect_path;
+ } else {
+ host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ?
+ fwd->listen_host : fwd->connect_host;
+ if (host == NULL) {
+ error("No forward host name.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
+ error("Forward host name too long.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Determine the bind address, cf. channel_fwd_bind_addr() comment */
+ addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(fwd->listen_host, &wildcard,
+ is_client, fwd_opts);
+ debug3("%s: type %d wildcard %d addr %s", __func__,
+ type, wildcard, (addr == NULL) ? "NULL" : addr);
+
+ /*
+ * getaddrinfo returns a loopback address if the hostname is
+ * set to NULL and hints.ai_flags is not AI_PASSIVE
+ */
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+ hints.ai_flags = wildcard ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", fwd->listen_port);
+ if ((r = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+ if (addr == NULL) {
+ /* This really shouldn't happen */
+ packet_disconnect("getaddrinfo: fatal error: %s",
+ ssh_gai_strerror(r));
+ } else {
+ error("%s: getaddrinfo(%.64s): %s", __func__, addr,
+ ssh_gai_strerror(r));
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (allocated_listen_port != NULL)
+ *allocated_listen_port = 0;
+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ switch (ai->ai_family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr)->
+ sin_port;
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr)->
+ sin6_port;
+ break;
+ default:
+ continue;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If allocating a port for -R forwards, then use the
+ * same port for all address families.
+ */
+ if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && fwd->listen_port == 0 &&
+ allocated_listen_port != NULL && *allocated_listen_port > 0)
+ *lport_p = htons(*allocated_listen_port);
+
+ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
+ strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
+ error("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Create a port to listen for the host. */
+ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+ if (sock < 0) {
+ /* this is no error since kernel may not support ipv6 */
+ verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ channel_set_reuseaddr(sock);
+ if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
+ sock_set_v6only(sock);
+
+ debug("Local forwarding listening on %s port %s.",
+ ntop, strport);
+
+ /* Bind the socket to the address. */
+ if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ /* address can be in use ipv6 address is already bound */
+ if (!ai->ai_next)
+ error("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ else
+ verbose("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ close(sock);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */
+ if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) {
+ error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ close(sock);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * fwd->listen_port == 0 requests a dynamically allocated port -
+ * record what we got.
+ */
+ if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && fwd->listen_port == 0 &&
+ allocated_listen_port != NULL &&
+ *allocated_listen_port == 0) {
+ *allocated_listen_port = get_local_port(sock);
+ debug("Allocated listen port %d",
+ *allocated_listen_port);
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */
+ c = channel_new("port listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+ 0, "port listener", 1);
+ c->path = xstrdup(host);
+ c->host_port = fwd->connect_port;
+ c->listening_addr = addr == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(addr);
+ if (fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL &&
+ !(datafellows & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT))
+ c->listening_port = *allocated_listen_port;
+ else
+ c->listening_port = fwd->listen_port;
+ success = 1;
+ }
+ if (success == 0)
+ error("%s: cannot listen to port: %d", __func__,
+ fwd->listen_port);
+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ return success;
+}
+
+static int
+channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(int type, struct Forward *fwd,
+ struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+ const char *path;
+ Channel *c;
+ int port, sock;
+ mode_t omask;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
+ if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
+ if (strlen(fwd->connect_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) {
+ error("Local connecting path too long: %s",
+ fwd->connect_path);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ path = fwd->connect_path;
+ port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+ } else {
+ if (fwd->connect_host == NULL) {
+ error("No forward host name.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
+ error("Forward host name too long.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ path = fwd->connect_host;
+ port = fwd->connect_port;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
+ path = fwd->listen_path;
+ port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("%s: unexpected channel type %d", __func__, type);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (fwd->listen_path == NULL) {
+ error("No forward path name.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (strlen(fwd->listen_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) {
+ error("Local listening path too long: %s", fwd->listen_path);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ debug3("%s: type %d path %s", __func__, type, fwd->listen_path);
+
+ /* Start a Unix domain listener. */
+ omask = umask(fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_mask);
+ sock = unix_listener(fwd->listen_path, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG,
+ fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_unlink);
+ umask(omask);
+ if (sock < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ debug("Local forwarding listening on path %s.", fwd->listen_path);
+
+ /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */
+ c = channel_new("unix listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+ 0, "unix listener", 1);
+ c->path = xstrdup(path);
+ c->host_port = port;
+ c->listening_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+ c->listening_addr = xstrdup(fwd->listen_path);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(const char *host, u_short port)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ int found = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+ Channel *c = channels[i];
+ if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER)
+ continue;
+ if (strcmp(c->path, host) == 0 && c->listening_port == port) {
+ debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i);
+ channel_free(c);
+ found = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (found);
+}
+
+static int
+channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(const char *path)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ int found = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+ Channel *c = channels[i];
+ if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER)
+ continue;
+ if (c->path == NULL)
+ continue;
+ if (strcmp(c->path, path) == 0) {
+ debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i);
+ channel_free(c);
+ found = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (found);
+}
+
+int
+channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct Forward *fwd)
+{
+ if (fwd->listen_path != NULL)
+ return channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(fwd->listen_path);
+ else
+ return channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port);
+}
+
+static int
+channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(const char *lhost, u_short lport,
+ int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ int found = 0;
+ const char *addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(lhost, NULL, 1, fwd_opts);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+ Channel *c = channels[i];
+ if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER)
+ continue;
+ if (c->listening_port != lport)
+ continue;
+ if (cport == CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC) {
+ /* skip dynamic forwardings */
+ if (c->host_port == 0)
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ if (c->host_port != cport)
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((c->listening_addr == NULL && addr != NULL) ||
+ (c->listening_addr != NULL && addr == NULL))
+ continue;
+ if (addr == NULL || strcmp(c->listening_addr, addr) == 0) {
+ debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i);
+ channel_free(c);
+ found = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (found);
+}
+
+static int
+channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(const char *path)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ int found = 0;
+
+ if (path == NULL) {
+ error("%s: no path specified.", __func__);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+ Channel *c = channels[i];
+ if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER)
+ continue;
+ if (c->listening_addr == NULL)
+ continue;
+ if (strcmp(c->listening_addr, path) == 0) {
+ debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i);
+ channel_free(c);
+ found = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (found);
+}
+
+int
+channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct Forward *fwd, int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
+{
+ if (fwd->listen_path != NULL)
+ return channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(fwd->listen_path);
+ else
+ return channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, cport, fwd_opts);
+}
+
+/* protocol local port fwd, used by ssh (and sshd in v1) */
+int
+channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
+{
+ if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
+ return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(
+ SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts);
+ } else {
+ return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER,
+ fwd, NULL, fwd_opts);
+ }
+}
+
+/* protocol v2 remote port fwd, used by sshd */
+int
+channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct Forward *fwd,
+ int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
+{
+ if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
+ return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(
+ SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts);
+ } else {
+ return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(
+ SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER, fwd, allocated_listen_port,
+ fwd_opts);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Translate the requested rfwd listen host to something usable for
+ * this server.
+ */
+static const char *
+channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host)
+{
+ if (listen_host == NULL) {
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR)
+ return "127.0.0.1";
+ else
+ return "localhost";
+ } else if (*listen_host == '\0' || strcmp(listen_host, "*") == 0) {
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR)
+ return "0.0.0.0";
+ else
+ return "";
+ } else
+ return listen_host;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initiate forwarding of connections to port "port" on remote host through
+ * the secure channel to host:port from local side.
+ * Returns handle (index) for updating the dynamic listen port with
+ * channel_update_permitted_opens().
+ */
+int
+channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct Forward *fwd)
+{
+ int type, success = 0, idx = -1;
+
+ /* Send the forward request to the remote side. */
+ if (compat20) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+ if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
+ packet_put_cstring("streamlocal-forward at openssh.com");
+ packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */
+ packet_put_cstring(fwd->listen_path);
+ } else {
+ packet_put_cstring("tcpip-forward");
+ packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */
+ packet_put_cstring(channel_rfwd_bind_host(fwd->listen_host));
+ packet_put_int(fwd->listen_port);
+ }
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ /* Assume that server accepts the request */
+ success = 1;
+ } else if (fwd->listen_path == NULL) {
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_int(fwd->listen_port);
+ packet_put_cstring(fwd->connect_host);
+ packet_put_int(fwd->connect_port);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Wait for response from the remote side. */
+ type = packet_read();
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS:
+ success = 1;
+ break;
+ case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE:
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Unknown packet */
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error for port forward request:"
+ "received packet type %d.", type);
+ }
+ } else {
+ logit("Warning: Server does not support remote stream local forwarding.");
+ }
+ if (success) {
+ /* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
+ permitted_opens = xreallocarray(permitted_opens,
+ num_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_opens));
+ idx = num_permitted_opens++;
+ if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
+ permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect =
+ xstrdup(fwd->connect_path);
+ permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect =
+ PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+ } else {
+ permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect =
+ xstrdup(fwd->connect_host);
+ permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect =
+ fwd->connect_port;
+ }
+ if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
+ permitted_opens[idx].listen_host = NULL;
+ permitted_opens[idx].listen_path =
+ xstrdup(fwd->listen_path);
+ permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+ } else {
+ permitted_opens[idx].listen_host =
+ fwd->listen_host ? xstrdup(fwd->listen_host) : NULL;
+ permitted_opens[idx].listen_path = NULL;
+ permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = fwd->listen_port;
+ }
+ }
+ return (idx);
+}
+
+static int
+open_match(ForwardPermission *allowed_open, const char *requestedhost,
+ int requestedport)
+{
+ if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (allowed_open->port_to_connect != FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT &&
+ allowed_open->port_to_connect != requestedport)
+ return 0;
+ if (strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST) != 0 &&
+ strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, requestedhost) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note that in the listen host/port case
+ * we don't support FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT and
+ * need to translate between the configured-host (listen_host)
+ * and what we've sent to the remote server (channel_rfwd_bind_host)
+ */
+static int
+open_listen_match_tcpip(ForwardPermission *allowed_open,
+ const char *requestedhost, u_short requestedport, int translate)
+{
+ const char *allowed_host;
+
+ if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (allowed_open->listen_port != requestedport)
+ return 0;
+ if (!translate && allowed_open->listen_host == NULL &&
+ requestedhost == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ allowed_host = translate ?
+ channel_rfwd_bind_host(allowed_open->listen_host) :
+ allowed_open->listen_host;
+ if (allowed_host == NULL ||
+ strcmp(allowed_host, requestedhost) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+open_listen_match_streamlocal(ForwardPermission *allowed_open,
+ const char *requestedpath)
+{
+ if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (allowed_open->listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
+ return 0;
+ if (allowed_open->listen_path == NULL ||
+ strcmp(allowed_open->listen_path, requestedpath) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of connection host:port from
+ * local side.
+ */
+static int
+channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(const char *host, u_short port)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (!compat20)
+ return -1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) {
+ if (open_listen_match_tcpip(&permitted_opens[i], host, port, 0))
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i >= num_permitted_opens) {
+ debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring("cancel-tcpip-forward");
+ packet_put_char(0);
+ packet_put_cstring(channel_rfwd_bind_host(host));
+ packet_put_int(port);
+ packet_send();
+
+ permitted_opens[i].listen_port = 0;
+ permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect = 0;
+ free(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect);
+ permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect = NULL;
+ free(permitted_opens[i].listen_host);
+ permitted_opens[i].listen_host = NULL;
+ permitted_opens[i].listen_path = NULL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of Unix domain socket
+ * path from local side.
+ */
+static int
+channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(const char *path)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (!compat20)
+ return -1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) {
+ if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(&permitted_opens[i], path))
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i >= num_permitted_opens) {
+ debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring("cancel-streamlocal-forward at openssh.com");
+ packet_put_char(0);
+ packet_put_cstring(path);
+ packet_send();
+
+ permitted_opens[i].listen_port = 0;
+ permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect = 0;
+ free(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect);
+ permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect = NULL;
+ permitted_opens[i].listen_host = NULL;
+ free(permitted_opens[i].listen_path);
+ permitted_opens[i].listen_path = NULL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of a connection from local side.
+ */
+int
+channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct Forward *fwd)
+{
+ if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
+ return (channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(
+ fwd->listen_path));
+ } else {
+ return (channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(fwd->listen_host,
+ fwd->listen_port ? fwd->listen_port : fwd->allocated_port));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called after receiving CHANNEL_FORWARDING_REQUEST. This initates
+ * listening for the port, and sends back a success reply (or disconnect
+ * message if there was an error).
+ */
+int
+channel_input_port_forward_request(int is_root, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
+{
+ int success = 0;
+ struct Forward fwd;
+
+ /* Get arguments from the packet. */
+ memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
+ fwd.listen_port = packet_get_int();
+ fwd.connect_host = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ fwd.connect_port = packet_get_int();
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ /*
+ * Check that an unprivileged user is not trying to forward a
+ * privileged port.
+ */
+ if (fwd.listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED && !is_root)
+ packet_disconnect(
+ "Requested forwarding of port %d but user is not root.",
+ fwd.listen_port);
+ if (fwd.connect_port == 0)
+ packet_disconnect("Dynamic forwarding denied.");
+#endif
+
+ /* Initiate forwarding */
+ success = channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(&fwd, fwd_opts);
+
+ /* Free the argument string. */
+ free(fwd.connect_host);
+
+ return (success ? 0 : -1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Permits opening to any host/port if permitted_opens[] is empty. This is
+ * usually called by the server, because the user could connect to any port
+ * anyway, and the server has no way to know but to trust the client anyway.
+ */
+void
+channel_permit_all_opens(void)
+{
+ if (num_permitted_opens == 0)
+ all_opens_permitted = 1;
+}
+
+void
+channel_add_permitted_opens(char *host, int port)
+{
+ debug("allow port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port);
+
+ permitted_opens = xreallocarray(permitted_opens,
+ num_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_opens));
+ permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host);
+ permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port;
+ permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].listen_host = NULL;
+ permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].listen_path = NULL;
+ permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].listen_port = 0;
+ num_permitted_opens++;
+
+ all_opens_permitted = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update the listen port for a dynamic remote forward, after
+ * the actual 'newport' has been allocated. If 'newport' < 0 is
+ * passed then they entry will be invalidated.
+ */
+void
+channel_update_permitted_opens(int idx, int newport)
+{
+ if (idx < 0 || idx >= num_permitted_opens) {
+ debug("channel_update_permitted_opens: index out of range:"
+ " %d num_permitted_opens %d", idx, num_permitted_opens);
+ return;
+ }
+ debug("%s allowed port %d for forwarding to host %s port %d",
+ newport > 0 ? "Updating" : "Removing",
+ newport,
+ permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect,
+ permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect);
+ if (newport >= 0) {
+ permitted_opens[idx].listen_port =
+ (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT) ? 0 : newport;
+ } else {
+ permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = 0;
+ permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect = 0;
+ free(permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect);
+ permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect = NULL;
+ free(permitted_opens[idx].listen_host);
+ permitted_opens[idx].listen_host = NULL;
+ free(permitted_opens[idx].listen_path);
+ permitted_opens[idx].listen_path = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+int
+channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(char *host, int port)
+{
+ debug("config allows port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port);
+
+ permitted_adm_opens = xreallocarray(permitted_adm_opens,
+ num_adm_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens));
+ permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect
+ = xstrdup(host);
+ permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port;
+ permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].listen_host = NULL;
+ permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].listen_path = NULL;
+ permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].listen_port = 0;
+ return ++num_adm_permitted_opens;
+}
+
+void
+channel_disable_adm_local_opens(void)
+{
+ channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens();
+ permitted_adm_opens = xcalloc(sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens), 1);
+ permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = NULL;
+ num_adm_permitted_opens = 1;
+}
+
+void
+channel_clear_permitted_opens(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) {
+ free(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect);
+ free(permitted_opens[i].listen_host);
+ free(permitted_opens[i].listen_path);
+ }
+ free(permitted_opens);
+ permitted_opens = NULL;
+ num_permitted_opens = 0;
+}
+
+void
+channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++) {
+ free(permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect);
+ free(permitted_adm_opens[i].listen_host);
+ free(permitted_adm_opens[i].listen_path);
+ }
+ free(permitted_adm_opens);
+ permitted_adm_opens = NULL;
+ num_adm_permitted_opens = 0;
+}
+
+void
+channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ printf("permitopen");
+ if (num_adm_permitted_opens == 0) {
+ printf(" any\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++)
+ if (permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect == NULL)
+ printf(" none");
+ else
+ printf(" %s:%d", permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect,
+ permitted_adm_opens[i].port_to_connect);
+ printf("\n");
+}
+
+/* returns port number, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT or -1 on error */
+int
+permitopen_port(const char *p)
+{
+ int port;
+
+ if (strcmp(p, "*") == 0)
+ return FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT;
+ if ((port = a2port(p)) > 0)
+ return port;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Try to start non-blocking connect to next host in cctx list */
+static int
+connect_next(struct channel_connect *cctx)
+{
+ int sock, saved_errno;
+ struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr;
+ char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[MAX(NI_MAXSERV,sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path))];
+
+ for (; cctx->ai; cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next) {
+ switch (cctx->ai->ai_family) {
+ case AF_UNIX:
+ /* unix:pathname instead of host:port */
+ sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)cctx->ai->ai_addr;
+ strlcpy(ntop, "unix", sizeof(ntop));
+ strlcpy(strport, sunaddr->sun_path, sizeof(strport));
+ break;
+ case AF_INET:
+ case AF_INET6:
+ if (getnameinfo(cctx->ai->ai_addr, cctx->ai->ai_addrlen,
+ ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+ NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
+ error("connect_next: getnameinfo failed");
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((sock = socket(cctx->ai->ai_family, cctx->ai->ai_socktype,
+ cctx->ai->ai_protocol)) == -1) {
+ if (cctx->ai->ai_next == NULL)
+ error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ else
+ verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (set_nonblock(sock) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, sock);
+ if (connect(sock, cctx->ai->ai_addr,
+ cctx->ai->ai_addrlen) == -1 && errno != EINPROGRESS) {
+ debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s): "
+ "%.100s", cctx->host, ntop, strport,
+ strerror(errno));
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ close(sock);
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ continue; /* fail -- try next */
+ }
+ if (cctx->ai->ai_family != AF_UNIX)
+ set_nodelay(sock);
+ debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s) "
+ "in progress, fd=%d", cctx->host, ntop, strport, sock);
+ cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next;
+ return sock;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *cctx)
+{
+ free(cctx->host);
+ if (cctx->aitop) {
+ if (cctx->aitop->ai_family == AF_UNIX)
+ free(cctx->aitop);
+ else
+ freeaddrinfo(cctx->aitop);
+ }
+ memset(cctx, 0, sizeof(*cctx));
+}
+
+/* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path */
+static Channel *
+connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname)
+{
+ struct addrinfo hints;
+ int gaierr;
+ int sock = -1;
+ char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+ struct channel_connect cctx;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx));
+
+ if (port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) {
+ struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr;
+ struct addrinfo *ai;
+
+ if (strlen(name) > sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)) {
+ error("%.100s: %.100s", name, strerror(ENAMETOOLONG));
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Fake up a struct addrinfo for AF_UNIX connections.
+ * channel_connect_ctx_free() must check ai_family
+ * and use free() not freeaddirinfo() for AF_UNIX.
+ */
+ ai = xmalloc(sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr));
+ memset(ai, 0, sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr));
+ ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)(ai + 1);
+ ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(*sunaddr);
+ ai->ai_family = AF_UNIX;
+ ai->ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ ai->ai_protocol = PF_UNSPEC;
+ sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)ai->ai_addr;
+ sunaddr->sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ strlcpy(sunaddr->sun_path, name, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path));
+ cctx.aitop = ai;
+ } else {
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+ if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx.aitop)) != 0) {
+ error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", name,
+ ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ cctx.host = xstrdup(name);
+ cctx.port = port;
+ cctx.ai = cctx.aitop;
+
+ if ((sock = connect_next(&cctx)) == -1) {
+ error("connect to %.100s port %d failed: %s",
+ name, port, strerror(errno));
+ channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ c = channel_new(ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1);
+ c->connect_ctx = cctx;
+ return c;
+}
+
+Channel *
+channel_connect_by_listen_address(const char *listen_host,
+ u_short listen_port, char *ctype, char *rname)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) {
+ if (open_listen_match_tcpip(&permitted_opens[i], listen_host,
+ listen_port, 1)) {
+ return connect_to(
+ permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect,
+ permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect, ctype, rname);
+ }
+ }
+ error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown listen_port %d",
+ listen_port);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+Channel *
+channel_connect_by_listen_path(const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) {
+ if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(&permitted_opens[i], path)) {
+ return connect_to(
+ permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect,
+ permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect, ctype, rname);
+ }
+ }
+ error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown path %.100s",
+ path);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Check if connecting to that port is permitted and connect. */
+Channel *
+channel_connect_to_port(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, char *rname)
+{
+ int i, permit, permit_adm = 1;
+
+ permit = all_opens_permitted;
+ if (!permit) {
+ for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++)
+ if (open_match(&permitted_opens[i], host, port)) {
+ permit = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (num_adm_permitted_opens > 0) {
+ permit_adm = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++)
+ if (open_match(&permitted_adm_opens[i], host, port)) {
+ permit_adm = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!permit || !permit_adm) {
+ logit("Received request to connect to host %.100s port %d, "
+ "but the request was denied.", host, port);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return connect_to(host, port, ctype, rname);
+}
+
+/* Check if connecting to that path is permitted and connect. */
+Channel *
+channel_connect_to_path(const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname)
+{
+ int i, permit, permit_adm = 1;
+
+ permit = all_opens_permitted;
+ if (!permit) {
+ for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++)
+ if (open_match(&permitted_opens[i], path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) {
+ permit = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (num_adm_permitted_opens > 0) {
+ permit_adm = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++)
+ if (open_match(&permitted_adm_opens[i], path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) {
+ permit_adm = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!permit || !permit_adm) {
+ logit("Received request to connect to path %.100s, "
+ "but the request was denied.", path);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return connect_to(path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL, ctype, rname);
+}
+
+void
+channel_send_window_changes(void)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ struct winsize ws;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+ if (channels[i] == NULL || !channels[i]->client_tty ||
+ channels[i]->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
+ continue;
+ if (ioctl(channels[i]->rfd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
+ continue;
+ channel_request_start(i, "window-change", 0);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+}
+
+/* -- X11 forwarding */
+
+/*
+ * Creates an internet domain socket for listening for X11 connections.
+ * Returns 0 and a suitable display number for the DISPLAY variable
+ * stored in display_numberp , or -1 if an error occurs.
+ */
+int
+x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost,
+ int single_connection, u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
+{
+ Channel *nc = NULL;
+ int display_number, sock;
+ u_short port;
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+ char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+ int gaierr, n, num_socks = 0, socks[NUM_SOCKS];
+
+ if (chanids == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ for (display_number = x11_display_offset;
+ display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
+ display_number++) {
+ port = 6000 + display_number;
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+ hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+ if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+ error("getaddrinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+ continue;
+ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
+ ai->ai_protocol);
+ if (sock < 0) {
+ if ((errno != EINVAL) && (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+#ifdef EPFNOSUPPORT
+ && (errno != EPFNOSUPPORT)
+#endif
+ ) {
+ error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ debug("x11_create_display_inet: Socket family %d not supported",
+ ai->ai_family);
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
+ sock_set_v6only(sock);
+ if (x11_use_localhost)
+ channel_set_reuseaddr(sock);
+ if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ debug2("bind port %d: %.100s", port, strerror(errno));
+ close(sock);
+
+ for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
+ close(socks[n]);
+ }
+ num_socks = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ socks[num_socks++] = sock;
+ if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
+ break;
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ if (num_socks > 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
+ error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */
+ for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
+ sock = socks[n];
+ if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) {
+ error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ close(sock);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate a channel for each socket. */
+ *chanids = xcalloc(num_socks + 1, sizeof(**chanids));
+ for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
+ sock = socks[n];
+ nc = channel_new("x11 listener",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+ 0, "X11 inet listener", 1);
+ nc->single_connection = single_connection;
+ (*chanids)[n] = nc->self;
+ }
+ (*chanids)[n] = -1;
+
+ /* Return the display number for the DISPLAY environment variable. */
+ *display_numberp = display_number;
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
+{
+ int sock;
+ struct sockaddr_un addr;
+
+ sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (sock < 0)
+ error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+ addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
+ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
+ return sock;
+ close(sock);
+ error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int
+connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
+{
+ char buf[1024];
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
+ return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf);
+}
+
+int
+x11_connect_display(void)
+{
+ u_int display_number;
+ const char *display;
+ char buf[1024], *cp;
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+ char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+ int gaierr, sock = 0;
+
+ /* Try to open a socket for the local X server. */
+ display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+ if (!display) {
+ error("DISPLAY not set.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Now we decode the value of the DISPLAY variable and make a
+ * connection to the real X server.
+ */
+
+ /* Check if the display is from launchd. */
+#ifdef __APPLE__
+ if (strncmp(display, "/tmp/launch", 11) == 0) {
+ sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(display);
+ if (sock < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
+ return sock;
+ }
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Check if it is a unix domain socket. Unix domain displays are in
+ * one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s]
+ */
+ if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 ||
+ display[0] == ':') {
+ /* Connect to the unix domain socket. */
+ if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
+ error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
+ display);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Create a socket. */
+ sock = connect_local_xsocket(display_number);
+ if (sock < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
+ return sock;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Connect to an inet socket. The DISPLAY value is supposedly
+ * hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address.
+ */
+ strlcpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf));
+ cp = strchr(buf, ':');
+ if (!cp) {
+ error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *cp = 0;
+ /* buf now contains the host name. But first we parse the display number. */
+ if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
+ error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
+ display);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Look up the host address */
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
+ if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+ error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
+ ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ /* Create a socket. */
+ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+ if (sock < 0) {
+ debug2("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Connect it to the display. */
+ if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
+ 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
+ close(sock);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Success */
+ break;
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ if (!ai) {
+ error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ set_nodelay(sock);
+ return sock;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called when SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN is received. The packet contains
+ * the remote channel number. We should do whatever we want, and respond
+ * with either SSH_MSG_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or SSH_MSG_OPEN_FAILURE.
+ */
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+x11_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+ int remote_id, sock = 0;
+ char *remote_host;
+
+ debug("Received X11 open request.");
+
+ remote_id = packet_get_int();
+
+ if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) {
+ remote_host = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ } else {
+ remote_host = xstrdup("unknown (remote did not supply name)");
+ }
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ /* Obtain a connection to the real X display. */
+ sock = x11_connect_display();
+ if (sock != -1) {
+ /* Allocate a channel for this connection. */
+ c = channel_new("connected x11 socket",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, 0, 0, 0,
+ remote_host, 1);
+ c->remote_id = remote_id;
+ c->force_drain = 1;
+ }
+ free(remote_host);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ /* Send refusal to the remote host. */
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_int(remote_id);
+ } else {
+ /* Send a confirmation to the remote host. */
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+ packet_put_int(remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(c->self);
+ }
+ packet_send();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* dummy protocol handler that denies SSH-1 requests (agent/x11) */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+deny_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int rchan = packet_get_int();
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN:
+ error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding.");
+ break;
+ case SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN:
+ error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding.");
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("deny_input_open: type %d", type);
+ break;
+ }
+ error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a malicious server.");
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_int(rchan);
+ packet_send();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Requests forwarding of X11 connections, generates fake authentication
+ * data, and enables authentication spoofing.
+ * This should be called in the client only.
+ */
+void
+x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int client_session_id, const char *disp,
+ const char *proto, const char *data, int want_reply)
+{
+ u_int data_len = (u_int) strlen(data) / 2;
+ u_int i, value;
+ char *new_data;
+ int screen_number;
+ const char *cp;
+ u_int32_t rnd = 0;
+
+ if (x11_saved_display == NULL)
+ x11_saved_display = xstrdup(disp);
+ else if (strcmp(disp, x11_saved_display) != 0) {
+ error("x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing: different "
+ "$DISPLAY already forwarded");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ cp = strchr(disp, ':');
+ if (cp)
+ cp = strchr(cp, '.');
+ if (cp)
+ screen_number = (u_int)strtonum(cp + 1, 0, 400, NULL);
+ else
+ screen_number = 0;
+
+ if (x11_saved_proto == NULL) {
+ /* Save protocol name. */
+ x11_saved_proto = xstrdup(proto);
+ /*
+ * Extract real authentication data and generate fake data
+ * of the same length.
+ */
+ x11_saved_data = xmalloc(data_len);
+ x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len);
+ for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
+ if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1)
+ fatal("x11_request_forwarding: bad "
+ "authentication data: %.100s", data);
+ if (i % 4 == 0)
+ rnd = arc4random();
+ x11_saved_data[i] = value;
+ x11_fake_data[i] = rnd & 0xff;
+ rnd >>= 8;
+ }
+ x11_saved_data_len = data_len;
+ x11_fake_data_len = data_len;
+ }
+
+ /* Convert the fake data into hex. */
+ new_data = tohex(x11_fake_data, data_len);
+
+ /* Send the request packet. */
+ if (compat20) {
+ channel_request_start(client_session_id, "x11-req", want_reply);
+ packet_put_char(0); /* XXX bool single connection */
+ } else {
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
+ }
+ packet_put_cstring(proto);
+ packet_put_cstring(new_data);
+ packet_put_int(screen_number);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ free(new_data);
+}
+
+
+/* -- agent forwarding */
+
+/* Sends a message to the server to request authentication fd forwarding. */
+
+void
+auth_request_forwarding(void)
+{
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/channels.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/channels.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/channels.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,309 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.113 2013/06/07 15:37:52 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#ifndef CHANNEL_H
-#define CHANNEL_H
-
-/* Definitions for channel types. */
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER 1 /* Listening for inet X11 conn. */
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER 2 /* Listening on a port. */
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING 3 /* waiting for confirmation */
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN 4 /* normal open two-way channel */
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED 5 /* waiting for close confirmation */
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET 6 /* authentication socket */
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN 7 /* reading first X11 packet */
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING 8 /* sending remaining data to conn */
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING 9 /* sending remaining data to app */
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL 10 /* larval session */
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER 11 /* Listening to a R-style port */
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING 12
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC 13
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE 14 /* Almost dead. */
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER 15 /* Listener for mux conn. */
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT 16 /* Conn. to mux slave */
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED 17 /* Abandoned session, eg mux */
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE 18
-
-#define CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC -1
-
-struct Channel;
-typedef struct Channel Channel;
-
-typedef void channel_open_fn(int, int, void *);
-typedef void channel_callback_fn(int, void *);
-typedef int channel_infilter_fn(struct Channel *, char *, int);
-typedef void channel_filter_cleanup_fn(int, void *);
-typedef u_char *channel_outfilter_fn(struct Channel *, u_char **, u_int *);
-
-/* Channel success/failure callbacks */
-typedef void channel_confirm_cb(int, struct Channel *, void *);
-typedef void channel_confirm_abandon_cb(struct Channel *, void *);
-struct channel_confirm {
- TAILQ_ENTRY(channel_confirm) entry;
- channel_confirm_cb *cb;
- channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb;
- void *ctx;
-};
-TAILQ_HEAD(channel_confirms, channel_confirm);
-
-/* Context for non-blocking connects */
-struct channel_connect {
- char *host;
- int port;
- struct addrinfo *ai, *aitop;
-};
-
-/* Callbacks for mux channels back into client-specific code */
-typedef int mux_callback_fn(struct Channel *);
-
-struct Channel {
- int type; /* channel type/state */
- int self; /* my own channel identifier */
- int remote_id; /* channel identifier for remote peer */
- u_int istate; /* input from channel (state of receive half) */
- u_int ostate; /* output to channel (state of transmit half) */
- int flags; /* close sent/rcvd */
- int rfd; /* read fd */
- int wfd; /* write fd */
- int efd; /* extended fd */
- int sock; /* sock fd */
- int ctl_chan; /* control channel (multiplexed connections) */
- int isatty; /* rfd is a tty */
-#ifdef _AIX
- int wfd_isatty; /* wfd is a tty */
-#endif
- int client_tty; /* (client) TTY has been requested */
- int force_drain; /* force close on iEOF */
- time_t notbefore; /* Pause IO until deadline (time_t) */
- int delayed; /* post-select handlers for newly created
- * channels are delayed until the first call
- * to a matching pre-select handler.
- * this way post-select handlers are not
- * accidentally called if a FD gets reused */
- Buffer input; /* data read from socket, to be sent over
- * encrypted connection */
- Buffer output; /* data received over encrypted connection for
- * send on socket */
- Buffer extended;
- char *path;
- /* path for unix domain sockets, or host name for forwards */
- int listening_port; /* port being listened for forwards */
- char *listening_addr; /* addr being listened for forwards */
- int host_port; /* remote port to connect for forwards */
- char *remote_name; /* remote hostname */
-
- u_int remote_window;
- u_int remote_maxpacket;
- u_int local_window;
- u_int local_window_max;
- u_int local_consumed;
- u_int local_maxpacket;
- int extended_usage;
- int single_connection;
-
- char *ctype; /* type */
-
- /* callback */
- channel_open_fn *open_confirm;
- void *open_confirm_ctx;
- channel_callback_fn *detach_user;
- int detach_close;
- struct channel_confirms status_confirms;
-
- /* filter */
- channel_infilter_fn *input_filter;
- channel_outfilter_fn *output_filter;
- void *filter_ctx;
- channel_filter_cleanup_fn *filter_cleanup;
-
- /* keep boundaries */
- int datagram;
-
- /* non-blocking connect */
- struct channel_connect connect_ctx;
-
- /* multiplexing protocol hook, called for each packet received */
- mux_callback_fn *mux_rcb;
- void *mux_ctx;
- int mux_pause;
-};
-
-#define CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE 0
-#define CHAN_EXTENDED_READ 1
-#define CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE 2
-
-/* default window/packet sizes for tcp/x11-fwd-channel */
-#define CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024)
-#define CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT)
-#define CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024)
-#define CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT)
-#define CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT (16*1024)
-#define CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT (4*CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT)
-
-/* possible input states */
-#define CHAN_INPUT_OPEN 0
-#define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 1
-#define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE 2
-#define CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED 3
-
-/* possible output states */
-#define CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN 0
-#define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 1
-#define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF 2
-#define CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED 3
-
-#define CHAN_CLOSE_SENT 0x01
-#define CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD 0x02
-#define CHAN_EOF_SENT 0x04
-#define CHAN_EOF_RCVD 0x08
-#define CHAN_LOCAL 0x10
-
-#define CHAN_RBUF 16*1024
-
-/* check whether 'efd' is still in use */
-#define CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c) \
- (compat20 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ && \
- (c->efd != -1 || \
- buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0))
-#define CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c) \
- (compat20 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && \
- c->efd != -1 && (!(c->flags & (CHAN_EOF_RCVD|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) || \
- buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0))
-
-/* channel management */
-
-Channel *channel_by_id(int);
-Channel *channel_lookup(int);
-Channel *channel_new(char *, int, int, int, int, u_int, u_int, int, char *, int);
-void channel_set_fds(int, int, int, int, int, int, int, u_int);
-void channel_free(Channel *);
-void channel_free_all(void);
-void channel_stop_listening(void);
-
-void channel_send_open(int);
-void channel_request_start(int, char *, int);
-void channel_register_cleanup(int, channel_callback_fn *, int);
-void channel_register_open_confirm(int, channel_open_fn *, void *);
-void channel_register_filter(int, channel_infilter_fn *,
- channel_outfilter_fn *, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *, void *);
-void channel_register_status_confirm(int, channel_confirm_cb *,
- channel_confirm_abandon_cb *, void *);
-void channel_cancel_cleanup(int);
-int channel_close_fd(int *);
-void channel_send_window_changes(void);
-
-/* protocol handler */
-
-void channel_input_close(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void channel_input_close_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void channel_input_data(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void channel_input_extended_data(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void channel_input_ieof(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void channel_input_oclose(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void channel_input_open_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void channel_input_open_failure(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void channel_input_port_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void channel_input_window_adjust(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void channel_input_status_confirm(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-
-/* file descriptor handling (read/write) */
-
-void channel_prepare_select(fd_set **, fd_set **, int *, u_int*,
- time_t*, int);
-void channel_after_select(fd_set *, fd_set *);
-void channel_output_poll(void);
-
-int channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(void);
-void channel_close_all(void);
-int channel_still_open(void);
-char *channel_open_message(void);
-int channel_find_open(void);
-
-/* tcp forwarding */
-void channel_set_af(int af);
-void channel_permit_all_opens(void);
-void channel_add_permitted_opens(char *, int);
-int channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(char *, int);
-void channel_disable_adm_local_opens(void);
-void channel_update_permitted_opens(int, int);
-void channel_clear_permitted_opens(void);
-void channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void);
-void channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(void);
-int channel_input_port_forward_request(int, int);
-Channel *channel_connect_to(const char *, u_short, char *, char *);
-Channel *channel_connect_stdio_fwd(const char*, u_short, int, int);
-Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_address(u_short, char *, char *);
-int channel_request_remote_forwarding(const char *, u_short,
- const char *, u_short);
-int channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(const char *, u_short,
- const char *, u_short, int);
-int channel_request_rforward_cancel(const char *host, u_short port);
-int channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(const char *, u_short, int *, int);
-int channel_cancel_rport_listener(const char *, u_short);
-int channel_cancel_lport_listener(const char *, u_short, int, int);
-int permitopen_port(const char *);
-
-/* x11 forwarding */
-
-int x11_connect_display(void);
-int x11_create_display_inet(int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
-void x11_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int, const char *, const char *,
- const char *, int);
-void deny_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-
-/* agent forwarding */
-
-void auth_request_forwarding(void);
-
-/* channel close */
-
-int chan_is_dead(Channel *, int);
-void chan_mark_dead(Channel *);
-
-/* channel events */
-
-void chan_rcvd_oclose(Channel *);
-void chan_rcvd_eow(Channel *); /* SSH2-only */
-void chan_read_failed(Channel *);
-void chan_ibuf_empty(Channel *);
-
-void chan_rcvd_ieof(Channel *);
-void chan_write_failed(Channel *);
-void chan_obuf_empty(Channel *);
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/channels.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/channels.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/channels.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/channels.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.118 2015/07/01 02:26:31 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef CHANNEL_H
+#define CHANNEL_H
+
+/* Definitions for channel types. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER 1 /* Listening for inet X11 conn. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER 2 /* Listening on a port. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING 3 /* waiting for confirmation */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN 4 /* normal open two-way channel */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED 5 /* waiting for close confirmation */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET 6 /* authentication socket */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN 7 /* reading first X11 packet */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING 8 /* sending remaining data to conn */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING 9 /* sending remaining data to app */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL 10 /* larval session */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER 11 /* Listening to a R-style port */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING 12
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC 13
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE 14 /* Almost dead. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER 15 /* Listener for mux conn. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT 16 /* Conn. to mux slave */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED 17 /* Abandoned session, eg mux */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER 18 /* Listening on a domain socket. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER 19 /* Listening to a R-style domain socket. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE 20
+
+#define CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC -1
+
+struct Channel;
+typedef struct Channel Channel;
+
+typedef void channel_open_fn(int, int, void *);
+typedef void channel_callback_fn(int, void *);
+typedef int channel_infilter_fn(struct Channel *, char *, int);
+typedef void channel_filter_cleanup_fn(int, void *);
+typedef u_char *channel_outfilter_fn(struct Channel *, u_char **, u_int *);
+
+/* Channel success/failure callbacks */
+typedef void channel_confirm_cb(int, struct Channel *, void *);
+typedef void channel_confirm_abandon_cb(struct Channel *, void *);
+struct channel_confirm {
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(channel_confirm) entry;
+ channel_confirm_cb *cb;
+ channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb;
+ void *ctx;
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(channel_confirms, channel_confirm);
+
+/* Context for non-blocking connects */
+struct channel_connect {
+ char *host;
+ int port;
+ struct addrinfo *ai, *aitop;
+};
+
+/* Callbacks for mux channels back into client-specific code */
+typedef int mux_callback_fn(struct Channel *);
+
+struct Channel {
+ int type; /* channel type/state */
+ int self; /* my own channel identifier */
+ int remote_id; /* channel identifier for remote peer */
+ u_int istate; /* input from channel (state of receive half) */
+ u_int ostate; /* output to channel (state of transmit half) */
+ int flags; /* close sent/rcvd */
+ int rfd; /* read fd */
+ int wfd; /* write fd */
+ int efd; /* extended fd */
+ int sock; /* sock fd */
+ int ctl_chan; /* control channel (multiplexed connections) */
+ int isatty; /* rfd is a tty */
+#ifdef _AIX
+ int wfd_isatty; /* wfd is a tty */
+#endif
+ int client_tty; /* (client) TTY has been requested */
+ int force_drain; /* force close on iEOF */
+ time_t notbefore; /* Pause IO until deadline (time_t) */
+ int delayed; /* post-select handlers for newly created
+ * channels are delayed until the first call
+ * to a matching pre-select handler.
+ * this way post-select handlers are not
+ * accidentally called if a FD gets reused */
+ Buffer input; /* data read from socket, to be sent over
+ * encrypted connection */
+ Buffer output; /* data received over encrypted connection for
+ * send on socket */
+ Buffer extended;
+ char *path;
+ /* path for unix domain sockets, or host name for forwards */
+ int listening_port; /* port being listened for forwards */
+ char *listening_addr; /* addr being listened for forwards */
+ int host_port; /* remote port to connect for forwards */
+ char *remote_name; /* remote hostname */
+
+ u_int remote_window;
+ u_int remote_maxpacket;
+ u_int local_window;
+ u_int local_window_max;
+ u_int local_consumed;
+ u_int local_maxpacket;
+ int extended_usage;
+ int single_connection;
+
+ char *ctype; /* type */
+
+ /* callback */
+ channel_open_fn *open_confirm;
+ void *open_confirm_ctx;
+ channel_callback_fn *detach_user;
+ int detach_close;
+ struct channel_confirms status_confirms;
+
+ /* filter */
+ channel_infilter_fn *input_filter;
+ channel_outfilter_fn *output_filter;
+ void *filter_ctx;
+ channel_filter_cleanup_fn *filter_cleanup;
+
+ /* keep boundaries */
+ int datagram;
+
+ /* non-blocking connect */
+ struct channel_connect connect_ctx;
+
+ /* multiplexing protocol hook, called for each packet received */
+ mux_callback_fn *mux_rcb;
+ void *mux_ctx;
+ int mux_pause;
+};
+
+#define CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE 0
+#define CHAN_EXTENDED_READ 1
+#define CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE 2
+
+/* default window/packet sizes for tcp/x11-fwd-channel */
+#define CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024)
+#define CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT)
+#define CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024)
+#define CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT)
+#define CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT (16*1024)
+#define CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT (4*CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT)
+
+/* possible input states */
+#define CHAN_INPUT_OPEN 0
+#define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 1
+#define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE 2
+#define CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED 3
+
+/* possible output states */
+#define CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN 0
+#define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 1
+#define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF 2
+#define CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED 3
+
+#define CHAN_CLOSE_SENT 0x01
+#define CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD 0x02
+#define CHAN_EOF_SENT 0x04
+#define CHAN_EOF_RCVD 0x08
+#define CHAN_LOCAL 0x10
+
+#define CHAN_RBUF 16*1024
+
+/* check whether 'efd' is still in use */
+#define CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c) \
+ (compat20 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ && \
+ (c->efd != -1 || \
+ buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0))
+#define CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c) \
+ (compat20 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && \
+ c->efd != -1 && (!(c->flags & (CHAN_EOF_RCVD|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) || \
+ buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0))
+
+/* channel management */
+
+Channel *channel_by_id(int);
+Channel *channel_lookup(int);
+Channel *channel_new(char *, int, int, int, int, u_int, u_int, int, char *, int);
+void channel_set_fds(int, int, int, int, int, int, int, u_int);
+void channel_free(Channel *);
+void channel_free_all(void);
+void channel_stop_listening(void);
+
+void channel_send_open(int);
+void channel_request_start(int, char *, int);
+void channel_register_cleanup(int, channel_callback_fn *, int);
+void channel_register_open_confirm(int, channel_open_fn *, void *);
+void channel_register_filter(int, channel_infilter_fn *,
+ channel_outfilter_fn *, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *, void *);
+void channel_register_status_confirm(int, channel_confirm_cb *,
+ channel_confirm_abandon_cb *, void *);
+void channel_cancel_cleanup(int);
+int channel_close_fd(int *);
+void channel_send_window_changes(void);
+
+/* protocol handler */
+
+int channel_input_close(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int channel_input_close_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int channel_input_data(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int channel_input_extended_data(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int channel_input_ieof(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int channel_input_oclose(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int channel_input_open_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int channel_input_open_failure(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int channel_input_port_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int channel_input_window_adjust(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int channel_input_status_confirm(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+/* file descriptor handling (read/write) */
+
+void channel_prepare_select(fd_set **, fd_set **, int *, u_int*,
+ time_t*, int);
+void channel_after_select(fd_set *, fd_set *);
+void channel_output_poll(void);
+
+int channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(void);
+void channel_close_all(void);
+int channel_still_open(void);
+char *channel_open_message(void);
+int channel_find_open(void);
+
+/* tcp forwarding */
+struct Forward;
+struct ForwardOptions;
+void channel_set_af(int af);
+void channel_permit_all_opens(void);
+void channel_add_permitted_opens(char *, int);
+int channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(char *, int);
+void channel_disable_adm_local_opens(void);
+void channel_update_permitted_opens(int, int);
+void channel_clear_permitted_opens(void);
+void channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void);
+void channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(void);
+int channel_input_port_forward_request(int, struct ForwardOptions *);
+Channel *channel_connect_to_port(const char *, u_short, char *, char *);
+Channel *channel_connect_to_path(const char *, char *, char *);
+Channel *channel_connect_stdio_fwd(const char*, u_short, int, int);
+Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_address(const char *, u_short,
+ char *, char *);
+Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_path(const char *, char *, char *);
+int channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct Forward *);
+int channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct Forward *, struct ForwardOptions *);
+int channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct Forward *);
+int channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct Forward *, int *, struct ForwardOptions *);
+int channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct Forward *);
+int channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct Forward *, int, struct ForwardOptions *);
+int permitopen_port(const char *);
+
+/* x11 forwarding */
+
+void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(u_int);
+int x11_connect_display(void);
+int x11_create_display_inet(int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
+int x11_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int, const char *, const char *,
+ const char *, int);
+int deny_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+/* agent forwarding */
+
+void auth_request_forwarding(void);
+
+/* channel close */
+
+int chan_is_dead(Channel *, int);
+void chan_mark_dead(Channel *);
+
+/* channel events */
+
+void chan_rcvd_oclose(Channel *);
+void chan_rcvd_eow(Channel *); /* SSH2-only */
+void chan_read_failed(Channel *);
+void chan_ibuf_empty(Channel *);
+
+void chan_rcvd_ieof(Channel *);
+void chan_write_failed(Channel *);
+void chan_obuf_empty(Channel *);
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-3des1.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-3des1.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-3des1.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,183 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher-3des1.c,v 1.10 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-
-/*
- * This is used by SSH1:
- *
- * What kind of triple DES are these 2 routines?
- *
- * Why is there a redundant initialization vector?
- *
- * If only iv3 was used, then, this would till effect have been
- * outer-cbc. However, there is also a private iv1 == iv2 which
- * perhaps makes differential analysis easier. On the other hand, the
- * private iv1 probably makes the CRC-32 attack ineffective. This is a
- * result of that there is no longer any known iv1 to use when
- * choosing the X block.
- */
-struct ssh1_3des_ctx
-{
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX k1, k2, k3;
-};
-
-const EVP_CIPHER * evp_ssh1_3des(void);
-void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int);
-
-static int
-ssh1_3des_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
- int enc)
-{
- struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c;
- u_char *k1, *k2, *k3;
-
- if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
- c = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*c));
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
- }
- if (key == NULL)
- return (1);
- if (enc == -1)
- enc = ctx->encrypt;
- k1 = k2 = k3 = (u_char *) key;
- k2 += 8;
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) >= 16+8) {
- if (enc)
- k3 += 16;
- else
- k1 += 16;
- }
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k1);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k2);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k3);
-#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
- EVP_CipherInit(&c->k1, EVP_des_cbc(), k1, NULL, enc);
- EVP_CipherInit(&c->k2, EVP_des_cbc(), k2, NULL, !enc);
- EVP_CipherInit(&c->k3, EVP_des_cbc(), k3, NULL, enc);
-#else
- if (EVP_CipherInit(&c->k1, EVP_des_cbc(), k1, NULL, enc) == 0 ||
- EVP_CipherInit(&c->k2, EVP_des_cbc(), k2, NULL, !enc) == 0 ||
- EVP_CipherInit(&c->k3, EVP_des_cbc(), k3, NULL, enc) == 0) {
- explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c));
- free(c);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
- return (0);
- }
-#endif
- return (1);
-}
-
-static int
-ssh1_3des_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
- LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE len)
-{
- struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c;
-
- if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
- error("ssh1_3des_cbc: no context");
- return (0);
- }
-#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
- EVP_Cipher(&c->k1, dest, (u_char *)src, len);
- EVP_Cipher(&c->k2, dest, dest, len);
- EVP_Cipher(&c->k3, dest, dest, len);
-#else
- if (EVP_Cipher(&c->k1, dest, (u_char *)src, len) == 0 ||
- EVP_Cipher(&c->k2, dest, dest, len) == 0 ||
- EVP_Cipher(&c->k3, dest, dest, len) == 0)
- return (0);
-#endif
- return (1);
-}
-
-static int
-ssh1_3des_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-{
- struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c;
-
- if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k1);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k2);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k3);
- explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c));
- free(c);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
- }
- return (1);
-}
-
-void
-ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int doset, u_char *iv, int len)
-{
- struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c;
-
- if (len != 24)
- fatal("%s: bad 3des iv length: %d", __func__, len);
- if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no 3des context", __func__);
- if (doset) {
- debug3("%s: Installed 3DES IV", __func__);
- memcpy(c->k1.iv, iv, 8);
- memcpy(c->k2.iv, iv + 8, 8);
- memcpy(c->k3.iv, iv + 16, 8);
- } else {
- debug3("%s: Copying 3DES IV", __func__);
- memcpy(iv, c->k1.iv, 8);
- memcpy(iv + 8, c->k2.iv, 8);
- memcpy(iv + 16, c->k3.iv, 8);
- }
-}
-
-const EVP_CIPHER *
-evp_ssh1_3des(void)
-{
- static EVP_CIPHER ssh1_3des;
-
- memset(&ssh1_3des, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
- ssh1_3des.nid = NID_undef;
- ssh1_3des.block_size = 8;
- ssh1_3des.iv_len = 0;
- ssh1_3des.key_len = 16;
- ssh1_3des.init = ssh1_3des_init;
- ssh1_3des.cleanup = ssh1_3des_cleanup;
- ssh1_3des.do_cipher = ssh1_3des_cbc;
-#ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
- ssh1_3des.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH;
-#endif
- return (&ssh1_3des);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-3des1.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-3des1.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-3des1.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-3des1.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-3des1.c,v 1.12 2015/01/14 10:24:42 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+/*
+ * This is used by SSH1:
+ *
+ * What kind of triple DES are these 2 routines?
+ *
+ * Why is there a redundant initialization vector?
+ *
+ * If only iv3 was used, then, this would till effect have been
+ * outer-cbc. However, there is also a private iv1 == iv2 which
+ * perhaps makes differential analysis easier. On the other hand, the
+ * private iv1 probably makes the CRC-32 attack ineffective. This is a
+ * result of that there is no longer any known iv1 to use when
+ * choosing the X block.
+ */
+struct ssh1_3des_ctx
+{
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX k1, k2, k3;
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER * evp_ssh1_3des(void);
+int ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int);
+
+static int
+ssh1_3des_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
+ int enc)
+{
+ struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c;
+ u_char *k1, *k2, *k3;
+
+ if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
+ if ((c = calloc(1, sizeof(*c))) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
+ }
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ if (enc == -1)
+ enc = ctx->encrypt;
+ k1 = k2 = k3 = (u_char *) key;
+ k2 += 8;
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) >= 16+8) {
+ if (enc)
+ k3 += 16;
+ else
+ k1 += 16;
+ }
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k1);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k2);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k3);
+ if (EVP_CipherInit(&c->k1, EVP_des_cbc(), k1, NULL, enc) == 0 ||
+ EVP_CipherInit(&c->k2, EVP_des_cbc(), k2, NULL, !enc) == 0 ||
+ EVP_CipherInit(&c->k3, EVP_des_cbc(), k3, NULL, enc) == 0) {
+ explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c));
+ free(c);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh1_3des_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, size_t len)
+{
+ struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c;
+
+ if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (EVP_Cipher(&c->k1, dest, (u_char *)src, len) == 0 ||
+ EVP_Cipher(&c->k2, dest, dest, len) == 0 ||
+ EVP_Cipher(&c->k3, dest, dest, len) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh1_3des_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c;
+
+ if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k1);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k2);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k3);
+ explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c));
+ free(c);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int
+ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int doset, u_char *iv, int len)
+{
+ struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c;
+
+ if (len != 24)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ if (doset) {
+ memcpy(c->k1.iv, iv, 8);
+ memcpy(c->k2.iv, iv + 8, 8);
+ memcpy(c->k3.iv, iv + 16, 8);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(iv, c->k1.iv, 8);
+ memcpy(iv + 8, c->k2.iv, 8);
+ memcpy(iv + 16, c->k3.iv, 8);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *
+evp_ssh1_3des(void)
+{
+ static EVP_CIPHER ssh1_3des;
+
+ memset(&ssh1_3des, 0, sizeof(ssh1_3des));
+ ssh1_3des.nid = NID_undef;
+ ssh1_3des.block_size = 8;
+ ssh1_3des.iv_len = 0;
+ ssh1_3des.key_len = 16;
+ ssh1_3des.init = ssh1_3des_init;
+ ssh1_3des.cleanup = ssh1_3des_cleanup;
+ ssh1_3des.do_cipher = ssh1_3des_cbc;
+ ssh1_3des.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH;
+ return &ssh1_3des;
+}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-aesctr.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-aesctr.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-aesctr.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-aesctr.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-aesctr.c,v 1.2 2015/01/14 10:24:42 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include "cipher-aesctr.h"
+
+/*
+ * increment counter 'ctr',
+ * the counter is of size 'len' bytes and stored in network-byte-order.
+ * (LSB at ctr[len-1], MSB at ctr[0])
+ */
+static inline void
+aesctr_inc(u8 *ctr, u32 len)
+{
+ ssize_t i;
+
+#ifndef CONSTANT_TIME_INCREMENT
+ for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+ if (++ctr[i]) /* continue on overflow */
+ return;
+#else
+ u8 x, add = 1;
+
+ for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ ctr[i] += add;
+ /* constant time for: x = ctr[i] ? 1 : 0 */
+ x = ctr[i];
+ x = (x | (x >> 4)) & 0xf;
+ x = (x | (x >> 2)) & 0x3;
+ x = (x | (x >> 1)) & 0x1;
+ add *= (x^1);
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+aesctr_keysetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *k,u32 kbits,u32 ivbits)
+{
+ x->rounds = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(x->ek, k, kbits);
+}
+
+void
+aesctr_ivsetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *iv)
+{
+ memcpy(x->ctr, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+void
+aesctr_encrypt_bytes(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *m,u8 *c,u32 bytes)
+{
+ u32 n = 0;
+ u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ while ((bytes--) > 0) {
+ if (n == 0) {
+ rijndaelEncrypt(x->ek, x->rounds, x->ctr, buf);
+ aesctr_inc(x->ctr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ }
+ *(c++) = *(m++) ^ buf[n];
+ n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-aesctr.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-aesctr.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-aesctr.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-aesctr.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-aesctr.h,v 1.1 2014/04/29 15:39:33 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSH_AESCTR_H
+#define OPENSSH_AESCTR_H
+
+#include "rijndael.h"
+
+#define AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+
+typedef struct aesctr_ctx {
+ int rounds; /* keylen-dependent #rounds */
+ u32 ek[4*(AES_MAXROUNDS + 1)]; /* encrypt key schedule */
+ u8 ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* counter */
+} aesctr_ctx;
+
+void aesctr_keysetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *k,u32 kbits,u32 ivbits);
+void aesctr_ivsetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *iv);
+void aesctr_encrypt_bytes(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *m,u8 *c,u32 bytes);
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-bf1.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-bf1.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-bf1.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher-bf1.c,v 1.6 2010/10/01 23:05:32 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-
-/*
- * SSH1 uses a variation on Blowfish, all bytes must be swapped before
- * and after encryption/decryption. Thus the swap_bytes stuff (yuk).
- */
-
-const EVP_CIPHER * evp_ssh1_bf(void);
-
-static void
-swap_bytes(const u_char *src, u_char *dst, int n)
-{
- u_char c[4];
-
- /* Process 4 bytes every lap. */
- for (n = n / 4; n > 0; n--) {
- c[3] = *src++;
- c[2] = *src++;
- c[1] = *src++;
- c[0] = *src++;
-
- *dst++ = c[0];
- *dst++ = c[1];
- *dst++ = c[2];
- *dst++ = c[3];
- }
-}
-
-#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
-static void bf_ssh1_init (EVP_CIPHER_CTX * ctx, const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-{
- if (iv != NULL)
- memcpy (&(ctx->oiv[0]), iv, 8);
- memcpy (&(ctx->iv[0]), &(ctx->oiv[0]), 8);
- if (key != NULL)
- BF_set_key (&(ctx->c.bf_ks), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length (ctx),
- key);
-}
-#endif
-
-static int (*orig_bf)(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, u_char *,
- const u_char *, LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE) = NULL;
-
-static int
-bf_ssh1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *out, const u_char *in,
- LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE len)
-{
- int ret;
-
- swap_bytes(in, out, len);
- ret = (*orig_bf)(ctx, out, out, len);
- swap_bytes(out, out, len);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-const EVP_CIPHER *
-evp_ssh1_bf(void)
-{
- static EVP_CIPHER ssh1_bf;
-
- memcpy(&ssh1_bf, EVP_bf_cbc(), sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
- orig_bf = ssh1_bf.do_cipher;
- ssh1_bf.nid = NID_undef;
-#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
- ssh1_bf.init = bf_ssh1_init;
-#endif
- ssh1_bf.do_cipher = bf_ssh1_cipher;
- ssh1_bf.key_len = 32;
- return (&ssh1_bf);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-bf1.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-bf1.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-bf1.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-bf1.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-bf1.c,v 1.7 2015/01/14 10:24:42 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_BF)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+/*
+ * SSH1 uses a variation on Blowfish, all bytes must be swapped before
+ * and after encryption/decryption. Thus the swap_bytes stuff (yuk).
+ */
+
+const EVP_CIPHER * evp_ssh1_bf(void);
+
+static void
+swap_bytes(const u_char *src, u_char *dst, int n)
+{
+ u_char c[4];
+
+ /* Process 4 bytes every lap. */
+ for (n = n / 4; n > 0; n--) {
+ c[3] = *src++;
+ c[2] = *src++;
+ c[1] = *src++;
+ c[0] = *src++;
+
+ *dst++ = c[0];
+ *dst++ = c[1];
+ *dst++ = c[2];
+ *dst++ = c[3];
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
+static void bf_ssh1_init (EVP_CIPHER_CTX * ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ if (iv != NULL)
+ memcpy (&(ctx->oiv[0]), iv, 8);
+ memcpy (&(ctx->iv[0]), &(ctx->oiv[0]), 8);
+ if (key != NULL)
+ BF_set_key (&(ctx->c.bf_ks), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length (ctx),
+ key);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int (*orig_bf)(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, u_char *,
+ const u_char *, LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE) = NULL;
+
+static int
+bf_ssh1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *out, const u_char *in,
+ LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE len)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ swap_bytes(in, out, len);
+ ret = (*orig_bf)(ctx, out, out, len);
+ swap_bytes(out, out, len);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *
+evp_ssh1_bf(void)
+{
+ static EVP_CIPHER ssh1_bf;
+
+ memcpy(&ssh1_bf, EVP_bf_cbc(), sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+ orig_bf = ssh1_bf.do_cipher;
+ ssh1_bf.nid = NID_undef;
+#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
+ ssh1_bf.init = bf_ssh1_init;
+#endif
+ ssh1_bf.do_cipher = bf_ssh1_cipher;
+ ssh1_bf.key_len = 32;
+ return (&ssh1_bf);
+}
+#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_BF) */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-chachapoly.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-chachapoly.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-chachapoly.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.c,v 1.4 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <stdarg.h> /* needed for log.h */
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdio.h> /* needed for misc.h */
-
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "cipher-chachapoly.h"
-
-void chachapoly_init(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx,
- const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
-{
- if (keylen != (32 + 32)) /* 2 x 256 bit keys */
- fatal("%s: invalid keylen %u", __func__, keylen);
- chacha_keysetup(&ctx->main_ctx, key, 256);
- chacha_keysetup(&ctx->header_ctx, key + 32, 256);
-}
-
-/*
- * chachapoly_crypt() operates as following:
- * En/decrypt with header key 'aadlen' bytes from 'src', storing result
- * to 'dest'. The ciphertext here is treated as additional authenticated
- * data for MAC calculation.
- * En/decrypt 'len' bytes at offset 'aadlen' from 'src' to 'dest'. Use
- * POLY1305_TAGLEN bytes at offset 'len'+'aadlen' as the authentication
- * tag. This tag is written on encryption and verified on decryption.
- */
-int
-chachapoly_crypt(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest,
- const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen, int do_encrypt)
-{
- u_char seqbuf[8];
- const u_char one[8] = { 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; /* NB little-endian */
- u_char expected_tag[POLY1305_TAGLEN], poly_key[POLY1305_KEYLEN];
- int r = -1;
-
- /*
- * Run ChaCha20 once to generate the Poly1305 key. The IV is the
- * packet sequence number.
- */
- memset(poly_key, 0, sizeof(poly_key));
- put_u64(seqbuf, seqnr);
- chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->main_ctx, seqbuf, NULL);
- chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->main_ctx,
- poly_key, poly_key, sizeof(poly_key));
- /* Set Chacha's block counter to 1 */
- chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->main_ctx, seqbuf, one);
-
- /* If decrypting, check tag before anything else */
- if (!do_encrypt) {
- const u_char *tag = src + aadlen + len;
-
- poly1305_auth(expected_tag, src, aadlen + len, poly_key);
- if (timingsafe_bcmp(expected_tag, tag, POLY1305_TAGLEN) != 0)
- goto out;
- }
- /* Crypt additional data */
- if (aadlen) {
- chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->header_ctx, seqbuf, NULL);
- chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->header_ctx, src, dest, aadlen);
- }
- chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->main_ctx, src + aadlen,
- dest + aadlen, len);
-
- /* If encrypting, calculate and append tag */
- if (do_encrypt) {
- poly1305_auth(dest + aadlen + len, dest, aadlen + len,
- poly_key);
- }
- r = 0;
-
- out:
- explicit_bzero(expected_tag, sizeof(expected_tag));
- explicit_bzero(seqbuf, sizeof(seqbuf));
- explicit_bzero(poly_key, sizeof(poly_key));
- return r;
-}
-
-/* Decrypt and extract the encrypted packet length */
-int
-chachapoly_get_length(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx,
- u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len)
-{
- u_char buf[4], seqbuf[8];
-
- if (len < 4)
- return -1; /* Insufficient length */
- put_u64(seqbuf, seqnr);
- chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->header_ctx, seqbuf, NULL);
- chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->header_ctx, cp, buf, 4);
- *plenp = get_u32(buf);
- return 0;
-}
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-chachapoly.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-chachapoly.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-chachapoly.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-chachapoly.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.c,v 1.7 2015/01/14 10:24:42 markus Exp $ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdarg.h> /* needed for log.h */
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h> /* needed for misc.h */
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "cipher-chachapoly.h"
+
+int chachapoly_init(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx,
+ const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
+{
+ if (keylen != (32 + 32)) /* 2 x 256 bit keys */
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ chacha_keysetup(&ctx->main_ctx, key, 256);
+ chacha_keysetup(&ctx->header_ctx, key + 32, 256);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * chachapoly_crypt() operates as following:
+ * En/decrypt with header key 'aadlen' bytes from 'src', storing result
+ * to 'dest'. The ciphertext here is treated as additional authenticated
+ * data for MAC calculation.
+ * En/decrypt 'len' bytes at offset 'aadlen' from 'src' to 'dest'. Use
+ * POLY1305_TAGLEN bytes at offset 'len'+'aadlen' as the authentication
+ * tag. This tag is written on encryption and verified on decryption.
+ */
+int
+chachapoly_crypt(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest,
+ const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen, int do_encrypt)
+{
+ u_char seqbuf[8];
+ const u_char one[8] = { 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; /* NB little-endian */
+ u_char expected_tag[POLY1305_TAGLEN], poly_key[POLY1305_KEYLEN];
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ /*
+ * Run ChaCha20 once to generate the Poly1305 key. The IV is the
+ * packet sequence number.
+ */
+ memset(poly_key, 0, sizeof(poly_key));
+ POKE_U64(seqbuf, seqnr);
+ chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->main_ctx, seqbuf, NULL);
+ chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->main_ctx,
+ poly_key, poly_key, sizeof(poly_key));
+
+ /* If decrypting, check tag before anything else */
+ if (!do_encrypt) {
+ const u_char *tag = src + aadlen + len;
+
+ poly1305_auth(expected_tag, src, aadlen + len, poly_key);
+ if (timingsafe_bcmp(expected_tag, tag, POLY1305_TAGLEN) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Crypt additional data */
+ if (aadlen) {
+ chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->header_ctx, seqbuf, NULL);
+ chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->header_ctx, src, dest, aadlen);
+ }
+
+ /* Set Chacha's block counter to 1 */
+ chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->main_ctx, seqbuf, one);
+ chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->main_ctx, src + aadlen,
+ dest + aadlen, len);
+
+ /* If encrypting, calculate and append tag */
+ if (do_encrypt) {
+ poly1305_auth(dest + aadlen + len, dest, aadlen + len,
+ poly_key);
+ }
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(expected_tag, sizeof(expected_tag));
+ explicit_bzero(seqbuf, sizeof(seqbuf));
+ explicit_bzero(poly_key, sizeof(poly_key));
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* Decrypt and extract the encrypted packet length */
+int
+chachapoly_get_length(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx,
+ u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len)
+{
+ u_char buf[4], seqbuf[8];
+
+ if (len < 4)
+ return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ POKE_U64(seqbuf, seqnr);
+ chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->header_ctx, seqbuf, NULL);
+ chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->header_ctx, cp, buf, 4);
+ *plenp = PEEK_U32(buf);
+ return 0;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-chachapoly.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-chachapoly.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-chachapoly.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.h,v 1.1 2013/11/21 00:45:44 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) Damien Miller 2013 <djm at mindrot.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-#ifndef CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_H
-#define CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_H
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include "chacha.h"
-#include "poly1305.h"
-
-#define CHACHA_KEYLEN 32 /* Only 256 bit keys used here */
-
-struct chachapoly_ctx {
- struct chacha_ctx main_ctx, header_ctx;
-};
-
-void chachapoly_init(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx,
- const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
-int chachapoly_crypt(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx, u_int seqnr,
- u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen,
- int do_encrypt);
-int chachapoly_get_length(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx,
- u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 4, 5)));
-
-#endif /* CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-chachapoly.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-chachapoly.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-chachapoly.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-chachapoly.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.h,v 1.4 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) Damien Miller 2013 <djm at mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+#ifndef CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_H
+#define CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include "chacha.h"
+#include "poly1305.h"
+
+#define CHACHA_KEYLEN 32 /* Only 256 bit keys used here */
+
+struct chachapoly_ctx {
+ struct chacha_ctx main_ctx, header_ctx;
+};
+
+int chachapoly_init(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx,
+ const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
+int chachapoly_crypt(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx, u_int seqnr,
+ u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen,
+ int do_encrypt);
+int chachapoly_get_length(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx,
+ u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 4, 5)));
+
+#endif /* CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-ctr.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-ctr.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-ctr.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,146 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher-ctr.c,v 1.11 2010/10/01 23:05:32 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl <markus at openbsd.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
-#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-
-#ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
-#include <openssl/aes.h>
-#endif
-
-struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx
-{
- AES_KEY aes_ctx;
- u_char aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-};
-
-/*
- * increment counter 'ctr',
- * the counter is of size 'len' bytes and stored in network-byte-order.
- * (LSB at ctr[len-1], MSB at ctr[0])
- */
-static void
-ssh_ctr_inc(u_char *ctr, size_t len)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--)
- if (++ctr[i]) /* continue on overflow */
- return;
-}
-
-static int
-ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
- LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE len)
-{
- struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
- size_t n = 0;
- u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-
- if (len == 0)
- return (1);
- if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- while ((len--) > 0) {
- if (n == 0) {
- AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx);
- ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- }
- *(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n];
- n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
- }
- return (1);
-}
-
-static int
-ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
- int enc)
-{
- struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
-
- if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
- c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
- }
- if (key != NULL)
- AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
- &c->aes_ctx);
- if (iv != NULL)
- memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- return (1);
-}
-
-static int
-ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-{
- struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
-
- if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
- memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
- free(c);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
- }
- return (1);
-}
-
-void
-ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int doset, u_char * iv, size_t len)
-{
- struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
-
- if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp)) == NULL)
- fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_iv: no context");
- if (doset)
- memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, len);
- else
- memcpy(iv, c->aes_counter, len);
-}
-
-const EVP_CIPHER *
-evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
-{
- static EVP_CIPHER aes_ctr;
-
- memset(&aes_ctr, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
- aes_ctr.nid = NID_undef;
- aes_ctr.block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
- aes_ctr.iv_len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
- aes_ctr.key_len = 16;
- aes_ctr.init = ssh_aes_ctr_init;
- aes_ctr.cleanup = ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup;
- aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
-#ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
- aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
- EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
-#endif
- return (&aes_ctr);
-}
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-ctr.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-ctr.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-ctr.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher-ctr.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-ctr.c,v 1.11 2010/10/01 23:05:32 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl <markus at openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR)
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#endif
+
+struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx
+{
+ AES_KEY aes_ctx;
+ u_char aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+};
+
+/*
+ * increment counter 'ctr',
+ * the counter is of size 'len' bytes and stored in network-byte-order.
+ * (LSB at ctr[len-1], MSB at ctr[0])
+ */
+static void
+ssh_ctr_inc(u_char *ctr, size_t len)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+ if (++ctr[i]) /* continue on overflow */
+ return;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
+ LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE len)
+{
+ struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
+ size_t n = 0;
+ u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ if (len == 0)
+ return (1);
+ if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ while ((len--) > 0) {
+ if (n == 0) {
+ AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx);
+ ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ }
+ *(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n];
+ n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
+ int enc)
+{
+ struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
+
+ if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
+ c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
+ }
+ if (key != NULL)
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &c->aes_ctx);
+ if (iv != NULL)
+ memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
+
+ if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
+ memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+ free(c);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int doset, u_char * iv, size_t len)
+{
+ struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
+
+ if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp)) == NULL)
+ fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_iv: no context");
+ if (doset)
+ memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, len);
+ else
+ memcpy(iv, c->aes_counter, len);
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *
+evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
+{
+ static EVP_CIPHER aes_ctr;
+
+ memset(&aes_ctr, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+ aes_ctr.nid = NID_undef;
+ aes_ctr.block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ aes_ctr.iv_len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ aes_ctr.key_len = 16;
+ aes_ctr.init = ssh_aes_ctr_init;
+ aes_ctr.cleanup = ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup;
+ aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
+#ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
+ aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
+ EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
+#endif
+ return (&aes_ctr);
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR) */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,572 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.97 2014/02/07 06:55:54 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- *
- * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-
-/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
-#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-
-extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void);
-extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
-extern void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int);
-
-struct Cipher {
- char *name;
- int number; /* for ssh1 only */
- u_int block_size;
- u_int key_len;
- u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */
- u_int auth_len;
- u_int discard_len;
- u_int flags;
-#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0)
-#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1)
- const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void);
-};
-
-static const struct Cipher ciphers[] = {
- { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
- { "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc },
- { "3des", SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des },
- { "blowfish", SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_bf },
-
- { "3des-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
- { "blowfish-cbc",
- SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_bf_cbc },
- { "cast128-cbc",
- SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_cast5_cbc },
- { "arcfour", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_rc4 },
- { "arcfour128", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 1536, 0, EVP_rc4 },
- { "arcfour256", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 32, 0, 0, 1536, 0, EVP_rc4 },
- { "aes128-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
- { "aes192-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
- { "aes256-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
- { "rijndael-cbc at lysator.liu.se",
- SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
- { "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr },
- { "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr },
- { "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr },
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
- { "aes128-gcm at openssh.com",
- SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm },
- { "aes256-gcm at openssh.com",
- SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm },
-#endif
- { "chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com",
- SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 64, 0, 16, 0, CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY, NULL },
- { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
-};
-
-/*--*/
-
-/* Returns a list of supported ciphers separated by the specified char. */
-char *
-cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only)
-{
- char *ret = NULL;
- size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
- const Cipher *c;
-
- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) {
- if (c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2)
- continue;
- if (auth_only && c->auth_len == 0)
- continue;
- if (ret != NULL)
- ret[rlen++] = sep;
- nlen = strlen(c->name);
- ret = xrealloc(ret, 1, rlen + nlen + 2);
- memcpy(ret + rlen, c->name, nlen + 1);
- rlen += nlen;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-u_int
-cipher_blocksize(const Cipher *c)
-{
- return (c->block_size);
-}
-
-u_int
-cipher_keylen(const Cipher *c)
-{
- return (c->key_len);
-}
-
-u_int
-cipher_seclen(const Cipher *c)
-{
- if (strcmp("3des-cbc", c->name) == 0)
- return 14;
- return cipher_keylen(c);
-}
-
-u_int
-cipher_authlen(const Cipher *c)
-{
- return (c->auth_len);
-}
-
-u_int
-cipher_ivlen(const Cipher *c)
-{
- /*
- * Default is cipher block size, except for chacha20+poly1305 that
- * needs no IV. XXX make iv_len == -1 default?
- */
- return (c->iv_len != 0 || (c->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) ?
- c->iv_len : c->block_size;
-}
-
-u_int
-cipher_get_number(const Cipher *c)
-{
- return (c->number);
-}
-
-u_int
-cipher_is_cbc(const Cipher *c)
-{
- return (c->flags & CFLAG_CBC) != 0;
-}
-
-u_int
-cipher_mask_ssh1(int client)
-{
- u_int mask = 0;
- mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES; /* Mandatory */
- mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH;
- if (client) {
- mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_DES;
- }
- return mask;
-}
-
-const Cipher *
-cipher_by_name(const char *name)
-{
- const Cipher *c;
- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
- if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
- return c;
- return NULL;
-}
-
-const Cipher *
-cipher_by_number(int id)
-{
- const Cipher *c;
- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
- if (c->number == id)
- return c;
- return NULL;
-}
-
-#define CIPHER_SEP ","
-int
-ciphers_valid(const char *names)
-{
- const Cipher *c;
- char *cipher_list, *cp;
- char *p;
-
- if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
- return 0;
- cipher_list = cp = xstrdup(names);
- for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
- (p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) {
- c = cipher_by_name(p);
- if (c == NULL || c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) {
- debug("bad cipher %s [%s]", p, names);
- free(cipher_list);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- debug3("ciphers ok: [%s]", names);
- free(cipher_list);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Parses the name of the cipher. Returns the number of the corresponding
- * cipher, or -1 on error.
- */
-
-int
-cipher_number(const char *name)
-{
- const Cipher *c;
- if (name == NULL)
- return -1;
- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
- if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0)
- return c->number;
- return -1;
-}
-
-char *
-cipher_name(int id)
-{
- const Cipher *c = cipher_by_number(id);
- return (c==NULL) ? "<unknown>" : c->name;
-}
-
-void
-cipher_init(CipherContext *cc, const Cipher *cipher,
- const u_char *key, u_int keylen, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen,
- int do_encrypt)
-{
- static int dowarn = 1;
-#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
- EVP_CIPHER *type;
-#else
- const EVP_CIPHER *type;
- int klen;
-#endif
- u_char *junk, *discard;
-
- if (cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_DES) {
- if (dowarn) {
- error("Warning: use of DES is strongly discouraged "
- "due to cryptographic weaknesses");
- dowarn = 0;
- }
- if (keylen > 8)
- keylen = 8;
- }
- cc->plaintext = (cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_NONE);
- cc->encrypt = do_encrypt;
-
- if (keylen < cipher->key_len)
- fatal("cipher_init: key length %d is insufficient for %s.",
- keylen, cipher->name);
- if (iv != NULL && ivlen < cipher_ivlen(cipher))
- fatal("cipher_init: iv length %d is insufficient for %s.",
- ivlen, cipher->name);
- cc->cipher = cipher;
-
- if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
- chachapoly_init(&cc->cp_ctx, key, keylen);
- return;
- }
- type = (*cipher->evptype)();
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cc->evp);
-#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
- if (type->key_len > 0 && type->key_len != keylen) {
- debug("cipher_init: set keylen (%d -> %d)",
- type->key_len, keylen);
- type->key_len = keylen;
- }
- EVP_CipherInit(&cc->evp, type, (u_char *)key, (u_char *)iv,
- (do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT));
-#else
- if (EVP_CipherInit(&cc->evp, type, NULL, (u_char *)iv,
- (do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0)
- fatal("cipher_init: EVP_CipherInit failed for %s",
- cipher->name);
- if (cipher_authlen(cipher) &&
- !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
- -1, (u_char *)iv))
- fatal("cipher_init: EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED failed for %s",
- cipher->name);
- klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&cc->evp);
- if (klen > 0 && keylen != (u_int)klen) {
- debug2("cipher_init: set keylen (%d -> %d)", klen, keylen);
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&cc->evp, keylen) == 0)
- fatal("cipher_init: set keylen failed (%d -> %d)",
- klen, keylen);
- }
- if (EVP_CipherInit(&cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)key, NULL, -1) == 0)
- fatal("cipher_init: EVP_CipherInit: set key failed for %s",
- cipher->name);
-#endif
-
- if (cipher->discard_len > 0) {
- junk = xmalloc(cipher->discard_len);
- discard = xmalloc(cipher->discard_len);
- if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, discard, junk,
- cipher->discard_len) == 0)
- fatal("evp_crypt: EVP_Cipher failed during discard");
- explicit_bzero(discard, cipher->discard_len);
- free(junk);
- free(discard);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * cipher_crypt() operates as following:
- * Copy 'aadlen' bytes (without en/decryption) from 'src' to 'dest'.
- * Theses bytes are treated as additional authenticated data for
- * authenticated encryption modes.
- * En/Decrypt 'len' bytes at offset 'aadlen' from 'src' to 'dest'.
- * Use 'authlen' bytes at offset 'len'+'aadlen' as the authentication tag.
- * This tag is written on encryption and verified on decryption.
- * Both 'aadlen' and 'authlen' can be set to 0.
- * cipher_crypt() returns 0 on success and -1 if the decryption integrity
- * check fails.
- */
-int
-cipher_crypt(CipherContext *cc, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
- u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen)
-{
- if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
- return chachapoly_crypt(&cc->cp_ctx, seqnr, dest, src, len,
- aadlen, authlen, cc->encrypt);
- if (authlen) {
- u_char lastiv[1];
-
- if (authlen != cipher_authlen(cc->cipher))
- fatal("%s: authlen mismatch %d", __func__, authlen);
- /* increment IV */
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN,
- 1, lastiv))
- fatal("%s: EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN", __func__);
- /* set tag on decyption */
- if (!cc->encrypt &&
- !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG,
- authlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen + len))
- fatal("%s: EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG", __func__);
- }
- if (aadlen) {
- if (authlen &&
- EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)src, aadlen) < 0)
- fatal("%s: EVP_Cipher(aad) failed", __func__);
- memcpy(dest, src, aadlen);
- }
- if (len % cc->cipher->block_size)
- fatal("%s: bad plaintext length %d", __func__, len);
- if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, dest + aadlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen,
- len) < 0)
- fatal("%s: EVP_Cipher failed", __func__);
- if (authlen) {
- /* compute tag (on encrypt) or verify tag (on decrypt) */
- if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, NULL, NULL, 0) < 0) {
- if (cc->encrypt)
- fatal("%s: EVP_Cipher(final) failed", __func__);
- else
- return -1;
- }
- if (cc->encrypt &&
- !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG,
- authlen, dest + aadlen + len))
- fatal("%s: EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG", __func__);
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Extract the packet length, including any decryption necessary beforehand */
-int
-cipher_get_length(CipherContext *cc, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr,
- const u_char *cp, u_int len)
-{
- if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
- return chachapoly_get_length(&cc->cp_ctx, plenp, seqnr,
- cp, len);
- if (len < 4)
- return -1;
- *plenp = get_u32(cp);
- return 0;
-}
-
-void
-cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *cc)
-{
- if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
- explicit_bzero(&cc->cp_ctx, sizeof(cc->cp_ctx));
- else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cc->evp) == 0)
- error("cipher_cleanup: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup failed");
-}
-
-/*
- * Selects the cipher, and keys if by computing the MD5 checksum of the
- * passphrase and using the resulting 16 bytes as the key.
- */
-
-void
-cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, const Cipher *cipher,
- const char *passphrase, int do_encrypt)
-{
- u_char digest[16];
-
- if (ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_MD5, passphrase, strlen(passphrase),
- digest, sizeof(digest)) < 0)
- fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
-
- cipher_init(cc, cipher, digest, 16, NULL, 0, do_encrypt);
-
- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-}
-
-/*
- * Exports an IV from the CipherContext required to export the key
- * state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent
- * process.
- */
-
-int
-cipher_get_keyiv_len(const CipherContext *cc)
-{
- const Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
- int ivlen;
-
- if (c->number == SSH_CIPHER_3DES)
- ivlen = 24;
- else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
- ivlen = 0;
- else
- ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
- return (ivlen);
-}
-
-void
-cipher_get_keyiv(CipherContext *cc, u_char *iv, u_int len)
-{
- const Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
- int evplen;
-
- if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
- if (len != 0)
- fatal("%s: wrong iv length %d != %d", __func__, len, 0);
- return;
- }
-
- switch (c->number) {
- case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2:
- case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
- case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
- evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
- if (evplen <= 0)
- return;
- if ((u_int)evplen != len)
- fatal("%s: wrong iv length %d != %d", __func__,
- evplen, len);
-#ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
- if (c->evptype == evp_rijndael)
- ssh_rijndael_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, len);
- else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
- if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr)
- ssh_aes_ctr_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, len);
- else
-#endif
- memcpy(iv, cc->evp.iv, len);
- break;
- case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
- ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, 24);
- break;
- default:
- fatal("%s: bad cipher %d", __func__, c->number);
- }
-}
-
-void
-cipher_set_keyiv(CipherContext *cc, u_char *iv)
-{
- const Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
- int evplen = 0;
-
- if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
- return;
-
- switch (c->number) {
- case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2:
- case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
- case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
- evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
- if (evplen == 0)
- return;
-#ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
- if (c->evptype == evp_rijndael)
- ssh_rijndael_iv(&cc->evp, 1, iv, evplen);
- else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
- if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr)
- ssh_aes_ctr_iv(&cc->evp, 1, iv, evplen);
- else
-#endif
- memcpy(cc->evp.iv, iv, evplen);
- break;
- case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
- ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 1, iv, 24);
- break;
- default:
- fatal("%s: bad cipher %d", __func__, c->number);
- }
-}
-
-int
-cipher_get_keycontext(const CipherContext *cc, u_char *dat)
-{
- const Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
- int plen = 0;
-
- if (c->evptype == EVP_rc4) {
- plen = EVP_X_STATE_LEN(cc->evp);
- if (dat == NULL)
- return (plen);
- memcpy(dat, EVP_X_STATE(cc->evp), plen);
- }
- return (plen);
-}
-
-void
-cipher_set_keycontext(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dat)
-{
- const Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
- int plen;
-
- if (c->evptype == EVP_rc4) {
- plen = EVP_X_STATE_LEN(cc->evp);
- memcpy(EVP_X_STATE(cc->evp), dat, plen);
- }
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,664 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.101 2015/12/10 17:08:40 mmcc Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void);
+extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
+extern int ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int);
+#endif
+
+struct sshcipher {
+ char *name;
+ int number; /* for ssh1 only */
+ u_int block_size;
+ u_int key_len;
+ u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */
+ u_int auth_len;
+ u_int discard_len;
+ u_int flags;
+#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0)
+#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1)
+#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2)
+#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3)
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void);
+#else
+ void *ignored;
+#endif
+};
+
+static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ { "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc },
+ { "3des", SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des },
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF
+ { "blowfish", SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_bf },
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_BF */
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
+ { "3des-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF
+ { "blowfish-cbc",
+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_bf_cbc },
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_BF */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST
+ { "cast128-cbc",
+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_cast5_cbc },
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CAST */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+ { "arcfour", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_rc4 },
+ { "arcfour128", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 1536, 0, EVP_rc4 },
+ { "arcfour256", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 32, 0, 0, 1536, 0, EVP_rc4 },
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RC4 */
+ { "aes128-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
+ { "aes192-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
+ { "aes256-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
+ { "rijndael-cbc at lysator.liu.se",
+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
+ { "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr },
+ { "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr },
+ { "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr },
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
+ { "aes128-gcm at openssh.com",
+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm },
+ { "aes256-gcm at openssh.com",
+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm },
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM */
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ { "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL },
+ { "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL },
+ { "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL },
+ { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_NONE, NULL },
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ { "chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com",
+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 64, 0, 16, 0, CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY, NULL },
+
+ { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
+};
+
+/*--*/
+
+/* Returns a comma-separated list of supported ciphers. */
+char *
+cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only)
+{
+ char *tmp, *ret = NULL;
+ size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
+ const struct sshcipher *c;
+
+ for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) {
+ if (c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2)
+ continue;
+ if (auth_only && c->auth_len == 0)
+ continue;
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ ret[rlen++] = sep;
+ nlen = strlen(c->name);
+ if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
+ free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret = tmp;
+ memcpy(ret + rlen, c->name, nlen + 1);
+ rlen += nlen;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+u_int
+cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *c)
+{
+ return (c->block_size);
+}
+
+u_int
+cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *c)
+{
+ return (c->key_len);
+}
+
+u_int
+cipher_seclen(const struct sshcipher *c)
+{
+ if (strcmp("3des-cbc", c->name) == 0)
+ return 14;
+ return cipher_keylen(c);
+}
+
+u_int
+cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *c)
+{
+ return (c->auth_len);
+}
+
+u_int
+cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *c)
+{
+ /*
+ * Default is cipher block size, except for chacha20+poly1305 that
+ * needs no IV. XXX make iv_len == -1 default?
+ */
+ return (c->iv_len != 0 || (c->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) ?
+ c->iv_len : c->block_size;
+}
+
+u_int
+cipher_get_number(const struct sshcipher *c)
+{
+ return (c->number);
+}
+
+u_int
+cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *c)
+{
+ return (c->flags & CFLAG_CBC) != 0;
+}
+
+u_int
+cipher_mask_ssh1(int client)
+{
+ u_int mask = 0;
+ mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES; /* Mandatory */
+ mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH;
+ if (client) {
+ mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_DES;
+ }
+ return mask;
+}
+
+const struct sshcipher *
+cipher_by_name(const char *name)
+{
+ const struct sshcipher *c;
+ for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
+ return c;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const struct sshcipher *
+cipher_by_number(int id)
+{
+ const struct sshcipher *c;
+ for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ if (c->number == id)
+ return c;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#define CIPHER_SEP ","
+int
+ciphers_valid(const char *names)
+{
+ const struct sshcipher *c;
+ char *cipher_list, *cp;
+ char *p;
+
+ if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if ((cipher_list = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
+ (p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) {
+ c = cipher_by_name(p);
+ if (c == NULL || c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) {
+ free(cipher_list);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ free(cipher_list);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parses the name of the cipher. Returns the number of the corresponding
+ * cipher, or -1 on error.
+ */
+
+int
+cipher_number(const char *name)
+{
+ const struct sshcipher *c;
+ if (name == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0)
+ return c->number;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+char *
+cipher_name(int id)
+{
+ const struct sshcipher *c = cipher_by_number(id);
+ return (c==NULL) ? "<unknown>" : c->name;
+}
+
+const char *
+cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
+{
+ if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (cc->cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_DES)
+ return "use of DES is strongly discouraged due to "
+ "cryptographic weaknesses";
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int
+cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const struct sshcipher *cipher,
+ const u_char *key, u_int keylen, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen,
+ int do_encrypt)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *type;
+ int klen;
+ u_char *junk, *discard;
+
+ if (cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_DES) {
+ if (keylen > 8)
+ keylen = 8;
+ }
+#endif
+ cc->plaintext = (cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_NONE);
+ cc->encrypt = do_encrypt;
+
+ if (keylen < cipher->key_len ||
+ (iv != NULL && ivlen < cipher_ivlen(cipher)))
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ cc->cipher = cipher;
+ if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
+ return chachapoly_init(&cc->cp_ctx, key, keylen);
+ }
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+ if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) {
+ aesctr_keysetup(&cc->ac_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, 8 * ivlen);
+ aesctr_ivsetup(&cc->ac_ctx, iv);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+#else
+ type = (*cipher->evptype)();
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cc->evp);
+ if (EVP_CipherInit(&cc->evp, type, NULL, (u_char *)iv,
+ (do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ if (cipher_authlen(cipher) &&
+ !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
+ -1, (u_char *)iv)) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&cc->evp);
+ if (klen > 0 && keylen != (u_int)klen) {
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&cc->evp, keylen) == 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+ if (EVP_CipherInit(&cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)key, NULL, -1) == 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ if (cipher->discard_len > 0) {
+ if ((junk = malloc(cipher->discard_len)) == NULL ||
+ (discard = malloc(cipher->discard_len)) == NULL) {
+ free(junk);
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ ret = EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, discard, junk, cipher->discard_len);
+ explicit_bzero(discard, cipher->discard_len);
+ free(junk);
+ free(discard);
+ if (ret != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ bad:
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cc->evp);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cipher_crypt() operates as following:
+ * Copy 'aadlen' bytes (without en/decryption) from 'src' to 'dest'.
+ * Theses bytes are treated as additional authenticated data for
+ * authenticated encryption modes.
+ * En/Decrypt 'len' bytes at offset 'aadlen' from 'src' to 'dest'.
+ * Use 'authlen' bytes at offset 'len'+'aadlen' as the authentication tag.
+ * This tag is written on encryption and verified on decryption.
+ * Both 'aadlen' and 'authlen' can be set to 0.
+ */
+int
+cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest,
+ const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen)
+{
+ if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
+ return chachapoly_crypt(&cc->cp_ctx, seqnr, dest, src,
+ len, aadlen, authlen, cc->encrypt);
+ }
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+ if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) {
+ if (aadlen)
+ memcpy(dest, src, aadlen);
+ aesctr_encrypt_bytes(&cc->ac_ctx, src + aadlen,
+ dest + aadlen, len);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) {
+ memcpy(dest, src, aadlen + len);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+#else
+ if (authlen) {
+ u_char lastiv[1];
+
+ if (authlen != cipher_authlen(cc->cipher))
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ /* increment IV */
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN,
+ 1, lastiv))
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ /* set tag on decyption */
+ if (!cc->encrypt &&
+ !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG,
+ authlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen + len))
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (aadlen) {
+ if (authlen &&
+ EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)src, aadlen) < 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ memcpy(dest, src, aadlen);
+ }
+ if (len % cc->cipher->block_size)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, dest + aadlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen,
+ len) < 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ if (authlen) {
+ /* compute tag (on encrypt) or verify tag (on decrypt) */
+ if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, NULL, NULL, 0) < 0)
+ return cc->encrypt ?
+ SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
+ if (cc->encrypt &&
+ !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG,
+ authlen, dest + aadlen + len))
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ }
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Extract the packet length, including any decryption necessary beforehand */
+int
+cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr,
+ const u_char *cp, u_int len)
+{
+ if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
+ return chachapoly_get_length(&cc->cp_ctx, plenp, seqnr,
+ cp, len);
+ if (len < 4)
+ return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ *plenp = get_u32(cp);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+cipher_cleanup(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
+{
+ if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
+ explicit_bzero(&cc->cp_ctx, sizeof(cc->cp_ctx));
+ else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0)
+ explicit_bzero(&cc->ac_ctx, sizeof(cc->ac_ctx));
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cc->evp) == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Selects the cipher, and keys if by computing the MD5 checksum of the
+ * passphrase and using the resulting 16 bytes as the key.
+ */
+int
+cipher_set_key_string(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const struct sshcipher *cipher,
+ const char *passphrase, int do_encrypt)
+{
+ u_char digest[16];
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_MD5,
+ passphrase, strlen(passphrase),
+ digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = cipher_init(cc, cipher, digest, 16, NULL, 0, do_encrypt);
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Exports an IV from the sshcipher_ctx required to export the key
+ * state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent
+ * process.
+ */
+int
+cipher_get_keyiv_len(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
+{
+ const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
+ int ivlen = 0;
+
+ if (c->number == SSH_CIPHER_3DES)
+ ivlen = 24;
+ else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
+ ivlen = 0;
+ else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0)
+ ivlen = sizeof(cc->ac_ctx.ctr);
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ else
+ ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ return (ivlen);
+}
+
+int
+cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_char *iv, u_int len)
+{
+ const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ int evplen;
+#endif
+
+ if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
+ if (len != 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) {
+ if (len != sizeof(cc->ac_ctx.ctr))
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ memcpy(iv, cc->ac_ctx.ctr, len);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (c->number) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2:
+ case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
+ case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
+ evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
+ if (evplen == 0)
+ return 0;
+ else if (evplen < 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ if ((u_int)evplen != len)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
+ if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr)
+ ssh_aes_ctr_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, len);
+ else
+#endif
+ if (cipher_authlen(c)) {
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN,
+ len, iv))
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ } else
+ memcpy(iv, cc->evp.iv, len);
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
+ return ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, 24);
+#endif
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const u_char *iv)
+{
+ const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ int evplen = 0;
+#endif
+
+ if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (c->number) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2:
+ case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
+ case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
+ evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
+ if (evplen <= 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ if (cipher_authlen(c)) {
+ /* XXX iv arg is const, but EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl isn't */
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp,
+ EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, (void *)iv))
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ } else
+ memcpy(cc->evp.iv, iv, evplen);
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
+ return ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 1, (u_char *)iv, 24);
+#endif
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#define EVP_X_STATE(evp) (evp).cipher_data
+#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp) (evp).cipher->ctx_size
+#endif
+
+int
+cipher_get_keycontext(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_char *dat)
+{
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4)
+ const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
+ int plen = 0;
+
+ if (c->evptype == EVP_rc4) {
+ plen = EVP_X_STATE_LEN(cc->evp);
+ if (dat == NULL)
+ return (plen);
+ memcpy(dat, EVP_X_STATE(cc->evp), plen);
+ }
+ return (plen);
+#else
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+cipher_set_keycontext(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const u_char *dat)
+{
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4)
+ const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
+ int plen;
+
+ if (c->evptype == EVP_rc4) {
+ plen = EVP_X_STATE_LEN(cc->evp);
+ memcpy(EVP_X_STATE(cc->evp), dat, plen);
+ }
+#endif
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.44 2014/01/25 10:12:50 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#ifndef CIPHER_H
-#define CIPHER_H
-
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include "cipher-chachapoly.h"
-
-/*
- * Cipher types for SSH-1. New types can be added, but old types should not
- * be removed for compatibility. The maximum allowed value is 31.
- */
-#define SSH_CIPHER_SSH2 -3
-#define SSH_CIPHER_INVALID -2 /* No valid cipher selected. */
-#define SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET -1 /* None selected (invalid number). */
-#define SSH_CIPHER_NONE 0 /* no encryption */
-#define SSH_CIPHER_IDEA 1 /* IDEA CFB */
-#define SSH_CIPHER_DES 2 /* DES CBC */
-#define SSH_CIPHER_3DES 3 /* 3DES CBC */
-#define SSH_CIPHER_BROKEN_TSS 4 /* TRI's Simple Stream encryption CBC */
-#define SSH_CIPHER_BROKEN_RC4 5 /* Alleged RC4 */
-#define SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH 6
-#define SSH_CIPHER_RESERVED 7
-#define SSH_CIPHER_MAX 31
-
-#define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1
-#define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0
-
-typedef struct Cipher Cipher;
-typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext;
-
-struct Cipher;
-struct CipherContext {
- int plaintext;
- int encrypt;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX evp;
- struct chachapoly_ctx cp_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */
- const Cipher *cipher;
-};
-
-u_int cipher_mask_ssh1(int);
-const Cipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
-const Cipher *cipher_by_number(int);
-int cipher_number(const char *);
-char *cipher_name(int);
-int ciphers_valid(const char *);
-char *cipher_alg_list(char, int);
-void cipher_init(CipherContext *, const Cipher *, const u_char *, u_int,
- const u_char *, u_int, int);
-int cipher_crypt(CipherContext *, u_int, u_char *, const u_char *,
- u_int, u_int, u_int);
-int cipher_get_length(CipherContext *, u_int *, u_int,
- const u_char *, u_int);
-void cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *);
-void cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, const Cipher *, const char *, int);
-u_int cipher_blocksize(const Cipher *);
-u_int cipher_keylen(const Cipher *);
-u_int cipher_seclen(const Cipher *);
-u_int cipher_authlen(const Cipher *);
-u_int cipher_ivlen(const Cipher *);
-u_int cipher_is_cbc(const Cipher *);
-
-u_int cipher_get_number(const Cipher *);
-void cipher_get_keyiv(CipherContext *, u_char *, u_int);
-void cipher_set_keyiv(CipherContext *, u_char *);
-int cipher_get_keyiv_len(const CipherContext *);
-int cipher_get_keycontext(const CipherContext *, u_char *);
-void cipher_set_keycontext(CipherContext *, u_char *);
-#endif /* CIPHER_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/cipher.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.48 2015/07/08 19:09:25 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef CIPHER_H
+#define CIPHER_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "cipher-chachapoly.h"
+#include "cipher-aesctr.h"
+
+/*
+ * Cipher types for SSH-1. New types can be added, but old types should not
+ * be removed for compatibility. The maximum allowed value is 31.
+ */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_SSH2 -3
+#define SSH_CIPHER_INVALID -2 /* No valid cipher selected. */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET -1 /* None selected (invalid number). */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_NONE 0 /* no encryption */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_IDEA 1 /* IDEA CFB */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_DES 2 /* DES CBC */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_3DES 3 /* 3DES CBC */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_BROKEN_TSS 4 /* TRI's Simple Stream encryption CBC */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_BROKEN_RC4 5 /* Alleged RC4 */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH 6
+#define SSH_CIPHER_RESERVED 7
+#define SSH_CIPHER_MAX 31
+
+#define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1
+#define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0
+
+struct sshcipher;
+struct sshcipher_ctx {
+ int plaintext;
+ int encrypt;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX evp;
+ struct chachapoly_ctx cp_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */
+ struct aesctr_ctx ac_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */
+ const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+};
+
+u_int cipher_mask_ssh1(int);
+const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
+const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_number(int);
+int cipher_number(const char *);
+char *cipher_name(int);
+const char *cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *);
+int ciphers_valid(const char *);
+char *cipher_alg_list(char, int);
+int cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx *, const struct sshcipher *,
+ const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int, int);
+int cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int, u_char *, const u_char *,
+ u_int, u_int, u_int);
+int cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int *, u_int,
+ const u_char *, u_int);
+int cipher_cleanup(struct sshcipher_ctx *);
+int cipher_set_key_string(struct sshcipher_ctx *, const struct sshcipher *,
+ const char *, int);
+u_int cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *);
+u_int cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *);
+u_int cipher_seclen(const struct sshcipher *);
+u_int cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *);
+u_int cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *);
+u_int cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *);
+
+u_int cipher_get_number(const struct sshcipher *);
+int cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_char *, u_int);
+int cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *, const u_char *);
+int cipher_get_keyiv_len(const struct sshcipher_ctx *);
+int cipher_get_keycontext(const struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_char *);
+void cipher_set_keycontext(struct sshcipher_ctx *, const u_char *);
+#endif /* CIPHER_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/clientloop.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/clientloop.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/clientloop.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,2273 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.258 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * The main loop for the interactive session (client side).
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- *
- * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- *
- * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl.
- * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/ioctl.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
-# include <sys/stat.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-#include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <termios.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "readconf.h"
-#include "clientloop.h"
-#include "sshconnect.h"
-#include "authfd.h"
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "sshpty.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "msg.h"
-#include "roaming.h"
-
-/* import options */
-extern Options options;
-
-/* Flag indicating that stdin should be redirected from /dev/null. */
-extern int stdin_null_flag;
-
-/* Flag indicating that no shell has been requested */
-extern int no_shell_flag;
-
-/* Control socket */
-extern int muxserver_sock; /* XXX use mux_client_cleanup() instead */
-
-/*
- * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the
- * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a
- * configuration file.
- */
-extern char *host;
-
-/*
- * Flag to indicate that we have received a window change signal which has
- * not yet been processed. This will cause a message indicating the new
- * window size to be sent to the server a little later. This is volatile
- * because this is updated in a signal handler.
- */
-static volatile sig_atomic_t received_window_change_signal = 0;
-static volatile sig_atomic_t received_signal = 0;
-
-/* Flag indicating whether the user's terminal is in non-blocking mode. */
-static int in_non_blocking_mode = 0;
-
-/* Time when backgrounded control master using ControlPersist should exit */
-static time_t control_persist_exit_time = 0;
-
-/* Common data for the client loop code. */
-volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; /* Set non-zero to quit the loop. */
-static int escape_char1; /* Escape character. (proto1 only) */
-static int escape_pending1; /* Last character was an escape (proto1 only) */
-static int last_was_cr; /* Last character was a newline. */
-static int exit_status; /* Used to store the command exit status. */
-static int stdin_eof; /* EOF has been encountered on stderr. */
-static Buffer stdin_buffer; /* Buffer for stdin data. */
-static Buffer stdout_buffer; /* Buffer for stdout data. */
-static Buffer stderr_buffer; /* Buffer for stderr data. */
-static u_int buffer_high; /* Soft max buffer size. */
-static int connection_in; /* Connection to server (input). */
-static int connection_out; /* Connection to server (output). */
-static int need_rekeying; /* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */
-static int session_closed; /* In SSH2: login session closed. */
-static int x11_refuse_time; /* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */
-
-static void client_init_dispatch(void);
-int session_ident = -1;
-
-int session_resumed = 0;
-
-/* Track escape per proto2 channel */
-struct escape_filter_ctx {
- int escape_pending;
- int escape_char;
-};
-
-/* Context for channel confirmation replies */
-struct channel_reply_ctx {
- const char *request_type;
- int id;
- enum confirm_action action;
-};
-
-/* Global request success/failure callbacks */
-struct global_confirm {
- TAILQ_ENTRY(global_confirm) entry;
- global_confirm_cb *cb;
- void *ctx;
- int ref_count;
-};
-TAILQ_HEAD(global_confirms, global_confirm);
-static struct global_confirms global_confirms =
- TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(global_confirms);
-
-/*XXX*/
-extern Kex *xxx_kex;
-
-void ssh_process_session2_setup(int, int, int, Buffer *);
-
-/* Restores stdin to blocking mode. */
-
-static void
-leave_non_blocking(void)
-{
- if (in_non_blocking_mode) {
- unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
- in_non_blocking_mode = 0;
- }
-}
-
-/* Puts stdin terminal in non-blocking mode. */
-
-static void
-enter_non_blocking(void)
-{
- in_non_blocking_mode = 1;
- set_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
-}
-
-/*
- * Signal handler for the window change signal (SIGWINCH). This just sets a
- * flag indicating that the window has changed.
- */
-/*ARGSUSED */
-static void
-window_change_handler(int sig)
-{
- received_window_change_signal = 1;
- signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler);
-}
-
-/*
- * Signal handler for signals that cause the program to terminate. These
- * signals must be trapped to restore terminal modes.
- */
-/*ARGSUSED */
-static void
-signal_handler(int sig)
-{
- received_signal = sig;
- quit_pending = 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns current time in seconds from Jan 1, 1970 with the maximum
- * available resolution.
- */
-
-static double
-get_current_time(void)
-{
- struct timeval tv;
- gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
- return (double) tv.tv_sec + (double) tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Sets control_persist_exit_time to the absolute time when the
- * backgrounded control master should exit due to expiry of the
- * ControlPersist timeout. Sets it to 0 if we are not a backgrounded
- * control master process, or if there is no ControlPersist timeout.
- */
-static void
-set_control_persist_exit_time(void)
-{
- if (muxserver_sock == -1 || !options.control_persist
- || options.control_persist_timeout == 0) {
- /* not using a ControlPersist timeout */
- control_persist_exit_time = 0;
- } else if (channel_still_open()) {
- /* some client connections are still open */
- if (control_persist_exit_time > 0)
- debug2("%s: cancel scheduled exit", __func__);
- control_persist_exit_time = 0;
- } else if (control_persist_exit_time <= 0) {
- /* a client connection has recently closed */
- control_persist_exit_time = monotime() +
- (time_t)options.control_persist_timeout;
- debug2("%s: schedule exit in %d seconds", __func__,
- options.control_persist_timeout);
- }
- /* else we are already counting down to the timeout */
-}
-
-#define SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS ":/.-_"
-static int
-client_x11_display_valid(const char *display)
-{
- size_t i, dlen;
-
- dlen = strlen(display);
- for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) {
- if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) &&
- strchr(SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS, display[i]) == NULL) {
- debug("Invalid character '%c' in DISPLAY", display[i]);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-#define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
-void
-client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
- u_int trusted, u_int timeout, char **_proto, char **_data)
-{
- char cmd[1024];
- char line[512];
- char xdisplay[512];
- static char proto[512], data[512];
- FILE *f;
- int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i;
- char *xauthdir, *xauthfile;
- struct stat st;
- u_int now;
-
- xauthdir = xauthfile = NULL;
- *_proto = proto;
- *_data = data;
- proto[0] = data[0] = '\0';
-
- if (xauth_path == NULL ||(stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1)) {
- debug("No xauth program.");
- } else if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) {
- logit("DISPLAY '%s' invalid, falling back to fake xauth data",
- display);
- } else {
- if (display == NULL) {
- debug("x11_get_proto: DISPLAY not set");
- return;
- }
- /*
- * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does
- * not match an authorization entry. For this we
- * just try "xauth list unix:displaynum.screennum".
- * XXX: "localhost" match to determine FamilyLocal
- * is not perfect.
- */
- if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) {
- snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s",
- display + 10);
- display = xdisplay;
- }
- if (trusted == 0) {
- xauthdir = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
- xauthfile = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
- mktemp_proto(xauthdir, MAXPATHLEN);
- if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) != NULL) {
- do_unlink = 1;
- snprintf(xauthfile, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/xauthfile",
- xauthdir);
- snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
- "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO
- " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
- xauth_path, xauthfile, display, timeout);
- debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
- if (system(cmd) == 0)
- generated = 1;
- if (x11_refuse_time == 0) {
- now = monotime() + 1;
- if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now)
- x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX;
- else
- x11_refuse_time = now + timeout;
- }
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * When in untrusted mode, we read the cookie only if it was
- * successfully generated as an untrusted one in the step
- * above.
- */
- if (trusted || generated) {
- snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
- "%s %s%s list %s 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
- xauth_path,
- generated ? "-f " : "" ,
- generated ? xauthfile : "",
- display);
- debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
- f = popen(cmd, "r");
- if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) &&
- sscanf(line, "%*s %511s %511s", proto, data) == 2)
- got_data = 1;
- if (f)
- pclose(f);
- } else
- error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: "
- "xauth key data not generated");
- }
-
- if (do_unlink) {
- unlink(xauthfile);
- rmdir(xauthdir);
- }
- free(xauthdir);
- free(xauthfile);
-
- /*
- * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
- * data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the
- * response anyway, and substitute this data. The X11
- * server, however, will ignore this fake data and use
- * whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise
- * for the local connection.
- */
- if (!got_data) {
- u_int32_t rnd = 0;
-
- logit("Warning: No xauth data; "
- "using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding.");
- strlcpy(proto, SSH_X11_PROTO, sizeof proto);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
- if (i % 4 == 0)
- rnd = arc4random();
- snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x",
- rnd & 0xff);
- rnd >>= 8;
- }
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * This is called when the interactive is entered. This checks if there is
- * an EOF coming on stdin. We must check this explicitly, as select() does
- * not appear to wake up when redirecting from /dev/null.
- */
-
-static void
-client_check_initial_eof_on_stdin(void)
-{
- int len;
- char buf[1];
-
- /*
- * If standard input is to be "redirected from /dev/null", we simply
- * mark that we have seen an EOF and send an EOF message to the
- * server. Otherwise, we try to read a single character; it appears
- * that for some files, such /dev/null, select() never wakes up for
- * read for this descriptor, which means that we never get EOF. This
- * way we will get the EOF if stdin comes from /dev/null or similar.
- */
- if (stdin_null_flag) {
- /* Fake EOF on stdin. */
- debug("Sending eof.");
- stdin_eof = 1;
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF);
- packet_send();
- } else {
- enter_non_blocking();
-
- /* Check for immediate EOF on stdin. */
- len = read(fileno(stdin), buf, 1);
- if (len == 0) {
- /*
- * EOF. Record that we have seen it and send
- * EOF to server.
- */
- debug("Sending eof.");
- stdin_eof = 1;
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF);
- packet_send();
- } else if (len > 0) {
- /*
- * Got data. We must store the data in the buffer,
- * and also process it as an escape character if
- * appropriate.
- */
- if ((u_char) buf[0] == escape_char1)
- escape_pending1 = 1;
- else
- buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, buf, 1);
- }
- leave_non_blocking();
- }
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Make packets from buffered stdin data, and buffer them for sending to the
- * connection.
- */
-
-static void
-client_make_packets_from_stdin_data(void)
-{
- u_int len;
-
- /* Send buffered stdin data to the server. */
- while (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0 &&
- packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
- len = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer);
- /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */
- if (len > packet_get_maxsize())
- len = packet_get_maxsize();
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA);
- packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer), len);
- packet_send();
- buffer_consume(&stdin_buffer, len);
- /* If we have a pending EOF, send it now. */
- if (stdin_eof && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF);
- packet_send();
- }
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Checks if the client window has changed, and sends a packet about it to
- * the server if so. The actual change is detected elsewhere (by a software
- * interrupt on Unix); this just checks the flag and sends a message if
- * appropriate.
- */
-
-static void
-client_check_window_change(void)
-{
- struct winsize ws;
-
- if (! received_window_change_signal)
- return;
- /** XXX race */
- received_window_change_signal = 0;
-
- debug2("client_check_window_change: changed");
-
- if (compat20) {
- channel_send_window_changes();
- } else {
- if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
- return;
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE);
- packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
- packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
- packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
- packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
- packet_send();
- }
-}
-
-static void
-client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- struct global_confirm *gc;
-
- if ((gc = TAILQ_FIRST(&global_confirms)) == NULL)
- return;
- if (gc->cb != NULL)
- gc->cb(type, seq, gc->ctx);
- if (--gc->ref_count <= 0) {
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&global_confirms, gc, entry);
- explicit_bzero(gc, sizeof(*gc));
- free(gc);
- }
-
- packet_set_alive_timeouts(0);
-}
-
-static void
-server_alive_check(void)
-{
- if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.server_alive_count_max) {
- logit("Timeout, server %s not responding.", host);
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring("keepalive at openssh.com");
- packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */
- packet_send();
- /* Insert an empty placeholder to maintain ordering */
- client_register_global_confirm(NULL, NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * Waits until the client can do something (some data becomes available on
- * one of the file descriptors).
- */
-static void
-client_wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp,
- int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, int rekeying)
-{
- struct timeval tv, *tvp;
- int timeout_secs;
- time_t minwait_secs = 0, server_alive_time = 0, now = monotime();
- int ret;
-
- /* Add any selections by the channel mechanism. */
- channel_prepare_select(readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp,
- &minwait_secs, rekeying);
-
- if (!compat20) {
- /* Read from the connection, unless our buffers are full. */
- if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) < buffer_high &&
- buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) < buffer_high &&
- channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
- FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
- /*
- * Read from stdin, unless we have seen EOF or have very much
- * buffered data to send to the server.
- */
- if (!stdin_eof && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
- FD_SET(fileno(stdin), *readsetp);
-
- /* Select stdout/stderr if have data in buffer. */
- if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0)
- FD_SET(fileno(stdout), *writesetp);
- if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0)
- FD_SET(fileno(stderr), *writesetp);
- } else {
- /* channel_prepare_select could have closed the last channel */
- if (session_closed && !channel_still_open() &&
- !packet_have_data_to_write()) {
- /* clear mask since we did not call select() */
- memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
- memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
- return;
- } else {
- FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
- }
- }
-
- /* Select server connection if have data to write to the server. */
- if (packet_have_data_to_write())
- FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp);
-
- /*
- * Wait for something to happen. This will suspend the process until
- * some selected descriptor can be read, written, or has some other
- * event pending, or a timeout expires.
- */
-
- timeout_secs = INT_MAX; /* we use INT_MAX to mean no timeout */
- if (options.server_alive_interval > 0 && compat20) {
- timeout_secs = options.server_alive_interval;
- server_alive_time = now + options.server_alive_interval;
- }
- if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && compat20 && !rekeying)
- timeout_secs = MIN(timeout_secs, packet_get_rekey_timeout());
- set_control_persist_exit_time();
- if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) {
- timeout_secs = MIN(timeout_secs,
- control_persist_exit_time - now);
- if (timeout_secs < 0)
- timeout_secs = 0;
- }
- if (minwait_secs != 0)
- timeout_secs = MIN(timeout_secs, (int)minwait_secs);
- if (timeout_secs == INT_MAX)
- tvp = NULL;
- else {
- tv.tv_sec = timeout_secs;
- tv.tv_usec = 0;
- tvp = &tv;
- }
-
- ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp);
- if (ret < 0) {
- char buf[100];
-
- /*
- * We have to clear the select masks, because we return.
- * We have to return, because the mainloop checks for the flags
- * set by the signal handlers.
- */
- memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
- memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
-
- if (errno == EINTR)
- return;
- /* Note: we might still have data in the buffers. */
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "select: %s\r\n", strerror(errno));
- buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
- quit_pending = 1;
- } else if (ret == 0) {
- /*
- * Timeout. Could have been either keepalive or rekeying.
- * Keepalive we check here, rekeying is checked in clientloop.
- */
- if (server_alive_time != 0 && server_alive_time <= monotime())
- server_alive_check();
- }
-
-}
-
-static void
-client_suspend_self(Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr)
-{
- /* Flush stdout and stderr buffers. */
- if (buffer_len(bout) > 0)
- atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(bout),
- buffer_len(bout));
- if (buffer_len(berr) > 0)
- atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(berr),
- buffer_len(berr));
-
- leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
-
- /*
- * Free (and clear) the buffer to reduce the amount of data that gets
- * written to swap.
- */
- buffer_free(bin);
- buffer_free(bout);
- buffer_free(berr);
-
- /* Send the suspend signal to the program itself. */
- kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP);
-
- /* Reset window sizes in case they have changed */
- received_window_change_signal = 1;
-
- /* OK, we have been continued by the user. Reinitialize buffers. */
- buffer_init(bin);
- buffer_init(bout);
- buffer_init(berr);
-
- enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
-}
-
-static void
-client_process_net_input(fd_set *readset)
-{
- int len, cont = 0;
- char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ];
-
- /*
- * Read input from the server, and add any such data to the buffer of
- * the packet subsystem.
- */
- if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
- /* Read as much as possible. */
- len = roaming_read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf), &cont);
- if (len == 0 && cont == 0) {
- /*
- * Received EOF. The remote host has closed the
- * connection.
- */
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
- "Connection to %.300s closed by remote host.\r\n",
- host);
- buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
- quit_pending = 1;
- return;
- }
- /*
- * There is a kernel bug on Solaris that causes select to
- * sometimes wake up even though there is no data available.
- */
- if (len < 0 &&
- (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
- len = 0;
-
- if (len < 0) {
- /*
- * An error has encountered. Perhaps there is a
- * network problem.
- */
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
- "Read from remote host %.300s: %.100s\r\n",
- host, strerror(errno));
- buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
- quit_pending = 1;
- return;
- }
- packet_process_incoming(buf, len);
- }
-}
-
-static void
-client_status_confirm(int type, Channel *c, void *ctx)
-{
- struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = (struct channel_reply_ctx *)ctx;
- char errmsg[256];
- int tochan;
-
- /*
- * If a TTY was explicitly requested, then a failure to allocate
- * one is fatal.
- */
- if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY &&
- (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE ||
- options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES))
- cr->action = CONFIRM_CLOSE;
-
- /* XXX supress on mux _client_ quietmode */
- tochan = options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR &&
- c->ctl_chan != -1 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE;
-
- if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
- debug2("%s request accepted on channel %d",
- cr->request_type, c->self);
- } else if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
- if (tochan) {
- snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg),
- "%s request failed\r\n", cr->request_type);
- } else {
- snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg),
- "%s request failed on channel %d",
- cr->request_type, c->self);
- }
- /* If error occurred on primary session channel, then exit */
- if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE && c->self == session_ident)
- fatal("%s", errmsg);
- /*
- * If error occurred on mux client, append to
- * their stderr.
- */
- if (tochan) {
- buffer_append(&c->extended, errmsg,
- strlen(errmsg));
- } else
- error("%s", errmsg);
- if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY) {
- /*
- * If a TTY allocation error occurred, then arrange
- * for the correct TTY to leave raw mode.
- */
- if (c->self == session_ident)
- leave_raw_mode(0);
- else
- mux_tty_alloc_failed(c);
- } else if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE) {
- chan_read_failed(c);
- chan_write_failed(c);
- }
- }
- free(cr);
-}
-
-static void
-client_abandon_status_confirm(Channel *c, void *ctx)
-{
- free(ctx);
-}
-
-void
-client_expect_confirm(int id, const char *request,
- enum confirm_action action)
-{
- struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cr));
-
- cr->request_type = request;
- cr->action = action;
-
- channel_register_status_confirm(id, client_status_confirm,
- client_abandon_status_confirm, cr);
-}
-
-void
-client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *cb, void *ctx)
-{
- struct global_confirm *gc, *last_gc;
-
- /* Coalesce identical callbacks */
- last_gc = TAILQ_LAST(&global_confirms, global_confirms);
- if (last_gc && last_gc->cb == cb && last_gc->ctx == ctx) {
- if (++last_gc->ref_count >= INT_MAX)
- fatal("%s: last_gc->ref_count = %d",
- __func__, last_gc->ref_count);
- return;
- }
-
- gc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*gc));
- gc->cb = cb;
- gc->ctx = ctx;
- gc->ref_count = 1;
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&global_confirms, gc, entry);
-}
-
-static void
-process_cmdline(void)
-{
- void (*handler)(int);
- char *s, *cmd, *cancel_host;
- int delete = 0, local = 0, remote = 0, dynamic = 0;
- int cancel_port, ok;
- Forward fwd;
-
- memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
- fwd.listen_host = fwd.connect_host = NULL;
-
- leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
- handler = signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
- cmd = s = read_passphrase("\r\nssh> ", RP_ECHO);
- if (s == NULL)
- goto out;
- while (isspace((u_char)*s))
- s++;
- if (*s == '-')
- s++; /* Skip cmdline '-', if any */
- if (*s == '\0')
- goto out;
-
- if (*s == 'h' || *s == 'H' || *s == '?') {
- logit("Commands:");
- logit(" -L[bind_address:]port:host:hostport "
- "Request local forward");
- logit(" -R[bind_address:]port:host:hostport "
- "Request remote forward");
- logit(" -D[bind_address:]port "
- "Request dynamic forward");
- logit(" -KL[bind_address:]port "
- "Cancel local forward");
- logit(" -KR[bind_address:]port "
- "Cancel remote forward");
- logit(" -KD[bind_address:]port "
- "Cancel dynamic forward");
- if (!options.permit_local_command)
- goto out;
- logit(" !args "
- "Execute local command");
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (*s == '!' && options.permit_local_command) {
- s++;
- ssh_local_cmd(s);
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (*s == 'K') {
- delete = 1;
- s++;
- }
- if (*s == 'L')
- local = 1;
- else if (*s == 'R')
- remote = 1;
- else if (*s == 'D')
- dynamic = 1;
- else {
- logit("Invalid command.");
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (delete && !compat20) {
- logit("Not supported for SSH protocol version 1.");
- goto out;
- }
-
- while (isspace((u_char)*++s))
- ;
-
- /* XXX update list of forwards in options */
- if (delete) {
- cancel_port = 0;
- cancel_host = hpdelim(&s); /* may be NULL */
- if (s != NULL) {
- cancel_port = a2port(s);
- cancel_host = cleanhostname(cancel_host);
- } else {
- cancel_port = a2port(cancel_host);
- cancel_host = NULL;
- }
- if (cancel_port <= 0) {
- logit("Bad forwarding close port");
- goto out;
- }
- if (remote)
- ok = channel_request_rforward_cancel(cancel_host,
- cancel_port) == 0;
- else if (dynamic)
- ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(cancel_host,
- cancel_port, 0, options.gateway_ports) > 0;
- else
- ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(cancel_host,
- cancel_port, CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC,
- options.gateway_ports) > 0;
- if (!ok) {
- logit("Unkown port forwarding.");
- goto out;
- }
- logit("Canceled forwarding.");
- } else {
- if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, dynamic, remote)) {
- logit("Bad forwarding specification.");
- goto out;
- }
- if (local || dynamic) {
- if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(fwd.listen_host,
- fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_host,
- fwd.connect_port, options.gateway_ports)) {
- logit("Port forwarding failed.");
- goto out;
- }
- } else {
- if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(fwd.listen_host,
- fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_host,
- fwd.connect_port) < 0) {
- logit("Port forwarding failed.");
- goto out;
- }
- }
- logit("Forwarding port.");
- }
-
-out:
- signal(SIGINT, handler);
- enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
- free(cmd);
- free(fwd.listen_host);
- free(fwd.connect_host);
-}
-
-/* reasons to suppress output of an escape command in help output */
-#define SUPPRESS_NEVER 0 /* never suppress, always show */
-#define SUPPRESS_PROTO1 1 /* don't show in protocol 1 sessions */
-#define SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT 2 /* don't show in mux client sessions */
-#define SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER 4 /* don't show in mux master sessions */
-#define SUPPRESS_SYSLOG 8 /* don't show when logging to syslog */
-struct escape_help_text {
- const char *cmd;
- const char *text;
- unsigned int flags;
-};
-static struct escape_help_text esc_txt[] = {
- {".", "terminate session", SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER},
- {".", "terminate connection (and any multiplexed sessions)",
- SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
- {"B", "send a BREAK to the remote system", SUPPRESS_PROTO1},
- {"C", "open a command line", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
- {"R", "request rekey", SUPPRESS_PROTO1},
- {"V/v", "decrease/increase verbosity (LogLevel)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
- {"^Z", "suspend ssh", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
- {"#", "list forwarded connections", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
- {"&", "background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)",
- SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
- {"?", "this message", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
-};
-
-static void
-print_escape_help(Buffer *b, int escape_char, int protocol2, int mux_client,
- int using_stderr)
-{
- unsigned int i, suppress_flags;
- char string[1024];
-
- snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c?\r\n"
- "Supported escape sequences:\r\n", escape_char);
- buffer_append(b, string, strlen(string));
-
- suppress_flags = (protocol2 ? 0 : SUPPRESS_PROTO1) |
- (mux_client ? SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT : 0) |
- (mux_client ? 0 : SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER) |
- (using_stderr ? 0 : SUPPRESS_SYSLOG);
-
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(esc_txt)/sizeof(esc_txt[0]); i++) {
- if (esc_txt[i].flags & suppress_flags)
- continue;
- snprintf(string, sizeof string, " %c%-3s - %s\r\n",
- escape_char, esc_txt[i].cmd, esc_txt[i].text);
- buffer_append(b, string, strlen(string));
- }
-
- snprintf(string, sizeof string,
- " %c%c - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n"
- "(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after "
- "newline.)\r\n", escape_char, escape_char);
- buffer_append(b, string, strlen(string));
-}
-
-/*
- * Process the characters one by one, call with c==NULL for proto1 case.
- */
-static int
-process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr,
- char *buf, int len)
-{
- char string[1024];
- pid_t pid;
- int bytes = 0;
- u_int i;
- u_char ch;
- char *s;
- int *escape_pendingp, escape_char;
- struct escape_filter_ctx *efc;
-
- if (c == NULL) {
- escape_pendingp = &escape_pending1;
- escape_char = escape_char1;
- } else {
- if (c->filter_ctx == NULL)
- return 0;
- efc = (struct escape_filter_ctx *)c->filter_ctx;
- escape_pendingp = &efc->escape_pending;
- escape_char = efc->escape_char;
- }
-
- if (len <= 0)
- return (0);
-
- for (i = 0; i < (u_int)len; i++) {
- /* Get one character at a time. */
- ch = buf[i];
-
- if (*escape_pendingp) {
- /* We have previously seen an escape character. */
- /* Clear the flag now. */
- *escape_pendingp = 0;
-
- /* Process the escaped character. */
- switch (ch) {
- case '.':
- /* Terminate the connection. */
- snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c.\r\n",
- escape_char);
- buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
-
- if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) {
- chan_read_failed(c);
- chan_write_failed(c);
- if (c->detach_user)
- c->detach_user(c->self, NULL);
- c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED;
- buffer_clear(&c->input);
- chan_ibuf_empty(c);
- return 0;
- } else
- quit_pending = 1;
- return -1;
-
- case 'Z' - 64:
- /* XXX support this for mux clients */
- if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) {
- char b[16];
- noescape:
- if (ch == 'Z' - 64)
- snprintf(b, sizeof b, "^Z");
- else
- snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%c", ch);
- snprintf(string, sizeof string,
- "%c%s escape not available to "
- "multiplexed sessions\r\n",
- escape_char, b);
- buffer_append(berr, string,
- strlen(string));
- continue;
- }
- /* Suspend the program. Inform the user */
- snprintf(string, sizeof string,
- "%c^Z [suspend ssh]\r\n", escape_char);
- buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
-
- /* Restore terminal modes and suspend. */
- client_suspend_self(bin, bout, berr);
-
- /* We have been continued. */
- continue;
-
- case 'B':
- if (compat20) {
- snprintf(string, sizeof string,
- "%cB\r\n", escape_char);
- buffer_append(berr, string,
- strlen(string));
- channel_request_start(c->self,
- "break", 0);
- packet_put_int(1000);
- packet_send();
- }
- continue;
-
- case 'R':
- if (compat20) {
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
- logit("Server does not "
- "support re-keying");
- else
- need_rekeying = 1;
- }
- continue;
-
- case 'V':
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case 'v':
- if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
- goto noescape;
- if (!log_is_on_stderr()) {
- snprintf(string, sizeof string,
- "%c%c [Logging to syslog]\r\n",
- escape_char, ch);
- buffer_append(berr, string,
- strlen(string));
- continue;
- }
- if (ch == 'V' && options.log_level >
- SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
- log_change_level(--options.log_level);
- if (ch == 'v' && options.log_level <
- SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
- log_change_level(++options.log_level);
- snprintf(string, sizeof string,
- "%c%c [LogLevel %s]\r\n", escape_char, ch,
- log_level_name(options.log_level));
- buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
- continue;
-
- case '&':
- if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
- goto noescape;
- /*
- * Detach the program (continue to serve
- * connections, but put in background and no
- * more new connections).
- */
- /* Restore tty modes. */
- leave_raw_mode(
- options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
-
- /* Stop listening for new connections. */
- channel_stop_listening();
-
- snprintf(string, sizeof string,
- "%c& [backgrounded]\n", escape_char);
- buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
-
- /* Fork into background. */
- pid = fork();
- if (pid < 0) {
- error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- continue;
- }
- if (pid != 0) { /* This is the parent. */
- /* The parent just exits. */
- exit(0);
- }
- /* The child continues serving connections. */
- if (compat20) {
- buffer_append(bin, "\004", 1);
- /* fake EOF on stdin */
- return -1;
- } else if (!stdin_eof) {
- /*
- * Sending SSH_CMSG_EOF alone does not
- * always appear to be enough. So we
- * try to send an EOF character first.
- */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA);
- packet_put_string("\004", 1);
- packet_send();
- /* Close stdin. */
- stdin_eof = 1;
- if (buffer_len(bin) == 0) {
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF);
- packet_send();
- }
- }
- continue;
-
- case '?':
- print_escape_help(berr, escape_char, compat20,
- (c && c->ctl_chan != -1),
- log_is_on_stderr());
- continue;
-
- case '#':
- snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c#\r\n",
- escape_char);
- buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
- s = channel_open_message();
- buffer_append(berr, s, strlen(s));
- free(s);
- continue;
-
- case 'C':
- if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
- goto noescape;
- process_cmdline();
- continue;
-
- default:
- if (ch != escape_char) {
- buffer_put_char(bin, escape_char);
- bytes++;
- }
- /* Escaped characters fall through here */
- break;
- }
- } else {
- /*
- * The previous character was not an escape char.
- * Check if this is an escape.
- */
- if (last_was_cr && ch == escape_char) {
- /*
- * It is. Set the flag and continue to
- * next character.
- */
- *escape_pendingp = 1;
- continue;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Normal character. Record whether it was a newline,
- * and append it to the buffer.
- */
- last_was_cr = (ch == '\r' || ch == '\n');
- buffer_put_char(bin, ch);
- bytes++;
- }
- return bytes;
-}
-
-static void
-client_process_input(fd_set *readset)
-{
- int len;
- char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ];
-
- /* Read input from stdin. */
- if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdin), readset)) {
- /* Read as much as possible. */
- len = read(fileno(stdin), buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (len < 0 &&
- (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
- return; /* we'll try again later */
- if (len <= 0) {
- /*
- * Received EOF or error. They are treated
- * similarly, except that an error message is printed
- * if it was an error condition.
- */
- if (len < 0) {
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "read: %.100s\r\n",
- strerror(errno));
- buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
- }
- /* Mark that we have seen EOF. */
- stdin_eof = 1;
- /*
- * Send an EOF message to the server unless there is
- * data in the buffer. If there is data in the
- * buffer, no message will be sent now. Code
- * elsewhere will send the EOF when the buffer
- * becomes empty if stdin_eof is set.
- */
- if (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF);
- packet_send();
- }
- } else if (escape_char1 == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) {
- /*
- * Normal successful read, and no escape character.
- * Just append the data to buffer.
- */
- buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, buf, len);
- } else {
- /*
- * Normal, successful read. But we have an escape
- * character and have to process the characters one
- * by one.
- */
- if (process_escapes(NULL, &stdin_buffer,
- &stdout_buffer, &stderr_buffer, buf, len) == -1)
- return;
- }
- }
-}
-
-static void
-client_process_output(fd_set *writeset)
-{
- int len;
- char buf[100];
-
- /* Write buffered output to stdout. */
- if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdout), writeset)) {
- /* Write as much data as possible. */
- len = write(fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer),
- buffer_len(&stdout_buffer));
- if (len <= 0) {
- if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
- errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
- len = 0;
- else {
- /*
- * An error or EOF was encountered. Put an
- * error message to stderr buffer.
- */
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
- "write stdout: %.50s\r\n", strerror(errno));
- buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
- quit_pending = 1;
- return;
- }
- }
- /* Consume printed data from the buffer. */
- buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len);
- }
- /* Write buffered output to stderr. */
- if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stderr), writeset)) {
- /* Write as much data as possible. */
- len = write(fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer),
- buffer_len(&stderr_buffer));
- if (len <= 0) {
- if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
- errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
- len = 0;
- else {
- /*
- * EOF or error, but can't even print
- * error message.
- */
- quit_pending = 1;
- return;
- }
- }
- /* Consume printed characters from the buffer. */
- buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Get packets from the connection input buffer, and process them as long as
- * there are packets available.
- *
- * Any unknown packets received during the actual
- * session cause the session to terminate. This is
- * intended to make debugging easier since no
- * confirmations are sent. Any compatible protocol
- * extensions must be negotiated during the
- * preparatory phase.
- */
-
-static void
-client_process_buffered_input_packets(void)
-{
- dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending,
- compat20 ? xxx_kex : NULL);
-}
-
-/* scan buf[] for '~' before sending data to the peer */
-
-/* Helper: allocate a new escape_filter_ctx and fill in its escape char */
-void *
-client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int escape_char)
-{
- struct escape_filter_ctx *ret;
-
- ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
- ret->escape_pending = 0;
- ret->escape_char = escape_char;
- return (void *)ret;
-}
-
-/* Free the escape filter context on channel free */
-void
-client_filter_cleanup(int cid, void *ctx)
-{
- free(ctx);
-}
-
-int
-client_simple_escape_filter(Channel *c, char *buf, int len)
-{
- if (c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE)
- return 0;
-
- return process_escapes(c, &c->input, &c->output, &c->extended,
- buf, len);
-}
-
-static void
-client_channel_closed(int id, void *arg)
-{
- channel_cancel_cleanup(id);
- session_closed = 1;
- leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
-}
-
-/*
- * Implements the interactive session with the server. This is called after
- * the user has been authenticated, and a command has been started on the
- * remote host. If escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, it is the character
- * used as an escape character for terminating or suspending the session.
- */
-
-int
-client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
-{
- fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
- double start_time, total_time;
- int max_fd = 0, max_fd2 = 0, len, rekeying = 0;
- u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
- u_int nalloc = 0;
- char buf[100];
-
- debug("Entering interactive session.");
-
- start_time = get_current_time();
-
- /* Initialize variables. */
- escape_pending1 = 0;
- last_was_cr = 1;
- exit_status = -1;
- stdin_eof = 0;
- buffer_high = 64 * 1024;
- connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
- connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
- max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
-
- if (!compat20) {
- /* enable nonblocking unless tty */
- if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)))
- set_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
- if (!isatty(fileno(stdout)))
- set_nonblock(fileno(stdout));
- if (!isatty(fileno(stderr)))
- set_nonblock(fileno(stderr));
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stdin));
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stdout));
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stderr));
- }
- quit_pending = 0;
- escape_char1 = escape_char_arg;
-
- /* Initialize buffers. */
- buffer_init(&stdin_buffer);
- buffer_init(&stdout_buffer);
- buffer_init(&stderr_buffer);
-
- client_init_dispatch();
-
- /*
- * Set signal handlers, (e.g. to restore non-blocking mode)
- * but don't overwrite SIG_IGN, matches behaviour from rsh(1)
- */
- if (signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
- signal(SIGHUP, signal_handler);
- if (signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
- signal(SIGINT, signal_handler);
- if (signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
- signal(SIGQUIT, signal_handler);
- if (signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
- signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler);
- signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler);
-
- if (have_pty)
- enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
-
- if (compat20) {
- session_ident = ssh2_chan_id;
- if (session_ident != -1) {
- if (escape_char_arg != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) {
- channel_register_filter(session_ident,
- client_simple_escape_filter, NULL,
- client_filter_cleanup,
- client_new_escape_filter_ctx(
- escape_char_arg));
- }
- channel_register_cleanup(session_ident,
- client_channel_closed, 0);
- }
- } else {
- /* Check if we should immediately send eof on stdin. */
- client_check_initial_eof_on_stdin();
- }
-
- /* Main loop of the client for the interactive session mode. */
- while (!quit_pending) {
-
- /* Process buffered packets sent by the server. */
- client_process_buffered_input_packets();
-
- if (compat20 && session_closed && !channel_still_open())
- break;
-
- rekeying = (xxx_kex != NULL && !xxx_kex->done);
-
- if (rekeying) {
- debug("rekeying in progress");
- } else {
- /*
- * Make packets of buffered stdin data, and buffer
- * them for sending to the server.
- */
- if (!compat20)
- client_make_packets_from_stdin_data();
-
- /*
- * Make packets from buffered channel data, and
- * enqueue them for sending to the server.
- */
- if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
- channel_output_poll();
-
- /*
- * Check if the window size has changed, and buffer a
- * message about it to the server if so.
- */
- client_check_window_change();
-
- if (quit_pending)
- break;
- }
- /*
- * Wait until we have something to do (something becomes
- * available on one of the descriptors).
- */
- max_fd2 = max_fd;
- client_wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset,
- &max_fd2, &nalloc, rekeying);
-
- if (quit_pending)
- break;
-
- /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
- if (!rekeying) {
- channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
- if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) {
- debug("need rekeying");
- xxx_kex->done = 0;
- kex_send_kexinit(xxx_kex);
- need_rekeying = 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* Buffer input from the connection. */
- client_process_net_input(readset);
-
- if (quit_pending)
- break;
-
- if (!compat20) {
- /* Buffer data from stdin */
- client_process_input(readset);
- /*
- * Process output to stdout and stderr. Output to
- * the connection is processed elsewhere (above).
- */
- client_process_output(writeset);
- }
-
- if (session_resumed) {
- connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
- connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, connection_out);
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, connection_in);
- session_resumed = 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * Send as much buffered packet data as possible to the
- * sender.
- */
- if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset))
- packet_write_poll();
-
- /*
- * If we are a backgrounded control master, and the
- * timeout has expired without any active client
- * connections, then quit.
- */
- if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) {
- if (monotime() >= control_persist_exit_time) {
- debug("ControlPersist timeout expired");
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- free(readset);
- free(writeset);
-
- /* Terminate the session. */
-
- /* Stop watching for window change. */
- signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL);
-
- if (compat20) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
- packet_put_int(SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION);
- packet_put_cstring("disconnected by user");
- packet_put_cstring(""); /* language tag */
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- }
-
- channel_free_all();
-
- if (have_pty)
- leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
-
- /* restore blocking io */
- if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)))
- unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
- if (!isatty(fileno(stdout)))
- unset_nonblock(fileno(stdout));
- if (!isatty(fileno(stderr)))
- unset_nonblock(fileno(stderr));
-
- /*
- * If there was no shell or command requested, there will be no remote
- * exit status to be returned. In that case, clear error code if the
- * connection was deliberately terminated at this end.
- */
- if (no_shell_flag && received_signal == SIGTERM) {
- received_signal = 0;
- exit_status = 0;
- }
-
- if (received_signal)
- fatal("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal);
-
- /*
- * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating
- * that the connection has been closed.
- */
- if (have_pty && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) {
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
- "Connection to %.64s closed.\r\n", host);
- buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
- }
-
- /* Output any buffered data for stdout. */
- if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) {
- len = atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stdout),
- buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), buffer_len(&stdout_buffer));
- if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != buffer_len(&stdout_buffer))
- error("Write failed flushing stdout buffer.");
- else
- buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len);
- }
-
- /* Output any buffered data for stderr. */
- if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) {
- len = atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr),
- buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), buffer_len(&stderr_buffer));
- if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != buffer_len(&stderr_buffer))
- error("Write failed flushing stderr buffer.");
- else
- buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len);
- }
-
- /* Clear and free any buffers. */
- memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
- buffer_free(&stdin_buffer);
- buffer_free(&stdout_buffer);
- buffer_free(&stderr_buffer);
-
- /* Report bytes transferred, and transfer rates. */
- total_time = get_current_time() - start_time;
- packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);
- packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);
- verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes, in %.1f seconds",
- (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes, total_time);
- if (total_time > 0)
- verbose("Bytes per second: sent %.1f, received %.1f",
- obytes / total_time, ibytes / total_time);
- /* Return the exit status of the program. */
- debug("Exit status %d", exit_status);
- return exit_status;
-}
-
-/*********/
-
-static void
-client_input_stdout_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- u_int data_len;
- char *data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
- packet_check_eom();
- buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, data, data_len);
- explicit_bzero(data, data_len);
- free(data);
-}
-static void
-client_input_stderr_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- u_int data_len;
- char *data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
- packet_check_eom();
- buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, data, data_len);
- explicit_bzero(data, data_len);
- free(data);
-}
-static void
-client_input_exit_status(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- exit_status = packet_get_int();
- packet_check_eom();
- /* Acknowledge the exit. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
- packet_send();
- /*
- * Must wait for packet to be sent since we are
- * exiting the loop.
- */
- packet_write_wait();
- /* Flag that we want to exit. */
- quit_pending = 1;
-}
-static void
-client_input_agent_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- Channel *c = NULL;
- int remote_id, sock;
-
- /* Read the remote channel number from the message. */
- remote_id = packet_get_int();
- packet_check_eom();
-
- /*
- * Get a connection to the local authentication agent (this may again
- * get forwarded).
- */
- sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket();
-
- /*
- * If we could not connect the agent, send an error message back to
- * the server. This should never happen unless the agent dies,
- * because authentication forwarding is only enabled if we have an
- * agent.
- */
- if (sock >= 0) {
- c = channel_new("", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock,
- -1, 0, 0, 0, "authentication agent connection", 1);
- c->remote_id = remote_id;
- c->force_drain = 1;
- }
- if (c == NULL) {
- packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
- packet_put_int(remote_id);
- } else {
- /* Send a confirmation to the remote host. */
- debug("Forwarding authentication connection.");
- packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
- packet_put_int(remote_id);
- packet_put_int(c->self);
- }
- packet_send();
-}
-
-static Channel *
-client_request_forwarded_tcpip(const char *request_type, int rchan)
-{
- Channel *c = NULL;
- char *listen_address, *originator_address;
- u_short listen_port, originator_port;
-
- /* Get rest of the packet */
- listen_address = packet_get_string(NULL);
- listen_port = packet_get_int();
- originator_address = packet_get_string(NULL);
- originator_port = packet_get_int();
- packet_check_eom();
-
- debug("client_request_forwarded_tcpip: listen %s port %d, "
- "originator %s port %d", listen_address, listen_port,
- originator_address, originator_port);
-
- c = channel_connect_by_listen_address(listen_port,
- "forwarded-tcpip", originator_address);
-
- free(originator_address);
- free(listen_address);
- return c;
-}
-
-static Channel *
-client_request_x11(const char *request_type, int rchan)
-{
- Channel *c = NULL;
- char *originator;
- u_short originator_port;
- int sock;
-
- if (!options.forward_x11) {
- error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding.");
- error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a "
- "malicious server.");
- return NULL;
- }
- if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) {
- verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout "
- "expired");
- return NULL;
- }
- originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_X11FWD) {
- debug2("buggy server: x11 request w/o originator_port");
- originator_port = 0;
- } else {
- originator_port = packet_get_int();
- }
- packet_check_eom();
- /* XXX check permission */
- debug("client_request_x11: request from %s %d", originator,
- originator_port);
- free(originator);
- sock = x11_connect_display();
- if (sock < 0)
- return NULL;
- c = channel_new("x11",
- SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
- CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1);
- c->force_drain = 1;
- return c;
-}
-
-static Channel *
-client_request_agent(const char *request_type, int rchan)
-{
- Channel *c = NULL;
- int sock;
-
- if (!options.forward_agent) {
- error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding.");
- error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a "
- "malicious server.");
- return NULL;
- }
- sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket();
- if (sock < 0)
- return NULL;
- c = channel_new("authentication agent connection",
- SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
- CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
- "authentication agent connection", 1);
- c->force_drain = 1;
- return c;
-}
-
-int
-client_request_tun_fwd(int tun_mode, int local_tun, int remote_tun)
-{
- Channel *c;
- int fd;
-
- if (tun_mode == SSH_TUNMODE_NO)
- return 0;
-
- if (!compat20) {
- error("Tunnel forwarding is not supported for protocol 1");
- return -1;
- }
-
- debug("Requesting tun unit %d in mode %d", local_tun, tun_mode);
-
- /* Open local tunnel device */
- if ((fd = tun_open(local_tun, tun_mode)) == -1) {
- error("Tunnel device open failed.");
- return -1;
- }
-
- c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1,
- CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
- c->datagram = 1;
-
-#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
- if (options.tun_open == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT)
- channel_register_filter(c->self, sys_tun_infilter,
- sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL);
-#endif
-
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
- packet_put_cstring("tun at openssh.com");
- packet_put_int(c->self);
- packet_put_int(c->local_window_max);
- packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
- packet_put_int(tun_mode);
- packet_put_int(remote_tun);
- packet_send();
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* XXXX move to generic input handler */
-static void
-client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- Channel *c = NULL;
- char *ctype;
- int rchan;
- u_int rmaxpack, rwindow, len;
-
- ctype = packet_get_string(&len);
- rchan = packet_get_int();
- rwindow = packet_get_int();
- rmaxpack = packet_get_int();
-
- debug("client_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d",
- ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack);
-
- if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-tcpip") == 0) {
- c = client_request_forwarded_tcpip(ctype, rchan);
- } else if (strcmp(ctype, "x11") == 0) {
- c = client_request_x11(ctype, rchan);
- } else if (strcmp(ctype, "auth-agent at openssh.com") == 0) {
- c = client_request_agent(ctype, rchan);
- }
-/* XXX duplicate : */
- if (c != NULL) {
- debug("confirm %s", ctype);
- c->remote_id = rchan;
- c->remote_window = rwindow;
- c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack;
- if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
- packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
- packet_put_int(c->self);
- packet_put_int(c->local_window);
- packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
- packet_send();
- }
- } else {
- debug("failure %s", ctype);
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
- packet_put_int(rchan);
- packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED);
- if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) {
- packet_put_cstring("open failed");
- packet_put_cstring("");
- }
- packet_send();
- }
- free(ctype);
-}
-static void
-client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- Channel *c = NULL;
- int exitval, id, reply, success = 0;
- char *rtype;
-
- id = packet_get_int();
- rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
- reply = packet_get_char();
-
- debug("client_input_channel_req: channel %d rtype %s reply %d",
- id, rtype, reply);
-
- if (id == -1) {
- error("client_input_channel_req: request for channel -1");
- } else if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) {
- error("client_input_channel_req: channel %d: "
- "unknown channel", id);
- } else if (strcmp(rtype, "eow at openssh.com") == 0) {
- packet_check_eom();
- chan_rcvd_eow(c);
- } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exit-status") == 0) {
- exitval = packet_get_int();
- if (c->ctl_chan != -1) {
- mux_exit_message(c, exitval);
- success = 1;
- } else if (id == session_ident) {
- /* Record exit value of local session */
- success = 1;
- exit_status = exitval;
- } else {
- /* Probably for a mux channel that has already closed */
- debug("%s: no sink for exit-status on channel %d",
- __func__, id);
- }
- packet_check_eom();
- }
- if (reply && c != NULL) {
- packet_start(success ?
- SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
- packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
- packet_send();
- }
- free(rtype);
-}
-static void
-client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- char *rtype;
- int want_reply;
- int success = 0;
-
- rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
- want_reply = packet_get_char();
- debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d",
- rtype, want_reply);
- if (want_reply) {
- packet_start(success ?
- SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- }
- free(rtype);
-}
-
-void
-client_session2_setup(int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem,
- const char *term, struct termios *tiop, int in_fd, Buffer *cmd, char **env)
-{
- int len;
- Channel *c = NULL;
-
- debug2("%s: id %d", __func__, id);
-
- if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL)
- fatal("client_session2_setup: channel %d: unknown channel", id);
-
- packet_set_interactive(want_tty,
- options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
-
- if (want_tty) {
- struct winsize ws;
-
- /* Store window size in the packet. */
- if (ioctl(in_fd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
- memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
-
- channel_request_start(id, "pty-req", 1);
- client_expect_confirm(id, "PTY allocation", CONFIRM_TTY);
- packet_put_cstring(term != NULL ? term : "");
- packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
- packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
- packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
- packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
- if (tiop == NULL)
- tiop = get_saved_tio();
- tty_make_modes(-1, tiop);
- packet_send();
- /* XXX wait for reply */
- c->client_tty = 1;
- }
-
- /* Transfer any environment variables from client to server */
- if (options.num_send_env != 0 && env != NULL) {
- int i, j, matched;
- char *name, *val;
-
- debug("Sending environment.");
- for (i = 0; env[i] != NULL; i++) {
- /* Split */
- name = xstrdup(env[i]);
- if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) {
- free(name);
- continue;
- }
- *val++ = '\0';
-
- matched = 0;
- for (j = 0; j < options.num_send_env; j++) {
- if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[j])) {
- matched = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!matched) {
- debug3("Ignored env %s", name);
- free(name);
- continue;
- }
-
- debug("Sending env %s = %s", name, val);
- channel_request_start(id, "env", 0);
- packet_put_cstring(name);
- packet_put_cstring(val);
- packet_send();
- free(name);
- }
- }
-
- len = buffer_len(cmd);
- if (len > 0) {
- if (len > 900)
- len = 900;
- if (want_subsystem) {
- debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s",
- len, (u_char*)buffer_ptr(cmd));
- channel_request_start(id, "subsystem", 1);
- client_expect_confirm(id, "subsystem", CONFIRM_CLOSE);
- } else {
- debug("Sending command: %.*s",
- len, (u_char*)buffer_ptr(cmd));
- channel_request_start(id, "exec", 1);
- client_expect_confirm(id, "exec", CONFIRM_CLOSE);
- }
- packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(cmd), buffer_len(cmd));
- packet_send();
- } else {
- channel_request_start(id, "shell", 1);
- client_expect_confirm(id, "shell", CONFIRM_CLOSE);
- packet_send();
- }
-}
-
-static void
-client_init_dispatch_20(void)
-{
- dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error);
-
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &client_input_channel_open);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &client_input_channel_req);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &channel_input_status_confirm);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &channel_input_status_confirm);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &client_input_global_request);
-
- /* rekeying */
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
-
- /* global request reply messages */
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &client_global_request_reply);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &client_global_request_reply);
-}
-
-static void
-client_init_dispatch_13(void)
-{
- dispatch_init(NULL);
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_close);
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_close_confirmation);
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN, &channel_input_port_open);
- dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS, &client_input_exit_status);
- dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA, &client_input_stderr_data);
- dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA, &client_input_stdout_data);
-
- dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN, options.forward_agent ?
- &client_input_agent_open : &deny_input_open);
- dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN, options.forward_x11 ?
- &x11_input_open : &deny_input_open);
-}
-
-static void
-client_init_dispatch_15(void)
-{
- client_init_dispatch_13();
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_ieof);
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, & channel_input_oclose);
-}
-
-static void
-client_init_dispatch(void)
-{
- if (compat20)
- client_init_dispatch_20();
- else if (compat13)
- client_init_dispatch_13();
- else
- client_init_dispatch_15();
-}
-
-void
-client_stop_mux(void)
-{
- if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
- unlink(options.control_path);
- /*
- * If we are in persist mode, or don't have a shell, signal that we
- * should close when all active channels are closed.
- */
- if (options.control_persist || no_shell_flag) {
- session_closed = 1;
- setproctitle("[stopped mux]");
- }
-}
-
-/* client specific fatal cleanup */
-void
-cleanup_exit(int i)
-{
- leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
- leave_non_blocking();
- if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
- unlink(options.control_path);
- ssh_kill_proxy_command();
- _exit(i);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/clientloop.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/clientloop.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/clientloop.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/clientloop.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,2731 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.286 2016/07/23 02:54:08 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * The main loop for the interactive session (client side).
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ *
+ * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h> /* MIN MAX */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "clientloop.h"
+#include "sshconnect.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+
+/* import options */
+extern Options options;
+
+/* Flag indicating that stdin should be redirected from /dev/null. */
+extern int stdin_null_flag;
+
+/* Flag indicating that no shell has been requested */
+extern int no_shell_flag;
+
+/* Flag indicating that ssh should daemonise after authentication is complete */
+extern int fork_after_authentication_flag;
+
+/* Control socket */
+extern int muxserver_sock; /* XXX use mux_client_cleanup() instead */
+
+/*
+ * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the
+ * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a
+ * configuration file.
+ */
+extern char *host;
+
+/*
+ * Flag to indicate that we have received a window change signal which has
+ * not yet been processed. This will cause a message indicating the new
+ * window size to be sent to the server a little later. This is volatile
+ * because this is updated in a signal handler.
+ */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t received_window_change_signal = 0;
+static volatile sig_atomic_t received_signal = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating whether the user's terminal is in non-blocking mode. */
+static int in_non_blocking_mode = 0;
+
+/* Time when backgrounded control master using ControlPersist should exit */
+static time_t control_persist_exit_time = 0;
+
+/* Common data for the client loop code. */
+volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; /* Set non-zero to quit the loop. */
+static int escape_char1; /* Escape character. (proto1 only) */
+static int escape_pending1; /* Last character was an escape (proto1 only) */
+static int last_was_cr; /* Last character was a newline. */
+static int exit_status; /* Used to store the command exit status. */
+static int stdin_eof; /* EOF has been encountered on stderr. */
+static Buffer stdin_buffer; /* Buffer for stdin data. */
+static Buffer stdout_buffer; /* Buffer for stdout data. */
+static Buffer stderr_buffer; /* Buffer for stderr data. */
+static u_int buffer_high; /* Soft max buffer size. */
+static int connection_in; /* Connection to server (input). */
+static int connection_out; /* Connection to server (output). */
+static int need_rekeying; /* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */
+static int session_closed; /* In SSH2: login session closed. */
+static u_int x11_refuse_time; /* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */
+
+static void client_init_dispatch(void);
+int session_ident = -1;
+
+/* Track escape per proto2 channel */
+struct escape_filter_ctx {
+ int escape_pending;
+ int escape_char;
+};
+
+/* Context for channel confirmation replies */
+struct channel_reply_ctx {
+ const char *request_type;
+ int id;
+ enum confirm_action action;
+};
+
+/* Global request success/failure callbacks */
+struct global_confirm {
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(global_confirm) entry;
+ global_confirm_cb *cb;
+ void *ctx;
+ int ref_count;
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(global_confirms, global_confirm);
+static struct global_confirms global_confirms =
+ TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(global_confirms);
+
+void ssh_process_session2_setup(int, int, int, Buffer *);
+
+/* Restores stdin to blocking mode. */
+
+static void
+leave_non_blocking(void)
+{
+ if (in_non_blocking_mode) {
+ unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
+ in_non_blocking_mode = 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Puts stdin terminal in non-blocking mode. */
+
+static void
+enter_non_blocking(void)
+{
+ in_non_blocking_mode = 1;
+ set_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signal handler for the window change signal (SIGWINCH). This just sets a
+ * flag indicating that the window has changed.
+ */
+/*ARGSUSED */
+static void
+window_change_handler(int sig)
+{
+ received_window_change_signal = 1;
+ signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signal handler for signals that cause the program to terminate. These
+ * signals must be trapped to restore terminal modes.
+ */
+/*ARGSUSED */
+static void
+signal_handler(int sig)
+{
+ received_signal = sig;
+ quit_pending = 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns current time in seconds from Jan 1, 1970 with the maximum
+ * available resolution.
+ */
+
+static double
+get_current_time(void)
+{
+ struct timeval tv;
+ gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
+ return (double) tv.tv_sec + (double) tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets control_persist_exit_time to the absolute time when the
+ * backgrounded control master should exit due to expiry of the
+ * ControlPersist timeout. Sets it to 0 if we are not a backgrounded
+ * control master process, or if there is no ControlPersist timeout.
+ */
+static void
+set_control_persist_exit_time(void)
+{
+ if (muxserver_sock == -1 || !options.control_persist
+ || options.control_persist_timeout == 0) {
+ /* not using a ControlPersist timeout */
+ control_persist_exit_time = 0;
+ } else if (channel_still_open()) {
+ /* some client connections are still open */
+ if (control_persist_exit_time > 0)
+ debug2("%s: cancel scheduled exit", __func__);
+ control_persist_exit_time = 0;
+ } else if (control_persist_exit_time <= 0) {
+ /* a client connection has recently closed */
+ control_persist_exit_time = monotime() +
+ (time_t)options.control_persist_timeout;
+ debug2("%s: schedule exit in %d seconds", __func__,
+ options.control_persist_timeout);
+ }
+ /* else we are already counting down to the timeout */
+}
+
+#define SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS ":/.-_"
+static int
+client_x11_display_valid(const char *display)
+{
+ size_t i, dlen;
+
+ if (display == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ dlen = strlen(display);
+ for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) {
+ if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) &&
+ strchr(SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS, display[i]) == NULL) {
+ debug("Invalid character '%c' in DISPLAY", display[i]);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
+#define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK 60
+int
+client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+ u_int trusted, u_int timeout, char **_proto, char **_data)
+{
+ char cmd[1024], line[512], xdisplay[512];
+ char xauthfile[PATH_MAX], xauthdir[PATH_MAX];
+ static char proto[512], data[512];
+ FILE *f;
+ int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i, r;
+ struct stat st;
+ u_int now, x11_timeout_real;
+
+ *_proto = proto;
+ *_data = data;
+ proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0';
+
+ if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) {
+ if (display != NULL)
+ logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding",
+ display);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (xauth_path != NULL && stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1) {
+ debug("No xauth program.");
+ xauth_path = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (xauth_path != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does
+ * not match an authorization entry. For this we
+ * just try "xauth list unix:displaynum.screennum".
+ * XXX: "localhost" match to determine FamilyLocal
+ * is not perfect.
+ */
+ if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) {
+ if ((r = snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s",
+ display + 10)) < 0 ||
+ (size_t)r >= sizeof(xdisplay)) {
+ error("%s: display name too long", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ display = xdisplay;
+ }
+ if (trusted == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Generate an untrusted X11 auth cookie.
+ *
+ * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive
+ * ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to
+ * avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server.
+ */
+ mktemp_proto(xauthdir, sizeof(xauthdir));
+ if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: mkdtemp: %s",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ do_unlink = 1;
+ if ((r = snprintf(xauthfile, sizeof(xauthfile),
+ "%s/xauthfile", xauthdir)) < 0 ||
+ (size_t)r >= sizeof(xauthfile)) {
+ error("%s: xauthfile path too long", __func__);
+ unlink(xauthfile);
+ rmdir(xauthdir);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (timeout >= UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK)
+ x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX;
+ else
+ x11_timeout_real = timeout + X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK;
+ if ((r = snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+ "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO
+ " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
+ xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
+ x11_timeout_real)) < 0 ||
+ (size_t)r >= sizeof(cmd))
+ fatal("%s: cmd too long", __func__);
+ debug2("%s: %s", __func__, cmd);
+ if (x11_refuse_time == 0) {
+ now = monotime() + 1;
+ if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now)
+ x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX;
+ else
+ x11_refuse_time = now + timeout;
+ channel_set_x11_refuse_time(x11_refuse_time);
+ }
+ if (system(cmd) == 0)
+ generated = 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * When in untrusted mode, we read the cookie only if it was
+ * successfully generated as an untrusted one in the step
+ * above.
+ */
+ if (trusted || generated) {
+ snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+ "%s %s%s list %s 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
+ xauth_path,
+ generated ? "-f " : "" ,
+ generated ? xauthfile : "",
+ display);
+ debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
+ f = popen(cmd, "r");
+ if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) &&
+ sscanf(line, "%*s %511s %511s", proto, data) == 2)
+ got_data = 1;
+ if (f)
+ pclose(f);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (do_unlink) {
+ unlink(xauthfile);
+ rmdir(xauthdir);
+ }
+
+ /* Don't fall back to fake X11 data for untrusted forwarding */
+ if (!trusted && !got_data) {
+ error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: "
+ "xauth key data not generated");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
+ * data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the
+ * response anyway, and substitute this data. The X11
+ * server, however, will ignore this fake data and use
+ * whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise
+ * for the local connection.
+ */
+ if (!got_data) {
+ u_int32_t rnd = 0;
+
+ logit("Warning: No xauth data; "
+ "using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding.");
+ strlcpy(proto, SSH_X11_PROTO, sizeof proto);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ if (i % 4 == 0)
+ rnd = arc4random();
+ snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x",
+ rnd & 0xff);
+ rnd >>= 8;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called when the interactive is entered. This checks if there is
+ * an EOF coming on stdin. We must check this explicitly, as select() does
+ * not appear to wake up when redirecting from /dev/null.
+ */
+
+static void
+client_check_initial_eof_on_stdin(void)
+{
+ int len;
+ char buf[1];
+
+ /*
+ * If standard input is to be "redirected from /dev/null", we simply
+ * mark that we have seen an EOF and send an EOF message to the
+ * server. Otherwise, we try to read a single character; it appears
+ * that for some files, such /dev/null, select() never wakes up for
+ * read for this descriptor, which means that we never get EOF. This
+ * way we will get the EOF if stdin comes from /dev/null or similar.
+ */
+ if (stdin_null_flag) {
+ /* Fake EOF on stdin. */
+ debug("Sending eof.");
+ stdin_eof = 1;
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF);
+ packet_send();
+ } else {
+ enter_non_blocking();
+
+ /* Check for immediate EOF on stdin. */
+ len = read(fileno(stdin), buf, 1);
+ if (len == 0) {
+ /*
+ * EOF. Record that we have seen it and send
+ * EOF to server.
+ */
+ debug("Sending eof.");
+ stdin_eof = 1;
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF);
+ packet_send();
+ } else if (len > 0) {
+ /*
+ * Got data. We must store the data in the buffer,
+ * and also process it as an escape character if
+ * appropriate.
+ */
+ if ((u_char) buf[0] == escape_char1)
+ escape_pending1 = 1;
+ else
+ buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, buf, 1);
+ }
+ leave_non_blocking();
+ }
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Make packets from buffered stdin data, and buffer them for sending to the
+ * connection.
+ */
+
+static void
+client_make_packets_from_stdin_data(void)
+{
+ u_int len;
+
+ /* Send buffered stdin data to the server. */
+ while (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0 &&
+ packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
+ len = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer);
+ /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */
+ if (len > packet_get_maxsize())
+ len = packet_get_maxsize();
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA);
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer), len);
+ packet_send();
+ buffer_consume(&stdin_buffer, len);
+ /* If we have a pending EOF, send it now. */
+ if (stdin_eof && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks if the client window has changed, and sends a packet about it to
+ * the server if so. The actual change is detected elsewhere (by a software
+ * interrupt on Unix); this just checks the flag and sends a message if
+ * appropriate.
+ */
+
+static void
+client_check_window_change(void)
+{
+ struct winsize ws;
+
+ if (! received_window_change_signal)
+ return;
+ /** XXX race */
+ received_window_change_signal = 0;
+
+ debug2("client_check_window_change: changed");
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ channel_send_window_changes();
+ } else {
+ if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
+ return;
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct global_confirm *gc;
+
+ if ((gc = TAILQ_FIRST(&global_confirms)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (gc->cb != NULL)
+ gc->cb(type, seq, gc->ctx);
+ if (--gc->ref_count <= 0) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&global_confirms, gc, entry);
+ explicit_bzero(gc, sizeof(*gc));
+ free(gc);
+ }
+
+ packet_set_alive_timeouts(0);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+server_alive_check(void)
+{
+ if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.server_alive_count_max) {
+ logit("Timeout, server %s not responding.", host);
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring("keepalive at openssh.com");
+ packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */
+ packet_send();
+ /* Insert an empty placeholder to maintain ordering */
+ client_register_global_confirm(NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Waits until the client can do something (some data becomes available on
+ * one of the file descriptors).
+ */
+static void
+client_wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp,
+ int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, int rekeying)
+{
+ struct timeval tv, *tvp;
+ int timeout_secs;
+ time_t minwait_secs = 0, server_alive_time = 0, now = monotime();
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Add any selections by the channel mechanism. */
+ channel_prepare_select(readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp,
+ &minwait_secs, rekeying);
+
+ if (!compat20) {
+ /* Read from the connection, unless our buffers are full. */
+ if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) < buffer_high &&
+ buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) < buffer_high &&
+ channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
+ FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
+ /*
+ * Read from stdin, unless we have seen EOF or have very much
+ * buffered data to send to the server.
+ */
+ if (!stdin_eof && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
+ FD_SET(fileno(stdin), *readsetp);
+
+ /* Select stdout/stderr if have data in buffer. */
+ if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0)
+ FD_SET(fileno(stdout), *writesetp);
+ if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0)
+ FD_SET(fileno(stderr), *writesetp);
+ } else {
+ /* channel_prepare_select could have closed the last channel */
+ if (session_closed && !channel_still_open() &&
+ !packet_have_data_to_write()) {
+ /* clear mask since we did not call select() */
+ memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
+ memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
+ return;
+ } else {
+ FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Select server connection if have data to write to the server. */
+ if (packet_have_data_to_write())
+ FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp);
+
+ /*
+ * Wait for something to happen. This will suspend the process until
+ * some selected descriptor can be read, written, or has some other
+ * event pending, or a timeout expires.
+ */
+
+ timeout_secs = INT_MAX; /* we use INT_MAX to mean no timeout */
+ if (options.server_alive_interval > 0 && compat20) {
+ timeout_secs = options.server_alive_interval;
+ server_alive_time = now + options.server_alive_interval;
+ }
+ if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && compat20 && !rekeying)
+ timeout_secs = MIN(timeout_secs, packet_get_rekey_timeout());
+ set_control_persist_exit_time();
+ if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) {
+ timeout_secs = MIN(timeout_secs,
+ control_persist_exit_time - now);
+ if (timeout_secs < 0)
+ timeout_secs = 0;
+ }
+ if (minwait_secs != 0)
+ timeout_secs = MIN(timeout_secs, (int)minwait_secs);
+ if (timeout_secs == INT_MAX)
+ tvp = NULL;
+ else {
+ tv.tv_sec = timeout_secs;
+ tv.tv_usec = 0;
+ tvp = &tv;
+ }
+
+ ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ char buf[100];
+
+ /*
+ * We have to clear the select masks, because we return.
+ * We have to return, because the mainloop checks for the flags
+ * set by the signal handlers.
+ */
+ memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
+ memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
+
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+ return;
+ /* Note: we might still have data in the buffers. */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "select: %s\r\n", strerror(errno));
+ buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+ quit_pending = 1;
+ } else if (ret == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Timeout. Could have been either keepalive or rekeying.
+ * Keepalive we check here, rekeying is checked in clientloop.
+ */
+ if (server_alive_time != 0 && server_alive_time <= monotime())
+ server_alive_check();
+ }
+
+}
+
+static void
+client_suspend_self(Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr)
+{
+ /* Flush stdout and stderr buffers. */
+ if (buffer_len(bout) > 0)
+ atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(bout),
+ buffer_len(bout));
+ if (buffer_len(berr) > 0)
+ atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(berr),
+ buffer_len(berr));
+
+ leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+
+ /*
+ * Free (and clear) the buffer to reduce the amount of data that gets
+ * written to swap.
+ */
+ buffer_free(bin);
+ buffer_free(bout);
+ buffer_free(berr);
+
+ /* Send the suspend signal to the program itself. */
+ kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP);
+
+ /* Reset window sizes in case they have changed */
+ received_window_change_signal = 1;
+
+ /* OK, we have been continued by the user. Reinitialize buffers. */
+ buffer_init(bin);
+ buffer_init(bout);
+ buffer_init(berr);
+
+ enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+}
+
+static void
+client_process_net_input(fd_set *readset)
+{
+ int len;
+ char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ];
+
+ /*
+ * Read input from the server, and add any such data to the buffer of
+ * the packet subsystem.
+ */
+ if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
+ /* Read as much as possible. */
+ len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (len == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Received EOF. The remote host has closed the
+ * connection.
+ */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
+ "Connection to %.300s closed by remote host.\r\n",
+ host);
+ buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+ quit_pending = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+ /*
+ * There is a kernel bug on Solaris that causes select to
+ * sometimes wake up even though there is no data available.
+ */
+ if (len < 0 &&
+ (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
+ len = 0;
+
+ if (len < 0) {
+ /*
+ * An error has encountered. Perhaps there is a
+ * network problem.
+ */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
+ "Read from remote host %.300s: %.100s\r\n",
+ host, strerror(errno));
+ buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+ quit_pending = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+ packet_process_incoming(buf, len);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+client_status_confirm(int type, Channel *c, void *ctx)
+{
+ struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = (struct channel_reply_ctx *)ctx;
+ char errmsg[256];
+ int tochan;
+
+ /*
+ * If a TTY was explicitly requested, then a failure to allocate
+ * one is fatal.
+ */
+ if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY &&
+ (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE ||
+ options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES))
+ cr->action = CONFIRM_CLOSE;
+
+ /* XXX supress on mux _client_ quietmode */
+ tochan = options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR &&
+ c->ctl_chan != -1 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE;
+
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
+ debug2("%s request accepted on channel %d",
+ cr->request_type, c->self);
+ } else if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
+ if (tochan) {
+ snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg),
+ "%s request failed\r\n", cr->request_type);
+ } else {
+ snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg),
+ "%s request failed on channel %d",
+ cr->request_type, c->self);
+ }
+ /* If error occurred on primary session channel, then exit */
+ if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE && c->self == session_ident)
+ fatal("%s", errmsg);
+ /*
+ * If error occurred on mux client, append to
+ * their stderr.
+ */
+ if (tochan) {
+ buffer_append(&c->extended, errmsg,
+ strlen(errmsg));
+ } else
+ error("%s", errmsg);
+ if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY) {
+ /*
+ * If a TTY allocation error occurred, then arrange
+ * for the correct TTY to leave raw mode.
+ */
+ if (c->self == session_ident)
+ leave_raw_mode(0);
+ else
+ mux_tty_alloc_failed(c);
+ } else if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE) {
+ chan_read_failed(c);
+ chan_write_failed(c);
+ }
+ }
+ free(cr);
+}
+
+static void
+client_abandon_status_confirm(Channel *c, void *ctx)
+{
+ free(ctx);
+}
+
+void
+client_expect_confirm(int id, const char *request,
+ enum confirm_action action)
+{
+ struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cr));
+
+ cr->request_type = request;
+ cr->action = action;
+
+ channel_register_status_confirm(id, client_status_confirm,
+ client_abandon_status_confirm, cr);
+}
+
+void
+client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *cb, void *ctx)
+{
+ struct global_confirm *gc, *last_gc;
+
+ /* Coalesce identical callbacks */
+ last_gc = TAILQ_LAST(&global_confirms, global_confirms);
+ if (last_gc && last_gc->cb == cb && last_gc->ctx == ctx) {
+ if (++last_gc->ref_count >= INT_MAX)
+ fatal("%s: last_gc->ref_count = %d",
+ __func__, last_gc->ref_count);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ gc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*gc));
+ gc->cb = cb;
+ gc->ctx = ctx;
+ gc->ref_count = 1;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&global_confirms, gc, entry);
+}
+
+static void
+process_cmdline(void)
+{
+ void (*handler)(int);
+ char *s, *cmd;
+ int ok, delete = 0, local = 0, remote = 0, dynamic = 0;
+ struct Forward fwd;
+
+ memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
+
+ leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+ handler = signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
+ cmd = s = read_passphrase("\r\nssh> ", RP_ECHO);
+ if (s == NULL)
+ goto out;
+ while (isspace((u_char)*s))
+ s++;
+ if (*s == '-')
+ s++; /* Skip cmdline '-', if any */
+ if (*s == '\0')
+ goto out;
+
+ if (*s == 'h' || *s == 'H' || *s == '?') {
+ logit("Commands:");
+ logit(" -L[bind_address:]port:host:hostport "
+ "Request local forward");
+ logit(" -R[bind_address:]port:host:hostport "
+ "Request remote forward");
+ logit(" -D[bind_address:]port "
+ "Request dynamic forward");
+ logit(" -KL[bind_address:]port "
+ "Cancel local forward");
+ logit(" -KR[bind_address:]port "
+ "Cancel remote forward");
+ logit(" -KD[bind_address:]port "
+ "Cancel dynamic forward");
+ if (!options.permit_local_command)
+ goto out;
+ logit(" !args "
+ "Execute local command");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (*s == '!' && options.permit_local_command) {
+ s++;
+ ssh_local_cmd(s);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (*s == 'K') {
+ delete = 1;
+ s++;
+ }
+ if (*s == 'L')
+ local = 1;
+ else if (*s == 'R')
+ remote = 1;
+ else if (*s == 'D')
+ dynamic = 1;
+ else {
+ logit("Invalid command.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (delete && !compat20) {
+ logit("Not supported for SSH protocol version 1.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ while (isspace((u_char)*++s))
+ ;
+
+ /* XXX update list of forwards in options */
+ if (delete) {
+ /* We pass 1 for dynamicfwd to restrict to 1 or 2 fields. */
+ if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, 1, 0)) {
+ logit("Bad forwarding close specification.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (remote)
+ ok = channel_request_rforward_cancel(&fwd) == 0;
+ else if (dynamic)
+ ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(&fwd,
+ 0, &options.fwd_opts) > 0;
+ else
+ ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(&fwd,
+ CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC,
+ &options.fwd_opts) > 0;
+ if (!ok) {
+ logit("Unkown port forwarding.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ logit("Canceled forwarding.");
+ } else {
+ if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, dynamic, remote)) {
+ logit("Bad forwarding specification.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (local || dynamic) {
+ if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(&fwd,
+ &options.fwd_opts)) {
+ logit("Port forwarding failed.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(&fwd) < 0) {
+ logit("Port forwarding failed.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ logit("Forwarding port.");
+ }
+
+out:
+ signal(SIGINT, handler);
+ enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+ free(cmd);
+ free(fwd.listen_host);
+ free(fwd.listen_path);
+ free(fwd.connect_host);
+ free(fwd.connect_path);
+}
+
+/* reasons to suppress output of an escape command in help output */
+#define SUPPRESS_NEVER 0 /* never suppress, always show */
+#define SUPPRESS_PROTO1 1 /* don't show in protocol 1 sessions */
+#define SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT 2 /* don't show in mux client sessions */
+#define SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER 4 /* don't show in mux master sessions */
+#define SUPPRESS_SYSLOG 8 /* don't show when logging to syslog */
+struct escape_help_text {
+ const char *cmd;
+ const char *text;
+ unsigned int flags;
+};
+static struct escape_help_text esc_txt[] = {
+ {".", "terminate session", SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER},
+ {".", "terminate connection (and any multiplexed sessions)",
+ SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
+ {"B", "send a BREAK to the remote system", SUPPRESS_PROTO1},
+ {"C", "open a command line", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
+ {"R", "request rekey", SUPPRESS_PROTO1},
+ {"V/v", "decrease/increase verbosity (LogLevel)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
+ {"^Z", "suspend ssh", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
+ {"#", "list forwarded connections", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
+ {"&", "background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)",
+ SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
+ {"?", "this message", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
+};
+
+static void
+print_escape_help(Buffer *b, int escape_char, int protocol2, int mux_client,
+ int using_stderr)
+{
+ unsigned int i, suppress_flags;
+ char string[1024];
+
+ snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c?\r\n"
+ "Supported escape sequences:\r\n", escape_char);
+ buffer_append(b, string, strlen(string));
+
+ suppress_flags = (protocol2 ? 0 : SUPPRESS_PROTO1) |
+ (mux_client ? SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT : 0) |
+ (mux_client ? 0 : SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER) |
+ (using_stderr ? 0 : SUPPRESS_SYSLOG);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(esc_txt)/sizeof(esc_txt[0]); i++) {
+ if (esc_txt[i].flags & suppress_flags)
+ continue;
+ snprintf(string, sizeof string, " %c%-3s - %s\r\n",
+ escape_char, esc_txt[i].cmd, esc_txt[i].text);
+ buffer_append(b, string, strlen(string));
+ }
+
+ snprintf(string, sizeof string,
+ " %c%c - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n"
+ "(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after "
+ "newline.)\r\n", escape_char, escape_char);
+ buffer_append(b, string, strlen(string));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process the characters one by one, call with c==NULL for proto1 case.
+ */
+static int
+process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr,
+ char *buf, int len)
+{
+ char string[1024];
+ pid_t pid;
+ int bytes = 0;
+ u_int i;
+ u_char ch;
+ char *s;
+ int *escape_pendingp, escape_char;
+ struct escape_filter_ctx *efc;
+
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ escape_pendingp = &escape_pending1;
+ escape_char = escape_char1;
+ } else {
+ if (c->filter_ctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ efc = (struct escape_filter_ctx *)c->filter_ctx;
+ escape_pendingp = &efc->escape_pending;
+ escape_char = efc->escape_char;
+ }
+
+ if (len <= 0)
+ return (0);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < (u_int)len; i++) {
+ /* Get one character at a time. */
+ ch = buf[i];
+
+ if (*escape_pendingp) {
+ /* We have previously seen an escape character. */
+ /* Clear the flag now. */
+ *escape_pendingp = 0;
+
+ /* Process the escaped character. */
+ switch (ch) {
+ case '.':
+ /* Terminate the connection. */
+ snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c.\r\n",
+ escape_char);
+ buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
+
+ if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) {
+ chan_read_failed(c);
+ chan_write_failed(c);
+ if (c->detach_user)
+ c->detach_user(c->self, NULL);
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED;
+ buffer_clear(&c->input);
+ chan_ibuf_empty(c);
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ quit_pending = 1;
+ return -1;
+
+ case 'Z' - 64:
+ /* XXX support this for mux clients */
+ if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) {
+ char b[16];
+ noescape:
+ if (ch == 'Z' - 64)
+ snprintf(b, sizeof b, "^Z");
+ else
+ snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%c", ch);
+ snprintf(string, sizeof string,
+ "%c%s escape not available to "
+ "multiplexed sessions\r\n",
+ escape_char, b);
+ buffer_append(berr, string,
+ strlen(string));
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Suspend the program. Inform the user */
+ snprintf(string, sizeof string,
+ "%c^Z [suspend ssh]\r\n", escape_char);
+ buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
+
+ /* Restore terminal modes and suspend. */
+ client_suspend_self(bin, bout, berr);
+
+ /* We have been continued. */
+ continue;
+
+ case 'B':
+ if (compat20) {
+ snprintf(string, sizeof string,
+ "%cB\r\n", escape_char);
+ buffer_append(berr, string,
+ strlen(string));
+ channel_request_start(c->self,
+ "break", 0);
+ packet_put_int(1000);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ continue;
+
+ case 'R':
+ if (compat20) {
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
+ logit("Server does not "
+ "support re-keying");
+ else
+ need_rekeying = 1;
+ }
+ continue;
+
+ case 'V':
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case 'v':
+ if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
+ goto noescape;
+ if (!log_is_on_stderr()) {
+ snprintf(string, sizeof string,
+ "%c%c [Logging to syslog]\r\n",
+ escape_char, ch);
+ buffer_append(berr, string,
+ strlen(string));
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (ch == 'V' && options.log_level >
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
+ log_change_level(--options.log_level);
+ if (ch == 'v' && options.log_level <
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+ log_change_level(++options.log_level);
+ snprintf(string, sizeof string,
+ "%c%c [LogLevel %s]\r\n", escape_char, ch,
+ log_level_name(options.log_level));
+ buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
+ continue;
+
+ case '&':
+ if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
+ goto noescape;
+ /*
+ * Detach the program (continue to serve
+ * connections, but put in background and no
+ * more new connections).
+ */
+ /* Restore tty modes. */
+ leave_raw_mode(
+ options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+
+ /* Stop listening for new connections. */
+ channel_stop_listening();
+
+ snprintf(string, sizeof string,
+ "%c& [backgrounded]\n", escape_char);
+ buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
+
+ /* Fork into background. */
+ pid = fork();
+ if (pid < 0) {
+ error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (pid != 0) { /* This is the parent. */
+ /* The parent just exits. */
+ exit(0);
+ }
+ /* The child continues serving connections. */
+ if (compat20) {
+ buffer_append(bin, "\004", 1);
+ /* fake EOF on stdin */
+ return -1;
+ } else if (!stdin_eof) {
+ /*
+ * Sending SSH_CMSG_EOF alone does not
+ * always appear to be enough. So we
+ * try to send an EOF character first.
+ */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA);
+ packet_put_string("\004", 1);
+ packet_send();
+ /* Close stdin. */
+ stdin_eof = 1;
+ if (buffer_len(bin) == 0) {
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ }
+ continue;
+
+ case '?':
+ print_escape_help(berr, escape_char, compat20,
+ (c && c->ctl_chan != -1),
+ log_is_on_stderr());
+ continue;
+
+ case '#':
+ snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c#\r\n",
+ escape_char);
+ buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
+ s = channel_open_message();
+ buffer_append(berr, s, strlen(s));
+ free(s);
+ continue;
+
+ case 'C':
+ if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
+ goto noescape;
+ process_cmdline();
+ continue;
+
+ default:
+ if (ch != escape_char) {
+ buffer_put_char(bin, escape_char);
+ bytes++;
+ }
+ /* Escaped characters fall through here */
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * The previous character was not an escape char.
+ * Check if this is an escape.
+ */
+ if (last_was_cr && ch == escape_char) {
+ /*
+ * It is. Set the flag and continue to
+ * next character.
+ */
+ *escape_pendingp = 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Normal character. Record whether it was a newline,
+ * and append it to the buffer.
+ */
+ last_was_cr = (ch == '\r' || ch == '\n');
+ buffer_put_char(bin, ch);
+ bytes++;
+ }
+ return bytes;
+}
+
+static void
+client_process_input(fd_set *readset)
+{
+ int len;
+ char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ];
+
+ /* Read input from stdin. */
+ if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdin), readset)) {
+ /* Read as much as possible. */
+ len = read(fileno(stdin), buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (len < 0 &&
+ (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
+ return; /* we'll try again later */
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ /*
+ * Received EOF or error. They are treated
+ * similarly, except that an error message is printed
+ * if it was an error condition.
+ */
+ if (len < 0) {
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "read: %.100s\r\n",
+ strerror(errno));
+ buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+ }
+ /* Mark that we have seen EOF. */
+ stdin_eof = 1;
+ /*
+ * Send an EOF message to the server unless there is
+ * data in the buffer. If there is data in the
+ * buffer, no message will be sent now. Code
+ * elsewhere will send the EOF when the buffer
+ * becomes empty if stdin_eof is set.
+ */
+ if (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ } else if (escape_char1 == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) {
+ /*
+ * Normal successful read, and no escape character.
+ * Just append the data to buffer.
+ */
+ buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, buf, len);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Normal, successful read. But we have an escape
+ * character and have to process the characters one
+ * by one.
+ */
+ if (process_escapes(NULL, &stdin_buffer,
+ &stdout_buffer, &stderr_buffer, buf, len) == -1)
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+client_process_output(fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ int len;
+ char buf[100];
+
+ /* Write buffered output to stdout. */
+ if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdout), writeset)) {
+ /* Write as much data as possible. */
+ len = write(fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer),
+ buffer_len(&stdout_buffer));
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
+ errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+ len = 0;
+ else {
+ /*
+ * An error or EOF was encountered. Put an
+ * error message to stderr buffer.
+ */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
+ "write stdout: %.50s\r\n", strerror(errno));
+ buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+ quit_pending = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Consume printed data from the buffer. */
+ buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len);
+ }
+ /* Write buffered output to stderr. */
+ if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stderr), writeset)) {
+ /* Write as much data as possible. */
+ len = write(fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer),
+ buffer_len(&stderr_buffer));
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
+ errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+ len = 0;
+ else {
+ /*
+ * EOF or error, but can't even print
+ * error message.
+ */
+ quit_pending = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Consume printed characters from the buffer. */
+ buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get packets from the connection input buffer, and process them as long as
+ * there are packets available.
+ *
+ * Any unknown packets received during the actual
+ * session cause the session to terminate. This is
+ * intended to make debugging easier since no
+ * confirmations are sent. Any compatible protocol
+ * extensions must be negotiated during the
+ * preparatory phase.
+ */
+
+static void
+client_process_buffered_input_packets(void)
+{
+ dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending, active_state);
+}
+
+/* scan buf[] for '~' before sending data to the peer */
+
+/* Helper: allocate a new escape_filter_ctx and fill in its escape char */
+void *
+client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int escape_char)
+{
+ struct escape_filter_ctx *ret;
+
+ ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
+ ret->escape_pending = 0;
+ ret->escape_char = escape_char;
+ return (void *)ret;
+}
+
+/* Free the escape filter context on channel free */
+void
+client_filter_cleanup(int cid, void *ctx)
+{
+ free(ctx);
+}
+
+int
+client_simple_escape_filter(Channel *c, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ if (c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE)
+ return 0;
+
+ return process_escapes(c, &c->input, &c->output, &c->extended,
+ buf, len);
+}
+
+static void
+client_channel_closed(int id, void *arg)
+{
+ channel_cancel_cleanup(id);
+ session_closed = 1;
+ leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Implements the interactive session with the server. This is called after
+ * the user has been authenticated, and a command has been started on the
+ * remote host. If escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, it is the character
+ * used as an escape character for terminating or suspending the session.
+ */
+
+int
+client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
+{
+ fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
+ double start_time, total_time;
+ int r, max_fd = 0, max_fd2 = 0, len;
+ u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
+ u_int nalloc = 0;
+ char buf[100];
+
+ debug("Entering interactive session.");
+
+ if (options.control_master &&
+ !option_clear_or_none(options.control_path)) {
+ debug("pledge: id");
+ if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns recvfd proc exec id tty",
+ NULL) == -1)
+ fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+ } else if (options.forward_x11 || options.permit_local_command) {
+ debug("pledge: exec");
+ if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc exec tty",
+ NULL) == -1)
+ fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+ } else if (options.update_hostkeys) {
+ debug("pledge: filesystem full");
+ if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc tty",
+ NULL) == -1)
+ fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+ } else if (!option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) ||
+ fork_after_authentication_flag) {
+ debug("pledge: proc");
+ if (pledge("stdio cpath unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1)
+ fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+ } else {
+ debug("pledge: network");
+ if (pledge("stdio unix inet dns tty", NULL) == -1)
+ fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ }
+
+ start_time = get_current_time();
+
+ /* Initialize variables. */
+ escape_pending1 = 0;
+ last_was_cr = 1;
+ exit_status = -1;
+ stdin_eof = 0;
+ buffer_high = 64 * 1024;
+ connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
+ connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
+ max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
+
+ if (!compat20) {
+ /* enable nonblocking unless tty */
+ if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)))
+ set_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
+ if (!isatty(fileno(stdout)))
+ set_nonblock(fileno(stdout));
+ if (!isatty(fileno(stderr)))
+ set_nonblock(fileno(stderr));
+ max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stdin));
+ max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stdout));
+ max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stderr));
+ }
+ quit_pending = 0;
+ escape_char1 = escape_char_arg;
+
+ /* Initialize buffers. */
+ buffer_init(&stdin_buffer);
+ buffer_init(&stdout_buffer);
+ buffer_init(&stderr_buffer);
+
+ client_init_dispatch();
+
+ /*
+ * Set signal handlers, (e.g. to restore non-blocking mode)
+ * but don't overwrite SIG_IGN, matches behaviour from rsh(1)
+ */
+ if (signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
+ signal(SIGHUP, signal_handler);
+ if (signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
+ signal(SIGINT, signal_handler);
+ if (signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
+ signal(SIGQUIT, signal_handler);
+ if (signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
+ signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler);
+ signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler);
+
+ if (have_pty)
+ enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ session_ident = ssh2_chan_id;
+ if (session_ident != -1) {
+ if (escape_char_arg != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) {
+ channel_register_filter(session_ident,
+ client_simple_escape_filter, NULL,
+ client_filter_cleanup,
+ client_new_escape_filter_ctx(
+ escape_char_arg));
+ }
+ channel_register_cleanup(session_ident,
+ client_channel_closed, 0);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Check if we should immediately send eof on stdin. */
+ client_check_initial_eof_on_stdin();
+ }
+
+ /* Main loop of the client for the interactive session mode. */
+ while (!quit_pending) {
+
+ /* Process buffered packets sent by the server. */
+ client_process_buffered_input_packets();
+
+ if (compat20 && session_closed && !channel_still_open())
+ break;
+
+ if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state)) {
+ debug("rekeying in progress");
+ } else if (need_rekeying) {
+ /* manual rekey request */
+ debug("need rekeying");
+ if ((r = kex_start_rekex(active_state)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: kex_start_rekex: %s", __func__,
+ ssh_err(r));
+ need_rekeying = 0;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Make packets of buffered stdin data, and buffer
+ * them for sending to the server.
+ */
+ if (!compat20)
+ client_make_packets_from_stdin_data();
+
+ /*
+ * Make packets from buffered channel data, and
+ * enqueue them for sending to the server.
+ */
+ if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
+ channel_output_poll();
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the window size has changed, and buffer a
+ * message about it to the server if so.
+ */
+ client_check_window_change();
+
+ if (quit_pending)
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Wait until we have something to do (something becomes
+ * available on one of the descriptors).
+ */
+ max_fd2 = max_fd;
+ client_wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset,
+ &max_fd2, &nalloc, ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state));
+
+ if (quit_pending)
+ break;
+
+ /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
+ if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state))
+ channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
+
+ /* Buffer input from the connection. */
+ client_process_net_input(readset);
+
+ if (quit_pending)
+ break;
+
+ if (!compat20) {
+ /* Buffer data from stdin */
+ client_process_input(readset);
+ /*
+ * Process output to stdout and stderr. Output to
+ * the connection is processed elsewhere (above).
+ */
+ client_process_output(writeset);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Send as much buffered packet data as possible to the
+ * sender.
+ */
+ if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset))
+ packet_write_poll();
+
+ /*
+ * If we are a backgrounded control master, and the
+ * timeout has expired without any active client
+ * connections, then quit.
+ */
+ if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) {
+ if (monotime() >= control_persist_exit_time) {
+ debug("ControlPersist timeout expired");
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ free(readset);
+ free(writeset);
+
+ /* Terminate the session. */
+
+ /* Stop watching for window change. */
+ signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL);
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
+ packet_put_int(SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION);
+ packet_put_cstring("disconnected by user");
+ packet_put_cstring(""); /* language tag */
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ }
+
+ channel_free_all();
+
+ if (have_pty)
+ leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+
+ /* restore blocking io */
+ if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)))
+ unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
+ if (!isatty(fileno(stdout)))
+ unset_nonblock(fileno(stdout));
+ if (!isatty(fileno(stderr)))
+ unset_nonblock(fileno(stderr));
+
+ /*
+ * If there was no shell or command requested, there will be no remote
+ * exit status to be returned. In that case, clear error code if the
+ * connection was deliberately terminated at this end.
+ */
+ if (no_shell_flag && received_signal == SIGTERM) {
+ received_signal = 0;
+ exit_status = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (received_signal)
+ fatal("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal);
+
+ /*
+ * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating
+ * that the connection has been closed.
+ */
+ if (have_pty && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) {
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
+ "Connection to %.64s closed.\r\n", host);
+ buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+ }
+
+ /* Output any buffered data for stdout. */
+ if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) {
+ len = atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stdout),
+ buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), buffer_len(&stdout_buffer));
+ if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != buffer_len(&stdout_buffer))
+ error("Write failed flushing stdout buffer.");
+ else
+ buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len);
+ }
+
+ /* Output any buffered data for stderr. */
+ if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) {
+ len = atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr),
+ buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), buffer_len(&stderr_buffer));
+ if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != buffer_len(&stderr_buffer))
+ error("Write failed flushing stderr buffer.");
+ else
+ buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len);
+ }
+
+ /* Clear and free any buffers. */
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ buffer_free(&stdin_buffer);
+ buffer_free(&stdout_buffer);
+ buffer_free(&stderr_buffer);
+
+ /* Report bytes transferred, and transfer rates. */
+ total_time = get_current_time() - start_time;
+ packet_get_bytes(&ibytes, &obytes);
+ verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes, in %.1f seconds",
+ (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes, total_time);
+ if (total_time > 0)
+ verbose("Bytes per second: sent %.1f, received %.1f",
+ obytes / total_time, ibytes / total_time);
+ /* Return the exit status of the program. */
+ debug("Exit status %d", exit_status);
+ return exit_status;
+}
+
+/*********/
+
+static int
+client_input_stdout_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ u_int data_len;
+ char *data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
+ packet_check_eom();
+ buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, data, data_len);
+ explicit_bzero(data, data_len);
+ free(data);
+ return 0;
+}
+static int
+client_input_stderr_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ u_int data_len;
+ char *data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
+ packet_check_eom();
+ buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, data, data_len);
+ explicit_bzero(data, data_len);
+ free(data);
+ return 0;
+}
+static int
+client_input_exit_status(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ exit_status = packet_get_int();
+ packet_check_eom();
+ /* Acknowledge the exit. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
+ packet_send();
+ /*
+ * Must wait for packet to be sent since we are
+ * exiting the loop.
+ */
+ packet_write_wait();
+ /* Flag that we want to exit. */
+ quit_pending = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+client_input_agent_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+ int r, remote_id, sock;
+
+ /* Read the remote channel number from the message. */
+ remote_id = packet_get_int();
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ /*
+ * Get a connection to the local authentication agent (this may again
+ * get forwarded).
+ */
+ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock)) != 0 &&
+ r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
+ debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+
+ /*
+ * If we could not connect the agent, send an error message back to
+ * the server. This should never happen unless the agent dies,
+ * because authentication forwarding is only enabled if we have an
+ * agent.
+ */
+ if (sock >= 0) {
+ c = channel_new("", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock,
+ -1, 0, 0, 0, "authentication agent connection", 1);
+ c->remote_id = remote_id;
+ c->force_drain = 1;
+ }
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_int(remote_id);
+ } else {
+ /* Send a confirmation to the remote host. */
+ debug("Forwarding authentication connection.");
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+ packet_put_int(remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(c->self);
+ }
+ packet_send();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static Channel *
+client_request_forwarded_tcpip(const char *request_type, int rchan)
+{
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+ char *listen_address, *originator_address;
+ u_short listen_port, originator_port;
+
+ /* Get rest of the packet */
+ listen_address = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ listen_port = packet_get_int();
+ originator_address = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ originator_port = packet_get_int();
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ debug("%s: listen %s port %d, originator %s port %d", __func__,
+ listen_address, listen_port, originator_address, originator_port);
+
+ c = channel_connect_by_listen_address(listen_address, listen_port,
+ "forwarded-tcpip", originator_address);
+
+ free(originator_address);
+ free(listen_address);
+ return c;
+}
+
+static Channel *
+client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(const char *request_type, int rchan)
+{
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+ char *listen_path;
+
+ /* Get the remote path. */
+ listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ /* XXX: Skip reserved field for now. */
+ if (packet_get_string_ptr(NULL) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: packet_get_string_ptr failed", __func__);
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ debug("%s: %s", __func__, listen_path);
+
+ c = channel_connect_by_listen_path(listen_path,
+ "forwarded-streamlocal at openssh.com", "forwarded-streamlocal");
+ free(listen_path);
+ return c;
+}
+
+static Channel *
+client_request_x11(const char *request_type, int rchan)
+{
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+ char *originator;
+ u_short originator_port;
+ int sock;
+
+ if (!options.forward_x11) {
+ error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding.");
+ error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a "
+ "malicious server.");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) {
+ verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout "
+ "expired");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_X11FWD) {
+ debug2("buggy server: x11 request w/o originator_port");
+ originator_port = 0;
+ } else {
+ originator_port = packet_get_int();
+ }
+ packet_check_eom();
+ /* XXX check permission */
+ debug("client_request_x11: request from %s %d", originator,
+ originator_port);
+ free(originator);
+ sock = x11_connect_display();
+ if (sock < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ c = channel_new("x11",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1);
+ c->force_drain = 1;
+ return c;
+}
+
+static Channel *
+client_request_agent(const char *request_type, int rchan)
+{
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+ int r, sock;
+
+ if (!options.forward_agent) {
+ error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding.");
+ error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a "
+ "malicious server.");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock)) != 0) {
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
+ debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ c = channel_new("authentication agent connection",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
+ "authentication agent connection", 1);
+ c->force_drain = 1;
+ return c;
+}
+
+int
+client_request_tun_fwd(int tun_mode, int local_tun, int remote_tun)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+ int fd;
+
+ if (tun_mode == SSH_TUNMODE_NO)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!compat20) {
+ error("Tunnel forwarding is not supported for protocol 1");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ debug("Requesting tun unit %d in mode %d", local_tun, tun_mode);
+
+ /* Open local tunnel device */
+ if ((fd = tun_open(local_tun, tun_mode)) == -1) {
+ error("Tunnel device open failed.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1,
+ CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
+ c->datagram = 1;
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
+ if (options.tun_open == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT)
+ channel_register_filter(c->self, sys_tun_infilter,
+ sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL);
+#endif
+
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
+ packet_put_cstring("tun at openssh.com");
+ packet_put_int(c->self);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_window_max);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+ packet_put_int(tun_mode);
+ packet_put_int(remote_tun);
+ packet_send();
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* XXXX move to generic input handler */
+static int
+client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+ char *ctype;
+ int rchan;
+ u_int rmaxpack, rwindow, len;
+
+ ctype = packet_get_string(&len);
+ rchan = packet_get_int();
+ rwindow = packet_get_int();
+ rmaxpack = packet_get_int();
+
+ debug("client_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d",
+ ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack);
+
+ if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-tcpip") == 0) {
+ c = client_request_forwarded_tcpip(ctype, rchan);
+ } else if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-streamlocal at openssh.com") == 0) {
+ c = client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(ctype, rchan);
+ } else if (strcmp(ctype, "x11") == 0) {
+ c = client_request_x11(ctype, rchan);
+ } else if (strcmp(ctype, "auth-agent at openssh.com") == 0) {
+ c = client_request_agent(ctype, rchan);
+ }
+/* XXX duplicate : */
+ if (c != NULL) {
+ debug("confirm %s", ctype);
+ c->remote_id = rchan;
+ c->remote_window = rwindow;
+ c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack;
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(c->self);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_window);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ } else {
+ debug("failure %s", ctype);
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_int(rchan);
+ packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED);
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) {
+ packet_put_cstring("open failed");
+ packet_put_cstring("");
+ }
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ free(ctype);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+ int exitval, id, reply, success = 0;
+ char *rtype;
+
+ id = packet_get_int();
+ rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ reply = packet_get_char();
+
+ debug("client_input_channel_req: channel %d rtype %s reply %d",
+ id, rtype, reply);
+
+ if (id == -1) {
+ error("client_input_channel_req: request for channel -1");
+ } else if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) {
+ error("client_input_channel_req: channel %d: "
+ "unknown channel", id);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "eow at openssh.com") == 0) {
+ packet_check_eom();
+ chan_rcvd_eow(c);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exit-status") == 0) {
+ exitval = packet_get_int();
+ if (c->ctl_chan != -1) {
+ mux_exit_message(c, exitval);
+ success = 1;
+ } else if (id == session_ident) {
+ /* Record exit value of local session */
+ success = 1;
+ exit_status = exitval;
+ } else {
+ /* Probably for a mux channel that has already closed */
+ debug("%s: no sink for exit-status on channel %d",
+ __func__, id);
+ }
+ packet_check_eom();
+ }
+ if (reply && c != NULL && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) {
+ packet_start(success ?
+ SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ free(rtype);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct hostkeys_update_ctx {
+ /* The hostname and (optionally) IP address string for the server */
+ char *host_str, *ip_str;
+
+ /*
+ * Keys received from the server and a flag for each indicating
+ * whether they already exist in known_hosts.
+ * keys_seen is filled in by hostkeys_find() and later (for new
+ * keys) by client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm().
+ */
+ struct sshkey **keys;
+ int *keys_seen;
+ size_t nkeys;
+
+ size_t nnew;
+
+ /*
+ * Keys that are in known_hosts, but were not present in the update
+ * from the server (i.e. scheduled to be deleted).
+ * Filled in by hostkeys_find().
+ */
+ struct sshkey **old_keys;
+ size_t nold;
+};
+
+static void
+hostkeys_update_ctx_free(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++)
+ sshkey_free(ctx->keys[i]);
+ free(ctx->keys);
+ free(ctx->keys_seen);
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++)
+ sshkey_free(ctx->old_keys[i]);
+ free(ctx->old_keys);
+ free(ctx->host_str);
+ free(ctx->ip_str);
+ free(ctx);
+}
+
+static int
+hostkeys_find(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+{
+ struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx;
+ size_t i;
+ struct sshkey **tmp;
+
+ if (l->status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED || l->key == NULL ||
+ l->key->type == KEY_RSA1)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Mark off keys we've already seen for this host */
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+ if (sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->keys[i])) {
+ debug3("%s: found %s key at %s:%ld", __func__,
+ sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->keys[i]), l->path, l->linenum);
+ ctx->keys_seen[i] = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ /* This line contained a key that not offered by the server */
+ debug3("%s: deprecated %s key at %s:%ld", __func__,
+ sshkey_ssh_name(l->key), l->path, l->linenum);
+ if ((tmp = reallocarray(ctx->old_keys, ctx->nold + 1,
+ sizeof(*ctx->old_keys))) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: reallocarray failed nold = %zu",
+ __func__, ctx->nold);
+ ctx->old_keys = tmp;
+ ctx->old_keys[ctx->nold++] = l->key;
+ l->key = NULL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ int r, was_raw = 0;
+ int loglevel = options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK ?
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
+ char *fp, *response;
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+ if (ctx->keys_seen[i] != 2)
+ continue;
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->keys[i],
+ options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ do_log2(loglevel, "Learned new hostkey: %s %s",
+ sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), fp);
+ free(fp);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) {
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->old_keys[i],
+ options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ do_log2(loglevel, "Deprecating obsolete hostkey: %s %s",
+ sshkey_type(ctx->old_keys[i]), fp);
+ free(fp);
+ }
+ if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) {
+ if (get_saved_tio() != NULL) {
+ leave_raw_mode(1);
+ was_raw = 1;
+ }
+ response = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; !quit_pending && i < 3; i++) {
+ free(response);
+ response = read_passphrase("Accept updated hostkeys? "
+ "(yes/no): ", RP_ECHO);
+ if (strcasecmp(response, "yes") == 0)
+ break;
+ else if (quit_pending || response == NULL ||
+ strcasecmp(response, "no") == 0) {
+ options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+ break;
+ } else {
+ do_log2(loglevel, "Please enter "
+ "\"yes\" or \"no\"");
+ }
+ }
+ if (quit_pending || i >= 3 || response == NULL)
+ options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+ free(response);
+ if (was_raw)
+ enter_raw_mode(1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now that all the keys are verified, we can go ahead and replace
+ * them in known_hosts (assuming SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK didn't
+ * cancel the operation).
+ */
+ if (options.update_hostkeys != 0 &&
+ (r = hostfile_replace_entries(options.user_hostfiles[0],
+ ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys,
+ options.hash_known_hosts, 0,
+ options.fingerprint_hash)) != 0)
+ error("%s: hostfile_replace_entries failed: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+static void
+client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *_ctx)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx;
+ size_t i, ndone;
+ struct sshbuf *signdata;
+ int r;
+ const u_char *sig;
+ size_t siglen;
+
+ if (ctx->nnew == 0)
+ fatal("%s: ctx->nnew == 0", __func__); /* sanity */
+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
+ error("Server failed to confirm ownership of "
+ "private host keys");
+ hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
+ return;
+ }
+ if ((signdata = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ /* Don't want to accidentally accept an unbound signature */
+ if (ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0)
+ fatal("%s: ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0", __func__);
+ /*
+ * Expect a signature for each of the ctx->nnew private keys we
+ * haven't seen before. They will be in the same order as the
+ * ctx->keys where the corresponding ctx->keys_seen[i] == 0.
+ */
+ for (ndone = i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+ if (ctx->keys_seen[i])
+ continue;
+ /* Prepare data to be signed: session ID, unique string, key */
+ sshbuf_reset(signdata);
+ if ( (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(signdata,
+ "hostkeys-prove-00 at openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(signdata, ssh->kex->session_id,
+ ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_puts(ctx->keys[i], signdata)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: failed to prepare signature: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ /* Extract and verify signature */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &sig, &siglen)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_verify(ctx->keys[i], sig, siglen,
+ sshbuf_ptr(signdata), sshbuf_len(signdata), 0)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: server gave bad signature for %s key %zu",
+ __func__, sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Key is good. Mark it as 'seen' */
+ ctx->keys_seen[i] = 2;
+ ndone++;
+ }
+ if (ndone != ctx->nnew)
+ fatal("%s: ndone != ctx->nnew (%zu / %zu)", __func__,
+ ndone, ctx->nnew); /* Shouldn't happen */
+ ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh);
+
+ /* Make the edits to known_hosts */
+ update_known_hosts(ctx);
+ out:
+ hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle hostkeys-00 at openssh.com global request to inform the client of all
+ * the server's hostkeys. The keys are checked against the user's
+ * HostkeyAlgorithms preference before they are accepted.
+ */
+static int
+client_input_hostkeys(void)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ const u_char *blob = NULL;
+ size_t i, len = 0;
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL, **tmp;
+ int r;
+ char *fp;
+ static int hostkeys_seen = 0; /* XXX use struct ssh */
+ extern struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; /* XXX from ssh.c */
+ struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+
+ if (hostkeys_seen)
+ fatal("%s: server already sent hostkeys", __func__);
+ if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK &&
+ options.batch_mode)
+ return 1; /* won't ask in batchmode, so don't even try */
+ if (!options.update_hostkeys || options.num_user_hostfiles <= 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx));
+ while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ key = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &len)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, len, &key)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ debug3("%s: received %s key %s", __func__,
+ sshkey_type(key), fp);
+ free(fp);
+
+ /* Check that the key is accepted in HostkeyAlgorithms */
+ if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+ options.hostkeyalgorithms ? options.hostkeyalgorithms :
+ KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, 0) != 1) {
+ debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms",
+ __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Skip certs */
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+ debug3("%s: %s key is a certificate; skipping",
+ __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Ensure keys are unique */
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+ if (sshkey_equal(key, ctx->keys[i])) {
+ error("%s: received duplicated %s host key",
+ __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Key is good, record it */
+ if ((tmp = reallocarray(ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys + 1,
+ sizeof(*ctx->keys))) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: reallocarray failed nkeys = %zu",
+ __func__, ctx->nkeys);
+ ctx->keys = tmp;
+ ctx->keys[ctx->nkeys++] = key;
+ key = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->nkeys == 0) {
+ debug("%s: server sent no hostkeys", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx->keys_seen = calloc(ctx->nkeys,
+ sizeof(*ctx->keys_seen))) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: calloc failed", __func__);
+
+ get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host,
+ options.check_host_ip ? (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr : NULL,
+ options.port, &ctx->host_str,
+ options.check_host_ip ? &ctx->ip_str : NULL);
+
+ /* Find which keys we already know about. */
+ if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(options.user_hostfiles[0], hostkeys_find,
+ ctx, ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str,
+ HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY|HKF_WANT_MATCH)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Figure out if we have any new keys to add */
+ ctx->nnew = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+ if (!ctx->keys_seen[i])
+ ctx->nnew++;
+ }
+
+ debug3("%s: %zu keys from server: %zu new, %zu retained. %zu to remove",
+ __func__, ctx->nkeys, ctx->nnew, ctx->nkeys - ctx->nnew, ctx->nold);
+
+ if (ctx->nnew == 0 && ctx->nold != 0) {
+ /* We have some keys to remove. Just do it. */
+ update_known_hosts(ctx);
+ } else if (ctx->nnew != 0) {
+ /*
+ * We have received hitherto-unseen keys from the server.
+ * Ask the server to confirm ownership of the private halves.
+ */
+ debug3("%s: asking server to prove ownership for %zu keys",
+ __func__, ctx->nnew);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
+ "hostkeys-prove-00 at openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* bool: want reply */
+ fatal("%s: cannot prepare packet: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+ if (ctx->keys_seen[i])
+ continue;
+ sshbuf_reset(buf);
+ if ((r = sshkey_putb(ctx->keys[i], buf)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_putb: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: sshpkt_put_string: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: sshpkt_send: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ client_register_global_confirm(
+ client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm, ctx);
+ ctx = NULL; /* will be freed in callback */
+ }
+
+ /* Success */
+ out:
+ hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ /*
+ * NB. Return success for all cases. The server doesn't need to know
+ * what the client does with its hosts file.
+ */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ char *rtype;
+ int want_reply;
+ int success = 0;
+
+ rtype = packet_get_cstring(NULL);
+ want_reply = packet_get_char();
+ debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d",
+ rtype, want_reply);
+ if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-00 at openssh.com") == 0)
+ success = client_input_hostkeys();
+ if (want_reply) {
+ packet_start(success ?
+ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ }
+ free(rtype);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+client_session2_setup(int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem,
+ const char *term, struct termios *tiop, int in_fd, Buffer *cmd, char **env)
+{
+ int len;
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+
+ debug2("%s: id %d", __func__, id);
+
+ if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL)
+ fatal("client_session2_setup: channel %d: unknown channel", id);
+
+ packet_set_interactive(want_tty,
+ options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
+
+ if (want_tty) {
+ struct winsize ws;
+
+ /* Store window size in the packet. */
+ if (ioctl(in_fd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
+ memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
+
+ channel_request_start(id, "pty-req", 1);
+ client_expect_confirm(id, "PTY allocation", CONFIRM_TTY);
+ packet_put_cstring(term != NULL ? term : "");
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
+ if (tiop == NULL)
+ tiop = get_saved_tio();
+ tty_make_modes(-1, tiop);
+ packet_send();
+ /* XXX wait for reply */
+ c->client_tty = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Transfer any environment variables from client to server */
+ if (options.num_send_env != 0 && env != NULL) {
+ int i, j, matched;
+ char *name, *val;
+
+ debug("Sending environment.");
+ for (i = 0; env[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ /* Split */
+ name = xstrdup(env[i]);
+ if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) {
+ free(name);
+ continue;
+ }
+ *val++ = '\0';
+
+ matched = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < options.num_send_env; j++) {
+ if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[j])) {
+ matched = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!matched) {
+ debug3("Ignored env %s", name);
+ free(name);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ debug("Sending env %s = %s", name, val);
+ channel_request_start(id, "env", 0);
+ packet_put_cstring(name);
+ packet_put_cstring(val);
+ packet_send();
+ free(name);
+ }
+ }
+
+ len = buffer_len(cmd);
+ if (len > 0) {
+ if (len > 900)
+ len = 900;
+ if (want_subsystem) {
+ debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s",
+ len, (u_char*)buffer_ptr(cmd));
+ channel_request_start(id, "subsystem", 1);
+ client_expect_confirm(id, "subsystem", CONFIRM_CLOSE);
+ } else {
+ debug("Sending command: %.*s",
+ len, (u_char*)buffer_ptr(cmd));
+ channel_request_start(id, "exec", 1);
+ client_expect_confirm(id, "exec", CONFIRM_CLOSE);
+ }
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(cmd), buffer_len(cmd));
+ packet_send();
+ } else {
+ channel_request_start(id, "shell", 1);
+ client_expect_confirm(id, "shell", CONFIRM_CLOSE);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+client_init_dispatch_20(void)
+{
+ dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error);
+
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &client_input_channel_open);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &client_input_channel_req);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &channel_input_status_confirm);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &channel_input_status_confirm);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &client_input_global_request);
+
+ /* rekeying */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
+
+ /* global request reply messages */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &client_global_request_reply);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &client_global_request_reply);
+}
+
+static void
+client_init_dispatch_13(void)
+{
+ dispatch_init(NULL);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_close);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_close_confirmation);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN, &channel_input_port_open);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS, &client_input_exit_status);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA, &client_input_stderr_data);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA, &client_input_stdout_data);
+
+ dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN, options.forward_agent ?
+ &client_input_agent_open : &deny_input_open);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN, options.forward_x11 ?
+ &x11_input_open : &deny_input_open);
+}
+
+static void
+client_init_dispatch_15(void)
+{
+ client_init_dispatch_13();
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_ieof);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, & channel_input_oclose);
+}
+
+static void
+client_init_dispatch(void)
+{
+ if (compat20)
+ client_init_dispatch_20();
+ else if (compat13)
+ client_init_dispatch_13();
+ else
+ client_init_dispatch_15();
+}
+
+void
+client_stop_mux(void)
+{
+ if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
+ unlink(options.control_path);
+ /*
+ * If we are in persist mode, or don't have a shell, signal that we
+ * should close when all active channels are closed.
+ */
+ if (options.control_persist || no_shell_flag) {
+ session_closed = 1;
+ setproctitle("[stopped mux]");
+ }
+}
+
+/* client specific fatal cleanup */
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+ leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+ leave_non_blocking();
+ if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
+ unlink(options.control_path);
+ ssh_kill_proxy_command();
+ _exit(i);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/clientloop.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/clientloop.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/clientloop.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.31 2013/06/02 23:36:29 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include <termios.h>
-
-/* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */
-int client_loop(int, int, int);
-void client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int,
- char **, char **);
-void client_global_request_reply_fwd(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void client_session2_setup(int, int, int, const char *, struct termios *,
- int, Buffer *, char **);
-int client_request_tun_fwd(int, int, int);
-void client_stop_mux(void);
-
-/* Escape filter for protocol 2 sessions */
-void *client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int);
-void client_filter_cleanup(int, void *);
-int client_simple_escape_filter(Channel *, char *, int);
-
-/* Global request confirmation callbacks */
-typedef void global_confirm_cb(int, u_int32_t seq, void *);
-void client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *, void *);
-
-/* Channel request confirmation callbacks */
-enum confirm_action { CONFIRM_WARN = 0, CONFIRM_CLOSE, CONFIRM_TTY };
-void client_expect_confirm(int, const char *, enum confirm_action);
-
-/* Multiplexing protocol version */
-#define SSHMUX_VER 4
-
-/* Multiplexing control protocol flags */
-#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN 1 /* Open new connection */
-#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK 2 /* Check master is alive */
-#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE 3 /* Ask master to exit */
-#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD 4 /* Open stdio fwd (ssh -W) */
-#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD 5 /* Forward only, no command */
-#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP 6 /* Disable mux but not conn */
-#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD 7 /* Cancel forwarding(s) */
-
-void muxserver_listen(void);
-void muxclient(const char *);
-void mux_exit_message(Channel *, int);
-void mux_tty_alloc_failed(Channel *);
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/clientloop.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/clientloop.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/clientloop.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/clientloop.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.32 2016/01/13 23:04:47 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <termios.h>
+
+/* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */
+int client_loop(int, int, int);
+int client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int,
+ char **, char **);
+void client_global_request_reply_fwd(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void client_session2_setup(int, int, int, const char *, struct termios *,
+ int, Buffer *, char **);
+int client_request_tun_fwd(int, int, int);
+void client_stop_mux(void);
+
+/* Escape filter for protocol 2 sessions */
+void *client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int);
+void client_filter_cleanup(int, void *);
+int client_simple_escape_filter(Channel *, char *, int);
+
+/* Global request confirmation callbacks */
+typedef void global_confirm_cb(int, u_int32_t seq, void *);
+void client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *, void *);
+
+/* Channel request confirmation callbacks */
+enum confirm_action { CONFIRM_WARN = 0, CONFIRM_CLOSE, CONFIRM_TTY };
+void client_expect_confirm(int, const char *, enum confirm_action);
+
+/* Multiplexing protocol version */
+#define SSHMUX_VER 4
+
+/* Multiplexing control protocol flags */
+#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN 1 /* Open new connection */
+#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK 2 /* Check master is alive */
+#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE 3 /* Ask master to exit */
+#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD 4 /* Open stdio fwd (ssh -W) */
+#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD 5 /* Forward only, no command */
+#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP 6 /* Disable mux but not conn */
+#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD 7 /* Cancel forwarding(s) */
+
+void muxserver_listen(void);
+void muxclient(const char *);
+void mux_exit_message(Channel *, int);
+void mux_tty_alloc_failed(Channel *);
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/compat.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/compat.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/compat.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,267 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.82 2013/12/30 23:52:27 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "match.h"
-
-int compat13 = 0;
-int compat20 = 0;
-int datafellows = 0;
-
-void
-enable_compat20(void)
-{
- if (compat20)
- return;
- debug("Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 2.0");
- compat20 = 1;
-}
-void
-enable_compat13(void)
-{
- debug("Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 1.3");
- compat13 = 1;
-}
-/* datafellows bug compatibility */
-void
-compat_datafellows(const char *version)
-{
- int i;
- static struct {
- char *pat;
- int bugs;
- } check[] = {
- { "OpenSSH-2.0*,"
- "OpenSSH-2.1*,"
- "OpenSSH_2.1*,"
- "OpenSSH_2.2*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_BANNER|
- SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|
- SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
- { "OpenSSH_2.3.0*", SSH_BUG_BANNER|SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|
- SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|
- SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
- { "OpenSSH_2.3.*", SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|SSH_OLD_DHGEX|
- SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|
- SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
- { "OpenSSH_2.5.0p1*,"
- "OpenSSH_2.5.1p1*",
- SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|SSH_OLD_DHGEX|
- SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|
- SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
- { "OpenSSH_2.5.0*,"
- "OpenSSH_2.5.1*,"
- "OpenSSH_2.5.2*", SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|
- SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
- { "OpenSSH_2.5.3*", SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|
- SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
- { "OpenSSH_2.*,"
- "OpenSSH_3.0*,"
- "OpenSSH_3.1*", SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
- { "OpenSSH_3.*", SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR },
- { "Sun_SSH_1.0*", SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
- { "OpenSSH_4*", 0 },
- { "OpenSSH_5*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT},
- { "OpenSSH*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH },
- { "*MindTerm*", 0 },
- { "2.1.0*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
- SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
- SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE|
- SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
- { "2.1 *", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
- SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
- SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE|
- SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
- { "2.0.13*,"
- "2.0.14*,"
- "2.0.15*,"
- "2.0.16*,"
- "2.0.17*,"
- "2.0.18*,"
- "2.0.19*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
- SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
- SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD|
- SSH_BUG_PKOK|SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|
- SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE|
- SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
- { "2.0.11*,"
- "2.0.12*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
- SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
- SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD|
- SSH_BUG_PKAUTH|SSH_BUG_PKOK|
- SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE|
- SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
- { "2.0.*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
- SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
- SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD|
- SSH_BUG_PKAUTH|SSH_BUG_PKOK|
- SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE|
- SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY|SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN|
- SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
- { "2.2.0*,"
- "2.3.0*", SSH_BUG_HMAC|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
- SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
- { "2.3.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG|SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|
- SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
- { "2.4", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID }, /* Van Dyke */
- { "2.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX|
- SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR },
- { "3.0.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG },
- { "3.0 SecureCRT*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID },
- { "1.7 SecureFX*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID },
- { "1.2.18*,"
- "1.2.19*,"
- "1.2.20*,"
- "1.2.21*,"
- "1.2.22*", SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG },
- { "1.3.2*", /* F-Secure */
- SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG },
- { "*SSH Compatible Server*", /* Netscreen */
- SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD },
- { "*OSU_0*,"
- "OSU_1.0*,"
- "OSU_1.1*,"
- "OSU_1.2*,"
- "OSU_1.3*,"
- "OSU_1.4*,"
- "OSU_1.5alpha1*,"
- "OSU_1.5alpha2*,"
- "OSU_1.5alpha3*", SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD },
- { "*SSH_Version_Mapper*",
- SSH_BUG_SCANNER },
- { "Probe-*",
- SSH_BUG_PROBE },
- { NULL, 0 }
- };
-
- /* process table, return first match */
- for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) {
- if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat,
- strlen(check[i].pat), 0) == 1) {
- datafellows = check[i].bugs;
- debug("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
- version, check[i].pat, datafellows);
- return;
- }
- }
- debug("no match: %s", version);
-}
-
-#define SEP ","
-int
-proto_spec(const char *spec)
-{
- char *s, *p, *q;
- int ret = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
-
- if (spec == NULL)
- return ret;
- q = s = xstrdup(spec);
- for ((p = strsep(&q, SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&q, SEP))) {
- switch (atoi(p)) {
- case 1:
- if (ret == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
- ret |= SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED;
- ret |= SSH_PROTO_1;
- break;
- case 2:
- ret |= SSH_PROTO_2;
- break;
- default:
- logit("ignoring bad proto spec: '%s'.", p);
- break;
- }
- }
- free(s);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Filters a proposal string, excluding any algorithm matching the 'filter'
- * pattern list.
- */
-static char *
-filter_proposal(char *proposal, const char *filter)
-{
- Buffer b;
- char *orig_prop, *fix_prop;
- char *cp, *tmp;
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- tmp = orig_prop = xstrdup(proposal);
- while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) {
- if (match_pattern_list(cp, filter, strlen(cp), 0) != 1) {
- if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
- buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
- buffer_append(&b, cp, strlen(cp));
- } else
- debug2("Compat: skipping algorithm \"%s\"", cp);
- }
- buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
- fix_prop = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
- buffer_free(&b);
- free(orig_prop);
-
- return fix_prop;
-}
-
-char *
-compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop)
-{
- if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES))
- return cipher_prop;
- debug2("%s: original cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop);
- cipher_prop = filter_proposal(cipher_prop, "aes*");
- debug2("%s: compat cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop);
- if (*cipher_prop == '\0')
- fatal("No supported ciphers found");
- return cipher_prop;
-}
-
-
-char *
-compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop)
-{
- if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5))
- return pkalg_prop;
- debug2("%s: original public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop);
- pkalg_prop = filter_proposal(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa");
- debug2("%s: compat public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop);
- if (*pkalg_prop == '\0')
- fatal("No supported PK algorithms found");
- return pkalg_prop;
-}
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/compat.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/compat.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/compat.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/compat.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.99 2016/05/24 02:31:57 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "match.h"
+
+int compat13 = 0;
+int compat20 = 0;
+int datafellows = 0;
+
+void
+enable_compat20(void)
+{
+ if (compat20)
+ return;
+ debug("Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 2.0");
+ compat20 = 1;
+}
+void
+enable_compat13(void)
+{
+ debug("Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 1.3");
+ compat13 = 1;
+}
+/* datafellows bug compatibility */
+u_int
+compat_datafellows(const char *version)
+{
+ int i;
+ static struct {
+ char *pat;
+ int bugs;
+ } check[] = {
+ { "OpenSSH-2.0*,"
+ "OpenSSH-2.1*,"
+ "OpenSSH_2.1*,"
+ "OpenSSH_2.2*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_BANNER|
+ SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|
+ SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
+ { "OpenSSH_2.3.0*", SSH_BUG_BANNER|SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|
+ SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|
+ SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
+ { "OpenSSH_2.3.*", SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|SSH_OLD_DHGEX|
+ SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|
+ SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
+ { "OpenSSH_2.5.0p1*,"
+ "OpenSSH_2.5.1p1*",
+ SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|SSH_OLD_DHGEX|
+ SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|
+ SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
+ { "OpenSSH_2.5.0*,"
+ "OpenSSH_2.5.1*,"
+ "OpenSSH_2.5.2*", SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|
+ SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
+ { "OpenSSH_2.5.3*", SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|
+ SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
+ { "OpenSSH_2.*,"
+ "OpenSSH_3.0*,"
+ "OpenSSH_3.1*", SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
+ { "OpenSSH_3.*", SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR },
+ { "Sun_SSH_1.0*", SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
+ { "OpenSSH_4*", 0 },
+ { "OpenSSH_5*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT},
+ { "OpenSSH_6.6.1*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH},
+ { "OpenSSH_6.5*,"
+ "OpenSSH_6.6*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD},
+ { "OpenSSH*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH },
+ { "*MindTerm*", 0 },
+ { "2.1.0*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
+ SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
+ SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE|
+ SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
+ { "2.1 *", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
+ SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
+ SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE|
+ SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
+ { "2.0.13*,"
+ "2.0.14*,"
+ "2.0.15*,"
+ "2.0.16*,"
+ "2.0.17*,"
+ "2.0.18*,"
+ "2.0.19*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
+ SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
+ SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD|
+ SSH_BUG_PKOK|SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|
+ SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE|
+ SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
+ { "2.0.11*,"
+ "2.0.12*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
+ SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
+ SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD|
+ SSH_BUG_PKAUTH|SSH_BUG_PKOK|
+ SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE|
+ SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
+ { "2.0.*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
+ SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
+ SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD|
+ SSH_BUG_PKAUTH|SSH_BUG_PKOK|
+ SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE|
+ SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY|SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN|
+ SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
+ { "2.2.0*,"
+ "2.3.0*", SSH_BUG_HMAC|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
+ SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
+ { "2.3.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG|SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|
+ SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
+ { "2.4", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID }, /* Van Dyke */
+ { "2.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX|
+ SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR },
+ { "3.0.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG },
+ { "3.0 SecureCRT*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID },
+ { "1.7 SecureFX*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID },
+ { "1.2.18*,"
+ "1.2.19*,"
+ "1.2.20*,"
+ "1.2.21*,"
+ "1.2.22*", SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG },
+ { "1.3.2*", /* F-Secure */
+ SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG },
+ { "Cisco-1.*", SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE|
+ SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS },
+ { "*SSH Compatible Server*", /* Netscreen */
+ SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD },
+ { "*OSU_0*,"
+ "OSU_1.0*,"
+ "OSU_1.1*,"
+ "OSU_1.2*,"
+ "OSU_1.3*,"
+ "OSU_1.4*,"
+ "OSU_1.5alpha1*,"
+ "OSU_1.5alpha2*,"
+ "OSU_1.5alpha3*", SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD },
+ { "*SSH_Version_Mapper*",
+ SSH_BUG_SCANNER },
+ { "PuTTY_Local:*," /* dev versions < Sep 2014 */
+ "PuTTY-Release-0.5*," /* 0.50-0.57, DH-GEX in >=0.52 */
+ "PuTTY_Release_0.5*," /* 0.58-0.59 */
+ "PuTTY_Release_0.60*,"
+ "PuTTY_Release_0.61*,"
+ "PuTTY_Release_0.62*,"
+ "PuTTY_Release_0.63*,"
+ "PuTTY_Release_0.64*",
+ SSH_OLD_DHGEX },
+ { "FuTTY*", SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, /* Putty Fork */
+ { "Probe-*",
+ SSH_BUG_PROBE },
+ { "TeraTerm SSH*,"
+ "TTSSH/1.5.*,"
+ "TTSSH/2.1*,"
+ "TTSSH/2.2*,"
+ "TTSSH/2.3*,"
+ "TTSSH/2.4*,"
+ "TTSSH/2.5*,"
+ "TTSSH/2.6*,"
+ "TTSSH/2.70*,"
+ "TTSSH/2.71*,"
+ "TTSSH/2.72*", SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS },
+ { "WinSCP_release_4*,"
+ "WinSCP_release_5.0*,"
+ "WinSCP_release_5.1*,"
+ "WinSCP_release_5.5*,"
+ "WinSCP_release_5.6*,"
+ "WinSCP_release_5.7,"
+ "WinSCP_release_5.7.1,"
+ "WinSCP_release_5.7.2,"
+ "WinSCP_release_5.7.3,"
+ "WinSCP_release_5.7.4",
+ SSH_OLD_DHGEX },
+ { NULL, 0 }
+ };
+
+ /* process table, return first match */
+ for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) {
+ if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) {
+ debug("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
+ version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
+ datafellows = check[i].bugs; /* XXX for now */
+ return check[i].bugs;
+ }
+ }
+ debug("no match: %s", version);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define SEP ","
+int
+proto_spec(const char *spec)
+{
+ char *s, *p, *q;
+ int ret = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
+
+ if (spec == NULL)
+ return ret;
+ q = s = strdup(spec);
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return ret;
+ for ((p = strsep(&q, SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&q, SEP))) {
+ switch (atoi(p)) {
+ case 1:
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ if (ret == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ ret |= SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED;
+ ret |= SSH_PROTO_1;
+#endif
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ ret |= SSH_PROTO_2;
+ break;
+ default:
+ logit("ignoring bad proto spec: '%s'.", p);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ free(s);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Filters a proposal string, excluding any algorithm matching the 'filter'
+ * pattern list.
+ */
+static char *
+filter_proposal(char *proposal, const char *filter)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ char *orig_prop, *fix_prop;
+ char *cp, *tmp;
+
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ tmp = orig_prop = xstrdup(proposal);
+ while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) {
+ if (match_pattern_list(cp, filter, 0) != 1) {
+ if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
+ buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
+ buffer_append(&b, cp, strlen(cp));
+ } else
+ debug2("Compat: skipping algorithm \"%s\"", cp);
+ }
+ buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
+ fix_prop = xstrdup((char *)buffer_ptr(&b));
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ free(orig_prop);
+
+ return fix_prop;
+}
+
+char *
+compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop)
+{
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES))
+ return cipher_prop;
+ debug2("%s: original cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop);
+ cipher_prop = filter_proposal(cipher_prop, "aes*");
+ debug2("%s: compat cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop);
+ if (*cipher_prop == '\0')
+ fatal("No supported ciphers found");
+ return cipher_prop;
+}
+
+char *
+compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop)
+{
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5))
+ return pkalg_prop;
+ debug2("%s: original public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop);
+ pkalg_prop = filter_proposal(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa");
+ debug2("%s: compat public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop);
+ if (*pkalg_prop == '\0')
+ fatal("No supported PK algorithms found");
+ return pkalg_prop;
+}
+
+char *
+compat_kex_proposal(char *p)
+{
+ if ((datafellows & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0)
+ return p;
+ debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p);
+ if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
+ p = filter_proposal(p, "curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org");
+ if ((datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
+ p = filter_proposal(p, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256");
+ p = filter_proposal(p, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1");
+ }
+ debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p);
+ if (*p == '\0')
+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found");
+ return p;
+}
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/compat.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/compat.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/compat.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.44 2013/12/30 23:52:27 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#ifndef COMPAT_H
-#define COMPAT_H
-
-#define SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN 0x00
-#define SSH_PROTO_1 0x01
-#define SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED 0x02
-#define SSH_PROTO_2 0x04
-
-#define SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB 0x00000001
-#define SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE 0x00000002
-#define SSH_BUG_HMAC 0x00000004
-#define SSH_BUG_X11FWD 0x00000008
-#define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID 0x00000010
-#define SSH_BUG_PKAUTH 0x00000020
-#define SSH_BUG_DEBUG 0x00000040
-#define SSH_BUG_BANNER 0x00000080
-#define SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG 0x00000100
-#define SSH_BUG_PKOK 0x00000200
-#define SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD 0x00000400
-#define SSH_BUG_SCANNER 0x00000800
-#define SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES 0x00001000
-#define SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 0x00002000
-#define SSH_OLD_DHGEX 0x00004000
-#define SSH_BUG_NOREKEY 0x00008000
-#define SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE 0x00010000
-#define SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE 0x00020000
-#define SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY 0x00040000
-#define SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN 0x00100000
-#define SSH_BUG_EXTEOF 0x00200000
-#define SSH_BUG_PROBE 0x00400000
-#define SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX 0x00800000
-#define SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR 0x01000000
-#define SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR 0x02000000
-#define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH 0x04000000
-#define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT 0x08000000
-
-void enable_compat13(void);
-void enable_compat20(void);
-void compat_datafellows(const char *);
-int proto_spec(const char *);
-char *compat_cipher_proposal(char *);
-char *compat_pkalg_proposal(char *);
-
-extern int compat13;
-extern int compat20;
-extern int datafellows;
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/compat.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/compat.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/compat.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/compat.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.48 2015/05/26 23:23:40 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef COMPAT_H
+#define COMPAT_H
+
+#define SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN 0x00
+#define SSH_PROTO_1 0x01
+#define SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED 0x02
+#define SSH_PROTO_2 0x04
+
+#define SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB 0x00000001
+#define SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE 0x00000002
+#define SSH_BUG_HMAC 0x00000004
+#define SSH_BUG_X11FWD 0x00000008
+#define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID 0x00000010
+#define SSH_BUG_PKAUTH 0x00000020
+#define SSH_BUG_DEBUG 0x00000040
+#define SSH_BUG_BANNER 0x00000080
+#define SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG 0x00000100
+#define SSH_BUG_PKOK 0x00000200
+#define SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD 0x00000400
+#define SSH_BUG_SCANNER 0x00000800
+#define SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES 0x00001000
+#define SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 0x00002000
+#define SSH_OLD_DHGEX 0x00004000
+#define SSH_BUG_NOREKEY 0x00008000
+#define SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE 0x00010000
+#define SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE 0x00020000
+#define SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY 0x00040000
+#define SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN 0x00100000
+#define SSH_BUG_EXTEOF 0x00200000
+#define SSH_BUG_PROBE 0x00400000
+#define SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX 0x00800000
+#define SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR 0x01000000
+#define SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR 0x02000000
+#define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH 0x04000000
+#define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT 0x08000000
+#define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD 0x10000000
+#define SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS 0x20000000
+#define SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE 0x40000000
+
+void enable_compat13(void);
+void enable_compat20(void);
+u_int compat_datafellows(const char *);
+int proto_spec(const char *);
+char *compat_cipher_proposal(char *);
+char *compat_pkalg_proposal(char *);
+char *compat_kex_proposal(char *);
+
+extern int compat13;
+extern int compat20;
+extern int datafellows;
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/compress.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/compress.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/compress.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: compress.c,v 1.26 2010/09/08 04:13:31 deraadt Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Interface to packet compression for ssh.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "compress.h"
-
-#include <zlib.h>
-
-z_stream incoming_stream;
-z_stream outgoing_stream;
-static int compress_init_send_called = 0;
-static int compress_init_recv_called = 0;
-static int inflate_failed = 0;
-static int deflate_failed = 0;
-
-/*
- * Initializes compression; level is compression level from 1 to 9
- * (as in gzip).
- */
-
-void
-buffer_compress_init_send(int level)
-{
- if (compress_init_send_called == 1)
- deflateEnd(&outgoing_stream);
- compress_init_send_called = 1;
- debug("Enabling compression at level %d.", level);
- if (level < 1 || level > 9)
- fatal("Bad compression level %d.", level);
- deflateInit(&outgoing_stream, level);
-}
-void
-buffer_compress_init_recv(void)
-{
- if (compress_init_recv_called == 1)
- inflateEnd(&incoming_stream);
- compress_init_recv_called = 1;
- inflateInit(&incoming_stream);
-}
-
-/* Frees any data structures allocated for compression. */
-
-void
-buffer_compress_uninit(void)
-{
- debug("compress outgoing: raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
- (unsigned long long)outgoing_stream.total_in,
- (unsigned long long)outgoing_stream.total_out,
- outgoing_stream.total_in == 0 ? 0.0 :
- (double) outgoing_stream.total_out / outgoing_stream.total_in);
- debug("compress incoming: raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
- (unsigned long long)incoming_stream.total_out,
- (unsigned long long)incoming_stream.total_in,
- incoming_stream.total_out == 0 ? 0.0 :
- (double) incoming_stream.total_in / incoming_stream.total_out);
- if (compress_init_recv_called == 1 && inflate_failed == 0)
- inflateEnd(&incoming_stream);
- if (compress_init_send_called == 1 && deflate_failed == 0)
- deflateEnd(&outgoing_stream);
-}
-
-/*
- * Compresses the contents of input_buffer into output_buffer. All packets
- * compressed using this function will form a single compressed data stream;
- * however, data will be flushed at the end of every call so that each
- * output_buffer can be decompressed independently (but in the appropriate
- * order since they together form a single compression stream) by the
- * receiver. This appends the compressed data to the output buffer.
- */
-
-void
-buffer_compress(Buffer * input_buffer, Buffer * output_buffer)
-{
- u_char buf[4096];
- int status;
-
- /* This case is not handled below. */
- if (buffer_len(input_buffer) == 0)
- return;
-
- /* Input is the contents of the input buffer. */
- outgoing_stream.next_in = buffer_ptr(input_buffer);
- outgoing_stream.avail_in = buffer_len(input_buffer);
-
- /* Loop compressing until deflate() returns with avail_out != 0. */
- do {
- /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
- outgoing_stream.next_out = buf;
- outgoing_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
-
- /* Compress as much data into the buffer as possible. */
- status = deflate(&outgoing_stream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
- switch (status) {
- case Z_OK:
- /* Append compressed data to output_buffer. */
- buffer_append(output_buffer, buf,
- sizeof(buf) - outgoing_stream.avail_out);
- break;
- default:
- deflate_failed = 1;
- fatal("buffer_compress: deflate returned %d", status);
- /* NOTREACHED */
- }
- } while (outgoing_stream.avail_out == 0);
-}
-
-/*
- * Uncompresses the contents of input_buffer into output_buffer. All packets
- * uncompressed using this function will form a single compressed data
- * stream; however, data will be flushed at the end of every call so that
- * each output_buffer. This must be called for the same size units that the
- * buffer_compress was called, and in the same order that buffers compressed
- * with that. This appends the uncompressed data to the output buffer.
- */
-
-void
-buffer_uncompress(Buffer * input_buffer, Buffer * output_buffer)
-{
- u_char buf[4096];
- int status;
-
- incoming_stream.next_in = buffer_ptr(input_buffer);
- incoming_stream.avail_in = buffer_len(input_buffer);
-
- for (;;) {
- /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
- incoming_stream.next_out = buf;
- incoming_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
-
- status = inflate(&incoming_stream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
- switch (status) {
- case Z_OK:
- buffer_append(output_buffer, buf,
- sizeof(buf) - incoming_stream.avail_out);
- break;
- case Z_BUF_ERROR:
- /*
- * Comments in zlib.h say that we should keep calling
- * inflate() until we get an error. This appears to
- * be the error that we get.
- */
- return;
- default:
- inflate_failed = 1;
- fatal("buffer_uncompress: inflate returned %d", status);
- /* NOTREACHED */
- }
- }
-}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/compress.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/compress.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/compress.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: compress.h,v 1.12 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Interface to packet compression for ssh.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#ifndef COMPRESS_H
-#define COMPRESS_H
-
-void buffer_compress_init_send(int);
-void buffer_compress_init_recv(void);
-void buffer_compress_uninit(void);
-void buffer_compress(Buffer *, Buffer *);
-void buffer_uncompress(Buffer *, Buffer *);
-
-#endif /* COMPRESS_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/config.guess
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/config.guess 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/config.guess 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1537 +0,0 @@
-#! /bin/sh
-# Attempt to guess a canonical system name.
-# Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999,
-# 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010,
-# 2011, 2012, 2013 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
-
-timestamp='2012-12-23'
-
-# This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
-# under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
-# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
-# (at your option) any later version.
-#
-# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
-# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
-# General Public License for more details.
-#
-# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-# along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-#
-# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you
-# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a
-# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under
-# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program.
-
-
-# Originally written by Per Bothner. Please send patches (context
-# diff format) to <config-patches at gnu.org> and include a ChangeLog
-# entry.
-#
-# This script attempts to guess a canonical system name similar to
-# config.sub. If it succeeds, it prints the system name on stdout, and
-# exits with 0. Otherwise, it exits with 1.
-#
-# You can get the latest version of this script from:
-# http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.guess;hb=HEAD
-
-me=`echo "$0" | sed -e 's,.*/,,'`
-
-usage="\
-Usage: $0 [OPTION]
-
-Output the configuration name of the system \`$me' is run on.
-
-Operation modes:
- -h, --help print this help, then exit
- -t, --time-stamp print date of last modification, then exit
- -v, --version print version number, then exit
-
-Report bugs and patches to <config-patches at gnu.org>."
-
-version="\
-GNU config.guess ($timestamp)
-
-Originally written by Per Bothner.
-Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000,
-2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011,
-2012, 2013 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
-
-This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO
-warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE."
-
-help="
-Try \`$me --help' for more information."
-
-# Parse command line
-while test $# -gt 0 ; do
- case $1 in
- --time-stamp | --time* | -t )
- echo "$timestamp" ; exit ;;
- --version | -v )
- echo "$version" ; exit ;;
- --help | --h* | -h )
- echo "$usage"; exit ;;
- -- ) # Stop option processing
- shift; break ;;
- - ) # Use stdin as input.
- break ;;
- -* )
- echo "$me: invalid option $1$help" >&2
- exit 1 ;;
- * )
- break ;;
- esac
-done
-
-if test $# != 0; then
- echo "$me: too many arguments$help" >&2
- exit 1
-fi
-
-trap 'exit 1' 1 2 15
-
-# CC_FOR_BUILD -- compiler used by this script. Note that the use of a
-# compiler to aid in system detection is discouraged as it requires
-# temporary files to be created and, as you can see below, it is a
-# headache to deal with in a portable fashion.
-
-# Historically, `CC_FOR_BUILD' used to be named `HOST_CC'. We still
-# use `HOST_CC' if defined, but it is deprecated.
-
-# Portable tmp directory creation inspired by the Autoconf team.
-
-set_cc_for_build='
-trap "exitcode=\$?; (rm -f \$tmpfiles 2>/dev/null; rmdir \$tmp 2>/dev/null) && exit \$exitcode" 0 ;
-trap "rm -f \$tmpfiles 2>/dev/null; rmdir \$tmp 2>/dev/null; exit 1" 1 2 13 15 ;
-: ${TMPDIR=/tmp} ;
- { tmp=`(umask 077 && mktemp -d "$TMPDIR/cgXXXXXX") 2>/dev/null` && test -n "$tmp" && test -d "$tmp" ; } ||
- { test -n "$RANDOM" && tmp=$TMPDIR/cg$$-$RANDOM && (umask 077 && mkdir $tmp) ; } ||
- { tmp=$TMPDIR/cg-$$ && (umask 077 && mkdir $tmp) && echo "Warning: creating insecure temp directory" >&2 ; } ||
- { echo "$me: cannot create a temporary directory in $TMPDIR" >&2 ; exit 1 ; } ;
-dummy=$tmp/dummy ;
-tmpfiles="$dummy.c $dummy.o $dummy.rel $dummy" ;
-case $CC_FOR_BUILD,$HOST_CC,$CC in
- ,,) echo "int x;" > $dummy.c ;
- for c in cc gcc c89 c99 ; do
- if ($c -c -o $dummy.o $dummy.c) >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
- CC_FOR_BUILD="$c"; break ;
- fi ;
- done ;
- if test x"$CC_FOR_BUILD" = x ; then
- CC_FOR_BUILD=no_compiler_found ;
- fi
- ;;
- ,,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$CC ;;
- ,*,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$HOST_CC ;;
-esac ; set_cc_for_build= ;'
-
-# This is needed to find uname on a Pyramid OSx when run in the BSD universe.
-# (ghazi at noc.rutgers.edu 1994-08-24)
-if (test -f /.attbin/uname) >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
- PATH=$PATH:/.attbin ; export PATH
-fi
-
-UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -m) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_MACHINE=unknown
-UNAME_RELEASE=`(uname -r) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_RELEASE=unknown
-UNAME_SYSTEM=`(uname -s) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_SYSTEM=unknown
-UNAME_VERSION=`(uname -v) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_VERSION=unknown
-
-# Note: order is significant - the case branches are not exclusive.
-
-case "${UNAME_MACHINE}:${UNAME_SYSTEM}:${UNAME_RELEASE}:${UNAME_VERSION}" in
- *:NetBSD:*:*)
- # NetBSD (nbsd) targets should (where applicable) match one or
- # more of the tuples: *-*-netbsdelf*, *-*-netbsdaout*,
- # *-*-netbsdecoff* and *-*-netbsd*. For targets that recently
- # switched to ELF, *-*-netbsd* would select the old
- # object file format. This provides both forward
- # compatibility and a consistent mechanism for selecting the
- # object file format.
- #
- # Note: NetBSD doesn't particularly care about the vendor
- # portion of the name. We always set it to "unknown".
- sysctl="sysctl -n hw.machine_arch"
- UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`(/sbin/$sysctl 2>/dev/null || \
- /usr/sbin/$sysctl 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)`
- case "${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}" in
- armeb) machine=armeb-unknown ;;
- arm*) machine=arm-unknown ;;
- sh3el) machine=shl-unknown ;;
- sh3eb) machine=sh-unknown ;;
- sh5el) machine=sh5le-unknown ;;
- *) machine=${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown ;;
- esac
- # The Operating System including object format, if it has switched
- # to ELF recently, or will in the future.
- case "${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}" in
- arm*|i386|m68k|ns32k|sh3*|sparc|vax)
- eval $set_cc_for_build
- if echo __ELF__ | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \
- | grep -q __ELF__
- then
- # Once all utilities can be ECOFF (netbsdecoff) or a.out (netbsdaout).
- # Return netbsd for either. FIX?
- os=netbsd
- else
- os=netbsdelf
- fi
- ;;
- *)
- os=netbsd
- ;;
- esac
- # The OS release
- # Debian GNU/NetBSD machines have a different userland, and
- # thus, need a distinct triplet. However, they do not need
- # kernel version information, so it can be replaced with a
- # suitable tag, in the style of linux-gnu.
- case "${UNAME_VERSION}" in
- Debian*)
- release='-gnu'
- ;;
- *)
- release=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-_].*/\./'`
- ;;
- esac
- # Since CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-KERNEL-OPERATING_SYSTEM:
- # contains redundant information, the shorter form:
- # CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-OPERATING_SYSTEM is used.
- echo "${machine}-${os}${release}"
- exit ;;
- *:Bitrig:*:*)
- UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`arch | sed 's/Bitrig.//'`
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown-bitrig${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- *:OpenBSD:*:*)
- UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`arch | sed 's/OpenBSD.//'`
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- *:ekkoBSD:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-ekkobsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- *:SolidBSD:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-solidbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- macppc:MirBSD:*:*)
- echo powerpc-unknown-mirbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- *:MirBSD:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-mirbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- alpha:OSF1:*:*)
- case $UNAME_RELEASE in
- *4.0)
- UNAME_RELEASE=`/usr/sbin/sizer -v | awk '{print $3}'`
- ;;
- *5.*)
- UNAME_RELEASE=`/usr/sbin/sizer -v | awk '{print $4}'`
- ;;
- esac
- # According to Compaq, /usr/sbin/psrinfo has been available on
- # OSF/1 and Tru64 systems produced since 1995. I hope that
- # covers most systems running today. This code pipes the CPU
- # types through head -n 1, so we only detect the type of CPU 0.
- ALPHA_CPU_TYPE=`/usr/sbin/psrinfo -v | sed -n -e 's/^ The alpha \(.*\) processor.*$/\1/p' | head -n 1`
- case "$ALPHA_CPU_TYPE" in
- "EV4 (21064)")
- UNAME_MACHINE="alpha" ;;
- "EV4.5 (21064)")
- UNAME_MACHINE="alpha" ;;
- "LCA4 (21066/21068)")
- UNAME_MACHINE="alpha" ;;
- "EV5 (21164)")
- UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev5" ;;
- "EV5.6 (21164A)")
- UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev56" ;;
- "EV5.6 (21164PC)")
- UNAME_MACHINE="alphapca56" ;;
- "EV5.7 (21164PC)")
- UNAME_MACHINE="alphapca57" ;;
- "EV6 (21264)")
- UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev6" ;;
- "EV6.7 (21264A)")
- UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev67" ;;
- "EV6.8CB (21264C)")
- UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev68" ;;
- "EV6.8AL (21264B)")
- UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev68" ;;
- "EV6.8CX (21264D)")
- UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev68" ;;
- "EV6.9A (21264/EV69A)")
- UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev69" ;;
- "EV7 (21364)")
- UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev7" ;;
- "EV7.9 (21364A)")
- UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev79" ;;
- esac
- # A Pn.n version is a patched version.
- # A Vn.n version is a released version.
- # A Tn.n version is a released field test version.
- # A Xn.n version is an unreleased experimental baselevel.
- # 1.2 uses "1.2" for uname -r.
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-dec-osf`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/^[PVTX]//' | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'`
- # Reset EXIT trap before exiting to avoid spurious non-zero exit code.
- exitcode=$?
- trap '' 0
- exit $exitcode ;;
- Alpha\ *:Windows_NT*:*)
- # How do we know it's Interix rather than the generic POSIX subsystem?
- # Should we change UNAME_MACHINE based on the output of uname instead
- # of the specific Alpha model?
- echo alpha-pc-interix
- exit ;;
- 21064:Windows_NT:50:3)
- echo alpha-dec-winnt3.5
- exit ;;
- Amiga*:UNIX_System_V:4.0:*)
- echo m68k-unknown-sysv4
- exit ;;
- *:[Aa]miga[Oo][Ss]:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-amigaos
- exit ;;
- *:[Mm]orph[Oo][Ss]:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-morphos
- exit ;;
- *:OS/390:*:*)
- echo i370-ibm-openedition
- exit ;;
- *:z/VM:*:*)
- echo s390-ibm-zvmoe
- exit ;;
- *:OS400:*:*)
- echo powerpc-ibm-os400
- exit ;;
- arm:RISC*:1.[012]*:*|arm:riscix:1.[012]*:*)
- echo arm-acorn-riscix${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- arm*:riscos:*:*|arm*:RISCOS:*:*)
- echo arm-unknown-riscos
- exit ;;
- SR2?01:HI-UX/MPP:*:* | SR8000:HI-UX/MPP:*:*)
- echo hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxmpp
- exit ;;
- Pyramid*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:SMP_DC-OSx*:*:*)
- # akee at wpdis03.wpafb.af.mil (Earle F. Ake) contributed MIS and NILE.
- if test "`(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null`" = att ; then
- echo pyramid-pyramid-sysv3
- else
- echo pyramid-pyramid-bsd
- fi
- exit ;;
- NILE*:*:*:dcosx)
- echo pyramid-pyramid-svr4
- exit ;;
- DRS?6000:unix:4.0:6*)
- echo sparc-icl-nx6
- exit ;;
- DRS?6000:UNIX_SV:4.2*:7* | DRS?6000:isis:4.2*:7*)
- case `/usr/bin/uname -p` in
- sparc) echo sparc-icl-nx7; exit ;;
- esac ;;
- s390x:SunOS:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
- exit ;;
- sun4H:SunOS:5.*:*)
- echo sparc-hal-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
- exit ;;
- sun4*:SunOS:5.*:* | tadpole*:SunOS:5.*:*)
- echo sparc-sun-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
- exit ;;
- i86pc:AuroraUX:5.*:* | i86xen:AuroraUX:5.*:*)
- echo i386-pc-auroraux${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- i86pc:SunOS:5.*:* | i86xen:SunOS:5.*:*)
- eval $set_cc_for_build
- SUN_ARCH="i386"
- # If there is a compiler, see if it is configured for 64-bit objects.
- # Note that the Sun cc does not turn __LP64__ into 1 like gcc does.
- # This test works for both compilers.
- if [ "$CC_FOR_BUILD" != 'no_compiler_found' ]; then
- if (echo '#ifdef __amd64'; echo IS_64BIT_ARCH; echo '#endif') | \
- (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) | \
- grep IS_64BIT_ARCH >/dev/null
- then
- SUN_ARCH="x86_64"
- fi
- fi
- echo ${SUN_ARCH}-pc-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
- exit ;;
- sun4*:SunOS:6*:*)
- # According to config.sub, this is the proper way to canonicalize
- # SunOS6. Hard to guess exactly what SunOS6 will be like, but
- # it's likely to be more like Solaris than SunOS4.
- echo sparc-sun-solaris3`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
- exit ;;
- sun4*:SunOS:*:*)
- case "`/usr/bin/arch -k`" in
- Series*|S4*)
- UNAME_RELEASE=`uname -v`
- ;;
- esac
- # Japanese Language versions have a version number like `4.1.3-JL'.
- echo sparc-sun-sunos`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/'`
- exit ;;
- sun3*:SunOS:*:*)
- echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- sun*:*:4.2BSD:*)
- UNAME_RELEASE=`(sed 1q /etc/motd | awk '{print substr($5,1,3)}') 2>/dev/null`
- test "x${UNAME_RELEASE}" = "x" && UNAME_RELEASE=3
- case "`/bin/arch`" in
- sun3)
- echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE}
- ;;
- sun4)
- echo sparc-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE}
- ;;
- esac
- exit ;;
- aushp:SunOS:*:*)
- echo sparc-auspex-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- # The situation for MiNT is a little confusing. The machine name
- # can be virtually everything (everything which is not
- # "atarist" or "atariste" at least should have a processor
- # > m68000). The system name ranges from "MiNT" over "FreeMiNT"
- # to the lowercase version "mint" (or "freemint"). Finally
- # the system name "TOS" denotes a system which is actually not
- # MiNT. But MiNT is downward compatible to TOS, so this should
- # be no problem.
- atarist[e]:*MiNT:*:* | atarist[e]:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*)
- echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- atari*:*MiNT:*:* | atari*:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*)
- echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- *falcon*:*MiNT:*:* | *falcon*:*mint:*:* | *falcon*:*TOS:*:*)
- echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- milan*:*MiNT:*:* | milan*:*mint:*:* | *milan*:*TOS:*:*)
- echo m68k-milan-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- hades*:*MiNT:*:* | hades*:*mint:*:* | *hades*:*TOS:*:*)
- echo m68k-hades-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- *:*MiNT:*:* | *:*mint:*:* | *:*TOS:*:*)
- echo m68k-unknown-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- m68k:machten:*:*)
- echo m68k-apple-machten${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- powerpc:machten:*:*)
- echo powerpc-apple-machten${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- RISC*:Mach:*:*)
- echo mips-dec-mach_bsd4.3
- exit ;;
- RISC*:ULTRIX:*:*)
- echo mips-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- VAX*:ULTRIX*:*:*)
- echo vax-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- 2020:CLIX:*:* | 2430:CLIX:*:*)
- echo clipper-intergraph-clix${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- mips:*:*:UMIPS | mips:*:*:RISCos)
- eval $set_cc_for_build
- sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-#include <stdio.h> /* for printf() prototype */
- int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
-#else
- int main (argc, argv) int argc; char *argv[]; {
-#endif
- #if defined (host_mips) && defined (MIPSEB)
- #if defined (SYSTYPE_SYSV)
- printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssysv\n", argv[1]); exit (0);
- #endif
- #if defined (SYSTYPE_SVR4)
- printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssvr4\n", argv[1]); exit (0);
- #endif
- #if defined (SYSTYPE_BSD43) || defined(SYSTYPE_BSD)
- printf ("mips-mips-riscos%sbsd\n", argv[1]); exit (0);
- #endif
- #endif
- exit (-1);
- }
-EOF
- $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c &&
- dummyarg=`echo "${UNAME_RELEASE}" | sed -n 's/\([0-9]*\).*/\1/p'` &&
- SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy $dummyarg` &&
- { echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"; exit; }
- echo mips-mips-riscos${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- Motorola:PowerMAX_OS:*:*)
- echo powerpc-motorola-powermax
- exit ;;
- Motorola:*:4.3:PL8-*)
- echo powerpc-harris-powermax
- exit ;;
- Night_Hawk:*:*:PowerMAX_OS | Synergy:PowerMAX_OS:*:*)
- echo powerpc-harris-powermax
- exit ;;
- Night_Hawk:Power_UNIX:*:*)
- echo powerpc-harris-powerunix
- exit ;;
- m88k:CX/UX:7*:*)
- echo m88k-harris-cxux7
- exit ;;
- m88k:*:4*:R4*)
- echo m88k-motorola-sysv4
- exit ;;
- m88k:*:3*:R3*)
- echo m88k-motorola-sysv3
- exit ;;
- AViiON:dgux:*:*)
- # DG/UX returns AViiON for all architectures
- UNAME_PROCESSOR=`/usr/bin/uname -p`
- if [ $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88100 ] || [ $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88110 ]
- then
- if [ ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = m88kdguxelfx ] || \
- [ ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = x ]
- then
- echo m88k-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE}
- else
- echo m88k-dg-dguxbcs${UNAME_RELEASE}
- fi
- else
- echo i586-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE}
- fi
- exit ;;
- M88*:DolphinOS:*:*) # DolphinOS (SVR3)
- echo m88k-dolphin-sysv3
- exit ;;
- M88*:*:R3*:*)
- # Delta 88k system running SVR3
- echo m88k-motorola-sysv3
- exit ;;
- XD88*:*:*:*) # Tektronix XD88 system running UTekV (SVR3)
- echo m88k-tektronix-sysv3
- exit ;;
- Tek43[0-9][0-9]:UTek:*:*) # Tektronix 4300 system running UTek (BSD)
- echo m68k-tektronix-bsd
- exit ;;
- *:IRIX*:*:*)
- echo mips-sgi-irix`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/g'`
- exit ;;
- ????????:AIX?:[12].1:2) # AIX 2.2.1 or AIX 2.1.1 is RT/PC AIX.
- echo romp-ibm-aix # uname -m gives an 8 hex-code CPU id
- exit ;; # Note that: echo "'`uname -s`'" gives 'AIX '
- i*86:AIX:*:*)
- echo i386-ibm-aix
- exit ;;
- ia64:AIX:*:*)
- if [ -x /usr/bin/oslevel ] ; then
- IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/oslevel`
- else
- IBM_REV=${UNAME_VERSION}.${UNAME_RELEASE}
- fi
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-aix${IBM_REV}
- exit ;;
- *:AIX:2:3)
- if grep bos325 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then
- eval $set_cc_for_build
- sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c
- #include <sys/systemcfg.h>
-
- main()
- {
- if (!__power_pc())
- exit(1);
- puts("powerpc-ibm-aix3.2.5");
- exit(0);
- }
-EOF
- if $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c && SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy`
- then
- echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"
- else
- echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.5
- fi
- elif grep bos324 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then
- echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.4
- else
- echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2
- fi
- exit ;;
- *:AIX:*:[4567])
- IBM_CPU_ID=`/usr/sbin/lsdev -C -c processor -S available | sed 1q | awk '{ print $1 }'`
- if /usr/sbin/lsattr -El ${IBM_CPU_ID} | grep ' POWER' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
- IBM_ARCH=rs6000
- else
- IBM_ARCH=powerpc
- fi
- if [ -x /usr/bin/oslevel ] ; then
- IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/oslevel`
- else
- IBM_REV=${UNAME_VERSION}.${UNAME_RELEASE}
- fi
- echo ${IBM_ARCH}-ibm-aix${IBM_REV}
- exit ;;
- *:AIX:*:*)
- echo rs6000-ibm-aix
- exit ;;
- ibmrt:4.4BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*)
- echo romp-ibm-bsd4.4
- exit ;;
- ibmrt:*BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*) # covers RT/PC BSD and
- echo romp-ibm-bsd${UNAME_RELEASE} # 4.3 with uname added to
- exit ;; # report: romp-ibm BSD 4.3
- *:BOSX:*:*)
- echo rs6000-bull-bosx
- exit ;;
- DPX/2?00:B.O.S.:*:*)
- echo m68k-bull-sysv3
- exit ;;
- 9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:1.*:*)
- echo m68k-hp-bsd
- exit ;;
- hp300:4.4BSD:*:* | 9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:2.*:*)
- echo m68k-hp-bsd4.4
- exit ;;
- 9000/[34678]??:HP-UX:*:*)
- HPUX_REV=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'`
- case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in
- 9000/31? ) HP_ARCH=m68000 ;;
- 9000/[34]?? ) HP_ARCH=m68k ;;
- 9000/[678][0-9][0-9])
- if [ -x /usr/bin/getconf ]; then
- sc_cpu_version=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_CPU_VERSION 2>/dev/null`
- sc_kernel_bits=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_KERNEL_BITS 2>/dev/null`
- case "${sc_cpu_version}" in
- 523) HP_ARCH="hppa1.0" ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_0
- 528) HP_ARCH="hppa1.1" ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_1
- 532) # CPU_PA_RISC2_0
- case "${sc_kernel_bits}" in
- 32) HP_ARCH="hppa2.0n" ;;
- 64) HP_ARCH="hppa2.0w" ;;
- '') HP_ARCH="hppa2.0" ;; # HP-UX 10.20
- esac ;;
- esac
- fi
- if [ "${HP_ARCH}" = "" ]; then
- eval $set_cc_for_build
- sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c
-
- #define _HPUX_SOURCE
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
-
- int main ()
- {
- #if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS)
- long bits = sysconf(_SC_KERNEL_BITS);
- #endif
- long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION);
-
- switch (cpu)
- {
- case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0"); break;
- case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1"); break;
- case CPU_PA_RISC2_0:
- #if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS)
- switch (bits)
- {
- case 64: puts ("hppa2.0w"); break;
- case 32: puts ("hppa2.0n"); break;
- default: puts ("hppa2.0"); break;
- } break;
- #else /* !defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) */
- puts ("hppa2.0"); break;
- #endif
- default: puts ("hppa1.0"); break;
- }
- exit (0);
- }
-EOF
- (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c 2>/dev/null) && HP_ARCH=`$dummy`
- test -z "$HP_ARCH" && HP_ARCH=hppa
- fi ;;
- esac
- if [ ${HP_ARCH} = "hppa2.0w" ]
- then
- eval $set_cc_for_build
-
- # hppa2.0w-hp-hpux* has a 64-bit kernel and a compiler generating
- # 32-bit code. hppa64-hp-hpux* has the same kernel and a compiler
- # generating 64-bit code. GNU and HP use different nomenclature:
- #
- # $ CC_FOR_BUILD=cc ./config.guess
- # => hppa2.0w-hp-hpux11.23
- # $ CC_FOR_BUILD="cc +DA2.0w" ./config.guess
- # => hppa64-hp-hpux11.23
-
- if echo __LP64__ | (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) |
- grep -q __LP64__
- then
- HP_ARCH="hppa2.0w"
- else
- HP_ARCH="hppa64"
- fi
- fi
- echo ${HP_ARCH}-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV}
- exit ;;
- ia64:HP-UX:*:*)
- HPUX_REV=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'`
- echo ia64-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV}
- exit ;;
- 3050*:HI-UX:*:*)
- eval $set_cc_for_build
- sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c
- #include <unistd.h>
- int
- main ()
- {
- long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION);
- /* The order matters, because CPU_IS_HP_MC68K erroneously returns
- true for CPU_PA_RISC1_0. CPU_IS_PA_RISC returns correct
- results, however. */
- if (CPU_IS_PA_RISC (cpu))
- {
- switch (cpu)
- {
- case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
- case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
- case CPU_PA_RISC2_0: puts ("hppa2.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
- default: puts ("hppa-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
- }
- }
- else if (CPU_IS_HP_MC68K (cpu))
- puts ("m68k-hitachi-hiuxwe2");
- else puts ("unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2");
- exit (0);
- }
-EOF
- $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c && SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy` &&
- { echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"; exit; }
- echo unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2
- exit ;;
- 9000/7??:4.3bsd:*:* | 9000/8?[79]:4.3bsd:*:* )
- echo hppa1.1-hp-bsd
- exit ;;
- 9000/8??:4.3bsd:*:*)
- echo hppa1.0-hp-bsd
- exit ;;
- *9??*:MPE/iX:*:* | *3000*:MPE/iX:*:*)
- echo hppa1.0-hp-mpeix
- exit ;;
- hp7??:OSF1:*:* | hp8?[79]:OSF1:*:* )
- echo hppa1.1-hp-osf
- exit ;;
- hp8??:OSF1:*:*)
- echo hppa1.0-hp-osf
- exit ;;
- i*86:OSF1:*:*)
- if [ -x /usr/sbin/sysversion ] ; then
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1mk
- else
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1
- fi
- exit ;;
- parisc*:Lites*:*:*)
- echo hppa1.1-hp-lites
- exit ;;
- C1*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C1*:*)
- echo c1-convex-bsd
- exit ;;
- C2*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C2*:*)
- if getsysinfo -f scalar_acc
- then echo c32-convex-bsd
- else echo c2-convex-bsd
- fi
- exit ;;
- C34*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C34*:*)
- echo c34-convex-bsd
- exit ;;
- C38*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C38*:*)
- echo c38-convex-bsd
- exit ;;
- C4*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C4*:*)
- echo c4-convex-bsd
- exit ;;
- CRAY*Y-MP:*:*:*)
- echo ymp-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
- exit ;;
- CRAY*[A-Z]90:*:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} \
- | sed -e 's/CRAY.*\([A-Z]90\)/\1/' \
- -e y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz/ \
- -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
- exit ;;
- CRAY*TS:*:*:*)
- echo t90-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
- exit ;;
- CRAY*T3E:*:*:*)
- echo alphaev5-cray-unicosmk${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
- exit ;;
- CRAY*SV1:*:*:*)
- echo sv1-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
- exit ;;
- *:UNICOS/mp:*:*)
- echo craynv-cray-unicosmp${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
- exit ;;
- F30[01]:UNIX_System_V:*:* | F700:UNIX_System_V:*:*)
- FUJITSU_PROC=`uname -m | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'`
- FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' | sed -e 's/\///'`
- FUJITSU_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/ /_/'`
- echo "${FUJITSU_PROC}-fujitsu-${FUJITSU_SYS}${FUJITSU_REL}"
- exit ;;
- 5000:UNIX_System_V:4.*:*)
- FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' | sed -e 's/\///'`
- FUJITSU_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' | sed -e 's/ /_/'`
- echo "sparc-fujitsu-${FUJITSU_SYS}${FUJITSU_REL}"
- exit ;;
- i*86:BSD/386:*:* | i*86:BSD/OS:*:* | *:Ascend\ Embedded/OS:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- sparc*:BSD/OS:*:*)
- echo sparc-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- *:BSD/OS:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- *:FreeBSD:*:*)
- UNAME_PROCESSOR=`/usr/bin/uname -p`
- case ${UNAME_PROCESSOR} in
- amd64)
- echo x86_64-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` ;;
- *)
- echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` ;;
- esac
- exit ;;
- i*:CYGWIN*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-cygwin
- exit ;;
- *:MINGW64*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mingw64
- exit ;;
- *:MINGW*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mingw32
- exit ;;
- i*:MSYS*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-msys
- exit ;;
- i*:windows32*:*)
- # uname -m includes "-pc" on this system.
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-mingw32
- exit ;;
- i*:PW*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-pw32
- exit ;;
- *:Interix*:*)
- case ${UNAME_MACHINE} in
- x86)
- echo i586-pc-interix${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- authenticamd | genuineintel | EM64T)
- echo x86_64-unknown-interix${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- IA64)
- echo ia64-unknown-interix${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- esac ;;
- [345]86:Windows_95:* | [345]86:Windows_98:* | [345]86:Windows_NT:*)
- echo i${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mks
- exit ;;
- 8664:Windows_NT:*)
- echo x86_64-pc-mks
- exit ;;
- i*:Windows_NT*:* | Pentium*:Windows_NT*:*)
- # How do we know it's Interix rather than the generic POSIX subsystem?
- # It also conflicts with pre-2.0 versions of AT&T UWIN. Should we
- # UNAME_MACHINE based on the output of uname instead of i386?
- echo i586-pc-interix
- exit ;;
- i*:UWIN*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-uwin
- exit ;;
- amd64:CYGWIN*:*:* | x86_64:CYGWIN*:*:*)
- echo x86_64-unknown-cygwin
- exit ;;
- p*:CYGWIN*:*)
- echo powerpcle-unknown-cygwin
- exit ;;
- prep*:SunOS:5.*:*)
- echo powerpcle-unknown-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
- exit ;;
- *:GNU:*:*)
- # the GNU system
- echo `echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}|sed -e 's,[-/].*$,,'`-unknown-gnu`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's,/.*$,,'`
- exit ;;
- *:GNU/*:*:*)
- # other systems with GNU libc and userland
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-`echo ${UNAME_SYSTEM} | sed 's,^[^/]*/,,' | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]'``echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`-gnu
- exit ;;
- i*86:Minix:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-minix
- exit ;;
- aarch64:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- aarch64_be:Linux:*:*)
- UNAME_MACHINE=aarch64_be
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- alpha:Linux:*:*)
- case `sed -n '/^cpu model/s/^.*: \(.*\)/\1/p' < /proc/cpuinfo` in
- EV5) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev5 ;;
- EV56) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev56 ;;
- PCA56) UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;;
- PCA57) UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;;
- EV6) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev6 ;;
- EV67) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev67 ;;
- EV68*) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;;
- esac
- objdump --private-headers /bin/sh | grep -q ld.so.1
- if test "$?" = 0 ; then LIBC="libc1" ; else LIBC="" ; fi
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu${LIBC}
- exit ;;
- arm*:Linux:*:*)
- eval $set_cc_for_build
- if echo __ARM_EABI__ | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \
- | grep -q __ARM_EABI__
- then
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
- else
- if echo __ARM_PCS_VFP | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \
- | grep -q __ARM_PCS_VFP
- then
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnueabi
- else
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnueabihf
- fi
- fi
- exit ;;
- avr32*:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- cris:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-axis-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- crisv32:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-axis-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- frv:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- hexagon:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- i*86:Linux:*:*)
- LIBC=gnu
- eval $set_cc_for_build
- sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c
- #ifdef __dietlibc__
- LIBC=dietlibc
- #endif
-EOF
- eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep '^LIBC'`
- echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-${LIBC}"
- exit ;;
- ia64:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- m32r*:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- m68*:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- mips:Linux:*:* | mips64:Linux:*:*)
- eval $set_cc_for_build
- sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c
- #undef CPU
- #undef ${UNAME_MACHINE}
- #undef ${UNAME_MACHINE}el
- #if defined(__MIPSEL__) || defined(__MIPSEL) || defined(_MIPSEL) || defined(MIPSEL)
- CPU=${UNAME_MACHINE}el
- #else
- #if defined(__MIPSEB__) || defined(__MIPSEB) || defined(_MIPSEB) || defined(MIPSEB)
- CPU=${UNAME_MACHINE}
- #else
- CPU=
- #endif
- #endif
-EOF
- eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep '^CPU'`
- test x"${CPU}" != x && { echo "${CPU}-unknown-linux-gnu"; exit; }
- ;;
- or32:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- padre:Linux:*:*)
- echo sparc-unknown-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- parisc64:Linux:*:* | hppa64:Linux:*:*)
- echo hppa64-unknown-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- parisc:Linux:*:* | hppa:Linux:*:*)
- # Look for CPU level
- case `grep '^cpu[^a-z]*:' /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d' ' -f2` in
- PA7*) echo hppa1.1-unknown-linux-gnu ;;
- PA8*) echo hppa2.0-unknown-linux-gnu ;;
- *) echo hppa-unknown-linux-gnu ;;
- esac
- exit ;;
- ppc64:Linux:*:*)
- echo powerpc64-unknown-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- ppc:Linux:*:*)
- echo powerpc-unknown-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- s390:Linux:*:* | s390x:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-linux
- exit ;;
- sh64*:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- sh*:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- sparc:Linux:*:* | sparc64:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- tile*:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- vax:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-dec-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- x86_64:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- xtensa*:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
- exit ;;
- i*86:DYNIX/ptx:4*:*)
- # ptx 4.0 does uname -s correctly, with DYNIX/ptx in there.
- # earlier versions are messed up and put the nodename in both
- # sysname and nodename.
- echo i386-sequent-sysv4
- exit ;;
- i*86:UNIX_SV:4.2MP:2.*)
- # Unixware is an offshoot of SVR4, but it has its own version
- # number series starting with 2...
- # I am not positive that other SVR4 systems won't match this,
- # I just have to hope. -- rms.
- # Use sysv4.2uw... so that sysv4* matches it.
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv4.2uw${UNAME_VERSION}
- exit ;;
- i*86:OS/2:*:*)
- # If we were able to find `uname', then EMX Unix compatibility
- # is probably installed.
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-os2-emx
- exit ;;
- i*86:XTS-300:*:STOP)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-stop
- exit ;;
- i*86:atheos:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-atheos
- exit ;;
- i*86:syllable:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-syllable
- exit ;;
- i*86:LynxOS:2.*:* | i*86:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | i*86:LynxOS:4.[02]*:*)
- echo i386-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- i*86:*DOS:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-msdosdjgpp
- exit ;;
- i*86:*:4.*:* | i*86:SYSTEM_V:4.*:*)
- UNAME_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed 's/\/MP$//'`
- if grep Novell /usr/include/link.h >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-univel-sysv${UNAME_REL}
- else
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv${UNAME_REL}
- fi
- exit ;;
- i*86:*:5:[678]*)
- # UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX and OpenServer 6.
- case `/bin/uname -X | grep "^Machine"` in
- *486*) UNAME_MACHINE=i486 ;;
- *Pentium) UNAME_MACHINE=i586 ;;
- *Pent*|*Celeron) UNAME_MACHINE=i686 ;;
- esac
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}${UNAME_SYSTEM}${UNAME_VERSION}
- exit ;;
- i*86:*:3.2:*)
- if test -f /usr/options/cb.name; then
- UNAME_REL=`sed -n 's/.*Version //p' </usr/options/cb.name`
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-isc$UNAME_REL
- elif /bin/uname -X 2>/dev/null >/dev/null ; then
- UNAME_REL=`(/bin/uname -X|grep Release|sed -e 's/.*= //')`
- (/bin/uname -X|grep i80486 >/dev/null) && UNAME_MACHINE=i486
- (/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pentium' >/dev/null) \
- && UNAME_MACHINE=i586
- (/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pent *II' >/dev/null) \
- && UNAME_MACHINE=i686
- (/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pentium Pro' >/dev/null) \
- && UNAME_MACHINE=i686
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sco$UNAME_REL
- else
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv32
- fi
- exit ;;
- pc:*:*:*)
- # Left here for compatibility:
- # uname -m prints for DJGPP always 'pc', but it prints nothing about
- # the processor, so we play safe by assuming i586.
- # Note: whatever this is, it MUST be the same as what config.sub
- # prints for the "djgpp" host, or else GDB configury will decide that
- # this is a cross-build.
- echo i586-pc-msdosdjgpp
- exit ;;
- Intel:Mach:3*:*)
- echo i386-pc-mach3
- exit ;;
- paragon:*:*:*)
- echo i860-intel-osf1
- exit ;;
- i860:*:4.*:*) # i860-SVR4
- if grep Stardent /usr/include/sys/uadmin.h >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
- echo i860-stardent-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} # Stardent Vistra i860-SVR4
- else # Add other i860-SVR4 vendors below as they are discovered.
- echo i860-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} # Unknown i860-SVR4
- fi
- exit ;;
- mini*:CTIX:SYS*5:*)
- # "miniframe"
- echo m68010-convergent-sysv
- exit ;;
- mc68k:UNIX:SYSTEM5:3.51m)
- echo m68k-convergent-sysv
- exit ;;
- M680?0:D-NIX:5.3:*)
- echo m68k-diab-dnix
- exit ;;
- M68*:*:R3V[5678]*:*)
- test -r /sysV68 && { echo 'm68k-motorola-sysv'; exit; } ;;
- 3[345]??:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??A:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??/*:*:4.0:3.0 | 4400:*:4.0:3.0 | 4850:*:4.0:3.0 | SKA40:*:4.0:3.0 | SDS2:*:4.0:3.0 | SHG2:*:4.0:3.0 | S7501*:*:4.0:3.0)
- OS_REL=''
- test -r /etc/.relid \
- && OS_REL=.`sed -n 's/[^ ]* [^ ]* \([0-9][0-9]\).*/\1/p' < /etc/.relid`
- /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \
- && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; }
- /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep entium >/dev/null \
- && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; } ;;
- 3[34]??:*:4.0:* | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:*)
- /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \
- && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4; exit; } ;;
- NCR*:*:4.2:* | MPRAS*:*:4.2:*)
- OS_REL='.3'
- test -r /etc/.relid \
- && OS_REL=.`sed -n 's/[^ ]* [^ ]* \([0-9][0-9]\).*/\1/p' < /etc/.relid`
- /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \
- && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; }
- /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep entium >/dev/null \
- && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; }
- /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep pteron >/dev/null \
- && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; } ;;
- m68*:LynxOS:2.*:* | m68*:LynxOS:3.0*:*)
- echo m68k-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- mc68030:UNIX_System_V:4.*:*)
- echo m68k-atari-sysv4
- exit ;;
- TSUNAMI:LynxOS:2.*:*)
- echo sparc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- rs6000:LynxOS:2.*:*)
- echo rs6000-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- PowerPC:LynxOS:2.*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:4.[02]*:*)
- echo powerpc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- SM[BE]S:UNIX_SV:*:*)
- echo mips-dde-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- RM*:ReliantUNIX-*:*:*)
- echo mips-sni-sysv4
- exit ;;
- RM*:SINIX-*:*:*)
- echo mips-sni-sysv4
- exit ;;
- *:SINIX-*:*:*)
- if uname -p 2>/dev/null >/dev/null ; then
- UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -p) 2>/dev/null`
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-sni-sysv4
- else
- echo ns32k-sni-sysv
- fi
- exit ;;
- PENTIUM:*:4.0*:*) # Unisys `ClearPath HMP IX 4000' SVR4/MP effort
- # says <Richard.M.Bartel at ccMail.Census.GOV>
- echo i586-unisys-sysv4
- exit ;;
- *:UNIX_System_V:4*:FTX*)
- # From Gerald Hewes <hewes at openmarket.com>.
- # How about differentiating between stratus architectures? -djm
- echo hppa1.1-stratus-sysv4
- exit ;;
- *:*:*:FTX*)
- # From seanf at swdc.stratus.com.
- echo i860-stratus-sysv4
- exit ;;
- i*86:VOS:*:*)
- # From Paul.Green at stratus.com.
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-stratus-vos
- exit ;;
- *:VOS:*:*)
- # From Paul.Green at stratus.com.
- echo hppa1.1-stratus-vos
- exit ;;
- mc68*:A/UX:*:*)
- echo m68k-apple-aux${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- news*:NEWS-OS:6*:*)
- echo mips-sony-newsos6
- exit ;;
- R[34]000:*System_V*:*:* | R4000:UNIX_SYSV:*:* | R*000:UNIX_SV:*:*)
- if [ -d /usr/nec ]; then
- echo mips-nec-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}
- else
- echo mips-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}
- fi
- exit ;;
- BeBox:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on hardware made by Be, PPC only.
- echo powerpc-be-beos
- exit ;;
- BeMac:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on Mac or Mac clone, PPC only.
- echo powerpc-apple-beos
- exit ;;
- BePC:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on Intel PC compatible.
- echo i586-pc-beos
- exit ;;
- BePC:Haiku:*:*) # Haiku running on Intel PC compatible.
- echo i586-pc-haiku
- exit ;;
- x86_64:Haiku:*:*)
- echo x86_64-unknown-haiku
- exit ;;
- SX-4:SUPER-UX:*:*)
- echo sx4-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- SX-5:SUPER-UX:*:*)
- echo sx5-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- SX-6:SUPER-UX:*:*)
- echo sx6-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- SX-7:SUPER-UX:*:*)
- echo sx7-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- SX-8:SUPER-UX:*:*)
- echo sx8-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- SX-8R:SUPER-UX:*:*)
- echo sx8r-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- Power*:Rhapsody:*:*)
- echo powerpc-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- *:Rhapsody:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- *:Darwin:*:*)
- UNAME_PROCESSOR=`uname -p` || UNAME_PROCESSOR=unknown
- case $UNAME_PROCESSOR in
- i386)
- eval $set_cc_for_build
- if [ "$CC_FOR_BUILD" != 'no_compiler_found' ]; then
- if (echo '#ifdef __LP64__'; echo IS_64BIT_ARCH; echo '#endif') | \
- (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) | \
- grep IS_64BIT_ARCH >/dev/null
- then
- UNAME_PROCESSOR="x86_64"
- fi
- fi ;;
- unknown) UNAME_PROCESSOR=powerpc ;;
- esac
- echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-apple-darwin${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- *:procnto*:*:* | *:QNX:[0123456789]*:*)
- UNAME_PROCESSOR=`uname -p`
- if test "$UNAME_PROCESSOR" = "x86"; then
- UNAME_PROCESSOR=i386
- UNAME_MACHINE=pc
- fi
- echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-${UNAME_MACHINE}-nto-qnx${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- *:QNX:*:4*)
- echo i386-pc-qnx
- exit ;;
- NEO-?:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*)
- echo neo-tandem-nsk${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- NSE-*:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*)
- echo nse-tandem-nsk${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- NSR-?:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*)
- echo nsr-tandem-nsk${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- *:NonStop-UX:*:*)
- echo mips-compaq-nonstopux
- exit ;;
- BS2000:POSIX*:*:*)
- echo bs2000-siemens-sysv
- exit ;;
- DS/*:UNIX_System_V:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-${UNAME_SYSTEM}-${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- *:Plan9:*:*)
- # "uname -m" is not consistent, so use $cputype instead. 386
- # is converted to i386 for consistency with other x86
- # operating systems.
- if test "$cputype" = "386"; then
- UNAME_MACHINE=i386
- else
- UNAME_MACHINE="$cputype"
- fi
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-plan9
- exit ;;
- *:TOPS-10:*:*)
- echo pdp10-unknown-tops10
- exit ;;
- *:TENEX:*:*)
- echo pdp10-unknown-tenex
- exit ;;
- KS10:TOPS-20:*:* | KL10:TOPS-20:*:* | TYPE4:TOPS-20:*:*)
- echo pdp10-dec-tops20
- exit ;;
- XKL-1:TOPS-20:*:* | TYPE5:TOPS-20:*:*)
- echo pdp10-xkl-tops20
- exit ;;
- *:TOPS-20:*:*)
- echo pdp10-unknown-tops20
- exit ;;
- *:ITS:*:*)
- echo pdp10-unknown-its
- exit ;;
- SEI:*:*:SEIUX)
- echo mips-sei-seiux${UNAME_RELEASE}
- exit ;;
- *:DragonFly:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-dragonfly`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`
- exit ;;
- *:*VMS:*:*)
- UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -p) 2>/dev/null`
- case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in
- A*) echo alpha-dec-vms ; exit ;;
- I*) echo ia64-dec-vms ; exit ;;
- V*) echo vax-dec-vms ; exit ;;
- esac ;;
- *:XENIX:*:SysV)
- echo i386-pc-xenix
- exit ;;
- i*86:skyos:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-skyos`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}` | sed -e 's/ .*$//'
- exit ;;
- i*86:rdos:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-rdos
- exit ;;
- i*86:AROS:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-aros
- exit ;;
- x86_64:VMkernel:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-esx
- exit ;;
-esac
-
-eval $set_cc_for_build
-cat >$dummy.c <<EOF
-#ifdef _SEQUENT_
-# include <sys/types.h>
-# include <sys/utsname.h>
-#endif
-main ()
-{
-#if defined (sony)
-#if defined (MIPSEB)
- /* BFD wants "bsd" instead of "newsos". Perhaps BFD should be changed,
- I don't know.... */
- printf ("mips-sony-bsd\n"); exit (0);
-#else
-#include <sys/param.h>
- printf ("m68k-sony-newsos%s\n",
-#ifdef NEWSOS4
- "4"
-#else
- ""
-#endif
- ); exit (0);
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#if defined (__arm) && defined (__acorn) && defined (__unix)
- printf ("arm-acorn-riscix\n"); exit (0);
-#endif
-
-#if defined (hp300) && !defined (hpux)
- printf ("m68k-hp-bsd\n"); exit (0);
-#endif
-
-#if defined (NeXT)
-#if !defined (__ARCHITECTURE__)
-#define __ARCHITECTURE__ "m68k"
-#endif
- int version;
- version=`(hostinfo | sed -n 's/.*NeXT Mach \([0-9]*\).*/\1/p') 2>/dev/null`;
- if (version < 4)
- printf ("%s-next-nextstep%d\n", __ARCHITECTURE__, version);
- else
- printf ("%s-next-openstep%d\n", __ARCHITECTURE__, version);
- exit (0);
-#endif
-
-#if defined (MULTIMAX) || defined (n16)
-#if defined (UMAXV)
- printf ("ns32k-encore-sysv\n"); exit (0);
-#else
-#if defined (CMU)
- printf ("ns32k-encore-mach\n"); exit (0);
-#else
- printf ("ns32k-encore-bsd\n"); exit (0);
-#endif
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#if defined (__386BSD__)
- printf ("i386-pc-bsd\n"); exit (0);
-#endif
-
-#if defined (sequent)
-#if defined (i386)
- printf ("i386-sequent-dynix\n"); exit (0);
-#endif
-#if defined (ns32000)
- printf ("ns32k-sequent-dynix\n"); exit (0);
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#if defined (_SEQUENT_)
- struct utsname un;
-
- uname(&un);
-
- if (strncmp(un.version, "V2", 2) == 0) {
- printf ("i386-sequent-ptx2\n"); exit (0);
- }
- if (strncmp(un.version, "V1", 2) == 0) { /* XXX is V1 correct? */
- printf ("i386-sequent-ptx1\n"); exit (0);
- }
- printf ("i386-sequent-ptx\n"); exit (0);
-
-#endif
-
-#if defined (vax)
-# if !defined (ultrix)
-# include <sys/param.h>
-# if defined (BSD)
-# if BSD == 43
- printf ("vax-dec-bsd4.3\n"); exit (0);
-# else
-# if BSD == 199006
- printf ("vax-dec-bsd4.3reno\n"); exit (0);
-# else
- printf ("vax-dec-bsd\n"); exit (0);
-# endif
-# endif
-# else
- printf ("vax-dec-bsd\n"); exit (0);
-# endif
-# else
- printf ("vax-dec-ultrix\n"); exit (0);
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#if defined (alliant) && defined (i860)
- printf ("i860-alliant-bsd\n"); exit (0);
-#endif
-
- exit (1);
-}
-EOF
-
-$CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c 2>/dev/null && SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy` &&
- { echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"; exit; }
-
-# Apollos put the system type in the environment.
-
-test -d /usr/apollo && { echo ${ISP}-apollo-${SYSTYPE}; exit; }
-
-# Convex versions that predate uname can use getsysinfo(1)
-
-if [ -x /usr/convex/getsysinfo ]
-then
- case `getsysinfo -f cpu_type` in
- c1*)
- echo c1-convex-bsd
- exit ;;
- c2*)
- if getsysinfo -f scalar_acc
- then echo c32-convex-bsd
- else echo c2-convex-bsd
- fi
- exit ;;
- c34*)
- echo c34-convex-bsd
- exit ;;
- c38*)
- echo c38-convex-bsd
- exit ;;
- c4*)
- echo c4-convex-bsd
- exit ;;
- esac
-fi
-
-cat >&2 <<EOF
-$0: unable to guess system type
-
-This script, last modified $timestamp, has failed to recognize
-the operating system you are using. It is advised that you
-download the most up to date version of the config scripts from
-
- http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.guess;hb=HEAD
-and
- http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.sub;hb=HEAD
-
-If the version you run ($0) is already up to date, please
-send the following data and any information you think might be
-pertinent to <config-patches at gnu.org> in order to provide the needed
-information to handle your system.
-
-config.guess timestamp = $timestamp
-
-uname -m = `(uname -m) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
-uname -r = `(uname -r) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
-uname -s = `(uname -s) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
-uname -v = `(uname -v) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
-
-/usr/bin/uname -p = `(/usr/bin/uname -p) 2>/dev/null`
-/bin/uname -X = `(/bin/uname -X) 2>/dev/null`
-
-hostinfo = `(hostinfo) 2>/dev/null`
-/bin/universe = `(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null`
-/usr/bin/arch -k = `(/usr/bin/arch -k) 2>/dev/null`
-/bin/arch = `(/bin/arch) 2>/dev/null`
-/usr/bin/oslevel = `(/usr/bin/oslevel) 2>/dev/null`
-/usr/convex/getsysinfo = `(/usr/convex/getsysinfo) 2>/dev/null`
-
-UNAME_MACHINE = ${UNAME_MACHINE}
-UNAME_RELEASE = ${UNAME_RELEASE}
-UNAME_SYSTEM = ${UNAME_SYSTEM}
-UNAME_VERSION = ${UNAME_VERSION}
-EOF
-
-exit 1
-
-# Local variables:
-# eval: (add-hook 'write-file-hooks 'time-stamp)
-# time-stamp-start: "timestamp='"
-# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d"
-# time-stamp-end: "'"
-# End:
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/config.guess (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/config.guess)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/config.guess (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/config.guess 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1543 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+# Attempt to guess a canonical system name.
+# Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999,
+# 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010,
+# 2011, 2012, 2013 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+timestamp='2012-12-23'
+
+# This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+# under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+# (at your option) any later version.
+#
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+# General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+# along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+#
+# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you
+# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a
+# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under
+# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program.
+
+
+# Originally written by Per Bothner. Please send patches (context
+# diff format) to <config-patches at gnu.org> and include a ChangeLog
+# entry.
+#
+# This script attempts to guess a canonical system name similar to
+# config.sub. If it succeeds, it prints the system name on stdout, and
+# exits with 0. Otherwise, it exits with 1.
+#
+# You can get the latest version of this script from:
+# http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.guess;hb=HEAD
+
+me=`echo "$0" | sed -e 's,.*/,,'`
+
+usage="\
+Usage: $0 [OPTION]
+
+Output the configuration name of the system \`$me' is run on.
+
+Operation modes:
+ -h, --help print this help, then exit
+ -t, --time-stamp print date of last modification, then exit
+ -v, --version print version number, then exit
+
+Report bugs and patches to <config-patches at gnu.org>."
+
+version="\
+GNU config.guess ($timestamp)
+
+Originally written by Per Bothner.
+Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000,
+2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011,
+2012, 2013 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO
+warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE."
+
+help="
+Try \`$me --help' for more information."
+
+# Parse command line
+while test $# -gt 0 ; do
+ case $1 in
+ --time-stamp | --time* | -t )
+ echo "$timestamp" ; exit ;;
+ --version | -v )
+ echo "$version" ; exit ;;
+ --help | --h* | -h )
+ echo "$usage"; exit ;;
+ -- ) # Stop option processing
+ shift; break ;;
+ - ) # Use stdin as input.
+ break ;;
+ -* )
+ echo "$me: invalid option $1$help" >&2
+ exit 1 ;;
+ * )
+ break ;;
+ esac
+done
+
+if test $# != 0; then
+ echo "$me: too many arguments$help" >&2
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+trap 'exit 1' 1 2 15
+
+# CC_FOR_BUILD -- compiler used by this script. Note that the use of a
+# compiler to aid in system detection is discouraged as it requires
+# temporary files to be created and, as you can see below, it is a
+# headache to deal with in a portable fashion.
+
+# Historically, `CC_FOR_BUILD' used to be named `HOST_CC'. We still
+# use `HOST_CC' if defined, but it is deprecated.
+
+# Portable tmp directory creation inspired by the Autoconf team.
+
+set_cc_for_build='
+trap "exitcode=\$?; (rm -f \$tmpfiles 2>/dev/null; rmdir \$tmp 2>/dev/null) && exit \$exitcode" 0 ;
+trap "rm -f \$tmpfiles 2>/dev/null; rmdir \$tmp 2>/dev/null; exit 1" 1 2 13 15 ;
+: ${TMPDIR=/tmp} ;
+ { tmp=`(umask 077 && mktemp -d "$TMPDIR/cgXXXXXX") 2>/dev/null` && test -n "$tmp" && test -d "$tmp" ; } ||
+ { test -n "$RANDOM" && tmp=$TMPDIR/cg$$-$RANDOM && (umask 077 && mkdir $tmp) ; } ||
+ { tmp=$TMPDIR/cg-$$ && (umask 077 && mkdir $tmp) && echo "Warning: creating insecure temp directory" >&2 ; } ||
+ { echo "$me: cannot create a temporary directory in $TMPDIR" >&2 ; exit 1 ; } ;
+dummy=$tmp/dummy ;
+tmpfiles="$dummy.c $dummy.o $dummy.rel $dummy" ;
+case $CC_FOR_BUILD,$HOST_CC,$CC in
+ ,,) echo "int x;" > $dummy.c ;
+ for c in cc gcc c89 c99 ; do
+ if ($c -c -o $dummy.o $dummy.c) >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+ CC_FOR_BUILD="$c"; break ;
+ fi ;
+ done ;
+ if test x"$CC_FOR_BUILD" = x ; then
+ CC_FOR_BUILD=no_compiler_found ;
+ fi
+ ;;
+ ,,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$CC ;;
+ ,*,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$HOST_CC ;;
+esac ; set_cc_for_build= ;'
+
+# This is needed to find uname on a Pyramid OSx when run in the BSD universe.
+# (ghazi at noc.rutgers.edu 1994-08-24)
+if (test -f /.attbin/uname) >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+ PATH=$PATH:/.attbin ; export PATH
+fi
+
+UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -m) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_MACHINE=unknown
+UNAME_RELEASE=`(uname -r) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_RELEASE=unknown
+UNAME_SYSTEM=`(uname -s) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_SYSTEM=unknown
+UNAME_VERSION=`(uname -v) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_VERSION=unknown
+
+# Note: order is significant - the case branches are not exclusive.
+
+case "${UNAME_MACHINE}:${UNAME_SYSTEM}:${UNAME_RELEASE}:${UNAME_VERSION}" in
+ *:NetBSD:*:*)
+ # NetBSD (nbsd) targets should (where applicable) match one or
+ # more of the tuples: *-*-netbsdelf*, *-*-netbsdaout*,
+ # *-*-netbsdecoff* and *-*-netbsd*. For targets that recently
+ # switched to ELF, *-*-netbsd* would select the old
+ # object file format. This provides both forward
+ # compatibility and a consistent mechanism for selecting the
+ # object file format.
+ #
+ # Note: NetBSD doesn't particularly care about the vendor
+ # portion of the name. We always set it to "unknown".
+ sysctl="sysctl -n hw.machine_arch"
+ UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`(/sbin/$sysctl 2>/dev/null || \
+ /usr/sbin/$sysctl 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)`
+ case "${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}" in
+ armeb) machine=armeb-unknown ;;
+ arm*) machine=arm-unknown ;;
+ sh3el) machine=shl-unknown ;;
+ sh3eb) machine=sh-unknown ;;
+ sh5el) machine=sh5le-unknown ;;
+ *) machine=${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown ;;
+ esac
+ # The Operating System including object format, if it has switched
+ # to ELF recently, or will in the future.
+ case "${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}" in
+ arm*|i386|m68k|ns32k|sh3*|sparc|vax)
+ eval $set_cc_for_build
+ if echo __ELF__ | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \
+ | grep -q __ELF__
+ then
+ # Once all utilities can be ECOFF (netbsdecoff) or a.out (netbsdaout).
+ # Return netbsd for either. FIX?
+ os=netbsd
+ else
+ os=netbsdelf
+ fi
+ ;;
+ *)
+ os=netbsd
+ ;;
+ esac
+ # The OS release
+ # Debian GNU/NetBSD machines have a different userland, and
+ # thus, need a distinct triplet. However, they do not need
+ # kernel version information, so it can be replaced with a
+ # suitable tag, in the style of linux-gnu.
+ case "${UNAME_VERSION}" in
+ Debian*)
+ release='-gnu'
+ ;;
+ *)
+ release=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-_].*/\./'`
+ ;;
+ esac
+ # Since CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-KERNEL-OPERATING_SYSTEM:
+ # contains redundant information, the shorter form:
+ # CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-OPERATING_SYSTEM is used.
+ echo "${machine}-${os}${release}"
+ exit ;;
+ *:Bitrig:*:*)
+ UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`arch | sed 's/Bitrig.//'`
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown-bitrig${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ *:OpenBSD:*:*)
+ UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`arch | sed 's/OpenBSD.//'`
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ *:ekkoBSD:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-ekkobsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ *:SolidBSD:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-solidbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ macppc:MirBSD:*:*)
+ echo powerpc-unknown-mirbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ *:MirBSD:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-mirbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ alpha:OSF1:*:*)
+ case $UNAME_RELEASE in
+ *4.0)
+ UNAME_RELEASE=`/usr/sbin/sizer -v | awk '{print $3}'`
+ ;;
+ *5.*)
+ UNAME_RELEASE=`/usr/sbin/sizer -v | awk '{print $4}'`
+ ;;
+ esac
+ # According to Compaq, /usr/sbin/psrinfo has been available on
+ # OSF/1 and Tru64 systems produced since 1995. I hope that
+ # covers most systems running today. This code pipes the CPU
+ # types through head -n 1, so we only detect the type of CPU 0.
+ ALPHA_CPU_TYPE=`/usr/sbin/psrinfo -v | sed -n -e 's/^ The alpha \(.*\) processor.*$/\1/p' | head -n 1`
+ case "$ALPHA_CPU_TYPE" in
+ "EV4 (21064)")
+ UNAME_MACHINE="alpha" ;;
+ "EV4.5 (21064)")
+ UNAME_MACHINE="alpha" ;;
+ "LCA4 (21066/21068)")
+ UNAME_MACHINE="alpha" ;;
+ "EV5 (21164)")
+ UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev5" ;;
+ "EV5.6 (21164A)")
+ UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev56" ;;
+ "EV5.6 (21164PC)")
+ UNAME_MACHINE="alphapca56" ;;
+ "EV5.7 (21164PC)")
+ UNAME_MACHINE="alphapca57" ;;
+ "EV6 (21264)")
+ UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev6" ;;
+ "EV6.7 (21264A)")
+ UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev67" ;;
+ "EV6.8CB (21264C)")
+ UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev68" ;;
+ "EV6.8AL (21264B)")
+ UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev68" ;;
+ "EV6.8CX (21264D)")
+ UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev68" ;;
+ "EV6.9A (21264/EV69A)")
+ UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev69" ;;
+ "EV7 (21364)")
+ UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev7" ;;
+ "EV7.9 (21364A)")
+ UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev79" ;;
+ esac
+ # A Pn.n version is a patched version.
+ # A Vn.n version is a released version.
+ # A Tn.n version is a released field test version.
+ # A Xn.n version is an unreleased experimental baselevel.
+ # 1.2 uses "1.2" for uname -r.
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-dec-osf`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/^[PVTX]//' | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'`
+ # Reset EXIT trap before exiting to avoid spurious non-zero exit code.
+ exitcode=$?
+ trap '' 0
+ exit $exitcode ;;
+ Alpha\ *:Windows_NT*:*)
+ # How do we know it's Interix rather than the generic POSIX subsystem?
+ # Should we change UNAME_MACHINE based on the output of uname instead
+ # of the specific Alpha model?
+ echo alpha-pc-interix
+ exit ;;
+ 21064:Windows_NT:50:3)
+ echo alpha-dec-winnt3.5
+ exit ;;
+ Amiga*:UNIX_System_V:4.0:*)
+ echo m68k-unknown-sysv4
+ exit ;;
+ *:[Aa]miga[Oo][Ss]:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-amigaos
+ exit ;;
+ *:[Mm]orph[Oo][Ss]:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-morphos
+ exit ;;
+ *:OS/390:*:*)
+ echo i370-ibm-openedition
+ exit ;;
+ *:z/VM:*:*)
+ echo s390-ibm-zvmoe
+ exit ;;
+ *:OS400:*:*)
+ echo powerpc-ibm-os400
+ exit ;;
+ arm:RISC*:1.[012]*:*|arm:riscix:1.[012]*:*)
+ echo arm-acorn-riscix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ arm*:riscos:*:*|arm*:RISCOS:*:*)
+ echo arm-unknown-riscos
+ exit ;;
+ SR2?01:HI-UX/MPP:*:* | SR8000:HI-UX/MPP:*:*)
+ echo hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxmpp
+ exit ;;
+ Pyramid*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:SMP_DC-OSx*:*:*)
+ # akee at wpdis03.wpafb.af.mil (Earle F. Ake) contributed MIS and NILE.
+ if test "`(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null`" = att ; then
+ echo pyramid-pyramid-sysv3
+ else
+ echo pyramid-pyramid-bsd
+ fi
+ exit ;;
+ NILE*:*:*:dcosx)
+ echo pyramid-pyramid-svr4
+ exit ;;
+ DRS?6000:unix:4.0:6*)
+ echo sparc-icl-nx6
+ exit ;;
+ DRS?6000:UNIX_SV:4.2*:7* | DRS?6000:isis:4.2*:7*)
+ case `/usr/bin/uname -p` in
+ sparc) echo sparc-icl-nx7; exit ;;
+ esac ;;
+ s390x:SunOS:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+ exit ;;
+ sun4H:SunOS:5.*:*)
+ echo sparc-hal-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+ exit ;;
+ sun4*:SunOS:5.*:* | tadpole*:SunOS:5.*:*)
+ echo sparc-sun-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+ exit ;;
+ i86pc:AuroraUX:5.*:* | i86xen:AuroraUX:5.*:*)
+ echo i386-pc-auroraux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ i86pc:SunOS:5.*:* | i86xen:SunOS:5.*:*)
+ eval $set_cc_for_build
+ SUN_ARCH="i386"
+ # If there is a compiler, see if it is configured for 64-bit objects.
+ # Note that the Sun cc does not turn __LP64__ into 1 like gcc does.
+ # This test works for both compilers.
+ if [ "$CC_FOR_BUILD" != 'no_compiler_found' ]; then
+ if (echo '#ifdef __amd64'; echo IS_64BIT_ARCH; echo '#endif') | \
+ (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) | \
+ grep IS_64BIT_ARCH >/dev/null
+ then
+ SUN_ARCH="x86_64"
+ fi
+ fi
+ echo ${SUN_ARCH}-pc-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+ exit ;;
+ sun4*:SunOS:6*:*)
+ # According to config.sub, this is the proper way to canonicalize
+ # SunOS6. Hard to guess exactly what SunOS6 will be like, but
+ # it's likely to be more like Solaris than SunOS4.
+ echo sparc-sun-solaris3`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+ exit ;;
+ sun4*:SunOS:*:*)
+ case "`/usr/bin/arch -k`" in
+ Series*|S4*)
+ UNAME_RELEASE=`uname -v`
+ ;;
+ esac
+ # Japanese Language versions have a version number like `4.1.3-JL'.
+ echo sparc-sun-sunos`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/'`
+ exit ;;
+ sun3*:SunOS:*:*)
+ echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ sun*:*:4.2BSD:*)
+ UNAME_RELEASE=`(sed 1q /etc/motd | awk '{print substr($5,1,3)}') 2>/dev/null`
+ test "x${UNAME_RELEASE}" = "x" && UNAME_RELEASE=3
+ case "`/bin/arch`" in
+ sun3)
+ echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ ;;
+ sun4)
+ echo sparc-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ ;;
+ esac
+ exit ;;
+ aushp:SunOS:*:*)
+ echo sparc-auspex-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ # The situation for MiNT is a little confusing. The machine name
+ # can be virtually everything (everything which is not
+ # "atarist" or "atariste" at least should have a processor
+ # > m68000). The system name ranges from "MiNT" over "FreeMiNT"
+ # to the lowercase version "mint" (or "freemint"). Finally
+ # the system name "TOS" denotes a system which is actually not
+ # MiNT. But MiNT is downward compatible to TOS, so this should
+ # be no problem.
+ atarist[e]:*MiNT:*:* | atarist[e]:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*)
+ echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ atari*:*MiNT:*:* | atari*:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*)
+ echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ *falcon*:*MiNT:*:* | *falcon*:*mint:*:* | *falcon*:*TOS:*:*)
+ echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ milan*:*MiNT:*:* | milan*:*mint:*:* | *milan*:*TOS:*:*)
+ echo m68k-milan-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ hades*:*MiNT:*:* | hades*:*mint:*:* | *hades*:*TOS:*:*)
+ echo m68k-hades-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ *:*MiNT:*:* | *:*mint:*:* | *:*TOS:*:*)
+ echo m68k-unknown-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ m68k:machten:*:*)
+ echo m68k-apple-machten${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ powerpc:machten:*:*)
+ echo powerpc-apple-machten${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ RISC*:Mach:*:*)
+ echo mips-dec-mach_bsd4.3
+ exit ;;
+ RISC*:ULTRIX:*:*)
+ echo mips-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ VAX*:ULTRIX*:*:*)
+ echo vax-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ 2020:CLIX:*:* | 2430:CLIX:*:*)
+ echo clipper-intergraph-clix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ mips:*:*:UMIPS | mips:*:*:RISCos)
+ eval $set_cc_for_build
+ sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+#include <stdio.h> /* for printf() prototype */
+ int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
+#else
+ int main (argc, argv) int argc; char *argv[]; {
+#endif
+ #if defined (host_mips) && defined (MIPSEB)
+ #if defined (SYSTYPE_SYSV)
+ printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssysv\n", argv[1]); exit (0);
+ #endif
+ #if defined (SYSTYPE_SVR4)
+ printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssvr4\n", argv[1]); exit (0);
+ #endif
+ #if defined (SYSTYPE_BSD43) || defined(SYSTYPE_BSD)
+ printf ("mips-mips-riscos%sbsd\n", argv[1]); exit (0);
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ exit (-1);
+ }
+EOF
+ $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c &&
+ dummyarg=`echo "${UNAME_RELEASE}" | sed -n 's/\([0-9]*\).*/\1/p'` &&
+ SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy $dummyarg` &&
+ { echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"; exit; }
+ echo mips-mips-riscos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ Motorola:PowerMAX_OS:*:*)
+ echo powerpc-motorola-powermax
+ exit ;;
+ Motorola:*:4.3:PL8-*)
+ echo powerpc-harris-powermax
+ exit ;;
+ Night_Hawk:*:*:PowerMAX_OS | Synergy:PowerMAX_OS:*:*)
+ echo powerpc-harris-powermax
+ exit ;;
+ Night_Hawk:Power_UNIX:*:*)
+ echo powerpc-harris-powerunix
+ exit ;;
+ m88k:CX/UX:7*:*)
+ echo m88k-harris-cxux7
+ exit ;;
+ m88k:*:4*:R4*)
+ echo m88k-motorola-sysv4
+ exit ;;
+ m88k:*:3*:R3*)
+ echo m88k-motorola-sysv3
+ exit ;;
+ AViiON:dgux:*:*)
+ # DG/UX returns AViiON for all architectures
+ UNAME_PROCESSOR=`/usr/bin/uname -p`
+ if [ $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88100 ] || [ $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88110 ]
+ then
+ if [ ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = m88kdguxelfx ] || \
+ [ ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = x ]
+ then
+ echo m88k-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ else
+ echo m88k-dg-dguxbcs${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ fi
+ else
+ echo i586-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ fi
+ exit ;;
+ M88*:DolphinOS:*:*) # DolphinOS (SVR3)
+ echo m88k-dolphin-sysv3
+ exit ;;
+ M88*:*:R3*:*)
+ # Delta 88k system running SVR3
+ echo m88k-motorola-sysv3
+ exit ;;
+ XD88*:*:*:*) # Tektronix XD88 system running UTekV (SVR3)
+ echo m88k-tektronix-sysv3
+ exit ;;
+ Tek43[0-9][0-9]:UTek:*:*) # Tektronix 4300 system running UTek (BSD)
+ echo m68k-tektronix-bsd
+ exit ;;
+ *:IRIX*:*:*)
+ echo mips-sgi-irix`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/g'`
+ exit ;;
+ ????????:AIX?:[12].1:2) # AIX 2.2.1 or AIX 2.1.1 is RT/PC AIX.
+ echo romp-ibm-aix # uname -m gives an 8 hex-code CPU id
+ exit ;; # Note that: echo "'`uname -s`'" gives 'AIX '
+ i*86:AIX:*:*)
+ echo i386-ibm-aix
+ exit ;;
+ ia64:AIX:*:*)
+ if [ -x /usr/bin/oslevel ] ; then
+ IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/oslevel`
+ else
+ IBM_REV=${UNAME_VERSION}.${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ fi
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-aix${IBM_REV}
+ exit ;;
+ *:AIX:2:3)
+ if grep bos325 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ eval $set_cc_for_build
+ sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c
+ #include <sys/systemcfg.h>
+
+ main()
+ {
+ if (!__power_pc())
+ exit(1);
+ puts("powerpc-ibm-aix3.2.5");
+ exit(0);
+ }
+EOF
+ if $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c && SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy`
+ then
+ echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"
+ else
+ echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.5
+ fi
+ elif grep bos324 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.4
+ else
+ echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2
+ fi
+ exit ;;
+ *:AIX:*:[4567])
+ IBM_CPU_ID=`/usr/sbin/lsdev -C -c processor -S available | sed 1q | awk '{ print $1 }'`
+ if /usr/sbin/lsattr -El ${IBM_CPU_ID} | grep ' POWER' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ IBM_ARCH=rs6000
+ else
+ IBM_ARCH=powerpc
+ fi
+ if [ -x /usr/bin/oslevel ] ; then
+ IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/oslevel`
+ else
+ IBM_REV=${UNAME_VERSION}.${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ fi
+ echo ${IBM_ARCH}-ibm-aix${IBM_REV}
+ exit ;;
+ *:AIX:*:*)
+ echo rs6000-ibm-aix
+ exit ;;
+ ibmrt:4.4BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*)
+ echo romp-ibm-bsd4.4
+ exit ;;
+ ibmrt:*BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*) # covers RT/PC BSD and
+ echo romp-ibm-bsd${UNAME_RELEASE} # 4.3 with uname added to
+ exit ;; # report: romp-ibm BSD 4.3
+ *:BOSX:*:*)
+ echo rs6000-bull-bosx
+ exit ;;
+ DPX/2?00:B.O.S.:*:*)
+ echo m68k-bull-sysv3
+ exit ;;
+ 9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:1.*:*)
+ echo m68k-hp-bsd
+ exit ;;
+ hp300:4.4BSD:*:* | 9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:2.*:*)
+ echo m68k-hp-bsd4.4
+ exit ;;
+ 9000/[34678]??:HP-UX:*:*)
+ HPUX_REV=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'`
+ case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in
+ 9000/31? ) HP_ARCH=m68000 ;;
+ 9000/[34]?? ) HP_ARCH=m68k ;;
+ 9000/[678][0-9][0-9])
+ if [ -x /usr/bin/getconf ]; then
+ sc_cpu_version=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_CPU_VERSION 2>/dev/null`
+ sc_kernel_bits=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_KERNEL_BITS 2>/dev/null`
+ case "${sc_cpu_version}" in
+ 523) HP_ARCH="hppa1.0" ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_0
+ 528) HP_ARCH="hppa1.1" ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_1
+ 532) # CPU_PA_RISC2_0
+ case "${sc_kernel_bits}" in
+ 32) HP_ARCH="hppa2.0n" ;;
+ 64) HP_ARCH="hppa2.0w" ;;
+ '') HP_ARCH="hppa2.0" ;; # HP-UX 10.20
+ esac ;;
+ esac
+ fi
+ if [ "${HP_ARCH}" = "" ]; then
+ eval $set_cc_for_build
+ sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c
+
+ #define _HPUX_SOURCE
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+
+ int main ()
+ {
+ #if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS)
+ long bits = sysconf(_SC_KERNEL_BITS);
+ #endif
+ long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION);
+
+ switch (cpu)
+ {
+ case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0"); break;
+ case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1"); break;
+ case CPU_PA_RISC2_0:
+ #if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS)
+ switch (bits)
+ {
+ case 64: puts ("hppa2.0w"); break;
+ case 32: puts ("hppa2.0n"); break;
+ default: puts ("hppa2.0"); break;
+ } break;
+ #else /* !defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) */
+ puts ("hppa2.0"); break;
+ #endif
+ default: puts ("hppa1.0"); break;
+ }
+ exit (0);
+ }
+EOF
+ (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c 2>/dev/null) && HP_ARCH=`$dummy`
+ test -z "$HP_ARCH" && HP_ARCH=hppa
+ fi ;;
+ esac
+ if [ ${HP_ARCH} = "hppa2.0w" ]
+ then
+ eval $set_cc_for_build
+
+ # hppa2.0w-hp-hpux* has a 64-bit kernel and a compiler generating
+ # 32-bit code. hppa64-hp-hpux* has the same kernel and a compiler
+ # generating 64-bit code. GNU and HP use different nomenclature:
+ #
+ # $ CC_FOR_BUILD=cc ./config.guess
+ # => hppa2.0w-hp-hpux11.23
+ # $ CC_FOR_BUILD="cc +DA2.0w" ./config.guess
+ # => hppa64-hp-hpux11.23
+
+ if echo __LP64__ | (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) |
+ grep -q __LP64__
+ then
+ HP_ARCH="hppa2.0w"
+ else
+ HP_ARCH="hppa64"
+ fi
+ fi
+ echo ${HP_ARCH}-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV}
+ exit ;;
+ ia64:HP-UX:*:*)
+ HPUX_REV=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'`
+ echo ia64-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV}
+ exit ;;
+ 3050*:HI-UX:*:*)
+ eval $set_cc_for_build
+ sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ int
+ main ()
+ {
+ long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION);
+ /* The order matters, because CPU_IS_HP_MC68K erroneously returns
+ true for CPU_PA_RISC1_0. CPU_IS_PA_RISC returns correct
+ results, however. */
+ if (CPU_IS_PA_RISC (cpu))
+ {
+ switch (cpu)
+ {
+ case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
+ case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
+ case CPU_PA_RISC2_0: puts ("hppa2.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
+ default: puts ("hppa-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (CPU_IS_HP_MC68K (cpu))
+ puts ("m68k-hitachi-hiuxwe2");
+ else puts ("unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2");
+ exit (0);
+ }
+EOF
+ $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c && SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy` &&
+ { echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"; exit; }
+ echo unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2
+ exit ;;
+ 9000/7??:4.3bsd:*:* | 9000/8?[79]:4.3bsd:*:* )
+ echo hppa1.1-hp-bsd
+ exit ;;
+ 9000/8??:4.3bsd:*:*)
+ echo hppa1.0-hp-bsd
+ exit ;;
+ *9??*:MPE/iX:*:* | *3000*:MPE/iX:*:*)
+ echo hppa1.0-hp-mpeix
+ exit ;;
+ hp7??:OSF1:*:* | hp8?[79]:OSF1:*:* )
+ echo hppa1.1-hp-osf
+ exit ;;
+ hp8??:OSF1:*:*)
+ echo hppa1.0-hp-osf
+ exit ;;
+ i*86:OSF1:*:*)
+ if [ -x /usr/sbin/sysversion ] ; then
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1mk
+ else
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1
+ fi
+ exit ;;
+ parisc*:Lites*:*:*)
+ echo hppa1.1-hp-lites
+ exit ;;
+ C1*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C1*:*)
+ echo c1-convex-bsd
+ exit ;;
+ C2*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C2*:*)
+ if getsysinfo -f scalar_acc
+ then echo c32-convex-bsd
+ else echo c2-convex-bsd
+ fi
+ exit ;;
+ C34*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C34*:*)
+ echo c34-convex-bsd
+ exit ;;
+ C38*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C38*:*)
+ echo c38-convex-bsd
+ exit ;;
+ C4*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C4*:*)
+ echo c4-convex-bsd
+ exit ;;
+ CRAY*Y-MP:*:*:*)
+ echo ymp-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+ exit ;;
+ CRAY*[A-Z]90:*:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} \
+ | sed -e 's/CRAY.*\([A-Z]90\)/\1/' \
+ -e y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz/ \
+ -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+ exit ;;
+ CRAY*TS:*:*:*)
+ echo t90-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+ exit ;;
+ CRAY*T3E:*:*:*)
+ echo alphaev5-cray-unicosmk${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+ exit ;;
+ CRAY*SV1:*:*:*)
+ echo sv1-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+ exit ;;
+ *:UNICOS/mp:*:*)
+ echo craynv-cray-unicosmp${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+ exit ;;
+ F30[01]:UNIX_System_V:*:* | F700:UNIX_System_V:*:*)
+ FUJITSU_PROC=`uname -m | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'`
+ FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' | sed -e 's/\///'`
+ FUJITSU_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/ /_/'`
+ echo "${FUJITSU_PROC}-fujitsu-${FUJITSU_SYS}${FUJITSU_REL}"
+ exit ;;
+ 5000:UNIX_System_V:4.*:*)
+ FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' | sed -e 's/\///'`
+ FUJITSU_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' | sed -e 's/ /_/'`
+ echo "sparc-fujitsu-${FUJITSU_SYS}${FUJITSU_REL}"
+ exit ;;
+ i*86:BSD/386:*:* | i*86:BSD/OS:*:* | *:Ascend\ Embedded/OS:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ sparc*:BSD/OS:*:*)
+ echo sparc-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ *:BSD/OS:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ *:FreeBSD:*:*)
+ UNAME_PROCESSOR=`/usr/bin/uname -p`
+ case ${UNAME_PROCESSOR} in
+ amd64)
+ echo x86_64-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` ;;
+ *)
+ echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` ;;
+ esac
+ exit ;;
+ i*:CYGWIN*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-cygwin
+ exit ;;
+ *:MINGW64*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mingw64
+ exit ;;
+ *:MINGW*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mingw32
+ exit ;;
+ i*:MSYS*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-msys
+ exit ;;
+ i*:windows32*:*)
+ # uname -m includes "-pc" on this system.
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-mingw32
+ exit ;;
+ i*:PW*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-pw32
+ exit ;;
+ *:Interix*:*)
+ case ${UNAME_MACHINE} in
+ x86)
+ echo i586-pc-interix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ authenticamd | genuineintel | EM64T)
+ echo x86_64-unknown-interix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ IA64)
+ echo ia64-unknown-interix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ esac ;;
+ [345]86:Windows_95:* | [345]86:Windows_98:* | [345]86:Windows_NT:*)
+ echo i${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mks
+ exit ;;
+ 8664:Windows_NT:*)
+ echo x86_64-pc-mks
+ exit ;;
+ i*:Windows_NT*:* | Pentium*:Windows_NT*:*)
+ # How do we know it's Interix rather than the generic POSIX subsystem?
+ # It also conflicts with pre-2.0 versions of AT&T UWIN. Should we
+ # UNAME_MACHINE based on the output of uname instead of i386?
+ echo i586-pc-interix
+ exit ;;
+ i*:UWIN*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-uwin
+ exit ;;
+ amd64:CYGWIN*:*:* | x86_64:CYGWIN*:*:*)
+ echo x86_64-unknown-cygwin
+ exit ;;
+ p*:CYGWIN*:*)
+ echo powerpcle-unknown-cygwin
+ exit ;;
+ prep*:SunOS:5.*:*)
+ echo powerpcle-unknown-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+ exit ;;
+ *:GNU:*:*)
+ # the GNU system
+ echo `echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}|sed -e 's,[-/].*$,,'`-unknown-gnu`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's,/.*$,,'`
+ exit ;;
+ *:GNU/*:*:*)
+ # other systems with GNU libc and userland
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-`echo ${UNAME_SYSTEM} | sed 's,^[^/]*/,,' | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]'``echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ i*86:Minix:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-minix
+ exit ;;
+ aarch64:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ aarch64_be:Linux:*:*)
+ UNAME_MACHINE=aarch64_be
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ alpha:Linux:*:*)
+ case `sed -n '/^cpu model/s/^.*: \(.*\)/\1/p' < /proc/cpuinfo` in
+ EV5) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev5 ;;
+ EV56) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev56 ;;
+ PCA56) UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;;
+ PCA57) UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;;
+ EV6) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev6 ;;
+ EV67) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev67 ;;
+ EV68*) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;;
+ esac
+ objdump --private-headers /bin/sh | grep -q ld.so.1
+ if test "$?" = 0 ; then LIBC="libc1" ; else LIBC="" ; fi
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu${LIBC}
+ exit ;;
+ arm*:Linux:*:*)
+ eval $set_cc_for_build
+ if echo __ARM_EABI__ | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \
+ | grep -q __ARM_EABI__
+ then
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+ else
+ if echo __ARM_PCS_VFP | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \
+ | grep -q __ARM_PCS_VFP
+ then
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnueabi
+ else
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnueabihf
+ fi
+ fi
+ exit ;;
+ avr32*:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ cris:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-axis-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ crisv32:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-axis-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ frv:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ hexagon:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ i*86:Linux:*:*)
+ LIBC=gnu
+ eval $set_cc_for_build
+ sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c
+ #ifdef __dietlibc__
+ LIBC=dietlibc
+ #endif
+EOF
+ eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep '^LIBC'`
+ echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-${LIBC}"
+ exit ;;
+ ia64:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ m32r*:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ m68*:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ mips:Linux:*:* | mips64:Linux:*:*)
+ eval $set_cc_for_build
+ sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c
+ #undef CPU
+ #undef ${UNAME_MACHINE}
+ #undef ${UNAME_MACHINE}el
+ #if defined(__MIPSEL__) || defined(__MIPSEL) || defined(_MIPSEL) || defined(MIPSEL)
+ CPU=${UNAME_MACHINE}el
+ #else
+ #if defined(__MIPSEB__) || defined(__MIPSEB) || defined(_MIPSEB) || defined(MIPSEB)
+ CPU=${UNAME_MACHINE}
+ #else
+ CPU=
+ #endif
+ #endif
+EOF
+ eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep '^CPU'`
+ test x"${CPU}" != x && { echo "${CPU}-unknown-linux-gnu"; exit; }
+ ;;
+ or32:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ padre:Linux:*:*)
+ echo sparc-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ parisc64:Linux:*:* | hppa64:Linux:*:*)
+ echo hppa64-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ parisc:Linux:*:* | hppa:Linux:*:*)
+ # Look for CPU level
+ case `grep '^cpu[^a-z]*:' /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d' ' -f2` in
+ PA7*) echo hppa1.1-unknown-linux-gnu ;;
+ PA8*) echo hppa2.0-unknown-linux-gnu ;;
+ *) echo hppa-unknown-linux-gnu ;;
+ esac
+ exit ;;
+ ppc64:Linux:*:*)
+ echo powerpc64-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ ppc:Linux:*:*)
+ echo powerpc-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ ppc64le:Linux:*:*)
+ echo powerpc64le-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ ppcle:Linux:*:*)
+ echo powerpcle-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ s390:Linux:*:* | s390x:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-linux
+ exit ;;
+ sh64*:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ sh*:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ sparc:Linux:*:* | sparc64:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ tile*:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ vax:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-dec-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ x86_64:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ xtensa*:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit ;;
+ i*86:DYNIX/ptx:4*:*)
+ # ptx 4.0 does uname -s correctly, with DYNIX/ptx in there.
+ # earlier versions are messed up and put the nodename in both
+ # sysname and nodename.
+ echo i386-sequent-sysv4
+ exit ;;
+ i*86:UNIX_SV:4.2MP:2.*)
+ # Unixware is an offshoot of SVR4, but it has its own version
+ # number series starting with 2...
+ # I am not positive that other SVR4 systems won't match this,
+ # I just have to hope. -- rms.
+ # Use sysv4.2uw... so that sysv4* matches it.
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv4.2uw${UNAME_VERSION}
+ exit ;;
+ i*86:OS/2:*:*)
+ # If we were able to find `uname', then EMX Unix compatibility
+ # is probably installed.
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-os2-emx
+ exit ;;
+ i*86:XTS-300:*:STOP)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-stop
+ exit ;;
+ i*86:atheos:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-atheos
+ exit ;;
+ i*86:syllable:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-syllable
+ exit ;;
+ i*86:LynxOS:2.*:* | i*86:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | i*86:LynxOS:4.[02]*:*)
+ echo i386-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ i*86:*DOS:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-msdosdjgpp
+ exit ;;
+ i*86:*:4.*:* | i*86:SYSTEM_V:4.*:*)
+ UNAME_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed 's/\/MP$//'`
+ if grep Novell /usr/include/link.h >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-univel-sysv${UNAME_REL}
+ else
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv${UNAME_REL}
+ fi
+ exit ;;
+ i*86:*:5:[678]*)
+ # UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX and OpenServer 6.
+ case `/bin/uname -X | grep "^Machine"` in
+ *486*) UNAME_MACHINE=i486 ;;
+ *Pentium) UNAME_MACHINE=i586 ;;
+ *Pent*|*Celeron) UNAME_MACHINE=i686 ;;
+ esac
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}${UNAME_SYSTEM}${UNAME_VERSION}
+ exit ;;
+ i*86:*:3.2:*)
+ if test -f /usr/options/cb.name; then
+ UNAME_REL=`sed -n 's/.*Version //p' </usr/options/cb.name`
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-isc$UNAME_REL
+ elif /bin/uname -X 2>/dev/null >/dev/null ; then
+ UNAME_REL=`(/bin/uname -X|grep Release|sed -e 's/.*= //')`
+ (/bin/uname -X|grep i80486 >/dev/null) && UNAME_MACHINE=i486
+ (/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pentium' >/dev/null) \
+ && UNAME_MACHINE=i586
+ (/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pent *II' >/dev/null) \
+ && UNAME_MACHINE=i686
+ (/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pentium Pro' >/dev/null) \
+ && UNAME_MACHINE=i686
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sco$UNAME_REL
+ else
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv32
+ fi
+ exit ;;
+ pc:*:*:*)
+ # Left here for compatibility:
+ # uname -m prints for DJGPP always 'pc', but it prints nothing about
+ # the processor, so we play safe by assuming i586.
+ # Note: whatever this is, it MUST be the same as what config.sub
+ # prints for the "djgpp" host, or else GDB configury will decide that
+ # this is a cross-build.
+ echo i586-pc-msdosdjgpp
+ exit ;;
+ Intel:Mach:3*:*)
+ echo i386-pc-mach3
+ exit ;;
+ paragon:*:*:*)
+ echo i860-intel-osf1
+ exit ;;
+ i860:*:4.*:*) # i860-SVR4
+ if grep Stardent /usr/include/sys/uadmin.h >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+ echo i860-stardent-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} # Stardent Vistra i860-SVR4
+ else # Add other i860-SVR4 vendors below as they are discovered.
+ echo i860-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} # Unknown i860-SVR4
+ fi
+ exit ;;
+ mini*:CTIX:SYS*5:*)
+ # "miniframe"
+ echo m68010-convergent-sysv
+ exit ;;
+ mc68k:UNIX:SYSTEM5:3.51m)
+ echo m68k-convergent-sysv
+ exit ;;
+ M680?0:D-NIX:5.3:*)
+ echo m68k-diab-dnix
+ exit ;;
+ M68*:*:R3V[5678]*:*)
+ test -r /sysV68 && { echo 'm68k-motorola-sysv'; exit; } ;;
+ 3[345]??:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??A:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??/*:*:4.0:3.0 | 4400:*:4.0:3.0 | 4850:*:4.0:3.0 | SKA40:*:4.0:3.0 | SDS2:*:4.0:3.0 | SHG2:*:4.0:3.0 | S7501*:*:4.0:3.0)
+ OS_REL=''
+ test -r /etc/.relid \
+ && OS_REL=.`sed -n 's/[^ ]* [^ ]* \([0-9][0-9]\).*/\1/p' < /etc/.relid`
+ /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \
+ && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; }
+ /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep entium >/dev/null \
+ && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; } ;;
+ 3[34]??:*:4.0:* | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:*)
+ /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \
+ && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4; exit; } ;;
+ NCR*:*:4.2:* | MPRAS*:*:4.2:*)
+ OS_REL='.3'
+ test -r /etc/.relid \
+ && OS_REL=.`sed -n 's/[^ ]* [^ ]* \([0-9][0-9]\).*/\1/p' < /etc/.relid`
+ /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \
+ && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; }
+ /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep entium >/dev/null \
+ && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; }
+ /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep pteron >/dev/null \
+ && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; } ;;
+ m68*:LynxOS:2.*:* | m68*:LynxOS:3.0*:*)
+ echo m68k-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ mc68030:UNIX_System_V:4.*:*)
+ echo m68k-atari-sysv4
+ exit ;;
+ TSUNAMI:LynxOS:2.*:*)
+ echo sparc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ rs6000:LynxOS:2.*:*)
+ echo rs6000-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ PowerPC:LynxOS:2.*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:4.[02]*:*)
+ echo powerpc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ SM[BE]S:UNIX_SV:*:*)
+ echo mips-dde-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ RM*:ReliantUNIX-*:*:*)
+ echo mips-sni-sysv4
+ exit ;;
+ RM*:SINIX-*:*:*)
+ echo mips-sni-sysv4
+ exit ;;
+ *:SINIX-*:*:*)
+ if uname -p 2>/dev/null >/dev/null ; then
+ UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -p) 2>/dev/null`
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-sni-sysv4
+ else
+ echo ns32k-sni-sysv
+ fi
+ exit ;;
+ PENTIUM:*:4.0*:*) # Unisys `ClearPath HMP IX 4000' SVR4/MP effort
+ # says <Richard.M.Bartel at ccMail.Census.GOV>
+ echo i586-unisys-sysv4
+ exit ;;
+ *:UNIX_System_V:4*:FTX*)
+ # From Gerald Hewes <hewes at openmarket.com>.
+ # How about differentiating between stratus architectures? -djm
+ echo hppa1.1-stratus-sysv4
+ exit ;;
+ *:*:*:FTX*)
+ # From seanf at swdc.stratus.com.
+ echo i860-stratus-sysv4
+ exit ;;
+ i*86:VOS:*:*)
+ # From Paul.Green at stratus.com.
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-stratus-vos
+ exit ;;
+ *:VOS:*:*)
+ # From Paul.Green at stratus.com.
+ echo hppa1.1-stratus-vos
+ exit ;;
+ mc68*:A/UX:*:*)
+ echo m68k-apple-aux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ news*:NEWS-OS:6*:*)
+ echo mips-sony-newsos6
+ exit ;;
+ R[34]000:*System_V*:*:* | R4000:UNIX_SYSV:*:* | R*000:UNIX_SV:*:*)
+ if [ -d /usr/nec ]; then
+ echo mips-nec-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ else
+ echo mips-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ fi
+ exit ;;
+ BeBox:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on hardware made by Be, PPC only.
+ echo powerpc-be-beos
+ exit ;;
+ BeMac:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on Mac or Mac clone, PPC only.
+ echo powerpc-apple-beos
+ exit ;;
+ BePC:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on Intel PC compatible.
+ echo i586-pc-beos
+ exit ;;
+ BePC:Haiku:*:*) # Haiku running on Intel PC compatible.
+ echo i586-pc-haiku
+ exit ;;
+ x86_64:Haiku:*:*)
+ echo x86_64-unknown-haiku
+ exit ;;
+ SX-4:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+ echo sx4-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ SX-5:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+ echo sx5-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ SX-6:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+ echo sx6-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ SX-7:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+ echo sx7-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ SX-8:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+ echo sx8-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ SX-8R:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+ echo sx8r-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ Power*:Rhapsody:*:*)
+ echo powerpc-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ *:Rhapsody:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ *:Darwin:*:*)
+ UNAME_PROCESSOR=`uname -p` || UNAME_PROCESSOR=unknown
+ case $UNAME_PROCESSOR in
+ i386)
+ eval $set_cc_for_build
+ if [ "$CC_FOR_BUILD" != 'no_compiler_found' ]; then
+ if (echo '#ifdef __LP64__'; echo IS_64BIT_ARCH; echo '#endif') | \
+ (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) | \
+ grep IS_64BIT_ARCH >/dev/null
+ then
+ UNAME_PROCESSOR="x86_64"
+ fi
+ fi ;;
+ unknown) UNAME_PROCESSOR=powerpc ;;
+ esac
+ echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-apple-darwin${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ *:procnto*:*:* | *:QNX:[0123456789]*:*)
+ UNAME_PROCESSOR=`uname -p`
+ if test "$UNAME_PROCESSOR" = "x86"; then
+ UNAME_PROCESSOR=i386
+ UNAME_MACHINE=pc
+ fi
+ echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-${UNAME_MACHINE}-nto-qnx${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ *:QNX:*:4*)
+ echo i386-pc-qnx
+ exit ;;
+ NEO-?:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*)
+ echo neo-tandem-nsk${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ NSE-*:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*)
+ echo nse-tandem-nsk${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ NSR-?:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*)
+ echo nsr-tandem-nsk${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ *:NonStop-UX:*:*)
+ echo mips-compaq-nonstopux
+ exit ;;
+ BS2000:POSIX*:*:*)
+ echo bs2000-siemens-sysv
+ exit ;;
+ DS/*:UNIX_System_V:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-${UNAME_SYSTEM}-${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ *:Plan9:*:*)
+ # "uname -m" is not consistent, so use $cputype instead. 386
+ # is converted to i386 for consistency with other x86
+ # operating systems.
+ if test "$cputype" = "386"; then
+ UNAME_MACHINE=i386
+ else
+ UNAME_MACHINE="$cputype"
+ fi
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-plan9
+ exit ;;
+ *:TOPS-10:*:*)
+ echo pdp10-unknown-tops10
+ exit ;;
+ *:TENEX:*:*)
+ echo pdp10-unknown-tenex
+ exit ;;
+ KS10:TOPS-20:*:* | KL10:TOPS-20:*:* | TYPE4:TOPS-20:*:*)
+ echo pdp10-dec-tops20
+ exit ;;
+ XKL-1:TOPS-20:*:* | TYPE5:TOPS-20:*:*)
+ echo pdp10-xkl-tops20
+ exit ;;
+ *:TOPS-20:*:*)
+ echo pdp10-unknown-tops20
+ exit ;;
+ *:ITS:*:*)
+ echo pdp10-unknown-its
+ exit ;;
+ SEI:*:*:SEIUX)
+ echo mips-sei-seiux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit ;;
+ *:DragonFly:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-dragonfly`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`
+ exit ;;
+ *:*VMS:*:*)
+ UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -p) 2>/dev/null`
+ case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in
+ A*) echo alpha-dec-vms ; exit ;;
+ I*) echo ia64-dec-vms ; exit ;;
+ V*) echo vax-dec-vms ; exit ;;
+ esac ;;
+ *:XENIX:*:SysV)
+ echo i386-pc-xenix
+ exit ;;
+ i*86:skyos:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-skyos`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}` | sed -e 's/ .*$//'
+ exit ;;
+ i*86:rdos:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-rdos
+ exit ;;
+ i*86:AROS:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-aros
+ exit ;;
+ x86_64:VMkernel:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-esx
+ exit ;;
+esac
+
+eval $set_cc_for_build
+cat >$dummy.c <<EOF
+#ifdef _SEQUENT_
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/utsname.h>
+#endif
+main ()
+{
+#if defined (sony)
+#if defined (MIPSEB)
+ /* BFD wants "bsd" instead of "newsos". Perhaps BFD should be changed,
+ I don't know.... */
+ printf ("mips-sony-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#else
+#include <sys/param.h>
+ printf ("m68k-sony-newsos%s\n",
+#ifdef NEWSOS4
+ "4"
+#else
+ ""
+#endif
+ ); exit (0);
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined (__arm) && defined (__acorn) && defined (__unix)
+ printf ("arm-acorn-riscix\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+
+#if defined (hp300) && !defined (hpux)
+ printf ("m68k-hp-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+
+#if defined (NeXT)
+#if !defined (__ARCHITECTURE__)
+#define __ARCHITECTURE__ "m68k"
+#endif
+ int version;
+ version=`(hostinfo | sed -n 's/.*NeXT Mach \([0-9]*\).*/\1/p') 2>/dev/null`;
+ if (version < 4)
+ printf ("%s-next-nextstep%d\n", __ARCHITECTURE__, version);
+ else
+ printf ("%s-next-openstep%d\n", __ARCHITECTURE__, version);
+ exit (0);
+#endif
+
+#if defined (MULTIMAX) || defined (n16)
+#if defined (UMAXV)
+ printf ("ns32k-encore-sysv\n"); exit (0);
+#else
+#if defined (CMU)
+ printf ("ns32k-encore-mach\n"); exit (0);
+#else
+ printf ("ns32k-encore-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined (__386BSD__)
+ printf ("i386-pc-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+
+#if defined (sequent)
+#if defined (i386)
+ printf ("i386-sequent-dynix\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#if defined (ns32000)
+ printf ("ns32k-sequent-dynix\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined (_SEQUENT_)
+ struct utsname un;
+
+ uname(&un);
+
+ if (strncmp(un.version, "V2", 2) == 0) {
+ printf ("i386-sequent-ptx2\n"); exit (0);
+ }
+ if (strncmp(un.version, "V1", 2) == 0) { /* XXX is V1 correct? */
+ printf ("i386-sequent-ptx1\n"); exit (0);
+ }
+ printf ("i386-sequent-ptx\n"); exit (0);
+
+#endif
+
+#if defined (vax)
+# if !defined (ultrix)
+# include <sys/param.h>
+# if defined (BSD)
+# if BSD == 43
+ printf ("vax-dec-bsd4.3\n"); exit (0);
+# else
+# if BSD == 199006
+ printf ("vax-dec-bsd4.3reno\n"); exit (0);
+# else
+ printf ("vax-dec-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+# endif
+# endif
+# else
+ printf ("vax-dec-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+# endif
+# else
+ printf ("vax-dec-ultrix\n"); exit (0);
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined (alliant) && defined (i860)
+ printf ("i860-alliant-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+
+ exit (1);
+}
+EOF
+
+$CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c 2>/dev/null && SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy` &&
+ { echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"; exit; }
+
+# Apollos put the system type in the environment.
+
+test -d /usr/apollo && { echo ${ISP}-apollo-${SYSTYPE}; exit; }
+
+# Convex versions that predate uname can use getsysinfo(1)
+
+if [ -x /usr/convex/getsysinfo ]
+then
+ case `getsysinfo -f cpu_type` in
+ c1*)
+ echo c1-convex-bsd
+ exit ;;
+ c2*)
+ if getsysinfo -f scalar_acc
+ then echo c32-convex-bsd
+ else echo c2-convex-bsd
+ fi
+ exit ;;
+ c34*)
+ echo c34-convex-bsd
+ exit ;;
+ c38*)
+ echo c38-convex-bsd
+ exit ;;
+ c4*)
+ echo c4-convex-bsd
+ exit ;;
+ esac
+fi
+
+cat >&2 <<EOF
+$0: unable to guess system type
+
+This script, last modified $timestamp, has failed to recognize
+the operating system you are using. It is advised that you
+download the most up to date version of the config scripts from
+
+ http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.guess;hb=HEAD
+and
+ http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.sub;hb=HEAD
+
+If the version you run ($0) is already up to date, please
+send the following data and any information you think might be
+pertinent to <config-patches at gnu.org> in order to provide the needed
+information to handle your system.
+
+config.guess timestamp = $timestamp
+
+uname -m = `(uname -m) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+uname -r = `(uname -r) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+uname -s = `(uname -s) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+uname -v = `(uname -v) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+
+/usr/bin/uname -p = `(/usr/bin/uname -p) 2>/dev/null`
+/bin/uname -X = `(/bin/uname -X) 2>/dev/null`
+
+hostinfo = `(hostinfo) 2>/dev/null`
+/bin/universe = `(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null`
+/usr/bin/arch -k = `(/usr/bin/arch -k) 2>/dev/null`
+/bin/arch = `(/bin/arch) 2>/dev/null`
+/usr/bin/oslevel = `(/usr/bin/oslevel) 2>/dev/null`
+/usr/convex/getsysinfo = `(/usr/convex/getsysinfo) 2>/dev/null`
+
+UNAME_MACHINE = ${UNAME_MACHINE}
+UNAME_RELEASE = ${UNAME_RELEASE}
+UNAME_SYSTEM = ${UNAME_SYSTEM}
+UNAME_VERSION = ${UNAME_VERSION}
+EOF
+
+exit 1
+
+# Local variables:
+# eval: (add-hook 'write-file-hooks 'time-stamp)
+# time-stamp-start: "timestamp='"
+# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d"
+# time-stamp-end: "'"
+# End:
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/config.h.in
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/config.h.in 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/config.h.in 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1708 +0,0 @@
-/* config.h.in. Generated from configure.ac by autoheader. */
-
-/* Define if building universal (internal helper macro) */
-#undef AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD
-
-/* Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails for the all-zeros IPv6 address
- */
-#undef AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK
-
-/* Define if your AIX loginfailed() function takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2) */
-#undef AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG
-
-/* System only supports IPv4 audit records */
-#undef AU_IPv4
-
-/* Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname */
-#undef BIND_8_COMPAT
-
-/* The system has incomplete BSM API */
-#undef BROKEN_BSM_API
-
-/* Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly */
-#undef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE
-
-/* getaddrinfo is broken (if present) */
-#undef BROKEN_GETADDRINFO
-
-/* getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1 */
-#undef BROKEN_GETGROUPS
-
-/* FreeBSD glob does not do what we need */
-#undef BROKEN_GLOB
-
-/* Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted (e.g. Irix gcc issue) */
-#undef BROKEN_INET_NTOA
-
-/* ia_uinfo routines not supported by OS yet */
-#undef BROKEN_LIBIAF
-
-/* Ultrix mmap can't map files */
-#undef BROKEN_MMAP
-
-/* Define if your struct dirent expects you to allocate extra space for d_name
- */
-#undef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME
-
-/* Can't do comparisons on readv */
-#undef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
-
-/* NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons
- against it */
-#undef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON
-
-/* Define if you have a broken realpath. */
-#undef BROKEN_REALPATH
-
-/* Needed for NeXT */
-#undef BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS
-
-/* Define if your setregid() is broken */
-#undef BROKEN_SETREGID
-
-/* Define if your setresgid() is broken */
-#undef BROKEN_SETRESGID
-
-/* Define if your setresuid() is broken */
-#undef BROKEN_SETRESUID
-
-/* Define if your setreuid() is broken */
-#undef BROKEN_SETREUID
-
-/* LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation */
-#undef BROKEN_SETVBUF
-
-/* QNX shadow support is broken */
-#undef BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE
-
-/* Define if your snprintf is busted */
-#undef BROKEN_SNPRINTF
-
-/* FreeBSD strnvis argument order is swapped compared to OpenBSD */
-#undef BROKEN_STRNVIS
-
-/* tcgetattr with ICANON may hang */
-#undef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON
-
-/* updwtmpx is broken (if present) */
-#undef BROKEN_UPDWTMPX
-
-/* Define if you have BSD auth support */
-#undef BSD_AUTH
-
-/* Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file */
-#undef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
-
-/* Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file */
-#undef CONF_UTMP_FILE
-
-/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file */
-#undef CONF_WTMPX_FILE
-
-/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file */
-#undef CONF_WTMP_FILE
-
-/* Define if your platform needs to skip post auth file descriptor passing */
-#undef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
-
-/* Define if you don't want to use lastlog */
-#undef DISABLE_LASTLOG
-
-/* Define if you don't want to use your system's login() call */
-#undef DISABLE_LOGIN
-
-/* Define if you don't want to use pututline() etc. to write [uw]tmp */
-#undef DISABLE_PUTUTLINE
-
-/* Define if you don't want to use pututxline() etc. to write [uw]tmpx */
-#undef DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE
-
-/* Define if you want to disable shadow passwords */
-#undef DISABLE_SHADOW
-
-/* Define if you don't want to use utmp */
-#undef DISABLE_UTMP
-
-/* Define if you don't want to use utmpx */
-#undef DISABLE_UTMPX
-
-/* Define if you don't want to use wtmp */
-#undef DISABLE_WTMP
-
-/* Define if you don't want to use wtmpx */
-#undef DISABLE_WTMPX
-
-/* Enable for PKCS#11 support */
-#undef ENABLE_PKCS11
-
-/* File names may not contain backslash characters */
-#undef FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH
-
-/* fsid_t has member val */
-#undef FSID_HAS_VAL
-
-/* fsid_t has member __val */
-#undef FSID_HAS___VAL
-
-/* Define to 1 if the `getpgrp' function requires zero arguments. */
-#undef GETPGRP_VOID
-
-/* Conflicting defs for getspnam */
-#undef GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS
-
-/* Define if your system glob() function has the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension */
-#undef GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC
-
-/* Define if your system glob() function has gl_matchc options in glob_t */
-#undef GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC
-
-/* Define if your system glob() function has gl_statv options in glob_t */
-#undef GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV
-
-/* Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol */
-#undef GSSAPI
-
-/* Define if you want to use shadow password expire field */
-#undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
-
-/* Define if your system uses access rights style file descriptor passing */
-#undef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
-
-/* Define if you have ut_addr in utmp.h */
-#undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP
-
-/* Define if you have ut_addr in utmpx.h */
-#undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX
-
-/* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmp.h */
-#undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
-
-/* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmpx.h */
-#undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random' function. */
-#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_buf' function. */
-#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_stir' function. */
-#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_uniform' function. */
-#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `asprintf' function. */
-#undef HAVE_ASPRINTF
-
-/* OpenBSD's gcc has bounded */
-#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__
-
-/* Have attribute nonnull */
-#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__
-
-/* OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel */
-#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `aug_get_machine' function. */
-#undef HAVE_AUG_GET_MACHINE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_ntop' function. */
-#undef HAVE_B64_NTOP
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_pton' function. */
-#undef HAVE_B64_PTON
-
-/* Define if you have the basename function. */
-#undef HAVE_BASENAME
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `bcopy' function. */
-#undef HAVE_BCOPY
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `bcrypt_pbkdf' function. */
-#undef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `bindresvport_sa' function. */
-#undef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `blf_enc' function. */
-#undef HAVE_BLF_ENC
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <blf.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_BLF_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expand0state' function. */
-#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expandstate' function. */
-#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPANDSTATE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_initstate' function. */
-#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_stream2word' function. */
-#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_STREAM2WORD
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `BN_is_prime_ex' function. */
-#undef HAVE_BN_IS_PRIME_EX
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <bsd/libutil.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_BSD_LIBUTIL_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <bsm/audit.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_BSM_AUDIT_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <bstring.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_BSTRING_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `cap_rights_limit' function. */
-#undef HAVE_CAP_RIGHTS_LIMIT
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `clock' function. */
-#undef HAVE_CLOCK
-
-/* Have clock_gettime */
-#undef HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME
-
-/* define if you have clock_t data type */
-#undef HAVE_CLOCK_T
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `closefrom' function. */
-#undef HAVE_CLOSEFROM
-
-/* Define if gai_strerror() returns const char * */
-#undef HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO
-
-/* Define if your system uses ancillary data style file descriptor passing */
-#undef HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' function. */
-#undef HAVE_CRYPT
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <crypto/sha2.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_CRYPTO_SHA2_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <crypt.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_CRYPT_H
-
-/* Define if you are on Cygwin */
-#undef HAVE_CYGWIN
-
-/* Define if your libraries define daemon() */
-#undef HAVE_DAEMON
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `authenticate', and to 0 if you
- don't. */
-#undef HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GLOB_NOMATCH', and to 0 if you
- don't. */
-#undef HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE',
- and to 0 if you don't. */
-#undef HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `howmany', and to 0 if you
- don't. */
-#undef HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `h_errno', and to 0 if you
- don't. */
-#undef HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginfailed', and to 0 if you
- don't. */
-#undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginrestrictions', and to 0 if
- you don't. */
-#undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginsuccess', and to 0 if you
- don't. */
-#undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `MAXSYMLINKS', and to 0 if you
- don't. */
-#undef HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `NFDBITS', and to 0 if you
- don't. */
-#undef HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `offsetof', and to 0 if you
- don't. */
-#undef HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `O_NONBLOCK', and to 0 if you
- don't. */
-#undef HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `passwdexpired', and to 0 if you
- don't. */
-#undef HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `setauthdb', and to 0 if you
- don't. */
-#undef HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `SHUT_RD', and to 0 if you
- don't. */
-#undef HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `writev', and to 0 if you don't.
- */
-#undef HAVE_DECL_WRITEV
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getlong', and to 0 if you
- don't. */
-#undef HAVE_DECL__GETLONG
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getshort', and to 0 if you
- don't. */
-#undef HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `DES_crypt' function. */
-#undef HAVE_DES_CRYPT
-
-/* Define if you have /dev/ptmx */
-#undef HAVE_DEV_PTMX
-
-/* Define if you have /dev/ptc */
-#undef HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <dirent.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_DIRENT_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `dirfd' function. */
-#undef HAVE_DIRFD
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `dirname' function. */
-#undef HAVE_DIRNAME
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_generate_parameters_ex' function. */
-#undef HAVE_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <elf.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_ELF_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `endgrent' function. */
-#undef HAVE_ENDGRENT
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <endian.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `endutent' function. */
-#undef HAVE_ENDUTENT
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `endutxent' function. */
-#undef HAVE_ENDUTXENT
-
-/* Define if your system has /etc/default/login */
-#undef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
-
-/* Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl */
-#undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestFinal_ex' function. */
-#undef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTFINAL_EX
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestInit_ex' function. */
-#undef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup' function. */
-#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_CLEANUP
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex' function. */
-#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_init' function. */
-#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_INIT
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha256' function. */
-#undef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-
-/* Define if you have ut_exit in utmp.h */
-#undef HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `explicit_bzero' function. */
-#undef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmod' function. */
-#undef HAVE_FCHMOD
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchown' function. */
-#undef HAVE_FCHOWN
-
-/* Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom */
-#undef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <fcntl.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_FCNTL_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fd_mask'. */
-#undef HAVE_FD_MASK
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <features.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_FEATURES_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <floatingpoint.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `fmt_scaled' function. */
-#undef HAVE_FMT_SCALED
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `freeaddrinfo' function. */
-#undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
-
-/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsblkcnt_t'. */
-#undef HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T
-
-/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsfilcnt_t'. */
-#undef HAVE_FSFILCNT_T
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatfs' function. */
-#undef HAVE_FSTATFS
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatvfs' function. */
-#undef HAVE_FSTATVFS
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `futimes' function. */
-#undef HAVE_FUTIMES
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `gai_strerror' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaddrinfo' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETAUDIT
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit_addr' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getcwd' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETCWD
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrouplist' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrset' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETGRSET
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getlastlogxbyname' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getluid' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETLUID
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getnameinfo' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getopt' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETOPT
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <getopt.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_GETOPT_H
-
-/* Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset */
-#undef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET
-
-/* Define if your libraries define getpagesize() */
-#undef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeereid' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETPEEREID
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeerucred' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETPEERUCRED
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgid' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETPGID
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgrp' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETPGRP
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpwanam' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETPWANAM
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getrlimit' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETRLIMIT
-
-/* Define if getrrsetbyname() exists */
-#undef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getrusage' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETRUSAGE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getseuserbyname' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `gettimeofday' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getttyent' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETTTYENT
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutent' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETUTENT
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutid' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETUTID
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutline' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETUTLINE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxent' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETUTXENT
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxid' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETUTXID
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxline' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETUTXLINE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxuser' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GETUTXUSER
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `get_default_context_with_level' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `glob' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GLOB
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <glob.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_GLOB_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `group_from_gid' function. */
-#undef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi_generic.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi_krb5.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
-
-/* Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h */
-#undef HAVE_HEADER_AD
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `HMAC_CTX_init' function. */
-#undef HAVE_HMAC_CTX_INIT
-
-/* Define if you have ut_host in utmp.h */
-#undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
-
-/* Define if you have ut_host in utmpx.h */
-#undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <iaf.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_IAF_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <ia.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_IA_H
-
-/* Define if you have ut_id in utmp.h */
-#undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP
-
-/* Define if you have ut_id in utmpx.h */
-#undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_aton' function. */
-#undef HAVE_INET_ATON
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntoa' function. */
-#undef HAVE_INET_NTOA
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntop' function. */
-#undef HAVE_INET_NTOP
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `innetgr' function. */
-#undef HAVE_INNETGR
-
-/* define if you have int64_t data type */
-#undef HAVE_INT64_T
-
-/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `intmax_t'. */
-#undef HAVE_INTMAX_T
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <inttypes.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_INTTYPES_H
-
-/* define if you have intxx_t data type */
-#undef HAVE_INTXX_T
-
-/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_addr_t'. */
-#undef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T
-
-/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_port_t'. */
-#undef HAVE_IN_PORT_T
-
-/* Define if you have isblank(3C). */
-#undef HAVE_ISBLANK
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_cc_new_unique' function. */
-#undef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_free_error_message' function. */
-#undef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_get_error_message' function. */
-#undef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <lastlog.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
-
-/* Define if you want ldns support */
-#undef HAVE_LDNS
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <libaudit.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_LIBAUDIT_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `bsm' library (-lbsm). */
-#undef HAVE_LIBBSM
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' library (-lcrypt). */
-#undef HAVE_LIBCRYPT
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `dl' library (-ldl). */
-#undef HAVE_LIBDL
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <libgen.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
-
-/* Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id */
-#undef HAVE_LIBIAF
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `network' library (-lnetwork). */
-#undef HAVE_LIBNETWORK
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `nsl' library (-lnsl). */
-#undef HAVE_LIBNSL
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam' library (-lpam). */
-#undef HAVE_LIBPAM
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `socket' library (-lsocket). */
-#undef HAVE_LIBSOCKET
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <libutil.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `xnet' library (-lxnet). */
-#undef HAVE_LIBXNET
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `z' library (-lz). */
-#undef HAVE_LIBZ
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <limits.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_LIMITS_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/audit.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/filter.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_LINUX_FILTER_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/if_tun.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/seccomp.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_LINUX_SECCOMP_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <locale.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_LOCALE_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `login' function. */
-#undef HAVE_LOGIN
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <login_cap.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `login_getcapbool' function. */
-#undef HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <login.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_LOGIN_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `logout' function. */
-#undef HAVE_LOGOUT
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `logwtmp' function. */
-#undef HAVE_LOGWTMP
-
-/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long double'. */
-#undef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE
-
-/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long long'. */
-#undef HAVE_LONG_LONG
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <maillock.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `mblen' function. */
-#undef HAVE_MBLEN
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `md5_crypt' function. */
-#undef HAVE_MD5_CRYPT
-
-/* Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords */
-#undef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `memmove' function. */
-#undef HAVE_MEMMOVE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <memory.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_MEMORY_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `mkdtemp' function. */
-#undef HAVE_MKDTEMP
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `mmap' function. */
-#undef HAVE_MMAP
-
-/* define if you have mode_t data type */
-#undef HAVE_MODE_T
-
-/* Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc */
-#undef HAVE_NANOSLEEP
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <ndir.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_NDIR_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <netdb.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_NETDB_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <netgroup.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_NETGROUP_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <net/if_tun.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H
-
-/* Define if you are on NeXT */
-#undef HAVE_NEXT
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `ngetaddrinfo' function. */
-#undef HAVE_NGETADDRINFO
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `nsleep' function. */
-#undef HAVE_NSLEEP
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `ogetaddrinfo' function. */
-#undef HAVE_OGETADDRINFO
-
-/* Define if you have an old version of PAM which takes only one argument to
- pam_strerror */
-#undef HAVE_OLD_PAM
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `openlog_r' function. */
-#undef HAVE_OPENLOG_R
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `openpty' function. */
-#undef HAVE_OPENPTY
-
-/* Define if your ssl headers are included with #include <openssl/header.h> */
-#undef HAVE_OPENSSL
-
-/* Define if you have Digital Unix Security Integration Architecture */
-#undef HAVE_OSF_SIA
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_getenvlist' function. */
-#undef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <pam/pam_appl.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_putenv' function. */
-#undef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <paths.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_PATHS_H
-
-/* Define if you have ut_pid in utmp.h */
-#undef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP
-
-/* define if you have pid_t data type */
-#undef HAVE_PID_T
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `poll' function. */
-#undef HAVE_POLL
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <poll.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_POLL_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `prctl' function. */
-#undef HAVE_PRCTL
-
-/* Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd */
-#undef HAVE_PROC_PID
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `pstat' function. */
-#undef HAVE_PSTAT
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <pty.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_PTY_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `pututline' function. */
-#undef HAVE_PUTUTLINE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `pututxline' function. */
-#undef HAVE_PUTUTXLINE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `readpassphrase' function. */
-#undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <readpassphrase.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `realpath' function. */
-#undef HAVE_REALPATH
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `recvmsg' function. */
-#undef HAVE_RECVMSG
-
-/* sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC */
-#undef HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <rpc/types.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `rresvport_af' function. */
-#undef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_generate_key_ex' function. */
-#undef HAVE_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get_default_method' function. */
-#undef HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sandbox.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SANDBOX_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `sandbox_init' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SANDBOX_INIT
-
-/* define if you have sa_family_t data type */
-#undef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `scan_scaled' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED
-
-/* Define if you have SecureWare-based protected password database */
-#undef HAVE_SECUREWARE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <security/pam_appl.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `sendmsg' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SENDMSG
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setauthdb' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setdtablesize' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setegid' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETEGID
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setenv' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETENV
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `seteuid' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETEUID
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroupent' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETGROUPENT
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroups' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETGROUPS
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setlinebuf' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETLINEBUF
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setlogin' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETLOGIN
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setluid' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETLUID
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpassent' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETPASSENT
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpcred' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETPCRED
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setproctitle' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setregid' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETREGID
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresgid' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETRESGID
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresuid' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETRESUID
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setreuid' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETREUID
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setrlimit' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setsid' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETSID
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutent' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETUTENT
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxdb' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETUTXDB
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxent' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETUTXENT
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `setvbuf' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SETVBUF
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `set_id' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SET_ID
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA256_Update' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sha2.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SHA2_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <shadow.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SHADOW_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `sigaction' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SIGACTION
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `sigvec' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SIGVEC
-
-/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `sig_atomic_t'. */
-#undef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
-
-/* define if you have size_t data type */
-#undef HAVE_SIZE_T
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `snprintf' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SNPRINTF
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `socketpair' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
-
-/* Have PEERCRED socket option */
-#undef HAVE_SO_PEERCRED
-
-/* define if you have ssize_t data type */
-#undef HAVE_SSIZE_T
-
-/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */
-#undef HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `statfs' function. */
-#undef HAVE_STATFS
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `statvfs' function. */
-#undef HAVE_STATVFS
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <stddef.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_STDDEF_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <stdint.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_STDINT_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <stdlib.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_STDLIB_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `strdup' function. */
-#undef HAVE_STRDUP
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `strerror' function. */
-#undef HAVE_STRERROR
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `strftime' function. */
-#undef HAVE_STRFTIME
-
-/* Silly mkstemp() */
-#undef HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <strings.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_STRINGS_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <string.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_STRING_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcat' function. */
-#undef HAVE_STRLCAT
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcpy' function. */
-#undef HAVE_STRLCPY
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `strmode' function. */
-#undef HAVE_STRMODE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `strnlen' function. */
-#undef HAVE_STRNLEN
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `strnvis' function. */
-#undef HAVE_STRNVIS
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `strptime' function. */
-#undef HAVE_STRPTIME
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `strsep' function. */
-#undef HAVE_STRSEP
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoll' function. */
-#undef HAVE_STRTOLL
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtonum' function. */
-#undef HAVE_STRTONUM
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoul' function. */
-#undef HAVE_STRTOUL
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoull' function. */
-#undef HAVE_STRTOULL
-
-/* define if you have struct addrinfo data type */
-#undef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO
-
-/* define if you have struct in6_addr data type */
-#undef HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR
-
-/* Define to 1 if `pw_change' is a member of `struct passwd'. */
-#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE
-
-/* Define to 1 if `pw_class' is a member of `struct passwd'. */
-#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
-
-/* Define to 1 if `pw_expire' is a member of `struct passwd'. */
-#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE
-
-/* Define to 1 if `pw_gecos' is a member of `struct passwd'. */
-#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
-
-/* define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type */
-#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6
-
-/* Define to 1 if `sin6_scope_id' is a member of `struct sockaddr_in6'. */
-#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID
-
-/* define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type */
-#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE
-
-/* Define to 1 if `st_blksize' is a member of `struct stat'. */
-#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE
-
-/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `struct timespec'. */
-#undef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC
-
-/* define if you have struct timeval */
-#undef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `swap32' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SWAP32
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `sysconf' function. */
-#undef HAVE_SYSCONF
-
-/* Define if you have syslen in utmpx.h */
-#undef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/audit.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/bitypes.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/bsdtty.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/capability.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_CAPABILITY_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/cdefs.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/dir.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_DIR_H
-
-/* Define if your system defines sys_errlist[] */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/mman.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/mount.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ndir.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H
-
-/* Define if your system defines sys_nerr */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_NERR
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/poll.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/prctl.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/pstat.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ptms.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/select.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/statvfs.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stat.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stream.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stropts.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/strtio.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H
-
-/* Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/sysmacros.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/timers.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/time.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/types.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/un.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `tcgetpgrp' function. */
-#undef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `tcsendbreak' function. */
-#undef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `time' function. */
-#undef HAVE_TIME
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <time.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_TIME_H
-
-/* Define if you have ut_time in utmp.h */
-#undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP
-
-/* Define if you have ut_time in utmpx.h */
-#undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `timingsafe_bcmp' function. */
-#undef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <tmpdir.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_TMPDIR_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `truncate' function. */
-#undef HAVE_TRUNCATE
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <ttyent.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_TTYENT_H
-
-/* Define if you have ut_tv in utmp.h */
-#undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP
-
-/* Define if you have ut_tv in utmpx.h */
-#undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX
-
-/* Define if you have ut_type in utmp.h */
-#undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
-
-/* Define if you have ut_type in utmpx.h */
-#undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <ucred.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_UCRED_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `uintmax_t'. */
-#undef HAVE_UINTMAX_T
-
-/* define if you have uintxx_t data type */
-#undef HAVE_UINTXX_T
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <unistd.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_UNISTD_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `unsetenv' function. */
-#undef HAVE_UNSETENV
-
-/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `unsigned long long'. */
-#undef HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmp' function. */
-#undef HAVE_UPDWTMP
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmpx' function. */
-#undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <usersec.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_USERSEC_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `user_from_uid' function. */
-#undef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `usleep' function. */
-#undef HAVE_USLEEP
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <util.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_UTIL_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `utimes' function. */
-#undef HAVE_UTIMES
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <utime.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_UTIME_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpname' function. */
-#undef HAVE_UTMPNAME
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpxname' function. */
-#undef HAVE_UTMPXNAME
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <utmpx.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_UTMPX_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <utmp.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_UTMP_H
-
-/* define if you have u_char data type */
-#undef HAVE_U_CHAR
-
-/* define if you have u_int data type */
-#undef HAVE_U_INT
-
-/* define if you have u_int64_t data type */
-#undef HAVE_U_INT64_T
-
-/* define if you have u_intxx_t data type */
-#undef HAVE_U_INTXX_T
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `vasprintf' function. */
-#undef HAVE_VASPRINTF
-
-/* Define if va_copy exists */
-#undef HAVE_VA_COPY
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `vhangup' function. */
-#undef HAVE_VHANGUP
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the <vis.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_VIS_H
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `vsnprintf' function. */
-#undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `waitpid' function. */
-#undef HAVE_WAITPID
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getlong' function. */
-#undef HAVE__GETLONG
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getpty' function. */
-#undef HAVE__GETPTY
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getshort' function. */
-#undef HAVE__GETSHORT
-
-/* Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern */
-#undef HAVE__RES_EXTERN
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_ntop' function. */
-#undef HAVE___B64_NTOP
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_pton' function. */
-#undef HAVE___B64_PTON
-
-/* Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__ */
-#undef HAVE___FUNCTION__
-
-/* Define if libc defines __progname */
-#undef HAVE___PROGNAME
-
-/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */
-#undef HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS
-
-/* Define if __va_copy exists */
-#undef HAVE___VA_COPY
-
-/* Define if compiler implements __func__ */
-#undef HAVE___func__
-
-/* Define this if you are using the Heimdal version of Kerberos V5 */
-#undef HEIMDAL
-
-/* Define if you need to use IP address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY */
-#undef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY
-
-/* Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and treat as IPv4 */
-#undef IPV4_IN_IPV6
-
-/* Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting */
-#undef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN
-
-/* Define if you want Kerberos 5 support */
-#undef KRB5
-
-/* Define if pututxline updates lastlog too */
-#undef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE
-
-/* Define if you want TCP Wrappers support */
-#undef LIBWRAP
-
-/* Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported" if it doesn't return
- EOPNOTSUPP. */
-#undef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO
-
-/* Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer */
-#undef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-
-/* max value of long long calculated by configure */
-#undef LLONG_MAX
-
-/* min value of long long calculated by configure */
-#undef LLONG_MIN
-
-/* Account locked with pw(1) */
-#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
-
-/* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */
-#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
-
-/* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */
-#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
-
-/* Some versions of /bin/login need the TERM supplied on the commandline */
-#undef LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM
-
-/* Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work */
-#undef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
-
-/* Define if your login program cannot handle end of options ("--") */
-#undef LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT
-
-/* If your header files don't define LOGIN_PROGRAM, then use this (detected)
- from environment and PATH */
-#undef LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK
-
-/* Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR */
-#undef MAIL_DIRECTORY
-
-/* Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty */
-#undef NEED_SETPGRP
-
-/* compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types */
-#undef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE
-
-/* Define if the concept of ports only accessible to superusers isn't known */
-#undef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT
-
-/* Define if you don't want to use lastlog in session.c */
-#undef NO_SSH_LASTLOG
-
-/* Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system */
-#undef NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS
-
-/* Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void */
-#undef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
-
-/* OpenSSL has ECC */
-#undef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-
-/* libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1 */
-#undef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
-
-/* libcrypto has NID_secp384r1 */
-#undef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384
-
-/* libcrypto has NID_secp521r1 */
-#undef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
-
-/* libcrypto has EVP AES CTR */
-#undef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
-
-/* libcrypto has EVP AES GCM */
-#undef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
-
-/* libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions */
-#undef OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES
-
-/* Define if you want OpenSSL's internally seeded PRNG only */
-#undef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
-
-/* Define to the address where bug reports for this package should be sent. */
-#undef PACKAGE_BUGREPORT
-
-/* Define to the full name of this package. */
-#undef PACKAGE_NAME
-
-/* Define to the full name and version of this package. */
-#undef PACKAGE_STRING
-
-/* Define to the one symbol short name of this package. */
-#undef PACKAGE_TARNAME
-
-/* Define to the home page for this package. */
-#undef PACKAGE_URL
-
-/* Define to the version of this package. */
-#undef PACKAGE_VERSION
-
-/* Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which passes pam_messages to
- the conversation function with an extra level of indirection */
-#undef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
-
-/* Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY */
-#undef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE
-
-/* must supply username to passwd */
-#undef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
-
-/* System dirs owned by bin (uid 2) */
-#undef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
-
-/* Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */
-#undef PRNGD_PORT
-
-/* Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */
-#undef PRNGD_SOCKET
-
-/* read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd */
-#undef PTY_ZEROREAD
-
-/* Sandbox using capsicum */
-#undef SANDBOX_CAPSICUM
-
-/* Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3) */
-#undef SANDBOX_DARWIN
-
-/* no privsep sandboxing */
-#undef SANDBOX_NULL
-
-/* Sandbox using setrlimit(2) */
-#undef SANDBOX_RLIMIT
-
-/* Sandbox using seccomp filter */
-#undef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER
-
-/* setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works */
-#undef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE
-
-/* define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things */
-#undef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE
-
-/* Sandbox using systrace(4) */
-#undef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE
-
-/* Specify the system call convention in use */
-#undef SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH
-
-/* Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid */
-#undef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID
-
-/* The size of `int', as computed by sizeof. */
-#undef SIZEOF_INT
-
-/* The size of `long int', as computed by sizeof. */
-#undef SIZEOF_LONG_INT
-
-/* The size of `long long int', as computed by sizeof. */
-#undef SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT
-
-/* The size of `short int', as computed by sizeof. */
-#undef SIZEOF_SHORT_INT
-
-/* Define if you want S/Key support */
-#undef SKEY
-
-/* Define if your skeychallenge() function takes 4 arguments (NetBSD) */
-#undef SKEYCHALLENGE_4ARG
-
-/* Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt */
-#undef SNPRINTF_CONST
-
-/* Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by
- bsd-setproctitle.c */
-#undef SPT_TYPE
-
-/* Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY after setsid() */
-#undef SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY
-
-/* Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set to the unpriv'ed user */
-#undef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID
-
-/* Use audit debugging module */
-#undef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-
-/* Windows is sensitive to read buffer size */
-#undef SSH_IOBUFSZ
-
-/* non-privileged user for privilege separation */
-#undef SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
-
-/* Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD */
-#undef SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF
-
-/* Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way */
-#undef SSH_TUN_FREEBSD
-
-/* Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way */
-#undef SSH_TUN_LINUX
-
-/* No layer 2 tunnel support */
-#undef SSH_TUN_NO_L2
-
-/* Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way */
-#undef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
-
-/* Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic */
-#undef SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the ANSI C header files. */
-#undef STDC_HEADERS
-
-/* Define if you want a different $PATH for the superuser */
-#undef SUPERUSER_PATH
-
-/* syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler */
-#undef SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
-
-/* Support passwords > 8 chars */
-#undef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS
-
-/* Specify default $PATH */
-#undef USER_PATH
-
-/* Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support */
-#undef USE_AFS
-
-/* Use BSM audit module */
-#undef USE_BSM_AUDIT
-
-/* Use btmp to log bad logins */
-#undef USE_BTMP
-
-/* Use libedit for sftp */
-#undef USE_LIBEDIT
-
-/* Use Linux audit module */
-#undef USE_LINUX_AUDIT
-
-/* Enable OpenSSL engine support */
-#undef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
-
-/* Define if you want to enable PAM support */
-#undef USE_PAM
-
-/* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */
-#undef USE_PIPES
-
-/* Define if you have Solaris process contracts */
-#undef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
-
-/* Define if you have Solaris projects */
-#undef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
-
-/* Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your ttyname in [uw]tmp */
-#undef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY
-
-/* Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function */
-#undef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
-
-/* Define if you have/want arrays (cluster-wide session managment, not C
- arrays) */
-#undef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY
-
-/* Define if you want IRIX audit trails */
-#undef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT
-
-/* Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs */
-#undef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
-
-/* Define if you want IRIX project management */
-#undef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
-
-/* Define if you want SELinux support. */
-#undef WITH_SELINUX
-
-/* Define WORDS_BIGENDIAN to 1 if your processor stores words with the most
- significant byte first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel). */
-#if defined AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD
-# if defined __BIG_ENDIAN__
-# define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1
-# endif
-#else
-# ifndef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
-# undef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
-# endif
-#endif
-
-/* Define if xauth is found in your path */
-#undef XAUTH_PATH
-
-/* Number of bits in a file offset, on hosts where this is settable. */
-#undef _FILE_OFFSET_BITS
-
-/* Define for large files, on AIX-style hosts. */
-#undef _LARGE_FILES
-
-/* log for bad login attempts */
-#undef _PATH_BTMP
-
-/* Full path of your "passwd" program */
-#undef _PATH_PASSWD_PROG
-
-/* Specify location of ssh.pid */
-#undef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR
-
-/* Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h */
-#undef __res_state
-
-/* Define to `__inline__' or `__inline' if that's what the C compiler
- calls it, or to nothing if 'inline' is not supported under any name. */
-#ifndef __cplusplus
-#undef inline
-#endif
-
-/* type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined */
-#undef socklen_t
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/config.h.in (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/config.h.in)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/config.h.in (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/config.h.in 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1755 @@
+/* config.h.in. Generated from configure.ac by autoheader. */
+
+/* Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails for the all-zeros IPv6 address
+ */
+#undef AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK
+
+/* Define if your AIX loginfailed() function takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2) */
+#undef AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG
+
+/* System only supports IPv4 audit records */
+#undef AU_IPv4
+
+/* Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname */
+#undef BIND_8_COMPAT
+
+/* The system has incomplete BSM API */
+#undef BROKEN_BSM_API
+
+/* Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly */
+#undef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE
+
+/* getaddrinfo is broken (if present) */
+#undef BROKEN_GETADDRINFO
+
+/* getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1 */
+#undef BROKEN_GETGROUPS
+
+/* FreeBSD glob does not do what we need */
+#undef BROKEN_GLOB
+
+/* Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted (e.g. Irix gcc issue) */
+#undef BROKEN_INET_NTOA
+
+/* ia_uinfo routines not supported by OS yet */
+#undef BROKEN_LIBIAF
+
+/* Ultrix mmap can't map files */
+#undef BROKEN_MMAP
+
+/* Define if your struct dirent expects you to allocate extra space for d_name
+ */
+#undef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME
+
+/* Can't do comparisons on readv */
+#undef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
+
+/* NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons
+ against it */
+#undef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON
+
+/* realpath does not work with nonexistent files */
+#undef BROKEN_REALPATH
+
+/* Needed for NeXT */
+#undef BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS
+
+/* Define if your setregid() is broken */
+#undef BROKEN_SETREGID
+
+/* Define if your setresgid() is broken */
+#undef BROKEN_SETRESGID
+
+/* Define if your setresuid() is broken */
+#undef BROKEN_SETRESUID
+
+/* Define if your setreuid() is broken */
+#undef BROKEN_SETREUID
+
+/* LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation */
+#undef BROKEN_SETVBUF
+
+/* QNX shadow support is broken */
+#undef BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE
+
+/* Define if your snprintf is busted */
+#undef BROKEN_SNPRINTF
+
+/* missing VIS_ALL */
+#undef BROKEN_STRNVIS
+
+/* tcgetattr with ICANON may hang */
+#undef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON
+
+/* updwtmpx is broken (if present) */
+#undef BROKEN_UPDWTMPX
+
+/* Define if you have BSD auth support */
+#undef BSD_AUTH
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file */
+#undef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file */
+#undef CONF_UTMP_FILE
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file */
+#undef CONF_WTMPX_FILE
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file */
+#undef CONF_WTMP_FILE
+
+/* Define if your platform needs to skip post auth file descriptor passing */
+#undef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use lastlog */
+#undef DISABLE_LASTLOG
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use your system's login() call */
+#undef DISABLE_LOGIN
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use pututline() etc. to write [uw]tmp */
+#undef DISABLE_PUTUTLINE
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use pututxline() etc. to write [uw]tmpx */
+#undef DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE
+
+/* Define if you want to disable shadow passwords */
+#undef DISABLE_SHADOW
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use utmp */
+#undef DISABLE_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use utmpx */
+#undef DISABLE_UTMPX
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use wtmp */
+#undef DISABLE_WTMP
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use wtmpx */
+#undef DISABLE_WTMPX
+
+/* Enable for PKCS#11 support */
+#undef ENABLE_PKCS11
+
+/* File names may not contain backslash characters */
+#undef FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH
+
+/* fsid_t has member val */
+#undef FSID_HAS_VAL
+
+/* fsid_t has member __val */
+#undef FSID_HAS___VAL
+
+/* Define to 1 if the `getpgrp' function requires zero arguments. */
+#undef GETPGRP_VOID
+
+/* Conflicting defs for getspnam */
+#undef GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS
+
+/* Define if your system glob() function has the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension */
+#undef GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC
+
+/* Define if your system glob() function has gl_matchc options in glob_t */
+#undef GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC
+
+/* Define if your system glob() function has gl_statv options in glob_t */
+#undef GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV
+
+/* Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol */
+#undef GSSAPI
+
+/* Define if you want to use shadow password expire field */
+#undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
+
+/* Define if your system uses access rights style file descriptor passing */
+#undef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+
+/* Define if you have ut_addr in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you have ut_addr in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_buf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_stir' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_uniform' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `asprintf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ASPRINTF
+
+/* OpenBSD's gcc has bounded */
+#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__
+
+/* Have attribute nonnull */
+#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__
+
+/* OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel */
+#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `aug_get_machine' function. */
+#undef HAVE_AUG_GET_MACHINE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_ntop' function. */
+#undef HAVE_B64_NTOP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_pton' function. */
+#undef HAVE_B64_PTON
+
+/* Define if you have the basename function. */
+#undef HAVE_BASENAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `bcopy' function. */
+#undef HAVE_BCOPY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `bcrypt_pbkdf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `bindresvport_sa' function. */
+#undef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `blf_enc' function. */
+#undef HAVE_BLF_ENC
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <blf.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_BLF_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expand0state' function. */
+#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expandstate' function. */
+#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPANDSTATE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_initstate' function. */
+#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_stream2word' function. */
+#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_STREAM2WORD
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `BN_is_prime_ex' function. */
+#undef HAVE_BN_IS_PRIME_EX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <bsd/libutil.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_BSD_LIBUTIL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <bsm/audit.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_BSM_AUDIT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <bstring.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_BSTRING_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `cap_rights_limit' function. */
+#undef HAVE_CAP_RIGHTS_LIMIT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `clock' function. */
+#undef HAVE_CLOCK
+
+/* Have clock_gettime */
+#undef HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME
+
+/* define if you have clock_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_CLOCK_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `closefrom' function. */
+#undef HAVE_CLOSEFROM
+
+/* Define if gai_strerror() returns const char * */
+#undef HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO
+
+/* Define if your system uses ancillary data style file descriptor passing */
+#undef HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' function. */
+#undef HAVE_CRYPT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <crypto/sha2.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_CRYPTO_SHA2_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <crypt.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_CRYPT_H
+
+/* Define if you are on Cygwin */
+#undef HAVE_CYGWIN
+
+/* Define if your libraries define daemon() */
+#undef HAVE_DAEMON
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `AI_NUMERICSERV', and to 0 if
+ you don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `authenticate', and to 0 if you
+ don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GLOB_NOMATCH', and to 0 if you
+ don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE',
+ and to 0 if you don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `howmany', and to 0 if you
+ don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `h_errno', and to 0 if you
+ don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginfailed', and to 0 if you
+ don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginrestrictions', and to 0 if
+ you don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginsuccess', and to 0 if you
+ don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `MAXSYMLINKS', and to 0 if you
+ don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `NFDBITS', and to 0 if you
+ don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `offsetof', and to 0 if you
+ don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `O_NONBLOCK', and to 0 if you
+ don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `passwdexpired', and to 0 if you
+ don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `setauthdb', and to 0 if you
+ don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `SHUT_RD', and to 0 if you
+ don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `writev', and to 0 if you don't.
+ */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_WRITEV
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getlong', and to 0 if you
+ don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL__GETLONG
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getshort', and to 0 if you
+ don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DES_crypt' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DES_CRYPT
+
+/* Define if you have /dev/ptmx */
+#undef HAVE_DEV_PTMX
+
+/* Define if you have /dev/ptc */
+#undef HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <dirent.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_DIRENT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `dirfd' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DIRFD
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `dirname' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DIRNAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_generate_parameters_ex' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <elf.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_ELF_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `endgrent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ENDGRENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <endian.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `endutent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ENDUTENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `endutxent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ENDUTXENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `err' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ERR
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `errx' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ERRX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <err.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_ERR_H
+
+/* Define if your system has /etc/default/login */
+#undef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
+
+/* Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestFinal_ex' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTFINAL_EX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestInit_ex' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_CLEANUP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_init' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_INIT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_ripemd160' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha256' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
+
+/* Define if you have ut_exit in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `explicit_bzero' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmod' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FCHMOD
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchown' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FCHOWN
+
+/* Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom */
+#undef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <fcntl.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fd_mask'. */
+#undef HAVE_FD_MASK
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <features.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_FEATURES_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <floatingpoint.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fmt_scaled' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FMT_SCALED
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `freeaddrinfo' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsblkcnt_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsfilcnt_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_FSFILCNT_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatfs' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FSTATFS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatvfs' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FSTATVFS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `futimes' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FUTIMES
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `gai_strerror' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaddrinfo' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETAUDIT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit_addr' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getcwd' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETCWD
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrouplist' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrset' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETGRSET
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getlastlogxbyname' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getluid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETLUID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getnameinfo' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getopt' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETOPT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <getopt.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GETOPT_H
+
+/* Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset */
+#undef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET
+
+/* Define if your libraries define getpagesize() */
+#undef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeereid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETPEEREID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeerucred' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETPEERUCRED
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETPGID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgrp' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETPGRP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpwanam' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETPWANAM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getrlimit' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETRLIMIT
+
+/* Define if getrrsetbyname() exists */
+#undef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getrusage' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETRUSAGE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getseuserbyname' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `gettimeofday' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getttyent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETTTYENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUTENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUTID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutline' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUTLINE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUTXENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUTXID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxline' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUTXLINE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxuser' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUTXUSER
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `get_default_context_with_level' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `glob' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GLOB
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <glob.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GLOB_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `group_from_gid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi_generic.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi_krb5.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
+
+/* Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h */
+#undef HAVE_HEADER_AD
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `HMAC_CTX_init' function. */
+#undef HAVE_HMAC_CTX_INIT
+
+/* Define if you have ut_host in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you have ut_host in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <iaf.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_IAF_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ia.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_IA_H
+
+/* Define if you have ut_id in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you have ut_id in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_aton' function. */
+#undef HAVE_INET_ATON
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntoa' function. */
+#undef HAVE_INET_NTOA
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntop' function. */
+#undef HAVE_INET_NTOP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `innetgr' function. */
+#undef HAVE_INNETGR
+
+/* define if you have int64_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_INT64_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `intmax_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_INTMAX_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <inttypes.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_INTTYPES_H
+
+/* define if you have intxx_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_INTXX_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_addr_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_port_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_IN_PORT_T
+
+/* Define if you have isblank(3C). */
+#undef HAVE_ISBLANK
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_cc_new_unique' function. */
+#undef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_free_error_message' function. */
+#undef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_get_error_message' function. */
+#undef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <langinfo.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LANGINFO_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <lastlog.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+
+/* Define if you want ldns support */
+#undef HAVE_LDNS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <libaudit.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LIBAUDIT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `bsm' library (-lbsm). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBBSM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' library (-lcrypt). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBCRYPT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `dl' library (-ldl). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBDL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <libgen.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
+
+/* Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id */
+#undef HAVE_LIBIAF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `network' library (-lnetwork). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBNETWORK
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam' library (-lpam). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBPAM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `socket' library (-lsocket). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBSOCKET
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <libutil.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `xnet' library (-lxnet). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBXNET
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `z' library (-lz). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBZ
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <limits.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LIMITS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/audit.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/filter.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LINUX_FILTER_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/if_tun.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/seccomp.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LINUX_SECCOMP_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <locale.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LOCALE_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `login' function. */
+#undef HAVE_LOGIN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <login_cap.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `login_getcapbool' function. */
+#undef HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <login.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LOGIN_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `logout' function. */
+#undef HAVE_LOGOUT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `logwtmp' function. */
+#undef HAVE_LOGWTMP
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long double'. */
+#undef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long long'. */
+#undef HAVE_LONG_LONG
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <maillock.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `mblen' function. */
+#undef HAVE_MBLEN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `mbtowc' function. */
+#undef HAVE_MBTOWC
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `md5_crypt' function. */
+#undef HAVE_MD5_CRYPT
+
+/* Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords */
+#undef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `memmove' function. */
+#undef HAVE_MEMMOVE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <memory.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_MEMORY_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `memset_s' function. */
+#undef HAVE_MEMSET_S
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `mkdtemp' function. */
+#undef HAVE_MKDTEMP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `mmap' function. */
+#undef HAVE_MMAP
+
+/* define if you have mode_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_MODE_T
+
+/* Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc */
+#undef HAVE_NANOSLEEP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ndir.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_NDIR_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <netdb.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_NETDB_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <netgroup.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_NETGROUP_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <net/if_tun.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H
+
+/* Define if you are on NeXT */
+#undef HAVE_NEXT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `ngetaddrinfo' function. */
+#undef HAVE_NGETADDRINFO
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `nl_langinfo' function. */
+#undef HAVE_NL_LANGINFO
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `nsleep' function. */
+#undef HAVE_NSLEEP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `ogetaddrinfo' function. */
+#undef HAVE_OGETADDRINFO
+
+/* Define if you have an old version of PAM which takes only one argument to
+ pam_strerror */
+#undef HAVE_OLD_PAM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `openlog_r' function. */
+#undef HAVE_OPENLOG_R
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `openpty' function. */
+#undef HAVE_OPENPTY
+
+/* Define if your ssl headers are included with #include <openssl/header.h> */
+#undef HAVE_OPENSSL
+
+/* Define if you have Digital Unix Security Integration Architecture */
+#undef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_getenvlist' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <pam/pam_appl.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_putenv' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <paths.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_PATHS_H
+
+/* Define if you have ut_pid in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP
+
+/* define if you have pid_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_PID_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pledge' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PLEDGE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `poll' function. */
+#undef HAVE_POLL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <poll.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_POLL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `prctl' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PRCTL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `priv_basicset' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PRIV_BASICSET
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <priv.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_PRIV_H
+
+/* Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd */
+#undef HAVE_PROC_PID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pstat' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PSTAT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <pty.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_PTY_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pututline' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PUTUTLINE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pututxline' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PUTUTXLINE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `readpassphrase' function. */
+#undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <readpassphrase.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `reallocarray' function. */
+#undef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `realpath' function. */
+#undef HAVE_REALPATH
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `recvmsg' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RECVMSG
+
+/* sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC */
+#undef HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <rpc/types.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `rresvport_af' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_generate_key_ex' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get_default_method' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sandbox.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SANDBOX_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sandbox_init' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SANDBOX_INIT
+
+/* define if you have sa_family_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `scan_scaled' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED
+
+/* Define if you have SecureWare-based protected password database */
+#undef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <security/pam_appl.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sendmsg' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SENDMSG
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setauthdb' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setdtablesize' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setegid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETEGID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setenv' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETENV
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `seteuid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETEUID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroupent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETGROUPENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroups' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETGROUPS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setlinebuf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETLINEBUF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setlogin' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETLOGIN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setluid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETLUID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpassent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETPASSENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpcred' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETPCRED
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpflags' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETPFLAGS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setppriv' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETPPRIV
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setproctitle' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setregid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETREGID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresgid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETRESGID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresuid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETRESUID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setreuid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETREUID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setrlimit' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setsid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETSID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETUTENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxdb' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETUTXDB
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETUTXENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setvbuf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETVBUF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `set_id' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SET_ID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA256_Update' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sha2.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SHA2_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <shadow.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SHADOW_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sigaction' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SIGACTION
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sigvec' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SIGVEC
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `sig_atomic_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
+
+/* define if you have size_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_SIZE_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `snprintf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `socketpair' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
+
+/* Have PEERCRED socket option */
+#undef HAVE_SO_PEERCRED
+
+/* define if you have ssize_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_SSIZE_T
+
+/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */
+#undef HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `statfs' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STATFS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `statvfs' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STATVFS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <stddef.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_STDDEF_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <stdint.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_STDINT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <stdlib.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_STDLIB_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strdup' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRDUP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strerror' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRERROR
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strftime' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRFTIME
+
+/* Silly mkstemp() */
+#undef HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <strings.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_STRINGS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <string.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_STRING_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcat' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRLCAT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcpy' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRLCPY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strmode' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRMODE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strnlen' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRNLEN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strnvis' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRNVIS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strptime' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRPTIME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strsep' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRSEP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoll' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRTOLL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtonum' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRTONUM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoul' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRTOUL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoull' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRTOULL
+
+/* define if you have struct addrinfo data type */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO
+
+/* define if you have struct in6_addr data type */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR
+
+/* Define to 1 if `pw_change' is member of `struct passwd'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE
+
+/* Define to 1 if `pw_class' is member of `struct passwd'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
+
+/* Define to 1 if `pw_expire' is member of `struct passwd'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE
+
+/* Define to 1 if `pw_gecos' is member of `struct passwd'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
+
+/* define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6
+
+/* Define to 1 if `sin6_scope_id' is member of `struct sockaddr_in6'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID
+
+/* define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE
+
+/* Define to 1 if `st_blksize' is member of `struct stat'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `struct timespec'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC
+
+/* define if you have struct timeval */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `swap32' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SWAP32
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sysconf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SYSCONF
+
+/* Define if you have syslen in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/audit.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/bitypes.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/bsdtty.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/capability.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_CAPABILITY_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/cdefs.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/dir.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_DIR_H
+
+/* Define if your system defines sys_errlist[] */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/mman.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/mount.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ndir.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H
+
+/* Define if your system defines sys_nerr */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_NERR
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/poll.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/prctl.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/pstat.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ptms.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/select.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/statvfs.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stat.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stream.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stropts.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/strtio.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H
+
+/* Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/sysmacros.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/timers.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/time.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/types.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/un.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `tcgetpgrp' function. */
+#undef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `tcsendbreak' function. */
+#undef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `time' function. */
+#undef HAVE_TIME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <time.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_TIME_H
+
+/* Define if you have ut_time in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you have ut_time in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `timingsafe_bcmp' function. */
+#undef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <tmpdir.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_TMPDIR_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `truncate' function. */
+#undef HAVE_TRUNCATE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ttyent.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_TTYENT_H
+
+/* Define if you have ut_tv in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you have ut_tv in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define if you have ut_type in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you have ut_type in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ucred.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_UCRED_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `uintmax_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_UINTMAX_T
+
+/* define if you have uintxx_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_UINTXX_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <unistd.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `unsetenv' function. */
+#undef HAVE_UNSETENV
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `unsigned long long'. */
+#undef HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmp' function. */
+#undef HAVE_UPDWTMP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmpx' function. */
+#undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <usersec.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_USERSEC_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `user_from_uid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `usleep' function. */
+#undef HAVE_USLEEP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <util.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_UTIL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `utimes' function. */
+#undef HAVE_UTIMES
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <utime.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_UTIME_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpname' function. */
+#undef HAVE_UTMPNAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpxname' function. */
+#undef HAVE_UTMPXNAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <utmpx.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <utmp.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_UTMP_H
+
+/* define if you have u_char data type */
+#undef HAVE_U_CHAR
+
+/* define if you have u_int data type */
+#undef HAVE_U_INT
+
+/* define if you have u_int64_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_U_INT64_T
+
+/* define if you have u_intxx_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_U_INTXX_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `vasprintf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_VASPRINTF
+
+/* Define if va_copy exists */
+#undef HAVE_VA_COPY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <vis.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_VIS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `vsnprintf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `waitpid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_WAITPID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `warn' function. */
+#undef HAVE_WARN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <wchar.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_WCHAR_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `wcwidth' function. */
+#undef HAVE_WCWIDTH
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getlong' function. */
+#undef HAVE__GETLONG
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getpty' function. */
+#undef HAVE__GETPTY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getshort' function. */
+#undef HAVE__GETSHORT
+
+/* Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern */
+#undef HAVE__RES_EXTERN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_ntop' function. */
+#undef HAVE___B64_NTOP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_pton' function. */
+#undef HAVE___B64_PTON
+
+/* Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__ */
+#undef HAVE___FUNCTION__
+
+/* Define if libc defines __progname */
+#undef HAVE___PROGNAME
+
+/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */
+#undef HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS
+
+/* Define if __va_copy exists */
+#undef HAVE___VA_COPY
+
+/* Define if compiler implements __func__ */
+#undef HAVE___func__
+
+/* Define this if you are using the Heimdal version of Kerberos V5 */
+#undef HEIMDAL
+
+/* Define if you need to use IP address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY */
+#undef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY
+
+/* Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and treat as IPv4 */
+#undef IPV4_IN_IPV6
+
+/* Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting */
+#undef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN
+
+/* Define if you want Kerberos 5 support */
+#undef KRB5
+
+/* Define if pututxline updates lastlog too */
+#undef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE
+
+/* Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported" if it doesn't return
+ EOPNOTSUPP. */
+#undef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO
+
+/* Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer */
+#undef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+
+/* max value of long long calculated by configure */
+#undef LLONG_MAX
+
+/* min value of long long calculated by configure */
+#undef LLONG_MIN
+
+/* Account locked with pw(1) */
+#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
+
+/* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */
+#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
+
+/* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */
+#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
+
+/* Some versions of /bin/login need the TERM supplied on the commandline */
+#undef LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM
+
+/* Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work */
+#undef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+
+/* Define if your login program cannot handle end of options ("--") */
+#undef LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT
+
+/* If your header files don't define LOGIN_PROGRAM, then use this (detected)
+ from environment and PATH */
+#undef LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK
+
+/* Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR */
+#undef MAIL_DIRECTORY
+
+/* Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty */
+#undef NEED_SETPGRP
+
+/* compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types */
+#undef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use lastlog in session.c */
+#undef NO_SSH_LASTLOG
+
+/* Define to disable UID restoration test */
+#undef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST
+
+/* Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system */
+#undef NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS
+
+/* Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void */
+#undef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
+
+/* OpenSSL has ECC */
+#undef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+
+/* libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1 */
+#undef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
+
+/* libcrypto has NID_secp384r1 */
+#undef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384
+
+/* libcrypto has NID_secp521r1 */
+#undef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+
+/* libcrypto has EVP AES CTR */
+#undef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
+
+/* libcrypto has EVP AES GCM */
+#undef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
+
+/* libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions */
+#undef OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES
+
+/* Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only */
+#undef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+
+/* Define to the address where bug reports for this package should be sent. */
+#undef PACKAGE_BUGREPORT
+
+/* Define to the full name of this package. */
+#undef PACKAGE_NAME
+
+/* Define to the full name and version of this package. */
+#undef PACKAGE_STRING
+
+/* Define to the one symbol short name of this package. */
+#undef PACKAGE_TARNAME
+
+/* Define to the version of this package. */
+#undef PACKAGE_VERSION
+
+/* Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which passes pam_messages to
+ the conversation function with an extra level of indirection */
+#undef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
+
+/* Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY */
+#undef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE
+
+/* must supply username to passwd */
+#undef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
+
+/* System dirs owned by bin (uid 2) */
+#undef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
+
+/* Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */
+#undef PRNGD_PORT
+
+/* Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */
+#undef PRNGD_SOCKET
+
+/* read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd */
+#undef PTY_ZEROREAD
+
+/* Sandbox using capsicum */
+#undef SANDBOX_CAPSICUM
+
+/* Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3) */
+#undef SANDBOX_DARWIN
+
+/* no privsep sandboxing */
+#undef SANDBOX_NULL
+
+/* Sandbox using pledge(2) */
+#undef SANDBOX_PLEDGE
+
+/* Sandbox using setrlimit(2) */
+#undef SANDBOX_RLIMIT
+
+/* Sandbox using seccomp filter */
+#undef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER
+
+/* setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works */
+#undef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE
+
+/* define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things */
+#undef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE
+
+/* Sandbox using Solaris/Illumos privileges */
+#undef SANDBOX_SOLARIS
+
+/* Sandbox using systrace(4) */
+#undef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE
+
+/* Specify the system call convention in use */
+#undef SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH
+
+/* Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid */
+#undef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID
+
+/* The size of `int', as computed by sizeof. */
+#undef SIZEOF_INT
+
+/* The size of `long int', as computed by sizeof. */
+#undef SIZEOF_LONG_INT
+
+/* The size of `long long int', as computed by sizeof. */
+#undef SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT
+
+/* The size of `short int', as computed by sizeof. */
+#undef SIZEOF_SHORT_INT
+
+/* Define if you want S/Key support */
+#undef SKEY
+
+/* Define if your skeychallenge() function takes 4 arguments (NetBSD) */
+#undef SKEYCHALLENGE_4ARG
+
+/* Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt */
+#undef SNPRINTF_CONST
+
+/* Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by
+ bsd-setproctitle.c */
+#undef SPT_TYPE
+
+/* Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY after setsid() */
+#undef SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY
+
+/* Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set to the unpriv'ed user */
+#undef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID
+
+/* Use audit debugging module */
+#undef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+
+/* Windows is sensitive to read buffer size */
+#undef SSH_IOBUFSZ
+
+/* non-privileged user for privilege separation */
+#undef SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+
+/* Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD */
+#undef SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF
+
+/* Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way */
+#undef SSH_TUN_FREEBSD
+
+/* Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way */
+#undef SSH_TUN_LINUX
+
+/* No layer 2 tunnel support */
+#undef SSH_TUN_NO_L2
+
+/* Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way */
+#undef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
+
+/* Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic */
+#undef SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the ANSI C header files. */
+#undef STDC_HEADERS
+
+/* Define if you want a different $PATH for the superuser */
+#undef SUPERUSER_PATH
+
+/* syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler */
+#undef SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
+
+/* Support passwords > 8 chars */
+#undef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS
+
+/* Specify default $PATH */
+#undef USER_PATH
+
+/* Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support */
+#undef USE_AFS
+
+/* Use BSM audit module */
+#undef USE_BSM_AUDIT
+
+/* Use btmp to log bad logins */
+#undef USE_BTMP
+
+/* Use libedit for sftp */
+#undef USE_LIBEDIT
+
+/* Use Linux audit module */
+#undef USE_LINUX_AUDIT
+
+/* Enable OpenSSL engine support */
+#undef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+
+/* Define if you want to enable PAM support */
+#undef USE_PAM
+
+/* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */
+#undef USE_PIPES
+
+/* Define if you have Solaris privileges */
+#undef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
+
+/* Define if you have Solaris process contracts */
+#undef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+
+/* Define if you have Solaris projects */
+#undef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
+
+/* Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your ttyname in [uw]tmp */
+#undef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY
+
+/* Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function */
+#undef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+
+/* Define if you have/want arrays (cluster-wide session managment, not C
+ arrays) */
+#undef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY
+
+/* Define if you want IRIX audit trails */
+#undef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT
+
+/* Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs */
+#undef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
+
+/* Define if you want IRIX project management */
+#undef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
+
+/* use libcrypto for cryptography */
+#undef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+/* Define if you want SELinux support. */
+#undef WITH_SELINUX
+
+/* include SSH protocol version 1 support */
+#undef WITH_SSH1
+
+/* Define to 1 if your processor stores words with the most significant byte
+ first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel and VAX). */
+#undef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+
+/* Define if xauth is found in your path */
+#undef XAUTH_PATH
+
+/* Number of bits in a file offset, on hosts where this is settable. */
+#undef _FILE_OFFSET_BITS
+
+/* Define for large files, on AIX-style hosts. */
+#undef _LARGE_FILES
+
+/* log for bad login attempts */
+#undef _PATH_BTMP
+
+/* Full path of your "passwd" program */
+#undef _PATH_PASSWD_PROG
+
+/* Specify location of ssh.pid */
+#undef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR
+
+/* Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h */
+#undef __res_state
+
+/* Define to `__inline__' or `__inline' if that's what the C compiler
+ calls it, or to nothing if 'inline' is not supported under any name. */
+#ifndef __cplusplus
+#undef inline
+#endif
+
+/* type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined */
+#undef socklen_t
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/configure
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/configure 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/configure 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,19741 +0,0 @@
-#! /bin/sh
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-#
-#
-# Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001,
-# 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 Free Software
-# Foundation, Inc.
-#
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-_ACEOF
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-
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-
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-$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
-as_fn_error $? "C preprocessor \"$CPP\" fails sanity check
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-
-ac_ext=c
-ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
-ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
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-ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for grep that handles long lines and -e" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for grep that handles long lines and -e... " >&6; }
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- for ac_prog in grep ggrep; do
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- ac_count=0
- $as_echo_n 0123456789 >"conftest.in"
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- cp "conftest.in" "conftest.nl"
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- "$ac_path_GREP" -e 'GREP$' -e '-(cannot match)-' < "conftest.nl" >"conftest.out" 2>/dev/null || break
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- as_fn_arith $ac_count + 1 && ac_count=$as_val
- if test $ac_count -gt ${ac_path_GREP_max-0}; then
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- ac_path_GREP_max=$ac_count
- fi
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- done
- rm -f conftest.in conftest.tmp conftest.nl conftest.out;;
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-
- $ac_path_GREP_found && break 3
- done
- done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
- if test -z "$ac_cv_path_GREP"; then
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- fi
-else
- ac_cv_path_GREP=$GREP
-fi
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_path_GREP" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_path_GREP" >&6; }
- GREP="$ac_cv_path_GREP"
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for egrep" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for egrep... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_EGREP+:} false; then :
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- if echo a | $GREP -E '(a|b)' >/dev/null 2>&1
- then ac_cv_path_EGREP="$GREP -E"
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- if test -z "$EGREP"; then
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- # Loop through the user's path and test for each of PROGNAME-LIST
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- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_prog in egrep; do
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- ac_path_EGREP="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"
- { test -f "$ac_path_EGREP" && $as_test_x "$ac_path_EGREP"; } || continue
-# Check for GNU ac_path_EGREP and select it if it is found.
- # Check for GNU $ac_path_EGREP
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-*GNU*)
- ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP" ac_path_EGREP_found=:;;
-*)
- ac_count=0
- $as_echo_n 0123456789 >"conftest.in"
- while :
- do
- cat "conftest.in" "conftest.in" >"conftest.tmp"
- mv "conftest.tmp" "conftest.in"
- cp "conftest.in" "conftest.nl"
- $as_echo 'EGREP' >> "conftest.nl"
- "$ac_path_EGREP" 'EGREP$' < "conftest.nl" >"conftest.out" 2>/dev/null || break
- diff "conftest.out" "conftest.nl" >/dev/null 2>&1 || break
- as_fn_arith $ac_count + 1 && ac_count=$as_val
- if test $ac_count -gt ${ac_path_EGREP_max-0}; then
- # Best one so far, save it but keep looking for a better one
- ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP"
- ac_path_EGREP_max=$ac_count
- fi
- # 10*(2^10) chars as input seems more than enough
- test $ac_count -gt 10 && break
- done
- rm -f conftest.in conftest.tmp conftest.nl conftest.out;;
-esac
-
- $ac_path_EGREP_found && break 3
- done
- done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
- if test -z "$ac_cv_path_EGREP"; then
- as_fn_error $? "no acceptable egrep could be found in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin" "$LINENO" 5
- fi
-else
- ac_cv_path_EGREP=$EGREP
-fi
-
- fi
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&6; }
- EGREP="$ac_cv_path_EGREP"
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ANSI C header files" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ANSI C header files... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_header_stdc+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <float.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_header_stdc=yes
-else
- ac_cv_header_stdc=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then
- # SunOS 4.x string.h does not declare mem*, contrary to ANSI.
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <string.h>
-
-_ACEOF
-if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
- $EGREP "memchr" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
-
-else
- ac_cv_header_stdc=no
-fi
-rm -f conftest*
-
-fi
-
-if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then
- # ISC 2.0.2 stdlib.h does not declare free, contrary to ANSI.
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <stdlib.h>
-
-_ACEOF
-if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
- $EGREP "free" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
-
-else
- ac_cv_header_stdc=no
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-rm -f conftest*
-
-fi
-
-if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then
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- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <ctype.h>
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-# define ISLOWER(c) ('a' <= (c) && (c) <= 'z')
-# define TOUPPER(c) (ISLOWER(c) ? 'A' + ((c) - 'a') : (c))
-#else
-# define ISLOWER(c) \
- (('a' <= (c) && (c) <= 'i') \
- || ('j' <= (c) && (c) <= 'r') \
- || ('s' <= (c) && (c) <= 'z'))
-# define TOUPPER(c) (ISLOWER(c) ? ((c) | 0x40) : (c))
-#endif
-
-#define XOR(e, f) (((e) && !(f)) || (!(e) && (f)))
-int
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-{
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- || toupper (i) != TOUPPER (i))
- return 2;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
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-else
- ac_cv_header_stdc=no
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
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-
-fi
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_header_stdc" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_header_stdc" >&6; }
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-$as_echo "#define STDC_HEADERS 1" >>confdefs.h
-
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-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
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-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether byte ordering is bigendian" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether byte ordering is bigendian... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_c_bigendian+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_cv_c_bigendian=unknown
- # See if we're dealing with a universal compiler.
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#ifndef __APPLE_CC__
- not a universal capable compiler
- #endif
- typedef int dummy;
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
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- # Check for potential -arch flags. It is not universal unless
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- else
- ac_cv_c_bigendian=universal
- break
- fi
- ;;
- esac
- ac_prev=
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- fi
- done
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
- if test $ac_cv_c_bigendian = unknown; then
- # See if sys/param.h defines the BYTE_ORDER macro.
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/param.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-#if ! (defined BYTE_ORDER && defined BIG_ENDIAN \
- && defined LITTLE_ENDIAN && BYTE_ORDER && BIG_ENDIAN \
- && LITTLE_ENDIAN)
- bogus endian macros
- #endif
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- # It does; now see whether it defined to BIG_ENDIAN or not.
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/param.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-#if BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN
- not big endian
- #endif
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes
-else
- ac_cv_c_bigendian=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
- fi
- if test $ac_cv_c_bigendian = unknown; then
- # See if <limits.h> defines _LITTLE_ENDIAN or _BIG_ENDIAN (e.g., Solaris).
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <limits.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-#if ! (defined _LITTLE_ENDIAN || defined _BIG_ENDIAN)
- bogus endian macros
- #endif
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- # It does; now see whether it defined to _BIG_ENDIAN or not.
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <limits.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-#ifndef _BIG_ENDIAN
- not big endian
- #endif
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes
-else
- ac_cv_c_bigendian=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
- fi
- if test $ac_cv_c_bigendian = unknown; then
- # Compile a test program.
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- # Try to guess by grepping values from an object file.
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-short int ascii_mm[] =
- { 0x4249, 0x4765, 0x6E44, 0x6961, 0x6E53, 0x7953, 0 };
- short int ascii_ii[] =
- { 0x694C, 0x5454, 0x656C, 0x6E45, 0x6944, 0x6E61, 0 };
- int use_ascii (int i) {
- return ascii_mm[i] + ascii_ii[i];
- }
- short int ebcdic_ii[] =
- { 0x89D3, 0xE3E3, 0x8593, 0x95C5, 0x89C4, 0x9581, 0 };
- short int ebcdic_mm[] =
- { 0xC2C9, 0xC785, 0x95C4, 0x8981, 0x95E2, 0xA8E2, 0 };
- int use_ebcdic (int i) {
- return ebcdic_mm[i] + ebcdic_ii[i];
- }
- extern int foo;
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-return use_ascii (foo) == use_ebcdic (foo);
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
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- fi
- if grep LiTTleEnDian conftest.$ac_objext >/dev/null ; then
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- else
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- ac_cv_c_bigendian=unknown
- fi
- fi
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-$ac_includes_default
-int
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-{
-
- /* Are we little or big endian? From Harbison&Steele. */
- union
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- long int l;
- char c[sizeof (long int)];
- } u;
- u.l = 1;
- return u.c[sizeof (long int) - 1] == 1;
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
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-else
- ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
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-fi
-
- fi
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_c_bigendian" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_c_bigendian" >&6; }
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- yes)
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- no)
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-$as_echo "#define AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;; #(
- *)
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- esac
-
-
-# Checks for programs.
-for ac_prog in gawk mawk nawk awk
-do
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-set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_prog_AWK+:} false; then :
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- ac_cv_prog_AWK="$ac_prog"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
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-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
-fi
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-AWK=$ac_cv_prog_AWK
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-$as_echo "$AWK" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
- test -n "$AWK" && break
-done
-
-ac_ext=c
-ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
-ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
-ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
-ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking how to run the C preprocessor" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking how to run the C preprocessor... " >&6; }
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-if test -n "$CPP" && test -d "$CPP"; then
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-if test -z "$CPP"; then
- if ${ac_cv_prog_CPP+:} false; then :
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- # Double quotes because CPP needs to be expanded
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- do
- ac_preproc_ok=false
-for ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in '' yes
-do
- # Use a header file that comes with gcc, so configuring glibc
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- # Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
- # <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers.
- # On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser,
- # not just through cpp. "Syntax error" is here to catch this case.
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#ifdef __STDC__
-# include <limits.h>
-#else
-# include <assert.h>
-#endif
- Syntax error
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then :
-
-else
- # Broken: fails on valid input.
-continue
-fi
-rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
-
- # OK, works on sane cases. Now check whether nonexistent headers
- # can be detected and how.
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <ac_nonexistent.h>
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then :
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-continue
-else
- # Passes both tests.
-ac_preproc_ok=:
-break
-fi
-rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
-
-done
-# Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped.
-rm -f conftest.i conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
-if $ac_preproc_ok; then :
- break
-fi
-
- done
- ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP
-
-fi
- CPP=$ac_cv_prog_CPP
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- ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CPP" >&5
-$as_echo "$CPP" >&6; }
-ac_preproc_ok=false
-for ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in '' yes
-do
- # Use a header file that comes with gcc, so configuring glibc
- # with a fresh cross-compiler works.
- # Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
- # <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers.
- # On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser,
- # not just through cpp. "Syntax error" is here to catch this case.
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#ifdef __STDC__
-# include <limits.h>
-#else
-# include <assert.h>
-#endif
- Syntax error
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then :
-
-else
- # Broken: fails on valid input.
-continue
-fi
-rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
-
- # OK, works on sane cases. Now check whether nonexistent headers
- # can be detected and how.
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <ac_nonexistent.h>
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then :
- # Broken: success on invalid input.
-continue
-else
- # Passes both tests.
-ac_preproc_ok=:
-break
-fi
-rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
-
-done
-# Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped.
-rm -f conftest.i conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
-if $ac_preproc_ok; then :
-
-else
- { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
-as_fn_error $? "C preprocessor \"$CPP\" fails sanity check
-See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
-fi
-
-ac_ext=c
-ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
-ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
-ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
-ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
-
-if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
- # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_prog_RANLIB+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- if test -n "$RANLIB"; then
- ac_cv_prog_RANLIB="$RANLIB" # Let the user override the test.
-else
-as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_prog_RANLIB="${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
-fi
-fi
-RANLIB=$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB
-if test -n "$RANLIB"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $RANLIB" >&5
-$as_echo "$RANLIB" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-fi
-if test -z "$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB"; then
- ac_ct_RANLIB=$RANLIB
- # Extract the first word of "ranlib", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy ranlib; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- if test -n "$ac_ct_RANLIB"; then
- ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB="$ac_ct_RANLIB" # Let the user override the test.
-else
-as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB="ranlib"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
-fi
-fi
-ac_ct_RANLIB=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB
-if test -n "$ac_ct_RANLIB"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_ct_RANLIB" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_ct_RANLIB" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
- if test "x$ac_ct_RANLIB" = x; then
- RANLIB=":"
- else
- case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
-yes:)
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
-ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
-esac
- RANLIB=$ac_ct_RANLIB
- fi
-else
- RANLIB="$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB"
-fi
-
-# Find a good install program. We prefer a C program (faster),
-# so one script is as good as another. But avoid the broken or
-# incompatible versions:
-# SysV /etc/install, /usr/sbin/install
-# SunOS /usr/etc/install
-# IRIX /sbin/install
-# AIX /bin/install
-# AmigaOS /C/install, which installs bootblocks on floppy discs
-# AIX 4 /usr/bin/installbsd, which doesn't work without a -g flag
-# AFS /usr/afsws/bin/install, which mishandles nonexistent args
-# SVR4 /usr/ucb/install, which tries to use the nonexistent group "staff"
-# OS/2's system install, which has a completely different semantic
-# ./install, which can be erroneously created by make from ./install.sh.
-# Reject install programs that cannot install multiple files.
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for a BSD-compatible install" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for a BSD-compatible install... " >&6; }
-if test -z "$INSTALL"; then
-if ${ac_cv_path_install+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- # Account for people who put trailing slashes in PATH elements.
-case $as_dir/ in #((
- ./ | .// | /[cC]/* | \
- /etc/* | /usr/sbin/* | /usr/etc/* | /sbin/* | /usr/afsws/bin/* | \
- ?:[\\/]os2[\\/]install[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]OS2[\\/]INSTALL[\\/]* | \
- /usr/ucb/* ) ;;
- *)
- # OSF1 and SCO ODT 3.0 have their own names for install.
- # Don't use installbsd from OSF since it installs stuff as root
- # by default.
- for ac_prog in ginstall scoinst install; do
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- if test $ac_prog = install &&
- grep dspmsg "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
- # AIX install. It has an incompatible calling convention.
- :
- elif test $ac_prog = install &&
- grep pwplus "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
- # program-specific install script used by HP pwplus--don't use.
- :
- else
- rm -rf conftest.one conftest.two conftest.dir
- echo one > conftest.one
- echo two > conftest.two
- mkdir conftest.dir
- if "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" -c conftest.one conftest.two "`pwd`/conftest.dir" &&
- test -s conftest.one && test -s conftest.two &&
- test -s conftest.dir/conftest.one &&
- test -s conftest.dir/conftest.two
- then
- ac_cv_path_install="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext -c"
- break 3
- fi
- fi
- fi
- done
- done
- ;;
-esac
-
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
-rm -rf conftest.one conftest.two conftest.dir
-
-fi
- if test "${ac_cv_path_install+set}" = set; then
- INSTALL=$ac_cv_path_install
- else
- # As a last resort, use the slow shell script. Don't cache a
- # value for INSTALL within a source directory, because that will
- # break other packages using the cache if that directory is
- # removed, or if the value is a relative name.
- INSTALL=$ac_install_sh
- fi
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $INSTALL" >&5
-$as_echo "$INSTALL" >&6; }
-
-# Use test -z because SunOS4 sh mishandles braces in ${var-val}.
-# It thinks the first close brace ends the variable substitution.
-test -z "$INSTALL_PROGRAM" && INSTALL_PROGRAM='${INSTALL}'
-
-test -z "$INSTALL_SCRIPT" && INSTALL_SCRIPT='${INSTALL}'
-
-test -z "$INSTALL_DATA" && INSTALL_DATA='${INSTALL} -m 644'
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for egrep" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for egrep... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_EGREP+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- if echo a | $GREP -E '(a|b)' >/dev/null 2>&1
- then ac_cv_path_EGREP="$GREP -E"
- else
- if test -z "$EGREP"; then
- ac_path_EGREP_found=false
- # Loop through the user's path and test for each of PROGNAME-LIST
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_prog in egrep; do
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- ac_path_EGREP="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"
- { test -f "$ac_path_EGREP" && $as_test_x "$ac_path_EGREP"; } || continue
-# Check for GNU ac_path_EGREP and select it if it is found.
- # Check for GNU $ac_path_EGREP
-case `"$ac_path_EGREP" --version 2>&1` in
-*GNU*)
- ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP" ac_path_EGREP_found=:;;
-*)
- ac_count=0
- $as_echo_n 0123456789 >"conftest.in"
- while :
- do
- cat "conftest.in" "conftest.in" >"conftest.tmp"
- mv "conftest.tmp" "conftest.in"
- cp "conftest.in" "conftest.nl"
- $as_echo 'EGREP' >> "conftest.nl"
- "$ac_path_EGREP" 'EGREP$' < "conftest.nl" >"conftest.out" 2>/dev/null || break
- diff "conftest.out" "conftest.nl" >/dev/null 2>&1 || break
- as_fn_arith $ac_count + 1 && ac_count=$as_val
- if test $ac_count -gt ${ac_path_EGREP_max-0}; then
- # Best one so far, save it but keep looking for a better one
- ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP"
- ac_path_EGREP_max=$ac_count
- fi
- # 10*(2^10) chars as input seems more than enough
- test $ac_count -gt 10 && break
- done
- rm -f conftest.in conftest.tmp conftest.nl conftest.out;;
-esac
-
- $ac_path_EGREP_found && break 3
- done
- done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
- if test -z "$ac_cv_path_EGREP"; then
- as_fn_error $? "no acceptable egrep could be found in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin" "$LINENO" 5
- fi
-else
- ac_cv_path_EGREP=$EGREP
-fi
-
- fi
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&6; }
- EGREP="$ac_cv_path_EGREP"
-
-
-# Extract the first word of "ar", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy ar; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_AR+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $AR in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_AR="$AR" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_AR="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-AR=$ac_cv_path_AR
-if test -n "$AR"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $AR" >&5
-$as_echo "$AR" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-# Extract the first word of "cat", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy cat; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_CAT+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $CAT in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_CAT="$CAT" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_CAT="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-CAT=$ac_cv_path_CAT
-if test -n "$CAT"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CAT" >&5
-$as_echo "$CAT" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-# Extract the first word of "kill", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy kill; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_KILL+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $KILL in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_KILL="$KILL" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_KILL="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-KILL=$ac_cv_path_KILL
-if test -n "$KILL"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $KILL" >&5
-$as_echo "$KILL" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-for ac_prog in perl5 perl
-do
- # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_PERL+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $PERL in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_PERL="$PERL" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_PERL="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-PERL=$ac_cv_path_PERL
-if test -n "$PERL"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PERL" >&5
-$as_echo "$PERL" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
- test -n "$PERL" && break
-done
-
-# Extract the first word of "sed", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy sed; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_SED+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $SED in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_SED="$SED" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_SED="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-SED=$ac_cv_path_SED
-if test -n "$SED"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $SED" >&5
-$as_echo "$SED" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-
-# Extract the first word of "ent", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy ent; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_ENT+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $ENT in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_ENT="$ENT" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_ENT="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-ENT=$ac_cv_path_ENT
-if test -n "$ENT"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ENT" >&5
-$as_echo "$ENT" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-
-# Extract the first word of "bash", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy bash; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH
-if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5
-$as_echo "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-# Extract the first word of "ksh", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy ksh; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH
-if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5
-$as_echo "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-# Extract the first word of "sh", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy sh; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH
-if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5
-$as_echo "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-# Extract the first word of "sh", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy sh; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_SH+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $SH in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_SH="$SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-SH=$ac_cv_path_SH
-if test -n "$SH"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $SH" >&5
-$as_echo "$SH" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-# Extract the first word of "groff", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy groff; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_GROFF+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $GROFF in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_GROFF="$GROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_GROFF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-GROFF=$ac_cv_path_GROFF
-if test -n "$GROFF"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $GROFF" >&5
-$as_echo "$GROFF" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-# Extract the first word of "nroff", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy nroff; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_NROFF+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $NROFF in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_NROFF="$NROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_NROFF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-NROFF=$ac_cv_path_NROFF
-if test -n "$NROFF"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NROFF" >&5
-$as_echo "$NROFF" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-# Extract the first word of "mandoc", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy mandoc; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_MANDOC+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $MANDOC in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_MANDOC="$MANDOC" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_MANDOC="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-MANDOC=$ac_cv_path_MANDOC
-if test -n "$MANDOC"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $MANDOC" >&5
-$as_echo "$MANDOC" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-TEST_SHELL=sh
-
-
-if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then
- MANFMT="$MANDOC"
-elif test "x$NROFF" != "x" ; then
- MANFMT="$NROFF -mandoc"
-elif test "x$GROFF" != "x" ; then
- MANFMT="$GROFF -mandoc -Tascii"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: no manpage formatted found" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: no manpage formatted found" >&2;}
- MANFMT="false"
-fi
-
-
-# Extract the first word of "groupadd", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy groupadd; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $PATH_GROUPADD_PROG in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in /usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- test -z "$ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" && ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="groupadd"
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-PATH_GROUPADD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG
-if test -n "$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" >&5
-$as_echo "$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-# Extract the first word of "useradd", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy useradd; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $PATH_USERADD_PROG in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="$PATH_USERADD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in /usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- test -z "$ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG" && ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="useradd"
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-PATH_USERADD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG
-if test -n "$PATH_USERADD_PROG"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_USERADD_PROG" >&5
-$as_echo "$PATH_USERADD_PROG" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-# Extract the first word of "pkgmk", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy pkgmk; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- if test -n "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED"; then
- ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" # Let the user override the test.
-else
-as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="yes"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- test -z "$ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" && ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="no"
-fi
-fi
-MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED=$ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED
-if test -n "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" >&5
-$as_echo "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-if test -x /sbin/sh; then
- STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL=/sbin/sh
-
-else
- STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL=/bin/sh
-
-fi
-
-# System features
-# Check whether --enable-largefile was given.
-if test "${enable_largefile+set}" = set; then :
- enableval=$enable_largefile;
-fi
-
-if test "$enable_largefile" != no; then
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for special C compiler options needed for large files" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for special C compiler options needed for large files... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC=no
- if test "$GCC" != yes; then
- ac_save_CC=$CC
- while :; do
- # IRIX 6.2 and later do not support large files by default,
- # so use the C compiler's -n32 option if that helps.
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <sys/types.h>
- /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
- We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
- since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
- incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
- int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
- && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
- ? 1 : -1];
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
- if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- break
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext
- CC="$CC -n32"
- if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC=' -n32'; break
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext
- break
- done
- CC=$ac_save_CC
- rm -f conftest.$ac_ext
- fi
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" >&6; }
- if test "$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" != no; then
- CC=$CC$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC
- fi
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for _FILE_OFFSET_BITS value needed for large files" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for _FILE_OFFSET_BITS value needed for large files... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- while :; do
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <sys/types.h>
- /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
- We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
- since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
- incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
- int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
- && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
- ? 1 : -1];
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=no; break
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS 64
-#include <sys/types.h>
- /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
- We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
- since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
- incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
- int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
- && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
- ? 1 : -1];
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=64; break
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
- ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=unknown
- break
-done
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits" >&6; }
-case $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits in #(
- no | unknown) ;;
- *)
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits
-_ACEOF
-;;
-esac
-rm -rf conftest*
- if test $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits = unknown; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for _LARGE_FILES value needed for large files" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for _LARGE_FILES value needed for large files... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_sys_large_files+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- while :; do
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <sys/types.h>
- /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
- We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
- since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
- incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
- int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
- && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
- ? 1 : -1];
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_sys_large_files=no; break
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#define _LARGE_FILES 1
-#include <sys/types.h>
- /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
- We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
- since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
- incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
- int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
- && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
- ? 1 : -1];
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_sys_large_files=1; break
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
- ac_cv_sys_large_files=unknown
- break
-done
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_large_files" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_sys_large_files" >&6; }
-case $ac_cv_sys_large_files in #(
- no | unknown) ;;
- *)
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define _LARGE_FILES $ac_cv_sys_large_files
-_ACEOF
-;;
-esac
-rm -rf conftest*
- fi
-fi
-
-
-if test -z "$AR" ; then
- as_fn_error $? "*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***" "$LINENO" 5
-fi
-
-# Use LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment if possible
-if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM" ; then
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK "$LOGIN_PROGRAM"
-_ACEOF
-
-else
- # Search for login
- # Extract the first word of "login", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy login; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK="$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK=$ac_cv_path_LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK
-if test -n "$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK" >&5
-$as_echo "$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
- if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK" ; then
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK "$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK"
-_ACEOF
-
- fi
-fi
-
-# Extract the first word of "passwd", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy passwd; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $PATH_PASSWD_PROG in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG="$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-PATH_PASSWD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG
-if test -n "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_PASSWD_PROG" >&5
-$as_echo "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-if test ! -z "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" ; then
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define _PATH_PASSWD_PROG "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-if test -z "$LD" ; then
- LD=$CC
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for inline" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for inline... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_c_inline+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_cv_c_inline=no
-for ac_kw in inline __inline__ __inline; do
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#ifndef __cplusplus
-typedef int foo_t;
-static $ac_kw foo_t static_foo () {return 0; }
-$ac_kw foo_t foo () {return 0; }
-#endif
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_c_inline=$ac_kw
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
- test "$ac_cv_c_inline" != no && break
-done
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_c_inline" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_c_inline" >&6; }
-
-case $ac_cv_c_inline in
- inline | yes) ;;
- *)
- case $ac_cv_c_inline in
- no) ac_val=;;
- *) ac_val=$ac_cv_c_inline;;
- esac
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#ifndef __cplusplus
-#define inline $ac_val
-#endif
-_ACEOF
- ;;
-esac
-
-
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "LLONG_MAX" "ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" "#include <limits.h>
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" = xyes; then :
- have_llong_max=1
-fi
-
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "SYSTR_POLICY_KILL" "ac_cv_have_decl_SYSTR_POLICY_KILL" "
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/param.h>
- #include <dev/systrace.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_SYSTR_POLICY_KILL" = xyes; then :
- have_systr_policy_kill=1
-fi
-
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "RLIMIT_NPROC" "ac_cv_have_decl_RLIMIT_NPROC" "
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/resource.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_RLIMIT_NPROC" = xyes; then :
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC /**/" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" "ac_cv_have_decl_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" "
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <linux/prctl.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" = xyes; then :
- have_linux_no_new_privs=1
-fi
-
-
-use_stack_protector=1
-use_toolchain_hardening=1
-
-# Check whether --with-stackprotect was given.
-if test "${with_stackprotect+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_stackprotect;
- if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
- use_stack_protector=0
- fi
-fi
-
-
-# Check whether --with-hardening was given.
-if test "${with_hardening+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_hardening;
- if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
- use_toolchain_hardening=0
- fi
-fi
-
-
-# We use -Werror for the tests only so that we catch warnings like "this is
-# on by default" for things like -fPIE.
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports -Werror" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports -Werror... " >&6; }
-saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
-CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-int main(void) { return 0; }
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- WERROR="-Werror"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- WERROR=""
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-
-if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then
- {
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Qunused-arguments" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Qunused-arguments... " >&6; }
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Qunused-arguments"
- _define_flag=""
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Qunused-arguments"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
- exit(0);
-}
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
-if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
-then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
-fi
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-}
- {
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunknown-warning-option" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunknown-warning-option... " >&6; }
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wunknown-warning-option"
- _define_flag=""
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wunknown-warning-option"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
- exit(0);
-}
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
-if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
-then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
-fi
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-}
- {
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wall" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wall... " >&6; }
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wall"
- _define_flag=""
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wall"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
- exit(0);
-}
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
-if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
-then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
-fi
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-}
- {
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-arith" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-arith... " >&6; }
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wpointer-arith"
- _define_flag=""
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wpointer-arith"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
- exit(0);
-}
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
-if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
-then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
-fi
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-}
- {
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wuninitialized" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wuninitialized... " >&6; }
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wuninitialized"
- _define_flag=""
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wuninitialized"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
- exit(0);
-}
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
-if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
-then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
-fi
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-}
- {
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsign-compare" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsign-compare... " >&6; }
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wsign-compare"
- _define_flag=""
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- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
- exit(0);
-}
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
-if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
-then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
-fi
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-}
- {
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wformat-security" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wformat-security... " >&6; }
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wformat-security"
- _define_flag=""
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wformat-security"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
- exit(0);
-}
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
-if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
-then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
-fi
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-}
- {
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess... " >&6; }
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess"
- _define_flag=""
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
- exit(0);
-}
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
-if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
-then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
-fi
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-}
- {
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-sign" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-sign... " >&6; }
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wpointer-sign"
- _define_flag="-Wno-pointer-sign"
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wpointer-sign"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
- exit(0);
-}
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
-if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
-then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
-fi
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-}
- {
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunused-result" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunused-result... " >&6; }
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wunused-result"
- _define_flag="-Wno-unused-result"
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wunused-result"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
- exit(0);
-}
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
-if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
-then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
-fi
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-}
- {
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -fno-strict-aliasing" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -fno-strict-aliasing... " >&6; }
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -fno-strict-aliasing"
- _define_flag=""
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-fno-strict-aliasing"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
- exit(0);
-}
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
-if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
-then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
-fi
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-}
- {
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2... " >&6; }
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2"
- _define_flag=""
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
- exit(0);
-}
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
-if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
-then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
-fi
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-}
- if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" = "x1"; then
- {
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,relro" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,relro... " >&6; }
- saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,relro"
- _define_flag=""
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,relro"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
- exit(0);
-}
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-}
- {
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,now" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,now... " >&6; }
- saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,now"
- _define_flag=""
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,now"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
- exit(0);
-}
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-}
- {
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,noexecstack" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,noexecstack... " >&6; }
- saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,noexecstack"
- _define_flag=""
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,noexecstack"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
- exit(0);
-}
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-}
- # NB. -ftrapv expects certain support functions to be present in
- # the compiler library (libgcc or similar) to detect integer operations
- # that can overflow. We must check that the result of enabling it
- # actually links. The test program compiled/linked includes a number
- # of integer operations that should exercise this.
- {
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -ftrapv and linking succeeds" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -ftrapv and linking succeeds... " >&6; }
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -ftrapv"
- _define_flag=""
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-ftrapv"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
- exit(0);
-}
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
-
-if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
-then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
-fi
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-}
- fi
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking gcc version" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking gcc version... " >&6; }
- GCC_VER=`$CC -v 2>&1 | $AWK '/gcc version /{print $3}'`
- case $GCC_VER in
- 1.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
- 2.8* | 2.9*)
- no_attrib_nonnull=1
- ;;
- 2.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
- *) ;;
- esac
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $GCC_VER" >&5
-$as_echo "$GCC_VER" >&6; }
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset... " >&6; }
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fno-builtin-memset"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <string.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- char b[10]; memset(b, 0, sizeof(b));
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
- # -fstack-protector-all doesn't always work for some GCC versions
- # and/or platforms, so we test if we can. If it's not supported
- # on a given platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror.
- if test "x$use_stack_protector" = "x1"; then
- for t in -fstack-protector-strong -fstack-protector-all \
- -fstack-protector; do
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports $t" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports $t... " >&6; }
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $t -Werror"
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $t -Werror"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <stdio.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- char x[256];
- snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX");
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $t"
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $t"
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $t works" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $t works... " >&6; }
- if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: cannot test" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: cannot test" >&2;}
- break
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <stdio.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- char x[256];
- snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX");
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- break
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
- done
- fi
-
- if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then
- # retry LLONG_MAX with -std=gnu99, needed on some Linuxes
- unset ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -std=gnu99"
- ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "LLONG_MAX" "ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" "#include <limits.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" = xyes; then :
- have_llong_max=1
-else
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-fi
-
- fi
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types... " >&6; }
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-__attribute__((__unused__)) static void foo(void){return;}
-int
-main ()
-{
- exit(0);
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-if test "x$no_attrib_nonnull" != "x1" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__ 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-
-# Check whether --with-rpath was given.
-if test "${with_rpath+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_rpath;
- if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
- need_dash_r=""
- fi
- if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
- need_dash_r=1
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# Allow user to specify flags
-
-# Check whether --with-cflags was given.
-if test "${with_cflags+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_cflags;
- if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
- test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $withval"
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# Check whether --with-cppflags was given.
-if test "${with_cppflags+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_cppflags;
- if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
- test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $withval"
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# Check whether --with-ldflags was given.
-if test "${with_ldflags+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_ldflags;
- if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
- test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $withval"
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# Check whether --with-libs was given.
-if test "${with_libs+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_libs;
- if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
- test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- LIBS="$LIBS $withval"
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# Check whether --with-Werror was given.
-if test "${with_Werror+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_Werror;
- if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno"; then
- werror_flags="-Werror"
- if test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- werror_flags="$withval"
- fi
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-for ac_header in \
- blf.h \
- bstring.h \
- crypt.h \
- crypto/sha2.h \
- dirent.h \
- endian.h \
- elf.h \
- features.h \
- fcntl.h \
- floatingpoint.h \
- getopt.h \
- glob.h \
- ia.h \
- iaf.h \
- inttypes.h \
- limits.h \
- locale.h \
- login.h \
- maillock.h \
- ndir.h \
- net/if_tun.h \
- netdb.h \
- netgroup.h \
- pam/pam_appl.h \
- paths.h \
- poll.h \
- pty.h \
- readpassphrase.h \
- rpc/types.h \
- security/pam_appl.h \
- sha2.h \
- shadow.h \
- stddef.h \
- stdint.h \
- string.h \
- strings.h \
- sys/audit.h \
- sys/bitypes.h \
- sys/bsdtty.h \
- sys/capability.h \
- sys/cdefs.h \
- sys/dir.h \
- sys/mman.h \
- sys/ndir.h \
- sys/poll.h \
- sys/prctl.h \
- sys/pstat.h \
- sys/select.h \
- sys/stat.h \
- sys/stream.h \
- sys/stropts.h \
- sys/strtio.h \
- sys/statvfs.h \
- sys/sysmacros.h \
- sys/time.h \
- sys/timers.h \
- time.h \
- tmpdir.h \
- ttyent.h \
- ucred.h \
- unistd.h \
- usersec.h \
- util.h \
- utime.h \
- utmp.h \
- utmpx.h \
- vis.h \
-
-do :
- as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-done
-
-
-# lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris
-for ac_header in lastlog.h
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "lastlog.h" "ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" "
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_LASTLOG_H 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-done
-
-
-# sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris
-for ac_header in sys/ptms.h
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/ptms.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_ptms_h" "
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H
-# include <sys/stream.h>
-#endif
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_ptms_h" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-done
-
-
-# login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD
-for ac_header in login_cap.h
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "login_cap.h" "ac_cv_header_login_cap_h" "
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_header_login_cap_h" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-done
-
-
-# older BSDs need sys/param.h before sys/mount.h
-for ac_header in sys/mount.h
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/mount.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_mount_h" "
-#include <sys/param.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_mount_h" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-done
-
-
-# Android requires sys/socket.h to be included before sys/un.h
-for ac_header in sys/un.h
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/un.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_un_h" "
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_un_h" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_SYS_UN_H 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-done
-
-
-# Messages for features tested for in target-specific section
-SIA_MSG="no"
-SPC_MSG="no"
-SP_MSG="no"
-
-# Check for some target-specific stuff
-case "$host" in
-*-*-aix*)
- # Some versions of VAC won't allow macro redefinitions at
- # -qlanglevel=ansi, and autoconf 2.60 sometimes insists on using that
- # particularly with older versions of vac or xlc.
- # It also throws errors about null macro argments, but these are
- # not fatal.
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if compiler allows macro redefinitions" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if compiler allows macro redefinitions... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#define testmacro foo
-#define testmacro bar
-int
-main ()
-{
- exit(0);
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CC="`echo $CC | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
- LD="`echo $LD | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
- CFLAGS="`echo $CFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
- CPPFLAGS="`echo $CPPFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)... " >&6; }
- if (test -z "$blibpath"); then
- blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib"
- fi
- saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
- if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then
- flags="-Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, -blibpath:"
- else
- flags="-blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath,"
- fi
- for tryflags in $flags ;do
- if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $tryflags$blibpath"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- blibflags=$tryflags
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
- fi
- done
- if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
-$as_echo "not found" >&6; }
- as_fn_error $? "*** must be able to specify blibpath on AIX - check config.log" "$LINENO" 5
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $blibflags" >&5
-$as_echo "$blibflags" >&6; }
- fi
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
- ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "authenticate" "ac_cv_func_authenticate"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_authenticate" = xyes; then :
-
-$as_echo "#define WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for authenticate in -ls" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for authenticate in -ls... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-ls $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char authenticate ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return authenticate ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate" = xyes; then :
- $as_echo "#define WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- LIBS="$LIBS -ls"
-
-fi
-
-
-fi
-
- ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "authenticate" "ac_cv_have_decl_authenticate" "#include <usersec.h>
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_authenticate" = xyes; then :
- ac_have_decl=1
-else
- ac_have_decl=0
-fi
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE $ac_have_decl
-_ACEOF
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "loginrestrictions" "ac_cv_have_decl_loginrestrictions" "#include <usersec.h>
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_loginrestrictions" = xyes; then :
- ac_have_decl=1
-else
- ac_have_decl=0
-fi
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS $ac_have_decl
-_ACEOF
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "loginsuccess" "ac_cv_have_decl_loginsuccess" "#include <usersec.h>
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_loginsuccess" = xyes; then :
- ac_have_decl=1
-else
- ac_have_decl=0
-fi
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS $ac_have_decl
-_ACEOF
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "passwdexpired" "ac_cv_have_decl_passwdexpired" "#include <usersec.h>
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_passwdexpired" = xyes; then :
- ac_have_decl=1
-else
- ac_have_decl=0
-fi
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED $ac_have_decl
-_ACEOF
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "setauthdb" "ac_cv_have_decl_setauthdb" "#include <usersec.h>
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_setauthdb" = xyes; then :
- ac_have_decl=1
-else
- ac_have_decl=0
-fi
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB $ac_have_decl
-_ACEOF
-
- ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "loginfailed" "ac_cv_have_decl_loginfailed" "#include <usersec.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_loginfailed" = xyes; then :
- ac_have_decl=1
-else
- ac_have_decl=0
-fi
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED $ac_have_decl
-_ACEOF
-if test $ac_have_decl = 1; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if loginfailed takes 4 arguments" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if loginfailed takes 4 arguments... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <usersec.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- (void)loginfailed("user","host","tty",0);
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
- for ac_func in getgrset setauthdb
-do :
- as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
- ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "F_CLOSEM" "ac_cv_have_decl_F_CLOSEM" " #include <limits.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_F_CLOSEM" = xyes; then :
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
- check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo=1
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_REALPATH 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define PTY_ZEROREAD 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID 2" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
-*-*-android*)
-
-$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
-*-*-cygwin*)
- check_for_libcrypt_later=1
- LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textreadmode.o"
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_CYGWIN 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define DISABLE_SHADOW 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define SSH_IOBUFSZ 65535" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- # Cygwin defines optargs, optargs as declspec(dllimport) for historical
- # reasons which cause compile warnings, so we disable those warnings.
- {
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wno-attributes" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wno-attributes... " >&6; }
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wno-attributes"
- _define_flag=""
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wno-attributes"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
- exit(0);
-}
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
-if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
-then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
-fi
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-}
- ;;
-*-*-dgux*)
-
-$as_echo "#define IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
-*-*-darwin*)
- use_pie=auto
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if we have working getaddrinfo" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if we have working getaddrinfo... " >&6; }
- if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: assume it is working" >&5
-$as_echo "assume it is working" >&6; }
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <mach-o/dyld.h>
-main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
- exit(0);
- else
- exit(1);
-}
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: working" >&5
-$as_echo "working" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: buggy" >&5
-$as_echo "buggy" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
- $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GLOB 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define BIND_8_COMPAT 1
-_ACEOF
-
-
-$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
- ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "AU_IPv4" "ac_cv_have_decl_AU_IPv4" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_AU_IPv4" = xyes; then :
-
-else
-
-$as_echo "#define AU_IPv4 0" >>confdefs.h
-
- #include <bsm/audit.h>
-
-$as_echo "#define LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-fi
-
-
-$as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h
-
- for ac_func in sandbox_init
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "sandbox_init" "ac_cv_func_sandbox_init"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_SANDBOX_INIT 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
- for ac_header in sandbox.h
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "sandbox.h" "ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_SANDBOX_H 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-done
-
- ;;
-*-*-dragonfly*)
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcrypt"
- TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
- ;;
-*-*-haiku*)
- LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd "
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for socket in -lnetwork" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for socket in -lnetwork... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_network_socket+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lnetwork $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char socket ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return socket ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_network_socket=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_network_socket=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_network_socket" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_network_socket" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_network_socket" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_LIBNETWORK 1
-_ACEOF
-
- LIBS="-lnetwork $LIBS"
-
-fi
-
- $as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- MANTYPE=man
- ;;
-*-*-hpux*)
- # first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1"
- IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
- $as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*\"" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_PSTAT" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID 2" >>confdefs.h
-
- maildir="/var/mail"
- LIBS="$LIBS -lsec"
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for t_error in -lxnet" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for t_error in -lxnet... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lxnet $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char t_error ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return t_error ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_LIBXNET 1
-_ACEOF
-
- LIBS="-lxnet $LIBS"
-
-else
- as_fn_error $? "*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5
-fi
-
-
- # next, we define all of the options specific to major releases
- case "$host" in
- *-*-hpux10*)
- if test -z "$GCC"; then
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae"
- fi
- ;;
- *-*-hpux11*)
-
-$as_echo "#define PAM_SUN_CODEBASE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1
- check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1
- ;;
- esac
-
- # lastly, we define options specific to minor releases
- case "$host" in
- *-*-hpux10.26)
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_SECUREWARE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- disable_ptmx_check=yes
- LIBS="$LIBS -lsecpw"
- ;;
- esac
- ;;
-*-*-irix5*)
- PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_INET_NTOA 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
-*-*-irix6*)
- PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
-
-$as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_ARRAY 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_PROJECT 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "jlimit_startjob" "ac_cv_func_jlimit_startjob"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_jlimit_startjob" = xyes; then :
-
-$as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_JOBS 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_INET_NTOA 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_UPDWTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
-*-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu)
- check_for_libcrypt_later=1
- $as_echo "#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX \"!\"" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define _PATH_BTMP \"/var/log/btmp\"" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
-*-*-linux*)
- no_dev_ptmx=1
- use_pie=auto
- check_for_libcrypt_later=1
- check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
-
-$as_echo "#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX \"!\"" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO EPERM" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define _PATH_BTMP \"/var/log/btmp\"" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define LINUX_OOM_ADJUST 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- inet6_default_4in6=yes
- case `uname -r` in
- 1.*|2.0.*)
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
- esac
- # tun(4) forwarding compat code
- for ac_header in linux/if_tun.h
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "linux/if_tun.h" "ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-done
-
- if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_LINUX 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- for ac_header in linux/seccomp.h linux/filter.h linux/audit.h
-do :
- as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "#include <linux/types.h>
-"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-done
-
- for ac_func in prctl
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "prctl" "ac_cv_func_prctl"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_PRCTL 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for seccomp architecture" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for seccomp architecture... " >&6; }
- seccomp_audit_arch=
- case "$host" in
- x86_64-*)
- seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
- ;;
- i*86-*)
- seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386
- ;;
- arm*-*)
- seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
- ;;
- esac
- if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: \"$seccomp_audit_arch\"" >&5
-$as_echo "\"$seccomp_audit_arch\"" >&6; }
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH $seccomp_audit_arch
-_ACEOF
-
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: architecture not supported" >&5
-$as_echo "architecture not supported" >&6; }
- fi
- ;;
-mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
-
-$as_echo "#define NEED_SETPGRP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- SONY=1
- ;;
-*-*-netbsd*)
- check_for_libcrypt_before=1
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- need_dash_r=1
- fi
-
-$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "net/if_tap.h" "ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" = xyes; then :
-
-else
-
-$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_NO_L2 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-
-
-$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_STRNVIS 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
-*-*-freebsd*)
- check_for_libcrypt_later=1
-
-$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX \"*LOCKED*\"" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "net/if_tap.h" "ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" = xyes; then :
-
-else
-
-$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_NO_L2 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GLOB 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_STRNVIS 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
- # Preauth crypto occasionally uses file descriptors for crypto offload
- # and will crash if they cannot be opened.
-
-$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
-*-*-bsdi*)
- $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
-*-next-*)
- conf_lastlog_location="/usr/adm/lastlog"
- conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
- conf_wtmp_location=/usr/adm/wtmp
- maildir=/usr/spool/mail
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_NEXT 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_REALPATH 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
-*-*-openbsd*)
- use_pie=auto
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__ 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__ 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_OPENBSD 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
- ;;
-*-*-solaris*)
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- need_dash_r=1
- fi
- $as_echo "#define PAM_SUN_CODEBASE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h
-
- # Pushing STREAMS modules will cause sshd to acquire a controlling tty.
-
-$as_echo "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- external_path_file=/etc/default/login
- # hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions)
- conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog"
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x... " >&6; }
- sol2ver=`echo "$host"| sed -e 's/.*[0-9]\.//'`
- if test "$sol2ver" -ge 8; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
-
-# Check whether --with-solaris-contracts was given.
-if test "${with_solaris_contracts+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_solaris_contracts;
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ct_tmpl_activate in -lcontract" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ct_tmpl_activate in -lcontract... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lcontract $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char ct_tmpl_activate ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return ct_tmpl_activate ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate" = xyes; then :
-
-$as_echo "#define USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcontract"
- SPC_MSG="yes"
-fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# Check whether --with-solaris-projects was given.
-if test "${with_solaris_projects+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_solaris_projects;
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for setproject in -lproject" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for setproject in -lproject... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_project_setproject+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lproject $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char setproject ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return setproject ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_project_setproject=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_project_setproject=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_project_setproject" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_project_setproject" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_project_setproject" = xyes; then :
-
-$as_echo "#define USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lproject"
- SP_MSG="yes"
-fi
-
-
-fi
-
- TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
- ;;
-*-*-sunos4*)
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4"
- for ac_func in getpwanam
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getpwanam" "ac_cv_func_getpwanam"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpwanam" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_GETPWANAM 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
- $as_echo "#define PAM_SUN_CODEBASE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
- conf_wtmp_location=/var/adm/wtmp
- conf_lastlog_location=/var/adm/lastlog
- $as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
-*-ncr-sysv*)
- LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"
- $as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
-*-sni-sysv*)
- # /usr/ucblib MUST NOT be searched on ReliantUNIX
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for dlsym in -ldl" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for dlsym in -ldl... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-ldl $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char dlsym ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return dlsym ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_LIBDL 1
-_ACEOF
-
- LIBS="-ldl $LIBS"
-
-fi
-
- # -lresolv needs to be at the end of LIBS or DNS lookups break
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for res_query in -lresolv" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for res_query in -lresolv... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lresolv $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char res_query ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return res_query ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query" = xyes; then :
- LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
-fi
-
- IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
- $as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- external_path_file=/etc/default/login
- # /usr/ucblib/libucb.a no longer needed on ReliantUNIX
- # Attention: always take care to bind libsocket and libnsl before libc,
- # otherwise you will find lots of "SIOCGPGRP errno 22" on syslog
- ;;
-# UnixWare 1.x, UnixWare 2.x, and others based on code from Univel.
-*-*-sysv4.2*)
- $as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h
-
- TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
- ;;
-# UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX 8
-*-*-sysv5*)
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -Dvsnprintf=_xvsnprintf -Dsnprintf=_xsnprintf"
-
-$as_echo "#define UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
- case "$host" in
- *-*-sysv5SCO_SV*) # SCO OpenServer 6.x
- maildir=/var/spool/mail
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_LIBIAF 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_UPDWTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for getluid in -lprot" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for getluid in -lprot... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lprot $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char getluid ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return getluid ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid" = xyes; then :
- LIBS="$LIBS -lprot"
- for ac_func in getluid setluid
-do :
- as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
- $as_echo "#define HAVE_SECUREWARE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_SHADOW 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-fi
-
- ;;
- *) $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h
-
- check_for_libcrypt_later=1
- ;;
- esac
- ;;
-*-*-sysv*)
- ;;
-# SCO UNIX and OEM versions of SCO UNIX
-*-*-sco3.2v4*)
- as_fn_error $? "\"This Platform is no longer supported.\"" "$LINENO" 5
- ;;
-# SCO OpenServer 5.x
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- if test -z "$GCC"; then
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- fi
- LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm"
- no_dev_ptmx=1
- $as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define HAVE_SECUREWARE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_SHADOW 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_UPDWTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- for ac_func in getluid setluid
-do :
- as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
- MANTYPE=man
- TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
- SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE=yes
- ;;
-*-*-unicosmk*)
-
-$as_echo "#define NO_SSH_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
- LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lrsc -lshare -luex -lacm"
- MANTYPE=cat
- ;;
-*-*-unicosmp*)
- $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
- LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lacid -ldb"
- MANTYPE=cat
- ;;
-*-*-unicos*)
- $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define NO_SSH_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -Wl,-Dmsglevel=334:fatal"
- LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lrsc -lshare -luex -lacm"
- MANTYPE=cat
- ;;
-*-dec-osf*)
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for Digital Unix SIA" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for Digital Unix SIA... " >&6; }
- no_osfsia=""
-
-# Check whether --with-osfsia was given.
-if test "${with_osfsia+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_osfsia;
- if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: disabled" >&5
-$as_echo "disabled" >&6; }
- no_osfsia=1
- fi
-
-fi
-
- if test -z "$no_osfsia" ; then
- if test -f /etc/sia/matrix.conf; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_OSF_SIA 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define DISABLE_LOGIN 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud"
- SIA_MSG="yes"
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR \"Nologin\"" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- fi
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
-
-*-*-nto-qnx*)
- $as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- enable_etc_default_login=no # has incompatible /etc/default/login
- case "$host" in
- *-*-nto-qnx6*)
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
- esac
- ;;
-
-*-*-ultrix*)
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETGROUPS 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_MMAP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define NEED_SETPGRP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
-
-*-*-lynxos)
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D__NO_INCLUDE_WARN__"
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETVBUF 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
-esac
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking compiler and flags for sanity" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking compiler and flags for sanity... " >&6; }
-if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity" >&2;}
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <stdio.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- exit(0);
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- as_fn_error $? "*** compiler cannot create working executables, check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5
-
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-
-# Checks for libraries.
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "yp_match" "ac_cv_func_yp_match"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_yp_match" = xyes; then :
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for yp_match in -lnsl" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for yp_match in -lnsl... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_nsl_yp_match+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lnsl $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char yp_match ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return yp_match ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_nsl_yp_match=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_nsl_yp_match=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nsl_yp_match" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nsl_yp_match" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nsl_yp_match" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_LIBNSL 1
-_ACEOF
-
- LIBS="-lnsl $LIBS"
-
-fi
-
-fi
-
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setsockopt" "ac_cv_func_setsockopt"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_setsockopt" = xyes; then :
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for setsockopt in -lsocket" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for setsockopt in -lsocket... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lsocket $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char setsockopt ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return setsockopt ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_LIBSOCKET 1
-_ACEOF
-
- LIBS="-lsocket $LIBS"
-
-fi
-
-fi
-
-
-for ac_func in dirname
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "dirname" "ac_cv_func_dirname"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_dirname" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_DIRNAME 1
-_ACEOF
- for ac_header in libgen.h
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "libgen.h" "ac_cv_header_libgen_h" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_header_libgen_h" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_LIBGEN_H 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-done
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for dirname in -lgen" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for dirname in -lgen... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lgen $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char dirname ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return dirname ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname" = xyes; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for broken dirname" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for broken dirname... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_broken_dirname+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- save_LIBS="$LIBS"
- LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
- if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
- ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no"
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <libgen.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- char *s, buf[32];
-
- strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32);
- s = dirname(buf);
- if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) {
- exit(1);
- } else {
- exit(0);
- }
-}
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no"
-else
- ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes"
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
- LIBS="$save_LIBS"
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" >&6; }
- if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then
- LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
- $as_echo "#define HAVE_DIRNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- for ac_header in libgen.h
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "libgen.h" "ac_cv_header_libgen_h" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_header_libgen_h" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_LIBGEN_H 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-done
-
- fi
-
-fi
-
-
-fi
-done
-
-
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getspnam" "ac_cv_func_getspnam"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_getspnam" = xyes; then :
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for getspnam in -lgen" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for getspnam in -lgen... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lgen $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char getspnam ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return getspnam ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam" = xyes; then :
- LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
-fi
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing basename" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for library containing basename... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_search_basename+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char basename ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return basename ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-for ac_lib in '' gen; do
- if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
- ac_res="none required"
- else
- ac_res=-l$ac_lib
- LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
- fi
- if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_search_basename=$ac_res
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext
- if ${ac_cv_search_basename+:} false; then :
- break
-fi
-done
-if ${ac_cv_search_basename+:} false; then :
-
-else
- ac_cv_search_basename=no
-fi
-rm conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_basename" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_basename" >&6; }
-ac_res=$ac_cv_search_basename
-if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
- test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_BASENAME 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-
-
-# Check whether --with-zlib was given.
-if test "${with_zlib+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_zlib; if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
- as_fn_error $? "*** zlib is required ***" "$LINENO" 5
- elif test "x$withval" != "xyes"; then
- if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
- else
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
- fi
- else
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
- else
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
- fi
- fi
- if test -d "$withval/include"; then
- CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
- else
- CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
- fi
- fi
-
-fi
-
-
-ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "zlib.h" "ac_cv_header_zlib_h" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_header_zlib_h" = xyes; then :
-
-else
- as_fn_error $? "*** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for deflate in -lz" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for deflate in -lz... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_z_deflate+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lz $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char deflate ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return deflate ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_z_deflate=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_z_deflate=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_z_deflate" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_z_deflate" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_z_deflate" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_LIBZ 1
-_ACEOF
-
- LIBS="-lz $LIBS"
-
-else
-
- saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
- saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
- save_LIBS="$LIBS"
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib -R/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
- else
- LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
- fi
- CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}"
- LIBS="$LIBS -lz"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char deflate ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return deflate ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- $as_echo "#define HAVE_LIBZ 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-else
-
- as_fn_error $? "*** zlib missing - please install first or check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-
-fi
-
-
-
-# Check whether --with-zlib-version-check was given.
-if test "${with_zlib_version_check+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_zlib_version_check; if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
- zlib_check_nonfatal=1
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for possibly buggy zlib" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for possibly buggy zlib... " >&6; }
-if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking zlib version" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking zlib version" >&2;}
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <zlib.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- int a=0, b=0, c=0, d=0, n, v;
- n = sscanf(ZLIB_VERSION, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &a, &b, &c, &d);
- if (n != 3 && n != 4)
- exit(1);
- v = a*1000000 + b*10000 + c*100 + d;
- fprintf(stderr, "found zlib version %s (%d)\n", ZLIB_VERSION, v);
-
- /* 1.1.4 is OK */
- if (a == 1 && b == 1 && c >= 4)
- exit(0);
-
- /* 1.2.3 and up are OK */
- if (v >= 1020300)
- exit(0);
-
- exit(2);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- if test -z "$zlib_check_nonfatal" ; then
- as_fn_error $? "*** zlib too old - check config.log ***
-Your reported zlib version has known security problems. It's possible your
-vendor has fixed these problems without changing the version number. If you
-are sure this is the case, you can disable the check by running
-\"./configure --without-zlib-version-check\".
-If you are in doubt, upgrade zlib to version 1.2.3 or greater.
-See http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ for details." "$LINENO" 5
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: zlib version may have security problems" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: zlib version may have security problems" >&2;}
- fi
-
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strcasecmp" "ac_cv_func_strcasecmp"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_strcasecmp" = xyes; then :
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for strcasecmp in -lresolv" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for strcasecmp in -lresolv... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lresolv $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char strcasecmp ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return strcasecmp ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp" = xyes; then :
- LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
-fi
-
-
-fi
-
-for ac_func in utimes
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "utimes" "ac_cv_func_utimes"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_utimes" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_UTIMES 1
-_ACEOF
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for utimes in -lc89" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for utimes in -lc89... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lc89 $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char utimes ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return utimes ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" = xyes; then :
- $as_echo "#define HAVE_UTIMES 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"
-fi
-
-
-fi
-done
-
-
-for ac_header in bsd/libutil.h libutil.h
-do :
- as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-done
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing fmt_scaled" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for library containing fmt_scaled... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char fmt_scaled ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return fmt_scaled ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
- if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
- ac_res="none required"
- else
- ac_res=-l$ac_lib
- LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
- fi
- if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled=$ac_res
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext
- if ${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+:} false; then :
- break
-fi
-done
-if ${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+:} false; then :
-
-else
- ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled=no
-fi
-rm conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled" >&6; }
-ac_res=$ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled
-if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
- test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing scan_scaled" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for library containing scan_scaled... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char scan_scaled ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return scan_scaled ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
- if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
- ac_res="none required"
- else
- ac_res=-l$ac_lib
- LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
- fi
- if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_search_scan_scaled=$ac_res
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext
- if ${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+:} false; then :
- break
-fi
-done
-if ${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+:} false; then :
-
-else
- ac_cv_search_scan_scaled=no
-fi
-rm conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_scan_scaled" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_scan_scaled" >&6; }
-ac_res=$ac_cv_search_scan_scaled
-if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
- test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing login" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for library containing login... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_search_login+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char login ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return login ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
- if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
- ac_res="none required"
- else
- ac_res=-l$ac_lib
- LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
- fi
- if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_search_login=$ac_res
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext
- if ${ac_cv_search_login+:} false; then :
- break
-fi
-done
-if ${ac_cv_search_login+:} false; then :
-
-else
- ac_cv_search_login=no
-fi
-rm conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_login" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_login" >&6; }
-ac_res=$ac_cv_search_login
-if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
- test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing logout" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for library containing logout... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_search_logout+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char logout ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return logout ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
- if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
- ac_res="none required"
- else
- ac_res=-l$ac_lib
- LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
- fi
- if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_search_logout=$ac_res
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext
- if ${ac_cv_search_logout+:} false; then :
- break
-fi
-done
-if ${ac_cv_search_logout+:} false; then :
-
-else
- ac_cv_search_logout=no
-fi
-rm conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_logout" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_logout" >&6; }
-ac_res=$ac_cv_search_logout
-if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
- test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing logwtmp" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for library containing logwtmp... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char logwtmp ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return logwtmp ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
- if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
- ac_res="none required"
- else
- ac_res=-l$ac_lib
- LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
- fi
- if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_search_logwtmp=$ac_res
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext
- if ${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+:} false; then :
- break
-fi
-done
-if ${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+:} false; then :
-
-else
- ac_cv_search_logwtmp=no
-fi
-rm conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_logwtmp" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_logwtmp" >&6; }
-ac_res=$ac_cv_search_logwtmp
-if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
- test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing openpty" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for library containing openpty... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_search_openpty+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char openpty ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return openpty ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
- if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
- ac_res="none required"
- else
- ac_res=-l$ac_lib
- LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
- fi
- if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_search_openpty=$ac_res
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext
- if ${ac_cv_search_openpty+:} false; then :
- break
-fi
-done
-if ${ac_cv_search_openpty+:} false; then :
-
-else
- ac_cv_search_openpty=no
-fi
-rm conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_openpty" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_openpty" >&6; }
-ac_res=$ac_cv_search_openpty
-if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
- test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing updwtmp" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for library containing updwtmp... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char updwtmp ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return updwtmp ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
- if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
- ac_res="none required"
- else
- ac_res=-l$ac_lib
- LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
- fi
- if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_search_updwtmp=$ac_res
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext
- if ${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+:} false; then :
- break
-fi
-done
-if ${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+:} false; then :
-
-else
- ac_cv_search_updwtmp=no
-fi
-rm conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_updwtmp" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_updwtmp" >&6; }
-ac_res=$ac_cv_search_updwtmp
-if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
- test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
-
-fi
-
-for ac_func in fmt_scaled scan_scaled login logout openpty updwtmp logwtmp
-do :
- as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
-
-# On some platforms, inet_ntop may be found in libresolv or libnsl.
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing inet_ntop" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for library containing inet_ntop... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char inet_ntop ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return inet_ntop ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-for ac_lib in '' resolv nsl; do
- if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
- ac_res="none required"
- else
- ac_res=-l$ac_lib
- LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
- fi
- if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_search_inet_ntop=$ac_res
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext
- if ${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+:} false; then :
- break
-fi
-done
-if ${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+:} false; then :
-
-else
- ac_cv_search_inet_ntop=no
-fi
-rm conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_inet_ntop" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_inet_ntop" >&6; }
-ac_res=$ac_cv_search_inet_ntop
-if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
- test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
-
-fi
-
-
-for ac_func in strftime
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strftime" "ac_cv_func_strftime"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_strftime" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_STRFTIME 1
-_ACEOF
-
-else
- # strftime is in -lintl on SCO UNIX.
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for strftime in -lintl" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for strftime in -lintl... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lintl $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char strftime ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return strftime ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" = xyes; then :
- $as_echo "#define HAVE_STRFTIME 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-LIBS="-lintl $LIBS"
-fi
-
-fi
-done
-
-
-# Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support... " >&6; }
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
- #include <glob.h>
- #ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC
- FOUNDIT
- #endif
-
-_ACEOF
-if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
- $EGREP "FOUNDIT" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
-
-
-$as_echo "#define GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-
-fi
-rm -f conftest*
-
-
-# Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gl_matchc field in glob_t" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for gl_matchc field in glob_t... " >&6; }
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <glob.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
-
-$as_echo "#define GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-# Check for g.gl_statv glob() extension
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob... " >&6; }
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <glob.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
-
-#ifndef GLOB_KEEPSTAT
-#error "glob does not support GLOB_KEEPSTAT extension"
-#endif
-glob_t g;
-g.gl_statv = NULL;
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
-
-$as_echo "#define GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "GLOB_NOMATCH" "ac_cv_have_decl_GLOB_NOMATCH" "#include <glob.h>
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_GLOB_NOMATCH" = xyes; then :
- ac_have_decl=1
-else
- ac_have_decl=0
-fi
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH $ac_have_decl
-_ACEOF
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name... " >&6; }
-if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME" >&2;}
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <dirent.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- struct dirent d;
- exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char));
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for /proc/pid/fd directory" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for /proc/pid/fd directory... " >&6; }
-if test -d "/proc/$$/fd" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_PROC_PID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-# Check whether user wants S/Key support
-SKEY_MSG="no"
-
-# Check whether --with-skey was given.
-if test "${with_skey+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_skey;
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
-
- if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
- fi
-
-
-$as_echo "#define SKEY 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- LIBS="-lskey $LIBS"
- SKEY_MSG="yes"
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for s/key support" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for s/key support... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <skey.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- char *ff = skey_keyinfo(""); ff="";
- exit(0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- as_fn_error $? "** Incomplete or missing s/key libraries." "$LINENO" 5
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if skeychallenge takes 4 arguments" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if skeychallenge takes 4 arguments... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <skey.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- (void)skeychallenge(NULL,"name","",0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define SKEYCHALLENGE_4ARG 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support
-TCPW_MSG="no"
-
-# Check whether --with-tcp-wrappers was given.
-if test "${with_tcp_wrappers+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_tcp_wrappers;
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
- saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
- saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
- if test -n "${withval}" && \
- test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
- else
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
- fi
- else
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
- else
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
- fi
- fi
- if test -d "${withval}/include"; then
- CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
- else
- CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
- fi
- fi
- LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS"
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for libwrap" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for libwrap... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <tcpd.h>
-int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0;
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- hosts_access(0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define LIBWRAP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lwrap"
- TCPW_MSG="yes"
-
-else
-
- as_fn_error $? "*** libwrap missing" "$LINENO" 5
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
- LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# Check whether user wants to use ldns
-LDNS_MSG="no"
-
-# Check whether --with-ldns was given.
-if test "${with_ldns+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_ldns;
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
-
- if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
- fi
-
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_LDNS 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
- LDNS_MSG="yes"
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ldns support" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ldns support... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
-#include <ldns/ldns.h>
-int main() { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); status=LDNS_STATUS_OK; exit(0); }
-
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- as_fn_error $? "** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries." "$LINENO" 5
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# Check whether user wants libedit support
-LIBEDIT_MSG="no"
-
-# Check whether --with-libedit was given.
-if test "${with_libedit+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_libedit; if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
- if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
- # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $PKGCONFIG in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG="$PKGCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-PKGCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG
-if test -n "$PKGCONFIG"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PKGCONFIG" >&5
-$as_echo "$PKGCONFIG" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-fi
-if test -z "$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG"; then
- ac_pt_PKGCONFIG=$PKGCONFIG
- # Extract the first word of "pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy pkg-config; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $ac_pt_PKGCONFIG in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG="$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-ac_pt_PKGCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG
-if test -n "$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
- if test "x$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" = x; then
- PKGCONFIG="no"
- else
- case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
-yes:)
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
-ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
-esac
- PKGCONFIG=$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG
- fi
-else
- PKGCONFIG="$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG"
-fi
-
- if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit... " >&6; }
- if "$PKGCONFIG" libedit; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- use_pkgconfig_for_libedit=yes
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
- fi
- else
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
- else
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
- fi
- fi
- if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libedit" = "xyes"; then
- LIBEDIT=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libedit`
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libedit`"
- else
- LIBEDIT="-ledit -lcurses"
- fi
- OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBEDIT | sed 's/-ledit//'`
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for el_init in -ledit" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for el_init in -ledit... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-ledit $OTHERLIBS
- $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char el_init ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return el_init ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init" = xyes; then :
-
-$as_echo "#define USE_LIBEDIT 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- LIBEDIT_MSG="yes"
-
-
-else
- as_fn_error $? "libedit not found" "$LINENO" 5
-fi
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if libedit version is compatible" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if libedit version is compatible... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <histedit.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- int i = H_SETSIZE;
- el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL);
- exit(0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- as_fn_error $? "libedit version is not compatible" "$LINENO" 5
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
- fi
-
-fi
-
-
-AUDIT_MODULE=none
-
-# Check whether --with-audit was given.
-if test "${with_audit+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_audit;
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for supported audit module" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for supported audit module... " >&6; }
- case "$withval" in
- bsm)
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: bsm" >&5
-$as_echo "bsm" >&6; }
- AUDIT_MODULE=bsm
- for ac_header in bsm/audit.h
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "bsm/audit.h" "ac_cv_header_bsm_audit_h" "
-#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
-# include <time.h>
-#endif
-
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_header_bsm_audit_h" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_BSM_AUDIT_H 1
-_ACEOF
-
-else
- as_fn_error $? "BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found" "$LINENO" 5
-fi
-
-done
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for getaudit in -lbsm" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for getaudit in -lbsm... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lbsm $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char getaudit ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return getaudit ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_LIBBSM 1
-_ACEOF
-
- LIBS="-lbsm $LIBS"
-
-else
- as_fn_error $? "BSM enabled and required library not found" "$LINENO" 5
-fi
-
- for ac_func in getaudit
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getaudit" "ac_cv_func_getaudit"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaudit" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_GETAUDIT 1
-_ACEOF
-
-else
- as_fn_error $? "BSM enabled and required function not found" "$LINENO" 5
-fi
-done
-
- # These are optional
- for ac_func in getaudit_addr aug_get_machine
-do :
- as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
-
-$as_echo "#define USE_BSM_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- if test "$sol2ver" -ge 11; then
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lscf"
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_BSM_API 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- ;;
- linux)
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: linux" >&5
-$as_echo "linux" >&6; }
- AUDIT_MODULE=linux
- for ac_header in libaudit.h
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "libaudit.h" "ac_cv_header_libaudit_h" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_header_libaudit_h" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_LIBAUDIT_H 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-done
-
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit"
-
-$as_echo "#define USE_LINUX_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
- debug)
- AUDIT_MODULE=debug
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: debug" >&5
-$as_echo "debug" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
- no)
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- ;;
- *)
- as_fn_error $? "Unknown audit module $withval" "$LINENO" 5
- ;;
- esac
-
-fi
-
-
-
-# Check whether --with-pie was given.
-if test "${with_pie+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_pie;
- if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
- use_pie=no
- fi
- if test "x$withval" = "xyes"; then
- use_pie=yes
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-if test "x$use_pie" = "x"; then
- use_pie=no
-fi
-if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" != "x1" && test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
- # Turn off automatic PIE when toolchain hardening is off.
- use_pie=no
-fi
-if test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
- # Automatic PIE requires gcc >= 4.x
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gcc >= 4.x" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for gcc >= 4.x... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#if !defined(__GNUC__) || __GNUC__ < 4
-#error gcc is too old
-#endif
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- use_pie=no
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then
- SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- SAVED_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
- {
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -fPIE" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -fPIE... " >&6; }
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -fPIE"
- _define_flag=""
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-fPIE"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
- exit(0);
-}
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
-if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
-then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
-fi
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-}
- {
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -pie" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if $LD supports link flag -pie... " >&6; }
- saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -pie"
- _define_flag=""
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-pie"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
- exit(0);
-}
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-}
- # We use both -fPIE and -pie or neither.
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported... " >&6; }
- if echo "x $CFLAGS" | grep ' -fPIE' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
- echo "x $LDFLAGS" | grep ' -pie' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS"
- LDFLAGS="$SAVED_LDFLAGS"
- fi
-fi
-
-for ac_func in \
- Blowfish_initstate \
- Blowfish_expandstate \
- Blowfish_expand0state \
- Blowfish_stream2word \
- arc4random \
- arc4random_buf \
- arc4random_stir \
- arc4random_uniform \
- asprintf \
- b64_ntop \
- __b64_ntop \
- b64_pton \
- __b64_pton \
- bcopy \
- bcrypt_pbkdf \
- bindresvport_sa \
- blf_enc \
- cap_rights_limit \
- clock \
- closefrom \
- dirfd \
- endgrent \
- explicit_bzero \
- fchmod \
- fchown \
- freeaddrinfo \
- fstatfs \
- fstatvfs \
- futimes \
- getaddrinfo \
- getcwd \
- getgrouplist \
- getnameinfo \
- getopt \
- getpeereid \
- getpeerucred \
- getpgid \
- getpgrp \
- _getpty \
- getrlimit \
- getttyent \
- glob \
- group_from_gid \
- inet_aton \
- inet_ntoa \
- inet_ntop \
- innetgr \
- login_getcapbool \
- mblen \
- md5_crypt \
- memmove \
- mkdtemp \
- mmap \
- ngetaddrinfo \
- nsleep \
- ogetaddrinfo \
- openlog_r \
- poll \
- prctl \
- pstat \
- readpassphrase \
- realpath \
- recvmsg \
- rresvport_af \
- sendmsg \
- setdtablesize \
- setegid \
- setenv \
- seteuid \
- setgroupent \
- setgroups \
- setlinebuf \
- setlogin \
- setpassent\
- setpcred \
- setproctitle \
- setregid \
- setreuid \
- setrlimit \
- setsid \
- setvbuf \
- sigaction \
- sigvec \
- snprintf \
- socketpair \
- statfs \
- statvfs \
- strdup \
- strerror \
- strlcat \
- strlcpy \
- strmode \
- strnlen \
- strnvis \
- strptime \
- strtonum \
- strtoll \
- strtoul \
- strtoull \
- swap32 \
- sysconf \
- tcgetpgrp \
- timingsafe_bcmp \
- truncate \
- unsetenv \
- updwtmpx \
- user_from_uid \
- usleep \
- vasprintf \
- vhangup \
- vsnprintf \
- waitpid \
-
-do :
- as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
-
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <ctype.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- return (isblank('a'));
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_ISBLANK 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-# PKCS#11 support requires dlopen() and co
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing dlopen" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for library containing dlopen... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_search_dlopen+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char dlopen ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return dlopen ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-for ac_lib in '' dl; do
- if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
- ac_res="none required"
- else
- ac_res=-l$ac_lib
- LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
- fi
- if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_search_dlopen=$ac_res
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext
- if ${ac_cv_search_dlopen+:} false; then :
- break
-fi
-done
-if ${ac_cv_search_dlopen+:} false; then :
-
-else
- ac_cv_search_dlopen=no
-fi
-rm conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_dlopen" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_dlopen" >&6; }
-ac_res=$ac_cv_search_dlopen
-if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
- test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
-
-$as_echo "#define ENABLE_PKCS11 /**/" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror()
-for ac_func in gai_strerror
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "gai_strerror" "ac_cv_func_gai_strerror"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_gai_strerror" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_GAI_STRERROR 1
-_ACEOF
-
- $as_echo "#define HAVE_GAI_STRERROR 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-
-const char *gai_strerror(int);
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- char *str;
- str = gai_strerror(0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-done
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing nanosleep" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for library containing nanosleep... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_search_nanosleep+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char nanosleep ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return nanosleep ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-for ac_lib in '' rt posix4; do
- if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
- ac_res="none required"
- else
- ac_res=-l$ac_lib
- LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
- fi
- if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_search_nanosleep=$ac_res
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext
- if ${ac_cv_search_nanosleep+:} false; then :
- break
-fi
-done
-if ${ac_cv_search_nanosleep+:} false; then :
-
-else
- ac_cv_search_nanosleep=no
-fi
-rm conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_nanosleep" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_nanosleep" >&6; }
-ac_res=$ac_cv_search_nanosleep
-if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
- test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_NANOSLEEP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing clock_gettime" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for library containing clock_gettime... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_search_clock_gettime+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char clock_gettime ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return clock_gettime ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-for ac_lib in '' rt; do
- if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
- ac_res="none required"
- else
- ac_res=-l$ac_lib
- LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
- fi
- if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_search_clock_gettime=$ac_res
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext
- if ${ac_cv_search_clock_gettime+:} false; then :
- break
-fi
-done
-if ${ac_cv_search_clock_gettime+:} false; then :
-
-else
- ac_cv_search_clock_gettime=no
-fi
-rm conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_clock_gettime" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_clock_gettime" >&6; }
-ac_res=$ac_cv_search_clock_gettime
-if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
- test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "getrusage" "ac_cv_have_decl_getrusage" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_getrusage" = xyes; then :
- for ac_func in getrusage
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getrusage" "ac_cv_func_getrusage"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_getrusage" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_GETRUSAGE 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
-fi
-
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "strsep" "ac_cv_have_decl_strsep" "
-#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
-# include <string.h>
-#endif
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_strsep" = xyes; then :
- for ac_func in strsep
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strsep" "ac_cv_func_strsep"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_strsep" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_STRSEP 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
-fi
-
-
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "tcsendbreak" "ac_cv_have_decl_tcsendbreak" "#include <termios.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_tcsendbreak" = xyes; then :
- $as_echo "#define HAVE_TCSENDBREAK 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-else
- for ac_func in tcsendbreak
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "tcsendbreak" "ac_cv_func_tcsendbreak"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_tcsendbreak" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_TCSENDBREAK 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
-fi
-
-
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "h_errno" "ac_cv_have_decl_h_errno" "#include <netdb.h>
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_h_errno" = xyes; then :
- ac_have_decl=1
-else
- ac_have_decl=0
-fi
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO $ac_have_decl
-_ACEOF
-
-
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "SHUT_RD" "ac_cv_have_decl_SHUT_RD" "
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_SHUT_RD" = xyes; then :
- ac_have_decl=1
-else
- ac_have_decl=0
-fi
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD $ac_have_decl
-_ACEOF
-
-
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "O_NONBLOCK" "ac_cv_have_decl_O_NONBLOCK" "
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
-# include <sys/stat.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
-# include <fcntl.h>
-#endif
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_O_NONBLOCK" = xyes; then :
- ac_have_decl=1
-else
- ac_have_decl=0
-fi
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK $ac_have_decl
-_ACEOF
-
-
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "writev" "ac_cv_have_decl_writev" "
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_writev" = xyes; then :
- ac_have_decl=1
-else
- ac_have_decl=0
-fi
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_DECL_WRITEV $ac_have_decl
-_ACEOF
-
-
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "MAXSYMLINKS" "ac_cv_have_decl_MAXSYMLINKS" "
-#include <sys/param.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_MAXSYMLINKS" = xyes; then :
- ac_have_decl=1
-else
- ac_have_decl=0
-fi
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS $ac_have_decl
-_ACEOF
-
-
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "offsetof" "ac_cv_have_decl_offsetof" "
-#include <stddef.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_offsetof" = xyes; then :
- ac_have_decl=1
-else
- ac_have_decl=0
-fi
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF $ac_have_decl
-_ACEOF
-
-
-# extra bits for select(2)
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "howmany" "ac_cv_have_decl_howmany" "
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
-#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
-#include <sys/select.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-#include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
-#include <unistd.h>
-#endif
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_howmany" = xyes; then :
- ac_have_decl=1
-else
- ac_have_decl=0
-fi
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY $ac_have_decl
-_ACEOF
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "NFDBITS" "ac_cv_have_decl_NFDBITS" "
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
-#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
-#include <sys/select.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-#include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
-#include <unistd.h>
-#endif
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_NFDBITS" = xyes; then :
- ac_have_decl=1
-else
- ac_have_decl=0
-fi
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS $ac_have_decl
-_ACEOF
-
-ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fd_mask" "ac_cv_type_fd_mask" "
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
-#include <sys/select.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-#include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
-#include <unistd.h>
-#endif
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_type_fd_mask" = xyes; then :
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_FD_MASK 1
-_ACEOF
-
-
-fi
-
-
-for ac_func in setresuid
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setresuid" "ac_cv_func_setresuid"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_setresuid" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_SETRESUID 1
-_ACEOF
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if setresuid seems to work" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if setresuid seems to work... " >&6; }
- if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&2;}
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- errno=0;
- setresuid(0,0,0);
- if (errno==ENOSYS)
- exit(1);
- else
- exit(0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETRESUID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not implemented" >&5
-$as_echo "not implemented" >&6; }
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-
-fi
-done
-
-
-for ac_func in setresgid
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setresgid" "ac_cv_func_setresgid"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_setresgid" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_SETRESGID 1
-_ACEOF
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if setresgid seems to work" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if setresgid seems to work... " >&6; }
- if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&2;}
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- errno=0;
- setresgid(0,0,0);
- if (errno==ENOSYS)
- exit(1);
- else
- exit(0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETRESGID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not implemented" >&5
-$as_echo "not implemented" >&6; }
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-
-fi
-done
-
-
-for ac_func in gettimeofday time
-do :
- as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
-for ac_func in endutent getutent getutid getutline pututline setutent
-do :
- as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
-for ac_func in utmpname
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "utmpname" "ac_cv_func_utmpname"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_utmpname" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_UTMPNAME 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
-for ac_func in endutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline getutxuser pututxline
-do :
- as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
-for ac_func in setutxdb setutxent utmpxname
-do :
- as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
-for ac_func in getlastlogxbyname
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getlastlogxbyname" "ac_cv_func_getlastlogxbyname"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_getlastlogxbyname" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
-
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "daemon" "ac_cv_func_daemon"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_daemon" = xyes; then :
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_DAEMON 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for daemon in -lbsd" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for daemon in -lbsd... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lbsd $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char daemon ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return daemon ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon" = xyes; then :
- LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd"; $as_echo "#define HAVE_DAEMON 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getpagesize" "ac_cv_func_getpagesize"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpagesize" = xyes; then :
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_GETPAGESIZE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for getpagesize in -lucb" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for getpagesize in -lucb... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lucb $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char getpagesize ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return getpagesize ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize" = xyes; then :
- LIBS="$LIBS -lucb"; $as_echo "#define HAVE_GETPAGESIZE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# Check for broken snprintf
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings... " >&6; }
- if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&2;}
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <stdio.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- char b[5];
- snprintf(b,5,"123456789");
- exit(b[4]!='\0');
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: ****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: ****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&2;}
-
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-fi
-
-# If we don't have a working asprintf, then we strongly depend on vsnprintf
-# returning the right thing on overflow: the number of characters it tried to
-# create (as per SUSv3)
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_asprintf" != "xyes" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow... " >&6; }
- if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()" >&2;}
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-int x_snprintf(char *str,size_t count,const char *fmt,...)
-{
- size_t ret; va_list ap;
- va_start(ap, fmt); ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap); va_end(ap);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- char x[1];
- exit(x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) == 11 ? 0 : 1);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: ****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: ****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&2;}
-
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-fi
-
-# On systems where [v]snprintf is broken, but is declared in stdio,
-# check that the fmt argument is const char * or just char *.
-# This is only useful for when BROKEN_SNPRINTF
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt... " >&6; }
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-int snprintf(char *a, size_t b, const char *c, ...) { return 0; }
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- snprintf(0, 0, 0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define SNPRINTF_CONST const" >>confdefs.h
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- $as_echo "#define SNPRINTF_CONST /* not const */" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-# Check for missing getpeereid (or equiv) support
-NO_PEERCHECK=""
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeereid" != "xyes" -a "x$ac_cv_func_getpeerucred" != "xyes"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
-int i = SO_PEERCRED;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_SO_PEERCRED 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- NO_PEERCHECK=1
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_mkdtemp" = "xyes" ; then
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for (overly) strict mkstemp" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for (overly) strict mkstemp... " >&6; }
-if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- $as_echo "#define HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test";
- if (mkstemp(template) == -1)
- exit(1);
- unlink(template);
- exit(0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-fi
-
-if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if openpty correctly handles controlling tty" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if openpty correctly handles controlling tty... " >&6; }
- if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&5
-$as_echo "cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&6; }
-
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <sys/fcntl.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- pid_t pid;
- int fd, ptyfd, ttyfd, status;
-
- pid = fork();
- if (pid < 0) { /* failed */
- exit(1);
- } else if (pid > 0) { /* parent */
- waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
- if (WIFEXITED(status))
- exit(WEXITSTATUS(status));
- else
- exit(2);
- } else { /* child */
- close(0); close(1); close(2);
- setsid();
- openpty(&ptyfd, &ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
- if (fd >= 0)
- exit(3); /* Acquired ctty: broken */
- else
- exit(0); /* Did not acquire ctty: OK */
- }
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- $as_echo "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-fi
-
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
- test "x$check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if getaddrinfo seems to work" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if getaddrinfo seems to work... " >&6; }
- if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&5
-$as_echo "cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&6; }
-
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-
-#define TEST_PORT "2222"
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- int err, sock;
- struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
- char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
-
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
-
- err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
- if (err != 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
- exit(1);
- }
-
- for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
- continue;
-
- err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
- sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
- NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
-
- if (err != 0) {
- if (err == EAI_SYSTEM)
- perror("getnameinfo EAI_SYSTEM");
- else
- fprintf(stderr, "getnameinfo failed: %s\n",
- gai_strerror(err));
- exit(2);
- }
-
- sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
- if (sock < 0)
- perror("socket");
- if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
- if (errno == EBADF)
- exit(3);
- }
- }
- exit(0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-fi
-
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
- test "x$check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if getaddrinfo seems to work" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if getaddrinfo seems to work... " >&6; }
- if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: cross-compiling, assuming no" >&5
-$as_echo "cross-compiling, assuming no" >&6; }
-
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-
-#define TEST_PORT "2222"
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- int err, sock;
- struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
- char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
-
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
-
- err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
- if (err != 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
- exit(1);
- }
-
- for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
- continue;
-
- err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
- sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
- NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
-
- if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET && err != 0) {
- perror("getnameinfo");
- exit(2);
- }
- }
- exit(0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-fi
-
-if test "x$check_for_conflicting_getspnam" = "x1"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <shadow.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- exit(0);
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether getpgrp requires zero arguments" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether getpgrp requires zero arguments... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_func_getpgrp_void+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- # Use it with a single arg.
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-$ac_includes_default
-int
-main ()
-{
-getpgrp (0);
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_func_getpgrp_void=no
-else
- ac_cv_func_getpgrp_void=yes
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_func_getpgrp_void" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_func_getpgrp_void" >&6; }
-if test $ac_cv_func_getpgrp_void = yes; then
-
-$as_echo "#define GETPGRP_VOID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-
-# Search for OpenSSL
-saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
-saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
-
-# Check whether --with-ssl-dir was given.
-if test "${with_ssl_dir+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_ssl_dir;
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- case "$withval" in
- # Relative paths
- ./*|../*) withval="`pwd`/$withval"
- esac
- if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
- else
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
- fi
- elif test -d "$withval/lib64"; then
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 -R${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
- else
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
- fi
- else
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
- else
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
- fi
- fi
- if test -d "$withval/include"; then
- CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
- else
- CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
- fi
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-LIBS="-lcrypto $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char RAND_add ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return RAND_add ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-else
-
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/ssl/lib -R/usr/local/ssl/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
- else
- LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/ssl/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
- fi
- CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/ssl/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}"
- ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "openssl/opensslv.h" "ac_cv_header_openssl_opensslv_h" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_header_openssl_opensslv_h" = xyes; then :
-
-else
- as_fn_error $? "*** OpenSSL headers missing - please install first or check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5
-fi
-
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char RAND_add ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return RAND_add ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- $as_echo "#define HAVE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-else
-
- as_fn_error $? "*** Can't find recent OpenSSL libcrypto (see config.log for details) ***" "$LINENO" 5
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-# Determine OpenSSL header version
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking OpenSSL header version" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking OpenSSL header version... " >&6; }
-if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;}
-
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-#define DATA "conftest.sslincver"
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- FILE *fd;
- int rc;
-
- fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
- if(fd == NULL)
- exit(1);
-
- if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%x (%s)\n", OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) <0)
- exit(1);
-
- exit(0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
-
- ssl_header_ver=`cat conftest.sslincver`
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ssl_header_ver" >&5
-$as_echo "$ssl_header_ver" >&6; }
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
-$as_echo "not found" >&6; }
- as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL version header not found." "$LINENO" 5
-
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-
-# Determine OpenSSL library version
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking OpenSSL library version" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking OpenSSL library version... " >&6; }
-if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;}
-
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#define DATA "conftest.ssllibver"
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- FILE *fd;
- int rc;
-
- fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
- if(fd == NULL)
- exit(1);
-
- if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%x (%s)\n", SSLeay(), SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION))) <0)
- exit(1);
-
- exit(0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
-
- ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver`
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ssl_library_ver" >&5
-$as_echo "$ssl_library_ver" >&6; }
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
-$as_echo "not found" >&6; }
- as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL library not found." "$LINENO" 5
-
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-
-
-# Check whether --with-openssl-header-check was given.
-if test "${with_openssl_header_check+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_openssl_header_check; if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
- openssl_check_nonfatal=1
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# Sanity check OpenSSL headers
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL's headers match the library" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL's headers match the library... " >&6; }
-if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;}
-
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- exit(SSLeay() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- if test "x$openssl_check_nonfatal" = "x"; then
- as_fn_error $? "Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
-library. Check config.log for details.
-If you are sure your installation is consistent, you can disable the check
-by running \"./configure --without-openssl-header-check\".
-Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.
-" "$LINENO" 5
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
-library. Check config.log for details.
-Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches." >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
-library. Check config.log for details.
-Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches." >&2;}
- fi
-
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if programs using OpenSSL functions will link" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if programs using OpenSSL functions will link... " >&6; }
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
- LIBS="$LIBS -ldl"
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-for ac_func in \
- BN_is_prime_ex \
- DSA_generate_parameters_ex \
- EVP_DigestInit_ex \
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex \
- EVP_MD_CTX_init \
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup \
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex \
- HMAC_CTX_init \
- RSA_generate_key_ex \
- RSA_get_default_method \
-
-do :
- as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
-
-
-# Check whether --with-ssl-engine was given.
-if test "${with_ssl_engine+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_ssl_engine; if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for OpenSSL ENGINE support" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for OpenSSL ENGINE support... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
- ENGINE_register_all_complete();
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-else
- as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL ENGINE support not found" "$LINENO" 5
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
- fi
-
-fi
-
-
-# Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support... " >&6; }
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-# Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*ctr
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP... " >&6; }
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- exit(EVP_aes_128_ctr() == NULL ||
- EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL ||
- EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-# Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*gcm
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP... " >&6; }
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- exit(EVP_aes_128_gcm() == NULL ||
- EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL ||
- EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED == 0 ||
- EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN == 0 ||
- EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG == 0 ||
- EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG == 0 ||
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(NULL, 0, 0, NULL) == 0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_cipers \
- aes128-gcm at openssh.com aes256-gcm at openssh.com"
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for library containing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-for ac_lib in '' crypto; do
- if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
- ac_res="none required"
- else
- ac_res=-l$ac_lib
- LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
- fi
- if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl=$ac_res
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext
- if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl+:} false; then :
- break
-fi
-done
-if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl+:} false; then :
-
-else
- ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl=no
-fi
-rm conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl" >&6; }
-ac_res=$ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl
-if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
- test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int... " >&6; }
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0))
- exit(0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-# Some systems want crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the version in OpenSSL,
-# because the system crypt() is more featureful.
-if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_before" = "x1"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char crypt ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return crypt ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_LIBCRYPT 1
-_ACEOF
-
- LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS"
-
-fi
-
-fi
-
-# Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the
-# version in OpenSSL.
-if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char crypt ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return crypt ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" = xyes; then :
- LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"
-fi
-
-fi
-for ac_func in crypt DES_crypt
-do :
- as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
-
-# Search for SHA256 support in libc and/or OpenSSL
-for ac_func in SHA256_Update EVP_sha256
-do :
- as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-else
- unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
- hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512 \
- diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 \
- hmac-sha2-256-etm at openssh.com hmac-sha2-512-etm at openssh.com"
-
-
-fi
-done
-
-
-# Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1... " >&6; }
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */
-# error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code"
-#endif
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
- const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- enable_nistp256=1
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1... " >&6; }
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */
-# error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code"
-#endif
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1);
- const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- enable_nistp384=1
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1... " >&6; }
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */
-# error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code"
-#endif
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
- const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional... " >&6; }
- if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross-compiling: assuming yes" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross-compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
- enable_nistp521=1
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
- const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
- exit(e == NULL || m == NULL);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- enable_nistp521=1
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-COMMENT_OUT_ECC="#no ecc#"
-TEST_SSH_ECC=no
-
-if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1 || test x$enable_nistp384 = x1 || \
- test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
-
-$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_ECC 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1; then
-
-$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
- COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
-else
- unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 \
- ecdh-sha2-nistp256 ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
-fi
-if test x$enable_nistp384 = x1; then
-
-$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
- COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
-else
- unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \
- ecdh-sha2-nistp384 ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
-fi
-if test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
-
-$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
- COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
-else
- unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms ecdh-sha2-nistp521 \
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
-fi
-
-
-
-
-saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ia_openinfo in -liaf" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ia_openinfo in -liaf... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-liaf $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char ia_openinfo ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return ia_openinfo ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" = xyes; then :
-
- LIBS="$LIBS -liaf"
- for ac_func in set_id
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "set_id" "ac_cv_func_set_id"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_set_id" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_SET_ID 1
-_ACEOF
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -liaf"
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_LIBIAF 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-fi
-done
-
-
-fi
-
-LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
-
-### Configure cryptographic random number support
-
-# Check wheter OpenSSL seeds itself
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded... " >&6; }
-if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
- # This is safe, since we will fatal() at runtime if
- # OpenSSL is not seeded correctly.
- OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
-
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
-
- OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-
-# PRNGD TCP socket
-
-# Check whether --with-prngd-port was given.
-if test "${with_prngd_port+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_prngd_port;
- case "$withval" in
- no)
- withval=""
- ;;
- [0-9]*)
- ;;
- *)
- as_fn_error $? "You must specify a numeric port number for --with-prngd-port" "$LINENO" 5
- ;;
- esac
- if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
- PRNGD_PORT="$withval"
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define PRNGD_PORT $PRNGD_PORT
-_ACEOF
-
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# PRNGD Unix domain socket
-
-# Check whether --with-prngd-socket was given.
-if test "${with_prngd_socket+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_prngd_socket;
- case "$withval" in
- yes)
- withval="/var/run/egd-pool"
- ;;
- no)
- withval=""
- ;;
- /*)
- ;;
- *)
- as_fn_error $? "You must specify an absolute path to the entropy socket" "$LINENO" 5
- ;;
- esac
-
- if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
- if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
- as_fn_error $? "You may not specify both a PRNGD/EGD port and socket" "$LINENO" 5
- fi
- if test ! -r "$withval" ; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Entropy socket is not readable" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Entropy socket is not readable" >&2;}
- fi
- PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval"
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define PRNGD_SOCKET "$PRNGD_SOCKET"
-_ACEOF
-
- fi
-
-else
-
- # Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already
- if test "x$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" != "xyes" ; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PRNGD/EGD socket" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for PRNGD/EGD socket... " >&6; }
- # Insert other locations here
- for sock in /var/run/egd-pool /dev/egd-pool /etc/entropy; do
- if test -r $sock && $TEST_MINUS_S_SH -c "test -S $sock -o -p $sock" ; then
- PRNGD_SOCKET="$sock"
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define PRNGD_SOCKET "$PRNGD_SOCKET"
-_ACEOF
-
- break;
- fi
- done
- if test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PRNGD_SOCKET" >&5
-$as_echo "$PRNGD_SOCKET" >&6; }
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
-$as_echo "not found" >&6; }
- fi
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# Which randomness source do we use?
-if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
- RAND_MSG="PRNGd port $PRNGD_PORT"
-elif test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
- RAND_MSG="PRNGd socket $PRNGD_SOCKET"
-elif test ! -z "$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- RAND_MSG="OpenSSL internal ONLY"
-else
- as_fn_error $? "OpenSSH has no source of random numbers. Please configure OpenSSL with an entropy source or re-run configure using one of the --with-prngd-port or --with-prngd-socket options" "$LINENO" 5
-fi
-
-# Check for PAM libs
-PAM_MSG="no"
-
-# Check whether --with-pam was given.
-if test "${with_pam+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_pam;
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then
- as_fn_error $? "PAM headers not found" "$LINENO" 5
- fi
-
- saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for dlopen in -ldl" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for dlopen in -ldl... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-ldl $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char dlopen ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return dlopen ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_LIBDL 1
-_ACEOF
-
- LIBS="-ldl $LIBS"
-
-fi
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_set_item in -lpam" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for pam_set_item in -lpam... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lpam $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char pam_set_item ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return pam_set_item ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_LIBPAM 1
-_ACEOF
-
- LIBS="-lpam $LIBS"
-
-else
- as_fn_error $? "*** libpam missing" "$LINENO" 5
-fi
-
- for ac_func in pam_getenvlist
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "pam_getenvlist" "ac_cv_func_pam_getenvlist"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_pam_getenvlist" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
- for ac_func in pam_putenv
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "pam_putenv" "ac_cv_func_pam_putenv"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_pam_putenv" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_PAM_PUTENV 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
- LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
-
- PAM_MSG="yes"
-
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
-
-$as_echo "#define USE_PAM 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
- if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then
- case "$LIBS" in
- *-ldl*)
- # libdl already in LIBS
- ;;
- *)
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
- ;;
- esac
- fi
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# Check for older PAM
-if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
- # Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM)
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether pam_strerror takes only one argument" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether pam_strerror takes only one argument... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
-#include <security/pam_appl.h>
-#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
-#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
-#endif
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
-(void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-else
-
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_OLD_PAM 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- PAM_MSG="yes (old library)"
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd
-
-# Check whether --with-privsep-user was given.
-if test "${with_privsep_user+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_privsep_user;
- if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
- test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=$withval
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER "$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"
-_ACEOF
-
-
-
-if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER" "ac_cv_have_decl_SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER" "
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <linux/seccomp.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER" = xyes; then :
- have_seccomp_filter=1
-fi
-
-fi
-if test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" ; then
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking kernel for seccomp_filter support" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking kernel for seccomp_filter support... " >&6; }
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <elf.h>
- #include <linux/audit.h>
- #include <linux/seccomp.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <sys/prctl.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- int i = $seccomp_audit_arch;
- errno = 0;
- prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0);
- exit(errno == EFAULT ? 0 : 1);
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- # Disable seccomp filter as a target
- have_seccomp_filter=0
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-# Decide which sandbox style to use
-sandbox_arg=""
-
-# Check whether --with-sandbox was given.
-if test "${with_sandbox+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_sandbox;
- if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
- sandbox_arg=""
- else
- sandbox_arg="$withval"
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# Some platforms (seems to be the ones that have a kernel poll(2)-type
-# function with which they implement select(2)) use an extra file descriptor
-# when calling select(2), which means we can't use the rlimit sandbox.
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if select works with descriptor rlimit" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if select works with descriptor rlimit... " >&6; }
-if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-#include <sys/resource.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
-# include <sys/select.h>
-#endif
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- struct rlimit rl_zero;
- int fd, r;
- fd_set fds;
- struct timeval tv;
-
- fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
- FD_ZERO(&fds);
- FD_SET(fd, &fds);
- rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
- setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero);
- setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
- tv.tv_sec = 1;
- tv.tv_usec = 0;
- r = select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
- exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- select_works_with_rlimit=yes
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- select_works_with_rlimit=no
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works... " >&6; }
-if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-#include <sys/resource.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- struct rlimit rl_zero;
- int fd, r;
- fd_set fds;
-
- rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
- r = setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
- exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works... " >&6; }
-if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/resource.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- struct rlimit rl_zero;
-
- rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
- exit(setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) != 0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-
-if test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsystrace" || \
- ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" = "x1" ) ; then
- test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" != "x1" && \
- as_fn_error $? "systrace sandbox requires systrace headers and SYSTR_POLICY_KILL support" "$LINENO" 5
- SANDBOX_STYLE="systrace"
-
-$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SYSTRACE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" || \
- ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = "xyes" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = "xyes") ; then
- test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" != "xyes" -o \
- "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" != "xyes" && \
- as_fn_error $? "Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function" "$LINENO" 5
- SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin"
-
-$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_DARWIN 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \
- ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
- test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_elf_h" = "xyes" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" = "xyes" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" = "xyes" && \
- test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" && \
- test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = "xyes" ) ; then
- test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" = "x" && \
- as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox not supported on $host" "$LINENO" 5
- test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" != "x1" && \
- as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" "$LINENO" 5
- test "x$have_seccomp_filter" != "x1" && \
- as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox requires seccomp headers" "$LINENO" 5
- test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" != "xyes" && \
- as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function" "$LINENO" 5
- SANDBOX_STYLE="seccomp_filter"
-
-$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \
- ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capability_h" = "xyes" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then
- test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capability_h" != "xyes" && \
- as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires sys/capability.h header" "$LINENO" 5
- test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \
- as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function" "$LINENO" 5
- SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum"
-
-$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_CAPSICUM 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \
- ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \
- test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \
- test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then
- test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \
- as_fn_error $? "rlimit sandbox requires setrlimit function" "$LINENO" 5
- test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" != "xyes" && \
- as_fn_error $? "rlimit sandbox requires select to work with rlimit" "$LINENO" 5
- SANDBOX_STYLE="rlimit"
-
-$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_RLIMIT 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-elif test -z "$sandbox_arg" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xno" || \
- test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnone" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnull" ; then
- SANDBOX_STYLE="none"
-
-$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_NULL 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-else
- as_fn_error $? "unsupported --with-sandbox" "$LINENO" 5
-fi
-
-# Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right.
-if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then
- LIBS="$LIBS -liberty";
-fi
-
-# Check for long long datatypes
-ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "long long" "ac_cv_type_long_long" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_type_long_long" = xyes; then :
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_LONG_LONG 1
-_ACEOF
-
-
-fi
-ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "unsigned long long" "ac_cv_type_unsigned_long_long" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_type_unsigned_long_long" = xyes; then :
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG 1
-_ACEOF
-
-
-fi
-ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "long double" "ac_cv_type_long_double" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_type_long_double" = xyes; then :
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE 1
-_ACEOF
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# Check datatype sizes
-# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
-# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
-# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
-# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of short int" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking size of short int... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_sizeof_short_int+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (short int))" "ac_cv_sizeof_short_int" "$ac_includes_default"; then :
-
-else
- if test "$ac_cv_type_short_int" = yes; then
- { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
-as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (short int)
-See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
- else
- ac_cv_sizeof_short_int=0
- fi
-fi
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_short_int" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_sizeof_short_int" >&6; }
-
-
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define SIZEOF_SHORT_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_short_int
-_ACEOF
-
-
-# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
-# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
-# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
-# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of int" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking size of int... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_sizeof_int+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (int))" "ac_cv_sizeof_int" "$ac_includes_default"; then :
-
-else
- if test "$ac_cv_type_int" = yes; then
- { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
-as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (int)
-See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
- else
- ac_cv_sizeof_int=0
- fi
-fi
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_int" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_sizeof_int" >&6; }
-
-
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define SIZEOF_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_int
-_ACEOF
-
-
-# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
-# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
-# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
-# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of long int" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking size of long int... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_sizeof_long_int+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (long int))" "ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" "$ac_includes_default"; then :
-
-else
- if test "$ac_cv_type_long_int" = yes; then
- { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
-as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (long int)
-See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
- else
- ac_cv_sizeof_long_int=0
- fi
-fi
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" >&6; }
-
-
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define SIZEOF_LONG_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_long_int
-_ACEOF
-
-
-# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
-# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
-# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
-# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of long long int" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking size of long long int... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (long long int))" "ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" "$ac_includes_default"; then :
-
-else
- if test "$ac_cv_type_long_long_int" = yes; then
- { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
-as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (long long int)
-See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
- else
- ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0
- fi
-fi
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" >&6; }
-
-
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int
-_ACEOF
-
-
-
-# Sanity check long long for some platforms (AIX)
-if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x4" ; then
- ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0
-fi
-
-# compute LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX if we don't know them.
-if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for max value of long long" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for max value of long long... " >&6; }
- if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;}
-
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-/* Why is this so damn hard? */
-#ifdef __GNUC__
-# undef __GNUC__
-#endif
-#define __USE_ISOC99
-#include <limits.h>
-#define DATA "conftest.llminmax"
-#define my_abs(a) ((a) < 0 ? ((a) * -1) : (a))
-
-/*
- * printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so
- * we do this the hard way.
- */
-static int
-fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n)
-{
- unsigned int i;
- int l[sizeof(long long) * 8];
-
- if (n < 0)
- if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0)
- return -1;
- for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) {
- l[i] = my_abs(n % 10);
- n /= 10;
- }
- do {
- if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0)
- return -1;
- } while (i != 0);
- if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0)
- return -1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- FILE *f;
- long long i, llmin, llmax = 0;
-
- if((f = fopen(DATA,"w")) == NULL)
- exit(1);
-
-#if defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LLONG_MAX)
- fprintf(stderr, "Using system header for LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
- llmin = LLONG_MIN;
- llmax = LLONG_MAX;
-#else
- fprintf(stderr, "Calculating LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
- /* This will work on one's complement and two's complement */
- for (i = 1; i > llmax; i <<= 1, i++)
- llmax = i;
- llmin = llmax + 1LL; /* wrap */
-#endif
-
- /* Sanity check */
- if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax
- || llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0
- || llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) {
- fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n");
- exit(2);
- }
-
- if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0)
- exit(3);
- if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0)
- exit(4);
- if (fclose(f) < 0)
- exit(5);
- exit(0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
-
- llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax`
- llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax`
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $llong_max" >&5
-$as_echo "$llong_max" >&6; }
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define LLONG_MAX ${llong_max}LL
-_ACEOF
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for min value of long long" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for min value of long long... " >&6; }
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $llong_min" >&5
-$as_echo "$llong_min" >&6; }
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define LLONG_MIN ${llong_min}LL
-_ACEOF
-
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
-$as_echo "not found" >&6; }
-
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-fi
-
-
-# More checks for data types
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_int type" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for u_int type... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_u_int+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <sys/types.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- u_int a; a = 1;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_u_int="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_u_int="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_u_int" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_u_int" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INT 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- have_u_int=1
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for intXX_t types" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for intXX_t types... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_intxx_t+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <sys/types.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_intxx_t="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_intxx_t="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_intxx_t" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- have_intxx_t=1
-fi
-
-if (test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
-then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for intXX_t types in stdint.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for intXX_t types in stdint.h... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <stdint.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
- $as_echo "#define HAVE_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for int64_t type" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for int64_t type... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_int64_t+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
-# include <stdint.h>
-#endif
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
-# include <sys/bitypes.h>
-#endif
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
-int64_t a; a = 1;
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_int64_t="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_int64_t="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_int64_t" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_int64_t" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_INT64_T 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_intXX_t types" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for u_intXX_t types... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <sys/types.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- have_u_intxx_t=1
-fi
-
-if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <sys/socket.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
- $as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_int64_t types" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for u_int64_t types... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_u_int64_t+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <sys/types.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- u_int64_t a; a = 1;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- have_u_int64_t=1
-fi
-
-if (test -z "$have_u_int64_t" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
-then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <sys/bitypes.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- u_int64_t a; a = 1
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
- $as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for uintXX_t types" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for uintXX_t types... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_uintxx_t+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- uint8_t a;
- uint16_t b;
- uint32_t c;
- a = b = c = 1;
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" >&6; }
- if test "x$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
-fi
-
-if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
-then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for uintXX_t types in stdint.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for uintXX_t types in stdint.h... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <stdint.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
- $as_echo "#define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_inttypes_h" = "xyes")
-then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <inttypes.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
- $as_echo "#define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-if (test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" || test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
-then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/bitypes.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c;
- u_int8_t e; u_int16_t f; u_int32_t g;
- a = b = c = e = f = g = 1;
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
- $as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define HAVE_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_char" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for u_char... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_u_char+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <sys/types.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- u_char foo; foo = 125;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_u_char="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_u_char="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_u_char" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_u_char" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_char" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_CHAR 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "intmax_t" "ac_cv_type_intmax_t" "
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_type_intmax_t" = xyes; then :
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_INTMAX_T 1
-_ACEOF
-
-
-fi
-ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "uintmax_t" "ac_cv_type_uintmax_t" "
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_type_uintmax_t" = xyes; then :
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_UINTMAX_T 1
-_ACEOF
-
-
-fi
-
-
-
- ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "socklen_t" "ac_cv_type_socklen_t" "#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_type_socklen_t" = xyes; then :
-
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for socklen_t equivalent" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for socklen_t equivalent... " >&6; }
- if ${curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- # Systems have either "struct sockaddr *" or
- # "void *" as the second argument to getpeername
- curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv=
- for arg2 in "struct sockaddr" void; do
- for t in int size_t unsigned long "unsigned long"; do
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/socket.h>
-
- int getpeername (int, $arg2 *, $t *);
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- $t len;
- getpeername(0,0,&len);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
- curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv="$t"
- break
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
- done
- done
-
- if test "x$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" = x; then
- as_fn_error $? "Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t" "$LINENO" 5
- fi
-
-fi
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" >&5
-$as_echo "$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" >&6; }
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define socklen_t $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-
-
-ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "sig_atomic_t" "ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t" "#include <signal.h>
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t" = xyes; then :
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T 1
-_ACEOF
-
-
-fi
-
-ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fsblkcnt_t" "ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t" "
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
-#include <sys/bitypes.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
-#include <sys/statfs.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
-#include <sys/statvfs.h>
-#endif
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t" = xyes; then :
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T 1
-_ACEOF
-
-
-fi
-ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fsfilcnt_t" "ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t" "
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
-#include <sys/bitypes.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
-#include <sys/statfs.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
-#include <sys/statvfs.h>
-#endif
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t" = xyes; then :
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_FSFILCNT_T 1
-_ACEOF
-
-
-fi
-
-
-ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "in_addr_t" "ac_cv_type_in_addr_t" "#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_type_in_addr_t" = xyes; then :
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_IN_ADDR_T 1
-_ACEOF
-
-
-fi
-ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "in_port_t" "ac_cv_type_in_port_t" "#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_type_in_port_t" = xyes; then :
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_IN_PORT_T 1
-_ACEOF
-
-
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for size_t" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for size_t... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_size_t+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <sys/types.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- size_t foo; foo = 1235;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_size_t="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_size_t="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_size_t" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_size_t" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_size_t" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_SIZE_T 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ssize_t" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ssize_t... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_ssize_t+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <sys/types.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- ssize_t foo; foo = 1235;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_ssize_t="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_ssize_t="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_ssize_t" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_SSIZE_T 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for clock_t" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for clock_t... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_clock_t+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <time.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- clock_t foo; foo = 1235;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_clock_t="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_clock_t="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_clock_t" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_clock_t" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_clock_t" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_CLOCK_T 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for sa_family_t" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for sa_family_t... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_sa_family_t+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes"
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pid_t" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for pid_t... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_pid_t+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <sys/types.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- pid_t foo; foo = 1235;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_pid_t="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_pid_t" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_pid_t" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_PID_T 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for mode_t" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for mode_t... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_mode_t+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <sys/types.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- mode_t foo; foo = 1235;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_mode_t="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_mode_t="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_mode_t" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_mode_t" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_mode_t" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_MODE_T 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct sockaddr_storage" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for struct sockaddr_storage... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- struct sockaddr_storage s;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct sockaddr_in6" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for struct sockaddr_in6... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- struct sockaddr_in6 s; s.sin6_family = 0;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct in6_addr" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for struct in6_addr... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
- ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct sockaddr_in6" "sin6_scope_id" "ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id" "
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#endif
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id" = xyes; then :
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID 1
-_ACEOF
-
-
-fi
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct addrinfo" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for struct addrinfo... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- struct addrinfo s; s.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct timeval" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for struct timeval... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_struct_timeval+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <sys/time.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- struct timeval tv; tv.tv_sec = 1;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- have_struct_timeval=1
-fi
-
-ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "struct timespec" "ac_cv_type_struct_timespec" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_type_struct_timespec" = xyes; then :
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC 1
-_ACEOF
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# We need int64_t or else certian parts of the compile will fail.
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then
- echo "OpenSSH requires int64_t support. Contact your vendor or install"
- echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing."
- echo ""
- exit 1;
-else
- if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&2;}
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF
-main()
-{
- char buf[50];
- char expected_out[50];
- int mazsize = 50 ;
-#if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
- long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff;
-#else
- long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll;
-#endif
- strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807");
- snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num);
- if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0)
- exit(1);
- exit(0);
-}
-#else
-main() { exit(0); }
-#endif
-
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
- true
-else
- $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-fi
-
-
-# look for field 'ut_host' in header 'utmp.h'
- ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
- ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_host
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_host field in utmp.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ut_host field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
- if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <utmp.h>
-
-_ACEOF
-if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
- $EGREP "ut_host" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
- eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
-else
- eval "$ossh_varname=no"
-fi
-rm -f conftest*
-
-fi
-
- ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
- if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
-$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
- if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
-
-
-# look for field 'ut_host' in header 'utmpx.h'
- ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
- ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_host
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_host field in utmpx.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ut_host field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
- if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <utmpx.h>
-
-_ACEOF
-if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
- $EGREP "ut_host" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
- eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
-else
- eval "$ossh_varname=no"
-fi
-rm -f conftest*
-
-fi
-
- ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
- if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
-$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
- if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
-
-
-# look for field 'syslen' in header 'utmpx.h'
- ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
- ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"syslen
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for syslen field in utmpx.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for syslen field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
- if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <utmpx.h>
-
-_ACEOF
-if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
- $EGREP "syslen" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
- eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
-else
- eval "$ossh_varname=no"
-fi
-rm -f conftest*
-
-fi
-
- ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
- if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
-$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
- if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
-
-
-# look for field 'ut_pid' in header 'utmp.h'
- ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
- ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_pid
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_pid field in utmp.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ut_pid field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
- if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <utmp.h>
-
-_ACEOF
-if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
- $EGREP "ut_pid" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
- eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
-else
- eval "$ossh_varname=no"
-fi
-rm -f conftest*
-
-fi
-
- ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
- if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
-$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
- if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
-
-
-# look for field 'ut_type' in header 'utmp.h'
- ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
- ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_type
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_type field in utmp.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ut_type field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
- if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <utmp.h>
-
-_ACEOF
-if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
- $EGREP "ut_type" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
- eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
-else
- eval "$ossh_varname=no"
-fi
-rm -f conftest*
-
-fi
-
- ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
- if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
-$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
- if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
-
-
-# look for field 'ut_type' in header 'utmpx.h'
- ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
- ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_type
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_type field in utmpx.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ut_type field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
- if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <utmpx.h>
-
-_ACEOF
-if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
- $EGREP "ut_type" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
- eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
-else
- eval "$ossh_varname=no"
-fi
-rm -f conftest*
-
-fi
-
- ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
- if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
-$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
- if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
-
-
-# look for field 'ut_tv' in header 'utmp.h'
- ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
- ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_tv
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_tv field in utmp.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ut_tv field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
- if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <utmp.h>
-
-_ACEOF
-if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
- $EGREP "ut_tv" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
- eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
-else
- eval "$ossh_varname=no"
-fi
-rm -f conftest*
-
-fi
-
- ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
- if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
-$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
- if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
-
-
-# look for field 'ut_id' in header 'utmp.h'
- ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
- ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_id
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_id field in utmp.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ut_id field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
- if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <utmp.h>
-
-_ACEOF
-if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
- $EGREP "ut_id" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
- eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
-else
- eval "$ossh_varname=no"
-fi
-rm -f conftest*
-
-fi
-
- ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
- if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
-$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
- if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
-
-
-# look for field 'ut_id' in header 'utmpx.h'
- ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
- ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_id
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_id field in utmpx.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ut_id field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
- if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <utmpx.h>
-
-_ACEOF
-if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
- $EGREP "ut_id" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
- eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
-else
- eval "$ossh_varname=no"
-fi
-rm -f conftest*
-
-fi
-
- ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
- if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
-$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
- if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
-
-
-# look for field 'ut_addr' in header 'utmp.h'
- ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
- ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr field in utmp.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
- if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <utmp.h>
-
-_ACEOF
-if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
- $EGREP "ut_addr" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
- eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
-else
- eval "$ossh_varname=no"
-fi
-rm -f conftest*
-
-fi
-
- ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
- if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
-$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
- if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
-
-
-# look for field 'ut_addr' in header 'utmpx.h'
- ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
- ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr field in utmpx.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
- if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <utmpx.h>
-
-_ACEOF
-if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
- $EGREP "ut_addr" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
- eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
-else
- eval "$ossh_varname=no"
-fi
-rm -f conftest*
-
-fi
-
- ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
- if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
-$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
- if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
-
-
-# look for field 'ut_addr_v6' in header 'utmp.h'
- ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
- ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr_v6
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmp.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
- if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <utmp.h>
-
-_ACEOF
-if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
- $EGREP "ut_addr_v6" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
- eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
-else
- eval "$ossh_varname=no"
-fi
-rm -f conftest*
-
-fi
-
- ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
- if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
-$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
- if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
-
-
-# look for field 'ut_addr_v6' in header 'utmpx.h'
- ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
- ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr_v6
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmpx.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
- if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <utmpx.h>
-
-_ACEOF
-if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
- $EGREP "ut_addr_v6" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
- eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
-else
- eval "$ossh_varname=no"
-fi
-rm -f conftest*
-
-fi
-
- ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
- if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
-$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
- if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
-
-
-# look for field 'ut_exit' in header 'utmp.h'
- ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
- ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_exit
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_exit field in utmp.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ut_exit field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
- if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <utmp.h>
-
-_ACEOF
-if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
- $EGREP "ut_exit" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
- eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
-else
- eval "$ossh_varname=no"
-fi
-rm -f conftest*
-
-fi
-
- ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
- if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
-$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
- if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
-
-
-# look for field 'ut_time' in header 'utmp.h'
- ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
- ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_time
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_time field in utmp.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ut_time field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
- if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <utmp.h>
-
-_ACEOF
-if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
- $EGREP "ut_time" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
- eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
-else
- eval "$ossh_varname=no"
-fi
-rm -f conftest*
-
-fi
-
- ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
- if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
-$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
- if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
-
-
-# look for field 'ut_time' in header 'utmpx.h'
- ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
- ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_time
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_time field in utmpx.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ut_time field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
- if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <utmpx.h>
-
-_ACEOF
-if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
- $EGREP "ut_time" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
- eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
-else
- eval "$ossh_varname=no"
-fi
-rm -f conftest*
-
-fi
-
- ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
- if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
-$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
- if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
-
-
-# look for field 'ut_tv' in header 'utmpx.h'
- ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
- ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_tv
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_tv field in utmpx.h" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ut_tv field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
- if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-#include <utmpx.h>
-
-_ACEOF
-if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
- $EGREP "ut_tv" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
- eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
-else
- eval "$ossh_varname=no"
-fi
-rm -f conftest*
-
-fi
-
- ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
- if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
-$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
- if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
-
-
-ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct stat" "st_blksize" "ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_blksize" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_blksize" = xyes; then :
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE 1
-_ACEOF
-
-
-fi
-
-ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct passwd" "pw_gecos" "ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_gecos" "
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_gecos" = xyes; then :
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS 1
-_ACEOF
-
-
-fi
-ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct passwd" "pw_class" "ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_class" "
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_class" = xyes; then :
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS 1
-_ACEOF
-
-
-fi
-ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct passwd" "pw_change" "ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_change" "
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_change" = xyes; then :
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE 1
-_ACEOF
-
-
-fi
-ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct passwd" "pw_expire" "ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_expire" "
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_expire" = xyes; then :
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE 1
-_ACEOF
-
-
-fi
-
-
-ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct __res_state" "retrans" "ac_cv_member_struct___res_state_retrans" "
-#include <stdio.h>
-#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
-# include <sys/types.h>
-#endif
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/nameser.h>
-#include <resolv.h>
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct___res_state_retrans" = xyes; then :
-
-else
-
-$as_echo "#define __res_state state" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- struct sockaddr_storage s; s.ss_family = 1;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="no"
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- struct sockaddr_storage s; s.__ss_family = 1;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
-#ifdef msg_accrights
-#error "msg_accrights is a macro"
-exit(1);
-#endif
-struct msghdr m;
-m.msg_accrights = 0;
-exit(0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type... " >&6; }
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
-#include <sys/mount.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
-#include <sys/statvfs.h>
-#endif
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- struct statvfs s; s.f_fsid = 0;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if fsid_t has member val" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if fsid_t has member val... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/statvfs.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- fsid_t t; t.val[0] = 0;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define FSID_HAS_VAL 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if f_fsid has member __val" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if f_fsid has member __val... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/statvfs.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- fsid_t t; t.__val[0] = 0;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define FSID_HAS___VAL 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for msg_control field in struct msghdr" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for msg_control field in struct msghdr... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
-#ifdef msg_control
-#error "msg_control is a macro"
-exit(1);
-#endif
-struct msghdr m;
-m.msg_control = 0;
-exit(0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if libc defines __progname" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if libc defines __progname... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_libc_defines___progname+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname);
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE___PROGNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <stdio.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- printf("%s", __FUNCTION__);
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE___FUNCTION__ 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether $CC implements __func__" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether $CC implements __func__... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_cc_implements___func__+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <stdio.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- printf("%s", __func__);
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE___func__ 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether va_copy exists" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether va_copy exists... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_va_copy+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-va_list x,y;
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- va_copy(x,y);
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_va_copy="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_va_copy="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_va_copy" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_va_copy" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_VA_COPY 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether __va_copy exists" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether __va_copy exists... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have___va_copy+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-va_list x,y;
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- __va_copy(x,y);
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have___va_copy="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have___va_copy="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have___va_copy" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have___va_copy" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have___va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE___VA_COPY 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether getopt has optreset support" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether getopt has optreset support... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <getopt.h>
-int
-main ()
-{
- extern int optreset; optreset = 0;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if libc defines sys_errlist" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if libc defines sys_errlist... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if libc defines sys_nerr" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if libc defines sys_nerr... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
-
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes"
-else
- ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no"
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" = "xyes" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_SYS_NERR 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-# Check libraries needed by DNS fingerprint support
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing getrrsetbyname" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for library containing getrrsetbyname... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char getrrsetbyname ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return getrrsetbyname ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-for ac_lib in '' resolv; do
- if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
- ac_res="none required"
- else
- ac_res=-l$ac_lib
- LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
- fi
- if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname=$ac_res
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext
- if ${ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname+:} false; then :
- break
-fi
-done
-if ${ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname+:} false; then :
-
-else
- ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname=no
-fi
-rm conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname" >&6; }
-ac_res=$ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname
-if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
- test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-else
-
- # Needed by our getrrsetbyname()
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing res_query" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for library containing res_query... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_search_res_query+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char res_query ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return res_query ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-for ac_lib in '' resolv; do
- if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
- ac_res="none required"
- else
- ac_res=-l$ac_lib
- LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
- fi
- if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_search_res_query=$ac_res
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext
- if ${ac_cv_search_res_query+:} false; then :
- break
-fi
-done
-if ${ac_cv_search_res_query+:} false; then :
-
-else
- ac_cv_search_res_query=no
-fi
-rm conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_res_query" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_res_query" >&6; }
-ac_res=$ac_cv_search_res_query
-if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
- test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
-
-fi
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing dn_expand" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for library containing dn_expand... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char dn_expand ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return dn_expand ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-for ac_lib in '' resolv; do
- if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
- ac_res="none required"
- else
- ac_res=-l$ac_lib
- LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
- fi
- if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_search_dn_expand=$ac_res
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext
- if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then :
- break
-fi
-done
-if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then :
-
-else
- ac_cv_search_dn_expand=no
-fi
-rm conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&6; }
-ac_res=$ac_cv_search_dn_expand
-if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
- test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
-
-fi
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if res_query will link" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if res_query will link... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/nameser.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-#include <resolv.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
- LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for res_query in -lresolv" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for res_query in -lresolv... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/nameser.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-#include <resolv.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
- LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
- for ac_func in _getshort _getlong
-do :
- as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
- ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "_getshort" "ac_cv_have_decl__getshort" "#include <sys/types.h>
- #include <arpa/nameser.h>
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl__getshort" = xyes; then :
- ac_have_decl=1
-else
- ac_have_decl=0
-fi
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT $ac_have_decl
-_ACEOF
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "_getlong" "ac_cv_have_decl__getlong" "#include <sys/types.h>
- #include <arpa/nameser.h>
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl__getlong" = xyes; then :
- ac_have_decl=1
-else
- ac_have_decl=0
-fi
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_DECL__GETLONG $ac_have_decl
-_ACEOF
-
- ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "HEADER" "ad" "ac_cv_member_HEADER_ad" "#include <arpa/nameser.h>
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_member_HEADER_ad" = xyes; then :
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_HEADER_AD 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if struct __res_state _res is an extern" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if struct __res_state _res is an extern... " >&6; }
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
-# include <sys/types.h>
-#endif
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/nameser.h>
-#include <resolv.h>
-extern struct __res_state _res;
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE__RES_EXTERN 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-# Check whether user wants SELinux support
-SELINUX_MSG="no"
-LIBSELINUX=""
-
-# Check whether --with-selinux was given.
-if test "${with_selinux+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_selinux; if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- save_LIBS="$LIBS"
-
-$as_echo "#define WITH_SELINUX 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- SELINUX_MSG="yes"
- ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "selinux/selinux.h" "ac_cv_header_selinux_selinux_h" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_header_selinux_selinux_h" = xyes; then :
-
-else
- as_fn_error $? "SELinux support requires selinux.h header" "$LINENO" 5
-fi
-
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for setexeccon in -lselinux" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for setexeccon in -lselinux... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lselinux $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char setexeccon ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return setexeccon ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon" = xyes; then :
- LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
- LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux"
-
-else
- as_fn_error $? "SELinux support requires libselinux library" "$LINENO" 5
-fi
-
- SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
- for ac_func in getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level
-do :
- as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
- LIBS="$save_LIBS"
- fi
-
-fi
-
-
-
-
-# Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
-KRB5_MSG="no"
-
-# Check whether --with-kerberos5 was given.
-if test "${with_kerberos5+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_kerberos5; if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
- KRB5ROOT="/usr/local"
- else
- KRB5ROOT=${withval}
- fi
-
-
-$as_echo "#define KRB5 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- KRB5_MSG="yes"
-
- # Extract the first word of "krb5-config", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy krb5-config; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $KRB5CONF in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF="$KRB5CONF" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-as_dummy="$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH"
-for as_dir in $as_dummy
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- test -z "$ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF" && ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF="$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config"
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-KRB5CONF=$ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF
-if test -n "$KRB5CONF"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $KRB5CONF" >&5
-$as_echo "$KRB5CONF" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
- if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then
- K5CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags`"
- K5LIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs`"
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS"
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gssapi support" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for gssapi support... " >&6; }
- if $KRB5CONF | grep gssapi >/dev/null ; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- GSSCFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags gssapi`"
- GSSLIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs gssapi`"
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS"
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether we are using Heimdal" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether we are using Heimdal... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <krb5.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- char *tmp = heimdal_version;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define HEIMDAL 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
- else
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include"
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether we are using Heimdal" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether we are using Heimdal... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <krb5.h>
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- char *tmp = heimdal_version;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- $as_echo "#define HEIMDAL 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- K5LIBS="-lkrb5"
- K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lcom_err -lasn1"
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for net_write in -lroken" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for net_write in -lroken... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lroken $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char net_write ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return net_write ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write" = xyes; then :
- K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lroken"
-fi
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for des_cbc_encrypt in -ldes" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for des_cbc_encrypt in -ldes... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-ldes $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char des_cbc_encrypt ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return des_cbc_encrypt ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" = xyes; then :
- K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -ldes"
-fi
-
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- K5LIBS="-lkrb5 -lk5crypto -lcom_err"
-
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing dn_expand" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for library containing dn_expand... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char dn_expand ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return dn_expand ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-for ac_lib in '' resolv; do
- if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
- ac_res="none required"
- else
- ac_res=-l$ac_lib
- LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
- fi
- if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_search_dn_expand=$ac_res
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext
- if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then :
- break
-fi
-done
-if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then :
-
-else
- ac_cv_search_dn_expand=no
-fi
-rm conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&6; }
-ac_res=$ac_cv_search_dn_expand
-if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
- test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
-
-fi
-
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi_krb5" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi_krb5... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lgssapi_krb5 $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char gss_init_sec_context ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return gss_init_sec_context ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context" = xyes; then :
- $as_echo "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- GSSLIBS="-lgssapi_krb5"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lgssapi $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char gss_init_sec_context ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return gss_init_sec_context ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context" = xyes; then :
- $as_echo "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- GSSLIBS="-lgssapi"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgss" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgss... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-LIBS="-lgss $LIBS"
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char gss_init_sec_context ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return gss_init_sec_context ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context=yes
-else
- ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context=no
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context" >&6; }
-if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context" = xyes; then :
- $as_echo "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- GSSLIBS="-lgss"
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail" >&2;}
-fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
- ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "gssapi.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" = xyes; then :
-
-else
- unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
- for ac_header in gssapi.h
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "gssapi.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_GSSAPI_H 1
-_ACEOF
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail" >&2;}
-
-fi
-
-done
-
-
-
-fi
-
-
-
- oldCPP="$CPPFLAGS"
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
- ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "gssapi_krb5.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h" = xyes; then :
-
-else
- CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP"
-fi
-
-
-
- fi
- if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -R${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
- fi
- if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
- blibpath="$blibpath:${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
- fi
-
- for ac_header in gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h
-do :
- as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-done
-
- for ac_header in gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h
-do :
- as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-done
-
- for ac_header in gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h
-do :
- as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-done
-
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing k_hasafs" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for library containing k_hasafs... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_search_k_hasafs+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char k_hasafs ();
-int
-main ()
-{
-return k_hasafs ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-for ac_lib in '' kafs; do
- if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
- ac_res="none required"
- else
- ac_res=-l$ac_lib
- LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
- fi
- if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- ac_cv_search_k_hasafs=$ac_res
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext
- if ${ac_cv_search_k_hasafs+:} false; then :
- break
-fi
-done
-if ${ac_cv_search_k_hasafs+:} false; then :
-
-else
- ac_cv_search_k_hasafs=no
-fi
-rm conftest.$ac_ext
-LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
-fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_k_hasafs" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_k_hasafs" >&6; }
-ac_res=$ac_cv_search_k_hasafs
-if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
- test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
-
-$as_echo "#define USE_AFS 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-fi
-
-
- ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE" "ac_cv_have_decl_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE" "
-#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
-# include <gssapi.h>
-#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H)
-# include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
-# include <gssapi_generic.h>
-#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H)
-# include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
-#endif
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE" = xyes; then :
- ac_have_decl=1
-else
- ac_have_decl=0
-fi
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE $ac_have_decl
-_ACEOF
-
- saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
- LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS"
- for ac_func in krb5_cc_new_unique krb5_get_error_message krb5_free_error_message
-do :
- as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
-ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-done
-
- LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
-
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-
-
-# Looking for programs, paths and files
-
-PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
-
-# Check whether --with-privsep-path was given.
-if test "${with_privsep_path+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_privsep_path;
- if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
- test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- PRIVSEP_PATH=$withval
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-
-
-# Check whether --with-xauth was given.
-if test "${with_xauth+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_xauth;
- if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
- test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- xauth_path=$withval
- fi
-
-else
-
- TestPath="$PATH"
- TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X/bin"
- TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/bin/X11"
- TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X11R6/bin"
- TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/openwin/bin"
- # Extract the first word of "xauth", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy xauth; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_xauth_path+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $xauth_path in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_xauth_path="$xauth_path" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $TestPath
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_xauth_path="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-xauth_path=$ac_cv_path_xauth_path
-if test -n "$xauth_path"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $xauth_path" >&5
-$as_echo "$xauth_path" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
- if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then
- xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth"
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-STRIP_OPT=-s
-# Check whether --enable-strip was given.
-if test "${enable_strip+set}" = set; then :
- enableval=$enable_strip;
- if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
- STRIP_OPT=
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-
-if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then
- XAUTH_PATH="undefined"
-
-else
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define XAUTH_PATH "$xauth_path"
-_ACEOF
-
- XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path
-
-fi
-
-# Check for mail directory
-
-# Check whether --with-maildir was given.
-if test "${with_maildir+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_maildir;
- if test "X$withval" != X && test "x$withval" != xno && \
- test "x${withval}" != xyes; then
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define MAIL_DIRECTORY "$withval"
-_ACEOF
-
- fi
-
-else
-
- if test "X$maildir" != "X"; then
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define MAIL_DIRECTORY "$maildir"
-_ACEOF
-
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking Discovering system mail directory" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking Discovering system mail directory... " >&6; }
- if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail" >&2;}
-
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-#include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
-#include <maillock.h>
-#endif
-#define DATA "conftest.maildir"
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- FILE *fd;
- int rc;
-
- fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
- if(fd == NULL)
- exit(1);
-
-#if defined (_PATH_MAILDIR)
- if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAILDIR:%s\n", _PATH_MAILDIR)) <0)
- exit(1);
-#elif defined (MAILDIR)
- if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"MAILDIR:%s\n", MAILDIR)) <0)
- exit(1);
-#elif defined (_PATH_MAIL)
- if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAIL:%s\n", _PATH_MAIL)) <0)
- exit(1);
-#else
- exit (2);
-#endif
-
- exit(0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
-
- maildir_what=`awk -F: '{print $1}' conftest.maildir`
- maildir=`awk -F: '{print $2}' conftest.maildir \
- | sed 's|/$||'`
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Using: $maildir from $maildir_what" >&5
-$as_echo "Using: $maildir from $maildir_what" >&6; }
- if test "x$maildir_what" != "x_PATH_MAILDIR"; then
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define MAIL_DIRECTORY "$maildir"
-_ACEOF
-
- fi
-
-else
-
- if test "X$ac_status" = "X2";then
-# our test program didn't find it. Default to /var/spool/mail
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Using: default value of /var/spool/mail" >&5
-$as_echo "Using: default value of /var/spool/mail" >&6; }
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define MAIL_DIRECTORY "/var/spool/mail"
-_ACEOF
-
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: *** not found ***" >&5
-$as_echo "*** not found ***" >&6; }
- fi
-
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
- fi
-
-
-fi
- # maildir
-
-if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test" >&2;}
- disable_ptmx_check=yes
-fi
-if test -z "$no_dev_ptmx" ; then
- if test "x$disable_ptmx_check" != "xyes" ; then
- as_ac_File=`$as_echo "ac_cv_file_"/dev/ptmx"" | $as_tr_sh`
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for \"/dev/ptmx\"" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for \"/dev/ptmx\"... " >&6; }
-if eval \${$as_ac_File+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- test "$cross_compiling" = yes &&
- as_fn_error $? "cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" "$LINENO" 5
-if test -r ""/dev/ptmx""; then
- eval "$as_ac_File=yes"
-else
- eval "$as_ac_File=no"
-fi
-fi
-eval ac_res=\$$as_ac_File
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_File"\" = x"yes"; then :
-
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_DEV_PTMX 1
-_ACEOF
-
- have_dev_ptmx=1
-
-
-fi
-
- fi
-fi
-
-if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" != "xyes"; then
- as_ac_File=`$as_echo "ac_cv_file_"/dev/ptc"" | $as_tr_sh`
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for \"/dev/ptc\"" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for \"/dev/ptc\"... " >&6; }
-if eval \${$as_ac_File+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- test "$cross_compiling" = yes &&
- as_fn_error $? "cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" "$LINENO" 5
-if test -r ""/dev/ptc""; then
- eval "$as_ac_File=yes"
-else
- eval "$as_ac_File=no"
-fi
-fi
-eval ac_res=\$$as_ac_File
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_File"\" = x"yes"; then :
-
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC 1
-_ACEOF
-
- have_dev_ptc=1
-
-
-fi
-
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test" >&2;}
-fi
-
-# Options from here on. Some of these are preset by platform above
-
-# Check whether --with-mantype was given.
-if test "${with_mantype+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_mantype;
- case "$withval" in
- man|cat|doc)
- MANTYPE=$withval
- ;;
- *)
- as_fn_error $? "invalid man type: $withval" "$LINENO" 5
- ;;
- esac
-
-
-fi
-
-if test -z "$MANTYPE"; then
- TestPath="/usr/bin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/ucb"
- for ac_prog in nroff awf
-do
- # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_NROFF+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $NROFF in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_NROFF="$NROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $TestPath
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_NROFF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-NROFF=$ac_cv_path_NROFF
-if test -n "$NROFF"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NROFF" >&5
-$as_echo "$NROFF" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
- test -n "$NROFF" && break
-done
-test -n "$NROFF" || NROFF="/bin/false"
-
- if ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
- MANTYPE=doc
- elif ${NROFF} -man ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
- MANTYPE=man
- else
- MANTYPE=cat
- fi
-fi
-
-if test "$MANTYPE" = "doc"; then
- mansubdir=man;
-else
- mansubdir=$MANTYPE;
-fi
-
-
-# Check whether to enable MD5 passwords
-MD5_MSG="no"
-
-# Check whether --with-md5-passwords was given.
-if test "${with_md5_passwords+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_md5_passwords;
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- MD5_MSG="yes"
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# Whether to disable shadow password support
-
-# Check whether --with-shadow was given.
-if test "${with_shadow+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_shadow;
- if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_SHADOW 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- disable_shadow=yes
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-if test -z "$disable_shadow" ; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if the systems has expire shadow information" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if the systems has expire shadow information... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <shadow.h>
-struct spwd sp;
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- sp.sp_expire = sp.sp_lstchg = sp.sp_inact = 0;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- sp_expire_available=yes
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
- if test "x$sp_expire_available" = "xyes" ; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
-fi
-
-# Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY
-if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then
- DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
-
-$as_echo "#define IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-else
- DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no"
-
-# Check whether --with-ipaddr-display was given.
-if test "${with_ipaddr_display+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_ipaddr_display;
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- $as_echo "#define IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-fi
-
-# check for /etc/default/login and use it if present.
-# Check whether --enable-etc-default-login was given.
-if test "${enable_etc_default_login+set}" = set; then :
- enableval=$enable_etc_default_login; if test "x$enableval" = "xno"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: /etc/default/login handling disabled" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: /etc/default/login handling disabled" >&6;}
- etc_default_login=no
- else
- etc_default_login=yes
- fi
-else
- if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes";
- then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login" >&2;}
- etc_default_login=no
- else
- etc_default_login=yes
- fi
-
-fi
-
-
-if test "x$etc_default_login" != "xno"; then
- as_ac_File=`$as_echo "ac_cv_file_"/etc/default/login"" | $as_tr_sh`
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for \"/etc/default/login\"" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for \"/etc/default/login\"... " >&6; }
-if eval \${$as_ac_File+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- test "$cross_compiling" = yes &&
- as_fn_error $? "cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" "$LINENO" 5
-if test -r ""/etc/default/login""; then
- eval "$as_ac_File=yes"
-else
- eval "$as_ac_File=no"
-fi
-fi
-eval ac_res=\$$as_ac_File
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
-if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_File"\" = x"yes"; then :
- external_path_file=/etc/default/login
-fi
-
- if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/default/login"; then
-
-$as_echo "#define HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
-fi
-
-if test $ac_cv_func_login_getcapbool = "yes" && \
- test $ac_cv_header_login_cap_h = "yes" ; then
- external_path_file=/etc/login.conf
-fi
-
-# Whether to mess with the default path
-SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)"
-
-# Check whether --with-default-path was given.
-if test "${with_default_path+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_default_path;
- if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING:
---with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system.
-Edit /etc/login.conf instead." >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING:
---with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system.
-Edit /etc/login.conf instead." >&2;}
- elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING:
---with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in
-$external_path_file ." >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING:
---with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in
-$external_path_file ." >&2;}
- fi
- user_path="$withval"
- SERVER_PATH_MSG="$withval"
- fi
-
-else
- if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf" >&2;}
- else
- if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING:
-If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included,
-otherwise scp will not work." >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING:
-If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included,
-otherwise scp will not work." >&2;}
- fi
- if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
- user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
-
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-/* find out what STDPATH is */
-#include <stdio.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
-# ifdef _PATH_USERPATH /* Irix */
-# define _PATH_STDPATH _PATH_USERPATH
-# else
-# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
-# endif
-#endif
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#define DATA "conftest.stdpath"
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-
- FILE *fd;
- int rc;
-
- fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
- if(fd == NULL)
- exit(1);
-
- if ((rc = fprintf(fd,"%s", _PATH_STDPATH)) < 0)
- exit(1);
-
- exit(0);
-
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
- user_path=`cat conftest.stdpath`
-else
- user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
-fi
-rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
- conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-
-# make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work
- t_bindir="${bindir}"
- while echo "${t_bindir}" | egrep '\$\{|NONE/' >/dev/null 2>&1; do
- t_bindir=`eval echo ${t_bindir}`
- case $t_bindir in
- NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$prefix~"` ;;
- esac
- case $t_bindir in
- NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
- esac
- done
- echo $user_path | grep ":$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1
- if test $? -ne 0 ; then
- echo $user_path | grep "^$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1
- if test $? -ne 0 ; then
- user_path=$user_path:$t_bindir
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work" >&5
-$as_echo "Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work" >&6; }
- fi
- fi
- fi
-
-fi
-
-if test "x$external_path_file" != "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define USER_PATH "$user_path"
-_ACEOF
-
-
-fi
-
-# Set superuser path separately to user path
-
-# Check whether --with-superuser-path was given.
-if test "${with_superuser_path+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_superuser_path;
- if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
- test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define SUPERUSER_PATH "$withval"
-_ACEOF
-
- superuser_path=$withval
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses... " >&6; }
-IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="no"
-
-# Check whether --with-4in6 was given.
-if test "${with_4in6+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_4in6;
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-
-$as_echo "#define IPV4_IN_IPV6 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- fi
-
-else
-
- if test "x$inet6_default_4in6" = "xyes"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes (default)" >&5
-$as_echo "yes (default)" >&6; }
- $as_echo "#define IPV4_IN_IPV6 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no (default)" >&5
-$as_echo "no (default)" >&6; }
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# Whether to enable BSD auth support
-BSD_AUTH_MSG=no
-
-# Check whether --with-bsd-auth was given.
-if test "${with_bsd_auth+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_bsd_auth;
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define BSD_AUTH 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# Where to place sshd.pid
-piddir=/var/run
-# make sure the directory exists
-if test ! -d $piddir ; then
- piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}`
- case $piddir in
- NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
- esac
-fi
-
-
-# Check whether --with-pid-dir was given.
-if test "${with_pid_dir+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_pid_dir;
- if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
- test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- piddir=$withval
- if test ! -d $piddir ; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: ** no $piddir directory on this system **" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: ** no $piddir directory on this system **" >&2;}
- fi
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "$piddir"
-_ACEOF
-
-
-
-# Check whether --enable-lastlog was given.
-if test "${enable_lastlog+set}" = set; then :
- enableval=$enable_lastlog;
- if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-# Check whether --enable-utmp was given.
-if test "${enable_utmp+set}" = set; then :
- enableval=$enable_utmp;
- if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-# Check whether --enable-utmpx was given.
-if test "${enable_utmpx+set}" = set; then :
- enableval=$enable_utmpx;
- if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-# Check whether --enable-wtmp was given.
-if test "${enable_wtmp+set}" = set; then :
- enableval=$enable_wtmp;
- if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-# Check whether --enable-wtmpx was given.
-if test "${enable_wtmpx+set}" = set; then :
- enableval=$enable_wtmpx;
- if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-# Check whether --enable-libutil was given.
-if test "${enable_libutil+set}" = set; then :
- enableval=$enable_libutil;
- if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_LOGIN 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-# Check whether --enable-pututline was given.
-if test "${enable_pututline+set}" = set; then :
- enableval=$enable_pututline;
- if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define DISABLE_PUTUTLINE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-# Check whether --enable-pututxline was given.
-if test "${enable_pututxline+set}" = set; then :
- enableval=$enable_pututxline;
- if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
-
-$as_echo "#define DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-# Check whether --with-lastlog was given.
-if test "${with_lastlog+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_lastlog;
- if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- elif test -n "$withval" && test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- conf_lastlog_location=$withval
- fi
-
-
-fi
-
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE... " >&6; }
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <utmp.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
-# include <lastlog.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
-# include <login.h>
-#endif
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- char *lastlog = LASTLOG_FILE;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG... " >&6; }
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <utmp.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
-# include <lastlog.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- char *lastlog = _PATH_LASTLOG;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
-
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- system_lastlog_path=no
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-
-if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
- if test x"$system_lastlog_path" = x"no" ; then
- for f in /var/log/lastlog /usr/adm/lastlog /var/adm/lastlog /etc/security/lastlog ; do
- if (test -d "$f" || test -f "$f") ; then
- conf_lastlog_location=$f
- fi
- done
- if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: ** Cannot find lastlog **" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: ** Cannot find lastlog **" >&2;}
- fi
- fi
-fi
-
-if test -n "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define CONF_LASTLOG_FILE "$conf_lastlog_location"
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines UTMP_FILE" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if your system defines UTMP_FILE... " >&6; }
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <utmp.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- char *utmp = UTMP_FILE;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- system_utmp_path=no
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
- if test x"$system_utmp_path" = x"no" ; then
- for f in /etc/utmp /usr/adm/utmp /var/run/utmp; do
- if test -f $f ; then
- conf_utmp_location=$f
- fi
- done
- if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- fi
-fi
-if test -n "$conf_utmp_location"; then
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define CONF_UTMP_FILE "$conf_utmp_location"
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines WTMP_FILE" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if your system defines WTMP_FILE... " >&6; }
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <utmp.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- char *wtmp = WTMP_FILE;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- system_wtmp_path=no
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
- if test x"$system_wtmp_path" = x"no" ; then
- for f in /usr/adm/wtmp /var/log/wtmp; do
- if test -f $f ; then
- conf_wtmp_location=$f
- fi
- done
- if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
- fi
-fi
-if test -n "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define CONF_WTMP_FILE "$conf_wtmp_location"
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines WTMPX_FILE" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking if your system defines WTMPX_FILE... " >&6; }
-cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <utmp.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
-#include <utmpx.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
-
-int
-main ()
-{
- char *wtmpx = WTMPX_FILE;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- system_wtmpx_path=no
-
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then
- if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
-else
-
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define CONF_WTMPX_FILE "$conf_wtmpx_location"
-_ACEOF
-
-fi
-
-
-if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $blibflags$blibpath"
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile" >&2;}
-fi
-
-ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct lastlog" "ll_line" "ac_cv_member_struct_lastlog_ll_line" "
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
-#include <utmp.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
-#include <utmpx.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
-#include <lastlog.h>
-#endif
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_lastlog_ll_line" = xyes; then :
-
-else
-
- if test x$SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE != "xyes" ; then
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- fi
-
-fi
-
-
-ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct utmp" "ut_line" "ac_cv_member_struct_utmp_ut_line" "
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
-#include <utmp.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
-#include <utmpx.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
-#include <lastlog.h>
-#endif
-
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_utmp_ut_line" = xyes; then :
-
-else
-
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- $as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
-
-
-fi
-
-
-CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags"
-
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" != "xyes" ; then
- TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
-else
- TEST_SSH_IPV6=yes
-fi
-ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "BROKEN_GETADDRINFO" "ac_cv_have_decl_BROKEN_GETADDRINFO" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_BROKEN_GETADDRINFO" = xyes; then :
- TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
-fi
-
-TEST_SSH_IPV6=$TEST_SSH_IPV6
-
-TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS=$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS
-
-UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS=$unsupported_algorithms
-
-
-
-ac_config_files="$ac_config_files Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile survey.sh"
-
-cat >confcache <<\_ACEOF
-# This file is a shell script that caches the results of configure
-# tests run on this system so they can be shared between configure
-# scripts and configure runs, see configure's option --config-cache.
-# It is not useful on other systems. If it contains results you don't
-# want to keep, you may remove or edit it.
-#
-# config.status only pays attention to the cache file if you give it
-# the --recheck option to rerun configure.
-#
-# `ac_cv_env_foo' variables (set or unset) will be overridden when
-# loading this file, other *unset* `ac_cv_foo' will be assigned the
-# following values.
-
-_ACEOF
-
-# The following way of writing the cache mishandles newlines in values,
-# but we know of no workaround that is simple, portable, and efficient.
-# So, we kill variables containing newlines.
-# Ultrix sh set writes to stderr and can't be redirected directly,
-# and sets the high bit in the cache file unless we assign to the vars.
-(
- for ac_var in `(set) 2>&1 | sed -n 's/^\([a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)=.*/\1/p'`; do
- eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
- case $ac_val in #(
- *${as_nl}*)
- case $ac_var in #(
- *_cv_*) { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cache variable $ac_var contains a newline" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cache variable $ac_var contains a newline" >&2;} ;;
- esac
- case $ac_var in #(
- _ | IFS | as_nl) ;; #(
- BASH_ARGV | BASH_SOURCE) eval $ac_var= ;; #(
- *) { eval $ac_var=; unset $ac_var;} ;;
- esac ;;
- esac
- done
-
- (set) 2>&1 |
- case $as_nl`(ac_space=' '; set) 2>&1` in #(
- *${as_nl}ac_space=\ *)
- # `set' does not quote correctly, so add quotes: double-quote
- # substitution turns \\\\ into \\, and sed turns \\ into \.
- sed -n \
- "s/'/'\\\\''/g;
- s/^\\([_$as_cr_alnum]*_cv_[_$as_cr_alnum]*\\)=\\(.*\\)/\\1='\\2'/p"
- ;; #(
- *)
- # `set' quotes correctly as required by POSIX, so do not add quotes.
- sed -n "/^[_$as_cr_alnum]*_cv_[_$as_cr_alnum]*=/p"
- ;;
- esac |
- sort
-) |
- sed '
- /^ac_cv_env_/b end
- t clear
- :clear
- s/^\([^=]*\)=\(.*[{}].*\)$/test "${\1+set}" = set || &/
- t end
- s/^\([^=]*\)=\(.*\)$/\1=${\1=\2}/
- :end' >>confcache
-if diff "$cache_file" confcache >/dev/null 2>&1; then :; else
- if test -w "$cache_file"; then
- if test "x$cache_file" != "x/dev/null"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: updating cache $cache_file" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: updating cache $cache_file" >&6;}
- if test ! -f "$cache_file" || test -h "$cache_file"; then
- cat confcache >"$cache_file"
- else
- case $cache_file in #(
- */* | ?:*)
- mv -f confcache "$cache_file"$$ &&
- mv -f "$cache_file"$$ "$cache_file" ;; #(
- *)
- mv -f confcache "$cache_file" ;;
- esac
- fi
- fi
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: not updating unwritable cache $cache_file" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: not updating unwritable cache $cache_file" >&6;}
- fi
-fi
-rm -f confcache
-
-test "x$prefix" = xNONE && prefix=$ac_default_prefix
-# Let make expand exec_prefix.
-test "x$exec_prefix" = xNONE && exec_prefix='${prefix}'
-
-DEFS=-DHAVE_CONFIG_H
-
-ac_libobjs=
-ac_ltlibobjs=
-U=
-for ac_i in : $LIBOBJS; do test "x$ac_i" = x: && continue
- # 1. Remove the extension, and $U if already installed.
- ac_script='s/\$U\././;s/\.o$//;s/\.obj$//'
- ac_i=`$as_echo "$ac_i" | sed "$ac_script"`
- # 2. Prepend LIBOBJDIR. When used with automake>=1.10 LIBOBJDIR
- # will be set to the directory where LIBOBJS objects are built.
- as_fn_append ac_libobjs " \${LIBOBJDIR}$ac_i\$U.$ac_objext"
- as_fn_append ac_ltlibobjs " \${LIBOBJDIR}$ac_i"'$U.lo'
-done
-LIBOBJS=$ac_libobjs
-
-LTLIBOBJS=$ac_ltlibobjs
-
-
-
-
-: "${CONFIG_STATUS=./config.status}"
-ac_write_fail=0
-ac_clean_files_save=$ac_clean_files
-ac_clean_files="$ac_clean_files $CONFIG_STATUS"
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: creating $CONFIG_STATUS" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: creating $CONFIG_STATUS" >&6;}
-as_write_fail=0
-cat >$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ASEOF || as_write_fail=1
-#! $SHELL
-# Generated by $as_me.
-# Run this file to recreate the current configuration.
-# Compiler output produced by configure, useful for debugging
-# configure, is in config.log if it exists.
-
-debug=false
-ac_cs_recheck=false
-ac_cs_silent=false
-
-SHELL=\${CONFIG_SHELL-$SHELL}
-export SHELL
-_ASEOF
-cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ASEOF || as_write_fail=1
-## -------------------- ##
-## M4sh Initialization. ##
-## -------------------- ##
-
-# Be more Bourne compatible
-DUALCASE=1; export DUALCASE # for MKS sh
-if test -n "${ZSH_VERSION+set}" && (emulate sh) >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
- emulate sh
- NULLCMD=:
- # Pre-4.2 versions of Zsh do word splitting on ${1+"$@"}, which
- # is contrary to our usage. Disable this feature.
- alias -g '${1+"$@"}'='"$@"'
- setopt NO_GLOB_SUBST
-else
- case `(set -o) 2>/dev/null` in #(
- *posix*) :
- set -o posix ;; #(
- *) :
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-
-
-as_nl='
-'
-export as_nl
-# Printing a long string crashes Solaris 7 /usr/bin/printf.
-as_echo='\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'
-as_echo=$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo
-as_echo=$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo
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-# but without wasting forks for bash or zsh.
-if test -z "$BASH_VERSION$ZSH_VERSION" \
- && (test "X`print -r -- $as_echo`" = "X$as_echo") 2>/dev/null; then
- as_echo='print -r --'
- as_echo_n='print -rn --'
-elif (test "X`printf %s $as_echo`" = "X$as_echo") 2>/dev/null; then
- as_echo='printf %s\n'
- as_echo_n='printf %s'
-else
- if test "X`(/usr/ucb/echo -n -n $as_echo) 2>/dev/null`" = "X-n $as_echo"; then
- as_echo_body='eval /usr/ucb/echo -n "$1$as_nl"'
- as_echo_n='/usr/ucb/echo -n'
- else
- as_echo_body='eval expr "X$1" : "X\\(.*\\)"'
- as_echo_n_body='eval
- arg=$1;
- case $arg in #(
- *"$as_nl"*)
- expr "X$arg" : "X\\(.*\\)$as_nl";
- arg=`expr "X$arg" : ".*$as_nl\\(.*\\)"`;;
- esac;
- expr "X$arg" : "X\\(.*\\)" | tr -d "$as_nl"
- '
- export as_echo_n_body
- as_echo_n='sh -c $as_echo_n_body as_echo'
- fi
- export as_echo_body
- as_echo='sh -c $as_echo_body as_echo'
-fi
-
-# The user is always right.
-if test "${PATH_SEPARATOR+set}" != set; then
- PATH_SEPARATOR=:
- (PATH='/bin;/bin'; FPATH=$PATH; sh -c :) >/dev/null 2>&1 && {
- (PATH='/bin:/bin'; FPATH=$PATH; sh -c :) >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
- PATH_SEPARATOR=';'
- }
-fi
-
-
-# IFS
-# We need space, tab and new line, in precisely that order. Quoting is
-# there to prevent editors from complaining about space-tab.
-# (If _AS_PATH_WALK were called with IFS unset, it would disable word
-# splitting by setting IFS to empty value.)
-IFS=" "" $as_nl"
-
-# Find who we are. Look in the path if we contain no directory separator.
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-case $0 in #((
- *[\\/]* ) as_myself=$0 ;;
- *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- test -r "$as_dir/$0" && as_myself=$as_dir/$0 && break
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
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- as_myself=$0
-fi
-if test ! -f "$as_myself"; then
- $as_echo "$as_myself: error: cannot find myself; rerun with an absolute file name" >&2
- exit 1
-fi
-
-# Unset variables that we do not need and which cause bugs (e.g. in
-# pre-3.0 UWIN ksh). But do not cause bugs in bash 2.01; the "|| exit 1"
-# suppresses any "Segmentation fault" message there. '((' could
-# trigger a bug in pdksh 5.2.14.
-for as_var in BASH_ENV ENV MAIL MAILPATH
-do eval test x\${$as_var+set} = xset \
- && ( (unset $as_var) || exit 1) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset $as_var || :
-done
-PS1='$ '
-PS2='> '
-PS4='+ '
-
-# NLS nuisances.
-LC_ALL=C
-export LC_ALL
-LANGUAGE=C
-export LANGUAGE
-
-# CDPATH.
-(unset CDPATH) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset CDPATH
-
-
-# as_fn_error STATUS ERROR [LINENO LOG_FD]
-# ----------------------------------------
-# Output "`basename $0`: error: ERROR" to stderr. If LINENO and LOG_FD are
-# provided, also output the error to LOG_FD, referencing LINENO. Then exit the
-# script with STATUS, using 1 if that was 0.
-as_fn_error ()
-{
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- if test "$4"; then
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- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: $2" >&$4
- fi
- $as_echo "$as_me: error: $2" >&2
- as_fn_exit $as_status
-} # as_fn_error
-
-
-# as_fn_set_status STATUS
-# -----------------------
-# Set $? to STATUS, without forking.
-as_fn_set_status ()
-{
- return $1
-} # as_fn_set_status
-
-# as_fn_exit STATUS
-# -----------------
-# Exit the shell with STATUS, even in a "trap 0" or "set -e" context.
-as_fn_exit ()
-{
- set +e
- as_fn_set_status $1
- exit $1
-} # as_fn_exit
-
-# as_fn_unset VAR
-# ---------------
-# Portably unset VAR.
-as_fn_unset ()
-{
- { eval $1=; unset $1;}
-}
-as_unset=as_fn_unset
-# as_fn_append VAR VALUE
-# ----------------------
-# Append the text in VALUE to the end of the definition contained in VAR. Take
-# advantage of any shell optimizations that allow amortized linear growth over
-# repeated appends, instead of the typical quadratic growth present in naive
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-if (eval "as_var=1; as_var+=2; test x\$as_var = x12") 2>/dev/null; then :
- eval 'as_fn_append ()
- {
- eval $1+=\$2
- }'
-else
- as_fn_append ()
- {
- eval $1=\$$1\$2
- }
-fi # as_fn_append
-
-# as_fn_arith ARG...
-# ------------------
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-# global $as_val. Take advantage of shells that can avoid forks. The arguments
-# must be portable across $(()) and expr.
-if (eval "test \$(( 1 + 1 )) = 2") 2>/dev/null; then :
- eval 'as_fn_arith ()
- {
- as_val=$(( $* ))
- }'
-else
- as_fn_arith ()
- {
- as_val=`expr "$@" || test $? -eq 1`
- }
-fi # as_fn_arith
-
-
-if expr a : '\(a\)' >/dev/null 2>&1 &&
- test "X`expr 00001 : '.*\(...\)'`" = X001; then
- as_expr=expr
-else
- as_expr=false
-fi
-
-if (basename -- /) >/dev/null 2>&1 && test "X`basename -- / 2>&1`" = "X/"; then
- as_basename=basename
-else
- as_basename=false
-fi
-
-if (as_dir=`dirname -- /` && test "X$as_dir" = X/) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
- as_dirname=dirname
-else
- as_dirname=false
-fi
-
-as_me=`$as_basename -- "$0" ||
-$as_expr X/"$0" : '.*/\([^/][^/]*\)/*$' \| \
- X"$0" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
- X"$0" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
-$as_echo X/"$0" |
- sed '/^.*\/\([^/][^/]*\)\/*$/{
- s//\1/
- q
- }
- /^X\/\(\/\/\)$/{
- s//\1/
- q
- }
- /^X\/\(\/\).*/{
- s//\1/
- q
- }
- s/.*/./; q'`
-
-# Avoid depending upon Character Ranges.
-as_cr_letters='abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'
-as_cr_LETTERS='ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'
-as_cr_Letters=$as_cr_letters$as_cr_LETTERS
-as_cr_digits='0123456789'
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-# by configure, so config.status won't be able to write to it; its
-# output is simply discarded. So we exec the FD to /dev/null,
-# effectively closing config.log, so it can be properly (re)opened and
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- exec 5>>config.log
- # Use ||, not &&, to avoid exiting from the if with $? = 1, which
- # would make configure fail if this is the last instruction.
- $ac_cs_success || as_fn_exit 1
-fi
-if test -n "$ac_unrecognized_opts" && test "$enable_option_checking" != no; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: unrecognized options: $ac_unrecognized_opts" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: unrecognized options: $ac_unrecognized_opts" >&2;}
-fi
-
-
-# Print summary of options
-
-# Someone please show me a better way :)
-A=`eval echo ${prefix}` ; A=`eval echo ${A}`
-B=`eval echo ${bindir}` ; B=`eval echo ${B}`
-C=`eval echo ${sbindir}` ; C=`eval echo ${C}`
-D=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` ; D=`eval echo ${D}`
-E=`eval echo ${libexecdir}/ssh-askpass` ; E=`eval echo ${E}`
-F=`eval echo ${mandir}/${mansubdir}X` ; F=`eval echo ${F}`
-G=`eval echo ${piddir}` ; G=`eval echo ${G}`
-H=`eval echo ${PRIVSEP_PATH}` ; H=`eval echo ${H}`
-I=`eval echo ${user_path}` ; I=`eval echo ${I}`
-J=`eval echo ${superuser_path}` ; J=`eval echo ${J}`
-
-echo ""
-echo "OpenSSH has been configured with the following options:"
-echo " User binaries: $B"
-echo " System binaries: $C"
-echo " Configuration files: $D"
-echo " Askpass program: $E"
-echo " Manual pages: $F"
-echo " PID file: $G"
-echo " Privilege separation chroot path: $H"
-if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
-echo " At runtime, sshd will use the path defined in $external_path_file"
-echo " Make sure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work"
-else
-echo " sshd default user PATH: $I"
- if test ! -z "$external_path_file"; then
-echo " (If PATH is set in $external_path_file it will be used instead. If"
-echo " used, ensure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work.)"
- fi
-fi
-if test ! -z "$superuser_path" ; then
-echo " sshd superuser user PATH: $J"
-fi
-echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE"
-echo " PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
-echo " OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
-echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
-echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
-echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
-echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
-echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
-echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
-echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
-echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
-echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
-echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
-echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
-echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
-echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
-echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
-
-echo ""
-
-echo " Host: ${host}"
-echo " Compiler: ${CC}"
-echo " Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}"
-echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}"
-echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}"
-echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}"
-if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
-echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
-fi
-if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then
-echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}"
-fi
-
-echo ""
-
-if test "x$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" = "xyes" ; then
- echo "SVR4 style packages are supported with \"make package\""
- echo ""
-fi
-
-if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
- echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file "
- echo "for sshd, otherwise password authentication may fail. "
- echo "Example PAM control files can be found in the contrib/ "
- echo "subdirectory"
- echo ""
-fi
-
-if test ! -z "$NO_PEERCHECK" ; then
- echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not"
- echo "appear to support getpeereid(), getpeerucred() or the"
- echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to"
- echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to"
- echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious"
- echo "user can connect to your agent."
- echo ""
-fi
-
-if test "$AUDIT_MODULE" = "bsm" ; then
- echo "WARNING: BSM audit support is currently considered EXPERIMENTAL."
- echo "See the Solaris section in README.platform for details."
-fi
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/configure (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/configure)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/configure (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/configure 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,37573 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+# From configure.ac Revision: 1.583 .
+# Guess values for system-dependent variables and create Makefiles.
+# Generated by GNU Autoconf 2.61 for OpenSSH Portable.
+#
+# Report bugs to <openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org>.
+#
+# Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001,
+# 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# This configure script is free software; the Free Software Foundation
+# gives unlimited permission to copy, distribute and modify it.
+## --------------------- ##
+## M4sh Initialization. ##
+## --------------------- ##
+
+# Be more Bourne compatible
+DUALCASE=1; export DUALCASE # for MKS sh
+if test -n "${ZSH_VERSION+set}" && (emulate sh) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ emulate sh
+ NULLCMD=:
+ # Zsh 3.x and 4.x performs word splitting on ${1+"$@"}, which
+ # is contrary to our usage. Disable this feature.
+ alias -g '${1+"$@"}'='"$@"'
+ setopt NO_GLOB_SUBST
+else
+ case `(set -o) 2>/dev/null` in
+ *posix*) set -o posix ;;
+esac
+
+fi
+
+
+
+
+# PATH needs CR
+# Avoid depending upon Character Ranges.
+as_cr_letters='abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'
+as_cr_LETTERS='ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'
+as_cr_Letters=$as_cr_letters$as_cr_LETTERS
+as_cr_digits='0123456789'
+as_cr_alnum=$as_cr_Letters$as_cr_digits
+
+# The user is always right.
+if test "${PATH_SEPARATOR+set}" != set; then
+ echo "#! /bin/sh" >conf$$.sh
+ echo "exit 0" >>conf$$.sh
+ chmod +x conf$$.sh
+ if (PATH="/nonexistent;."; conf$$.sh) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ PATH_SEPARATOR=';'
+ else
+ PATH_SEPARATOR=:
+ fi
+ rm -f conf$$.sh
+fi
+
+# Support unset when possible.
+if ( (MAIL=60; unset MAIL) || exit) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ as_unset=unset
+else
+ as_unset=false
+fi
+
+
+# IFS
+# We need space, tab and new line, in precisely that order. Quoting is
+# there to prevent editors from complaining about space-tab.
+# (If _AS_PATH_WALK were called with IFS unset, it would disable word
+# splitting by setting IFS to empty value.)
+as_nl='
+'
+IFS=" "" $as_nl"
+
+# Find who we are. Look in the path if we contain no directory separator.
+case $0 in
+ *[\\/]* ) as_myself=$0 ;;
+ *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ test -r "$as_dir/$0" && as_myself=$as_dir/$0 && break
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+# We did not find ourselves, most probably we were run as `sh COMMAND'
+# in which case we are not to be found in the path.
+if test "x$as_myself" = x; then
+ as_myself=$0
+fi
+if test ! -f "$as_myself"; then
+ echo "$as_myself: error: cannot find myself; rerun with an absolute file name" >&2
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }
+fi
+
+# Work around bugs in pre-3.0 UWIN ksh.
+for as_var in ENV MAIL MAILPATH
+do ($as_unset $as_var) >/dev/null 2>&1 && $as_unset $as_var
+done
+PS1='$ '
+PS2='> '
+PS4='+ '
+
+# NLS nuisances.
+for as_var in \
+ LANG LANGUAGE LC_ADDRESS LC_ALL LC_COLLATE LC_CTYPE LC_IDENTIFICATION \
+ LC_MEASUREMENT LC_MESSAGES LC_MONETARY LC_NAME LC_NUMERIC LC_PAPER \
+ LC_TELEPHONE LC_TIME
+do
+ if (set +x; test -z "`(eval $as_var=C; export $as_var) 2>&1`"); then
+ eval $as_var=C; export $as_var
+ else
+ ($as_unset $as_var) >/dev/null 2>&1 && $as_unset $as_var
+ fi
+done
+
+# Required to use basename.
+if expr a : '\(a\)' >/dev/null 2>&1 &&
+ test "X`expr 00001 : '.*\(...\)'`" = X001; then
+ as_expr=expr
+else
+ as_expr=false
+fi
+
+if (basename -- /) >/dev/null 2>&1 && test "X`basename -- / 2>&1`" = "X/"; then
+ as_basename=basename
+else
+ as_basename=false
+fi
+
+
+# Name of the executable.
+as_me=`$as_basename -- "$0" ||
+$as_expr X/"$0" : '.*/\([^/][^/]*\)/*$' \| \
+ X"$0" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
+ X"$0" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
+echo X/"$0" |
+ sed '/^.*\/\([^/][^/]*\)\/*$/{
+ s//\1/
+ q
+ }
+ /^X\/\(\/\/\)$/{
+ s//\1/
+ q
+ }
+ /^X\/\(\/\).*/{
+ s//\1/
+ q
+ }
+ s/.*/./; q'`
+
+# CDPATH.
+$as_unset CDPATH
+
+
+if test "x$CONFIG_SHELL" = x; then
+ if (eval ":") 2>/dev/null; then
+ as_have_required=yes
+else
+ as_have_required=no
+fi
+
+ if test $as_have_required = yes && (eval ":
+(as_func_return () {
+ (exit \$1)
+}
+as_func_success () {
+ as_func_return 0
+}
+as_func_failure () {
+ as_func_return 1
+}
+as_func_ret_success () {
+ return 0
+}
+as_func_ret_failure () {
+ return 1
+}
+
+exitcode=0
+if as_func_success; then
+ :
+else
+ exitcode=1
+ echo as_func_success failed.
+fi
+
+if as_func_failure; then
+ exitcode=1
+ echo as_func_failure succeeded.
+fi
+
+if as_func_ret_success; then
+ :
+else
+ exitcode=1
+ echo as_func_ret_success failed.
+fi
+
+if as_func_ret_failure; then
+ exitcode=1
+ echo as_func_ret_failure succeeded.
+fi
+
+if ( set x; as_func_ret_success y && test x = \"\$1\" ); then
+ :
+else
+ exitcode=1
+ echo positional parameters were not saved.
+fi
+
+test \$exitcode = 0) || { (exit 1); exit 1; }
+
+(
+ as_lineno_1=\$LINENO
+ as_lineno_2=\$LINENO
+ test \"x\$as_lineno_1\" != \"x\$as_lineno_2\" &&
+ test \"x\`expr \$as_lineno_1 + 1\`\" = \"x\$as_lineno_2\") || { (exit 1); exit 1; }
+") 2> /dev/null; then
+ :
+else
+ as_candidate_shells=
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in /bin$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/bin$PATH_SEPARATOR$PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ case $as_dir in
+ /*)
+ for as_base in sh bash ksh sh5; do
+ as_candidate_shells="$as_candidate_shells $as_dir/$as_base"
+ done;;
+ esac
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+
+ for as_shell in $as_candidate_shells $SHELL; do
+ # Try only shells that exist, to save several forks.
+ if { test -f "$as_shell" || test -f "$as_shell.exe"; } &&
+ { ("$as_shell") 2> /dev/null <<\_ASEOF
+if test -n "${ZSH_VERSION+set}" && (emulate sh) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ emulate sh
+ NULLCMD=:
+ # Zsh 3.x and 4.x performs word splitting on ${1+"$@"}, which
+ # is contrary to our usage. Disable this feature.
+ alias -g '${1+"$@"}'='"$@"'
+ setopt NO_GLOB_SUBST
+else
+ case `(set -o) 2>/dev/null` in
+ *posix*) set -o posix ;;
+esac
+
+fi
+
+
+:
+_ASEOF
+}; then
+ CONFIG_SHELL=$as_shell
+ as_have_required=yes
+ if { "$as_shell" 2> /dev/null <<\_ASEOF
+if test -n "${ZSH_VERSION+set}" && (emulate sh) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ emulate sh
+ NULLCMD=:
+ # Zsh 3.x and 4.x performs word splitting on ${1+"$@"}, which
+ # is contrary to our usage. Disable this feature.
+ alias -g '${1+"$@"}'='"$@"'
+ setopt NO_GLOB_SUBST
+else
+ case `(set -o) 2>/dev/null` in
+ *posix*) set -o posix ;;
+esac
+
+fi
+
+
+:
+(as_func_return () {
+ (exit $1)
+}
+as_func_success () {
+ as_func_return 0
+}
+as_func_failure () {
+ as_func_return 1
+}
+as_func_ret_success () {
+ return 0
+}
+as_func_ret_failure () {
+ return 1
+}
+
+exitcode=0
+if as_func_success; then
+ :
+else
+ exitcode=1
+ echo as_func_success failed.
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+ -host | --host | --hos | --ho)
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+ -htmldir | --htmldir | --htmldi | --htmld | --html | --htm | --ht)
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+ -htmldir=* | --htmldir=* | --htmldi=* | --htmld=* | --html=* | --htm=* \
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+ -includedir | --includedir | --includedi | --included | --include \
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+ -infodir | --infodir | --infodi | --infod | --info | --inf)
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+ -libdir=* | --libdir=* | --libdi=* | --libd=*)
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+ -localedir | --localedir | --localedi | --localed | --locale)
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+ -localedir=* | --localedir=* | --localedi=* | --localed=* | --locale=*)
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+
+ -localstatedir | --localstatedir | --localstatedi | --localstated \
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+ -localstatedir=* | --localstatedir=* | --localstatedi=* | --localstated=* \
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+
+ -mandir | --mandir | --mandi | --mand | --man | --ma | --m)
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+ -mandir=* | --mandir=* | --mandi=* | --mand=* | --man=* | --ma=* | --m=*)
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+
+ -nfp | --nfp | --nf)
+ # Obsolete; use --without-fp.
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+ -no-create | --no-create | --no-creat | --no-crea | --no-cre \
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+
+ -no-recursion | --no-recursion | --no-recursio | --no-recursi \
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+
+ -oldincludedir | --oldincludedir | --oldincludedi | --oldincluded \
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+ -oldincludedir=* | --oldincludedir=* | --oldincludedi=* | --oldincluded=* \
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+ ac_prev=sharedstatedir ;;
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+ sharedstatedir=$ac_optarg ;;
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+ ac_option=--`echo $ac_prev | sed 's/_/-/g'`
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+ if test ! -r "$srcdir/$ac_unique_file"; then
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+ fi
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+ac_msg="sources are in $srcdir, but \`cd $srcdir' does not work"
+ac_abs_confdir=`(
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+ srcdir=.
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+# Remove unnecessary trailing slashes from srcdir.
+# Double slashes in file names in object file debugging info
+# mess up M-x gdb in Emacs.
+case $srcdir in
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+esac
+for ac_var in $ac_precious_vars; do
+ eval ac_env_${ac_var}_set=\${${ac_var}+set}
+ eval ac_env_${ac_var}_value=\$${ac_var}
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+done
+
+#
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+#
+if test "$ac_init_help" = "long"; then
+ # Omit some internal or obsolete options to make the list less imposing.
+ # This message is too long to be a string in the A/UX 3.1 sh.
+ cat <<_ACEOF
+\`configure' configures OpenSSH Portable to adapt to many kinds of systems.
+
+Usage: $0 [OPTION]... [VAR=VALUE]...
+
+To assign environment variables (e.g., CC, CFLAGS...), specify them as
+VAR=VALUE. See below for descriptions of some of the useful variables.
+
+Defaults for the options are specified in brackets.
+
+Configuration:
+ -h, --help display this help and exit
+ --help=short display options specific to this package
+ --help=recursive display the short help of all the included packages
+ -V, --version display version information and exit
+ -q, --quiet, --silent do not print \`checking...' messages
+ --cache-file=FILE cache test results in FILE [disabled]
+ -C, --config-cache alias for \`--cache-file=config.cache'
+ -n, --no-create do not create output files
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+Installation directories:
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+ --exec-prefix=EPREFIX install architecture-dependent files in EPREFIX
+ [PREFIX]
+
+By default, \`make install' will install all the files in
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+an installation prefix other than \`$ac_default_prefix' using \`--prefix',
+for instance \`--prefix=\$HOME'.
+
+For better control, use the options below.
+
+Fine tuning of the installation directories:
+ --bindir=DIR user executables [EPREFIX/bin]
+ --sbindir=DIR system admin executables [EPREFIX/sbin]
+ --libexecdir=DIR program executables [EPREFIX/libexec]
+ --sysconfdir=DIR read-only single-machine data [PREFIX/etc]
+ --sharedstatedir=DIR modifiable architecture-independent data [PREFIX/com]
+ --localstatedir=DIR modifiable single-machine data [PREFIX/var]
+ --libdir=DIR object code libraries [EPREFIX/lib]
+ --includedir=DIR C header files [PREFIX/include]
+ --oldincludedir=DIR C header files for non-gcc [/usr/include]
+ --datarootdir=DIR read-only arch.-independent data root [PREFIX/share]
+ --datadir=DIR read-only architecture-independent data [DATAROOTDIR]
+ --infodir=DIR info documentation [DATAROOTDIR/info]
+ --localedir=DIR locale-dependent data [DATAROOTDIR/locale]
+ --mandir=DIR man documentation [DATAROOTDIR/man]
+ --docdir=DIR documentation root [DATAROOTDIR/doc/openssh]
+ --htmldir=DIR html documentation [DOCDIR]
+ --dvidir=DIR dvi documentation [DOCDIR]
+ --pdfdir=DIR pdf documentation [DOCDIR]
+ --psdir=DIR ps documentation [DOCDIR]
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat <<\_ACEOF
+
+System types:
+ --build=BUILD configure for building on BUILD [guessed]
+ --host=HOST cross-compile to build programs to run on HOST [BUILD]
+_ACEOF
+fi
+
+if test -n "$ac_init_help"; then
+ case $ac_init_help in
+ short | recursive ) echo "Configuration of OpenSSH Portable:";;
+ esac
+ cat <<\_ACEOF
+
+Optional Features:
+ --disable-FEATURE do not include FEATURE (same as --enable-FEATURE=no)
+ --enable-FEATURE[=ARG] include FEATURE [ARG=yes]
+ --disable-largefile omit support for large files
+ --disable-pkcs11 disable PKCS#11 support code [no]
+ --disable-strip Disable calling strip(1) on install
+ --disable-etc-default-login Disable using PATH from /etc/default/login no
+ --disable-lastlog disable use of lastlog even if detected no
+ --disable-utmp disable use of utmp even if detected no
+ --disable-utmpx disable use of utmpx even if detected no
+ --disable-wtmp disable use of wtmp even if detected no
+ --disable-wtmpx disable use of wtmpx even if detected no
+ --disable-libutil disable use of libutil (login() etc.) no
+ --disable-pututline disable use of pututline() etc. (uwtmp) no
+ --disable-pututxline disable use of pututxline() etc. (uwtmpx) no
+
+Optional Packages:
+ --with-PACKAGE[=ARG] use PACKAGE [ARG=yes]
+ --without-PACKAGE do not use PACKAGE (same as --with-PACKAGE=no)
+ --without-openssl Disable use of OpenSSL; use only limited internal crypto **EXPERIMENTAL**
+ --with-ssh1 Enable support for SSH protocol 1
+ --without-stackprotect Don't use compiler's stack protection
+ --without-hardening Don't use toolchain hardening flags
+ --without-rpath Disable auto-added -R linker paths
+ --with-cflags Specify additional flags to pass to compiler
+ --with-cppflags Specify additional flags to pass to preprocessor
+ --with-ldflags Specify additional flags to pass to linker
+ --with-libs Specify additional libraries to link with
+ --with-Werror Build main code with -Werror
+ --with-solaris-contracts Enable Solaris process contracts (experimental)
+ --with-solaris-projects Enable Solaris projects (experimental)
+ --with-solaris-privs Enable Solaris/Illumos privileges (experimental)
+ --with-osfsia Enable Digital Unix SIA
+ --with-zlib=PATH Use zlib in PATH
+ --without-zlib-version-check Disable zlib version check
+ --with-skey[=PATH] Enable S/Key support (optionally in PATH)
+ --with-ldns[=PATH] Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)
+ --with-libedit[=PATH] Enable libedit support for sftp
+ --with-audit=module Enable audit support (modules=debug,bsm,linux)
+ --with-pie Build Position Independent Executables if possible
+ --with-ssl-dir=PATH Specify path to OpenSSL installation
+ --without-openssl-header-check Disable OpenSSL version consistency check
+ --with-ssl-engine Enable OpenSSL (hardware) ENGINE support
+ --with-prngd-port=PORT read entropy from PRNGD/EGD TCP localhost:PORT
+ --with-prngd-socket=FILE read entropy from PRNGD/EGD socket FILE (default=/var/run/egd-pool)
+ --with-pam Enable PAM support
+ --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation
+ --with-sandbox=style Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, capsicum, darwin, rlimit, seccomp_filter, systrace, pledge)
+ --with-selinux Enable SELinux support
+ --with-kerberos5=PATH Enable Kerberos 5 support
+ --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot (default=/var/empty)
+ --with-xauth=PATH Specify path to xauth program
+ --with-maildir=/path/to/mail Specify your system mail directory
+ --with-mantype=man|cat|doc Set man page type
+ --with-md5-passwords Enable use of MD5 passwords
+ --without-shadow Disable shadow password support
+ --with-ipaddr-display Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY
+ --with-default-path= Specify default $PATH environment for server
+ --with-superuser-path= Specify different path for super-user
+ --with-4in6 Check for and convert IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses
+ --with-bsd-auth Enable BSD auth support
+ --with-pid-dir=PATH Specify location of ssh.pid file
+ --with-lastlog=FILE|DIR specify lastlog location common locations
+
+Some influential environment variables:
+ CC C compiler command
+ CFLAGS C compiler flags
+ LDFLAGS linker flags, e.g. -L<lib dir> if you have libraries in a
+ nonstandard directory <lib dir>
+ LIBS libraries to pass to the linker, e.g. -l<library>
+ CPPFLAGS C/C++/Objective C preprocessor flags, e.g. -I<include dir> if
+ you have headers in a nonstandard directory <include dir>
+ CPP C preprocessor
+
+Use these variables to override the choices made by `configure' or to help
+it to find libraries and programs with nonstandard names/locations.
+
+Report bugs to <openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org>.
+_ACEOF
+ac_status=$?
+fi
+
+if test "$ac_init_help" = "recursive"; then
+ # If there are subdirs, report their specific --help.
+ for ac_dir in : $ac_subdirs_all; do test "x$ac_dir" = x: && continue
+ test -d "$ac_dir" || continue
+ ac_builddir=.
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+case "$ac_dir" in
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+ case $ac_top_builddir_sub in
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+ac_abs_builddir=$ac_pwd$ac_dir_suffix
+# for backward compatibility:
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+ ac_srcdir=.
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+ ac_abs_top_srcdir=$ac_pwd/$srcdir ;;
+esac
+ac_abs_srcdir=$ac_abs_top_srcdir$ac_dir_suffix
+
+ cd "$ac_dir" || { ac_status=$?; continue; }
+ # Check for guested configure.
+ if test -f "$ac_srcdir/configure.gnu"; then
+ echo &&
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+ elif test -f "$ac_srcdir/configure"; then
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+ echo "$as_me: WARNING: no configuration information is in $ac_dir" >&2
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+ cd "$ac_pwd" || { ac_status=$?; break; }
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+fi
+
+test -n "$ac_init_help" && exit $ac_status
+if $ac_init_version; then
+ cat <<\_ACEOF
+OpenSSH configure Portable
+generated by GNU Autoconf 2.61
+
+Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001,
+2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+This configure script is free software; the Free Software Foundation
+gives unlimited permission to copy, distribute and modify it.
+_ACEOF
+ exit
+fi
+cat >config.log <<_ACEOF
+This file contains any messages produced by compilers while
+running configure, to aid debugging if configure makes a mistake.
+
+It was created by OpenSSH $as_me Portable, which was
+generated by GNU Autoconf 2.61. Invocation command line was
+
+ $ $0 $@
+
+_ACEOF
+exec 5>>config.log
+{
+cat <<_ASUNAME
+## --------- ##
+## Platform. ##
+## --------- ##
+
+hostname = `(hostname || uname -n) 2>/dev/null | sed 1q`
+uname -m = `(uname -m) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+uname -r = `(uname -r) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+uname -s = `(uname -s) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+uname -v = `(uname -v) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+
+/usr/bin/uname -p = `(/usr/bin/uname -p) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+/bin/uname -X = `(/bin/uname -X) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+
+/bin/arch = `(/bin/arch) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+/usr/bin/arch -k = `(/usr/bin/arch -k) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+/usr/convex/getsysinfo = `(/usr/convex/getsysinfo) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+/usr/bin/hostinfo = `(/usr/bin/hostinfo) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+/bin/machine = `(/bin/machine) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+/usr/bin/oslevel = `(/usr/bin/oslevel) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+/bin/universe = `(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+
+_ASUNAME
+
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
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+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+} >&5
+
+cat >&5 <<_ACEOF
+
+
+## ----------- ##
+## Core tests. ##
+## ----------- ##
+
+_ACEOF
+
+
+# Keep a trace of the command line.
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+ ac_configure_args1="$ac_configure_args1 '$ac_arg'"
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+ case "$ac_configure_args0 " in
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+ ac_configure_args="$ac_configure_args '$ac_arg'"
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+$as_unset ac_configure_args0 || test "${ac_configure_args0+set}" != set || { ac_configure_args0=; export ac_configure_args0; }
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+# WARNING: Use '\'' to represent an apostrophe within the trap.
+# WARNING: Do not start the trap code with a newline, due to a FreeBSD 4.0 bug.
+trap 'exit_status=$?
+ # Save into config.log some information that might help in debugging.
+ {
+ echo
+
+ cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ---------------- ##
+## Cache variables. ##
+## ---------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ echo
+ # The following way of writing the cache mishandles newlines in values,
+(
+ for ac_var in `(set) 2>&1 | sed -n '\''s/^\([a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)=.*/\1/p'\''`; do
+ eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
+ case $ac_val in #(
+ *${as_nl}*)
+ case $ac_var in #(
+ *_cv_*) { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: Cache variable $ac_var contains a newline." >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: Cache variable $ac_var contains a newline." >&2;} ;;
+ esac
+ case $ac_var in #(
+ _ | IFS | as_nl) ;; #(
+ *) $as_unset $ac_var ;;
+ esac ;;
+ esac
+ done
+ (set) 2>&1 |
+ case $as_nl`(ac_space='\'' '\''; set) 2>&1` in #(
+ *${as_nl}ac_space=\ *)
+ sed -n \
+ "s/'\''/'\''\\\\'\'''\''/g;
+ s/^\\([_$as_cr_alnum]*_cv_[_$as_cr_alnum]*\\)=\\(.*\\)/\\1='\''\\2'\''/p"
+ ;; #(
+ *)
+ sed -n "/^[_$as_cr_alnum]*_cv_[_$as_cr_alnum]*=/p"
+ ;;
+ esac |
+ sort
+)
+ echo
+
+ cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ----------------- ##
+## Output variables. ##
+## ----------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ echo
+ for ac_var in $ac_subst_vars
+ do
+ eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
+ case $ac_val in
+ *\'\''*) ac_val=`echo "$ac_val" | sed "s/'\''/'\''\\\\\\\\'\'''\''/g"`;;
+ esac
+ echo "$ac_var='\''$ac_val'\''"
+ done | sort
+ echo
+
+ if test -n "$ac_subst_files"; then
+ cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ------------------- ##
+## File substitutions. ##
+## ------------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ echo
+ for ac_var in $ac_subst_files
+ do
+ eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
+ case $ac_val in
+ *\'\''*) ac_val=`echo "$ac_val" | sed "s/'\''/'\''\\\\\\\\'\'''\''/g"`;;
+ esac
+ echo "$ac_var='\''$ac_val'\''"
+ done | sort
+ echo
+ fi
+
+ if test -s confdefs.h; then
+ cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ----------- ##
+## confdefs.h. ##
+## ----------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ echo
+ cat confdefs.h
+ echo
+ fi
+ test "$ac_signal" != 0 &&
+ echo "$as_me: caught signal $ac_signal"
+ echo "$as_me: exit $exit_status"
+ } >&5
+ rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* &&
+ rm -f -r conftest* confdefs* conf$$* $ac_clean_files &&
+ exit $exit_status
+' 0
+for ac_signal in 1 2 13 15; do
+ trap 'ac_signal='$ac_signal'; { (exit 1); exit 1; }' $ac_signal
+done
+ac_signal=0
+
+# confdefs.h avoids OS command line length limits that DEFS can exceed.
+rm -f -r conftest* confdefs.h
+
+# Predefined preprocessor variables.
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define PACKAGE_NAME "$PACKAGE_NAME"
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define PACKAGE_TARNAME "$PACKAGE_TARNAME"
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define PACKAGE_VERSION "$PACKAGE_VERSION"
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define PACKAGE_STRING "$PACKAGE_STRING"
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define PACKAGE_BUGREPORT "$PACKAGE_BUGREPORT"
+_ACEOF
+
+
+# Let the site file select an alternate cache file if it wants to.
+# Prefer explicitly selected file to automatically selected ones.
+if test -n "$CONFIG_SITE"; then
+ set x "$CONFIG_SITE"
+elif test "x$prefix" != xNONE; then
+ set x "$prefix/share/config.site" "$prefix/etc/config.site"
+else
+ set x "$ac_default_prefix/share/config.site" \
+ "$ac_default_prefix/etc/config.site"
+fi
+shift
+for ac_site_file
+do
+ if test -r "$ac_site_file"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: loading site script $ac_site_file" >&5
+echo "$as_me: loading site script $ac_site_file" >&6;}
+ sed 's/^/| /' "$ac_site_file" >&5
+ . "$ac_site_file"
+ fi
+done
+
+if test -r "$cache_file"; then
+ # Some versions of bash will fail to source /dev/null (special
+ # files actually), so we avoid doing that.
+ if test -f "$cache_file"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: loading cache $cache_file" >&5
+echo "$as_me: loading cache $cache_file" >&6;}
+ case $cache_file in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]* ) . "$cache_file";;
+ *) . "./$cache_file";;
+ esac
+ fi
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: creating cache $cache_file" >&5
+echo "$as_me: creating cache $cache_file" >&6;}
+ >$cache_file
+fi
+
+# Check that the precious variables saved in the cache have kept the same
+# value.
+ac_cache_corrupted=false
+for ac_var in $ac_precious_vars; do
+ eval ac_old_set=\$ac_cv_env_${ac_var}_set
+ eval ac_new_set=\$ac_env_${ac_var}_set
+ eval ac_old_val=\$ac_cv_env_${ac_var}_value
+ eval ac_new_val=\$ac_env_${ac_var}_value
+ case $ac_old_set,$ac_new_set in
+ set,)
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: \`$ac_var' was set to \`$ac_old_val' in the previous run" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: \`$ac_var' was set to \`$ac_old_val' in the previous run" >&2;}
+ ac_cache_corrupted=: ;;
+ ,set)
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: \`$ac_var' was not set in the previous run" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: \`$ac_var' was not set in the previous run" >&2;}
+ ac_cache_corrupted=: ;;
+ ,);;
+ *)
+ if test "x$ac_old_val" != "x$ac_new_val"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: \`$ac_var' has changed since the previous run:" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: \`$ac_var' has changed since the previous run:" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: former value: $ac_old_val" >&5
+echo "$as_me: former value: $ac_old_val" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: current value: $ac_new_val" >&5
+echo "$as_me: current value: $ac_new_val" >&2;}
+ ac_cache_corrupted=:
+ fi;;
+ esac
+ # Pass precious variables to config.status.
+ if test "$ac_new_set" = set; then
+ case $ac_new_val in
+ *\'*) ac_arg=$ac_var=`echo "$ac_new_val" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"` ;;
+ *) ac_arg=$ac_var=$ac_new_val ;;
+ esac
+ case " $ac_configure_args " in
+ *" '$ac_arg' "*) ;; # Avoid dups. Use of quotes ensures accuracy.
+ *) ac_configure_args="$ac_configure_args '$ac_arg'" ;;
+ esac
+ fi
+done
+if $ac_cache_corrupted; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: changes in the environment can compromise the build" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: changes in the environment can compromise the build" >&2;}
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: run \`make distclean' and/or \`rm $cache_file' and start over" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: run \`make distclean' and/or \`rm $cache_file' and start over" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ac_ext=c
+ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
+ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
+ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
+ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
+
+
+
+
+ac_ext=c
+ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
+ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
+ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
+ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
+
+
+ac_config_headers="$ac_config_headers config.h"
+
+ac_ext=c
+ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
+ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
+ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
+ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
+if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
+ # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}gcc", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}gcc; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_prog_CC+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ if test -n "$CC"; then
+ ac_cv_prog_CC="$CC" # Let the user override the test.
+else
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_prog_CC="${ac_tool_prefix}gcc"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+fi
+fi
+CC=$ac_cv_prog_CC
+if test -n "$CC"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $CC" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$CC" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+fi
+if test -z "$ac_cv_prog_CC"; then
+ ac_ct_CC=$CC
+ # Extract the first word of "gcc", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy gcc; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ if test -n "$ac_ct_CC"; then
+ ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC="$ac_ct_CC" # Let the user override the test.
+else
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC="gcc"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+fi
+fi
+ac_ct_CC=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC
+if test -n "$ac_ct_CC"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_ct_CC" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_ct_CC" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test "x$ac_ct_CC" = x; then
+ CC=""
+ else
+ case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
+yes:)
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: In the future, Autoconf will not detect cross-tools
+whose name does not start with the host triplet. If you think this
+configuration is useful to you, please write to autoconf at gnu.org." >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: In the future, Autoconf will not detect cross-tools
+whose name does not start with the host triplet. If you think this
+configuration is useful to you, please write to autoconf at gnu.org." >&2;}
+ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
+esac
+ CC=$ac_ct_CC
+ fi
+else
+ CC="$ac_cv_prog_CC"
+fi
+
+if test -z "$CC"; then
+ if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
+ # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}cc", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}cc; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_prog_CC+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ if test -n "$CC"; then
+ ac_cv_prog_CC="$CC" # Let the user override the test.
+else
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_prog_CC="${ac_tool_prefix}cc"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+fi
+fi
+CC=$ac_cv_prog_CC
+if test -n "$CC"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $CC" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$CC" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ fi
+fi
+if test -z "$CC"; then
+ # Extract the first word of "cc", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy cc; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_prog_CC+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ if test -n "$CC"; then
+ ac_cv_prog_CC="$CC" # Let the user override the test.
+else
+ ac_prog_rejected=no
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ if test "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" = "/usr/ucb/cc"; then
+ ac_prog_rejected=yes
+ continue
+ fi
+ ac_cv_prog_CC="cc"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+if test $ac_prog_rejected = yes; then
+ # We found a bogon in the path, so make sure we never use it.
+ set dummy $ac_cv_prog_CC
+ shift
+ if test $# != 0; then
+ # We chose a different compiler from the bogus one.
+ # However, it has the same basename, so the bogon will be chosen
+ # first if we set CC to just the basename; use the full file name.
+ shift
+ ac_cv_prog_CC="$as_dir/$ac_word${1+' '}$@"
+ fi
+fi
+fi
+fi
+CC=$ac_cv_prog_CC
+if test -n "$CC"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $CC" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$CC" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+fi
+if test -z "$CC"; then
+ if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
+ for ac_prog in cl.exe
+ do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_prog_CC+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ if test -n "$CC"; then
+ ac_cv_prog_CC="$CC" # Let the user override the test.
+else
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_prog_CC="$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+fi
+fi
+CC=$ac_cv_prog_CC
+if test -n "$CC"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $CC" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$CC" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$CC" && break
+ done
+fi
+if test -z "$CC"; then
+ ac_ct_CC=$CC
+ for ac_prog in cl.exe
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ if test -n "$ac_ct_CC"; then
+ ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC="$ac_ct_CC" # Let the user override the test.
+else
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC="$ac_prog"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+fi
+fi
+ac_ct_CC=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC
+if test -n "$ac_ct_CC"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_ct_CC" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_ct_CC" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$ac_ct_CC" && break
+done
+
+ if test "x$ac_ct_CC" = x; then
+ CC=""
+ else
+ case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
+yes:)
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: In the future, Autoconf will not detect cross-tools
+whose name does not start with the host triplet. If you think this
+configuration is useful to you, please write to autoconf at gnu.org." >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: In the future, Autoconf will not detect cross-tools
+whose name does not start with the host triplet. If you think this
+configuration is useful to you, please write to autoconf at gnu.org." >&2;}
+ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
+esac
+ CC=$ac_ct_CC
+ fi
+fi
+
+fi
+
+
+test -z "$CC" && { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: no acceptable C compiler found in \$PATH
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: no acceptable C compiler found in \$PATH
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+
+# Provide some information about the compiler.
+echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for C compiler version" >&5
+ac_compiler=`set X $ac_compile; echo $2`
+{ (ac_try="$ac_compiler --version >&5"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compiler --version >&5") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }
+{ (ac_try="$ac_compiler -v >&5"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compiler -v >&5") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }
+{ (ac_try="$ac_compiler -V >&5"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compiler -V >&5") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }
+
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+ac_clean_files_save=$ac_clean_files
+ac_clean_files="$ac_clean_files a.out a.exe b.out"
+# Try to create an executable without -o first, disregard a.out.
+# It will help us diagnose broken compilers, and finding out an intuition
+# of exeext.
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for C compiler default output file name" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for C compiler default output file name... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ac_link_default=`echo "$ac_link" | sed 's/ -o *conftest[^ ]*//'`
+#
+# List of possible output files, starting from the most likely.
+# The algorithm is not robust to junk in `.', hence go to wildcards (a.*)
+# only as a last resort. b.out is created by i960 compilers.
+ac_files='a_out.exe a.exe conftest.exe a.out conftest a.* conftest.* b.out'
+#
+# The IRIX 6 linker writes into existing files which may not be
+# executable, retaining their permissions. Remove them first so a
+# subsequent execution test works.
+ac_rmfiles=
+for ac_file in $ac_files
+do
+ case $ac_file in
+ *.$ac_ext | *.xcoff | *.tds | *.d | *.pdb | *.xSYM | *.bb | *.bbg | *.map | *.inf | *.o | *.obj ) ;;
+ * ) ac_rmfiles="$ac_rmfiles $ac_file";;
+ esac
+done
+rm -f $ac_rmfiles
+
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link_default"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link_default") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; then
+ # Autoconf-2.13 could set the ac_cv_exeext variable to `no'.
+# So ignore a value of `no', otherwise this would lead to `EXEEXT = no'
+# in a Makefile. We should not override ac_cv_exeext if it was cached,
+# so that the user can short-circuit this test for compilers unknown to
+# Autoconf.
+for ac_file in $ac_files ''
+do
+ test -f "$ac_file" || continue
+ case $ac_file in
+ *.$ac_ext | *.xcoff | *.tds | *.d | *.pdb | *.xSYM | *.bb | *.bbg | *.map | *.inf | *.o | *.obj )
+ ;;
+ [ab].out )
+ # We found the default executable, but exeext='' is most
+ # certainly right.
+ break;;
+ *.* )
+ if test "${ac_cv_exeext+set}" = set && test "$ac_cv_exeext" != no;
+ then :; else
+ ac_cv_exeext=`expr "$ac_file" : '[^.]*\(\..*\)'`
+ fi
+ # We set ac_cv_exeext here because the later test for it is not
+ # safe: cross compilers may not add the suffix if given an `-o'
+ # argument, so we may need to know it at that point already.
+ # Even if this section looks crufty: it has the advantage of
+ # actually working.
+ break;;
+ * )
+ break;;
+ esac
+done
+test "$ac_cv_exeext" = no && ac_cv_exeext=
+
+else
+ ac_file=''
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_file" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_file" >&6; }
+if test -z "$ac_file"; then
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+{ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: C compiler cannot create executables
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: C compiler cannot create executables
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&2;}
+ { (exit 77); exit 77; }; }
+fi
+
+ac_exeext=$ac_cv_exeext
+
+# Check that the compiler produces executables we can run. If not, either
+# the compiler is broken, or we cross compile.
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether the C compiler works" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether the C compiler works... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+# FIXME: These cross compiler hacks should be removed for Autoconf 3.0
+# If not cross compiling, check that we can run a simple program.
+if test "$cross_compiling" != yes; then
+ if { ac_try='./$ac_file'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ cross_compiling=no
+ else
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = maybe; then
+ cross_compiling=yes
+ else
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: cannot run C compiled programs.
+If you meant to cross compile, use \`--host'.
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: cannot run C compiled programs.
+If you meant to cross compile, use \`--host'.
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ fi
+ fi
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+rm -f a.out a.exe conftest$ac_cv_exeext b.out
+ac_clean_files=$ac_clean_files_save
+# Check that the compiler produces executables we can run. If not, either
+# the compiler is broken, or we cross compile.
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether we are cross compiling" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether we are cross compiling... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $cross_compiling" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$cross_compiling" >&6; }
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for suffix of executables" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for suffix of executables... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; then
+ # If both `conftest.exe' and `conftest' are `present' (well, observable)
+# catch `conftest.exe'. For instance with Cygwin, `ls conftest' will
+# work properly (i.e., refer to `conftest.exe'), while it won't with
+# `rm'.
+for ac_file in conftest.exe conftest conftest.*; do
+ test -f "$ac_file" || continue
+ case $ac_file in
+ *.$ac_ext | *.xcoff | *.tds | *.d | *.pdb | *.xSYM | *.bb | *.bbg | *.map | *.inf | *.o | *.obj ) ;;
+ *.* ) ac_cv_exeext=`expr "$ac_file" : '[^.]*\(\..*\)'`
+ break;;
+ * ) break;;
+ esac
+done
+else
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: cannot compute suffix of executables: cannot compile and link
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: cannot compute suffix of executables: cannot compile and link
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest$ac_cv_exeext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_exeext" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_exeext" >&6; }
+
+rm -f conftest.$ac_ext
+EXEEXT=$ac_cv_exeext
+ac_exeext=$EXEEXT
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for suffix of object files" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for suffix of object files... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_objext+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.o conftest.obj
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; then
+ for ac_file in conftest.o conftest.obj conftest.*; do
+ test -f "$ac_file" || continue;
+ case $ac_file in
+ *.$ac_ext | *.xcoff | *.tds | *.d | *.pdb | *.xSYM | *.bb | *.bbg | *.map | *.inf ) ;;
+ *) ac_cv_objext=`expr "$ac_file" : '.*\.\(.*\)'`
+ break;;
+ esac
+done
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+{ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: cannot compute suffix of object files: cannot compile
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: cannot compute suffix of object files: cannot compile
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.$ac_cv_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_objext" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_objext" >&6; }
+OBJEXT=$ac_cv_objext
+ac_objext=$OBJEXT
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether we are using the GNU C compiler" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether we are using the GNU C compiler... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef __GNUC__
+ choke me
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_compiler_gnu=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_compiler_gnu=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu=$ac_compiler_gnu
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu" >&6; }
+GCC=`test $ac_compiler_gnu = yes && echo yes`
+ac_test_CFLAGS=${CFLAGS+set}
+ac_save_CFLAGS=$CFLAGS
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether $CC accepts -g" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether $CC accepts -g... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_prog_cc_g+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_save_c_werror_flag=$ac_c_werror_flag
+ ac_c_werror_flag=yes
+ ac_cv_prog_cc_g=no
+ CFLAGS="-g"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_prog_cc_g=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ CFLAGS=""
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ :
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_c_werror_flag=$ac_save_c_werror_flag
+ CFLAGS="-g"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_prog_cc_g=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+ ac_c_werror_flag=$ac_save_c_werror_flag
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_prog_cc_g" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_prog_cc_g" >&6; }
+if test "$ac_test_CFLAGS" = set; then
+ CFLAGS=$ac_save_CFLAGS
+elif test $ac_cv_prog_cc_g = yes; then
+ if test "$GCC" = yes; then
+ CFLAGS="-g -O2"
+ else
+ CFLAGS="-g"
+ fi
+else
+ if test "$GCC" = yes; then
+ CFLAGS="-O2"
+ else
+ CFLAGS=
+ fi
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $CC option to accept ISO C89" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $CC option to accept ISO C89... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_prog_cc_c89+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_cv_prog_cc_c89=no
+ac_save_CC=$CC
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+/* Most of the following tests are stolen from RCS 5.7's src/conf.sh. */
+struct buf { int x; };
+FILE * (*rcsopen) (struct buf *, struct stat *, int);
+static char *e (p, i)
+ char **p;
+ int i;
+{
+ return p[i];
+}
+static char *f (char * (*g) (char **, int), char **p, ...)
+{
+ char *s;
+ va_list v;
+ va_start (v,p);
+ s = g (p, va_arg (v,int));
+ va_end (v);
+ return s;
+}
+
+/* OSF 4.0 Compaq cc is some sort of almost-ANSI by default. It has
+ function prototypes and stuff, but not '\xHH' hex character constants.
+ These don't provoke an error unfortunately, instead are silently treated
+ as 'x'. The following induces an error, until -std is added to get
+ proper ANSI mode. Curiously '\x00'!='x' always comes out true, for an
+ array size at least. It's necessary to write '\x00'==0 to get something
+ that's true only with -std. */
+int osf4_cc_array ['\x00' == 0 ? 1 : -1];
+
+/* IBM C 6 for AIX is almost-ANSI by default, but it replaces macro parameters
+ inside strings and character constants. */
+#define FOO(x) 'x'
+int xlc6_cc_array[FOO(a) == 'x' ? 1 : -1];
+
+int test (int i, double x);
+struct s1 {int (*f) (int a);};
+struct s2 {int (*f) (double a);};
+int pairnames (int, char **, FILE *(*)(struct buf *, struct stat *, int), int, int);
+int argc;
+char **argv;
+int
+main ()
+{
+return f (e, argv, 0) != argv[0] || f (e, argv, 1) != argv[1];
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_arg in '' -qlanglvl=extc89 -qlanglvl=ansi -std \
+ -Ae "-Aa -D_HPUX_SOURCE" "-Xc -D__EXTENSIONS__"
+do
+ CC="$ac_save_CC $ac_arg"
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_prog_cc_c89=$ac_arg
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext
+ test "x$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" != "xno" && break
+done
+rm -f conftest.$ac_ext
+CC=$ac_save_CC
+
+fi
+# AC_CACHE_VAL
+case "x$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" in
+ x)
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: none needed" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}none needed" >&6; } ;;
+ xno)
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: unsupported" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}unsupported" >&6; } ;;
+ *)
+ CC="$CC $ac_cv_prog_cc_c89"
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" >&6; } ;;
+esac
+
+
+ac_ext=c
+ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
+ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
+ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
+ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
+
+ac_aux_dir=
+for ac_dir in "$srcdir" "$srcdir/.." "$srcdir/../.."; do
+ if test -f "$ac_dir/install-sh"; then
+ ac_aux_dir=$ac_dir
+ ac_install_sh="$ac_aux_dir/install-sh -c"
+ break
+ elif test -f "$ac_dir/install.sh"; then
+ ac_aux_dir=$ac_dir
+ ac_install_sh="$ac_aux_dir/install.sh -c"
+ break
+ elif test -f "$ac_dir/shtool"; then
+ ac_aux_dir=$ac_dir
+ ac_install_sh="$ac_aux_dir/shtool install -c"
+ break
+ fi
+done
+if test -z "$ac_aux_dir"; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: cannot find install-sh or install.sh in \"$srcdir\" \"$srcdir/..\" \"$srcdir/../..\"" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: cannot find install-sh or install.sh in \"$srcdir\" \"$srcdir/..\" \"$srcdir/../..\"" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+# These three variables are undocumented and unsupported,
+# and are intended to be withdrawn in a future Autoconf release.
+# They can cause serious problems if a builder's source tree is in a directory
+# whose full name contains unusual characters.
+ac_config_guess="$SHELL $ac_aux_dir/config.guess" # Please don't use this var.
+ac_config_sub="$SHELL $ac_aux_dir/config.sub" # Please don't use this var.
+ac_configure="$SHELL $ac_aux_dir/configure" # Please don't use this var.
+
+
+# Make sure we can run config.sub.
+$SHELL "$ac_aux_dir/config.sub" sun4 >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: cannot run $SHELL $ac_aux_dir/config.sub" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: cannot run $SHELL $ac_aux_dir/config.sub" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking build system type" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking build system type... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_build+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_build_alias=$build_alias
+test "x$ac_build_alias" = x &&
+ ac_build_alias=`$SHELL "$ac_aux_dir/config.guess"`
+test "x$ac_build_alias" = x &&
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: cannot guess build type; you must specify one" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: cannot guess build type; you must specify one" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ac_cv_build=`$SHELL "$ac_aux_dir/config.sub" $ac_build_alias` ||
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: $SHELL $ac_aux_dir/config.sub $ac_build_alias failed" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: $SHELL $ac_aux_dir/config.sub $ac_build_alias failed" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_build" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_build" >&6; }
+case $ac_cv_build in
+*-*-*) ;;
+*) { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: invalid value of canonical build" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: invalid value of canonical build" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; };;
+esac
+build=$ac_cv_build
+ac_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS='-'
+set x $ac_cv_build
+shift
+build_cpu=$1
+build_vendor=$2
+shift; shift
+# Remember, the first character of IFS is used to create $*,
+# except with old shells:
+build_os=$*
+IFS=$ac_save_IFS
+case $build_os in *\ *) build_os=`echo "$build_os" | sed 's/ /-/g'`;; esac
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking host system type" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking host system type... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_host+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ if test "x$host_alias" = x; then
+ ac_cv_host=$ac_cv_build
+else
+ ac_cv_host=`$SHELL "$ac_aux_dir/config.sub" $host_alias` ||
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: $SHELL $ac_aux_dir/config.sub $host_alias failed" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: $SHELL $ac_aux_dir/config.sub $host_alias failed" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_host" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_host" >&6; }
+case $ac_cv_host in
+*-*-*) ;;
+*) { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: invalid value of canonical host" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: invalid value of canonical host" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; };;
+esac
+host=$ac_cv_host
+ac_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS='-'
+set x $ac_cv_host
+shift
+host_cpu=$1
+host_vendor=$2
+shift; shift
+# Remember, the first character of IFS is used to create $*,
+# except with old shells:
+host_os=$*
+IFS=$ac_save_IFS
+case $host_os in *\ *) host_os=`echo "$host_os" | sed 's/ /-/g'`;; esac
+
+
+
+ac_ext=c
+ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
+ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
+ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
+ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking how to run the C preprocessor" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking how to run the C preprocessor... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+# On Suns, sometimes $CPP names a directory.
+if test -n "$CPP" && test -d "$CPP"; then
+ CPP=
+fi
+if test -z "$CPP"; then
+ if test "${ac_cv_prog_CPP+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ # Double quotes because CPP needs to be expanded
+ for CPP in "$CC -E" "$CC -E -traditional-cpp" "/lib/cpp"
+ do
+ ac_preproc_ok=false
+for ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in '' yes
+do
+ # Use a header file that comes with gcc, so configuring glibc
+ # with a fresh cross-compiler works.
+ # Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ # <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers.
+ # On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser,
+ # not just through cpp. "Syntax error" is here to catch this case.
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+ Syntax error
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ :
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ # Broken: fails on valid input.
+continue
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+
+ # OK, works on sane cases. Now check whether nonexistent headers
+ # can be detected and how.
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <ac_nonexistent.h>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ # Broken: success on invalid input.
+continue
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ # Passes both tests.
+ac_preproc_ok=:
+break
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+
+done
+# Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped.
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+if $ac_preproc_ok; then
+ break
+fi
+
+ done
+ ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP
+
+fi
+ CPP=$ac_cv_prog_CPP
+else
+ ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $CPP" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$CPP" >&6; }
+ac_preproc_ok=false
+for ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in '' yes
+do
+ # Use a header file that comes with gcc, so configuring glibc
+ # with a fresh cross-compiler works.
+ # Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ # <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers.
+ # On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser,
+ # not just through cpp. "Syntax error" is here to catch this case.
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+ Syntax error
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ :
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ # Broken: fails on valid input.
+continue
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+
+ # OK, works on sane cases. Now check whether nonexistent headers
+ # can be detected and how.
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <ac_nonexistent.h>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ # Broken: success on invalid input.
+continue
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ # Passes both tests.
+ac_preproc_ok=:
+break
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+
+done
+# Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped.
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+if $ac_preproc_ok; then
+ :
+else
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: C preprocessor \"$CPP\" fails sanity check
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: C preprocessor \"$CPP\" fails sanity check
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+ac_ext=c
+ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
+ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
+ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
+ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for grep that handles long lines and -e" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for grep that handles long lines and -e... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_GREP+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ # Extract the first word of "grep ggrep" to use in msg output
+if test -z "$GREP"; then
+set dummy grep ggrep; ac_prog_name=$2
+if test "${ac_cv_path_GREP+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_path_GREP_found=false
+# Loop through the user's path and test for each of PROGNAME-LIST
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_prog in grep ggrep; do
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ ac_path_GREP="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"
+ { test -f "$ac_path_GREP" && $as_test_x "$ac_path_GREP"; } || continue
+ # Check for GNU ac_path_GREP and select it if it is found.
+ # Check for GNU $ac_path_GREP
+case `"$ac_path_GREP" --version 2>&1` in
+*GNU*)
+ ac_cv_path_GREP="$ac_path_GREP" ac_path_GREP_found=:;;
+*)
+ ac_count=0
+ echo $ECHO_N "0123456789$ECHO_C" >"conftest.in"
+ while :
+ do
+ cat "conftest.in" "conftest.in" >"conftest.tmp"
+ mv "conftest.tmp" "conftest.in"
+ cp "conftest.in" "conftest.nl"
+ echo 'GREP' >> "conftest.nl"
+ "$ac_path_GREP" -e 'GREP$' -e '-(cannot match)-' < "conftest.nl" >"conftest.out" 2>/dev/null || break
+ diff "conftest.out" "conftest.nl" >/dev/null 2>&1 || break
+ ac_count=`expr $ac_count + 1`
+ if test $ac_count -gt ${ac_path_GREP_max-0}; then
+ # Best one so far, save it but keep looking for a better one
+ ac_cv_path_GREP="$ac_path_GREP"
+ ac_path_GREP_max=$ac_count
+ fi
+ # 10*(2^10) chars as input seems more than enough
+ test $ac_count -gt 10 && break
+ done
+ rm -f conftest.in conftest.tmp conftest.nl conftest.out;;
+esac
+
+
+ $ac_path_GREP_found && break 3
+ done
+done
+
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+
+fi
+
+GREP="$ac_cv_path_GREP"
+if test -z "$GREP"; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: no acceptable $ac_prog_name could be found in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: no acceptable $ac_prog_name could be found in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+else
+ ac_cv_path_GREP=$GREP
+fi
+
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_path_GREP" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_path_GREP" >&6; }
+ GREP="$ac_cv_path_GREP"
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for egrep" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for egrep... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_EGREP+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ if echo a | $GREP -E '(a|b)' >/dev/null 2>&1
+ then ac_cv_path_EGREP="$GREP -E"
+ else
+ # Extract the first word of "egrep" to use in msg output
+if test -z "$EGREP"; then
+set dummy egrep; ac_prog_name=$2
+if test "${ac_cv_path_EGREP+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_path_EGREP_found=false
+# Loop through the user's path and test for each of PROGNAME-LIST
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_prog in egrep; do
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ ac_path_EGREP="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"
+ { test -f "$ac_path_EGREP" && $as_test_x "$ac_path_EGREP"; } || continue
+ # Check for GNU ac_path_EGREP and select it if it is found.
+ # Check for GNU $ac_path_EGREP
+case `"$ac_path_EGREP" --version 2>&1` in
+*GNU*)
+ ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP" ac_path_EGREP_found=:;;
+*)
+ ac_count=0
+ echo $ECHO_N "0123456789$ECHO_C" >"conftest.in"
+ while :
+ do
+ cat "conftest.in" "conftest.in" >"conftest.tmp"
+ mv "conftest.tmp" "conftest.in"
+ cp "conftest.in" "conftest.nl"
+ echo 'EGREP' >> "conftest.nl"
+ "$ac_path_EGREP" 'EGREP$' < "conftest.nl" >"conftest.out" 2>/dev/null || break
+ diff "conftest.out" "conftest.nl" >/dev/null 2>&1 || break
+ ac_count=`expr $ac_count + 1`
+ if test $ac_count -gt ${ac_path_EGREP_max-0}; then
+ # Best one so far, save it but keep looking for a better one
+ ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP"
+ ac_path_EGREP_max=$ac_count
+ fi
+ # 10*(2^10) chars as input seems more than enough
+ test $ac_count -gt 10 && break
+ done
+ rm -f conftest.in conftest.tmp conftest.nl conftest.out;;
+esac
+
+
+ $ac_path_EGREP_found && break 3
+ done
+done
+
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+
+fi
+
+EGREP="$ac_cv_path_EGREP"
+if test -z "$EGREP"; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: no acceptable $ac_prog_name could be found in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: no acceptable $ac_prog_name could be found in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+else
+ ac_cv_path_EGREP=$EGREP
+fi
+
+
+ fi
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&6; }
+ EGREP="$ac_cv_path_EGREP"
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ANSI C header files" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ANSI C header files... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_header_stdc+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <float.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_header_stdc=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_header_stdc=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then
+ # SunOS 4.x string.h does not declare mem*, contrary to ANSI.
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <string.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+ $EGREP "memchr" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ :
+else
+ ac_cv_header_stdc=no
+fi
+rm -f conftest*
+
+fi
+
+if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then
+ # ISC 2.0.2 stdlib.h does not declare free, contrary to ANSI.
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+ $EGREP "free" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ :
+else
+ ac_cv_header_stdc=no
+fi
+rm -f conftest*
+
+fi
+
+if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then
+ # /bin/cc in Irix-4.0.5 gets non-ANSI ctype macros unless using -ansi.
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ :
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#if ((' ' & 0x0FF) == 0x020)
+# define ISLOWER(c) ('a' <= (c) && (c) <= 'z')
+# define TOUPPER(c) (ISLOWER(c) ? 'A' + ((c) - 'a') : (c))
+#else
+# define ISLOWER(c) \
+ (('a' <= (c) && (c) <= 'i') \
+ || ('j' <= (c) && (c) <= 'r') \
+ || ('s' <= (c) && (c) <= 'z'))
+# define TOUPPER(c) (ISLOWER(c) ? ((c) | 0x40) : (c))
+#endif
+
+#define XOR(e, f) (((e) && !(f)) || (!(e) && (f)))
+int
+main ()
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
+ if (XOR (islower (i), ISLOWER (i))
+ || toupper (i) != TOUPPER (i))
+ return 2;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ :
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+ac_cv_header_stdc=no
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+fi
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_header_stdc" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_header_stdc" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define STDC_HEADERS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+# On IRIX 5.3, sys/types and inttypes.h are conflicting.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+for ac_header in sys/types.h sys/stat.h stdlib.h string.h memory.h strings.h \
+ inttypes.h stdint.h unistd.h
+do
+as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether byte ordering is bigendian" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether byte ordering is bigendian... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_c_bigendian+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ # See if sys/param.h defines the BYTE_ORDER macro.
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#if ! (defined BYTE_ORDER && defined BIG_ENDIAN && defined LITTLE_ENDIAN \
+ && BYTE_ORDER && BIG_ENDIAN && LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+ bogus endian macros
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ # It does; now see whether it defined to BIG_ENDIAN or not.
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#if BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN
+ not big endian
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_c_bigendian=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ # It does not; compile a test program.
+if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ # try to guess the endianness by grepping values into an object file
+ ac_cv_c_bigendian=unknown
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+short int ascii_mm[] = { 0x4249, 0x4765, 0x6E44, 0x6961, 0x6E53, 0x7953, 0 };
+short int ascii_ii[] = { 0x694C, 0x5454, 0x656C, 0x6E45, 0x6944, 0x6E61, 0 };
+void _ascii () { char *s = (char *) ascii_mm; s = (char *) ascii_ii; }
+short int ebcdic_ii[] = { 0x89D3, 0xE3E3, 0x8593, 0x95C5, 0x89C4, 0x9581, 0 };
+short int ebcdic_mm[] = { 0xC2C9, 0xC785, 0x95C4, 0x8981, 0x95E2, 0xA8E2, 0 };
+void _ebcdic () { char *s = (char *) ebcdic_mm; s = (char *) ebcdic_ii; }
+int
+main ()
+{
+ _ascii (); _ebcdic ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ if grep BIGenDianSyS conftest.$ac_objext >/dev/null ; then
+ ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes
+fi
+if grep LiTTleEnDian conftest.$ac_objext >/dev/null ; then
+ if test "$ac_cv_c_bigendian" = unknown; then
+ ac_cv_c_bigendian=no
+ else
+ # finding both strings is unlikely to happen, but who knows?
+ ac_cv_c_bigendian=unknown
+ fi
+fi
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ /* Are we little or big endian? From Harbison&Steele. */
+ union
+ {
+ long int l;
+ char c[sizeof (long int)];
+ } u;
+ u.l = 1;
+ return u.c[sizeof (long int) - 1] == 1;
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ ac_cv_c_bigendian=no
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_c_bigendian" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_c_bigendian" >&6; }
+case $ac_cv_c_bigendian in
+ yes)
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1
+_ACEOF
+ ;;
+ no)
+ ;;
+ *)
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: unknown endianness
+presetting ac_cv_c_bigendian=no (or yes) will help" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: unknown endianness
+presetting ac_cv_c_bigendian=no (or yes) will help" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; } ;;
+esac
+
+
+# Checks for programs.
+for ac_prog in gawk mawk nawk awk
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_prog_AWK+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ if test -n "$AWK"; then
+ ac_cv_prog_AWK="$AWK" # Let the user override the test.
+else
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_prog_AWK="$ac_prog"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+fi
+fi
+AWK=$ac_cv_prog_AWK
+if test -n "$AWK"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $AWK" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$AWK" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$AWK" && break
+done
+
+ac_ext=c
+ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
+ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
+ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
+ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking how to run the C preprocessor" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking how to run the C preprocessor... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+# On Suns, sometimes $CPP names a directory.
+if test -n "$CPP" && test -d "$CPP"; then
+ CPP=
+fi
+if test -z "$CPP"; then
+ if test "${ac_cv_prog_CPP+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ # Double quotes because CPP needs to be expanded
+ for CPP in "$CC -E" "$CC -E -traditional-cpp" "/lib/cpp"
+ do
+ ac_preproc_ok=false
+for ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in '' yes
+do
+ # Use a header file that comes with gcc, so configuring glibc
+ # with a fresh cross-compiler works.
+ # Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ # <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers.
+ # On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser,
+ # not just through cpp. "Syntax error" is here to catch this case.
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+ Syntax error
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ :
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ # Broken: fails on valid input.
+continue
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+
+ # OK, works on sane cases. Now check whether nonexistent headers
+ # can be detected and how.
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <ac_nonexistent.h>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ # Broken: success on invalid input.
+continue
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ # Passes both tests.
+ac_preproc_ok=:
+break
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+
+done
+# Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped.
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+if $ac_preproc_ok; then
+ break
+fi
+
+ done
+ ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP
+
+fi
+ CPP=$ac_cv_prog_CPP
+else
+ ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $CPP" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$CPP" >&6; }
+ac_preproc_ok=false
+for ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in '' yes
+do
+ # Use a header file that comes with gcc, so configuring glibc
+ # with a fresh cross-compiler works.
+ # Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ # <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers.
+ # On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser,
+ # not just through cpp. "Syntax error" is here to catch this case.
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+ Syntax error
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ :
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ # Broken: fails on valid input.
+continue
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+
+ # OK, works on sane cases. Now check whether nonexistent headers
+ # can be detected and how.
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <ac_nonexistent.h>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ # Broken: success on invalid input.
+continue
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ # Passes both tests.
+ac_preproc_ok=:
+break
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+
+done
+# Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped.
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+if $ac_preproc_ok; then
+ :
+else
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: C preprocessor \"$CPP\" fails sanity check
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: C preprocessor \"$CPP\" fails sanity check
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+ac_ext=c
+ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
+ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
+ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
+ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
+
+if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
+ # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_prog_RANLIB+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ if test -n "$RANLIB"; then
+ ac_cv_prog_RANLIB="$RANLIB" # Let the user override the test.
+else
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_prog_RANLIB="${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+fi
+fi
+RANLIB=$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB
+if test -n "$RANLIB"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $RANLIB" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$RANLIB" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+fi
+if test -z "$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB"; then
+ ac_ct_RANLIB=$RANLIB
+ # Extract the first word of "ranlib", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy ranlib; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ if test -n "$ac_ct_RANLIB"; then
+ ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB="$ac_ct_RANLIB" # Let the user override the test.
+else
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB="ranlib"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+fi
+fi
+ac_ct_RANLIB=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB
+if test -n "$ac_ct_RANLIB"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_ct_RANLIB" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_ct_RANLIB" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test "x$ac_ct_RANLIB" = x; then
+ RANLIB=":"
+ else
+ case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
+yes:)
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: In the future, Autoconf will not detect cross-tools
+whose name does not start with the host triplet. If you think this
+configuration is useful to you, please write to autoconf at gnu.org." >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: In the future, Autoconf will not detect cross-tools
+whose name does not start with the host triplet. If you think this
+configuration is useful to you, please write to autoconf at gnu.org." >&2;}
+ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
+esac
+ RANLIB=$ac_ct_RANLIB
+ fi
+else
+ RANLIB="$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB"
+fi
+
+# Find a good install program. We prefer a C program (faster),
+# so one script is as good as another. But avoid the broken or
+# incompatible versions:
+# SysV /etc/install, /usr/sbin/install
+# SunOS /usr/etc/install
+# IRIX /sbin/install
+# AIX /bin/install
+# AmigaOS /C/install, which installs bootblocks on floppy discs
+# AIX 4 /usr/bin/installbsd, which doesn't work without a -g flag
+# AFS /usr/afsws/bin/install, which mishandles nonexistent args
+# SVR4 /usr/ucb/install, which tries to use the nonexistent group "staff"
+# OS/2's system install, which has a completely different semantic
+# ./install, which can be erroneously created by make from ./install.sh.
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for a BSD-compatible install" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for a BSD-compatible install... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test -z "$INSTALL"; then
+if test "${ac_cv_path_install+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ # Account for people who put trailing slashes in PATH elements.
+case $as_dir/ in
+ ./ | .// | /cC/* | \
+ /etc/* | /usr/sbin/* | /usr/etc/* | /sbin/* | /usr/afsws/bin/* | \
+ ?:\\/os2\\/install\\/* | ?:\\/OS2\\/INSTALL\\/* | \
+ /usr/ucb/* ) ;;
+ *)
+ # OSF1 and SCO ODT 3.0 have their own names for install.
+ # Don't use installbsd from OSF since it installs stuff as root
+ # by default.
+ for ac_prog in ginstall scoinst install; do
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ if test $ac_prog = install &&
+ grep dspmsg "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ # AIX install. It has an incompatible calling convention.
+ :
+ elif test $ac_prog = install &&
+ grep pwplus "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ # program-specific install script used by HP pwplus--don't use.
+ :
+ else
+ ac_cv_path_install="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext -c"
+ break 3
+ fi
+ fi
+ done
+ done
+ ;;
+esac
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+
+fi
+ if test "${ac_cv_path_install+set}" = set; then
+ INSTALL=$ac_cv_path_install
+ else
+ # As a last resort, use the slow shell script. Don't cache a
+ # value for INSTALL within a source directory, because that will
+ # break other packages using the cache if that directory is
+ # removed, or if the value is a relative name.
+ INSTALL=$ac_install_sh
+ fi
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $INSTALL" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$INSTALL" >&6; }
+
+# Use test -z because SunOS4 sh mishandles braces in ${var-val}.
+# It thinks the first close brace ends the variable substitution.
+test -z "$INSTALL_PROGRAM" && INSTALL_PROGRAM='${INSTALL}'
+
+test -z "$INSTALL_SCRIPT" && INSTALL_SCRIPT='${INSTALL}'
+
+test -z "$INSTALL_DATA" && INSTALL_DATA='${INSTALL} -m 644'
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for egrep" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for egrep... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_EGREP+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ if echo a | $GREP -E '(a|b)' >/dev/null 2>&1
+ then ac_cv_path_EGREP="$GREP -E"
+ else
+ # Extract the first word of "egrep" to use in msg output
+if test -z "$EGREP"; then
+set dummy egrep; ac_prog_name=$2
+if test "${ac_cv_path_EGREP+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_path_EGREP_found=false
+# Loop through the user's path and test for each of PROGNAME-LIST
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_prog in egrep; do
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ ac_path_EGREP="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"
+ { test -f "$ac_path_EGREP" && $as_test_x "$ac_path_EGREP"; } || continue
+ # Check for GNU ac_path_EGREP and select it if it is found.
+ # Check for GNU $ac_path_EGREP
+case `"$ac_path_EGREP" --version 2>&1` in
+*GNU*)
+ ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP" ac_path_EGREP_found=:;;
+*)
+ ac_count=0
+ echo $ECHO_N "0123456789$ECHO_C" >"conftest.in"
+ while :
+ do
+ cat "conftest.in" "conftest.in" >"conftest.tmp"
+ mv "conftest.tmp" "conftest.in"
+ cp "conftest.in" "conftest.nl"
+ echo 'EGREP' >> "conftest.nl"
+ "$ac_path_EGREP" 'EGREP$' < "conftest.nl" >"conftest.out" 2>/dev/null || break
+ diff "conftest.out" "conftest.nl" >/dev/null 2>&1 || break
+ ac_count=`expr $ac_count + 1`
+ if test $ac_count -gt ${ac_path_EGREP_max-0}; then
+ # Best one so far, save it but keep looking for a better one
+ ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP"
+ ac_path_EGREP_max=$ac_count
+ fi
+ # 10*(2^10) chars as input seems more than enough
+ test $ac_count -gt 10 && break
+ done
+ rm -f conftest.in conftest.tmp conftest.nl conftest.out;;
+esac
+
+
+ $ac_path_EGREP_found && break 3
+ done
+done
+
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+
+fi
+
+EGREP="$ac_cv_path_EGREP"
+if test -z "$EGREP"; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: no acceptable $ac_prog_name could be found in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: no acceptable $ac_prog_name could be found in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+else
+ ac_cv_path_EGREP=$EGREP
+fi
+
+
+ fi
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&6; }
+ EGREP="$ac_cv_path_EGREP"
+
+
+if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
+ for ac_prog in ar
+ do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_prog_AR+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ if test -n "$AR"; then
+ ac_cv_prog_AR="$AR" # Let the user override the test.
+else
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_prog_AR="$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+fi
+fi
+AR=$ac_cv_prog_AR
+if test -n "$AR"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $AR" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$AR" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$AR" && break
+ done
+fi
+if test -z "$AR"; then
+ ac_ct_AR=$AR
+ for ac_prog in ar
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ if test -n "$ac_ct_AR"; then
+ ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR="$ac_ct_AR" # Let the user override the test.
+else
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR="$ac_prog"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+fi
+fi
+ac_ct_AR=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR
+if test -n "$ac_ct_AR"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_ct_AR" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_ct_AR" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$ac_ct_AR" && break
+done
+
+ if test "x$ac_ct_AR" = x; then
+ AR=""
+ else
+ case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
+yes:)
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: In the future, Autoconf will not detect cross-tools
+whose name does not start with the host triplet. If you think this
+configuration is useful to you, please write to autoconf at gnu.org." >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: In the future, Autoconf will not detect cross-tools
+whose name does not start with the host triplet. If you think this
+configuration is useful to you, please write to autoconf at gnu.org." >&2;}
+ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
+esac
+ AR=$ac_ct_AR
+ fi
+fi
+
+# Extract the first word of "cat", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy cat; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_CAT+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ case $CAT in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_CAT="$CAT" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_path_CAT="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+CAT=$ac_cv_path_CAT
+if test -n "$CAT"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $CAT" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$CAT" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "kill", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy kill; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_KILL+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ case $KILL in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_KILL="$KILL" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_path_KILL="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+KILL=$ac_cv_path_KILL
+if test -n "$KILL"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $KILL" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$KILL" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+for ac_prog in perl5 perl
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_PERL+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ case $PERL in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_PERL="$PERL" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_path_PERL="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+PERL=$ac_cv_path_PERL
+if test -n "$PERL"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $PERL" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$PERL" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$PERL" && break
+done
+
+# Extract the first word of "sed", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy sed; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_SED+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ case $SED in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_SED="$SED" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_path_SED="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+SED=$ac_cv_path_SED
+if test -n "$SED"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $SED" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$SED" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "ent", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy ent; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_ENT+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ case $ENT in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_ENT="$ENT" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_path_ENT="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+ENT=$ac_cv_path_ENT
+if test -n "$ENT"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ENT" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ENT" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "bash", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy bash; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH
+if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "ksh", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy ksh; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH
+if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "sh", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy sh; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH
+if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "sh", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy sh; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_SH+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ case $SH in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_SH="$SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_path_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+SH=$ac_cv_path_SH
+if test -n "$SH"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $SH" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$SH" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "groff", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy groff; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_GROFF+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ case $GROFF in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_GROFF="$GROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_path_GROFF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+GROFF=$ac_cv_path_GROFF
+if test -n "$GROFF"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $GROFF" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$GROFF" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "nroff", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy nroff; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_NROFF+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ case $NROFF in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NROFF="$NROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_path_NROFF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NROFF=$ac_cv_path_NROFF
+if test -n "$NROFF"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $NROFF" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$NROFF" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "mandoc", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy mandoc; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_MANDOC+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ case $MANDOC in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_MANDOC="$MANDOC" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_path_MANDOC="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+MANDOC=$ac_cv_path_MANDOC
+if test -n "$MANDOC"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $MANDOC" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$MANDOC" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+TEST_SHELL=sh
+
+
+if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then
+ MANFMT="$MANDOC"
+elif test "x$NROFF" != "x" ; then
+ MANFMT="$NROFF -mandoc"
+elif test "x$GROFF" != "x" ; then
+ MANFMT="$GROFF -mandoc -Tascii"
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: no manpage formatted found" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: no manpage formatted found" >&2;}
+ MANFMT="false"
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "groupadd", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy groupadd; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ case $PATH_GROUPADD_PROG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in /usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ test -z "$ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" && ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="groupadd"
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+PATH_GROUPADD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG
+if test -n "$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "useradd", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy useradd; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ case $PATH_USERADD_PROG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="$PATH_USERADD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in /usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ test -z "$ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG" && ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="useradd"
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+PATH_USERADD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG
+if test -n "$PATH_USERADD_PROG"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $PATH_USERADD_PROG" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$PATH_USERADD_PROG" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "pkgmk", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy pkgmk; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ if test -n "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED"; then
+ ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" # Let the user override the test.
+else
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="yes"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ test -z "$ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" && ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="no"
+fi
+fi
+MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED=$ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED
+if test -n "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+if test -x /sbin/sh; then
+ STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL=/sbin/sh
+
+else
+ STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL=/bin/sh
+
+fi
+
+# System features
+# Check whether --enable-largefile was given.
+if test "${enable_largefile+set}" = set; then
+ enableval=$enable_largefile;
+fi
+
+if test "$enable_largefile" != no; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for special C compiler options needed for large files" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for special C compiler options needed for large files... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC=no
+ if test "$GCC" != yes; then
+ ac_save_CC=$CC
+ while :; do
+ # IRIX 6.2 and later do not support large files by default,
+ # so use the C compiler's -n32 option if that helps.
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+ /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
+ We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
+ since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
+ incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
+#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+ int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
+ && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
+ ? 1 : -1];
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ break
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext
+ CC="$CC -n32"
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC=' -n32'; break
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext
+ break
+ done
+ CC=$ac_save_CC
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_ext
+ fi
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" >&6; }
+ if test "$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" != no; then
+ CC=$CC$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC
+ fi
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for _FILE_OFFSET_BITS value needed for large files" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for _FILE_OFFSET_BITS value needed for large files... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ while :; do
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+ /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
+ We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
+ since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
+ incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
+#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+ int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
+ && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
+ ? 1 : -1];
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=no; break
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS 64
+#include <sys/types.h>
+ /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
+ We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
+ since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
+ incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
+#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+ int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
+ && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
+ ? 1 : -1];
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=64; break
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+ ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=unknown
+ break
+done
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits" >&6; }
+case $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits in #(
+ no | unknown) ;;
+ *)
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits
+_ACEOF
+;;
+esac
+rm -f conftest*
+ if test $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits = unknown; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for _LARGE_FILES value needed for large files" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for _LARGE_FILES value needed for large files... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_sys_large_files+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ while :; do
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+ /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
+ We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
+ since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
+ incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
+#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+ int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
+ && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
+ ? 1 : -1];
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_sys_large_files=no; break
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#define _LARGE_FILES 1
+#include <sys/types.h>
+ /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
+ We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
+ since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
+ incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
+#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+ int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
+ && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
+ ? 1 : -1];
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_sys_large_files=1; break
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+ ac_cv_sys_large_files=unknown
+ break
+done
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_sys_large_files" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_sys_large_files" >&6; }
+case $ac_cv_sys_large_files in #(
+ no | unknown) ;;
+ *)
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define _LARGE_FILES $ac_cv_sys_large_files
+_ACEOF
+;;
+esac
+rm -f conftest*
+ fi
+fi
+
+
+if test -z "$AR" ; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: *** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: *** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+# Use LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment if possible
+if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK "$LOGIN_PROGRAM"
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ # Search for login
+ # Extract the first word of "login", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy login; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ case $LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK="$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_path_LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK=$ac_cv_path_LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK
+if test -n "$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK" ; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK "$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK"
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+fi
+
+# Extract the first word of "passwd", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy passwd; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ case $PATH_PASSWD_PROG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG="$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+PATH_PASSWD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG
+if test -n "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $PATH_PASSWD_PROG" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+if test ! -z "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define _PATH_PASSWD_PROG "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+if test -z "$LD" ; then
+ LD=$CC
+fi
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for inline" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for inline... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_c_inline+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_cv_c_inline=no
+for ac_kw in inline __inline__ __inline; do
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#ifndef __cplusplus
+typedef int foo_t;
+static $ac_kw foo_t static_foo () {return 0; }
+$ac_kw foo_t foo () {return 0; }
+#endif
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_c_inline=$ac_kw
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+ test "$ac_cv_c_inline" != no && break
+done
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_c_inline" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_c_inline" >&6; }
+
+
+case $ac_cv_c_inline in
+ inline | yes) ;;
+ *)
+ case $ac_cv_c_inline in
+ no) ac_val=;;
+ *) ac_val=$ac_cv_c_inline;;
+ esac
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#ifndef __cplusplus
+#define inline $ac_val
+#endif
+_ACEOF
+ ;;
+esac
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether LLONG_MAX is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether LLONG_MAX is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <limits.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef LLONG_MAX
+ (void) LLONG_MAX;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX = yes; then
+ have_llong_max=1
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether SYSTR_POLICY_KILL is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether SYSTR_POLICY_KILL is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_SYSTR_POLICY_KILL+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/param.h>
+ #include <dev/systrace.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef SYSTR_POLICY_KILL
+ (void) SYSTR_POLICY_KILL;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_SYSTR_POLICY_KILL=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_SYSTR_POLICY_KILL=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_SYSTR_POLICY_KILL" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_SYSTR_POLICY_KILL" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_SYSTR_POLICY_KILL = yes; then
+ have_systr_policy_kill=1
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether RLIMIT_NPROC is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether RLIMIT_NPROC is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_RLIMIT_NPROC+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/resource.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef RLIMIT_NPROC
+ (void) RLIMIT_NPROC;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_RLIMIT_NPROC=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_RLIMIT_NPROC=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_RLIMIT_NPROC" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_RLIMIT_NPROC" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_RLIMIT_NPROC = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <linux/prctl.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
+ (void) PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS = yes; then
+ have_linux_no_new_privs=1
+fi
+
+
+openssl=yes
+ssh1=no
+
+# Check whether --with-openssl was given.
+if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_openssl; if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+ openssl=no
+ ssh1=no
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define WITH_OPENSSL 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-ssh1 was given.
+if test "${with_ssh1+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_ssh1;
+ if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+ if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: Cannot enable SSH protocol 1 with OpenSSL disabled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: Cannot enable SSH protocol 1 with OpenSSL disabled" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ fi
+ ssh1=yes
+ elif test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+ ssh1=no
+ else
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: unknown --with-ssh1 argument" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: unknown --with-ssh1 argument" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether SSH protocol 1 support is enabled" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether SSH protocol 1 support is enabled... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "x$ssh1" = "xyes" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define WITH_SSH1 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+use_stack_protector=1
+use_toolchain_hardening=1
+
+# Check whether --with-stackprotect was given.
+if test "${with_stackprotect+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_stackprotect;
+ if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
+ use_stack_protector=0
+ fi
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-hardening was given.
+if test "${with_hardening+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_hardening;
+ if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
+ use_toolchain_hardening=0
+ fi
+fi
+
+
+# We use -Werror for the tests only so that we catch warnings like "this is
+# on by default" for things like -fPIE.
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $CC supports -Werror" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $CC supports -Werror... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+int main(void) { return 0; }
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ WERROR="-Werror"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ WERROR=""
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then
+ {
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Qunused-arguments" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Qunused-arguments... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Qunused-arguments"
+ _define_flag=""
+ test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Qunused-arguments"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+ float l = i * 2.1;
+ double m = l / 0.5;
+ long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+ printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
+then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+ {
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunknown-warning-option" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunknown-warning-option... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wunknown-warning-option"
+ _define_flag=""
+ test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wunknown-warning-option"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+ float l = i * 2.1;
+ double m = l / 0.5;
+ long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+ printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
+then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+ {
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wall" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wall... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wall"
+ _define_flag=""
+ test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wall"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+ float l = i * 2.1;
+ double m = l / 0.5;
+ long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+ printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
+then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+ {
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-arith" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-arith... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wpointer-arith"
+ _define_flag=""
+ test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wpointer-arith"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+ float l = i * 2.1;
+ double m = l / 0.5;
+ long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+ printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
+then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+ {
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wuninitialized" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wuninitialized... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wuninitialized"
+ _define_flag=""
+ test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wuninitialized"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+ float l = i * 2.1;
+ double m = l / 0.5;
+ long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+ printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
+then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+ {
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsign-compare" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsign-compare... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wsign-compare"
+ _define_flag=""
+ test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wsign-compare"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+ float l = i * 2.1;
+ double m = l / 0.5;
+ long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+ printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
+then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+ {
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wformat-security" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wformat-security... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wformat-security"
+ _define_flag=""
+ test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wformat-security"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+ float l = i * 2.1;
+ double m = l / 0.5;
+ long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+ printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
+then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+ {
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess"
+ _define_flag=""
+ test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+ float l = i * 2.1;
+ double m = l / 0.5;
+ long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+ printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
+then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+ {
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-sign" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-sign... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wpointer-sign"
+ _define_flag="-Wno-pointer-sign"
+ test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wpointer-sign"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+ float l = i * 2.1;
+ double m = l / 0.5;
+ long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+ printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
+then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+ {
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunused-result" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunused-result... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wunused-result"
+ _define_flag="-Wno-unused-result"
+ test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wunused-result"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+ float l = i * 2.1;
+ double m = l / 0.5;
+ long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+ printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
+then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+ {
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $CC supports compile flag -fno-strict-aliasing" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $CC supports compile flag -fno-strict-aliasing... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -fno-strict-aliasing"
+ _define_flag=""
+ test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-fno-strict-aliasing"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+ float l = i * 2.1;
+ double m = l / 0.5;
+ long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+ printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
+then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+ {
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $CC supports compile flag -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $CC supports compile flag -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2"
+ _define_flag=""
+ test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+ float l = i * 2.1;
+ double m = l / 0.5;
+ long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+ printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
+then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+ if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" = "x1"; then
+ {
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,relro" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,relro... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,relro"
+ _define_flag=""
+ test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,relro"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+ float l = i * 2.1;
+ double m = l / 0.5;
+ long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+ printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+ {
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,now" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,now... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,now"
+ _define_flag=""
+ test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,now"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+ float l = i * 2.1;
+ double m = l / 0.5;
+ long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+ printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+ {
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,noexecstack" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,noexecstack... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,noexecstack"
+ _define_flag=""
+ test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,noexecstack"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+ float l = i * 2.1;
+ double m = l / 0.5;
+ long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+ printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+ # NB. -ftrapv expects certain support functions to be present in
+ # the compiler library (libgcc or similar) to detect integer operations
+ # that can overflow. We must check that the result of enabling it
+ # actually links. The test program compiled/linked includes a number
+ # of integer operations that should exercise this.
+ {
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $CC supports compile flag -ftrapv and linking succeeds" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $CC supports compile flag -ftrapv and linking succeeds... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -ftrapv"
+ _define_flag=""
+ test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-ftrapv"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+ float l = i * 2.1;
+ double m = l / 0.5;
+ long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+ printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+
+if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
+then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+ fi
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking gcc version" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking gcc version... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ GCC_VER=`$CC -v 2>&1 | $AWK '/gcc version /{print $3}'`
+ case $GCC_VER in
+ 1.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
+ 2.8* | 2.9*)
+ no_attrib_nonnull=1
+ ;;
+ 2.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
+ *) ;;
+ esac
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $GCC_VER" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$GCC_VER" >&6; }
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fno-builtin-memset"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <string.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ char b[10]; memset(b, 0, sizeof(b));
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+ # -fstack-protector-all doesn't always work for some GCC versions
+ # and/or platforms, so we test if we can. If it's not supported
+ # on a given platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror.
+ if test "x$use_stack_protector" = "x1"; then
+ for t in -fstack-protector-strong -fstack-protector-all \
+ -fstack-protector; do
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $CC supports $t" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $CC supports $t... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $t -Werror"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $t -Werror"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <stdio.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ char x[256];
+ snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX");
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $t"
+ LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $t"
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $t works" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $t works... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: cannot test" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: cannot test" >&2;}
+ break
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <stdio.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ char x[256];
+ snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX");
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ break
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+ LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+ done
+ fi
+
+ if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then
+ # retry LLONG_MAX with -std=gnu99, needed on some Linuxes
+ unset ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -std=gnu99"
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether LLONG_MAX is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether LLONG_MAX is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <limits.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef LLONG_MAX
+ (void) LLONG_MAX;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX = yes; then
+ have_llong_max=1
+else
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+fi
+
+ fi
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+__attribute__((__unused__)) static void foo(void){return;}
+int
+main ()
+{
+ exit(0);
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+if test "x$no_attrib_nonnull" != "x1" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__ 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-rpath was given.
+if test "${with_rpath+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_rpath;
+ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+ need_dash_r=""
+ fi
+ if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+ need_dash_r=1
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Allow user to specify flags
+
+# Check whether --with-cflags was given.
+if test "${with_cflags+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_cflags;
+ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $withval"
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-cppflags was given.
+if test "${with_cppflags+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_cppflags;
+ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $withval"
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-ldflags was given.
+if test "${with_ldflags+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_ldflags;
+ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $withval"
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-libs was given.
+if test "${with_libs+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_libs;
+ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ LIBS="$LIBS $withval"
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-Werror was given.
+if test "${with_Werror+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_Werror;
+ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno"; then
+ werror_flags="-Werror"
+ if test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ werror_flags="$withval"
+ fi
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+for ac_header in \
+ blf.h \
+ bstring.h \
+ crypt.h \
+ crypto/sha2.h \
+ dirent.h \
+ endian.h \
+ elf.h \
+ err.h \
+ features.h \
+ fcntl.h \
+ floatingpoint.h \
+ getopt.h \
+ glob.h \
+ ia.h \
+ iaf.h \
+ inttypes.h \
+ langinfo.h \
+ limits.h \
+ locale.h \
+ login.h \
+ maillock.h \
+ ndir.h \
+ net/if_tun.h \
+ netdb.h \
+ netgroup.h \
+ pam/pam_appl.h \
+ paths.h \
+ poll.h \
+ pty.h \
+ readpassphrase.h \
+ rpc/types.h \
+ security/pam_appl.h \
+ sha2.h \
+ shadow.h \
+ stddef.h \
+ stdint.h \
+ string.h \
+ strings.h \
+ sys/audit.h \
+ sys/bitypes.h \
+ sys/bsdtty.h \
+ sys/capability.h \
+ sys/cdefs.h \
+ sys/dir.h \
+ sys/mman.h \
+ sys/ndir.h \
+ sys/poll.h \
+ sys/prctl.h \
+ sys/pstat.h \
+ sys/select.h \
+ sys/stat.h \
+ sys/stream.h \
+ sys/stropts.h \
+ sys/strtio.h \
+ sys/statvfs.h \
+ sys/sysmacros.h \
+ sys/time.h \
+ sys/timers.h \
+ time.h \
+ tmpdir.h \
+ ttyent.h \
+ ucred.h \
+ unistd.h \
+ usersec.h \
+ util.h \
+ utime.h \
+ utmp.h \
+ utmpx.h \
+ vis.h \
+ wchar.h \
+
+do
+as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+else
+ # Is the header compilable?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header usability" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header usability... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_header_compiler=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_compiler=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_compiler" >&6; }
+
+# Is the header present?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header presence" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header presence... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_preproc=no
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_preproc" >&6; }
+
+# So? What about this header?
+case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in
+ yes:no: )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+ ;;
+ no:yes:* )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&2;}
+ ( cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+## Report this to openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ##
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ ) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
+ ;;
+esac
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=\$ac_header_preproc"
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+
+fi
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+
+# lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris
+
+for ac_header in lastlog.h
+do
+as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+
+# sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris
+
+for ac_header in sys/ptms.h
+do
+as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H
+# include <sys/stream.h>
+#endif
+
+
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+
+# login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD
+
+for ac_header in login_cap.h
+do
+as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+
+# older BSDs need sys/param.h before sys/mount.h
+
+for ac_header in sys/mount.h
+do
+as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+
+# Android requires sys/socket.h to be included before sys/un.h
+
+for ac_header in sys/un.h
+do
+as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+
+# Messages for features tested for in target-specific section
+SIA_MSG="no"
+SPC_MSG="no"
+SP_MSG="no"
+SPP_MSG="no"
+
+# Support for Solaris/Illumos privileges (this test is used by both
+# the --with-solaris-privs option and --with-sandbox=solaris).
+SOLARIS_PRIVS="no"
+
+# Check for some target-specific stuff
+case "$host" in
+*-*-aix*)
+ # Some versions of VAC won't allow macro redefinitions at
+ # -qlanglevel=ansi, and autoconf 2.60 sometimes insists on using that
+ # particularly with older versions of vac or xlc.
+ # It also throws errors about null macro argments, but these are
+ # not fatal.
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if compiler allows macro redefinitions" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if compiler allows macro redefinitions... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#define testmacro foo
+#define testmacro bar
+int
+main ()
+{
+ exit(0);
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CC="`echo $CC | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+ LD="`echo $LD | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+ CFLAGS="`echo $CFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+ CPPFLAGS="`echo $CPPFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if (test -z "$blibpath"); then
+ blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib"
+ fi
+ saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then
+ flags="-Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, -blibpath:"
+ else
+ flags="-blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath,"
+ fi
+ for tryflags in $flags ;do
+ if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
+ LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $tryflags$blibpath"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ blibflags=$tryflags
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+ fi
+ done
+ if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: not found" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}not found" >&6; }
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: *** must be able to specify blibpath on AIX - check config.log" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: *** must be able to specify blibpath on AIX - check config.log" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $blibflags" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$blibflags" >&6; }
+ fi
+ LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for authenticate" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for authenticate... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_func_authenticate+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define authenticate to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares authenticate.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define authenticate innocuous_authenticate
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char authenticate (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef authenticate
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char authenticate ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_authenticate || defined __stub___authenticate
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return authenticate ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_func_authenticate=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_func_authenticate=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_func_authenticate" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_func_authenticate" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_func_authenticate = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for authenticate in -ls" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for authenticate in -ls... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-ls $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char authenticate ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return authenticate ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="$LIBS -ls"
+
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether authenticate is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether authenticate is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_authenticate+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <usersec.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef authenticate
+ (void) authenticate;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_authenticate=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_authenticate=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_authenticate" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_authenticate" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_authenticate = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE 0
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether loginrestrictions is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether loginrestrictions is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_loginrestrictions+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <usersec.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef loginrestrictions
+ (void) loginrestrictions;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_loginrestrictions=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_loginrestrictions=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_loginrestrictions" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_loginrestrictions" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_loginrestrictions = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS 0
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether loginsuccess is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether loginsuccess is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_loginsuccess+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <usersec.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef loginsuccess
+ (void) loginsuccess;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_loginsuccess=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_loginsuccess=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_loginsuccess" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_loginsuccess" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_loginsuccess = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS 0
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether passwdexpired is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether passwdexpired is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_passwdexpired+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <usersec.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef passwdexpired
+ (void) passwdexpired;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_passwdexpired=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_passwdexpired=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_passwdexpired" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_passwdexpired" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_passwdexpired = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED 0
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether setauthdb is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether setauthdb is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_setauthdb+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <usersec.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef setauthdb
+ (void) setauthdb;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_setauthdb=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_setauthdb=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_setauthdb" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_setauthdb" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_setauthdb = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB 0
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether loginfailed is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether loginfailed is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_loginfailed+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <usersec.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef loginfailed
+ (void) loginfailed;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_loginfailed=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_loginfailed=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_loginfailed" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_loginfailed" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_loginfailed = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED 1
+_ACEOF
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if loginfailed takes 4 arguments" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if loginfailed takes 4 arguments... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <usersec.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ (void)loginfailed("user","host","tty",0);
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+else
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED 0
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+
+for ac_func in getgrset setauthdb
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether F_CLOSEM is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether F_CLOSEM is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_F_CLOSEM+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <limits.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef F_CLOSEM
+ (void) F_CLOSEM;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_F_CLOSEM=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_F_CLOSEM=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_F_CLOSEM" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_F_CLOSEM" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_F_CLOSEM = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+ check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo=1
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_REALPATH 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define PTY_ZEROREAD 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID 2
+_ACEOF
+
+ ;;
+*-*-android*)
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_UTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_WTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ ;;
+*-*-cygwin*)
+ check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+ LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textreadmode.o"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_CYGWIN 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_PIPES 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_SHADOW 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SSH_IOBUFSZ 65535
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ # Cygwin defines optargs, optargs as declspec(dllimport) for historical
+ # reasons which cause compile warnings, so we disable those warnings.
+ {
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wno-attributes" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wno-attributes... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wno-attributes"
+ _define_flag=""
+ test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wno-attributes"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+ float l = i * 2.1;
+ double m = l / 0.5;
+ long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+ printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
+then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+ ;;
+*-*-dgux*)
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ ;;
+*-*-darwin*)
+ use_pie=auto
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if we have working getaddrinfo" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if we have working getaddrinfo... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: assume it is working" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}assume it is working" >&6; }
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <mach-o/dyld.h>
+main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
+ exit(0);
+ else
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: working" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}working" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: buggy" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}buggy" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_GLOB 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define BIND_8_COMPAT 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether AU_IPv4 is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether AU_IPv4 is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_AU_IPv4+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef AU_IPv4
+ (void) AU_IPv4;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_AU_IPv4=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_AU_IPv4=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_AU_IPv4" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_AU_IPv4" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_AU_IPv4 = yes; then
+ :
+else
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define AU_IPv4 0
+_ACEOF
+
+ #include <bsm/audit.h>
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV
+_ACEOF
+
+
+for ac_func in sandbox_init
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+for ac_header in sandbox.h
+do
+as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+else
+ # Is the header compilable?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header usability" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header usability... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_header_compiler=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_compiler=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_compiler" >&6; }
+
+# Is the header present?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header presence" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header presence... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_preproc=no
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_preproc" >&6; }
+
+# So? What about this header?
+case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in
+ yes:no: )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+ ;;
+ no:yes:* )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&2;}
+ ( cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+## Report this to openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ##
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ ) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
+ ;;
+esac
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=\$ac_header_preproc"
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+
+fi
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for sandbox_apply in -lsandbox" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for sandbox_apply in -lsandbox... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lsandbox $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char sandbox_apply ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return sandbox_apply ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply = yes; then
+
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lsandbox"
+
+fi
+
+ ;;
+*-*-dragonfly*)
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcrypt"
+ TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
+ ;;
+*-*-haiku*)
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd "
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for socket in -lnetwork" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for socket in -lnetwork... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_network_socket+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnetwork $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char socket ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return socket ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_network_socket=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_network_socket=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_network_socket" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_network_socket" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_network_socket = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNETWORK 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnetwork $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ MANTYPE=man
+ ;;
+*-*-hpux*)
+ # first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1"
+ IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_PIPES 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING "*"
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SPT_TYPE SPT_PSTAT
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID 2
+_ACEOF
+
+ maildir="/var/mail"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lsec"
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for t_error in -lxnet" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for t_error in -lxnet... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lxnet $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char t_error ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return t_error ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBXNET 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lxnet $LIBS"
+
+else
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: *** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: *** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+
+ # next, we define all of the options specific to major releases
+ case "$host" in
+ *-*-hpux10*)
+ if test -z "$GCC"; then
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae"
+ fi
+ ;;
+ *-*-hpux11*)
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define PAM_SUN_CODEBASE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_UTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_BTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1
+ check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+ # lastly, we define options specific to minor releases
+ case "$host" in
+ *-*-hpux10.26)
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_SECUREWARE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ disable_ptmx_check=yes
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lsecpw"
+ ;;
+ esac
+ ;;
+*-*-irix5*)
+ PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_INET_NTOA 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING "*LK*"
+_ACEOF
+
+ ;;
+*-*-irix6*)
+ PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define WITH_IRIX_ARRAY 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define WITH_IRIX_PROJECT 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define WITH_IRIX_AUDIT 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for jlimit_startjob" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for jlimit_startjob... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_func_jlimit_startjob+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define jlimit_startjob to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares jlimit_startjob.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define jlimit_startjob innocuous_jlimit_startjob
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char jlimit_startjob (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef jlimit_startjob
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char jlimit_startjob ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_jlimit_startjob || defined __stub___jlimit_startjob
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return jlimit_startjob ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_func_jlimit_startjob=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_func_jlimit_startjob=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_func_jlimit_startjob" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_func_jlimit_startjob" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_func_jlimit_startjob = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define WITH_IRIX_JOBS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_INET_NTOA 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_UPDWTMPX 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING "*LK*"
+_ACEOF
+
+ ;;
+*-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu)
+ check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX "!"
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define _PATH_BTMP "/var/log/btmp"
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_BTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ ;;
+*-*-linux*)
+ no_dev_ptmx=1
+ use_pie=auto
+ check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+ check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX "!"
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO EPERM
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define _PATH_BTMP "/var/log/btmp"
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_BTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define LINUX_OOM_ADJUST 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ inet6_default_4in6=yes
+ case `uname -r` in
+ 1.*|2.0.*)
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ ;;
+ esac
+ # tun(4) forwarding compat code
+
+for ac_header in linux/if_tun.h
+do
+as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+else
+ # Is the header compilable?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header usability" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header usability... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_header_compiler=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_compiler=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_compiler" >&6; }
+
+# Is the header present?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header presence" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header presence... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_preproc=no
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_preproc" >&6; }
+
+# So? What about this header?
+case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in
+ yes:no: )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+ ;;
+ no:yes:* )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&2;}
+ ( cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+## Report this to openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ##
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ ) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
+ ;;
+esac
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=\$ac_header_preproc"
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+
+fi
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+ if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SSH_TUN_LINUX 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+
+
+
+for ac_header in linux/seccomp.h linux/filter.h linux/audit.h
+do
+as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+
+for ac_func in prctl
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for seccomp architecture" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for seccomp architecture... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ seccomp_audit_arch=
+ case "$host" in
+ x86_64-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
+ ;;
+ i*86-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386
+ ;;
+ arm*-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
+ ;;
+ aarch64*-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64
+ ;;
+ s390x-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390X
+ ;;
+ s390-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390
+ ;;
+ powerpc64-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64
+ ;;
+ powerpc64le-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE
+ ;;
+ mips-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS
+ ;;
+ mipsel-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL
+ ;;
+ mips64-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64
+ ;;
+ mips64el-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64
+ ;;
+ esac
+ if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: \"$seccomp_audit_arch\"" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}\"$seccomp_audit_arch\"" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH $seccomp_audit_arch
+_ACEOF
+
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: architecture not supported" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}architecture not supported" >&6; }
+ fi
+ ;;
+mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define NEED_SETPGRP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ SONY=1
+ ;;
+*-*-netbsd*)
+ check_for_libcrypt_before=1
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ need_dash_r=1
+ fi
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_OPENBSD_SOURCE"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ if test "${ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h+set}" = set; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for net/if_tap.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for net/if_tap.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" >&6; }
+else
+ # Is the header compilable?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking net/if_tap.h usability" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking net/if_tap.h usability... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+#include <net/if_tap.h>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_header_compiler=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_compiler=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_compiler" >&6; }
+
+# Is the header present?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking net/if_tap.h presence" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking net/if_tap.h presence... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <net/if_tap.h>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_preproc=no
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_preproc" >&6; }
+
+# So? What about this header?
+case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in
+ yes:no: )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+ ;;
+ no:yes:* )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&2;}
+ ( cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+## Report this to openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ##
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ ) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
+ ;;
+esac
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for net/if_tap.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for net/if_tap.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h=$ac_header_preproc
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" >&6; }
+
+fi
+if test $ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h = yes; then
+ :
+else
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SSH_TUN_NO_L2 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_STRNVIS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ ;;
+*-*-freebsd*)
+ check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX "*LOCKED*"
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ if test "${ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h+set}" = set; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for net/if_tap.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for net/if_tap.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" >&6; }
+else
+ # Is the header compilable?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking net/if_tap.h usability" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking net/if_tap.h usability... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+#include <net/if_tap.h>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_header_compiler=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_compiler=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_compiler" >&6; }
+
+# Is the header present?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking net/if_tap.h presence" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking net/if_tap.h presence... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <net/if_tap.h>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_preproc=no
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_preproc" >&6; }
+
+# So? What about this header?
+case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in
+ yes:no: )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+ ;;
+ no:yes:* )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: net/if_tap.h: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&2;}
+ ( cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+## Report this to openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ##
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ ) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
+ ;;
+esac
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for net/if_tap.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for net/if_tap.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h=$ac_header_preproc
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" >&6; }
+
+fi
+if test $ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h = yes; then
+ :
+else
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SSH_TUN_NO_L2 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_GLOB 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_STRNVIS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
+ # Preauth crypto occasionally uses file descriptors for crypto offload
+ # and will crash if they cannot be opened.
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ ;;
+*-*-bsdi*)
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ ;;
+*-next-*)
+ conf_lastlog_location="/usr/adm/lastlog"
+ conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
+ conf_wtmp_location=/usr/adm/wtmp
+ maildir=/usr/spool/mail
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_NEXT 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_REALPATH 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_PIPES 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ ;;
+*-*-openbsd*)
+ use_pie=auto
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__ 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__ 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SSH_TUN_OPENBSD 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
+ ;;
+*-*-solaris*)
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ need_dash_r=1
+ fi
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define PAM_SUN_CODEBASE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING "*LK*"
+_ACEOF
+
+ # Pushing STREAMS modules will cause sshd to acquire a controlling tty.
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ external_path_file=/etc/default/login
+ # hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions)
+ conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog"
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ sol2ver=`echo "$host"| sed -e 's/.*[0-9]\.//'`
+ if test "$sol2ver" -ge 8; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_UTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_WTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+for ac_func in setpflags
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+for ac_func in setppriv
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+for ac_func in priv_basicset
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+for ac_header in priv.h
+do
+as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+else
+ # Is the header compilable?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header usability" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header usability... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_header_compiler=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_compiler=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_compiler" >&6; }
+
+# Is the header present?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header presence" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header presence... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_preproc=no
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_preproc" >&6; }
+
+# So? What about this header?
+case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in
+ yes:no: )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+ ;;
+ no:yes:* )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&2;}
+ ( cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+## Report this to openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ##
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ ) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
+ ;;
+esac
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=\$ac_header_preproc"
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+
+fi
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+
+# Check whether --with-solaris-contracts was given.
+if test "${with_solaris_contracts+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_solaris_contracts;
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ct_tmpl_activate in -lcontract" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ct_tmpl_activate in -lcontract... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lcontract $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char ct_tmpl_activate ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return ct_tmpl_activate ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lcontract"
+ SPC_MSG="yes"
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-solaris-projects was given.
+if test "${with_solaris_projects+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_solaris_projects;
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for setproject in -lproject" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for setproject in -lproject... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_project_setproject+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lproject $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char setproject ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return setproject ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_project_setproject=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_project_setproject=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_project_setproject" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_project_setproject" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_project_setproject = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lproject"
+ SP_MSG="yes"
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-solaris-privs was given.
+if test "${with_solaris_privs+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_solaris_privs;
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for Solaris/Illumos privilege support" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for Solaris/Illumos privilege support... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if test "x$ac_cv_func_setppriv" = "xyes" -a \
+ "x$ac_cv_header_priv_h" = "xyes" ; then
+ SOLARIS_PRIVS=yes
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: found" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}found" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ SPP_MSG="yes"
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: not found" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}not found" >&6; }
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: *** must have support for Solaris privileges to use --with-solaris-privs" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: *** must have support for Solaris privileges to use --with-solaris-privs" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ fi
+
+fi
+
+ TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
+ ;;
+*-*-sunos4*)
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4"
+
+for ac_func in getpwanam
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define PAM_SUN_CODEBASE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
+ conf_wtmp_location=/var/adm/wtmp
+ conf_lastlog_location=/var/adm/lastlog
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_PIPES 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ ;;
+*-ncr-sysv*)
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_PIPES 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ ;;
+*-sni-sysv*)
+ # /usr/ucblib MUST NOT be searched on ReliantUNIX
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for dlsym in -ldl" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for dlsym in -ldl... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-ldl $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char dlsym ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return dlsym ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBDL 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-ldl $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+ # -lresolv needs to be at the end of LIBS or DNS lookups break
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for res_query in -lresolv" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for res_query in -lresolv... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lresolv $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char res_query ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return res_query ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query = yes; then
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
+fi
+
+ IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_PIPES 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ external_path_file=/etc/default/login
+ # /usr/ucblib/libucb.a no longer needed on ReliantUNIX
+ # Attention: always take care to bind libsocket and libnsl before libc,
+ # otherwise you will find lots of "SIOCGPGRP errno 22" on syslog
+ ;;
+# UnixWare 1.x, UnixWare 2.x, and others based on code from Univel.
+*-*-sysv4.2*)
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_PIPES 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING "*LK*"
+_ACEOF
+
+ TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
+ ;;
+# UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX 8
+*-*-sysv5*)
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -Dvsnprintf=_xvsnprintf -Dsnprintf=_xsnprintf"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_PIPES 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
+ case "$host" in
+ *-*-sysv5SCO_SV*) # SCO OpenServer 6.x
+ maildir=/var/spool/mail
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_LIBIAF 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_UPDWTMPX 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for getluid in -lprot" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for getluid in -lprot... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lprot $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char getluid ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return getluid ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid = yes; then
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lprot"
+
+
+for ac_func in getluid setluid
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_SECUREWARE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_SHADOW 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+ ;;
+ *) cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING "*LK*"
+_ACEOF
+
+ check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+ ;;
+ esac
+ ;;
+*-*-sysv*)
+ ;;
+# SCO UNIX and OEM versions of SCO UNIX
+*-*-sco3.2v4*)
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: \"This Platform is no longer supported.\"" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: \"This Platform is no longer supported.\"" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ ;;
+# SCO OpenServer 5.x
+*-*-sco3.2v5*)
+ if test -z "$GCC"; then
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -belf"
+ fi
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm"
+ no_dev_ptmx=1
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_PIPES 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_SECUREWARE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_SHADOW 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_UPDWTMPX 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+
+for ac_func in getluid setluid
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+ MANTYPE=man
+ TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
+ SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE=yes
+ ;;
+*-*-unicosmk*)
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define NO_SSH_LASTLOG 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_PIPES 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lrsc -lshare -luex -lacm"
+ MANTYPE=cat
+ ;;
+*-*-unicosmp*)
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_PIPES 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lacid -ldb"
+ MANTYPE=cat
+ ;;
+*-*-unicos*)
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_PIPES 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define NO_SSH_LASTLOG 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -Wl,-Dmsglevel=334:fatal"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lrsc -lshare -luex -lacm"
+ MANTYPE=cat
+ ;;
+*-dec-osf*)
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for Digital Unix SIA" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for Digital Unix SIA... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ no_osfsia=""
+
+# Check whether --with-osfsia was given.
+if test "${with_osfsia+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_osfsia;
+ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: disabled" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}disabled" >&6; }
+ no_osfsia=1
+ fi
+
+fi
+
+ if test -z "$no_osfsia" ; then
+ if test -f /etc/sia/matrix.conf; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_OSF_SIA 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_LOGIN 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud"
+ SIA_MSG="yes"
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR "Nologin"
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ fi
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ ;;
+
+*-*-nto-qnx*)
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_PIPES 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ enable_etc_default_login=no # has incompatible /etc/default/login
+ case "$host" in
+ *-*-nto-qnx6*)
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ ;;
+ esac
+ ;;
+
+*-*-ultrix*)
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_GETGROUPS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_MMAP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define NEED_SETPGRP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ ;;
+
+*-*-lynxos)
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D__NO_INCLUDE_WARN__"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETVBUF 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ ;;
+esac
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking compiler and flags for sanity" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking compiler and flags for sanity... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity" >&2;}
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <stdio.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ exit(0);
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: *** compiler cannot create working executables, check config.log ***" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: *** compiler cannot create working executables, check config.log ***" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+
+# Checks for libraries.
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for setsockopt" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for setsockopt... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_func_setsockopt+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define setsockopt to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares setsockopt.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define setsockopt innocuous_setsockopt
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char setsockopt (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef setsockopt
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char setsockopt ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_setsockopt || defined __stub___setsockopt
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return setsockopt ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_func_setsockopt=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_func_setsockopt=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_func_setsockopt" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_func_setsockopt" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_func_setsockopt = yes; then
+ :
+else
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for setsockopt in -lsocket" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for setsockopt in -lsocket... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lsocket $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char setsockopt ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return setsockopt ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSOCKET 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lsocket $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+fi
+
+
+
+for ac_func in dirname
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+for ac_header in libgen.h
+do
+as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+else
+ # Is the header compilable?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header usability" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header usability... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_header_compiler=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_compiler=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_compiler" >&6; }
+
+# Is the header present?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header presence" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header presence... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_preproc=no
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_preproc" >&6; }
+
+# So? What about this header?
+case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in
+ yes:no: )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+ ;;
+ no:yes:* )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&2;}
+ ( cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+## Report this to openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ##
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ ) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
+ ;;
+esac
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=\$ac_header_preproc"
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+
+fi
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+else
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for dirname in -lgen" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for dirname in -lgen... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lgen $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char dirname ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return dirname ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname = yes; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for broken dirname" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for broken dirname... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_broken_dirname+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ save_LIBS="$LIBS"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no"
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <libgen.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ char *s, buf[32];
+
+ strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32);
+ s = dirname(buf);
+ if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) {
+ exit(1);
+ } else {
+ exit(0);
+ }
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes"
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+ LIBS="$save_LIBS"
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" >&6; }
+ if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DIRNAME 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+for ac_header in libgen.h
+do
+as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+else
+ # Is the header compilable?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header usability" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header usability... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_header_compiler=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_compiler=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_compiler" >&6; }
+
+# Is the header present?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header presence" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header presence... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_preproc=no
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_preproc" >&6; }
+
+# So? What about this header?
+case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in
+ yes:no: )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+ ;;
+ no:yes:* )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&2;}
+ ( cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+## Report this to openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ##
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ ) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
+ ;;
+esac
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=\$ac_header_preproc"
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+
+fi
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+ fi
+
+fi
+
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for getspnam" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for getspnam... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_func_getspnam+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define getspnam to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares getspnam.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define getspnam innocuous_getspnam
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char getspnam (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef getspnam
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char getspnam ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_getspnam || defined __stub___getspnam
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return getspnam ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_func_getspnam=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_func_getspnam=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_func_getspnam" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_func_getspnam" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_func_getspnam = yes; then
+ :
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for getspnam in -lgen" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for getspnam in -lgen... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lgen $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char getspnam ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return getspnam ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam = yes; then
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
+fi
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for library containing basename" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for library containing basename... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_search_basename+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char basename ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return basename ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' gen; do
+ if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+ ac_res="none required"
+ else
+ ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+ LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+ fi
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_search_basename=$ac_res
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext
+ if test "${ac_cv_search_basename+set}" = set; then
+ break
+fi
+done
+if test "${ac_cv_search_basename+set}" = set; then
+ :
+else
+ ac_cv_search_basename=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_search_basename" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_search_basename" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_basename
+if test "$ac_res" != no; then
+ test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_BASENAME 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-zlib was given.
+if test "${with_zlib+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_zlib; if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: *** zlib is required ***" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: *** zlib is required ***" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ elif test "x$withval" != "xyes"; then
+ if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ else
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ fi
+ if test -d "$withval/include"; then
+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
+ else
+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ fi
+
+fi
+
+
+if test "${ac_cv_header_zlib_h+set}" = set; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for zlib.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for zlib.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_header_zlib_h+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_header_zlib_h" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_header_zlib_h" >&6; }
+else
+ # Is the header compilable?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking zlib.h usability" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking zlib.h usability... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+#include <zlib.h>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_header_compiler=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_compiler=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_compiler" >&6; }
+
+# Is the header present?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking zlib.h presence" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking zlib.h presence... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <zlib.h>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_preproc=no
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_preproc" >&6; }
+
+# So? What about this header?
+case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in
+ yes:no: )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: zlib.h: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: zlib.h: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: zlib.h: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: zlib.h: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+ ;;
+ no:yes:* )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: zlib.h: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: zlib.h: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: zlib.h: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: zlib.h: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: zlib.h: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: zlib.h: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: zlib.h: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: zlib.h: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: zlib.h: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: zlib.h: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: zlib.h: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: zlib.h: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&2;}
+ ( cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+## Report this to openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ##
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ ) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
+ ;;
+esac
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for zlib.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for zlib.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_header_zlib_h+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_cv_header_zlib_h=$ac_header_preproc
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_header_zlib_h" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_header_zlib_h" >&6; }
+
+fi
+if test $ac_cv_header_zlib_h = yes; then
+ :
+else
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: *** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: *** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for deflate in -lz" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for deflate in -lz... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_z_deflate+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lz $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char deflate ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return deflate ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_z_deflate=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_z_deflate=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_z_deflate" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_z_deflate" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_z_deflate = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBZ 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lz $LIBS"
+
+else
+
+ saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
+ saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ save_LIBS="$LIBS"
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib -R/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lz"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char deflate ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return deflate ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBZ 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: *** zlib missing - please install first or check config.log ***" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: *** zlib missing - please install first or check config.log ***" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-zlib-version-check was given.
+if test "${with_zlib_version_check+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_zlib_version_check; if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+ zlib_check_nonfatal=1
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for possibly buggy zlib" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for possibly buggy zlib... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking zlib version" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking zlib version" >&2;}
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <zlib.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ int a=0, b=0, c=0, d=0, n, v;
+ n = sscanf(ZLIB_VERSION, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &a, &b, &c, &d);
+ if (n != 3 && n != 4)
+ exit(1);
+ v = a*1000000 + b*10000 + c*100 + d;
+ fprintf(stderr, "found zlib version %s (%d)\n", ZLIB_VERSION, v);
+
+ /* 1.1.4 is OK */
+ if (a == 1 && b == 1 && c >= 4)
+ exit(0);
+
+ /* 1.2.3 and up are OK */
+ if (v >= 1020300)
+ exit(0);
+
+ exit(2);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ if test -z "$zlib_check_nonfatal" ; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: *** zlib too old - check config.log ***
+Your reported zlib version has known security problems. It's possible your
+vendor has fixed these problems without changing the version number. If you
+are sure this is the case, you can disable the check by running
+\"./configure --without-zlib-version-check\".
+If you are in doubt, upgrade zlib to version 1.2.3 or greater.
+See http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ for details." >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: *** zlib too old - check config.log ***
+Your reported zlib version has known security problems. It's possible your
+vendor has fixed these problems without changing the version number. If you
+are sure this is the case, you can disable the check by running
+\"./configure --without-zlib-version-check\".
+If you are in doubt, upgrade zlib to version 1.2.3 or greater.
+See http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ for details." >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: zlib version may have security problems" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: zlib version may have security problems" >&2;}
+ fi
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for strcasecmp" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for strcasecmp... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_func_strcasecmp+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define strcasecmp to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares strcasecmp.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define strcasecmp innocuous_strcasecmp
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char strcasecmp (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef strcasecmp
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char strcasecmp ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_strcasecmp || defined __stub___strcasecmp
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return strcasecmp ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_func_strcasecmp=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_func_strcasecmp=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_func_strcasecmp" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_func_strcasecmp" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_func_strcasecmp = yes; then
+ :
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for strcasecmp in -lresolv" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for strcasecmp in -lresolv... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lresolv $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char strcasecmp ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return strcasecmp ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp = yes; then
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+for ac_func in utimes
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for utimes in -lc89" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for utimes in -lc89... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lc89 $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char utimes ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return utimes ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_UTIMES 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"
+fi
+
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+
+
+for ac_header in bsd/libutil.h libutil.h
+do
+as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+else
+ # Is the header compilable?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header usability" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header usability... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_header_compiler=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_compiler=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_compiler" >&6; }
+
+# Is the header present?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header presence" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header presence... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_preproc=no
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_preproc" >&6; }
+
+# So? What about this header?
+case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in
+ yes:no: )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+ ;;
+ no:yes:* )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&2;}
+ ( cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+## Report this to openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ##
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ ) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
+ ;;
+esac
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=\$ac_header_preproc"
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+
+fi
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for library containing fmt_scaled" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for library containing fmt_scaled... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char fmt_scaled ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return fmt_scaled ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
+ if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+ ac_res="none required"
+ else
+ ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+ LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+ fi
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled=$ac_res
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext
+ if test "${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+set}" = set; then
+ break
+fi
+done
+if test "${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+set}" = set; then
+ :
+else
+ ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled
+if test "$ac_res" != no; then
+ test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for library containing scan_scaled" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for library containing scan_scaled... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char scan_scaled ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return scan_scaled ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
+ if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+ ac_res="none required"
+ else
+ ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+ LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+ fi
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_search_scan_scaled=$ac_res
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext
+ if test "${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+set}" = set; then
+ break
+fi
+done
+if test "${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+set}" = set; then
+ :
+else
+ ac_cv_search_scan_scaled=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_search_scan_scaled" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_search_scan_scaled" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_scan_scaled
+if test "$ac_res" != no; then
+ test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for library containing login" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for library containing login... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_search_login+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char login ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return login ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
+ if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+ ac_res="none required"
+ else
+ ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+ LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+ fi
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_search_login=$ac_res
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext
+ if test "${ac_cv_search_login+set}" = set; then
+ break
+fi
+done
+if test "${ac_cv_search_login+set}" = set; then
+ :
+else
+ ac_cv_search_login=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_search_login" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_search_login" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_login
+if test "$ac_res" != no; then
+ test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for library containing logout" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for library containing logout... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_search_logout+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char logout ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return logout ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
+ if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+ ac_res="none required"
+ else
+ ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+ LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+ fi
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_search_logout=$ac_res
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext
+ if test "${ac_cv_search_logout+set}" = set; then
+ break
+fi
+done
+if test "${ac_cv_search_logout+set}" = set; then
+ :
+else
+ ac_cv_search_logout=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_search_logout" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_search_logout" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_logout
+if test "$ac_res" != no; then
+ test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for library containing logwtmp" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for library containing logwtmp... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char logwtmp ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return logwtmp ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
+ if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+ ac_res="none required"
+ else
+ ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+ LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+ fi
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_search_logwtmp=$ac_res
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext
+ if test "${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+set}" = set; then
+ break
+fi
+done
+if test "${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+set}" = set; then
+ :
+else
+ ac_cv_search_logwtmp=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_search_logwtmp" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_search_logwtmp" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_logwtmp
+if test "$ac_res" != no; then
+ test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for library containing openpty" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for library containing openpty... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_search_openpty+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char openpty ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return openpty ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
+ if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+ ac_res="none required"
+ else
+ ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+ LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+ fi
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_search_openpty=$ac_res
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext
+ if test "${ac_cv_search_openpty+set}" = set; then
+ break
+fi
+done
+if test "${ac_cv_search_openpty+set}" = set; then
+ :
+else
+ ac_cv_search_openpty=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_search_openpty" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_search_openpty" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_openpty
+if test "$ac_res" != no; then
+ test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for library containing updwtmp" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for library containing updwtmp... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char updwtmp ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return updwtmp ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
+ if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+ ac_res="none required"
+ else
+ ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+ LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+ fi
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_search_updwtmp=$ac_res
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext
+ if test "${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+set}" = set; then
+ break
+fi
+done
+if test "${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+set}" = set; then
+ :
+else
+ ac_cv_search_updwtmp=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_search_updwtmp" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_search_updwtmp" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_updwtmp
+if test "$ac_res" != no; then
+ test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+for ac_func in fmt_scaled scan_scaled login logout openpty updwtmp logwtmp
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+# On some platforms, inet_ntop and gethostbyname may be found in libresolv
+# or libnsl.
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for library containing inet_ntop" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for library containing inet_ntop... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char inet_ntop ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return inet_ntop ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' resolv nsl; do
+ if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+ ac_res="none required"
+ else
+ ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+ LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+ fi
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_search_inet_ntop=$ac_res
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext
+ if test "${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+set}" = set; then
+ break
+fi
+done
+if test "${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+set}" = set; then
+ :
+else
+ ac_cv_search_inet_ntop=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_search_inet_ntop" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_search_inet_ntop" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_inet_ntop
+if test "$ac_res" != no; then
+ test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for library containing gethostbyname" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for library containing gethostbyname... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_search_gethostbyname+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char gethostbyname ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return gethostbyname ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' resolv nsl; do
+ if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+ ac_res="none required"
+ else
+ ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+ LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+ fi
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_search_gethostbyname=$ac_res
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext
+ if test "${ac_cv_search_gethostbyname+set}" = set; then
+ break
+fi
+done
+if test "${ac_cv_search_gethostbyname+set}" = set; then
+ :
+else
+ ac_cv_search_gethostbyname=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_search_gethostbyname" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_search_gethostbyname" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_gethostbyname
+if test "$ac_res" != no; then
+ test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+
+
+for ac_func in strftime
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ # strftime is in -lintl on SCO UNIX.
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for strftime in -lintl" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for strftime in -lintl... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lintl $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char strftime ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return strftime ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_STRFTIME 1
+_ACEOF
+
+LIBS="-lintl $LIBS"
+fi
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+# Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+ #include <glob.h>
+ #ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC
+ FOUNDIT
+ #endif
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+ $EGREP "FOUNDIT" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+else
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+
+fi
+rm -f conftest*
+
+
+# Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for gl_matchc field in glob_t" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for gl_matchc field in glob_t... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <glob.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+# Check for g.gl_statv glob() extension
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <glob.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+#ifndef GLOB_KEEPSTAT
+#error "glob does not support GLOB_KEEPSTAT extension"
+#endif
+glob_t g;
+g.gl_statv = NULL;
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether GLOB_NOMATCH is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether GLOB_NOMATCH is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_GLOB_NOMATCH+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <glob.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef GLOB_NOMATCH
+ (void) GLOB_NOMATCH;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_GLOB_NOMATCH=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_GLOB_NOMATCH=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_GLOB_NOMATCH" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_GLOB_NOMATCH" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_GLOB_NOMATCH = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH 0
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether VIS_ALL is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether VIS_ALL is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_VIS_ALL+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <vis.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef VIS_ALL
+ (void) VIS_ALL;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_VIS_ALL=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_VIS_ALL=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_VIS_ALL" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_VIS_ALL" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_VIS_ALL = yes; then
+ :
+else
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_STRNVIS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME" >&2;}
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ struct dirent d;
+ exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char));
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for /proc/pid/fd directory" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for /proc/pid/fd directory... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test -d "/proc/$$/fd" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_PROC_PID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+# Check whether user wants S/Key support
+SKEY_MSG="no"
+
+# Check whether --with-skey was given.
+if test "${with_skey+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_skey;
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+
+ if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
+ fi
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SKEY 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lskey $LIBS"
+ SKEY_MSG="yes"
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for s/key support" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for s/key support... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <skey.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ char *ff = skey_keyinfo(""); ff="";
+ exit(0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: ** Incomplete or missing s/key libraries." >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: ** Incomplete or missing s/key libraries." >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if skeychallenge takes 4 arguments" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if skeychallenge takes 4 arguments... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <skey.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ (void)skeychallenge(NULL,"name","",0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SKEYCHALLENGE_4ARG 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether user wants to use ldns
+LDNS_MSG="no"
+
+# Check whether --with-ldns was given.
+if test "${with_ldns+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_ldns;
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+
+ if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
+ fi
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LDNS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
+ LDNS_MSG="yes"
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ldns support" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ldns support... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <ldns/ldns.h>
+int main() { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); status=LDNS_STATUS_OK; exit(0); }
+
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: ** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries." >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: ** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries." >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether user wants libedit support
+LIBEDIT_MSG="no"
+
+# Check whether --with-libedit was given.
+if test "${with_libedit+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_libedit; if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+ if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
+ # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ case $PKGCONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG="$PKGCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+PKGCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG
+if test -n "$PKGCONFIG"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $PKGCONFIG" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$PKGCONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+fi
+if test -z "$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG"; then
+ ac_pt_PKGCONFIG=$PKGCONFIG
+ # Extract the first word of "pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy pkg-config; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ case $ac_pt_PKGCONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG="$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+ac_pt_PKGCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG
+if test -n "$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test "x$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" = x; then
+ PKGCONFIG="no"
+ else
+ case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
+yes:)
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: In the future, Autoconf will not detect cross-tools
+whose name does not start with the host triplet. If you think this
+configuration is useful to you, please write to autoconf at gnu.org." >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: In the future, Autoconf will not detect cross-tools
+whose name does not start with the host triplet. If you think this
+configuration is useful to you, please write to autoconf at gnu.org." >&2;}
+ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
+esac
+ PKGCONFIG=$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG
+ fi
+else
+ PKGCONFIG="$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG"
+fi
+
+ if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if "$PKGCONFIG" libedit; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ use_pkgconfig_for_libedit=yes
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+ fi
+ else
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ fi
+ if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libedit" = "xyes"; then
+ LIBEDIT=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libedit`
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libedit`"
+ else
+ LIBEDIT="-ledit -lcurses"
+ fi
+ OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBEDIT | sed 's/-ledit//'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for el_init in -ledit" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for el_init in -ledit... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-ledit $OTHERLIBS
+ $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char el_init ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return el_init ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_LIBEDIT 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBEDIT_MSG="yes"
+
+
+else
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: libedit not found" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: libedit not found" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if libedit version is compatible" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if libedit version is compatible... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <histedit.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ int i = H_SETSIZE;
+ el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ exit(0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: libedit version is not compatible" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: libedit version is not compatible" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+ fi
+
+fi
+
+
+AUDIT_MODULE=none
+
+# Check whether --with-audit was given.
+if test "${with_audit+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_audit;
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for supported audit module" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for supported audit module... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ case "$withval" in
+ bsm)
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: bsm" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}bsm" >&6; }
+ AUDIT_MODULE=bsm
+
+for ac_header in bsm/audit.h
+do
+as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+# include <time.h>
+#endif
+
+
+
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+done
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for getaudit in -lbsm" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for getaudit in -lbsm... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lbsm $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char getaudit ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return getaudit ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBBSM 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lbsm $LIBS"
+
+else
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: BSM enabled and required library not found" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: BSM enabled and required library not found" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+
+for ac_func in getaudit
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: BSM enabled and required function not found" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: BSM enabled and required function not found" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+done
+
+ # These are optional
+
+
+for ac_func in getaudit_addr aug_get_machine
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_BSM_AUDIT 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ if test "$sol2ver" -ge 11; then
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lscf"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_BSM_API 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ ;;
+ linux)
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: linux" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}linux" >&6; }
+ AUDIT_MODULE=linux
+
+for ac_header in libaudit.h
+do
+as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+else
+ # Is the header compilable?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header usability" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header usability... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_header_compiler=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_compiler=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_compiler" >&6; }
+
+# Is the header present?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header presence" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header presence... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_preproc=no
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_preproc" >&6; }
+
+# So? What about this header?
+case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in
+ yes:no: )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+ ;;
+ no:yes:* )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&2;}
+ ( cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+## Report this to openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ##
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ ) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
+ ;;
+esac
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=\$ac_header_preproc"
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+
+fi
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_LINUX_AUDIT 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ ;;
+ debug)
+ AUDIT_MODULE=debug
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: debug" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}debug" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ ;;
+ no)
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ ;;
+ *)
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: Unknown audit module $withval" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: Unknown audit module $withval" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+fi
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-pie was given.
+if test "${with_pie+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_pie;
+ if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
+ use_pie=no
+ fi
+ if test "x$withval" = "xyes"; then
+ use_pie=yes
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+if test "x$use_pie" = "x"; then
+ use_pie=no
+fi
+if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" != "x1" && test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
+ # Turn off automatic PIE when toolchain hardening is off.
+ use_pie=no
+fi
+if test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
+ # Automatic PIE requires gcc >= 4.x
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for gcc >= 4.x" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for gcc >= 4.x... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#if !defined(__GNUC__) || __GNUC__ < 4
+#error gcc is too old
+#endif
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ use_pie=no
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then
+ SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ SAVED_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ {
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $CC supports compile flag -fPIE" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $CC supports compile flag -fPIE... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -fPIE"
+ _define_flag=""
+ test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-fPIE"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+ float l = i * 2.1;
+ double m = l / 0.5;
+ long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+ printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
+then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+ {
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $LD supports link flag -pie" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if $LD supports link flag -pie... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -pie"
+ _define_flag=""
+ test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-pie"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+ float l = i * 2.1;
+ double m = l / 0.5;
+ long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+ printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+ # We use both -fPIE and -pie or neither.
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if echo "x $CFLAGS" | grep ' -fPIE' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+ echo "x $LDFLAGS" | grep ' -pie' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS"
+ LDFLAGS="$SAVED_LDFLAGS"
+ fi
+fi
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+for ac_func in \
+ Blowfish_initstate \
+ Blowfish_expandstate \
+ Blowfish_expand0state \
+ Blowfish_stream2word \
+ asprintf \
+ b64_ntop \
+ __b64_ntop \
+ b64_pton \
+ __b64_pton \
+ bcopy \
+ bcrypt_pbkdf \
+ bindresvport_sa \
+ blf_enc \
+ cap_rights_limit \
+ clock \
+ closefrom \
+ dirfd \
+ endgrent \
+ err \
+ errx \
+ explicit_bzero \
+ fchmod \
+ fchown \
+ freeaddrinfo \
+ fstatfs \
+ fstatvfs \
+ futimes \
+ getaddrinfo \
+ getcwd \
+ getgrouplist \
+ getnameinfo \
+ getopt \
+ getpeereid \
+ getpeerucred \
+ getpgid \
+ getpgrp \
+ _getpty \
+ getrlimit \
+ getttyent \
+ glob \
+ group_from_gid \
+ inet_aton \
+ inet_ntoa \
+ inet_ntop \
+ innetgr \
+ login_getcapbool \
+ md5_crypt \
+ memmove \
+ memset_s \
+ mkdtemp \
+ mmap \
+ ngetaddrinfo \
+ nsleep \
+ ogetaddrinfo \
+ openlog_r \
+ pledge \
+ poll \
+ prctl \
+ pstat \
+ readpassphrase \
+ reallocarray \
+ recvmsg \
+ rresvport_af \
+ sendmsg \
+ setdtablesize \
+ setegid \
+ setenv \
+ seteuid \
+ setgroupent \
+ setgroups \
+ setlinebuf \
+ setlogin \
+ setpassent\
+ setpcred \
+ setproctitle \
+ setregid \
+ setreuid \
+ setrlimit \
+ setsid \
+ setvbuf \
+ sigaction \
+ sigvec \
+ snprintf \
+ socketpair \
+ statfs \
+ statvfs \
+ strdup \
+ strerror \
+ strlcat \
+ strlcpy \
+ strmode \
+ strnlen \
+ strnvis \
+ strptime \
+ strtonum \
+ strtoll \
+ strtoul \
+ strtoull \
+ swap32 \
+ sysconf \
+ tcgetpgrp \
+ timingsafe_bcmp \
+ truncate \
+ unsetenv \
+ updwtmpx \
+ user_from_uid \
+ usleep \
+ vasprintf \
+ vsnprintf \
+ waitpid \
+ warn \
+
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE"
+
+
+
+
+for ac_func in mblen mbtowc nl_langinfo wcwidth
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <ctype.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ return (isblank('a'));
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_ISBLANK 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+disable_pkcs11=
+# Check whether --enable-pkcs11 was given.
+if test "${enable_pkcs11+set}" = set; then
+ enableval=$enable_pkcs11;
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+ disable_pkcs11=1
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# PKCS11 depends on OpenSSL.
+if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" && test "x$disable_pkcs11" = "x"; then
+ # PKCS#11 support requires dlopen() and co
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for library containing dlopen" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for library containing dlopen... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_search_dlopen+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char dlopen ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return dlopen ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' dl; do
+ if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+ ac_res="none required"
+ else
+ ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+ LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+ fi
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_search_dlopen=$ac_res
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext
+ if test "${ac_cv_search_dlopen+set}" = set; then
+ break
+fi
+done
+if test "${ac_cv_search_dlopen+set}" = set; then
+ :
+else
+ ac_cv_search_dlopen=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_search_dlopen" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_search_dlopen" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_dlopen
+if test "$ac_res" != no; then
+ test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define ENABLE_PKCS11
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+fi
+
+# IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror()
+
+for ac_func in gai_strerror
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_GAI_STRERROR 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+
+const char *gai_strerror(int);
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ char *str;
+ str = gai_strerror(0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+done
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for library containing nanosleep" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for library containing nanosleep... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_search_nanosleep+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char nanosleep ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return nanosleep ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' rt posix4; do
+ if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+ ac_res="none required"
+ else
+ ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+ LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+ fi
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_search_nanosleep=$ac_res
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext
+ if test "${ac_cv_search_nanosleep+set}" = set; then
+ break
+fi
+done
+if test "${ac_cv_search_nanosleep+set}" = set; then
+ :
+else
+ ac_cv_search_nanosleep=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_search_nanosleep" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_search_nanosleep" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_nanosleep
+if test "$ac_res" != no; then
+ test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_NANOSLEEP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for library containing clock_gettime" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for library containing clock_gettime... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_search_clock_gettime+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char clock_gettime ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return clock_gettime ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' rt; do
+ if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+ ac_res="none required"
+ else
+ ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+ LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+ fi
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_search_clock_gettime=$ac_res
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext
+ if test "${ac_cv_search_clock_gettime+set}" = set; then
+ break
+fi
+done
+if test "${ac_cv_search_clock_gettime+set}" = set; then
+ :
+else
+ ac_cv_search_clock_gettime=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_search_clock_gettime" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_search_clock_gettime" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_clock_gettime
+if test "$ac_res" != no; then
+ test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether getrusage is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether getrusage is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_getrusage+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef getrusage
+ (void) getrusage;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_getrusage=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_getrusage=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_getrusage" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_getrusage" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_getrusage = yes; then
+
+for ac_func in getrusage
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether strsep is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether strsep is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_strsep+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
+# include <string.h>
+#endif
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef strsep
+ (void) strsep;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_strsep=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_strsep=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_strsep" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_strsep" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_strsep = yes; then
+
+for ac_func in strsep
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+fi
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether tcsendbreak is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether tcsendbreak is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_tcsendbreak+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <termios.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef tcsendbreak
+ (void) tcsendbreak;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_tcsendbreak=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_tcsendbreak=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_tcsendbreak" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_tcsendbreak" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_tcsendbreak = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_TCSENDBREAK 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+
+for ac_func in tcsendbreak
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+fi
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether h_errno is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether h_errno is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_h_errno+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <netdb.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef h_errno
+ (void) h_errno;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_h_errno=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_h_errno=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_h_errno" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_h_errno" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_h_errno = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO 0
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether SHUT_RD is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether SHUT_RD is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_SHUT_RD+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef SHUT_RD
+ (void) SHUT_RD;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_SHUT_RD=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_SHUT_RD=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_SHUT_RD" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_SHUT_RD" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_SHUT_RD = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD 0
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether O_NONBLOCK is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether O_NONBLOCK is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_O_NONBLOCK+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef O_NONBLOCK
+ (void) O_NONBLOCK;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_O_NONBLOCK=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_O_NONBLOCK=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_O_NONBLOCK" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_O_NONBLOCK" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_O_NONBLOCK = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK 0
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether writev is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether writev is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_writev+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef writev
+ (void) writev;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_writev=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_writev=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_writev" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_writev" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_writev = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_WRITEV 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_WRITEV 0
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether MAXSYMLINKS is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether MAXSYMLINKS is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_MAXSYMLINKS+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef MAXSYMLINKS
+ (void) MAXSYMLINKS;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_MAXSYMLINKS=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_MAXSYMLINKS=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_MAXSYMLINKS" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_MAXSYMLINKS" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_MAXSYMLINKS = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS 0
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether offsetof is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether offsetof is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_offsetof+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef offsetof
+ (void) offsetof;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_offsetof=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_offsetof=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_offsetof" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_offsetof" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_offsetof = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF 0
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+# extra bits for select(2)
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether howmany is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether howmany is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_howmany+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+#include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef howmany
+ (void) howmany;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_howmany=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_howmany=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_howmany" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_howmany" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_howmany = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY 0
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether NFDBITS is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether NFDBITS is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_NFDBITS+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+#include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef NFDBITS
+ (void) NFDBITS;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_NFDBITS=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_NFDBITS=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_NFDBITS" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_NFDBITS" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_NFDBITS = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS 0
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for fd_mask" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for fd_mask... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_type_fd_mask+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+#include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+
+typedef fd_mask ac__type_new_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+if ((ac__type_new_ *) 0)
+ return 0;
+if (sizeof (ac__type_new_))
+ return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_type_fd_mask=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_type_fd_mask=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_type_fd_mask" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_type_fd_mask" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_type_fd_mask = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_FD_MASK 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+for ac_func in setresuid
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if setresuid seems to work" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if setresuid seems to work... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&2;}
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ errno=0;
+ setresuid(0,0,0);
+ if (errno==ENOSYS)
+ exit(1);
+ else
+ exit(0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETRESUID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: not implemented" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}not implemented" >&6; }
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+
+for ac_func in setresgid
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if setresgid seems to work" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if setresgid seems to work... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&2;}
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ errno=0;
+ setresgid(0,0,0);
+ if (errno==ENOSYS)
+ exit(1);
+ else
+ exit(0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SETRESGID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: not implemented" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}not implemented" >&6; }
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+
+for ac_func in realpath
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if realpath works with non-existent files" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if realpath works with non-existent files... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming working" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming working" >&2;}
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ char buf[PATH_MAX];
+ if (realpath("/opensshnonexistentfilename1234", buf) == NULL)
+ if (errno == ENOENT)
+ exit(1);
+ exit(0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_REALPATH 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+
+
+for ac_func in gettimeofday time
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+for ac_func in endutent getutent getutid getutline pututline setutent
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+for ac_func in utmpname
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+for ac_func in endutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline getutxuser pututxline
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+
+
+for ac_func in setutxdb setutxent utmpxname
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+for ac_func in getlastlogxbyname
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for daemon" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for daemon... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_func_daemon+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define daemon to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares daemon.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define daemon innocuous_daemon
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char daemon (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef daemon
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char daemon ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_daemon || defined __stub___daemon
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return daemon ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_func_daemon=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_func_daemon=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_func_daemon" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_func_daemon" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_func_daemon = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DAEMON 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for daemon in -lbsd" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for daemon in -lbsd... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lbsd $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char daemon ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return daemon ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon = yes; then
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd"; cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DAEMON 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for getpagesize" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for getpagesize... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_func_getpagesize+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define getpagesize to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares getpagesize.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define getpagesize innocuous_getpagesize
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char getpagesize (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef getpagesize
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char getpagesize ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_getpagesize || defined __stub___getpagesize
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return getpagesize ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_func_getpagesize=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_func_getpagesize=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_func_getpagesize" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_func_getpagesize" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_func_getpagesize = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_GETPAGESIZE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for getpagesize in -lucb" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for getpagesize in -lucb... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lucb $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char getpagesize ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return getpagesize ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize = yes; then
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lucb"; cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_GETPAGESIZE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check for broken snprintf
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&2;}
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <stdio.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ char b[5];
+ snprintf(b,5,"123456789");
+ exit(b[4]!='\0');
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: ****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: ****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&2;}
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+# We depend on vsnprintf returning the right thing on overflow: the
+# number of characters it tried to create (as per SUSv3)
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()" >&2;}
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ size_t ret;
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+char x[1];
+if (x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
+ return 1;
+if (x_snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
+ return 1;
+return 0;
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: ****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: ****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&2;}
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+# On systems where [v]snprintf is broken, but is declared in stdio,
+# check that the fmt argument is const char * or just char *.
+# This is only useful for when BROKEN_SNPRINTF
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+int snprintf(char *a, size_t b, const char *c, ...) { return 0; }
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ snprintf(0, 0, 0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SNPRINTF_CONST const
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SNPRINTF_CONST /* not const */
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+# Check for missing getpeereid (or equiv) support
+NO_PEERCHECK=""
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeereid" != "xyes" -a "x$ac_cv_func_getpeerucred" != "xyes"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+int i = SO_PEERCRED;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_SO_PEERCRED 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ NO_PEERCHECK=1
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_mkdtemp" = "xyes" ; then
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for (overly) strict mkstemp" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for (overly) strict mkstemp... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test";
+ if (mkstemp(template) == -1)
+ exit(1);
+ unlink(template);
+ exit(0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if openpty correctly handles controlling tty" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if openpty correctly handles controlling tty... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&6; }
+
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ pid_t pid;
+ int fd, ptyfd, ttyfd, status;
+
+ pid = fork();
+ if (pid < 0) { /* failed */
+ exit(1);
+ } else if (pid > 0) { /* parent */
+ waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
+ if (WIFEXITED(status))
+ exit(WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ else
+ exit(2);
+ } else { /* child */
+ close(0); close(1); close(2);
+ setsid();
+ openpty(&ptyfd, &ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ exit(3); /* Acquired ctty: broken */
+ else
+ exit(0); /* Did not acquire ctty: OK */
+ }
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
+ test "x$check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if getaddrinfo seems to work" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if getaddrinfo seems to work... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&6; }
+
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#define TEST_PORT "2222"
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ int err, sock;
+ struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
+ char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
+
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+
+ err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
+ if (err != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+ continue;
+
+ err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
+ sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+ NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
+
+ if (err != 0) {
+ if (err == EAI_SYSTEM)
+ perror("getnameinfo EAI_SYSTEM");
+ else
+ fprintf(stderr, "getnameinfo failed: %s\n",
+ gai_strerror(err));
+ exit(2);
+ }
+
+ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+ if (sock < 0)
+ perror("socket");
+ if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ if (errno == EBADF)
+ exit(3);
+ }
+ }
+ exit(0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
+ test "x$check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if getaddrinfo seems to work" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if getaddrinfo seems to work... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: cross-compiling, assuming no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}cross-compiling, assuming no" >&6; }
+
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#define TEST_PORT "2222"
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ int err, sock;
+ struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
+ char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
+
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+
+ err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
+ if (err != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+ continue;
+
+ err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
+ sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+ NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
+
+ if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET && err != 0) {
+ perror("getnameinfo");
+ exit(2);
+ }
+ }
+ exit(0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether AI_NUMERICSERV is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether AI_NUMERICSERV is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_AI_NUMERICSERV+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/socket.h>
+ #include <netdb.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef AI_NUMERICSERV
+ (void) AI_NUMERICSERV;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_AI_NUMERICSERV=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_AI_NUMERICSERV=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_AI_NUMERICSERV" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_AI_NUMERICSERV" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_AI_NUMERICSERV = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV 0
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+if test "x$check_for_conflicting_getspnam" = "x1"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <shadow.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ exit(0);
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether getpgrp requires zero arguments" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether getpgrp requires zero arguments... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_func_getpgrp_void+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ # Use it with a single arg.
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+int
+main ()
+{
+getpgrp (0);
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_func_getpgrp_void=no
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_func_getpgrp_void=yes
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_func_getpgrp_void" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_func_getpgrp_void" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_func_getpgrp_void = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define GETPGRP_VOID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+
+# Search for OpenSSL
+saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
+saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+
+# Check whether --with-ssl-dir was given.
+if test "${with_ssl_dir+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_ssl_dir;
+ if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: cannot use --with-ssl-dir when OpenSSL disabled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: cannot use --with-ssl-dir when OpenSSL disabled" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ fi
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ case "$withval" in
+ # Relative paths
+ ./*|../*) withval="`pwd`/$withval"
+ esac
+ if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ elif test -d "$withval/lib64"; then
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 -R${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ else
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ fi
+ if test -d "$withval/include"; then
+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
+ else
+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-openssl-header-check was given.
+if test "${with_openssl_header_check+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_openssl_header_check;
+ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+ openssl_check_nonfatal=1
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+openssl_engine=no
+
+# Check whether --with-ssl-engine was given.
+if test "${with_ssl_engine+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_ssl_engine;
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: cannot use --with-ssl-engine when OpenSSL disabled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: cannot use --with-ssl-engine when OpenSSL disabled" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ fi
+ openssl_engine=yes
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+ LIBS="-lcrypto $LIBS"
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char RAND_add ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return RAND_add ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_OPENSSL 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/ssl/lib -R/usr/local/ssl/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/ssl/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/ssl/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}"
+ if test "${ac_cv_header_openssl_opensslv_h+set}" = set; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for openssl/opensslv.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for openssl/opensslv.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_header_openssl_opensslv_h+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_header_openssl_opensslv_h" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_header_openssl_opensslv_h" >&6; }
+else
+ # Is the header compilable?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking openssl/opensslv.h usability" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking openssl/opensslv.h usability... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_header_compiler=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_compiler=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_compiler" >&6; }
+
+# Is the header present?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking openssl/opensslv.h presence" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking openssl/opensslv.h presence... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_preproc=no
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_preproc" >&6; }
+
+# So? What about this header?
+case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in
+ yes:no: )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: openssl/opensslv.h: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: openssl/opensslv.h: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: openssl/opensslv.h: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: openssl/opensslv.h: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+ ;;
+ no:yes:* )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: openssl/opensslv.h: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: openssl/opensslv.h: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: openssl/opensslv.h: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: openssl/opensslv.h: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: openssl/opensslv.h: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: openssl/opensslv.h: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: openssl/opensslv.h: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: openssl/opensslv.h: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: openssl/opensslv.h: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: openssl/opensslv.h: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: openssl/opensslv.h: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: openssl/opensslv.h: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&2;}
+ ( cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+## Report this to openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ##
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ ) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
+ ;;
+esac
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for openssl/opensslv.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for openssl/opensslv.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_header_openssl_opensslv_h+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_cv_header_openssl_opensslv_h=$ac_header_preproc
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_header_openssl_opensslv_h" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_header_openssl_opensslv_h" >&6; }
+
+fi
+if test $ac_cv_header_openssl_opensslv_h = yes; then
+ :
+else
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: *** OpenSSL headers missing - please install first or check config.log ***" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: *** OpenSSL headers missing - please install first or check config.log ***" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char RAND_add ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return RAND_add ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_OPENSSL 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: *** Can't find recent OpenSSL libcrypto (see config.log for details) ***" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: *** Can't find recent OpenSSL libcrypto (see config.log for details) ***" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+ # Determine OpenSSL header version
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking OpenSSL header version" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking OpenSSL header version... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;}
+
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+ #define DATA "conftest.sslincver"
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ FILE *fd;
+ int rc;
+
+ fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
+ if(fd == NULL)
+ exit(1);
+
+ if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n",
+ (unsigned long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER,
+ OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) < 0)
+ exit(1);
+
+ exit(0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+
+ ssl_header_ver=`cat conftest.sslincver`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ssl_header_ver" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ssl_header_ver" >&6; }
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: not found" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}not found" >&6; }
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: OpenSSL version header not found." >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: OpenSSL version header not found." >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+
+ # Determine OpenSSL library version
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking OpenSSL library version" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking OpenSSL library version... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;}
+
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #define DATA "conftest.ssllibver"
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ FILE *fd;
+ int rc;
+
+ fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
+ if(fd == NULL)
+ exit(1);
+
+ if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n", (unsigned long)SSLeay(),
+ SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION))) < 0)
+ exit(1);
+
+ exit(0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+
+ ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver`
+ # Check version is supported.
+ case "$ssl_library_ver" in
+ 0090[0-7]*|009080[0-5]*)
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: OpenSSL >= 0.9.8f required (have \"$ssl_library_ver\")" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: OpenSSL >= 0.9.8f required (have \"$ssl_library_ver\")" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ ;;
+ *) ;;
+ esac
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ssl_library_ver" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ssl_library_ver" >&6; }
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: not found" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}not found" >&6; }
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: OpenSSL library not found." >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: OpenSSL library not found." >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+
+ # Sanity check OpenSSL headers
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether OpenSSL's headers match the library" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether OpenSSL's headers match the library... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;}
+
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ exit(SSLeay() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ if test "x$openssl_check_nonfatal" = "x"; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
+ library. Check config.log for details.
+ If you are sure your installation is consistent, you can disable the check
+ by running \"./configure --without-openssl-header-check\".
+ Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.
+ " >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
+ library. Check config.log for details.
+ If you are sure your installation is consistent, you can disable the check
+ by running \"./configure --without-openssl-header-check\".
+ Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.
+ " >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
+ library. Check config.log for details.
+ Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches." >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
+ library. Check config.log for details.
+ Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches." >&2;}
+ fi
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if programs using OpenSSL functions will link" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if programs using OpenSSL functions will link... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -ldl"
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+for ac_func in \
+ BN_is_prime_ex \
+ DSA_generate_parameters_ex \
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex \
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex \
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init \
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup \
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex \
+ HMAC_CTX_init \
+ RSA_generate_key_ex \
+ RSA_get_default_method \
+
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+ if test "x$openssl_engine" = "xyes" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for OpenSSL ENGINE support" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for OpenSSL ENGINE support... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+ #include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+ ENGINE_register_all_complete();
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: OpenSSL ENGINE support not found" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: OpenSSL ENGINE support not found" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+ fi
+
+ # Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+ # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*ctr
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ exit(EVP_aes_128_ctr() == NULL ||
+ EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL ||
+ EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+ # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*gcm
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ exit(EVP_aes_128_gcm() == NULL ||
+ EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL ||
+ EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED == 0 ||
+ EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN == 0 ||
+ EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG == 0 ||
+ EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG == 0 ||
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(NULL, 0, 0, NULL) == 0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_cipers \
+ aes128-gcm at openssh.com \
+ aes256-gcm at openssh.com"
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for library containing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for library containing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' crypto; do
+ if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+ ac_res="none required"
+ else
+ ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+ LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+ fi
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl=$ac_res
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext
+ if test "${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl+set}" = set; then
+ break
+fi
+done
+if test "${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl+set}" = set; then
+ :
+else
+ ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl
+if test "$ac_res" != no; then
+ test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0))
+ exit(0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+ # Some systems want crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the version in OpenSSL,
+ # because the system crypt() is more featureful.
+ if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_before" = "x1"; then
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char crypt ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return crypt ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBCRYPT 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+ fi
+
+ # Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the
+ # version in OpenSSL.
+ if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char crypt ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return crypt ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt = yes; then
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"
+fi
+
+ fi
+
+
+for ac_func in crypt DES_crypt
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+ # Search for SHA256 support in libc and/or OpenSSL
+
+
+for ac_func in SHA256_Update EVP_sha256
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
+ hmac-sha2-256 \
+ hmac-sha2-512 \
+ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 \
+ hmac-sha2-256-etm at openssh.com \
+ hmac-sha2-512-etm at openssh.com"
+
+
+fi
+done
+
+ # Search for RIPE-MD support in OpenSSL
+
+for ac_func in EVP_ripemd160
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
+ hmac-ripemd160 \
+ hmac-ripemd160 at openssh.com \
+ hmac-ripemd160-etm at openssh.com"
+
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+ # Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+ #include <openssl/ec.h>
+ #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+ #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/objects.h>
+ #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */
+ # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code"
+ #endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+ const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ enable_nistp256=1
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+ #include <openssl/ec.h>
+ #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+ #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/objects.h>
+ #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */
+ # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code"
+ #endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1);
+ const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ enable_nistp384=1
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+ #include <openssl/ec.h>
+ #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+ #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/objects.h>
+ #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */
+ # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code"
+ #endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
+ const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross-compiling: assuming yes" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross-compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
+ enable_nistp521=1
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+ #include <openssl/ec.h>
+ #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+ #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/objects.h>
+ #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
+ const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
+ exit(e == NULL || m == NULL);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ enable_nistp521=1
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+ COMMENT_OUT_ECC="#no ecc#"
+ TEST_SSH_ECC=no
+
+ if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1 || test x$enable_nistp384 = x1 || \
+ test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define OPENSSL_HAS_ECC 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
+ COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
+ else
+ unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 \
+ ecdh-sha2-nistp256 \
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
+ fi
+ if test x$enable_nistp384 = x1; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
+ COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
+ else
+ unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \
+ ecdh-sha2-nistp384 \
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
+ fi
+ if test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
+ COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
+ else
+ unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
+ ecdh-sha2-nistp521 \
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 \
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
+ fi
+
+
+
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char crypt ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return crypt ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt = yes; then
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"
+fi
+
+
+for ac_func in crypt
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+fi
+
+
+
+
+
+for ac_func in \
+ arc4random \
+ arc4random_buf \
+ arc4random_stir \
+ arc4random_uniform \
+
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ia_openinfo in -liaf" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ia_openinfo in -liaf... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-liaf $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char ia_openinfo ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return ia_openinfo ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo = yes; then
+
+ LIBS="$LIBS -liaf"
+
+for ac_func in set_id
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -liaf"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBIAF 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+fi
+
+LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+
+### Configure cryptographic random number support
+
+# Check wheter OpenSSL seeds itself
+if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
+ # This is safe, since we will fatal() at runtime if
+ # OpenSSL is not seeded correctly.
+ OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
+
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+
+ OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+# PRNGD TCP socket
+
+# Check whether --with-prngd-port was given.
+if test "${with_prngd_port+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_prngd_port;
+ case "$withval" in
+ no)
+ withval=""
+ ;;
+ [0-9]*)
+ ;;
+ *)
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: You must specify a numeric port number for --with-prngd-port" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: You must specify a numeric port number for --with-prngd-port" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ ;;
+ esac
+ if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
+ PRNGD_PORT="$withval"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define PRNGD_PORT $PRNGD_PORT
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# PRNGD Unix domain socket
+
+# Check whether --with-prngd-socket was given.
+if test "${with_prngd_socket+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_prngd_socket;
+ case "$withval" in
+ yes)
+ withval="/var/run/egd-pool"
+ ;;
+ no)
+ withval=""
+ ;;
+ /*)
+ ;;
+ *)
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: You must specify an absolute path to the entropy socket" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: You must specify an absolute path to the entropy socket" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+ if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
+ if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: You may not specify both a PRNGD/EGD port and socket" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: You may not specify both a PRNGD/EGD port and socket" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ fi
+ if test ! -r "$withval" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: Entropy socket is not readable" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: Entropy socket is not readable" >&2;}
+ fi
+ PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define PRNGD_SOCKET "$PRNGD_SOCKET"
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+
+else
+
+ # Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already
+ if test "x$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" != "xyes" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for PRNGD/EGD socket" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for PRNGD/EGD socket... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ # Insert other locations here
+ for sock in /var/run/egd-pool /dev/egd-pool /etc/entropy; do
+ if test -r $sock && $TEST_MINUS_S_SH -c "test -S $sock -o -p $sock" ; then
+ PRNGD_SOCKET="$sock"
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define PRNGD_SOCKET "$PRNGD_SOCKET"
+_ACEOF
+
+ break;
+ fi
+ done
+ if test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $PRNGD_SOCKET" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$PRNGD_SOCKET" >&6; }
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: not found" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}not found" >&6; }
+ fi
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Which randomness source do we use?
+if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
+ RAND_MSG="PRNGd port $PRNGD_PORT"
+elif test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
+ RAND_MSG="PRNGd socket $PRNGD_SOCKET"
+elif test ! -z "$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ RAND_MSG="OpenSSL internal ONLY"
+elif test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible" >&2;}
+else
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: OpenSSH has no source of random numbers. Please configure OpenSSL with an entropy source or re-run configure using one of the --with-prngd-port or --with-prngd-socket options" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: OpenSSH has no source of random numbers. Please configure OpenSSL with an entropy source or re-run configure using one of the --with-prngd-port or --with-prngd-socket options" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+# Check for PAM libs
+PAM_MSG="no"
+
+# Check whether --with-pam was given.
+if test "${with_pam+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_pam;
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: PAM headers not found" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: PAM headers not found" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ fi
+
+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for dlopen in -ldl" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for dlopen in -ldl... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-ldl $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char dlopen ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return dlopen ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBDL 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-ldl $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for pam_set_item in -lpam" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for pam_set_item in -lpam... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lpam $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char pam_set_item ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return pam_set_item ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBPAM 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lpam $LIBS"
+
+else
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: *** libpam missing" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: *** libpam missing" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+
+for ac_func in pam_getenvlist
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+
+for ac_func in pam_putenv
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+
+ PAM_MSG="yes"
+
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_PAM 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+ if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then
+ case "$LIBS" in
+ *-ldl*)
+ # libdl already in LIBS
+ ;;
+ *)
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
+ ;;
+ esac
+ fi
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check for older PAM
+if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
+ # Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM)
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether pam_strerror takes only one argument" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether pam_strerror takes only one argument... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
+#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+(void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_OLD_PAM 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ PAM_MSG="yes (old library)"
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+case "$host" in
+*-*-cygwin*)
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+ ;;
+*)
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd
+ ;;
+esac
+
+# Check whether --with-privsep-user was given.
+if test "${with_privsep_user+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_privsep_user;
+ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=$withval
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+if test "x$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" = "xCYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER "$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+
+if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <linux/seccomp.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
+ (void) SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER = yes; then
+ have_seccomp_filter=1
+fi
+
+fi
+if test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" ; then
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking kernel for seccomp_filter support" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking kernel for seccomp_filter support... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <elf.h>
+ #include <linux/audit.h>
+ #include <linux/seccomp.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <sys/prctl.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ int i = $seccomp_audit_arch;
+ errno = 0;
+ prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0);
+ exit(errno == EFAULT ? 0 : 1);
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ # Disable seccomp filter as a target
+ have_seccomp_filter=0
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+# Decide which sandbox style to use
+sandbox_arg=""
+
+# Check whether --with-sandbox was given.
+if test "${with_sandbox+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_sandbox;
+ if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+ sandbox_arg=""
+ else
+ sandbox_arg="$withval"
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Some platforms (seems to be the ones that have a kernel poll(2)-type
+# function with which they implement select(2)) use an extra file descriptor
+# when calling select(2), which means we can't use the rlimit sandbox.
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if select works with descriptor rlimit" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if select works with descriptor rlimit... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ struct rlimit rl_zero;
+ int fd, r;
+ fd_set fds;
+ struct timeval tv;
+
+ fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
+ FD_ZERO(&fds);
+ FD_SET(fd, &fds);
+ rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+ setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero);
+ setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
+ tv.tv_sec = 1;
+ tv.tv_usec = 0;
+ r = select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
+ exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ select_works_with_rlimit=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ select_works_with_rlimit=no
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ struct rlimit rl_zero;
+ int fd, r;
+ fd_set fds;
+
+ rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+ r = setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
+ exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ struct rlimit rl_zero;
+
+ rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+ exit(setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) != 0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+
+if test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xpledge" || \
+ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" = "xyes" ) ; then
+ test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" != "xyes" && \
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: pledge sandbox requires pledge(2) support" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: pledge sandbox requires pledge(2) support" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ SANDBOX_STYLE="pledge"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SANDBOX_PLEDGE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsystrace" || \
+ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" = "x1" ) ; then
+ test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" != "x1" && \
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: systrace sandbox requires systrace headers and SYSTR_POLICY_KILL support" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: systrace sandbox requires systrace headers and SYSTR_POLICY_KILL support" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ SANDBOX_STYLE="systrace"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SANDBOX_SYSTRACE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" || \
+ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = "xyes" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = "xyes") ; then
+ test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" != "xyes" -o \
+ "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" != "xyes" && \
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SANDBOX_DARWIN 1
+_ACEOF
+
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \
+ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
+ test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_elf_h" = "xyes" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" = "xyes" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" = "xyes" && \
+ test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" && \
+ test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = "xyes" ) ; then
+ test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" = "x" && \
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: seccomp_filter sandbox not supported on $host" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: seccomp_filter sandbox not supported on $host" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" != "x1" && \
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: seccomp_filter sandbox requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: seccomp_filter sandbox requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ test "x$have_seccomp_filter" != "x1" && \
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: seccomp_filter sandbox requires seccomp headers" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: seccomp_filter sandbox requires seccomp headers" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" != "xyes" && \
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ SANDBOX_STYLE="seccomp_filter"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER 1
+_ACEOF
+
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \
+ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capability_h" = "xyes" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capability_h" != "xyes" && \
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: capsicum sandbox requires sys/capability.h header" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: capsicum sandbox requires sys/capability.h header" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SANDBOX_CAPSICUM 1
+_ACEOF
+
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \
+ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \
+ test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \
+ test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then
+ test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: rlimit sandbox requires setrlimit function" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: rlimit sandbox requires setrlimit function" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" != "xyes" && \
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: rlimit sandbox requires select to work with rlimit" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: rlimit sandbox requires select to work with rlimit" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ SANDBOX_STYLE="rlimit"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SANDBOX_RLIMIT 1
+_ACEOF
+
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsolaris" || \
+ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$SOLARIS_PRIVS" = "xyes" ) ; then
+ SANDBOX_STYLE="solaris"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SANDBOX_SOLARIS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+elif test -z "$sandbox_arg" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xno" || \
+ test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnone" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnull" ; then
+ SANDBOX_STYLE="none"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SANDBOX_NULL 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: unsupported --with-sandbox" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: unsupported --with-sandbox" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+# Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right.
+if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then
+ LIBS="$LIBS -liberty";
+fi
+
+# Check for long long datatypes
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for long long" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for long long... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_type_long_long+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+typedef long long ac__type_new_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+if ((ac__type_new_ *) 0)
+ return 0;
+if (sizeof (ac__type_new_))
+ return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_type_long_long=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_type_long_long=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_type_long_long" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_type_long_long" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_type_long_long = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LONG_LONG 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for unsigned long long" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for unsigned long long... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_type_unsigned_long_long+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+typedef unsigned long long ac__type_new_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+if ((ac__type_new_ *) 0)
+ return 0;
+if (sizeof (ac__type_new_))
+ return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_type_unsigned_long_long=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_type_unsigned_long_long=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_type_unsigned_long_long" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_type_unsigned_long_long" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_type_unsigned_long_long = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for long double" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for long double... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_type_long_double+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+typedef long double ac__type_new_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+if ((ac__type_new_ *) 0)
+ return 0;
+if (sizeof (ac__type_new_))
+ return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_type_long_double=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_type_long_double=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_type_long_double" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_type_long_double" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_type_long_double = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check datatype sizes
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for short int" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for short int... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_type_short_int+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+typedef short int ac__type_new_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+if ((ac__type_new_ *) 0)
+ return 0;
+if (sizeof (ac__type_new_))
+ return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_type_short_int=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_type_short_int=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_type_short_int" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_type_short_int" >&6; }
+
+# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
+# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
+# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
+# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking size of short int" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking size of short int... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_sizeof_short_int+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ # Depending upon the size, compute the lo and hi bounds.
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef short int ac__type_sizeof_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) >= 0)];
+test_array [0] = 0
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_lo=0 ac_mid=0
+ while :; do
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef short int ac__type_sizeof_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) <= $ac_mid)];
+test_array [0] = 0
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_hi=$ac_mid; break
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_lo=`expr $ac_mid + 1`
+ if test $ac_lo -le $ac_mid; then
+ ac_lo= ac_hi=
+ break
+ fi
+ ac_mid=`expr 2 '*' $ac_mid + 1`
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+ done
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef short int ac__type_sizeof_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) < 0)];
+test_array [0] = 0
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_hi=-1 ac_mid=-1
+ while :; do
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef short int ac__type_sizeof_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) >= $ac_mid)];
+test_array [0] = 0
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_lo=$ac_mid; break
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_hi=`expr '(' $ac_mid ')' - 1`
+ if test $ac_mid -le $ac_hi; then
+ ac_lo= ac_hi=
+ break
+ fi
+ ac_mid=`expr 2 '*' $ac_mid`
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+ done
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_lo= ac_hi=
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+# Binary search between lo and hi bounds.
+while test "x$ac_lo" != "x$ac_hi"; do
+ ac_mid=`expr '(' $ac_hi - $ac_lo ')' / 2 + $ac_lo`
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef short int ac__type_sizeof_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) <= $ac_mid)];
+test_array [0] = 0
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_hi=$ac_mid
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_lo=`expr '(' $ac_mid ')' + 1`
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+done
+case $ac_lo in
+?*) ac_cv_sizeof_short_int=$ac_lo;;
+'') if test "$ac_cv_type_short_int" = yes; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: cannot compute sizeof (short int)
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: cannot compute sizeof (short int)
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&2;}
+ { (exit 77); exit 77; }; }
+ else
+ ac_cv_sizeof_short_int=0
+ fi ;;
+esac
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef short int ac__type_sizeof_;
+static long int longval () { return (long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_)); }
+static unsigned long int ulongval () { return (long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_)); }
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ FILE *f = fopen ("conftest.val", "w");
+ if (! f)
+ return 1;
+ if (((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) < 0)
+ {
+ long int i = longval ();
+ if (i != ((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))))
+ return 1;
+ fprintf (f, "%ld\n", i);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ unsigned long int i = ulongval ();
+ if (i != ((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))))
+ return 1;
+ fprintf (f, "%lu\n", i);
+ }
+ return ferror (f) || fclose (f) != 0;
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ ac_cv_sizeof_short_int=`cat conftest.val`
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+if test "$ac_cv_type_short_int" = yes; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: cannot compute sizeof (short int)
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: cannot compute sizeof (short int)
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&2;}
+ { (exit 77); exit 77; }; }
+ else
+ ac_cv_sizeof_short_int=0
+ fi
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+rm -f conftest.val
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_short_int" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_sizeof_short_int" >&6; }
+
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define SIZEOF_SHORT_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_short_int
+_ACEOF
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for int" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for int... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_type_int+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+typedef int ac__type_new_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+if ((ac__type_new_ *) 0)
+ return 0;
+if (sizeof (ac__type_new_))
+ return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_type_int=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_type_int=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_type_int" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_type_int" >&6; }
+
+# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
+# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
+# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
+# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking size of int" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking size of int... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_sizeof_int+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ # Depending upon the size, compute the lo and hi bounds.
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef int ac__type_sizeof_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) >= 0)];
+test_array [0] = 0
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_lo=0 ac_mid=0
+ while :; do
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef int ac__type_sizeof_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) <= $ac_mid)];
+test_array [0] = 0
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_hi=$ac_mid; break
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_lo=`expr $ac_mid + 1`
+ if test $ac_lo -le $ac_mid; then
+ ac_lo= ac_hi=
+ break
+ fi
+ ac_mid=`expr 2 '*' $ac_mid + 1`
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+ done
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef int ac__type_sizeof_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) < 0)];
+test_array [0] = 0
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_hi=-1 ac_mid=-1
+ while :; do
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef int ac__type_sizeof_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) >= $ac_mid)];
+test_array [0] = 0
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_lo=$ac_mid; break
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_hi=`expr '(' $ac_mid ')' - 1`
+ if test $ac_mid -le $ac_hi; then
+ ac_lo= ac_hi=
+ break
+ fi
+ ac_mid=`expr 2 '*' $ac_mid`
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+ done
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_lo= ac_hi=
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+# Binary search between lo and hi bounds.
+while test "x$ac_lo" != "x$ac_hi"; do
+ ac_mid=`expr '(' $ac_hi - $ac_lo ')' / 2 + $ac_lo`
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef int ac__type_sizeof_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) <= $ac_mid)];
+test_array [0] = 0
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_hi=$ac_mid
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_lo=`expr '(' $ac_mid ')' + 1`
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+done
+case $ac_lo in
+?*) ac_cv_sizeof_int=$ac_lo;;
+'') if test "$ac_cv_type_int" = yes; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: cannot compute sizeof (int)
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: cannot compute sizeof (int)
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&2;}
+ { (exit 77); exit 77; }; }
+ else
+ ac_cv_sizeof_int=0
+ fi ;;
+esac
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef int ac__type_sizeof_;
+static long int longval () { return (long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_)); }
+static unsigned long int ulongval () { return (long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_)); }
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ FILE *f = fopen ("conftest.val", "w");
+ if (! f)
+ return 1;
+ if (((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) < 0)
+ {
+ long int i = longval ();
+ if (i != ((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))))
+ return 1;
+ fprintf (f, "%ld\n", i);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ unsigned long int i = ulongval ();
+ if (i != ((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))))
+ return 1;
+ fprintf (f, "%lu\n", i);
+ }
+ return ferror (f) || fclose (f) != 0;
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ ac_cv_sizeof_int=`cat conftest.val`
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+if test "$ac_cv_type_int" = yes; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: cannot compute sizeof (int)
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: cannot compute sizeof (int)
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&2;}
+ { (exit 77); exit 77; }; }
+ else
+ ac_cv_sizeof_int=0
+ fi
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+rm -f conftest.val
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_int" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_sizeof_int" >&6; }
+
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define SIZEOF_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_int
+_ACEOF
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for long int" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for long int... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_type_long_int+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+typedef long int ac__type_new_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+if ((ac__type_new_ *) 0)
+ return 0;
+if (sizeof (ac__type_new_))
+ return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_type_long_int=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_type_long_int=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_type_long_int" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_type_long_int" >&6; }
+
+# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
+# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
+# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
+# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking size of long int" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking size of long int... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_sizeof_long_int+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ # Depending upon the size, compute the lo and hi bounds.
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef long int ac__type_sizeof_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) >= 0)];
+test_array [0] = 0
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_lo=0 ac_mid=0
+ while :; do
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef long int ac__type_sizeof_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) <= $ac_mid)];
+test_array [0] = 0
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_hi=$ac_mid; break
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_lo=`expr $ac_mid + 1`
+ if test $ac_lo -le $ac_mid; then
+ ac_lo= ac_hi=
+ break
+ fi
+ ac_mid=`expr 2 '*' $ac_mid + 1`
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+ done
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef long int ac__type_sizeof_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) < 0)];
+test_array [0] = 0
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_hi=-1 ac_mid=-1
+ while :; do
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef long int ac__type_sizeof_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) >= $ac_mid)];
+test_array [0] = 0
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_lo=$ac_mid; break
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_hi=`expr '(' $ac_mid ')' - 1`
+ if test $ac_mid -le $ac_hi; then
+ ac_lo= ac_hi=
+ break
+ fi
+ ac_mid=`expr 2 '*' $ac_mid`
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+ done
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_lo= ac_hi=
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+# Binary search between lo and hi bounds.
+while test "x$ac_lo" != "x$ac_hi"; do
+ ac_mid=`expr '(' $ac_hi - $ac_lo ')' / 2 + $ac_lo`
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef long int ac__type_sizeof_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) <= $ac_mid)];
+test_array [0] = 0
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_hi=$ac_mid
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_lo=`expr '(' $ac_mid ')' + 1`
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+done
+case $ac_lo in
+?*) ac_cv_sizeof_long_int=$ac_lo;;
+'') if test "$ac_cv_type_long_int" = yes; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: cannot compute sizeof (long int)
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: cannot compute sizeof (long int)
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&2;}
+ { (exit 77); exit 77; }; }
+ else
+ ac_cv_sizeof_long_int=0
+ fi ;;
+esac
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef long int ac__type_sizeof_;
+static long int longval () { return (long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_)); }
+static unsigned long int ulongval () { return (long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_)); }
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ FILE *f = fopen ("conftest.val", "w");
+ if (! f)
+ return 1;
+ if (((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) < 0)
+ {
+ long int i = longval ();
+ if (i != ((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))))
+ return 1;
+ fprintf (f, "%ld\n", i);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ unsigned long int i = ulongval ();
+ if (i != ((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))))
+ return 1;
+ fprintf (f, "%lu\n", i);
+ }
+ return ferror (f) || fclose (f) != 0;
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ ac_cv_sizeof_long_int=`cat conftest.val`
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+if test "$ac_cv_type_long_int" = yes; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: cannot compute sizeof (long int)
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: cannot compute sizeof (long int)
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&2;}
+ { (exit 77); exit 77; }; }
+ else
+ ac_cv_sizeof_long_int=0
+ fi
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+rm -f conftest.val
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" >&6; }
+
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define SIZEOF_LONG_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_long_int
+_ACEOF
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for long long int" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for long long int... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_type_long_long_int+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+typedef long long int ac__type_new_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+if ((ac__type_new_ *) 0)
+ return 0;
+if (sizeof (ac__type_new_))
+ return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_type_long_long_int=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_type_long_long_int=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_type_long_long_int" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_type_long_long_int" >&6; }
+
+# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
+# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
+# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
+# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking size of long long int" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking size of long long int... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ # Depending upon the size, compute the lo and hi bounds.
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef long long int ac__type_sizeof_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) >= 0)];
+test_array [0] = 0
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_lo=0 ac_mid=0
+ while :; do
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef long long int ac__type_sizeof_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) <= $ac_mid)];
+test_array [0] = 0
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_hi=$ac_mid; break
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_lo=`expr $ac_mid + 1`
+ if test $ac_lo -le $ac_mid; then
+ ac_lo= ac_hi=
+ break
+ fi
+ ac_mid=`expr 2 '*' $ac_mid + 1`
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+ done
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef long long int ac__type_sizeof_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) < 0)];
+test_array [0] = 0
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_hi=-1 ac_mid=-1
+ while :; do
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef long long int ac__type_sizeof_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) >= $ac_mid)];
+test_array [0] = 0
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_lo=$ac_mid; break
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_hi=`expr '(' $ac_mid ')' - 1`
+ if test $ac_mid -le $ac_hi; then
+ ac_lo= ac_hi=
+ break
+ fi
+ ac_mid=`expr 2 '*' $ac_mid`
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+ done
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_lo= ac_hi=
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+# Binary search between lo and hi bounds.
+while test "x$ac_lo" != "x$ac_hi"; do
+ ac_mid=`expr '(' $ac_hi - $ac_lo ')' / 2 + $ac_lo`
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef long long int ac__type_sizeof_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) <= $ac_mid)];
+test_array [0] = 0
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_hi=$ac_mid
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_lo=`expr '(' $ac_mid ')' + 1`
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+done
+case $ac_lo in
+?*) ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=$ac_lo;;
+'') if test "$ac_cv_type_long_long_int" = yes; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: cannot compute sizeof (long long int)
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: cannot compute sizeof (long long int)
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&2;}
+ { (exit 77); exit 77; }; }
+ else
+ ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0
+ fi ;;
+esac
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+ typedef long long int ac__type_sizeof_;
+static long int longval () { return (long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_)); }
+static unsigned long int ulongval () { return (long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_)); }
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ FILE *f = fopen ("conftest.val", "w");
+ if (! f)
+ return 1;
+ if (((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))) < 0)
+ {
+ long int i = longval ();
+ if (i != ((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))))
+ return 1;
+ fprintf (f, "%ld\n", i);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ unsigned long int i = ulongval ();
+ if (i != ((long int) (sizeof (ac__type_sizeof_))))
+ return 1;
+ fprintf (f, "%lu\n", i);
+ }
+ return ferror (f) || fclose (f) != 0;
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=`cat conftest.val`
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+if test "$ac_cv_type_long_long_int" = yes; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: cannot compute sizeof (long long int)
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: cannot compute sizeof (long long int)
+See \`config.log' for more details." >&2;}
+ { (exit 77); exit 77; }; }
+ else
+ ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0
+ fi
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+rm -f conftest.val
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" >&6; }
+
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int
+_ACEOF
+
+
+
+# Sanity check long long for some platforms (AIX)
+if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x4" ; then
+ ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0
+fi
+
+# compute LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX if we don't know them.
+if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for max value of long long" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for max value of long long... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;}
+
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Why is this so damn hard? */
+#ifdef __GNUC__
+# undef __GNUC__
+#endif
+#define __USE_ISOC99
+#include <limits.h>
+#define DATA "conftest.llminmax"
+#define my_abs(a) ((a) < 0 ? ((a) * -1) : (a))
+
+/*
+ * printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so
+ * we do this the hard way.
+ */
+static int
+fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ int l[sizeof(long long) * 8];
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0)
+ return -1;
+ for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) {
+ l[i] = my_abs(n % 10);
+ n /= 10;
+ }
+ do {
+ if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ } while (i != 0);
+ if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ FILE *f;
+ long long i, llmin, llmax = 0;
+
+ if((f = fopen(DATA,"w")) == NULL)
+ exit(1);
+
+#if defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LLONG_MAX)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Using system header for LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
+ llmin = LLONG_MIN;
+ llmax = LLONG_MAX;
+#else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Calculating LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
+ /* This will work on one's complement and two's complement */
+ for (i = 1; i > llmax; i <<= 1, i++)
+ llmax = i;
+ llmin = llmax + 1LL; /* wrap */
+#endif
+
+ /* Sanity check */
+ if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax
+ || llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0
+ || llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) {
+ fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n");
+ exit(2);
+ }
+
+ if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0)
+ exit(3);
+ if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0)
+ exit(4);
+ if (fclose(f) < 0)
+ exit(5);
+ exit(0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+
+ llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax`
+ llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax`
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $llong_max" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$llong_max" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define LLONG_MAX ${llong_max}LL
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for min value of long long" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for min value of long long... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $llong_min" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$llong_min" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define LLONG_MIN ${llong_min}LL
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: not found" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}not found" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# More checks for data types
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for u_int type" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for u_int type... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_u_int+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ u_int a; a = 1;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_u_int="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_u_int="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_u_int" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_u_int" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_U_INT 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ have_u_int=1
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for intXX_t types" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for intXX_t types... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_intxx_t+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_intxx_t" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_INTXX_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ have_intxx_t=1
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
+then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for intXX_t types in stdint.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for intXX_t types in stdint.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <stdint.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_INTXX_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for int64_t type" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for int64_t type... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_int64_t+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
+# include <sys/bitypes.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+int64_t a; a = 1;
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_int64_t="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_int64_t="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_int64_t" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_int64_t" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_INT64_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for u_intXX_t types" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for u_intXX_t types... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ have_u_intxx_t=1
+fi
+
+if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <sys/socket.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for u_int64_t types" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for u_int64_t types... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_u_int64_t+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ u_int64_t a; a = 1;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ have_u_int64_t=1
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_u_int64_t" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
+then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <sys/bitypes.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ u_int64_t a; a = 1
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for uintXX_t types" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for uintXX_t types... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_uintxx_t+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ uint8_t a;
+ uint16_t b;
+ uint32_t c;
+ a = b = c = 1;
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" >&6; }
+ if test "x$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
+then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for uintXX_t types in stdint.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for uintXX_t types in stdint.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <stdint.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_inttypes_h" = "xyes")
+then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <inttypes.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" || test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
+then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/bitypes.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c;
+ u_int8_t e; u_int16_t f; u_int32_t g;
+ a = b = c = e = f = g = 1;
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_INTXX_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for u_char" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for u_char... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_u_char+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ u_char foo; foo = 125;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_u_char="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_u_char="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_u_char" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_u_char" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_char" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_U_CHAR 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for intmax_t" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for intmax_t... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_type_intmax_t+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+
+typedef intmax_t ac__type_new_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+if ((ac__type_new_ *) 0)
+ return 0;
+if (sizeof (ac__type_new_))
+ return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_type_intmax_t=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_type_intmax_t=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_type_intmax_t" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_type_intmax_t" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_type_intmax_t = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_INTMAX_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for uintmax_t" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for uintmax_t... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_type_uintmax_t+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+
+typedef uintmax_t ac__type_new_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+if ((ac__type_new_ *) 0)
+ return 0;
+if (sizeof (ac__type_new_))
+ return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_type_uintmax_t=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_type_uintmax_t=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_type_uintmax_t" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_type_uintmax_t" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_type_uintmax_t = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_UINTMAX_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for socklen_t" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for socklen_t... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_type_socklen_t+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+typedef socklen_t ac__type_new_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+if ((ac__type_new_ *) 0)
+ return 0;
+if (sizeof (ac__type_new_))
+ return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_type_socklen_t=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_type_socklen_t=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_type_socklen_t" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_type_socklen_t" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_type_socklen_t = yes; then
+ :
+else
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for socklen_t equivalent" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for socklen_t equivalent... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if test "${curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ # Systems have either "struct sockaddr *" or
+ # "void *" as the second argument to getpeername
+ curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv=
+ for arg2 in "struct sockaddr" void; do
+ for t in int size_t unsigned long "unsigned long"; do
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/socket.h>
+
+ int getpeername (int, $arg2 *, $t *);
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ $t len;
+ getpeername(0,0,&len);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+
+ curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv="$t"
+ break
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+ done
+ done
+
+ if test "x$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" = x; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ fi
+
+fi
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define socklen_t $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for sig_atomic_t" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for sig_atomic_t... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <signal.h>
+
+typedef sig_atomic_t ac__type_new_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+if ((ac__type_new_ *) 0)
+ return 0;
+if (sizeof (ac__type_new_))
+ return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for fsblkcnt_t" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for fsblkcnt_t... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
+#include <sys/bitypes.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
+#include <sys/statfs.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+
+
+typedef fsblkcnt_t ac__type_new_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+if ((ac__type_new_ *) 0)
+ return 0;
+if (sizeof (ac__type_new_))
+ return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for fsfilcnt_t" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for fsfilcnt_t... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
+#include <sys/bitypes.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
+#include <sys/statfs.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+
+
+typedef fsfilcnt_t ac__type_new_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+if ((ac__type_new_ *) 0)
+ return 0;
+if (sizeof (ac__type_new_))
+ return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_FSFILCNT_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for in_addr_t" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for in_addr_t... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_type_in_addr_t+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+typedef in_addr_t ac__type_new_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+if ((ac__type_new_ *) 0)
+ return 0;
+if (sizeof (ac__type_new_))
+ return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_type_in_addr_t=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_type_in_addr_t=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_type_in_addr_t" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_type_in_addr_t" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_type_in_addr_t = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_IN_ADDR_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for in_port_t" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for in_port_t... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_type_in_port_t+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+typedef in_port_t ac__type_new_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+if ((ac__type_new_ *) 0)
+ return 0;
+if (sizeof (ac__type_new_))
+ return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_type_in_port_t=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_type_in_port_t=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_type_in_port_t" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_type_in_port_t" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_type_in_port_t = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_IN_PORT_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for size_t" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for size_t... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_size_t+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ size_t foo; foo = 1235;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_size_t="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_size_t="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_size_t" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_size_t" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_size_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_SIZE_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ssize_t" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ssize_t... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_ssize_t+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ ssize_t foo; foo = 1235;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_ssize_t" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_SSIZE_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for clock_t" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for clock_t... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_clock_t+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <time.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ clock_t foo; foo = 1235;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_clock_t="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_clock_t="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_clock_t" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_clock_t" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_clock_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_CLOCK_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for sa_family_t" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for sa_family_t... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_sa_family_t+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for pid_t" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for pid_t... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_pid_t+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ pid_t foo; foo = 1235;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_pid_t="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_pid_t" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_pid_t" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_PID_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for mode_t" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for mode_t... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_mode_t+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ mode_t foo; foo = 1235;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_mode_t="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_mode_t="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_mode_t" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_mode_t" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_mode_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_MODE_T 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for struct sockaddr_storage" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for struct sockaddr_storage... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage s;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for struct sockaddr_in6" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for struct sockaddr_in6... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ struct sockaddr_in6 s; s.sin6_family = 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for struct in6_addr" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for struct in6_addr... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for struct sockaddr_in6.sin6_scope_id" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for struct sockaddr_in6.sin6_scope_id... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+static struct sockaddr_in6 ac_aggr;
+if (ac_aggr.sin6_scope_id)
+return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+static struct sockaddr_in6 ac_aggr;
+if (sizeof ac_aggr.sin6_scope_id)
+return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for struct addrinfo" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for struct addrinfo... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ struct addrinfo s; s.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for struct timeval" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for struct timeval... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_struct_timeval+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <sys/time.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ struct timeval tv; tv.tv_sec = 1;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ have_struct_timeval=1
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for struct timespec" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for struct timespec... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_type_struct_timespec+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+typedef struct timespec ac__type_new_;
+int
+main ()
+{
+if ((ac__type_new_ *) 0)
+ return 0;
+if (sizeof (ac__type_new_))
+ return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_type_struct_timespec=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_type_struct_timespec=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_type_struct_timespec" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_type_struct_timespec" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_type_struct_timespec = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# We need int64_t or else certian parts of the compile will fail.
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then
+ echo "OpenSSH requires int64_t support. Contact your vendor or install"
+ echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing."
+ echo ""
+ exit 1;
+else
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&2;}
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+main()
+{
+ char buf[50];
+ char expected_out[50];
+ int mazsize = 50 ;
+#if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
+ long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff;
+#else
+ long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll;
+#endif
+ strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807");
+ snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num);
+ if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0)
+ exit(1);
+ exit(0);
+}
+#else
+main() { exit(0); }
+#endif
+
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ true
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_host' in header 'utmp.h'
+ ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+ ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_host
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ut_host field in utmp.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ut_host field in utmp.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if { as_var=$ossh_varname; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <utmp.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+ $EGREP "ut_host" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else
+ eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -f conftest*
+
+fi
+
+ ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+ if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ossh_result" >&6; }
+ if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_host' in header 'utmpx.h'
+ ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+ ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_host
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ut_host field in utmpx.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ut_host field in utmpx.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if { as_var=$ossh_varname; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <utmpx.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+ $EGREP "ut_host" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else
+ eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -f conftest*
+
+fi
+
+ ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+ if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ossh_result" >&6; }
+ if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+
+# look for field 'syslen' in header 'utmpx.h'
+ ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+ ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"syslen
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for syslen field in utmpx.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for syslen field in utmpx.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if { as_var=$ossh_varname; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <utmpx.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+ $EGREP "syslen" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else
+ eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -f conftest*
+
+fi
+
+ ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+ if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ossh_result" >&6; }
+ if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_pid' in header 'utmp.h'
+ ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+ ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_pid
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ut_pid field in utmp.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ut_pid field in utmp.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if { as_var=$ossh_varname; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <utmp.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+ $EGREP "ut_pid" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else
+ eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -f conftest*
+
+fi
+
+ ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+ if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ossh_result" >&6; }
+ if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_type' in header 'utmp.h'
+ ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+ ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_type
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ut_type field in utmp.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ut_type field in utmp.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if { as_var=$ossh_varname; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <utmp.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+ $EGREP "ut_type" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else
+ eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -f conftest*
+
+fi
+
+ ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+ if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ossh_result" >&6; }
+ if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_type' in header 'utmpx.h'
+ ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+ ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_type
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ut_type field in utmpx.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ut_type field in utmpx.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if { as_var=$ossh_varname; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <utmpx.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+ $EGREP "ut_type" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else
+ eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -f conftest*
+
+fi
+
+ ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+ if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ossh_result" >&6; }
+ if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_tv' in header 'utmp.h'
+ ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+ ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_tv
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ut_tv field in utmp.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ut_tv field in utmp.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if { as_var=$ossh_varname; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <utmp.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+ $EGREP "ut_tv" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else
+ eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -f conftest*
+
+fi
+
+ ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+ if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ossh_result" >&6; }
+ if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_id' in header 'utmp.h'
+ ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+ ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_id
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ut_id field in utmp.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ut_id field in utmp.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if { as_var=$ossh_varname; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <utmp.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+ $EGREP "ut_id" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else
+ eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -f conftest*
+
+fi
+
+ ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+ if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ossh_result" >&6; }
+ if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_id' in header 'utmpx.h'
+ ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+ ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_id
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ut_id field in utmpx.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ut_id field in utmpx.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if { as_var=$ossh_varname; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <utmpx.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+ $EGREP "ut_id" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else
+ eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -f conftest*
+
+fi
+
+ ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+ if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ossh_result" >&6; }
+ if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_addr' in header 'utmp.h'
+ ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+ ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ut_addr field in utmp.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ut_addr field in utmp.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if { as_var=$ossh_varname; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <utmp.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+ $EGREP "ut_addr" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else
+ eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -f conftest*
+
+fi
+
+ ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+ if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ossh_result" >&6; }
+ if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_addr' in header 'utmpx.h'
+ ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+ ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ut_addr field in utmpx.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ut_addr field in utmpx.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if { as_var=$ossh_varname; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <utmpx.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+ $EGREP "ut_addr" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else
+ eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -f conftest*
+
+fi
+
+ ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+ if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ossh_result" >&6; }
+ if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_addr_v6' in header 'utmp.h'
+ ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+ ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr_v6
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmp.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmp.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if { as_var=$ossh_varname; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <utmp.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+ $EGREP "ut_addr_v6" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else
+ eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -f conftest*
+
+fi
+
+ ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+ if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ossh_result" >&6; }
+ if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_addr_v6' in header 'utmpx.h'
+ ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+ ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr_v6
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmpx.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmpx.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if { as_var=$ossh_varname; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <utmpx.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+ $EGREP "ut_addr_v6" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else
+ eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -f conftest*
+
+fi
+
+ ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+ if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ossh_result" >&6; }
+ if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_exit' in header 'utmp.h'
+ ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+ ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_exit
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ut_exit field in utmp.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ut_exit field in utmp.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if { as_var=$ossh_varname; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <utmp.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+ $EGREP "ut_exit" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else
+ eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -f conftest*
+
+fi
+
+ ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+ if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ossh_result" >&6; }
+ if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_time' in header 'utmp.h'
+ ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+ ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_time
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ut_time field in utmp.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ut_time field in utmp.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if { as_var=$ossh_varname; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <utmp.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+ $EGREP "ut_time" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else
+ eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -f conftest*
+
+fi
+
+ ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+ if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ossh_result" >&6; }
+ if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_time' in header 'utmpx.h'
+ ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+ ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_time
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ut_time field in utmpx.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ut_time field in utmpx.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if { as_var=$ossh_varname; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <utmpx.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+ $EGREP "ut_time" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else
+ eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -f conftest*
+
+fi
+
+ ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+ if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ossh_result" >&6; }
+ if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_tv' in header 'utmpx.h'
+ ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+ ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_tv
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ut_tv field in utmpx.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ut_tv field in utmpx.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if { as_var=$ossh_varname; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <utmpx.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+ $EGREP "ut_tv" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else
+ eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -f conftest*
+
+fi
+
+ ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+ if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ossh_result" >&6; }
+ if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for struct stat.st_blksize" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for struct stat.st_blksize... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_blksize+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+int
+main ()
+{
+static struct stat ac_aggr;
+if (ac_aggr.st_blksize)
+return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_blksize=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+int
+main ()
+{
+static struct stat ac_aggr;
+if (sizeof ac_aggr.st_blksize)
+return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_blksize=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_blksize=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_blksize" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_blksize" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_blksize = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for struct passwd.pw_gecos" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for struct passwd.pw_gecos... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_gecos+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+static struct passwd ac_aggr;
+if (ac_aggr.pw_gecos)
+return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_gecos=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+static struct passwd ac_aggr;
+if (sizeof ac_aggr.pw_gecos)
+return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_gecos=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_gecos=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_gecos" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_gecos" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_gecos = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for struct passwd.pw_class" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for struct passwd.pw_class... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_class+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+static struct passwd ac_aggr;
+if (ac_aggr.pw_class)
+return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_class=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+static struct passwd ac_aggr;
+if (sizeof ac_aggr.pw_class)
+return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_class=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_class=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_class" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_class" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_class = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for struct passwd.pw_change" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for struct passwd.pw_change... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_change+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+static struct passwd ac_aggr;
+if (ac_aggr.pw_change)
+return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_change=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+static struct passwd ac_aggr;
+if (sizeof ac_aggr.pw_change)
+return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_change=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_change=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_change" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_change" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_change = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for struct passwd.pw_expire" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for struct passwd.pw_expire... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_expire+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+static struct passwd ac_aggr;
+if (ac_aggr.pw_expire)
+return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_expire=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+static struct passwd ac_aggr;
+if (sizeof ac_aggr.pw_expire)
+return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_expire=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_expire=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_expire" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_expire" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_expire = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for struct __res_state.retrans" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for struct __res_state.retrans... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_member_struct___res_state_retrans+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+static struct __res_state ac_aggr;
+if (ac_aggr.retrans)
+return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_member_struct___res_state_retrans=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+static struct __res_state ac_aggr;
+if (sizeof ac_aggr.retrans)
+return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_member_struct___res_state_retrans=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_member_struct___res_state_retrans=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_member_struct___res_state_retrans" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_member_struct___res_state_retrans" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_member_struct___res_state_retrans = yes; then
+ :
+else
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define __res_state state
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.ss_family = 1;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.__ss_family = 1;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+#ifdef msg_accrights
+#error "msg_accrights is a macro"
+exit(1);
+#endif
+struct msghdr m;
+m.msg_accrights = 0;
+exit(0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ struct statvfs s; s.f_fsid = 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if fsid_t has member val" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if fsid_t has member val... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ fsid_t t; t.val[0] = 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define FSID_HAS_VAL 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if f_fsid has member __val" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if f_fsid has member __val... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ fsid_t t; t.__val[0] = 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define FSID_HAS___VAL 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for msg_control field in struct msghdr" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for msg_control field in struct msghdr... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+#ifdef msg_control
+#error "msg_control is a macro"
+exit(1);
+#endif
+struct msghdr m;
+m.msg_control = 0;
+exit(0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if libc defines __progname" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if libc defines __progname... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_libc_defines___progname+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname);
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE___PROGNAME 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <stdio.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ printf("%s", __FUNCTION__);
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE___FUNCTION__ 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether $CC implements __func__" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether $CC implements __func__... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_cc_implements___func__+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <stdio.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ printf("%s", __func__);
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE___func__ 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether va_copy exists" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether va_copy exists... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_va_copy+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+va_list x,y;
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ va_copy(x,y);
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_have_va_copy="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_va_copy="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_va_copy" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_va_copy" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_VA_COPY 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether __va_copy exists" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether __va_copy exists... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have___va_copy+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+va_list x,y;
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ __va_copy(x,y);
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_have___va_copy="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have___va_copy="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have___va_copy" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have___va_copy" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have___va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE___VA_COPY 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether getopt has optreset support" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether getopt has optreset support... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <getopt.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ extern int optreset; optreset = 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if libc defines sys_errlist" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if libc defines sys_errlist... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if libc defines sys_nerr" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if libc defines sys_nerr... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" = "xyes" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_SYS_NERR 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+# Check libraries needed by DNS fingerprint support
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for library containing getrrsetbyname" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for library containing getrrsetbyname... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char getrrsetbyname ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return getrrsetbyname ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' resolv; do
+ if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+ ac_res="none required"
+ else
+ ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+ LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+ fi
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname=$ac_res
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext
+ if test "${ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname+set}" = set; then
+ break
+fi
+done
+if test "${ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname+set}" = set; then
+ :
+else
+ ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname
+if test "$ac_res" != no; then
+ test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+
+ # Needed by our getrrsetbyname()
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for library containing res_query" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for library containing res_query... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_search_res_query+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char res_query ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return res_query ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' resolv; do
+ if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+ ac_res="none required"
+ else
+ ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+ LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+ fi
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_search_res_query=$ac_res
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext
+ if test "${ac_cv_search_res_query+set}" = set; then
+ break
+fi
+done
+if test "${ac_cv_search_res_query+set}" = set; then
+ :
+else
+ ac_cv_search_res_query=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_search_res_query" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_search_res_query" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_res_query
+if test "$ac_res" != no; then
+ test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for library containing dn_expand" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for library containing dn_expand... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char dn_expand ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return dn_expand ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' resolv; do
+ if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+ ac_res="none required"
+ else
+ ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+ LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+ fi
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_search_dn_expand=$ac_res
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext
+ if test "${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+set}" = set; then
+ break
+fi
+done
+if test "${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+set}" = set; then
+ :
+else
+ ac_cv_search_dn_expand=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_dn_expand
+if test "$ac_res" != no; then
+ test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if res_query will link" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if res_query will link... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for res_query in -lresolv" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for res_query in -lresolv... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+
+for ac_func in _getshort _getlong
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether _getshort is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether _getshort is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl__getshort+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <arpa/nameser.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef _getshort
+ (void) _getshort;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl__getshort=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl__getshort=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl__getshort" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl__getshort" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl__getshort = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT 0
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether _getlong is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether _getlong is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl__getlong+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <arpa/nameser.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef _getlong
+ (void) _getlong;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl__getlong=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl__getlong=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl__getlong" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl__getlong" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl__getlong = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL__GETLONG 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL__GETLONG 0
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for HEADER.ad" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for HEADER.ad... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_member_HEADER_ad+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+static HEADER ac_aggr;
+if (ac_aggr.ad)
+return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_member_HEADER_ad=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+static HEADER ac_aggr;
+if (sizeof ac_aggr.ad)
+return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_member_HEADER_ad=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_member_HEADER_ad=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_member_HEADER_ad" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_member_HEADER_ad" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_member_HEADER_ad = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_HEADER_AD 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if struct __res_state _res is an extern" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if struct __res_state _res is an extern... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+extern struct __res_state _res;
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+struct __res_state *volatile p = &_res; /* force resolution of _res */
+return 0;
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE__RES_EXTERN 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+# Check whether user wants SELinux support
+SELINUX_MSG="no"
+LIBSELINUX=""
+
+# Check whether --with-selinux was given.
+if test "${with_selinux+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_selinux; if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ save_LIBS="$LIBS"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define WITH_SELINUX 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ SELINUX_MSG="yes"
+ if test "${ac_cv_header_selinux_selinux_h+set}" = set; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for selinux/selinux.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for selinux/selinux.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_header_selinux_selinux_h+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_header_selinux_selinux_h" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_header_selinux_selinux_h" >&6; }
+else
+ # Is the header compilable?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking selinux/selinux.h usability" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking selinux/selinux.h usability... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_header_compiler=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_compiler=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_compiler" >&6; }
+
+# Is the header present?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking selinux/selinux.h presence" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking selinux/selinux.h presence... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_preproc=no
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_preproc" >&6; }
+
+# So? What about this header?
+case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in
+ yes:no: )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: selinux/selinux.h: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: selinux/selinux.h: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: selinux/selinux.h: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: selinux/selinux.h: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+ ;;
+ no:yes:* )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: selinux/selinux.h: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: selinux/selinux.h: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: selinux/selinux.h: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: selinux/selinux.h: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: selinux/selinux.h: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: selinux/selinux.h: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: selinux/selinux.h: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: selinux/selinux.h: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: selinux/selinux.h: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: selinux/selinux.h: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: selinux/selinux.h: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: selinux/selinux.h: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&2;}
+ ( cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+## Report this to openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ##
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ ) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
+ ;;
+esac
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for selinux/selinux.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for selinux/selinux.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_header_selinux_selinux_h+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_cv_header_selinux_selinux_h=$ac_header_preproc
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_header_selinux_selinux_h" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_header_selinux_selinux_h" >&6; }
+
+fi
+if test $ac_cv_header_selinux_selinux_h = yes; then
+ :
+else
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: SELinux support requires selinux.h header" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: SELinux support requires selinux.h header" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for setexeccon in -lselinux" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for setexeccon in -lselinux... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lselinux $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char setexeccon ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return setexeccon ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon = yes; then
+ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux"
+
+else
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: SELinux support requires libselinux library" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: SELinux support requires libselinux library" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+fi
+
+ SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
+
+
+for ac_func in getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+ LIBS="$save_LIBS"
+ fi
+
+fi
+
+
+
+
+# Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
+KRB5_MSG="no"
+
+# Check whether --with-kerberos5 was given.
+if test "${with_kerberos5+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_kerberos5; if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+ KRB5ROOT="/usr/local"
+ else
+ KRB5ROOT=${withval}
+ fi
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define KRB5 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ KRB5_MSG="yes"
+
+ # Extract the first word of "krb5-config", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy krb5-config; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ case $KRB5CONF in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF="$KRB5CONF" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+as_dummy="$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH"
+for as_dir in $as_dummy
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ test -z "$ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF" && ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF="$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config"
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+KRB5CONF=$ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF
+if test -n "$KRB5CONF"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $KRB5CONF" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$KRB5CONF" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then
+ K5CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags`"
+ K5LIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs`"
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS"
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for gssapi support" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for gssapi support... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if $KRB5CONF | grep gssapi >/dev/null ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define GSSAPI 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ GSSCFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags gssapi`"
+ GSSLIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs gssapi`"
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS"
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether we are using Heimdal" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether we are using Heimdal... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <krb5.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ char *tmp = heimdal_version;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HEIMDAL 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+ else
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether we are using Heimdal" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether we are using Heimdal... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <krb5.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ char *tmp = heimdal_version;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HEIMDAL 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ K5LIBS="-lkrb5"
+ K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lcom_err -lasn1"
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for net_write in -lroken" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for net_write in -lroken... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lroken $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char net_write ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return net_write ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write = yes; then
+ K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lroken"
+fi
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for des_cbc_encrypt in -ldes" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for des_cbc_encrypt in -ldes... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-ldes $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char des_cbc_encrypt ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return des_cbc_encrypt ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt = yes; then
+ K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -ldes"
+fi
+
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ K5LIBS="-lkrb5 -lk5crypto -lcom_err"
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for library containing dn_expand" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for library containing dn_expand... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char dn_expand ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return dn_expand ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' resolv; do
+ if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+ ac_res="none required"
+ else
+ ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+ LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+ fi
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_search_dn_expand=$ac_res
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext
+ if test "${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+set}" = set; then
+ break
+fi
+done
+if test "${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+set}" = set; then
+ :
+else
+ ac_cv_search_dn_expand=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_dn_expand
+if test "$ac_res" != no; then
+ test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi_krb5" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi_krb5... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lgssapi_krb5 $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char gss_init_sec_context ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return gss_init_sec_context ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define GSSAPI 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ GSSLIBS="-lgssapi_krb5"
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lgssapi $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char gss_init_sec_context ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return gss_init_sec_context ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define GSSAPI 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ GSSLIBS="-lgssapi"
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgss" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgss... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lgss $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char gss_init_sec_context ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return gss_init_sec_context ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define GSSAPI 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ GSSLIBS="-lgss"
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail" >&2;}
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+ if test "${ac_cv_header_gssapi_h+set}" = set; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for gssapi.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for gssapi.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_header_gssapi_h+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" >&6; }
+else
+ # Is the header compilable?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking gssapi.h usability" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking gssapi.h usability... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+#include <gssapi.h>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_header_compiler=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_compiler=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_compiler" >&6; }
+
+# Is the header present?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking gssapi.h presence" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking gssapi.h presence... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <gssapi.h>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_preproc=no
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_preproc" >&6; }
+
+# So? What about this header?
+case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in
+ yes:no: )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: gssapi.h: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: gssapi.h: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: gssapi.h: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: gssapi.h: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+ ;;
+ no:yes:* )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: gssapi.h: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: gssapi.h: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: gssapi.h: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: gssapi.h: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: gssapi.h: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: gssapi.h: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: gssapi.h: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: gssapi.h: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: gssapi.h: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: gssapi.h: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: gssapi.h: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: gssapi.h: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&2;}
+ ( cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+## Report this to openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ##
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ ) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
+ ;;
+esac
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for gssapi.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for gssapi.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_header_gssapi_h+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_cv_header_gssapi_h=$ac_header_preproc
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" >&6; }
+
+fi
+if test $ac_cv_header_gssapi_h = yes; then
+ :
+else
+ unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
+
+for ac_header in gssapi.h
+do
+as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+else
+ # Is the header compilable?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header usability" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header usability... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_header_compiler=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_compiler=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_compiler" >&6; }
+
+# Is the header present?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header presence" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header presence... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_preproc=no
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_preproc" >&6; }
+
+# So? What about this header?
+case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in
+ yes:no: )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+ ;;
+ no:yes:* )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&2;}
+ ( cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+## Report this to openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ##
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ ) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
+ ;;
+esac
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=\$ac_header_preproc"
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+
+fi
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail" >&2;}
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+ oldCPP="$CPPFLAGS"
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
+ if test "${ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h+set}" = set; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for gssapi_krb5.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for gssapi_krb5.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h" >&6; }
+else
+ # Is the header compilable?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking gssapi_krb5.h usability" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking gssapi_krb5.h usability... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+#include <gssapi_krb5.h>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_header_compiler=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_compiler=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_compiler" >&6; }
+
+# Is the header present?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking gssapi_krb5.h presence" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking gssapi_krb5.h presence... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <gssapi_krb5.h>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_preproc=no
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_preproc" >&6; }
+
+# So? What about this header?
+case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in
+ yes:no: )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: gssapi_krb5.h: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: gssapi_krb5.h: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: gssapi_krb5.h: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: gssapi_krb5.h: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+ ;;
+ no:yes:* )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: gssapi_krb5.h: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: gssapi_krb5.h: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: gssapi_krb5.h: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: gssapi_krb5.h: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: gssapi_krb5.h: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: gssapi_krb5.h: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: gssapi_krb5.h: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: gssapi_krb5.h: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: gssapi_krb5.h: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: gssapi_krb5.h: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: gssapi_krb5.h: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: gssapi_krb5.h: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&2;}
+ ( cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+## Report this to openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ##
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ ) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
+ ;;
+esac
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for gssapi_krb5.h" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for gssapi_krb5.h... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h=$ac_header_preproc
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h" >&6; }
+
+fi
+if test $ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h = yes; then
+ :
+else
+ CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP"
+fi
+
+
+
+ fi
+ if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -R${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
+ fi
+ if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
+ blibpath="$blibpath:${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
+ fi
+
+
+
+for ac_header in gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h
+do
+as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+else
+ # Is the header compilable?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header usability" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header usability... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_header_compiler=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_compiler=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_compiler" >&6; }
+
+# Is the header present?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header presence" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header presence... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_preproc=no
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_preproc" >&6; }
+
+# So? What about this header?
+case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in
+ yes:no: )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+ ;;
+ no:yes:* )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&2;}
+ ( cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+## Report this to openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ##
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ ) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
+ ;;
+esac
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=\$ac_header_preproc"
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+
+fi
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+
+
+for ac_header in gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h
+do
+as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+else
+ # Is the header compilable?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header usability" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header usability... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_header_compiler=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_compiler=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_compiler" >&6; }
+
+# Is the header present?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header presence" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header presence... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_preproc=no
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_preproc" >&6; }
+
+# So? What about this header?
+case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in
+ yes:no: )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+ ;;
+ no:yes:* )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&2;}
+ ( cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+## Report this to openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ##
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ ) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
+ ;;
+esac
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=\$ac_header_preproc"
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+
+fi
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+
+
+for ac_header in gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h
+do
+as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+else
+ # Is the header compilable?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header usability" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header usability... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_header_compiler=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_compiler=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_compiler" >&6; }
+
+# Is the header present?
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header presence" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header presence... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <$ac_header>
+_ACEOF
+if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ }; then
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_header_preproc=no
+fi
+
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_preproc" >&6; }
+
+# So? What about this header?
+case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in
+ yes:no: )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
+ ac_header_preproc=yes
+ ;;
+ no:yes:* )
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&2;}
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&2;}
+ ( cat <<\_ASBOX
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+## Report this to openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ##
+## ------------------------------------------- ##
+_ASBOX
+ ) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
+ ;;
+esac
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ eval "$as_ac_Header=\$ac_header_preproc"
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+
+fi
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for library containing k_hasafs" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for library containing k_hasafs... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_search_k_hasafs+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char k_hasafs ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return k_hasafs ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' kafs; do
+ if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+ ac_res="none required"
+ else
+ ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+ LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+ fi
+ rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ ac_cv_search_k_hasafs=$ac_res
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext
+ if test "${ac_cv_search_k_hasafs+set}" = set; then
+ break
+fi
+done
+if test "${ac_cv_search_k_hasafs+set}" = set; then
+ :
+else
+ ac_cv_search_k_hasafs=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_search_k_hasafs" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_search_k_hasafs" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_k_hasafs
+if test "$ac_res" != no; then
+ test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_AFS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
+# include <gssapi.h>
+#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H)
+# include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+# include <gssapi_generic.h>
+#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H)
+# include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
+#endif
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
+ (void) GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+else
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE 0
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+ LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS"
+
+
+
+for ac_func in krb5_cc_new_unique krb5_get_error_message krb5_free_error_message
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+ $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+
+# Looking for programs, paths and files
+
+PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
+
+# Check whether --with-privsep-path was given.
+if test "${with_privsep_path+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_privsep_path;
+ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=$withval
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-xauth was given.
+if test "${with_xauth+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_xauth;
+ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ xauth_path=$withval
+ fi
+
+else
+
+ TestPath="$PATH"
+ TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X/bin"
+ TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/bin/X11"
+ TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X11R6/bin"
+ TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/openwin/bin"
+ # Extract the first word of "xauth", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy xauth; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_xauth_path+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ case $xauth_path in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_xauth_path="$xauth_path" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $TestPath
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_path_xauth_path="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+xauth_path=$ac_cv_path_xauth_path
+if test -n "$xauth_path"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $xauth_path" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$xauth_path" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then
+ xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth"
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+STRIP_OPT=-s
+# Check whether --enable-strip was given.
+if test "${enable_strip+set}" = set; then
+ enableval=$enable_strip;
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+ STRIP_OPT=
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then
+ XAUTH_PATH="undefined"
+
+else
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define XAUTH_PATH "$xauth_path"
+_ACEOF
+
+ XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path
+
+fi
+
+# Check for mail directory
+
+# Check whether --with-maildir was given.
+if test "${with_maildir+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_maildir;
+ if test "X$withval" != X && test "x$withval" != xno && \
+ test "x${withval}" != xyes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define MAIL_DIRECTORY "$withval"
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+
+else
+
+ if test "X$maildir" != "X"; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define MAIL_DIRECTORY "$maildir"
+_ACEOF
+
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking Discovering system mail directory" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking Discovering system mail directory... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail" >&2;}
+
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
+#include <maillock.h>
+#endif
+#define DATA "conftest.maildir"
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ FILE *fd;
+ int rc;
+
+ fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
+ if(fd == NULL)
+ exit(1);
+
+#if defined (_PATH_MAILDIR)
+ if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAILDIR:%s\n", _PATH_MAILDIR)) <0)
+ exit(1);
+#elif defined (MAILDIR)
+ if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"MAILDIR:%s\n", MAILDIR)) <0)
+ exit(1);
+#elif defined (_PATH_MAIL)
+ if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAIL:%s\n", _PATH_MAIL)) <0)
+ exit(1);
+#else
+ exit (2);
+#endif
+
+ exit(0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+
+ maildir_what=`awk -F: '{print $1}' conftest.maildir`
+ maildir=`awk -F: '{print $2}' conftest.maildir \
+ | sed 's|/$||'`
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: Using: $maildir from $maildir_what" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}Using: $maildir from $maildir_what" >&6; }
+ if test "x$maildir_what" != "x_PATH_MAILDIR"; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define MAIL_DIRECTORY "$maildir"
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+
+ if test "X$ac_status" = "X2";then
+# our test program didn't find it. Default to /var/spool/mail
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: Using: default value of /var/spool/mail" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}Using: default value of /var/spool/mail" >&6; }
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define MAIL_DIRECTORY "/var/spool/mail"
+_ACEOF
+
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: *** not found ***" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}*** not found ***" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+ # maildir
+
+if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test" >&2;}
+ disable_ptmx_check=yes
+fi
+if test -z "$no_dev_ptmx" ; then
+ if test "x$disable_ptmx_check" != "xyes" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for \"/dev/ptmx\"" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for \"/dev/ptmx\"... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_file___dev_ptmx_+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ test "$cross_compiling" = yes &&
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+if test -r ""/dev/ptmx""; then
+ ac_cv_file___dev_ptmx_=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_file___dev_ptmx_=no
+fi
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_file___dev_ptmx_" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_file___dev_ptmx_" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_file___dev_ptmx_ = yes; then
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DEV_PTMX 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ have_dev_ptmx=1
+
+
+fi
+
+ fi
+fi
+
+if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" != "xyes"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for \"/dev/ptc\"" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for \"/dev/ptc\"... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_file___dev_ptc_+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ test "$cross_compiling" = yes &&
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+if test -r ""/dev/ptc""; then
+ ac_cv_file___dev_ptc_=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_file___dev_ptc_=no
+fi
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_file___dev_ptc_" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_file___dev_ptc_" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_file___dev_ptc_ = yes; then
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ have_dev_ptc=1
+
+
+fi
+
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test" >&2;}
+fi
+
+# Options from here on. Some of these are preset by platform above
+
+# Check whether --with-mantype was given.
+if test "${with_mantype+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_mantype;
+ case "$withval" in
+ man|cat|doc)
+ MANTYPE=$withval
+ ;;
+ *)
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: invalid man type: $withval" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: invalid man type: $withval" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+
+fi
+
+if test -z "$MANTYPE"; then
+ TestPath="/usr/bin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/ucb"
+ for ac_prog in nroff awf
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_path_NROFF+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ case $NROFF in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NROFF="$NROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $TestPath
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+ ac_cv_path_NROFF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NROFF=$ac_cv_path_NROFF
+if test -n "$NROFF"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $NROFF" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$NROFF" >&6; }
+else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NROFF" && break
+done
+test -n "$NROFF" || NROFF="/bin/false"
+
+ if ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ MANTYPE=doc
+ elif ${NROFF} -man ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ MANTYPE=man
+ else
+ MANTYPE=cat
+ fi
+fi
+
+if test "$MANTYPE" = "doc"; then
+ mansubdir=man;
+else
+ mansubdir=$MANTYPE;
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether to enable MD5 passwords
+MD5_MSG="no"
+
+# Check whether --with-md5-passwords was given.
+if test "${with_md5_passwords+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_md5_passwords;
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ MD5_MSG="yes"
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Whether to disable shadow password support
+
+# Check whether --with-shadow was given.
+if test "${with_shadow+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_shadow;
+ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_SHADOW 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ disable_shadow=yes
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+if test -z "$disable_shadow" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if the systems has expire shadow information" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if the systems has expire shadow information... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+struct spwd sp;
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ sp.sp_expire = sp.sp_lstchg = sp.sp_inact = 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ sp_expire_available=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+ if test "x$sp_expire_available" = "xyes" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+fi
+
+# Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY
+if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then
+ DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY 1
+_ACEOF
+
+else
+ DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no"
+
+# Check whether --with-ipaddr-display was given.
+if test "${with_ipaddr_display+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_ipaddr_display;
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+fi
+
+# check for /etc/default/login and use it if present.
+# Check whether --enable-etc-default-login was given.
+if test "${enable_etc_default_login+set}" = set; then
+ enableval=$enable_etc_default_login; if test "x$enableval" = "xno"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: /etc/default/login handling disabled" >&5
+echo "$as_me: /etc/default/login handling disabled" >&6;}
+ etc_default_login=no
+ else
+ etc_default_login=yes
+ fi
+else
+ if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes";
+ then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login" >&2;}
+ etc_default_login=no
+ else
+ etc_default_login=yes
+ fi
+
+fi
+
+
+if test "x$etc_default_login" != "xno"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for \"/etc/default/login\"" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for \"/etc/default/login\"... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_file___etc_default_login_+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ test "$cross_compiling" = yes &&
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+if test -r ""/etc/default/login""; then
+ ac_cv_file___etc_default_login_=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_file___etc_default_login_=no
+fi
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_file___etc_default_login_" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_file___etc_default_login_" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_file___etc_default_login_ = yes; then
+ external_path_file=/etc/default/login
+fi
+
+ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/default/login"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+fi
+
+if test $ac_cv_func_login_getcapbool = "yes" && \
+ test $ac_cv_header_login_cap_h = "yes" ; then
+ external_path_file=/etc/login.conf
+fi
+
+# Whether to mess with the default path
+SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)"
+
+# Check whether --with-default-path was given.
+if test "${with_default_path+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_default_path;
+ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING:
+--with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system.
+Edit /etc/login.conf instead." >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING:
+--with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system.
+Edit /etc/login.conf instead." >&2;}
+ elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING:
+--with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in
+$external_path_file ." >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING:
+--with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in
+$external_path_file ." >&2;}
+ fi
+ user_path="$withval"
+ SERVER_PATH_MSG="$withval"
+ fi
+
+else
+ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf" >&2;}
+ else
+ if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING:
+If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included,
+otherwise scp will not work." >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING:
+If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included,
+otherwise scp will not work." >&2;}
+ fi
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
+
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* find out what STDPATH is */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
+# ifdef _PATH_USERPATH /* Irix */
+# define _PATH_STDPATH _PATH_USERPATH
+# else
+# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
+# endif
+#endif
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#define DATA "conftest.stdpath"
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+
+ FILE *fd;
+ int rc;
+
+ fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
+ if(fd == NULL)
+ exit(1);
+
+ if ((rc = fprintf(fd,"%s", _PATH_STDPATH)) < 0)
+ exit(1);
+
+ exit(0);
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+ { (case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
+ user_path=`cat conftest.stdpath`
+else
+ echo "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+( exit $ac_status )
+ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+# make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work
+ t_bindir="${bindir}"
+ while echo "${t_bindir}" | egrep '\$\{|NONE/' >/dev/null 2>&1; do
+ t_bindir=`eval echo ${t_bindir}`
+ case $t_bindir in
+ NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$prefix~"` ;;
+ esac
+ case $t_bindir in
+ NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
+ esac
+ done
+ echo $user_path | grep ":$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1
+ if test $? -ne 0 ; then
+ echo $user_path | grep "^$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1
+ if test $? -ne 0 ; then
+ user_path=$user_path:$t_bindir
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work" >&6; }
+ fi
+ fi
+ fi
+
+fi
+
+if test "x$external_path_file" != "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define USER_PATH "$user_path"
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+# Set superuser path separately to user path
+
+# Check whether --with-superuser-path was given.
+if test "${with_superuser_path+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_superuser_path;
+ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define SUPERUSER_PATH "$withval"
+_ACEOF
+
+ superuser_path=$withval
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="no"
+
+# Check whether --with-4in6 was given.
+if test "${with_4in6+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_4in6;
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define IPV4_IN_IPV6 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+else
+
+ if test "x$inet6_default_4in6" = "xyes"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes (default)" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes (default)" >&6; }
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define IPV4_IN_IPV6 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no (default)" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no (default)" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Whether to enable BSD auth support
+BSD_AUTH_MSG=no
+
+# Check whether --with-bsd-auth was given.
+if test "${with_bsd_auth+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_bsd_auth;
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define BSD_AUTH 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Where to place sshd.pid
+piddir=/var/run
+# make sure the directory exists
+if test ! -d $piddir ; then
+ piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}`
+ case $piddir in
+ NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
+ esac
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-pid-dir was given.
+if test "${with_pid_dir+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_pid_dir;
+ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ piddir=$withval
+ if test ! -d $piddir ; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: ** no $piddir directory on this system **" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: ** no $piddir directory on this system **" >&2;}
+ fi
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "$piddir"
+_ACEOF
+
+
+
+# Check whether --enable-lastlog was given.
+if test "${enable_lastlog+set}" = set; then
+ enableval=$enable_lastlog;
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+# Check whether --enable-utmp was given.
+if test "${enable_utmp+set}" = set; then
+ enableval=$enable_utmp;
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_UTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+# Check whether --enable-utmpx was given.
+if test "${enable_utmpx+set}" = set; then
+ enableval=$enable_utmpx;
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_UTMPX 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+# Check whether --enable-wtmp was given.
+if test "${enable_wtmp+set}" = set; then
+ enableval=$enable_wtmp;
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_WTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+# Check whether --enable-wtmpx was given.
+if test "${enable_wtmpx+set}" = set; then
+ enableval=$enable_wtmpx;
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_WTMPX 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+# Check whether --enable-libutil was given.
+if test "${enable_libutil+set}" = set; then
+ enableval=$enable_libutil;
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_LOGIN 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+# Check whether --enable-pututline was given.
+if test "${enable_pututline+set}" = set; then
+ enableval=$enable_pututline;
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_PUTUTLINE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+# Check whether --enable-pututxline was given.
+if test "${enable_pututxline+set}" = set; then
+ enableval=$enable_pututxline;
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-lastlog was given.
+if test "${with_lastlog+set}" = set; then
+ withval=$with_lastlog;
+ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ elif test -n "$withval" && test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ conf_lastlog_location=$withval
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+# include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
+# include <login.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ char *lastlog = LASTLOG_FILE;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+# include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ char *lastlog = _PATH_LASTLOG;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ system_lastlog_path=no
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
+ if test x"$system_lastlog_path" = x"no" ; then
+ for f in /var/log/lastlog /usr/adm/lastlog /var/adm/lastlog /etc/security/lastlog ; do
+ if (test -d "$f" || test -f "$f") ; then
+ conf_lastlog_location=$f
+ fi
+ done
+ if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: ** Cannot find lastlog **" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: ** Cannot find lastlog **" >&2;}
+ fi
+ fi
+fi
+
+if test -n "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define CONF_LASTLOG_FILE "$conf_lastlog_location"
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if your system defines UTMP_FILE" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if your system defines UTMP_FILE... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ char *utmp = UTMP_FILE;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ system_utmp_path=no
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
+ if test x"$system_utmp_path" = x"no" ; then
+ for f in /etc/utmp /usr/adm/utmp /var/run/utmp; do
+ if test -f $f ; then
+ conf_utmp_location=$f
+ fi
+ done
+ if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_UTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ fi
+fi
+if test -n "$conf_utmp_location"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define CONF_UTMP_FILE "$conf_utmp_location"
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if your system defines WTMP_FILE" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if your system defines WTMP_FILE... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ char *wtmp = WTMP_FILE;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ system_wtmp_path=no
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
+ if test x"$system_wtmp_path" = x"no" ; then
+ for f in /usr/adm/wtmp /var/log/wtmp; do
+ if test -f $f ; then
+ conf_wtmp_location=$f
+ fi
+ done
+ if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_WTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+ fi
+fi
+if test -n "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define CONF_WTMP_FILE "$conf_wtmp_location"
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if your system defines WTMPX_FILE" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking if your system defines WTMPX_FILE... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+#include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ char *wtmpx = WTMPX_FILE;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: yes" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}yes" >&6; }
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6; }
+ system_wtmpx_path=no
+
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then
+ if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_WTMPX 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+else
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define CONF_WTMPX_FILE "$conf_wtmpx_location"
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+
+
+if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $blibflags$blibpath"
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile" >&2;}
+fi
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for struct lastlog.ll_line" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for struct lastlog.ll_line... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_member_struct_lastlog_ll_line+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
+#include <utmp.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+#include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+#include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+static struct lastlog ac_aggr;
+if (ac_aggr.ll_line)
+return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_member_struct_lastlog_ll_line=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
+#include <utmp.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+#include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+#include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+static struct lastlog ac_aggr;
+if (sizeof ac_aggr.ll_line)
+return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_member_struct_lastlog_ll_line=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_member_struct_lastlog_ll_line=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_member_struct_lastlog_ll_line" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_member_struct_lastlog_ll_line" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_member_struct_lastlog_ll_line = yes; then
+ :
+else
+
+ if test x$SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE != "xyes" ; then
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ fi
+
+fi
+
+
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for struct utmp.ut_line" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for struct utmp.ut_line... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_member_struct_utmp_ut_line+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
+#include <utmp.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+#include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+#include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+static struct utmp ac_aggr;
+if (ac_aggr.ut_line)
+return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_member_struct_utmp_ut_line=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
+#include <utmp.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+#include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+#include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+static struct utmp ac_aggr;
+if (sizeof ac_aggr.ut_line)
+return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_member_struct_utmp_ut_line=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_member_struct_utmp_ut_line=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_member_struct_utmp_ut_line" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_member_struct_utmp_ut_line" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_member_struct_utmp_ut_line = yes; then
+ :
+else
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_UTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_WTMP 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
+
+CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags"
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" != "xyes" ; then
+ TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
+else
+ TEST_SSH_IPV6=yes
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking whether BROKEN_GETADDRINFO is declared" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking whether BROKEN_GETADDRINFO is declared... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_have_decl_BROKEN_GETADDRINFO+set}" = set; then
+ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h. */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$ac_includes_default
+int
+main ()
+{
+#ifndef BROKEN_GETADDRINFO
+ (void) BROKEN_GETADDRINFO;
+#endif
+
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+ ac_status=$?
+ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+ rm -f conftest.er1
+ cat conftest.err >&5
+ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ (exit $ac_status); } && {
+ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+ test ! -s conftest.err
+ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+ ac_cv_have_decl_BROKEN_GETADDRINFO=yes
+else
+ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+ ac_cv_have_decl_BROKEN_GETADDRINFO=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_have_decl_BROKEN_GETADDRINFO" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_have_decl_BROKEN_GETADDRINFO" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_have_decl_BROKEN_GETADDRINFO = yes; then
+ TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
+fi
+
+TEST_SSH_IPV6=$TEST_SSH_IPV6
+
+TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS=$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS
+
+UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS=$unsupported_algorithms
+
+
+
+ac_config_files="$ac_config_files Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile survey.sh"
+
+cat >confcache <<\_ACEOF
+# This file is a shell script that caches the results of configure
+# tests run on this system so they can be shared between configure
+# scripts and configure runs, see configure's option --config-cache.
+# It is not useful on other systems. If it contains results you don't
+# want to keep, you may remove or edit it.
+#
+# config.status only pays attention to the cache file if you give it
+# the --recheck option to rerun configure.
+#
+# `ac_cv_env_foo' variables (set or unset) will be overridden when
+# loading this file, other *unset* `ac_cv_foo' will be assigned the
+# following values.
+
+_ACEOF
+
+# The following way of writing the cache mishandles newlines in values,
+# but we know of no workaround that is simple, portable, and efficient.
+# So, we kill variables containing newlines.
+# Ultrix sh set writes to stderr and can't be redirected directly,
+# and sets the high bit in the cache file unless we assign to the vars.
+(
+ for ac_var in `(set) 2>&1 | sed -n 's/^\([a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)=.*/\1/p'`; do
+ eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
+ case $ac_val in #(
+ *${as_nl}*)
+ case $ac_var in #(
+ *_cv_*) { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: Cache variable $ac_var contains a newline." >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: Cache variable $ac_var contains a newline." >&2;} ;;
+ esac
+ case $ac_var in #(
+ _ | IFS | as_nl) ;; #(
+ *) $as_unset $ac_var ;;
+ esac ;;
+ esac
+ done
+
+ (set) 2>&1 |
+ case $as_nl`(ac_space=' '; set) 2>&1` in #(
+ *${as_nl}ac_space=\ *)
+ # `set' does not quote correctly, so add quotes (double-quote
+ # substitution turns \\\\ into \\, and sed turns \\ into \).
+ sed -n \
+ "s/'/'\\\\''/g;
+ s/^\\([_$as_cr_alnum]*_cv_[_$as_cr_alnum]*\\)=\\(.*\\)/\\1='\\2'/p"
+ ;; #(
+ *)
+ # `set' quotes correctly as required by POSIX, so do not add quotes.
+ sed -n "/^[_$as_cr_alnum]*_cv_[_$as_cr_alnum]*=/p"
+ ;;
+ esac |
+ sort
+) |
+ sed '
+ /^ac_cv_env_/b end
+ t clear
+ :clear
+ s/^\([^=]*\)=\(.*[{}].*\)$/test "${\1+set}" = set || &/
+ t end
+ s/^\([^=]*\)=\(.*\)$/\1=${\1=\2}/
+ :end' >>confcache
+if diff "$cache_file" confcache >/dev/null 2>&1; then :; else
+ if test -w "$cache_file"; then
+ test "x$cache_file" != "x/dev/null" &&
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: updating cache $cache_file" >&5
+echo "$as_me: updating cache $cache_file" >&6;}
+ cat confcache >$cache_file
+ else
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: not updating unwritable cache $cache_file" >&5
+echo "$as_me: not updating unwritable cache $cache_file" >&6;}
+ fi
+fi
+rm -f confcache
+
+test "x$prefix" = xNONE && prefix=$ac_default_prefix
+# Let make expand exec_prefix.
+test "x$exec_prefix" = xNONE && exec_prefix='${prefix}'
+
+DEFS=-DHAVE_CONFIG_H
+
+ac_libobjs=
+ac_ltlibobjs=
+for ac_i in : $LIBOBJS; do test "x$ac_i" = x: && continue
+ # 1. Remove the extension, and $U if already installed.
+ ac_script='s/\$U\././;s/\.o$//;s/\.obj$//'
+ ac_i=`echo "$ac_i" | sed "$ac_script"`
+ # 2. Prepend LIBOBJDIR. When used with automake>=1.10 LIBOBJDIR
+ # will be set to the directory where LIBOBJS objects are built.
+ ac_libobjs="$ac_libobjs \${LIBOBJDIR}$ac_i\$U.$ac_objext"
+ ac_ltlibobjs="$ac_ltlibobjs \${LIBOBJDIR}$ac_i"'$U.lo'
+done
+LIBOBJS=$ac_libobjs
+
+LTLIBOBJS=$ac_ltlibobjs
+
+
+
+: ${CONFIG_STATUS=./config.status}
+ac_clean_files_save=$ac_clean_files
+ac_clean_files="$ac_clean_files $CONFIG_STATUS"
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: creating $CONFIG_STATUS" >&5
+echo "$as_me: creating $CONFIG_STATUS" >&6;}
+cat >$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF
+#! $SHELL
+# Generated by $as_me.
+# Run this file to recreate the current configuration.
+# Compiler output produced by configure, useful for debugging
+# configure, is in config.log if it exists.
+
+debug=false
+ac_cs_recheck=false
+ac_cs_silent=false
+SHELL=\${CONFIG_SHELL-$SHELL}
+_ACEOF
+
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF
+## --------------------- ##
+## M4sh Initialization. ##
+## --------------------- ##
+
+# Be more Bourne compatible
+DUALCASE=1; export DUALCASE # for MKS sh
+if test -n "${ZSH_VERSION+set}" && (emulate sh) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ emulate sh
+ NULLCMD=:
+ # Zsh 3.x and 4.x performs word splitting on ${1+"$@"}, which
+ # is contrary to our usage. Disable this feature.
+ alias -g '${1+"$@"}'='"$@"'
+ setopt NO_GLOB_SUBST
+else
+ case `(set -o) 2>/dev/null` in
+ *posix*) set -o posix ;;
+esac
+
+fi
+
+
+
+
+# PATH needs CR
+# Avoid depending upon Character Ranges.
+as_cr_letters='abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'
+as_cr_LETTERS='ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'
+as_cr_Letters=$as_cr_letters$as_cr_LETTERS
+as_cr_digits='0123456789'
+as_cr_alnum=$as_cr_Letters$as_cr_digits
+
+# The user is always right.
+if test "${PATH_SEPARATOR+set}" != set; then
+ echo "#! /bin/sh" >conf$$.sh
+ echo "exit 0" >>conf$$.sh
+ chmod +x conf$$.sh
+ if (PATH="/nonexistent;."; conf$$.sh) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ PATH_SEPARATOR=';'
+ else
+ PATH_SEPARATOR=:
+ fi
+ rm -f conf$$.sh
+fi
+
+# Support unset when possible.
+if ( (MAIL=60; unset MAIL) || exit) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ as_unset=unset
+else
+ as_unset=false
+fi
+
+
+# IFS
+# We need space, tab and new line, in precisely that order. Quoting is
+# there to prevent editors from complaining about space-tab.
+# (If _AS_PATH_WALK were called with IFS unset, it would disable word
+# splitting by setting IFS to empty value.)
+as_nl='
+'
+IFS=" "" $as_nl"
+
+# Find who we are. Look in the path if we contain no directory separator.
+case $0 in
+ *[\\/]* ) as_myself=$0 ;;
+ *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ test -r "$as_dir/$0" && as_myself=$as_dir/$0 && break
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+# We did not find ourselves, most probably we were run as `sh COMMAND'
+# in which case we are not to be found in the path.
+if test "x$as_myself" = x; then
+ as_myself=$0
+fi
+if test ! -f "$as_myself"; then
+ echo "$as_myself: error: cannot find myself; rerun with an absolute file name" >&2
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }
+fi
+
+# Work around bugs in pre-3.0 UWIN ksh.
+for as_var in ENV MAIL MAILPATH
+do ($as_unset $as_var) >/dev/null 2>&1 && $as_unset $as_var
+done
+PS1='$ '
+PS2='> '
+PS4='+ '
+
+# NLS nuisances.
+for as_var in \
+ LANG LANGUAGE LC_ADDRESS LC_ALL LC_COLLATE LC_CTYPE LC_IDENTIFICATION \
+ LC_MEASUREMENT LC_MESSAGES LC_MONETARY LC_NAME LC_NUMERIC LC_PAPER \
+ LC_TELEPHONE LC_TIME
+do
+ if (set +x; test -z "`(eval $as_var=C; export $as_var) 2>&1`"); then
+ eval $as_var=C; export $as_var
+ else
+ ($as_unset $as_var) >/dev/null 2>&1 && $as_unset $as_var
+ fi
+done
+
+# Required to use basename.
+if expr a : '\(a\)' >/dev/null 2>&1 &&
+ test "X`expr 00001 : '.*\(...\)'`" = X001; then
+ as_expr=expr
+else
+ as_expr=false
+fi
+
+if (basename -- /) >/dev/null 2>&1 && test "X`basename -- / 2>&1`" = "X/"; then
+ as_basename=basename
+else
+ as_basename=false
+fi
+
+
+# Name of the executable.
+as_me=`$as_basename -- "$0" ||
+$as_expr X/"$0" : '.*/\([^/][^/]*\)/*$' \| \
+ X"$0" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
+ X"$0" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
+echo X/"$0" |
+ sed '/^.*\/\([^/][^/]*\)\/*$/{
+ s//\1/
+ q
+ }
+ /^X\/\(\/\/\)$/{
+ s//\1/
+ q
+ }
+ /^X\/\(\/\).*/{
+ s//\1/
+ q
+ }
+ s/.*/./; q'`
+
+# CDPATH.
+$as_unset CDPATH
+
+
+
+ as_lineno_1=$LINENO
+ as_lineno_2=$LINENO
+ test "x$as_lineno_1" != "x$as_lineno_2" &&
+ test "x`expr $as_lineno_1 + 1`" = "x$as_lineno_2" || {
+
+ # Create $as_me.lineno as a copy of $as_myself, but with $LINENO
+ # uniformly replaced by the line number. The first 'sed' inserts a
+ # line-number line after each line using $LINENO; the second 'sed'
+ # does the real work. The second script uses 'N' to pair each
+ # line-number line with the line containing $LINENO, and appends
+ # trailing '-' during substitution so that $LINENO is not a special
+ # case at line end.
+ # (Raja R Harinath suggested sed '=', and Paul Eggert wrote the
+ # scripts with optimization help from Paolo Bonzini. Blame Lee
+ # E. McMahon (1931-1989) for sed's syntax. :-)
+ sed -n '
+ p
+ /[$]LINENO/=
+ ' <$as_myself |
+ sed '
+ s/[$]LINENO.*/&-/
+ t lineno
+ b
+ :lineno
+ N
+ :loop
+ s/[$]LINENO\([^'$as_cr_alnum'_].*\n\)\(.*\)/\2\1\2/
+ t loop
+ s/-\n.*//
+ ' >$as_me.lineno &&
+ chmod +x "$as_me.lineno" ||
+ { echo "$as_me: error: cannot create $as_me.lineno; rerun with a POSIX shell" >&2
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+
+ # Don't try to exec as it changes $[0], causing all sort of problems
+ # (the dirname of $[0] is not the place where we might find the
+ # original and so on. Autoconf is especially sensitive to this).
+ . "./$as_me.lineno"
+ # Exit status is that of the last command.
+ exit
+}
+
+
+if (as_dir=`dirname -- /` && test "X$as_dir" = X/) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ as_dirname=dirname
+else
+ as_dirname=false
+fi
+
+ECHO_C= ECHO_N= ECHO_T=
+case `echo -n x` in
+-n*)
+ case `echo 'x\c'` in
+ *c*) ECHO_T=' ';; # ECHO_T is single tab character.
+ *) ECHO_C='\c';;
+ esac;;
+*)
+ ECHO_N='-n';;
+esac
+
+if expr a : '\(a\)' >/dev/null 2>&1 &&
+ test "X`expr 00001 : '.*\(...\)'`" = X001; then
+ as_expr=expr
+else
+ as_expr=false
+fi
+
+rm -f conf$$ conf$$.exe conf$$.file
+if test -d conf$$.dir; then
+ rm -f conf$$.dir/conf$$.file
+else
+ rm -f conf$$.dir
+ mkdir conf$$.dir
+fi
+echo >conf$$.file
+if ln -s conf$$.file conf$$ 2>/dev/null; then
+ as_ln_s='ln -s'
+ # ... but there are two gotchas:
+ # 1) On MSYS, both `ln -s file dir' and `ln file dir' fail.
+ # 2) DJGPP < 2.04 has no symlinks; `ln -s' creates a wrapper executable.
+ # In both cases, we have to default to `cp -p'.
+ ln -s conf$$.file conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null && test ! -f conf$$.exe ||
+ as_ln_s='cp -p'
+elif ln conf$$.file conf$$ 2>/dev/null; then
+ as_ln_s=ln
+else
+ as_ln_s='cp -p'
+fi
+rm -f conf$$ conf$$.exe conf$$.dir/conf$$.file conf$$.file
+rmdir conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null
+
+if mkdir -p . 2>/dev/null; then
+ as_mkdir_p=:
+else
+ test -d ./-p && rmdir ./-p
+ as_mkdir_p=false
+fi
+
+if test -x / >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ as_test_x='test -x'
+else
+ if ls -dL / >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ as_ls_L_option=L
+ else
+ as_ls_L_option=
+ fi
+ as_test_x='
+ eval sh -c '\''
+ if test -d "$1"; then
+ test -d "$1/.";
+ else
+ case $1 in
+ -*)set "./$1";;
+ esac;
+ case `ls -ld'$as_ls_L_option' "$1" 2>/dev/null` in
+ ???[sx]*):;;*)false;;esac;fi
+ '\'' sh
+ '
+fi
+as_executable_p=$as_test_x
+
+# Sed expression to map a string onto a valid CPP name.
+as_tr_cpp="eval sed 'y%*$as_cr_letters%P$as_cr_LETTERS%;s%[^_$as_cr_alnum]%_%g'"
+
+# Sed expression to map a string onto a valid variable name.
+as_tr_sh="eval sed 'y%*+%pp%;s%[^_$as_cr_alnum]%_%g'"
+
+
+exec 6>&1
+
+# Save the log message, to keep $[0] and so on meaningful, and to
+# report actual input values of CONFIG_FILES etc. instead of their
+# values after options handling.
+ac_log="
+This file was extended by OpenSSH $as_me Portable, which was
+generated by GNU Autoconf 2.61. Invocation command line was
+
+ CONFIG_FILES = $CONFIG_FILES
+ CONFIG_HEADERS = $CONFIG_HEADERS
+ CONFIG_LINKS = $CONFIG_LINKS
+ CONFIG_COMMANDS = $CONFIG_COMMANDS
+ $ $0 $@
+
+on `(hostname || uname -n) 2>/dev/null | sed 1q`
+"
+
+_ACEOF
+
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF
+# Files that config.status was made for.
+config_files="$ac_config_files"
+config_headers="$ac_config_headers"
+
+_ACEOF
+
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF
+ac_cs_usage="\
+\`$as_me' instantiates files from templates according to the
+current configuration.
+
+Usage: $0 [OPTIONS] [FILE]...
+
+ -h, --help print this help, then exit
+ -V, --version print version number and configuration settings, then exit
+ -q, --quiet do not print progress messages
+ -d, --debug don't remove temporary files
+ --recheck update $as_me by reconfiguring in the same conditions
+ --file=FILE[:TEMPLATE]
+ instantiate the configuration file FILE
+ --header=FILE[:TEMPLATE]
+ instantiate the configuration header FILE
+
+Configuration files:
+$config_files
+
+Configuration headers:
+$config_headers
+
+Report bugs to <bug-autoconf at gnu.org>."
+
+_ACEOF
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF
+ac_cs_version="\\
+OpenSSH config.status Portable
+configured by $0, generated by GNU Autoconf 2.61,
+ with options \\"`echo "$ac_configure_args" | sed 's/^ //; s/[\\""\`\$]/\\\\&/g'`\\"
+
+Copyright (C) 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+This config.status script is free software; the Free Software Foundation
+gives unlimited permission to copy, distribute and modify it."
+
+ac_pwd='$ac_pwd'
+srcdir='$srcdir'
+INSTALL='$INSTALL'
+_ACEOF
+
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF
+# If no file are specified by the user, then we need to provide default
+# value. By we need to know if files were specified by the user.
+ac_need_defaults=:
+while test $# != 0
+do
+ case $1 in
+ --*=*)
+ ac_option=`expr "X$1" : 'X\([^=]*\)='`
+ ac_optarg=`expr "X$1" : 'X[^=]*=\(.*\)'`
+ ac_shift=:
+ ;;
+ *)
+ ac_option=$1
+ ac_optarg=$2
+ ac_shift=shift
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+ case $ac_option in
+ # Handling of the options.
+ -recheck | --recheck | --rechec | --reche | --rech | --rec | --re | --r)
+ ac_cs_recheck=: ;;
+ --version | --versio | --versi | --vers | --ver | --ve | --v | -V )
+ echo "$ac_cs_version"; exit ;;
+ --debug | --debu | --deb | --de | --d | -d )
+ debug=: ;;
+ --file | --fil | --fi | --f )
+ $ac_shift
+ CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES $ac_optarg"
+ ac_need_defaults=false;;
+ --header | --heade | --head | --hea )
+ $ac_shift
+ CONFIG_HEADERS="$CONFIG_HEADERS $ac_optarg"
+ ac_need_defaults=false;;
+ --he | --h)
+ # Conflict between --help and --header
+ { echo "$as_me: error: ambiguous option: $1
+Try \`$0 --help' for more information." >&2
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; };;
+ --help | --hel | -h )
+ echo "$ac_cs_usage"; exit ;;
+ -q | -quiet | --quiet | --quie | --qui | --qu | --q \
+ | -silent | --silent | --silen | --sile | --sil | --si | --s)
+ ac_cs_silent=: ;;
+
+ # This is an error.
+ -*) { echo "$as_me: error: unrecognized option: $1
+Try \`$0 --help' for more information." >&2
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; } ;;
+
+ *) ac_config_targets="$ac_config_targets $1"
+ ac_need_defaults=false ;;
+
+ esac
+ shift
+done
+
+ac_configure_extra_args=
+
+if $ac_cs_silent; then
+ exec 6>/dev/null
+ ac_configure_extra_args="$ac_configure_extra_args --silent"
+fi
+
+_ACEOF
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF
+if \$ac_cs_recheck; then
+ echo "running CONFIG_SHELL=$SHELL $SHELL $0 "$ac_configure_args \$ac_configure_extra_args " --no-create --no-recursion" >&6
+ CONFIG_SHELL=$SHELL
+ export CONFIG_SHELL
+ exec $SHELL "$0"$ac_configure_args \$ac_configure_extra_args --no-create --no-recursion
+fi
+
+_ACEOF
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF
+exec 5>>config.log
+{
+ echo
+ sed 'h;s/./-/g;s/^.../## /;s/...$/ ##/;p;x;p;x' <<_ASBOX
+## Running $as_me. ##
+_ASBOX
+ echo "$ac_log"
+} >&5
+
+_ACEOF
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF
+_ACEOF
+
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF
+
+# Handling of arguments.
+for ac_config_target in $ac_config_targets
+do
+ case $ac_config_target in
+ "config.h") CONFIG_HEADERS="$CONFIG_HEADERS config.h" ;;
+ "Makefile") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES Makefile" ;;
+ "buildpkg.sh") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES buildpkg.sh" ;;
+ "opensshd.init") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES opensshd.init" ;;
+ "openssh.xml") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES openssh.xml" ;;
+ "openbsd-compat/Makefile") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES openbsd-compat/Makefile" ;;
+ "openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile" ;;
+ "survey.sh") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES survey.sh" ;;
+
+ *) { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: invalid argument: $ac_config_target" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: invalid argument: $ac_config_target" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; };;
+ esac
+done
+
+
+# If the user did not use the arguments to specify the items to instantiate,
+# then the envvar interface is used. Set only those that are not.
+# We use the long form for the default assignment because of an extremely
+# bizarre bug on SunOS 4.1.3.
+if $ac_need_defaults; then
+ test "${CONFIG_FILES+set}" = set || CONFIG_FILES=$config_files
+ test "${CONFIG_HEADERS+set}" = set || CONFIG_HEADERS=$config_headers
+fi
+
+# Have a temporary directory for convenience. Make it in the build tree
+# simply because there is no reason against having it here, and in addition,
+# creating and moving files from /tmp can sometimes cause problems.
+# Hook for its removal unless debugging.
+# Note that there is a small window in which the directory will not be cleaned:
+# after its creation but before its name has been assigned to `$tmp'.
+$debug ||
+{
+ tmp=
+ trap 'exit_status=$?
+ { test -z "$tmp" || test ! -d "$tmp" || rm -fr "$tmp"; } && exit $exit_status
+' 0
+ trap '{ (exit 1); exit 1; }' 1 2 13 15
+}
+# Create a (secure) tmp directory for tmp files.
+
+{
+ tmp=`(umask 077 && mktemp -d "./confXXXXXX") 2>/dev/null` &&
+ test -n "$tmp" && test -d "$tmp"
+} ||
+{
+ tmp=./conf$$-$RANDOM
+ (umask 077 && mkdir "$tmp")
+} ||
+{
+ echo "$me: cannot create a temporary directory in ." >&2
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }
+}
+
+#
+# Set up the sed scripts for CONFIG_FILES section.
+#
+
+# No need to generate the scripts if there are no CONFIG_FILES.
+# This happens for instance when ./config.status config.h
+if test -n "$CONFIG_FILES"; then
+
+_ACEOF
+
+
+
+ac_delim='%!_!# '
+for ac_last_try in false false false false false :; do
+ cat >conf$$subs.sed <<_ACEOF
+SHELL!$SHELL$ac_delim
+PATH_SEPARATOR!$PATH_SEPARATOR$ac_delim
+PACKAGE_NAME!$PACKAGE_NAME$ac_delim
+PACKAGE_TARNAME!$PACKAGE_TARNAME$ac_delim
+PACKAGE_VERSION!$PACKAGE_VERSION$ac_delim
+PACKAGE_STRING!$PACKAGE_STRING$ac_delim
+PACKAGE_BUGREPORT!$PACKAGE_BUGREPORT$ac_delim
+exec_prefix!$exec_prefix$ac_delim
+prefix!$prefix$ac_delim
+program_transform_name!$program_transform_name$ac_delim
+bindir!$bindir$ac_delim
+sbindir!$sbindir$ac_delim
+libexecdir!$libexecdir$ac_delim
+datarootdir!$datarootdir$ac_delim
+datadir!$datadir$ac_delim
+sysconfdir!$sysconfdir$ac_delim
+sharedstatedir!$sharedstatedir$ac_delim
+localstatedir!$localstatedir$ac_delim
+includedir!$includedir$ac_delim
+oldincludedir!$oldincludedir$ac_delim
+docdir!$docdir$ac_delim
+infodir!$infodir$ac_delim
+htmldir!$htmldir$ac_delim
+dvidir!$dvidir$ac_delim
+pdfdir!$pdfdir$ac_delim
+psdir!$psdir$ac_delim
+libdir!$libdir$ac_delim
+localedir!$localedir$ac_delim
+mandir!$mandir$ac_delim
+DEFS!$DEFS$ac_delim
+ECHO_C!$ECHO_C$ac_delim
+ECHO_N!$ECHO_N$ac_delim
+ECHO_T!$ECHO_T$ac_delim
+LIBS!$LIBS$ac_delim
+build_alias!$build_alias$ac_delim
+host_alias!$host_alias$ac_delim
+target_alias!$target_alias$ac_delim
+CC!$CC$ac_delim
+CFLAGS!$CFLAGS$ac_delim
+LDFLAGS!$LDFLAGS$ac_delim
+CPPFLAGS!$CPPFLAGS$ac_delim
+ac_ct_CC!$ac_ct_CC$ac_delim
+EXEEXT!$EXEEXT$ac_delim
+OBJEXT!$OBJEXT$ac_delim
+build!$build$ac_delim
+build_cpu!$build_cpu$ac_delim
+build_vendor!$build_vendor$ac_delim
+build_os!$build_os$ac_delim
+host!$host$ac_delim
+host_cpu!$host_cpu$ac_delim
+host_vendor!$host_vendor$ac_delim
+host_os!$host_os$ac_delim
+CPP!$CPP$ac_delim
+GREP!$GREP$ac_delim
+EGREP!$EGREP$ac_delim
+AWK!$AWK$ac_delim
+RANLIB!$RANLIB$ac_delim
+INSTALL_PROGRAM!$INSTALL_PROGRAM$ac_delim
+INSTALL_SCRIPT!$INSTALL_SCRIPT$ac_delim
+INSTALL_DATA!$INSTALL_DATA$ac_delim
+AR!$AR$ac_delim
+ac_ct_AR!$ac_ct_AR$ac_delim
+CAT!$CAT$ac_delim
+KILL!$KILL$ac_delim
+PERL!$PERL$ac_delim
+SED!$SED$ac_delim
+ENT!$ENT$ac_delim
+TEST_MINUS_S_SH!$TEST_MINUS_S_SH$ac_delim
+SH!$SH$ac_delim
+GROFF!$GROFF$ac_delim
+NROFF!$NROFF$ac_delim
+MANDOC!$MANDOC$ac_delim
+TEST_SHELL!$TEST_SHELL$ac_delim
+MANFMT!$MANFMT$ac_delim
+PATH_GROUPADD_PROG!$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG$ac_delim
+PATH_USERADD_PROG!$PATH_USERADD_PROG$ac_delim
+MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED!$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED$ac_delim
+STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL!$STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL$ac_delim
+LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK!$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK$ac_delim
+PATH_PASSWD_PROG!$PATH_PASSWD_PROG$ac_delim
+LD!$LD$ac_delim
+PKGCONFIG!$PKGCONFIG$ac_delim
+LIBEDIT!$LIBEDIT$ac_delim
+TEST_SSH_ECC!$TEST_SSH_ECC$ac_delim
+COMMENT_OUT_ECC!$COMMENT_OUT_ECC$ac_delim
+SSH_PRIVSEP_USER!$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER$ac_delim
+SSHLIBS!$SSHLIBS$ac_delim
+SSHDLIBS!$SSHDLIBS$ac_delim
+KRB5CONF!$KRB5CONF$ac_delim
+GSSLIBS!$GSSLIBS$ac_delim
+K5LIBS!$K5LIBS$ac_delim
+PRIVSEP_PATH!$PRIVSEP_PATH$ac_delim
+xauth_path!$xauth_path$ac_delim
+STRIP_OPT!$STRIP_OPT$ac_delim
+XAUTH_PATH!$XAUTH_PATH$ac_delim
+MANTYPE!$MANTYPE$ac_delim
+mansubdir!$mansubdir$ac_delim
+_ACEOF
+
+ if test `sed -n "s/.*$ac_delim\$/X/p" conf$$subs.sed | grep -c X` = 97; then
+ break
+ elif $ac_last_try; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: could not make $CONFIG_STATUS" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: could not make $CONFIG_STATUS" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ else
+ ac_delim="$ac_delim!$ac_delim _$ac_delim!! "
+ fi
+done
+
+ac_eof=`sed -n '/^CEOF[0-9]*$/s/CEOF/0/p' conf$$subs.sed`
+if test -n "$ac_eof"; then
+ ac_eof=`echo "$ac_eof" | sort -nru | sed 1q`
+ ac_eof=`expr $ac_eof + 1`
+fi
+
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF
+cat >"\$tmp/subs-1.sed" <<\CEOF$ac_eof
+/@[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z_0-9]*@/!b
+_ACEOF
+sed '
+s/[,\\&]/\\&/g; s/@/@|#_!!_#|/g
+s/^/s,@/; s/!/@,|#_!!_#|/
+:n
+t n
+s/'"$ac_delim"'$/,g/; t
+s/$/\\/; p
+N; s/^.*\n//; s/[,\\&]/\\&/g; s/@/@|#_!!_#|/g; b n
+' >>$CONFIG_STATUS <conf$$subs.sed
+rm -f conf$$subs.sed
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF
+CEOF$ac_eof
+_ACEOF
+
+
+ac_delim='%!_!# '
+for ac_last_try in false false false false false :; do
+ cat >conf$$subs.sed <<_ACEOF
+user_path!$user_path$ac_delim
+piddir!$piddir$ac_delim
+TEST_SSH_IPV6!$TEST_SSH_IPV6$ac_delim
+TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS!$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS$ac_delim
+UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS!$UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS$ac_delim
+LIBOBJS!$LIBOBJS$ac_delim
+LTLIBOBJS!$LTLIBOBJS$ac_delim
+_ACEOF
+
+ if test `sed -n "s/.*$ac_delim\$/X/p" conf$$subs.sed | grep -c X` = 7; then
+ break
+ elif $ac_last_try; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: could not make $CONFIG_STATUS" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: could not make $CONFIG_STATUS" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
+ else
+ ac_delim="$ac_delim!$ac_delim _$ac_delim!! "
+ fi
+done
+
+ac_eof=`sed -n '/^CEOF[0-9]*$/s/CEOF/0/p' conf$$subs.sed`
+if test -n "$ac_eof"; then
+ ac_eof=`echo "$ac_eof" | sort -nru | sed 1q`
+ ac_eof=`expr $ac_eof + 1`
+fi
+
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF
+cat >"\$tmp/subs-2.sed" <<\CEOF$ac_eof
+/@[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z_0-9]*@/!b end
+_ACEOF
+sed '
+s/[,\\&]/\\&/g; s/@/@|#_!!_#|/g
+s/^/s,@/; s/!/@,|#_!!_#|/
+:n
+t n
+s/'"$ac_delim"'$/,g/; t
+s/$/\\/; p
+N; s/^.*\n//; s/[,\\&]/\\&/g; s/@/@|#_!!_#|/g; b n
+' >>$CONFIG_STATUS <conf$$subs.sed
+rm -f conf$$subs.sed
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF
+:end
+s/|#_!!_#|//g
+CEOF$ac_eof
+_ACEOF
+
+
+# VPATH may cause trouble with some makes, so we remove $(srcdir),
+# ${srcdir} and @srcdir@ from VPATH if srcdir is ".", strip leading and
+# trailing colons and then remove the whole line if VPATH becomes empty
+# (actually we leave an empty line to preserve line numbers).
+if test "x$srcdir" = x.; then
+ ac_vpsub='/^[ ]*VPATH[ ]*=/{
+s/:*\$(srcdir):*/:/
+s/:*\${srcdir}:*/:/
+s/:*@srcdir@:*/:/
+s/^\([^=]*=[ ]*\):*/\1/
+s/:*$//
+s/^[^=]*=[ ]*$//
+}'
+fi
+
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF
+fi # test -n "$CONFIG_FILES"
+
+
+for ac_tag in :F $CONFIG_FILES :H $CONFIG_HEADERS
+do
+ case $ac_tag in
+ :[FHLC]) ac_mode=$ac_tag; continue;;
+ esac
+ case $ac_mode$ac_tag in
+ :[FHL]*:*);;
+ :L* | :C*:*) { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: Invalid tag $ac_tag." >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: Invalid tag $ac_tag." >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; };;
+ :[FH]-) ac_tag=-:-;;
+ :[FH]*) ac_tag=$ac_tag:$ac_tag.in;;
+ esac
+ ac_save_IFS=$IFS
+ IFS=:
+ set x $ac_tag
+ IFS=$ac_save_IFS
+ shift
+ ac_file=$1
+ shift
+
+ case $ac_mode in
+ :L) ac_source=$1;;
+ :[FH])
+ ac_file_inputs=
+ for ac_f
+ do
+ case $ac_f in
+ -) ac_f="$tmp/stdin";;
+ *) # Look for the file first in the build tree, then in the source tree
+ # (if the path is not absolute). The absolute path cannot be DOS-style,
+ # because $ac_f cannot contain `:'.
+ test -f "$ac_f" ||
+ case $ac_f in
+ [\\/$]*) false;;
+ *) test -f "$srcdir/$ac_f" && ac_f="$srcdir/$ac_f";;
+ esac ||
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: cannot find input file: $ac_f" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: cannot find input file: $ac_f" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; };;
+ esac
+ ac_file_inputs="$ac_file_inputs $ac_f"
+ done
+
+ # Let's still pretend it is `configure' which instantiates (i.e., don't
+ # use $as_me), people would be surprised to read:
+ # /* config.h. Generated by config.status. */
+ configure_input="Generated from "`IFS=:
+ echo $* | sed 's|^[^:]*/||;s|:[^:]*/|, |g'`" by configure."
+ if test x"$ac_file" != x-; then
+ configure_input="$ac_file. $configure_input"
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: creating $ac_file" >&5
+echo "$as_me: creating $ac_file" >&6;}
+ fi
+
+ case $ac_tag in
+ *:-:* | *:-) cat >"$tmp/stdin";;
+ esac
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+ ac_dir=`$as_dirname -- "$ac_file" ||
+$as_expr X"$ac_file" : 'X\(.*[^/]\)//*[^/][^/]*/*$' \| \
+ X"$ac_file" : 'X\(//\)[^/]' \| \
+ X"$ac_file" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
+ X"$ac_file" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
+echo X"$ac_file" |
+ sed '/^X\(.*[^/]\)\/\/*[^/][^/]*\/*$/{
+ s//\1/
+ q
+ }
+ /^X\(\/\/\)[^/].*/{
+ s//\1/
+ q
+ }
+ /^X\(\/\/\)$/{
+ s//\1/
+ q
+ }
+ /^X\(\/\).*/{
+ s//\1/
+ q
+ }
+ s/.*/./; q'`
+ { as_dir="$ac_dir"
+ case $as_dir in #(
+ -*) as_dir=./$as_dir;;
+ esac
+ test -d "$as_dir" || { $as_mkdir_p && mkdir -p "$as_dir"; } || {
+ as_dirs=
+ while :; do
+ case $as_dir in #(
+ *\'*) as_qdir=`echo "$as_dir" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"`;; #(
+ *) as_qdir=$as_dir;;
+ esac
+ as_dirs="'$as_qdir' $as_dirs"
+ as_dir=`$as_dirname -- "$as_dir" ||
+$as_expr X"$as_dir" : 'X\(.*[^/]\)//*[^/][^/]*/*$' \| \
+ X"$as_dir" : 'X\(//\)[^/]' \| \
+ X"$as_dir" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
+ X"$as_dir" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
+echo X"$as_dir" |
+ sed '/^X\(.*[^/]\)\/\/*[^/][^/]*\/*$/{
+ s//\1/
+ q
+ }
+ /^X\(\/\/\)[^/].*/{
+ s//\1/
+ q
+ }
+ /^X\(\/\/\)$/{
+ s//\1/
+ q
+ }
+ /^X\(\/\).*/{
+ s//\1/
+ q
+ }
+ s/.*/./; q'`
+ test -d "$as_dir" && break
+ done
+ test -z "$as_dirs" || eval "mkdir $as_dirs"
+ } || test -d "$as_dir" || { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: cannot create directory $as_dir" >&5
+echo "$as_me: error: cannot create directory $as_dir" >&2;}
+ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }; }
+ ac_builddir=.
+
+case "$ac_dir" in
+.) ac_dir_suffix= ac_top_builddir_sub=. ac_top_build_prefix= ;;
+*)
+ ac_dir_suffix=/`echo "$ac_dir" | sed 's,^\.[\\/],,'`
+ # A ".." for each directory in $ac_dir_suffix.
+ ac_top_builddir_sub=`echo "$ac_dir_suffix" | sed 's,/[^\\/]*,/..,g;s,/,,'`
+ case $ac_top_builddir_sub in
+ "") ac_top_builddir_sub=. ac_top_build_prefix= ;;
+ *) ac_top_build_prefix=$ac_top_builddir_sub/ ;;
+ esac ;;
+esac
+ac_abs_top_builddir=$ac_pwd
+ac_abs_builddir=$ac_pwd$ac_dir_suffix
+# for backward compatibility:
+ac_top_builddir=$ac_top_build_prefix
+
+case $srcdir in
+ .) # We are building in place.
+ ac_srcdir=.
+ ac_top_srcdir=$ac_top_builddir_sub
+ ac_abs_top_srcdir=$ac_pwd ;;
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]* ) # Absolute name.
+ ac_srcdir=$srcdir$ac_dir_suffix;
+ ac_top_srcdir=$srcdir
+ ac_abs_top_srcdir=$srcdir ;;
+ *) # Relative name.
+ ac_srcdir=$ac_top_build_prefix$srcdir$ac_dir_suffix
+ ac_top_srcdir=$ac_top_build_prefix$srcdir
+ ac_abs_top_srcdir=$ac_pwd/$srcdir ;;
+esac
+ac_abs_srcdir=$ac_abs_top_srcdir$ac_dir_suffix
+
+
+ case $ac_mode in
+ :F)
+ #
+ # CONFIG_FILE
+ #
+
+ case $INSTALL in
+ [\\/$]* | ?:[\\/]* ) ac_INSTALL=$INSTALL ;;
+ *) ac_INSTALL=$ac_top_build_prefix$INSTALL ;;
+ esac
+_ACEOF
+
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF
+# If the template does not know about datarootdir, expand it.
+# FIXME: This hack should be removed a few years after 2.60.
+ac_datarootdir_hack=; ac_datarootdir_seen=
+
+case `sed -n '/datarootdir/ {
+ p
+ q
+}
+/@datadir@/p
+/@docdir@/p
+/@infodir@/p
+/@localedir@/p
+/@mandir@/p
+' $ac_file_inputs` in
+*datarootdir*) ac_datarootdir_seen=yes;;
+*@datadir@*|*@docdir@*|*@infodir@*|*@localedir@*|*@mandir@*)
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_file_inputs seems to ignore the --datarootdir setting" >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_file_inputs seems to ignore the --datarootdir setting" >&2;}
+_ACEOF
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF
+ ac_datarootdir_hack='
+ s&@datadir@&$datadir&g
+ s&@docdir@&$docdir&g
+ s&@infodir@&$infodir&g
+ s&@localedir@&$localedir&g
+ s&@mandir@&$mandir&g
+ s&\\\${datarootdir}&$datarootdir&g' ;;
+esac
+_ACEOF
+
+# Neutralize VPATH when `$srcdir' = `.'.
+# Shell code in configure.ac might set extrasub.
+# FIXME: do we really want to maintain this feature?
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF
+ sed "$ac_vpsub
+$extrasub
+_ACEOF
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF
+:t
+/@[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z_0-9]*@/!b
+s&@configure_input@&$configure_input&;t t
+s&@top_builddir@&$ac_top_builddir_sub&;t t
+s&@srcdir@&$ac_srcdir&;t t
+s&@abs_srcdir@&$ac_abs_srcdir&;t t
+s&@top_srcdir@&$ac_top_srcdir&;t t
+s&@abs_top_srcdir@&$ac_abs_top_srcdir&;t t
+s&@builddir@&$ac_builddir&;t t
+s&@abs_builddir@&$ac_abs_builddir&;t t
+s&@abs_top_builddir@&$ac_abs_top_builddir&;t t
+s&@INSTALL@&$ac_INSTALL&;t t
+$ac_datarootdir_hack
+" $ac_file_inputs | sed -f "$tmp/subs-1.sed" | sed -f "$tmp/subs-2.sed" >$tmp/out
+
+test -z "$ac_datarootdir_hack$ac_datarootdir_seen" &&
+ { ac_out=`sed -n '/\${datarootdir}/p' "$tmp/out"`; test -n "$ac_out"; } &&
+ { ac_out=`sed -n '/^[ ]*datarootdir[ ]*:*=/p' "$tmp/out"`; test -z "$ac_out"; } &&
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_file contains a reference to the variable \`datarootdir'
+which seems to be undefined. Please make sure it is defined." >&5
+echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_file contains a reference to the variable \`datarootdir'
+which seems to be undefined. Please make sure it is defined." >&2;}
+
+ rm -f "$tmp/stdin"
+ case $ac_file in
+ -) cat "$tmp/out"; rm -f "$tmp/out";;
+ *) rm -f "$ac_file"; mv "$tmp/out" $ac_file;;
+ esac
+ ;;
+ :H)
+ #
+ # CONFIG_HEADER
+ #
+_ACEOF
+
+# Transform confdefs.h into a sed script `conftest.defines', that
+# substitutes the proper values into config.h.in to produce config.h.
+rm -f conftest.defines conftest.tail
+# First, append a space to every undef/define line, to ease matching.
+echo 's/$/ /' >conftest.defines
+# Then, protect against being on the right side of a sed subst, or in
+# an unquoted here document, in config.status. If some macros were
+# called several times there might be several #defines for the same
+# symbol, which is useless. But do not sort them, since the last
+# AC_DEFINE must be honored.
+ac_word_re=[_$as_cr_Letters][_$as_cr_alnum]*
+# These sed commands are passed to sed as "A NAME B PARAMS C VALUE D", where
+# NAME is the cpp macro being defined, VALUE is the value it is being given.
+# PARAMS is the parameter list in the macro definition--in most cases, it's
+# just an empty string.
+ac_dA='s,^\\([ #]*\\)[^ ]*\\([ ]*'
+ac_dB='\\)[ (].*,\\1define\\2'
+ac_dC=' '
+ac_dD=' ,'
+
+uniq confdefs.h |
+ sed -n '
+ t rset
+ :rset
+ s/^[ ]*#[ ]*define[ ][ ]*//
+ t ok
+ d
+ :ok
+ s/[\\&,]/\\&/g
+ s/^\('"$ac_word_re"'\)\(([^()]*)\)[ ]*\(.*\)/ '"$ac_dA"'\1'"$ac_dB"'\2'"${ac_dC}"'\3'"$ac_dD"'/p
+ s/^\('"$ac_word_re"'\)[ ]*\(.*\)/'"$ac_dA"'\1'"$ac_dB$ac_dC"'\2'"$ac_dD"'/p
+ ' >>conftest.defines
+
+# Remove the space that was appended to ease matching.
+# Then replace #undef with comments. This is necessary, for
+# example, in the case of _POSIX_SOURCE, which is predefined and required
+# on some systems where configure will not decide to define it.
+# (The regexp can be short, since the line contains either #define or #undef.)
+echo 's/ $//
+s,^[ #]*u.*,/* & */,' >>conftest.defines
+
+# Break up conftest.defines:
+ac_max_sed_lines=50
+
+# First sed command is: sed -f defines.sed $ac_file_inputs >"$tmp/out1"
+# Second one is: sed -f defines.sed "$tmp/out1" >"$tmp/out2"
+# Third one will be: sed -f defines.sed "$tmp/out2" >"$tmp/out1"
+# et cetera.
+ac_in='$ac_file_inputs'
+ac_out='"$tmp/out1"'
+ac_nxt='"$tmp/out2"'
+
+while :
+do
+ # Write a here document:
+ cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF
+ # First, check the format of the line:
+ cat >"\$tmp/defines.sed" <<\\CEOF
+/^[ ]*#[ ]*undef[ ][ ]*$ac_word_re[ ]*\$/b def
+/^[ ]*#[ ]*define[ ][ ]*$ac_word_re[( ]/b def
+b
+:def
+_ACEOF
+ sed ${ac_max_sed_lines}q conftest.defines >>$CONFIG_STATUS
+ echo 'CEOF
+ sed -f "$tmp/defines.sed"' "$ac_in >$ac_out" >>$CONFIG_STATUS
+ ac_in=$ac_out; ac_out=$ac_nxt; ac_nxt=$ac_in
+ sed 1,${ac_max_sed_lines}d conftest.defines >conftest.tail
+ grep . conftest.tail >/dev/null || break
+ rm -f conftest.defines
+ mv conftest.tail conftest.defines
+done
+rm -f conftest.defines conftest.tail
+
+echo "ac_result=$ac_in" >>$CONFIG_STATUS
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF
+ if test x"$ac_file" != x-; then
+ echo "/* $configure_input */" >"$tmp/config.h"
+ cat "$ac_result" >>"$tmp/config.h"
+ if diff $ac_file "$tmp/config.h" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_file is unchanged" >&5
+echo "$as_me: $ac_file is unchanged" >&6;}
+ else
+ rm -f $ac_file
+ mv "$tmp/config.h" $ac_file
+ fi
+ else
+ echo "/* $configure_input */"
+ cat "$ac_result"
+ fi
+ rm -f "$tmp/out12"
+ ;;
+
+
+ esac
+
+done # for ac_tag
+
+
+{ (exit 0); exit 0; }
+_ACEOF
+chmod +x $CONFIG_STATUS
+ac_clean_files=$ac_clean_files_save
+
+
+# configure is writing to config.log, and then calls config.status.
+# config.status does its own redirection, appending to config.log.
+# Unfortunately, on DOS this fails, as config.log is still kept open
+# by configure, so config.status won't be able to write to it; its
+# output is simply discarded. So we exec the FD to /dev/null,
+# effectively closing config.log, so it can be properly (re)opened and
+# appended to by config.status. When coming back to configure, we
+# need to make the FD available again.
+if test "$no_create" != yes; then
+ ac_cs_success=:
+ ac_config_status_args=
+ test "$silent" = yes &&
+ ac_config_status_args="$ac_config_status_args --quiet"
+ exec 5>/dev/null
+ $SHELL $CONFIG_STATUS $ac_config_status_args || ac_cs_success=false
+ exec 5>>config.log
+ # Use ||, not &&, to avoid exiting from the if with $? = 1, which
+ # would make configure fail if this is the last instruction.
+ $ac_cs_success || { (exit 1); exit 1; }
+fi
+
+
+# Print summary of options
+
+# Someone please show me a better way :)
+A=`eval echo ${prefix}` ; A=`eval echo ${A}`
+B=`eval echo ${bindir}` ; B=`eval echo ${B}`
+C=`eval echo ${sbindir}` ; C=`eval echo ${C}`
+D=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` ; D=`eval echo ${D}`
+E=`eval echo ${libexecdir}/ssh-askpass` ; E=`eval echo ${E}`
+F=`eval echo ${mandir}/${mansubdir}X` ; F=`eval echo ${F}`
+G=`eval echo ${piddir}` ; G=`eval echo ${G}`
+H=`eval echo ${PRIVSEP_PATH}` ; H=`eval echo ${H}`
+I=`eval echo ${user_path}` ; I=`eval echo ${I}`
+J=`eval echo ${superuser_path}` ; J=`eval echo ${J}`
+
+echo ""
+echo "OpenSSH has been configured with the following options:"
+echo " User binaries: $B"
+echo " System binaries: $C"
+echo " Configuration files: $D"
+echo " Askpass program: $E"
+echo " Manual pages: $F"
+echo " PID file: $G"
+echo " Privilege separation chroot path: $H"
+if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
+echo " At runtime, sshd will use the path defined in $external_path_file"
+echo " Make sure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work"
+else
+echo " sshd default user PATH: $I"
+ if test ! -z "$external_path_file"; then
+echo " (If PATH is set in $external_path_file it will be used instead. If"
+echo " used, ensure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work.)"
+ fi
+fi
+if test ! -z "$superuser_path" ; then
+echo " sshd superuser user PATH: $J"
+fi
+echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE"
+echo " PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
+echo " OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
+echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
+echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
+echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
+echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
+echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
+echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
+echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
+echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
+echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
+echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
+echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
+echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
+echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
+
+echo ""
+
+echo " Host: ${host}"
+echo " Compiler: ${CC}"
+echo " Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}"
+echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}"
+echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}"
+echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}"
+if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
+echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
+fi
+if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then
+echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}"
+fi
+
+echo ""
+
+if test "x$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" = "xyes" ; then
+ echo "SVR4 style packages are supported with \"make package\""
+ echo ""
+fi
+
+if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
+ echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file "
+ echo "for sshd, otherwise password authentication may fail. "
+ echo "Example PAM control files can be found in the contrib/ "
+ echo "subdirectory"
+ echo ""
+fi
+
+if test ! -z "$NO_PEERCHECK" ; then
+ echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not"
+ echo "appear to support getpeereid(), getpeerucred() or the"
+ echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to"
+ echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to"
+ echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious"
+ echo "user can connect to your agent."
+ echo ""
+fi
+
+if test "$AUDIT_MODULE" = "bsm" ; then
+ echo "WARNING: BSM audit support is currently considered EXPERIMENTAL."
+ echo "See the Solaris section in README.platform for details."
+fi
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/configure.ac
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/configure.ac 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/configure.ac 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,4901 +0,0 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.571 2014/02/21 17:09:34 tim Exp $
-#
-# Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
-#
-# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
-# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-#
-# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
-# WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
-# ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-# WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-# ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-# OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-
-AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.571 $)
-AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
-AC_LANG([C])
-
-AC_CONFIG_HEADER([config.h])
-AC_PROG_CC
-AC_CANONICAL_HOST
-AC_C_BIGENDIAN
-
-# Checks for programs.
-AC_PROG_AWK
-AC_PROG_CPP
-AC_PROG_RANLIB
-AC_PROG_INSTALL
-AC_PROG_EGREP
-AC_PATH_PROG([AR], [ar])
-AC_PATH_PROG([CAT], [cat])
-AC_PATH_PROG([KILL], [kill])
-AC_PATH_PROGS([PERL], [perl5 perl])
-AC_PATH_PROG([SED], [sed])
-AC_SUBST([PERL])
-AC_PATH_PROG([ENT], [ent])
-AC_SUBST([ENT])
-AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [bash])
-AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [ksh])
-AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [sh])
-AC_PATH_PROG([SH], [sh])
-AC_PATH_PROG([GROFF], [groff])
-AC_PATH_PROG([NROFF], [nroff])
-AC_PATH_PROG([MANDOC], [mandoc])
-AC_SUBST([TEST_SHELL], [sh])
-
-dnl select manpage formatter
-if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then
- MANFMT="$MANDOC"
-elif test "x$NROFF" != "x" ; then
- MANFMT="$NROFF -mandoc"
-elif test "x$GROFF" != "x" ; then
- MANFMT="$GROFF -mandoc -Tascii"
-else
- AC_MSG_WARN([no manpage formatted found])
- MANFMT="false"
-fi
-AC_SUBST([MANFMT])
-
-dnl for buildpkg.sh
-AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_GROUPADD_PROG], [groupadd], [groupadd],
- [/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc])
-AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_USERADD_PROG], [useradd], [useradd],
- [/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc])
-AC_CHECK_PROG([MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED], [pkgmk], [yes], [no])
-if test -x /sbin/sh; then
- AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/sbin/sh])
-else
- AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/bin/sh])
-fi
-
-# System features
-AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
-
-if test -z "$AR" ; then
- AC_MSG_ERROR([*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***])
-fi
-
-# Use LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment if possible
-if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM" ; then
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK], ["$LOGIN_PROGRAM"],
- [If your header files don't define LOGIN_PROGRAM,
- then use this (detected) from environment and PATH])
-else
- # Search for login
- AC_PATH_PROG([LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK], [login])
- if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK" ; then
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK], ["$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK"])
- fi
-fi
-
-AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_PASSWD_PROG], [passwd])
-if test ! -z "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" ; then
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_PASSWD_PROG], ["$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"],
- [Full path of your "passwd" program])
-fi
-
-if test -z "$LD" ; then
- LD=$CC
-fi
-AC_SUBST([LD])
-
-AC_C_INLINE
-
-AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX], [have_llong_max=1], , [#include <limits.h>])
-AC_CHECK_DECL([SYSTR_POLICY_KILL], [have_systr_policy_kill=1], , [
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/param.h>
- #include <dev/systrace.h>
-])
-AC_CHECK_DECL([RLIMIT_NPROC],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC], [], [sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC])], , [
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/resource.h>
-])
-AC_CHECK_DECL([PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS], [have_linux_no_new_privs=1], , [
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <linux/prctl.h>
-])
-
-use_stack_protector=1
-use_toolchain_hardening=1
-AC_ARG_WITH([stackprotect],
- [ --without-stackprotect Don't use compiler's stack protection], [
- if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
- use_stack_protector=0
- fi ])
-AC_ARG_WITH([hardening],
- [ --without-hardening Don't use toolchain hardening flags], [
- if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
- use_toolchain_hardening=0
- fi ])
-
-# We use -Werror for the tests only so that we catch warnings like "this is
-# on by default" for things like -fPIE.
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports -Werror])
-saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
-CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror"
-AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[int main(void) { return 0; }]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- WERROR="-Werror"],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- WERROR="" ]
-)
-CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-
-if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then
- OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Qunused-arguments])
- OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunknown-warning-option])
- OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wall])
- OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-arith])
- OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wuninitialized])
- OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsign-compare])
- OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wformat-security])
- OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess])
- OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-sign], [-Wno-pointer-sign])
- OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunused-result], [-Wno-unused-result])
- OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fno-strict-aliasing])
- OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2])
- if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" = "x1"; then
- OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,relro])
- OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,now])
- OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,noexecstack])
- # NB. -ftrapv expects certain support functions to be present in
- # the compiler library (libgcc or similar) to detect integer operations
- # that can overflow. We must check that the result of enabling it
- # actually links. The test program compiled/linked includes a number
- # of integer operations that should exercise this.
- OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK([-ftrapv])
- fi
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([gcc version])
- GCC_VER=`$CC -v 2>&1 | $AWK '/gcc version /{print $3}'`
- case $GCC_VER in
- 1.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
- 2.8* | 2.9*)
- no_attrib_nonnull=1
- ;;
- 2.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
- *) ;;
- esac
- AC_MSG_RESULT([$GCC_VER])
-
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset])
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fno-builtin-memset"
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <string.h> ]],
- [[ char b[10]; memset(b, 0, sizeof(b)); ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ]
- )
-
- # -fstack-protector-all doesn't always work for some GCC versions
- # and/or platforms, so we test if we can. If it's not supported
- # on a given platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror.
- if test "x$use_stack_protector" = "x1"; then
- for t in -fstack-protector-strong -fstack-protector-all \
- -fstack-protector; do
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports $t])
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $t -Werror"
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $t -Werror"
- AC_LINK_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
- [[
- char x[256];
- snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX");
- ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $t"
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $t"
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $t works])
- AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
- [[
- char x[256];
- snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX");
- ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- break ],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ],
- [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: cannot test])
- break ]
- )
- ],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
- )
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
- done
- fi
-
- if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then
- # retry LLONG_MAX with -std=gnu99, needed on some Linuxes
- unset ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -std=gnu99"
- AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX],
- [have_llong_max=1],
- [CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"],
- [#include <limits.h>]
- )
- fi
-fi
-
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types])
-AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <stdlib.h>
-__attribute__((__unused__)) static void foo(void){return;}]],
- [[ exit(0); ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- AC_DEFINE(NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE, 1,
- [compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types]) ]
-)
-
-if test "x$no_attrib_nonnull" != "x1" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__], [1], [Have attribute nonnull])
-fi
-
-AC_ARG_WITH([rpath],
- [ --without-rpath Disable auto-added -R linker paths],
- [
- if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
- need_dash_r=""
- fi
- if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
- need_dash_r=1
- fi
- ]
-)
-
-# Allow user to specify flags
-AC_ARG_WITH([cflags],
- [ --with-cflags Specify additional flags to pass to compiler],
- [
- if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
- test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $withval"
- fi
- ]
-)
-AC_ARG_WITH([cppflags],
- [ --with-cppflags Specify additional flags to pass to preprocessor] ,
- [
- if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
- test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $withval"
- fi
- ]
-)
-AC_ARG_WITH([ldflags],
- [ --with-ldflags Specify additional flags to pass to linker],
- [
- if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
- test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $withval"
- fi
- ]
-)
-AC_ARG_WITH([libs],
- [ --with-libs Specify additional libraries to link with],
- [
- if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
- test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- LIBS="$LIBS $withval"
- fi
- ]
-)
-AC_ARG_WITH([Werror],
- [ --with-Werror Build main code with -Werror],
- [
- if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno"; then
- werror_flags="-Werror"
- if test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- werror_flags="$withval"
- fi
- fi
- ]
-)
-
-AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \
- blf.h \
- bstring.h \
- crypt.h \
- crypto/sha2.h \
- dirent.h \
- endian.h \
- elf.h \
- features.h \
- fcntl.h \
- floatingpoint.h \
- getopt.h \
- glob.h \
- ia.h \
- iaf.h \
- inttypes.h \
- limits.h \
- locale.h \
- login.h \
- maillock.h \
- ndir.h \
- net/if_tun.h \
- netdb.h \
- netgroup.h \
- pam/pam_appl.h \
- paths.h \
- poll.h \
- pty.h \
- readpassphrase.h \
- rpc/types.h \
- security/pam_appl.h \
- sha2.h \
- shadow.h \
- stddef.h \
- stdint.h \
- string.h \
- strings.h \
- sys/audit.h \
- sys/bitypes.h \
- sys/bsdtty.h \
- sys/capability.h \
- sys/cdefs.h \
- sys/dir.h \
- sys/mman.h \
- sys/ndir.h \
- sys/poll.h \
- sys/prctl.h \
- sys/pstat.h \
- sys/select.h \
- sys/stat.h \
- sys/stream.h \
- sys/stropts.h \
- sys/strtio.h \
- sys/statvfs.h \
- sys/sysmacros.h \
- sys/time.h \
- sys/timers.h \
- time.h \
- tmpdir.h \
- ttyent.h \
- ucred.h \
- unistd.h \
- usersec.h \
- util.h \
- utime.h \
- utmp.h \
- utmpx.h \
- vis.h \
-])
-
-# lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris
-AC_CHECK_HEADERS([lastlog.h], [], [], [
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-])
-
-# sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris
-AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/ptms.h], [], [], [
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H
-# include <sys/stream.h>
-#endif
-])
-
-# login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD
-AC_CHECK_HEADERS([login_cap.h], [], [], [
-#include <sys/types.h>
-])
-
-# older BSDs need sys/param.h before sys/mount.h
-AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/mount.h], [], [], [
-#include <sys/param.h>
-])
-
-# Android requires sys/socket.h to be included before sys/un.h
-AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/un.h], [], [], [
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-])
-
-# Messages for features tested for in target-specific section
-SIA_MSG="no"
-SPC_MSG="no"
-SP_MSG="no"
-
-# Check for some target-specific stuff
-case "$host" in
-*-*-aix*)
- # Some versions of VAC won't allow macro redefinitions at
- # -qlanglevel=ansi, and autoconf 2.60 sometimes insists on using that
- # particularly with older versions of vac or xlc.
- # It also throws errors about null macro argments, but these are
- # not fatal.
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows macro redefinitions])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#define testmacro foo
-#define testmacro bar]],
- [[ exit(0); ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- CC="`echo $CC | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
- LD="`echo $LD | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
- CFLAGS="`echo $CFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
- CPPFLAGS="`echo $CPPFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
- ]
- )
-
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)])
- if (test -z "$blibpath"); then
- blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib"
- fi
- saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
- if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then
- flags="-Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, -blibpath:"
- else
- flags="-blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath,"
- fi
- for tryflags in $flags ;do
- if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $tryflags$blibpath"
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[]])],
- [blibflags=$tryflags], [])
- fi
- done
- if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
- AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
- AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must be able to specify blibpath on AIX - check config.log])
- else
- AC_MSG_RESULT([$blibflags])
- fi
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
- dnl Check for authenticate. Might be in libs.a on older AIXes
- AC_CHECK_FUNC([authenticate], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE], [1],
- [Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function])],
- [AC_CHECK_LIB([s], [authenticate],
- [ AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE])
- LIBS="$LIBS -ls"
- ])
- ])
- dnl Check for various auth function declarations in headers.
- AC_CHECK_DECLS([authenticate, loginrestrictions, loginsuccess,
- passwdexpired, setauthdb], , , [#include <usersec.h>])
- dnl Check if loginfailed is declared and takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2)
- AC_CHECK_DECLS([loginfailed],
- [AC_MSG_CHECKING([if loginfailed takes 4 arguments])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <usersec.h> ]],
- [[ (void)loginfailed("user","host","tty",0); ]])],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG], [1],
- [Define if your AIX loginfailed() function
- takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2)])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- ])],
- [],
- [#include <usersec.h>]
- )
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getgrset setauthdb])
- AC_CHECK_DECL([F_CLOSEM],
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM], [1], [Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom]),
- [],
- [ #include <limits.h>
- #include <fcntl.h> ]
- )
- check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo=1
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_REALPATH], [1], [Define if you have a broken realpath.])
- AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID], [1],
- [Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID], [1], [Define if your setreuid() is broken])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID], [1], [Define if your setregid() is broken])
- dnl AIX handles lastlog as part of its login message
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG], [1], [Define if you don't want to use lastlog])
- AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX], [1],
- [Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work])
- AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV],
- [Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is
- supported by bsd-setproctitle.c])
- AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1],
- [AIX 5.2 and 5.3 (and presumably newer) require this])
- AC_DEFINE([PTY_ZEROREAD], [1], [read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd])
- AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)])
- ;;
-*-*-android*)
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmp])
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmp])
- ;;
-*-*-cygwin*)
- check_for_libcrypt_later=1
- LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textreadmode.o"
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CYGWIN], [1], [Define if you are on Cygwin])
- AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES], [1], [Use PIPES instead of a socketpair()])
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW], [1],
- [Define if you want to disable shadow passwords])
- AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS], [1],
- [Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system])
- AC_DEFINE([NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT], [1],
- [Define if the concept of ports only accessible to
- superusers isn't known])
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING], [1],
- [Define if your platform needs to skip post auth
- file descriptor passing])
- AC_DEFINE([SSH_IOBUFSZ], [65535], [Windows is sensitive to read buffer size])
- AC_DEFINE([FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH], [1], [File names may not contain backslash characters])
- # Cygwin defines optargs, optargs as declspec(dllimport) for historical
- # reasons which cause compile warnings, so we disable those warnings.
- OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wno-attributes])
- ;;
-*-*-dgux*)
- AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN], [1],
- [Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting])
- AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
- ;;
-*-*-darwin*)
- use_pie=auto
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have working getaddrinfo])
- AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include <mach-o/dyld.h>
-main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
- exit(0);
- else
- exit(1);
-}
- ]])],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([working])],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([buggy])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [1],
- [getaddrinfo is broken (if present)])
- ],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([assume it is working])])
- AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [OS X glob does not do what we expect])
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([BIND_8_COMPAT], [1],
- [Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname])
- AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way])
- AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1],
- [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
- AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
- [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
- m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
- AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
- AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
- [#include <bsm/audit.h>]
- AC_DEFINE([LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE], [1],
- [Define if pututxline updates lastlog too])
- )
- AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV],
- [Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is
- supported by bsd-setproctitle.c])
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS([sandbox_init])
- AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sandbox.h])
- ;;
-*-*-dragonfly*)
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcrypt"
- TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
- ;;
-*-*-haiku*)
- LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd "
- AC_CHECK_LIB([network], [socket])
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T])
- MANTYPE=man
- ;;
-*-*-hpux*)
- # first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1"
- IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
- AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
- AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT], [1],
- [Define if your login program cannot handle end of options ("--")])
- AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX])
- AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*"],
- [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
- AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_PSTAT])
- AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)])
- maildir="/var/mail"
- LIBS="$LIBS -lsec"
- AC_CHECK_LIB([xnet], [t_error], ,
- [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***])])
-
- # next, we define all of the options specific to major releases
- case "$host" in
- *-*-hpux10*)
- if test -z "$GCC"; then
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae"
- fi
- ;;
- *-*-hpux11*)
- AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE], [1],
- [Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which
- passes pam_messages to the conversation function
- with an extra level of indirection])
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1],
- [Define if you don't want to use utmp])
- AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins])
- check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1
- check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1
- ;;
- esac
-
- # lastly, we define options specific to minor releases
- case "$host" in
- *-*-hpux10.26)
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE], [1],
- [Define if you have SecureWare-based
- protected password database])
- disable_ptmx_check=yes
- LIBS="$LIBS -lsecpw"
- ;;
- esac
- ;;
-*-*-irix5*)
- PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA], [1],
- [Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted
- (e.g. Irix gcc issue)])
- AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
- AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY], [1],
- [Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your
- ttyname in [uw]tmp])
- AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
- ;;
-*-*-irix6*)
- PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
- AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_ARRAY], [1],
- [Define if you have/want arrays
- (cluster-wide session managment, not C arrays)])
- AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_PROJECT], [1],
- [Define if you want IRIX project management])
- AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_AUDIT], [1],
- [Define if you want IRIX audit trails])
- AC_CHECK_FUNC([jlimit_startjob], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_JOBS], [1],
- [Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs])])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA])
- AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX], [1], [updwtmpx is broken (if present)])
- AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY])
- AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
- ;;
-*-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu)
- check_for_libcrypt_later=1
- AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE])
- AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"])
- AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV])
- AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts])
- AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins])
- ;;
-*-*-linux*)
- no_dev_ptmx=1
- use_pie=auto
- check_for_libcrypt_later=1
- check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
- AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1],
- [Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY])
- AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"],
- [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
- AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV])
- AC_DEFINE([LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO], [EPERM],
- [Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported"
- if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP.])
- AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts])
- AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP])
- AC_DEFINE([LINUX_OOM_ADJUST], [1], [Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer])
- inet6_default_4in6=yes
- case `uname -r` in
- 1.*|2.0.*)
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE], [1],
- [Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly])
- ;;
- esac
- # tun(4) forwarding compat code
- AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/if_tun.h])
- if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_LINUX], [1],
- [Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way])
- AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1],
- [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
- AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
- [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
- fi
- AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/seccomp.h linux/filter.h linux/audit.h], [],
- [], [#include <linux/types.h>])
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS([prctl])
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for seccomp architecture])
- seccomp_audit_arch=
- case "$host" in
- x86_64-*)
- seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
- ;;
- i*86-*)
- seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386
- ;;
- arm*-*)
- seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
- ;;
- esac
- if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then
- AC_MSG_RESULT(["$seccomp_audit_arch"])
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch],
- [Specify the system call convention in use])
- else
- AC_MSG_RESULT([architecture not supported])
- fi
- ;;
-mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
- AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP], [1], [Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty])
- SONY=1
- ;;
-*-*-netbsd*)
- check_for_libcrypt_before=1
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- need_dash_r=1
- fi
- AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way])
- AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], ,
- AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support]))
- AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
- [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
- TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1],
- [NetBSD strnvis argument order is swapped compared to OpenBSD])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON], [1],
- [NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons against it])
- ;;
-*-*-freebsd*)
- check_for_libcrypt_later=1
- AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["*LOCKED*"], [Account locked with pw(1)])
- AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way])
- AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], ,
- AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support]))
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [FreeBSD glob does not do what we need])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1],
- [FreeBSD strnvis argument order is swapped compared to OpenBSD])
- TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
- # Preauth crypto occasionally uses file descriptors for crypto offload
- # and will crash if they cannot be opened.
- AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE], [1],
- [define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things])
- ;;
-*-*-bsdi*)
- AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
- ;;
-*-next-*)
- conf_lastlog_location="/usr/adm/lastlog"
- conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
- conf_wtmp_location=/usr/adm/wtmp
- maildir=/usr/spool/mail
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NEXT], [1], [Define if you are on NeXT])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_REALPATH])
- AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS], [1], [Needed for NeXT])
- ;;
-*-*-openbsd*)
- use_pie=auto
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel])
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has bounded])
- AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_OPENBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way])
- AC_DEFINE([SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND], [1],
- [syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler])
- TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
- ;;
-*-*-solaris*)
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- need_dash_r=1
- fi
- AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE])
- AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX])
- AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM], [1],
- [Some versions of /bin/login need the TERM supplied
- on the commandline])
- AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE])
- AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1],
- [Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set
- to the unpriv'ed user])
- AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
- # Pushing STREAMS modules will cause sshd to acquire a controlling tty.
- AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY], [1],
- [Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY
- after setsid()])
- AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd
- in case the name is longer than 8 chars])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON], [1], [tcgetattr with ICANON may hang])
- external_path_file=/etc/default/login
- # hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions)
- conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog"
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x])
- sol2ver=`echo "$host"| sed -e 's/.*[[0-9]]\.//'`
- if test "$sol2ver" -ge 8; then
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1],
- [Define if you don't want to use wtmp])
- else
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- fi
- AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-contracts],
- [ --with-solaris-contracts Enable Solaris process contracts (experimental)],
- [
- AC_CHECK_LIB([contract], [ct_tmpl_activate],
- [ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS], [1],
- [Define if you have Solaris process contracts])
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcontract"
- SPC_MSG="yes" ], )
- ],
- )
- AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-projects],
- [ --with-solaris-projects Enable Solaris projects (experimental)],
- [
- AC_CHECK_LIB([project], [setproject],
- [ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS], [1],
- [Define if you have Solaris projects])
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lproject"
- SP_MSG="yes" ], )
- ],
- )
- TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
- ;;
-*-*-sunos4*)
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4"
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getpwanam])
- AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE])
- conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
- conf_wtmp_location=/var/adm/wtmp
- conf_lastlog_location=/var/adm/lastlog
- AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
- ;;
-*-ncr-sysv*)
- LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"
- AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
- AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
- AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
- ;;
-*-sni-sysv*)
- # /usr/ucblib MUST NOT be searched on ReliantUNIX
- AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlsym], ,)
- # -lresolv needs to be at the end of LIBS or DNS lookups break
- AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [res_query], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" ])
- IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
- AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
- AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN])
- AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
- AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
- external_path_file=/etc/default/login
- # /usr/ucblib/libucb.a no longer needed on ReliantUNIX
- # Attention: always take care to bind libsocket and libnsl before libc,
- # otherwise you will find lots of "SIOCGPGRP errno 22" on syslog
- ;;
-# UnixWare 1.x, UnixWare 2.x, and others based on code from Univel.
-*-*-sysv4.2*)
- AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
- AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
- AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd])
- AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
- TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
- ;;
-# UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX 8
-*-*-sysv5*)
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -Dvsnprintf=_xvsnprintf -Dsnprintf=_xsnprintf"
- AC_DEFINE([UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS], [1], [Support passwords > 8 chars])
- AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
- AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
- AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME])
- TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
- case "$host" in
- *-*-sysv5SCO_SV*) # SCO OpenServer 6.x
- maildir=/var/spool/mail
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_LIBIAF], [1],
- [ia_uinfo routines not supported by OS yet])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX])
- AC_CHECK_LIB([prot], [getluid], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lprot"
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid], , , [-lprot])
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE])
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW])
- ], , )
- ;;
- *) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
- check_for_libcrypt_later=1
- ;;
- esac
- ;;
-*-*-sysv*)
- ;;
-# SCO UNIX and OEM versions of SCO UNIX
-*-*-sco3.2v4*)
- AC_MSG_ERROR("This Platform is no longer supported.")
- ;;
-# SCO OpenServer 5.x
-*-*-sco3.2v5*)
- if test -z "$GCC"; then
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -belf"
- fi
- LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm"
- no_dev_ptmx=1
- AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE])
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW])
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
- AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
- AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX])
- AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME])
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid])
- MANTYPE=man
- TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
- SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE=yes
- ;;
-*-*-unicosmk*)
- AC_DEFINE([NO_SSH_LASTLOG], [1],
- [Define if you don't want to use lastlog in session.c])
- AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
- AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
- LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lrsc -lshare -luex -lacm"
- MANTYPE=cat
- ;;
-*-*-unicosmp*)
- AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
- AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY])
- AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
- LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lacid -ldb"
- MANTYPE=cat
- ;;
-*-*-unicos*)
- AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
- AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
- AC_DEFINE([NO_SSH_LASTLOG])
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -Wl,-Dmsglevel=334:fatal"
- LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lrsc -lshare -luex -lacm"
- MANTYPE=cat
- ;;
-*-dec-osf*)
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Digital Unix SIA])
- no_osfsia=""
- AC_ARG_WITH([osfsia],
- [ --with-osfsia Enable Digital Unix SIA],
- [
- if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
- AC_MSG_RESULT([disabled])
- no_osfsia=1
- fi
- ],
- )
- if test -z "$no_osfsia" ; then
- if test -f /etc/sia/matrix.conf; then
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OSF_SIA], [1],
- [Define if you have Digital Unix Security
- Integration Architecture])
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN], [1],
- [Define if you don't want to use your
- system's login() call])
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
- LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud"
- SIA_MSG="yes"
- else
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR], ["Nologin"],
- [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
- fi
- fi
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
- AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON], [1], [Can't do comparisons on readv])
- ;;
-
-*-*-nto-qnx*)
- AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
- AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS])
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
- AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1], [QNX shadow support is broken])
- enable_etc_default_login=no # has incompatible /etc/default/login
- case "$host" in
- *-*-nto-qnx6*)
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
- ;;
- esac
- ;;
-
-*-*-ultrix*)
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETGROUPS], [1], [getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_MMAP], [1], [Ultrix mmap can't map files])
- AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP])
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H], [1], [Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix])
- ;;
-
-*-*-lynxos)
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D__NO_INCLUDE_WARN__"
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETVBUF], [1], [LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation])
- ;;
-esac
-
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([compiler and flags for sanity])
-AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]], [[ exit(0); ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- AC_MSG_ERROR([*** compiler cannot create working executables, check config.log ***])
- ],
- [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity]) ]
-)
-
-dnl Checks for header files.
-# Checks for libraries.
-AC_CHECK_FUNC([yp_match], , [AC_CHECK_LIB([nsl], [yp_match])])
-AC_CHECK_FUNC([setsockopt], , [AC_CHECK_LIB([socket], [setsockopt])])
-
-dnl IRIX and Solaris 2.5.1 have dirname() in libgen
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dirname], [AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h])] , [
- AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [dirname], [
- AC_CACHE_CHECK([for broken dirname],
- ac_cv_have_broken_dirname, [
- save_LIBS="$LIBS"
- LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
- AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
-#include <libgen.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- char *s, buf[32];
-
- strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32);
- s = dirname(buf);
- if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) {
- exit(1);
- } else {
- exit(0);
- }
-}
- ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ],
- [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes" ],
- [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ],
- )
- LIBS="$save_LIBS"
- ])
- if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then
- LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DIRNAME])
- AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h])
- fi
- ])
-])
-
-AC_CHECK_FUNC([getspnam], ,
- [AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [getspnam], [LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"])])
-AC_SEARCH_LIBS([basename], [gen], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BASENAME], [1],
- [Define if you have the basename function.])])
-
-dnl zlib is required
-AC_ARG_WITH([zlib],
- [ --with-zlib=PATH Use zlib in PATH],
- [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
- AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib is required ***])
- elif test "x$withval" != "xyes"; then
- if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
- else
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
- fi
- else
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
- else
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
- fi
- fi
- if test -d "$withval/include"; then
- CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
- else
- CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
- fi
- fi ]
-)
-
-AC_CHECK_HEADER([zlib.h], ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***])])
-AC_CHECK_LIB([z], [deflate], ,
- [
- saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
- saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
- save_LIBS="$LIBS"
- dnl Check default zlib install dir
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib -R/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
- else
- LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
- fi
- CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}"
- LIBS="$LIBS -lz"
- AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([deflate], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBZ])],
- [
- AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib missing - please install first or check config.log ***])
- ]
- )
- ]
-)
-
-AC_ARG_WITH([zlib-version-check],
- [ --without-zlib-version-check Disable zlib version check],
- [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
- zlib_check_nonfatal=1
- fi
- ]
-)
-
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([for possibly buggy zlib])
-AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <zlib.h>
- ]],
- [[
- int a=0, b=0, c=0, d=0, n, v;
- n = sscanf(ZLIB_VERSION, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &a, &b, &c, &d);
- if (n != 3 && n != 4)
- exit(1);
- v = a*1000000 + b*10000 + c*100 + d;
- fprintf(stderr, "found zlib version %s (%d)\n", ZLIB_VERSION, v);
-
- /* 1.1.4 is OK */
- if (a == 1 && b == 1 && c >= 4)
- exit(0);
-
- /* 1.2.3 and up are OK */
- if (v >= 1020300)
- exit(0);
-
- exit(2);
- ]])],
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no]),
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- if test -z "$zlib_check_nonfatal" ; then
- AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib too old - check config.log ***
-Your reported zlib version has known security problems. It's possible your
-vendor has fixed these problems without changing the version number. If you
-are sure this is the case, you can disable the check by running
-"./configure --without-zlib-version-check".
-If you are in doubt, upgrade zlib to version 1.2.3 or greater.
-See http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ for details.])
- else
- AC_MSG_WARN([zlib version may have security problems])
- fi
- ],
- [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking zlib version]) ]
-)
-
-dnl UnixWare 2.x
-AC_CHECK_FUNC([strcasecmp],
- [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [strcasecmp], [LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"]) ]
-)
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utimes],
- [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([c89], [utimes], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UTIMES])
- LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"]) ]
-)
-
-dnl Checks for libutil functions
-AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsd/libutil.h libutil.h])
-AC_SEARCH_LIBS([fmt_scaled], [util bsd])
-AC_SEARCH_LIBS([scan_scaled], [util bsd])
-AC_SEARCH_LIBS([login], [util bsd])
-AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logout], [util bsd])
-AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logwtmp], [util bsd])
-AC_SEARCH_LIBS([openpty], [util bsd])
-AC_SEARCH_LIBS([updwtmp], [util bsd])
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([fmt_scaled scan_scaled login logout openpty updwtmp logwtmp])
-
-# On some platforms, inet_ntop may be found in libresolv or libnsl.
-AC_SEARCH_LIBS([inet_ntop], [resolv nsl])
-
-AC_FUNC_STRFTIME
-
-# Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support])
-AC_EGREP_CPP([FOUNDIT],
- [
- #include <glob.h>
- #ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC
- FOUNDIT
- #endif
- ],
- [
- AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC], [1],
- [Define if your system glob() function has
- the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension])
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- ]
-)
-
-# Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_matchc field in glob_t])
-AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <glob.h> ]],
- [[ glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1; ]])],
- [
- AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC], [1],
- [Define if your system glob() function has
- gl_matchc options in glob_t])
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- ], [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
-])
-
-# Check for g.gl_statv glob() extension
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob])
-AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <glob.h> ]], [[
-#ifndef GLOB_KEEPSTAT
-#error "glob does not support GLOB_KEEPSTAT extension"
-#endif
-glob_t g;
-g.gl_statv = NULL;
-]])],
- [
- AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV], [1],
- [Define if your system glob() function has
- gl_statv options in glob_t])
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- ], [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
-
-])
-
-AC_CHECK_DECLS([GLOB_NOMATCH], , , [#include <glob.h>])
-
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name])
-AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <dirent.h>]],
- [[
- struct dirent d;
- exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char));
- ]])],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME], [1],
- [Define if your struct dirent expects you to
- allocate extra space for d_name])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME])
- ]
-)
-
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([for /proc/pid/fd directory])
-if test -d "/proc/$$/fd" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PROC_PID], [1], [Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd])
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
-else
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
-fi
-
-# Check whether user wants S/Key support
-SKEY_MSG="no"
-AC_ARG_WITH([skey],
- [ --with-skey[[=PATH]] Enable S/Key support (optionally in PATH)],
- [
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
-
- if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
- fi
-
- AC_DEFINE([SKEY], [1], [Define if you want S/Key support])
- LIBS="-lskey $LIBS"
- SKEY_MSG="yes"
-
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for s/key support])
- AC_LINK_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <skey.h>
- ]], [[
- char *ff = skey_keyinfo(""); ff="";
- exit(0);
- ]])],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing s/key libraries.])
- ])
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if skeychallenge takes 4 arguments])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <skey.h>
- ]], [[
- (void)skeychallenge(NULL,"name","",0);
- ]])],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([SKEYCHALLENGE_4ARG], [1],
- [Define if your skeychallenge()
- function takes 4 arguments (NetBSD)])],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- ])
- fi
- ]
-)
-
-# Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support
-TCPW_MSG="no"
-AC_ARG_WITH([tcp-wrappers],
- [ --with-tcp-wrappers[[=PATH]] Enable tcpwrappers support (optionally in PATH)],
- [
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
- saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
- saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
- if test -n "${withval}" && \
- test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
- else
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
- fi
- else
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
- else
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
- fi
- fi
- if test -d "${withval}/include"; then
- CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
- else
- CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
- fi
- fi
- LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS"
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libwrap])
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <tcpd.h>
-int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0;
- ]], [[
- hosts_access(0);
- ]])], [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([LIBWRAP], [1],
- [Define if you want
- TCP Wrappers support])
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lwrap"
- TCPW_MSG="yes"
- ], [
- AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing])
-
- ])
- LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
- fi
- ]
-)
-
-# Check whether user wants to use ldns
-LDNS_MSG="no"
-AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
- [ --with-ldns[[=PATH]] Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)],
- [
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
-
- if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
- fi
-
- AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LDNS, 1, [Define if you want ldns support])
- LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
- LDNS_MSG="yes"
-
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ldns support])
- AC_LINK_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
-#include <ldns/ldns.h>
-int main() { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); status=LDNS_STATUS_OK; exit(0); }
- ]])
- ],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
- AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries.])
- ])
- fi
- ]
-)
-
-# Check whether user wants libedit support
-LIBEDIT_MSG="no"
-AC_ARG_WITH([libedit],
- [ --with-libedit[[=PATH]] Enable libedit support for sftp],
- [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
- if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit])
- if "$PKGCONFIG" libedit; then
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- use_pkgconfig_for_libedit=yes
- else
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- fi
- fi
- else
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
- else
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
- fi
- fi
- if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libedit" = "xyes"; then
- LIBEDIT=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libedit`
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libedit`"
- else
- LIBEDIT="-ledit -lcurses"
- fi
- OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBEDIT | sed 's/-ledit//'`
- AC_CHECK_LIB([edit], [el_init],
- [ AC_DEFINE([USE_LIBEDIT], [1], [Use libedit for sftp])
- LIBEDIT_MSG="yes"
- AC_SUBST([LIBEDIT])
- ],
- [ AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit not found]) ],
- [ $OTHERLIBS ]
- )
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if libedit version is compatible])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <histedit.h> ]],
- [[
- int i = H_SETSIZE;
- el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL);
- exit(0);
- ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit version is not compatible]) ]
- )
- fi ]
-)
-
-AUDIT_MODULE=none
-AC_ARG_WITH([audit],
- [ --with-audit=module Enable audit support (modules=debug,bsm,linux)],
- [
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for supported audit module])
- case "$withval" in
- bsm)
- AC_MSG_RESULT([bsm])
- AUDIT_MODULE=bsm
- dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions
- AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsm/audit.h], [],
- [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found])],
- [
-#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
-# include <time.h>
-#endif
- ]
-)
- AC_CHECK_LIB([bsm], [getaudit], [],
- [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required library not found])])
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit], [],
- [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required function not found])])
- # These are optional
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit_addr aug_get_machine])
- AC_DEFINE([USE_BSM_AUDIT], [1], [Use BSM audit module])
- if test "$sol2ver" -ge 11; then
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lscf"
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_BSM_API], [1],
- [The system has incomplete BSM API])
- fi
- ;;
- linux)
- AC_MSG_RESULT([linux])
- AUDIT_MODULE=linux
- dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions
- AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libaudit.h])
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit"
- AC_DEFINE([USE_LINUX_AUDIT], [1], [Use Linux audit module])
- ;;
- debug)
- AUDIT_MODULE=debug
- AC_MSG_RESULT([debug])
- AC_DEFINE([SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS], [1], [Use audit debugging module])
- ;;
- no)
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- ;;
- *)
- AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown audit module $withval])
- ;;
- esac ]
-)
-
-AC_ARG_WITH([pie],
- [ --with-pie Build Position Independent Executables if possible], [
- if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
- use_pie=no
- fi
- if test "x$withval" = "xyes"; then
- use_pie=yes
- fi
- ]
-)
-if test "x$use_pie" = "x"; then
- use_pie=no
-fi
-if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" != "x1" && test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
- # Turn off automatic PIE when toolchain hardening is off.
- use_pie=no
-fi
-if test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
- # Automatic PIE requires gcc >= 4.x
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gcc >= 4.x])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
-#if !defined(__GNUC__) || __GNUC__ < 4
-#error gcc is too old
-#endif
-]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- use_pie=no ]
-)
-fi
-if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then
- SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- SAVED_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
- OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fPIE])
- OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-pie])
- # We use both -fPIE and -pie or neither.
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported])
- if echo "x $CFLAGS" | grep ' -fPIE' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
- echo "x $LDFLAGS" | grep ' -pie' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- else
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS"
- LDFLAGS="$SAVED_LDFLAGS"
- fi
-fi
-
-dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
- Blowfish_initstate \
- Blowfish_expandstate \
- Blowfish_expand0state \
- Blowfish_stream2word \
- arc4random \
- arc4random_buf \
- arc4random_stir \
- arc4random_uniform \
- asprintf \
- b64_ntop \
- __b64_ntop \
- b64_pton \
- __b64_pton \
- bcopy \
- bcrypt_pbkdf \
- bindresvport_sa \
- blf_enc \
- cap_rights_limit \
- clock \
- closefrom \
- dirfd \
- endgrent \
- explicit_bzero \
- fchmod \
- fchown \
- freeaddrinfo \
- fstatfs \
- fstatvfs \
- futimes \
- getaddrinfo \
- getcwd \
- getgrouplist \
- getnameinfo \
- getopt \
- getpeereid \
- getpeerucred \
- getpgid \
- getpgrp \
- _getpty \
- getrlimit \
- getttyent \
- glob \
- group_from_gid \
- inet_aton \
- inet_ntoa \
- inet_ntop \
- innetgr \
- login_getcapbool \
- mblen \
- md5_crypt \
- memmove \
- mkdtemp \
- mmap \
- ngetaddrinfo \
- nsleep \
- ogetaddrinfo \
- openlog_r \
- poll \
- prctl \
- pstat \
- readpassphrase \
- realpath \
- recvmsg \
- rresvport_af \
- sendmsg \
- setdtablesize \
- setegid \
- setenv \
- seteuid \
- setgroupent \
- setgroups \
- setlinebuf \
- setlogin \
- setpassent\
- setpcred \
- setproctitle \
- setregid \
- setreuid \
- setrlimit \
- setsid \
- setvbuf \
- sigaction \
- sigvec \
- snprintf \
- socketpair \
- statfs \
- statvfs \
- strdup \
- strerror \
- strlcat \
- strlcpy \
- strmode \
- strnlen \
- strnvis \
- strptime \
- strtonum \
- strtoll \
- strtoul \
- strtoull \
- swap32 \
- sysconf \
- tcgetpgrp \
- timingsafe_bcmp \
- truncate \
- unsetenv \
- updwtmpx \
- user_from_uid \
- usleep \
- vasprintf \
- vhangup \
- vsnprintf \
- waitpid \
-])
-
-AC_LINK_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM(
- [[ #include <ctype.h> ]],
- [[ return (isblank('a')); ]])],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ISBLANK], [1], [Define if you have isblank(3C).])
-])
-
-# PKCS#11 support requires dlopen() and co
-AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl],
- [AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_PKCS11], [], [Enable for PKCS#11 support])]
-)
-
-# IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror()
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gai_strerror], [
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GAI_STRERROR])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-
-const char *gai_strerror(int);
- ]], [[
- char *str;
- str = gai_strerror(0);
- ]])], [
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO], [1],
- [Define if gai_strerror() returns const char *])], [])])
-
-AC_SEARCH_LIBS([nanosleep], [rt posix4], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NANOSLEEP], [1],
- [Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc])])
-
-AC_SEARCH_LIBS([clock_gettime], [rt],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME], [1], [Have clock_gettime])])
-
-dnl Make sure prototypes are defined for these before using them.
-AC_CHECK_DECL([getrusage], [AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getrusage])])
-AC_CHECK_DECL([strsep],
- [AC_CHECK_FUNCS([strsep])],
- [],
- [
-#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
-# include <string.h>
-#endif
- ])
-
-dnl tcsendbreak might be a macro
-AC_CHECK_DECL([tcsendbreak],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_TCSENDBREAK])],
- [AC_CHECK_FUNCS([tcsendbreak])],
- [#include <termios.h>]
-)
-
-AC_CHECK_DECLS([h_errno], , ,[#include <netdb.h>])
-
-AC_CHECK_DECLS([SHUT_RD], , ,
- [
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
- ])
-
-AC_CHECK_DECLS([O_NONBLOCK], , ,
- [
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
-# include <sys/stat.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
-# include <fcntl.h>
-#endif
- ])
-
-AC_CHECK_DECLS([writev], , , [
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
- ])
-
-AC_CHECK_DECLS([MAXSYMLINKS], , , [
-#include <sys/param.h>
- ])
-
-AC_CHECK_DECLS([offsetof], , , [
-#include <stddef.h>
- ])
-
-# extra bits for select(2)
-AC_CHECK_DECLS([howmany, NFDBITS], [], [], [[
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
-#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
-#include <sys/select.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-#include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
-#include <unistd.h>
-#endif
- ]])
-AC_CHECK_TYPES([fd_mask], [], [], [[
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
-#include <sys/select.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-#include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
-#include <unistd.h>
-#endif
- ]])
-
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresuid], [
- dnl Some platorms have setresuid that isn't implemented, test for this
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresuid seems to work])
- AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <errno.h>
- ]], [[
- errno=0;
- setresuid(0,0,0);
- if (errno==ENOSYS)
- exit(1);
- else
- exit(0);
- ]])],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
- [AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESUID], [1],
- [Define if your setresuid() is broken])
- AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])],
- [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])]
- )
-])
-
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresgid], [
- dnl Some platorms have setresgid that isn't implemented, test for this
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresgid seems to work])
- AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <errno.h>
- ]], [[
- errno=0;
- setresgid(0,0,0);
- if (errno==ENOSYS)
- exit(1);
- else
- exit(0);
- ]])],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
- [AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESGID], [1],
- [Define if your setresgid() is broken])
- AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])],
- [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])]
- )
-])
-
-dnl Checks for time functions
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gettimeofday time])
-dnl Checks for utmp functions
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutent getutent getutid getutline pututline setutent])
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utmpname])
-dnl Checks for utmpx functions
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline getutxuser pututxline])
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setutxdb setutxent utmpxname])
-dnl Checks for lastlog functions
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getlastlogxbyname])
-
-AC_CHECK_FUNC([daemon],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON], [1], [Define if your libraries define daemon()])],
- [AC_CHECK_LIB([bsd], [daemon],
- [LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON])])]
-)
-
-AC_CHECK_FUNC([getpagesize],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE], [1],
- [Define if your libraries define getpagesize()])],
- [AC_CHECK_LIB([ucb], [getpagesize],
- [LIBS="$LIBS -lucb"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE])])]
-)
-
-# Check for broken snprintf
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings])
- AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
- [[
- char b[5];
- snprintf(b,5,"123456789");
- exit(b[4]!='\0');
- ]])],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1],
- [Define if your snprintf is busted])
- AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor])
- ],
- [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ]
- )
-fi
-
-# If we don't have a working asprintf, then we strongly depend on vsnprintf
-# returning the right thing on overflow: the number of characters it tried to
-# create (as per SUSv3)
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_asprintf" != "xyes" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow])
- AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-int x_snprintf(char *str,size_t count,const char *fmt,...)
-{
- size_t ret; va_list ap;
- va_start(ap, fmt); ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap); va_end(ap);
- return ret;
-}
- ]], [[
- char x[1];
- exit(x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) == 11 ? 0 : 1);
- ]])],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1],
- [Define if your snprintf is busted])
- AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor])
- ],
- [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()]) ]
- )
-fi
-
-# On systems where [v]snprintf is broken, but is declared in stdio,
-# check that the fmt argument is const char * or just char *.
-# This is only useful for when BROKEN_SNPRINTF
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt])
-AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <stdio.h>
-int snprintf(char *a, size_t b, const char *c, ...) { return 0; }
- ]], [[
- snprintf(0, 0, 0);
- ]])],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [const],
- [Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt])],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [/* not const */])])
-
-# Check for missing getpeereid (or equiv) support
-NO_PEERCHECK=""
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeereid" != "xyes" -a "x$ac_cv_func_getpeerucred" != "xyes"; then
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>]], [[int i = SO_PEERCRED;]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SO_PEERCRED], [1], [Have PEERCRED socket option])
- ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- NO_PEERCHECK=1
- ])
-fi
-
-dnl see whether mkstemp() requires XXXXXX
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_mkdtemp" = "xyes" ; then
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([for (overly) strict mkstemp])
-AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <stdlib.h>
- ]], [[
- char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test";
- if (mkstemp(template) == -1)
- exit(1);
- unlink(template);
- exit(0);
- ]])],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP], [1], [Silly mkstemp()])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP])
- ]
-)
-fi
-
-dnl make sure that openpty does not reacquire controlling terminal
-if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if openpty correctly handles controlling tty])
- AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <sys/fcntl.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
- ]], [[
- pid_t pid;
- int fd, ptyfd, ttyfd, status;
-
- pid = fork();
- if (pid < 0) { /* failed */
- exit(1);
- } else if (pid > 0) { /* parent */
- waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
- if (WIFEXITED(status))
- exit(WEXITSTATUS(status));
- else
- exit(2);
- } else { /* child */
- close(0); close(1); close(2);
- setsid();
- openpty(&ptyfd, &ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
- if (fd >= 0)
- exit(3); /* Acquired ctty: broken */
- else
- exit(0); /* Did not acquire ctty: OK */
- }
- ]])],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes])
- ]
- )
-fi
-
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
- test "x$check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work])
- AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-
-#define TEST_PORT "2222"
- ]], [[
- int err, sock;
- struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
- char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
-
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
-
- err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
- if (err != 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
- exit(1);
- }
-
- for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
- continue;
-
- err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
- sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
- NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
-
- if (err != 0) {
- if (err == EAI_SYSTEM)
- perror("getnameinfo EAI_SYSTEM");
- else
- fprintf(stderr, "getnameinfo failed: %s\n",
- gai_strerror(err));
- exit(2);
- }
-
- sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
- if (sock < 0)
- perror("socket");
- if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
- if (errno == EBADF)
- exit(3);
- }
- }
- exit(0);
- ]])],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes])
- ]
- )
-fi
-
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
- test "x$check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work])
- AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-
-#define TEST_PORT "2222"
- ]], [[
- int err, sock;
- struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
- char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
-
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
-
- err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
- if (err != 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
- exit(1);
- }
-
- for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
- continue;
-
- err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
- sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
- NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
-
- if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET && err != 0) {
- perror("getnameinfo");
- exit(2);
- }
- }
- exit(0);
- ]])],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK], [1],
- [Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails
- for the all-zeros IPv6 address])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming no])
- ]
- )
-fi
-
-if test "x$check_for_conflicting_getspnam" = "x1"; then
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <shadow.h> ]],
- [[ exit(0); ]])],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS], [1],
- [Conflicting defs for getspnam])
- ]
- )
-fi
-
-AC_FUNC_GETPGRP
-
-# Search for OpenSSL
-saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
-saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
-AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-dir],
- [ --with-ssl-dir=PATH Specify path to OpenSSL installation ],
- [
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- case "$withval" in
- # Relative paths
- ./*|../*) withval="`pwd`/$withval"
- esac
- if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
- else
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
- fi
- elif test -d "$withval/lib64"; then
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 -R${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
- else
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
- fi
- else
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
- else
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
- fi
- fi
- if test -d "$withval/include"; then
- CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
- else
- CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
- fi
- fi
- ]
-)
-LIBS="-lcrypto $LIBS"
-AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([RAND_add], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OPENSSL], [1],
- [Define if your ssl headers are included
- with #include <openssl/header.h>])],
- [
- dnl Check default openssl install dir
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/ssl/lib -R/usr/local/ssl/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
- else
- LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/ssl/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
- fi
- CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/ssl/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}"
- AC_CHECK_HEADER([openssl/opensslv.h], ,
- [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** OpenSSL headers missing - please install first or check config.log ***])])
- AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([RAND_add], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OPENSSL])],
- [
- AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Can't find recent OpenSSL libcrypto (see config.log for details) ***])
- ]
- )
- ]
-)
-
-# Determine OpenSSL header version
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL header version])
-AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-#define DATA "conftest.sslincver"
- ]], [[
- FILE *fd;
- int rc;
-
- fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
- if(fd == NULL)
- exit(1);
-
- if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%x (%s)\n", OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) <0)
- exit(1);
-
- exit(0);
- ]])],
- [
- ssl_header_ver=`cat conftest.sslincver`
- AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_header_ver])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
- AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL version header not found.])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
- ]
-)
-
-# Determine OpenSSL library version
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL library version])
-AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#define DATA "conftest.ssllibver"
- ]], [[
- FILE *fd;
- int rc;
-
- fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
- if(fd == NULL)
- exit(1);
-
- if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%x (%s)\n", SSLeay(), SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION))) <0)
- exit(1);
-
- exit(0);
- ]])],
- [
- ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver`
- AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_library_ver])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
- AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL library not found.])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
- ]
-)
-
-AC_ARG_WITH([openssl-header-check],
- [ --without-openssl-header-check Disable OpenSSL version consistency check],
- [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
- openssl_check_nonfatal=1
- fi
- ]
-)
-
-# Sanity check OpenSSL headers
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's headers match the library])
-AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
- ]], [[
- exit(SSLeay() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1);
- ]])],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- if test "x$openssl_check_nonfatal" = "x"; then
- AC_MSG_ERROR([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
-library. Check config.log for details.
-If you are sure your installation is consistent, you can disable the check
-by running "./configure --without-openssl-header-check".
-Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.
-])
- else
- AC_MSG_WARN([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
-library. Check config.log for details.
-Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.])
- fi
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
- ]
-)
-
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL functions will link])
-AC_LINK_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <openssl/evp.h> ]],
- [[ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ]])],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
- LIBS="$LIBS -ldl"
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl])
- AC_LINK_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <openssl/evp.h> ]],
- [[ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ]])],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
- ]
- )
- ]
-)
-
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
- BN_is_prime_ex \
- DSA_generate_parameters_ex \
- EVP_DigestInit_ex \
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex \
- EVP_MD_CTX_init \
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup \
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex \
- HMAC_CTX_init \
- RSA_generate_key_ex \
- RSA_get_default_method \
-])
-
-AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-engine],
- [ --with-ssl-engine Enable OpenSSL (hardware) ENGINE support ],
- [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for OpenSSL ENGINE support])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
- ]], [[
- ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
- ENGINE_register_all_complete();
- ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE], [1],
- [Enable OpenSSL engine support])
- ], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL ENGINE support not found])
- ])
- fi ]
-)
-
-# Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support])
-AC_LINK_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
- ]], [[
- exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);
- ]])],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES], [1],
- [libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions])
- ]
-)
-
-# Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*ctr
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP])
-AC_LINK_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
- ]], [[
- exit(EVP_aes_128_ctr() == NULL ||
- EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL ||
- EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);
- ]])],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR], [1],
- [libcrypto has EVP AES CTR])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- ]
-)
-
-# Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*gcm
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP])
-AC_LINK_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
- ]], [[
- exit(EVP_aes_128_gcm() == NULL ||
- EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL ||
- EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED == 0 ||
- EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN == 0 ||
- EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG == 0 ||
- EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG == 0 ||
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(NULL, 0, 0, NULL) == 0);
- ]])],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM], [1],
- [libcrypto has EVP AES GCM])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_cipers \
- aes128-gcm at openssh.com aes256-gcm at openssh.com"
- ]
-)
-
-AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl])])
-
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int])
-AC_LINK_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
- ]], [[
- if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0))
- exit(0);
- ]])],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID], [1],
- [Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void])
- ]
-)
-
-# Some systems want crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the version in OpenSSL,
-# because the system crypt() is more featureful.
-if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_before" = "x1"; then
- AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt])
-fi
-
-# Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the
-# version in OpenSSL.
-if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then
- AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt], [LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"])
-fi
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([crypt DES_crypt])
-
-# Search for SHA256 support in libc and/or OpenSSL
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([SHA256_Update EVP_sha256], ,
- [unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
- hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512 \
- diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 \
- hmac-sha2-256-etm at openssh.com hmac-sha2-512-etm at openssh.com"
- ]
-)
-
-# Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1])
-AC_LINK_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */
-# error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code"
-#endif
- ]], [[
- EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
- const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */
- ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- enable_nistp256=1 ],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
-)
-
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1])
-AC_LINK_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */
-# error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code"
-#endif
- ]], [[
- EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1);
- const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */
- ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- enable_nistp384=1 ],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
-)
-
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1])
-AC_LINK_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */
-# error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code"
-#endif
- ]], [[
- EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
- const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
- ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional])
- AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
- ]],[[
- EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
- const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
- exit(e == NULL || m == NULL);
- ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- enable_nistp521=1 ],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ],
- [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross-compiling: assuming yes])
- enable_nistp521=1 ]
- )],
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
-)
-
-COMMENT_OUT_ECC="#no ecc#"
-TEST_SSH_ECC=no
-
-if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1 || test x$enable_nistp384 = x1 || \
- test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
- AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC, [1], [OpenSSL has ECC])
-fi
-if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1; then
- AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256], [1],
- [libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1])
- TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
- COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
-else
- unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 \
- ecdh-sha2-nistp256 ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
-fi
-if test x$enable_nistp384 = x1; then
- AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp384r1])
- TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
- COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
-else
- unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \
- ecdh-sha2-nistp384 ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
-fi
-if test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
- AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp521r1])
- TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
- COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
-else
- unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms ecdh-sha2-nistp521 \
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
-fi
-
-AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_ECC])
-AC_SUBST([COMMENT_OUT_ECC])
-
-saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
-AC_CHECK_LIB([iaf], [ia_openinfo], [
- LIBS="$LIBS -liaf"
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS([set_id], [SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -liaf"
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBIAF], [1],
- [Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id])
- ])
-])
-LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
-
-### Configure cryptographic random number support
-
-# Check wheter OpenSSL seeds itself
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded])
-AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
- ]], [[
- exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1);
- ]])],
- [
- OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])
- # This is safe, since we will fatal() at runtime if
- # OpenSSL is not seeded correctly.
- OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
- ]
-)
-
-# PRNGD TCP socket
-AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-port],
- [ --with-prngd-port=PORT read entropy from PRNGD/EGD TCP localhost:PORT],
- [
- case "$withval" in
- no)
- withval=""
- ;;
- [[0-9]]*)
- ;;
- *)
- AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify a numeric port number for --with-prngd-port])
- ;;
- esac
- if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
- PRNGD_PORT="$withval"
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_PORT], [$PRNGD_PORT],
- [Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket])
- fi
- ]
-)
-
-# PRNGD Unix domain socket
-AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-socket],
- [ --with-prngd-socket=FILE read entropy from PRNGD/EGD socket FILE (default=/var/run/egd-pool)],
- [
- case "$withval" in
- yes)
- withval="/var/run/egd-pool"
- ;;
- no)
- withval=""
- ;;
- /*)
- ;;
- *)
- AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify an absolute path to the entropy socket])
- ;;
- esac
-
- if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
- if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
- AC_MSG_ERROR([You may not specify both a PRNGD/EGD port and socket])
- fi
- if test ! -r "$withval" ; then
- AC_MSG_WARN([Entropy socket is not readable])
- fi
- PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval"
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"],
- [Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket])
- fi
- ],
- [
- # Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already
- if test "x$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" != "xyes" ; then
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for PRNGD/EGD socket])
- # Insert other locations here
- for sock in /var/run/egd-pool /dev/egd-pool /etc/entropy; do
- if test -r $sock && $TEST_MINUS_S_SH -c "test -S $sock -o -p $sock" ; then
- PRNGD_SOCKET="$sock"
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"])
- break;
- fi
- done
- if test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
- AC_MSG_RESULT([$PRNGD_SOCKET])
- else
- AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
- fi
- fi
- ]
-)
-
-# Which randomness source do we use?
-if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
- RAND_MSG="PRNGd port $PRNGD_PORT"
-elif test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
- RAND_MSG="PRNGd socket $PRNGD_SOCKET"
-elif test ! -z "$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY], [1],
- [Define if you want OpenSSL's internally seeded PRNG only])
- RAND_MSG="OpenSSL internal ONLY"
-else
- AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSH has no source of random numbers. Please configure OpenSSL with an entropy source or re-run configure using one of the --with-prngd-port or --with-prngd-socket options])
-fi
-
-# Check for PAM libs
-PAM_MSG="no"
-AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
- [ --with-pam Enable PAM support ],
- [
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then
- AC_MSG_ERROR([PAM headers not found])
- fi
-
- saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
- AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlopen], , )
- AC_CHECK_LIB([pam], [pam_set_item], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libpam missing])])
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_getenvlist])
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_putenv])
- LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
-
- PAM_MSG="yes"
-
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
- AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
- [Define if you want to enable PAM support])
-
- if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then
- case "$LIBS" in
- *-ldl*)
- # libdl already in LIBS
- ;;
- *)
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
- ;;
- esac
- fi
- fi
- ]
-)
-
-# Check for older PAM
-if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
- # Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM)
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pam_strerror takes only one argument])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
-#include <security/pam_appl.h>
-#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
-#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
-#endif
- ]], [[
-(void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1);
- ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])], [
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OLD_PAM], [1],
- [Define if you have an old version of PAM
- which takes only one argument to pam_strerror])
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- PAM_MSG="yes (old library)"
-
- ])
-fi
-
-SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd
-AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-user],
- [ --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation],
- [
- if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
- test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=$withval
- fi
- ]
-)
-AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], ["$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"],
- [non-privileged user for privilege separation])
-AC_SUBST([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER])
-
-if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then
-AC_CHECK_DECL([SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER], [have_seccomp_filter=1], , [
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <linux/seccomp.h>
-])
-fi
-if test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" ; then
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([kernel for seccomp_filter support])
-AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <elf.h>
- #include <linux/audit.h>
- #include <linux/seccomp.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <sys/prctl.h>
- ]],
- [[ int i = $seccomp_audit_arch;
- errno = 0;
- prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0);
- exit(errno == EFAULT ? 0 : 1); ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- # Disable seccomp filter as a target
- have_seccomp_filter=0
- ]
-)
-fi
-
-# Decide which sandbox style to use
-sandbox_arg=""
-AC_ARG_WITH([sandbox],
- [ --with-sandbox=style Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, darwin, rlimit, systrace, seccomp_filter, capsicum)],
- [
- if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
- sandbox_arg=""
- else
- sandbox_arg="$withval"
- fi
- ]
-)
-
-# Some platforms (seems to be the ones that have a kernel poll(2)-type
-# function with which they implement select(2)) use an extra file descriptor
-# when calling select(2), which means we can't use the rlimit sandbox.
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([if select works with descriptor rlimit])
-AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-#include <sys/resource.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
-# include <sys/select.h>
-#endif
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
- ]],[[
- struct rlimit rl_zero;
- int fd, r;
- fd_set fds;
- struct timeval tv;
-
- fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
- FD_ZERO(&fds);
- FD_SET(fd, &fds);
- rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
- setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero);
- setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
- tv.tv_sec = 1;
- tv.tv_usec = 0;
- r = select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
- exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
- ]])],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- select_works_with_rlimit=yes],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- select_works_with_rlimit=no],
- [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])]
-)
-
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works])
-AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-#include <sys/resource.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
- ]],[[
- struct rlimit rl_zero;
- int fd, r;
- fd_set fds;
-
- rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
- r = setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
- exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
- ]])],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no],
- [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])]
-)
-
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works])
-AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/resource.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
- ]],[[
- struct rlimit rl_zero;
-
- rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
- exit(setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) != 0);
- ]])],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- AC_DEFINE(SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE, 1,
- [setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works])],
- [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])]
-)
-
-if test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsystrace" || \
- ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" = "x1" ) ; then
- test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" != "x1" && \
- AC_MSG_ERROR([systrace sandbox requires systrace headers and SYSTR_POLICY_KILL support])
- SANDBOX_STYLE="systrace"
- AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SYSTRACE], [1], [Sandbox using systrace(4)])
-elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" || \
- ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = "xyes" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = "xyes") ; then
- test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" != "xyes" -o \
- "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" != "xyes" && \
- AC_MSG_ERROR([Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function])
- SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin"
- AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_DARWIN], [1], [Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3)])
-elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \
- ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
- test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_elf_h" = "xyes" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" = "xyes" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" = "xyes" && \
- test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" && \
- test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = "xyes" ) ; then
- test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" = "x" && \
- AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox not supported on $host])
- test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" != "x1" && \
- AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS])
- test "x$have_seccomp_filter" != "x1" && \
- AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires seccomp headers])
- test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" != "xyes" && \
- AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function])
- SANDBOX_STYLE="seccomp_filter"
- AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER], [1], [Sandbox using seccomp filter])
-elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \
- ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capability_h" = "xyes" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then
- test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capability_h" != "xyes" && \
- AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires sys/capability.h header])
- test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \
- AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function])
- SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum"
- AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_CAPSICUM], [1], [Sandbox using capsicum])
-elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \
- ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \
- test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \
- test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then
- test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \
- AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires setrlimit function])
- test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" != "xyes" && \
- AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires select to work with rlimit])
- SANDBOX_STYLE="rlimit"
- AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_RLIMIT], [1], [Sandbox using setrlimit(2)])
-elif test -z "$sandbox_arg" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xno" || \
- test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnone" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnull" ; then
- SANDBOX_STYLE="none"
- AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_NULL], [1], [no privsep sandboxing])
-else
- AC_MSG_ERROR([unsupported --with-sandbox])
-fi
-
-# Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right.
-if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then
- LIBS="$LIBS -liberty";
-fi
-
-# Check for long long datatypes
-AC_CHECK_TYPES([long long, unsigned long long, long double])
-
-# Check datatype sizes
-AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([short int], [2])
-AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([int], [4])
-AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long int], [4])
-AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long long int], [8])
-
-# Sanity check long long for some platforms (AIX)
-if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x4" ; then
- ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0
-fi
-
-# compute LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX if we don't know them.
-if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for max value of long long])
- AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <stdio.h>
-/* Why is this so damn hard? */
-#ifdef __GNUC__
-# undef __GNUC__
-#endif
-#define __USE_ISOC99
-#include <limits.h>
-#define DATA "conftest.llminmax"
-#define my_abs(a) ((a) < 0 ? ((a) * -1) : (a))
-
-/*
- * printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so
- * we do this the hard way.
- */
-static int
-fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n)
-{
- unsigned int i;
- int l[sizeof(long long) * 8];
-
- if (n < 0)
- if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0)
- return -1;
- for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) {
- l[i] = my_abs(n % 10);
- n /= 10;
- }
- do {
- if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0)
- return -1;
- } while (i != 0);
- if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0)
- return -1;
- return 0;
-}
- ]], [[
- FILE *f;
- long long i, llmin, llmax = 0;
-
- if((f = fopen(DATA,"w")) == NULL)
- exit(1);
-
-#if defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LLONG_MAX)
- fprintf(stderr, "Using system header for LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
- llmin = LLONG_MIN;
- llmax = LLONG_MAX;
-#else
- fprintf(stderr, "Calculating LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
- /* This will work on one's complement and two's complement */
- for (i = 1; i > llmax; i <<= 1, i++)
- llmax = i;
- llmin = llmax + 1LL; /* wrap */
-#endif
-
- /* Sanity check */
- if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax
- || llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0
- || llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) {
- fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n");
- exit(2);
- }
-
- if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0)
- exit(3);
- if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0)
- exit(4);
- if (fclose(f) < 0)
- exit(5);
- exit(0);
- ]])],
- [
- llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax`
- llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax`
-
- AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_max])
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MAX], [${llong_max}LL],
- [max value of long long calculated by configure])
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for min value of long long])
- AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_min])
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MIN], [${llong_min}LL],
- [min value of long long calculated by configure])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
- ]
- )
-fi
-
-
-# More checks for data types
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int type], ac_cv_have_u_int, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
- [[ u_int a; a = 1;]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_u_int="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT], [1], [define if you have u_int data type])
- have_u_int=1
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([for intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_intxx_t, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
- [[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have intxx_t data type])
- have_intxx_t=1
-fi
-
-if (test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
-then
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t types in stdint.h])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdint.h> ]],
- [[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
- [
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T])
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- ])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([for int64_t type], ac_cv_have_int64_t, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
-# include <stdint.h>
-#endif
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
-# include <sys/bitypes.h>
-#endif
- ]], [[
-int64_t a; a = 1;
- ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have int64_t data type])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
- [[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have u_intxx_t data type])
- have_u_intxx_t=1
-fi
-
-if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/socket.h> ]],
- [[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
- [
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T])
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- ])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int64_t types], ac_cv_have_u_int64_t, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
- [[ u_int64_t a; a = 1;]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have u_int64_t data type])
- have_u_int64_t=1
-fi
-
-if (test -z "$have_u_int64_t" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
-then
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/bitypes.h> ]],
- [[ u_int64_t a; a = 1]])],
- [
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T])
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- ])
-fi
-
-if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
- AC_CACHE_CHECK([for uintXX_t types], ac_cv_have_uintxx_t, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
- ]], [[
- uint8_t a;
- uint16_t b;
- uint32_t c;
- a = b = c = 1;
- ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="no"
- ])
- ])
- if test "x$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T], [1],
- [define if you have uintxx_t data type])
- fi
-fi
-
-if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
-then
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in stdint.h])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdint.h> ]],
- [[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
- [
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T])
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- ])
-fi
-
-if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_inttypes_h" = "xyes")
-then
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <inttypes.h> ]],
- [[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
- [
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T])
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- ])
-fi
-
-if (test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" || test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
-then
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/bitypes.h>
- ]], [[
- int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c;
- u_int8_t e; u_int16_t f; u_int32_t g;
- a = b = c = e = f = g = 1;
- ]])],
- [
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T])
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T])
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- ])
-fi
-
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_char], ac_cv_have_u_char, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
- [[ u_char foo; foo = 125; ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_u_char="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_char="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_char" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_CHAR], [1], [define if you have u_char data type])
-fi
-
-AC_CHECK_TYPES([intmax_t, uintmax_t], , , [
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
-])
-
-TYPE_SOCKLEN_T
-
-AC_CHECK_TYPES([sig_atomic_t], , , [#include <signal.h>])
-AC_CHECK_TYPES([fsblkcnt_t, fsfilcnt_t], , , [
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
-#include <sys/bitypes.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
-#include <sys/statfs.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
-#include <sys/statvfs.h>
-#endif
-])
-
-AC_CHECK_TYPES([in_addr_t, in_port_t], , ,
-[#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>])
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([for size_t], ac_cv_have_size_t, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
- [[ size_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_size_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_size_t="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_size_t" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SIZE_T], [1], [define if you have size_t data type])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ssize_t], ac_cv_have_ssize_t, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
- [[ ssize_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SSIZE_T], [1], [define if you have ssize_t data type])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([for clock_t], ac_cv_have_clock_t, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <time.h> ]],
- [[ clock_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_clock_t" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_T], [1], [define if you have clock_t data type])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([for sa_family_t], ac_cv_have_sa_family_t, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
- ]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ],
- [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
- ]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ],
- [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no" ]
- )
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T], [1],
- [define if you have sa_family_t data type])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([for pid_t], ac_cv_have_pid_t, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
- [[ pid_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PID_T], [1], [define if you have pid_t data type])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([for mode_t], ac_cv_have_mode_t, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
- [[ mode_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_mode_t" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MODE_T], [1], [define if you have mode_t data type])
-fi
-
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
- ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="yes" ],
- [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE], [1],
- [define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_in6], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
- ]], [[ struct sockaddr_in6 s; s.sin6_family = 0; ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="yes" ],
- [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6], [1],
- [define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct in6_addr], ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
- ]], [[ struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0; ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes" ],
- [ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR], [1],
- [define if you have struct in6_addr data type])
-
-dnl Now check for sin6_scope_id
- AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct sockaddr_in6.sin6_scope_id], , ,
- [
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#endif
-#include <netinet/in.h>
- ])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct addrinfo], ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
- ]], [[ struct addrinfo s; s.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="yes" ],
- [ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO], [1],
- [define if you have struct addrinfo data type])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct timeval], ac_cv_have_struct_timeval, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/time.h> ]],
- [[ struct timeval tv; tv.tv_sec = 1;]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="yes" ],
- [ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL], [1], [define if you have struct timeval])
- have_struct_timeval=1
-fi
-
-AC_CHECK_TYPES([struct timespec])
-
-# We need int64_t or else certian parts of the compile will fail.
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then
- echo "OpenSSH requires int64_t support. Contact your vendor or install"
- echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing."
- echo ""
- exit 1;
-else
-dnl test snprintf (broken on SCO w/gcc)
- AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF
-main()
-{
- char buf[50];
- char expected_out[50];
- int mazsize = 50 ;
-#if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
- long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff;
-#else
- long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll;
-#endif
- strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807");
- snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num);
- if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0)
- exit(1);
- exit(0);
-}
-#else
-main() { exit(0); }
-#endif
- ]])], [ true ], [ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF]) ],
- AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()])
- )
-fi
-
-dnl Checks for structure members
-OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmp.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP])
-OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX])
-OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([syslen], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX])
-OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_pid], [utmp.h], [HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP])
-OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP])
-OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX])
-OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP])
-OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP])
-OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX])
-OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP])
-OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX])
-OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP])
-OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX])
-OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_exit], [utmp.h], [HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP])
-OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP])
-OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX])
-OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX])
-
-AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_blksize])
-AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct passwd.pw_gecos, struct passwd.pw_class,
-struct passwd.pw_change, struct passwd.pw_expire],
-[], [], [[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-]])
-
-AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct __res_state.retrans], [], [AC_DEFINE([__res_state], [state],
- [Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h])],
-[[
-#include <stdio.h>
-#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
-# include <sys/types.h>
-#endif
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/nameser.h>
-#include <resolv.h>
-]])
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage],
- ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
- ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.ss_family = 1; ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ],
- [ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1], [Fields in struct sockaddr_storage])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage],
- ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
- ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.__ss_family = 1; ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ],
- [ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1],
- [Fields in struct sockaddr_storage])
-fi
-
-dnl make sure we're using the real structure members and not defines
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr],
- ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
- ]], [[
-#ifdef msg_accrights
-#error "msg_accrights is a macro"
-exit(1);
-#endif
-struct msghdr m;
-m.msg_accrights = 0;
-exit(0);
- ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes" ],
- [ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="no" ]
- )
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR], [1],
- [Define if your system uses access rights style
- file descriptor passing])
-fi
-
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type])
-AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
-#include <sys/mount.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
-#include <sys/statvfs.h>
-#endif
- ]], [[ struct statvfs s; s.f_fsid = 0; ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
-
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if fsid_t has member val])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/statvfs.h>
- ]], [[ fsid_t t; t.val[0] = 0; ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS_VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member val]) ],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ])
-
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if f_fsid has member __val])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/statvfs.h>
- ]], [[ fsid_t t; t.__val[0] = 0; ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS___VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member __val]) ],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ])
-])
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_control field in struct msghdr],
- ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr, [
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
- ]], [[
-#ifdef msg_control
-#error "msg_control is a macro"
-exit(1);
-#endif
-struct msghdr m;
-m.msg_control = 0;
-exit(0);
- ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes" ],
- [ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="no" ]
- )
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR], [1],
- [Define if your system uses ancillary data style
- file descriptor passing])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines __progname], ac_cv_libc_defines___progname, [
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]],
- [[ extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname); ]])],
- [ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes" ],
- [ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE___PROGNAME], [1], [Define if libc defines __progname])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__], ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__, [
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
- [[ printf("%s", __FUNCTION__); ]])],
- [ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="yes" ],
- [ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE___FUNCTION__], [1],
- [Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __func__], ac_cv_cc_implements___func__, [
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
- [[ printf("%s", __func__); ]])],
- [ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="yes" ],
- [ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE___func__], [1], [Define if compiler implements __func__])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether va_copy exists], ac_cv_have_va_copy, [
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <stdarg.h>
-va_list x,y;
- ]], [[ va_copy(x,y); ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_va_copy="yes" ],
- [ ac_cv_have_va_copy="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_VA_COPY], [1], [Define if va_copy exists])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether __va_copy exists], ac_cv_have___va_copy, [
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <stdarg.h>
-va_list x,y;
- ]], [[ __va_copy(x,y); ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have___va_copy="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have___va_copy="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have___va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE___VA_COPY], [1], [Define if __va_copy exists])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether getopt has optreset support],
- ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset, [
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <getopt.h> ]],
- [[ extern int optreset; optreset = 0; ]])],
- [ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="yes" ],
- [ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET], [1],
- [Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_errlist], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist, [
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]],
-[[ extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);]])],
- [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes" ],
- [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST], [1],
- [Define if your system defines sys_errlist[]])
-fi
-
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_nerr], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr, [
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]],
-[[ extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);]])],
- [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes" ],
- [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no"
- ])
-])
-if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_NERR], [1], [Define if your system defines sys_nerr])
-fi
-
-# Check libraries needed by DNS fingerprint support
-AC_SEARCH_LIBS([getrrsetbyname], [resolv],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME], [1],
- [Define if getrrsetbyname() exists])],
- [
- # Needed by our getrrsetbyname()
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([res_query], [resolv])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv])
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if res_query will link])
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/nameser.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-#include <resolv.h>
- ]], [[
- res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
- ]])],
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]),
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
- LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for res_query in -lresolv])
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/nameser.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-#include <resolv.h>
- ]], [[
- res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
- ]])],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
- [LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])])
- ])
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS([_getshort _getlong])
- AC_CHECK_DECLS([_getshort, _getlong], , ,
- [#include <sys/types.h>
- #include <arpa/nameser.h>])
- AC_CHECK_MEMBER([HEADER.ad],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_HEADER_AD], [1],
- [Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h])], ,
- [#include <arpa/nameser.h>])
- ])
-
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct __res_state _res is an extern])
-AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <stdio.h>
-#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
-# include <sys/types.h>
-#endif
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/nameser.h>
-#include <resolv.h>
-extern struct __res_state _res;
- ]], [[ ]])],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE__RES_EXTERN], [1],
- [Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern])
- ],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
-)
-
-# Check whether user wants SELinux support
-SELINUX_MSG="no"
-LIBSELINUX=""
-AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
- [ --with-selinux Enable SELinux support],
- [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- save_LIBS="$LIBS"
- AC_DEFINE([WITH_SELINUX], [1],
- [Define if you want SELinux support.])
- SELINUX_MSG="yes"
- AC_CHECK_HEADER([selinux/selinux.h], ,
- AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires selinux.h header]))
- AC_CHECK_LIB([selinux], [setexeccon],
- [ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
- LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux"
- ],
- AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires libselinux library]))
- SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level])
- LIBS="$save_LIBS"
- fi ]
-)
-AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS])
-AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
-
-# Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
-KRB5_MSG="no"
-AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
- [ --with-kerberos5=PATH Enable Kerberos 5 support],
- [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
- KRB5ROOT="/usr/local"
- else
- KRB5ROOT=${withval}
- fi
-
- AC_DEFINE([KRB5], [1], [Define if you want Kerberos 5 support])
- KRB5_MSG="yes"
-
- AC_PATH_PROG([KRB5CONF], [krb5-config],
- [$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config],
- [$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH])
- if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then
- K5CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags`"
- K5LIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs`"
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS"
-
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gssapi support])
- if $KRB5CONF | grep gssapi >/dev/null ; then
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI], [1],
- [Define this if you want GSSAPI
- support in the version 2 protocol])
- GSSCFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags gssapi`"
- GSSLIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs gssapi`"
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS"
- else
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- fi
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <krb5.h>
- ]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL], [1],
- [Define this if you are using the Heimdal
- version of Kerberos V5]) ],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- ])
- else
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include"
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <krb5.h>
- ]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL])
- K5LIBS="-lkrb5"
- K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lcom_err -lasn1"
- AC_CHECK_LIB([roken], [net_write],
- [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lroken"])
- AC_CHECK_LIB([des], [des_cbc_encrypt],
- [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -ldes"])
- ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- K5LIBS="-lkrb5 -lk5crypto -lcom_err"
-
- ])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv])
-
- AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi_krb5], [gss_init_sec_context],
- [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
- GSSLIBS="-lgssapi_krb5" ],
- [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi], [gss_init_sec_context],
- [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
- GSSLIBS="-lgssapi" ],
- [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gss], [gss_init_sec_context],
- [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
- GSSLIBS="-lgss" ],
- AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail]))
- ])
- ])
-
- AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi.h], ,
- [ unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
- AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h], ,
- AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail])
- )
- ]
- )
-
- oldCPP="$CPPFLAGS"
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
- AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi_krb5.h], ,
- [ CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP" ])
-
- fi
- if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -R${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
- fi
- if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
- blibpath="$blibpath:${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
- fi
-
- AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h])
- AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h])
- AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h])
-
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1],
- [Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])])
-
- AC_CHECK_DECLS([GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE], [], [], [[
-#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
-# include <gssapi.h>
-#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H)
-# include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
-# include <gssapi_generic.h>
-#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H)
-# include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
-#endif
- ]])
- saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
- LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS"
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS([krb5_cc_new_unique krb5_get_error_message krb5_free_error_message])
- LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
-
- fi
- ]
-)
-AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
-AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
-
-# Looking for programs, paths and files
-
-PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
-AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-path],
- [ --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot (default=/var/empty)],
- [
- if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
- test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- PRIVSEP_PATH=$withval
- fi
- ]
-)
-AC_SUBST([PRIVSEP_PATH])
-
-AC_ARG_WITH([xauth],
- [ --with-xauth=PATH Specify path to xauth program ],
- [
- if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
- test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- xauth_path=$withval
- fi
- ],
- [
- TestPath="$PATH"
- TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X/bin"
- TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/bin/X11"
- TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X11R6/bin"
- TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/openwin/bin"
- AC_PATH_PROG([xauth_path], [xauth], , [$TestPath])
- if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then
- xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth"
- fi
- ]
-)
-
-STRIP_OPT=-s
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([strip],
- [ --disable-strip Disable calling strip(1) on install],
- [
- if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
- STRIP_OPT=
- fi
- ]
-)
-AC_SUBST([STRIP_OPT])
-
-if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then
- XAUTH_PATH="undefined"
- AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH])
-else
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([XAUTH_PATH], ["$xauth_path"],
- [Define if xauth is found in your path])
- XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path
- AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH])
-fi
-
-dnl # --with-maildir=/path/to/mail gets top priority.
-dnl # if maildir is set in the platform case statement above we use that.
-dnl # Otherwise we run a program to get the dir from system headers.
-dnl # We first look for _PATH_MAILDIR then MAILDIR then _PATH_MAIL
-dnl # If we find _PATH_MAILDIR we do nothing because that is what
-dnl # session.c expects anyway. Otherwise we set to the value found
-dnl # stripping any trailing slash. If for some strage reason our program
-dnl # does not find what it needs, we default to /var/spool/mail.
-# Check for mail directory
-AC_ARG_WITH([maildir],
- [ --with-maildir=/path/to/mail Specify your system mail directory],
- [
- if test "X$withval" != X && test "x$withval" != xno && \
- test "x${withval}" != xyes; then
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$withval"],
- [Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR])
- fi
- ],[
- if test "X$maildir" != "X"; then
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"])
- else
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([Discovering system mail directory])
- AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-#include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
-#include <maillock.h>
-#endif
-#define DATA "conftest.maildir"
- ]], [[
- FILE *fd;
- int rc;
-
- fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
- if(fd == NULL)
- exit(1);
-
-#if defined (_PATH_MAILDIR)
- if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAILDIR:%s\n", _PATH_MAILDIR)) <0)
- exit(1);
-#elif defined (MAILDIR)
- if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"MAILDIR:%s\n", MAILDIR)) <0)
- exit(1);
-#elif defined (_PATH_MAIL)
- if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAIL:%s\n", _PATH_MAIL)) <0)
- exit(1);
-#else
- exit (2);
-#endif
-
- exit(0);
- ]])],
- [
- maildir_what=`awk -F: '{print $1}' conftest.maildir`
- maildir=`awk -F: '{print $2}' conftest.maildir \
- | sed 's|/$||'`
- AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: $maildir from $maildir_what])
- if test "x$maildir_what" != "x_PATH_MAILDIR"; then
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"])
- fi
- ],
- [
- if test "X$ac_status" = "X2";then
-# our test program didn't find it. Default to /var/spool/mail
- AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: default value of /var/spool/mail])
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["/var/spool/mail"])
- else
- AC_MSG_RESULT([*** not found ***])
- fi
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail])
- ]
- )
- fi
- ]
-) # maildir
-
-if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then
- AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test])
- disable_ptmx_check=yes
-fi
-if test -z "$no_dev_ptmx" ; then
- if test "x$disable_ptmx_check" != "xyes" ; then
- AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptmx"],
- [
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTMX], [1],
- [Define if you have /dev/ptmx])
- have_dev_ptmx=1
- ]
- )
- fi
-fi
-
-if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" != "xyes"; then
- AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptc"],
- [
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC], [1],
- [Define if you have /dev/ptc])
- have_dev_ptc=1
- ]
- )
-else
- AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test])
-fi
-
-# Options from here on. Some of these are preset by platform above
-AC_ARG_WITH([mantype],
- [ --with-mantype=man|cat|doc Set man page type],
- [
- case "$withval" in
- man|cat|doc)
- MANTYPE=$withval
- ;;
- *)
- AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid man type: $withval])
- ;;
- esac
- ]
-)
-if test -z "$MANTYPE"; then
- TestPath="/usr/bin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/ucb"
- AC_PATH_PROGS([NROFF], [nroff awf], [/bin/false], [$TestPath])
- if ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
- MANTYPE=doc
- elif ${NROFF} -man ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
- MANTYPE=man
- else
- MANTYPE=cat
- fi
-fi
-AC_SUBST([MANTYPE])
-if test "$MANTYPE" = "doc"; then
- mansubdir=man;
-else
- mansubdir=$MANTYPE;
-fi
-AC_SUBST([mansubdir])
-
-# Check whether to enable MD5 passwords
-MD5_MSG="no"
-AC_ARG_WITH([md5-passwords],
- [ --with-md5-passwords Enable use of MD5 passwords],
- [
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS], [1],
- [Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords])
- MD5_MSG="yes"
- fi
- ]
-)
-
-# Whether to disable shadow password support
-AC_ARG_WITH([shadow],
- [ --without-shadow Disable shadow password support],
- [
- if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW])
- disable_shadow=yes
- fi
- ]
-)
-
-if test -z "$disable_shadow" ; then
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if the systems has expire shadow information])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <shadow.h>
-struct spwd sp;
- ]], [[ sp.sp_expire = sp.sp_lstchg = sp.sp_inact = 0; ]])],
- [ sp_expire_available=yes ], [
- ])
-
- if test "x$sp_expire_available" = "xyes" ; then
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1],
- [Define if you want to use shadow password expire field])
- else
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- fi
-fi
-
-# Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY
-if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then
- DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
- AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY], [1],
- [Define if you need to use IP address
- instead of hostname in $DISPLAY])
-else
- DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no"
- AC_ARG_WITH([ipaddr-display],
- [ --with-ipaddr-display Use ip address instead of hostname in \$DISPLAY],
- [
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY])
- DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
- fi
- ]
- )
-fi
-
-# check for /etc/default/login and use it if present.
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([etc-default-login],
- [ --disable-etc-default-login Disable using PATH from /etc/default/login [no]],
- [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno"; then
- AC_MSG_NOTICE([/etc/default/login handling disabled])
- etc_default_login=no
- else
- etc_default_login=yes
- fi ],
- [ if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes";
- then
- AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login])
- etc_default_login=no
- else
- etc_default_login=yes
- fi ]
-)
-
-if test "x$etc_default_login" != "xno"; then
- AC_CHECK_FILE(["/etc/default/login"],
- [ external_path_file=/etc/default/login ])
- if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/default/login"; then
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN], [1],
- [Define if your system has /etc/default/login])
- fi
-fi
-
-dnl BSD systems use /etc/login.conf so --with-default-path= has no effect
-if test $ac_cv_func_login_getcapbool = "yes" && \
- test $ac_cv_header_login_cap_h = "yes" ; then
- external_path_file=/etc/login.conf
-fi
-
-# Whether to mess with the default path
-SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)"
-AC_ARG_WITH([default-path],
- [ --with-default-path= Specify default \$PATH environment for server],
- [
- if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
- AC_MSG_WARN([
---with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system.
-Edit /etc/login.conf instead.])
- elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
- AC_MSG_WARN([
---with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in
-$external_path_file .])
- fi
- user_path="$withval"
- SERVER_PATH_MSG="$withval"
- fi
- ],
- [ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
- AC_MSG_WARN([Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf])
- else
- if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
- AC_MSG_WARN([
-If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included,
-otherwise scp will not work.])
- fi
- AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-/* find out what STDPATH is */
-#include <stdio.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
-# ifdef _PATH_USERPATH /* Irix */
-# define _PATH_STDPATH _PATH_USERPATH
-# else
-# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
-# endif
-#endif
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#define DATA "conftest.stdpath"
- ]], [[
- FILE *fd;
- int rc;
-
- fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
- if(fd == NULL)
- exit(1);
-
- if ((rc = fprintf(fd,"%s", _PATH_STDPATH)) < 0)
- exit(1);
-
- exit(0);
- ]])],
- [ user_path=`cat conftest.stdpath` ],
- [ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ],
- [ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ]
- )
-# make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work
- t_bindir="${bindir}"
- while echo "${t_bindir}" | egrep '\$\{|NONE/' >/dev/null 2>&1; do
- t_bindir=`eval echo ${t_bindir}`
- case $t_bindir in
- NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$prefix~"` ;;
- esac
- case $t_bindir in
- NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
- esac
- done
- echo $user_path | grep ":$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1
- if test $? -ne 0 ; then
- echo $user_path | grep "^$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1
- if test $? -ne 0 ; then
- user_path=$user_path:$t_bindir
- AC_MSG_RESULT([Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work])
- fi
- fi
- fi ]
-)
-if test "x$external_path_file" != "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([USER_PATH], ["$user_path"], [Specify default $PATH])
- AC_SUBST([user_path])
-fi
-
-# Set superuser path separately to user path
-AC_ARG_WITH([superuser-path],
- [ --with-superuser-path= Specify different path for super-user],
- [
- if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
- test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SUPERUSER_PATH], ["$withval"],
- [Define if you want a different $PATH
- for the superuser])
- superuser_path=$withval
- fi
- ]
-)
-
-
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses])
-IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="no"
-AC_ARG_WITH(4in6,
- [ --with-4in6 Check for and convert IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses],
- [
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6], [1],
- [Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses
- and treat as IPv4])
- IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
- else
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- fi
- ], [
- if test "x$inet6_default_4in6" = "xyes"; then
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes (default)])
- AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6])
- IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
- else
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no (default)])
- fi
- ]
-)
-
-# Whether to enable BSD auth support
-BSD_AUTH_MSG=no
-AC_ARG_WITH([bsd-auth],
- [ --with-bsd-auth Enable BSD auth support],
- [
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([BSD_AUTH], [1],
- [Define if you have BSD auth support])
- BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes
- fi
- ]
-)
-
-# Where to place sshd.pid
-piddir=/var/run
-# make sure the directory exists
-if test ! -d $piddir ; then
- piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}`
- case $piddir in
- NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
- esac
-fi
-
-AC_ARG_WITH([pid-dir],
- [ --with-pid-dir=PATH Specify location of ssh.pid file],
- [
- if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
- test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- piddir=$withval
- if test ! -d $piddir ; then
- AC_MSG_WARN([** no $piddir directory on this system **])
- fi
- fi
- ]
-)
-
-AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR], ["$piddir"],
- [Specify location of ssh.pid])
-AC_SUBST([piddir])
-
-dnl allow user to disable some login recording features
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([lastlog],
- [ --disable-lastlog disable use of lastlog even if detected [no]],
- [
- if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
- fi
- ]
-)
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmp],
- [ --disable-utmp disable use of utmp even if detected [no]],
- [
- if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
- fi
- ]
-)
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmpx],
- [ --disable-utmpx disable use of utmpx even if detected [no]],
- [
- if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1],
- [Define if you don't want to use utmpx])
- fi
- ]
-)
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmp],
- [ --disable-wtmp disable use of wtmp even if detected [no]],
- [
- if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP])
- fi
- ]
-)
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmpx],
- [ --disable-wtmpx disable use of wtmpx even if detected [no]],
- [
- if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX], [1],
- [Define if you don't want to use wtmpx])
- fi
- ]
-)
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([libutil],
- [ --disable-libutil disable use of libutil (login() etc.) [no]],
- [
- if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN])
- fi
- ]
-)
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututline],
- [ --disable-pututline disable use of pututline() etc. ([uw]tmp) [no]],
- [
- if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTLINE], [1],
- [Define if you don't want to use pututline()
- etc. to write [uw]tmp])
- fi
- ]
-)
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututxline],
- [ --disable-pututxline disable use of pututxline() etc. ([uw]tmpx) [no]],
- [
- if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE], [1],
- [Define if you don't want to use pututxline()
- etc. to write [uw]tmpx])
- fi
- ]
-)
-AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog],
- [ --with-lastlog=FILE|DIR specify lastlog location [common locations]],
- [
- if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
- elif test -n "$withval" && test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
- conf_lastlog_location=$withval
- fi
- ]
-)
-
-dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection
-dnl NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the
-dnl need for command-line parameters
-dnl lastlog and [uw]tmp are subject to a file search if all else fails
-
-dnl lastlog detection
-dnl NOTE: the code itself will detect if lastlog is a directory
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE])
-AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <utmp.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
-# include <lastlog.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
-# include <login.h>
-#endif
- ]], [[ char *lastlog = LASTLOG_FILE; ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <utmp.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
-# include <lastlog.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
- ]], [[ char *lastlog = _PATH_LASTLOG; ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- system_lastlog_path=no
- ])
-])
-
-if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
- if test x"$system_lastlog_path" = x"no" ; then
- for f in /var/log/lastlog /usr/adm/lastlog /var/adm/lastlog /etc/security/lastlog ; do
- if (test -d "$f" || test -f "$f") ; then
- conf_lastlog_location=$f
- fi
- done
- if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
- AC_MSG_WARN([** Cannot find lastlog **])
- dnl Don't define DISABLE_LASTLOG - that means we don't try wtmp/wtmpx
- fi
- fi
-fi
-
-if test -n "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_LASTLOG_FILE], ["$conf_lastlog_location"],
- [Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file])
-fi
-
-dnl utmp detection
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines UTMP_FILE])
-AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <utmp.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
- ]], [[ char *utmp = UTMP_FILE; ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- system_utmp_path=no
-])
-if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
- if test x"$system_utmp_path" = x"no" ; then
- for f in /etc/utmp /usr/adm/utmp /var/run/utmp; do
- if test -f $f ; then
- conf_utmp_location=$f
- fi
- done
- if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
- fi
- fi
-fi
-if test -n "$conf_utmp_location"; then
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_UTMP_FILE], ["$conf_utmp_location"],
- [Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file])
-fi
-
-dnl wtmp detection
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMP_FILE])
-AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <utmp.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
- ]], [[ char *wtmp = WTMP_FILE; ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- system_wtmp_path=no
-])
-if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
- if test x"$system_wtmp_path" = x"no" ; then
- for f in /usr/adm/wtmp /var/log/wtmp; do
- if test -f $f ; then
- conf_wtmp_location=$f
- fi
- done
- if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP])
- fi
- fi
-fi
-if test -n "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMP_FILE], ["$conf_wtmp_location"],
- [Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file])
-fi
-
-dnl wtmpx detection
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMPX_FILE])
-AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <utmp.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
-#include <utmpx.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
- ]], [[ char *wtmpx = WTMPX_FILE; ]])],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- system_wtmpx_path=no
-])
-if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then
- if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX])
- fi
-else
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMPX_FILE], ["$conf_wtmpx_location"],
- [Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file])
-fi
-
-
-if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $blibflags$blibpath"
- AC_MSG_WARN([Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile])
-fi
-
-AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct lastlog.ll_line], [], [
- if test x$SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE != "xyes" ; then
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
- fi
- ], [
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
-#include <utmp.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
-#include <utmpx.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
-#include <lastlog.h>
-#endif
- ])
-
-AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct utmp.ut_line], [], [
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
- AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP])
- ], [
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
-#include <utmp.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
-#include <utmpx.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
-#include <lastlog.h>
-#endif
- ])
-
-dnl Adding -Werror to CFLAGS early prevents configure tests from running.
-dnl Add now.
-CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags"
-
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" != "xyes" ; then
- TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
-else
- TEST_SSH_IPV6=yes
-fi
-AC_CHECK_DECL([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [TEST_SSH_IPV6=no])
-AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_IPV6], [$TEST_SSH_IPV6])
-AC_SUBST([TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS], [$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS])
-AC_SUBST([UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS], [$unsupported_algorithms])
-
-AC_EXEEXT
-AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml \
- openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile \
- survey.sh])
-AC_OUTPUT
-
-# Print summary of options
-
-# Someone please show me a better way :)
-A=`eval echo ${prefix}` ; A=`eval echo ${A}`
-B=`eval echo ${bindir}` ; B=`eval echo ${B}`
-C=`eval echo ${sbindir}` ; C=`eval echo ${C}`
-D=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` ; D=`eval echo ${D}`
-E=`eval echo ${libexecdir}/ssh-askpass` ; E=`eval echo ${E}`
-F=`eval echo ${mandir}/${mansubdir}X` ; F=`eval echo ${F}`
-G=`eval echo ${piddir}` ; G=`eval echo ${G}`
-H=`eval echo ${PRIVSEP_PATH}` ; H=`eval echo ${H}`
-I=`eval echo ${user_path}` ; I=`eval echo ${I}`
-J=`eval echo ${superuser_path}` ; J=`eval echo ${J}`
-
-echo ""
-echo "OpenSSH has been configured with the following options:"
-echo " User binaries: $B"
-echo " System binaries: $C"
-echo " Configuration files: $D"
-echo " Askpass program: $E"
-echo " Manual pages: $F"
-echo " PID file: $G"
-echo " Privilege separation chroot path: $H"
-if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
-echo " At runtime, sshd will use the path defined in $external_path_file"
-echo " Make sure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work"
-else
-echo " sshd default user PATH: $I"
- if test ! -z "$external_path_file"; then
-echo " (If PATH is set in $external_path_file it will be used instead. If"
-echo " used, ensure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work.)"
- fi
-fi
-if test ! -z "$superuser_path" ; then
-echo " sshd superuser user PATH: $J"
-fi
-echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE"
-echo " PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
-echo " OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
-echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
-echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
-echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
-echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
-echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
-echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
-echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
-echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
-echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
-echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
-echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
-echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
-echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
-echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
-
-echo ""
-
-echo " Host: ${host}"
-echo " Compiler: ${CC}"
-echo " Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}"
-echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}"
-echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}"
-echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}"
-if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
-echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
-fi
-if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then
-echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}"
-fi
-
-echo ""
-
-if test "x$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" = "xyes" ; then
- echo "SVR4 style packages are supported with \"make package\""
- echo ""
-fi
-
-if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
- echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file "
- echo "for sshd, otherwise password authentication may fail. "
- echo "Example PAM control files can be found in the contrib/ "
- echo "subdirectory"
- echo ""
-fi
-
-if test ! -z "$NO_PEERCHECK" ; then
- echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not"
- echo "appear to support getpeereid(), getpeerucred() or the"
- echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to"
- echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to"
- echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious"
- echo "user can connect to your agent."
- echo ""
-fi
-
-if test "$AUDIT_MODULE" = "bsm" ; then
- echo "WARNING: BSM audit support is currently considered EXPERIMENTAL."
- echo "See the Solaris section in README.platform for details."
-fi
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/configure.ac (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/configure.ac)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/configure.ac (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/configure.ac 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,5092 @@
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.583 2014/08/26 20:32:01 djm Exp $
+#
+# Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
+#
+# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+#
+# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+# WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+# ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+# WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+# ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+# OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+
+AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org])
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.583 $)
+AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
+AC_LANG([C])
+
+AC_CONFIG_HEADER([config.h])
+AC_PROG_CC
+AC_CANONICAL_HOST
+AC_C_BIGENDIAN
+
+# Checks for programs.
+AC_PROG_AWK
+AC_PROG_CPP
+AC_PROG_RANLIB
+AC_PROG_INSTALL
+AC_PROG_EGREP
+AC_CHECK_TOOLS([AR], [ar])
+AC_PATH_PROG([CAT], [cat])
+AC_PATH_PROG([KILL], [kill])
+AC_PATH_PROGS([PERL], [perl5 perl])
+AC_PATH_PROG([SED], [sed])
+AC_SUBST([PERL])
+AC_PATH_PROG([ENT], [ent])
+AC_SUBST([ENT])
+AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [bash])
+AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [ksh])
+AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [sh])
+AC_PATH_PROG([SH], [sh])
+AC_PATH_PROG([GROFF], [groff])
+AC_PATH_PROG([NROFF], [nroff])
+AC_PATH_PROG([MANDOC], [mandoc])
+AC_SUBST([TEST_SHELL], [sh])
+
+dnl select manpage formatter
+if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then
+ MANFMT="$MANDOC"
+elif test "x$NROFF" != "x" ; then
+ MANFMT="$NROFF -mandoc"
+elif test "x$GROFF" != "x" ; then
+ MANFMT="$GROFF -mandoc -Tascii"
+else
+ AC_MSG_WARN([no manpage formatted found])
+ MANFMT="false"
+fi
+AC_SUBST([MANFMT])
+
+dnl for buildpkg.sh
+AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_GROUPADD_PROG], [groupadd], [groupadd],
+ [/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc])
+AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_USERADD_PROG], [useradd], [useradd],
+ [/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc])
+AC_CHECK_PROG([MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED], [pkgmk], [yes], [no])
+if test -x /sbin/sh; then
+ AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/sbin/sh])
+else
+ AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/bin/sh])
+fi
+
+# System features
+AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
+
+if test -z "$AR" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***])
+fi
+
+# Use LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment if possible
+if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK], ["$LOGIN_PROGRAM"],
+ [If your header files don't define LOGIN_PROGRAM,
+ then use this (detected) from environment and PATH])
+else
+ # Search for login
+ AC_PATH_PROG([LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK], [login])
+ if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK], ["$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK"])
+ fi
+fi
+
+AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_PASSWD_PROG], [passwd])
+if test ! -z "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_PASSWD_PROG], ["$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"],
+ [Full path of your "passwd" program])
+fi
+
+if test -z "$LD" ; then
+ LD=$CC
+fi
+AC_SUBST([LD])
+
+AC_C_INLINE
+
+AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX], [have_llong_max=1], , [#include <limits.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECL([SYSTR_POLICY_KILL], [have_systr_policy_kill=1], , [
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/param.h>
+ #include <dev/systrace.h>
+])
+AC_CHECK_DECL([RLIMIT_NPROC],
+ [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC], [], [sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC])], , [
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/resource.h>
+])
+AC_CHECK_DECL([PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS], [have_linux_no_new_privs=1], , [
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <linux/prctl.h>
+])
+
+openssl=yes
+ssh1=no
+AC_ARG_WITH([openssl],
+ [ --without-openssl Disable use of OpenSSL; use only limited internal crypto **EXPERIMENTAL** ],
+ [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+ openssl=no
+ ssh1=no
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography])
+if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([WITH_OPENSSL], [1], [use libcrypto for cryptography])
+else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+fi
+
+AC_ARG_WITH([ssh1],
+ [ --with-ssh1 Enable support for SSH protocol 1],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+ if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot enable SSH protocol 1 with OpenSSL disabled])
+ fi
+ ssh1=yes
+ elif test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+ ssh1=no
+ else
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([unknown --with-ssh1 argument])
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether SSH protocol 1 support is enabled])
+if test "x$ssh1" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([WITH_SSH1], [1], [include SSH protocol version 1 support])
+else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+fi
+
+use_stack_protector=1
+use_toolchain_hardening=1
+AC_ARG_WITH([stackprotect],
+ [ --without-stackprotect Don't use compiler's stack protection], [
+ if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
+ use_stack_protector=0
+ fi ])
+AC_ARG_WITH([hardening],
+ [ --without-hardening Don't use toolchain hardening flags], [
+ if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
+ use_toolchain_hardening=0
+ fi ])
+
+# We use -Werror for the tests only so that we catch warnings like "this is
+# on by default" for things like -fPIE.
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports -Werror])
+saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror"
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[int main(void) { return 0; }]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ WERROR="-Werror"],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ WERROR="" ]
+)
+CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Qunused-arguments])
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunknown-warning-option])
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wall])
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-arith])
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wuninitialized])
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsign-compare])
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wformat-security])
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess])
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-sign], [-Wno-pointer-sign])
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunused-result], [-Wno-unused-result])
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fno-strict-aliasing])
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2])
+ if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" = "x1"; then
+ OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,relro])
+ OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,now])
+ OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,noexecstack])
+ # NB. -ftrapv expects certain support functions to be present in
+ # the compiler library (libgcc or similar) to detect integer operations
+ # that can overflow. We must check that the result of enabling it
+ # actually links. The test program compiled/linked includes a number
+ # of integer operations that should exercise this.
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK([-ftrapv])
+ fi
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([gcc version])
+ GCC_VER=`$CC -v 2>&1 | $AWK '/gcc version /{print $3}'`
+ case $GCC_VER in
+ 1.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
+ 2.8* | 2.9*)
+ no_attrib_nonnull=1
+ ;;
+ 2.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
+ *) ;;
+ esac
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([$GCC_VER])
+
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset])
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fno-builtin-memset"
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <string.h> ]],
+ [[ char b[10]; memset(b, 0, sizeof(b)); ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ]
+ )
+
+ # -fstack-protector-all doesn't always work for some GCC versions
+ # and/or platforms, so we test if we can. If it's not supported
+ # on a given platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror.
+ if test "x$use_stack_protector" = "x1"; then
+ for t in -fstack-protector-strong -fstack-protector-all \
+ -fstack-protector; do
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports $t])
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $t -Werror"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $t -Werror"
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
+ [[
+ char x[256];
+ snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX");
+ ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $t"
+ LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $t"
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $t works])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
+ [[
+ char x[256];
+ snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX");
+ ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ break ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: cannot test])
+ break ]
+ )
+ ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
+ )
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+ LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+ done
+ fi
+
+ if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then
+ # retry LLONG_MAX with -std=gnu99, needed on some Linuxes
+ unset ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -std=gnu99"
+ AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX],
+ [have_llong_max=1],
+ [CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"],
+ [#include <limits.h>]
+ )
+ fi
+fi
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdlib.h>
+__attribute__((__unused__)) static void foo(void){return;}]],
+ [[ exit(0); ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ AC_DEFINE(NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE, 1,
+ [compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types]) ]
+)
+
+if test "x$no_attrib_nonnull" != "x1" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__], [1], [Have attribute nonnull])
+fi
+
+AC_ARG_WITH([rpath],
+ [ --without-rpath Disable auto-added -R linker paths],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+ need_dash_r=""
+ fi
+ if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+ need_dash_r=1
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+# Allow user to specify flags
+AC_ARG_WITH([cflags],
+ [ --with-cflags Specify additional flags to pass to compiler],
+ [
+ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $withval"
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_ARG_WITH([cppflags],
+ [ --with-cppflags Specify additional flags to pass to preprocessor] ,
+ [
+ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $withval"
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_ARG_WITH([ldflags],
+ [ --with-ldflags Specify additional flags to pass to linker],
+ [
+ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $withval"
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_ARG_WITH([libs],
+ [ --with-libs Specify additional libraries to link with],
+ [
+ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ LIBS="$LIBS $withval"
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_ARG_WITH([Werror],
+ [ --with-Werror Build main code with -Werror],
+ [
+ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno"; then
+ werror_flags="-Werror"
+ if test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ werror_flags="$withval"
+ fi
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \
+ blf.h \
+ bstring.h \
+ crypt.h \
+ crypto/sha2.h \
+ dirent.h \
+ endian.h \
+ elf.h \
+ err.h \
+ features.h \
+ fcntl.h \
+ floatingpoint.h \
+ getopt.h \
+ glob.h \
+ ia.h \
+ iaf.h \
+ inttypes.h \
+ langinfo.h \
+ limits.h \
+ locale.h \
+ login.h \
+ maillock.h \
+ ndir.h \
+ net/if_tun.h \
+ netdb.h \
+ netgroup.h \
+ pam/pam_appl.h \
+ paths.h \
+ poll.h \
+ pty.h \
+ readpassphrase.h \
+ rpc/types.h \
+ security/pam_appl.h \
+ sha2.h \
+ shadow.h \
+ stddef.h \
+ stdint.h \
+ string.h \
+ strings.h \
+ sys/audit.h \
+ sys/bitypes.h \
+ sys/bsdtty.h \
+ sys/capability.h \
+ sys/cdefs.h \
+ sys/dir.h \
+ sys/mman.h \
+ sys/ndir.h \
+ sys/poll.h \
+ sys/prctl.h \
+ sys/pstat.h \
+ sys/select.h \
+ sys/stat.h \
+ sys/stream.h \
+ sys/stropts.h \
+ sys/strtio.h \
+ sys/statvfs.h \
+ sys/sysmacros.h \
+ sys/time.h \
+ sys/timers.h \
+ time.h \
+ tmpdir.h \
+ ttyent.h \
+ ucred.h \
+ unistd.h \
+ usersec.h \
+ util.h \
+ utime.h \
+ utmp.h \
+ utmpx.h \
+ vis.h \
+ wchar.h \
+])
+
+# lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS([lastlog.h], [], [], [
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+])
+
+# sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/ptms.h], [], [], [
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H
+# include <sys/stream.h>
+#endif
+])
+
+# login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS([login_cap.h], [], [], [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+])
+
+# older BSDs need sys/param.h before sys/mount.h
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/mount.h], [], [], [
+#include <sys/param.h>
+])
+
+# Android requires sys/socket.h to be included before sys/un.h
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/un.h], [], [], [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+])
+
+# Messages for features tested for in target-specific section
+SIA_MSG="no"
+SPC_MSG="no"
+SP_MSG="no"
+SPP_MSG="no"
+
+# Support for Solaris/Illumos privileges (this test is used by both
+# the --with-solaris-privs option and --with-sandbox=solaris).
+SOLARIS_PRIVS="no"
+
+# Check for some target-specific stuff
+case "$host" in
+*-*-aix*)
+ # Some versions of VAC won't allow macro redefinitions at
+ # -qlanglevel=ansi, and autoconf 2.60 sometimes insists on using that
+ # particularly with older versions of vac or xlc.
+ # It also throws errors about null macro argments, but these are
+ # not fatal.
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows macro redefinitions])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#define testmacro foo
+#define testmacro bar]],
+ [[ exit(0); ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ CC="`echo $CC | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+ LD="`echo $LD | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+ CFLAGS="`echo $CFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+ CPPFLAGS="`echo $CPPFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+ ]
+ )
+
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)])
+ if (test -z "$blibpath"); then
+ blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib"
+ fi
+ saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then
+ flags="-Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, -blibpath:"
+ else
+ flags="-blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath,"
+ fi
+ for tryflags in $flags ;do
+ if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
+ LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $tryflags$blibpath"
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[]])],
+ [blibflags=$tryflags], [])
+ fi
+ done
+ if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must be able to specify blibpath on AIX - check config.log])
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([$blibflags])
+ fi
+ LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+ dnl Check for authenticate. Might be in libs.a on older AIXes
+ AC_CHECK_FUNC([authenticate], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE], [1],
+ [Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function])],
+ [AC_CHECK_LIB([s], [authenticate],
+ [ AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE])
+ LIBS="$LIBS -ls"
+ ])
+ ])
+ dnl Check for various auth function declarations in headers.
+ AC_CHECK_DECLS([authenticate, loginrestrictions, loginsuccess,
+ passwdexpired, setauthdb], , , [#include <usersec.h>])
+ dnl Check if loginfailed is declared and takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2)
+ AC_CHECK_DECLS([loginfailed],
+ [AC_MSG_CHECKING([if loginfailed takes 4 arguments])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <usersec.h> ]],
+ [[ (void)loginfailed("user","host","tty",0); ]])],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG], [1],
+ [Define if your AIX loginfailed() function
+ takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2)])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ ])],
+ [],
+ [#include <usersec.h>]
+ )
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getgrset setauthdb])
+ AC_CHECK_DECL([F_CLOSEM],
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM], [1], [Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom]),
+ [],
+ [ #include <limits.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h> ]
+ )
+ check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo=1
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_REALPATH], [1], [Define if you have a broken realpath.])
+ AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID], [1],
+ [Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID], [1], [Define if your setreuid() is broken])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID], [1], [Define if your setregid() is broken])
+ dnl AIX handles lastlog as part of its login message
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG], [1], [Define if you don't want to use lastlog])
+ AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX], [1],
+ [Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work])
+ AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV],
+ [Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is
+ supported by bsd-setproctitle.c])
+ AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1],
+ [AIX 5.2 and 5.3 (and presumably newer) require this])
+ AC_DEFINE([PTY_ZEROREAD], [1], [read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd])
+ AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)])
+ ;;
+*-*-android*)
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmp])
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmp])
+ ;;
+*-*-cygwin*)
+ check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+ LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textreadmode.o"
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CYGWIN], [1], [Define if you are on Cygwin])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES], [1], [Use PIPES instead of a socketpair()])
+ AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1],
+ [Define to disable UID restoration test])
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW], [1],
+ [Define if you want to disable shadow passwords])
+ AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS], [1],
+ [Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system])
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING], [1],
+ [Define if your platform needs to skip post auth
+ file descriptor passing])
+ AC_DEFINE([SSH_IOBUFSZ], [65535], [Windows is sensitive to read buffer size])
+ AC_DEFINE([FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH], [1], [File names may not contain backslash characters])
+ # Cygwin defines optargs, optargs as declspec(dllimport) for historical
+ # reasons which cause compile warnings, so we disable those warnings.
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wno-attributes])
+ ;;
+*-*-dgux*)
+ AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN], [1],
+ [Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting])
+ AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+ ;;
+*-*-darwin*)
+ use_pie=auto
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have working getaddrinfo])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include <mach-o/dyld.h>
+main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
+ exit(0);
+ else
+ exit(1);
+}
+ ]])],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([working])],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([buggy])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [1],
+ [getaddrinfo is broken (if present)])
+ ],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([assume it is working])])
+ AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [OS X glob does not do what we expect])
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([BIND_8_COMPAT], [1],
+ [Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname])
+ AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way])
+ AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1],
+ [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
+ AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
+ [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
+ m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
+ AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
+ AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
+ [#include <bsm/audit.h>]
+ AC_DEFINE([LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE], [1],
+ [Define if pututxline updates lastlog too])
+ )
+ AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV],
+ [Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is
+ supported by bsd-setproctitle.c])
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([sandbox_init])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sandbox.h])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([sandbox], [sandbox_apply], [
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lsandbox"
+ ])
+ ;;
+*-*-dragonfly*)
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcrypt"
+ TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
+ ;;
+*-*-haiku*)
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd "
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([network], [socket])
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T])
+ MANTYPE=man
+ ;;
+*-*-hpux*)
+ # first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1"
+ IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
+ AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT], [1],
+ [Define if your login program cannot handle end of options ("--")])
+ AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX])
+ AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*"],
+ [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
+ AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_PSTAT])
+ AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)])
+ maildir="/var/mail"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lsec"
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([xnet], [t_error], ,
+ [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***])])
+
+ # next, we define all of the options specific to major releases
+ case "$host" in
+ *-*-hpux10*)
+ if test -z "$GCC"; then
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae"
+ fi
+ ;;
+ *-*-hpux11*)
+ AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE], [1],
+ [Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which
+ passes pam_messages to the conversation function
+ with an extra level of indirection])
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1],
+ [Define if you don't want to use utmp])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins])
+ check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1
+ check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+ # lastly, we define options specific to minor releases
+ case "$host" in
+ *-*-hpux10.26)
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE], [1],
+ [Define if you have SecureWare-based
+ protected password database])
+ disable_ptmx_check=yes
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lsecpw"
+ ;;
+ esac
+ ;;
+*-*-irix5*)
+ PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA], [1],
+ [Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted
+ (e.g. Irix gcc issue)])
+ AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+ AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY], [1],
+ [Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your
+ ttyname in [uw]tmp])
+ AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
+ ;;
+*-*-irix6*)
+ PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
+ AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_ARRAY], [1],
+ [Define if you have/want arrays
+ (cluster-wide session managment, not C arrays)])
+ AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_PROJECT], [1],
+ [Define if you want IRIX project management])
+ AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_AUDIT], [1],
+ [Define if you want IRIX audit trails])
+ AC_CHECK_FUNC([jlimit_startjob], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_JOBS], [1],
+ [Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs])])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA])
+ AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX], [1], [updwtmpx is broken (if present)])
+ AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY])
+ AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
+ ;;
+*-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu)
+ check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+ AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE])
+ AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"])
+ AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV])
+ AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins])
+ ;;
+*-*-linux*)
+ no_dev_ptmx=1
+ use_pie=auto
+ check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+ check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
+ AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1],
+ [Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY])
+ AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"],
+ [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
+ AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV])
+ AC_DEFINE([LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO], [EPERM],
+ [Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported"
+ if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP.])
+ AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP])
+ AC_DEFINE([LINUX_OOM_ADJUST], [1], [Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer])
+ inet6_default_4in6=yes
+ case `uname -r` in
+ 1.*|2.0.*)
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE], [1],
+ [Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly])
+ ;;
+ esac
+ # tun(4) forwarding compat code
+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/if_tun.h])
+ if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_LINUX], [1],
+ [Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way])
+ AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1],
+ [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
+ AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
+ [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
+ fi
+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/seccomp.h linux/filter.h linux/audit.h], [],
+ [], [#include <linux/types.h>])
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([prctl])
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for seccomp architecture])
+ seccomp_audit_arch=
+ case "$host" in
+ x86_64-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
+ ;;
+ i*86-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386
+ ;;
+ arm*-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
+ ;;
+ aarch64*-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64
+ ;;
+ s390x-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390X
+ ;;
+ s390-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390
+ ;;
+ powerpc64-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64
+ ;;
+ powerpc64le-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE
+ ;;
+ mips-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS
+ ;;
+ mipsel-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL
+ ;;
+ mips64-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64
+ ;;
+ mips64el-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64
+ ;;
+ esac
+ if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(["$seccomp_audit_arch"])
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch],
+ [Specify the system call convention in use])
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([architecture not supported])
+ fi
+ ;;
+mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
+ AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP], [1], [Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty])
+ SONY=1
+ ;;
+*-*-netbsd*)
+ check_for_libcrypt_before=1
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ need_dash_r=1
+ fi
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_OPENBSD_SOURCE"
+ AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], ,
+ AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support]))
+ AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
+ [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
+ TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1],
+ [NetBSD strnvis argument order is swapped compared to OpenBSD])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON], [1],
+ [NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons against it])
+ ;;
+*-*-freebsd*)
+ check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+ AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["*LOCKED*"], [Account locked with pw(1)])
+ AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], ,
+ AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support]))
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [FreeBSD glob does not do what we need])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1],
+ [FreeBSD strnvis argument order is swapped compared to OpenBSD])
+ TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
+ # Preauth crypto occasionally uses file descriptors for crypto offload
+ # and will crash if they cannot be opened.
+ AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE], [1],
+ [define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things])
+ ;;
+*-*-bsdi*)
+ AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+ ;;
+*-next-*)
+ conf_lastlog_location="/usr/adm/lastlog"
+ conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
+ conf_wtmp_location=/usr/adm/wtmp
+ maildir=/usr/spool/mail
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NEXT], [1], [Define if you are on NeXT])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_REALPATH])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS], [1], [Needed for NeXT])
+ ;;
+*-*-openbsd*)
+ use_pie=auto
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel])
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has bounded])
+ AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_OPENBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way])
+ AC_DEFINE([SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND], [1],
+ [syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler])
+ TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
+ ;;
+*-*-solaris*)
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ need_dash_r=1
+ fi
+ AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE])
+ AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX])
+ AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM], [1],
+ [Some versions of /bin/login need the TERM supplied
+ on the commandline])
+ AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE])
+ AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1],
+ [Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set
+ to the unpriv'ed user])
+ AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
+ # Pushing STREAMS modules will cause sshd to acquire a controlling tty.
+ AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY], [1],
+ [Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY
+ after setsid()])
+ AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd
+ in case the name is longer than 8 chars])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON], [1], [tcgetattr with ICANON may hang])
+ external_path_file=/etc/default/login
+ # hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions)
+ conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog"
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x])
+ sol2ver=`echo "$host"| sed -e 's/.*[[0-9]]\.//'`
+ if test "$sol2ver" -ge 8; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1],
+ [Define if you don't want to use wtmp])
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ fi
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setpflags])
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setppriv])
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([priv_basicset])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([priv.h])
+ AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-contracts],
+ [ --with-solaris-contracts Enable Solaris process contracts (experimental)],
+ [
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([contract], [ct_tmpl_activate],
+ [ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS], [1],
+ [Define if you have Solaris process contracts])
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lcontract"
+ SPC_MSG="yes" ], )
+ ],
+ )
+ AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-projects],
+ [ --with-solaris-projects Enable Solaris projects (experimental)],
+ [
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([project], [setproject],
+ [ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS], [1],
+ [Define if you have Solaris projects])
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lproject"
+ SP_MSG="yes" ], )
+ ],
+ )
+ AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-privs],
+ [ --with-solaris-privs Enable Solaris/Illumos privileges (experimental)],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Solaris/Illumos privilege support])
+ if test "x$ac_cv_func_setppriv" = "xyes" -a \
+ "x$ac_cv_header_priv_h" = "xyes" ; then
+ SOLARIS_PRIVS=yes
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([found])
+ AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1],
+ [Define to disable UID restoration test])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS], [1],
+ [Define if you have Solaris privileges])
+ SPP_MSG="yes"
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must have support for Solaris privileges to use --with-solaris-privs])
+ fi
+ ],
+ )
+ TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
+ ;;
+*-*-sunos4*)
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4"
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getpwanam])
+ AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE])
+ conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
+ conf_wtmp_location=/var/adm/wtmp
+ conf_lastlog_location=/var/adm/lastlog
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
+ ;;
+*-ncr-sysv*)
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
+ AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
+ AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+ ;;
+*-sni-sysv*)
+ # /usr/ucblib MUST NOT be searched on ReliantUNIX
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlsym], ,)
+ # -lresolv needs to be at the end of LIBS or DNS lookups break
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [res_query], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" ])
+ IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
+ AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN])
+ AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+ AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
+ external_path_file=/etc/default/login
+ # /usr/ucblib/libucb.a no longer needed on ReliantUNIX
+ # Attention: always take care to bind libsocket and libnsl before libc,
+ # otherwise you will find lots of "SIOCGPGRP errno 22" on syslog
+ ;;
+# UnixWare 1.x, UnixWare 2.x, and others based on code from Univel.
+*-*-sysv4.2*)
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
+ AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+ AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd])
+ AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
+ TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
+ ;;
+# UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX 8
+*-*-sysv5*)
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -Dvsnprintf=_xvsnprintf -Dsnprintf=_xsnprintf"
+ AC_DEFINE([UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS], [1], [Support passwords > 8 chars])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
+ AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+ AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME])
+ TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
+ case "$host" in
+ *-*-sysv5SCO_SV*) # SCO OpenServer 6.x
+ maildir=/var/spool/mail
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_LIBIAF], [1],
+ [ia_uinfo routines not supported by OS yet])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([prot], [getluid], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lprot"
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid], , , [-lprot])
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE])
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW])
+ ], , )
+ ;;
+ *) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
+ check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+ ;;
+ esac
+ ;;
+*-*-sysv*)
+ ;;
+# SCO UNIX and OEM versions of SCO UNIX
+*-*-sco3.2v4*)
+ AC_MSG_ERROR("This Platform is no longer supported.")
+ ;;
+# SCO OpenServer 5.x
+*-*-sco3.2v5*)
+ if test -z "$GCC"; then
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -belf"
+ fi
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm"
+ no_dev_ptmx=1
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE])
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW])
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
+ AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+ AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX])
+ AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME])
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid])
+ MANTYPE=man
+ TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
+ SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE=yes
+ ;;
+*-*-unicosmk*)
+ AC_DEFINE([NO_SSH_LASTLOG], [1],
+ [Define if you don't want to use lastlog in session.c])
+ AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lrsc -lshare -luex -lacm"
+ MANTYPE=cat
+ ;;
+*-*-unicosmp*)
+ AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+ AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lacid -ldb"
+ MANTYPE=cat
+ ;;
+*-*-unicos*)
+ AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
+ AC_DEFINE([NO_SSH_LASTLOG])
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -Wl,-Dmsglevel=334:fatal"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lrsc -lshare -luex -lacm"
+ MANTYPE=cat
+ ;;
+*-dec-osf*)
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Digital Unix SIA])
+ no_osfsia=""
+ AC_ARG_WITH([osfsia],
+ [ --with-osfsia Enable Digital Unix SIA],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([disabled])
+ no_osfsia=1
+ fi
+ ],
+ )
+ if test -z "$no_osfsia" ; then
+ if test -f /etc/sia/matrix.conf; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OSF_SIA], [1],
+ [Define if you have Digital Unix Security
+ Integration Architecture])
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN], [1],
+ [Define if you don't want to use your
+ system's login() call])
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud"
+ SIA_MSG="yes"
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR], ["Nologin"],
+ [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
+ fi
+ fi
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
+ AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON], [1], [Can't do comparisons on readv])
+ ;;
+
+*-*-nto-qnx*)
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
+ AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS])
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
+ AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1], [QNX shadow support is broken])
+ enable_etc_default_login=no # has incompatible /etc/default/login
+ case "$host" in
+ *-*-nto-qnx6*)
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
+ ;;
+ esac
+ ;;
+
+*-*-ultrix*)
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETGROUPS], [1], [getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_MMAP], [1], [Ultrix mmap can't map files])
+ AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP])
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H], [1], [Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix])
+ ;;
+
+*-*-lynxos)
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D__NO_INCLUDE_WARN__"
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETVBUF], [1], [LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation])
+ ;;
+esac
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([compiler and flags for sanity])
+AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]], [[ exit(0); ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** compiler cannot create working executables, check config.log ***])
+ ],
+ [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity]) ]
+)
+
+dnl Checks for header files.
+# Checks for libraries.
+AC_CHECK_FUNC([setsockopt], , [AC_CHECK_LIB([socket], [setsockopt])])
+
+dnl IRIX and Solaris 2.5.1 have dirname() in libgen
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dirname], [AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h])] , [
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [dirname], [
+ AC_CACHE_CHECK([for broken dirname],
+ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname, [
+ save_LIBS="$LIBS"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#include <libgen.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ char *s, buf[32];
+
+ strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32);
+ s = dirname(buf);
+ if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) {
+ exit(1);
+ } else {
+ exit(0);
+ }
+}
+ ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ],
+ )
+ LIBS="$save_LIBS"
+ ])
+ if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DIRNAME])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h])
+ fi
+ ])
+])
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNC([getspnam], ,
+ [AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [getspnam], [LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"])])
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([basename], [gen], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BASENAME], [1],
+ [Define if you have the basename function.])])
+
+dnl zlib is required
+AC_ARG_WITH([zlib],
+ [ --with-zlib=PATH Use zlib in PATH],
+ [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib is required ***])
+ elif test "x$withval" != "xyes"; then
+ if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ else
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ fi
+ if test -d "$withval/include"; then
+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
+ else
+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ fi ]
+)
+
+AC_CHECK_HEADER([zlib.h], ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***])])
+AC_CHECK_LIB([z], [deflate], ,
+ [
+ saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
+ saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ save_LIBS="$LIBS"
+ dnl Check default zlib install dir
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib -R/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lz"
+ AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([deflate], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBZ])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib missing - please install first or check config.log ***])
+ ]
+ )
+ ]
+)
+
+AC_ARG_WITH([zlib-version-check],
+ [ --without-zlib-version-check Disable zlib version check],
+ [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+ zlib_check_nonfatal=1
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for possibly buggy zlib])
+AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <zlib.h>
+ ]],
+ [[
+ int a=0, b=0, c=0, d=0, n, v;
+ n = sscanf(ZLIB_VERSION, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &a, &b, &c, &d);
+ if (n != 3 && n != 4)
+ exit(1);
+ v = a*1000000 + b*10000 + c*100 + d;
+ fprintf(stderr, "found zlib version %s (%d)\n", ZLIB_VERSION, v);
+
+ /* 1.1.4 is OK */
+ if (a == 1 && b == 1 && c >= 4)
+ exit(0);
+
+ /* 1.2.3 and up are OK */
+ if (v >= 1020300)
+ exit(0);
+
+ exit(2);
+ ]])],
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]),
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ if test -z "$zlib_check_nonfatal" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib too old - check config.log ***
+Your reported zlib version has known security problems. It's possible your
+vendor has fixed these problems without changing the version number. If you
+are sure this is the case, you can disable the check by running
+"./configure --without-zlib-version-check".
+If you are in doubt, upgrade zlib to version 1.2.3 or greater.
+See http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ for details.])
+ else
+ AC_MSG_WARN([zlib version may have security problems])
+ fi
+ ],
+ [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking zlib version]) ]
+)
+
+dnl UnixWare 2.x
+AC_CHECK_FUNC([strcasecmp],
+ [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [strcasecmp], [LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"]) ]
+)
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utimes],
+ [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([c89], [utimes], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UTIMES])
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"]) ]
+)
+
+dnl Checks for libutil functions
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsd/libutil.h libutil.h])
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([fmt_scaled], [util bsd])
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([scan_scaled], [util bsd])
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([login], [util bsd])
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logout], [util bsd])
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logwtmp], [util bsd])
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([openpty], [util bsd])
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([updwtmp], [util bsd])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([fmt_scaled scan_scaled login logout openpty updwtmp logwtmp])
+
+# On some platforms, inet_ntop and gethostbyname may be found in libresolv
+# or libnsl.
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([inet_ntop], [resolv nsl])
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([gethostbyname], [resolv nsl])
+
+AC_FUNC_STRFTIME
+
+# Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support])
+AC_EGREP_CPP([FOUNDIT],
+ [
+ #include <glob.h>
+ #ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC
+ FOUNDIT
+ #endif
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC], [1],
+ [Define if your system glob() function has
+ the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ ]
+)
+
+# Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_matchc field in glob_t])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <glob.h> ]],
+ [[ glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1; ]])],
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC], [1],
+ [Define if your system glob() function has
+ gl_matchc options in glob_t])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ ], [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+])
+
+# Check for g.gl_statv glob() extension
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <glob.h> ]], [[
+#ifndef GLOB_KEEPSTAT
+#error "glob does not support GLOB_KEEPSTAT extension"
+#endif
+glob_t g;
+g.gl_statv = NULL;
+]])],
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV], [1],
+ [Define if your system glob() function has
+ gl_statv options in glob_t])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ ], [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+
+])
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([GLOB_NOMATCH], , , [#include <glob.h>])
+
+AC_CHECK_DECL([VIS_ALL], ,
+ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_STRNVIS, 1, [missing VIS_ALL]), [#include <vis.h>])
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name])
+AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <dirent.h>]],
+ [[
+ struct dirent d;
+ exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char));
+ ]])],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME], [1],
+ [Define if your struct dirent expects you to
+ allocate extra space for d_name])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME])
+ ]
+)
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for /proc/pid/fd directory])
+if test -d "/proc/$$/fd" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PROC_PID], [1], [Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+fi
+
+# Check whether user wants S/Key support
+SKEY_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH([skey],
+ [ --with-skey[[=PATH]] Enable S/Key support (optionally in PATH)],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+
+ if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
+ fi
+
+ AC_DEFINE([SKEY], [1], [Define if you want S/Key support])
+ LIBS="-lskey $LIBS"
+ SKEY_MSG="yes"
+
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for s/key support])
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <skey.h>
+ ]], [[
+ char *ff = skey_keyinfo(""); ff="";
+ exit(0);
+ ]])],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing s/key libraries.])
+ ])
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if skeychallenge takes 4 arguments])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <skey.h>
+ ]], [[
+ (void)skeychallenge(NULL,"name","",0);
+ ]])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([SKEYCHALLENGE_4ARG], [1],
+ [Define if your skeychallenge()
+ function takes 4 arguments (NetBSD)])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ ])
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+# Check whether user wants to use ldns
+LDNS_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
+ [ --with-ldns[[=PATH]] Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+
+ if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
+ fi
+
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LDNS, 1, [Define if you want ldns support])
+ LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
+ LDNS_MSG="yes"
+
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ldns support])
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <ldns/ldns.h>
+int main() { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); status=LDNS_STATUS_OK; exit(0); }
+ ]])
+ ],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries.])
+ ])
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+# Check whether user wants libedit support
+LIBEDIT_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH([libedit],
+ [ --with-libedit[[=PATH]] Enable libedit support for sftp],
+ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
+ if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit])
+ if "$PKGCONFIG" libedit; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ use_pkgconfig_for_libedit=yes
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ fi
+ fi
+ else
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ fi
+ if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libedit" = "xyes"; then
+ LIBEDIT=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libedit`
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libedit`"
+ else
+ LIBEDIT="-ledit -lcurses"
+ fi
+ OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBEDIT | sed 's/-ledit//'`
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([edit], [el_init],
+ [ AC_DEFINE([USE_LIBEDIT], [1], [Use libedit for sftp])
+ LIBEDIT_MSG="yes"
+ AC_SUBST([LIBEDIT])
+ ],
+ [ AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit not found]) ],
+ [ $OTHERLIBS ]
+ )
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if libedit version is compatible])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <histedit.h> ]],
+ [[
+ int i = H_SETSIZE;
+ el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ exit(0);
+ ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit version is not compatible]) ]
+ )
+ fi ]
+)
+
+AUDIT_MODULE=none
+AC_ARG_WITH([audit],
+ [ --with-audit=module Enable audit support (modules=debug,bsm,linux)],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for supported audit module])
+ case "$withval" in
+ bsm)
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([bsm])
+ AUDIT_MODULE=bsm
+ dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions
+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsm/audit.h], [],
+ [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found])],
+ [
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+# include <time.h>
+#endif
+ ]
+)
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([bsm], [getaudit], [],
+ [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required library not found])])
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit], [],
+ [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required function not found])])
+ # These are optional
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit_addr aug_get_machine])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_BSM_AUDIT], [1], [Use BSM audit module])
+ if test "$sol2ver" -ge 11; then
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lscf"
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_BSM_API], [1],
+ [The system has incomplete BSM API])
+ fi
+ ;;
+ linux)
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([linux])
+ AUDIT_MODULE=linux
+ dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions
+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libaudit.h])
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit"
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_LINUX_AUDIT], [1], [Use Linux audit module])
+ ;;
+ debug)
+ AUDIT_MODULE=debug
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([debug])
+ AC_DEFINE([SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS], [1], [Use audit debugging module])
+ ;;
+ no)
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ ;;
+ *)
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown audit module $withval])
+ ;;
+ esac ]
+)
+
+AC_ARG_WITH([pie],
+ [ --with-pie Build Position Independent Executables if possible], [
+ if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
+ use_pie=no
+ fi
+ if test "x$withval" = "xyes"; then
+ use_pie=yes
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+if test "x$use_pie" = "x"; then
+ use_pie=no
+fi
+if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" != "x1" && test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
+ # Turn off automatic PIE when toolchain hardening is off.
+ use_pie=no
+fi
+if test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
+ # Automatic PIE requires gcc >= 4.x
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gcc >= 4.x])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#if !defined(__GNUC__) || __GNUC__ < 4
+#error gcc is too old
+#endif
+]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ use_pie=no ]
+)
+fi
+if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then
+ SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ SAVED_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fPIE])
+ OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-pie])
+ # We use both -fPIE and -pie or neither.
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported])
+ if echo "x $CFLAGS" | grep ' -fPIE' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+ echo "x $LDFLAGS" | grep ' -pie' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS"
+ LDFLAGS="$SAVED_LDFLAGS"
+ fi
+fi
+
+dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
+ Blowfish_initstate \
+ Blowfish_expandstate \
+ Blowfish_expand0state \
+ Blowfish_stream2word \
+ asprintf \
+ b64_ntop \
+ __b64_ntop \
+ b64_pton \
+ __b64_pton \
+ bcopy \
+ bcrypt_pbkdf \
+ bindresvport_sa \
+ blf_enc \
+ cap_rights_limit \
+ clock \
+ closefrom \
+ dirfd \
+ endgrent \
+ err \
+ errx \
+ explicit_bzero \
+ fchmod \
+ fchown \
+ freeaddrinfo \
+ fstatfs \
+ fstatvfs \
+ futimes \
+ getaddrinfo \
+ getcwd \
+ getgrouplist \
+ getnameinfo \
+ getopt \
+ getpeereid \
+ getpeerucred \
+ getpgid \
+ getpgrp \
+ _getpty \
+ getrlimit \
+ getttyent \
+ glob \
+ group_from_gid \
+ inet_aton \
+ inet_ntoa \
+ inet_ntop \
+ innetgr \
+ login_getcapbool \
+ md5_crypt \
+ memmove \
+ memset_s \
+ mkdtemp \
+ mmap \
+ ngetaddrinfo \
+ nsleep \
+ ogetaddrinfo \
+ openlog_r \
+ pledge \
+ poll \
+ prctl \
+ pstat \
+ readpassphrase \
+ reallocarray \
+ recvmsg \
+ rresvport_af \
+ sendmsg \
+ setdtablesize \
+ setegid \
+ setenv \
+ seteuid \
+ setgroupent \
+ setgroups \
+ setlinebuf \
+ setlogin \
+ setpassent\
+ setpcred \
+ setproctitle \
+ setregid \
+ setreuid \
+ setrlimit \
+ setsid \
+ setvbuf \
+ sigaction \
+ sigvec \
+ snprintf \
+ socketpair \
+ statfs \
+ statvfs \
+ strdup \
+ strerror \
+ strlcat \
+ strlcpy \
+ strmode \
+ strnlen \
+ strnvis \
+ strptime \
+ strtonum \
+ strtoll \
+ strtoul \
+ strtoull \
+ swap32 \
+ sysconf \
+ tcgetpgrp \
+ timingsafe_bcmp \
+ truncate \
+ unsetenv \
+ updwtmpx \
+ user_from_uid \
+ usleep \
+ vasprintf \
+ vsnprintf \
+ waitpid \
+ warn \
+])
+
+dnl Wide character support. Linux man page says it needs _XOPEN_SOURCE.
+saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE"
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([mblen mbtowc nl_langinfo wcwidth])
+CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM(
+ [[ #include <ctype.h> ]],
+ [[ return (isblank('a')); ]])],
+ [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ISBLANK], [1], [Define if you have isblank(3C).])
+])
+
+disable_pkcs11=
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([pkcs11],
+ [ --disable-pkcs11 disable PKCS#11 support code [no]],
+ [
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+ disable_pkcs11=1
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+# PKCS11 depends on OpenSSL.
+if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" && test "x$disable_pkcs11" = "x"; then
+ # PKCS#11 support requires dlopen() and co
+ AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl],
+ [AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_PKCS11], [], [Enable for PKCS#11 support])]
+ )
+fi
+
+# IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror()
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gai_strerror], [
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GAI_STRERROR])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+
+const char *gai_strerror(int);
+ ]], [[
+ char *str;
+ str = gai_strerror(0);
+ ]])], [
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO], [1],
+ [Define if gai_strerror() returns const char *])], [])])
+
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([nanosleep], [rt posix4], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NANOSLEEP], [1],
+ [Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc])])
+
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([clock_gettime], [rt],
+ [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME], [1], [Have clock_gettime])])
+
+dnl Make sure prototypes are defined for these before using them.
+AC_CHECK_DECL([getrusage], [AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getrusage])])
+AC_CHECK_DECL([strsep],
+ [AC_CHECK_FUNCS([strsep])],
+ [],
+ [
+#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
+# include <string.h>
+#endif
+ ])
+
+dnl tcsendbreak might be a macro
+AC_CHECK_DECL([tcsendbreak],
+ [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_TCSENDBREAK])],
+ [AC_CHECK_FUNCS([tcsendbreak])],
+ [#include <termios.h>]
+)
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([h_errno], , ,[#include <netdb.h>])
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([SHUT_RD], , ,
+ [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+ ])
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([O_NONBLOCK], , ,
+ [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+ ])
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([writev], , , [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+ ])
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([MAXSYMLINKS], , , [
+#include <sys/param.h>
+ ])
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([offsetof], , , [
+#include <stddef.h>
+ ])
+
+# extra bits for select(2)
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([howmany, NFDBITS], [], [], [[
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+#include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+ ]])
+AC_CHECK_TYPES([fd_mask], [], [], [[
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+#include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+ ]])
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresuid], [
+ dnl Some platorms have setresuid that isn't implemented, test for this
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresuid seems to work])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+ ]], [[
+ errno=0;
+ setresuid(0,0,0);
+ if (errno==ENOSYS)
+ exit(1);
+ else
+ exit(0);
+ ]])],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+ [AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESUID], [1],
+ [Define if your setresuid() is broken])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])],
+ [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])]
+ )
+])
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresgid], [
+ dnl Some platorms have setresgid that isn't implemented, test for this
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresgid seems to work])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+ ]], [[
+ errno=0;
+ setresgid(0,0,0);
+ if (errno==ENOSYS)
+ exit(1);
+ else
+ exit(0);
+ ]])],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+ [AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESGID], [1],
+ [Define if your setresgid() is broken])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])],
+ [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])]
+ )
+])
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([realpath], [
+ dnl the sftp v3 spec says SSH_FXP_REALPATH will "canonicalize any given
+ dnl path name", however some implementations of realpath (and some
+ dnl versions of the POSIX spec) do not work on non-existent files,
+ dnl so we use the OpenBSD implementation on those platforms.
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if realpath works with non-existent files])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+ ]], [[
+ char buf[PATH_MAX];
+ if (realpath("/opensshnonexistentfilename1234", buf) == NULL)
+ if (errno == ENOENT)
+ exit(1);
+ exit(0);
+ ]])],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+ [AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_REALPATH], [1],
+ [realpath does not work with nonexistent files])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])],
+ [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming working])]
+ )
+])
+
+dnl Checks for time functions
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gettimeofday time])
+dnl Checks for utmp functions
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutent getutent getutid getutline pututline setutent])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utmpname])
+dnl Checks for utmpx functions
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline getutxuser pututxline])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setutxdb setutxent utmpxname])
+dnl Checks for lastlog functions
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getlastlogxbyname])
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNC([daemon],
+ [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON], [1], [Define if your libraries define daemon()])],
+ [AC_CHECK_LIB([bsd], [daemon],
+ [LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON])])]
+)
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNC([getpagesize],
+ [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE], [1],
+ [Define if your libraries define getpagesize()])],
+ [AC_CHECK_LIB([ucb], [getpagesize],
+ [LIBS="$LIBS -lucb"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE])])]
+)
+
+# Check for broken snprintf
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
+ [[
+ char b[5];
+ snprintf(b,5,"123456789");
+ exit(b[4]!='\0');
+ ]])],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1],
+ [Define if your snprintf is busted])
+ AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor])
+ ],
+ [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ]
+ )
+fi
+
+# We depend on vsnprintf returning the right thing on overflow: the
+# number of characters it tried to create (as per SUSv3)
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ size_t ret;
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ return ret;
+}
+ ]], [[
+char x[1];
+if (x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
+ return 1;
+if (x_snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
+ return 1;
+return 0;
+ ]])],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1],
+ [Define if your snprintf is busted])
+ AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor])
+ ],
+ [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()]) ]
+ )
+fi
+
+# On systems where [v]snprintf is broken, but is declared in stdio,
+# check that the fmt argument is const char * or just char *.
+# This is only useful for when BROKEN_SNPRINTF
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+int snprintf(char *a, size_t b, const char *c, ...) { return 0; }
+ ]], [[
+ snprintf(0, 0, 0);
+ ]])],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [const],
+ [Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt])],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [/* not const */])])
+
+# Check for missing getpeereid (or equiv) support
+NO_PEERCHECK=""
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeereid" != "xyes" -a "x$ac_cv_func_getpeerucred" != "xyes"; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>]], [[int i = SO_PEERCRED;]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SO_PEERCRED], [1], [Have PEERCRED socket option])
+ ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ NO_PEERCHECK=1
+ ])
+fi
+
+dnl see whether mkstemp() requires XXXXXX
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_mkdtemp" = "xyes" ; then
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for (overly) strict mkstemp])
+AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdlib.h>
+ ]], [[
+ char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test";
+ if (mkstemp(template) == -1)
+ exit(1);
+ unlink(template);
+ exit(0);
+ ]])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP], [1], [Silly mkstemp()])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP])
+ ]
+)
+fi
+
+dnl make sure that openpty does not reacquire controlling terminal
+if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if openpty correctly handles controlling tty])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+ ]], [[
+ pid_t pid;
+ int fd, ptyfd, ttyfd, status;
+
+ pid = fork();
+ if (pid < 0) { /* failed */
+ exit(1);
+ } else if (pid > 0) { /* parent */
+ waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
+ if (WIFEXITED(status))
+ exit(WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ else
+ exit(2);
+ } else { /* child */
+ close(0); close(1); close(2);
+ setsid();
+ openpty(&ptyfd, &ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ exit(3); /* Acquired ctty: broken */
+ else
+ exit(0); /* Did not acquire ctty: OK */
+ }
+ ]])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes])
+ ]
+ )
+fi
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
+ test "x$check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#define TEST_PORT "2222"
+ ]], [[
+ int err, sock;
+ struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
+ char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
+
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+
+ err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
+ if (err != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+ continue;
+
+ err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
+ sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+ NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
+
+ if (err != 0) {
+ if (err == EAI_SYSTEM)
+ perror("getnameinfo EAI_SYSTEM");
+ else
+ fprintf(stderr, "getnameinfo failed: %s\n",
+ gai_strerror(err));
+ exit(2);
+ }
+
+ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+ if (sock < 0)
+ perror("socket");
+ if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ if (errno == EBADF)
+ exit(3);
+ }
+ }
+ exit(0);
+ ]])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes])
+ ]
+ )
+fi
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
+ test "x$check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#define TEST_PORT "2222"
+ ]], [[
+ int err, sock;
+ struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
+ char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
+
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+
+ err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
+ if (err != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+ continue;
+
+ err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
+ sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+ NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
+
+ if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET && err != 0) {
+ perror("getnameinfo");
+ exit(2);
+ }
+ }
+ exit(0);
+ ]])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK], [1],
+ [Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails
+ for the all-zeros IPv6 address])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming no])
+ ]
+ )
+fi
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes"; then
+ AC_CHECK_DECLS(AI_NUMERICSERV, , ,
+ [#include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/socket.h>
+ #include <netdb.h>])
+fi
+
+if test "x$check_for_conflicting_getspnam" = "x1"; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <shadow.h> ]],
+ [[ exit(0); ]])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS], [1],
+ [Conflicting defs for getspnam])
+ ]
+ )
+fi
+
+AC_FUNC_GETPGRP
+
+# Search for OpenSSL
+saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
+saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-dir],
+ [ --with-ssl-dir=PATH Specify path to OpenSSL installation ],
+ [
+ if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-ssl-dir when OpenSSL disabled])
+ fi
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ case "$withval" in
+ # Relative paths
+ ./*|../*) withval="`pwd`/$withval"
+ esac
+ if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ elif test -d "$withval/lib64"; then
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 -R${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ else
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ fi
+ if test -d "$withval/include"; then
+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
+ else
+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+AC_ARG_WITH([openssl-header-check],
+ [ --without-openssl-header-check Disable OpenSSL version consistency check],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+ openssl_check_nonfatal=1
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+openssl_engine=no
+AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-engine],
+ [ --with-ssl-engine Enable OpenSSL (hardware) ENGINE support ],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-ssl-engine when OpenSSL disabled])
+ fi
+ openssl_engine=yes
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+ LIBS="-lcrypto $LIBS"
+ AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([RAND_add], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OPENSSL], [1],
+ [Define if your ssl headers are included
+ with #include <openssl/header.h>])],
+ [
+ dnl Check default openssl install dir
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/ssl/lib -R/usr/local/ssl/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/ssl/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/ssl/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}"
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER([openssl/opensslv.h], ,
+ [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** OpenSSL headers missing - please install first or check config.log ***])])
+ AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([RAND_add], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OPENSSL])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Can't find recent OpenSSL libcrypto (see config.log for details) ***])
+ ]
+ )
+ ]
+ )
+
+ # Determine OpenSSL header version
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL header version])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+ #define DATA "conftest.sslincver"
+ ]], [[
+ FILE *fd;
+ int rc;
+
+ fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
+ if(fd == NULL)
+ exit(1);
+
+ if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n",
+ (unsigned long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER,
+ OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) < 0)
+ exit(1);
+
+ exit(0);
+ ]])],
+ [
+ ssl_header_ver=`cat conftest.sslincver`
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_header_ver])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL version header not found.])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
+ ]
+ )
+
+ # Determine OpenSSL library version
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL library version])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #define DATA "conftest.ssllibver"
+ ]], [[
+ FILE *fd;
+ int rc;
+
+ fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
+ if(fd == NULL)
+ exit(1);
+
+ if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n", (unsigned long)SSLeay(),
+ SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION))) < 0)
+ exit(1);
+
+ exit(0);
+ ]])],
+ [
+ ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver`
+ # Check version is supported.
+ case "$ssl_library_ver" in
+ 0090[[0-7]]*|009080[[0-5]]*)
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 0.9.8f required (have "$ssl_library_ver")])
+ ;;
+ *) ;;
+ esac
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_library_ver])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL library not found.])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
+ ]
+ )
+
+ # Sanity check OpenSSL headers
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's headers match the library])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ ]], [[
+ exit(SSLeay() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1);
+ ]])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ if test "x$openssl_check_nonfatal" = "x"; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
+ library. Check config.log for details.
+ If you are sure your installation is consistent, you can disable the check
+ by running "./configure --without-openssl-header-check".
+ Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.
+ ])
+ else
+ AC_MSG_WARN([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
+ library. Check config.log for details.
+ Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.])
+ fi
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
+ ]
+ )
+
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL functions will link])
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <openssl/evp.h> ]],
+ [[ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ]])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -ldl"
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl])
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <openssl/evp.h> ]],
+ [[ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ]])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+ ]
+ )
+ ]
+ )
+
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
+ BN_is_prime_ex \
+ DSA_generate_parameters_ex \
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex \
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex \
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init \
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup \
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex \
+ HMAC_CTX_init \
+ RSA_generate_key_ex \
+ RSA_get_default_method \
+ ])
+
+ if test "x$openssl_engine" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for OpenSSL ENGINE support])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <openssl/engine.h>
+ ]], [[
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+ ENGINE_register_all_complete();
+ ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE], [1],
+ [Enable OpenSSL engine support])
+ ], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL ENGINE support not found])
+ ])
+ fi
+
+ # Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support])
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ ]], [[
+ exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);
+ ]])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES], [1],
+ [libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions])
+ ]
+ )
+
+ # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*ctr
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP])
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ ]], [[
+ exit(EVP_aes_128_ctr() == NULL ||
+ EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL ||
+ EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);
+ ]])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR], [1],
+ [libcrypto has EVP AES CTR])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ ]
+ )
+
+ # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*gcm
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP])
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ ]], [[
+ exit(EVP_aes_128_gcm() == NULL ||
+ EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL ||
+ EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED == 0 ||
+ EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN == 0 ||
+ EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG == 0 ||
+ EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG == 0 ||
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(NULL, 0, 0, NULL) == 0);
+ ]])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM], [1],
+ [libcrypto has EVP AES GCM])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_cipers \
+ aes128-gcm at openssh.com \
+ aes256-gcm at openssh.com"
+ ]
+ )
+
+ AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl], [crypto],
+ [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL], [1],
+ [Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl])])
+
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int])
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ ]], [[
+ if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0))
+ exit(0);
+ ]])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID], [1],
+ [Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void])
+ ]
+ )
+
+ # Some systems want crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the version in OpenSSL,
+ # because the system crypt() is more featureful.
+ if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_before" = "x1"; then
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt])
+ fi
+
+ # Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the
+ # version in OpenSSL.
+ if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt], [LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"])
+ fi
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([crypt DES_crypt])
+
+ # Search for SHA256 support in libc and/or OpenSSL
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([SHA256_Update EVP_sha256], ,
+ [unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
+ hmac-sha2-256 \
+ hmac-sha2-512 \
+ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 \
+ hmac-sha2-256-etm at openssh.com \
+ hmac-sha2-512-etm at openssh.com"
+ ]
+ )
+ # Search for RIPE-MD support in OpenSSL
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([EVP_ripemd160], ,
+ [unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
+ hmac-ripemd160 \
+ hmac-ripemd160 at openssh.com \
+ hmac-ripemd160-etm at openssh.com"
+ ]
+ )
+
+ # Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1])
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <openssl/ec.h>
+ #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+ #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/objects.h>
+ #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */
+ # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code"
+ #endif
+ ]], [[
+ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+ const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */
+ ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ enable_nistp256=1 ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
+ )
+
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1])
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <openssl/ec.h>
+ #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+ #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/objects.h>
+ #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */
+ # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code"
+ #endif
+ ]], [[
+ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1);
+ const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */
+ ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ enable_nistp384=1 ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
+ )
+
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1])
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <openssl/ec.h>
+ #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+ #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/objects.h>
+ #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */
+ # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code"
+ #endif
+ ]], [[
+ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
+ const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
+ ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <openssl/ec.h>
+ #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+ #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/objects.h>
+ #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+ ]],[[
+ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
+ const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
+ exit(e == NULL || m == NULL);
+ ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ enable_nistp521=1 ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross-compiling: assuming yes])
+ enable_nistp521=1 ]
+ )],
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ )
+
+ COMMENT_OUT_ECC="#no ecc#"
+ TEST_SSH_ECC=no
+
+ if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1 || test x$enable_nistp384 = x1 || \
+ test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
+ AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC, [1], [OpenSSL has ECC])
+ fi
+ if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1; then
+ AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256], [1],
+ [libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1])
+ TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
+ COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
+ else
+ unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 \
+ ecdh-sha2-nistp256 \
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
+ fi
+ if test x$enable_nistp384 = x1; then
+ AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp384r1])
+ TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
+ COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
+ else
+ unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \
+ ecdh-sha2-nistp384 \
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
+ fi
+ if test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
+ AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp521r1])
+ TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
+ COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
+ else
+ unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
+ ecdh-sha2-nistp521 \
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 \
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
+ fi
+
+ AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_ECC])
+ AC_SUBST([COMMENT_OUT_ECC])
+else
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt], [LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"])
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([crypt])
+fi
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
+ arc4random \
+ arc4random_buf \
+ arc4random_stir \
+ arc4random_uniform \
+])
+
+saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+AC_CHECK_LIB([iaf], [ia_openinfo], [
+ LIBS="$LIBS -liaf"
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([set_id], [SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -liaf"
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBIAF], [1],
+ [Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id])
+ ])
+])
+LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+
+### Configure cryptographic random number support
+
+# Check wheter OpenSSL seeds itself
+if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
+ ]], [[
+ exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1);
+ ]])],
+ [
+ OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])
+ # This is safe, since we will fatal() at runtime if
+ # OpenSSL is not seeded correctly.
+ OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
+ ]
+ )
+fi
+
+# PRNGD TCP socket
+AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-port],
+ [ --with-prngd-port=PORT read entropy from PRNGD/EGD TCP localhost:PORT],
+ [
+ case "$withval" in
+ no)
+ withval=""
+ ;;
+ [[0-9]]*)
+ ;;
+ *)
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify a numeric port number for --with-prngd-port])
+ ;;
+ esac
+ if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
+ PRNGD_PORT="$withval"
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_PORT], [$PRNGD_PORT],
+ [Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket])
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+# PRNGD Unix domain socket
+AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-socket],
+ [ --with-prngd-socket=FILE read entropy from PRNGD/EGD socket FILE (default=/var/run/egd-pool)],
+ [
+ case "$withval" in
+ yes)
+ withval="/var/run/egd-pool"
+ ;;
+ no)
+ withval=""
+ ;;
+ /*)
+ ;;
+ *)
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify an absolute path to the entropy socket])
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+ if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
+ if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([You may not specify both a PRNGD/EGD port and socket])
+ fi
+ if test ! -r "$withval" ; then
+ AC_MSG_WARN([Entropy socket is not readable])
+ fi
+ PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval"
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"],
+ [Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket])
+ fi
+ ],
+ [
+ # Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already
+ if test "x$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" != "xyes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for PRNGD/EGD socket])
+ # Insert other locations here
+ for sock in /var/run/egd-pool /dev/egd-pool /etc/entropy; do
+ if test -r $sock && $TEST_MINUS_S_SH -c "test -S $sock -o -p $sock" ; then
+ PRNGD_SOCKET="$sock"
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"])
+ break;
+ fi
+ done
+ if test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([$PRNGD_SOCKET])
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
+ fi
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+# Which randomness source do we use?
+if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
+ RAND_MSG="PRNGd port $PRNGD_PORT"
+elif test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
+ RAND_MSG="PRNGd socket $PRNGD_SOCKET"
+elif test ! -z "$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY], [1],
+ [Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only])
+ RAND_MSG="OpenSSL internal ONLY"
+elif test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
+ AC_MSG_WARN([OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible])
+else
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSH has no source of random numbers. Please configure OpenSSL with an entropy source or re-run configure using one of the --with-prngd-port or --with-prngd-socket options])
+fi
+
+# Check for PAM libs
+PAM_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
+ [ --with-pam Enable PAM support ],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([PAM headers not found])
+ fi
+
+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlopen], , )
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([pam], [pam_set_item], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libpam missing])])
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_getenvlist])
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_putenv])
+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+
+ PAM_MSG="yes"
+
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
+ [Define if you want to enable PAM support])
+
+ if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then
+ case "$LIBS" in
+ *-ldl*)
+ # libdl already in LIBS
+ ;;
+ *)
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
+ ;;
+ esac
+ fi
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+# Check for older PAM
+if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
+ # Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM)
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pam_strerror takes only one argument])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
+#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
+#endif
+ ]], [[
+(void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1);
+ ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])], [
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OLD_PAM], [1],
+ [Define if you have an old version of PAM
+ which takes only one argument to pam_strerror])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ PAM_MSG="yes (old library)"
+
+ ])
+fi
+
+case "$host" in
+*-*-cygwin*)
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+ ;;
+*)
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd
+ ;;
+esac
+AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-user],
+ [ --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation],
+ [
+ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=$withval
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+if test "x$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" = "xCYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], [CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER],
+ [Cygwin function to fetch non-privileged user for privilege separation])
+else
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], ["$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"],
+ [non-privileged user for privilege separation])
+fi
+AC_SUBST([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER])
+
+if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then
+AC_CHECK_DECL([SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER], [have_seccomp_filter=1], , [
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <linux/seccomp.h>
+])
+fi
+if test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" ; then
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([kernel for seccomp_filter support])
+AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <elf.h>
+ #include <linux/audit.h>
+ #include <linux/seccomp.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <sys/prctl.h>
+ ]],
+ [[ int i = $seccomp_audit_arch;
+ errno = 0;
+ prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0);
+ exit(errno == EFAULT ? 0 : 1); ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ # Disable seccomp filter as a target
+ have_seccomp_filter=0
+ ]
+)
+fi
+
+# Decide which sandbox style to use
+sandbox_arg=""
+AC_ARG_WITH([sandbox],
+ [ --with-sandbox=style Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, capsicum, darwin, rlimit, seccomp_filter, systrace, pledge)],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+ sandbox_arg=""
+ else
+ sandbox_arg="$withval"
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+# Some platforms (seems to be the ones that have a kernel poll(2)-type
+# function with which they implement select(2)) use an extra file descriptor
+# when calling select(2), which means we can't use the rlimit sandbox.
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if select works with descriptor rlimit])
+AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+ ]],[[
+ struct rlimit rl_zero;
+ int fd, r;
+ fd_set fds;
+ struct timeval tv;
+
+ fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
+ FD_ZERO(&fds);
+ FD_SET(fd, &fds);
+ rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+ setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero);
+ setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
+ tv.tv_sec = 1;
+ tv.tv_usec = 0;
+ r = select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
+ exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
+ ]])],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ select_works_with_rlimit=yes],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ select_works_with_rlimit=no],
+ [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])]
+)
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works])
+AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+ ]],[[
+ struct rlimit rl_zero;
+ int fd, r;
+ fd_set fds;
+
+ rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+ r = setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
+ exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
+ ]])],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no],
+ [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])]
+)
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works])
+AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+ ]],[[
+ struct rlimit rl_zero;
+
+ rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+ exit(setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) != 0);
+ ]])],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ AC_DEFINE(SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE, 1,
+ [setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works])],
+ [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])]
+)
+
+if test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xpledge" || \
+ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" = "xyes" ) ; then
+ test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" != "xyes" && \
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([pledge sandbox requires pledge(2) support])
+ SANDBOX_STYLE="pledge"
+ AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_PLEDGE], [1], [Sandbox using pledge(2)])
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsystrace" || \
+ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" = "x1" ) ; then
+ test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" != "x1" && \
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([systrace sandbox requires systrace headers and SYSTR_POLICY_KILL support])
+ SANDBOX_STYLE="systrace"
+ AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SYSTRACE], [1], [Sandbox using systrace(4)])
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" || \
+ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = "xyes" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = "xyes") ; then
+ test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" != "xyes" -o \
+ "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" != "xyes" && \
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function])
+ SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin"
+ AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_DARWIN], [1], [Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3)])
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \
+ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
+ test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_elf_h" = "xyes" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" = "xyes" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" = "xyes" && \
+ test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" && \
+ test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = "xyes" ) ; then
+ test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" = "x" && \
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox not supported on $host])
+ test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" != "x1" && \
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS])
+ test "x$have_seccomp_filter" != "x1" && \
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires seccomp headers])
+ test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" != "xyes" && \
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function])
+ SANDBOX_STYLE="seccomp_filter"
+ AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER], [1], [Sandbox using seccomp filter])
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \
+ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capability_h" = "xyes" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capability_h" != "xyes" && \
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires sys/capability.h header])
+ test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function])
+ SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum"
+ AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_CAPSICUM], [1], [Sandbox using capsicum])
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \
+ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \
+ test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \
+ test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then
+ test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires setrlimit function])
+ test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" != "xyes" && \
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires select to work with rlimit])
+ SANDBOX_STYLE="rlimit"
+ AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_RLIMIT], [1], [Sandbox using setrlimit(2)])
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsolaris" || \
+ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$SOLARIS_PRIVS" = "xyes" ) ; then
+ SANDBOX_STYLE="solaris"
+ AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SOLARIS], [1], [Sandbox using Solaris/Illumos privileges])
+elif test -z "$sandbox_arg" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xno" || \
+ test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnone" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnull" ; then
+ SANDBOX_STYLE="none"
+ AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_NULL], [1], [no privsep sandboxing])
+else
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([unsupported --with-sandbox])
+fi
+
+# Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right.
+if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then
+ LIBS="$LIBS -liberty";
+fi
+
+# Check for long long datatypes
+AC_CHECK_TYPES([long long, unsigned long long, long double])
+
+# Check datatype sizes
+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([short int], [2])
+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([int], [4])
+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long int], [4])
+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long long int], [8])
+
+# Sanity check long long for some platforms (AIX)
+if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x4" ; then
+ ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0
+fi
+
+# compute LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX if we don't know them.
+if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for max value of long long])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Why is this so damn hard? */
+#ifdef __GNUC__
+# undef __GNUC__
+#endif
+#define __USE_ISOC99
+#include <limits.h>
+#define DATA "conftest.llminmax"
+#define my_abs(a) ((a) < 0 ? ((a) * -1) : (a))
+
+/*
+ * printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so
+ * we do this the hard way.
+ */
+static int
+fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ int l[sizeof(long long) * 8];
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0)
+ return -1;
+ for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) {
+ l[i] = my_abs(n % 10);
+ n /= 10;
+ }
+ do {
+ if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ } while (i != 0);
+ if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+ ]], [[
+ FILE *f;
+ long long i, llmin, llmax = 0;
+
+ if((f = fopen(DATA,"w")) == NULL)
+ exit(1);
+
+#if defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LLONG_MAX)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Using system header for LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
+ llmin = LLONG_MIN;
+ llmax = LLONG_MAX;
+#else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Calculating LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
+ /* This will work on one's complement and two's complement */
+ for (i = 1; i > llmax; i <<= 1, i++)
+ llmax = i;
+ llmin = llmax + 1LL; /* wrap */
+#endif
+
+ /* Sanity check */
+ if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax
+ || llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0
+ || llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) {
+ fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n");
+ exit(2);
+ }
+
+ if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0)
+ exit(3);
+ if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0)
+ exit(4);
+ if (fclose(f) < 0)
+ exit(5);
+ exit(0);
+ ]])],
+ [
+ llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax`
+ llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax`
+
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_max])
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MAX], [${llong_max}LL],
+ [max value of long long calculated by configure])
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for min value of long long])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_min])
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MIN], [${llong_min}LL],
+ [min value of long long calculated by configure])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
+ ]
+ )
+fi
+
+
+# More checks for data types
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int type], ac_cv_have_u_int, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
+ [[ u_int a; a = 1;]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_u_int="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT], [1], [define if you have u_int data type])
+ have_u_int=1
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_intxx_t, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
+ [[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have intxx_t data type])
+ have_intxx_t=1
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
+then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t types in stdint.h])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdint.h> ]],
+ [[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ ])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for int64_t type], ac_cv_have_int64_t, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
+# include <sys/bitypes.h>
+#endif
+ ]], [[
+int64_t a; a = 1;
+ ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have int64_t data type])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
+ [[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have u_intxx_t data type])
+ have_u_intxx_t=1
+fi
+
+if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/socket.h> ]],
+ [[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ ])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int64_t types], ac_cv_have_u_int64_t, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
+ [[ u_int64_t a; a = 1;]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have u_int64_t data type])
+ have_u_int64_t=1
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_u_int64_t" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
+then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/bitypes.h> ]],
+ [[ u_int64_t a; a = 1]])],
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ ])
+fi
+
+if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
+ AC_CACHE_CHECK([for uintXX_t types], ac_cv_have_uintxx_t, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+ ]], [[
+ uint8_t a;
+ uint16_t b;
+ uint32_t c;
+ a = b = c = 1;
+ ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="no"
+ ])
+ ])
+ if test "x$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T], [1],
+ [define if you have uintxx_t data type])
+ fi
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
+then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in stdint.h])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdint.h> ]],
+ [[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ ])
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_inttypes_h" = "xyes")
+then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <inttypes.h> ]],
+ [[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ ])
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" || test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
+then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/bitypes.h>
+ ]], [[
+ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c;
+ u_int8_t e; u_int16_t f; u_int32_t g;
+ a = b = c = e = f = g = 1;
+ ]])],
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T])
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ ])
+fi
+
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_char], ac_cv_have_u_char, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
+ [[ u_char foo; foo = 125; ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_u_char="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_char="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_char" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_CHAR], [1], [define if you have u_char data type])
+fi
+
+AC_CHECK_TYPES([intmax_t, uintmax_t], , , [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+])
+
+TYPE_SOCKLEN_T
+
+AC_CHECK_TYPES([sig_atomic_t], , , [#include <signal.h>])
+AC_CHECK_TYPES([fsblkcnt_t, fsfilcnt_t], , , [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
+#include <sys/bitypes.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
+#include <sys/statfs.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+])
+
+AC_CHECK_TYPES([in_addr_t, in_port_t], , ,
+[#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>])
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for size_t], ac_cv_have_size_t, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
+ [[ size_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_size_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_size_t="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_size_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SIZE_T], [1], [define if you have size_t data type])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ssize_t], ac_cv_have_ssize_t, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
+ [[ ssize_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SSIZE_T], [1], [define if you have ssize_t data type])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for clock_t], ac_cv_have_clock_t, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <time.h> ]],
+ [[ clock_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_clock_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_T], [1], [define if you have clock_t data type])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for sa_family_t], ac_cv_have_sa_family_t, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+ ]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ],
+ [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+ ]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no" ]
+ )
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T], [1],
+ [define if you have sa_family_t data type])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for pid_t], ac_cv_have_pid_t, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
+ [[ pid_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PID_T], [1], [define if you have pid_t data type])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for mode_t], ac_cv_have_mode_t, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
+ [[ mode_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_mode_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MODE_T], [1], [define if you have mode_t data type])
+fi
+
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+ ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE], [1],
+ [define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_in6], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+ ]], [[ struct sockaddr_in6 s; s.sin6_family = 0; ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6], [1],
+ [define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct in6_addr], ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+ ]], [[ struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0; ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR], [1],
+ [define if you have struct in6_addr data type])
+
+dnl Now check for sin6_scope_id
+ AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct sockaddr_in6.sin6_scope_id], , ,
+ [
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+ ])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct addrinfo], ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+ ]], [[ struct addrinfo s; s.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO], [1],
+ [define if you have struct addrinfo data type])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct timeval], ac_cv_have_struct_timeval, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/time.h> ]],
+ [[ struct timeval tv; tv.tv_sec = 1;]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL], [1], [define if you have struct timeval])
+ have_struct_timeval=1
+fi
+
+AC_CHECK_TYPES([struct timespec])
+
+# We need int64_t or else certian parts of the compile will fail.
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then
+ echo "OpenSSH requires int64_t support. Contact your vendor or install"
+ echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing."
+ echo ""
+ exit 1;
+else
+dnl test snprintf (broken on SCO w/gcc)
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+main()
+{
+ char buf[50];
+ char expected_out[50];
+ int mazsize = 50 ;
+#if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
+ long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff;
+#else
+ long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll;
+#endif
+ strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807");
+ snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num);
+ if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0)
+ exit(1);
+ exit(0);
+}
+#else
+main() { exit(0); }
+#endif
+ ]])], [ true ], [ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF]) ],
+ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()])
+ )
+fi
+
+dnl Checks for structure members
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmp.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([syslen], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_pid], [utmp.h], [HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_exit], [utmp.h], [HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX])
+
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_blksize])
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct passwd.pw_gecos, struct passwd.pw_class,
+struct passwd.pw_change, struct passwd.pw_expire],
+[], [], [[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+]])
+
+AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct __res_state.retrans], [], [AC_DEFINE([__res_state], [state],
+ [Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h])],
+[[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+]])
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage],
+ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+ ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.ss_family = 1; ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1], [Fields in struct sockaddr_storage])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage],
+ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+ ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.__ss_family = 1; ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1],
+ [Fields in struct sockaddr_storage])
+fi
+
+dnl make sure we're using the real structure members and not defines
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr],
+ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+ ]], [[
+#ifdef msg_accrights
+#error "msg_accrights is a macro"
+exit(1);
+#endif
+struct msghdr m;
+m.msg_accrights = 0;
+exit(0);
+ ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR], [1],
+ [Define if your system uses access rights style
+ file descriptor passing])
+fi
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+ ]], [[ struct statvfs s; s.f_fsid = 0; ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if fsid_t has member val])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+ ]], [[ fsid_t t; t.val[0] = 0; ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS_VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member val]) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ])
+
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if f_fsid has member __val])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+ ]], [[ fsid_t t; t.__val[0] = 0; ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS___VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member __val]) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ])
+])
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_control field in struct msghdr],
+ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+ ]], [[
+#ifdef msg_control
+#error "msg_control is a macro"
+exit(1);
+#endif
+struct msghdr m;
+m.msg_control = 0;
+exit(0);
+ ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR], [1],
+ [Define if your system uses ancillary data style
+ file descriptor passing])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines __progname], ac_cv_libc_defines___progname, [
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]],
+ [[ extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname); ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE___PROGNAME], [1], [Define if libc defines __progname])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__], ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__, [
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
+ [[ printf("%s", __FUNCTION__); ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE___FUNCTION__], [1],
+ [Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __func__], ac_cv_cc_implements___func__, [
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
+ [[ printf("%s", __func__); ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE___func__], [1], [Define if compiler implements __func__])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether va_copy exists], ac_cv_have_va_copy, [
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdarg.h>
+va_list x,y;
+ ]], [[ va_copy(x,y); ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_va_copy="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_va_copy="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_VA_COPY], [1], [Define if va_copy exists])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether __va_copy exists], ac_cv_have___va_copy, [
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdarg.h>
+va_list x,y;
+ ]], [[ __va_copy(x,y); ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have___va_copy="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have___va_copy="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have___va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE___VA_COPY], [1], [Define if __va_copy exists])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether getopt has optreset support],
+ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset, [
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <getopt.h> ]],
+ [[ extern int optreset; optreset = 0; ]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET], [1],
+ [Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_errlist], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist, [
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]],
+[[ extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);]])],
+ [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST], [1],
+ [Define if your system defines sys_errlist[]])
+fi
+
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_nerr], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr, [
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]],
+[[ extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);]])],
+ [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_NERR], [1], [Define if your system defines sys_nerr])
+fi
+
+# Check libraries needed by DNS fingerprint support
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([getrrsetbyname], [resolv],
+ [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME], [1],
+ [Define if getrrsetbyname() exists])],
+ [
+ # Needed by our getrrsetbyname()
+ AC_SEARCH_LIBS([res_query], [resolv])
+ AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv])
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if res_query will link])
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+ ]], [[
+ res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ ]])],
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]),
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for res_query in -lresolv])
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+ ]], [[
+ res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ ]])],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+ [LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])])
+ ])
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([_getshort _getlong])
+ AC_CHECK_DECLS([_getshort, _getlong], , ,
+ [#include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <arpa/nameser.h>])
+ AC_CHECK_MEMBER([HEADER.ad],
+ [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_HEADER_AD], [1],
+ [Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h])], ,
+ [#include <arpa/nameser.h>])
+ ])
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct __res_state _res is an extern])
+AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+extern struct __res_state _res;
+ ]], [[
+struct __res_state *volatile p = &_res; /* force resolution of _res */
+return 0;
+ ]],)],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE__RES_EXTERN], [1],
+ [Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern])
+ ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
+)
+
+# Check whether user wants SELinux support
+SELINUX_MSG="no"
+LIBSELINUX=""
+AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
+ [ --with-selinux Enable SELinux support],
+ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ save_LIBS="$LIBS"
+ AC_DEFINE([WITH_SELINUX], [1],
+ [Define if you want SELinux support.])
+ SELINUX_MSG="yes"
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER([selinux/selinux.h], ,
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires selinux.h header]))
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([selinux], [setexeccon],
+ [ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux"
+ ],
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires libselinux library]))
+ SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level])
+ LIBS="$save_LIBS"
+ fi ]
+)
+AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS])
+AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
+
+# Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
+KRB5_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
+ [ --with-kerberos5=PATH Enable Kerberos 5 support],
+ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+ KRB5ROOT="/usr/local"
+ else
+ KRB5ROOT=${withval}
+ fi
+
+ AC_DEFINE([KRB5], [1], [Define if you want Kerberos 5 support])
+ KRB5_MSG="yes"
+
+ AC_PATH_PROG([KRB5CONF], [krb5-config],
+ [$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config],
+ [$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH])
+ if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then
+ K5CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags`"
+ K5LIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs`"
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS"
+
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gssapi support])
+ if $KRB5CONF | grep gssapi >/dev/null ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI], [1],
+ [Define this if you want GSSAPI
+ support in the version 2 protocol])
+ GSSCFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags gssapi`"
+ GSSLIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs gssapi`"
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS"
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ fi
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <krb5.h>
+ ]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL], [1],
+ [Define this if you are using the Heimdal
+ version of Kerberos V5]) ],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ ])
+ else
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <krb5.h>
+ ]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL])
+ K5LIBS="-lkrb5"
+ K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lcom_err -lasn1"
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([roken], [net_write],
+ [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lroken"])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([des], [des_cbc_encrypt],
+ [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -ldes"])
+ ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ K5LIBS="-lkrb5 -lk5crypto -lcom_err"
+ ])
+ AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv])
+
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi_krb5], [gss_init_sec_context],
+ [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
+ GSSLIBS="-lgssapi_krb5" ],
+ [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi], [gss_init_sec_context],
+ [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
+ GSSLIBS="-lgssapi" ],
+ [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gss], [gss_init_sec_context],
+ [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
+ GSSLIBS="-lgss" ],
+ AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail]))
+ ])
+ ])
+
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi.h], ,
+ [ unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h], ,
+ AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail])
+ )
+ ]
+ )
+
+ oldCPP="$CPPFLAGS"
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi_krb5.h], ,
+ [ CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP" ])
+
+ fi
+ if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -R${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
+ fi
+ if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
+ blibpath="$blibpath:${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
+ fi
+
+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h])
+
+ AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1],
+ [Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])])
+
+ AC_CHECK_DECLS([GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE], [], [], [[
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
+# include <gssapi.h>
+#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H)
+# include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+# include <gssapi_generic.h>
+#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H)
+# include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
+#endif
+ ]])
+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+ LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS"
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([krb5_cc_new_unique krb5_get_error_message krb5_free_error_message])
+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
+AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
+
+# Looking for programs, paths and files
+
+PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
+AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-path],
+ [ --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot (default=/var/empty)],
+ [
+ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=$withval
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_SUBST([PRIVSEP_PATH])
+
+AC_ARG_WITH([xauth],
+ [ --with-xauth=PATH Specify path to xauth program ],
+ [
+ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ xauth_path=$withval
+ fi
+ ],
+ [
+ TestPath="$PATH"
+ TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X/bin"
+ TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/bin/X11"
+ TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X11R6/bin"
+ TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/openwin/bin"
+ AC_PATH_PROG([xauth_path], [xauth], , [$TestPath])
+ if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then
+ xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth"
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+STRIP_OPT=-s
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([strip],
+ [ --disable-strip Disable calling strip(1) on install],
+ [
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+ STRIP_OPT=
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_SUBST([STRIP_OPT])
+
+if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then
+ XAUTH_PATH="undefined"
+ AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH])
+else
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([XAUTH_PATH], ["$xauth_path"],
+ [Define if xauth is found in your path])
+ XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path
+ AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH])
+fi
+
+dnl # --with-maildir=/path/to/mail gets top priority.
+dnl # if maildir is set in the platform case statement above we use that.
+dnl # Otherwise we run a program to get the dir from system headers.
+dnl # We first look for _PATH_MAILDIR then MAILDIR then _PATH_MAIL
+dnl # If we find _PATH_MAILDIR we do nothing because that is what
+dnl # session.c expects anyway. Otherwise we set to the value found
+dnl # stripping any trailing slash. If for some strage reason our program
+dnl # does not find what it needs, we default to /var/spool/mail.
+# Check for mail directory
+AC_ARG_WITH([maildir],
+ [ --with-maildir=/path/to/mail Specify your system mail directory],
+ [
+ if test "X$withval" != X && test "x$withval" != xno && \
+ test "x${withval}" != xyes; then
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$withval"],
+ [Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR])
+ fi
+ ],[
+ if test "X$maildir" != "X"; then
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"])
+ else
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([Discovering system mail directory])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
+#include <maillock.h>
+#endif
+#define DATA "conftest.maildir"
+ ]], [[
+ FILE *fd;
+ int rc;
+
+ fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
+ if(fd == NULL)
+ exit(1);
+
+#if defined (_PATH_MAILDIR)
+ if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAILDIR:%s\n", _PATH_MAILDIR)) <0)
+ exit(1);
+#elif defined (MAILDIR)
+ if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"MAILDIR:%s\n", MAILDIR)) <0)
+ exit(1);
+#elif defined (_PATH_MAIL)
+ if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAIL:%s\n", _PATH_MAIL)) <0)
+ exit(1);
+#else
+ exit (2);
+#endif
+
+ exit(0);
+ ]])],
+ [
+ maildir_what=`awk -F: '{print $1}' conftest.maildir`
+ maildir=`awk -F: '{print $2}' conftest.maildir \
+ | sed 's|/$||'`
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: $maildir from $maildir_what])
+ if test "x$maildir_what" != "x_PATH_MAILDIR"; then
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"])
+ fi
+ ],
+ [
+ if test "X$ac_status" = "X2";then
+# our test program didn't find it. Default to /var/spool/mail
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: default value of /var/spool/mail])
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["/var/spool/mail"])
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([*** not found ***])
+ fi
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail])
+ ]
+ )
+ fi
+ ]
+) # maildir
+
+if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then
+ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test])
+ disable_ptmx_check=yes
+fi
+if test -z "$no_dev_ptmx" ; then
+ if test "x$disable_ptmx_check" != "xyes" ; then
+ AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptmx"],
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTMX], [1],
+ [Define if you have /dev/ptmx])
+ have_dev_ptmx=1
+ ]
+ )
+ fi
+fi
+
+if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" != "xyes"; then
+ AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptc"],
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC], [1],
+ [Define if you have /dev/ptc])
+ have_dev_ptc=1
+ ]
+ )
+else
+ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test])
+fi
+
+# Options from here on. Some of these are preset by platform above
+AC_ARG_WITH([mantype],
+ [ --with-mantype=man|cat|doc Set man page type],
+ [
+ case "$withval" in
+ man|cat|doc)
+ MANTYPE=$withval
+ ;;
+ *)
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid man type: $withval])
+ ;;
+ esac
+ ]
+)
+if test -z "$MANTYPE"; then
+ TestPath="/usr/bin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/ucb"
+ AC_PATH_PROGS([NROFF], [nroff awf], [/bin/false], [$TestPath])
+ if ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ MANTYPE=doc
+ elif ${NROFF} -man ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ MANTYPE=man
+ else
+ MANTYPE=cat
+ fi
+fi
+AC_SUBST([MANTYPE])
+if test "$MANTYPE" = "doc"; then
+ mansubdir=man;
+else
+ mansubdir=$MANTYPE;
+fi
+AC_SUBST([mansubdir])
+
+# Check whether to enable MD5 passwords
+MD5_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH([md5-passwords],
+ [ --with-md5-passwords Enable use of MD5 passwords],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS], [1],
+ [Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords])
+ MD5_MSG="yes"
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+# Whether to disable shadow password support
+AC_ARG_WITH([shadow],
+ [ --without-shadow Disable shadow password support],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW])
+ disable_shadow=yes
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+if test -z "$disable_shadow" ; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if the systems has expire shadow information])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+struct spwd sp;
+ ]], [[ sp.sp_expire = sp.sp_lstchg = sp.sp_inact = 0; ]])],
+ [ sp_expire_available=yes ], [
+ ])
+
+ if test "x$sp_expire_available" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1],
+ [Define if you want to use shadow password expire field])
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ fi
+fi
+
+# Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY
+if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then
+ DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
+ AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY], [1],
+ [Define if you need to use IP address
+ instead of hostname in $DISPLAY])
+else
+ DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no"
+ AC_ARG_WITH([ipaddr-display],
+ [ --with-ipaddr-display Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY])
+ DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
+ fi
+ ]
+ )
+fi
+
+# check for /etc/default/login and use it if present.
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([etc-default-login],
+ [ --disable-etc-default-login Disable using PATH from /etc/default/login [no]],
+ [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno"; then
+ AC_MSG_NOTICE([/etc/default/login handling disabled])
+ etc_default_login=no
+ else
+ etc_default_login=yes
+ fi ],
+ [ if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes";
+ then
+ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login])
+ etc_default_login=no
+ else
+ etc_default_login=yes
+ fi ]
+)
+
+if test "x$etc_default_login" != "xno"; then
+ AC_CHECK_FILE(["/etc/default/login"],
+ [ external_path_file=/etc/default/login ])
+ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/default/login"; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN], [1],
+ [Define if your system has /etc/default/login])
+ fi
+fi
+
+dnl BSD systems use /etc/login.conf so --with-default-path= has no effect
+if test $ac_cv_func_login_getcapbool = "yes" && \
+ test $ac_cv_header_login_cap_h = "yes" ; then
+ external_path_file=/etc/login.conf
+fi
+
+# Whether to mess with the default path
+SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)"
+AC_ARG_WITH([default-path],
+ [ --with-default-path= Specify default $PATH environment for server],
+ [
+ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
+ AC_MSG_WARN([
+--with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system.
+Edit /etc/login.conf instead.])
+ elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
+ AC_MSG_WARN([
+--with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in
+$external_path_file .])
+ fi
+ user_path="$withval"
+ SERVER_PATH_MSG="$withval"
+ fi
+ ],
+ [ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
+ AC_MSG_WARN([Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf])
+ else
+ if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
+ AC_MSG_WARN([
+If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included,
+otherwise scp will not work.])
+ fi
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+/* find out what STDPATH is */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
+# ifdef _PATH_USERPATH /* Irix */
+# define _PATH_STDPATH _PATH_USERPATH
+# else
+# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
+# endif
+#endif
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#define DATA "conftest.stdpath"
+ ]], [[
+ FILE *fd;
+ int rc;
+
+ fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
+ if(fd == NULL)
+ exit(1);
+
+ if ((rc = fprintf(fd,"%s", _PATH_STDPATH)) < 0)
+ exit(1);
+
+ exit(0);
+ ]])],
+ [ user_path=`cat conftest.stdpath` ],
+ [ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ],
+ [ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ]
+ )
+# make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work
+ t_bindir="${bindir}"
+ while echo "${t_bindir}" | egrep '\$\{|NONE/' >/dev/null 2>&1; do
+ t_bindir=`eval echo ${t_bindir}`
+ case $t_bindir in
+ NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$prefix~"` ;;
+ esac
+ case $t_bindir in
+ NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
+ esac
+ done
+ echo $user_path | grep ":$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1
+ if test $? -ne 0 ; then
+ echo $user_path | grep "^$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1
+ if test $? -ne 0 ; then
+ user_path=$user_path:$t_bindir
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work])
+ fi
+ fi
+ fi ]
+)
+if test "x$external_path_file" != "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([USER_PATH], ["$user_path"], [Specify default $PATH])
+ AC_SUBST([user_path])
+fi
+
+# Set superuser path separately to user path
+AC_ARG_WITH([superuser-path],
+ [ --with-superuser-path= Specify different path for super-user],
+ [
+ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SUPERUSER_PATH], ["$withval"],
+ [Define if you want a different $PATH
+ for the superuser])
+ superuser_path=$withval
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses])
+IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(4in6,
+ [ --with-4in6 Check for and convert IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6], [1],
+ [Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses
+ and treat as IPv4])
+ IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ fi
+ ], [
+ if test "x$inet6_default_4in6" = "xyes"; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes (default)])
+ AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6])
+ IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no (default)])
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+# Whether to enable BSD auth support
+BSD_AUTH_MSG=no
+AC_ARG_WITH([bsd-auth],
+ [ --with-bsd-auth Enable BSD auth support],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([BSD_AUTH], [1],
+ [Define if you have BSD auth support])
+ BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+# Where to place sshd.pid
+piddir=/var/run
+# make sure the directory exists
+if test ! -d $piddir ; then
+ piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}`
+ case $piddir in
+ NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
+ esac
+fi
+
+AC_ARG_WITH([pid-dir],
+ [ --with-pid-dir=PATH Specify location of ssh.pid file],
+ [
+ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ piddir=$withval
+ if test ! -d $piddir ; then
+ AC_MSG_WARN([** no $piddir directory on this system **])
+ fi
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR], ["$piddir"],
+ [Specify location of ssh.pid])
+AC_SUBST([piddir])
+
+dnl allow user to disable some login recording features
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([lastlog],
+ [ --disable-lastlog disable use of lastlog even if detected [no]],
+ [
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmp],
+ [ --disable-utmp disable use of utmp even if detected [no]],
+ [
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmpx],
+ [ --disable-utmpx disable use of utmpx even if detected [no]],
+ [
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1],
+ [Define if you don't want to use utmpx])
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmp],
+ [ --disable-wtmp disable use of wtmp even if detected [no]],
+ [
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP])
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmpx],
+ [ --disable-wtmpx disable use of wtmpx even if detected [no]],
+ [
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX], [1],
+ [Define if you don't want to use wtmpx])
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([libutil],
+ [ --disable-libutil disable use of libutil (login() etc.) [no]],
+ [
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN])
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututline],
+ [ --disable-pututline disable use of pututline() etc. ([uw]tmp) [no]],
+ [
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTLINE], [1],
+ [Define if you don't want to use pututline()
+ etc. to write [uw]tmp])
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututxline],
+ [ --disable-pututxline disable use of pututxline() etc. ([uw]tmpx) [no]],
+ [
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE], [1],
+ [Define if you don't want to use pututxline()
+ etc. to write [uw]tmpx])
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog],
+ [ --with-lastlog=FILE|DIR specify lastlog location [common locations]],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
+ elif test -n "$withval" && test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ conf_lastlog_location=$withval
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection
+dnl NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the
+dnl need for command-line parameters
+dnl lastlog and [uw]tmp are subject to a file search if all else fails
+
+dnl lastlog detection
+dnl NOTE: the code itself will detect if lastlog is a directory
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+# include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
+# include <login.h>
+#endif
+ ]], [[ char *lastlog = LASTLOG_FILE; ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+# include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+ ]], [[ char *lastlog = _PATH_LASTLOG; ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ system_lastlog_path=no
+ ])
+])
+
+if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
+ if test x"$system_lastlog_path" = x"no" ; then
+ for f in /var/log/lastlog /usr/adm/lastlog /var/adm/lastlog /etc/security/lastlog ; do
+ if (test -d "$f" || test -f "$f") ; then
+ conf_lastlog_location=$f
+ fi
+ done
+ if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
+ AC_MSG_WARN([** Cannot find lastlog **])
+ dnl Don't define DISABLE_LASTLOG - that means we don't try wtmp/wtmpx
+ fi
+ fi
+fi
+
+if test -n "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_LASTLOG_FILE], ["$conf_lastlog_location"],
+ [Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file])
+fi
+
+dnl utmp detection
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines UTMP_FILE])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+ ]], [[ char *utmp = UTMP_FILE; ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ system_utmp_path=no
+])
+if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
+ if test x"$system_utmp_path" = x"no" ; then
+ for f in /etc/utmp /usr/adm/utmp /var/run/utmp; do
+ if test -f $f ; then
+ conf_utmp_location=$f
+ fi
+ done
+ if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
+ fi
+ fi
+fi
+if test -n "$conf_utmp_location"; then
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_UTMP_FILE], ["$conf_utmp_location"],
+ [Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file])
+fi
+
+dnl wtmp detection
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMP_FILE])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+ ]], [[ char *wtmp = WTMP_FILE; ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ system_wtmp_path=no
+])
+if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
+ if test x"$system_wtmp_path" = x"no" ; then
+ for f in /usr/adm/wtmp /var/log/wtmp; do
+ if test -f $f ; then
+ conf_wtmp_location=$f
+ fi
+ done
+ if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP])
+ fi
+ fi
+fi
+if test -n "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMP_FILE], ["$conf_wtmp_location"],
+ [Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file])
+fi
+
+dnl wtmpx detection
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMPX_FILE])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+#include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+ ]], [[ char *wtmpx = WTMPX_FILE; ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ system_wtmpx_path=no
+])
+if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then
+ if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX])
+ fi
+else
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMPX_FILE], ["$conf_wtmpx_location"],
+ [Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file])
+fi
+
+
+if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $blibflags$blibpath"
+ AC_MSG_WARN([Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile])
+fi
+
+AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct lastlog.ll_line], [], [
+ if test x$SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE != "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
+ fi
+ ], [
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
+#include <utmp.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+#include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+#include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+ ])
+
+AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct utmp.ut_line], [], [
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP])
+ ], [
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
+#include <utmp.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+#include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+#include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+ ])
+
+dnl Adding -Werror to CFLAGS early prevents configure tests from running.
+dnl Add now.
+CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags"
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" != "xyes" ; then
+ TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
+else
+ TEST_SSH_IPV6=yes
+fi
+AC_CHECK_DECL([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [TEST_SSH_IPV6=no])
+AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_IPV6], [$TEST_SSH_IPV6])
+AC_SUBST([TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS], [$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS])
+AC_SUBST([UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS], [$unsupported_algorithms])
+
+AC_EXEEXT
+AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml \
+ openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile \
+ survey.sh])
+AC_OUTPUT
+
+# Print summary of options
+
+# Someone please show me a better way :)
+A=`eval echo ${prefix}` ; A=`eval echo ${A}`
+B=`eval echo ${bindir}` ; B=`eval echo ${B}`
+C=`eval echo ${sbindir}` ; C=`eval echo ${C}`
+D=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` ; D=`eval echo ${D}`
+E=`eval echo ${libexecdir}/ssh-askpass` ; E=`eval echo ${E}`
+F=`eval echo ${mandir}/${mansubdir}X` ; F=`eval echo ${F}`
+G=`eval echo ${piddir}` ; G=`eval echo ${G}`
+H=`eval echo ${PRIVSEP_PATH}` ; H=`eval echo ${H}`
+I=`eval echo ${user_path}` ; I=`eval echo ${I}`
+J=`eval echo ${superuser_path}` ; J=`eval echo ${J}`
+
+echo ""
+echo "OpenSSH has been configured with the following options:"
+echo " User binaries: $B"
+echo " System binaries: $C"
+echo " Configuration files: $D"
+echo " Askpass program: $E"
+echo " Manual pages: $F"
+echo " PID file: $G"
+echo " Privilege separation chroot path: $H"
+if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
+echo " At runtime, sshd will use the path defined in $external_path_file"
+echo " Make sure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work"
+else
+echo " sshd default user PATH: $I"
+ if test ! -z "$external_path_file"; then
+echo " (If PATH is set in $external_path_file it will be used instead. If"
+echo " used, ensure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work.)"
+ fi
+fi
+if test ! -z "$superuser_path" ; then
+echo " sshd superuser user PATH: $J"
+fi
+echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE"
+echo " PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
+echo " OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
+echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
+echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
+echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
+echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
+echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
+echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
+echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
+echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
+echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
+echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
+echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
+echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
+echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
+
+echo ""
+
+echo " Host: ${host}"
+echo " Compiler: ${CC}"
+echo " Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}"
+echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}"
+echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}"
+echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}"
+if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
+echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
+fi
+if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then
+echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}"
+fi
+
+echo ""
+
+if test "x$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" = "xyes" ; then
+ echo "SVR4 style packages are supported with \"make package\""
+ echo ""
+fi
+
+if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
+ echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file "
+ echo "for sshd, otherwise password authentication may fail. "
+ echo "Example PAM control files can be found in the contrib/ "
+ echo "subdirectory"
+ echo ""
+fi
+
+if test ! -z "$NO_PEERCHECK" ; then
+ echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not"
+ echo "appear to support getpeereid(), getpeerucred() or the"
+ echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to"
+ echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to"
+ echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious"
+ echo "user can connect to your agent."
+ echo ""
+fi
+
+if test "$AUDIT_MODULE" = "bsm" ; then
+ echo "WARNING: BSM audit support is currently considered EXPERIMENTAL."
+ echo "See the Solaris section in README.platform for details."
+fi
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/Makefile
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/Makefile 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/Makefile 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-PKG_CONFIG = pkg-config
-
-all:
- @echo "Valid targets: gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass2"
-
-gnome-ssh-askpass1: gnome-ssh-askpass1.c
- $(CC) `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
- gnome-ssh-askpass1.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass1 \
- `gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui`
-
-gnome-ssh-askpass2: gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
- $(CC) `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
- gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass2 \
- `$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs gtk+-2.0 x11`
-
-clean:
- rm -f *.o gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/Makefile (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/Makefile)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/Makefile (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/Makefile 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+PKG_CONFIG = pkg-config
+
+all:
+ @echo "Valid targets: gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass2"
+
+gnome-ssh-askpass1: gnome-ssh-askpass1.c
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
+ gnome-ssh-askpass1.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass1 \
+ `gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui`
+
+gnome-ssh-askpass2: gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
+ gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass2 \
+ `$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs gtk+-2.0 x11`
+
+clean:
+ rm -f *.o gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/README
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/README 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/README 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-Other patches and addons for OpenSSH. Please send submissions to
-djm at mindrot.org
-
-Externally maintained
----------------------
-
-SSH Proxy Command -- connect.c
-
-Shun-ichi GOTO <gotoh at imasy.or.jp> has written a very useful ProxyCommand
-which allows the use of outbound SSH from behind a SOCKS4, SOCKS5 or
-https CONNECT style proxy server. His page for connect.c has extensive
-documentation on its use as well as compiled versions for Win32.
-
-http://www.taiyo.co.jp/~gotoh/ssh/connect.html
-
-
-X11 SSH Askpass:
-
-Jim Knoble <jmknoble at pobox.com> has written an excellent X11
-passphrase requester. This is highly recommended:
-
-http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/
-
-
-In this directory
------------------
-
-ssh-copy-id:
-
-Phil Hands' <phil at hands.com> shell script to automate the process of adding
-your public key to a remote machine's ~/.ssh/authorized_keys file.
-
-gnome-ssh-askpass[12]:
-
-A GNOME and Gtk2 passphrase requesters. Use "make gnome-ssh-askpass1" or
-"make gnome-ssh-askpass2" to build.
-
-sshd.pam.generic:
-
-A generic PAM config file which may be useful on your system. YMMV
-
-sshd.pam.freebsd:
-
-A PAM config file which works with FreeBSD's PAM port. Contributed by
-Dominik Brettnacher <domi at saargate.de>
-
-findssl.sh:
-
-Search for all instances of OpenSSL headers and libraries and print their
-versions. This is intended to help diagnose OpenSSH's "OpenSSL headers do not
-match your library" errors.
-
-aix:
- Files to build an AIX native (installp or SMIT installable) package.
-
-caldera:
- RPM spec file and scripts for building Caldera OpenLinuix packages
-
-cygwin:
- Support files for Cygwin
-
-hpux:
- Support files for HP-UX
-
-redhat:
- RPM spec file and scripts for building Redhat packages
-
-suse:
- RPM spec file and scripts for building SuSE packages
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/README (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/README)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/README (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/README 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+Other patches and addons for OpenSSH. Please send submissions to
+djm at mindrot.org
+
+Externally maintained
+---------------------
+
+SSH Proxy Command -- connect.c
+
+Shun-ichi GOTO <gotoh at imasy.or.jp> has written a very useful ProxyCommand
+which allows the use of outbound SSH from behind a SOCKS4, SOCKS5 or
+https CONNECT style proxy server. His page for connect.c has extensive
+documentation on its use as well as compiled versions for Win32.
+
+https://bitbucket.org/gotoh/connect/wiki/Home
+
+
+X11 SSH Askpass:
+
+Jim Knoble <jmknoble at pobox.com> has written an excellent X11
+passphrase requester. This is highly recommended:
+
+http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/
+
+
+In this directory
+-----------------
+
+ssh-copy-id:
+
+Phil Hands' <phil at hands.com> shell script to automate the process of adding
+your public key to a remote machine's ~/.ssh/authorized_keys file.
+
+gnome-ssh-askpass[12]:
+
+A GNOME and Gtk2 passphrase requesters. Use "make gnome-ssh-askpass1" or
+"make gnome-ssh-askpass2" to build.
+
+sshd.pam.generic:
+
+A generic PAM config file which may be useful on your system. YMMV
+
+sshd.pam.freebsd:
+
+A PAM config file which works with FreeBSD's PAM port. Contributed by
+Dominik Brettnacher <domi at saargate.de>
+
+findssl.sh:
+
+Search for all instances of OpenSSL headers and libraries and print their
+versions. This is intended to help diagnose OpenSSH's "OpenSSL headers do not
+match your library" errors.
+
+aix:
+ Files to build an AIX native (installp or SMIT installable) package.
+
+caldera:
+ RPM spec file and scripts for building Caldera OpenLinuix packages
+
+cygwin:
+ Support files for Cygwin
+
+hpux:
+ Support files for HP-UX
+
+redhat:
+ RPM spec file and scripts for building Redhat packages
+
+suse:
+ RPM spec file and scripts for building SuSE packages
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/cygwin/README
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/README 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/cygwin/README 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
-This package describes important Cygwin specific stuff concerning OpenSSH.
-
-The binary package is usually built for recent Cygwin versions and might
-not run on older versions. Please check http://cygwin.com/ for information
-about current Cygwin releases.
-
-==================
-Host configuration
-==================
-
-If you are installing OpenSSH the first time, you can generate global config
-files and server keys, as well as installing sshd as a service, by running
-
- /usr/bin/ssh-host-config
-
-Note that this binary archive doesn't contain default config files in /etc.
-That files are only created if ssh-host-config is started.
-
-To support testing and unattended installation ssh-host-config got
-some options:
-
-usage: ssh-host-config [OPTION]...
-Options:
- --debug -d Enable shell's debug output.
- --yes -y Answer all questions with "yes" automatically.
- --no -n Answer all questions with "no" automatically.
- --cygwin -c <options> Use "options" as value for CYGWIN environment var.
- --port -p <n> sshd listens on port n.
- --user -u <account> privileged user for service, default 'cyg_server'.
- --pwd -w <passwd> Use "pwd" as password for privileged user.
- --privileged On Windows XP, require privileged user
- instead of LocalSystem for sshd service.
-
-Installing sshd as daemon via ssh-host-config is recommended.
-
-Alternatively you can start sshd via inetd, if you have the inetutils
-package installed. Just run ssh-host-config, but answer "no" when asked
-to install sshd as service. The ssh-host-config script also adds the
-required lines to /etc/inetd.conf and /etc/services.
-
-==================
-User configuration
-==================
-
-Any user can simplify creating the own private and public keys by running
-
- /usr/bin/ssh-user-config
-
-To support testing and unattended installation ssh-user-config got
-some options as well:
-
-usage: ssh-user-config [OPTION]...
-Options:
- --debug -d Enable shell's debug output.
- --yes -y Answer all questions with "yes" automatically.
- --no -n Answer all questions with "no" automatically.
- --passphrase -p word Use "word" as passphrase automatically.
-
-Please note that OpenSSH does never use the value of $HOME to
-search for the users configuration files! It always uses the
-value of the pw_dir field in /etc/passwd as the home directory.
-If no home diretory is set in /etc/passwd, the root directory
-is used instead!
-
-================
-Building OpenSSH
-================
-
-Building from source is easy. Just unpack the source archive, cd to that
-directory, and call cygport:
-
- cygport openssh.cygport almostall
-
-You must have installed the following packages to be able to build OpenSSH
-with the aforementioned cygport script:
-
- zlib
- crypt
- openssl-devel
- libwrap-devel
- libedit-devel
- libkrb5-devel
-
-Please send requests, error reports etc. to cygwin at cygwin.com.
-
-
-Have fun,
-
-Corinna Vinschen
-Cygwin Developer
-Red Hat Inc.
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/cygwin/README (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/README)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/cygwin/README (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/cygwin/README 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+This package describes important Cygwin specific stuff concerning OpenSSH.
+
+The binary package is usually built for recent Cygwin versions and might
+not run on older versions. Please check http://cygwin.com/ for information
+about current Cygwin releases.
+
+==================
+Host configuration
+==================
+
+If you are installing OpenSSH the first time, you can generate global config
+files and server keys, as well as installing sshd as a service, by running
+
+ /usr/bin/ssh-host-config
+
+Note that this binary archive doesn't contain default config files in /etc.
+That files are only created if ssh-host-config is started.
+
+To support testing and unattended installation ssh-host-config got
+some options:
+
+usage: ssh-host-config [OPTION]...
+Options:
+ --debug -d Enable shell's debug output.
+ --yes -y Answer all questions with "yes" automatically.
+ --no -n Answer all questions with "no" automatically.
+ --cygwin -c <options> Use "options" as value for CYGWIN environment var.
+ --name -N <name> sshd windows service name.
+ --port -p <n> sshd listens on port n.
+ --user -u <account> privileged user for service, default 'cyg_server'.
+ --pwd -w <passwd> Use "pwd" as password for privileged user.
+ --privileged On Windows XP, require privileged user
+ instead of LocalSystem for sshd service.
+
+Installing sshd as daemon via ssh-host-config is recommended.
+
+Alternatively you can start sshd via inetd, if you have the inetutils
+package installed. Just run ssh-host-config, but answer "no" when asked
+to install sshd as service. The ssh-host-config script also adds the
+required lines to /etc/inetd.conf and /etc/services.
+
+==================
+User configuration
+==================
+
+Any user can simplify creating the own private and public keys by running
+
+ /usr/bin/ssh-user-config
+
+To support testing and unattended installation ssh-user-config got
+some options as well:
+
+usage: ssh-user-config [OPTION]...
+Options:
+ --debug -d Enable shell's debug output.
+ --yes -y Answer all questions with "yes" automatically.
+ --no -n Answer all questions with "no" automatically.
+ --passphrase -p word Use "word" as passphrase automatically.
+
+Please note that OpenSSH does never use the value of $HOME to
+search for the users configuration files! It always uses the
+value of the pw_dir field in /etc/passwd as the home directory.
+If no home diretory is set in /etc/passwd, the root directory
+is used instead!
+
+================
+Building OpenSSH
+================
+
+Building from source is easy. Just unpack the source archive, cd to that
+directory, and call cygport:
+
+ cygport openssh.cygport all
+
+You must have installed the following packages to be able to build OpenSSH
+with the aforementioned cygport script:
+
+ zlib
+ crypt
+ openssl-devel
+ libedit-devel
+ libkrb5-devel
+
+Please send requests, error reports etc. to cygwin at cygwin.com.
+
+
+Have fun,
+
+Corinna Vinschen
+Cygwin Developer
+Red Hat Inc.
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,710 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-# ssh-host-config, Copyright 2000-2011 Red Hat Inc.
-#
-# This file is part of the Cygwin port of OpenSSH.
-#
-# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
-# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-#
-# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
-# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
-# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.
-# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,
-# DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR
-# OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR
-# THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
-
-# ======================================================================
-# Initialization
-# ======================================================================
-
-CSIH_SCRIPT=/usr/share/csih/cygwin-service-installation-helper.sh
-
-# List of apps used. This is checkad for existance in csih_sanity_check
-# Don't use *any* transient commands before sourcing the csih helper script,
-# otherwise the sanity checks are short-circuited.
-declare -a csih_required_commands=(
- /usr/bin/basename coreutils
- /usr/bin/cat coreutils
- /usr/bin/chmod coreutils
- /usr/bin/dirname coreutils
- /usr/bin/id coreutils
- /usr/bin/mv coreutils
- /usr/bin/rm coreutils
- /usr/bin/cygpath cygwin
- /usr/bin/mount cygwin
- /usr/bin/ps cygwin
- /usr/bin/setfacl cygwin
- /usr/bin/umount cygwin
- /usr/bin/cmp diffutils
- /usr/bin/grep grep
- /usr/bin/awk gawk
- /usr/bin/ssh-keygen openssh
- /usr/sbin/sshd openssh
- /usr/bin/sed sed
-)
-csih_sanity_check_server=yes
-source ${CSIH_SCRIPT}
-
-PROGNAME=$(/usr/bin/basename $0)
-_tdir=$(/usr/bin/dirname $0)
-PROGDIR=$(cd $_tdir && pwd)
-
-# Subdirectory where the new package is being installed
-PREFIX=/usr
-
-# Directory where the config files are stored
-SYSCONFDIR=/etc
-LOCALSTATEDIR=/var
-
-port_number=22
-privsep_configured=no
-privsep_used=yes
-cygwin_value=""
-user_account=
-password_value=
-opt_force=no
-
-# ======================================================================
-# Routine: update_services_file
-# ======================================================================
-update_services_file() {
- local _my_etcdir="/ssh-host-config.$$"
- local _win_etcdir
- local _services
- local _spaces
- local _serv_tmp
- local _wservices
- local ret=0
-
- _win_etcdir="${SYSTEMROOT}\\system32\\drivers\\etc"
- _services="${_my_etcdir}/services"
- _spaces=" #"
- _serv_tmp="${_my_etcdir}/srv.out.$$"
-
- /usr/bin/mount -o text,posix=0,noacl -f "${_win_etcdir}" "${_my_etcdir}"
-
- # Depends on the above mount
- _wservices=`cygpath -w "${_services}"`
-
- # Remove sshd 22/port from services
- if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q 'sshd[ \t][ \t]*22' "${_services}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ]
- then
- /usr/bin/grep -v 'sshd[ \t][ \t]*22' "${_services}" > "${_serv_tmp}"
- if [ -f "${_serv_tmp}" ]
- then
- if /usr/bin/mv "${_serv_tmp}" "${_services}"
- then
- csih_inform "Removing sshd from ${_wservices}"
- else
- csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_wservices} failed!"
- let ++ret
- fi
- /usr/bin/rm -f "${_serv_tmp}"
- else
- csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_wservices} failed!"
- let ++ret
- fi
- fi
-
- # Add ssh 22/tcp and ssh 22/udp to services
- if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q 'ssh[ \t][ \t]*22' "${_services}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ]
- then
- if /usr/bin/awk '{ if ( $2 ~ /^23\/tcp/ ) print "ssh 22/tcp'"${_spaces}"'SSH Remote Login Protocol\nssh 22/udp'"${_spaces}"'SSH Remote Login Protocol"; print $0; }' < "${_services}" > "${_serv_tmp}"
- then
- if /usr/bin/mv "${_serv_tmp}" "${_services}"
- then
- csih_inform "Added ssh to ${_wservices}"
- else
- csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_wservices} failed!"
- let ++ret
- fi
- /usr/bin/rm -f "${_serv_tmp}"
- else
- csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_wservices} failed!"
- let ++ret
- fi
- fi
- /usr/bin/umount "${_my_etcdir}"
- return $ret
-} # --- End of update_services_file --- #
-
-# ======================================================================
-# Routine: sshd_privsep
-# MODIFIES: privsep_configured privsep_used
-# ======================================================================
-sshd_privsep() {
- local sshdconfig_tmp
- local ret=0
-
- if [ "${privsep_configured}" != "yes" ]
- then
- csih_inform "Privilege separation is set to yes by default since OpenSSH 3.3."
- csih_inform "However, this requires a non-privileged account called 'sshd'."
- csih_inform "For more info on privilege separation read /usr/share/doc/openssh/README.privsep."
- if csih_request "Should privilege separation be used?"
- then
- privsep_used=yes
- if ! csih_create_unprivileged_user sshd
- then
- csih_error_recoverable "Couldn't create user 'sshd'!"
- csih_error_recoverable "Privilege separation set to 'no' again!"
- csih_error_recoverable "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
- let ++ret
- privsep_used=no
- fi
- else
- privsep_used=no
- fi
- fi
-
- # Create default sshd_config from skeleton files in /etc/defaults/etc or
- # modify to add the missing privsep configuration option
- if /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" >/dev/null 2>&1
- then
- csih_inform "Updating ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file"
- sshdconfig_tmp=${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config.$$
- /usr/bin/sed -e "s/^#UsePrivilegeSeparation yes/UsePrivilegeSeparation ${privsep_used}/
- s/^#Port 22/Port ${port_number}/
- s/^#StrictModes yes/StrictModes no/" \
- < ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config \
- > "${sshdconfig_tmp}"
- if ! /usr/bin/mv "${sshdconfig_tmp}" ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
- then
- csih_warning "Setting privilege separation to 'yes' failed!"
- csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
- let ++ret
- fi
- elif [ "${privsep_configured}" != "yes" ]
- then
- echo >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
- if ! echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation ${privsep_used}" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
- then
- csih_warning "Setting privilege separation to 'yes' failed!"
- csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
- let ++ret
- fi
- fi
- return $ret
-} # --- End of sshd_privsep --- #
-
-# ======================================================================
-# Routine: update_inetd_conf
-# ======================================================================
-update_inetd_conf() {
- local _inetcnf="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.conf"
- local _inetcnf_tmp="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.conf.$$"
- local _inetcnf_dir="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.d"
- local _sshd_inetd_conf="${_inetcnf_dir}/sshd-inetd"
- local _sshd_inetd_conf_tmp="${_inetcnf_dir}/sshd-inetd.$$"
- local _with_comment=1
- local ret=0
-
- if [ -d "${_inetcnf_dir}" ]
- then
- # we have inetutils-1.5 inetd.d support
- if [ -f "${_inetcnf}" ]
- then
- /usr/bin/grep -q '^[ \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0
-
- # check for sshd OR ssh in top-level inetd.conf file, and remove
- # will be replaced by a file in inetd.d/
- if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ]
- then
- /usr/bin/grep -v '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
- if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ]
- then
- if /usr/bin/mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}"
- then
- csih_inform "Removed ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf}"
- else
- csih_warning "Removing ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
- let ++ret
- fi
- /usr/bin/rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
- else
- csih_warning "Removing ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
- let ++ret
- fi
- fi
- fi
-
- csih_install_config "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults"
- if /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults${_sshd_inetd_conf}" "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" >/dev/null 2>&1
- then
- if [ "${_with_comment}" -eq 0 ]
- then
- /usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[ \t]*//' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}"
- else
- /usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[ \t]*/# /' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}"
- fi
- if /usr/bin/mv "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}" "${_sshd_inetd_conf}"
- then
- csih_inform "Updated ${_sshd_inetd_conf}"
- else
- csih_warning "Updating ${_sshd_inetd_conf} failed!"
- let ++ret
- fi
- fi
-
- elif [ -f "${_inetcnf}" ]
- then
- /usr/bin/grep -q '^[ \t]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0
-
- # check for sshd in top-level inetd.conf file, and remove
- # will be replaced by a file in inetd.d/
- if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ]
- then
- /usr/bin/grep -v '^[# \t]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
- if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ]
- then
- if /usr/bin/mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}"
- then
- csih_inform "Removed sshd from ${_inetcnf}"
- else
- csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
- let ++ret
- fi
- /usr/bin/rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
- else
- csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
- let ++ret
- fi
- fi
-
- # Add ssh line to inetd.conf
- if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ]
- then
- if [ "${_with_comment}" -eq 0 ]
- then
- echo 'ssh stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}"
- else
- echo '# ssh stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}"
- fi
- if [ $? -eq 0 ]
- then
- csih_inform "Added ssh to ${_inetcnf}"
- else
- csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_inetcnf} failed!"
- let ++ret
- fi
- fi
- fi
- return $ret
-} # --- End of update_inetd_conf --- #
-
-# ======================================================================
-# Routine: check_service_files_ownership
-# Checks that the files in /etc and /var belong to the right owner
-# ======================================================================
-check_service_files_ownership() {
- local run_service_as=$1
- local ret=0
-
- if [ -z "${run_service_as}" ]
- then
- accnt_name=$(/usr/bin/cygrunsrv -VQ sshd | /usr/bin/sed -ne 's/^Account *: *//gp')
- if [ "${accnt_name}" = "LocalSystem" ]
- then
- # Convert "LocalSystem" to "SYSTEM" as is the correct account name
- accnt_name="SYSTEM:"
- elif [[ "${accnt_name}" =~ ^\.\\ ]]
- then
- # Convert "." domain to local machine name
- accnt_name="U-${COMPUTERNAME}${accnt_name#.},"
- fi
- run_service_as=$(/usr/bin/grep -Fi "${accnt_name}" /etc/passwd | /usr/bin/awk -F: '{print $1;}')
- if [ -z "${run_service_as}" ]
- then
- csih_warning "Couldn't determine name of user running sshd service from /etc/passwd!"
- csih_warning "As a result, this script cannot make sure that the files used"
- csih_warning "by the sshd service belong to the user running the service."
- csih_warning "Please re-run the mkpasswd tool to make sure the /etc/passwd"
- csih_warning "file is in a good shape."
- return 1
- fi
- fi
- for i in "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_config "${SYSCONFDIR}"/sshd_config "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_host_*key "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_host_*key.pub
- do
- if [ -f "$i" ]
- then
- if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 "$i" >/dev/null 2>&1
- then
- csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of $i!"
- let ++ret
- fi
- fi
- done
- if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty >/dev/null 2>&1
- then
- csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty!"
- let ++ret
- fi
- if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog >/dev/null 2>&1
- then
- csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog!"
- let ++ret
- fi
- if [ -f ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log ]
- then
- if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log >/dev/null 2>&1
- then
- csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log!"
- let ++ret
- fi
- fi
- if [ $ret -ne 0 ]
- then
- csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of important files to ${run_service_as}!"
- csih_warning "This may cause the sshd service to fail! Please make sure that"
- csih_warning "you have suufficient permissions to change the ownership of files"
- csih_warning "and try to run the ssh-host-config script again."
- fi
- return $ret
-} # --- End of check_service_files_ownership --- #
-
-# ======================================================================
-# Routine: install_service
-# Install sshd as a service
-# ======================================================================
-install_service() {
- local run_service_as
- local password
- local ret=0
-
- echo
- if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -Q sshd >/dev/null 2>&1
- then
- csih_inform "Sshd service is already installed."
- check_service_files_ownership "" || let ret+=$?
- else
- echo -e "${_csih_QUERY_STR} Do you want to install sshd as a service?"
- if csih_request "(Say \"no\" if it is already installed as a service)"
- then
- csih_get_cygenv "${cygwin_value}"
-
- if ( csih_is_nt2003 || [ "$csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER" = "yes" ] )
- then
- csih_inform "On Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and above, the"
- csih_inform "SYSTEM account cannot setuid to other users -- a capability"
- csih_inform "sshd requires. You need to have or to create a privileged"
- csih_inform "account. This script will help you do so."
- echo
-
- [ "${opt_force}" = "yes" ] && opt_f=-f
- [ -n "${user_account}" ] && opt_u="-u ""${user_account}"""
- csih_select_privileged_username ${opt_f} ${opt_u} sshd
-
- if ! csih_create_privileged_user "${password_value}"
- then
- csih_error_recoverable "There was a serious problem creating a privileged user."
- csih_request "Do you want to proceed anyway?" || exit 1
- let ++ret
- fi
- fi
-
- # Never returns empty if NT or above
- run_service_as=$(csih_service_should_run_as)
-
- if [ "${run_service_as}" = "${csih_PRIVILEGED_USERNAME}" ]
- then
- password="${csih_PRIVILEGED_PASSWORD}"
- if [ -z "${password}" ]
- then
- csih_get_value "Please enter the password for user '${run_service_as}':" "-s"
- password="${csih_value}"
- fi
- fi
-
- # At this point, we either have $run_service_as = "system" and
- # $password is empty, or $run_service_as is some privileged user and
- # (hopefully) $password contains the correct password. So, from here
- # out, we use '-z "${password}"' to discriminate the two cases.
-
- csih_check_user "${run_service_as}"
-
- if [ -n "${csih_cygenv}" ]
- then
- cygwin_env=( -e "CYGWIN=${csih_cygenv}" )
- fi
- if [ -z "${password}" ]
- then
- if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -I sshd -d "CYGWIN sshd" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \
- -a "-D" -y tcpip "${cygwin_env[@]}"
- then
- echo
- csih_inform "The sshd service has been installed under the LocalSystem"
- csih_inform "account (also known as SYSTEM). To start the service now, call"
- csih_inform "\`net start sshd' or \`cygrunsrv -S sshd'. Otherwise, it"
- csih_inform "will start automatically after the next reboot."
- fi
- else
- if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -I sshd -d "CYGWIN sshd" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \
- -a "-D" -y tcpip "${cygwin_env[@]}" \
- -u "${run_service_as}" -w "${password}"
- then
- /usr/bin/editrights -u "${run_service_as}" -a SeServiceLogonRight
- echo
- csih_inform "The sshd service has been installed under the '${run_service_as}'"
- csih_inform "account. To start the service now, call \`net start sshd' or"
- csih_inform "\`cygrunsrv -S sshd'. Otherwise, it will start automatically"
- csih_inform "after the next reboot."
- fi
- fi
-
- if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -Q sshd >/dev/null 2>&1
- then
- check_service_files_ownership "${run_service_as}" || let ret+=$?
- else
- csih_error_recoverable "Installing sshd as a service failed!"
- let ++ret
- fi
- fi # user allowed us to install as service
- fi # service not yet installed
- return $ret
-} # --- End of install_service --- #
-
-# ======================================================================
-# Main Entry Point
-# ======================================================================
-
-# Check how the script has been started. If
-# (1) it has been started by giving the full path and
-# that path is /etc/postinstall, OR
-# (2) Otherwise, if the environment variable
-# SSH_HOST_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO is set
-# then set auto_answer to "no". This allows automatic
-# creation of the config files in /etc w/o overwriting
-# them if they already exist. In both cases, color
-# escape sequences are suppressed, so as to prevent
-# cluttering setup's logfiles.
-if [ "$PROGDIR" = "/etc/postinstall" ]
-then
- csih_auto_answer="no"
- csih_disable_color
- opt_force=yes
-fi
-if [ -n "${SSH_HOST_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO}" ]
-then
- csih_auto_answer="no"
- csih_disable_color
- opt_force=yes
-fi
-
-# ======================================================================
-# Parse options
-# ======================================================================
-while :
-do
- case $# in
- 0)
- break
- ;;
- esac
-
- option=$1
- shift
-
- case "${option}" in
- -d | --debug )
- set -x
- csih_trace_on
- ;;
-
- -y | --yes )
- csih_auto_answer=yes
- opt_force=yes
- ;;
-
- -n | --no )
- csih_auto_answer=no
- opt_force=yes
- ;;
-
- -c | --cygwin )
- cygwin_value="$1"
- shift
- ;;
-
- -p | --port )
- port_number=$1
- shift
- ;;
-
- -u | --user )
- user_account="$1"
- shift
- ;;
-
- -w | --pwd )
- password_value="$1"
- shift
- ;;
-
- --privileged )
- csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER=yes
- ;;
-
- *)
- echo "usage: ${progname} [OPTION]..."
- echo
- echo "This script creates an OpenSSH host configuration."
- echo
- echo "Options:"
- echo " --debug -d Enable shell's debug output."
- echo " --yes -y Answer all questions with \"yes\" automatically."
- echo " --no -n Answer all questions with \"no\" automatically."
- echo " --cygwin -c <options> Use \"options\" as value for CYGWIN environment var."
- echo " --port -p <n> sshd listens on port n."
- echo " --user -u <account> privileged user for service, default 'cyg_server'."
- echo " --pwd -w <passwd> Use \"pwd\" as password for privileged user."
- echo " --privileged On Windows XP, require privileged user"
- echo " instead of LocalSystem for sshd service."
- echo
- exit 1
- ;;
-
- esac
-done
-
-# ======================================================================
-# Action!
-# ======================================================================
-
-# Check for running ssh/sshd processes first. Refuse to do anything while
-# some ssh processes are still running
-if /usr/bin/ps -ef | /usr/bin/grep -q '/sshd\?$'
-then
- echo
- csih_error "There are still ssh processes running. Please shut them down first."
-fi
-
-# Make sure the user is running in an administrative context
-admin=$(/usr/bin/id -G | /usr/bin/grep -Eq '\<544\>' && echo yes || echo no)
-if [ "${admin}" != "yes" ]
-then
- echo
- csih_warning "Running this script typically requires administrator privileges!"
- csih_warning "However, it seems your account does not have these privileges."
- csih_warning "Here's the list of groups in your user token:"
- echo
- for i in $(/usr/bin/id -G)
- do
- /usr/bin/awk -F: "/[^:]*:[^:]*:$i:/{ print \" \" \$1; }" /etc/group
- done
- echo
- csih_warning "This usually means you're running this script from a non-admin"
- csih_warning "desktop session, or in a non-elevated shell under UAC control."
- echo
- csih_warning "Make sure you have the appropriate privileges right now,"
- csih_warning "otherwise parts of this script will probably fail!"
- echo
- echo -e "${_csih_QUERY_STR} Are you sure you want to continue? (Say \"no\" if you're not sure"
- if ! csih_request "you have the required privileges)"
- then
- echo
- csih_inform "Ok. Exiting. Make sure to switch to an administrative account"
- csih_inform "or to start this script from an elevated shell."
- exit 1
- fi
-fi
-
-echo
-
-warning_cnt=0
-
-# Check for ${SYSCONFDIR} directory
-csih_make_dir "${SYSCONFDIR}" "Cannot create global configuration files."
-if ! /usr/bin/chmod 775 "${SYSCONFDIR}" >/dev/null 2>&1
-then
- csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${SYSCONFDIR}!"
- let ++warning_cnt
-fi
-if ! /usr/bin/setfacl -m u:system:rwx "${SYSCONFDIR}" >/dev/null 2>&1
-then
- csih_warning "Can't set extended permissions on ${SYSCONFDIR}!"
- let ++warning_cnt
-fi
-
-# Check for /var/log directory
-csih_make_dir "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log" "Cannot create log directory."
-if ! /usr/bin/chmod 775 "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log" >/dev/null 2>&1
-then
- csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log!"
- let ++warning_cnt
-fi
-if ! /usr/bin/setfacl -m u:system:rwx "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log" >/dev/null 2>&1
-then
- csih_warning "Can't set extended permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log!"
- let ++warning_cnt
-fi
-
-# Create /var/log/lastlog if not already exists
-if [ -e ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog -a ! -f ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog ]
-then
- echo
- csih_error_multi "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog exists, but is not a file." \
- "Cannot create ssh host configuration."
-fi
-if [ ! -e ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog ]
-then
- /usr/bin/cat /dev/null > ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog
- if ! /usr/bin/chmod 644 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog >/dev/null 2>&1
- then
- csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog!"
- let ++warning_cnt
- fi
-fi
-
-# Create /var/empty file used as chroot jail for privilege separation
-csih_make_dir "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty" "Cannot create ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty directory."
-if ! /usr/bin/chmod 755 "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty" >/dev/null 2>&1
-then
- csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty!"
- let ++warning_cnt
-fi
-if ! /usr/bin/setfacl -m u:system:rwx "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty" >/dev/null 2>&1
-then
- csih_warning "Can't set extended permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty!"
- let ++warning_cnt
-fi
-
-# generate missing host keys
-/usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A || let warning_cnt+=$?
-
-# handle ssh_config
-csih_install_config "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" || let ++warning_cnt
-if /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" >/dev/null 2>&1
-then
- if [ "${port_number}" != "22" ]
- then
- csih_inform "Updating ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config file with requested port"
- echo "Host localhost" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config
- echo " Port ${port_number}" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config
- fi
-fi
-
-# handle sshd_config (and privsep)
-csih_install_config "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" || let ++warning_cnt
-if ! /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" >/dev/null 2>&1
-then
- /usr/bin/grep -q UsePrivilegeSeparation ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config && privsep_configured=yes
-fi
-sshd_privsep || let warning_cnt+=$?
-
-update_services_file || let warning_cnt+=$?
-update_inetd_conf || let warning_cnt+=$?
-install_service || let warning_cnt+=$?
-
-echo
-if [ $warning_cnt -eq 0 ]
-then
- csih_inform "Host configuration finished. Have fun!"
-else
- csih_warning "Host configuration exited with ${warning_cnt} errors or warnings!"
- csih_warning "Make sure that all problems reported are fixed,"
- csih_warning "then re-run ssh-host-config."
-fi
-exit $warning_cnt
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,718 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+# ssh-host-config, Copyright 2000-2014 Red Hat Inc.
+#
+# This file is part of the Cygwin port of OpenSSH.
+#
+# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+#
+# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
+# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.
+# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,
+# DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR
+# OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR
+# THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Initialization
+# ======================================================================
+
+CSIH_SCRIPT=/usr/share/csih/cygwin-service-installation-helper.sh
+
+# List of apps used. This is checkad for existance in csih_sanity_check
+# Don't use *any* transient commands before sourcing the csih helper script,
+# otherwise the sanity checks are short-circuited.
+declare -a csih_required_commands=(
+ /usr/bin/basename coreutils
+ /usr/bin/cat coreutils
+ /usr/bin/chmod coreutils
+ /usr/bin/dirname coreutils
+ /usr/bin/id coreutils
+ /usr/bin/mv coreutils
+ /usr/bin/rm coreutils
+ /usr/bin/cygpath cygwin
+ /usr/bin/mkpasswd cygwin
+ /usr/bin/mount cygwin
+ /usr/bin/ps cygwin
+ /usr/bin/umount cygwin
+ /usr/bin/cmp diffutils
+ /usr/bin/grep grep
+ /usr/bin/awk gawk
+ /usr/bin/ssh-keygen openssh
+ /usr/sbin/sshd openssh
+ /usr/bin/sed sed
+)
+csih_sanity_check_server=yes
+source ${CSIH_SCRIPT}
+
+PROGNAME=$(/usr/bin/basename $0)
+_tdir=$(/usr/bin/dirname $0)
+PROGDIR=$(cd $_tdir && pwd)
+
+# Subdirectory where the new package is being installed
+PREFIX=/usr
+
+# Directory where the config files are stored
+SYSCONFDIR=/etc
+LOCALSTATEDIR=/var
+
+sshd_config_configured=no
+port_number=22
+service_name=sshd
+strictmodes=yes
+privsep_used=yes
+cygwin_value=""
+user_account=
+password_value=
+opt_force=no
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: update_services_file
+# ======================================================================
+update_services_file() {
+ local _my_etcdir="/ssh-host-config.$$"
+ local _win_etcdir
+ local _services
+ local _spaces
+ local _serv_tmp
+ local _wservices
+ local ret=0
+
+ _win_etcdir="${SYSTEMROOT}\\system32\\drivers\\etc"
+ _services="${_my_etcdir}/services"
+ _spaces=" #"
+ _serv_tmp="${_my_etcdir}/srv.out.$$"
+
+ /usr/bin/mount -o text,posix=0,noacl -f "${_win_etcdir}" "${_my_etcdir}"
+
+ # Depends on the above mount
+ _wservices=`cygpath -w "${_services}"`
+
+ # Add ssh 22/tcp and ssh 22/udp to services
+ if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q 'ssh[[:space:]][[:space:]]*22' "${_services}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ]
+ then
+ if /usr/bin/awk '{ if ( $2 ~ /^23\/tcp/ ) print "ssh 22/tcp'"${_spaces}"'SSH Remote Login Protocol\nssh 22/udp'"${_spaces}"'SSH Remote Login Protocol"; print $0; }' < "${_services}" > "${_serv_tmp}"
+ then
+ if /usr/bin/mv "${_serv_tmp}" "${_services}"
+ then
+ csih_inform "Added ssh to ${_wservices}"
+ else
+ csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_wservices} failed!"
+ let ++ret
+ fi
+ /usr/bin/rm -f "${_serv_tmp}"
+ else
+ csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_wservices} failed!"
+ let ++ret
+ fi
+ fi
+ /usr/bin/umount "${_my_etcdir}"
+ return $ret
+} # --- End of update_services_file --- #
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: sshd_strictmodes
+# MODIFIES: strictmodes
+# ======================================================================
+sshd_strictmodes() {
+ if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ]
+ then
+ echo
+ csih_inform "StrictModes is set to 'yes' by default."
+ csih_inform "This is the recommended setting, but it requires that the POSIX"
+ csih_inform "permissions of the user's home directory, the user's .ssh"
+ csih_inform "directory, and the user's ssh key files are tight so that"
+ csih_inform "only the user has write permissions."
+ csih_inform "On the other hand, StrictModes don't work well with default"
+ csih_inform "Windows permissions of a home directory mounted with the"
+ csih_inform "'noacl' option, and they don't work at all if the home"
+ csih_inform "directory is on a FAT or FAT32 partition."
+ if ! csih_request "Should StrictModes be used?"
+ then
+ strictmodes=no
+ fi
+ fi
+ return 0
+}
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: sshd_privsep
+# MODIFIES: privsep_used
+# ======================================================================
+sshd_privsep() {
+ local ret=0
+
+ if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ]
+ then
+ echo
+ csih_inform "Privilege separation is set to 'sandbox' by default since"
+ csih_inform "OpenSSH 6.1. This is unsupported by Cygwin and has to be set"
+ csih_inform "to 'yes' or 'no'."
+ csih_inform "However, using privilege separation requires a non-privileged account"
+ csih_inform "called 'sshd'."
+ csih_inform "For more info on privilege separation read /usr/share/doc/openssh/README.privsep."
+ if csih_request "Should privilege separation be used?"
+ then
+ privsep_used=yes
+ if ! csih_create_unprivileged_user sshd
+ then
+ csih_error_recoverable "Couldn't create user 'sshd'!"
+ csih_error_recoverable "Privilege separation set to 'no' again!"
+ csih_error_recoverable "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
+ let ++ret
+ privsep_used=no
+ fi
+ else
+ privsep_used=no
+ fi
+ fi
+ return $ret
+} # --- End of sshd_privsep --- #
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: sshd_config_tweak
+# ======================================================================
+sshd_config_tweak() {
+ local ret=0
+
+ # Modify sshd_config
+ csih_inform "Updating ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file"
+ if [ "${port_number}" -ne 22 ]
+ then
+ /usr/bin/sed -i -e "s/^#\?[[:space:]]*Port[[:space:]].*/Port ${port_number}/" \
+ ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]
+ then
+ csih_warning "Setting listening port to ${port_number} failed!"
+ csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
+ let ++ret
+ fi
+ fi
+ if [ "${strictmodes}" = "no" ]
+ then
+ /usr/bin/sed -i -e "s/^#\?[[:space:]]*StrictModes[[:space:]].*/StrictModes no/" \
+ ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]
+ then
+ csih_warning "Setting StrictModes to 'no' failed!"
+ csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
+ let ++ret
+ fi
+ fi
+ if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ]
+ then
+ /usr/bin/sed -i -e "
+ s/^#\?UsePrivilegeSeparation .*/UsePrivilegeSeparation ${privsep_used}/" \
+ ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]
+ then
+ csih_warning "Setting privilege separation failed!"
+ csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
+ let ++ret
+ fi
+ fi
+ return $ret
+} # --- End of sshd_config_tweak --- #
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: update_inetd_conf
+# ======================================================================
+update_inetd_conf() {
+ local _inetcnf="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.conf"
+ local _inetcnf_tmp="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.conf.$$"
+ local _inetcnf_dir="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.d"
+ local _sshd_inetd_conf="${_inetcnf_dir}/sshd-inetd"
+ local _sshd_inetd_conf_tmp="${_inetcnf_dir}/sshd-inetd.$$"
+ local _with_comment=1
+ local ret=0
+
+ if [ -d "${_inetcnf_dir}" ]
+ then
+ # we have inetutils-1.5 inetd.d support
+ if [ -f "${_inetcnf}" ]
+ then
+ /usr/bin/grep -q '^[[:space:]]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0
+
+ # check for sshd OR ssh in top-level inetd.conf file, and remove
+ # will be replaced by a file in inetd.d/
+ if [ $(/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?) -eq 0 ]
+ then
+ /usr/bin/grep -v '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
+ if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ]
+ then
+ if /usr/bin/mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}"
+ then
+ csih_inform "Removed ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf}"
+ else
+ csih_warning "Removing ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
+ let ++ret
+ fi
+ /usr/bin/rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
+ else
+ csih_warning "Removing ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
+ let ++ret
+ fi
+ fi
+ fi
+
+ csih_install_config "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults"
+ if /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults${_sshd_inetd_conf}" "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" >/dev/null 2>&1
+ then
+ if [ "${_with_comment}" -eq 0 ]
+ then
+ /usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[[:space:]]*//' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}"
+ else
+ /usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[[:space:]]*/# /' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}"
+ fi
+ if /usr/bin/mv "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}" "${_sshd_inetd_conf}"
+ then
+ csih_inform "Updated ${_sshd_inetd_conf}"
+ else
+ csih_warning "Updating ${_sshd_inetd_conf} failed!"
+ let ++ret
+ fi
+ fi
+
+ elif [ -f "${_inetcnf}" ]
+ then
+ /usr/bin/grep -q '^[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0
+
+ # check for sshd in top-level inetd.conf file, and remove
+ # will be replaced by a file in inetd.d/
+ if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^#\?[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ]
+ then
+ /usr/bin/grep -v '^#\?[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
+ if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ]
+ then
+ if /usr/bin/mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}"
+ then
+ csih_inform "Removed sshd from ${_inetcnf}"
+ else
+ csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
+ let ++ret
+ fi
+ /usr/bin/rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
+ else
+ csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
+ let ++ret
+ fi
+ fi
+
+ # Add ssh line to inetd.conf
+ if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ]
+ then
+ if [ "${_with_comment}" -eq 0 ]
+ then
+ echo 'ssh stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}"
+ else
+ echo '# ssh stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}"
+ fi
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]
+ then
+ csih_inform "Added ssh to ${_inetcnf}"
+ else
+ csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_inetcnf} failed!"
+ let ++ret
+ fi
+ fi
+ fi
+ return $ret
+} # --- End of update_inetd_conf --- #
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: check_service_files_ownership
+# Checks that the files in /etc and /var belong to the right owner
+# ======================================================================
+check_service_files_ownership() {
+ local run_service_as=$1
+ local ret=0
+
+ if [ -z "${run_service_as}" ]
+ then
+ accnt_name=$(/usr/bin/cygrunsrv -VQ sshd |
+ /usr/bin/sed -ne 's/^Account *: *//gp')
+ if [ "${accnt_name}" = "LocalSystem" ]
+ then
+ # Convert "LocalSystem" to "SYSTEM" as is the correct account name
+ run_service_as="SYSTEM"
+ else
+ dom="${accnt_name%%\\*}"
+ accnt_name="${accnt_name#*\\}"
+ if [ "${dom}" = '.' ]
+ then
+ # Check local account
+ run_service_as=$(/usr/bin/mkpasswd -l -u "${accnt_name}" |
+ /usr/bin/awk -F: '{print $1;}')
+ else
+ # Check domain
+ run_service_as=$(/usr/bin/mkpasswd -d "${dom}" -u "${accnt_name}" |
+ /usr/bin/awk -F: '{print $1;}')
+ fi
+ fi
+ if [ -z "${run_service_as}" ]
+ then
+ csih_warning "Couldn't determine name of user running sshd service from account database!"
+ csih_warning "As a result, this script cannot make sure that the files used"
+ csih_warning "by the sshd service belong to the user running the service."
+ return 1
+ fi
+ fi
+ for i in "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_config "${SYSCONFDIR}"/sshd_config "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_host_*key "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_host_*key.pub
+ do
+ if [ -f "$i" ]
+ then
+ if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 "$i" >/dev/null 2>&1
+ then
+ csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of $i!"
+ let ++ret
+ fi
+ fi
+ done
+ if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty >/dev/null 2>&1
+ then
+ csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty!"
+ let ++ret
+ fi
+ if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog >/dev/null 2>&1
+ then
+ csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog!"
+ let ++ret
+ fi
+ if [ -f ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log ]
+ then
+ if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log >/dev/null 2>&1
+ then
+ csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log!"
+ let ++ret
+ fi
+ fi
+ if [ $ret -ne 0 ]
+ then
+ csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of important files to ${run_service_as}!"
+ csih_warning "This may cause the sshd service to fail! Please make sure that"
+ csih_warning "you have suufficient permissions to change the ownership of files"
+ csih_warning "and try to run the ssh-host-config script again."
+ fi
+ return $ret
+} # --- End of check_service_files_ownership --- #
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: install_service
+# Install sshd as a service
+# ======================================================================
+install_service() {
+ local run_service_as
+ local password
+ local ret=0
+
+ echo
+ if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -Q ${service_name} >/dev/null 2>&1
+ then
+ csih_inform "Sshd service is already installed."
+ check_service_files_ownership "" || let ret+=$?
+ else
+ echo -e "${_csih_QUERY_STR} Do you want to install sshd as a service?"
+ if csih_request "(Say \"no\" if it is already installed as a service)"
+ then
+ csih_get_cygenv "${cygwin_value}"
+
+ if ( csih_is_nt2003 || [ "$csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER" = "yes" ] )
+ then
+ csih_inform "On Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and above, the"
+ csih_inform "SYSTEM account cannot setuid to other users -- a capability"
+ csih_inform "sshd requires. You need to have or to create a privileged"
+ csih_inform "account. This script will help you do so."
+ echo
+
+ [ "${opt_force}" = "yes" ] && opt_f=-f
+ [ -n "${user_account}" ] && opt_u="-u ""${user_account}"""
+ csih_select_privileged_username ${opt_f} ${opt_u} sshd
+
+ if ! csih_create_privileged_user "${password_value}"
+ then
+ csih_error_recoverable "There was a serious problem creating a privileged user."
+ csih_request "Do you want to proceed anyway?" || exit 1
+ let ++ret
+ fi
+ fi
+
+ # Never returns empty if NT or above
+ run_service_as=$(csih_service_should_run_as)
+
+ if [ "${run_service_as}" = "${csih_PRIVILEGED_USERNAME}" ]
+ then
+ password="${csih_PRIVILEGED_PASSWORD}"
+ if [ -z "${password}" ]
+ then
+ csih_get_value "Please enter the password for user '${run_service_as}':" "-s"
+ password="${csih_value}"
+ fi
+ fi
+
+ # At this point, we either have $run_service_as = "system" and
+ # $password is empty, or $run_service_as is some privileged user and
+ # (hopefully) $password contains the correct password. So, from here
+ # out, we use '-z "${password}"' to discriminate the two cases.
+
+ csih_check_user "${run_service_as}"
+
+ if [ -n "${csih_cygenv}" ]
+ then
+ cygwin_env=( -e "CYGWIN=${csih_cygenv}" )
+ fi
+ if [ -z "${password}" ]
+ then
+ if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -I ${service_name} -d "CYGWIN ${service_name}" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \
+ -a "-D" -y tcpip "${cygwin_env[@]}"
+ then
+ echo
+ csih_inform "The sshd service has been installed under the LocalSystem"
+ csih_inform "account (also known as SYSTEM). To start the service now, call"
+ csih_inform "\`net start sshd' or \`cygrunsrv -S sshd'. Otherwise, it"
+ csih_inform "will start automatically after the next reboot."
+ fi
+ else
+ if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -I ${service_name} -d "CYGWIN ${service_name}" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \
+ -a "-D" -y tcpip "${cygwin_env[@]}" \
+ -u "${run_service_as}" -w "${password}"
+ then
+ /usr/bin/editrights -u "${run_service_as}" -a SeServiceLogonRight
+ echo
+ csih_inform "The sshd service has been installed under the '${run_service_as}'"
+ csih_inform "account. To start the service now, call \`net start ${service_name}' or"
+ csih_inform "\`cygrunsrv -S ${service_name}'. Otherwise, it will start automatically"
+ csih_inform "after the next reboot."
+ fi
+ fi
+
+ if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -Q ${service_name} >/dev/null 2>&1
+ then
+ check_service_files_ownership "${run_service_as}" || let ret+=$?
+ else
+ csih_error_recoverable "Installing sshd as a service failed!"
+ let ++ret
+ fi
+ fi # user allowed us to install as service
+ fi # service not yet installed
+ return $ret
+} # --- End of install_service --- #
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Main Entry Point
+# ======================================================================
+
+# Check how the script has been started. If
+# (1) it has been started by giving the full path and
+# that path is /etc/postinstall, OR
+# (2) Otherwise, if the environment variable
+# SSH_HOST_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO is set
+# then set auto_answer to "no". This allows automatic
+# creation of the config files in /etc w/o overwriting
+# them if they already exist. In both cases, color
+# escape sequences are suppressed, so as to prevent
+# cluttering setup's logfiles.
+if [ "$PROGDIR" = "/etc/postinstall" ]
+then
+ csih_auto_answer="no"
+ csih_disable_color
+ opt_force=yes
+fi
+if [ -n "${SSH_HOST_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO}" ]
+then
+ csih_auto_answer="no"
+ csih_disable_color
+ opt_force=yes
+fi
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Parse options
+# ======================================================================
+while :
+do
+ case $# in
+ 0)
+ break
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+ option=$1
+ shift
+
+ case "${option}" in
+ -d | --debug )
+ set -x
+ csih_trace_on
+ ;;
+
+ -y | --yes )
+ csih_auto_answer=yes
+ opt_force=yes
+ ;;
+
+ -n | --no )
+ csih_auto_answer=no
+ opt_force=yes
+ ;;
+
+ -c | --cygwin )
+ cygwin_value="$1"
+ shift
+ ;;
+
+ -N | --name )
+ service_name=$1
+ shift
+ ;;
+
+ -p | --port )
+ port_number=$1
+ shift
+ ;;
+
+ -u | --user )
+ user_account="$1"
+ shift
+ ;;
+
+ -w | --pwd )
+ password_value="$1"
+ shift
+ ;;
+
+ --privileged )
+ csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER=yes
+ ;;
+
+ *)
+ echo "usage: ${progname} [OPTION]..."
+ echo
+ echo "This script creates an OpenSSH host configuration."
+ echo
+ echo "Options:"
+ echo " --debug -d Enable shell's debug output."
+ echo " --yes -y Answer all questions with \"yes\" automatically."
+ echo " --no -n Answer all questions with \"no\" automatically."
+ echo " --cygwin -c <options> Use \"options\" as value for CYGWIN environment var."
+ echo " --name -N <name> sshd windows service name."
+ echo " --port -p <n> sshd listens on port n."
+ echo " --user -u <account> privileged user for service, default 'cyg_server'."
+ echo " --pwd -w <passwd> Use \"pwd\" as password for privileged user."
+ echo " --privileged On Windows XP, require privileged user"
+ echo " instead of LocalSystem for sshd service."
+ echo
+ exit 1
+ ;;
+
+ esac
+done
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Action!
+# ======================================================================
+
+# Check for running ssh/sshd processes first. Refuse to do anything while
+# some ssh processes are still running
+if /usr/bin/ps -ef | /usr/bin/grep -q '/sshd\?$'
+then
+ echo
+ csih_error "There are still ssh processes running. Please shut them down first."
+fi
+
+# Make sure the user is running in an administrative context
+admin=$(/usr/bin/id -G | /usr/bin/grep -Eq '\<544\>' && echo yes || echo no)
+if [ "${admin}" != "yes" ]
+then
+ echo
+ csih_warning "Running this script typically requires administrator privileges!"
+ csih_warning "However, it seems your account does not have these privileges."
+ csih_warning "Here's the list of groups in your user token:"
+ echo
+ /usr/bin/id -Gnz | xargs -0n1 echo " "
+ echo
+ csih_warning "This usually means you're running this script from a non-admin"
+ csih_warning "desktop session, or in a non-elevated shell under UAC control."
+ echo
+ csih_warning "Make sure you have the appropriate privileges right now,"
+ csih_warning "otherwise parts of this script will probably fail!"
+ echo
+ echo -e "${_csih_QUERY_STR} Are you sure you want to continue? (Say \"no\" if you're not sure"
+ if ! csih_request "you have the required privileges)"
+ then
+ echo
+ csih_inform "Ok. Exiting. Make sure to switch to an administrative account"
+ csih_inform "or to start this script from an elevated shell."
+ exit 1
+ fi
+fi
+
+echo
+
+warning_cnt=0
+
+# Create /var/log/lastlog if not already exists
+if [ -e ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog -a ! -f ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog ]
+then
+ echo
+ csih_error_multi "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog exists, but is not a file." \
+ "Cannot create ssh host configuration."
+fi
+if [ ! -e ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog ]
+then
+ /usr/bin/cat /dev/null > ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog
+ if ! /usr/bin/chmod 644 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog >/dev/null 2>&1
+ then
+ csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog!"
+ let ++warning_cnt
+ fi
+fi
+
+# Create /var/empty file used as chroot jail for privilege separation
+csih_make_dir "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty" "Cannot create ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty directory."
+if ! /usr/bin/chmod 755 "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then
+ csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty!"
+ let ++warning_cnt
+fi
+
+# generate missing host keys
+csih_inform "Generating missing SSH host keys"
+/usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A || let warning_cnt+=$?
+
+# handle ssh_config
+csih_install_config "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" || let ++warning_cnt
+if /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then
+ if [ "${port_number}" != "22" ]
+ then
+ csih_inform "Updating ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config file with requested port"
+ echo "Host localhost" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config
+ echo " Port ${port_number}" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config
+ fi
+fi
+
+# handle sshd_config (and privsep)
+csih_install_config "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" || let ++warning_cnt
+if ! /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then
+ sshd_config_configured=yes
+fi
+sshd_strictmodes || let warning_cnt+=$?
+sshd_privsep || let warning_cnt+=$?
+sshd_config_tweak || let warning_cnt+=$?
+update_services_file || let warning_cnt+=$?
+update_inetd_conf || let warning_cnt+=$?
+install_service || let warning_cnt+=$?
+
+echo
+if [ $warning_cnt -eq 0 ]
+then
+ csih_inform "Host configuration finished. Have fun!"
+else
+ csih_warning "Host configuration exited with ${warning_cnt} errors or warnings!"
+ csih_warning "Make sure that all problems reported are fixed,"
+ csih_warning "then re-run ssh-host-config."
+fi
+exit $warning_cnt
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,266 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-# ssh-user-config, Copyright 2000-2008 Red Hat Inc.
-#
-# This file is part of the Cygwin port of OpenSSH.
-#
-# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
-# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-#
-# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
-# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
-# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.
-# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,
-# DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR
-# OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR
-# THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
-
-# ======================================================================
-# Initialization
-# ======================================================================
-PROGNAME=$(basename -- $0)
-_tdir=$(dirname -- $0)
-PROGDIR=$(cd $_tdir && pwd)
-
-CSIH_SCRIPT=/usr/share/csih/cygwin-service-installation-helper.sh
-
-# Subdirectory where the new package is being installed
-PREFIX=/usr
-
-# Directory where the config files are stored
-SYSCONFDIR=/etc
-
-source ${CSIH_SCRIPT}
-
-auto_passphrase="no"
-passphrase=""
-pwdhome=
-with_passphrase=
-
-# ======================================================================
-# Routine: create_identity
-# optionally create identity of type argument in ~/.ssh
-# optionally add result to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-# ======================================================================
-create_identity() {
- local file="$1"
- local type="$2"
- local name="$3"
- if [ ! -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}" ]
- then
- if csih_request "Shall I create a ${name} identity file for you?"
- then
- csih_inform "Generating ${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}"
- if [ "${with_passphrase}" = "yes" ]
- then
- ssh-keygen -t "${type}" -N "${passphrase}" -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}" > /dev/null
- else
- ssh-keygen -t "${type}" -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}" > /dev/null
- fi
- if csih_request "Do you want to use this identity to login to this machine?"
- then
- csih_inform "Adding to ${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
- cat "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}.pub" >> "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
- fi
- fi
- fi
-} # === End of create_ssh1_identity() === #
-readonly -f create_identity
-
-# ======================================================================
-# Routine: check_user_homedir
-# Perform various checks on the user's home directory
-# SETS GLOBAL VARIABLE:
-# pwdhome
-# ======================================================================
-check_user_homedir() {
- local uid=$(id -u)
- pwdhome=$(awk -F: '{ if ( $3 == '${uid}' ) print $6; }' < ${SYSCONFDIR}/passwd)
- if [ "X${pwdhome}" = "X" ]
- then
- csih_error_multi \
- "There is no home directory set for you in ${SYSCONFDIR}/passwd." \
- 'Setting $HOME is not sufficient!'
- fi
-
- if [ ! -d "${pwdhome}" ]
- then
- csih_error_multi \
- "${pwdhome} is set in ${SYSCONFDIR}/passwd as your home directory" \
- 'but it is not a valid directory. Cannot create user identity files.'
- fi
-
- # If home is the root dir, set home to empty string to avoid error messages
- # in subsequent parts of that script.
- if [ "X${pwdhome}" = "X/" ]
- then
- # But first raise a warning!
- csih_warning "Your home directory in ${SYSCONFDIR}/passwd is set to root (/). This is not recommended!"
- if csih_request "Would you like to proceed anyway?"
- then
- pwdhome=''
- else
- csih_warning "Exiting. Configuration is not complete"
- exit 1
- fi
- fi
-
- if [ -d "${pwdhome}" -a csih_is_nt -a -n "`chmod -c g-w,o-w "${pwdhome}"`" ]
- then
- echo
- csih_warning 'group and other have been revoked write permission to your home'
- csih_warning "directory ${pwdhome}."
- csih_warning 'This is required by OpenSSH to allow public key authentication using'
- csih_warning 'the key files stored in your .ssh subdirectory.'
- csih_warning 'Revert this change ONLY if you know what you are doing!'
- echo
- fi
-} # === End of check_user_homedir() === #
-readonly -f check_user_homedir
-
-# ======================================================================
-# Routine: check_user_dot_ssh_dir
-# Perform various checks on the ~/.ssh directory
-# PREREQUISITE:
-# pwdhome -- check_user_homedir()
-# ======================================================================
-check_user_dot_ssh_dir() {
- if [ -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" -a ! -d "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ]
- then
- csih_error "${pwdhome}/.ssh is existant but not a directory. Cannot create user identity files."
- fi
-
- if [ ! -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ]
- then
- mkdir "${pwdhome}/.ssh"
- if [ ! -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ]
- then
- csih_error "Creating users ${pwdhome}/.ssh directory failed"
- fi
- fi
-} # === End of check_user_dot_ssh_dir() === #
-readonly -f check_user_dot_ssh_dir
-
-# ======================================================================
-# Routine: fix_authorized_keys_perms
-# Corrects the permissions of ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-# PREREQUISITE:
-# pwdhome -- check_user_homedir()
-# ======================================================================
-fix_authorized_keys_perms() {
- if [ csih_is_nt -a -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" ]
- then
- if ! setfacl -m "u::rw-,g::---,o::---" "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
- then
- csih_warning "Setting correct permissions to ${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
- csih_warning "failed. Please care for the correct permissions. The minimum requirement"
- csih_warning "is, the owner needs read permissions."
- echo
- fi
- fi
-} # === End of fix_authorized_keys_perms() === #
-readonly -f fix_authorized_keys_perms
-
-
-# ======================================================================
-# Main Entry Point
-# ======================================================================
-
-# Check how the script has been started. If
-# (1) it has been started by giving the full path and
-# that path is /etc/postinstall, OR
-# (2) Otherwise, if the environment variable
-# SSH_USER_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO is set
-# then set auto_answer to "no". This allows automatic
-# creation of the config files in /etc w/o overwriting
-# them if they already exist. In both cases, color
-# escape sequences are suppressed, so as to prevent
-# cluttering setup's logfiles.
-if [ "$PROGDIR" = "/etc/postinstall" ]
-then
- csih_auto_answer="no"
- csih_disable_color
-fi
-if [ -n "${SSH_USER_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO}" ]
-then
- csih_auto_answer="no"
- csih_disable_color
-fi
-
-# ======================================================================
-# Parse options
-# ======================================================================
-while :
-do
- case $# in
- 0)
- break
- ;;
- esac
-
- option=$1
- shift
-
- case "$option" in
- -d | --debug )
- set -x
- csih_trace_on
- ;;
-
- -y | --yes )
- csih_auto_answer=yes
- ;;
-
- -n | --no )
- csih_auto_answer=no
- ;;
-
- -p | --passphrase )
- with_passphrase="yes"
- passphrase=$1
- shift
- ;;
-
- *)
- echo "usage: ${PROGNAME} [OPTION]..."
- echo
- echo "This script creates an OpenSSH user configuration."
- echo
- echo "Options:"
- echo " --debug -d Enable shell's debug output."
- echo " --yes -y Answer all questions with \"yes\" automatically."
- echo " --no -n Answer all questions with \"no\" automatically."
- echo " --passphrase -p word Use \"word\" as passphrase automatically."
- echo
- exit 1
- ;;
-
- esac
-done
-
-# ======================================================================
-# Action!
-# ======================================================================
-
-# Check passwd file
-if [ ! -f ${SYSCONFDIR}/passwd ]
-then
- csih_error_multi \
- "${SYSCONFDIR}/passwd is nonexistant. Please generate an ${SYSCONFDIR}/passwd file" \
- 'first using mkpasswd. Check if it contains an entry for you and' \
- 'please care for the home directory in your entry as well.'
-fi
-
-check_user_homedir
-check_user_dot_ssh_dir
-create_identity id_rsa rsa "SSH2 RSA"
-create_identity id_dsa dsa "SSH2 DSA"
-create_identity id_ecdsa ecdsa "SSH2 ECDSA"
-create_identity identity rsa1 "(deprecated) SSH1 RSA"
-fix_authorized_keys_perms
-
-echo
-csih_inform "Configuration finished. Have fun!"
-
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+# ssh-user-config, Copyright 2000-2014 Red Hat Inc.
+#
+# This file is part of the Cygwin port of OpenSSH.
+#
+# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+#
+# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
+# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.
+# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,
+# DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR
+# OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR
+# THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Initialization
+# ======================================================================
+PROGNAME=$(basename -- $0)
+_tdir=$(dirname -- $0)
+PROGDIR=$(cd $_tdir && pwd)
+
+CSIH_SCRIPT=/usr/share/csih/cygwin-service-installation-helper.sh
+
+# Subdirectory where the new package is being installed
+PREFIX=/usr
+
+# Directory where the config files are stored
+SYSCONFDIR=/etc
+
+source ${CSIH_SCRIPT}
+
+auto_passphrase="no"
+passphrase=""
+pwdhome=
+with_passphrase=
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: create_identity
+# optionally create identity of type argument in ~/.ssh
+# optionally add result to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+# ======================================================================
+create_identity() {
+ local file="$1"
+ local type="$2"
+ local name="$3"
+ if [ ! -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}" ]
+ then
+ if csih_request "Shall I create a ${name} identity file for you?"
+ then
+ csih_inform "Generating ${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}"
+ if [ "${with_passphrase}" = "yes" ]
+ then
+ ssh-keygen -t "${type}" -N "${passphrase}" -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}" > /dev/null
+ else
+ ssh-keygen -t "${type}" -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}" > /dev/null
+ fi
+ if csih_request "Do you want to use this identity to login to this machine?"
+ then
+ csih_inform "Adding to ${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
+ cat "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}.pub" >> "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
+ fi
+ fi
+ fi
+} # === End of create_ssh1_identity() === #
+readonly -f create_identity
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: check_user_homedir
+# Perform various checks on the user's home directory
+# SETS GLOBAL VARIABLE:
+# pwdhome
+# ======================================================================
+check_user_homedir() {
+ pwdhome=$(getent passwd $UID | awk -F: '{ print $6; }')
+ if [ "X${pwdhome}" = "X" ]
+ then
+ csih_error_multi \
+ "There is no home directory set for you in the account database." \
+ 'Setting $HOME is not sufficient!'
+ fi
+
+ if [ ! -d "${pwdhome}" ]
+ then
+ csih_error_multi \
+ "${pwdhome} is set in the account database as your home directory" \
+ 'but it is not a valid directory. Cannot create user identity files.'
+ fi
+
+ # If home is the root dir, set home to empty string to avoid error messages
+ # in subsequent parts of that script.
+ if [ "X${pwdhome}" = "X/" ]
+ then
+ # But first raise a warning!
+ csih_warning "Your home directory in the account database is set to root (/). This is not recommended!"
+ if csih_request "Would you like to proceed anyway?"
+ then
+ pwdhome=''
+ else
+ csih_warning "Exiting. Configuration is not complete"
+ exit 1
+ fi
+ fi
+
+ if [ -d "${pwdhome}" -a -n "`chmod -c g-w,o-w "${pwdhome}"`" ]
+ then
+ echo
+ csih_warning 'group and other have been revoked write permission to your home'
+ csih_warning "directory ${pwdhome}."
+ csih_warning 'This is required by OpenSSH to allow public key authentication using'
+ csih_warning 'the key files stored in your .ssh subdirectory.'
+ csih_warning 'Revert this change ONLY if you know what you are doing!'
+ echo
+ fi
+} # === End of check_user_homedir() === #
+readonly -f check_user_homedir
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: check_user_dot_ssh_dir
+# Perform various checks on the ~/.ssh directory
+# PREREQUISITE:
+# pwdhome -- check_user_homedir()
+# ======================================================================
+check_user_dot_ssh_dir() {
+ if [ -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" -a ! -d "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ]
+ then
+ csih_error "${pwdhome}/.ssh is existant but not a directory. Cannot create user identity files."
+ fi
+
+ if [ ! -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ]
+ then
+ mkdir "${pwdhome}/.ssh"
+ if [ ! -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ]
+ then
+ csih_error "Creating users ${pwdhome}/.ssh directory failed"
+ fi
+ fi
+} # === End of check_user_dot_ssh_dir() === #
+readonly -f check_user_dot_ssh_dir
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: fix_authorized_keys_perms
+# Corrects the permissions of ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+# PREREQUISITE:
+# pwdhome -- check_user_homedir()
+# ======================================================================
+fix_authorized_keys_perms() {
+ if [ -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" ]
+ then
+ setfacl -b "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" 2>/dev/null || echo -n
+ if ! chmod u-x,g-wx,o-wx "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
+ then
+ csih_warning "Setting correct permissions to ${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
+ csih_warning "failed. Please care for the correct permissions. The minimum requirement"
+ csih_warning "is, the owner needs read permissions."
+ echo
+ fi
+ fi
+} # === End of fix_authorized_keys_perms() === #
+readonly -f fix_authorized_keys_perms
+
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Main Entry Point
+# ======================================================================
+
+# Check how the script has been started. If
+# (1) it has been started by giving the full path and
+# that path is /etc/postinstall, OR
+# (2) Otherwise, if the environment variable
+# SSH_USER_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO is set
+# then set auto_answer to "no". This allows automatic
+# creation of the config files in /etc w/o overwriting
+# them if they already exist. In both cases, color
+# escape sequences are suppressed, so as to prevent
+# cluttering setup's logfiles.
+if [ "$PROGDIR" = "/etc/postinstall" ]
+then
+ csih_auto_answer="no"
+ csih_disable_color
+fi
+if [ -n "${SSH_USER_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO}" ]
+then
+ csih_auto_answer="no"
+ csih_disable_color
+fi
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Parse options
+# ======================================================================
+while :
+do
+ case $# in
+ 0)
+ break
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+ option=$1
+ shift
+
+ case "$option" in
+ -d | --debug )
+ set -x
+ csih_trace_on
+ ;;
+
+ -y | --yes )
+ csih_auto_answer=yes
+ ;;
+
+ -n | --no )
+ csih_auto_answer=no
+ ;;
+
+ -p | --passphrase )
+ with_passphrase="yes"
+ passphrase=$1
+ shift
+ ;;
+
+ *)
+ echo "usage: ${PROGNAME} [OPTION]..."
+ echo
+ echo "This script creates an OpenSSH user configuration."
+ echo
+ echo "Options:"
+ echo " --debug -d Enable shell's debug output."
+ echo " --yes -y Answer all questions with \"yes\" automatically."
+ echo " --no -n Answer all questions with \"no\" automatically."
+ echo " --passphrase -p word Use \"word\" as passphrase automatically."
+ echo
+ exit 1
+ ;;
+
+ esac
+done
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Action!
+# ======================================================================
+
+check_user_homedir
+check_user_dot_ssh_dir
+create_identity id_rsa rsa "SSH2 RSA"
+create_identity id_dsa dsa "SSH2 DSA"
+create_identity id_ecdsa ecdsa "SSH2 ECDSA"
+create_identity identity rsa1 "(deprecated) SSH1 RSA"
+fix_authorized_keys_perms
+
+echo
+csih_inform "Configuration finished. Have fun!"
+
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,812 +0,0 @@
-%define ver 6.6p1
-%define rel 1
-
-# OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID
-%define sshd_uid 74
-%define sshd_gid 74
-
-# Version of ssh-askpass
-%define aversion 1.2.4.1
-
-# Do we want to disable building of x11-askpass? (1=yes 0=no)
-%define no_x11_askpass 0
-
-# Do we want to disable building of gnome-askpass? (1=yes 0=no)
-%define no_gnome_askpass 0
-
-# Do we want to link against a static libcrypto? (1=yes 0=no)
-%define static_libcrypto 0
-
-# Do we want smartcard support (1=yes 0=no)
-%define scard 0
-
-# Use GTK2 instead of GNOME in gnome-ssh-askpass
-%define gtk2 1
-
-# Is this build for RHL 6.x?
-%define build6x 0
-
-# Do we want kerberos5 support (1=yes 0=no)
-%define kerberos5 1
-
-# Reserve options to override askpass settings with:
-# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'skip_xxx 1'
-%{?skip_x11_askpass:%define no_x11_askpass 1}
-%{?skip_gnome_askpass:%define no_gnome_askpass 1}
-
-# Add option to build without GTK2 for older platforms with only GTK+.
-# RedHat <= 7.2 and Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1 are examples.
-# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'no_gtk2 1'
-%{?no_gtk2:%define gtk2 0}
-
-# Is this a build for RHL 6.x or earlier?
-%{?build_6x:%define build6x 1}
-
-# If this is RHL 6.x, the default configuration has sysconfdir in /usr/etc.
-%if %{build6x}
-%define _sysconfdir /etc
-%endif
-
-# Options for static OpenSSL link:
-# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1"
-%{?static_openssl:%define static_libcrypto 1}
-
-# Options for Smartcard support: (needs libsectok and openssl-engine)
-# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "smartcard 1"
-%{?smartcard:%define scard 1}
-
-# Is this a build for the rescue CD (without PAM, with MD5)? (1=yes 0=no)
-%define rescue 0
-%{?build_rescue:%define rescue 1}
-
-# Turn off some stuff for resuce builds
-%if %{rescue}
-%define kerberos5 0
-%endif
-
-Summary: The OpenSSH implementation of SSH protocol versions 1 and 2.
-Name: openssh
-Version: %{ver}
-%if %{rescue}
-Release: %{rel}rescue
-%else
-Release: %{rel}
-%endif
-URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
-Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
-%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
-Source1: http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}.tar.gz
-%endif
-License: BSD
-Group: Applications/Internet
-BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-buildroot
-Obsoletes: ssh
-%if %{build6x}
-PreReq: initscripts >= 5.00
-%else
-Requires: initscripts >= 5.20
-%endif
-BuildRequires: perl, openssl-devel, tcp_wrappers
-BuildRequires: /bin/login
-%if ! %{build6x}
-BuildPreReq: glibc-devel, pam
-%else
-BuildRequires: /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h
-%endif
-%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
-BuildRequires: /usr/include/X11/Xlib.h
-%endif
-%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
-BuildRequires: pkgconfig
-%endif
-%if %{kerberos5}
-BuildRequires: krb5-devel
-BuildRequires: krb5-libs
-%endif
-
-%package clients
-Summary: OpenSSH clients.
-Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
-Group: Applications/Internet
-Obsoletes: ssh-clients
-
-%package server
-Summary: The OpenSSH server daemon.
-Group: System Environment/Daemons
-Obsoletes: ssh-server
-Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}, chkconfig >= 0.9
-%if ! %{build6x}
-Requires: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
-%endif
-
-%package askpass
-Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X.
-Group: Applications/Internet
-Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
-Obsoletes: ssh-extras
-
-%package askpass-gnome
-Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH, X, and GNOME.
-Group: Applications/Internet
-Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
-Obsoletes: ssh-extras
-
-%description
-SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing
-commands on a remote machine. SSH is intended to replace rlogin and
-rsh, and to provide secure encrypted communications between two
-untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and
-arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
-
-OpenSSH is OpenBSD's version of the last free version of SSH, bringing
-it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing
-all patented algorithms to separate libraries.
-
-This package includes the core files necessary for both the OpenSSH
-client and server. To make this package useful, you should also
-install openssh-clients, openssh-server, or both.
-
-%description clients
-OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
-into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package includes
-the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers.
-You'll also need to install the openssh package on OpenSSH clients.
-
-%description server
-OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
-into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
-the secure shell daemon (sshd). The sshd daemon allows SSH clients to
-securely connect to your SSH server. You also need to have the openssh
-package installed.
-
-%description askpass
-OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
-into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
-an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
-
-%description askpass-gnome
-OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
-into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
-an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the GNOME GUI desktop
-environment.
-
-%prep
-
-%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
-%setup -q -a 1
-%else
-%setup -q
-%endif
-
-%build
-%if %{rescue}
-CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -Os"; export CFLAGS
-%endif
-
-%if %{kerberos5}
-K5DIR=`rpm -ql krb5-devel | grep include/krb5.h | sed 's,\/include\/krb5.h,,'`
-echo K5DIR=$K5DIR
-%endif
-
-%configure \
- --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
- --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh \
- --datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \
- --with-tcp-wrappers \
- --with-rsh=%{_bindir}/rsh \
- --with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin \
- --with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \
- --with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/sshd \
- --with-md5-passwords \
-%if %{scard}
- --with-smartcard \
-%endif
-%if %{rescue}
- --without-pam \
-%else
- --with-pam \
-%endif
-%if %{kerberos5}
- --with-kerberos5=$K5DIR \
-%endif
-
-
-%if %{static_libcrypto}
-perl -pi -e "s|-lcrypto|%{_libdir}/libcrypto.a|g" Makefile
-%endif
-
-make
-
-%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
-pushd x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}
-%configure --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh
-xmkmf -a
-make
-popd
-%endif
-
-# Define a variable to toggle gnome1/gtk2 building. This is necessary
-# because RPM doesn't handle nested %if statements.
-%if %{gtk2}
- gtk2=yes
-%else
- gtk2=no
-%endif
-
-%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
-pushd contrib
-if [ $gtk2 = yes ] ; then
- make gnome-ssh-askpass2
- mv gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass
-else
- make gnome-ssh-askpass1
- mv gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass
-fi
-popd
-%endif
-
-%install
-rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
-mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh
-mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh
-mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_var}/empty/sshd
-
-make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT
-
-install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/
-install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d
-install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh
-%if %{build6x}
-install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
-%else
-install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
-%endif
-install -m755 contrib/redhat/sshd.init $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd
-
-%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
-install -s x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass
-ln -s x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
-%endif
-
-%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
-install -s contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
-%endif
-
-%if ! %{scard}
- rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/openssh/Ssh.bin
-%endif
-
-%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
-install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
-install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
-install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
-%endif
-
-perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/*
-
-%clean
-rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
-
-%triggerun server -- ssh-server
-if [ "$1" != 0 -a -r /var/run/sshd.pid ] ; then
- touch /var/run/sshd.restart
-fi
-
-%triggerun server -- openssh-server < 2.5.0p1
-# Count the number of HostKey and HostDsaKey statements we have.
-gawk 'BEGIN {IGNORECASE=1}
- /^hostkey/ || /^hostdsakey/ {sawhostkey = sawhostkey + 1}
- END {exit sawhostkey}' /etc/ssh/sshd_config
-# And if we only found one, we know the client was relying on the old default
-# behavior, which loaded the the SSH2 DSA host key when HostDsaKey wasn't
-# specified. Now that HostKey is used for both SSH1 and SSH2 keys, specifying
-# one nullifies the default, which would have loaded both.
-if [ $? -eq 1 ] ; then
- echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
- echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
-fi
-
-%triggerpostun server -- ssh-server
-if [ "$1" != 0 ] ; then
- /sbin/chkconfig --add sshd
- if test -f /var/run/sshd.restart ; then
- rm -f /var/run/sshd.restart
- /sbin/service sshd start > /dev/null 2>&1 || :
- fi
-fi
-
-%pre server
-%{_sbindir}/groupadd -r -g %{sshd_gid} sshd 2>/dev/null || :
-%{_sbindir}/useradd -d /var/empty/sshd -s /bin/false -u %{sshd_uid} \
- -g sshd -M -r sshd 2>/dev/null || :
-
-%post server
-/sbin/chkconfig --add sshd
-
-%postun server
-/sbin/service sshd condrestart > /dev/null 2>&1 || :
-
-%preun server
-if [ "$1" = 0 ]
-then
- /sbin/service sshd stop > /dev/null 2>&1 || :
- /sbin/chkconfig --del sshd
-fi
-
-%files
-%defattr(-,root,root)
-%doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL LICENCE OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* TODO
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1*
-%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
-%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli
-%if ! %{rescue}
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1*
-%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh
-%attr(4711,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8*
-%endif
-%if %{scard}
-%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_datadir}/openssh
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_datadir}/openssh/Ssh.bin
-%endif
-
-%files clients
-%defattr(-,root,root)
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config
-%attr(-,root,root) %{_bindir}/slogin
-%attr(-,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/slogin.1*
-%if ! %{rescue}
-%attr(2755,root,nobody) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1*
-%endif
-
-%if ! %{rescue}
-%files server
-%defattr(-,root,root)
-%dir %attr(0111,root,root) %{_var}/empty/sshd
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8*
-%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
-%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
-%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd
-%attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd
-%endif
-
-%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
-%files askpass
-%defattr(-,root,root)
-%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/README
-%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/ChangeLog
-%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/SshAskpass*.ad
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass
-%endif
-
-%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
-%files askpass-gnome
-%defattr(-,root,root)
-%attr(0755,root,root) %config %{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.*
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
-%endif
-
-%changelog
-* Wed Jul 14 2010 Tim Rice <tim at multitalents.net>
-- test for skip_x11_askpass (line 77) should have been for no_x11_askpass
-
-* Mon Jun 2 2003 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
-- Remove noip6 option. This may be controlled at run-time in client config
- file using new AddressFamily directive
-
-* Mon May 12 2003 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
-- Don't install profile.d scripts when not building with GNOME/GTK askpass
- (patch from bet at rahul.net)
-
-* Wed Oct 01 2002 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
-- Install ssh-agent setgid nobody to prevent ptrace() key theft attacks
-
-* Mon Sep 30 2002 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
-- Use contrib/ Makefile for building askpass programs
-
-* Fri Jun 21 2002 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
-- Merge in spec changes from seba at iq.pl (Sebastian Pachuta)
-- Add new {ssh,sshd}_config.5 manpages
-- Add new ssh-keysign program and remove setuid from ssh client
-
-* Fri May 10 2002 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
-- Merge in spec changes from RedHat, reorgansie a little
-- Add Privsep user, group and directory
-
-* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 3.1p1-2
-- bump and grind (through the build system)
-
-* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 3.1p1-1
-- require sharutils for building (mindrot #137)
-- require db1-devel only when building for 6.x (#55105), which probably won't
- work anyway (3.1 requires OpenSSL 0.9.6 to build), but what the heck
-- require pam-devel by file (not by package name) again
-- add Markus's patch to compile with OpenSSL 0.9.5a (from
- http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=141) and apply it if we're
- building for 6.x
-
-* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 3.1p1-0
-- update to 3.1p1
-
-* Tue Mar 5 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> SNAP-20020305
-- update to SNAP-20020305
-- drop debug patch, fixed upstream
-
-* Wed Feb 20 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> SNAP-20020220
-- update to SNAP-20020220 for testing purposes (you've been warned, if there's
- anything to be warned about, gss patches won't apply, I don't mind)
-
-* Wed Feb 13 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 3.0.2p1-3
-- add patches from Simon Wilkinson and Nicolas Williams for GSSAPI key
- exchange, authentication, and named key support
-
-* Wed Jan 23 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 3.0.2p1-2
-- remove dependency on db1-devel, which has just been swallowed up whole
- by gnome-libs-devel
-
-* Sun Dec 29 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- adjust build dependencies so that build6x actually works right (fix
- from Hugo van der Kooij)
-
-* Tue Dec 4 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 3.0.2p1-1
-- update to 3.0.2p1
-
-* Fri Nov 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 3.0.1p1-1
-- update to 3.0.1p1
-
-* Tue Nov 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- update to current CVS (not for use in distribution)
-
-* Thu Nov 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 3.0p1-1
-- merge some of Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org> changes from the upstream
- 3.0p1 spec file and init script
-
-* Wed Nov 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- update to 3.0p1
-- update to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.4.1
-- change build dependency on a file from pam-devel to the pam-devel package
-- replace primes with moduli
-
-* Thu Sep 27 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 2.9p2-9
-- incorporate fix from Markus Friedl's advisory for IP-based authorization bugs
-
-* Thu Sep 13 2001 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <bero at redhat.com> 2.9p2-8
-- Merge changes to rescue build from current sysadmin survival cd
-
-* Thu Sep 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 2.9p2-7
-- fix scp's server's reporting of file sizes, and build with the proper
- preprocessor define to get large-file capable open(), stat(), etc.
- (sftp has been doing this correctly all along) (#51827)
-- configure without --with-ipv4-default on RHL 7.x and newer (#45987,#52247)
-- pull cvs patch to fix support for /etc/nologin for non-PAM logins (#47298)
-- mark profile.d scriptlets as config files (#42337)
-- refer to Jason Stone's mail for zsh workaround for exit-hanging quasi-bug
-- change a couple of log() statements to debug() statements (#50751)
-- pull cvs patch to add -t flag to sshd (#28611)
-- clear fd_sets correctly (one bit per FD, not one byte per FD) (#43221)
-
-* Mon Aug 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 2.9p2-6
-- add db1-devel as a BuildPrerequisite (noted by Hans Ecke)
-
-* Thu Aug 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- pull cvs patch to fix remote port forwarding with protocol 2
-
-* Thu Aug 9 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- pull cvs patch to add session initialization to no-pty sessions
-- pull cvs patch to not cut off challengeresponse auth needlessly
-- refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable
- it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed (#49263)
-
-* Wed Aug 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- don't apply patches to code we don't intend to build (spotted by Matt Galgoci)
-
-* Mon Aug 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- pass OPTIONS correctly to initlog (#50151)
-
-* Wed Jul 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- switch to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.2
-
-* Wed Jul 11 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- rebuild in new environment
-
-* Mon Jun 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- disable the gssapi patch
-
-* Mon Jun 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- update to 2.9p2
-- refresh to a new version of the gssapi patch
-
-* Thu Jun 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- change Copyright: BSD to License: BSD
-- add Markus Friedl's unverified patch for the cookie file deletion problem
- so that we can verify it
-- drop patch to check if xauth is present (was folded into cookie patch)
-- don't apply gssapi patches for the errata candidate
-- clear supplemental groups list at startup
-
-* Fri May 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- fix an error parsing the new default sshd_config
-- add a fix from Markus Friedl (via openssh-unix-dev) for ssh-keygen not
- dealing with comments right
-
-* Thu May 24 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- add in Simon Wilkinson's GSSAPI patch to give it some testing in-house,
- to be removed before the next beta cycle because it's a big departure
- from the upstream version
-
-* Thu May 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- finish marking strings in the init script for translation
-- modify init script to source /etc/sysconfig/sshd and pass $OPTIONS to sshd
- at startup (change merged from openssh.com init script, originally by
- Pekka Savola)
-- refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable
- it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed
-
-* Wed May 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- update to 2.9
-- drop various patches that came from or went upstream or to or from CVS
-
-* Wed Apr 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- only require initscripts 5.00 on 6.2 (reported by Peter Bieringer)
-
-* Sun Apr 8 2001 Preston Brown <pbrown at redhat.com>
-- remove explicit openssl requirement, fixes builddistro issue
-- make initscript stop() function wait until sshd really dead to avoid
- races in condrestart
-
-* Mon Apr 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- mention that challengereponse supports PAM, so disabling password doesn't
- limit users to pubkey and rsa auth (#34378)
-- bypass the daemon() function in the init script and call initlog directly,
- because daemon() won't start a daemon it detects is already running (like
- open connections)
-- require the version of openssl we had when we were built
-
-* Fri Mar 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- make do_pam_setcred() smart enough to know when to establish creds and
- when to reinitialize them
-- add in a couple of other fixes from Damien for inclusion in the errata
-
-* Thu Mar 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- update to 2.5.2p2
-- call setcred() again after initgroups, because the "creds" could actually
- be group memberships
-
-* Tue Mar 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- update to 2.5.2p1 (includes endianness fixes in the rijndael implementation)
-- don't enable challenge-response by default until we find a way to not
- have too many userauth requests (we may make up to six pubkey and up to
- three password attempts as it is)
-- remove build dependency on rsh to match openssh.com's packages more closely
-
-* Sat Mar 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- remove dependency on openssl -- would need to be too precise
-
-* Fri Mar 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- rebuild in new environment
-
-* Mon Feb 26 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Revert the patch to move pam_open_session.
-- Init script and spec file changes from Pekka Savola. (#28750)
-- Patch sftp to recognize '-o protocol' arguments. (#29540)
-
-* Thu Feb 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Chuck the closing patch.
-- Add a trigger to add host keys for protocol 2 to the config file, now that
- configuration file syntax requires us to specify it with HostKey if we
- specify any other HostKey values, which we do.
-
-* Tue Feb 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Redo patch to move pam_open_session after the server setuid()s to the user.
-- Rework the nopam patch to use be picked up by autoconf.
-
-* Mon Feb 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Update for 2.5.1p1.
-- Add init script mods from Pekka Savola.
-- Tweak the init script to match the CVS contrib script more closely.
-- Redo patch to ssh-add to try to adding both identity and id_dsa to also try
- adding id_rsa.
-
-* Fri Feb 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Update for 2.5.0p1.
-- Use $RPM_OPT_FLAGS instead of -O when building gnome-ssh-askpass
-- Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS, including
- update of x11 askpass to 1.2.0.
-- Only require openssl (don't prereq) because we generate keys in the init
- script now.
-
-* Tue Feb 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Don't open a PAM session until we've forked and become the user (#25690).
-- Apply Andrew Bartlett's patch for letting pam_authenticate() know which
- host the user is attempting a login from.
-- Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS.
-- Don't expose KbdInt responses in debug messages (from CVS).
-- Detect and handle errors in rsa_{public,private}_decrypt (from CVS).
-
-* Wed Feb 7 2001 Trond Eivind Glomsrxd <teg at redhat.com>
-- i18n-tweak to initscript.
-
-* Tue Jan 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- More gettextizing.
-- Close all files after going into daemon mode (needs more testing).
-- Extract patch from CVS to handle auth banners (in the client).
-- Extract patch from CVS to handle compat weirdness.
-
-* Fri Jan 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Finish with the gettextizing.
-
-* Thu Jan 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Fix a bug in auth2-pam.c (#23877)
-- Gettextize the init script.
-
-* Wed Dec 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Incorporate a switch for using PAM configs for 6.x, just in case.
-
-* Tue Dec 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Incorporate Bero's changes for a build specifically for rescue CDs.
-
-* Wed Nov 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Don't treat pam_setcred() failure as fatal unless pam_authenticate() has
- succeeded, to allow public-key authentication after a failure with "none"
- authentication. (#21268)
-
-* Tue Nov 28 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Update to x11-askpass 1.1.1. (#21301)
-- Don't second-guess fixpaths, which causes paths to get fixed twice. (#21290)
-
-* Mon Nov 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Merge multiple PAM text messages into subsequent prompts when possible when
- doing keyboard-interactive authentication.
-
-* Sun Nov 26 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Disable the built-in MD5 password support. We're using PAM.
-- Take a crack at doing keyboard-interactive authentication with PAM, and
- enable use of it in the default client configuration so that the client
- will try it when the server disallows password authentication.
-- Build with debugging flags. Build root policies strip all binaries anyway.
-
-* Tue Nov 21 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Use DESTDIR instead of %%makeinstall.
-- Remove /usr/X11R6/bin from the path-fixing patch.
-
-* Mon Nov 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Add the primes file from the latest snapshot to the main package (#20884).
-- Add the dev package to the prereq list (#19984).
-- Remove the default path and mimic login's behavior in the server itself.
-
-* Fri Nov 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Resync with conditional options in Damien Miller's .spec file for an errata.
-- Change libexecdir from %%{_libexecdir}/ssh to %%{_libexecdir}/openssh.
-
-* Tue Nov 7 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Update to OpenSSH 2.3.0p1.
-- Update to x11-askpass 1.1.0.
-- Enable keyboard-interactive authentication.
-
-* Mon Oct 30 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Update to ssh-askpass-x11 1.0.3.
-- Change authentication related messages to be private (#19966).
-
-* Tue Oct 10 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Patch ssh-keygen to be able to list signatures for DSA public key files
- it generates.
-
-* Thu Oct 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Add BuildRequires on /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h to be sure we always
- build PAM authentication in.
-- Try setting SSH_ASKPASS if gnome-ssh-askpass is installed.
-- Clean out no-longer-used patches.
-- Patch ssh-add to try to add both identity and id_dsa, and to error only
- when neither exists.
-
-* Mon Oct 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Update x11-askpass to 1.0.2. (#17835)
-- Add BuildRequiress for /bin/login and /usr/bin/rsh so that configure will
- always find them in the right place. (#17909)
-- Set the default path to be the same as the one supplied by /bin/login, but
- add /usr/X11R6/bin. (#17909)
-- Try to handle obsoletion of ssh-server more cleanly. Package names
- are different, but init script name isn't. (#17865)
-
-* Wed Sep 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Update to 2.2.0p1. (#17835)
-- Tweak the init script to allow proper restarting. (#18023)
-
-* Wed Aug 23 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Update to 20000823 snapshot.
-- Change subpackage requirements from %%{version} to %%{version}-%%{release}
-- Back out the pipe patch.
-
-* Mon Jul 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Update to 2.1.1p4, which includes fixes for config file parsing problems.
-- Move the init script back.
-- Add Damien's quick fix for wackiness.
-
-* Wed Jul 12 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Update to 2.1.1p3, which includes fixes for X11 forwarding and strtok().
-
-* Thu Jul 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Move condrestart to server postun.
-- Move key generation to init script.
-- Actually use the right patch for moving the key generation to the init script.
-- Clean up the init script a bit.
-
-* Wed Jul 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Fix X11 forwarding, from mail post by Chan Shih-Ping Richard.
-
-* Sun Jul 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Update to 2.1.1p2.
-- Use of strtok() considered harmful.
-
-* Sat Jul 1 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Get the build root out of the man pages.
-
-* Thu Jun 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Add and use condrestart support in the init script.
-- Add newer initscripts as a prereq.
-
-* Tue Jun 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Build in new environment (release 2)
-- Move -clients subpackage to Applications/Internet group
-
-* Fri Jun 9 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Update to 2.2.1p1
-
-* Sat Jun 3 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
-- Patch to build with neither RSA nor RSAref.
-- Miscellaneous FHS-compliance tweaks.
-- Fix for possibly-compressed man pages.
-
-* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
-- Updated for new location
-- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build
-
-* Sun Dec 26 1999 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
-- Added Jim Knoble's <jmknoble at pobox.com> askpass
-
-* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
-- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble <jmknoble at pobox.com>
-
-* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
-- Added 'Obsoletes' directives
-
-* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
-- Use make install
-- Subpackages
-
-* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
-- Added links for slogin
-- Fixed perms on manpages
-
-* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
-- Renamed init script
-
-* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
-- Back to old binary names
-
-* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
-- Use autoconf
-- New binary names
-
-* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
-- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's <kas at fi.muni.cz> spec.
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,808 @@
+%define ver 7.3p1
+%define rel 1
+
+# OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID
+%define sshd_uid 74
+%define sshd_gid 74
+
+# Version of ssh-askpass
+%define aversion 1.2.4.1
+
+# Do we want to disable building of x11-askpass? (1=yes 0=no)
+%define no_x11_askpass 0
+
+# Do we want to disable building of gnome-askpass? (1=yes 0=no)
+%define no_gnome_askpass 0
+
+# Do we want to link against a static libcrypto? (1=yes 0=no)
+%define static_libcrypto 0
+
+# Do we want smartcard support (1=yes 0=no)
+%define scard 0
+
+# Use GTK2 instead of GNOME in gnome-ssh-askpass
+%define gtk2 1
+
+# Is this build for RHL 6.x?
+%define build6x 0
+
+# Do we want kerberos5 support (1=yes 0=no)
+%define kerberos5 1
+
+# Reserve options to override askpass settings with:
+# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'skip_xxx 1'
+%{?skip_x11_askpass:%define no_x11_askpass 1}
+%{?skip_gnome_askpass:%define no_gnome_askpass 1}
+
+# Add option to build without GTK2 for older platforms with only GTK+.
+# RedHat <= 7.2 and Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1 are examples.
+# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'no_gtk2 1'
+%{?no_gtk2:%define gtk2 0}
+
+# Is this a build for RHL 6.x or earlier?
+%{?build_6x:%define build6x 1}
+
+# If this is RHL 6.x, the default configuration has sysconfdir in /usr/etc.
+%if %{build6x}
+%define _sysconfdir /etc
+%endif
+
+# Options for static OpenSSL link:
+# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1"
+%{?static_openssl:%define static_libcrypto 1}
+
+# Options for Smartcard support: (needs libsectok and openssl-engine)
+# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "smartcard 1"
+%{?smartcard:%define scard 1}
+
+# Is this a build for the rescue CD (without PAM, with MD5)? (1=yes 0=no)
+%define rescue 0
+%{?build_rescue:%define rescue 1}
+
+# Turn off some stuff for resuce builds
+%if %{rescue}
+%define kerberos5 0
+%endif
+
+Summary: The OpenSSH implementation of SSH protocol versions 1 and 2.
+Name: openssh
+Version: %{ver}
+%if %{rescue}
+Release: %{rel}rescue
+%else
+Release: %{rel}
+%endif
+URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
+Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+Source1: http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}.tar.gz
+%endif
+License: BSD
+Group: Applications/Internet
+BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-buildroot
+Obsoletes: ssh
+%if %{build6x}
+PreReq: initscripts >= 5.00
+%else
+Requires: initscripts >= 5.20
+%endif
+BuildRequires: perl, openssl-devel
+BuildRequires: /bin/login
+%if ! %{build6x}
+BuildRequires: glibc-devel, pam
+%else
+BuildRequires: /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h
+%endif
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+BuildRequires: /usr/include/X11/Xlib.h
+%endif
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig
+%endif
+%if %{kerberos5}
+BuildRequires: krb5-devel
+BuildRequires: krb5-libs
+%endif
+
+%package clients
+Summary: OpenSSH clients.
+Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
+Group: Applications/Internet
+Obsoletes: ssh-clients
+
+%package server
+Summary: The OpenSSH server daemon.
+Group: System Environment/Daemons
+Obsoletes: ssh-server
+Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}, chkconfig >= 0.9
+%if ! %{build6x}
+Requires: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
+%endif
+
+%package askpass
+Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X.
+Group: Applications/Internet
+Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
+Obsoletes: ssh-extras
+
+%package askpass-gnome
+Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH, X, and GNOME.
+Group: Applications/Internet
+Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
+Obsoletes: ssh-extras
+
+%description
+SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing
+commands on a remote machine. SSH is intended to replace rlogin and
+rsh, and to provide secure encrypted communications between two
+untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and
+arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+
+OpenSSH is OpenBSD's version of the last free version of SSH, bringing
+it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing
+all patented algorithms to separate libraries.
+
+This package includes the core files necessary for both the OpenSSH
+client and server. To make this package useful, you should also
+install openssh-clients, openssh-server, or both.
+
+%description clients
+OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
+into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package includes
+the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers.
+You'll also need to install the openssh package on OpenSSH clients.
+
+%description server
+OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
+into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
+the secure shell daemon (sshd). The sshd daemon allows SSH clients to
+securely connect to your SSH server. You also need to have the openssh
+package installed.
+
+%description askpass
+OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
+into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
+an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
+
+%description askpass-gnome
+OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
+into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
+an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the GNOME GUI desktop
+environment.
+
+%prep
+
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+%setup -q -a 1
+%else
+%setup -q
+%endif
+
+%build
+%if %{rescue}
+CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -Os"; export CFLAGS
+%endif
+
+%if %{kerberos5}
+K5DIR=`rpm -ql krb5-devel | grep 'include/krb5\.h' | sed 's,\/include\/krb5.h,,'`
+echo K5DIR=$K5DIR
+%endif
+
+%configure \
+ --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
+ --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh \
+ --datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \
+ --with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin \
+ --with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \
+ --with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/sshd \
+ --with-md5-passwords \
+%if %{scard}
+ --with-smartcard \
+%endif
+%if %{rescue}
+ --without-pam \
+%else
+ --with-pam \
+%endif
+%if %{kerberos5}
+ --with-kerberos5=$K5DIR \
+%endif
+
+
+%if %{static_libcrypto}
+perl -pi -e "s|-lcrypto|%{_libdir}/libcrypto.a|g" Makefile
+%endif
+
+make
+
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+pushd x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}
+%configure --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh
+xmkmf -a
+make
+popd
+%endif
+
+# Define a variable to toggle gnome1/gtk2 building. This is necessary
+# because RPM doesn't handle nested %if statements.
+%if %{gtk2}
+ gtk2=yes
+%else
+ gtk2=no
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+pushd contrib
+if [ $gtk2 = yes ] ; then
+ make gnome-ssh-askpass2
+ mv gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass
+else
+ make gnome-ssh-askpass1
+ mv gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass
+fi
+popd
+%endif
+
+%install
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh
+mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh
+mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_var}/empty/sshd
+
+make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh
+%if %{build6x}
+install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
+%else
+install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
+%endif
+install -m755 contrib/redhat/sshd.init $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd
+
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+install -s x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass
+ln -s x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+install -s contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{scard}
+ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/openssh/Ssh.bin
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
+install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
+install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
+%endif
+
+perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/*
+
+%clean
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+
+%triggerun server -- ssh-server
+if [ "$1" != 0 -a -r /var/run/sshd.pid ] ; then
+ touch /var/run/sshd.restart
+fi
+
+%triggerun server -- openssh-server < 2.5.0p1
+# Count the number of HostKey and HostDsaKey statements we have.
+gawk 'BEGIN {IGNORECASE=1}
+ /^hostkey/ || /^hostdsakey/ {sawhostkey = sawhostkey + 1}
+ END {exit sawhostkey}' /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+# And if we only found one, we know the client was relying on the old default
+# behavior, which loaded the the SSH2 DSA host key when HostDsaKey wasn't
+# specified. Now that HostKey is used for both SSH1 and SSH2 keys, specifying
+# one nullifies the default, which would have loaded both.
+if [ $? -eq 1 ] ; then
+ echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+ echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+fi
+
+%triggerpostun server -- ssh-server
+if [ "$1" != 0 ] ; then
+ /sbin/chkconfig --add sshd
+ if test -f /var/run/sshd.restart ; then
+ rm -f /var/run/sshd.restart
+ /sbin/service sshd start > /dev/null 2>&1 || :
+ fi
+fi
+
+%pre server
+%{_sbindir}/groupadd -r -g %{sshd_gid} sshd 2>/dev/null || :
+%{_sbindir}/useradd -d /var/empty/sshd -s /bin/false -u %{sshd_uid} \
+ -g sshd -M -r sshd 2>/dev/null || :
+
+%post server
+/sbin/chkconfig --add sshd
+
+%postun server
+/sbin/service sshd condrestart > /dev/null 2>&1 || :
+
+%preun server
+if [ "$1" = 0 ]
+then
+ /sbin/service sshd stop > /dev/null 2>&1 || :
+ /sbin/chkconfig --del sshd
+fi
+
+%files
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL LICENCE OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* TODO
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1*
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli
+%if ! %{rescue}
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1*
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh
+%attr(4711,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8*
+%endif
+%if %{scard}
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_datadir}/openssh
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_datadir}/openssh/Ssh.bin
+%endif
+
+%files clients
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config
+%if ! %{rescue}
+%attr(2755,root,nobody) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1*
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{rescue}
+%files server
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%dir %attr(0111,root,root) %{_var}/empty/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8*
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+%files askpass
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/README
+%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/ChangeLog
+%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/SshAskpass*.ad
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+%files askpass-gnome
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%attr(0755,root,root) %config %{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.*
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
+%endif
+
+%changelog
+* Wed Jul 14 2010 Tim Rice <tim at multitalents.net>
+- test for skip_x11_askpass (line 77) should have been for no_x11_askpass
+
+* Mon Jun 2 2003 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+- Remove noip6 option. This may be controlled at run-time in client config
+ file using new AddressFamily directive
+
+* Mon May 12 2003 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+- Don't install profile.d scripts when not building with GNOME/GTK askpass
+ (patch from bet at rahul.net)
+
+* Wed Oct 01 2002 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+- Install ssh-agent setgid nobody to prevent ptrace() key theft attacks
+
+* Mon Sep 30 2002 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+- Use contrib/ Makefile for building askpass programs
+
+* Fri Jun 21 2002 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+- Merge in spec changes from seba at iq.pl (Sebastian Pachuta)
+- Add new {ssh,sshd}_config.5 manpages
+- Add new ssh-keysign program and remove setuid from ssh client
+
+* Fri May 10 2002 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+- Merge in spec changes from RedHat, reorgansie a little
+- Add Privsep user, group and directory
+
+* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 3.1p1-2
+- bump and grind (through the build system)
+
+* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 3.1p1-1
+- require sharutils for building (mindrot #137)
+- require db1-devel only when building for 6.x (#55105), which probably won't
+ work anyway (3.1 requires OpenSSL 0.9.6 to build), but what the heck
+- require pam-devel by file (not by package name) again
+- add Markus's patch to compile with OpenSSL 0.9.5a (from
+ http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=141) and apply it if we're
+ building for 6.x
+
+* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 3.1p1-0
+- update to 3.1p1
+
+* Tue Mar 5 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> SNAP-20020305
+- update to SNAP-20020305
+- drop debug patch, fixed upstream
+
+* Wed Feb 20 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> SNAP-20020220
+- update to SNAP-20020220 for testing purposes (you've been warned, if there's
+ anything to be warned about, gss patches won't apply, I don't mind)
+
+* Wed Feb 13 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 3.0.2p1-3
+- add patches from Simon Wilkinson and Nicolas Williams for GSSAPI key
+ exchange, authentication, and named key support
+
+* Wed Jan 23 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 3.0.2p1-2
+- remove dependency on db1-devel, which has just been swallowed up whole
+ by gnome-libs-devel
+
+* Sun Dec 29 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- adjust build dependencies so that build6x actually works right (fix
+ from Hugo van der Kooij)
+
+* Tue Dec 4 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 3.0.2p1-1
+- update to 3.0.2p1
+
+* Fri Nov 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 3.0.1p1-1
+- update to 3.0.1p1
+
+* Tue Nov 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- update to current CVS (not for use in distribution)
+
+* Thu Nov 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 3.0p1-1
+- merge some of Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org> changes from the upstream
+ 3.0p1 spec file and init script
+
+* Wed Nov 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- update to 3.0p1
+- update to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.4.1
+- change build dependency on a file from pam-devel to the pam-devel package
+- replace primes with moduli
+
+* Thu Sep 27 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 2.9p2-9
+- incorporate fix from Markus Friedl's advisory for IP-based authorization bugs
+
+* Thu Sep 13 2001 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <bero at redhat.com> 2.9p2-8
+- Merge changes to rescue build from current sysadmin survival cd
+
+* Thu Sep 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 2.9p2-7
+- fix scp's server's reporting of file sizes, and build with the proper
+ preprocessor define to get large-file capable open(), stat(), etc.
+ (sftp has been doing this correctly all along) (#51827)
+- configure without --with-ipv4-default on RHL 7.x and newer (#45987,#52247)
+- pull cvs patch to fix support for /etc/nologin for non-PAM logins (#47298)
+- mark profile.d scriptlets as config files (#42337)
+- refer to Jason Stone's mail for zsh workaround for exit-hanging quasi-bug
+- change a couple of log() statements to debug() statements (#50751)
+- pull cvs patch to add -t flag to sshd (#28611)
+- clear fd_sets correctly (one bit per FD, not one byte per FD) (#43221)
+
+* Mon Aug 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com> 2.9p2-6
+- add db1-devel as a BuildPrerequisite (noted by Hans Ecke)
+
+* Thu Aug 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- pull cvs patch to fix remote port forwarding with protocol 2
+
+* Thu Aug 9 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- pull cvs patch to add session initialization to no-pty sessions
+- pull cvs patch to not cut off challengeresponse auth needlessly
+- refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable
+ it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed (#49263)
+
+* Wed Aug 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- don't apply patches to code we don't intend to build (spotted by Matt Galgoci)
+
+* Mon Aug 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- pass OPTIONS correctly to initlog (#50151)
+
+* Wed Jul 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- switch to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.2
+
+* Wed Jul 11 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- rebuild in new environment
+
+* Mon Jun 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- disable the gssapi patch
+
+* Mon Jun 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- update to 2.9p2
+- refresh to a new version of the gssapi patch
+
+* Thu Jun 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- change Copyright: BSD to License: BSD
+- add Markus Friedl's unverified patch for the cookie file deletion problem
+ so that we can verify it
+- drop patch to check if xauth is present (was folded into cookie patch)
+- don't apply gssapi patches for the errata candidate
+- clear supplemental groups list at startup
+
+* Fri May 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- fix an error parsing the new default sshd_config
+- add a fix from Markus Friedl (via openssh-unix-dev) for ssh-keygen not
+ dealing with comments right
+
+* Thu May 24 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- add in Simon Wilkinson's GSSAPI patch to give it some testing in-house,
+ to be removed before the next beta cycle because it's a big departure
+ from the upstream version
+
+* Thu May 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- finish marking strings in the init script for translation
+- modify init script to source /etc/sysconfig/sshd and pass $OPTIONS to sshd
+ at startup (change merged from openssh.com init script, originally by
+ Pekka Savola)
+- refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable
+ it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed
+
+* Wed May 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- update to 2.9
+- drop various patches that came from or went upstream or to or from CVS
+
+* Wed Apr 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- only require initscripts 5.00 on 6.2 (reported by Peter Bieringer)
+
+* Sun Apr 8 2001 Preston Brown <pbrown at redhat.com>
+- remove explicit openssl requirement, fixes builddistro issue
+- make initscript stop() function wait until sshd really dead to avoid
+ races in condrestart
+
+* Mon Apr 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- mention that challengereponse supports PAM, so disabling password doesn't
+ limit users to pubkey and rsa auth (#34378)
+- bypass the daemon() function in the init script and call initlog directly,
+ because daemon() won't start a daemon it detects is already running (like
+ open connections)
+- require the version of openssl we had when we were built
+
+* Fri Mar 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- make do_pam_setcred() smart enough to know when to establish creds and
+ when to reinitialize them
+- add in a couple of other fixes from Damien for inclusion in the errata
+
+* Thu Mar 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- update to 2.5.2p2
+- call setcred() again after initgroups, because the "creds" could actually
+ be group memberships
+
+* Tue Mar 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- update to 2.5.2p1 (includes endianness fixes in the rijndael implementation)
+- don't enable challenge-response by default until we find a way to not
+ have too many userauth requests (we may make up to six pubkey and up to
+ three password attempts as it is)
+- remove build dependency on rsh to match openssh.com's packages more closely
+
+* Sat Mar 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- remove dependency on openssl -- would need to be too precise
+
+* Fri Mar 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- rebuild in new environment
+
+* Mon Feb 26 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Revert the patch to move pam_open_session.
+- Init script and spec file changes from Pekka Savola. (#28750)
+- Patch sftp to recognize '-o protocol' arguments. (#29540)
+
+* Thu Feb 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Chuck the closing patch.
+- Add a trigger to add host keys for protocol 2 to the config file, now that
+ configuration file syntax requires us to specify it with HostKey if we
+ specify any other HostKey values, which we do.
+
+* Tue Feb 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Redo patch to move pam_open_session after the server setuid()s to the user.
+- Rework the nopam patch to use be picked up by autoconf.
+
+* Mon Feb 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Update for 2.5.1p1.
+- Add init script mods from Pekka Savola.
+- Tweak the init script to match the CVS contrib script more closely.
+- Redo patch to ssh-add to try to adding both identity and id_dsa to also try
+ adding id_rsa.
+
+* Fri Feb 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Update for 2.5.0p1.
+- Use $RPM_OPT_FLAGS instead of -O when building gnome-ssh-askpass
+- Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS, including
+ update of x11 askpass to 1.2.0.
+- Only require openssl (don't prereq) because we generate keys in the init
+ script now.
+
+* Tue Feb 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Don't open a PAM session until we've forked and become the user (#25690).
+- Apply Andrew Bartlett's patch for letting pam_authenticate() know which
+ host the user is attempting a login from.
+- Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS.
+- Don't expose KbdInt responses in debug messages (from CVS).
+- Detect and handle errors in rsa_{public,private}_decrypt (from CVS).
+
+* Wed Feb 7 2001 Trond Eivind Glomsrxd <teg at redhat.com>
+- i18n-tweak to initscript.
+
+* Tue Jan 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- More gettextizing.
+- Close all files after going into daemon mode (needs more testing).
+- Extract patch from CVS to handle auth banners (in the client).
+- Extract patch from CVS to handle compat weirdness.
+
+* Fri Jan 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Finish with the gettextizing.
+
+* Thu Jan 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Fix a bug in auth2-pam.c (#23877)
+- Gettextize the init script.
+
+* Wed Dec 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Incorporate a switch for using PAM configs for 6.x, just in case.
+
+* Tue Dec 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Incorporate Bero's changes for a build specifically for rescue CDs.
+
+* Wed Nov 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Don't treat pam_setcred() failure as fatal unless pam_authenticate() has
+ succeeded, to allow public-key authentication after a failure with "none"
+ authentication. (#21268)
+
+* Tue Nov 28 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Update to x11-askpass 1.1.1. (#21301)
+- Don't second-guess fixpaths, which causes paths to get fixed twice. (#21290)
+
+* Mon Nov 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Merge multiple PAM text messages into subsequent prompts when possible when
+ doing keyboard-interactive authentication.
+
+* Sun Nov 26 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Disable the built-in MD5 password support. We're using PAM.
+- Take a crack at doing keyboard-interactive authentication with PAM, and
+ enable use of it in the default client configuration so that the client
+ will try it when the server disallows password authentication.
+- Build with debugging flags. Build root policies strip all binaries anyway.
+
+* Tue Nov 21 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Use DESTDIR instead of %%makeinstall.
+- Remove /usr/X11R6/bin from the path-fixing patch.
+
+* Mon Nov 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Add the primes file from the latest snapshot to the main package (#20884).
+- Add the dev package to the prereq list (#19984).
+- Remove the default path and mimic login's behavior in the server itself.
+
+* Fri Nov 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Resync with conditional options in Damien Miller's .spec file for an errata.
+- Change libexecdir from %%{_libexecdir}/ssh to %%{_libexecdir}/openssh.
+
+* Tue Nov 7 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Update to OpenSSH 2.3.0p1.
+- Update to x11-askpass 1.1.0.
+- Enable keyboard-interactive authentication.
+
+* Mon Oct 30 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Update to ssh-askpass-x11 1.0.3.
+- Change authentication related messages to be private (#19966).
+
+* Tue Oct 10 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Patch ssh-keygen to be able to list signatures for DSA public key files
+ it generates.
+
+* Thu Oct 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Add BuildRequires on /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h to be sure we always
+ build PAM authentication in.
+- Try setting SSH_ASKPASS if gnome-ssh-askpass is installed.
+- Clean out no-longer-used patches.
+- Patch ssh-add to try to add both identity and id_dsa, and to error only
+ when neither exists.
+
+* Mon Oct 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Update x11-askpass to 1.0.2. (#17835)
+- Add BuildRequiress for /bin/login and /usr/bin/rsh so that configure will
+ always find them in the right place. (#17909)
+- Set the default path to be the same as the one supplied by /bin/login, but
+ add /usr/X11R6/bin. (#17909)
+- Try to handle obsoletion of ssh-server more cleanly. Package names
+ are different, but init script name isn't. (#17865)
+
+* Wed Sep 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Update to 2.2.0p1. (#17835)
+- Tweak the init script to allow proper restarting. (#18023)
+
+* Wed Aug 23 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Update to 20000823 snapshot.
+- Change subpackage requirements from %%{version} to %%{version}-%%{release}
+- Back out the pipe patch.
+
+* Mon Jul 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Update to 2.1.1p4, which includes fixes for config file parsing problems.
+- Move the init script back.
+- Add Damien's quick fix for wackiness.
+
+* Wed Jul 12 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Update to 2.1.1p3, which includes fixes for X11 forwarding and strtok().
+
+* Thu Jul 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Move condrestart to server postun.
+- Move key generation to init script.
+- Actually use the right patch for moving the key generation to the init script.
+- Clean up the init script a bit.
+
+* Wed Jul 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Fix X11 forwarding, from mail post by Chan Shih-Ping Richard.
+
+* Sun Jul 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Update to 2.1.1p2.
+- Use of strtok() considered harmful.
+
+* Sat Jul 1 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Get the build root out of the man pages.
+
+* Thu Jun 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Add and use condrestart support in the init script.
+- Add newer initscripts as a prereq.
+
+* Tue Jun 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Build in new environment (release 2)
+- Move -clients subpackage to Applications/Internet group
+
+* Fri Jun 9 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Update to 2.2.1p1
+
+* Sat Jun 3 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>
+- Patch to build with neither RSA nor RSAref.
+- Miscellaneous FHS-compliance tweaks.
+- Fix for possibly-compressed man pages.
+
+* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
+- Updated for new location
+- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build
+
+* Sun Dec 26 1999 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+- Added Jim Knoble's <jmknoble at pobox.com> askpass
+
+* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble <jmknoble at pobox.com>
+
+* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+- Added 'Obsoletes' directives
+
+* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
+- Use make install
+- Subpackages
+
+* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
+- Added links for slogin
+- Fixed perms on manpages
+
+* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
+- Renamed init script
+
+* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
+- Back to old binary names
+
+* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
+- Use autoconf
+- New binary names
+
+* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
+- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's <kas at fi.muni.cz> spec.
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/ssh-copy-id 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,300 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-
-# Copyright (c) 1999-2013 Philip Hands <phil at hands.com>
-# 2013 Martin Kletzander <mkletzan at redhat.com>
-# 2010 Adeodato =?iso-8859-1?Q?Sim=F3?= <asp16 at alu.ua.es>
-# 2010 Eric Moret <eric.moret at gmail.com>
-# 2009 Xr <xr at i-jeuxvideo.com>
-# 2007 Justin Pryzby <justinpryzby at users.sourceforge.net>
-# 2004 Reini Urban <rurban at x-ray.at>
-# 2003 Colin Watson <cjwatson at debian.org>
-# All rights reserved.
-#
-# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-# are met:
-# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-# documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-#
-# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-# IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-# OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-# INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-# NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-# DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-# THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-# (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-# THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-
-# Shell script to install your public key(s) on a remote machine
-# See the ssh-copy-id(1) man page for details
-
-# check that we have something mildly sane as our shell, or try to find something better
-if false ^ printf "%s: WARNING: ancient shell, hunting for a more modern one... " "$0"
-then
- SANE_SH=${SANE_SH:-/usr/bin/ksh}
- if printf 'true ^ false\n' | "$SANE_SH"
- then
- printf "'%s' seems viable.\n" "$SANE_SH"
- exec "$SANE_SH" "$0" "$@"
- else
- cat <<-EOF
- oh dear.
-
- If you have a more recent shell available, that supports \$(...) etc.
- please try setting the environment variable SANE_SH to the path of that
- shell, and then retry running this script. If that works, please report
- a bug describing your setup, and the shell you used to make it work.
-
- EOF
- printf "%s: ERROR: Less dimwitted shell required.\n" "$0"
- exit 1
- fi
-fi
-
-DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE=$(ls -t ${HOME}/.ssh/id*.pub 2>/dev/null | grep -v -- '-cert.pub$' | head -n 1)
-
-usage () {
- printf 'Usage: %s [-h|-?|-n] [-i [identity_file]] [-p port] [[-o <ssh -o options>] ...] [user@]hostname\n' "$0" >&2
- exit 1
-}
-
-# escape any single quotes in an argument
-quote() {
- printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed -e "s/'/'\\\\''/g"
-}
-
-use_id_file() {
- local L_ID_FILE="$1"
-
- if expr "$L_ID_FILE" : ".*\.pub$" >/dev/null ; then
- PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE"
- else
- PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE.pub"
- fi
-
- PRIV_ID_FILE=$(dirname "$PUB_ID_FILE")/$(basename "$PUB_ID_FILE" .pub)
-
- # check that the files are readable
- for f in $PUB_ID_FILE $PRIV_ID_FILE ; do
- ErrMSG=$( { : < $f ; } 2>&1 ) || {
- printf "\n%s: ERROR: failed to open ID file '%s': %s\n\n" "$0" "$f" "$(printf "%s\n" "$ErrMSG" | sed -e 's/.*: *//')"
- exit 1
- }
- done
- GET_ID="cat \"$PUB_ID_FILE\""
-}
-
-if [ -n "$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" ] && ssh-add -L >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
- GET_ID="ssh-add -L"
-fi
-
-while test "$#" -gt 0
-do
- [ "${SEEN_OPT_I}" ] && expr "$1" : "[-]i" >/dev/null && {
- printf "\n%s: ERROR: -i option must not be specified more than once\n\n" "$0"
- usage
- }
-
- OPT= OPTARG=
- # implement something like getopt to avoid Solaris pain
- case "$1" in
- -i?*|-o?*|-p?*)
- OPT="$(printf -- "$1"|cut -c1-2)"
- OPTARG="$(printf -- "$1"|cut -c3-)"
- shift
- ;;
- -o|-p)
- OPT="$1"
- OPTARG="$2"
- shift 2
- ;;
- -i)
- OPT="$1"
- test "$#" -le 2 || expr "$2" : "[-]" >/dev/null || {
- OPTARG="$2"
- shift
- }
- shift
- ;;
- -n|-h|-\?)
- OPT="$1"
- OPTARG=
- shift
- ;;
- --)
- shift
- while test "$#" -gt 0
- do
- SAVEARGS="${SAVEARGS:+$SAVEARGS }'$(quote "$1")'"
- shift
- done
- break
- ;;
- -*)
- printf "\n%s: ERROR: invalid option (%s)\n\n" "$0" "$1"
- usage
- ;;
- *)
- SAVEARGS="${SAVEARGS:+$SAVEARGS }'$(quote "$1")'"
- shift
- continue
- ;;
- esac
-
- case "$OPT" in
- -i)
- SEEN_OPT_I="yes"
- use_id_file "${OPTARG:-$DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE}"
- ;;
- -o|-p)
- SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }$OPT '$(quote "$OPTARG")'"
- ;;
- -n)
- DRY_RUN=1
- ;;
- -h|-\?)
- usage
- ;;
- esac
-done
-
-eval set -- "$SAVEARGS"
-
-if [ $# = 0 ] ; then
- usage
-fi
-if [ $# != 1 ] ; then
- printf '%s: ERROR: Too many arguments. Expecting a target hostname, got: %s\n\n' "$0" "$SAVEARGS" >&2
- usage
-fi
-
-# drop trailing colon
-USER_HOST=$(printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed 's/:$//')
-# tack the hostname onto SSH_OPTS
-SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }'$(quote "$USER_HOST")'"
-# and populate "$@" for later use (only way to get proper quoting of options)
-eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
-
-if [ -z "$(eval $GET_ID)" ] && [ -r "${PUB_ID_FILE:=$DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE}" ] ; then
- use_id_file "$PUB_ID_FILE"
-fi
-
-if [ -z "$(eval $GET_ID)" ] ; then
- printf '%s: ERROR: No identities found\n' "$0" >&2
- exit 1
-fi
-
-# populate_new_ids() uses several global variables ($USER_HOST, $SSH_OPTS ...)
-# and has the side effect of setting $NEW_IDS
-populate_new_ids() {
- local L_SUCCESS="$1"
-
- # repopulate "$@" inside this function
- eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
-
- umask 0177
- local L_TMP_ID_FILE=$(mktemp ~/.ssh/ssh-copy-id_id.XXXXXXXXXX)
- if test $? -ne 0 || test "x$L_TMP_ID_FILE" = "x" ; then
- echo "mktemp failed" 1>&2
- exit 1
- fi
- trap "rm -f $L_TMP_ID_FILE ${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.pub" EXIT TERM INT QUIT
- printf '%s: INFO: attempting to log in with the new key(s), to filter out any that are already installed\n' "$0" >&2
- NEW_IDS=$(
- eval $GET_ID | {
- while read ID ; do
- printf '%s\n' "$ID" > $L_TMP_ID_FILE
-
- # the next line assumes $PRIV_ID_FILE only set if using a single id file - this
- # assumption will break if we implement the possibility of multiple -i options.
- # The point being that if file based, ssh needs the private key, which it cannot
- # find if only given the contents of the .pub file in an unrelated tmpfile
- ssh -i "${PRIV_ID_FILE:-$L_TMP_ID_FILE}" \
- -o PreferredAuthentications=publickey \
- -o IdentitiesOnly=yes "$@" exit 2>$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr </dev/null
- if [ "$?" = "$L_SUCCESS" ] ; then
- : > $L_TMP_ID_FILE
- else
- grep 'Permission denied' $L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr >/dev/null || {
- sed -e 's/^/ERROR: /' <$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr >$L_TMP_ID_FILE
- cat >/dev/null #consume the other keys, causing loop to end
- }
- fi
-
- cat $L_TMP_ID_FILE
- done
- }
- )
- rm -f $L_TMP_ID_FILE* && trap - EXIT TERM INT QUIT
-
- if expr "$NEW_IDS" : "^ERROR: " >/dev/null ; then
- printf '\n%s: %s\n\n' "$0" "$NEW_IDS" >&2
- exit 1
- fi
- if [ -z "$NEW_IDS" ] ; then
- printf '\n%s: WARNING: All keys were skipped because they already exist on the remote system.\n\n' "$0" >&2
- exit 0
- fi
- printf '%s: INFO: %d key(s) remain to be installed -- if you are prompted now it is to install the new keys\n' "$0" "$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)" >&2
-}
-
-REMOTE_VERSION=$(ssh -v -o PreferredAuthentications=',' "$@" 2>&1 |
- sed -ne 's/.*remote software version //p')
-
-case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in
- NetScreen*)
- populate_new_ids 1
- for KEY in $(printf "%s" "$NEW_IDS" | cut -d' ' -f2) ; do
- KEY_NO=$(($KEY_NO + 1))
- printf "%s\n" "$KEY" | grep ssh-dss >/dev/null || {
- printf '%s: WARNING: Non-dsa key (#%d) skipped (NetScreen only supports DSA keys)\n' "$0" "$KEY_NO" >&2
- continue
- }
- [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf 'set ssh pka-dsa key %s\nsave\nexit\n' "$KEY" | ssh -T "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? = 255 ] ; then
- printf '%s: ERROR: installation of key #%d failed (please report a bug describing what caused this, so that we can make this message useful)\n' "$0" "$KEY_NO" >&2
- else
- ADDED=$(($ADDED + 1))
- fi
- done
- if [ -z "$ADDED" ] ; then
- exit 1
- fi
- ;;
- *)
- # Assuming that the remote host treats ~/.ssh/authorized_keys as one might expect
- populate_new_ids 0
- [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | ssh "$@" "
- umask 077 ;
- mkdir -p .ssh && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ;
- if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi" \
- || exit 1
- ADDED=$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)
- ;;
-esac
-
-if [ "$DRY_RUN" ] ; then
- cat <<-EOF
- =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
- Would have added the following key(s):
-
- $NEW_IDS
- =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
- EOF
-else
- cat <<-EOF
-
- Number of key(s) added: $ADDED
-
- Now try logging into the machine, with: "ssh $SSH_OPTS"
- and check to make sure that only the key(s) you wanted were added.
-
- EOF
-fi
-
-# =-=-=-=
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/ssh-copy-id)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Copyright (c) 1999-2013 Philip Hands <phil at hands.com>
+# 2013 Martin Kletzander <mkletzan at redhat.com>
+# 2010 Adeodato =?iso-8859-1?Q?Sim=F3?= <asp16 at alu.ua.es>
+# 2010 Eric Moret <eric.moret at gmail.com>
+# 2009 Xr <xr at i-jeuxvideo.com>
+# 2007 Justin Pryzby <justinpryzby at users.sourceforge.net>
+# 2004 Reini Urban <rurban at x-ray.at>
+# 2003 Colin Watson <cjwatson at debian.org>
+# All rights reserved.
+#
+# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+# are met:
+# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+# documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+#
+# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+# IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+# OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+# INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+# NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+# DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+# THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+# (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+# THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+# Shell script to install your public key(s) on a remote machine
+# See the ssh-copy-id(1) man page for details
+
+# check that we have something mildly sane as our shell, or try to find something better
+if false ^ printf "%s: WARNING: ancient shell, hunting for a more modern one... " "$0"
+then
+ SANE_SH=${SANE_SH:-/usr/bin/ksh}
+ if printf 'true ^ false\n' | "$SANE_SH"
+ then
+ printf "'%s' seems viable.\n" "$SANE_SH"
+ exec "$SANE_SH" "$0" "$@"
+ else
+ cat <<-EOF
+ oh dear.
+
+ If you have a more recent shell available, that supports \$(...) etc.
+ please try setting the environment variable SANE_SH to the path of that
+ shell, and then retry running this script. If that works, please report
+ a bug describing your setup, and the shell you used to make it work.
+
+ EOF
+ printf "%s: ERROR: Less dimwitted shell required.\n" "$0"
+ exit 1
+ fi
+fi
+
+DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE="$HOME/$(cd "$HOME" ; ls -t .ssh/id*.pub 2>/dev/null | grep -v -- '-cert.pub$' | head -n 1)"
+
+usage () {
+ printf 'Usage: %s [-h|-?|-f|-n] [-i [identity_file]] [-p port] [[-o <ssh -o options>] ...] [user@]hostname\n' "$0" >&2
+ printf '\t-f: force mode -- copy keys without trying to check if they are already installed\n' >&2
+ printf '\t-n: dry run -- no keys are actually copied\n' >&2
+ printf '\t-h|-?: print this help\n' >&2
+ exit 1
+}
+
+# escape any single quotes in an argument
+quote() {
+ printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed -e "s/'/'\\\\''/g"
+}
+
+use_id_file() {
+ local L_ID_FILE="$1"
+
+ if expr "$L_ID_FILE" : ".*\.pub$" >/dev/null ; then
+ PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE"
+ else
+ PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE.pub"
+ fi
+
+ [ "$FORCED" ] || PRIV_ID_FILE=$(dirname "$PUB_ID_FILE")/$(basename "$PUB_ID_FILE" .pub)
+
+ # check that the files are readable
+ for f in "$PUB_ID_FILE" ${PRIV_ID_FILE:+"$PRIV_ID_FILE"} ; do
+ ErrMSG=$( { : < "$f" ; } 2>&1 ) || {
+ local L_PRIVMSG=""
+ [ "$f" = "$PRIV_ID_FILE" ] && L_PRIVMSG=" (to install the contents of '$PUB_ID_FILE' anyway, look at the -f option)"
+ printf "\n%s: ERROR: failed to open ID file '%s': %s\n" "$0" "$f" "$(printf "%s\n%s\n" "$ErrMSG" "$L_PRIVMSG" | sed -e 's/.*: *//')"
+ exit 1
+ }
+ done
+ printf '%s: INFO: Source of key(s) to be installed: "%s"\n' "$0" "$PUB_ID_FILE" >&2
+ GET_ID="cat \"$PUB_ID_FILE\""
+}
+
+if [ -n "$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" ] && ssh-add -L >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+ GET_ID="ssh-add -L"
+fi
+
+while test "$#" -gt 0
+do
+ [ "${SEEN_OPT_I}" ] && expr "$1" : "[-]i" >/dev/null && {
+ printf "\n%s: ERROR: -i option must not be specified more than once\n\n" "$0"
+ usage
+ }
+
+ OPT= OPTARG=
+ # implement something like getopt to avoid Solaris pain
+ case "$1" in
+ -i?*|-o?*|-p?*)
+ OPT="$(printf -- "$1"|cut -c1-2)"
+ OPTARG="$(printf -- "$1"|cut -c3-)"
+ shift
+ ;;
+ -o|-p)
+ OPT="$1"
+ OPTARG="$2"
+ shift 2
+ ;;
+ -i)
+ OPT="$1"
+ test "$#" -le 2 || expr "$2" : "[-]" >/dev/null || {
+ OPTARG="$2"
+ shift
+ }
+ shift
+ ;;
+ -f|-n|-h|-\?)
+ OPT="$1"
+ OPTARG=
+ shift
+ ;;
+ --)
+ shift
+ while test "$#" -gt 0
+ do
+ SAVEARGS="${SAVEARGS:+$SAVEARGS }'$(quote "$1")'"
+ shift
+ done
+ break
+ ;;
+ -*)
+ printf "\n%s: ERROR: invalid option (%s)\n\n" "$0" "$1"
+ usage
+ ;;
+ *)
+ SAVEARGS="${SAVEARGS:+$SAVEARGS }'$(quote "$1")'"
+ shift
+ continue
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+ case "$OPT" in
+ -i)
+ SEEN_OPT_I="yes"
+ use_id_file "${OPTARG:-$DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE}"
+ ;;
+ -o|-p)
+ SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }$OPT '$(quote "$OPTARG")'"
+ ;;
+ -f)
+ FORCED=1
+ ;;
+ -n)
+ DRY_RUN=1
+ ;;
+ -h|-\?)
+ usage
+ ;;
+ esac
+done
+
+eval set -- "$SAVEARGS"
+
+if [ $# = 0 ] ; then
+ usage
+fi
+if [ $# != 1 ] ; then
+ printf '%s: ERROR: Too many arguments. Expecting a target hostname, got: %s\n\n' "$0" "$SAVEARGS" >&2
+ usage
+fi
+
+# drop trailing colon
+USER_HOST=$(printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed 's/:$//')
+# tack the hostname onto SSH_OPTS
+SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }'$(quote "$USER_HOST")'"
+# and populate "$@" for later use (only way to get proper quoting of options)
+eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
+
+if [ -z "$(eval $GET_ID)" ] && [ -r "${PUB_ID_FILE:=$DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE}" ] ; then
+ use_id_file "$PUB_ID_FILE"
+fi
+
+if [ -z "$(eval $GET_ID)" ] ; then
+ printf '%s: ERROR: No identities found\n' "$0" >&2
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+# populate_new_ids() uses several global variables ($USER_HOST, $SSH_OPTS ...)
+# and has the side effect of setting $NEW_IDS
+populate_new_ids() {
+ local L_SUCCESS="$1"
+
+ if [ "$FORCED" ] ; then
+ NEW_IDS=$(eval $GET_ID)
+ return
+ fi
+
+ # repopulate "$@" inside this function
+ eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
+
+ umask 0177
+ local L_TMP_ID_FILE=$(mktemp ~/.ssh/ssh-copy-id_id.XXXXXXXXXX)
+ if test $? -ne 0 || test "x$L_TMP_ID_FILE" = "x" ; then
+ printf '%s: ERROR: mktemp failed\n' "$0" >&2
+ exit 1
+ fi
+ local L_CLEANUP="rm -f \"$L_TMP_ID_FILE\" \"${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.stderr\""
+ trap "$L_CLEANUP" EXIT TERM INT QUIT
+ printf '%s: INFO: attempting to log in with the new key(s), to filter out any that are already installed\n' "$0" >&2
+ NEW_IDS=$(
+ eval $GET_ID | {
+ while read ID || [ "$ID" ] ; do
+ printf '%s\n' "$ID" > "$L_TMP_ID_FILE"
+
+ # the next line assumes $PRIV_ID_FILE only set if using a single id file - this
+ # assumption will break if we implement the possibility of multiple -i options.
+ # The point being that if file based, ssh needs the private key, which it cannot
+ # find if only given the contents of the .pub file in an unrelated tmpfile
+ ssh -i "${PRIV_ID_FILE:-$L_TMP_ID_FILE}" \
+ -o ControlPath=none \
+ -o LogLevel=INFO \
+ -o PreferredAuthentications=publickey \
+ -o IdentitiesOnly=yes "$@" exit 2>"$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr" </dev/null
+ if [ "$?" = "$L_SUCCESS" ] ; then
+ : > "$L_TMP_ID_FILE"
+ else
+ grep 'Permission denied' "$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr" >/dev/null || {
+ sed -e 's/^/ERROR: /' <"$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr" >"$L_TMP_ID_FILE"
+ cat >/dev/null #consume the other keys, causing loop to end
+ }
+ fi
+
+ cat "$L_TMP_ID_FILE"
+ done
+ }
+ )
+ eval "$L_CLEANUP" && trap - EXIT TERM INT QUIT
+
+ if expr "$NEW_IDS" : "^ERROR: " >/dev/null ; then
+ printf '\n%s: %s\n\n' "$0" "$NEW_IDS" >&2
+ exit 1
+ fi
+ if [ -z "$NEW_IDS" ] ; then
+ printf '\n%s: WARNING: All keys were skipped because they already exist on the remote system.\n' "$0" >&2
+ printf '\t\t(if you think this is a mistake, you may want to use -f option)\n\n' "$0" >&2
+ exit 0
+ fi
+ printf '%s: INFO: %d key(s) remain to be installed -- if you are prompted now it is to install the new keys\n' "$0" "$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)" >&2
+}
+
+REMOTE_VERSION=$(ssh -v -o PreferredAuthentications=',' -o ControlPath=none "$@" 2>&1 |
+ sed -ne 's/.*remote software version //p')
+
+case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in
+ NetScreen*)
+ populate_new_ids 1
+ for KEY in $(printf "%s" "$NEW_IDS" | cut -d' ' -f2) ; do
+ KEY_NO=$(($KEY_NO + 1))
+ printf "%s\n" "$KEY" | grep ssh-dss >/dev/null || {
+ printf '%s: WARNING: Non-dsa key (#%d) skipped (NetScreen only supports DSA keys)\n' "$0" "$KEY_NO" >&2
+ continue
+ }
+ [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf 'set ssh pka-dsa key %s\nsave\nexit\n' "$KEY" | ssh -T "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? = 255 ] ; then
+ printf '%s: ERROR: installation of key #%d failed (please report a bug describing what caused this, so that we can make this message useful)\n' "$0" "$KEY_NO" >&2
+ else
+ ADDED=$(($ADDED + 1))
+ fi
+ done
+ if [ -z "$ADDED" ] ; then
+ exit 1
+ fi
+ ;;
+ *)
+ # Assuming that the remote host treats ~/.ssh/authorized_keys as one might expect
+ populate_new_ids 0
+ # in ssh below - to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX; 'cd' to be at $HOME; and all on one line, because tcsh.
+ [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | \
+ ssh "$@" "exec sh -c 'cd ; umask 077 ; mkdir -p .ssh && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ; if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi'" \
+ || exit 1
+ ADDED=$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)
+ ;;
+esac
+
+if [ "$DRY_RUN" ] ; then
+ cat <<-EOF
+ =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
+ Would have added the following key(s):
+
+ $NEW_IDS
+ =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
+ EOF
+else
+ cat <<-EOF
+
+ Number of key(s) added: $ADDED
+
+ Now try logging into the machine, with: "ssh $SSH_OPTS"
+ and check to make sure that only the key(s) you wanted were added.
+
+ EOF
+fi
+
+# =-=-=-=
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,186 +0,0 @@
-.ig \" -*- nroff -*-
-Copyright (c) 1999-2013 hands.com Ltd. <http://hands.com/>
-
-Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-are met:
-1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-
-THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-..
-.Dd $Mdocdate: June 17 2010 $
-.Dt SSH-COPY-ID 1
-.Os
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm ssh-copy-id
-.Nd use locally available keys to authorise logins on a remote machine
-.Sh SYNOPSIS
-.Nm
-.Op Fl n
-.Op Fl i Op Ar identity_file
-.Op Fl p Ar port
-.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
-.Op Ar user Ns @ Ns
-.Ar hostname
-.Nm
-.Fl h | Fl ?
-.br
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-.Nm
-is a script that uses
-.Xr ssh 1
-to log into a remote machine (presumably using a login password,
-so password authentication should be enabled, unless you've done some
-clever use of multiple identities). It assembles a list of one or more
-fingerprints (as described below) and tries to log in with each key, to
-see if any of them are already installed (of course, if you are not using
-.Xr ssh-agent 1
-this may result in you being repeatedly prompted for pass-phrases).
-It then assembles a list of those that failed to log in, and using ssh,
-enables logins with those keys on the remote server. By default it adds
-the keys by appending them to the remote user's
-.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-(creating the file, and directory, if necessary). It is also capable
-of detecting if the remote system is a NetScreen, and using its
-.Ql set ssh pka-dsa key ...
-command instead.
-.Pp
-The options are as follows:
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Fl i Ar identity_file
-Use only the key(s) contained in
-.Ar identity_file
-(rather than looking for identities via
-.Xr ssh-add 1
-or in the
-.Ic default_ID_file ) .
-If the filename does not end in
-.Pa .pub
-this is added. If the filename is omitted, the
-.Ic default_ID_file
-is used.
-.Pp
-Note that this can be used to ensure that the keys copied have the
-comment one prefers and/or extra options applied, by ensuring that the
-key file has these set as preferred before the copy is attempted.
-.It Fl n
-do a dry-run. Instead of installing keys on the remote system simply
-prints the key(s) that would have been installed.
-.It Fl h , Fl ?
-Print Usage summary
-.It Fl p Ar port , Fl o Ar ssh_option
-These two options are simply passed through untouched, along with their
-argument, to allow one to set the port or other
-.Xr ssh 1
-options, respectively.
-.Pp
-Rather than specifying these as command line options, it is often better to use (per-host) settings in
-.Xr ssh 1 Ns 's
-configuration file:
-.Xr ssh_config 5 .
-.El
-.Pp
-Default behaviour without
-.Fl i ,
-is to check if
-.Ql ssh-add -L
-provides any output, and if so those keys are used. Note that this results in
-the comment on the key being the filename that was given to
-.Xr ssh-add 1
-when the key was loaded into your
-.Xr ssh-agent 1
-rather than the comment contained in that file, which is a bit of a shame.
-Otherwise, if
-.Xr ssh-add 1
-provides no keys contents of the
-.Ic default_ID_file
-will be used.
-.Pp
-The
-.Ic default_ID_file
-is the most recent file that matches:
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id*.pub ,
-(excluding those that match
-.Pa ~/.ssh/*-cert.pub )
-so if you create a key that is not the one you want
-.Nm
-to use, just use
-.Xr touch 1
-on your preferred key's
-.Pa .pub
-file to reinstate it as the most recent.
-.Pp
-.Sh EXAMPLES
-If you have already installed keys from one system on a lot of remote
-hosts, and you then create a new key, on a new client machine, say,
-it can be difficult to keep track of which systems on which you've
-installed the new key. One way of dealing with this is to load both
-the new key and old key(s) into your
-.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
-Load the new key first, without the
-.Fl c
-option, then load one or more old keys into the agent, possibly by
-ssh-ing to the client machine that has that old key, using the
-.Fl A
-option to allow agent forwarding:
-.Pp
-.D1 user at newclient$ ssh-add
-.D1 user at newclient$ ssh -A old.client
-.D1 user at oldl$ ssh-add -c
-.D1 No ... prompt for pass-phrase ...
-.D1 user at old$ logoff
-.D1 user at newclient$ ssh someserver
-.Pp
-now, if the new key is installed on the server, you'll be allowed in
-unprompted, whereas if you only have the old key(s) enabled, you'll be
-asked for confirmation, which is your cue to log back out and run
-.Pp
-.D1 user at newclient$ ssh-copy-id -i someserver
-.Pp
-The reason you might want to specify the -i option in this case is to
-ensure that the comment on the installed key is the one from the
-.Pa .pub
-file, rather than just the filename that was loaded into you agent.
-It also ensures that only the id you intended is installed, rather than
-all the keys that you have in your
-.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
-Of course, you can specify another id, or use the contents of the
-.Xr ssh-agent 1
-as you prefer.
-.Pp
-Having mentioned
-.Xr ssh-add 1 Ns 's
-.Fl c
-option, you might consider using this whenever using agent forwarding
-to avoid your key being hijacked, but it is much better to instead use
-.Xr ssh 1 Ns 's
-.Ar ProxyCommand
-and
-.Fl W
-option,
-to bounce through remote servers while always doing direct end-to-end
-authentication. This way the middle hop(s) don't get access to your
-.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
-A web search for
-.Ql ssh proxycommand nc
-should prove enlightening (N.B. the modern approach is to use the
-.Fl W
-option, rather than
-.Xr nc 1 ) .
-.Sh "SEE ALSO"
-.Xr ssh 1 ,
-.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
-.Xr sshd 8
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+.ig \" -*- nroff -*-
+Copyright (c) 1999-2013 hands.com Ltd. <http://hands.com/>
+
+Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+are met:
+1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+
+THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+..
+.Dd $Mdocdate: June 17 2010 $
+.Dt SSH-COPY-ID 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-copy-id
+.Nd use locally available keys to authorise logins on a remote machine
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm
+.Op Fl f
+.Op Fl n
+.Op Fl i Op Ar identity_file
+.Op Fl p Ar port
+.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
+.Op Ar user Ns @ Ns
+.Ar hostname
+.Nm
+.Fl h | Fl ?
+.br
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is a script that uses
+.Xr ssh 1
+to log into a remote machine (presumably using a login password,
+so password authentication should be enabled, unless you've done some
+clever use of multiple identities). It assembles a list of one or more
+fingerprints (as described below) and tries to log in with each key, to
+see if any of them are already installed (of course, if you are not using
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+this may result in you being repeatedly prompted for pass-phrases).
+It then assembles a list of those that failed to log in, and using ssh,
+enables logins with those keys on the remote server. By default it adds
+the keys by appending them to the remote user's
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+(creating the file, and directory, if necessary). It is also capable
+of detecting if the remote system is a NetScreen, and using its
+.Ql set ssh pka-dsa key ...
+command instead.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl i Ar identity_file
+Use only the key(s) contained in
+.Ar identity_file
+(rather than looking for identities via
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+or in the
+.Ic default_ID_file ) .
+If the filename does not end in
+.Pa .pub
+this is added. If the filename is omitted, the
+.Ic default_ID_file
+is used.
+.Pp
+Note that this can be used to ensure that the keys copied have the
+comment one prefers and/or extra options applied, by ensuring that the
+key file has these set as preferred before the copy is attempted.
+.It Fl f
+Forced mode: doesn't check if the keys are present on the remote server.
+This means that it does not need the private key. Of course, this can result
+in more than one copy of the key being installed on the remote system.
+.It Fl n
+do a dry-run. Instead of installing keys on the remote system simply
+prints the key(s) that would have been installed.
+.It Fl h , Fl ?
+Print Usage summary
+.It Fl p Ar port , Fl o Ar ssh_option
+These two options are simply passed through untouched, along with their
+argument, to allow one to set the port or other
+.Xr ssh 1
+options, respectively.
+.Pp
+Rather than specifying these as command line options, it is often better to use (per-host) settings in
+.Xr ssh 1 Ns 's
+configuration file:
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.El
+.Pp
+Default behaviour without
+.Fl i ,
+is to check if
+.Ql ssh-add -L
+provides any output, and if so those keys are used. Note that this results in
+the comment on the key being the filename that was given to
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+when the key was loaded into your
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+rather than the comment contained in that file, which is a bit of a shame.
+Otherwise, if
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+provides no keys contents of the
+.Ic default_ID_file
+will be used.
+.Pp
+The
+.Ic default_ID_file
+is the most recent file that matches:
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id*.pub ,
+(excluding those that match
+.Pa ~/.ssh/*-cert.pub )
+so if you create a key that is not the one you want
+.Nm
+to use, just use
+.Xr touch 1
+on your preferred key's
+.Pa .pub
+file to reinstate it as the most recent.
+.Pp
+.Sh EXAMPLES
+If you have already installed keys from one system on a lot of remote
+hosts, and you then create a new key, on a new client machine, say,
+it can be difficult to keep track of which systems on which you've
+installed the new key. One way of dealing with this is to load both
+the new key and old key(s) into your
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+Load the new key first, without the
+.Fl c
+option, then load one or more old keys into the agent, possibly by
+ssh-ing to the client machine that has that old key, using the
+.Fl A
+option to allow agent forwarding:
+.Pp
+.D1 user at newclient$ ssh-add
+.D1 user at newclient$ ssh -A old.client
+.D1 user at oldl$ ssh-add -c
+.D1 No ... prompt for pass-phrase ...
+.D1 user at old$ logoff
+.D1 user at newclient$ ssh someserver
+.Pp
+now, if the new key is installed on the server, you'll be allowed in
+unprompted, whereas if you only have the old key(s) enabled, you'll be
+asked for confirmation, which is your cue to log back out and run
+.Pp
+.D1 user at newclient$ ssh-copy-id -i someserver
+.Pp
+The reason you might want to specify the -i option in this case is to
+ensure that the comment on the installed key is the one from the
+.Pa .pub
+file, rather than just the filename that was loaded into you agent.
+It also ensures that only the id you intended is installed, rather than
+all the keys that you have in your
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+Of course, you can specify another id, or use the contents of the
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+as you prefer.
+.Pp
+Having mentioned
+.Xr ssh-add 1 Ns 's
+.Fl c
+option, you might consider using this whenever using agent forwarding
+to avoid your key being hijacked, but it is much better to instead use
+.Xr ssh 1 Ns 's
+.Ar ProxyCommand
+and
+.Fl W
+option,
+to bounce through remote servers while always doing direct end-to-end
+authentication. This way the middle hop(s) don't get access to your
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+A web search for
+.Ql ssh proxycommand nc
+should prove enlightening (N.B. the modern approach is to use the
+.Fl W
+option, rather than
+.Xr nc 1 ) .
+.Sh "SEE ALSO"
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/suse/openssh.spec 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/suse/openssh.spec 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,246 +0,0 @@
-# Default values for additional components
-%define build_x11_askpass 1
-
-# Define the UID/GID to use for privilege separation
-%define sshd_gid 65
-%define sshd_uid 71
-
-# The version of x11-ssh-askpass to use
-%define xversion 1.2.4.1
-
-# Allow the ability to override defaults with -D skip_xxx=1
-%{?skip_x11_askpass:%define build_x11_askpass 0}
-
-Summary: OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation
-Name: openssh
-Version: 6.6p1
-URL: http://www.openssh.com/
-Release: 1
-Source0: openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
-Source1: x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}.tar.gz
-License: BSD
-Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH
-BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/openssh-%{version}-buildroot
-PreReq: openssl
-Obsoletes: ssh
-Provides: ssh
-#
-# (Build[ing] Prereq[uisites] only work for RPM 2.95 and newer.)
-# building prerequisites -- stuff for
-# OpenSSL (openssl-devel),
-# TCP Wrappers (tcpd-devel),
-# and Gnome (glibdev, gtkdev, and gnlibsd)
-#
-BuildPrereq: openssl
-BuildPrereq: tcpd-devel
-BuildPrereq: zlib-devel
-#BuildPrereq: glibdev
-#BuildPrereq: gtkdev
-#BuildPrereq: gnlibsd
-
-%package askpass
-Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the X window System.
-Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH
-Requires: openssh = %{version}
-Obsoletes: ssh-extras
-Provides: openssh:${_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass
-
-%if %{build_x11_askpass}
-BuildPrereq: XFree86-devel
-%endif
-
-%description
-Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
-executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace
-rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between
-two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and
-arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
-
-OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it
-up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all
-patented algorithms to seperate libraries (OpenSSL).
-
-This package includes all files necessary for both the OpenSSH
-client and server.
-
-%description askpass
-Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
-executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace
-rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between
-two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and
-arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
-
-OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it
-up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all
-patented algorithms to seperate libraries (OpenSSL).
-
-This package contains an X Window System passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
-
-%changelog
-* Wed Oct 26 2005 Iain Morgan <imorgan at nas.nasa.gov>
-- Removed accidental inclusion of --without-zlib-version-check
-* Tue Oct 25 2005 Iain Morgan <imorgan at nas.nasa.gov>
-- Overhaul to deal with newer versions of SuSE and OpenSSH
-* Mon Jun 12 2000 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
-- Glob manpages to catch compressed files
-* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
-- Updated for new location
-- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build
-* Sun Dec 26 1999 Chris Saia <csaia at wtower.com>
-- Made symlink to gnome-ssh-askpass called ssh-askpass
-* Wed Nov 24 1999 Chris Saia <csaia at wtower.com>
-- Removed patches that included /etc/pam.d/sshd, /sbin/init.d/rc.sshd, and
- /var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd, since Damien merged these into
- his released tarfile
-- Changed permissions on ssh_config in the install procedure to 644 from 600
- even though it was correct in the %files section and thus right in the RPMs
-- Postinstall script for the server now only prints "Generating SSH host
- key..." if we need to actually do this, in order to eliminate a confusing
- message if an SSH host key is already in place
-- Marked all manual pages as %doc(umentation)
-* Mon Nov 22 1999 Chris Saia <csaia at wtower.com>
-- Added flag to configure daemon with TCP Wrappers support
-- Added building prerequisites (works in RPM 3.0 and newer)
-* Thu Nov 18 1999 Chris Saia <csaia at wtower.com>
-- Made this package correct for SuSE.
-- Changed instances of pam_pwdb.so to pam_unix.so, since it works more properly
- with SuSE, and lib_pwdb.so isn't installed by default.
-* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
-- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble <jmknoble at pobox.com>
-* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
-- Added 'Obsoletes' directives
-* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
-- Use make install
-- Subpackages
-* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
-- Added links for slogin
-- Fixed perms on manpages
-* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
-- Renamed init script
-* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
-- Back to old binary names
-* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
-- Use autoconf
-- New binary names
-* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
-- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's <kas at fi.muni.cz> spec.
-
-%prep
-
-%if %{build_x11_askpass}
-%setup -q -a 1
-%else
-%setup -q
-%endif
-
-%build
-CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \
-%configure --prefix=/usr \
- --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
- --mandir=%{_mandir} \
- --with-privsep-path=/var/lib/empty \
- --with-pam \
- --with-tcp-wrappers \
- --libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh
-make
-
-%if %{build_x11_askpass}
-cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}
-%configure --mandir=/usr/X11R6/man \
- --libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh
-xmkmf -a
-make
-cd ..
-%endif
-
-%install
-rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
-make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/
-install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/
-install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/
-install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates
-install -m644 contrib/sshd.pam.generic $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
-install -m744 contrib/suse/rc.sshd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/sshd
-install -m744 contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh \
- $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates
-
-%if %{build_x11_askpass}
-cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}
-make install install.man BINDIR=%{_libdir}/ssh DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/
-rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/Ssh.bin
-%endif
-
-%clean
-rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
-
-%pre
-/usr/sbin/groupadd -g %{sshd_gid} -o -r sshd 2> /dev/null || :
-/usr/sbin/useradd -r -o -g sshd -u %{sshd_uid} -s /bin/false -c "SSH Privilege Separation User" -d /var/lib/sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || :
-
-%post
-/usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A
-%{fillup_and_insserv -n -y ssh sshd}
-%run_permissions
-
-%verifyscript
-%verify_permissions -e /etc/ssh/sshd_config -e /etc/ssh/ssh_config -e /usr/bin/ssh
-
-%preun
-%stop_on_removal sshd
-
-%postun
-%restart_on_update sshd
-%{insserv_cleanup}
-
-%files
-%defattr(-,root,root)
-%doc ChangeLog OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL*
-%doc TODO CREDITS LICENCE
-%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
-%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config
-%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
-%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli
-%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd
-%attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/init.d/sshd
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh
-%attr(-,root,root) %{_bindir}/slogin
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
-%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libdir}/ssh
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/sftp-server
-%attr(4711,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-keysign
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper
-%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1*
-%attr(-,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/slogin.1*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8*
-%attr(0644,root,root) /var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.ssh
-
-%if %{build_x11_askpass}
-%files askpass
-%defattr(-,root,root)
-%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/README
-%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/ChangeLog
-%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/SshAskpass*.ad
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/x11-ssh-askpass
-%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/ssh-askpass.1x*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/x11-ssh-askpass.1x*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %config /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/app-defaults/SshAskpass
-%endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/suse/openssh.spec (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/suse/openssh.spec)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/suse/openssh.spec (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/contrib/suse/openssh.spec 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+# Default values for additional components
+%define build_x11_askpass 1
+
+# Define the UID/GID to use for privilege separation
+%define sshd_gid 65
+%define sshd_uid 71
+
+# The version of x11-ssh-askpass to use
+%define xversion 1.2.4.1
+
+# Allow the ability to override defaults with -D skip_xxx=1
+%{?skip_x11_askpass:%define build_x11_askpass 0}
+
+Summary: OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation
+Name: openssh
+Version: 7.3p1
+URL: http://www.openssh.com/
+Release: 1
+Source0: openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
+Source1: x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}.tar.gz
+License: BSD
+Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH
+BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/openssh-%{version}-buildroot
+PreReq: openssl
+Obsoletes: ssh
+Provides: ssh
+#
+# (Build[ing] Prereq[uisites] only work for RPM 2.95 and newer.)
+# building prerequisites -- stuff for
+# OpenSSL (openssl-devel),
+# and Gnome (glibdev, gtkdev, and gnlibsd)
+#
+BuildPrereq: openssl
+BuildPrereq: zlib-devel
+#BuildPrereq: glibdev
+#BuildPrereq: gtkdev
+#BuildPrereq: gnlibsd
+
+%package askpass
+Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the X window System.
+Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH
+Requires: openssh = %{version}
+Obsoletes: ssh-extras
+Provides: openssh:${_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass
+
+%if %{build_x11_askpass}
+BuildPrereq: XFree86-devel
+%endif
+
+%description
+Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
+executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace
+rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between
+two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and
+arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+
+OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it
+up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all
+patented algorithms to seperate libraries (OpenSSL).
+
+This package includes all files necessary for both the OpenSSH
+client and server.
+
+%description askpass
+Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
+executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace
+rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between
+two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and
+arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+
+OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it
+up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all
+patented algorithms to seperate libraries (OpenSSL).
+
+This package contains an X Window System passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
+
+%changelog
+* Wed Oct 26 2005 Iain Morgan <imorgan at nas.nasa.gov>
+- Removed accidental inclusion of --without-zlib-version-check
+* Tue Oct 25 2005 Iain Morgan <imorgan at nas.nasa.gov>
+- Overhaul to deal with newer versions of SuSE and OpenSSH
+* Mon Jun 12 2000 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+- Glob manpages to catch compressed files
+* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
+- Updated for new location
+- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build
+* Sun Dec 26 1999 Chris Saia <csaia at wtower.com>
+- Made symlink to gnome-ssh-askpass called ssh-askpass
+* Wed Nov 24 1999 Chris Saia <csaia at wtower.com>
+- Removed patches that included /etc/pam.d/sshd, /sbin/init.d/rc.sshd, and
+ /var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd, since Damien merged these into
+ his released tarfile
+- Changed permissions on ssh_config in the install procedure to 644 from 600
+ even though it was correct in the %files section and thus right in the RPMs
+- Postinstall script for the server now only prints "Generating SSH host
+ key..." if we need to actually do this, in order to eliminate a confusing
+ message if an SSH host key is already in place
+- Marked all manual pages as %doc(umentation)
+* Mon Nov 22 1999 Chris Saia <csaia at wtower.com>
+- Added flag to configure daemon with TCP Wrappers support
+- Added building prerequisites (works in RPM 3.0 and newer)
+* Thu Nov 18 1999 Chris Saia <csaia at wtower.com>
+- Made this package correct for SuSE.
+- Changed instances of pam_pwdb.so to pam_unix.so, since it works more properly
+ with SuSE, and lib_pwdb.so isn't installed by default.
+* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble <jmknoble at pobox.com>
+* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+- Added 'Obsoletes' directives
+* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
+- Use make install
+- Subpackages
+* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
+- Added links for slogin
+- Fixed perms on manpages
+* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
+- Renamed init script
+* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
+- Back to old binary names
+* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
+- Use autoconf
+- New binary names
+* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller <djm at ibs.com.au>
+- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's <kas at fi.muni.cz> spec.
+
+%prep
+
+%if %{build_x11_askpass}
+%setup -q -a 1
+%else
+%setup -q
+%endif
+
+%build
+CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \
+%configure --prefix=/usr \
+ --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
+ --mandir=%{_mandir} \
+ --with-privsep-path=/var/lib/empty \
+ --with-pam \
+ --libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh
+make
+
+%if %{build_x11_askpass}
+cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}
+%configure --mandir=/usr/X11R6/man \
+ --libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh
+xmkmf -a
+make
+cd ..
+%endif
+
+%install
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates
+install -m644 contrib/sshd.pam.generic $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
+install -m744 contrib/suse/rc.sshd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/sshd
+install -m744 contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh \
+ $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates
+
+%if %{build_x11_askpass}
+cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}
+make install install.man BINDIR=%{_libdir}/ssh DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/
+rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/Ssh.bin
+%endif
+
+%clean
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+
+%pre
+/usr/sbin/groupadd -g %{sshd_gid} -o -r sshd 2> /dev/null || :
+/usr/sbin/useradd -r -o -g sshd -u %{sshd_uid} -s /bin/false -c "SSH Privilege Separation User" -d /var/lib/sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || :
+
+%post
+/usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A
+%{fillup_and_insserv -n -y ssh sshd}
+%run_permissions
+
+%verifyscript
+%verify_permissions -e /etc/ssh/sshd_config -e /etc/ssh/ssh_config -e /usr/bin/ssh
+
+%preun
+%stop_on_removal sshd
+
+%postun
+%restart_on_update sshd
+%{insserv_cleanup}
+
+%files
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%doc ChangeLog OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL*
+%doc TODO CREDITS LICENCE
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/init.d/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libdir}/ssh
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/sftp-server
+%attr(4711,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-keysign
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) /var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.ssh
+
+%if %{build_x11_askpass}
+%files askpass
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/README
+%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/ChangeLog
+%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/SshAskpass*.ad
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/x11-ssh-askpass
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/ssh-askpass.1x*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/x11-ssh-askpass.1x*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/app-defaults/SshAskpass
+%endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/deattack.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/deattack.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/deattack.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,160 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: deattack.c,v 1.30 2006/09/16 19:53:37 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - source code
- *
- * Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina.
- *
- * All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary
- * forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that
- * this copyright notice is retained.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
- * WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CORE SDI S.A. BE
- * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR
- * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR MISUSE OF THIS
- * SOFTWARE.
- *
- * Ariel Futoransky <futo at core-sdi.com>
- * <http://www.core-sdi.com>
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "deattack.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "crc32.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-
-/*
- * CRC attack detection has a worst-case behaviour that is O(N^3) over
- * the number of identical blocks in a packet. This behaviour can be
- * exploited to create a limited denial of service attack.
- *
- * However, because we are dealing with encrypted data, identical
- * blocks should only occur every 2^35 maximally-sized packets or so.
- * Consequently, we can detect this DoS by looking for identical blocks
- * in a packet.
- *
- * The parameter below determines how many identical blocks we will
- * accept in a single packet, trading off between attack detection and
- * likelihood of terminating a legitimate connection. A value of 32
- * corresponds to an average of 2^40 messages before an attack is
- * misdetected
- */
-#define MAX_IDENTICAL 32
-
-/* SSH Constants */
-#define SSH_MAXBLOCKS (32 * 1024)
-#define SSH_BLOCKSIZE (8)
-
-/* Hashing constants */
-#define HASH_MINSIZE (8 * 1024)
-#define HASH_ENTRYSIZE (2)
-#define HASH_FACTOR(x) ((x)*3/2)
-#define HASH_UNUSEDCHAR (0xff)
-#define HASH_UNUSED (0xffff)
-#define HASH_IV (0xfffe)
-
-#define HASH_MINBLOCKS (7*SSH_BLOCKSIZE)
-
-
-/* Hash function (Input keys are cipher results) */
-#define HASH(x) get_u32(x)
-
-#define CMP(a, b) (memcmp(a, b, SSH_BLOCKSIZE))
-
-static void
-crc_update(u_int32_t *a, u_int32_t b)
-{
- b ^= *a;
- *a = ssh_crc32((u_char *)&b, sizeof(b));
-}
-
-/* detect if a block is used in a particular pattern */
-static int
-check_crc(u_char *S, u_char *buf, u_int32_t len)
-{
- u_int32_t crc;
- u_char *c;
-
- crc = 0;
- for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
- if (!CMP(S, c)) {
- crc_update(&crc, 1);
- crc_update(&crc, 0);
- } else {
- crc_update(&crc, 0);
- crc_update(&crc, 0);
- }
- }
- return (crc == 0);
-}
-
-
-/* Detect a crc32 compensation attack on a packet */
-int
-detect_attack(u_char *buf, u_int32_t len)
-{
- static u_int16_t *h = (u_int16_t *) NULL;
- static u_int32_t n = HASH_MINSIZE / HASH_ENTRYSIZE;
- u_int32_t i, j;
- u_int32_t l, same;
- u_char *c;
- u_char *d;
-
- if (len > (SSH_MAXBLOCKS * SSH_BLOCKSIZE) ||
- len % SSH_BLOCKSIZE != 0) {
- fatal("detect_attack: bad length %d", len);
- }
- for (l = n; l < HASH_FACTOR(len / SSH_BLOCKSIZE); l = l << 2)
- ;
-
- if (h == NULL) {
- debug("Installing crc compensation attack detector.");
- h = (u_int16_t *) xcalloc(l, HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
- n = l;
- } else {
- if (l > n) {
- h = (u_int16_t *)xrealloc(h, l, HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
- n = l;
- }
- }
-
- if (len <= HASH_MINBLOCKS) {
- for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
- for (d = buf; d < c; d += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
- if (!CMP(c, d)) {
- if ((check_crc(c, buf, len)))
- return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
- else
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- return (DEATTACK_OK);
- }
- memset(h, HASH_UNUSEDCHAR, n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
-
- for (c = buf, same = j = 0; c < (buf + len); c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE, j++) {
- for (i = HASH(c) & (n - 1); h[i] != HASH_UNUSED;
- i = (i + 1) & (n - 1)) {
- if (!CMP(c, buf + h[i] * SSH_BLOCKSIZE)) {
- if (++same > MAX_IDENTICAL)
- return (DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED);
- if (check_crc(c, buf, len))
- return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
- else
- break;
- }
- }
- h[i] = j;
- }
- return (DEATTACK_OK);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/deattack.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/deattack.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/deattack.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/deattack.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: deattack.c,v 1.32 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - source code
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina.
+ *
+ * All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary
+ * forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that
+ * this copyright notice is retained.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CORE SDI S.A. BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR MISUSE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * Ariel Futoransky <futo at core-sdi.com>
+ * <http://www.core-sdi.com>
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "deattack.h"
+#include "crc32.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/*
+ * CRC attack detection has a worst-case behaviour that is O(N^3) over
+ * the number of identical blocks in a packet. This behaviour can be
+ * exploited to create a limited denial of service attack.
+ *
+ * However, because we are dealing with encrypted data, identical
+ * blocks should only occur every 2^35 maximally-sized packets or so.
+ * Consequently, we can detect this DoS by looking for identical blocks
+ * in a packet.
+ *
+ * The parameter below determines how many identical blocks we will
+ * accept in a single packet, trading off between attack detection and
+ * likelihood of terminating a legitimate connection. A value of 32
+ * corresponds to an average of 2^40 messages before an attack is
+ * misdetected
+ */
+#define MAX_IDENTICAL 32
+
+/* SSH Constants */
+#define SSH_MAXBLOCKS (32 * 1024)
+#define SSH_BLOCKSIZE (8)
+
+/* Hashing constants */
+#define HASH_MINSIZE (8 * 1024)
+#define HASH_ENTRYSIZE (2)
+#define HASH_FACTOR(x) ((x)*3/2)
+#define HASH_UNUSEDCHAR (0xff)
+#define HASH_UNUSED (0xffff)
+#define HASH_IV (0xfffe)
+
+#define HASH_MINBLOCKS (7*SSH_BLOCKSIZE)
+
+
+/* Hash function (Input keys are cipher results) */
+#define HASH(x) PEEK_U32(x)
+
+#define CMP(a, b) (memcmp(a, b, SSH_BLOCKSIZE))
+
+static void
+crc_update(u_int32_t *a, u_int32_t b)
+{
+ b ^= *a;
+ *a = ssh_crc32((u_char *)&b, sizeof(b));
+}
+
+/* detect if a block is used in a particular pattern */
+static int
+check_crc(const u_char *S, const u_char *buf, u_int32_t len)
+{
+ u_int32_t crc;
+ const u_char *c;
+
+ crc = 0;
+ for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
+ if (!CMP(S, c)) {
+ crc_update(&crc, 1);
+ crc_update(&crc, 0);
+ } else {
+ crc_update(&crc, 0);
+ crc_update(&crc, 0);
+ }
+ }
+ return crc == 0;
+}
+
+void
+deattack_init(struct deattack_ctx *dctx)
+{
+ bzero(dctx, sizeof(*dctx));
+ dctx->n = HASH_MINSIZE / HASH_ENTRYSIZE;
+}
+
+/* Detect a crc32 compensation attack on a packet */
+int
+detect_attack(struct deattack_ctx *dctx, const u_char *buf, u_int32_t len)
+{
+ u_int32_t i, j, l, same;
+ u_int16_t *tmp;
+ const u_char *c, *d;
+
+ if (len > (SSH_MAXBLOCKS * SSH_BLOCKSIZE) ||
+ len % SSH_BLOCKSIZE != 0)
+ return DEATTACK_ERROR;
+ for (l = dctx->n; l < HASH_FACTOR(len / SSH_BLOCKSIZE); l = l << 2)
+ ;
+
+ if (dctx->h == NULL) {
+ if ((dctx->h = calloc(l, HASH_ENTRYSIZE)) == NULL)
+ return DEATTACK_ERROR;
+ dctx->n = l;
+ } else {
+ if (l > dctx->n) {
+ if ((tmp = reallocarray(dctx->h, l, HASH_ENTRYSIZE))
+ == NULL) {
+ free(dctx->h);
+ dctx->h = NULL;
+ return DEATTACK_ERROR;
+ }
+ dctx->h = tmp;
+ dctx->n = l;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (len <= HASH_MINBLOCKS) {
+ for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
+ for (d = buf; d < c; d += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
+ if (!CMP(c, d)) {
+ if ((check_crc(c, buf, len)))
+ return DEATTACK_DETECTED;
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return DEATTACK_OK;
+ }
+ memset(dctx->h, HASH_UNUSEDCHAR, dctx->n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
+
+ for (c = buf, same = j = 0; c < (buf + len); c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE, j++) {
+ for (i = HASH(c) & (dctx->n - 1); dctx->h[i] != HASH_UNUSED;
+ i = (i + 1) & (dctx->n - 1)) {
+ if (!CMP(c, buf + dctx->h[i] * SSH_BLOCKSIZE)) {
+ if (++same > MAX_IDENTICAL)
+ return DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED;
+ if (check_crc(c, buf, len))
+ return DEATTACK_DETECTED;
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ dctx->h[i] = j;
+ }
+ return DEATTACK_OK;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/deattack.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/deattack.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/deattack.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: deattack.h,v 1.10 2006/09/16 19:53:37 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - Header file
- *
- * Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina.
- *
- * All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary
- * forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that
- * this copyright notice is retained.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
- * WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CORE SDI S.A. BE
- * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR
- * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR MISUSE OF THIS
- * SOFTWARE.
- *
- * Ariel Futoransky <futo at core-sdi.com>
- * <http://www.core-sdi.com>
- */
-
-#ifndef _DEATTACK_H
-#define _DEATTACK_H
-
-/* Return codes */
-#define DEATTACK_OK 0
-#define DEATTACK_DETECTED 1
-#define DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED 2
-
-int detect_attack(u_char *, u_int32_t);
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/deattack.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/deattack.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/deattack.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/deattack.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: deattack.h,v 1.11 2015/01/19 19:52:16 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - Header file
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina.
+ *
+ * All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary
+ * forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that
+ * this copyright notice is retained.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CORE SDI S.A. BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR MISUSE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * Ariel Futoransky <futo at core-sdi.com>
+ * <http://www.core-sdi.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _DEATTACK_H
+#define _DEATTACK_H
+
+/* Return codes */
+#define DEATTACK_OK 0
+#define DEATTACK_DETECTED 1
+#define DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED 2
+#define DEATTACK_ERROR 3
+
+struct deattack_ctx {
+ u_int16_t *h;
+ u_int32_t n;
+};
+
+void deattack_init(struct deattack_ctx *);
+int detect_attack(struct deattack_ctx *, const u_char *, u_int32_t);
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/defines.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/defines.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/defines.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,829 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#ifndef _DEFINES_H
-#define _DEFINES_H
-
-/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.176 2014/01/17 13:12:38 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-
-/* Constants */
-
-#if defined(HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD) && HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD == 0
-enum
-{
- SHUT_RD = 0, /* No more receptions. */
- SHUT_WR, /* No more transmissions. */
- SHUT_RDWR /* No more receptions or transmissions. */
-};
-# define SHUT_RD SHUT_RD
-# define SHUT_WR SHUT_WR
-# define SHUT_RDWR SHUT_RDWR
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Definitions for IP type of service (ip_tos)
- */
-#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
-#include <netinet/ip.h>
-#ifndef IPTOS_LOWDELAY
-# define IPTOS_LOWDELAY 0x10
-# define IPTOS_THROUGHPUT 0x08
-# define IPTOS_RELIABILITY 0x04
-# define IPTOS_LOWCOST 0x02
-# define IPTOS_MINCOST IPTOS_LOWCOST
-#endif /* IPTOS_LOWDELAY */
-
-/*
- * Definitions for DiffServ Codepoints as per RFC2474
- */
-#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_AF11
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 0x28
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 0x30
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 0x38
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 0x48
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 0x50
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 0x58
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 0x68
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 0x70
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 0x78
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 0x88
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 0x90
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 0x98
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_EF 0xb8
-#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 */
-#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_CS0
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 0x00
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 0x20
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 0x40
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 0x60
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 0x80
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 0xa0
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 0xc0
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 0xe0
-#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 */
-#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_EF
-# define IPTOS_DSCP_EF 0xb8
-#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_EF */
-
-#ifndef PATH_MAX
-# ifdef _POSIX_PATH_MAX
-# define PATH_MAX _POSIX_PATH_MAX
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#ifndef MAXPATHLEN
-# ifdef PATH_MAX
-# define MAXPATHLEN PATH_MAX
-# else /* PATH_MAX */
-# define MAXPATHLEN 64
-/* realpath uses a fixed buffer of size MAXPATHLEN, so force use of ours */
-# ifndef BROKEN_REALPATH
-# define BROKEN_REALPATH 1
-# endif /* BROKEN_REALPATH */
-# endif /* PATH_MAX */
-#endif /* MAXPATHLEN */
-
-#if defined(HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS) && HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS == 0
-# define MAXSYMLINKS 5
-#endif
-
-#ifndef STDIN_FILENO
-# define STDIN_FILENO 0
-#endif
-#ifndef STDOUT_FILENO
-# define STDOUT_FILENO 1
-#endif
-#ifndef STDERR_FILENO
-# define STDERR_FILENO 2
-#endif
-
-#ifndef NGROUPS_MAX /* Disable groupaccess if NGROUP_MAX is not set */
-#ifdef NGROUPS
-#define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS
-#else
-#define NGROUPS_MAX 0
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK) && HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK == 0
-# define O_NONBLOCK 00004 /* Non Blocking Open */
-#endif
-
-#ifndef S_IFSOCK
-# define S_IFSOCK 0
-#endif /* S_IFSOCK */
-
-#ifndef S_ISDIR
-# define S_ISDIR(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFDIR))
-#endif /* S_ISDIR */
-
-#ifndef S_ISREG
-# define S_ISREG(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFREG))
-#endif /* S_ISREG */
-
-#ifndef S_ISLNK
-# define S_ISLNK(mode) (((mode) & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK)
-#endif /* S_ISLNK */
-
-#ifndef S_IXUSR
-# define S_IXUSR 0000100 /* execute/search permission, */
-# define S_IXGRP 0000010 /* execute/search permission, */
-# define S_IXOTH 0000001 /* execute/search permission, */
-# define _S_IWUSR 0000200 /* write permission, */
-# define S_IWUSR _S_IWUSR /* write permission, owner */
-# define S_IWGRP 0000020 /* write permission, group */
-# define S_IWOTH 0000002 /* write permission, other */
-# define S_IRUSR 0000400 /* read permission, owner */
-# define S_IRGRP 0000040 /* read permission, group */
-# define S_IROTH 0000004 /* read permission, other */
-# define S_IRWXU 0000700 /* read, write, execute */
-# define S_IRWXG 0000070 /* read, write, execute */
-# define S_IRWXO 0000007 /* read, write, execute */
-#endif /* S_IXUSR */
-
-#if !defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(MAP_ANONYMOUS)
-#define MAP_ANON MAP_ANONYMOUS
-#endif
-
-#ifndef MAP_FAILED
-# define MAP_FAILED ((void *)-1)
-#endif
-
-/*
-SCO Open Server 3 has INADDR_LOOPBACK defined in rpc/rpc.h but
-including rpc/rpc.h breaks Solaris 6
-*/
-#ifndef INADDR_LOOPBACK
-#define INADDR_LOOPBACK ((u_long)0x7f000001)
-#endif
-
-/* Types */
-
-/* If sys/types.h does not supply intXX_t, supply them ourselves */
-/* (or die trying) */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_U_INT
-typedef unsigned int u_int;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_INTXX_T
-typedef signed char int8_t;
-# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2)
-typedef short int int16_t;
-# else
-# ifdef _UNICOS
-# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 4)
-typedef short int16_t;
-# else
-typedef long int16_t;
-# endif
-# else
-# error "16 bit int type not found."
-# endif /* _UNICOS */
-# endif
-# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
-typedef int int32_t;
-# else
-# ifdef _UNICOS
-typedef long int32_t;
-# else
-# error "32 bit int type not found."
-# endif /* _UNICOS */
-# endif
-#endif
-
-/* If sys/types.h does not supply u_intXX_t, supply them ourselves */
-#ifndef HAVE_U_INTXX_T
-# ifdef HAVE_UINTXX_T
-typedef uint8_t u_int8_t;
-typedef uint16_t u_int16_t;
-typedef uint32_t u_int32_t;
-# define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1
-# else
-typedef unsigned char u_int8_t;
-# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2)
-typedef unsigned short int u_int16_t;
-# else
-# ifdef _UNICOS
-# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 4)
-typedef unsigned short u_int16_t;
-# else
-typedef unsigned long u_int16_t;
-# endif
-# else
-# error "16 bit int type not found."
-# endif
-# endif
-# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
-typedef unsigned int u_int32_t;
-# else
-# ifdef _UNICOS
-typedef unsigned long u_int32_t;
-# else
-# error "32 bit int type not found."
-# endif
-# endif
-# endif
-#define __BIT_TYPES_DEFINED__
-#endif
-
-/* 64-bit types */
-#ifndef HAVE_INT64_T
-# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
-typedef long int int64_t;
-# else
-# if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
-typedef long long int int64_t;
-# endif
-# endif
-#endif
-#ifndef HAVE_U_INT64_T
-# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
-typedef unsigned long int u_int64_t;
-# else
-# if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
-typedef unsigned long long int u_int64_t;
-# endif
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_UINTXX_T
-typedef u_int8_t uint8_t;
-typedef u_int16_t uint16_t;
-typedef u_int32_t uint32_t;
-typedef u_int64_t uint64_t;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_INTMAX_T
-typedef long long intmax_t;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_UINTMAX_T
-typedef unsigned long long uintmax_t;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_U_CHAR
-typedef unsigned char u_char;
-# define HAVE_U_CHAR
-#endif /* HAVE_U_CHAR */
-
-#ifndef ULLONG_MAX
-# define ULLONG_MAX ((unsigned long long)-1)
-#endif
-
-#ifndef SIZE_T_MAX
-#define SIZE_T_MAX ULONG_MAX
-#endif /* SIZE_T_MAX */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SIZE_T
-typedef unsigned int size_t;
-# define HAVE_SIZE_T
-# define SIZE_T_MAX UINT_MAX
-#endif /* HAVE_SIZE_T */
-
-#ifndef SIZE_MAX
-#define SIZE_MAX SIZE_T_MAX
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SSIZE_T
-typedef int ssize_t;
-# define HAVE_SSIZE_T
-#endif /* HAVE_SSIZE_T */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_CLOCK_T
-typedef long clock_t;
-# define HAVE_CLOCK_T
-#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_T */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
-typedef int sa_family_t;
-# define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
-#endif /* HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_PID_T
-typedef int pid_t;
-# define HAVE_PID_T
-#endif /* HAVE_PID_T */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
-typedef int sig_atomic_t;
-# define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
-#endif /* HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_MODE_T
-typedef int mode_t;
-# define HAVE_MODE_T
-#endif /* HAVE_MODE_T */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS)
-# define ss_family __ss_family
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE_SA_FAMILY_IN_SS) */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
-struct sockaddr_un {
- short sun_family; /* AF_UNIX */
- char sun_path[108]; /* path name (gag) */
-};
-#endif /* HAVE_SYS_UN_H */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T
-typedef u_int32_t in_addr_t;
-#endif
-#ifndef HAVE_IN_PORT_T
-typedef u_int16_t in_port_t;
-#endif
-
-#if defined(BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H) && !defined(_STRUCT_WINSIZE)
-#define _STRUCT_WINSIZE
-struct winsize {
- unsigned short ws_row; /* rows, in characters */
- unsigned short ws_col; /* columns, in character */
- unsigned short ws_xpixel; /* horizontal size, pixels */
- unsigned short ws_ypixel; /* vertical size, pixels */
-};
-#endif
-
-/* bits needed for select that may not be in the system headers */
-#ifndef HAVE_FD_MASK
- typedef unsigned long int fd_mask;
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS) && HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS == 0
-# define NFDBITS (8 * sizeof(unsigned long))
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY) && HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY == 0
-# define howmany(x,y) (((x)+((y)-1))/(y))
-#endif
-
-/* Paths */
-
-#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL
-# define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh"
-#endif
-
-#ifdef USER_PATH
-# ifdef _PATH_STDPATH
-# undef _PATH_STDPATH
-# endif
-# define _PATH_STDPATH USER_PATH
-#endif
-
-#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
-# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
-#endif
-
-#ifndef SUPERUSER_PATH
-# define SUPERUSER_PATH _PATH_STDPATH
-#endif
-
-#ifndef _PATH_DEVNULL
-# define _PATH_DEVNULL "/dev/null"
-#endif
-
-/* user may have set a different path */
-#if defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY)
-# undef _PATH_MAILDIR MAILDIR
-#endif /* defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY) */
-
-#ifdef MAIL_DIRECTORY
-# define _PATH_MAILDIR MAIL_DIRECTORY
-#endif
-
-#ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN
-# define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin"
-#endif
-
-/* Define this to be the path of the xauth program. */
-#ifdef XAUTH_PATH
-#define _PATH_XAUTH XAUTH_PATH
-#endif /* XAUTH_PATH */
-
-/* derived from XF4/xc/lib/dps/Xlibnet.h */
-#ifndef X_UNIX_PATH
-# ifdef __hpux
-# define X_UNIX_PATH "/var/spool/sockets/X11/%u"
-# else
-# define X_UNIX_PATH "/tmp/.X11-unix/X%u"
-# endif
-#endif /* X_UNIX_PATH */
-#define _PATH_UNIX_X X_UNIX_PATH
-
-#ifndef _PATH_TTY
-# define _PATH_TTY "/dev/tty"
-#endif
-
-/* Macros */
-
-#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL) && defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H)
-# define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
-#endif
-
-#ifndef MAX
-# define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))
-# define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b))
-#endif
-
-#ifndef roundup
-# define roundup(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y))
-#endif
-
-#ifndef timersub
-#define timersub(a, b, result) \
- do { \
- (result)->tv_sec = (a)->tv_sec - (b)->tv_sec; \
- (result)->tv_usec = (a)->tv_usec - (b)->tv_usec; \
- if ((result)->tv_usec < 0) { \
- --(result)->tv_sec; \
- (result)->tv_usec += 1000000; \
- } \
- } while (0)
-#endif
-
-#ifndef TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC
-#define TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(tv, ts) { \
- (ts)->tv_sec = (tv)->tv_sec; \
- (ts)->tv_nsec = (tv)->tv_usec * 1000; \
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL
-#define TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(tv, ts) { \
- (tv)->tv_sec = (ts)->tv_sec; \
- (tv)->tv_usec = (ts)->tv_nsec / 1000; \
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef __P
-# define __P(x) x
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED)
-# define IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(a) \
- ((((u_int32_t *) (a))[0] == 0) && (((u_int32_t *) (a))[1] == 0) && \
- (((u_int32_t *) (a))[2] == htonl (0xffff)))
-#endif /* !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) */
-
-#if !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2)
-# define __attribute__(x)
-#endif /* !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2) */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__) && !defined(__sentinel__)
-# define __sentinel__
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__) && !defined(__bounded__)
-# define __bounded__(x, y, z)
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__) && !defined(__nonnull__)
-# define __nonnull__(x)
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OSSH_ALIGNBYTES
-#define OSSH_ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1)
-#endif
-#ifndef __CMSG_ALIGN
-#define __CMSG_ALIGN(p) (((u_int)(p) + OSSH_ALIGNBYTES) &~ OSSH_ALIGNBYTES)
-#endif
-
-/* Length of the contents of a control message of length len */
-#ifndef CMSG_LEN
-#define CMSG_LEN(len) (__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + (len))
-#endif
-
-/* Length of the space taken up by a padded control message of length len */
-#ifndef CMSG_SPACE
-#define CMSG_SPACE(len) (__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + __CMSG_ALIGN(len))
-#endif
-
-/* given pointer to struct cmsghdr, return pointer to data */
-#ifndef CMSG_DATA
-#define CMSG_DATA(cmsg) ((u_char *)(cmsg) + __CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)))
-#endif /* CMSG_DATA */
-
-/*
- * RFC 2292 requires to check msg_controllen, in case that the kernel returns
- * an empty list for some reasons.
- */
-#ifndef CMSG_FIRSTHDR
-#define CMSG_FIRSTHDR(mhdr) \
- ((mhdr)->msg_controllen >= sizeof(struct cmsghdr) ? \
- (struct cmsghdr *)(mhdr)->msg_control : \
- (struct cmsghdr *)NULL)
-#endif /* CMSG_FIRSTHDR */
-
-#if defined(HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF) && HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF == 0
-# define offsetof(type, member) ((size_t) &((type *)0)->member)
-#endif
-
-/* Set up BSD-style BYTE_ORDER definition if it isn't there already */
-/* XXX: doesn't try to cope with strange byte orders (PDP_ENDIAN) */
-#ifndef BYTE_ORDER
-# ifndef LITTLE_ENDIAN
-# define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234
-# endif /* LITTLE_ENDIAN */
-# ifndef BIG_ENDIAN
-# define BIG_ENDIAN 4321
-# endif /* BIG_ENDIAN */
-# ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
-# define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN
-# else /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
-# define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN
-# endif /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
-#endif /* BYTE_ORDER */
-
-/* Function replacement / compatibility hacks */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) && (defined(HAVE_OGETADDRINFO) || defined(HAVE_NGETADDRINFO))
-# define HAVE_GETADDRINFO
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET
-# undef getopt
-# undef opterr
-# undef optind
-# undef optopt
-# undef optreset
-# undef optarg
-# define getopt(ac, av, o) BSDgetopt(ac, av, o)
-# define opterr BSDopterr
-# define optind BSDoptind
-# define optopt BSDoptopt
-# define optreset BSDoptreset
-# define optarg BSDoptarg
-#endif
-
-#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO)
-# undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
-#endif
-#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_FREEADDRINFO)
-# undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
-#endif
-#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR)
-# undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
-#endif
-
-#if defined(BROKEN_UPDWTMPX) && defined(HAVE_UPDWTMPX)
-# undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
-#endif
-
-#if defined(BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
-# undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) && \
- defined(SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND)
-# define DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY)
-# define memmove(s1, s2, n) bcopy((s2), (s1), (n))
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) */
-
-#if defined(HAVE_VHANGUP) && !defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX)
-# define USE_VHANGUP
-#endif /* defined(HAVE_VHANGUP) && !defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) */
-
-#ifndef GETPGRP_VOID
-# include <unistd.h>
-# define getpgrp() getpgrp(0)
-#endif
-
-#ifdef USE_BSM_AUDIT
-# define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-# define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-#endif
-
-#ifdef USE_LINUX_AUDIT
-# define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-# define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(HAVE___func__) && defined(HAVE___FUNCTION__)
-# define __func__ __FUNCTION__
-#elif !defined(HAVE___func__)
-# define __func__ ""
-#endif
-
-#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
-# define krb5_get_err_text(context,code) error_message(code)
-#endif
-
-#if defined(SKEYCHALLENGE_4ARG)
-# define _compat_skeychallenge(a,b,c,d) skeychallenge(a,b,c,d)
-#else
-# define _compat_skeychallenge(a,b,c,d) skeychallenge(a,b,c)
-#endif
-
-/* Maximum number of file descriptors available */
-#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF
-# define SSH_SYSFDMAX sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX)
-#else
-# define SSH_SYSFDMAX 10000
-#endif
-
-#ifdef FSID_HAS_VAL
-/* encode f_fsid into a 64 bit value */
-#define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \
- ((((u_int64_t)(f).val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \
- ((f).val[1] & 0xffffffffUL))
-#elif defined(FSID_HAS___VAL)
-#define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \
- ((((u_int64_t)(f).__val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \
- ((f).__val[1] & 0xffffffffUL))
-#else
-# define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) ((f))
-#endif
-
-#if defined(__Lynx__)
- /*
- * LynxOS defines these in param.h which we do not want to include since
- * it will also pull in a bunch of kernel definitions.
- */
-# define ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1)
-# define ALIGN(p) (((unsigned)p + ALIGNBYTES) & ~ALIGNBYTES)
- /* Missing prototypes on LynxOS */
- int snprintf (char *, size_t, const char *, ...);
- int mkstemp (char *);
- char *crypt (const char *, const char *);
- int seteuid (uid_t);
- int setegid (gid_t);
- char *mkdtemp (char *);
- int rresvport_af (int *, sa_family_t);
- int innetgr (const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Define this to use pipes instead of socketpairs for communicating with the
- * client program. Socketpairs do not seem to work on all systems.
- *
- * configure.ac sets this for a few OS's which are known to have problems
- * but you may need to set it yourself
- */
-/* #define USE_PIPES 1 */
-
-/**
- ** login recorder definitions
- **/
-
-/* FIXME: put default paths back in */
-#ifndef UTMP_FILE
-# ifdef _PATH_UTMP
-# define UTMP_FILE _PATH_UTMP
-# else
-# ifdef CONF_UTMP_FILE
-# define UTMP_FILE CONF_UTMP_FILE
-# endif
-# endif
-#endif
-#ifndef WTMP_FILE
-# ifdef _PATH_WTMP
-# define WTMP_FILE _PATH_WTMP
-# else
-# ifdef CONF_WTMP_FILE
-# define WTMP_FILE CONF_WTMP_FILE
-# endif
-# endif
-#endif
-/* pick up the user's location for lastlog if given */
-#ifndef LASTLOG_FILE
-# ifdef _PATH_LASTLOG
-# define LASTLOG_FILE _PATH_LASTLOG
-# else
-# ifdef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
-# define LASTLOG_FILE CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
-# endif
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
-# define USE_SHADOW
-#endif
-
-/* The login() library function in libutil is first choice */
-#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN) && !defined(DISABLE_LOGIN)
-# define USE_LOGIN
-
-#else
-/* Simply select your favourite login types. */
-/* Can't do if-else because some systems use several... <sigh> */
-# if !defined(DISABLE_UTMPX)
-# define USE_UTMPX
-# endif
-# if defined(UTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_UTMP)
-# define USE_UTMP
-# endif
-# if defined(WTMPX_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMPX)
-# define USE_WTMPX
-# endif
-# if defined(WTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMP)
-# define USE_WTMP
-# endif
-
-#endif
-
-#ifndef UT_LINESIZE
-# define UT_LINESIZE 8
-#endif
-
-/* I hope that the presence of LASTLOG_FILE is enough to detect this */
-#if defined(LASTLOG_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
-# define USE_LASTLOG
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
-# ifdef USE_SHADOW
-# undef USE_SHADOW
-# endif
-# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
-# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
-#endif
-#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
-# define USE_LIBIAF
-#endif
-
-/* HP-UX 11.11 */
-#ifdef BTMP_FILE
-# define _PATH_BTMP BTMP_FILE
-#endif
-
-#if defined(USE_BTMP) && defined(_PATH_BTMP)
-# define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
-#endif
-
-/** end of login recorder definitions */
-
-#ifdef BROKEN_GETGROUPS
-# define getgroups(a,b) ((a)==0 && (b)==NULL ? NGROUPS_MAX : getgroups((a),(b)))
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HAVE_MMAP) && defined(BROKEN_MMAP)
-# undef HAVE_MMAP
-#endif
-
-#ifndef IOV_MAX
-# if defined(_XOPEN_IOV_MAX)
-# define IOV_MAX _XOPEN_IOV_MAX
-# elif defined(DEF_IOV_MAX)
-# define IOV_MAX DEF_IOV_MAX
-# else
-# define IOV_MAX 16
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#ifndef EWOULDBLOCK
-# define EWOULDBLOCK EAGAIN
-#endif
-
-#ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN /* for non IPv6 machines */
-#define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46
-#endif
-
-#ifndef SSH_IOBUFSZ
-# define SSH_IOBUFSZ 8192
-#endif
-
-#ifndef _NSIG
-# ifdef NSIG
-# define _NSIG NSIG
-# else
-# define _NSIG 128
-# endif
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Platforms that have arc4random_uniform() and not arc4random_stir()
- * shouldn't need the latter.
- */
-#if defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM) && \
- !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR)
-# define arc4random_stir()
-#endif
-
-#endif /* _DEFINES_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/defines.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/defines.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/defines.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/defines.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,873 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _DEFINES_H
+#define _DEFINES_H
+
+/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.183 2014/09/02 19:33:26 djm Exp $ */
+
+
+/* Constants */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD) && HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD == 0
+enum
+{
+ SHUT_RD = 0, /* No more receptions. */
+ SHUT_WR, /* No more transmissions. */
+ SHUT_RDWR /* No more receptions or transmissions. */
+};
+# define SHUT_RD SHUT_RD
+# define SHUT_WR SHUT_WR
+# define SHUT_RDWR SHUT_RDWR
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Cygwin doesn't really have a notion of reserved ports. It is still
+ * is useful on the client side so for compatibility it defines as 1024 via
+ * netinet/in.h inside an enum. We * don't actually want that restriction
+ * so we want to set that to zero, but we can't do it direct in config.h
+ * because it'll cause a conflicting definition the first time we include
+ * netinet/in.h.
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+#define IPPORT_RESERVED 0
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Definitions for IP type of service (ip_tos)
+ */
+#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+#ifndef IPTOS_LOWDELAY
+# define IPTOS_LOWDELAY 0x10
+# define IPTOS_THROUGHPUT 0x08
+# define IPTOS_RELIABILITY 0x04
+# define IPTOS_LOWCOST 0x02
+# define IPTOS_MINCOST IPTOS_LOWCOST
+#endif /* IPTOS_LOWDELAY */
+
+/*
+ * Definitions for DiffServ Codepoints as per RFC2474
+ */
+#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_AF11
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 0x28
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 0x30
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 0x38
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 0x48
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 0x50
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 0x58
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 0x68
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 0x70
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 0x78
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 0x88
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 0x90
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 0x98
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_EF 0xb8
+#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 */
+#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_CS0
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 0x00
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 0x20
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 0x40
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 0x60
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 0x80
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 0xa0
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 0xc0
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 0xe0
+#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 */
+#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_EF
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_EF 0xb8
+#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_EF */
+
+#ifndef PATH_MAX
+# ifdef _POSIX_PATH_MAX
+# define PATH_MAX _POSIX_PATH_MAX
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MAXPATHLEN
+# ifdef PATH_MAX
+# define MAXPATHLEN PATH_MAX
+# else /* PATH_MAX */
+# define MAXPATHLEN 64
+/* realpath uses a fixed buffer of size MAXPATHLEN, so force use of ours */
+# ifndef BROKEN_REALPATH
+# define BROKEN_REALPATH 1
+# endif /* BROKEN_REALPATH */
+# endif /* PATH_MAX */
+#endif /* MAXPATHLEN */
+
+#ifndef HOST_NAME_MAX
+# include "netdb.h" /* for MAXHOSTNAMELEN */
+# if defined(_POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX)
+# define HOST_NAME_MAX _POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX
+# elif defined(MAXHOSTNAMELEN)
+# define HOST_NAME_MAX MAXHOSTNAMELEN
+# else
+# define HOST_NAME_MAX 255
+# endif
+#endif /* HOST_NAME_MAX */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS) && HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS == 0
+# define MAXSYMLINKS 5
+#endif
+
+#ifndef STDIN_FILENO
+# define STDIN_FILENO 0
+#endif
+#ifndef STDOUT_FILENO
+# define STDOUT_FILENO 1
+#endif
+#ifndef STDERR_FILENO
+# define STDERR_FILENO 2
+#endif
+
+#ifndef NGROUPS_MAX /* Disable groupaccess if NGROUP_MAX is not set */
+#ifdef NGROUPS
+#define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS
+#else
+#define NGROUPS_MAX 0
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK) && HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK == 0
+# define O_NONBLOCK 00004 /* Non Blocking Open */
+#endif
+
+#ifndef S_IFSOCK
+# define S_IFSOCK 0
+#endif /* S_IFSOCK */
+
+#ifndef S_ISDIR
+# define S_ISDIR(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFDIR))
+#endif /* S_ISDIR */
+
+#ifndef S_ISREG
+# define S_ISREG(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFREG))
+#endif /* S_ISREG */
+
+#ifndef S_ISLNK
+# define S_ISLNK(mode) (((mode) & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK)
+#endif /* S_ISLNK */
+
+#ifndef S_IXUSR
+# define S_IXUSR 0000100 /* execute/search permission, */
+# define S_IXGRP 0000010 /* execute/search permission, */
+# define S_IXOTH 0000001 /* execute/search permission, */
+# define _S_IWUSR 0000200 /* write permission, */
+# define S_IWUSR _S_IWUSR /* write permission, owner */
+# define S_IWGRP 0000020 /* write permission, group */
+# define S_IWOTH 0000002 /* write permission, other */
+# define S_IRUSR 0000400 /* read permission, owner */
+# define S_IRGRP 0000040 /* read permission, group */
+# define S_IROTH 0000004 /* read permission, other */
+# define S_IRWXU 0000700 /* read, write, execute */
+# define S_IRWXG 0000070 /* read, write, execute */
+# define S_IRWXO 0000007 /* read, write, execute */
+#endif /* S_IXUSR */
+
+#if !defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(MAP_ANONYMOUS)
+#define MAP_ANON MAP_ANONYMOUS
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MAP_FAILED
+# define MAP_FAILED ((void *)-1)
+#endif
+
+/*
+SCO Open Server 3 has INADDR_LOOPBACK defined in rpc/rpc.h but
+including rpc/rpc.h breaks Solaris 6
+*/
+#ifndef INADDR_LOOPBACK
+#define INADDR_LOOPBACK ((u_long)0x7f000001)
+#endif
+
+/* Types */
+
+/* If sys/types.h does not supply intXX_t, supply them ourselves */
+/* (or die trying) */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_U_INT
+typedef unsigned int u_int;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INTXX_T
+typedef signed char int8_t;
+# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2)
+typedef short int int16_t;
+# else
+# ifdef _UNICOS
+# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 4)
+typedef short int16_t;
+# else
+typedef long int16_t;
+# endif
+# else
+# error "16 bit int type not found."
+# endif /* _UNICOS */
+# endif
+# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
+typedef int int32_t;
+# else
+# ifdef _UNICOS
+typedef long int32_t;
+# else
+# error "32 bit int type not found."
+# endif /* _UNICOS */
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/* If sys/types.h does not supply u_intXX_t, supply them ourselves */
+#ifndef HAVE_U_INTXX_T
+# ifdef HAVE_UINTXX_T
+typedef uint8_t u_int8_t;
+typedef uint16_t u_int16_t;
+typedef uint32_t u_int32_t;
+# define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1
+# else
+typedef unsigned char u_int8_t;
+# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2)
+typedef unsigned short int u_int16_t;
+# else
+# ifdef _UNICOS
+# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 4)
+typedef unsigned short u_int16_t;
+# else
+typedef unsigned long u_int16_t;
+# endif
+# else
+# error "16 bit int type not found."
+# endif
+# endif
+# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
+typedef unsigned int u_int32_t;
+# else
+# ifdef _UNICOS
+typedef unsigned long u_int32_t;
+# else
+# error "32 bit int type not found."
+# endif
+# endif
+# endif
+#define __BIT_TYPES_DEFINED__
+#endif
+
+/* 64-bit types */
+#ifndef HAVE_INT64_T
+# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
+typedef long int int64_t;
+# else
+# if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
+typedef long long int int64_t;
+# endif
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_U_INT64_T
+# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
+typedef unsigned long int u_int64_t;
+# else
+# if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
+typedef unsigned long long int u_int64_t;
+# endif
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UINTXX_T
+typedef u_int8_t uint8_t;
+typedef u_int16_t uint16_t;
+typedef u_int32_t uint32_t;
+typedef u_int64_t uint64_t;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INTMAX_T
+typedef long long intmax_t;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UINTMAX_T
+typedef unsigned long long uintmax_t;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_U_CHAR
+typedef unsigned char u_char;
+# define HAVE_U_CHAR
+#endif /* HAVE_U_CHAR */
+
+#ifndef ULLONG_MAX
+# define ULLONG_MAX ((unsigned long long)-1)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SIZE_T_MAX
+#define SIZE_T_MAX ULONG_MAX
+#endif /* SIZE_T_MAX */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SIZE_T
+typedef unsigned int size_t;
+# define HAVE_SIZE_T
+# define SIZE_T_MAX UINT_MAX
+#endif /* HAVE_SIZE_T */
+
+#ifndef SIZE_MAX
+#define SIZE_MAX SIZE_T_MAX
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSIZE_T
+typedef int ssize_t;
+# define HAVE_SSIZE_T
+#endif /* HAVE_SSIZE_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CLOCK_T
+typedef long clock_t;
+# define HAVE_CLOCK_T
+#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
+typedef int sa_family_t;
+# define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
+#endif /* HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_PID_T
+typedef int pid_t;
+# define HAVE_PID_T
+#endif /* HAVE_PID_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
+typedef int sig_atomic_t;
+# define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
+#endif /* HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_MODE_T
+typedef int mode_t;
+# define HAVE_MODE_T
+#endif /* HAVE_MODE_T */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS)
+# define ss_family __ss_family
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE_SA_FAMILY_IN_SS) */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+struct sockaddr_un {
+ short sun_family; /* AF_UNIX */
+ char sun_path[108]; /* path name (gag) */
+};
+#endif /* HAVE_SYS_UN_H */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T
+typedef u_int32_t in_addr_t;
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_IN_PORT_T
+typedef u_int16_t in_port_t;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H) && !defined(_STRUCT_WINSIZE)
+#define _STRUCT_WINSIZE
+struct winsize {
+ unsigned short ws_row; /* rows, in characters */
+ unsigned short ws_col; /* columns, in character */
+ unsigned short ws_xpixel; /* horizontal size, pixels */
+ unsigned short ws_ypixel; /* vertical size, pixels */
+};
+#endif
+
+/* bits needed for select that may not be in the system headers */
+#ifndef HAVE_FD_MASK
+ typedef unsigned long int fd_mask;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS) && HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS == 0
+# define NFDBITS (8 * sizeof(unsigned long))
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY) && HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY == 0
+# define howmany(x,y) (((x)+((y)-1))/(y))
+#endif
+
+/* Paths */
+
+#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL
+# define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USER_PATH
+# ifdef _PATH_STDPATH
+# undef _PATH_STDPATH
+# endif
+# define _PATH_STDPATH USER_PATH
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
+# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SUPERUSER_PATH
+# define SUPERUSER_PATH _PATH_STDPATH
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _PATH_DEVNULL
+# define _PATH_DEVNULL "/dev/null"
+#endif
+
+/* user may have set a different path */
+#if defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY)
+# undef _PATH_MAILDIR
+#endif /* defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY) */
+
+#ifdef MAIL_DIRECTORY
+# define _PATH_MAILDIR MAIL_DIRECTORY
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN
+# define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin"
+#endif
+
+/* Define this to be the path of the xauth program. */
+#ifdef XAUTH_PATH
+#define _PATH_XAUTH XAUTH_PATH
+#endif /* XAUTH_PATH */
+
+/* derived from XF4/xc/lib/dps/Xlibnet.h */
+#ifndef X_UNIX_PATH
+# ifdef __hpux
+# define X_UNIX_PATH "/var/spool/sockets/X11/%u"
+# else
+# define X_UNIX_PATH "/tmp/.X11-unix/X%u"
+# endif
+#endif /* X_UNIX_PATH */
+#define _PATH_UNIX_X X_UNIX_PATH
+
+#ifndef _PATH_TTY
+# define _PATH_TTY "/dev/tty"
+#endif
+
+/* Macros */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL) && defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H)
+# define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MAX
+# define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))
+# define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef roundup
+# define roundup(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef timersub
+#define timersub(a, b, result) \
+ do { \
+ (result)->tv_sec = (a)->tv_sec - (b)->tv_sec; \
+ (result)->tv_usec = (a)->tv_usec - (b)->tv_usec; \
+ if ((result)->tv_usec < 0) { \
+ --(result)->tv_sec; \
+ (result)->tv_usec += 1000000; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC
+#define TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(tv, ts) { \
+ (ts)->tv_sec = (tv)->tv_sec; \
+ (ts)->tv_nsec = (tv)->tv_usec * 1000; \
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL
+#define TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(tv, ts) { \
+ (tv)->tv_sec = (ts)->tv_sec; \
+ (tv)->tv_usec = (ts)->tv_nsec / 1000; \
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __P
+# define __P(x) x
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED)
+# define IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(a) \
+ ((((u_int32_t *) (a))[0] == 0) && (((u_int32_t *) (a))[1] == 0) && \
+ (((u_int32_t *) (a))[2] == htonl (0xffff)))
+#endif /* !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) */
+
+#if !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2)
+# define __attribute__(x)
+#endif /* !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__) && !defined(__sentinel__)
+# define __sentinel__
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__) && !defined(__bounded__)
+# define __bounded__(x, y, z)
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__) && !defined(__nonnull__)
+# define __nonnull__(x)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OSSH_ALIGNBYTES
+#define OSSH_ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1)
+#endif
+#ifndef __CMSG_ALIGN
+#define __CMSG_ALIGN(p) (((u_int)(p) + OSSH_ALIGNBYTES) &~ OSSH_ALIGNBYTES)
+#endif
+
+/* Length of the contents of a control message of length len */
+#ifndef CMSG_LEN
+#define CMSG_LEN(len) (__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + (len))
+#endif
+
+/* Length of the space taken up by a padded control message of length len */
+#ifndef CMSG_SPACE
+#define CMSG_SPACE(len) (__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + __CMSG_ALIGN(len))
+#endif
+
+/* given pointer to struct cmsghdr, return pointer to data */
+#ifndef CMSG_DATA
+#define CMSG_DATA(cmsg) ((u_char *)(cmsg) + __CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)))
+#endif /* CMSG_DATA */
+
+/*
+ * RFC 2292 requires to check msg_controllen, in case that the kernel returns
+ * an empty list for some reasons.
+ */
+#ifndef CMSG_FIRSTHDR
+#define CMSG_FIRSTHDR(mhdr) \
+ ((mhdr)->msg_controllen >= sizeof(struct cmsghdr) ? \
+ (struct cmsghdr *)(mhdr)->msg_control : \
+ (struct cmsghdr *)NULL)
+#endif /* CMSG_FIRSTHDR */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF) && HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF == 0
+# define offsetof(type, member) ((size_t) &((type *)0)->member)
+#endif
+
+/* Set up BSD-style BYTE_ORDER definition if it isn't there already */
+/* XXX: doesn't try to cope with strange byte orders (PDP_ENDIAN) */
+#ifndef BYTE_ORDER
+# ifndef LITTLE_ENDIAN
+# define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234
+# endif /* LITTLE_ENDIAN */
+# ifndef BIG_ENDIAN
+# define BIG_ENDIAN 4321
+# endif /* BIG_ENDIAN */
+# ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+# define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN
+# else /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
+# define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN
+# endif /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
+#endif /* BYTE_ORDER */
+
+/* Function replacement / compatibility hacks */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) && (defined(HAVE_OGETADDRINFO) || defined(HAVE_NGETADDRINFO))
+# define HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET
+# undef getopt
+# undef opterr
+# undef optind
+# undef optopt
+# undef optreset
+# undef optarg
+# define getopt(ac, av, o) BSDgetopt(ac, av, o)
+# define opterr BSDopterr
+# define optind BSDoptind
+# define optopt BSDoptopt
+# define optreset BSDoptreset
+# define optarg BSDoptarg
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO)
+# undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+#endif
+#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_FREEADDRINFO)
+# undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
+#endif
+#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR)
+# undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO)
+# if defined(HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV) && HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV == 0
+# define AI_NUMERICSERV 0
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_UPDWTMPX) && defined(HAVE_UPDWTMPX)
+# undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+# undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) && \
+ defined(SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND)
+# define DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY)
+# define memmove(s1, s2, n) bcopy((s2), (s1), (n))
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) */
+
+#ifndef GETPGRP_VOID
+# include <unistd.h>
+# define getpgrp() getpgrp(0)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_BSM_AUDIT
+# define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+# define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_LINUX_AUDIT
+# define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+# define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE___func__) && defined(HAVE___FUNCTION__)
+# define __func__ __FUNCTION__
+#elif !defined(HAVE___func__)
+# define __func__ ""
+#endif
+
+#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+# define krb5_get_err_text(context,code) error_message(code)
+#endif
+
+#if defined(SKEYCHALLENGE_4ARG)
+# define _compat_skeychallenge(a,b,c,d) skeychallenge(a,b,c,d)
+#else
+# define _compat_skeychallenge(a,b,c,d) skeychallenge(a,b,c)
+#endif
+
+/* Maximum number of file descriptors available */
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF
+# define SSH_SYSFDMAX sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX)
+#else
+# define SSH_SYSFDMAX 10000
+#endif
+
+#ifdef FSID_HAS_VAL
+/* encode f_fsid into a 64 bit value */
+#define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \
+ ((((u_int64_t)(f).val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \
+ ((f).val[1] & 0xffffffffUL))
+#elif defined(FSID_HAS___VAL)
+#define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \
+ ((((u_int64_t)(f).__val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \
+ ((f).__val[1] & 0xffffffffUL))
+#else
+# define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) ((f))
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__Lynx__)
+ /*
+ * LynxOS defines these in param.h which we do not want to include since
+ * it will also pull in a bunch of kernel definitions.
+ */
+# define ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1)
+# define ALIGN(p) (((unsigned)p + ALIGNBYTES) & ~ALIGNBYTES)
+ /* Missing prototypes on LynxOS */
+ int snprintf (char *, size_t, const char *, ...);
+ int mkstemp (char *);
+ char *crypt (const char *, const char *);
+ int seteuid (uid_t);
+ int setegid (gid_t);
+ char *mkdtemp (char *);
+ int rresvport_af (int *, sa_family_t);
+ int innetgr (const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Define this to use pipes instead of socketpairs for communicating with the
+ * client program. Socketpairs do not seem to work on all systems.
+ *
+ * configure.ac sets this for a few OS's which are known to have problems
+ * but you may need to set it yourself
+ */
+/* #define USE_PIPES 1 */
+
+/**
+ ** login recorder definitions
+ **/
+
+/* FIXME: put default paths back in */
+#ifndef UTMP_FILE
+# ifdef _PATH_UTMP
+# define UTMP_FILE _PATH_UTMP
+# else
+# ifdef CONF_UTMP_FILE
+# define UTMP_FILE CONF_UTMP_FILE
+# endif
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifndef WTMP_FILE
+# ifdef _PATH_WTMP
+# define WTMP_FILE _PATH_WTMP
+# else
+# ifdef CONF_WTMP_FILE
+# define WTMP_FILE CONF_WTMP_FILE
+# endif
+# endif
+#endif
+/* pick up the user's location for lastlog if given */
+#ifndef LASTLOG_FILE
+# ifdef _PATH_LASTLOG
+# define LASTLOG_FILE _PATH_LASTLOG
+# else
+# ifdef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
+# define LASTLOG_FILE CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
+# endif
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+# define USE_SHADOW
+#endif
+
+/* The login() library function in libutil is first choice */
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN) && !defined(DISABLE_LOGIN)
+# define USE_LOGIN
+
+#else
+/* Simply select your favourite login types. */
+/* Can't do if-else because some systems use several... <sigh> */
+# if !defined(DISABLE_UTMPX)
+# define USE_UTMPX
+# endif
+# if defined(UTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_UTMP)
+# define USE_UTMP
+# endif
+# if defined(WTMPX_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMPX)
+# define USE_WTMPX
+# endif
+# if defined(WTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMP)
+# define USE_WTMP
+# endif
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef UT_LINESIZE
+# define UT_LINESIZE 8
+#endif
+
+/* I hope that the presence of LASTLOG_FILE is enough to detect this */
+#if defined(LASTLOG_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
+# define USE_LASTLOG
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+# ifdef USE_SHADOW
+# undef USE_SHADOW
+# endif
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+# define USE_LIBIAF
+#endif
+
+/* HP-UX 11.11 */
+#ifdef BTMP_FILE
+# define _PATH_BTMP BTMP_FILE
+#endif
+
+#if defined(USE_BTMP) && defined(_PATH_BTMP)
+# define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
+#endif
+
+/** end of login recorder definitions */
+
+#ifdef BROKEN_GETGROUPS
+# define getgroups(a,b) ((a)==0 && (b)==NULL ? NGROUPS_MAX : getgroups((a),(b)))
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_MMAP) && defined(BROKEN_MMAP)
+# undef HAVE_MMAP
+#endif
+
+#ifndef IOV_MAX
+# if defined(_XOPEN_IOV_MAX)
+# define IOV_MAX _XOPEN_IOV_MAX
+# elif defined(DEF_IOV_MAX)
+# define IOV_MAX DEF_IOV_MAX
+# else
+# define IOV_MAX 16
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef EWOULDBLOCK
+# define EWOULDBLOCK EAGAIN
+#endif
+
+#ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN /* for non IPv6 machines */
+#define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SSH_IOBUFSZ
+# define SSH_IOBUFSZ 8192
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Platforms that have arc4random_uniform() and not arc4random_stir()
+ * shouldn't need the latter.
+ */
+#if defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM) && \
+ !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR)
+# define arc4random_stir()
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_VA_COPY
+# ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY
+# define va_copy(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src)
+# else
+# define va_copy(dest, src) (dest) = (src)
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __predict_true
+# if defined(__GNUC__) && \
+ ((__GNUC__ > (2)) || (__GNUC__ == (2) && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= (96)))
+# define __predict_true(exp) __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 1)
+# define __predict_false(exp) __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 0)
+# else
+# define __predict_true(exp) ((exp) != 0)
+# define __predict_false(exp) ((exp) != 0)
+# endif /* gcc version */
+#endif /* __predict_true */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) && defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) && \
+ defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) && defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) && \
+ defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) && HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH != 0 && \
+ !defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
+# define USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _DEFINES_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dh.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/dh.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dh.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,357 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.53 2013/11/21 00:45:44 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/param.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "dh.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-
-static int
-parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg)
-{
- char *cp, *arg;
- char *strsize, *gen, *prime;
- const char *errstr = NULL;
- long long n;
-
- dhg->p = dhg->g = NULL;
- cp = line;
- if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
- return 0;
- /* Ignore leading whitespace */
- if (*arg == '\0')
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#')
- return 0;
-
- /* time */
- if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
- goto truncated;
- arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* type */
- if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
- goto truncated;
- /* Ensure this is a safe prime */
- n = strtonum(arg, 0, 5, &errstr);
- if (errstr != NULL || n != MODULI_TYPE_SAFE) {
- error("moduli:%d: type is not %d", linenum, MODULI_TYPE_SAFE);
- goto fail;
- }
- arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* tests */
- if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
- goto truncated;
- /* Ensure prime has been tested and is not composite */
- n = strtonum(arg, 0, 0x1f, &errstr);
- if (errstr != NULL ||
- (n & MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE) || !(n & ~MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE)) {
- error("moduli:%d: invalid moduli tests flag", linenum);
- goto fail;
- }
- arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* tries */
- if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
- goto truncated;
- n = strtonum(arg, 0, 1<<30, &errstr);
- if (errstr != NULL || n == 0) {
- error("moduli:%d: invalid primality trial count", linenum);
- goto fail;
- }
- strsize = strsep(&cp, " "); /* size */
- if (cp == NULL || *strsize == '\0' ||
- (dhg->size = (int)strtonum(strsize, 0, 64*1024, &errstr)) == 0 ||
- errstr) {
- error("moduli:%d: invalid prime length", linenum);
- goto fail;
- }
- /* The whole group is one bit larger */
- dhg->size++;
- gen = strsep(&cp, " "); /* gen */
- if (cp == NULL || *gen == '\0')
- goto truncated;
- prime = strsep(&cp, " "); /* prime */
- if (cp != NULL || *prime == '\0') {
- truncated:
- error("moduli:%d: truncated", linenum);
- goto fail;
- }
-
- if ((dhg->g = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("parse_prime: BN_new failed");
- if ((dhg->p = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("parse_prime: BN_new failed");
- if (BN_hex2bn(&dhg->g, gen) == 0) {
- error("moduli:%d: could not parse generator value", linenum);
- goto fail;
- }
- if (BN_hex2bn(&dhg->p, prime) == 0) {
- error("moduli:%d: could not parse prime value", linenum);
- goto fail;
- }
- if (BN_num_bits(dhg->p) != dhg->size) {
- error("moduli:%d: prime has wrong size: actual %d listed %d",
- linenum, BN_num_bits(dhg->p), dhg->size - 1);
- goto fail;
- }
- if (BN_cmp(dhg->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0) {
- error("moduli:%d: generator is invalid", linenum);
- goto fail;
- }
-
- return 1;
-
- fail:
- if (dhg->g != NULL)
- BN_clear_free(dhg->g);
- if (dhg->p != NULL)
- BN_clear_free(dhg->p);
- dhg->g = dhg->p = NULL;
- error("Bad prime description in line %d", linenum);
- return 0;
-}
-
-DH *
-choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
-{
- FILE *f;
- char line[4096];
- int best, bestcount, which;
- int linenum;
- struct dhgroup dhg;
-
- if ((f = fopen(_PATH_DH_MODULI, "r")) == NULL &&
- (f = fopen(_PATH_DH_PRIMES, "r")) == NULL) {
- logit("WARNING: %s does not exist, using fixed modulus",
- _PATH_DH_MODULI);
- return (dh_new_group14());
- }
-
- linenum = 0;
- best = bestcount = 0;
- while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
- linenum++;
- if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg))
- continue;
- BN_clear_free(dhg.g);
- BN_clear_free(dhg.p);
-
- if (dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min)
- continue;
-
- if ((dhg.size > wantbits && dhg.size < best) ||
- (dhg.size > best && best < wantbits)) {
- best = dhg.size;
- bestcount = 0;
- }
- if (dhg.size == best)
- bestcount++;
- }
- rewind(f);
-
- if (bestcount == 0) {
- fclose(f);
- logit("WARNING: no suitable primes in %s", _PATH_DH_PRIMES);
- return (dh_new_group14());
- }
-
- linenum = 0;
- which = arc4random_uniform(bestcount);
- while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
- if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg))
- continue;
- if ((dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min) ||
- dhg.size != best ||
- linenum++ != which) {
- BN_clear_free(dhg.g);
- BN_clear_free(dhg.p);
- continue;
- }
- break;
- }
- fclose(f);
- if (linenum != which+1)
- fatal("WARNING: line %d disappeared in %s, giving up",
- which, _PATH_DH_PRIMES);
-
- return (dh_new_group(dhg.g, dhg.p));
-}
-
-/* diffie-hellman-groupN-sha1 */
-
-int
-dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub)
-{
- int i;
- int n = BN_num_bits(dh_pub);
- int bits_set = 0;
- BIGNUM *tmp;
-
- if (dh_pub->neg) {
- logit("invalid public DH value: negative");
- return 0;
- }
- if (BN_cmp(dh_pub, BN_value_one()) != 1) { /* pub_exp <= 1 */
- logit("invalid public DH value: <= 1");
- return 0;
- }
-
- if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- error("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!BN_sub(tmp, dh->p, BN_value_one()) ||
- BN_cmp(dh_pub, tmp) != -1) { /* pub_exp > p-2 */
- BN_clear_free(tmp);
- logit("invalid public DH value: >= p-1");
- return 0;
- }
- BN_clear_free(tmp);
-
- for (i = 0; i <= n; i++)
- if (BN_is_bit_set(dh_pub, i))
- bits_set++;
- debug2("bits set: %d/%d", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p));
-
- /* if g==2 and bits_set==1 then computing log_g(dh_pub) is trivial */
- if (bits_set > 1)
- return 1;
-
- logit("invalid public DH value (%d/%d)", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p));
- return 0;
-}
-
-void
-dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
-{
- int pbits;
-
- if (need <= 0)
- fatal("%s: need <= 0", __func__);
- if (dh->p == NULL)
- fatal("%s: dh->p == NULL", __func__);
- if ((pbits = BN_num_bits(dh->p)) <= 0)
- fatal("%s: bits(p) <= 0", __func__);
- dh->length = MIN(need * 2, pbits - 1);
- if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
- fatal("%s: key generation failed", __func__);
- if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh->pub_key))
- fatal("%s: generated invalid key", __func__);
-}
-
-DH *
-dh_new_group_asc(const char *gen, const char *modulus)
-{
- DH *dh;
-
- if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("dh_new_group_asc: DH_new");
-
- if (BN_hex2bn(&dh->p, modulus) == 0)
- fatal("BN_hex2bn p");
- if (BN_hex2bn(&dh->g, gen) == 0)
- fatal("BN_hex2bn g");
-
- return (dh);
-}
-
-/*
- * This just returns the group, we still need to generate the exchange
- * value.
- */
-
-DH *
-dh_new_group(BIGNUM *gen, BIGNUM *modulus)
-{
- DH *dh;
-
- if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("dh_new_group: DH_new");
- dh->p = modulus;
- dh->g = gen;
-
- return (dh);
-}
-
-DH *
-dh_new_group1(void)
-{
- static char *gen = "2", *group1 =
- "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1"
- "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD"
- "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245"
- "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED"
- "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE65381"
- "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF";
-
- return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group1));
-}
-
-DH *
-dh_new_group14(void)
-{
- static char *gen = "2", *group14 =
- "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1"
- "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD"
- "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245"
- "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED"
- "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D"
- "C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F"
- "83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D"
- "670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B"
- "E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9"
- "DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510"
- "15728E5A" "8AACAA68" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF";
-
- return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group14));
-}
-
-/*
- * Estimates the group order for a Diffie-Hellman group that has an
- * attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits).
- * Values from NIST Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key
- * Management Part 1 (rev 3) limited by the recommended maximum value
- * from RFC4419 section 3.
- */
-
-int
-dh_estimate(int bits)
-{
- if (bits <= 112)
- return 2048;
- if (bits <= 128)
- return 3072;
- if (bits <= 192)
- return 7680;
- return 8192;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dh.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/dh.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dh.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dh.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,468 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.60 2016/05/02 10:26:04 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h> /* MIN */
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+static int
+parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg)
+{
+ char *cp, *arg;
+ char *strsize, *gen, *prime;
+ const char *errstr = NULL;
+ long long n;
+
+ dhg->p = dhg->g = NULL;
+ cp = line;
+ if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ /* Ignore leading whitespace */
+ if (*arg == '\0')
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#')
+ return 0;
+
+ /* time */
+ if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
+ goto truncated;
+ arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* type */
+ if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
+ goto truncated;
+ /* Ensure this is a safe prime */
+ n = strtonum(arg, 0, 5, &errstr);
+ if (errstr != NULL || n != MODULI_TYPE_SAFE) {
+ error("moduli:%d: type is not %d", linenum, MODULI_TYPE_SAFE);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* tests */
+ if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
+ goto truncated;
+ /* Ensure prime has been tested and is not composite */
+ n = strtonum(arg, 0, 0x1f, &errstr);
+ if (errstr != NULL ||
+ (n & MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE) || !(n & ~MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE)) {
+ error("moduli:%d: invalid moduli tests flag", linenum);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* tries */
+ if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
+ goto truncated;
+ n = strtonum(arg, 0, 1<<30, &errstr);
+ if (errstr != NULL || n == 0) {
+ error("moduli:%d: invalid primality trial count", linenum);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ strsize = strsep(&cp, " "); /* size */
+ if (cp == NULL || *strsize == '\0' ||
+ (dhg->size = (int)strtonum(strsize, 0, 64*1024, &errstr)) == 0 ||
+ errstr) {
+ error("moduli:%d: invalid prime length", linenum);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /* The whole group is one bit larger */
+ dhg->size++;
+ gen = strsep(&cp, " "); /* gen */
+ if (cp == NULL || *gen == '\0')
+ goto truncated;
+ prime = strsep(&cp, " "); /* prime */
+ if (cp != NULL || *prime == '\0') {
+ truncated:
+ error("moduli:%d: truncated", linenum);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if ((dhg->g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (dhg->p = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ error("parse_prime: BN_new failed");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (BN_hex2bn(&dhg->g, gen) == 0) {
+ error("moduli:%d: could not parse generator value", linenum);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (BN_hex2bn(&dhg->p, prime) == 0) {
+ error("moduli:%d: could not parse prime value", linenum);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (BN_num_bits(dhg->p) != dhg->size) {
+ error("moduli:%d: prime has wrong size: actual %d listed %d",
+ linenum, BN_num_bits(dhg->p), dhg->size - 1);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (BN_cmp(dhg->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0) {
+ error("moduli:%d: generator is invalid", linenum);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+ fail:
+ if (dhg->g != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(dhg->g);
+ if (dhg->p != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(dhg->p);
+ dhg->g = dhg->p = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+DH *
+choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char line[4096];
+ int best, bestcount, which;
+ int linenum;
+ struct dhgroup dhg;
+
+ if ((f = fopen(_PATH_DH_MODULI, "r")) == NULL) {
+ logit("WARNING: could open open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
+ _PATH_DH_MODULI, strerror(errno));
+ return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
+ }
+
+ linenum = 0;
+ best = bestcount = 0;
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+ linenum++;
+ if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg))
+ continue;
+ BN_clear_free(dhg.g);
+ BN_clear_free(dhg.p);
+
+ if (dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min)
+ continue;
+
+ if ((dhg.size > wantbits && dhg.size < best) ||
+ (dhg.size > best && best < wantbits)) {
+ best = dhg.size;
+ bestcount = 0;
+ }
+ if (dhg.size == best)
+ bestcount++;
+ }
+ rewind(f);
+
+ if (bestcount == 0) {
+ fclose(f);
+ logit("WARNING: no suitable primes in %s", _PATH_DH_MODULI);
+ return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
+ }
+
+ linenum = 0;
+ which = arc4random_uniform(bestcount);
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+ if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg))
+ continue;
+ if ((dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min) ||
+ dhg.size != best ||
+ linenum++ != which) {
+ BN_clear_free(dhg.g);
+ BN_clear_free(dhg.p);
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+ if (linenum != which+1) {
+ logit("WARNING: line %d disappeared in %s, giving up",
+ which, _PATH_DH_MODULI);
+ return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
+ }
+
+ return (dh_new_group(dhg.g, dhg.p));
+}
+
+/* diffie-hellman-groupN-sha1 */
+
+int
+dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub)
+{
+ int i;
+ int n = BN_num_bits(dh_pub);
+ int bits_set = 0;
+ BIGNUM *tmp;
+
+ if (dh_pub->neg) {
+ logit("invalid public DH value: negative");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (BN_cmp(dh_pub, BN_value_one()) != 1) { /* pub_exp <= 1 */
+ logit("invalid public DH value: <= 1");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!BN_sub(tmp, dh->p, BN_value_one()) ||
+ BN_cmp(dh_pub, tmp) != -1) { /* pub_exp > p-2 */
+ BN_clear_free(tmp);
+ logit("invalid public DH value: >= p-1");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ BN_clear_free(tmp);
+
+ for (i = 0; i <= n; i++)
+ if (BN_is_bit_set(dh_pub, i))
+ bits_set++;
+ debug2("bits set: %d/%d", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p));
+
+ /*
+ * if g==2 and bits_set==1 then computing log_g(dh_pub) is trivial
+ */
+ if (bits_set < 4) {
+ logit("invalid public DH value (%d/%d)",
+ bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int
+dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
+{
+ int pbits;
+
+ if (need < 0 || dh->p == NULL ||
+ (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh->p)) <= 0 ||
+ need > INT_MAX / 2 || 2 * need > pbits)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (need < 256)
+ need = 256;
+ /*
+ * Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)),
+ * so double requested need here.
+ */
+ dh->length = MIN(need * 2, pbits - 1);
+ if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0 ||
+ !dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh->pub_key)) {
+ BN_clear_free(dh->priv_key);
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+DH *
+dh_new_group_asc(const char *gen, const char *modulus)
+{
+ DH *dh;
+
+ if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (BN_hex2bn(&dh->p, modulus) == 0 ||
+ BN_hex2bn(&dh->g, gen) == 0) {
+ DH_free(dh);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return (dh);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This just returns the group, we still need to generate the exchange
+ * value.
+ */
+
+DH *
+dh_new_group(BIGNUM *gen, BIGNUM *modulus)
+{
+ DH *dh;
+
+ if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ dh->p = modulus;
+ dh->g = gen;
+
+ return (dh);
+}
+
+/* rfc2409 "Second Oakley Group" (1024 bits) */
+DH *
+dh_new_group1(void)
+{
+ static char *gen = "2", *group1 =
+ "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1"
+ "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD"
+ "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245"
+ "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED"
+ "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE65381"
+ "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF";
+
+ return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group1));
+}
+
+/* rfc3526 group 14 "2048-bit MODP Group" */
+DH *
+dh_new_group14(void)
+{
+ static char *gen = "2", *group14 =
+ "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1"
+ "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD"
+ "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245"
+ "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED"
+ "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D"
+ "C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F"
+ "83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D"
+ "670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B"
+ "E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9"
+ "DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510"
+ "15728E5A" "8AACAA68" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF";
+
+ return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group14));
+}
+
+/* rfc3526 group 16 "4096-bit MODP Group" */
+DH *
+dh_new_group16(void)
+{
+ static char *gen = "2", *group16 =
+ "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1"
+ "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD"
+ "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245"
+ "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED"
+ "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D"
+ "C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F"
+ "83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D"
+ "670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B"
+ "E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9"
+ "DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510"
+ "15728E5A" "8AAAC42D" "AD33170D" "04507A33" "A85521AB" "DF1CBA64"
+ "ECFB8504" "58DBEF0A" "8AEA7157" "5D060C7D" "B3970F85" "A6E1E4C7"
+ "ABF5AE8C" "DB0933D7" "1E8C94E0" "4A25619D" "CEE3D226" "1AD2EE6B"
+ "F12FFA06" "D98A0864" "D8760273" "3EC86A64" "521F2B18" "177B200C"
+ "BBE11757" "7A615D6C" "770988C0" "BAD946E2" "08E24FA0" "74E5AB31"
+ "43DB5BFC" "E0FD108E" "4B82D120" "A9210801" "1A723C12" "A787E6D7"
+ "88719A10" "BDBA5B26" "99C32718" "6AF4E23C" "1A946834" "B6150BDA"
+ "2583E9CA" "2AD44CE8" "DBBBC2DB" "04DE8EF9" "2E8EFC14" "1FBECAA6"
+ "287C5947" "4E6BC05D" "99B2964F" "A090C3A2" "233BA186" "515BE7ED"
+ "1F612970" "CEE2D7AF" "B81BDD76" "2170481C" "D0069127" "D5B05AA9"
+ "93B4EA98" "8D8FDDC1" "86FFB7DC" "90A6C08F" "4DF435C9" "34063199"
+ "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF";
+
+ return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group16));
+}
+
+/* rfc3526 group 18 "8192-bit MODP Group" */
+DH *
+dh_new_group18(void)
+{
+ static char *gen = "2", *group16 =
+ "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1"
+ "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD"
+ "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245"
+ "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED"
+ "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D"
+ "C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F"
+ "83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D"
+ "670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B"
+ "E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9"
+ "DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510"
+ "15728E5A" "8AAAC42D" "AD33170D" "04507A33" "A85521AB" "DF1CBA64"
+ "ECFB8504" "58DBEF0A" "8AEA7157" "5D060C7D" "B3970F85" "A6E1E4C7"
+ "ABF5AE8C" "DB0933D7" "1E8C94E0" "4A25619D" "CEE3D226" "1AD2EE6B"
+ "F12FFA06" "D98A0864" "D8760273" "3EC86A64" "521F2B18" "177B200C"
+ "BBE11757" "7A615D6C" "770988C0" "BAD946E2" "08E24FA0" "74E5AB31"
+ "43DB5BFC" "E0FD108E" "4B82D120" "A9210801" "1A723C12" "A787E6D7"
+ "88719A10" "BDBA5B26" "99C32718" "6AF4E23C" "1A946834" "B6150BDA"
+ "2583E9CA" "2AD44CE8" "DBBBC2DB" "04DE8EF9" "2E8EFC14" "1FBECAA6"
+ "287C5947" "4E6BC05D" "99B2964F" "A090C3A2" "233BA186" "515BE7ED"
+ "1F612970" "CEE2D7AF" "B81BDD76" "2170481C" "D0069127" "D5B05AA9"
+ "93B4EA98" "8D8FDDC1" "86FFB7DC" "90A6C08F" "4DF435C9" "34028492"
+ "36C3FAB4" "D27C7026" "C1D4DCB2" "602646DE" "C9751E76" "3DBA37BD"
+ "F8FF9406" "AD9E530E" "E5DB382F" "413001AE" "B06A53ED" "9027D831"
+ "179727B0" "865A8918" "DA3EDBEB" "CF9B14ED" "44CE6CBA" "CED4BB1B"
+ "DB7F1447" "E6CC254B" "33205151" "2BD7AF42" "6FB8F401" "378CD2BF"
+ "5983CA01" "C64B92EC" "F032EA15" "D1721D03" "F482D7CE" "6E74FEF6"
+ "D55E702F" "46980C82" "B5A84031" "900B1C9E" "59E7C97F" "BEC7E8F3"
+ "23A97A7E" "36CC88BE" "0F1D45B7" "FF585AC5" "4BD407B2" "2B4154AA"
+ "CC8F6D7E" "BF48E1D8" "14CC5ED2" "0F8037E0" "A79715EE" "F29BE328"
+ "06A1D58B" "B7C5DA76" "F550AA3D" "8A1FBFF0" "EB19CCB1" "A313D55C"
+ "DA56C9EC" "2EF29632" "387FE8D7" "6E3C0468" "043E8F66" "3F4860EE"
+ "12BF2D5B" "0B7474D6" "E694F91E" "6DBE1159" "74A3926F" "12FEE5E4"
+ "38777CB6" "A932DF8C" "D8BEC4D0" "73B931BA" "3BC832B6" "8D9DD300"
+ "741FA7BF" "8AFC47ED" "2576F693" "6BA42466" "3AAB639C" "5AE4F568"
+ "3423B474" "2BF1C978" "238F16CB" "E39D652D" "E3FDB8BE" "FC848AD9"
+ "22222E04" "A4037C07" "13EB57A8" "1A23F0C7" "3473FC64" "6CEA306B"
+ "4BCBC886" "2F8385DD" "FA9D4B7F" "A2C087E8" "79683303" "ED5BDD3A"
+ "062B3CF5" "B3A278A6" "6D2A13F8" "3F44F82D" "DF310EE0" "74AB6A36"
+ "4597E899" "A0255DC1" "64F31CC5" "0846851D" "F9AB4819" "5DED7EA1"
+ "B1D510BD" "7EE74D73" "FAF36BC3" "1ECFA268" "359046F4" "EB879F92"
+ "4009438B" "481C6CD7" "889A002E" "D5EE382B" "C9190DA6" "FC026E47"
+ "9558E447" "5677E9AA" "9E3050E2" "765694DF" "C81F56E8" "80B96E71"
+ "60C980DD" "98EDD3DF" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF";
+
+ return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group16));
+}
+
+/* Select fallback group used by DH-GEX if moduli file cannot be read. */
+DH *
+dh_new_group_fallback(int max)
+{
+ debug3("%s: requested max size %d", __func__, max);
+ if (max < 3072) {
+ debug3("using 2k bit group 14");
+ return dh_new_group14();
+ } else if (max < 6144) {
+ debug3("using 4k bit group 16");
+ return dh_new_group16();
+ }
+ debug3("using 8k bit group 18");
+ return dh_new_group18();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Estimates the group order for a Diffie-Hellman group that has an
+ * attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits).
+ * Values from NIST Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key
+ * Management Part 1 (rev 3) limited by the recommended maximum value
+ * from RFC4419 section 3.
+ */
+u_int
+dh_estimate(int bits)
+{
+ if (bits <= 112)
+ return 2048;
+ if (bits <= 128)
+ return 3072;
+ if (bits <= 192)
+ return 7680;
+ return 8192;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dh.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/dh.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dh.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.11 2013/10/08 11:42:13 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-#ifndef DH_H
-#define DH_H
-
-struct dhgroup {
- int size;
- BIGNUM *g;
- BIGNUM *p;
-};
-
-DH *choose_dh(int, int, int);
-DH *dh_new_group_asc(const char *, const char *);
-DH *dh_new_group(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *);
-DH *dh_new_group1(void);
-DH *dh_new_group14(void);
-
-void dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
-int dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *);
-
-int dh_estimate(int);
-
-/* Min and max values from RFC4419. */
-#define DH_GRP_MIN 1024
-#define DH_GRP_MAX 8192
-
-/*
- * Values for "type" field of moduli(5)
- * Specifies the internal structure of the prime modulus.
- */
-#define MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN (0)
-#define MODULI_TYPE_UNSTRUCTURED (1)
-#define MODULI_TYPE_SAFE (2)
-#define MODULI_TYPE_SCHNORR (3)
-#define MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN (4)
-#define MODULI_TYPE_STRONG (5)
-
-/*
- * Values for "tests" field of moduli(5)
- * Specifies the methods used in checking for primality.
- * Usually, more than one test is used.
- */
-#define MODULI_TESTS_UNTESTED (0x00)
-#define MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE (0x01)
-#define MODULI_TESTS_SIEVE (0x02)
-#define MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN (0x04)
-#define MODULI_TESTS_JACOBI (0x08)
-#define MODULI_TESTS_ELLIPTIC (0x10)
-
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dh.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/dh.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dh.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dh.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.15 2016/05/02 10:26:04 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef DH_H
+#define DH_H
+
+struct dhgroup {
+ int size;
+ BIGNUM *g;
+ BIGNUM *p;
+};
+
+DH *choose_dh(int, int, int);
+DH *dh_new_group_asc(const char *, const char *);
+DH *dh_new_group(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *);
+DH *dh_new_group1(void);
+DH *dh_new_group14(void);
+DH *dh_new_group16(void);
+DH *dh_new_group18(void);
+DH *dh_new_group_fallback(int);
+
+int dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
+int dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *);
+
+u_int dh_estimate(int);
+
+/*
+ * Max value from RFC4419.
+ * Miniumum increased in light of DH precomputation attacks.
+ */
+#define DH_GRP_MIN 2048
+#define DH_GRP_MAX 8192
+
+/*
+ * Values for "type" field of moduli(5)
+ * Specifies the internal structure of the prime modulus.
+ */
+#define MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN (0)
+#define MODULI_TYPE_UNSTRUCTURED (1)
+#define MODULI_TYPE_SAFE (2)
+#define MODULI_TYPE_SCHNORR (3)
+#define MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN (4)
+#define MODULI_TYPE_STRONG (5)
+
+/*
+ * Values for "tests" field of moduli(5)
+ * Specifies the methods used in checking for primality.
+ * Usually, more than one test is used.
+ */
+#define MODULI_TESTS_UNTESTED (0x00)
+#define MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE (0x01)
+#define MODULI_TESTS_SIEVE (0x02)
+#define MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN (0x04)
+#define MODULI_TESTS_JACOBI (0x08)
+#define MODULI_TESTS_ELLIPTIC (0x10)
+
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/digest-libc.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/digest-libc.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/digest-libc.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,238 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.2 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
- * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <md5.h>
-#include <rmd160.h>
-#include <sha1.h>
-#include <sha2.h>
-
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-
-typedef void md_init_fn(void *mdctx);
-typedef void md_update_fn(void *mdctx, const u_int8_t *m, size_t mlen);
-typedef void md_final_fn(u_int8_t[], void *mdctx);
-
-struct ssh_digest_ctx {
- int alg;
- void *mdctx;
-};
-
-struct ssh_digest {
- int id;
- const char *name;
- size_t block_len;
- size_t digest_len;
- size_t ctx_len;
- md_init_fn *md_init;
- md_update_fn *md_update;
- md_final_fn *md_final;
-};
-
-/* NB. Indexed directly by algorithm number */
-const struct ssh_digest digests[SSH_DIGEST_MAX] = {
- {
- SSH_DIGEST_MD5,
- "MD5",
- MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH,
- MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- sizeof(MD5_CTX),
- (md_init_fn *) MD5Init,
- (md_update_fn *) MD5Update,
- (md_final_fn *) MD5Final
- },
- {
- SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160,
- "RIPEMD160",
- RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH,
- RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- sizeof(RMD160_CTX),
- (md_init_fn *) RMD160Init,
- (md_update_fn *) RMD160Update,
- (md_final_fn *) RMD160Final
- },
- {
- SSH_DIGEST_SHA1,
- "SHA1",
- SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH,
- SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- sizeof(SHA1_CTX),
- (md_init_fn *) SHA1Init,
- (md_update_fn *) SHA1Update,
- (md_final_fn *) SHA1Final
- },
- {
- SSH_DIGEST_SHA256,
- "SHA256",
- SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH,
- SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- sizeof(SHA2_CTX),
- (md_init_fn *) SHA256Init,
- (md_update_fn *) SHA256Update,
- (md_final_fn *) SHA256Final
- },
- {
- SSH_DIGEST_SHA384,
- "SHA384",
- SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH,
- SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- sizeof(SHA2_CTX),
- (md_init_fn *) SHA384Init,
- (md_update_fn *) SHA384Update,
- (md_final_fn *) SHA384Final
- },
- {
- SSH_DIGEST_SHA512,
- "SHA512",
- SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH,
- SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- sizeof(SHA2_CTX),
- (md_init_fn *) SHA512Init,
- (md_update_fn *) SHA512Update,
- (md_final_fn *) SHA512Final
- }
-};
-
-static const struct ssh_digest *
-ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
-{
- if (alg < 0 || alg >= SSH_DIGEST_MAX)
- return NULL;
- if (digests[alg].id != alg) /* sanity */
- return NULL;
- return &(digests[alg]);
-}
-
-size_t
-ssh_digest_bytes(int alg)
-{
- const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
-
- return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->digest_len;
-}
-
-size_t
-ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
-{
- const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
-
- return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->block_len;
-}
-
-struct ssh_digest_ctx *
-ssh_digest_start(int alg)
-{
- const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
- struct ssh_digest_ctx *ret;
-
- if (digest == NULL || (ret = calloc(1, sizeof(ret))) == NULL)
- return NULL;
- if ((ret->mdctx = calloc(1, digest->ctx_len)) == NULL) {
- free(ret);
- return NULL;
- }
- ret->alg = alg;
- digest->md_init(ret->mdctx);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int
-ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to)
-{
- const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(from->alg);
-
- if (digest == NULL || from->alg != to->alg)
- return -1;
- memcpy(to->mdctx, from->mdctx, digest->ctx_len);
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
-{
- const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
-
- if (digest == NULL)
- return -1;
- digest->md_update(ctx->mdctx, m, mlen);
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const Buffer *b)
-{
- return ssh_digest_update(ctx, buffer_ptr(b), buffer_len(b));
-}
-
-int
-ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
-{
- const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
-
- if (digest == NULL)
- return -1;
- if (dlen > UINT_MAX)
- return -1;
- if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */
- return -1;
- digest->md_final(d, ctx->mdctx);
- return 0;
-}
-
-void
-ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
-{
- const struct ssh_digest *digest;
-
- if (ctx != NULL) {
- digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
- if (digest) {
- explicit_bzero(ctx->mdctx, digest->ctx_len);
- free(ctx->mdctx);
- explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
- free(ctx);
- }
- }
-}
-
-int
-ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
-{
- struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx = ssh_digest_start(alg);
-
- if (ctx == NULL)
- return -1;
- if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, m, mlen) != 0 ||
- ssh_digest_final(ctx, d, dlen) != 0)
- return -1;
- ssh_digest_free(ctx);
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const Buffer *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
-{
- return ssh_digest_memory(alg, buffer_ptr(b), buffer_len(b), d, dlen);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/digest-libc.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/digest-libc.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/digest-libc.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/digest-libc.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.5 2015/05/05 02:48:17 jsg Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if 0
+#include <md5.h>
+#include <rmd160.h>
+#include <sha1.h>
+#include <sha2.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+typedef void md_init_fn(void *mdctx);
+typedef void md_update_fn(void *mdctx, const u_int8_t *m, size_t mlen);
+typedef void md_final_fn(u_int8_t[], void *mdctx);
+
+struct ssh_digest_ctx {
+ int alg;
+ void *mdctx;
+};
+
+struct ssh_digest {
+ int id;
+ const char *name;
+ size_t block_len;
+ size_t digest_len;
+ size_t ctx_len;
+ md_init_fn *md_init;
+ md_update_fn *md_update;
+ md_final_fn *md_final;
+};
+
+/* NB. Indexed directly by algorithm number */
+const struct ssh_digest digests[SSH_DIGEST_MAX] = {
+ {
+ SSH_DIGEST_MD5,
+ "MD5",
+ MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ sizeof(MD5_CTX),
+ (md_init_fn *) MD5Init,
+ (md_update_fn *) MD5Update,
+ (md_final_fn *) MD5Final
+ },
+ {
+ SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160,
+ "RIPEMD160",
+ RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH,
+ RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ sizeof(RMD160_CTX),
+ (md_init_fn *) RMD160Init,
+ (md_update_fn *) RMD160Update,
+ (md_final_fn *) RMD160Final
+ },
+ {
+ SSH_DIGEST_SHA1,
+ "SHA1",
+ SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH,
+ SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ sizeof(SHA1_CTX),
+ (md_init_fn *) SHA1Init,
+ (md_update_fn *) SHA1Update,
+ (md_final_fn *) SHA1Final
+ },
+ {
+ SSH_DIGEST_SHA256,
+ "SHA256",
+ SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH,
+ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ sizeof(SHA256_CTX),
+ (md_init_fn *) SHA256_Init,
+ (md_update_fn *) SHA256_Update,
+ (md_final_fn *) SHA256_Final
+ },
+ {
+ SSH_DIGEST_SHA384,
+ "SHA384",
+ SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH,
+ SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ sizeof(SHA384_CTX),
+ (md_init_fn *) SHA384_Init,
+ (md_update_fn *) SHA384_Update,
+ (md_final_fn *) SHA384_Final
+ },
+ {
+ SSH_DIGEST_SHA512,
+ "SHA512",
+ SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH,
+ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ sizeof(SHA512_CTX),
+ (md_init_fn *) SHA512_Init,
+ (md_update_fn *) SHA512_Update,
+ (md_final_fn *) SHA512_Final
+ }
+};
+
+static const struct ssh_digest *
+ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
+{
+ if (alg < 0 || alg >= SSH_DIGEST_MAX)
+ return NULL;
+ if (digests[alg].id != alg) /* sanity */
+ return NULL;
+ return &(digests[alg]);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+{
+ int alg;
+
+ for (alg = 0; alg < SSH_DIGEST_MAX; alg++) {
+ if (strcasecmp(name, digests[alg].name) == 0)
+ return digests[alg].id;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+const char *
+ssh_digest_alg_name(int alg)
+{
+ const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
+
+ return digest == NULL ? NULL : digest->name;
+}
+
+size_t
+ssh_digest_bytes(int alg)
+{
+ const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
+
+ return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->digest_len;
+}
+
+size_t
+ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
+
+ return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->block_len;
+}
+
+struct ssh_digest_ctx *
+ssh_digest_start(int alg)
+{
+ const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx *ret;
+
+ if (digest == NULL || (ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if ((ret->mdctx = calloc(1, digest->ctx_len)) == NULL) {
+ free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret->alg = alg;
+ digest->md_init(ret->mdctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to)
+{
+ const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(from->alg);
+
+ if (digest == NULL || from->alg != to->alg)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ memcpy(to->mdctx, from->mdctx, digest->ctx_len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
+{
+ const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
+
+ if (digest == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ digest->md_update(ctx->mdctx, m, mlen);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+ return ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b));
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+ const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
+
+ if (digest == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (dlen > UINT_MAX)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ digest->md_final(d, ctx->mdctx);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ const struct ssh_digest *digest;
+
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
+ if (digest) {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx->mdctx, digest->ctx_len);
+ free(ctx->mdctx);
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+ free(ctx);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx = ssh_digest_start(alg);
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, m, mlen) != 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_final(ctx, d, dlen) != 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ ssh_digest_free(ctx);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+ return ssh_digest_memory(alg, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), d, dlen);
+}
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/digest-openssl.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/digest-openssl.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/digest-openssl.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.2 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-
-struct ssh_digest_ctx {
- int alg;
- EVP_MD_CTX mdctx;
-};
-
-struct ssh_digest {
- int id;
- const char *name;
- size_t digest_len;
- const EVP_MD *(*mdfunc)(void);
-};
-
-/* NB. Indexed directly by algorithm number */
-const struct ssh_digest digests[] = {
- { SSH_DIGEST_MD5, "MD5", 16, EVP_md5 },
- { SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, "RIPEMD160", 20, EVP_ripemd160 },
- { SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, "SHA1", 20, EVP_sha1 },
-#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 /* XXX replace with local if missing */
- { SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, "SHA256", 32, EVP_sha256 },
- { SSH_DIGEST_SHA384, "SHA384", 48, EVP_sha384 },
- { SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, "SHA512", 64, EVP_sha512 },
-#endif
- { -1, NULL, 0, NULL },
-};
-
-static const struct ssh_digest *
-ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
-{
- if (alg < 0 || alg >= SSH_DIGEST_MAX)
- return NULL;
- if (digests[alg].id != alg) /* sanity */
- return NULL;
- return &(digests[alg]);
-}
-
-size_t
-ssh_digest_bytes(int alg)
-{
- const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
-
- return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->digest_len;
-}
-
-size_t
-ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
-{
- return EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(&ctx->mdctx);
-}
-
-struct ssh_digest_ctx *
-ssh_digest_start(int alg)
-{
- const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
- struct ssh_digest_ctx *ret;
-
- if (digest == NULL || ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL))
- return NULL;
- ret->alg = alg;
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ret->mdctx);
- if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ret->mdctx, digest->mdfunc(), NULL) != 1) {
- free(ret);
- return NULL;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-int
-ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to)
-{
- /* we have bcopy-style order while openssl has memcpy-style */
- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&to->mdctx, &from->mdctx))
- return -1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
-{
- if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->mdctx, m, mlen) != 1)
- return -1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const Buffer *b)
-{
- return ssh_digest_update(ctx, buffer_ptr(b), buffer_len(b));
-}
-
-int
-ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
-{
- const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
- u_int l = dlen;
-
- if (dlen > UINT_MAX)
- return -1;
- if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */
- return -1;
- if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->mdctx, d, &l) != 1)
- return -1;
- if (l != digest->digest_len) /* sanity */
- return -1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-void
-ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
-{
- if (ctx != NULL) {
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->mdctx);
- explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
- free(ctx);
- }
-}
-
-int
-ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
-{
- struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx = ssh_digest_start(alg);
-
- if (ctx == NULL)
- return -1;
- if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, m, mlen) != 0 ||
- ssh_digest_final(ctx, d, dlen) != 0)
- return -1;
- ssh_digest_free(ctx);
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const Buffer *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
-{
- return ssh_digest_memory(alg, buffer_ptr(b), buffer_len(b), d, dlen);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/digest-openssl.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/digest-openssl.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/digest-openssl.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/digest-openssl.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.5 2014/12/21 22:27:56 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160
+# define EVP_ripemd160 NULL
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160 */
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
+# define EVP_sha256 NULL
+# define EVP_sha384 NULL
+# define EVP_sha512 NULL
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */
+
+struct ssh_digest_ctx {
+ int alg;
+ EVP_MD_CTX mdctx;
+};
+
+struct ssh_digest {
+ int id;
+ const char *name;
+ size_t digest_len;
+ const EVP_MD *(*mdfunc)(void);
+};
+
+/* NB. Indexed directly by algorithm number */
+const struct ssh_digest digests[] = {
+ { SSH_DIGEST_MD5, "MD5", 16, EVP_md5 },
+ { SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, "RIPEMD160", 20, EVP_ripemd160 },
+ { SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, "SHA1", 20, EVP_sha1 },
+ { SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, "SHA256", 32, EVP_sha256 },
+ { SSH_DIGEST_SHA384, "SHA384", 48, EVP_sha384 },
+ { SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, "SHA512", 64, EVP_sha512 },
+ { -1, NULL, 0, NULL },
+};
+
+static const struct ssh_digest *
+ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
+{
+ if (alg < 0 || alg >= SSH_DIGEST_MAX)
+ return NULL;
+ if (digests[alg].id != alg) /* sanity */
+ return NULL;
+ if (digests[alg].mdfunc == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return &(digests[alg]);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+{
+ int alg;
+
+ for (alg = 0; digests[alg].id != -1; alg++) {
+ if (strcasecmp(name, digests[alg].name) == 0)
+ return digests[alg].id;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+const char *
+ssh_digest_alg_name(int alg)
+{
+ const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
+
+ return digest == NULL ? NULL : digest->name;
+}
+
+size_t
+ssh_digest_bytes(int alg)
+{
+ const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
+
+ return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->digest_len;
+}
+
+size_t
+ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ return EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(&ctx->mdctx);
+}
+
+struct ssh_digest_ctx *
+ssh_digest_start(int alg)
+{
+ const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx *ret;
+
+ if (digest == NULL || ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL))
+ return NULL;
+ ret->alg = alg;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ret->mdctx);
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ret->mdctx, digest->mdfunc(), NULL) != 1) {
+ free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to)
+{
+ if (from->alg != to->alg)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ /* we have bcopy-style order while openssl has memcpy-style */
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&to->mdctx, &from->mdctx))
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
+{
+ if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->mdctx, m, mlen) != 1)
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+ return ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b));
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+ const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
+ u_int l = dlen;
+
+ if (dlen > UINT_MAX)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->mdctx, d, &l) != 1)
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ if (l != digest->digest_len) /* sanity */
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->mdctx);
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+ free(ctx);
+ }
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+ const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
+ u_int mdlen;
+
+ if (digest == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (dlen > UINT_MAX)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (dlen < digest->digest_len)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ mdlen = dlen;
+ if (!EVP_Digest(m, mlen, d, &mdlen, digest->mdfunc(), NULL))
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+ return ssh_digest_memory(alg, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), d, dlen);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/digest.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/digest.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/digest.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: digest.h,v 1.2 2014/01/27 18:58:14 markus Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#ifndef _DIGEST_H
-#define _DIGEST_H
-
-/* Maximum digest output length */
-#define SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH 64
-
-/* Digest algorithms */
-#define SSH_DIGEST_MD5 0
-#define SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160 1
-#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 2
-#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 3
-#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 4
-#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 5
-#define SSH_DIGEST_MAX 6
-
-struct ssh_digest_ctx;
-
-/* Returns the algorithm's digest length in bytes or 0 for invalid algorithm */
-size_t ssh_digest_bytes(int alg);
-
-/* Returns the block size of the digest, e.g. for implementing HMAC */
-size_t ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx);
-
-/* Copies internal state of digest of 'from' to 'to' */
-int ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from,
- struct ssh_digest_ctx *to);
-
-/* One-shot API */
-int ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen,
- u_char *d, size_t dlen)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)))
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 4, 5)));
-int ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const Buffer *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 3, 4)));
-
-/* Update API */
-struct ssh_digest_ctx *ssh_digest_start(int alg);
-int ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
-int ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const Buffer *b);
-int ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
-void ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx);
-
-#endif /* _DIGEST_H */
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/digest.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/digest.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/digest.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/digest.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: digest.h,v 1.7 2014/12/21 22:27:56 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _DIGEST_H
+#define _DIGEST_H
+
+/* Maximum digest output length */
+#define SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH 64
+
+/* Digest algorithms */
+#define SSH_DIGEST_MD5 0
+#define SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160 1
+#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 2
+#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 3
+#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 4
+#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 5
+#define SSH_DIGEST_MAX 6
+
+struct sshbuf;
+struct ssh_digest_ctx;
+
+/* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */
+int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name);
+
+/* Returns the algorithm name for a digest identifier */
+const char *ssh_digest_alg_name(int alg);
+
+/* Returns the algorithm's digest length in bytes or 0 for invalid algorithm */
+size_t ssh_digest_bytes(int alg);
+
+/* Returns the block size of the digest, e.g. for implementing HMAC */
+size_t ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx);
+
+/* Copies internal state of digest of 'from' to 'to' */
+int ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from,
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx *to);
+
+/* One-shot API */
+int ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen,
+ u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)))
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 4, 5)));
+int ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 3, 4)));
+
+/* Update API */
+struct ssh_digest_ctx *ssh_digest_start(int alg);
+int ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
+int ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx,
+ const struct sshbuf *b);
+int ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
+void ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx);
+
+#endif /* _DIGEST_H */
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dispatch.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/dispatch.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dispatch.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.22 2008/10/31 15:05:34 stevesk Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-
-#define DISPATCH_MAX 255
-
-dispatch_fn *dispatch[DISPATCH_MAX];
-
-void
-dispatch_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- logit("dispatch_protocol_error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
- if (!compat20)
- fatal("protocol error");
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
- packet_put_int(seq);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-}
-void
-dispatch_protocol_ignore(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- logit("dispatch_protocol_ignore: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
-}
-void
-dispatch_init(dispatch_fn *dflt)
-{
- u_int i;
- for (i = 0; i < DISPATCH_MAX; i++)
- dispatch[i] = dflt;
-}
-void
-dispatch_range(u_int from, u_int to, dispatch_fn *fn)
-{
- u_int i;
-
- for (i = from; i <= to; i++) {
- if (i >= DISPATCH_MAX)
- break;
- dispatch[i] = fn;
- }
-}
-void
-dispatch_set(int type, dispatch_fn *fn)
-{
- dispatch[type] = fn;
-}
-void
-dispatch_run(int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done, void *ctxt)
-{
- for (;;) {
- int type;
- u_int32_t seqnr;
-
- if (mode == DISPATCH_BLOCK) {
- type = packet_read_seqnr(&seqnr);
- } else {
- type = packet_read_poll_seqnr(&seqnr);
- if (type == SSH_MSG_NONE)
- return;
- }
- if (type > 0 && type < DISPATCH_MAX && dispatch[type] != NULL)
- (*dispatch[type])(type, seqnr, ctxt);
- else
- packet_disconnect("protocol error: rcvd type %d", type);
- if (done != NULL && *done)
- return;
- }
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dispatch.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/dispatch.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dispatch.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dispatch.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.27 2015/05/01 07:10:01 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+int
+dispatch_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctx)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ int r;
+
+ logit("dispatch_protocol_error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
+ if (!compat20)
+ fatal("protocol error");
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+dispatch_protocol_ignore(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ssh)
+{
+ logit("dispatch_protocol_ignore: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_dispatch_init(struct ssh *ssh, dispatch_fn *dflt)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < DISPATCH_MAX; i++)
+ ssh->dispatch[i] = dflt;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_dispatch_range(struct ssh *ssh, u_int from, u_int to, dispatch_fn *fn)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = from; i <= to; i++) {
+ if (i >= DISPATCH_MAX)
+ break;
+ ssh->dispatch[i] = fn;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+ssh_dispatch_set(struct ssh *ssh, int type, dispatch_fn *fn)
+{
+ ssh->dispatch[type] = fn;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_dispatch_run(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done,
+ void *ctxt)
+{
+ int r;
+ u_char type;
+ u_int32_t seqnr;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if (mode == DISPATCH_BLOCK) {
+ r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, &seqnr);
+ if (r != 0)
+ return r;
+ } else {
+ r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, &type, &seqnr);
+ if (r != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (type == SSH_MSG_NONE)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (type > 0 && type < DISPATCH_MAX &&
+ ssh->dispatch[type] != NULL) {
+ if (ssh->dispatch_skip_packets) {
+ debug2("skipped packet (type %u)", type);
+ ssh->dispatch_skip_packets--;
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* XXX 'ssh' will replace 'ctxt' later */
+ r = (*ssh->dispatch[type])(type, seqnr, ctxt);
+ if (r != 0)
+ return r;
+ } else {
+ r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
+ "protocol error: rcvd type %d", type);
+ if (r != 0)
+ return r;
+ return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
+ }
+ if (done != NULL && *done)
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done,
+ void *ctxt)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = ssh_dispatch_run(ssh, mode, done, ctxt)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dispatch.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/dispatch.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dispatch.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.h,v 1.11 2006/04/20 09:27:09 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include <signal.h>
-
-enum {
- DISPATCH_BLOCK,
- DISPATCH_NONBLOCK
-};
-
-typedef void dispatch_fn(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-
-void dispatch_init(dispatch_fn *);
-void dispatch_set(int, dispatch_fn *);
-void dispatch_range(u_int, u_int, dispatch_fn *);
-void dispatch_run(int, volatile sig_atomic_t *, void *);
-void dispatch_protocol_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void dispatch_protocol_ignore(int, u_int32_t, void *);
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dispatch.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/dispatch.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dispatch.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dispatch.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.h,v 1.12 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef DISPATCH_H
+#define DISPATCH_H
+
+#define DISPATCH_MAX 255
+
+enum {
+ DISPATCH_BLOCK,
+ DISPATCH_NONBLOCK
+};
+
+struct ssh;
+
+typedef int dispatch_fn(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+int dispatch_protocol_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int dispatch_protocol_ignore(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void ssh_dispatch_init(struct ssh *, dispatch_fn *);
+void ssh_dispatch_set(struct ssh *, int, dispatch_fn *);
+void ssh_dispatch_range(struct ssh *, u_int, u_int, dispatch_fn *);
+int ssh_dispatch_run(struct ssh *, int, volatile sig_atomic_t *, void *);
+void ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(struct ssh *, int, volatile sig_atomic_t *, void *);
+
+#define dispatch_init(dflt) \
+ ssh_dispatch_init(active_state, (dflt))
+#define dispatch_range(from, to, fn) \
+ ssh_dispatch_range(active_state, (from), (to), (fn))
+#define dispatch_set(type, fn) \
+ ssh_dispatch_set(active_state, (type), (fn))
+#define dispatch_run(mode, done, ctxt) \
+ ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(active_state, (mode), (done), (ctxt))
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dns.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/dns.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dns.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,341 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.29 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2003 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-#include <netdb.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "dns.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-static const char *errset_text[] = {
- "success", /* 0 ERRSET_SUCCESS */
- "out of memory", /* 1 ERRSET_NOMEMORY */
- "general failure", /* 2 ERRSET_FAIL */
- "invalid parameter", /* 3 ERRSET_INVAL */
- "name does not exist", /* 4 ERRSET_NONAME */
- "data does not exist", /* 5 ERRSET_NODATA */
-};
-
-static const char *
-dns_result_totext(unsigned int res)
-{
- switch (res) {
- case ERRSET_SUCCESS:
- return errset_text[ERRSET_SUCCESS];
- case ERRSET_NOMEMORY:
- return errset_text[ERRSET_NOMEMORY];
- case ERRSET_FAIL:
- return errset_text[ERRSET_FAIL];
- case ERRSET_INVAL:
- return errset_text[ERRSET_INVAL];
- case ERRSET_NONAME:
- return errset_text[ERRSET_NONAME];
- case ERRSET_NODATA:
- return errset_text[ERRSET_NODATA];
- default:
- return "unknown error";
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Read SSHFP parameters from key buffer.
- */
-static int
-dns_read_key(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type,
- u_char **digest, u_int *digest_len, Key *key)
-{
- int success = 0;
- enum fp_type fp_type = 0;
-
- switch (key->type) {
- case KEY_RSA:
- *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RSA;
- if (!*digest_type)
- *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1;
- break;
- case KEY_DSA:
- *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_DSA;
- if (!*digest_type)
- *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1;
- break;
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA;
- if (!*digest_type)
- *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA256;
- break;
- default:
- *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED; /* 0 */
- *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; /* 0 */
- }
-
- switch (*digest_type) {
- case SSHFP_HASH_SHA1:
- fp_type = SSH_FP_SHA1;
- break;
- case SSHFP_HASH_SHA256:
- fp_type = SSH_FP_SHA256;
- break;
- default:
- *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; /* 0 */
- }
-
- if (*algorithm && *digest_type) {
- *digest = key_fingerprint_raw(key, fp_type, digest_len);
- if (*digest == NULL)
- fatal("dns_read_key: null from key_fingerprint_raw()");
- success = 1;
- } else {
- *digest = NULL;
- *digest_len = 0;
- success = 0;
- }
-
- return success;
-}
-
-/*
- * Read SSHFP parameters from rdata buffer.
- */
-static int
-dns_read_rdata(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type,
- u_char **digest, u_int *digest_len, u_char *rdata, int rdata_len)
-{
- int success = 0;
-
- *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED;
- *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED;
-
- if (rdata_len >= 2) {
- *algorithm = rdata[0];
- *digest_type = rdata[1];
- *digest_len = rdata_len - 2;
-
- if (*digest_len > 0) {
- *digest = (u_char *) xmalloc(*digest_len);
- memcpy(*digest, rdata + 2, *digest_len);
- } else {
- *digest = (u_char *)xstrdup("");
- }
-
- success = 1;
- }
-
- return success;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check if hostname is numerical.
- * Returns -1 if hostname is numeric, 0 otherwise
- */
-static int
-is_numeric_hostname(const char *hostname)
-{
- struct addrinfo hints, *ai;
-
- /*
- * We shouldn't ever get a null host but if we do then log an error
- * and return -1 which stops DNS key fingerprint processing.
- */
- if (hostname == NULL) {
- error("is_numeric_hostname called with NULL hostname");
- return -1;
- }
-
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;
- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
-
- if (getaddrinfo(hostname, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
- freeaddrinfo(ai);
- return -1;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Verify the given hostname, address and host key using DNS.
- * Returns 0 if lookup succeeds, -1 otherwise
- */
-int
-verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
- Key *hostkey, int *flags)
-{
- u_int counter;
- int result;
- struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL;
-
- u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm;
- u_int8_t hostkey_digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED;
- u_char *hostkey_digest;
- u_int hostkey_digest_len;
-
- u_int8_t dnskey_algorithm;
- u_int8_t dnskey_digest_type;
- u_char *dnskey_digest;
- u_int dnskey_digest_len;
-
- *flags = 0;
-
- debug3("verify_host_key_dns");
- if (hostkey == NULL)
- fatal("No key to look up!");
-
- if (is_numeric_hostname(hostname)) {
- debug("skipped DNS lookup for numerical hostname");
- return -1;
- }
-
- result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN,
- DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints);
- if (result) {
- verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result));
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (fingerprints->rri_flags & RRSET_VALIDATED) {
- *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_SECURE;
- debug("found %d secure fingerprints in DNS",
- fingerprints->rri_nrdatas);
- } else {
- debug("found %d insecure fingerprints in DNS",
- fingerprints->rri_nrdatas);
- }
-
- /* Initialize default host key parameters */
- if (!dns_read_key(&hostkey_algorithm, &hostkey_digest_type,
- &hostkey_digest, &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) {
- error("Error calculating host key fingerprint.");
- freerrset(fingerprints);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (fingerprints->rri_nrdatas)
- *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_FOUND;
-
- for (counter = 0; counter < fingerprints->rri_nrdatas; counter++) {
- /*
- * Extract the key from the answer. Ignore any badly
- * formatted fingerprints.
- */
- if (!dns_read_rdata(&dnskey_algorithm, &dnskey_digest_type,
- &dnskey_digest, &dnskey_digest_len,
- fingerprints->rri_rdatas[counter].rdi_data,
- fingerprints->rri_rdatas[counter].rdi_length)) {
- verbose("Error parsing fingerprint from DNS.");
- continue;
- }
-
- if (hostkey_digest_type != dnskey_digest_type) {
- hostkey_digest_type = dnskey_digest_type;
- free(hostkey_digest);
-
- /* Initialize host key parameters */
- if (!dns_read_key(&hostkey_algorithm,
- &hostkey_digest_type, &hostkey_digest,
- &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) {
- error("Error calculating key fingerprint.");
- freerrset(fingerprints);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- /* Check if the current key is the same as the given key */
- if (hostkey_algorithm == dnskey_algorithm &&
- hostkey_digest_type == dnskey_digest_type) {
- if (hostkey_digest_len == dnskey_digest_len &&
- timingsafe_bcmp(hostkey_digest, dnskey_digest,
- hostkey_digest_len) == 0)
- *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_MATCH;
- }
- free(dnskey_digest);
- }
-
- free(hostkey_digest); /* from key_fingerprint_raw() */
- freerrset(fingerprints);
-
- if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND)
- if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH)
- debug("matching host key fingerprint found in DNS");
- else
- debug("mismatching host key fingerprint found in DNS");
- else
- debug("no host key fingerprint found in DNS");
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Export the fingerprint of a key as a DNS resource record
- */
-int
-export_dns_rr(const char *hostname, Key *key, FILE *f, int generic)
-{
- u_int8_t rdata_pubkey_algorithm = 0;
- u_int8_t rdata_digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED;
- u_int8_t dtype;
- u_char *rdata_digest;
- u_int i, rdata_digest_len;
- int success = 0;
-
- for (dtype = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1; dtype < SSHFP_HASH_MAX; dtype++) {
- rdata_digest_type = dtype;
- if (dns_read_key(&rdata_pubkey_algorithm, &rdata_digest_type,
- &rdata_digest, &rdata_digest_len, key)) {
- if (generic) {
- fprintf(f, "%s IN TYPE%d \\# %d %02x %02x ",
- hostname, DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP,
- 2 + rdata_digest_len,
- rdata_pubkey_algorithm, rdata_digest_type);
- } else {
- fprintf(f, "%s IN SSHFP %d %d ", hostname,
- rdata_pubkey_algorithm, rdata_digest_type);
- }
- for (i = 0; i < rdata_digest_len; i++)
- fprintf(f, "%02x", rdata_digest[i]);
- fprintf(f, "\n");
- free(rdata_digest); /* from key_fingerprint_raw() */
- success = 1;
- }
- }
-
- /* No SSHFP record was generated at all */
- if (success == 0) {
- error("%s: unsupported algorithm and/or digest_type", __func__);
- }
-
- return success;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dns.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/dns.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dns.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dns.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.35 2015/08/20 22:32:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "dns.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+static const char *errset_text[] = {
+ "success", /* 0 ERRSET_SUCCESS */
+ "out of memory", /* 1 ERRSET_NOMEMORY */
+ "general failure", /* 2 ERRSET_FAIL */
+ "invalid parameter", /* 3 ERRSET_INVAL */
+ "name does not exist", /* 4 ERRSET_NONAME */
+ "data does not exist", /* 5 ERRSET_NODATA */
+};
+
+static const char *
+dns_result_totext(unsigned int res)
+{
+ switch (res) {
+ case ERRSET_SUCCESS:
+ return errset_text[ERRSET_SUCCESS];
+ case ERRSET_NOMEMORY:
+ return errset_text[ERRSET_NOMEMORY];
+ case ERRSET_FAIL:
+ return errset_text[ERRSET_FAIL];
+ case ERRSET_INVAL:
+ return errset_text[ERRSET_INVAL];
+ case ERRSET_NONAME:
+ return errset_text[ERRSET_NONAME];
+ case ERRSET_NODATA:
+ return errset_text[ERRSET_NODATA];
+ default:
+ return "unknown error";
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read SSHFP parameters from key buffer.
+ */
+static int
+dns_read_key(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type,
+ u_char **digest, size_t *digest_len, struct sshkey *key)
+{
+ int r, success = 0;
+ int fp_alg = -1;
+
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RSA;
+ if (!*digest_type)
+ *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1;
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_DSA;
+ if (!*digest_type)
+ *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA;
+ if (!*digest_type)
+ *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA256;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_ED25519;
+ if (!*digest_type)
+ *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA256;
+ break;
+ default:
+ *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED; /* 0 */
+ *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; /* 0 */
+ }
+
+ switch (*digest_type) {
+ case SSHFP_HASH_SHA1:
+ fp_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
+ break;
+ case SSHFP_HASH_SHA256:
+ fp_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
+ break;
+ default:
+ *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; /* 0 */
+ }
+
+ if (*algorithm && *digest_type) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, fp_alg, digest,
+ digest_len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint_raw: %s", __func__,
+ ssh_err(r));
+ success = 1;
+ } else {
+ *digest = NULL;
+ *digest_len = 0;
+ success = 0;
+ }
+
+ return success;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read SSHFP parameters from rdata buffer.
+ */
+static int
+dns_read_rdata(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type,
+ u_char **digest, size_t *digest_len, u_char *rdata, int rdata_len)
+{
+ int success = 0;
+
+ *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED;
+ *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED;
+
+ if (rdata_len >= 2) {
+ *algorithm = rdata[0];
+ *digest_type = rdata[1];
+ *digest_len = rdata_len - 2;
+
+ if (*digest_len > 0) {
+ *digest = xmalloc(*digest_len);
+ memcpy(*digest, rdata + 2, *digest_len);
+ } else {
+ *digest = (u_char *)xstrdup("");
+ }
+
+ success = 1;
+ }
+
+ return success;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if hostname is numerical.
+ * Returns -1 if hostname is numeric, 0 otherwise
+ */
+static int
+is_numeric_hostname(const char *hostname)
+{
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai;
+
+ /*
+ * We shouldn't ever get a null host but if we do then log an error
+ * and return -1 which stops DNS key fingerprint processing.
+ */
+ if (hostname == NULL) {
+ error("is_numeric_hostname called with NULL hostname");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+
+ if (getaddrinfo(hostname, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+ freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the given hostname, address and host key using DNS.
+ * Returns 0 if lookup succeeds, -1 otherwise
+ */
+int
+verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
+ struct sshkey *hostkey, int *flags)
+{
+ u_int counter;
+ int result;
+ struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL;
+
+ u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm;
+ u_int8_t hostkey_digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED;
+ u_char *hostkey_digest;
+ size_t hostkey_digest_len;
+
+ u_int8_t dnskey_algorithm;
+ u_int8_t dnskey_digest_type;
+ u_char *dnskey_digest;
+ size_t dnskey_digest_len;
+
+ *flags = 0;
+
+ debug3("verify_host_key_dns");
+ if (hostkey == NULL)
+ fatal("No key to look up!");
+
+ if (is_numeric_hostname(hostname)) {
+ debug("skipped DNS lookup for numerical hostname");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN,
+ DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints);
+ if (result) {
+ verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (fingerprints->rri_flags & RRSET_VALIDATED) {
+ *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_SECURE;
+ debug("found %d secure fingerprints in DNS",
+ fingerprints->rri_nrdatas);
+ } else {
+ debug("found %d insecure fingerprints in DNS",
+ fingerprints->rri_nrdatas);
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize default host key parameters */
+ if (!dns_read_key(&hostkey_algorithm, &hostkey_digest_type,
+ &hostkey_digest, &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) {
+ error("Error calculating host key fingerprint.");
+ freerrset(fingerprints);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (fingerprints->rri_nrdatas)
+ *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_FOUND;
+
+ for (counter = 0; counter < fingerprints->rri_nrdatas; counter++) {
+ /*
+ * Extract the key from the answer. Ignore any badly
+ * formatted fingerprints.
+ */
+ if (!dns_read_rdata(&dnskey_algorithm, &dnskey_digest_type,
+ &dnskey_digest, &dnskey_digest_len,
+ fingerprints->rri_rdatas[counter].rdi_data,
+ fingerprints->rri_rdatas[counter].rdi_length)) {
+ verbose("Error parsing fingerprint from DNS.");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (hostkey_digest_type != dnskey_digest_type) {
+ hostkey_digest_type = dnskey_digest_type;
+ free(hostkey_digest);
+
+ /* Initialize host key parameters */
+ if (!dns_read_key(&hostkey_algorithm,
+ &hostkey_digest_type, &hostkey_digest,
+ &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) {
+ error("Error calculating key fingerprint.");
+ freerrset(fingerprints);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the current key is the same as the given key */
+ if (hostkey_algorithm == dnskey_algorithm &&
+ hostkey_digest_type == dnskey_digest_type) {
+ if (hostkey_digest_len == dnskey_digest_len &&
+ timingsafe_bcmp(hostkey_digest, dnskey_digest,
+ hostkey_digest_len) == 0)
+ *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_MATCH;
+ }
+ free(dnskey_digest);
+ }
+
+ free(hostkey_digest); /* from sshkey_fingerprint_raw() */
+ freerrset(fingerprints);
+
+ if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND)
+ if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH)
+ debug("matching host key fingerprint found in DNS");
+ else
+ debug("mismatching host key fingerprint found in DNS");
+ else
+ debug("no host key fingerprint found in DNS");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Export the fingerprint of a key as a DNS resource record
+ */
+int
+export_dns_rr(const char *hostname, struct sshkey *key, FILE *f, int generic)
+{
+ u_int8_t rdata_pubkey_algorithm = 0;
+ u_int8_t rdata_digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED;
+ u_int8_t dtype;
+ u_char *rdata_digest;
+ size_t i, rdata_digest_len;
+ int success = 0;
+
+ for (dtype = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1; dtype < SSHFP_HASH_MAX; dtype++) {
+ rdata_digest_type = dtype;
+ if (dns_read_key(&rdata_pubkey_algorithm, &rdata_digest_type,
+ &rdata_digest, &rdata_digest_len, key)) {
+ if (generic) {
+ fprintf(f, "%s IN TYPE%d \\# %zu %02x %02x ",
+ hostname, DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP,
+ 2 + rdata_digest_len,
+ rdata_pubkey_algorithm, rdata_digest_type);
+ } else {
+ fprintf(f, "%s IN SSHFP %d %d ", hostname,
+ rdata_pubkey_algorithm, rdata_digest_type);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < rdata_digest_len; i++)
+ fprintf(f, "%02x", rdata_digest[i]);
+ fprintf(f, "\n");
+ free(rdata_digest); /* from sshkey_fingerprint_raw() */
+ success = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* No SSHFP record was generated at all */
+ if (success == 0) {
+ error("%s: unsupported algorithm and/or digest_type", __func__);
+ }
+
+ return success;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dns.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/dns.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dns.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.12 2012/05/23 03:28:28 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2003 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#ifndef DNS_H
-#define DNS_H
-
-enum sshfp_types {
- SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED = 0,
- SSHFP_KEY_RSA = 1,
- SSHFP_KEY_DSA = 2,
- SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA = 3
-};
-
-enum sshfp_hashes {
- SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED = 0,
- SSHFP_HASH_SHA1 = 1,
- SSHFP_HASH_SHA256 = 2,
- SSHFP_HASH_MAX = 3
-};
-
-#define DNS_RDATACLASS_IN 1
-#define DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP 44
-
-#define DNS_VERIFY_FOUND 0x00000001
-#define DNS_VERIFY_MATCH 0x00000002
-#define DNS_VERIFY_SECURE 0x00000004
-
-int verify_host_key_dns(const char *, struct sockaddr *, Key *, int *);
-int export_dns_rr(const char *, Key *, FILE *, int);
-
-#endif /* DNS_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dns.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/dns.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dns.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/dns.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.15 2015/05/08 06:45:13 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef DNS_H
+#define DNS_H
+
+enum sshfp_types {
+ SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED = 0,
+ SSHFP_KEY_RSA = 1,
+ SSHFP_KEY_DSA = 2,
+ SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA = 3,
+ SSHFP_KEY_ED25519 = 4
+};
+
+enum sshfp_hashes {
+ SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED = 0,
+ SSHFP_HASH_SHA1 = 1,
+ SSHFP_HASH_SHA256 = 2,
+ SSHFP_HASH_MAX = 3
+};
+
+#define DNS_RDATACLASS_IN 1
+#define DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP 44
+
+#define DNS_VERIFY_FOUND 0x00000001
+#define DNS_VERIFY_MATCH 0x00000002
+#define DNS_VERIFY_SECURE 0x00000004
+
+int verify_host_key_dns(const char *, struct sockaddr *,
+ struct sshkey *, int *);
+int export_dns_rr(const char *, struct sshkey *, FILE *, int);
+
+#endif /* DNS_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/entropy.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/entropy.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/entropy.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,239 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
-# include <sys/un.h>
-#endif
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <stddef.h> /* for offsetof */
-
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-
-/*
- * Portable OpenSSH PRNG seeding:
- * If OpenSSL has not "internally seeded" itself (e.g. pulled data from
- * /dev/random), then collect RANDOM_SEED_SIZE bytes of randomness from
- * PRNGd.
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
-
-#define RANDOM_SEED_SIZE 48
-
-/*
- * Collect 'len' bytes of entropy into 'buf' from PRNGD/EGD daemon
- * listening either on 'tcp_port', or via Unix domain socket at *
- * 'socket_path'.
- * Either a non-zero tcp_port or a non-null socket_path must be
- * supplied.
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on error
- */
-int
-get_random_bytes_prngd(unsigned char *buf, int len,
- unsigned short tcp_port, char *socket_path)
-{
- int fd, addr_len, rval, errors;
- u_char msg[2];
- struct sockaddr_storage addr;
- struct sockaddr_in *addr_in = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr;
- struct sockaddr_un *addr_un = (struct sockaddr_un *)&addr;
- mysig_t old_sigpipe;
-
- /* Sanity checks */
- if (socket_path == NULL && tcp_port == 0)
- fatal("You must specify a port or a socket");
- if (socket_path != NULL &&
- strlen(socket_path) >= sizeof(addr_un->sun_path))
- fatal("Random pool path is too long");
- if (len <= 0 || len > 255)
- fatal("Too many bytes (%d) to read from PRNGD", len);
-
- memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
-
- if (tcp_port != 0) {
- addr_in->sin_family = AF_INET;
- addr_in->sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
- addr_in->sin_port = htons(tcp_port);
- addr_len = sizeof(*addr_in);
- } else {
- addr_un->sun_family = AF_UNIX;
- strlcpy(addr_un->sun_path, socket_path,
- sizeof(addr_un->sun_path));
- addr_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
- strlen(socket_path) + 1;
- }
-
- old_sigpipe = mysignal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-
- errors = 0;
- rval = -1;
-reopen:
- fd = socket(addr.ss_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- if (fd == -1) {
- error("Couldn't create socket: %s", strerror(errno));
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
- if (tcp_port != 0) {
- error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD port %d: %s",
- tcp_port, strerror(errno));
- } else {
- error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD socket \"%s\": %s",
- addr_un->sun_path, strerror(errno));
- }
- goto done;
- }
-
- /* Send blocking read request to PRNGD */
- msg[0] = 0x02;
- msg[1] = len;
-
- if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, msg, sizeof(msg)) != sizeof(msg)) {
- if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) {
- close(fd);
- errors++;
- goto reopen;
- }
- error("Couldn't write to PRNGD socket: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, len) != (size_t)len) {
- if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) {
- close(fd);
- errors++;
- goto reopen;
- }
- error("Couldn't read from PRNGD socket: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- goto done;
- }
-
- rval = 0;
-done:
- mysignal(SIGPIPE, old_sigpipe);
- if (fd != -1)
- close(fd);
- return rval;
-}
-
-static int
-seed_from_prngd(unsigned char *buf, size_t bytes)
-{
-#ifdef PRNGD_PORT
- debug("trying egd/prngd port %d", PRNGD_PORT);
- if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, PRNGD_PORT, NULL) == 0)
- return 0;
-#endif
-#ifdef PRNGD_SOCKET
- debug("trying egd/prngd socket %s", PRNGD_SOCKET);
- if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, 0, PRNGD_SOCKET) == 0)
- return 0;
-#endif
- return -1;
-}
-
-void
-rexec_send_rng_seed(Buffer *m)
-{
- u_char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
-
- if (RAND_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf)) <= 0) {
- error("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)",
- ERR_get_error());
- buffer_put_string(m, "", 0);
- } else
- buffer_put_string(m, buf, sizeof(buf));
-}
-
-void
-rexec_recv_rng_seed(Buffer *m)
-{
- u_char *buf;
- u_int len;
-
- buf = buffer_get_string_ret(m, &len);
- if (buf != NULL) {
- debug3("rexec_recv_rng_seed: seeding rng with %u bytes", len);
- RAND_add(buf, len, len);
- }
-}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
-
-void
-seed_rng(void)
-{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
- unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
-#endif
- /*
- * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
- * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
- * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
- * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
- * within a patch series.
- */
- u_long version_mask = SSLeay() >= 0x1000000f ? ~0xffff0L : ~0xff0L;
- if (((SSLeay() ^ OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) & version_mask) ||
- (SSLeay() >> 12) < (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >> 12))
- fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
- "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
- if (RAND_status() == 1) {
- debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
- return;
- }
-
- if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
- fatal("Could not obtain seed from PRNGd");
- RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
- memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
- if (RAND_status() != 1)
- fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/entropy.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/entropy.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/entropy.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/entropy.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+# include <sys/un.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stddef.h> /* for offsetof */
+
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+
+/*
+ * Portable OpenSSH PRNG seeding:
+ * If OpenSSL has not "internally seeded" itself (e.g. pulled data from
+ * /dev/random), then collect RANDOM_SEED_SIZE bytes of randomness from
+ * PRNGd.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+
+#define RANDOM_SEED_SIZE 48
+
+/*
+ * Collect 'len' bytes of entropy into 'buf' from PRNGD/EGD daemon
+ * listening either on 'tcp_port', or via Unix domain socket at *
+ * 'socket_path'.
+ * Either a non-zero tcp_port or a non-null socket_path must be
+ * supplied.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on error
+ */
+int
+get_random_bytes_prngd(unsigned char *buf, int len,
+ unsigned short tcp_port, char *socket_path)
+{
+ int fd, addr_len, rval, errors;
+ u_char msg[2];
+ struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+ struct sockaddr_in *addr_in = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr;
+ struct sockaddr_un *addr_un = (struct sockaddr_un *)&addr;
+ mysig_t old_sigpipe;
+
+ /* Sanity checks */
+ if (socket_path == NULL && tcp_port == 0)
+ fatal("You must specify a port or a socket");
+ if (socket_path != NULL &&
+ strlen(socket_path) >= sizeof(addr_un->sun_path))
+ fatal("Random pool path is too long");
+ if (len <= 0 || len > 255)
+ fatal("Too many bytes (%d) to read from PRNGD", len);
+
+ memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
+
+ if (tcp_port != 0) {
+ addr_in->sin_family = AF_INET;
+ addr_in->sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
+ addr_in->sin_port = htons(tcp_port);
+ addr_len = sizeof(*addr_in);
+ } else {
+ addr_un->sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ strlcpy(addr_un->sun_path, socket_path,
+ sizeof(addr_un->sun_path));
+ addr_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
+ strlen(socket_path) + 1;
+ }
+
+ old_sigpipe = mysignal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
+ errors = 0;
+ rval = -1;
+reopen:
+ fd = socket(addr.ss_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ error("Couldn't create socket: %s", strerror(errno));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
+ if (tcp_port != 0) {
+ error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD port %d: %s",
+ tcp_port, strerror(errno));
+ } else {
+ error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD socket \"%s\": %s",
+ addr_un->sun_path, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Send blocking read request to PRNGD */
+ msg[0] = 0x02;
+ msg[1] = len;
+
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, msg, sizeof(msg)) != sizeof(msg)) {
+ if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) {
+ close(fd);
+ errors++;
+ goto reopen;
+ }
+ error("Couldn't write to PRNGD socket: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, len) != (size_t)len) {
+ if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) {
+ close(fd);
+ errors++;
+ goto reopen;
+ }
+ error("Couldn't read from PRNGD socket: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ rval = 0;
+done:
+ mysignal(SIGPIPE, old_sigpipe);
+ if (fd != -1)
+ close(fd);
+ return rval;
+}
+
+static int
+seed_from_prngd(unsigned char *buf, size_t bytes)
+{
+#ifdef PRNGD_PORT
+ debug("trying egd/prngd port %d", PRNGD_PORT);
+ if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, PRNGD_PORT, NULL) == 0)
+ return 0;
+#endif
+#ifdef PRNGD_SOCKET
+ debug("trying egd/prngd socket %s", PRNGD_SOCKET);
+ if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, 0, PRNGD_SOCKET) == 0)
+ return 0;
+#endif
+ return -1;
+}
+
+void
+rexec_send_rng_seed(Buffer *m)
+{
+ u_char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
+
+ if (RAND_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf)) <= 0) {
+ error("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)",
+ ERR_get_error());
+ buffer_put_string(m, "", 0);
+ } else
+ buffer_put_string(m, buf, sizeof(buf));
+}
+
+void
+rexec_recv_rng_seed(Buffer *m)
+{
+ u_char *buf;
+ u_int len;
+
+ buf = buffer_get_string_ret(m, &len);
+ if (buf != NULL) {
+ debug3("rexec_recv_rng_seed: seeding rng with %u bytes", len);
+ RAND_add(buf, len, len);
+ }
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
+
+void
+seed_rng(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+ unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
+#endif
+ if (!ssh_compatible_openssl(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay()))
+ fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
+ "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+ if (RAND_status() == 1) {
+ debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
+ fatal("Could not obtain seed from PRNGd");
+ RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
+ memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
+ if (RAND_status() != 1)
+ fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
+}
+
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+/* Handled in arc4random() */
+void
+seed_rng(void)
+{
+}
+
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ge25519.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ge25519.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ge25519.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ge25519.h,v 1.3 2013/12/09 11:03:45 markus Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Public Domain, Authors: Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange,
- * Peter Schwabe, Bo-Yin Yang.
- * Copied from supercop-20130419/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/ge25519.h
- */
-
-#ifndef GE25519_H
-#define GE25519_H
-
-#include "fe25519.h"
-#include "sc25519.h"
-
-#define ge25519 crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_ge25519
-#define ge25519_base crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_ge25519_base
-#define ge25519_unpackneg_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_unpackneg_vartime
-#define ge25519_pack crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_pack
-#define ge25519_isneutral_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_isneutral_vartime
-#define ge25519_double_scalarmult_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_double_scalarmult_vartime
-#define ge25519_scalarmult_base crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_scalarmult_base
-
-typedef struct
-{
- fe25519 x;
- fe25519 y;
- fe25519 z;
- fe25519 t;
-} ge25519;
-
-const ge25519 ge25519_base;
-
-int ge25519_unpackneg_vartime(ge25519 *r, const unsigned char p[32]);
-
-void ge25519_pack(unsigned char r[32], const ge25519 *p);
-
-int ge25519_isneutral_vartime(const ge25519 *p);
-
-void ge25519_double_scalarmult_vartime(ge25519 *r, const ge25519 *p1, const sc25519 *s1, const ge25519 *p2, const sc25519 *s2);
-
-void ge25519_scalarmult_base(ge25519 *r, const sc25519 *s);
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ge25519.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ge25519.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ge25519.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ge25519.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ge25519.h,v 1.4 2015/02/16 18:26:26 miod Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Public Domain, Authors: Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange,
+ * Peter Schwabe, Bo-Yin Yang.
+ * Copied from supercop-20130419/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/ge25519.h
+ */
+
+#ifndef GE25519_H
+#define GE25519_H
+
+#include "fe25519.h"
+#include "sc25519.h"
+
+#define ge25519 crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_ge25519
+#define ge25519_base crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_ge25519_base
+#define ge25519_unpackneg_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_unpackneg_vartime
+#define ge25519_pack crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_pack
+#define ge25519_isneutral_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_isneutral_vartime
+#define ge25519_double_scalarmult_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_double_scalarmult_vartime
+#define ge25519_scalarmult_base crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_scalarmult_base
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ fe25519 x;
+ fe25519 y;
+ fe25519 z;
+ fe25519 t;
+} ge25519;
+
+extern const ge25519 ge25519_base;
+
+int ge25519_unpackneg_vartime(ge25519 *r, const unsigned char p[32]);
+
+void ge25519_pack(unsigned char r[32], const ge25519 *p);
+
+int ge25519_isneutral_vartime(const ge25519 *p);
+
+void ge25519_double_scalarmult_vartime(ge25519 *r, const ge25519 *p1, const sc25519 *s1, const ge25519 *p2, const sc25519 *s2);
+
+void ge25519_scalarmult_base(ge25519 *r, const sc25519 *s);
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/groupaccess.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/groupaccess.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/groupaccess.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.c,v 1.14 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-
-#include <grp.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "groupaccess.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-static int ngroups;
-static char **groups_byname;
-
-/*
- * Initialize group access list for user with primary (base) and
- * supplementary groups. Return the number of groups in the list.
- */
-int
-ga_init(const char *user, gid_t base)
-{
- gid_t *groups_bygid;
- int i, j;
- struct group *gr;
-
- if (ngroups > 0)
- ga_free();
-
- ngroups = NGROUPS_MAX;
-#if defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) && defined(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX)
- ngroups = MAX(NGROUPS_MAX, sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX));
-#endif
-
- groups_bygid = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_bygid));
- groups_byname = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_byname));
-
- if (getgrouplist(user, base, groups_bygid, &ngroups) == -1)
- logit("getgrouplist: groups list too small");
- for (i = 0, j = 0; i < ngroups; i++)
- if ((gr = getgrgid(groups_bygid[i])) != NULL)
- groups_byname[j++] = xstrdup(gr->gr_name);
- free(groups_bygid);
- return (ngroups = j);
-}
-
-/*
- * Return 1 if one of user's groups is contained in groups.
- * Return 0 otherwise. Use match_pattern() for string comparison.
- */
-int
-ga_match(char * const *groups, int n)
-{
- int i, j;
-
- for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++)
- for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
- if (match_pattern(groups_byname[i], groups[j]))
- return 1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Return 1 if one of user's groups matches group_pattern list.
- * Return 0 on negated or no match.
- */
-int
-ga_match_pattern_list(const char *group_pattern)
-{
- int i, found = 0;
- size_t len = strlen(group_pattern);
-
- for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
- switch (match_pattern_list(groups_byname[i],
- group_pattern, len, 0)) {
- case -1:
- return 0; /* Negated match wins */
- case 0:
- continue;
- case 1:
- found = 1;
- }
- }
- return found;
-}
-
-/*
- * Free memory allocated for group access list.
- */
-void
-ga_free(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (ngroups > 0) {
- for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++)
- free(groups_byname[i]);
- ngroups = 0;
- free(groups_byname);
- }
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/groupaccess.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/groupaccess.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/groupaccess.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/groupaccess.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.c,v 1.16 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "groupaccess.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+static int ngroups;
+static char **groups_byname;
+
+/*
+ * Initialize group access list for user with primary (base) and
+ * supplementary groups. Return the number of groups in the list.
+ */
+int
+ga_init(const char *user, gid_t base)
+{
+ gid_t *groups_bygid;
+ int i, j;
+ struct group *gr;
+
+ if (ngroups > 0)
+ ga_free();
+
+ ngroups = NGROUPS_MAX;
+#if defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) && defined(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX)
+ ngroups = MAX(NGROUPS_MAX, sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX));
+#endif
+
+ groups_bygid = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_bygid));
+ groups_byname = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_byname));
+
+ if (getgrouplist(user, base, groups_bygid, &ngroups) == -1)
+ logit("getgrouplist: groups list too small");
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < ngroups; i++)
+ if ((gr = getgrgid(groups_bygid[i])) != NULL)
+ groups_byname[j++] = xstrdup(gr->gr_name);
+ free(groups_bygid);
+ return (ngroups = j);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if one of user's groups is contained in groups.
+ * Return 0 otherwise. Use match_pattern() for string comparison.
+ */
+int
+ga_match(char * const *groups, int n)
+{
+ int i, j;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++)
+ for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
+ if (match_pattern(groups_byname[i], groups[j]))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if one of user's groups matches group_pattern list.
+ * Return 0 on negated or no match.
+ */
+int
+ga_match_pattern_list(const char *group_pattern)
+{
+ int i, found = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
+ switch (match_pattern_list(groups_byname[i], group_pattern, 0)) {
+ case -1:
+ return 0; /* Negated match wins */
+ case 0:
+ continue;
+ case 1:
+ found = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return found;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free memory allocated for group access list.
+ */
+void
+ga_free(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (ngroups > 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++)
+ free(groups_byname[i]);
+ ngroups = 0;
+ free(groups_byname);
+ }
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/gss-genr.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/gss-genr.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/gss-genr.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,281 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.22 2013/11/08 00:39:15 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-
-extern u_char *session_id2;
-extern u_int session_id2_len;
-
-/* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
-int
-ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
-{
- return (ctx != NULL && ctx->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID &&
- ctx->oid->length == len &&
- memcmp(ctx->oid->elements, data, len) == 0);
-}
-
-/* Set the contexts OID from a data stream */
-void
-ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
-{
- if (ctx->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID) {
- free(ctx->oid->elements);
- free(ctx->oid);
- }
- ctx->oid = xcalloc(1, sizeof(gss_OID_desc));
- ctx->oid->length = len;
- ctx->oid->elements = xmalloc(len);
- memcpy(ctx->oid->elements, data, len);
-}
-
-/* Set the contexts OID */
-void
-ssh_gssapi_set_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_OID oid)
-{
- ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(ctx, oid->elements, oid->length);
-}
-
-/* All this effort to report an error ... */
-void
-ssh_gssapi_error(Gssctxt *ctxt)
-{
- char *s;
-
- s = ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, NULL, NULL);
- debug("%s", s);
- free(s);
-}
-
-char *
-ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, OM_uint32 *major_status,
- OM_uint32 *minor_status)
-{
- OM_uint32 lmin;
- gss_buffer_desc msg = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- OM_uint32 ctx;
- Buffer b;
- char *ret;
-
- buffer_init(&b);
-
- if (major_status != NULL)
- *major_status = ctxt->major;
- if (minor_status != NULL)
- *minor_status = ctxt->minor;
-
- ctx = 0;
- /* The GSSAPI error */
- do {
- gss_display_status(&lmin, ctxt->major,
- GSS_C_GSS_CODE, ctxt->oid, &ctx, &msg);
-
- buffer_append(&b, msg.value, msg.length);
- buffer_put_char(&b, '\n');
-
- gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &msg);
- } while (ctx != 0);
-
- /* The mechanism specific error */
- do {
- gss_display_status(&lmin, ctxt->minor,
- GSS_C_MECH_CODE, ctxt->oid, &ctx, &msg);
-
- buffer_append(&b, msg.value, msg.length);
- buffer_put_char(&b, '\n');
-
- gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &msg);
- } while (ctx != 0);
-
- buffer_put_char(&b, '\0');
- ret = xmalloc(buffer_len(&b));
- buffer_get(&b, ret, buffer_len(&b));
- buffer_free(&b);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-/*
- * Initialise our GSSAPI context. We use this opaque structure to contain all
- * of the data which both the client and server need to persist across
- * {accept,init}_sec_context calls, so that when we do it from the userauth
- * stuff life is a little easier
- */
-void
-ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx)
-{
- *ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof (Gssctxt));
- (*ctx)->context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
- (*ctx)->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
- (*ctx)->oid = GSS_C_NO_OID;
- (*ctx)->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
- (*ctx)->client = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
- (*ctx)->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-}
-
-/* Delete our context, providing it has been built correctly */
-void
-ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx)
-{
- OM_uint32 ms;
-
- if ((*ctx) == NULL)
- return;
- if ((*ctx)->context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
- gss_delete_sec_context(&ms, &(*ctx)->context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
- if ((*ctx)->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
- gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->name);
- if ((*ctx)->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID) {
- free((*ctx)->oid->elements);
- free((*ctx)->oid);
- (*ctx)->oid = GSS_C_NO_OID;
- }
- if ((*ctx)->creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
- gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->creds);
- if ((*ctx)->client != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
- gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->client);
- if ((*ctx)->client_creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
- gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->client_creds);
-
- free(*ctx);
- *ctx = NULL;
-}
-
-/*
- * Wrapper to init_sec_context
- * Requires that the context contains:
- * oid
- * server name (from ssh_gssapi_import_name)
- */
-OM_uint32
-ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
- gss_buffer_desc* send_tok, OM_uint32 *flags)
-{
- int deleg_flag = 0;
-
- if (deleg_creds) {
- deleg_flag = GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG;
- debug("Delegating credentials");
- }
-
- ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
- GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
- 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
-
- if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major))
- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-
- return (ctx->major);
-}
-
-/* Create a service name for the given host */
-OM_uint32
-ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
-{
- gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
- char *val;
-
- xasprintf(&val, "host@%s", host);
- gssbuf.value = val;
- gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
-
- if ((ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor,
- &gssbuf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, &ctx->name)))
- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-
- free(gssbuf.value);
- return (ctx->major);
-}
-
-OM_uint32
-ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
-{
- if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
- GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-
- return (ctx->major);
-}
-
-void
-ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
- const char *context)
-{
- buffer_init(b);
- buffer_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
- buffer_put_char(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- buffer_put_cstring(b, user);
- buffer_put_cstring(b, service);
- buffer_put_cstring(b, context);
-}
-
-int
-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
-{
- gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- OM_uint32 major, minor;
- gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
-
- /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
- if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
- (memcmp(oid->elements, spnego_oid.elements, oid->length) == 0))
- return 0; /* false */
-
- ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
- ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
- major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
- if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
- major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
- NULL);
- gss_release_buffer(&minor, &token);
- if ((*ctx)->context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
- gss_delete_sec_context(&minor, &(*ctx)->context,
- GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
- }
-
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
-
- return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
-}
-
-#endif /* GSSAPI */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/gss-genr.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/gss-genr.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/gss-genr.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/gss-genr.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.23 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+extern u_char *session_id2;
+extern u_int session_id2_len;
+
+/* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
+int
+ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ return (ctx != NULL && ctx->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID &&
+ ctx->oid->length == len &&
+ memcmp(ctx->oid->elements, data, len) == 0);
+}
+
+/* Set the contexts OID from a data stream */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ if (ctx->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID) {
+ free(ctx->oid->elements);
+ free(ctx->oid);
+ }
+ ctx->oid = xcalloc(1, sizeof(gss_OID_desc));
+ ctx->oid->length = len;
+ ctx->oid->elements = xmalloc(len);
+ memcpy(ctx->oid->elements, data, len);
+}
+
+/* Set the contexts OID */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_set_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_OID oid)
+{
+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(ctx, oid->elements, oid->length);
+}
+
+/* All this effort to report an error ... */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_error(Gssctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ char *s;
+
+ s = ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, NULL, NULL);
+ debug("%s", s);
+ free(s);
+}
+
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, OM_uint32 *major_status,
+ OM_uint32 *minor_status)
+{
+ OM_uint32 lmin;
+ gss_buffer_desc msg = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ OM_uint32 ctx;
+ Buffer b;
+ char *ret;
+
+ buffer_init(&b);
+
+ if (major_status != NULL)
+ *major_status = ctxt->major;
+ if (minor_status != NULL)
+ *minor_status = ctxt->minor;
+
+ ctx = 0;
+ /* The GSSAPI error */
+ do {
+ gss_display_status(&lmin, ctxt->major,
+ GSS_C_GSS_CODE, ctxt->oid, &ctx, &msg);
+
+ buffer_append(&b, msg.value, msg.length);
+ buffer_put_char(&b, '\n');
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &msg);
+ } while (ctx != 0);
+
+ /* The mechanism specific error */
+ do {
+ gss_display_status(&lmin, ctxt->minor,
+ GSS_C_MECH_CODE, ctxt->oid, &ctx, &msg);
+
+ buffer_append(&b, msg.value, msg.length);
+ buffer_put_char(&b, '\n');
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &msg);
+ } while (ctx != 0);
+
+ buffer_put_char(&b, '\0');
+ ret = xmalloc(buffer_len(&b));
+ buffer_get(&b, ret, buffer_len(&b));
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialise our GSSAPI context. We use this opaque structure to contain all
+ * of the data which both the client and server need to persist across
+ * {accept,init}_sec_context calls, so that when we do it from the userauth
+ * stuff life is a little easier
+ */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx)
+{
+ *ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof (Gssctxt));
+ (*ctx)->context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
+ (*ctx)->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+ (*ctx)->oid = GSS_C_NO_OID;
+ (*ctx)->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+ (*ctx)->client = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+ (*ctx)->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+}
+
+/* Delete our context, providing it has been built correctly */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx)
+{
+ OM_uint32 ms;
+
+ if ((*ctx) == NULL)
+ return;
+ if ((*ctx)->context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ gss_delete_sec_context(&ms, &(*ctx)->context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ if ((*ctx)->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
+ gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->name);
+ if ((*ctx)->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID) {
+ free((*ctx)->oid->elements);
+ free((*ctx)->oid);
+ (*ctx)->oid = GSS_C_NO_OID;
+ }
+ if ((*ctx)->creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+ gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->creds);
+ if ((*ctx)->client != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
+ gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->client);
+ if ((*ctx)->client_creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+ gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->client_creds);
+
+ free(*ctx);
+ *ctx = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wrapper to init_sec_context
+ * Requires that the context contains:
+ * oid
+ * server name (from ssh_gssapi_import_name)
+ */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
+ gss_buffer_desc* send_tok, OM_uint32 *flags)
+{
+ int deleg_flag = 0;
+
+ if (deleg_creds) {
+ deleg_flag = GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG;
+ debug("Delegating credentials");
+ }
+
+ ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
+ GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
+ 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major))
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+ return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+/* Create a service name for the given host */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
+{
+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+ char *val;
+
+ xasprintf(&val, "host@%s", host);
+ gssbuf.value = val;
+ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
+
+ if ((ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor,
+ &gssbuf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, &ctx->name)))
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+ free(gssbuf.value);
+ return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+{
+ if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+ GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+ return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+ const char *context)
+{
+ buffer_init(b);
+ buffer_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+ buffer_put_char(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ buffer_put_cstring(b, user);
+ buffer_put_cstring(b, service);
+ buffer_put_cstring(b, context);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+{
+ gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
+ gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
+
+ /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
+ if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
+ (memcmp(oid->elements, spnego_oid.elements, oid->length) == 0))
+ return 0; /* false */
+
+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
+ major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+ major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
+ NULL);
+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &token);
+ if ((*ctx)->context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ gss_delete_sec_context(&minor, &(*ctx)->context,
+ GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ }
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
+
+ return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
+}
+
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/gss-serv-krb5.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,211 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.8 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#ifdef KRB5
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-#ifdef HEIMDAL
-# include <krb5.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
-# include <gssapi_krb5.h>
-#elif HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
-# include <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>
-#endif
-
-static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
-
-/* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
-
-static int
-ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
-{
- krb5_error_code problem;
-
- if (krb_context != NULL)
- return 1;
-
- problem = krb5_init_context(&krb_context);
- if (problem) {
- logit("Cannot initialize krb5 context");
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* Check if this user is OK to login. This only works with krb5 - other
- * GSSAPI mechanisms will need their own.
- * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
- */
-
-static int
-ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
-{
- krb5_principal princ;
- int retval;
- const char *errmsg;
-
- if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
- return 0;
-
- if ((retval = krb5_parse_name(krb_context, client->exportedname.value,
- &princ))) {
- errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, retval);
- logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg);
- krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
- return 0;
- }
- if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name)) {
- retval = 1;
- logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
- name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
- } else
- retval = 0;
-
- krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
- return retval;
-}
-
-
-/* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
- * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
-
-static void
-ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
-{
- krb5_ccache ccache;
- krb5_error_code problem;
- krb5_principal princ;
- OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
- int len;
- const char *errmsg;
-
- if (client->creds == NULL) {
- debug("No credentials stored");
- return;
- }
-
- if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
- return;
-
-#ifdef HEIMDAL
-# ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
- if ((problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(krb_context, krb5_fcc_ops.prefix,
- NULL, &ccache)) != 0) {
- errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
- logit("krb5_cc_new_unique(): %.100s", errmsg);
-# else
- if ((problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(krb_context, &krb5_fcc_ops, &ccache))) {
- logit("krb5_cc_gen_new(): %.100s",
- krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-# endif
- krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
- return;
- }
-#else
- if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb_context, &ccache))) {
- errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
- logit("ssh_krb5_cc_gen(): %.100s", errmsg);
- krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
- return;
- }
-#endif /* #ifdef HEIMDAL */
-
- if ((problem = krb5_parse_name(krb_context,
- client->exportedname.value, &princ))) {
- errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
- logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg);
- krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
- return;
- }
-
- if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, princ))) {
- errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
- logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s", errmsg);
- krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
- krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
- krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
- return;
- }
-
- krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
-
- if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status,
- client->creds, ccache))) {
- logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed");
- krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
- return;
- }
-
- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
- client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
- do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
-#endif
-
- krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-
- return;
-}
-
-ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
- "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
- "Kerberos",
- {9, "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x12\x01\x02\x02"},
- NULL,
- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
- NULL,
- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
-};
-
-#endif /* KRB5 */
-
-#endif /* GSSAPI */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/gss-serv-krb5.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.8 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#ifdef KRB5
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+#ifdef HEIMDAL
+# include <krb5.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
+# include <gssapi_krb5.h>
+#elif HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
+# include <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>
+#endif
+
+static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
+
+/* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
+
+static int
+ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+{
+ krb5_error_code problem;
+
+ if (krb_context != NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ problem = krb5_init_context(&krb_context);
+ if (problem) {
+ logit("Cannot initialize krb5 context");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Check if this user is OK to login. This only works with krb5 - other
+ * GSSAPI mechanisms will need their own.
+ * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
+ */
+
+static int
+ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+{
+ krb5_principal princ;
+ int retval;
+ const char *errmsg;
+
+ if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((retval = krb5_parse_name(krb_context, client->exportedname.value,
+ &princ))) {
+ errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, retval);
+ logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg);
+ krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name)) {
+ retval = 1;
+ logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
+ name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
+ } else
+ retval = 0;
+
+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+
+/* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
+ * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
+
+static void
+ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+{
+ krb5_ccache ccache;
+ krb5_error_code problem;
+ krb5_principal princ;
+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+ int len;
+ const char *errmsg;
+
+ if (client->creds == NULL) {
+ debug("No credentials stored");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
+ return;
+
+#ifdef HEIMDAL
+# ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(krb_context, krb5_fcc_ops.prefix,
+ NULL, &ccache)) != 0) {
+ errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
+ logit("krb5_cc_new_unique(): %.100s", errmsg);
+# else
+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(krb_context, &krb5_fcc_ops, &ccache))) {
+ logit("krb5_cc_gen_new(): %.100s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+# endif
+ krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+ return;
+ }
+#else
+ if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb_context, &ccache))) {
+ errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
+ logit("ssh_krb5_cc_gen(): %.100s", errmsg);
+ krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+ return;
+ }
+#endif /* #ifdef HEIMDAL */
+
+ if ((problem = krb5_parse_name(krb_context,
+ client->exportedname.value, &princ))) {
+ errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
+ logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg);
+ krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, princ))) {
+ errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
+ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s", errmsg);
+ krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+ krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+
+ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status,
+ client->creds, ccache))) {
+ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed");
+ krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
+ client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+ len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
+ client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
+ snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+ do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
+#endif
+
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+
+ return;
+}
+
+ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+ "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
+ "Kerberos",
+ {9, "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x12\x01\x02\x02"},
+ NULL,
+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
+ NULL,
+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
+};
+
+#endif /* KRB5 */
+
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/gss-serv.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/gss-serv.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/gss-serv.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,387 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.26 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "session.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-
-static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
- { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
-
-ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-
-#ifdef KRB5
-extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
-#endif
-
-ssh_gssapi_mech* supported_mechs[]= {
-#ifdef KRB5
- &gssapi_kerberos_mech,
-#endif
- &gssapi_null_mech,
-};
-
-/*
- * ssh_gssapi_supported_oids() can cause sandbox violations, so prepare the
- * list of supported mechanisms before privsep is set up.
- */
-static gss_OID_set supported_oids;
-
-void
-ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(void)
-{
- ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported_oids);
-}
-
-OM_uint32
-ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *ms, gss_OID member, int *present)
-{
- if (supported_oids == NULL)
- ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
- return gss_test_oid_set_member(ms, member, supported_oids, present);
-}
-
-/*
- * Acquire credentials for a server running on the current host.
- * Requires that the context structure contains a valid OID
- */
-
-/* Returns a GSSAPI error code */
-/* Privileged (called from ssh_gssapi_server_ctx) */
-static OM_uint32
-ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
-{
- OM_uint32 status;
- char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
- gss_OID_set oidset;
-
- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
- gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-
- if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
- return (ctx->major);
- }
-
- if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
- ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-
- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
- return (ctx->major);
-}
-
-/* Privileged */
-OM_uint32
-ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
-{
- if (*ctx)
- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
- ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
- ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
- return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
-}
-
-/* Unprivileged */
-void
-ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
-{
- int i = 0;
- OM_uint32 min_status;
- int present;
- gss_OID_set supported;
-
- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
-
- while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
- if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
- &supported_mechs[i]->oid, supported, &present)))
- present = 0;
- if (present)
- gss_add_oid_set_member(&min_status,
- &supported_mechs[i]->oid, oidset);
- i++;
- }
-
- gss_release_oid_set(&min_status, &supported);
-}
-
-
-/* Wrapper around accept_sec_context
- * Requires that the context contains:
- * oid
- * credentials (from ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred)
- */
-/* Privileged */
-OM_uint32
-ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
- gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, OM_uint32 *flags)
-{
- OM_uint32 status;
- gss_OID mech;
-
- ctx->major = gss_accept_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
- &ctx->context, ctx->creds, recv_tok,
- GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, &ctx->client, &mech,
- send_tok, flags, NULL, &ctx->client_creds);
-
- if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major))
- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-
- if (ctx->client_creds)
- debug("Received some client credentials");
- else
- debug("Got no client credentials");
-
- status = ctx->major;
-
- /* Now, if we're complete and we have the right flags, then
- * we flag the user as also having been authenticated
- */
-
- if (((flags == NULL) || ((*flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) &&
- (*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)) {
- if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client))
- fatal("Couldn't convert client name");
- }
-
- return (status);
-}
-
-/*
- * This parses an exported name, extracting the mechanism specific portion
- * to use for ACL checking. It verifies that the name belongs the mechanism
- * originally selected.
- */
-static OM_uint32
-ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name)
-{
- u_char *tok;
- OM_uint32 offset;
- OM_uint32 oidl;
-
- tok = ename->value;
-
- /*
- * Check that ename is long enough for all of the fixed length
- * header, and that the initial ID bytes are correct
- */
-
- if (ename->length < 6 || memcmp(tok, "\x04\x01", 2) != 0)
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
-
- /*
- * Extract the OID, and check it. Here GSSAPI breaks with tradition
- * and does use the OID type and length bytes. To confuse things
- * there are two lengths - the first including these, and the
- * second without.
- */
-
- oidl = get_u16(tok+2); /* length including next two bytes */
- oidl = oidl-2; /* turn it into the _real_ length of the variable OID */
-
- /*
- * Check the BER encoding for correct type and length, that the
- * string is long enough and that the OID matches that in our context
- */
- if (tok[4] != 0x06 || tok[5] != oidl ||
- ename->length < oidl+6 ||
- !ssh_gssapi_check_oid(ctx, tok+6, oidl))
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
-
- offset = oidl+6;
-
- if (ename->length < offset+4)
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
-
- name->length = get_u32(tok+offset);
- offset += 4;
-
- if (UINT_MAX - offset < name->length)
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- if (ename->length < offset+name->length)
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
-
- name->value = xmalloc(name->length+1);
- memcpy(name->value, tok+offset, name->length);
- ((char *)name->value)[name->length] = 0;
-
- return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-}
-
-/* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably
- * be called once for a context */
-
-/* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */
-OM_uint32
-ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
-{
- int i = 0;
-
- gss_buffer_desc ename;
-
- client->mech = NULL;
-
- while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
- if (supported_mechs[i]->oid.length == ctx->oid->length &&
- (memcmp(supported_mechs[i]->oid.elements,
- ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) == 0))
- client->mech = supported_mechs[i];
- i++;
- }
-
- if (client->mech == NULL)
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
-
- if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
- &client->displayname, NULL))) {
- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
- return (ctx->major);
- }
-
- if ((ctx->major = gss_export_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
- &ename))) {
- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
- return (ctx->major);
- }
-
- if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(ctx,&ename,
- &client->exportedname))) {
- return (ctx->major);
- }
-
- /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
- client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
- ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
- return (ctx->major);
-}
-
-/* As user - called on fatal/exit */
-void
-ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
-{
- if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) {
- /* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */
- debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"",
- gssapi_client.store.filename);
- unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename);
- }
-}
-
-/* As user */
-void
-ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
-{
- if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
- (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
- } else
- debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
-}
-
-/* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the childs environment based
- * on the passed authentication process and credentials.
- */
-/* As user */
-void
-ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
-{
-
- if (gssapi_client.store.envvar != NULL &&
- gssapi_client.store.envval != NULL) {
- debug("Setting %s to %s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
- gssapi_client.store.envval);
- child_set_env(envp, envsizep, gssapi_client.store.envvar,
- gssapi_client.store.envval);
- }
-}
-
-/* Privileged */
-int
-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
-{
- OM_uint32 lmin;
-
- if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 ||
- gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) {
- debug("No suitable client data");
- return 0;
- }
- if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
- return 1;
- else {
- /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
- gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
- gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
- gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds);
- explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client,
- sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
- return 0;
- }
- else
- debug("ssh_gssapi_userok: Unknown GSSAPI mechanism");
- return (0);
-}
-
-/* Privileged */
-OM_uint32
-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
-{
- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
-
- return (ctx->major);
-}
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/gss-serv.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/gss-serv.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/gss-serv.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/gss-serv.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,396 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.29 2015/05/22 03:50:02 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+ { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
+
+ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
+#endif
+
+ssh_gssapi_mech* supported_mechs[]= {
+#ifdef KRB5
+ &gssapi_kerberos_mech,
+#endif
+ &gssapi_null_mech,
+};
+
+/*
+ * ssh_gssapi_supported_oids() can cause sandbox violations, so prepare the
+ * list of supported mechanisms before privsep is set up.
+ */
+static gss_OID_set supported_oids;
+
+void
+ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(void)
+{
+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported_oids);
+}
+
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *ms, gss_OID member, int *present)
+{
+ if (supported_oids == NULL)
+ ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
+ return gss_test_oid_set_member(ms, member, supported_oids, present);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Acquire credentials for a server running on the current host.
+ * Requires that the context structure contains a valid OID
+ */
+
+/* Returns a GSSAPI error code */
+/* Privileged (called from ssh_gssapi_server_ctx) */
+static OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
+{
+ OM_uint32 status;
+ char lname[NI_MAXHOST];
+ gss_OID_set oidset;
+
+ if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
+
+ if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
+ ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds,
+ NULL, NULL)))
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+ return (ctx->major);
+ } else {
+ ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+ ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+ }
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/* Privileged */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
+{
+ if (*ctx)
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
+ return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
+}
+
+/* Unprivileged */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ OM_uint32 min_status;
+ int present;
+ gss_OID_set supported;
+
+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
+ gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
+
+ while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
+ &supported_mechs[i]->oid, supported, &present)))
+ present = 0;
+ if (present)
+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&min_status,
+ &supported_mechs[i]->oid, oidset);
+ i++;
+ }
+
+ gss_release_oid_set(&min_status, &supported);
+}
+
+
+/* Wrapper around accept_sec_context
+ * Requires that the context contains:
+ * oid
+ * credentials (from ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred)
+ */
+/* Privileged */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
+ gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, OM_uint32 *flags)
+{
+ OM_uint32 status;
+ gss_OID mech;
+
+ ctx->major = gss_accept_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
+ &ctx->context, ctx->creds, recv_tok,
+ GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, &ctx->client, &mech,
+ send_tok, flags, NULL, &ctx->client_creds);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major))
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+ if (ctx->client_creds)
+ debug("Received some client credentials");
+ else
+ debug("Got no client credentials");
+
+ status = ctx->major;
+
+ /* Now, if we're complete and we have the right flags, then
+ * we flag the user as also having been authenticated
+ */
+
+ if (((flags == NULL) || ((*flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) &&
+ (*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)) {
+ if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client))
+ fatal("Couldn't convert client name");
+ }
+
+ return (status);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This parses an exported name, extracting the mechanism specific portion
+ * to use for ACL checking. It verifies that the name belongs the mechanism
+ * originally selected.
+ */
+static OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name)
+{
+ u_char *tok;
+ OM_uint32 offset;
+ OM_uint32 oidl;
+
+ tok = ename->value;
+
+ /*
+ * Check that ename is long enough for all of the fixed length
+ * header, and that the initial ID bytes are correct
+ */
+
+ if (ename->length < 6 || memcmp(tok, "\x04\x01", 2) != 0)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ /*
+ * Extract the OID, and check it. Here GSSAPI breaks with tradition
+ * and does use the OID type and length bytes. To confuse things
+ * there are two lengths - the first including these, and the
+ * second without.
+ */
+
+ oidl = get_u16(tok+2); /* length including next two bytes */
+ oidl = oidl-2; /* turn it into the _real_ length of the variable OID */
+
+ /*
+ * Check the BER encoding for correct type and length, that the
+ * string is long enough and that the OID matches that in our context
+ */
+ if (tok[4] != 0x06 || tok[5] != oidl ||
+ ename->length < oidl+6 ||
+ !ssh_gssapi_check_oid(ctx, tok+6, oidl))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ offset = oidl+6;
+
+ if (ename->length < offset+4)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ name->length = get_u32(tok+offset);
+ offset += 4;
+
+ if (UINT_MAX - offset < name->length)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ if (ename->length < offset+name->length)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ name->value = xmalloc(name->length+1);
+ memcpy(name->value, tok+offset, name->length);
+ ((char *)name->value)[name->length] = 0;
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably
+ * be called once for a context */
+
+/* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+
+ gss_buffer_desc ename;
+
+ client->mech = NULL;
+
+ while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
+ if (supported_mechs[i]->oid.length == ctx->oid->length &&
+ (memcmp(supported_mechs[i]->oid.elements,
+ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) == 0))
+ client->mech = supported_mechs[i];
+ i++;
+ }
+
+ if (client->mech == NULL)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
+ &client->displayname, NULL))) {
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx->major = gss_export_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
+ &ename))) {
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(ctx,&ename,
+ &client->exportedname))) {
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
+ /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+ return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+/* As user - called on fatal/exit */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
+{
+ if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) {
+ /* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */
+ debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"",
+ gssapi_client.store.filename);
+ unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename);
+ }
+}
+
+/* As user */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
+{
+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
+ (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
+ } else
+ debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
+}
+
+/* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the childs environment based
+ * on the passed authentication process and credentials.
+ */
+/* As user */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
+{
+
+ if (gssapi_client.store.envvar != NULL &&
+ gssapi_client.store.envval != NULL) {
+ debug("Setting %s to %s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
+ gssapi_client.store.envval);
+ child_set_env(envp, envsizep, gssapi_client.store.envvar,
+ gssapi_client.store.envval);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Privileged */
+int
+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+{
+ OM_uint32 lmin;
+
+ if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 ||
+ gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) {
+ debug("No suitable client data");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
+ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
+ return 1;
+ else {
+ /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+ gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds);
+ explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client,
+ sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else
+ debug("ssh_gssapi_userok: Unknown GSSAPI mechanism");
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/* Privileged */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+{
+ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
+
+ return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hmac.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/hmac.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hmac.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,197 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hmac.c,v 1.10 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-#include "hmac.h"
-
-struct ssh_hmac_ctx {
- int alg;
- struct ssh_digest_ctx *ictx;
- struct ssh_digest_ctx *octx;
- struct ssh_digest_ctx *digest;
- u_char *buf;
- size_t buf_len;
-};
-
-size_t
-ssh_hmac_bytes(int alg)
-{
- return ssh_digest_bytes(alg);
-}
-
-struct ssh_hmac_ctx *
-ssh_hmac_start(int alg)
-{
- struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ret;
-
- if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
- return NULL;
- ret->alg = alg;
- if ((ret->ictx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL ||
- (ret->octx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL ||
- (ret->digest = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL)
- goto fail;
- ret->buf_len = ssh_digest_blocksize(ret->ictx);
- if ((ret->buf = calloc(1, ret->buf_len)) == NULL)
- goto fail;
- return ret;
-fail:
- ssh_hmac_free(ret);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-int
-ssh_hmac_init(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *key, size_t klen)
-{
- size_t i;
-
- /* reset ictx and octx if no is key given */
- if (key != NULL) {
- /* truncate long keys */
- if (klen <= ctx->buf_len)
- memcpy(ctx->buf, key, klen);
- else if (ssh_digest_memory(ctx->alg, key, klen, ctx->buf,
- ctx->buf_len) < 0)
- return -1;
- for (i = 0; i < ctx->buf_len; i++)
- ctx->buf[i] ^= 0x36;
- if (ssh_digest_update(ctx->ictx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len) < 0)
- return -1;
- for (i = 0; i < ctx->buf_len; i++)
- ctx->buf[i] ^= 0x36 ^ 0x5c;
- if (ssh_digest_update(ctx->octx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len) < 0)
- return -1;
- explicit_bzero(ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len);
- }
- /* start with ictx */
- if (ssh_digest_copy_state(ctx->ictx, ctx->digest) < 0)
- return -1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-ssh_hmac_update(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
-{
- return ssh_digest_update(ctx->digest, m, mlen);
-}
-
-int
-ssh_hmac_update_buffer(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const Buffer *b)
-{
- return ssh_digest_update_buffer(ctx->digest, b);
-}
-
-int
-ssh_hmac_final(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
-{
- size_t len;
-
- len = ssh_digest_bytes(ctx->alg);
- if (dlen < len ||
- ssh_digest_final(ctx->digest, ctx->buf, len))
- return -1;
- /* switch to octx */
- if (ssh_digest_copy_state(ctx->octx, ctx->digest) < 0 ||
- ssh_digest_update(ctx->digest, ctx->buf, len) < 0 ||
- ssh_digest_final(ctx->digest, d, dlen) < 0)
- return -1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-void
-ssh_hmac_free(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx)
-{
- if (ctx != NULL) {
- ssh_digest_free(ctx->ictx);
- ssh_digest_free(ctx->octx);
- ssh_digest_free(ctx->digest);
- if (ctx->buf) {
- explicit_bzero(ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len);
- free(ctx->buf);
- }
- explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
- free(ctx);
- }
-}
-
-#ifdef TEST
-
-/* cc -DTEST hmac.c digest.c buffer.c cleanup.c fatal.c log.c xmalloc.c -lcrypto */
-static void
-hmac_test(void *key, size_t klen, void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *e, size_t elen)
-{
- struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx;
- size_t i;
- u_char digest[16];
-
- if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL)
- printf("ssh_hmac_start failed");
- if (ssh_hmac_init(ctx, key, klen) < 0 ||
- ssh_hmac_update(ctx, m, mlen) < 0 ||
- ssh_hmac_final(ctx, digest, sizeof(digest)) < 0)
- printf("ssh_hmac_xxx failed");
- ssh_hmac_free(ctx);
-
- if (memcmp(e, digest, elen)) {
- for (i = 0; i < elen; i++)
- printf("[%zd] %2.2x %2.2x\n", i, e[i], digest[i]);
- printf("mismatch\n");
- } else
- printf("ok\n");
-}
-
-int
-main(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- /* try test vectors from RFC 2104 */
-
- u_char key1[16] = {
- 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb,
- 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb };
- u_char *data1 = "Hi There";
- u_char dig1[16] = {
- 0x92, 0x94, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x36, 0x38, 0xbb, 0x1c,
- 0x13, 0xf4, 0x8e, 0xf8, 0x15, 0x8b, 0xfc, 0x9d };
-
- u_char *key2 = "Jefe";
- u_char *data2 = "what do ya want for nothing?";
- u_char dig2[16] = {
- 0x75, 0x0c, 0x78, 0x3e, 0x6a, 0xb0, 0xb5, 0x03,
- 0xea, 0xa8, 0x6e, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x5d, 0xb7, 0x38 };
-
- u_char key3[16];
- u_char data3[50];
- u_char dig3[16] = {
- 0x56, 0xbe, 0x34, 0x52, 0x1d, 0x14, 0x4c, 0x88,
- 0xdb, 0xb8, 0xc7, 0x33, 0xf0, 0xe8, 0xb3, 0xf6 };
- memset(key3, 0xaa, sizeof(key3));
- memset(data3, 0xdd, sizeof(data3));
-
- hmac_test(key1, sizeof(key1), data1, strlen(data1), dig1, sizeof(dig1));
- hmac_test(key2, strlen(key2), data2, strlen(data2), dig2, sizeof(dig2));
- hmac_test(key3, sizeof(key3), data3, sizeof(data3), dig3, sizeof(dig3));
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hmac.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/hmac.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hmac.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hmac.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: hmac.c,v 1.12 2015/03/24 20:03:44 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "hmac.h"
+
+struct ssh_hmac_ctx {
+ int alg;
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx *ictx;
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx *octx;
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx *digest;
+ u_char *buf;
+ size_t buf_len;
+};
+
+size_t
+ssh_hmac_bytes(int alg)
+{
+ return ssh_digest_bytes(alg);
+}
+
+struct ssh_hmac_ctx *
+ssh_hmac_start(int alg)
+{
+ struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ret;
+
+ if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ ret->alg = alg;
+ if ((ret->ictx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL ||
+ (ret->octx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL ||
+ (ret->digest = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+ ret->buf_len = ssh_digest_blocksize(ret->ictx);
+ if ((ret->buf = calloc(1, ret->buf_len)) == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+ return ret;
+fail:
+ ssh_hmac_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_hmac_init(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *key, size_t klen)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* reset ictx and octx if no is key given */
+ if (key != NULL) {
+ /* truncate long keys */
+ if (klen <= ctx->buf_len)
+ memcpy(ctx->buf, key, klen);
+ else if (ssh_digest_memory(ctx->alg, key, klen, ctx->buf,
+ ctx->buf_len) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->buf_len; i++)
+ ctx->buf[i] ^= 0x36;
+ if (ssh_digest_update(ctx->ictx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->buf_len; i++)
+ ctx->buf[i] ^= 0x36 ^ 0x5c;
+ if (ssh_digest_update(ctx->octx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ explicit_bzero(ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len);
+ }
+ /* start with ictx */
+ if (ssh_digest_copy_state(ctx->ictx, ctx->digest) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_hmac_update(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
+{
+ return ssh_digest_update(ctx->digest, m, mlen);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_hmac_update_buffer(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+ return ssh_digest_update_buffer(ctx->digest, b);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_hmac_final(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+ size_t len;
+
+ len = ssh_digest_bytes(ctx->alg);
+ if (dlen < len ||
+ ssh_digest_final(ctx->digest, ctx->buf, len))
+ return -1;
+ /* switch to octx */
+ if (ssh_digest_copy_state(ctx->octx, ctx->digest) < 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_update(ctx->digest, ctx->buf, len) < 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_final(ctx->digest, d, dlen) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_hmac_free(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ ssh_digest_free(ctx->ictx);
+ ssh_digest_free(ctx->octx);
+ ssh_digest_free(ctx->digest);
+ if (ctx->buf) {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len);
+ free(ctx->buf);
+ }
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+ free(ctx);
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef TEST
+
+/* cc -DTEST hmac.c digest.c buffer.c cleanup.c fatal.c log.c xmalloc.c -lcrypto */
+static void
+hmac_test(void *key, size_t klen, void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *e, size_t elen)
+{
+ struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx;
+ size_t i;
+ u_char digest[16];
+
+ if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL)
+ printf("ssh_hmac_start failed");
+ if (ssh_hmac_init(ctx, key, klen) < 0 ||
+ ssh_hmac_update(ctx, m, mlen) < 0 ||
+ ssh_hmac_final(ctx, digest, sizeof(digest)) < 0)
+ printf("ssh_hmac_xxx failed");
+ ssh_hmac_free(ctx);
+
+ if (memcmp(e, digest, elen)) {
+ for (i = 0; i < elen; i++)
+ printf("[%zu] %2.2x %2.2x\n", i, e[i], digest[i]);
+ printf("mismatch\n");
+ } else
+ printf("ok\n");
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ /* try test vectors from RFC 2104 */
+
+ u_char key1[16] = {
+ 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb,
+ 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb };
+ u_char *data1 = "Hi There";
+ u_char dig1[16] = {
+ 0x92, 0x94, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x36, 0x38, 0xbb, 0x1c,
+ 0x13, 0xf4, 0x8e, 0xf8, 0x15, 0x8b, 0xfc, 0x9d };
+
+ u_char *key2 = "Jefe";
+ u_char *data2 = "what do ya want for nothing?";
+ u_char dig2[16] = {
+ 0x75, 0x0c, 0x78, 0x3e, 0x6a, 0xb0, 0xb5, 0x03,
+ 0xea, 0xa8, 0x6e, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x5d, 0xb7, 0x38 };
+
+ u_char key3[16];
+ u_char data3[50];
+ u_char dig3[16] = {
+ 0x56, 0xbe, 0x34, 0x52, 0x1d, 0x14, 0x4c, 0x88,
+ 0xdb, 0xb8, 0xc7, 0x33, 0xf0, 0xe8, 0xb3, 0xf6 };
+ memset(key3, 0xaa, sizeof(key3));
+ memset(data3, 0xdd, sizeof(data3));
+
+ hmac_test(key1, sizeof(key1), data1, strlen(data1), dig1, sizeof(dig1));
+ hmac_test(key2, strlen(key2), data2, strlen(data2), dig2, sizeof(dig2));
+ hmac_test(key3, sizeof(key3), data3, sizeof(data3), dig3, sizeof(dig3));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hmac.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/hmac.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hmac.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hmac.h,v 1.6 2014/01/27 18:58:14 markus Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#ifndef _HMAC_H
-#define _HMAC_H
-
-/* Returns the algorithm's digest length in bytes or 0 for invalid algorithm */
-size_t ssh_hmac_bytes(int alg);
-
-struct ssh_hmac_ctx;
-struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ssh_hmac_start(int alg);
-
-/* Sets the state of the HMAC or resets the state if key == NULL */
-int ssh_hmac_init(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *key, size_t klen)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
-int ssh_hmac_update(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
-int ssh_hmac_update_buffer(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const Buffer *b);
-int ssh_hmac_final(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
-void ssh_hmac_free(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx);
-
-#endif /* _HMAC_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hmac.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/hmac.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hmac.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hmac.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: hmac.h,v 1.9 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _HMAC_H
+#define _HMAC_H
+
+/* Returns the algorithm's digest length in bytes or 0 for invalid algorithm */
+size_t ssh_hmac_bytes(int alg);
+
+struct sshbuf;
+struct ssh_hmac_ctx;
+struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ssh_hmac_start(int alg);
+
+/* Sets the state of the HMAC or resets the state if key == NULL */
+int ssh_hmac_init(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *key, size_t klen)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
+int ssh_hmac_update(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
+int ssh_hmac_update_buffer(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b);
+int ssh_hmac_final(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
+void ssh_hmac_free(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx);
+
+#endif /* _HMAC_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hostfile.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/hostfile.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hostfile.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,489 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.55 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Functions for manipulating the known hosts files.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- *
- * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-
-#include <resolv.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-#include "hmac.h"
-
-struct hostkeys {
- struct hostkey_entry *entries;
- u_int num_entries;
-};
-
-static int
-extract_salt(const char *s, u_int l, u_char *salt, size_t salt_len)
-{
- char *p, *b64salt;
- u_int b64len;
- int ret;
-
- if (l < sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) {
- debug2("extract_salt: string too short");
- return (-1);
- }
- if (strncmp(s, HASH_MAGIC, sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) {
- debug2("extract_salt: invalid magic identifier");
- return (-1);
- }
- s += sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1;
- l -= sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1;
- if ((p = memchr(s, HASH_DELIM, l)) == NULL) {
- debug2("extract_salt: missing salt termination character");
- return (-1);
- }
-
- b64len = p - s;
- /* Sanity check */
- if (b64len == 0 || b64len > 1024) {
- debug2("extract_salt: bad encoded salt length %u", b64len);
- return (-1);
- }
- b64salt = xmalloc(1 + b64len);
- memcpy(b64salt, s, b64len);
- b64salt[b64len] = '\0';
-
- ret = __b64_pton(b64salt, salt, salt_len);
- free(b64salt);
- if (ret == -1) {
- debug2("extract_salt: salt decode error");
- return (-1);
- }
- if (ret != (int)ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) {
- debug2("extract_salt: expected salt len %zd, got %d",
- ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1), ret);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-char *
-host_hash(const char *host, const char *name_from_hostfile, u_int src_len)
-{
- struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx;
- u_char salt[256], result[256];
- char uu_salt[512], uu_result[512];
- static char encoded[1024];
- u_int i, len;
-
- len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
-
- if (name_from_hostfile == NULL) {
- /* Create new salt */
- for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
- salt[i] = arc4random();
- } else {
- /* Extract salt from known host entry */
- if (extract_salt(name_from_hostfile, src_len, salt,
- sizeof(salt)) == -1)
- return (NULL);
- }
-
- if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL ||
- ssh_hmac_init(ctx, salt, len) < 0 ||
- ssh_hmac_update(ctx, host, strlen(host)) < 0 ||
- ssh_hmac_final(ctx, result, sizeof(result)))
- fatal("%s: ssh_hmac failed", __func__);
- ssh_hmac_free(ctx);
-
- if (__b64_ntop(salt, len, uu_salt, sizeof(uu_salt)) == -1 ||
- __b64_ntop(result, len, uu_result, sizeof(uu_result)) == -1)
- fatal("%s: __b64_ntop failed", __func__);
-
- snprintf(encoded, sizeof(encoded), "%s%s%c%s", HASH_MAGIC, uu_salt,
- HASH_DELIM, uu_result);
-
- return (encoded);
-}
-
-/*
- * Parses an RSA (number of bits, e, n) or DSA key from a string. Moves the
- * pointer over the key. Skips any whitespace at the beginning and at end.
- */
-
-int
-hostfile_read_key(char **cpp, int *bitsp, Key *ret)
-{
- char *cp;
-
- /* Skip leading whitespace. */
- for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
- ;
-
- if (key_read(ret, &cp) != 1)
- return 0;
-
- /* Skip trailing whitespace. */
- for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
- ;
-
- /* Return results. */
- *cpp = cp;
- if (bitsp != NULL) {
- if ((*bitsp = key_size(ret)) <= 0)
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int
-hostfile_check_key(int bits, const Key *key, const char *host,
- const char *filename, u_long linenum)
-{
- if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_RSA1 || key->rsa == NULL)
- return 1;
- if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) {
- logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch for host %s: "
- "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
- filename, linenum, host, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
- logit("Warning: replace %d with %d in %s, line %lu.",
- bits, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), filename, linenum);
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static HostkeyMarker
-check_markers(char **cpp)
-{
- char marker[32], *sp, *cp = *cpp;
- int ret = MRK_NONE;
-
- while (*cp == '@') {
- /* Only one marker is allowed */
- if (ret != MRK_NONE)
- return MRK_ERROR;
- /* Markers are terminated by whitespace */
- if ((sp = strchr(cp, ' ')) == NULL &&
- (sp = strchr(cp, '\t')) == NULL)
- return MRK_ERROR;
- /* Extract marker for comparison */
- if (sp <= cp + 1 || sp >= cp + sizeof(marker))
- return MRK_ERROR;
- memcpy(marker, cp, sp - cp);
- marker[sp - cp] = '\0';
- if (strcmp(marker, CA_MARKER) == 0)
- ret = MRK_CA;
- else if (strcmp(marker, REVOKE_MARKER) == 0)
- ret = MRK_REVOKE;
- else
- return MRK_ERROR;
-
- /* Skip past marker and any whitespace that follows it */
- cp = sp;
- for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
- ;
- }
- *cpp = cp;
- return ret;
-}
-
-struct hostkeys *
-init_hostkeys(void)
-{
- struct hostkeys *ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
-
- ret->entries = NULL;
- return ret;
-}
-
-void
-load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *host, const char *path)
-{
- FILE *f;
- char line[8192];
- u_long linenum = 0, num_loaded = 0;
- char *cp, *cp2, *hashed_host;
- HostkeyMarker marker;
- Key *key;
- int kbits;
-
- if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
- return;
- debug3("%s: loading entries for host \"%.100s\" from file \"%s\"",
- __func__, host, path);
- while (read_keyfile_line(f, path, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) == 0) {
- cp = line;
-
- /* Skip any leading whitespace, comments and empty lines. */
- for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
- ;
- if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n')
- continue;
-
- if ((marker = check_markers(&cp)) == MRK_ERROR) {
- verbose("%s: invalid marker at %s:%lu",
- __func__, path, linenum);
- continue;
- }
-
- /* Find the end of the host name portion. */
- for (cp2 = cp; *cp2 && *cp2 != ' ' && *cp2 != '\t'; cp2++)
- ;
-
- /* Check if the host name matches. */
- if (match_hostname(host, cp, (u_int) (cp2 - cp)) != 1) {
- if (*cp != HASH_DELIM)
- continue;
- hashed_host = host_hash(host, cp, (u_int) (cp2 - cp));
- if (hashed_host == NULL) {
- debug("Invalid hashed host line %lu of %s",
- linenum, path);
- continue;
- }
- if (strncmp(hashed_host, cp, (u_int) (cp2 - cp)) != 0)
- continue;
- }
-
- /* Got a match. Skip host name. */
- cp = cp2;
-
- /*
- * Extract the key from the line. This will skip any leading
- * whitespace. Ignore badly formatted lines.
- */
- key = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
- if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, key)) {
- key_free(key);
- key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
- if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, key)) {
- key_free(key);
- continue;
- }
- }
- if (!hostfile_check_key(kbits, key, host, path, linenum))
- continue;
-
- debug3("%s: found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu", __func__,
- marker == MRK_NONE ? "" :
- (marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "),
- key_type(key), path, linenum);
- hostkeys->entries = xrealloc(hostkeys->entries,
- hostkeys->num_entries + 1, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries));
- hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].host = xstrdup(host);
- hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].file = xstrdup(path);
- hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].line = linenum;
- hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].key = key;
- hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].marker = marker;
- hostkeys->num_entries++;
- num_loaded++;
- }
- debug3("%s: loaded %lu keys", __func__, num_loaded);
- fclose(f);
- return;
-}
-
-void
-free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys)
-{
- u_int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
- free(hostkeys->entries[i].host);
- free(hostkeys->entries[i].file);
- key_free(hostkeys->entries[i].key);
- explicit_bzero(hostkeys->entries + i, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries));
- }
- free(hostkeys->entries);
- explicit_bzero(hostkeys, sizeof(*hostkeys));
- free(hostkeys);
-}
-
-static int
-check_key_not_revoked(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *k)
-{
- int is_cert = key_is_cert(k);
- u_int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
- if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != MRK_REVOKE)
- continue;
- if (key_equal_public(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key))
- return -1;
- if (is_cert &&
- key_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key,
- hostkeys->entries[i].key))
- return -1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Match keys against a specified key, or look one up by key type.
- *
- * If looking for a keytype (key == NULL) and one is found then return
- * HOST_FOUND, otherwise HOST_NEW.
- *
- * If looking for a key (key != NULL):
- * 1. If the key is a cert and a matching CA is found, return HOST_OK
- * 2. If the key is not a cert and a matching key is found, return HOST_OK
- * 3. If no key matches but a key with a different type is found, then
- * return HOST_CHANGED
- * 4. If no matching keys are found, then return HOST_NEW.
- *
- * Finally, check any found key is not revoked.
- */
-static HostStatus
-check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys,
- Key *k, int keytype, const struct hostkey_entry **found)
-{
- u_int i;
- HostStatus end_return = HOST_NEW;
- int want_cert = key_is_cert(k);
- HostkeyMarker want_marker = want_cert ? MRK_CA : MRK_NONE;
- int proto = (k ? k->type : keytype) == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2;
-
- if (found != NULL)
- *found = NULL;
-
- for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
- if (proto == 1 && hostkeys->entries[i].key->type != KEY_RSA1)
- continue;
- if (proto == 2 && hostkeys->entries[i].key->type == KEY_RSA1)
- continue;
- if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != want_marker)
- continue;
- if (k == NULL) {
- if (hostkeys->entries[i].key->type != keytype)
- continue;
- end_return = HOST_FOUND;
- if (found != NULL)
- *found = hostkeys->entries + i;
- k = hostkeys->entries[i].key;
- break;
- }
- if (want_cert) {
- if (key_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key,
- hostkeys->entries[i].key)) {
- /* A matching CA exists */
- end_return = HOST_OK;
- if (found != NULL)
- *found = hostkeys->entries + i;
- break;
- }
- } else {
- if (key_equal(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) {
- end_return = HOST_OK;
- if (found != NULL)
- *found = hostkeys->entries + i;
- break;
- }
- /* A non-maching key exists */
- end_return = HOST_CHANGED;
- if (found != NULL)
- *found = hostkeys->entries + i;
- }
- }
- if (check_key_not_revoked(hostkeys, k) != 0) {
- end_return = HOST_REVOKED;
- if (found != NULL)
- *found = NULL;
- }
- return end_return;
-}
-
-HostStatus
-check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *key,
- const struct hostkey_entry **found)
-{
- if (key == NULL)
- fatal("no key to look up");
- return check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, key, 0, found);
-}
-
-int
-lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int keytype,
- const struct hostkey_entry **found)
-{
- return (check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, NULL, keytype,
- found) == HOST_FOUND);
-}
-
-/*
- * Appends an entry to the host file. Returns false if the entry could not
- * be appended.
- */
-
-int
-add_host_to_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, const Key *key,
- int store_hash)
-{
- FILE *f;
- int success = 0;
- char *hashed_host = NULL;
-
- if (key == NULL)
- return 1; /* XXX ? */
- f = fopen(filename, "a");
- if (!f)
- return 0;
-
- if (store_hash) {
- if ((hashed_host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL) {
- error("add_host_to_hostfile: host_hash failed");
- fclose(f);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- fprintf(f, "%s ", store_hash ? hashed_host : host);
-
- if (key_write(key, f)) {
- success = 1;
- } else {
- error("add_host_to_hostfile: saving key in %s failed", filename);
- }
- fprintf(f, "\n");
- fclose(f);
- return success;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hostfile.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/hostfile.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hostfile.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hostfile.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,852 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.66 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Functions for manipulating the known hosts files.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "hmac.h"
+
+struct hostkeys {
+ struct hostkey_entry *entries;
+ u_int num_entries;
+};
+
+/* XXX hmac is too easy to dictionary attack; use bcrypt? */
+
+static int
+extract_salt(const char *s, u_int l, u_char *salt, size_t salt_len)
+{
+ char *p, *b64salt;
+ u_int b64len;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (l < sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) {
+ debug2("extract_salt: string too short");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (strncmp(s, HASH_MAGIC, sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) {
+ debug2("extract_salt: invalid magic identifier");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ s += sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1;
+ l -= sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1;
+ if ((p = memchr(s, HASH_DELIM, l)) == NULL) {
+ debug2("extract_salt: missing salt termination character");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ b64len = p - s;
+ /* Sanity check */
+ if (b64len == 0 || b64len > 1024) {
+ debug2("extract_salt: bad encoded salt length %u", b64len);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ b64salt = xmalloc(1 + b64len);
+ memcpy(b64salt, s, b64len);
+ b64salt[b64len] = '\0';
+
+ ret = __b64_pton(b64salt, salt, salt_len);
+ free(b64salt);
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ debug2("extract_salt: salt decode error");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (ret != (int)ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) {
+ debug2("extract_salt: expected salt len %zd, got %d",
+ ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1), ret);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+char *
+host_hash(const char *host, const char *name_from_hostfile, u_int src_len)
+{
+ struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx;
+ u_char salt[256], result[256];
+ char uu_salt[512], uu_result[512];
+ static char encoded[1024];
+ u_int i, len;
+
+ len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
+
+ if (name_from_hostfile == NULL) {
+ /* Create new salt */
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+ salt[i] = arc4random();
+ } else {
+ /* Extract salt from known host entry */
+ if (extract_salt(name_from_hostfile, src_len, salt,
+ sizeof(salt)) == -1)
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL ||
+ ssh_hmac_init(ctx, salt, len) < 0 ||
+ ssh_hmac_update(ctx, host, strlen(host)) < 0 ||
+ ssh_hmac_final(ctx, result, sizeof(result)))
+ fatal("%s: ssh_hmac failed", __func__);
+ ssh_hmac_free(ctx);
+
+ if (__b64_ntop(salt, len, uu_salt, sizeof(uu_salt)) == -1 ||
+ __b64_ntop(result, len, uu_result, sizeof(uu_result)) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: __b64_ntop failed", __func__);
+
+ snprintf(encoded, sizeof(encoded), "%s%s%c%s", HASH_MAGIC, uu_salt,
+ HASH_DELIM, uu_result);
+
+ return (encoded);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parses an RSA (number of bits, e, n) or DSA key from a string. Moves the
+ * pointer over the key. Skips any whitespace at the beginning and at end.
+ */
+
+int
+hostfile_read_key(char **cpp, u_int *bitsp, struct sshkey *ret)
+{
+ char *cp;
+ int r;
+
+ /* Skip leading whitespace. */
+ for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_read(ret, &cp)) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Skip trailing whitespace. */
+ for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+
+ /* Return results. */
+ *cpp = cp;
+ if (bitsp != NULL)
+ *bitsp = sshkey_size(ret);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static HostkeyMarker
+check_markers(char **cpp)
+{
+ char marker[32], *sp, *cp = *cpp;
+ int ret = MRK_NONE;
+
+ while (*cp == '@') {
+ /* Only one marker is allowed */
+ if (ret != MRK_NONE)
+ return MRK_ERROR;
+ /* Markers are terminated by whitespace */
+ if ((sp = strchr(cp, ' ')) == NULL &&
+ (sp = strchr(cp, '\t')) == NULL)
+ return MRK_ERROR;
+ /* Extract marker for comparison */
+ if (sp <= cp + 1 || sp >= cp + sizeof(marker))
+ return MRK_ERROR;
+ memcpy(marker, cp, sp - cp);
+ marker[sp - cp] = '\0';
+ if (strcmp(marker, CA_MARKER) == 0)
+ ret = MRK_CA;
+ else if (strcmp(marker, REVOKE_MARKER) == 0)
+ ret = MRK_REVOKE;
+ else
+ return MRK_ERROR;
+
+ /* Skip past marker and any whitespace that follows it */
+ cp = sp;
+ for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ }
+ *cpp = cp;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+struct hostkeys *
+init_hostkeys(void)
+{
+ struct hostkeys *ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
+
+ ret->entries = NULL;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+struct load_callback_ctx {
+ const char *host;
+ u_long num_loaded;
+ struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
+};
+
+static int
+record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+{
+ struct load_callback_ctx *ctx = (struct load_callback_ctx *)_ctx;
+ struct hostkeys *hostkeys = ctx->hostkeys;
+ struct hostkey_entry *tmp;
+
+ if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
+ /* XXX make this verbose() in the future */
+ debug("%s:%ld: parse error in hostkeys file",
+ l->path, l->linenum);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ debug3("%s: found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu", __func__,
+ l->marker == MRK_NONE ? "" :
+ (l->marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "),
+ sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum);
+ if ((tmp = reallocarray(hostkeys->entries,
+ hostkeys->num_entries + 1, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries))) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ hostkeys->entries = tmp;
+ hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].host = xstrdup(ctx->host);
+ hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].file = xstrdup(l->path);
+ hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].line = l->linenum;
+ hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].key = l->key;
+ l->key = NULL; /* steal it */
+ hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].marker = l->marker;
+ hostkeys->num_entries++;
+ ctx->num_loaded++;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *host, const char *path)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct load_callback_ctx ctx;
+
+ ctx.host = host;
+ ctx.num_loaded = 0;
+ ctx.hostkeys = hostkeys;
+
+ if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(path, record_hostkey, &ctx, host, NULL,
+ HKF_WANT_MATCH|HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY)) != 0) {
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno != ENOENT)
+ debug("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed for %s: %s",
+ __func__, path, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ if (ctx.num_loaded != 0)
+ debug3("%s: loaded %lu keys from %s", __func__,
+ ctx.num_loaded, host);
+}
+
+void
+free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
+ free(hostkeys->entries[i].host);
+ free(hostkeys->entries[i].file);
+ sshkey_free(hostkeys->entries[i].key);
+ explicit_bzero(hostkeys->entries + i, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries));
+ }
+ free(hostkeys->entries);
+ explicit_bzero(hostkeys, sizeof(*hostkeys));
+ free(hostkeys);
+}
+
+static int
+check_key_not_revoked(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ int is_cert = sshkey_is_cert(k);
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
+ if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != MRK_REVOKE)
+ continue;
+ if (sshkey_equal_public(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key))
+ return -1;
+ if (is_cert &&
+ sshkey_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key,
+ hostkeys->entries[i].key))
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Match keys against a specified key, or look one up by key type.
+ *
+ * If looking for a keytype (key == NULL) and one is found then return
+ * HOST_FOUND, otherwise HOST_NEW.
+ *
+ * If looking for a key (key != NULL):
+ * 1. If the key is a cert and a matching CA is found, return HOST_OK
+ * 2. If the key is not a cert and a matching key is found, return HOST_OK
+ * 3. If no key matches but a key with a different type is found, then
+ * return HOST_CHANGED
+ * 4. If no matching keys are found, then return HOST_NEW.
+ *
+ * Finally, check any found key is not revoked.
+ */
+static HostStatus
+check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys,
+ struct sshkey *k, int keytype, const struct hostkey_entry **found)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ HostStatus end_return = HOST_NEW;
+ int want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(k);
+ HostkeyMarker want_marker = want_cert ? MRK_CA : MRK_NONE;
+ int proto = (k ? k->type : keytype) == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2;
+
+ if (found != NULL)
+ *found = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
+ if (proto == 1 && hostkeys->entries[i].key->type != KEY_RSA1)
+ continue;
+ if (proto == 2 && hostkeys->entries[i].key->type == KEY_RSA1)
+ continue;
+ if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != want_marker)
+ continue;
+ if (k == NULL) {
+ if (hostkeys->entries[i].key->type != keytype)
+ continue;
+ end_return = HOST_FOUND;
+ if (found != NULL)
+ *found = hostkeys->entries + i;
+ k = hostkeys->entries[i].key;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (want_cert) {
+ if (sshkey_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key,
+ hostkeys->entries[i].key)) {
+ /* A matching CA exists */
+ end_return = HOST_OK;
+ if (found != NULL)
+ *found = hostkeys->entries + i;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (sshkey_equal(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) {
+ end_return = HOST_OK;
+ if (found != NULL)
+ *found = hostkeys->entries + i;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* A non-maching key exists */
+ end_return = HOST_CHANGED;
+ if (found != NULL)
+ *found = hostkeys->entries + i;
+ }
+ }
+ if (check_key_not_revoked(hostkeys, k) != 0) {
+ end_return = HOST_REVOKED;
+ if (found != NULL)
+ *found = NULL;
+ }
+ return end_return;
+}
+
+HostStatus
+check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *key,
+ const struct hostkey_entry **found)
+{
+ if (key == NULL)
+ fatal("no key to look up");
+ return check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, key, 0, found);
+}
+
+int
+lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int keytype,
+ const struct hostkey_entry **found)
+{
+ return (check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, NULL, keytype,
+ found) == HOST_FOUND);
+}
+
+static int
+write_host_entry(FILE *f, const char *host, const char *ip,
+ const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash)
+{
+ int r, success = 0;
+ char *hashed_host = NULL;
+
+ if (store_hash) {
+ if ((hashed_host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: host_hash failed", __func__);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ fprintf(f, "%s ", hashed_host);
+ } else if (ip != NULL)
+ fprintf(f, "%s,%s ", host, ip);
+ else
+ fprintf(f, "%s ", host);
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_write(key, f)) == 0)
+ success = 1;
+ else
+ error("%s: sshkey_write failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fputc('\n', f);
+ return success;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Appends an entry to the host file. Returns false if the entry could not
+ * be appended.
+ */
+int
+add_host_to_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host,
+ const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ int success;
+
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return 1; /* XXX ? */
+ f = fopen(filename, "a");
+ if (!f)
+ return 0;
+ success = write_host_entry(f, host, NULL, key, store_hash);
+ fclose(f);
+ return success;
+}
+
+struct host_delete_ctx {
+ FILE *out;
+ int quiet;
+ const char *host;
+ int *skip_keys; /* XXX split for host/ip? might want to ensure both */
+ struct sshkey * const *keys;
+ size_t nkeys;
+ int modified;
+};
+
+static int
+host_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+{
+ struct host_delete_ctx *ctx = (struct host_delete_ctx *)_ctx;
+ int loglevel = ctx->quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) {
+ if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
+ /* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */
+ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX might need a knob for this later */
+ /* Don't remove RSA1 keys */
+ if (l->key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If this line contains one of the keys that we will be
+ * adding later, then don't change it and mark the key for
+ * skipping.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+ if (sshkey_equal(ctx->keys[i], l->key)) {
+ ctx->skip_keys[i] = 1;
+ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+ debug3("%s: %s key already at %s:%ld", __func__,
+ sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke marker, delete it
+ * by *not* writing the line to ctx->out.
+ */
+ do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s:%ld: Removed %s key for host %s",
+ ctx->quiet ? __func__ : "", ctx->quiet ? ": " : "",
+ l->path, l->linenum, sshkey_type(l->key), ctx->host);
+ ctx->modified = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Retain non-matching hosts and invalid lines when deleting */
+ if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
+ do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s:%ld: invalid known_hosts entry",
+ ctx->quiet ? __func__ : "", ctx->quiet ? ": " : "",
+ l->path, l->linenum);
+ }
+ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+hostfile_replace_entries(const char *filename, const char *host, const char *ip,
+ struct sshkey **keys, size_t nkeys, int store_hash, int quiet, int hash_alg)
+{
+ int r, fd, oerrno = 0;
+ int loglevel = quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
+ struct host_delete_ctx ctx;
+ char *fp, *temp = NULL, *back = NULL;
+ mode_t omask;
+ size_t i;
+
+ omask = umask(077);
+
+ memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+ ctx.host = host;
+ ctx.quiet = quiet;
+ if ((ctx.skip_keys = calloc(nkeys, sizeof(*ctx.skip_keys))) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ ctx.keys = keys;
+ ctx.nkeys = nkeys;
+ ctx.modified = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Prepare temporary file for in-place deletion.
+ */
+ if ((r = asprintf(&temp, "%s.XXXXXXXXXXX", filename)) < 0 ||
+ (r = asprintf(&back, "%s.old", filename)) < 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if ((fd = mkstemp(temp)) == -1) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error("%s: mkstemp: %s", __func__, strerror(oerrno));
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ close(fd);
+ error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(oerrno));
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* Remove all entries for the specified host from the file */
+ if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(filename, host_delete, &ctx, host, ip,
+ HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* Add the requested keys */
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+ if (ctx.skip_keys[i])
+ continue;
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], hash_alg,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ do_log2(loglevel, "%s%sAdding new key for %s to %s: %s %s",
+ quiet ? __func__ : "", quiet ? ": " : "", host, filename,
+ sshkey_ssh_name(keys[i]), fp);
+ free(fp);
+ if (!write_host_entry(ctx.out, host, ip, keys[i], store_hash)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ ctx.modified = 1;
+ }
+ fclose(ctx.out);
+ ctx.out = NULL;
+
+ if (ctx.modified) {
+ /* Backup the original file and replace it with the temporary */
+ if (unlink(back) == -1 && errno != ENOENT) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error("%s: unlink %.100s: %s", __func__,
+ back, strerror(errno));
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (link(filename, back) == -1) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error("%s: link %.100s to %.100s: %s", __func__,
+ filename, back, strerror(errno));
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (rename(temp, filename) == -1) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error("%s: rename \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", __func__,
+ temp, filename, strerror(errno));
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* No changes made; just delete the temporary file */
+ if (unlink(temp) != 0)
+ error("%s: unlink \"%s\": %s", __func__,
+ temp, strerror(errno));
+ }
+
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ fail:
+ if (temp != NULL && r != 0)
+ unlink(temp);
+ free(temp);
+ free(back);
+ if (ctx.out != NULL)
+ fclose(ctx.out);
+ free(ctx.skip_keys);
+ umask(omask);
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+match_maybe_hashed(const char *host, const char *names, int *was_hashed)
+{
+ int hashed = *names == HASH_DELIM;
+ const char *hashed_host;
+ size_t nlen = strlen(names);
+
+ if (was_hashed != NULL)
+ *was_hashed = hashed;
+ if (hashed) {
+ if ((hashed_host = host_hash(host, names, nlen)) == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ return nlen == strlen(hashed_host) &&
+ strncmp(hashed_host, names, nlen) == 0;
+ }
+ return match_hostname(host, names) == 1;
+}
+
+int
+hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx,
+ const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char line[8192], oline[8192], ktype[128];
+ u_long linenum = 0;
+ char *cp, *cp2;
+ u_int kbits;
+ int hashed;
+ int s, r = 0;
+ struct hostkey_foreach_line lineinfo;
+ size_t l;
+
+ memset(&lineinfo, 0, sizeof(lineinfo));
+ if (host == NULL && (options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+
+ debug3("%s: reading file \"%s\"", __func__, path);
+ while (read_keyfile_line(f, path, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) == 0) {
+ line[strcspn(line, "\n")] = '\0';
+ strlcpy(oline, line, sizeof(oline));
+
+ sshkey_free(lineinfo.key);
+ memset(&lineinfo, 0, sizeof(lineinfo));
+ lineinfo.path = path;
+ lineinfo.linenum = linenum;
+ lineinfo.line = oline;
+ lineinfo.marker = MRK_NONE;
+ lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_OK;
+ lineinfo.keytype = KEY_UNSPEC;
+
+ /* Skip any leading whitespace, comments and empty lines. */
+ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') {
+ if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) == 0) {
+ lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_COMMENT;
+ if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if ((lineinfo.marker = check_markers(&cp)) == MRK_ERROR) {
+ verbose("%s: invalid marker at %s:%lu",
+ __func__, path, linenum);
+ if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) == 0)
+ goto bad;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Find the end of the host name portion. */
+ for (cp2 = cp; *cp2 && *cp2 != ' ' && *cp2 != '\t'; cp2++)
+ ;
+ lineinfo.hosts = cp;
+ *cp2++ = '\0';
+
+ /* Check if the host name matches. */
+ if (host != NULL) {
+ if ((s = match_maybe_hashed(host, lineinfo.hosts,
+ &hashed)) == -1) {
+ debug2("%s: %s:%ld: bad host hash \"%.32s\"",
+ __func__, path, linenum, lineinfo.hosts);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ if (s == 1) {
+ lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED;
+ lineinfo.match |= HKF_MATCH_HOST |
+ (hashed ? HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED : 0);
+ }
+ /* Try matching IP address if supplied */
+ if (ip != NULL) {
+ if ((s = match_maybe_hashed(ip, lineinfo.hosts,
+ &hashed)) == -1) {
+ debug2("%s: %s:%ld: bad ip hash "
+ "\"%.32s\"", __func__, path,
+ linenum, lineinfo.hosts);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ if (s == 1) {
+ lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED;
+ lineinfo.match |= HKF_MATCH_IP |
+ (hashed ? HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED : 0);
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Skip this line if host matching requested and
+ * neither host nor address matched.
+ */
+ if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0 &&
+ lineinfo.status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED)
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Got a match. Skip host name and any following whitespace */
+ for (; *cp2 == ' ' || *cp2 == '\t'; cp2++)
+ ;
+ if (*cp2 == '\0' || *cp2 == '#') {
+ debug2("%s:%ld: truncated before key type",
+ path, linenum);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ lineinfo.rawkey = cp = cp2;
+
+ if ((options & HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * Extract the key from the line. This will skip
+ * any leading whitespace. Ignore badly formatted
+ * lines.
+ */
+ if ((lineinfo.key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, lineinfo.key)) {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ sshkey_free(lineinfo.key);
+ lineinfo.key = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1);
+ if (lineinfo.key == NULL) {
+ error("%s: sshkey_new fail", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits,
+ lineinfo.key))
+ goto bad;
+#else
+ goto bad;
+#endif
+ }
+ lineinfo.keytype = lineinfo.key->type;
+ lineinfo.comment = cp;
+ } else {
+ /* Extract and parse key type */
+ l = strcspn(lineinfo.rawkey, " \t");
+ if (l <= 1 || l >= sizeof(ktype) ||
+ lineinfo.rawkey[l] == '\0')
+ goto bad;
+ memcpy(ktype, lineinfo.rawkey, l);
+ ktype[l] = '\0';
+ lineinfo.keytype = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype);
+
+ /*
+ * Assume RSA1 if the first component is a short
+ * decimal number.
+ */
+ if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC && l < 8 &&
+ strspn(ktype, "0123456789") == l)
+ lineinfo.keytype = KEY_RSA1;
+
+ /*
+ * Check that something other than whitespace follows
+ * the key type. This won't catch all corruption, but
+ * it does catch trivial truncation.
+ */
+ cp2 += l; /* Skip past key type */
+ for (; *cp2 == ' ' || *cp2 == '\t'; cp2++)
+ ;
+ if (*cp2 == '\0' || *cp2 == '#') {
+ debug2("%s:%ld: truncated after key type",
+ path, linenum);
+ lineinfo.keytype = KEY_UNSPEC;
+ }
+ if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+ bad:
+ sshkey_free(lineinfo.key);
+ lineinfo.key = NULL;
+ lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_INVALID;
+ if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0)
+ break;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ sshkey_free(lineinfo.key);
+ fclose(f);
+ return r;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hostfile.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/hostfile.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hostfile.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.20 2013/07/12 00:19:58 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-#ifndef HOSTFILE_H
-#define HOSTFILE_H
-
-typedef enum {
- HOST_OK, HOST_NEW, HOST_CHANGED, HOST_REVOKED, HOST_FOUND
-} HostStatus;
-
-typedef enum {
- MRK_ERROR, MRK_NONE, MRK_REVOKE, MRK_CA
-} HostkeyMarker;
-
-struct hostkey_entry {
- char *host;
- char *file;
- u_long line;
- Key *key;
- HostkeyMarker marker;
-};
-struct hostkeys;
-
-struct hostkeys *init_hostkeys(void);
-void load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, const char *, const char *);
-void free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *);
-
-HostStatus check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, Key *,
- const struct hostkey_entry **);
-int lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *, int,
- const struct hostkey_entry **);
-
-int hostfile_read_key(char **, int *, Key *);
-int add_host_to_hostfile(const char *, const char *, const Key *, int);
-
-#define HASH_MAGIC "|1|"
-#define HASH_DELIM '|'
-
-#define CA_MARKER "@cert-authority"
-#define REVOKE_MARKER "@revoked"
-
-char *host_hash(const char *, const char *, u_int);
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hostfile.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/hostfile.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hostfile.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/hostfile.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.24 2015/02/16 22:08:57 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+#ifndef HOSTFILE_H
+#define HOSTFILE_H
+
+typedef enum {
+ HOST_OK, HOST_NEW, HOST_CHANGED, HOST_REVOKED, HOST_FOUND
+} HostStatus;
+
+typedef enum {
+ MRK_ERROR, MRK_NONE, MRK_REVOKE, MRK_CA
+} HostkeyMarker;
+
+struct hostkey_entry {
+ char *host;
+ char *file;
+ u_long line;
+ struct sshkey *key;
+ HostkeyMarker marker;
+};
+struct hostkeys;
+
+struct hostkeys *init_hostkeys(void);
+void load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, const char *, const char *);
+void free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *);
+
+HostStatus check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, struct sshkey *,
+ const struct hostkey_entry **);
+int lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *, int,
+ const struct hostkey_entry **);
+
+int hostfile_read_key(char **, u_int *, struct sshkey *);
+int add_host_to_hostfile(const char *, const char *,
+ const struct sshkey *, int);
+
+int hostfile_replace_entries(const char *filename,
+ const char *host, const char *ip, struct sshkey **keys, size_t nkeys,
+ int store_hash, int quiet, int hash_alg);
+
+#define HASH_MAGIC "|1|"
+#define HASH_DELIM '|'
+
+#define CA_MARKER "@cert-authority"
+#define REVOKE_MARKER "@revoked"
+
+char *host_hash(const char *, const char *, u_int);
+
+/*
+ * Iterate through a hostkeys file, optionally parsing keys and matching
+ * hostnames. Allows access to the raw keyfile lines to allow
+ * streaming edits to the file to take place.
+ */
+#define HKF_WANT_MATCH (1) /* return only matching hosts/addrs */
+#define HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY (1<<1) /* need key parsed */
+
+#define HKF_STATUS_OK 0 /* Line parsed, didn't match host */
+#define HKF_STATUS_INVALID 1 /* line had parse error */
+#define HKF_STATUS_COMMENT 2 /* valid line contained no key */
+#define HKF_STATUS_MATCHED 3 /* hostname or IP matched */
+
+#define HKF_MATCH_HOST (1) /* hostname matched */
+#define HKF_MATCH_IP (1<<1) /* address matched */
+#define HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED (1<<2) /* hostname was hashed */
+#define HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED (1<<3) /* address was hashed */
+/* XXX HKF_MATCH_KEY_TYPE? */
+
+/*
+ * The callback function receives this as an argument for each matching
+ * hostkey line. The callback may "steal" the 'key' field by setting it to NULL.
+ * If a parse error occurred, then "hosts" and subsequent options may be NULL.
+ */
+struct hostkey_foreach_line {
+ const char *path; /* Path of file */
+ u_long linenum; /* Line number */
+ u_int status; /* One of HKF_STATUS_* */
+ u_int match; /* Zero or more of HKF_MATCH_* OR'd together */
+ char *line; /* Entire key line; mutable by callback */
+ int marker; /* CA/revocation markers; indicated by MRK_* value */
+ const char *hosts; /* Raw hosts text, may be hashed or list multiple */
+ const char *rawkey; /* Text of key and any comment following it */
+ int keytype; /* Type of key; KEY_UNSPEC for invalid/comment lines */
+ struct sshkey *key; /* Key, if parsed ok and HKF_WANT_MATCH_HOST set */
+ const char *comment; /* Any comment following the key */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Callback fires for each line (or matching line if a HKF_WANT_* option
+ * is set). The foreach loop will terminate if the callback returns a non-
+ * zero exit status.
+ */
+typedef int hostkeys_foreach_fn(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *ctx);
+
+/* Iterate over a hostkeys file */
+int hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx,
+ const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options);
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/includes.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/includes.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/includes.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: includes.h,v 1.54 2006/07/22 20:48:23 stevesk Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * This file includes most of the needed system headers.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#ifndef INCLUDES_H
-#define INCLUDES_H
-
-#include "config.h"
-
-#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
-#define _GNU_SOURCE /* activate extra prototypes for glibc */
-#endif
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h> /* For CMSG_* */
-
-#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
-# include <limits.h> /* For PATH_MAX */
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_BSTRING_H
-# include <bstring.h>
-#endif
-#if defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) && defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) && \
- defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) && defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) && \
- defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) && HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH != 0 && \
- !defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
-# include <glob.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
-# include <endian.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_TTYENT_H
-# include <ttyent.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_UTIME_H
-# include <utime.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
-# include <maillock.h> /* For _PATH_MAILDIR */
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_NEXT
-# include <libc.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
-
-/*
- *-*-nto-qnx needs these headers for strcasecmp and LASTLOG_FILE respectively
- */
-#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
-# include <strings.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
-# include <login.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
-# include <utmp.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
-# include <utmpx.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
-# include <lastlog.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
-# include <sys/select.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H
-# include <sys/bsdtty.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
-# include <stdint.h>
-#endif
-#include <termios.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
-# include <sys/bitypes.h> /* For u_intXX_t */
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H
-# include <sys/cdefs.h> /* For __P() */
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
-# include <sys/stat.h> /* For S_* constants and macros */
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
-# include <sys/sysmacros.h> /* For MIN, MAX, etc */
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
-#include <sys/mman.h> /* for MAP_ANONYMOUS */
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H
-#include <sys/strtio.h> /* for TIOCCBRK on HP-UX */
-#endif
-#if defined(HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H) && defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX)
-# if defined(HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H)
-# include <sys/stream.h> /* reqd for queue_t on Solaris 2.5.1 */
-# endif
-#include <sys/ptms.h> /* for grantpt() and friends */
-#endif
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <netinet/in_systm.h> /* For typedefs */
-#ifdef HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H
-# include <rpc/types.h> /* For INADDR_LOOPBACK */
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
-# include <security/pam_appl.h>
-#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
-# include <pam/pam_appl.h>
-#endif
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H
-# include <readpassphrase.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_IA_H
-# include <ia.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_IAF_H
-# include <iaf.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_TMPDIR_H
-# include <tmpdir.h>
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HAVE_BSD_LIBUTIL_H)
-# include <bsd/libutil.h>
-#elif defined(HAVE_LIBUTIL_H)
-# include <libutil.h>
-#endif
-
-#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
-# include <krb5.h>
-# include <kafs.h>
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H)
-# include <sys/syslog.h>
-#endif
-
-#include <errno.h>
-
-/*
- * On HP-UX 11.11, shadow.h and prot.h provide conflicting declarations
- * of getspnam when _INCLUDE__STDC__ is defined, so we unset it here.
- */
-#ifdef GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS
-# ifdef _INCLUDE__STDC__
-# undef _INCLUDE__STDC__
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h> /* For OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
-
-#include "defines.h"
-
-#include "platform.h"
-#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
-#include "openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h"
-
-#include "entropy.h"
-
-#endif /* INCLUDES_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/includes.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/includes.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/includes.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/includes.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: includes.h,v 1.54 2006/07/22 20:48:23 stevesk Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * This file includes most of the needed system headers.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef INCLUDES_H
+#define INCLUDES_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
+#define _GNU_SOURCE /* activate extra prototypes for glibc */
+#endif
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h> /* For CMSG_* */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
+# include <limits.h> /* For PATH_MAX, _POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_BSTRING_H
+# include <bstring.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
+# include <endian.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_TTYENT_H
+# include <ttyent.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIME_H
+# include <utime.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
+# include <maillock.h> /* For _PATH_MAILDIR */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_NEXT
+# include <libc.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ *-*-nto-qnx needs these headers for strcasecmp and LASTLOG_FILE respectively
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
+# include <strings.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
+# include <login.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
+# include <utmp.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+# include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+# include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H
+# include <sys/bsdtty.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <termios.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
+# include <sys/bitypes.h> /* For u_intXX_t */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H
+# include <sys/cdefs.h> /* For __P() */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h> /* For S_* constants and macros */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+# include <sys/sysmacros.h> /* For MIN, MAX, etc */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
+#include <sys/mman.h> /* for MAP_ANONYMOUS */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H
+#include <sys/strtio.h> /* for TIOCCBRK on HP-UX */
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H) && defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX)
+# if defined(HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H)
+# include <sys/stream.h> /* reqd for queue_t on Solaris 2.5.1 */
+# endif
+#include <sys/ptms.h> /* for grantpt() and friends */
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/in_systm.h> /* For typedefs */
+#ifdef HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H
+# include <rpc/types.h> /* For INADDR_LOOPBACK */
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
+# include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
+# include <pam/pam_appl.h>
+#endif
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H
+# include <readpassphrase.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_IA_H
+# include <ia.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_IAF_H
+# include <iaf.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_TMPDIR_H
+# include <tmpdir.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_BSD_LIBUTIL_H)
+# include <bsd/libutil.h>
+#elif defined(HAVE_LIBUTIL_H)
+# include <libutil.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
+# include <krb5.h>
+# include <kafs.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H)
+# include <sys/syslog.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+
+/*
+ * On HP-UX 11.11, shadow.h and prot.h provide conflicting declarations
+ * of getspnam when _INCLUDE__STDC__ is defined, so we unset it here.
+ */
+#ifdef GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS
+# ifdef _INCLUDE__STDC__
+# undef _INCLUDE__STDC__
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h> /* For OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+#endif
+
+#include "defines.h"
+
+#include "platform.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h"
+
+#include "entropy.h"
+
+#endif /* INCLUDES_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kex.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kex.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kex.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,689 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.98 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/param.h>
-
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "mac.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "monitor.h"
-#include "roaming.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
-# if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
-# define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
-# else
-extern const EVP_MD *evp_ssh_sha256(void);
-# endif
-#endif
-
-/* prototype */
-static void kex_kexinit_finish(Kex *);
-static void kex_choose_conf(Kex *);
-
-struct kexalg {
- char *name;
- int type;
- int ec_nid;
- int hash_alg;
-};
-static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
- { KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
- { KEX_DH14, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
- { KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
- { KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
-#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
- NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
- { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1,
- SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 },
-# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
- { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1,
- SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
-# endif
-#endif
- { KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
- { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
-#endif
- { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
-};
-
-char *
-kex_alg_list(char sep)
-{
- char *ret = NULL;
- size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
- const struct kexalg *k;
-
- for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
- if (ret != NULL)
- ret[rlen++] = sep;
- nlen = strlen(k->name);
- ret = xrealloc(ret, 1, rlen + nlen + 2);
- memcpy(ret + rlen, k->name, nlen + 1);
- rlen += nlen;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-static const struct kexalg *
-kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
-{
- const struct kexalg *k;
-
- for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
- if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
- return k;
- }
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/* Validate KEX method name list */
-int
-kex_names_valid(const char *names)
-{
- char *s, *cp, *p;
-
- if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
- return 0;
- s = cp = xstrdup(names);
- for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
- (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
- if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
- error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
- free(s);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- debug3("kex names ok: [%s]", names);
- free(s);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* put algorithm proposal into buffer */
-static void
-kex_prop2buf(Buffer *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
-{
- u_int i;
-
- buffer_clear(b);
- /*
- * add a dummy cookie, the cookie will be overwritten by
- * kex_send_kexinit(), each time a kexinit is set
- */
- for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
- buffer_put_char(b, 0);
- for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
- buffer_put_cstring(b, proposal[i]);
- buffer_put_char(b, 0); /* first_kex_packet_follows */
- buffer_put_int(b, 0); /* uint32 reserved */
-}
-
-/* parse buffer and return algorithm proposal */
-static char **
-kex_buf2prop(Buffer *raw, int *first_kex_follows)
-{
- Buffer b;
- u_int i;
- char **proposal;
-
- proposal = xcalloc(PROPOSAL_MAX, sizeof(char *));
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, buffer_ptr(raw), buffer_len(raw));
- /* skip cookie */
- for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
- buffer_get_char(&b);
- /* extract kex init proposal strings */
- for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
- proposal[i] = buffer_get_cstring(&b,NULL);
- debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: %s", proposal[i]);
- }
- /* first kex follows / reserved */
- i = buffer_get_char(&b);
- if (first_kex_follows != NULL)
- *first_kex_follows = i;
- debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: first_kex_follows %d ", i);
- i = buffer_get_int(&b);
- debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: reserved %u ", i);
- buffer_free(&b);
- return proposal;
-}
-
-static void
-kex_prop_free(char **proposal)
-{
- u_int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
- free(proposal[i]);
- free(proposal);
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void
-kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- error("Hm, kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
-}
-
-static void
-kex_reset_dispatch(void)
-{
- dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN,
- SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX, &kex_protocol_error);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
-}
-
-void
-kex_finish(Kex *kex)
-{
- kex_reset_dispatch();
-
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
- packet_send();
- /* packet_write_wait(); */
- debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
-
- debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS");
- packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
- packet_check_eom();
- debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received");
-
- kex->done = 1;
- buffer_clear(&kex->peer);
- /* buffer_clear(&kex->my); */
- kex->flags &= ~KEX_INIT_SENT;
- free(kex->name);
- kex->name = NULL;
-}
-
-void
-kex_send_kexinit(Kex *kex)
-{
- u_int32_t rnd = 0;
- u_char *cookie;
- u_int i;
-
- if (kex == NULL) {
- error("kex_send_kexinit: no kex, cannot rekey");
- return;
- }
- if (kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT) {
- debug("KEX_INIT_SENT");
- return;
- }
- kex->done = 0;
-
- /* generate a random cookie */
- if (buffer_len(&kex->my) < KEX_COOKIE_LEN)
- fatal("kex_send_kexinit: kex proposal too short");
- cookie = buffer_ptr(&kex->my);
- for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) {
- if (i % 4 == 0)
- rnd = arc4random();
- cookie[i] = rnd;
- rnd >>= 8;
- }
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
- packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my));
- packet_send();
- debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT sent");
- kex->flags |= KEX_INIT_SENT;
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- char *ptr;
- u_int i, dlen;
- Kex *kex = (Kex *)ctxt;
-
- debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
- if (kex == NULL)
- fatal("kex_input_kexinit: no kex, cannot rekey");
-
- ptr = packet_get_raw(&dlen);
- buffer_append(&kex->peer, ptr, dlen);
-
- /* discard packet */
- for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
- packet_get_char();
- for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
- free(packet_get_string(NULL));
- /*
- * XXX RFC4253 sec 7: "each side MAY guess" - currently no supported
- * KEX method has the server move first, but a server might be using
- * a custom method or one that we otherwise don't support. We should
- * be prepared to remember first_kex_follows here so we can eat a
- * packet later.
- * XXX2 - RFC4253 is kind of ambiguous on what first_kex_follows means
- * for cases where the server *doesn't* go first. I guess we should
- * ignore it when it is set for these cases, which is what we do now.
- */
- (void) packet_get_char(); /* first_kex_follows */
- (void) packet_get_int(); /* reserved */
- packet_check_eom();
-
- kex_kexinit_finish(kex);
-}
-
-Kex *
-kex_setup(char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
-{
- Kex *kex;
-
- kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
- buffer_init(&kex->peer);
- buffer_init(&kex->my);
- kex_prop2buf(&kex->my, proposal);
- kex->done = 0;
-
- kex_send_kexinit(kex); /* we start */
- kex_reset_dispatch();
-
- return kex;
-}
-
-static void
-kex_kexinit_finish(Kex *kex)
-{
- if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
- kex_send_kexinit(kex);
-
- kex_choose_conf(kex);
-
- if (kex->kex_type >= 0 && kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX &&
- kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL) {
- (kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(kex);
- } else {
- fatal("Unsupported key exchange %d", kex->kex_type);
- }
-}
-
-static void
-choose_enc(Enc *enc, char *client, char *server)
-{
- char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
- if (name == NULL)
- fatal("no matching cipher found: client %s server %s",
- client, server);
- if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL)
- fatal("matching cipher is not supported: %s", name);
- enc->name = name;
- enc->enabled = 0;
- enc->iv = NULL;
- enc->iv_len = cipher_ivlen(enc->cipher);
- enc->key = NULL;
- enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher);
- enc->block_size = cipher_blocksize(enc->cipher);
-}
-
-static void
-choose_mac(Mac *mac, char *client, char *server)
-{
- char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
- if (name == NULL)
- fatal("no matching mac found: client %s server %s",
- client, server);
- if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0)
- fatal("unsupported mac %s", name);
- /* truncate the key */
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_HMAC)
- mac->key_len = 16;
- mac->name = name;
- mac->key = NULL;
- mac->enabled = 0;
-}
-
-static void
-choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server)
-{
- char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
- if (name == NULL)
- fatal("no matching comp found: client %s server %s", client, server);
- if (strcmp(name, "zlib at openssh.com") == 0) {
- comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
- } else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
- comp->type = COMP_ZLIB;
- } else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
- comp->type = COMP_NONE;
- } else {
- fatal("unsupported comp %s", name);
- }
- comp->name = name;
-}
-
-static void
-choose_kex(Kex *k, char *client, char *server)
-{
- const struct kexalg *kexalg;
-
- k->name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
- if (k->name == NULL)
- fatal("Unable to negotiate a key exchange method");
- if ((kexalg = kex_alg_by_name(k->name)) == NULL)
- fatal("unsupported kex alg %s", k->name);
- k->kex_type = kexalg->type;
- k->hash_alg = kexalg->hash_alg;
- k->ec_nid = kexalg->ec_nid;
-}
-
-static void
-choose_hostkeyalg(Kex *k, char *client, char *server)
-{
- char *hostkeyalg = match_list(client, server, NULL);
- if (hostkeyalg == NULL)
- fatal("no hostkey alg");
- k->hostkey_type = key_type_from_name(hostkeyalg);
- if (k->hostkey_type == KEY_UNSPEC)
- fatal("bad hostkey alg '%s'", hostkeyalg);
- free(hostkeyalg);
-}
-
-static int
-proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
-{
- static int check[] = {
- PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS, PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS, -1
- };
- int *idx;
- char *p;
-
- for (idx = &check[0]; *idx != -1; idx++) {
- if ((p = strchr(my[*idx], ',')) != NULL)
- *p = '\0';
- if ((p = strchr(peer[*idx], ',')) != NULL)
- *p = '\0';
- if (strcmp(my[*idx], peer[*idx]) != 0) {
- debug2("proposal mismatch: my %s peer %s",
- my[*idx], peer[*idx]);
- return (0);
- }
- }
- debug2("proposals match");
- return (1);
-}
-
-static void
-kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
-{
- Newkeys *newkeys;
- char **my, **peer;
- char **cprop, **sprop;
- int nenc, nmac, ncomp;
- u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen;
- int first_kex_follows, type;
-
- my = kex_buf2prop(&kex->my, NULL);
- peer = kex_buf2prop(&kex->peer, &first_kex_follows);
-
- if (kex->server) {
- cprop=peer;
- sprop=my;
- } else {
- cprop=my;
- sprop=peer;
- }
-
- /* Check whether server offers roaming */
- if (!kex->server) {
- char *roaming;
- roaming = match_list(KEX_RESUME, peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
- if (roaming) {
- kex->roaming = 1;
- free(roaming);
- }
- }
-
- /* Algorithm Negotiation */
- for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
- newkeys = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*newkeys));
- kex->newkeys[mode] = newkeys;
- ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) ||
- (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
- nenc = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC;
- nmac = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC;
- ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC;
- choose_enc(&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc], sprop[nenc]);
- /* ignore mac for authenticated encryption */
- authlen = cipher_authlen(newkeys->enc.cipher);
- if (authlen == 0)
- choose_mac(&newkeys->mac, cprop[nmac], sprop[nmac]);
- choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp], sprop[ncomp]);
- debug("kex: %s %s %s %s",
- ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client",
- newkeys->enc.name,
- authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
- newkeys->comp.name);
- }
- choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
- choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
- sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]);
- need = dh_need = 0;
- for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
- newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode];
- need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.key_len);
- need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.block_size);
- need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
- need = MAX(need, newkeys->mac.key_len);
- dh_need = MAX(dh_need, cipher_seclen(newkeys->enc.cipher));
- dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size);
- dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
- dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len);
- }
- /* XXX need runden? */
- kex->we_need = need;
- kex->dh_need = dh_need;
-
- /* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */
- if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer) &&
- !(datafellows & SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX)) {
- type = packet_read();
- debug2("skipping next packet (type %u)", type);
- }
-
- kex_prop_free(my);
- kex_prop_free(peer);
-}
-
-static u_char *
-derive_key(Kex *kex, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
- const u_char *shared_secret, u_int slen)
-{
- Buffer b;
- struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx;
- char c = id;
- u_int have;
- size_t mdsz;
- u_char *digest;
-
- if ((mdsz = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0)
- fatal("bad kex md size %zu", mdsz);
- digest = xmalloc(roundup(need, mdsz));
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, shared_secret, slen);
-
- /* K1 = HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id) */
- if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: ssh_digest_start failed", __func__);
- if (ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, &b) != 0 ||
- ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 ||
- ssh_digest_update(hashctx, &c, 1) != 0 ||
- ssh_digest_update(hashctx, kex->session_id,
- kex->session_id_len) != 0)
- fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update failed", __func__);
- if (ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest, mdsz) != 0)
- fatal("%s: ssh_digest_final failed", __func__);
- ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
-
- /*
- * expand key:
- * Kn = HASH(K || H || K1 || K2 || ... || Kn-1)
- * Key = K1 || K2 || ... || Kn
- */
- for (have = mdsz; need > have; have += mdsz) {
- if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: ssh_digest_start failed", __func__);
- if (ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, &b) != 0 ||
- ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 ||
- ssh_digest_update(hashctx, digest, have) != 0)
- fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update failed", __func__);
- if (ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest + have, mdsz) != 0)
- fatal("%s: ssh_digest_final failed", __func__);
- ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
- }
- buffer_free(&b);
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
- fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", c);
- dump_digest("key", digest, need);
-#endif
- return digest;
-}
-
-Newkeys *current_keys[MODE_MAX];
-
-#define NKEYS 6
-void
-kex_derive_keys(Kex *kex, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
- const u_char *shared_secret, u_int slen)
-{
- u_char *keys[NKEYS];
- u_int i, mode, ctos;
-
- for (i = 0; i < NKEYS; i++) {
- keys[i] = derive_key(kex, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, hashlen,
- shared_secret, slen);
- }
-
- debug2("kex_derive_keys");
- for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
- current_keys[mode] = kex->newkeys[mode];
- kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
- ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) ||
- (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
- current_keys[mode]->enc.iv = keys[ctos ? 0 : 1];
- current_keys[mode]->enc.key = keys[ctos ? 2 : 3];
- current_keys[mode]->mac.key = keys[ctos ? 4 : 5];
- }
-}
-
-void
-kex_derive_keys_bn(Kex *kex, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, const BIGNUM *secret)
-{
- Buffer shared_secret;
-
- buffer_init(&shared_secret);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&shared_secret, secret);
- kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen,
- buffer_ptr(&shared_secret), buffer_len(&shared_secret));
- buffer_free(&shared_secret);
-}
-
-Newkeys *
-kex_get_newkeys(int mode)
-{
- Newkeys *ret;
-
- ret = current_keys[mode];
- current_keys[mode] = NULL;
- return ret;
-}
-
-void
-derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *host_modulus, BIGNUM *server_modulus,
- u_int8_t cookie[8], u_int8_t id[16])
-{
- u_int8_t nbuf[2048], obuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
- int len;
- struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx;
-
- if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: ssh_digest_start", __func__);
-
- len = BN_num_bytes(host_modulus);
- if (len < (512 / 8) || (u_int)len > sizeof(nbuf))
- fatal("%s: bad host modulus (len %d)", __func__, len);
- BN_bn2bin(host_modulus, nbuf);
- if (ssh_digest_update(hashctx, nbuf, len) != 0)
- fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update failed", __func__);
-
- len = BN_num_bytes(server_modulus);
- if (len < (512 / 8) || (u_int)len > sizeof(nbuf))
- fatal("%s: bad server modulus (len %d)", __func__, len);
- BN_bn2bin(server_modulus, nbuf);
- if (ssh_digest_update(hashctx, nbuf, len) != 0 ||
- ssh_digest_update(hashctx, cookie, 8) != 0)
- fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update failed", __func__);
- if (ssh_digest_final(hashctx, obuf, sizeof(obuf)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: ssh_digest_final failed", __func__);
- memcpy(id, obuf, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5));
-
- explicit_bzero(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf));
- explicit_bzero(obuf, sizeof(obuf));
-}
-
-#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
-void
-dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, int len)
-{
- int i;
-
- fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg);
- for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%02x", digest[i]);
- if (i%32 == 31)
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- else if (i%8 == 7)
- fprintf(stderr, " ");
- }
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-}
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kex.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kex.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kex.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kex.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1019 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.118 2016/05/02 10:26:04 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h> /* MAX roundup */
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+# if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
+# define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
+# else
+extern const EVP_MD *evp_ssh_sha256(void);
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/* prototype */
+static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
+static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
+ "KEX algorithms",
+ "host key algorithms",
+ "ciphers ctos",
+ "ciphers stoc",
+ "MACs ctos",
+ "MACs stoc",
+ "compression ctos",
+ "compression stoc",
+ "languages ctos",
+ "languages stoc",
+};
+
+struct kexalg {
+ char *name;
+ u_int type;
+ int ec_nid;
+ int hash_alg;
+};
+static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ { KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
+ { KEX_DH14_SHA1, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
+ { KEX_DH14_SHA256, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
+ { KEX_DH16_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
+ { KEX_DH18_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
+ { KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
+ { KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
+ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1,
+ SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 },
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1,
+ SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+#if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) || !defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
+ { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
+};
+
+char *
+kex_alg_list(char sep)
+{
+ char *ret = NULL, *tmp;
+ size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
+ const struct kexalg *k;
+
+ for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ ret[rlen++] = sep;
+ nlen = strlen(k->name);
+ if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
+ free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret = tmp;
+ memcpy(ret + rlen, k->name, nlen + 1);
+ rlen += nlen;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct kexalg *
+kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+{
+ const struct kexalg *k;
+
+ for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
+ if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
+ return k;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Validate KEX method name list */
+int
+kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+{
+ char *s, *cp, *p;
+
+ if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
+ error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
+ free(s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ debug3("kex names ok: [%s]", names);
+ free(s);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process.
+ * Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+char *
+kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+{
+ char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
+ return NULL;
+ if (b == NULL || *b == '\0')
+ return strdup(a);
+ if (strlen(b) > 1024*1024)
+ return NULL;
+ len = strlen(a) + strlen(b) + 2;
+ if ((tmp = cp = strdup(b)) == NULL ||
+ (ret = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
+ free(tmp);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ strlcpy(ret, a, len);
+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ if (match_list(ret, p, NULL) != NULL)
+ continue; /* Algorithm already present */
+ if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
+ strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
+ free(tmp);
+ free(ret);
+ return NULL; /* Shouldn't happen */
+ }
+ }
+ free(tmp);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Assemble a list of algorithms from a default list and a string from a
+ * configuration file. The user-provided string may begin with '+' to
+ * indicate that it should be appended to the default.
+ */
+int
+kex_assemble_names(const char *def, char **list)
+{
+ char *ret;
+
+ if (list == NULL || *list == NULL || **list == '\0') {
+ *list = strdup(def);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (**list != '+') {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = kex_names_cat(def, *list + 1)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ free(*list);
+ *list = ret;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* put algorithm proposal into buffer */
+int
+kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+{
+ u_int i;
+ int r;
+
+ sshbuf_reset(b);
+
+ /*
+ * add a dummy cookie, the cookie will be overwritten by
+ * kex_send_kexinit(), each time a kexinit is set
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, proposal[i])) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* first_kex_packet_follows */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, 0)) != 0) /* uint32 reserved */
+ return r;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* parse buffer and return algorithm proposal */
+int
+kex_buf2prop(struct sshbuf *raw, int *first_kex_follows, char ***propp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ u_char v;
+ u_int i;
+ char **proposal = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ *propp = NULL;
+ if ((proposal = calloc(PROPOSAL_MAX, sizeof(char *))) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(raw)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, KEX_COOKIE_LEN)) != 0) /* skip cookie */
+ goto out;
+ /* extract kex init proposal strings */
+ for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(proposal[i]), NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ debug2("%s: %s", proposal_names[i], proposal[i]);
+ }
+ /* first kex follows / reserved */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &v)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i)) != 0) /* reserved */
+ goto out;
+ if (first_kex_follows != NULL)
+ *first_kex_follows = v;
+ debug2("first_kex_follows %d ", v);
+ debug2("reserved %u ", i);
+ r = 0;
+ *propp = proposal;
+ out:
+ if (r != 0 && proposal != NULL)
+ kex_prop_free(proposal);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+}
+
+void
+kex_prop_free(char **proposal)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ if (proposal == NULL)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
+ free(proposal[i]);
+ free(proposal);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ int r;
+
+ error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+kex_reset_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN,
+ SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX, &kex_protocol_error);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
+}
+
+static int
+kex_send_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ kex_reset_dispatch(ssh);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
+ debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS");
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_input_newkeys);
+ if (ssh->kex->ext_info_c)
+ if ((r = kex_send_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ u_int32_t i, ninfo;
+ char *name, *val, *found;
+ int r;
+
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO received");
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &val, NULL)) != 0) {
+ free(name);
+ return r;
+ }
+ debug("%s: %s=<%s>", __func__, name, val);
+ if (strcmp(name, "server-sig-algs") == 0) {
+ found = match_list("rsa-sha2-256", val, NULL);
+ if (found) {
+ kex->rsa_sha2 = 256;
+ free(found);
+ }
+ found = match_list("rsa-sha2-512", val, NULL);
+ if (found) {
+ kex->rsa_sha2 = 512;
+ free(found);
+ }
+ }
+ free(name);
+ free(val);
+ }
+ return sshpkt_get_end(ssh);
+}
+
+static int
+kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ int r;
+
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received");
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ kex->done = 1;
+ sshbuf_reset(kex->peer);
+ /* sshbuf_reset(kex->my); */
+ kex->flags &= ~KEX_INIT_SENT;
+ free(kex->name);
+ kex->name = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ u_char *cookie;
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ int r;
+
+ if (kex == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ if (kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT)
+ return 0;
+ kex->done = 0;
+
+ /* generate a random cookie */
+ if (sshbuf_len(kex->my) < KEX_COOKIE_LEN)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ if ((cookie = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(kex->my)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ arc4random_buf(cookie, KEX_COOKIE_LEN);
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, kex->my)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT sent");
+ kex->flags |= KEX_INIT_SENT;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ const u_char *ptr;
+ u_int i;
+ size_t dlen;
+ int r;
+
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
+ if (kex == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
+ /* discard packet */
+ for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ /*
+ * XXX RFC4253 sec 7: "each side MAY guess" - currently no supported
+ * KEX method has the server move first, but a server might be using
+ * a custom method or one that we otherwise don't support. We should
+ * be prepared to remember first_kex_follows here so we can eat a
+ * packet later.
+ * XXX2 - RFC4253 is kind of ambiguous on what first_kex_follows means
+ * for cases where the server *doesn't* go first. I guess we should
+ * ignore it when it is set for these cases, which is what we do now.
+ */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
+ if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
+ return (kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(ssh);
+
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+
+int
+kex_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX], struct kex **kexp)
+{
+ struct kex *kex;
+ int r;
+
+ *kexp = NULL;
+ if ((kex = calloc(1, sizeof(*kex))) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((kex->peer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (kex->my = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = kex_prop2buf(kex->my, proposal)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ kex->done = 0;
+ kex_reset_dispatch(ssh);
+ r = 0;
+ *kexp = kex;
+ out:
+ if (r != 0)
+ kex_free(kex);
+ return r;
+}
+
+void
+kex_free_newkeys(struct newkeys *newkeys)
+{
+ if (newkeys == NULL)
+ return;
+ if (newkeys->enc.key) {
+ explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.key, newkeys->enc.key_len);
+ free(newkeys->enc.key);
+ newkeys->enc.key = NULL;
+ }
+ if (newkeys->enc.iv) {
+ explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.iv, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
+ free(newkeys->enc.iv);
+ newkeys->enc.iv = NULL;
+ }
+ free(newkeys->enc.name);
+ explicit_bzero(&newkeys->enc, sizeof(newkeys->enc));
+ free(newkeys->comp.name);
+ explicit_bzero(&newkeys->comp, sizeof(newkeys->comp));
+ mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);
+ if (newkeys->mac.key) {
+ explicit_bzero(newkeys->mac.key, newkeys->mac.key_len);
+ free(newkeys->mac.key);
+ newkeys->mac.key = NULL;
+ }
+ free(newkeys->mac.name);
+ explicit_bzero(&newkeys->mac, sizeof(newkeys->mac));
+ explicit_bzero(newkeys, sizeof(*newkeys));
+ free(newkeys);
+}
+
+void
+kex_free(struct kex *kex)
+{
+ u_int mode;
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ if (kex->dh)
+ DH_free(kex->dh);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ if (kex->ec_client_key)
+ EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+ kex_free_newkeys(kex->newkeys[mode]);
+ kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(kex->peer);
+ sshbuf_free(kex->my);
+ free(kex->session_id);
+ free(kex->client_version_string);
+ free(kex->server_version_string);
+ free(kex->failed_choice);
+ free(kex->hostkey_alg);
+ free(kex->name);
+ free(kex);
+}
+
+int
+kex_setup(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = kex_new(ssh, proposal, &ssh->kex)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) { /* we start */
+ kex_free(ssh->kex);
+ ssh->kex = NULL;
+ return r;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Request key re-exchange, returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error
+ * code otherwise. Must not be called if KEX is incomplete or in-progress.
+ */
+int
+kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ if (ssh->kex == NULL) {
+ error("%s: no kex", __func__);
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (ssh->kex->done == 0) {
+ error("%s: requested twice", __func__);
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ ssh->kex->done = 0;
+ return kex_send_kexinit(ssh);
+}
+
+static int
+choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server)
+{
+ char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+
+ if (name == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH;
+ if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ enc->name = name;
+ enc->enabled = 0;
+ enc->iv = NULL;
+ enc->iv_len = cipher_ivlen(enc->cipher);
+ enc->key = NULL;
+ enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher);
+ enc->block_size = cipher_blocksize(enc->cipher);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server)
+{
+ char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+
+ if (name == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH;
+ if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ /* truncate the key */
+ if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HMAC)
+ mac->key_len = 16;
+ mac->name = name;
+ mac->key = NULL;
+ mac->enabled = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server)
+{
+ char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+
+ if (name == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH;
+ if (strcmp(name, "zlib at openssh.com") == 0) {
+ comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
+ comp->type = COMP_ZLIB;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
+ comp->type = COMP_NONE;
+ } else {
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ comp->name = name;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+choose_kex(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server)
+{
+ const struct kexalg *kexalg;
+
+ k->name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+
+ debug("kex: algorithm: %s", k->name ? k->name : "(no match)");
+ if (k->name == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH;
+ if ((kexalg = kex_alg_by_name(k->name)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ k->kex_type = kexalg->type;
+ k->hash_alg = kexalg->hash_alg;
+ k->ec_nid = kexalg->ec_nid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+choose_hostkeyalg(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server)
+{
+ k->hostkey_alg = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+
+ debug("kex: host key algorithm: %s",
+ k->hostkey_alg ? k->hostkey_alg : "(no match)");
+ if (k->hostkey_alg == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH;
+ k->hostkey_type = sshkey_type_from_name(k->hostkey_alg);
+ if (k->hostkey_type == KEY_UNSPEC)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ k->hostkey_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(k->hostkey_alg);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+{
+ static int check[] = {
+ PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS, PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS, -1
+ };
+ int *idx;
+ char *p;
+
+ for (idx = &check[0]; *idx != -1; idx++) {
+ if ((p = strchr(my[*idx], ',')) != NULL)
+ *p = '\0';
+ if ((p = strchr(peer[*idx], ',')) != NULL)
+ *p = '\0';
+ if (strcmp(my[*idx], peer[*idx]) != 0) {
+ debug2("proposal mismatch: my %s peer %s",
+ my[*idx], peer[*idx]);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+ debug2("proposals match");
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ struct newkeys *newkeys;
+ char **my = NULL, **peer = NULL;
+ char **cprop, **sprop;
+ int nenc, nmac, ncomp;
+ u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen;
+ int r, first_kex_follows;
+
+ debug2("local %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "server" : "client");
+ if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &my)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ debug2("peer %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "client" : "server");
+ if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->peer, &first_kex_follows, &peer)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (kex->server) {
+ cprop=peer;
+ sprop=my;
+ } else {
+ cprop=my;
+ sprop=peer;
+ }
+
+ /* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */
+ if (kex->server) {
+ char *ext;
+
+ ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
+ if (ext) {
+ kex->ext_info_c = 1;
+ free(ext);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Algorithm Negotiation */
+ if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+ sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0) {
+ kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+ peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+ sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) != 0) {
+ kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+ peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+ if ((newkeys = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkeys))) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ kex->newkeys[mode] = newkeys;
+ ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) ||
+ (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
+ nenc = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC;
+ nmac = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC;
+ ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC;
+ if ((r = choose_enc(&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc],
+ sprop[nenc])) != 0) {
+ kex->failed_choice = peer[nenc];
+ peer[nenc] = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ authlen = cipher_authlen(newkeys->enc.cipher);
+ /* ignore mac for authenticated encryption */
+ if (authlen == 0 &&
+ (r = choose_mac(ssh, &newkeys->mac, cprop[nmac],
+ sprop[nmac])) != 0) {
+ kex->failed_choice = peer[nmac];
+ peer[nmac] = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp],
+ sprop[ncomp])) != 0) {
+ kex->failed_choice = peer[ncomp];
+ peer[ncomp] = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ debug("kex: %s cipher: %s MAC: %s compression: %s",
+ ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client",
+ newkeys->enc.name,
+ authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
+ newkeys->comp.name);
+ }
+ need = dh_need = 0;
+ for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+ newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode];
+ need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.key_len);
+ need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.block_size);
+ need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
+ need = MAX(need, newkeys->mac.key_len);
+ dh_need = MAX(dh_need, cipher_seclen(newkeys->enc.cipher));
+ dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size);
+ dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
+ dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len);
+ }
+ /* XXX need runden? */
+ kex->we_need = need;
+ kex->dh_need = dh_need;
+
+ /* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */
+ if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer) &&
+ !(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX))
+ ssh->dispatch_skip_packets = 1;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ kex_prop_free(my);
+ kex_prop_free(peer);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+ const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
+{
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx = NULL;
+ char c = id;
+ u_int have;
+ size_t mdsz;
+ u_char *digest;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((mdsz = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((digest = calloc(1, roundup(need, mdsz))) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* K1 = HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id) */
+ if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL ||
+ ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_update(hashctx, &c, 1) != 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_update(hashctx, kex->session_id,
+ kex->session_id_len) != 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest, mdsz) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
+ hashctx = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * expand key:
+ * Kn = HASH(K || H || K1 || K2 || ... || Kn-1)
+ * Key = K1 || K2 || ... || Kn
+ */
+ for (have = mdsz; need > have; have += mdsz) {
+ if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL ||
+ ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_update(hashctx, digest, have) != 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest + have, mdsz) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
+ hashctx = NULL;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+ fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", c);
+ dump_digest("key", digest, need);
+#endif
+ *keyp = digest;
+ digest = NULL;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ free(digest);
+ ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
+ return r;
+}
+
+#define NKEYS 6
+int
+kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+ const struct sshbuf *shared_secret)
+{
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ u_char *keys[NKEYS];
+ u_int i, j, mode, ctos;
+ int r;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NKEYS; i++) {
+ if ((r = derive_key(ssh, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, hashlen,
+ shared_secret, &keys[i])) != 0) {
+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
+ free(keys[j]);
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+ for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+ ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) ||
+ (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
+ kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.iv = keys[ctos ? 0 : 1];
+ kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.key = keys[ctos ? 2 : 3];
+ kex->newkeys[mode]->mac.key = keys[ctos ? 4 : 5];
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+int
+kex_derive_keys_bn(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+ const BIGNUM *secret)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *shared_secret;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(shared_secret, secret)) == 0)
+ r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
+ sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+int
+derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *host_modulus, BIGNUM *server_modulus,
+ u_int8_t cookie[8], u_int8_t id[16])
+{
+ u_int8_t hbuf[2048], sbuf[2048], obuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx = NULL;
+ size_t hlen, slen;
+ int r;
+
+ hlen = BN_num_bytes(host_modulus);
+ slen = BN_num_bytes(server_modulus);
+ if (hlen < (512 / 8) || (u_int)hlen > sizeof(hbuf) ||
+ slen < (512 / 8) || (u_int)slen > sizeof(sbuf))
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH;
+ if (BN_bn2bin(host_modulus, hbuf) <= 0 ||
+ BN_bn2bin(server_modulus, sbuf) <= 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hbuf, hlen) != 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_update(hashctx, sbuf, slen) != 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_update(hashctx, cookie, 8) != 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_final(hashctx, obuf, sizeof(obuf)) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(id, obuf, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5));
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
+ explicit_bzero(hbuf, sizeof(hbuf));
+ explicit_bzero(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf));
+ explicit_bzero(obuf, sizeof(obuf));
+ return r;
+}
+#endif
+
+#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
+void
+dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, int len)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(digest, len, stderr);
+}
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kex.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kex.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kex.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.62 2014/01/27 18:58:14 markus Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-#ifndef KEX_H
-#define KEX_H
-
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-#endif
-
-#define KEX_COOKIE_LEN 16
-
-#define KEX_DH1 "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
-#define KEX_DH14 "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
-#define KEX_DHGEX_SHA1 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"
-#define KEX_DHGEX_SHA256 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256"
-#define KEX_RESUME "resume at appgate.com"
-#define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256 "ecdh-sha2-nistp256"
-#define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384 "ecdh-sha2-nistp384"
-#define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521 "ecdh-sha2-nistp521"
-#define KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256 "curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org"
-
-#define COMP_NONE 0
-#define COMP_ZLIB 1
-#define COMP_DELAYED 2
-
-enum kex_init_proposals {
- PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS,
- PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS,
- PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS,
- PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC,
- PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS,
- PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC,
- PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS,
- PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC,
- PROPOSAL_LANG_CTOS,
- PROPOSAL_LANG_STOC,
- PROPOSAL_MAX
-};
-
-enum kex_modes {
- MODE_IN,
- MODE_OUT,
- MODE_MAX
-};
-
-enum kex_exchange {
- KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1,
- KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1,
- KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1,
- KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
- KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
- KEX_C25519_SHA256,
- KEX_MAX
-};
-
-#define KEX_INIT_SENT 0x0001
-
-typedef struct Kex Kex;
-typedef struct Mac Mac;
-typedef struct Comp Comp;
-typedef struct Enc Enc;
-typedef struct Newkeys Newkeys;
-
-struct Enc {
- char *name;
- const Cipher *cipher;
- int enabled;
- u_int key_len;
- u_int iv_len;
- u_int block_size;
- u_char *key;
- u_char *iv;
-};
-struct Mac {
- char *name;
- int enabled;
- u_int mac_len;
- u_char *key;
- u_int key_len;
- int type;
- int etm; /* Encrypt-then-MAC */
- struct ssh_hmac_ctx *hmac_ctx;
- struct umac_ctx *umac_ctx;
-};
-struct Comp {
- int type;
- int enabled;
- char *name;
-};
-struct Newkeys {
- Enc enc;
- Mac mac;
- Comp comp;
-};
-struct Kex {
- u_char *session_id;
- u_int session_id_len;
- Newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
- u_int we_need;
- u_int dh_need;
- int server;
- char *name;
- int hostkey_type;
- int kex_type;
- int roaming;
- Buffer my;
- Buffer peer;
- sig_atomic_t done;
- int flags;
- int hash_alg;
- int ec_nid;
- char *client_version_string;
- char *server_version_string;
- int (*verify_host_key)(Key *);
- Key *(*load_host_public_key)(int);
- Key *(*load_host_private_key)(int);
- int (*host_key_index)(Key *);
- void (*sign)(Key *, Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
- void (*kex[KEX_MAX])(Kex *);
-};
-
-int kex_names_valid(const char *);
-char *kex_alg_list(char);
-
-Kex *kex_setup(char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
-void kex_finish(Kex *);
-
-void kex_send_kexinit(Kex *);
-void kex_input_kexinit(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void kex_derive_keys(Kex *, u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
-void kex_derive_keys_bn(Kex *, u_char *, u_int, const BIGNUM *);
-
-Newkeys *kex_get_newkeys(int);
-
-void kexdh_client(Kex *);
-void kexdh_server(Kex *);
-void kexgex_client(Kex *);
-void kexgex_server(Kex *);
-void kexecdh_client(Kex *);
-void kexecdh_server(Kex *);
-void kexc25519_client(Kex *);
-void kexc25519_server(Kex *);
-
-void
-kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
- BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
-void
-kexgex_hash(int, char *, char *, char *, int, char *,
- int, u_char *, int, int, int, int, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
- BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-void
-kex_ecdh_hash(int, const EC_GROUP *, char *, char *, char *, int,
- char *, int, u_char *, int, const EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *,
- const BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
-#endif
-void
-kex_c25519_hash(int, char *, char *, char *, int,
- char *, int, u_char *, int, const u_char *, const u_char *,
- const u_char *, u_int, u_char **, u_int *);
-
-#define CURVE25519_SIZE 32
-void kexc25519_keygen(u_char[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char[CURVE25519_SIZE])
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
-void kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
- const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], Buffer *out)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
-
-void
-derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_int8_t[8], u_int8_t[16]);
-
-#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
-void dump_digest(char *, u_char *, int);
-#endif
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kex.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kex.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kex.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kex.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.78 2016/05/02 10:26:04 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef KEX_H
+#define KEX_H
+
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "buffer.h" /* XXX for typedef */
+#include "key.h" /* XXX for typedef */
+
+#ifdef WITH_LEAKMALLOC
+#include "leakmalloc.h"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+# else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+# define EC_KEY void
+# define EC_GROUP void
+# define EC_POINT void
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+# define EC_KEY void
+# define EC_GROUP void
+# define EC_POINT void
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#define KEX_COOKIE_LEN 16
+
+#define KEX_DH1 "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
+#define KEX_DH14_SHA1 "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
+#define KEX_DH14_SHA256 "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
+#define KEX_DH16_SHA512 "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512"
+#define KEX_DH18_SHA512 "diffie-hellman-group18-sha512"
+#define KEX_DHGEX_SHA1 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"
+#define KEX_DHGEX_SHA256 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256"
+#define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256 "ecdh-sha2-nistp256"
+#define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384 "ecdh-sha2-nistp384"
+#define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521 "ecdh-sha2-nistp521"
+#define KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256 "curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org"
+
+#define COMP_NONE 0
+#define COMP_ZLIB 1
+#define COMP_DELAYED 2
+
+#define CURVE25519_SIZE 32
+
+enum kex_init_proposals {
+ PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS,
+ PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS,
+ PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS,
+ PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC,
+ PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS,
+ PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC,
+ PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS,
+ PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC,
+ PROPOSAL_LANG_CTOS,
+ PROPOSAL_LANG_STOC,
+ PROPOSAL_MAX
+};
+
+enum kex_modes {
+ MODE_IN,
+ MODE_OUT,
+ MODE_MAX
+};
+
+enum kex_exchange {
+ KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1,
+ KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1,
+ KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256,
+ KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512,
+ KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512,
+ KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1,
+ KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
+ KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
+ KEX_C25519_SHA256,
+ KEX_MAX
+};
+
+#define KEX_INIT_SENT 0x0001
+
+struct sshenc {
+ char *name;
+ const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+ int enabled;
+ u_int key_len;
+ u_int iv_len;
+ u_int block_size;
+ u_char *key;
+ u_char *iv;
+};
+struct sshcomp {
+ u_int type;
+ int enabled;
+ char *name;
+};
+struct newkeys {
+ struct sshenc enc;
+ struct sshmac mac;
+ struct sshcomp comp;
+};
+
+struct ssh;
+
+struct kex {
+ u_char *session_id;
+ size_t session_id_len;
+ struct newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
+ u_int we_need;
+ u_int dh_need;
+ int server;
+ char *name;
+ char *hostkey_alg;
+ int hostkey_type;
+ int hostkey_nid;
+ u_int kex_type;
+ int rsa_sha2;
+ int ext_info_c;
+ struct sshbuf *my;
+ struct sshbuf *peer;
+ sig_atomic_t done;
+ u_int flags;
+ int hash_alg;
+ int ec_nid;
+ char *client_version_string;
+ char *server_version_string;
+ char *failed_choice;
+ int (*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *);
+ struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *);
+ struct sshkey *(*load_host_private_key)(int, int, struct ssh *);
+ int (*host_key_index)(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *);
+ int (*sign)(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
+ int (*kex[KEX_MAX])(struct ssh *);
+ /* kex specific state */
+ DH *dh; /* DH */
+ u_int min, max, nbits; /* GEX */
+ EC_KEY *ec_client_key; /* ECDH */
+ const EC_GROUP *ec_group; /* ECDH */
+ u_char c25519_client_key[CURVE25519_SIZE]; /* 25519 */
+ u_char c25519_client_pubkey[CURVE25519_SIZE]; /* 25519 */
+};
+
+int kex_names_valid(const char *);
+char *kex_alg_list(char);
+char *kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *);
+int kex_assemble_names(const char *, char **);
+
+int kex_new(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX], struct kex **);
+int kex_setup(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
+void kex_free_newkeys(struct newkeys *);
+void kex_free(struct kex *);
+
+int kex_buf2prop(struct sshbuf *, int *, char ***);
+int kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
+void kex_prop_free(char **);
+
+int kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *);
+int kex_input_kexinit(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int kex_input_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int, const struct sshbuf *);
+int kex_derive_keys_bn(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int, const BIGNUM *);
+int kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *);
+int kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *);
+
+int kexdh_client(struct ssh *);
+int kexdh_server(struct ssh *);
+int kexgex_client(struct ssh *);
+int kexgex_server(struct ssh *);
+int kexecdh_client(struct ssh *);
+int kexecdh_server(struct ssh *);
+int kexc25519_client(struct ssh *);
+int kexc25519_server(struct ssh *);
+
+int kex_dh_hash(int, const char *, const char *,
+ const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
+ const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *);
+
+int kexgex_hash(int, const char *, const char *,
+ const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
+ int, int, int,
+ const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+ const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+ u_char *, size_t *);
+
+int kex_ecdh_hash(int, const EC_GROUP *, const char *, const char *,
+ const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
+ const EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *);
+
+int kex_c25519_hash(int, const char *, const char *,
+ const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
+ const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, const u_char *,
+ const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t *);
+
+void kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE])
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
+int kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
+ const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
+
+int
+derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_int8_t[8], u_int8_t[16]);
+
+#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
+void dump_digest(char *, u_char *, int);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) || !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+# undef EC_KEY
+# undef EC_GROUP
+# undef EC_POINT
+#endif
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexc25519.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexc25519.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexc25519.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.5 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2013 Aris Adamantiadis. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-
-extern int crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(u_char a[CURVE25519_SIZE],
- const u_char b[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char c[CURVE25519_SIZE])
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 3, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
-
-void
-kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE])
-{
- static const u_char basepoint[CURVE25519_SIZE] = {9};
-
- arc4random_buf(key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
- crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(pub, key, basepoint);
-}
-
-void
-kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
- const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], Buffer *out)
-{
- u_char shared_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
-
- crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(shared_key, key, pub);
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- dump_digest("shared secret", shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
-#endif
- buffer_clear(out);
- buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(out, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
- explicit_bzero(shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
-}
-
-void
-kex_c25519_hash(
- int hash_alg,
- char *client_version_string,
- char *server_version_string,
- char *ckexinit, int ckexinitlen,
- char *skexinit, int skexinitlen,
- u_char *serverhostkeyblob, int sbloblen,
- const u_char client_dh_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE],
- const u_char server_dh_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE],
- const u_char *shared_secret, u_int secretlen,
- u_char **hash, u_int *hashlen)
-{
- Buffer b;
- static u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, client_version_string);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, server_version_string);
-
- /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
- buffer_put_int(&b, ckexinitlen+1);
- buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
- buffer_append(&b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen);
- buffer_put_int(&b, skexinitlen+1);
- buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
- buffer_append(&b, skexinit, skexinitlen);
-
- buffer_put_string(&b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen);
- buffer_put_string(&b, client_dh_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
- buffer_put_string(&b, server_dh_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
- buffer_append(&b, shared_secret, secretlen);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
- buffer_dump(&b);
-#endif
- if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, &b, digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: digest_buffer failed", __func__);
-
- buffer_free(&b);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
- dump_digest("hash", digest, ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg));
-#endif
- *hash = digest;
- *hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexc25519.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexc25519.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexc25519.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexc25519.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.10 2016/05/02 08:49:03 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Aris Adamantiadis. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+extern int crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(u_char a[CURVE25519_SIZE],
+ const u_char b[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char c[CURVE25519_SIZE])
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 3, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
+
+void
+kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE])
+{
+ static const u_char basepoint[CURVE25519_SIZE] = {9};
+
+ arc4random_buf(key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+ crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(pub, key, basepoint);
+}
+
+int
+kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
+ const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out)
+{
+ u_char shared_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
+ int r;
+
+ /* Check for all-zero public key */
+ explicit_bzero(shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+ if (timingsafe_bcmp(pub, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE) == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
+
+ crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(shared_key, key, pub);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("shared secret", shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#endif
+ sshbuf_reset(out);
+ r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(out, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+ explicit_bzero(shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_c25519_hash(
+ int hash_alg,
+ const char *client_version_string,
+ const char *server_version_string,
+ const u_char *ckexinit, size_t ckexinitlen,
+ const u_char *skexinit, size_t skexinitlen,
+ const u_char *serverhostkeyblob, size_t sbloblen,
+ const u_char client_dh_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE],
+ const u_char server_dh_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE],
+ const u_char *shared_secret, size_t secretlen,
+ u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ int r;
+
+ if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg))
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, client_version_string)) < 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, server_version_string)) < 0 ||
+ /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, ckexinitlen+1)) < 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) < 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen)) < 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, skexinitlen+1)) < 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) < 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(b, skexinit, skexinitlen)) < 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen)) < 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, client_dh_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE)) < 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, server_dh_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE)) < 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(b, shared_secret, secretlen)) < 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+ sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
+#endif
+ if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ *hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+ dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexc25519c.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexc25519c.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexc25519c.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519c.c,v 1.4 2014/01/12 08:13:13 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2013 Aris Adamantiadis. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-
-void
-kexc25519_client(Kex *kex)
-{
- Key *server_host_key;
- u_char client_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
- u_char client_pubkey[CURVE25519_SIZE];
- u_char *server_pubkey = NULL;
- u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
- u_char *hash;
- u_int slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
- Buffer shared_secret;
-
- kexc25519_keygen(client_key, client_pubkey);
-
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT);
- packet_put_string(client_pubkey, sizeof(client_pubkey));
- packet_send();
- debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- dump_digest("client private key:", client_key, sizeof(client_key));
-#endif
-
- debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY");
- packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY);
-
- /* hostkey */
- server_host_key_blob = packet_get_string(&sbloblen);
- server_host_key = key_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
- if (server_host_key == NULL)
- fatal("cannot decode server_host_key_blob");
- if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type)
- fatal("type mismatch for decoded server_host_key_blob");
- if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL)
- fatal("cannot verify server_host_key");
- if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1)
- fatal("server_host_key verification failed");
-
- /* Q_S, server public key */
- server_pubkey = packet_get_string(&slen);
- if (slen != CURVE25519_SIZE)
- fatal("Incorrect size for server Curve25519 pubkey: %d", slen);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- dump_digest("server public key:", server_pubkey, CURVE25519_SIZE);
-#endif
-
- /* signed H */
- signature = packet_get_string(&slen);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- buffer_init(&shared_secret);
- kexc25519_shared_key(client_key, server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
-
- /* calc and verify H */
- kex_c25519_hash(
- kex->hash_alg,
- kex->client_version_string,
- kex->server_version_string,
- buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
- buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
- server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- client_pubkey,
- server_pubkey,
- buffer_ptr(&shared_secret), buffer_len(&shared_secret),
- &hash, &hashlen
- );
- free(server_host_key_blob);
- free(server_pubkey);
- if (key_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen) != 1)
- fatal("key_verify failed for server_host_key");
- key_free(server_host_key);
- free(signature);
-
- /* save session id */
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
- kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
- memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
- }
- kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen,
- buffer_ptr(&shared_secret), buffer_len(&shared_secret));
- buffer_free(&shared_secret);
- kex_finish(kex);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexc25519c.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexc25519c.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexc25519c.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexc25519c.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519c.c,v 1.7 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Aris Adamantiadis. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+static int
+input_kex_c25519_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt);
+
+int
+kexc25519_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ int r;
+
+ kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, kex->c25519_client_pubkey);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("client private key:", kex->c25519_client_key,
+ sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key));
+#endif
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, kex->c25519_client_pubkey,
+ sizeof(kex->c25519_client_pubkey))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
+ debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY");
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY, &input_kex_c25519_reply);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+input_kex_c25519_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
+ u_char *server_pubkey = NULL;
+ u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t slen, pklen, sbloblen, hashlen;
+ int r;
+
+ if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* hostkey */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_host_key_blob,
+ &sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+ &server_host_key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type ||
+ (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA &&
+ server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Q_S, server public key */
+ /* signed H */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_pubkey, &pklen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (pklen != CURVE25519_SIZE) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("server public key:", server_pubkey, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#endif
+
+ if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pubkey,
+ shared_secret)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* calc and verify H */
+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+ if ((r = kex_c25519_hash(
+ kex->hash_alg,
+ kex->client_version_string,
+ kex->server_version_string,
+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
+ server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+ kex->c25519_client_pubkey,
+ server_pubkey,
+ sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
+ hash, &hashlen)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen,
+ ssh->compat)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* save session id */
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+ kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+ }
+
+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+out:
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key));
+ free(server_host_key_blob);
+ free(server_pubkey);
+ free(signature);
+ sshkey_free(server_host_key);
+ sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
+ return r;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexc25519s.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexc25519s.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexc25519s.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519s.c,v 1.4 2014/01/12 08:13:13 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2013 Aris Adamantiadis. All rights reserved.
- *
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-
-void
-kexc25519_server(Kex *kex)
-{
- Key *server_host_private, *server_host_public;
- u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
- u_char server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
- u_char *client_pubkey = NULL;
- u_char server_pubkey[CURVE25519_SIZE];
- u_char *hash;
- u_int slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
- Buffer shared_secret;
-
- /* generate private key */
- kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pubkey);
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- dump_digest("server private key:", server_key, sizeof(server_key));
-#endif
-
- if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
- kex->load_host_private_key == NULL)
- fatal("Cannot load hostkey");
- server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type);
- if (server_host_public == NULL)
- fatal("Unsupported hostkey type %d", kex->hostkey_type);
- server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type);
-
- debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
- packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT);
- client_pubkey = packet_get_string(&slen);
- if (slen != CURVE25519_SIZE)
- fatal("Incorrect size for server Curve25519 pubkey: %d", slen);
- packet_check_eom();
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- dump_digest("client public key:", client_pubkey, CURVE25519_SIZE);
-#endif
-
- buffer_init(&shared_secret);
- kexc25519_shared_key(server_key, client_pubkey, &shared_secret);
-
- /* calc H */
- key_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen);
- kex_c25519_hash(
- kex->hash_alg,
- kex->client_version_string,
- kex->server_version_string,
- buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
- buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
- server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- client_pubkey,
- server_pubkey,
- buffer_ptr(&shared_secret), buffer_len(&shared_secret),
- &hash, &hashlen
- );
-
- /* save session id := H */
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
- kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
- memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
- }
-
- /* sign H */
- kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature, &slen,
- hash, hashlen);
-
- /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
-
- /* send server hostkey, ECDH pubkey 'Q_S' and signed H */
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY);
- packet_put_string(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
- packet_put_string(server_pubkey, sizeof(server_pubkey));
- packet_put_string(signature, slen);
- packet_send();
-
- free(signature);
- free(server_host_key_blob);
- /* have keys, free server key */
- free(client_pubkey);
-
- kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen,
- buffer_ptr(&shared_secret), buffer_len(&shared_secret));
- buffer_free(&shared_secret);
- kex_finish(kex);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexc25519s.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexc25519s.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexc25519s.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexc25519s.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519s.c,v 1.10 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Aris Adamantiadis. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+static int input_kex_c25519_init(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+int
+kexc25519_server(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT, &input_kex_c25519_init);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+input_kex_c25519_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ struct sshkey *server_host_private, *server_host_public;
+ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
+ u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+ u_char server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
+ u_char *client_pubkey = NULL;
+ u_char server_pubkey[CURVE25519_SIZE];
+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t slen, pklen, sbloblen, hashlen;
+ int r;
+
+ /* generate private key */
+ kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pubkey);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("server private key:", server_key, sizeof(server_key));
+#endif
+ if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
+ kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type,
+ kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
+ server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type,
+ kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
+ if (server_host_public == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &client_pubkey, &pklen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (pklen != CURVE25519_SIZE) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("client public key:", client_pubkey, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#endif
+
+ if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key(server_key, client_pubkey,
+ shared_secret)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* calc H */
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob,
+ &sbloblen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+ if ((r = kex_c25519_hash(
+ kex->hash_alg,
+ kex->client_version_string,
+ kex->server_version_string,
+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
+ server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+ client_pubkey,
+ server_pubkey,
+ sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
+ hash, &hashlen)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* save session id := H */
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+ kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+ }
+
+ /* sign H */
+ if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature,
+ &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* send server hostkey, ECDH pubkey 'Q_S' and signed H */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_pubkey, sizeof(server_pubkey))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+out:
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key));
+ free(server_host_key_blob);
+ free(signature);
+ free(client_pubkey);
+ sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
+ return r;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexdh.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexdh.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexdh.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexdh.c,v 1.24 2014/01/09 23:20:00 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-void
-kex_dh_hash(
- char *client_version_string,
- char *server_version_string,
- char *ckexinit, int ckexinitlen,
- char *skexinit, int skexinitlen,
- u_char *serverhostkeyblob, int sbloblen,
- BIGNUM *client_dh_pub,
- BIGNUM *server_dh_pub,
- BIGNUM *shared_secret,
- u_char **hash, u_int *hashlen)
-{
- Buffer b;
- static u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, client_version_string);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, server_version_string);
-
- /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
- buffer_put_int(&b, ckexinitlen+1);
- buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
- buffer_append(&b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen);
- buffer_put_int(&b, skexinitlen+1);
- buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
- buffer_append(&b, skexinit, skexinitlen);
-
- buffer_put_string(&b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&b, client_dh_pub);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&b, server_dh_pub);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&b, shared_secret);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
- buffer_dump(&b);
-#endif
- if (ssh_digest_buffer(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &b, digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: ssh_digest_buffer failed", __func__);
-
- buffer_free(&b);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
- dump_digest("hash", digest, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1));
-#endif
- *hash = digest;
- *hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexdh.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexdh.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexdh.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexdh.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexdh.c,v 1.26 2016/05/02 10:26:04 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+int
+kex_dh_hash(
+ int hash_alg,
+ const char *client_version_string,
+ const char *server_version_string,
+ const u_char *ckexinit, size_t ckexinitlen,
+ const u_char *skexinit, size_t skexinitlen,
+ const u_char *serverhostkeyblob, size_t sbloblen,
+ const BIGNUM *client_dh_pub,
+ const BIGNUM *server_dh_pub,
+ const BIGNUM *shared_secret,
+ u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ int r;
+
+ if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg))
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, client_version_string)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, server_version_string)) != 0 ||
+ /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, ckexinitlen+1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, skexinitlen+1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(b, skexinit, skexinitlen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, client_dh_pub)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, server_dh_pub)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, shared_secret)) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+ sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
+#endif
+ if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ *hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+ dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexdhc.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexdhc.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexdhc.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,161 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexdhc.c,v 1.15 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "dh.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-
-void
-kexdh_client(Kex *kex)
-{
- BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL;
- DH *dh;
- Key *server_host_key;
- u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
- u_char *kbuf, *hash;
- u_int klen, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
- int kout;
-
- /* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
- switch (kex->kex_type) {
- case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
- dh = dh_new_group1();
- break;
- case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
- dh = dh_new_group14();
- break;
- default:
- fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
- }
- dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT);
- packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
- packet_send();
-
- debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
- fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-#endif
-
- debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY");
- packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY);
-
- /* key, cert */
- server_host_key_blob = packet_get_string(&sbloblen);
- server_host_key = key_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
- if (server_host_key == NULL)
- fatal("cannot decode server_host_key_blob");
- if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type)
- fatal("type mismatch for decoded server_host_key_blob");
- if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL)
- fatal("cannot verify server_host_key");
- if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1)
- fatal("server_host_key verification failed");
-
- /* DH parameter f, server public DH key */
- if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
- packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- fprintf(stderr, "dh_server_pub= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_server_pub);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_server_pub));
-#endif
-
- /* signed H */
- signature = packet_get_string(&slen);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
- packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
-
- klen = DH_size(dh);
- kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
- if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh)) < 0)
- fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
-#endif
- if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("kexdh_client: BN_new failed");
- if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
- fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
- explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
- free(kbuf);
-
- /* calc and verify H */
- kex_dh_hash(
- kex->client_version_string,
- kex->server_version_string,
- buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
- buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
- server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- dh->pub_key,
- dh_server_pub,
- shared_secret,
- &hash, &hashlen
- );
- free(server_host_key_blob);
- BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
- DH_free(dh);
-
- if (key_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen) != 1)
- fatal("key_verify failed for server_host_key");
- key_free(server_host_key);
- free(signature);
-
- /* save session id */
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
- kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
- memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
- }
-
- kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
- BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
- kex_finish(kex);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexdhc.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexdhc.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexdhc.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexdhc.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexdhc.c,v 1.19 2016/05/02 10:26:04 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+static int input_kex_dh(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+int
+kexdh_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ int r;
+
+ /* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
+ case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
+ kex->dh = dh_new_group1();
+ break;
+ case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
+ case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256:
+ kex->dh = dh_new_group14();
+ break;
+ case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512:
+ kex->dh = dh_new_group16();
+ break;
+ case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
+ kex->dh = dh_new_group18();
+ break;
+ default:
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (kex->dh == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
+ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
+ fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh->pub_key);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+#endif
+ debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY");
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, &input_kex_dh);
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+input_kex_dh(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL;
+ u_char *kbuf = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t klen = 0, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
+ int kout, r;
+
+ if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* key, cert */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_host_key_blob,
+ &sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+ &server_host_key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type ||
+ (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA &&
+ server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* DH parameter f, server public DH key */
+ if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* signed H */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, dh_server_pub)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ fprintf(stderr, "dh_server_pub= ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_server_pub);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_server_pub));
+#endif
+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_server_pub)) {
+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "bad server public DH value");
+ r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
+ if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+ (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
+ BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
+#endif
+
+ /* calc and verify H */
+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+ if ((r = kex_dh_hash(
+ kex->hash_alg,
+ kex->client_version_string,
+ kex->server_version_string,
+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
+ server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+ kex->dh->pub_key,
+ dh_server_pub,
+ shared_secret,
+ hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen,
+ ssh->compat)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* save session id */
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+ kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+ }
+
+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ DH_free(kex->dh);
+ kex->dh = NULL;
+ if (dh_server_pub)
+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
+ if (kbuf) {
+ explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
+ free(kbuf);
+ }
+ if (shared_secret)
+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ sshkey_free(server_host_key);
+ free(server_host_key_blob);
+ free(signature);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexdhs.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexdhs.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexdhs.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,160 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.18 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "dh.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-
-void
-kexdh_server(Kex *kex)
-{
- BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL;
- DH *dh;
- Key *server_host_public, *server_host_private;
- u_char *kbuf, *hash, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
- u_int sbloblen, klen, hashlen, slen;
- int kout;
-
- /* generate server DH public key */
- switch (kex->kex_type) {
- case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
- dh = dh_new_group1();
- break;
- case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
- dh = dh_new_group14();
- break;
- default:
- fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
- }
- dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-
- debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
- packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT);
-
- if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
- kex->load_host_private_key == NULL)
- fatal("Cannot load hostkey");
- server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type);
- if (server_host_public == NULL)
- fatal("Unsupported hostkey type %d", kex->hostkey_type);
- server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type);
-
- /* key, cert */
- if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
- packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
- packet_check_eom();
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- fprintf(stderr, "dh_client_pub= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_client_pub);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub));
-#endif
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
- fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-#endif
- if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
- packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
-
- klen = DH_size(dh);
- kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
- if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh)) < 0)
- fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
-#endif
- if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("kexdh_server: BN_new failed");
- if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
- fatal("kexdh_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
- explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
- free(kbuf);
-
- key_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen);
-
- /* calc H */
- kex_dh_hash(
- kex->client_version_string,
- kex->server_version_string,
- buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
- buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
- server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- dh_client_pub,
- dh->pub_key,
- shared_secret,
- &hash, &hashlen
- );
- BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
-
- /* save session id := H */
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
- kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
- memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
- }
-
- /* sign H */
- kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature, &slen,
- hash, hashlen);
-
- /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
-
- /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY);
- packet_put_string(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
- packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); /* f */
- packet_put_string(signature, slen);
- packet_send();
-
- free(signature);
- free(server_host_key_blob);
- /* have keys, free DH */
- DH_free(dh);
-
- kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
- BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
- kex_finish(kex);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexdhs.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexdhs.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexdhs.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexdhs.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.24 2016/05/02 10:26:04 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+static int input_kex_dh_init(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+int
+kexdh_server(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ int r;
+
+ /* generate server DH public key */
+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
+ case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
+ kex->dh = dh_new_group1();
+ break;
+ case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
+ case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256:
+ kex->dh = dh_new_group14();
+ break;
+ case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512:
+ kex->dh = dh_new_group16();
+ break;
+ case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
+ kex->dh = dh_new_group18();
+ break;
+ default:
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (kex->dh == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, &input_kex_dh_init);
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *server_host_public, *server_host_private;
+ u_char *kbuf = NULL, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t sbloblen, slen;
+ size_t klen = 0, hashlen;
+ int kout, r;
+
+ if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
+ kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type,
+ kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
+ server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type,
+ kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
+ if (server_host_public == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* key, cert */
+ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, dh_client_pub)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ fprintf(stderr, "dh_client_pub= ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_client_pub);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub));
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
+ fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh->pub_key);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+#endif
+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_client_pub)) {
+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "bad client public DH value");
+ r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
+ if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+ (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
+ BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
+#endif
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob,
+ &sbloblen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* calc H */
+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+ if ((r = kex_dh_hash(
+ kex->hash_alg,
+ kex->client_version_string,
+ kex->server_version_string,
+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
+ server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+ dh_client_pub,
+ kex->dh->pub_key,
+ shared_secret,
+ hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* save session id := H */
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+ kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+ }
+
+ /* sign H */
+ if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature,
+ &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
+
+ /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ DH_free(kex->dh);
+ kex->dh = NULL;
+ if (dh_client_pub)
+ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
+ if (kbuf) {
+ explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
+ free(kbuf);
+ }
+ if (shared_secret)
+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ free(server_host_key_blob);
+ free(signature);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexecdh.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexecdh.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexecdh.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexecdh.c,v 1.5 2014/01/09 23:20:00 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
-
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-
-void
-kex_ecdh_hash(
- int hash_alg,
- const EC_GROUP *ec_group,
- char *client_version_string,
- char *server_version_string,
- char *ckexinit, int ckexinitlen,
- char *skexinit, int skexinitlen,
- u_char *serverhostkeyblob, int sbloblen,
- const EC_POINT *client_dh_pub,
- const EC_POINT *server_dh_pub,
- const BIGNUM *shared_secret,
- u_char **hash, u_int *hashlen)
-{
- Buffer b;
- static u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, client_version_string);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, server_version_string);
-
- /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
- buffer_put_int(&b, ckexinitlen+1);
- buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
- buffer_append(&b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen);
- buffer_put_int(&b, skexinitlen+1);
- buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
- buffer_append(&b, skexinit, skexinitlen);
-
- buffer_put_string(&b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen);
- buffer_put_ecpoint(&b, ec_group, client_dh_pub);
- buffer_put_ecpoint(&b, ec_group, server_dh_pub);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&b, shared_secret);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
- buffer_dump(&b);
-#endif
- if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, &b, digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: ssh_digest_buffer failed", __func__);
-
- buffer_free(&b);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
- dump_digest("hash", digest, ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg));
-#endif
- *hash = digest;
- *hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
-}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexecdh.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexecdh.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexecdh.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexecdh.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexecdh.c,v 1.6 2015/01/19 20:16:15 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+int
+kex_ecdh_hash(
+ int hash_alg,
+ const EC_GROUP *ec_group,
+ const char *client_version_string,
+ const char *server_version_string,
+ const u_char *ckexinit, size_t ckexinitlen,
+ const u_char *skexinit, size_t skexinitlen,
+ const u_char *serverhostkeyblob, size_t sbloblen,
+ const EC_POINT *client_dh_pub,
+ const EC_POINT *server_dh_pub,
+ const BIGNUM *shared_secret,
+ u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ int r;
+
+ if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg))
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, client_version_string)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, server_version_string)) != 0 ||
+ /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, ckexinitlen+1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, skexinitlen+1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(b, skexinit, skexinitlen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_ec(b, client_dh_pub, ec_group)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_ec(b, server_dh_pub, ec_group)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, shared_secret)) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+ sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
+#endif
+ if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ *hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+ dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexecdhc.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexecdhc.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexecdhc.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhc.c,v 1.7 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "dh.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-
-#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
-
-void
-kexecdh_client(Kex *kex)
-{
- EC_KEY *client_key;
- EC_POINT *server_public;
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- BIGNUM *shared_secret;
- Key *server_host_key;
- u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
- u_char *kbuf, *hash;
- u_int klen, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
-
- if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed", __func__);
- if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1)
- fatal("%s: EC_KEY_generate_key failed", __func__);
- group = EC_KEY_get0_group(client_key);
-
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT);
- packet_put_ecpoint(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key));
- packet_send();
- debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- fputs("client private key:\n", stderr);
- key_dump_ec_key(client_key);
-#endif
-
- debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY");
- packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY);
-
- /* hostkey */
- server_host_key_blob = packet_get_string(&sbloblen);
- server_host_key = key_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
- if (server_host_key == NULL)
- fatal("cannot decode server_host_key_blob");
- if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type)
- fatal("type mismatch for decoded server_host_key_blob");
- if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL)
- fatal("cannot verify server_host_key");
- if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1)
- fatal("server_host_key verification failed");
-
- /* Q_S, server public key */
- if ((server_public = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: EC_POINT_new failed", __func__);
- packet_get_ecpoint(group, server_public);
-
- if (key_ec_validate_public(group, server_public) != 0)
- fatal("%s: invalid server public key", __func__);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- fputs("server public key:\n", stderr);
- key_dump_ec_point(group, server_public);
-#endif
-
- /* signed H */
- signature = packet_get_string(&slen);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
- kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
- if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, server_public,
- client_key, NULL) != (int)klen)
- fatal("%s: ECDH_compute_key failed", __func__);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
-#endif
- if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
- if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__);
- explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
- free(kbuf);
-
- /* calc and verify H */
- kex_ecdh_hash(
- kex->hash_alg,
- group,
- kex->client_version_string,
- kex->server_version_string,
- buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
- buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
- server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key),
- server_public,
- shared_secret,
- &hash, &hashlen
- );
- free(server_host_key_blob);
- EC_POINT_clear_free(server_public);
- EC_KEY_free(client_key);
-
- if (key_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen) != 1)
- fatal("key_verify failed for server_host_key");
- key_free(server_host_key);
- free(signature);
-
- /* save session id */
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
- kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
- memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
- }
-
- kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
- BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
- kex_finish(kex);
-}
-#else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-void
-kexecdh_client(Kex *kex)
-{
- fatal("ECC support is not enabled");
-}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexecdhc.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexecdhc.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexecdhc.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexecdhc.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhc.c,v 1.10 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+static int input_kex_ecdh_reply(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+int
+kexecdh_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ EC_KEY *client_key = NULL;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ const EC_POINT *public_key;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(client_key);
+ public_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key);
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_ec(ssh, public_key, group)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ fputs("client private key:\n", stderr);
+ sshkey_dump_ec_key(client_key);
+#endif
+ kex->ec_client_key = client_key;
+ kex->ec_group = group;
+ client_key = NULL; /* owned by the kex */
+
+ debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY");
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY, &input_kex_ecdh_reply);
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ if (client_key)
+ EC_KEY_free(client_key);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+input_kex_ecdh_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ EC_POINT *server_public = NULL;
+ EC_KEY *client_key;
+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL;
+ u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+ u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t slen, sbloblen;
+ size_t klen = 0, hashlen;
+ int r;
+
+ if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ group = kex->ec_group;
+ client_key = kex->ec_client_key;
+
+ /* hostkey */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_host_key_blob,
+ &sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+ &server_host_key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type ||
+ (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA &&
+ server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Q_S, server public key */
+ /* signed H */
+ if ((server_public = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_ec(ssh, server_public, group)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ fputs("server public key:\n", stderr);
+ sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, server_public);
+#endif
+ if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, server_public) != 0) {
+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid server public key");
+ r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+ if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+ (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, server_public,
+ client_key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
+ BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+#endif
+ /* calc and verify H */
+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+ if ((r = kex_ecdh_hash(
+ kex->hash_alg,
+ group,
+ kex->client_version_string,
+ kex->server_version_string,
+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
+ server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key),
+ server_public,
+ shared_secret,
+ hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash,
+ hashlen, ssh->compat)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* save session id */
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+ kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+ }
+
+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ if (kex->ec_client_key) {
+ EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key);
+ kex->ec_client_key = NULL;
+ }
+ if (server_public)
+ EC_POINT_clear_free(server_public);
+ if (kbuf) {
+ explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
+ free(kbuf);
+ }
+ if (shared_secret)
+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ sshkey_free(server_host_key);
+ free(server_host_key_blob);
+ free(signature);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) */
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexecdhs.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexecdhs.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexecdhs.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,161 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhs.c,v 1.10 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-
-#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
-
-void
-kexecdh_server(Kex *kex)
-{
- EC_POINT *client_public;
- EC_KEY *server_key;
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- BIGNUM *shared_secret;
- Key *server_host_private, *server_host_public;
- u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
- u_char *kbuf, *hash;
- u_int klen, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
-
- if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed", __func__);
- if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1)
- fatal("%s: EC_KEY_generate_key failed", __func__);
- group = EC_KEY_get0_group(server_key);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- fputs("server private key:\n", stderr);
- key_dump_ec_key(server_key);
-#endif
-
- if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
- kex->load_host_private_key == NULL)
- fatal("Cannot load hostkey");
- server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type);
- if (server_host_public == NULL)
- fatal("Unsupported hostkey type %d", kex->hostkey_type);
- server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type);
-
- debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
- packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT);
- if ((client_public = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: EC_POINT_new failed", __func__);
- packet_get_ecpoint(group, client_public);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- if (key_ec_validate_public(group, client_public) != 0)
- fatal("%s: invalid client public key", __func__);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- fputs("client public key:\n", stderr);
- key_dump_ec_point(group, client_public);
-#endif
-
- /* Calculate shared_secret */
- klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
- kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
- if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, client_public,
- server_key, NULL) != (int)klen)
- fatal("%s: ECDH_compute_key failed", __func__);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
-#endif
- if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
- if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__);
- explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
- free(kbuf);
-
- /* calc H */
- key_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen);
- kex_ecdh_hash(
- kex->hash_alg,
- group,
- kex->client_version_string,
- kex->server_version_string,
- buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
- buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
- server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- client_public,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(server_key),
- shared_secret,
- &hash, &hashlen
- );
- EC_POINT_clear_free(client_public);
-
- /* save session id := H */
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
- kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
- memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
- }
-
- /* sign H */
- kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature, &slen,
- hash, hashlen);
-
- /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
-
- /* send server hostkey, ECDH pubkey 'Q_S' and signed H */
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY);
- packet_put_string(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
- packet_put_ecpoint(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(server_key));
- packet_put_string(signature, slen);
- packet_send();
-
- free(signature);
- free(server_host_key_blob);
- /* have keys, free server key */
- EC_KEY_free(server_key);
-
- kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
- BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
- kex_finish(kex);
-}
-#else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-void
-kexecdh_server(Kex *kex)
-{
- fatal("ECC support is not enabled");
-}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexecdhs.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexecdhs.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexecdhs.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexecdhs.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhs.c,v 1.15 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+static int input_kex_ecdh_init(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+int
+kexecdh_server(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT, &input_kex_ecdh_init);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+input_kex_ecdh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ EC_POINT *client_public;
+ EC_KEY *server_key = NULL;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ const EC_POINT *public_key;
+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *server_host_private, *server_host_public;
+ u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+ u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t slen, sbloblen;
+ size_t klen = 0, hashlen;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(server_key);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ fputs("server private key:\n", stderr);
+ sshkey_dump_ec_key(server_key);
+#endif
+
+ if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
+ kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type,
+ kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
+ server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type,
+ kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
+ if (server_host_public == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((client_public = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_ec(ssh, client_public, group)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ fputs("client public key:\n", stderr);
+ sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, client_public);
+#endif
+ if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, client_public) != 0) {
+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid client public key");
+ r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate shared_secret */
+ klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+ if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+ (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, client_public,
+ server_key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
+ BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+#endif
+ /* calc H */
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob,
+ &sbloblen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+ if ((r = kex_ecdh_hash(
+ kex->hash_alg,
+ group,
+ kex->client_version_string,
+ kex->server_version_string,
+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
+ server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+ client_public,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(server_key),
+ shared_secret,
+ hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* save session id := H */
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+ kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+ }
+
+ /* sign H */
+ if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature,
+ &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
+
+ public_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(server_key);
+ /* send server hostkey, ECDH pubkey 'Q_S' and signed H */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_ec(ssh, public_key, group)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ if (kex->ec_client_key) {
+ EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key);
+ kex->ec_client_key = NULL;
+ }
+ if (server_key)
+ EC_KEY_free(server_key);
+ if (kbuf) {
+ explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
+ free(kbuf);
+ }
+ if (shared_secret)
+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ free(server_host_key_blob);
+ free(signature);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) */
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexgex.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexgex.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexgex.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexgex.c,v 1.28 2014/01/09 23:20:00 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-void
-kexgex_hash(
- int hash_alg,
- char *client_version_string,
- char *server_version_string,
- char *ckexinit, int ckexinitlen,
- char *skexinit, int skexinitlen,
- u_char *serverhostkeyblob, int sbloblen,
- int min, int wantbits, int max, BIGNUM *prime, BIGNUM *gen,
- BIGNUM *client_dh_pub,
- BIGNUM *server_dh_pub,
- BIGNUM *shared_secret,
- u_char **hash, u_int *hashlen)
-{
- Buffer b;
- static u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, client_version_string);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, server_version_string);
-
- /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
- buffer_put_int(&b, ckexinitlen+1);
- buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
- buffer_append(&b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen);
- buffer_put_int(&b, skexinitlen+1);
- buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
- buffer_append(&b, skexinit, skexinitlen);
-
- buffer_put_string(&b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen);
- if (min == -1 || max == -1)
- buffer_put_int(&b, wantbits);
- else {
- buffer_put_int(&b, min);
- buffer_put_int(&b, wantbits);
- buffer_put_int(&b, max);
- }
- buffer_put_bignum2(&b, prime);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&b, gen);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&b, client_dh_pub);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&b, server_dh_pub);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&b, shared_secret);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- buffer_dump(&b);
-#endif
- if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, &b, digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: ssh_digest_buffer failed", __func__);
-
- buffer_free(&b);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
- dump_digest("hash", digest, ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg));
-#endif
- *hash = digest;
- *hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexgex.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexgex.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexgex.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexgex.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgex.c,v 1.29 2015/01/19 20:16:15 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+int
+kexgex_hash(
+ int hash_alg,
+ const char *client_version_string,
+ const char *server_version_string,
+ const u_char *ckexinit, size_t ckexinitlen,
+ const u_char *skexinit, size_t skexinitlen,
+ const u_char *serverhostkeyblob, size_t sbloblen,
+ int min, int wantbits, int max,
+ const BIGNUM *prime,
+ const BIGNUM *gen,
+ const BIGNUM *client_dh_pub,
+ const BIGNUM *server_dh_pub,
+ const BIGNUM *shared_secret,
+ u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ int r;
+
+ if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1))
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, client_version_string)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, server_version_string)) != 0 ||
+ /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, ckexinitlen+1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, skexinitlen+1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(b, skexinit, skexinitlen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+ (min != -1 && (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, min)) != 0) ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, wantbits)) != 0 ||
+ (max != -1 && (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, max)) != 0) ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, prime)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, gen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, client_dh_pub)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, server_dh_pub)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, shared_secret)) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
+#endif
+ if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ *hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexgexc.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexgexc.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexgexc.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.17 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "dh.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-
-void
-kexgex_client(Kex *kex)
-{
- BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL;
- BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL;
- Key *server_host_key;
- u_char *kbuf, *hash, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
- u_int klen, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
- int kout;
- int min, max, nbits;
- DH *dh;
-
- nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8);
-
- if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) {
- /* Old GEX request */
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD);
- packet_put_int(nbits);
- min = DH_GRP_MIN;
- max = DH_GRP_MAX;
-
- debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD(%u) sent", nbits);
- } else {
- /* New GEX request */
- min = DH_GRP_MIN;
- max = DH_GRP_MAX;
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
- packet_put_int(min);
- packet_put_int(nbits);
- packet_put_int(max);
-
- debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(%u<%u<%u) sent",
- min, nbits, max);
- }
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- fprintf(stderr, "\nmin = %d, nbits = %d, max = %d\n",
- min, nbits, max);
-#endif
- packet_send();
-
- debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP");
- packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP);
-
- if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("BN_new");
- packet_get_bignum2(p);
- if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("BN_new");
- packet_get_bignum2(g);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
- fatal("DH_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
- min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
-
- dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
- dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
- fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-#endif
-
- debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT sent");
- /* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT);
- packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
- packet_send();
-
- debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY");
- packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY);
-
- /* key, cert */
- server_host_key_blob = packet_get_string(&sbloblen);
- server_host_key = key_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
- if (server_host_key == NULL)
- fatal("cannot decode server_host_key_blob");
- if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type)
- fatal("type mismatch for decoded server_host_key_blob");
- if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL)
- fatal("cannot verify server_host_key");
- if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1)
- fatal("server_host_key verification failed");
-
- /* DH parameter f, server public DH key */
- if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
- packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- fprintf(stderr, "dh_server_pub= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_server_pub);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_server_pub));
-#endif
-
- /* signed H */
- signature = packet_get_string(&slen);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
- packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
-
- klen = DH_size(dh);
- kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
- if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh)) < 0)
- fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
-#endif
- if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("kexgex_client: BN_new failed");
- if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
- fatal("kexgex_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
- explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
- free(kbuf);
-
- if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX)
- min = max = -1;
-
- /* calc and verify H */
- kexgex_hash(
- kex->hash_alg,
- kex->client_version_string,
- kex->server_version_string,
- buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
- buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
- server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- min, nbits, max,
- dh->p, dh->g,
- dh->pub_key,
- dh_server_pub,
- shared_secret,
- &hash, &hashlen
- );
-
- /* have keys, free DH */
- DH_free(dh);
- free(server_host_key_blob);
- BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
-
- if (key_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen) != 1)
- fatal("key_verify failed for server_host_key");
- key_free(server_host_key);
- free(signature);
-
- /* save session id */
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
- kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
- memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
- }
- kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
- BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-
- kex_finish(kex);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexgexc.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexgexc.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexgexc.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexgexc.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.22 2015/05/26 23:23:40 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+int
+kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ int r;
+ u_int nbits;
+
+ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8);
+
+ kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN;
+ kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+ kex->nbits = nbits;
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE)
+ kex->nbits = MIN(kex->nbits, 4096);
+ /* New GEX request */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->max)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(%u<%u<%u) sent",
+ kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ fprintf(stderr, "\nmin = %d, nbits = %d, max = %d\n",
+ kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max);
+#endif
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP,
+ &input_kex_dh_gex_group);
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL;
+ int r, bits;
+
+ debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP");
+
+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (g = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, g)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((bits = BN_num_bits(p)) < 0 ||
+ (u_int)bits < kex->min || (u_int)bits > kex->max) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((kex->dh = dh_new_group(g, p)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
+
+ /* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
+ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT sent");
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
+ fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh->pub_key);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+#endif
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, NULL);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, &input_kex_dh_gex_reply);
+ r = 0;
+out:
+ if (p)
+ BN_clear_free(p);
+ if (g)
+ BN_clear_free(g);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL;
+ u_char *kbuf = NULL, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t klen = 0, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
+ int kout, r;
+
+ debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY");
+ if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* key, cert */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_host_key_blob,
+ &sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+ &server_host_key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type ||
+ (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA &&
+ server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* DH parameter f, server public DH key */
+ if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* signed H */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, dh_server_pub)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ fprintf(stderr, "dh_server_pub= ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_server_pub);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_server_pub));
+#endif
+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_server_pub)) {
+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "bad server public DH value");
+ r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
+ if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+ (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
+ BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
+#endif
+ if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX)
+ kex->min = kex->max = -1;
+
+ /* calc and verify H */
+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+ if ((r = kexgex_hash(
+ kex->hash_alg,
+ kex->client_version_string,
+ kex->server_version_string,
+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
+ server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+ kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max,
+ kex->dh->p, kex->dh->g,
+ kex->dh->pub_key,
+ dh_server_pub,
+ shared_secret,
+ hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash,
+ hashlen, ssh->compat)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* save session id */
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+ kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+ }
+
+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ DH_free(kex->dh);
+ kex->dh = NULL;
+ if (dh_server_pub)
+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
+ if (kbuf) {
+ explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
+ free(kbuf);
+ }
+ if (shared_secret)
+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ sshkey_free(server_host_key);
+ free(server_host_key_blob);
+ free(signature);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexgexs.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexgexs.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexgexs.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,208 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.19 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/param.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "dh.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
-void
-kexgex_server(Kex *kex)
-{
- BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL;
- Key *server_host_public, *server_host_private;
- DH *dh;
- u_char *kbuf, *hash, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
- u_int sbloblen, klen, slen, hashlen;
- int omin = -1, min = -1, omax = -1, max = -1, onbits = -1, nbits = -1;
- int type, kout;
-
- if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
- kex->load_host_private_key == NULL)
- fatal("Cannot load hostkey");
- server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type);
- if (server_host_public == NULL)
- fatal("Unsupported hostkey type %d", kex->hostkey_type);
- server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type);
-
- type = packet_read();
- switch (type) {
- case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST:
- debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received");
- omin = min = packet_get_int();
- onbits = nbits = packet_get_int();
- omax = max = packet_get_int();
- min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
- max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
- nbits = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
- nbits = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
- break;
- case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD:
- debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD received");
- onbits = nbits = packet_get_int();
- /* unused for old GEX */
- omin = min = DH_GRP_MIN;
- omax = max = DH_GRP_MAX;
- break;
- default:
- fatal("protocol error during kex, no DH_GEX_REQUEST: %d", type);
- }
- packet_check_eom();
-
- if (omax < omin || onbits < omin || omax < onbits)
- fatal("DH_GEX_REQUEST, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
- omin, onbits, omax);
-
- /* Contact privileged parent */
- dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
- if (dh == NULL)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching DH grp found");
-
- debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP sent");
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP);
- packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
- packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
- packet_send();
-
- /* flush */
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */
- dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-
- debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT");
- packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT);
-
- /* key, cert */
- if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
- packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
- packet_check_eom();
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- fprintf(stderr, "dh_client_pub= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_client_pub);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub));
-#endif
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
- fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-#endif
- if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
- packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
-
- klen = DH_size(dh);
- kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
- if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh)) < 0)
- fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
-#endif
- if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("kexgex_server: BN_new failed");
- if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
- fatal("kexgex_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
- explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
- free(kbuf);
-
- key_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen);
-
- if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD)
- omin = min = omax = max = -1;
-
- /* calc H */
- kexgex_hash(
- kex->hash_alg,
- kex->client_version_string,
- kex->server_version_string,
- buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
- buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
- server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- omin, onbits, omax,
- dh->p, dh->g,
- dh_client_pub,
- dh->pub_key,
- shared_secret,
- &hash, &hashlen
- );
- BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
-
- /* save session id := H */
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
- kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
- memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
- }
-
- /* sign H */
- kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature, &slen,
- hash, hashlen);
-
- /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
-
- /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
- debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY sent");
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY);
- packet_put_string(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
- packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); /* f */
- packet_put_string(signature, slen);
- packet_send();
-
- free(signature);
- free(server_host_key_blob);
- /* have keys, free DH */
- DH_free(dh);
-
- kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
- BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-
- kex_finish(kex);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexgexs.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexgexs.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexgexs.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/kexgexs.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.29 2016/06/08 02:13:01 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/param.h> /* MIN MAX */
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+int
+kexgex_server(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST,
+ &input_kex_dh_gex_request);
+ debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ int r;
+ u_int min = 0, max = 0, nbits = 0;
+
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received");
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &max)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ kex->nbits = nbits;
+ kex->min = min;
+ kex->max = max;
+ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
+ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
+ nbits = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
+ nbits = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
+
+ if (kex->max < kex->min || kex->nbits < kex->min ||
+ kex->max < kex->nbits || kex->max < DH_GRP_MIN) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Contact privileged parent */
+ kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
+ if (kex->dh == NULL) {
+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "no matching DH grp found");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP sent");
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->g)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */
+ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT");
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, &input_kex_dh_gex_init);
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *server_host_public, *server_host_private;
+ u_char *kbuf = NULL, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t sbloblen, slen;
+ size_t klen = 0, hashlen;
+ int kout, r;
+
+ if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
+ kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type,
+ kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
+ server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type,
+ kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
+ if (server_host_public == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* key, cert */
+ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, dh_client_pub)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ fprintf(stderr, "dh_client_pub= ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_client_pub);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub));
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
+ fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh->pub_key);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+#endif
+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_client_pub)) {
+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "bad client public DH value");
+ r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
+ if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+ (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
+ BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
+#endif
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob,
+ &sbloblen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* calc H */
+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+ if ((r = kexgex_hash(
+ kex->hash_alg,
+ kex->client_version_string,
+ kex->server_version_string,
+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
+ server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+ kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max,
+ kex->dh->p, kex->dh->g,
+ dh_client_pub,
+ kex->dh->pub_key,
+ shared_secret,
+ hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* save session id := H */
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+ kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+ }
+
+ /* sign H */
+ if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature,
+ &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
+
+ /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+ out:
+ DH_free(kex->dh);
+ kex->dh = NULL;
+ if (dh_client_pub)
+ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
+ if (kbuf) {
+ explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
+ free(kbuf);
+ }
+ if (shared_secret)
+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ free(server_host_key_blob);
+ free(signature);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/key.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/key.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/key.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,2625 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.116 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * read_bignum():
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- *
- * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include "crypto_api.h"
-
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "uuencode.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-
-static int to_blob(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, int);
-static Key *key_from_blob2(const u_char *, u_int, int);
-
-static struct KeyCert *
-cert_new(void)
-{
- struct KeyCert *cert;
-
- cert = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cert));
- buffer_init(&cert->certblob);
- buffer_init(&cert->critical);
- buffer_init(&cert->extensions);
- cert->key_id = NULL;
- cert->principals = NULL;
- cert->signature_key = NULL;
- return cert;
-}
-
-Key *
-key_new(int type)
-{
- Key *k;
- RSA *rsa;
- DSA *dsa;
- k = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k));
- k->type = type;
- k->ecdsa = NULL;
- k->ecdsa_nid = -1;
- k->dsa = NULL;
- k->rsa = NULL;
- k->cert = NULL;
- k->ed25519_sk = NULL;
- k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
- switch (k->type) {
- case KEY_RSA1:
- case KEY_RSA:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("key_new: RSA_new failed");
- if ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
- if ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
- k->rsa = rsa;
- break;
- case KEY_DSA:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("key_new: DSA_new failed");
- if ((dsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
- if ((dsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
- if ((dsa->g = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
- if ((dsa->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
- k->dsa = dsa;
- break;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- /* Cannot do anything until we know the group */
- break;
-#endif
- case KEY_ED25519:
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- /* no need to prealloc */
- break;
- case KEY_UNSPEC:
- break;
- default:
- fatal("key_new: bad key type %d", k->type);
- break;
- }
-
- if (key_is_cert(k))
- k->cert = cert_new();
-
- return k;
-}
-
-void
-key_add_private(Key *k)
-{
- switch (k->type) {
- case KEY_RSA1:
- case KEY_RSA:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- if ((k->rsa->d = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
- if ((k->rsa->iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
- if ((k->rsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
- if ((k->rsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
- if ((k->rsa->dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
- if ((k->rsa->dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
- break;
- case KEY_DSA:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- if ((k->dsa->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
- break;
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- /* Cannot do anything until we know the group */
- break;
- case KEY_ED25519:
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- /* no need to prealloc */
- break;
- case KEY_UNSPEC:
- break;
- default:
- break;
- }
-}
-
-Key *
-key_new_private(int type)
-{
- Key *k = key_new(type);
-
- key_add_private(k);
- return k;
-}
-
-static void
-cert_free(struct KeyCert *cert)
-{
- u_int i;
-
- buffer_free(&cert->certblob);
- buffer_free(&cert->critical);
- buffer_free(&cert->extensions);
- free(cert->key_id);
- for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++)
- free(cert->principals[i]);
- free(cert->principals);
- if (cert->signature_key != NULL)
- key_free(cert->signature_key);
- free(cert);
-}
-
-void
-key_free(Key *k)
-{
- if (k == NULL)
- fatal("key_free: key is NULL");
- switch (k->type) {
- case KEY_RSA1:
- case KEY_RSA:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- if (k->rsa != NULL)
- RSA_free(k->rsa);
- k->rsa = NULL;
- break;
- case KEY_DSA:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- if (k->dsa != NULL)
- DSA_free(k->dsa);
- k->dsa = NULL;
- break;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- if (k->ecdsa != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(k->ecdsa);
- k->ecdsa = NULL;
- break;
-#endif
- case KEY_ED25519:
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- if (k->ed25519_pk) {
- explicit_bzero(k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
- free(k->ed25519_pk);
- k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
- }
- if (k->ed25519_sk) {
- explicit_bzero(k->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ);
- free(k->ed25519_sk);
- k->ed25519_sk = NULL;
- }
- break;
- case KEY_UNSPEC:
- break;
- default:
- fatal("key_free: bad key type %d", k->type);
- break;
- }
- if (key_is_cert(k)) {
- if (k->cert != NULL)
- cert_free(k->cert);
- k->cert = NULL;
- }
-
- free(k);
-}
-
-static int
-cert_compare(struct KeyCert *a, struct KeyCert *b)
-{
- if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
- return 1;
- if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (buffer_len(&a->certblob) != buffer_len(&b->certblob))
- return 0;
- if (timingsafe_bcmp(buffer_ptr(&a->certblob), buffer_ptr(&b->certblob),
- buffer_len(&a->certblob)) != 0)
- return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Compare public portions of key only, allowing comparisons between
- * certificates and plain keys too.
- */
-int
-key_equal_public(const Key *a, const Key *b)
-{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- BN_CTX *bnctx;
-#endif
-
- if (a == NULL || b == NULL ||
- key_type_plain(a->type) != key_type_plain(b->type))
- return 0;
-
- switch (a->type) {
- case KEY_RSA1:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- case KEY_RSA:
- return a->rsa != NULL && b->rsa != NULL &&
- BN_cmp(a->rsa->e, b->rsa->e) == 0 &&
- BN_cmp(a->rsa->n, b->rsa->n) == 0;
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- case KEY_DSA:
- return a->dsa != NULL && b->dsa != NULL &&
- BN_cmp(a->dsa->p, b->dsa->p) == 0 &&
- BN_cmp(a->dsa->q, b->dsa->q) == 0 &&
- BN_cmp(a->dsa->g, b->dsa->g) == 0 &&
- BN_cmp(a->dsa->pub_key, b->dsa->pub_key) == 0;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- if (a->ecdsa == NULL || b->ecdsa == NULL ||
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa) == NULL ||
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa) == NULL)
- return 0;
- if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__);
- if (EC_GROUP_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa),
- EC_KEY_get0_group(b->ecdsa), bnctx) != 0 ||
- EC_POINT_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa),
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa),
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa), bnctx) != 0) {
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
- return 0;
- }
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
- return 1;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
- case KEY_ED25519:
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- return a->ed25519_pk != NULL && b->ed25519_pk != NULL &&
- memcmp(a->ed25519_pk, b->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ) == 0;
- default:
- fatal("key_equal: bad key type %d", a->type);
- }
- /* NOTREACHED */
-}
-
-int
-key_equal(const Key *a, const Key *b)
-{
- if (a == NULL || b == NULL || a->type != b->type)
- return 0;
- if (key_is_cert(a)) {
- if (!cert_compare(a->cert, b->cert))
- return 0;
- }
- return key_equal_public(a, b);
-}
-
-u_char*
-key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type,
- u_int *dgst_raw_length)
-{
- u_char *blob = NULL;
- u_char *retval = NULL;
- u_int len = 0;
- int nlen, elen, hash_alg = -1;
-
- *dgst_raw_length = 0;
-
- /* XXX switch to DIGEST_* directly? */
- switch (dgst_type) {
- case SSH_FP_MD5:
- hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_MD5;
- break;
- case SSH_FP_SHA1:
- hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
- break;
- case SSH_FP_SHA256:
- hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
- break;
- default:
- fatal("%s: bad digest type %d", __func__, dgst_type);
- }
- switch (k->type) {
- case KEY_RSA1:
- nlen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->n);
- elen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->e);
- len = nlen + elen;
- blob = xmalloc(len);
- BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->n, blob);
- BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->e, blob + nlen);
- break;
- case KEY_DSA:
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- case KEY_RSA:
- case KEY_ED25519:
- key_to_blob(k, &blob, &len);
- break;
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- /* We want a fingerprint of the _key_ not of the cert */
- to_blob(k, &blob, &len, 1);
- break;
- case KEY_UNSPEC:
- return retval;
- default:
- fatal("%s: bad key type %d", __func__, k->type);
- break;
- }
- if (blob != NULL) {
- retval = xmalloc(SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH);
- if ((ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, blob, len,
- retval, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: digest_memory failed", __func__);
- explicit_bzero(blob, len);
- free(blob);
- *dgst_raw_length = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
- } else {
- fatal("%s: blob is null", __func__);
- }
- return retval;
-}
-
-static char *
-key_fingerprint_hex(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len)
-{
- char *retval;
- u_int i;
-
- retval = xcalloc(1, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1);
- for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
- char hex[4];
- snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%02x:", dgst_raw[i]);
- strlcat(retval, hex, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1);
- }
-
- /* Remove the trailing ':' character */
- retval[(dgst_raw_len * 3) - 1] = '\0';
- return retval;
-}
-
-static char *
-key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len)
-{
- char vowels[] = { 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o', 'u', 'y' };
- char consonants[] = { 'b', 'c', 'd', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'k', 'l', 'm',
- 'n', 'p', 'r', 's', 't', 'v', 'z', 'x' };
- u_int i, j = 0, rounds, seed = 1;
- char *retval;
-
- rounds = (dgst_raw_len / 2) + 1;
- retval = xcalloc((rounds * 6), sizeof(char));
- retval[j++] = 'x';
- for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
- u_int idx0, idx1, idx2, idx3, idx4;
- if ((i + 1 < rounds) || (dgst_raw_len % 2 != 0)) {
- idx0 = (((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 6) & 3) +
- seed) % 6;
- idx1 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 2) & 15;
- idx2 = ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) & 3) +
- (seed / 6)) % 6;
- retval[j++] = vowels[idx0];
- retval[j++] = consonants[idx1];
- retval[j++] = vowels[idx2];
- if ((i + 1) < rounds) {
- idx3 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])) >> 4) & 15;
- idx4 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1]))) & 15;
- retval[j++] = consonants[idx3];
- retval[j++] = '-';
- retval[j++] = consonants[idx4];
- seed = ((seed * 5) +
- ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) * 7) +
- ((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])))) % 36;
- }
- } else {
- idx0 = seed % 6;
- idx1 = 16;
- idx2 = seed / 6;
- retval[j++] = vowels[idx0];
- retval[j++] = consonants[idx1];
- retval[j++] = vowels[idx2];
- }
- }
- retval[j++] = 'x';
- retval[j++] = '\0';
- return retval;
-}
-
-/*
- * Draw an ASCII-Art representing the fingerprint so human brain can
- * profit from its built-in pattern recognition ability.
- * This technique is called "random art" and can be found in some
- * scientific publications like this original paper:
- *
- * "Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security",
- * Perrig A. and Song D., 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
- * Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)
- * sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/validation/validation.pdf
- *
- * The subject came up in a talk by Dan Kaminsky, too.
- *
- * If you see the picture is different, the key is different.
- * If the picture looks the same, you still know nothing.
- *
- * The algorithm used here is a worm crawling over a discrete plane,
- * leaving a trace (augmenting the field) everywhere it goes.
- * Movement is taken from dgst_raw 2bit-wise. Bumping into walls
- * makes the respective movement vector be ignored for this turn.
- * Graphs are not unambiguous, because circles in graphs can be
- * walked in either direction.
- */
-
-/*
- * Field sizes for the random art. Have to be odd, so the starting point
- * can be in the exact middle of the picture, and FLDBASE should be >=8 .
- * Else pictures would be too dense, and drawing the frame would
- * fail, too, because the key type would not fit in anymore.
- */
-#define FLDBASE 8
-#define FLDSIZE_Y (FLDBASE + 1)
-#define FLDSIZE_X (FLDBASE * 2 + 1)
-static char *
-key_fingerprint_randomart(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len, const Key *k)
-{
- /*
- * Chars to be used after each other every time the worm
- * intersects with itself. Matter of taste.
- */
- char *augmentation_string = " .o+=*BOX@%&#/^SE";
- char *retval, *p;
- u_char field[FLDSIZE_X][FLDSIZE_Y];
- u_int i, b;
- int x, y;
- size_t len = strlen(augmentation_string) - 1;
-
- retval = xcalloc(1, (FLDSIZE_X + 3) * (FLDSIZE_Y + 2));
-
- /* initialize field */
- memset(field, 0, FLDSIZE_X * FLDSIZE_Y * sizeof(char));
- x = FLDSIZE_X / 2;
- y = FLDSIZE_Y / 2;
-
- /* process raw key */
- for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
- int input;
- /* each byte conveys four 2-bit move commands */
- input = dgst_raw[i];
- for (b = 0; b < 4; b++) {
- /* evaluate 2 bit, rest is shifted later */
- x += (input & 0x1) ? 1 : -1;
- y += (input & 0x2) ? 1 : -1;
-
- /* assure we are still in bounds */
- x = MAX(x, 0);
- y = MAX(y, 0);
- x = MIN(x, FLDSIZE_X - 1);
- y = MIN(y, FLDSIZE_Y - 1);
-
- /* augment the field */
- if (field[x][y] < len - 2)
- field[x][y]++;
- input = input >> 2;
- }
- }
-
- /* mark starting point and end point*/
- field[FLDSIZE_X / 2][FLDSIZE_Y / 2] = len - 1;
- field[x][y] = len;
-
- /* fill in retval */
- snprintf(retval, FLDSIZE_X, "+--[%4s %4u]", key_type(k), key_size(k));
- p = strchr(retval, '\0');
-
- /* output upper border */
- for (i = p - retval - 1; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
- *p++ = '-';
- *p++ = '+';
- *p++ = '\n';
-
- /* output content */
- for (y = 0; y < FLDSIZE_Y; y++) {
- *p++ = '|';
- for (x = 0; x < FLDSIZE_X; x++)
- *p++ = augmentation_string[MIN(field[x][y], len)];
- *p++ = '|';
- *p++ = '\n';
- }
-
- /* output lower border */
- *p++ = '+';
- for (i = 0; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
- *p++ = '-';
- *p++ = '+';
-
- return retval;
-}
-
-char *
-key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, enum fp_rep dgst_rep)
-{
- char *retval = NULL;
- u_char *dgst_raw;
- u_int dgst_raw_len;
-
- dgst_raw = key_fingerprint_raw(k, dgst_type, &dgst_raw_len);
- if (!dgst_raw)
- fatal("key_fingerprint: null from key_fingerprint_raw()");
- switch (dgst_rep) {
- case SSH_FP_HEX:
- retval = key_fingerprint_hex(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
- break;
- case SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE:
- retval = key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
- break;
- case SSH_FP_RANDOMART:
- retval = key_fingerprint_randomart(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, k);
- break;
- default:
- fatal("key_fingerprint: bad digest representation %d",
- dgst_rep);
- break;
- }
- explicit_bzero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
- free(dgst_raw);
- return retval;
-}
-
-/*
- * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances
- * the pointer. The integer must already be initialized. This function is
- * permitted to modify the buffer. This leaves *cpp to point just beyond the
- * last processed (and maybe modified) character. Note that this may modify
- * the buffer containing the number.
- */
-static int
-read_bignum(char **cpp, BIGNUM * value)
-{
- char *cp = *cpp;
- int old;
-
- /* Skip any leading whitespace. */
- for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
- ;
-
- /* Check that it begins with a decimal digit. */
- if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9')
- return 0;
-
- /* Save starting position. */
- *cpp = cp;
-
- /* Move forward until all decimal digits skipped. */
- for (; *cp >= '0' && *cp <= '9'; cp++)
- ;
-
- /* Save the old terminating character, and replace it by \0. */
- old = *cp;
- *cp = 0;
-
- /* Parse the number. */
- if (BN_dec2bn(&value, *cpp) == 0)
- return 0;
-
- /* Restore old terminating character. */
- *cp = old;
-
- /* Move beyond the number and return success. */
- *cpp = cp;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int
-write_bignum(FILE *f, BIGNUM *num)
-{
- char *buf = BN_bn2dec(num);
- if (buf == NULL) {
- error("write_bignum: BN_bn2dec() failed");
- return 0;
- }
- fprintf(f, " %s", buf);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* returns 1 ok, -1 error */
-int
-key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
-{
- Key *k;
- int success = -1;
- char *cp, *space;
- int len, n, type;
- u_int bits;
- u_char *blob;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- int curve_nid = -1;
-#endif
-
- cp = *cpp;
-
- switch (ret->type) {
- case KEY_RSA1:
- /* Get number of bits. */
- if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9')
- return -1; /* Bad bit count... */
- for (bits = 0; *cp >= '0' && *cp <= '9'; cp++)
- bits = 10 * bits + *cp - '0';
- if (bits == 0)
- return -1;
- *cpp = cp;
- /* Get public exponent, public modulus. */
- if (!read_bignum(cpp, ret->rsa->e))
- return -1;
- if (!read_bignum(cpp, ret->rsa->n))
- return -1;
- /* validate the claimed number of bits */
- if ((u_int)BN_num_bits(ret->rsa->n) != bits) {
- verbose("key_read: claimed key size %d does not match "
- "actual %d", bits, BN_num_bits(ret->rsa->n));
- return -1;
- }
- success = 1;
- break;
- case KEY_UNSPEC:
- case KEY_RSA:
- case KEY_DSA:
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- case KEY_ED25519:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- space = strchr(cp, ' ');
- if (space == NULL) {
- debug3("key_read: missing whitespace");
- return -1;
- }
- *space = '\0';
- type = key_type_from_name(cp);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- if (key_type_plain(type) == KEY_ECDSA &&
- (curve_nid = key_ecdsa_nid_from_name(cp)) == -1) {
- debug("key_read: invalid curve");
- return -1;
- }
-#endif
- *space = ' ';
- if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
- debug3("key_read: missing keytype");
- return -1;
- }
- cp = space+1;
- if (*cp == '\0') {
- debug3("key_read: short string");
- return -1;
- }
- if (ret->type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
- ret->type = type;
- } else if (ret->type != type) {
- /* is a key, but different type */
- debug3("key_read: type mismatch");
- return -1;
- }
- len = 2*strlen(cp);
- blob = xmalloc(len);
- n = uudecode(cp, blob, len);
- if (n < 0) {
- error("key_read: uudecode %s failed", cp);
- free(blob);
- return -1;
- }
- k = key_from_blob(blob, (u_int)n);
- free(blob);
- if (k == NULL) {
- error("key_read: key_from_blob %s failed", cp);
- return -1;
- }
- if (k->type != type) {
- error("key_read: type mismatch: encoding error");
- key_free(k);
- return -1;
- }
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- if (key_type_plain(type) == KEY_ECDSA &&
- curve_nid != k->ecdsa_nid) {
- error("key_read: type mismatch: EC curve mismatch");
- key_free(k);
- return -1;
- }
-#endif
-/*XXXX*/
- if (key_is_cert(ret)) {
- if (!key_is_cert(k)) {
- error("key_read: loaded key is not a cert");
- key_free(k);
- return -1;
- }
- if (ret->cert != NULL)
- cert_free(ret->cert);
- ret->cert = k->cert;
- k->cert = NULL;
- }
- if (key_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_RSA) {
- if (ret->rsa != NULL)
- RSA_free(ret->rsa);
- ret->rsa = k->rsa;
- k->rsa = NULL;
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
- RSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->rsa, 8);
-#endif
- }
- if (key_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_DSA) {
- if (ret->dsa != NULL)
- DSA_free(ret->dsa);
- ret->dsa = k->dsa;
- k->dsa = NULL;
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
- DSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->dsa, 8);
-#endif
- }
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- if (key_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_ECDSA) {
- if (ret->ecdsa != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdsa);
- ret->ecdsa = k->ecdsa;
- ret->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid;
- k->ecdsa = NULL;
- k->ecdsa_nid = -1;
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
- key_dump_ec_key(ret->ecdsa);
-#endif
- }
-#endif
- if (key_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_ED25519) {
- free(ret->ed25519_pk);
- ret->ed25519_pk = k->ed25519_pk;
- k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
- /* XXX */
-#endif
- }
- success = 1;
-/*XXXX*/
- key_free(k);
- if (success != 1)
- break;
- /* advance cp: skip whitespace and data */
- while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t')
- cp++;
- while (*cp != '\0' && *cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')
- cp++;
- *cpp = cp;
- break;
- default:
- fatal("key_read: bad key type: %d", ret->type);
- break;
- }
- return success;
-}
-
-int
-key_write(const Key *key, FILE *f)
-{
- int n, success = 0;
- u_int len, bits = 0;
- u_char *blob;
- char *uu;
-
- if (key_is_cert(key)) {
- if (key->cert == NULL) {
- error("%s: no cert data", __func__);
- return 0;
- }
- if (buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
- error("%s: no signed certificate blob", __func__);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- switch (key->type) {
- case KEY_RSA1:
- if (key->rsa == NULL)
- return 0;
- /* size of modulus 'n' */
- bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
- fprintf(f, "%u", bits);
- if (write_bignum(f, key->rsa->e) &&
- write_bignum(f, key->rsa->n))
- return 1;
- error("key_write: failed for RSA key");
- return 0;
- case KEY_DSA:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- if (key->dsa == NULL)
- return 0;
- break;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- if (key->ecdsa == NULL)
- return 0;
- break;
-#endif
- case KEY_ED25519:
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- if (key->ed25519_pk == NULL)
- return 0;
- break;
- case KEY_RSA:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- if (key->rsa == NULL)
- return 0;
- break;
- default:
- return 0;
- }
-
- key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len);
- uu = xmalloc(2*len);
- n = uuencode(blob, len, uu, 2*len);
- if (n > 0) {
- fprintf(f, "%s %s", key_ssh_name(key), uu);
- success = 1;
- }
- free(blob);
- free(uu);
-
- return success;
-}
-
-const char *
-key_cert_type(const Key *k)
-{
- switch (k->cert->type) {
- case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER:
- return "user";
- case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST:
- return "host";
- default:
- return "unknown";
- }
-}
-
-struct keytype {
- char *name;
- char *shortname;
- int type;
- int nid;
- int cert;
-};
-static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
- { NULL, "RSA1", KEY_RSA1, 0, 0 },
- { "ssh-rsa", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0 },
- { "ssh-dss", "DSA", KEY_DSA, 0, 0 },
- { "ssh-ed25519", "ED25519", KEY_ED25519, 0, 0 },
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "ECDSA", KEY_ECDSA, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 0 },
- { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384", "ECDSA", KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp384r1, 0 },
-# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
- { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521", "ECDSA", KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp521r1, 0 },
-# endif
-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
- { "ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com", "RSA-CERT", KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1 },
- { "ssh-dss-cert-v01 at openssh.com", "DSA-CERT", KEY_DSA_CERT, 0, 1 },
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT",
- KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1 },
- { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT",
- KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp384r1, 1 },
-# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
- { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT",
- KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp521r1, 1 },
-# endif
-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
- { "ssh-rsa-cert-v00 at openssh.com", "RSA-CERT-V00",
- KEY_RSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 },
- { "ssh-dss-cert-v00 at openssh.com", "DSA-CERT-V00",
- KEY_DSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 },
- { "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com", "ED25519-CERT",
- KEY_ED25519_CERT, 0, 1 },
- { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0 }
-};
-
-const char *
-key_type(const Key *k)
-{
- const struct keytype *kt;
-
- for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
- if (kt->type == k->type)
- return kt->shortname;
- }
- return "unknown";
-}
-
-static const char *
-key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(int type, int nid)
-{
- const struct keytype *kt;
-
- for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
- if (kt->type == type && (kt->nid == 0 || kt->nid == nid))
- return kt->name;
- }
- return "ssh-unknown";
-}
-
-const char *
-key_ssh_name(const Key *k)
-{
- return key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(k->type, k->ecdsa_nid);
-}
-
-const char *
-key_ssh_name_plain(const Key *k)
-{
- return key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(key_type_plain(k->type),
- k->ecdsa_nid);
-}
-
-int
-key_type_from_name(char *name)
-{
- const struct keytype *kt;
-
- for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
- /* Only allow shortname matches for plain key types */
- if ((kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0) ||
- (!kt->cert && strcasecmp(kt->shortname, name) == 0))
- return kt->type;
- }
- debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name);
- return KEY_UNSPEC;
-}
-
-int
-key_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *name)
-{
- const struct keytype *kt;
-
- for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
- if (kt->type != KEY_ECDSA && kt->type != KEY_ECDSA_CERT)
- continue;
- if (kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0)
- return kt->nid;
- }
- debug2("%s: unknown/non-ECDSA key type '%s'", __func__, name);
- return -1;
-}
-
-char *
-key_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only)
-{
- char *ret = NULL;
- size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
- const struct keytype *kt;
-
- for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
- if (kt->name == NULL)
- continue;
- if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert))
- continue;
- if (ret != NULL)
- ret[rlen++] = '\n';
- nlen = strlen(kt->name);
- ret = xrealloc(ret, 1, rlen + nlen + 2);
- memcpy(ret + rlen, kt->name, nlen + 1);
- rlen += nlen;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-int
-key_type_is_cert(int type)
-{
- const struct keytype *kt;
-
- for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
- if (kt->type == type)
- return kt->cert;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-key_type_is_valid_ca(int type)
-{
- switch (type) {
- case KEY_RSA:
- case KEY_DSA:
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- case KEY_ED25519:
- return 1;
- default:
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
-u_int
-key_size(const Key *k)
-{
- switch (k->type) {
- case KEY_RSA1:
- case KEY_RSA:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n);
- case KEY_DSA:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p);
- case KEY_ED25519:
- return 256; /* XXX */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- return key_curve_nid_to_bits(k->ecdsa_nid);
-#endif
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static RSA *
-rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits)
-{
- RSA *private = RSA_new();
- BIGNUM *f4 = BN_new();
-
- if (private == NULL)
- fatal("%s: RSA_new failed", __func__);
- if (f4 == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
- if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4))
- fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
- if (!RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL))
- fatal("%s: key generation failed.", __func__);
- BN_free(f4);
- return private;
-}
-
-static DSA*
-dsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits)
-{
- DSA *private = DSA_new();
-
- if (private == NULL)
- fatal("%s: DSA_new failed", __func__);
- if (!DSA_generate_parameters_ex(private, bits, NULL, 0, NULL,
- NULL, NULL))
- fatal("%s: DSA_generate_parameters failed", __func__);
- if (!DSA_generate_key(private))
- fatal("%s: DSA_generate_key failed.", __func__);
- return private;
-}
-
-int
-key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int bits)
-{
- switch (bits) {
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case 256:
- return NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
- case 384:
- return NID_secp384r1;
-# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
- case 521:
- return NID_secp521r1;
-# endif
-#endif
- default:
- return -1;
- }
-}
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-int
-key_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *k)
-{
- EC_GROUP *eg;
- int nids[] = {
- NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
- NID_secp384r1,
-# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
- NID_secp521r1,
-# endif
- -1
- };
- int nid;
- u_int i;
- BN_CTX *bnctx;
- const EC_GROUP *g = EC_KEY_get0_group(k);
-
- /*
- * The group may be stored in a ASN.1 encoded private key in one of two
- * ways: as a "named group", which is reconstituted by ASN.1 object ID
- * or explicit group parameters encoded into the key blob. Only the
- * "named group" case sets the group NID for us, but we can figure
- * it out for the other case by comparing against all the groups that
- * are supported.
- */
- if ((nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(g)) > 0)
- return nid;
- if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new() failed", __func__);
- for (i = 0; nids[i] != -1; i++) {
- if ((eg = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nids[i])) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name failed",
- __func__);
- if (EC_GROUP_cmp(g, eg, bnctx) == 0)
- break;
- EC_GROUP_free(eg);
- }
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
- debug3("%s: nid = %d", __func__, nids[i]);
- if (nids[i] != -1) {
- /* Use the group with the NID attached */
- EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(eg, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
- if (EC_KEY_set_group(k, eg) != 1)
- fatal("%s: EC_KEY_set_group", __func__);
- }
- return nids[i];
-}
-
-static EC_KEY*
-ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, int *nid)
-{
- EC_KEY *private;
-
- if ((*nid = key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1)
- fatal("%s: invalid key length", __func__);
- if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(*nid)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed", __func__);
- if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1)
- fatal("%s: EC_KEY_generate_key failed", __func__);
- EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(private, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
- return private;
-}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-
-Key *
-key_generate(int type, u_int bits)
-{
- Key *k = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
- switch (type) {
- case KEY_DSA:
- k->dsa = dsa_generate_private_key(bits);
- break;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- k->ecdsa = ecdsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->ecdsa_nid);
- break;
-#endif
- case KEY_RSA:
- case KEY_RSA1:
- k->rsa = rsa_generate_private_key(bits);
- break;
- case KEY_ED25519:
- k->ed25519_pk = xmalloc(ED25519_PK_SZ);
- k->ed25519_sk = xmalloc(ED25519_SK_SZ);
- crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(k->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_sk);
- break;
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- fatal("key_generate: cert keys cannot be generated directly");
- default:
- fatal("key_generate: unknown type %d", type);
- }
- k->type = type;
- return k;
-}
-
-void
-key_cert_copy(const Key *from_key, struct Key *to_key)
-{
- u_int i;
- const struct KeyCert *from;
- struct KeyCert *to;
-
- if (to_key->cert != NULL) {
- cert_free(to_key->cert);
- to_key->cert = NULL;
- }
-
- if ((from = from_key->cert) == NULL)
- return;
-
- to = to_key->cert = cert_new();
-
- buffer_append(&to->certblob, buffer_ptr(&from->certblob),
- buffer_len(&from->certblob));
-
- buffer_append(&to->critical,
- buffer_ptr(&from->critical), buffer_len(&from->critical));
- buffer_append(&to->extensions,
- buffer_ptr(&from->extensions), buffer_len(&from->extensions));
-
- to->serial = from->serial;
- to->type = from->type;
- to->key_id = from->key_id == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(from->key_id);
- to->valid_after = from->valid_after;
- to->valid_before = from->valid_before;
- to->signature_key = from->signature_key == NULL ?
- NULL : key_from_private(from->signature_key);
-
- to->nprincipals = from->nprincipals;
- if (to->nprincipals > CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS)
- fatal("%s: nprincipals (%u) > CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS (%u)",
- __func__, to->nprincipals, CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS);
- if (to->nprincipals > 0) {
- to->principals = xcalloc(from->nprincipals,
- sizeof(*to->principals));
- for (i = 0; i < to->nprincipals; i++)
- to->principals[i] = xstrdup(from->principals[i]);
- }
-}
-
-Key *
-key_from_private(const Key *k)
-{
- Key *n = NULL;
- switch (k->type) {
- case KEY_DSA:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- n = key_new(k->type);
- if ((BN_copy(n->dsa->p, k->dsa->p) == NULL) ||
- (BN_copy(n->dsa->q, k->dsa->q) == NULL) ||
- (BN_copy(n->dsa->g, k->dsa->g) == NULL) ||
- (BN_copy(n->dsa->pub_key, k->dsa->pub_key) == NULL))
- fatal("key_from_private: BN_copy failed");
- break;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- n = key_new(k->type);
- n->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid;
- if ((n->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed", __func__);
- if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(n->ecdsa,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 1)
- fatal("%s: EC_KEY_set_public_key failed", __func__);
- break;
-#endif
- case KEY_RSA:
- case KEY_RSA1:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- n = key_new(k->type);
- if ((BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n) == NULL) ||
- (BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e) == NULL))
- fatal("key_from_private: BN_copy failed");
- break;
- case KEY_ED25519:
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- n = key_new(k->type);
- if (k->ed25519_pk != NULL) {
- n->ed25519_pk = xmalloc(ED25519_PK_SZ);
- memcpy(n->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
- }
- break;
- default:
- fatal("key_from_private: unknown type %d", k->type);
- break;
- }
- if (key_is_cert(k))
- key_cert_copy(k, n);
- return n;
-}
-
-int
-key_names_valid2(const char *names)
-{
- char *s, *cp, *p;
-
- if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
- return 0;
- s = cp = xstrdup(names);
- for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
- (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
- switch (key_type_from_name(p)) {
- case KEY_RSA1:
- case KEY_UNSPEC:
- free(s);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- debug3("key names ok: [%s]", names);
- free(s);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int
-cert_parse(Buffer *b, Key *key, const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
-{
- u_char *principals, *critical, *exts, *sig_key, *sig;
- u_int signed_len, plen, clen, sklen, slen, kidlen, elen;
- Buffer tmp;
- char *principal;
- int ret = -1;
- int v00 = key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00 ||
- key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00;
-
- buffer_init(&tmp);
-
- /* Copy the entire key blob for verification and later serialisation */
- buffer_append(&key->cert->certblob, blob, blen);
-
- elen = 0; /* Not touched for v00 certs */
- principals = exts = critical = sig_key = sig = NULL;
- if ((!v00 && buffer_get_int64_ret(&key->cert->serial, b) != 0) ||
- buffer_get_int_ret(&key->cert->type, b) != 0 ||
- (key->cert->key_id = buffer_get_cstring_ret(b, &kidlen)) == NULL ||
- (principals = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &plen)) == NULL ||
- buffer_get_int64_ret(&key->cert->valid_after, b) != 0 ||
- buffer_get_int64_ret(&key->cert->valid_before, b) != 0 ||
- (critical = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &clen)) == NULL ||
- (!v00 && (exts = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &elen)) == NULL) ||
- (v00 && buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(b, NULL) == NULL) || /* nonce */
- buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(b, NULL) == NULL || /* reserved */
- (sig_key = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &sklen)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: parse error", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* Signature is left in the buffer so we can calculate this length */
- signed_len = buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob) - buffer_len(b);
-
- if ((sig = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &slen)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: parse error", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER &&
- key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) {
- error("Unknown certificate type %u", key->cert->type);
- goto out;
- }
-
- buffer_append(&tmp, principals, plen);
- while (buffer_len(&tmp) > 0) {
- if (key->cert->nprincipals >= CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) {
- error("%s: Too many principals", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if ((principal = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&tmp, &plen)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: Principals data invalid", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- key->cert->principals = xrealloc(key->cert->principals,
- key->cert->nprincipals + 1, sizeof(*key->cert->principals));
- key->cert->principals[key->cert->nprincipals++] = principal;
- }
-
- buffer_clear(&tmp);
-
- buffer_append(&key->cert->critical, critical, clen);
- buffer_append(&tmp, critical, clen);
- /* validate structure */
- while (buffer_len(&tmp) != 0) {
- if (buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&tmp, NULL) == NULL ||
- buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&tmp, NULL) == NULL) {
- error("%s: critical option data invalid", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- }
- buffer_clear(&tmp);
-
- buffer_append(&key->cert->extensions, exts, elen);
- buffer_append(&tmp, exts, elen);
- /* validate structure */
- while (buffer_len(&tmp) != 0) {
- if (buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&tmp, NULL) == NULL ||
- buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&tmp, NULL) == NULL) {
- error("%s: extension data invalid", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- }
- buffer_clear(&tmp);
-
- if ((key->cert->signature_key = key_from_blob2(sig_key, sklen, 0))
- == NULL) {
- error("%s: Signature key invalid", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if (!key_type_is_valid_ca(key->cert->signature_key->type)) {
- error("%s: Invalid signature key type %s (%d)", __func__,
- key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
- key->cert->signature_key->type);
- goto out;
- }
-
- switch (key_verify(key->cert->signature_key, sig, slen,
- buffer_ptr(&key->cert->certblob), signed_len)) {
- case 1:
- ret = 0;
- break; /* Good signature */
- case 0:
- error("%s: Invalid signature on certificate", __func__);
- goto out;
- case -1:
- error("%s: Certificate signature verification failed",
- __func__);
- goto out;
- }
-
- out:
- buffer_free(&tmp);
- free(principals);
- free(critical);
- free(exts);
- free(sig_key);
- free(sig);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static Key *
-key_from_blob2(const u_char *blob, u_int blen, int allow_cert)
-{
- Buffer b;
- int rlen, type;
- u_int len;
- char *ktype = NULL, *curve = NULL;
- u_char *pk = NULL;
- Key *key = NULL;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- EC_POINT *q = NULL;
- int nid = -1;
-#endif
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
- dump_base64(stderr, blob, blen);
-#endif
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, blob, blen);
- if ((ktype = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&b, NULL)) == NULL) {
- error("key_from_blob: can't read key type");
- goto out;
- }
-
- type = key_type_from_name(ktype);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- if (key_type_plain(type) == KEY_ECDSA)
- nid = key_ecdsa_nid_from_name(ktype);
-#endif
- if (!allow_cert && key_type_is_cert(type)) {
- error("key_from_blob: certificate not allowed in this context");
- goto out;
- }
- switch (type) {
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- (void)buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&b, NULL); /* Skip nonce */
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case KEY_RSA:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- key = key_new(type);
- if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->rsa->e) == -1 ||
- buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->rsa->n) == -1) {
- error("key_from_blob: can't read rsa key");
- badkey:
- key_free(key);
- key = NULL;
- goto out;
- }
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
- RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8);
-#endif
- break;
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- (void)buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&b, NULL); /* Skip nonce */
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case KEY_DSA:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- key = key_new(type);
- if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->p) == -1 ||
- buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->q) == -1 ||
- buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->g) == -1 ||
- buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->pub_key) == -1) {
- error("key_from_blob: can't read dsa key");
- goto badkey;
- }
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
- DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8);
-#endif
- break;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- (void)buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&b, NULL); /* Skip nonce */
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- key = key_new(type);
- key->ecdsa_nid = nid;
- if ((curve = buffer_get_string_ret(&b, NULL)) == NULL) {
- error("key_from_blob: can't read ecdsa curve");
- goto badkey;
- }
- if (key->ecdsa_nid != key_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) {
- error("key_from_blob: ecdsa curve doesn't match type");
- goto badkey;
- }
- if (key->ecdsa != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(key->ecdsa);
- if ((key->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(key->ecdsa_nid))
- == NULL)
- fatal("key_from_blob: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed");
- if ((q = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) == NULL)
- fatal("key_from_blob: EC_POINT_new failed");
- if (buffer_get_ecpoint_ret(&b, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa),
- q) == -1) {
- error("key_from_blob: can't read ecdsa key point");
- goto badkey;
- }
- if (key_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa),
- q) != 0)
- goto badkey;
- if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(key->ecdsa, q) != 1)
- fatal("key_from_blob: EC_KEY_set_public_key failed");
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
- key_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), q);
-#endif
- break;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- (void)buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&b, NULL); /* Skip nonce */
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case KEY_ED25519:
- if ((pk = buffer_get_string_ret(&b, &len)) == NULL) {
- error("key_from_blob: can't read ed25519 key");
- goto badkey;
- }
- if (len != ED25519_PK_SZ) {
- error("key_from_blob: ed25519 len %d != %d",
- len, ED25519_PK_SZ);
- goto badkey;
- }
- key = key_new(type);
- key->ed25519_pk = pk;
- pk = NULL;
- break;
- case KEY_UNSPEC:
- key = key_new(type);
- break;
- default:
- error("key_from_blob: cannot handle type %s", ktype);
- goto out;
- }
- if (key_is_cert(key) && cert_parse(&b, key, blob, blen) == -1) {
- error("key_from_blob: can't parse cert data");
- goto badkey;
- }
- rlen = buffer_len(&b);
- if (key != NULL && rlen != 0)
- error("key_from_blob: remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen);
- out:
- free(ktype);
- free(curve);
- free(pk);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- if (q != NULL)
- EC_POINT_free(q);
-#endif
- buffer_free(&b);
- return key;
-}
-
-Key *
-key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
-{
- return key_from_blob2(blob, blen, 1);
-}
-
-static int
-to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp, int force_plain)
-{
- Buffer b;
- int len, type;
-
- if (blobp != NULL)
- *blobp = NULL;
- if (lenp != NULL)
- *lenp = 0;
- if (key == NULL) {
- error("key_to_blob: key == NULL");
- return 0;
- }
- buffer_init(&b);
- type = force_plain ? key_type_plain(key->type) : key->type;
- switch (type) {
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- /* Use the existing blob */
- buffer_append(&b, buffer_ptr(&key->cert->certblob),
- buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob));
- break;
- case KEY_DSA:
- buffer_put_cstring(&b,
- key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid));
- buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->p);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->q);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->g);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->pub_key);
- break;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- buffer_put_cstring(&b,
- key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid));
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid));
- buffer_put_ecpoint(&b, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa),
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key->ecdsa));
- break;
-#endif
- case KEY_RSA:
- buffer_put_cstring(&b,
- key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid));
- buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->e);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->n);
- break;
- case KEY_ED25519:
- buffer_put_cstring(&b,
- key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid));
- buffer_put_string(&b, key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
- break;
- default:
- error("key_to_blob: unsupported key type %d", key->type);
- buffer_free(&b);
- return 0;
- }
- len = buffer_len(&b);
- if (lenp != NULL)
- *lenp = len;
- if (blobp != NULL) {
- *blobp = xmalloc(len);
- memcpy(*blobp, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
- }
- explicit_bzero(buffer_ptr(&b), len);
- buffer_free(&b);
- return len;
-}
-
-int
-key_to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
-{
- return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 0);
-}
-
-int
-key_sign(
- const Key *key,
- u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
- const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
- switch (key->type) {
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- case KEY_DSA:
- return ssh_dss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- return ssh_ecdsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
-#endif
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- case KEY_RSA:
- return ssh_rsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
- case KEY_ED25519:
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- return ssh_ed25519_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
- default:
- error("key_sign: invalid key type %d", key->type);
- return -1;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * key_verify returns 1 for a correct signature, 0 for an incorrect signature
- * and -1 on error.
- */
-int
-key_verify(
- const Key *key,
- const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
- const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
- if (signaturelen == 0)
- return -1;
-
- switch (key->type) {
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- case KEY_DSA:
- return ssh_dss_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- return ssh_ecdsa_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
-#endif
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- case KEY_RSA:
- return ssh_rsa_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
- case KEY_ED25519:
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- return ssh_ed25519_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
- default:
- error("key_verify: invalid key type %d", key->type);
- return -1;
- }
-}
-
-/* Converts a private to a public key */
-Key *
-key_demote(const Key *k)
-{
- Key *pk;
-
- pk = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*pk));
- pk->type = k->type;
- pk->flags = k->flags;
- pk->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid;
- pk->dsa = NULL;
- pk->ecdsa = NULL;
- pk->rsa = NULL;
- pk->ed25519_pk = NULL;
- pk->ed25519_sk = NULL;
-
- switch (k->type) {
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- key_cert_copy(k, pk);
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case KEY_RSA1:
- case KEY_RSA:
- if ((pk->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("key_demote: RSA_new failed");
- if ((pk->rsa->e = BN_dup(k->rsa->e)) == NULL)
- fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
- if ((pk->rsa->n = BN_dup(k->rsa->n)) == NULL)
- fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
- break;
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- key_cert_copy(k, pk);
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case KEY_DSA:
- if ((pk->dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("key_demote: DSA_new failed");
- if ((pk->dsa->p = BN_dup(k->dsa->p)) == NULL)
- fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
- if ((pk->dsa->q = BN_dup(k->dsa->q)) == NULL)
- fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
- if ((pk->dsa->g = BN_dup(k->dsa->g)) == NULL)
- fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
- if ((pk->dsa->pub_key = BN_dup(k->dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
- fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
- break;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- key_cert_copy(k, pk);
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- if ((pk->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(pk->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL)
- fatal("key_demote: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed");
- if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(pk->ecdsa,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 1)
- fatal("key_demote: EC_KEY_set_public_key failed");
- break;
-#endif
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- key_cert_copy(k, pk);
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case KEY_ED25519:
- if (k->ed25519_pk != NULL) {
- pk->ed25519_pk = xmalloc(ED25519_PK_SZ);
- memcpy(pk->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
- }
- break;
- default:
- fatal("key_demote: bad key type %d", k->type);
- break;
- }
-
- return (pk);
-}
-
-int
-key_is_cert(const Key *k)
-{
- if (k == NULL)
- return 0;
- return key_type_is_cert(k->type);
-}
-
-/* Return the cert-less equivalent to a certified key type */
-int
-key_type_plain(int type)
-{
- switch (type) {
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- return KEY_RSA;
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- return KEY_DSA;
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- return KEY_ECDSA;
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- return KEY_ED25519;
- default:
- return type;
- }
-}
-
-/* Convert a plain key to their _CERT equivalent */
-int
-key_to_certified(Key *k, int legacy)
-{
- switch (k->type) {
- case KEY_RSA:
- k->cert = cert_new();
- k->type = legacy ? KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 : KEY_RSA_CERT;
- return 0;
- case KEY_DSA:
- k->cert = cert_new();
- k->type = legacy ? KEY_DSA_CERT_V00 : KEY_DSA_CERT;
- return 0;
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- if (legacy)
- fatal("%s: legacy ECDSA certificates are not supported",
- __func__);
- k->cert = cert_new();
- k->type = KEY_ECDSA_CERT;
- return 0;
- case KEY_ED25519:
- if (legacy)
- fatal("%s: legacy ED25519 certificates are not "
- "supported", __func__);
- k->cert = cert_new();
- k->type = KEY_ED25519_CERT;
- return 0;
- default:
- error("%s: key has incorrect type %s", __func__, key_type(k));
- return -1;
- }
-}
-
-/* Convert a certificate to its raw key equivalent */
-int
-key_drop_cert(Key *k)
-{
- if (!key_type_is_cert(k->type)) {
- error("%s: key has incorrect type %s", __func__, key_type(k));
- return -1;
- }
- cert_free(k->cert);
- k->cert = NULL;
- k->type = key_type_plain(k->type);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Sign a certified key, (re-)generating the signed certblob. */
-int
-key_certify(Key *k, Key *ca)
-{
- Buffer principals;
- u_char *ca_blob, *sig_blob, nonce[32];
- u_int i, ca_len, sig_len;
-
- if (k->cert == NULL) {
- error("%s: key lacks cert info", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (!key_is_cert(k)) {
- error("%s: certificate has unknown type %d", __func__,
- k->cert->type);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (!key_type_is_valid_ca(ca->type)) {
- error("%s: CA key has unsupported type %s", __func__,
- key_type(ca));
- return -1;
- }
-
- key_to_blob(ca, &ca_blob, &ca_len);
-
- buffer_clear(&k->cert->certblob);
- buffer_put_cstring(&k->cert->certblob, key_ssh_name(k));
-
- /* -v01 certs put nonce first */
- arc4random_buf(&nonce, sizeof(nonce));
- if (!key_cert_is_legacy(k))
- buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
-
- /* XXX this substantially duplicates to_blob(); refactor */
- switch (k->type) {
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->p);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->q);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->g);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->pub_key);
- break;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- buffer_put_cstring(&k->cert->certblob,
- key_curve_nid_to_name(k->ecdsa_nid));
- buffer_put_ecpoint(&k->cert->certblob,
- EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa),
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa));
- break;
-#endif
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->rsa->e);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->rsa->n);
- break;
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob,
- k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
- break;
- default:
- error("%s: key has incorrect type %s", __func__, key_type(k));
- buffer_clear(&k->cert->certblob);
- free(ca_blob);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* -v01 certs have a serial number next */
- if (!key_cert_is_legacy(k))
- buffer_put_int64(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->serial);
-
- buffer_put_int(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->type);
- buffer_put_cstring(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->key_id);
-
- buffer_init(&principals);
- for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++)
- buffer_put_cstring(&principals, k->cert->principals[i]);
- buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, buffer_ptr(&principals),
- buffer_len(&principals));
- buffer_free(&principals);
-
- buffer_put_int64(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->valid_after);
- buffer_put_int64(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->valid_before);
- buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob,
- buffer_ptr(&k->cert->critical), buffer_len(&k->cert->critical));
-
- /* -v01 certs have non-critical options here */
- if (!key_cert_is_legacy(k)) {
- buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob,
- buffer_ptr(&k->cert->extensions),
- buffer_len(&k->cert->extensions));
- }
-
- /* -v00 certs put the nonce at the end */
- if (key_cert_is_legacy(k))
- buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
-
- buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, NULL, 0); /* reserved */
- buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, ca_blob, ca_len);
- free(ca_blob);
-
- /* Sign the whole mess */
- if (key_sign(ca, &sig_blob, &sig_len, buffer_ptr(&k->cert->certblob),
- buffer_len(&k->cert->certblob)) != 0) {
- error("%s: signature operation failed", __func__);
- buffer_clear(&k->cert->certblob);
- return -1;
- }
- /* Append signature and we are done */
- buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, sig_blob, sig_len);
- free(sig_blob);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-key_cert_check_authority(const Key *k, int want_host, int require_principal,
- const char *name, const char **reason)
-{
- u_int i, principal_matches;
- time_t now = time(NULL);
-
- if (want_host) {
- if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) {
- *reason = "Certificate invalid: not a host certificate";
- return -1;
- }
- } else {
- if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) {
- *reason = "Certificate invalid: not a user certificate";
- return -1;
- }
- }
- if (now < 0) {
- error("%s: system clock lies before epoch", __func__);
- *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid";
- return -1;
- }
- if ((u_int64_t)now < k->cert->valid_after) {
- *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid";
- return -1;
- }
- if ((u_int64_t)now >= k->cert->valid_before) {
- *reason = "Certificate invalid: expired";
- return -1;
- }
- if (k->cert->nprincipals == 0) {
- if (require_principal) {
- *reason = "Certificate lacks principal list";
- return -1;
- }
- } else if (name != NULL) {
- principal_matches = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) {
- if (strcmp(name, k->cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
- principal_matches = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!principal_matches) {
- *reason = "Certificate invalid: name is not a listed "
- "principal";
- return -1;
- }
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-key_cert_is_legacy(const Key *k)
-{
- switch (k->type) {
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- return 1;
- default:
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
-/* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
-int
-key_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
-{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- if (strcmp(name, "nistp256") == 0)
- return NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
- else if (strcmp(name, "nistp384") == 0)
- return NID_secp384r1;
-# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
- else if (strcmp(name, "nistp521") == 0)
- return NID_secp521r1;
-# endif
-#endif
-
- debug("%s: unsupported EC curve name \"%.100s\"", __func__, name);
- return -1;
-}
-
-u_int
-key_curve_nid_to_bits(int nid)
-{
- switch (nid) {
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
- return 256;
- case NID_secp384r1:
- return 384;
-# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
- case NID_secp521r1:
- return 521;
-# endif
-#endif
- default:
- error("%s: unsupported EC curve nid %d", __func__, nid);
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
-const char *
-key_curve_nid_to_name(int nid)
-{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- if (nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1)
- return "nistp256";
- else if (nid == NID_secp384r1)
- return "nistp384";
-# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
- else if (nid == NID_secp521r1)
- return "nistp521";
-# endif
-#endif
- error("%s: unsupported EC curve nid %d", __func__, nid);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-int
-key_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid)
-{
- int kbits = key_curve_nid_to_bits(nid);
-
- if (kbits == 0)
- fatal("%s: invalid nid %d", __func__, nid);
- /* RFC5656 section 6.2.1 */
- if (kbits <= 256)
- return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
- else if (kbits <= 384)
- return SSH_DIGEST_SHA384;
- else
- return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512;
-}
-
-int
-key_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public)
-{
- BN_CTX *bnctx;
- EC_POINT *nq = NULL;
- BIGNUM *order, *x, *y, *tmp;
- int ret = -1;
-
- if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__);
- BN_CTX_start(bnctx);
-
- /*
- * We shouldn't ever hit this case because bignum_get_ecpoint()
- * refuses to load GF2m points.
- */
- if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
- NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
- error("%s: group is not a prime field", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* Q != infinity */
- if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, public)) {
- error("%s: received degenerate public key (infinity)",
- __func__);
- goto out;
- }
-
- if ((x = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
- (y = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
- (order = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
- (tmp = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_CTX_get failed", __func__);
-
- /* log2(x) > log2(order)/2, log2(y) > log2(order)/2 */
- if (EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, bnctx) != 1)
- fatal("%s: EC_GROUP_get_order failed", __func__);
- if (EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, public,
- x, y, bnctx) != 1)
- fatal("%s: EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp", __func__);
- if (BN_num_bits(x) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2) {
- error("%s: public key x coordinate too small: "
- "bits(x) = %d, bits(order)/2 = %d", __func__,
- BN_num_bits(x), BN_num_bits(order) / 2);
- goto out;
- }
- if (BN_num_bits(y) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2) {
- error("%s: public key y coordinate too small: "
- "bits(y) = %d, bits(order)/2 = %d", __func__,
- BN_num_bits(x), BN_num_bits(order) / 2);
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* nQ == infinity (n == order of subgroup) */
- if ((nq = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_CTX_tmp failed", __func__);
- if (EC_POINT_mul(group, nq, NULL, public, order, bnctx) != 1)
- fatal("%s: EC_GROUP_mul failed", __func__);
- if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, nq) != 1) {
- error("%s: received degenerate public key (nQ != infinity)",
- __func__);
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* x < order - 1, y < order - 1 */
- if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one()))
- fatal("%s: BN_sub failed", __func__);
- if (BN_cmp(x, tmp) >= 0) {
- error("%s: public key x coordinate >= group order - 1",
- __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if (BN_cmp(y, tmp) >= 0) {
- error("%s: public key y coordinate >= group order - 1",
- __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- ret = 0;
- out:
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
- EC_POINT_free(nq);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int
-key_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *key)
-{
- BN_CTX *bnctx;
- BIGNUM *order, *tmp;
- int ret = -1;
-
- if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__);
- BN_CTX_start(bnctx);
-
- if ((order = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
- (tmp = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_CTX_get failed", __func__);
-
- /* log2(private) > log2(order)/2 */
- if (EC_GROUP_get_order(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), order, bnctx) != 1)
- fatal("%s: EC_GROUP_get_order failed", __func__);
- if (BN_num_bits(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) <=
- BN_num_bits(order) / 2) {
- error("%s: private key too small: "
- "bits(y) = %d, bits(order)/2 = %d", __func__,
- BN_num_bits(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)),
- BN_num_bits(order) / 2);
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* private < order - 1 */
- if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one()))
- fatal("%s: BN_sub failed", __func__);
- if (BN_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key), tmp) >= 0) {
- error("%s: private key >= group order - 1", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- ret = 0;
- out:
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
- return ret;
-}
-
-#if defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) || defined(DEBUG_PK)
-void
-key_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point)
-{
- BIGNUM *x, *y;
- BN_CTX *bnctx;
-
- if (point == NULL) {
- fputs("point=(NULL)\n", stderr);
- return;
- }
- if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__);
- BN_CTX_start(bnctx);
- if ((x = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || (y = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_CTX_get failed", __func__);
- if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
- NID_X9_62_prime_field)
- fatal("%s: group is not a prime field", __func__);
- if (EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, bnctx) != 1)
- fatal("%s: EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp", __func__);
- fputs("x=", stderr);
- BN_print_fp(stderr, x);
- fputs("\ny=", stderr);
- BN_print_fp(stderr, y);
- fputs("\n", stderr);
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
-}
-
-void
-key_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *key)
-{
- const BIGNUM *exponent;
-
- key_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key));
- fputs("exponent=", stderr);
- if ((exponent = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) == NULL)
- fputs("(NULL)", stderr);
- else
- BN_print_fp(stderr, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key));
- fputs("\n", stderr);
-}
-#endif /* defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) || defined(DEBUG_PK) */
-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-
-void
-key_private_serialize(const Key *key, Buffer *b)
-{
- buffer_put_cstring(b, key_ssh_name(key));
- switch (key->type) {
- case KEY_RSA:
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n);
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e);
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d);
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp);
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p);
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q);
- break;
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- if (key->cert == NULL || buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob) == 0)
- fatal("%s: no cert/certblob", __func__);
- buffer_put_string(b, buffer_ptr(&key->cert->certblob),
- buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob));
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d);
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp);
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p);
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q);
- break;
- case KEY_DSA:
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p);
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q);
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g);
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key);
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key);
- break;
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- if (key->cert == NULL || buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob) == 0)
- fatal("%s: no cert/certblob", __func__);
- buffer_put_string(b, buffer_ptr(&key->cert->certblob),
- buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob));
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key);
- break;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- buffer_put_cstring(b, key_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid));
- buffer_put_ecpoint(b, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa),
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key->ecdsa));
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa));
- break;
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- if (key->cert == NULL || buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob) == 0)
- fatal("%s: no cert/certblob", __func__);
- buffer_put_string(b, buffer_ptr(&key->cert->certblob),
- buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob));
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa));
- break;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
- case KEY_ED25519:
- buffer_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
- buffer_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ);
- break;
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- if (key->cert == NULL || buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob) == 0)
- fatal("%s: no cert/certblob", __func__);
- buffer_put_string(b, buffer_ptr(&key->cert->certblob),
- buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob));
- buffer_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
- buffer_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ);
- break;
- }
-}
-
-Key *
-key_private_deserialize(Buffer *blob)
-{
- char *type_name;
- Key *k = NULL;
- u_char *cert;
- u_int len, pklen, sklen;
- int type;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- char *curve;
- BIGNUM *exponent;
- EC_POINT *q;
-#endif
-
- type_name = buffer_get_string(blob, NULL);
- type = key_type_from_name(type_name);
- switch (type) {
- case KEY_DSA:
- k = key_new_private(type);
- buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->dsa->p);
- buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->dsa->q);
- buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->dsa->g);
- buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->dsa->pub_key);
- buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->dsa->priv_key);
- break;
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- cert = buffer_get_string(blob, &len);
- if ((k = key_from_blob(cert, len)) == NULL)
- fatal("Certificate parse failed");
- free(cert);
- key_add_private(k);
- buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->dsa->priv_key);
- break;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- k = key_new_private(type);
- k->ecdsa_nid = key_ecdsa_nid_from_name(type_name);
- curve = buffer_get_string(blob, NULL);
- if (k->ecdsa_nid != key_curve_name_to_nid(curve))
- fatal("%s: curve names mismatch", __func__);
- free(curve);
- k->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid);
- if (k->ecdsa == NULL)
- fatal("%s: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed",
- __func__);
- q = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa));
- if (q == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
- if ((exponent = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
- buffer_get_ecpoint(blob,
- EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa), q);
- buffer_get_bignum2(blob, exponent);
- if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(k->ecdsa, q) != 1)
- fatal("%s: EC_KEY_set_public_key failed",
- __func__);
- if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1)
- fatal("%s: EC_KEY_set_private_key failed",
- __func__);
- if (key_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa),
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: bad ECDSA public key", __func__);
- if (key_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa) != 0)
- fatal("%s: bad ECDSA private key", __func__);
- BN_clear_free(exponent);
- EC_POINT_free(q);
- break;
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- cert = buffer_get_string(blob, &len);
- if ((k = key_from_blob(cert, len)) == NULL)
- fatal("Certificate parse failed");
- free(cert);
- key_add_private(k);
- if ((exponent = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
- buffer_get_bignum2(blob, exponent);
- if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1)
- fatal("%s: EC_KEY_set_private_key failed",
- __func__);
- if (key_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa),
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
- key_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa) != 0)
- fatal("%s: bad ECDSA key", __func__);
- BN_clear_free(exponent);
- break;
-#endif
- case KEY_RSA:
- k = key_new_private(type);
- buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->rsa->n);
- buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->rsa->e);
- buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->rsa->d);
- buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->rsa->iqmp);
- buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->rsa->p);
- buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->rsa->q);
-
- /* Generate additional parameters */
- rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa);
- break;
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- cert = buffer_get_string(blob, &len);
- if ((k = key_from_blob(cert, len)) == NULL)
- fatal("Certificate parse failed");
- free(cert);
- key_add_private(k);
- buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->rsa->d);
- buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->rsa->iqmp);
- buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->rsa->p);
- buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->rsa->q);
- break;
- case KEY_ED25519:
- k = key_new_private(type);
- k->ed25519_pk = buffer_get_string(blob, &pklen);
- k->ed25519_sk = buffer_get_string(blob, &sklen);
- if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ)
- fatal("%s: ed25519 pklen %d != %d",
- __func__, pklen, ED25519_PK_SZ);
- if (sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ)
- fatal("%s: ed25519 sklen %d != %d",
- __func__, sklen, ED25519_SK_SZ);
- break;
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- cert = buffer_get_string(blob, &len);
- if ((k = key_from_blob(cert, len)) == NULL)
- fatal("Certificate parse failed");
- free(cert);
- key_add_private(k);
- k->ed25519_pk = buffer_get_string(blob, &pklen);
- k->ed25519_sk = buffer_get_string(blob, &sklen);
- if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ)
- fatal("%s: ed25519 pklen %d != %d",
- __func__, pklen, ED25519_PK_SZ);
- if (sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ)
- fatal("%s: ed25519 sklen %d != %d",
- __func__, sklen, ED25519_SK_SZ);
- break;
- default:
- free(type_name);
- buffer_clear(blob);
- return NULL;
- }
- free(type_name);
-
- /* enable blinding */
- switch (k->type) {
- case KEY_RSA:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- case KEY_RSA1:
- if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
- error("%s: RSA_blinding_on failed", __func__);
- key_free(k);
- return NULL;
- }
- break;
- }
- return k;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/key.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/key.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/key.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/key.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,426 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.130 2016/05/02 09:36:42 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#define SSH_KEY_NO_DEFINE
+#include "key.h"
+
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+
+void
+key_add_private(Key *k)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+Key *
+key_new_private(int type)
+{
+ Key *ret = NULL;
+
+ if ((ret = sshkey_new_private(type)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: failed", __func__);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
+{
+ return sshkey_read(ret, cpp) == 0 ? 1 : -1;
+}
+
+int
+key_write(const Key *key, FILE *f)
+{
+ return sshkey_write(key, f) == 0 ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+Key *
+key_generate(int type, u_int bits)
+{
+ int r;
+ Key *ret = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &ret)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void
+key_cert_copy(const Key *from_key, Key *to_key)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(from_key, to_key)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+Key *
+key_from_private(const Key *k)
+{
+ int r;
+ Key *ret = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(k, &ret)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+fatal_on_fatal_errors(int r, const char *func, int extra_fatal)
+{
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR ||
+ r == SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL ||
+ (extra_fatal != 0 && r == extra_fatal))
+ fatal("%s: %s", func, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+Key *
+key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
+{
+ int r;
+ Key *ret = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &ret)) != 0) {
+ fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0);
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+key_to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
+{
+ u_char *blob;
+ size_t blen;
+ int r;
+
+ if (blobp != NULL)
+ *blobp = NULL;
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = 0;
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) {
+ fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0);
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (blen > INT_MAX)
+ fatal("%s: giant len %zu", __func__, blen);
+ if (blobp != NULL)
+ *blobp = blob;
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = blen;
+ return blen;
+}
+
+int
+key_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, u_int datalen, const char *alg)
+{
+ int r;
+ u_char *sig;
+ size_t siglen;
+
+ if (sigp != NULL)
+ *sigp = NULL;
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = 0;
+ if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &siglen,
+ data, datalen, alg, datafellows)) != 0) {
+ fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0);
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (siglen > INT_MAX)
+ fatal("%s: giant len %zu", __func__, siglen);
+ if (sigp != NULL)
+ *sigp = sig;
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = siglen;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
+ const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen,
+ data, datalen, datafellows)) != 0) {
+ fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0);
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return r == SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID ? 0 : -1;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+Key *
+key_demote(const Key *k)
+{
+ int r;
+ Key *ret = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_demote(k, &ret)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+key_to_certified(Key *k)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(k)) != 0) {
+ fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0);
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+key_drop_cert(Key *k)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(k)) != 0) {
+ fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0);
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+key_certify(Key *k, Key *ca)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_certify(k, ca, NULL)) != 0) {
+ fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0);
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+key_cert_check_authority(const Key *k, int want_host, int require_principal,
+ const char *name, const char **reason)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_cert_check_authority(k, want_host, require_principal,
+ name, reason)) != 0) {
+ fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0);
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+int
+key_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, public)) != 0) {
+ fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR);
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+key_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(key)) != 0) {
+ fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR);
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+void
+key_private_serialize(const Key *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, b)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+Key *
+key_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *blob)
+{
+ int r;
+ Key *ret = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(blob, &ret)) != 0) {
+ fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR);
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* authfile.c */
+
+int
+key_save_private(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
+ const char *comment, int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher,
+ int new_format_rounds)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(key, filename, passphrase, comment,
+ force_new_format, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds)) != 0) {
+ fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR);
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int
+key_load_file(int fd, const char *filename, struct sshbuf *blob)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, blob)) != 0) {
+ fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR);
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+Key *
+key_load_cert(const char *filename)
+{
+ int r;
+ Key *ret = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_cert(filename, &ret)) != 0) {
+ fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR);
+ /* Old authfile.c ignored all file errors. */
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
+ debug("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ else
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+
+}
+
+Key *
+key_load_public(const char *filename, char **commentp)
+{
+ int r;
+ Key *ret = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &ret, commentp)) != 0) {
+ fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR);
+ /* Old authfile.c ignored all file errors. */
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
+ debug("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ else
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+Key *
+key_load_private(const char *path, const char *passphrase,
+ char **commentp)
+{
+ int r;
+ Key *ret = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_private(path, passphrase, &ret, commentp)) != 0) {
+ fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR);
+ /* Old authfile.c ignored all file errors. */
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR ||
+ r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
+ debug("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ else
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+Key *
+key_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
+ int *perm_ok)
+{
+ int r;
+ Key *ret = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_private_cert(type, filename, passphrase,
+ &ret, perm_ok)) != 0) {
+ fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR);
+ /* Old authfile.c ignored all file errors. */
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR ||
+ r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
+ debug("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ else
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+Key *
+key_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
+ char **commentp, int *perm_ok)
+{
+ int r;
+ Key *ret = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(type, filename, passphrase,
+ &ret, commentp, perm_ok)) != 0) {
+ fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR);
+ /* Old authfile.c ignored all file errors. */
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR ||
+ (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE))
+ debug("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ else
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
+{
+ return sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) == 0 ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/key.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/key.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/key.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.41 2014/01/09 23:20:00 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-#ifndef KEY_H
-#define KEY_H
-
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-#endif
-
-typedef struct Key Key;
-enum types {
- KEY_RSA1,
- KEY_RSA,
- KEY_DSA,
- KEY_ECDSA,
- KEY_ED25519,
- KEY_RSA_CERT,
- KEY_DSA_CERT,
- KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
- KEY_ED25519_CERT,
- KEY_RSA_CERT_V00,
- KEY_DSA_CERT_V00,
- KEY_UNSPEC
-};
-enum fp_type {
- SSH_FP_SHA1,
- SSH_FP_MD5,
- SSH_FP_SHA256
-};
-enum fp_rep {
- SSH_FP_HEX,
- SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE,
- SSH_FP_RANDOMART
-};
-
-/* key is stored in external hardware */
-#define KEY_FLAG_EXT 0x0001
-
-#define CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS 256
-struct KeyCert {
- Buffer certblob; /* Kept around for use on wire */
- u_int type; /* SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER or SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST */
- u_int64_t serial;
- char *key_id;
- u_int nprincipals;
- char **principals;
- u_int64_t valid_after, valid_before;
- Buffer critical;
- Buffer extensions;
- Key *signature_key;
-};
-
-struct Key {
- int type;
- int flags;
- RSA *rsa;
- DSA *dsa;
- int ecdsa_nid; /* NID of curve */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- EC_KEY *ecdsa;
-#else
- void *ecdsa;
-#endif
- struct KeyCert *cert;
- u_char *ed25519_sk;
- u_char *ed25519_pk;
-};
-
-#define ED25519_SK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES
-#define ED25519_PK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES
-
-Key *key_new(int);
-void key_add_private(Key *);
-Key *key_new_private(int);
-void key_free(Key *);
-Key *key_demote(const Key *);
-int key_equal_public(const Key *, const Key *);
-int key_equal(const Key *, const Key *);
-char *key_fingerprint(const Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep);
-u_char *key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *);
-const char *key_type(const Key *);
-const char *key_cert_type(const Key *);
-int key_write(const Key *, FILE *);
-int key_read(Key *, char **);
-u_int key_size(const Key *);
-
-Key *key_generate(int, u_int);
-Key *key_from_private(const Key *);
-int key_type_from_name(char *);
-int key_is_cert(const Key *);
-int key_type_is_cert(int);
-int key_type_plain(int);
-int key_to_certified(Key *, int);
-int key_drop_cert(Key *);
-int key_certify(Key *, Key *);
-void key_cert_copy(const Key *, struct Key *);
-int key_cert_check_authority(const Key *, int, int, const char *,
- const char **);
-int key_cert_is_legacy(const Key *);
-
-int key_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *);
-int key_curve_name_to_nid(const char *);
-const char *key_curve_nid_to_name(int);
-u_int key_curve_nid_to_bits(int);
-int key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-int key_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *);
-int key_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid);
-int key_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
-int key_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *);
-#endif
-char *key_alg_list(int, int);
-
-Key *key_from_blob(const u_char *, u_int);
-int key_to_blob(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *);
-const char *key_ssh_name(const Key *);
-const char *key_ssh_name_plain(const Key *);
-int key_names_valid2(const char *);
-
-int key_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int);
-int key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
-
-int ssh_dss_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int);
-int ssh_dss_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
-int ssh_ecdsa_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int);
-int ssh_ecdsa_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
-int ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int);
-int ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
-int ssh_ed25519_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int);
-int ssh_ed25519_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && (defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) || defined(DEBUG_PK))
-void key_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
-void key_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *);
-#endif
-
-void key_private_serialize(const Key *, Buffer *);
-Key *key_private_deserialize(Buffer *);
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/key.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/key.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/key.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/key.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.49 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef KEY_H
+#define KEY_H
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+
+typedef struct sshkey Key;
+
+#define types sshkey_types
+#define fp_type sshkey_fp_type
+#define fp_rep sshkey_fp_rep
+
+#ifndef SSH_KEY_NO_DEFINE
+#define key_new sshkey_new
+#define key_free sshkey_free
+#define key_equal_public sshkey_equal_public
+#define key_equal sshkey_equal
+#define key_type sshkey_type
+#define key_cert_type sshkey_cert_type
+#define key_ssh_name sshkey_ssh_name
+#define key_ssh_name_plain sshkey_ssh_name_plain
+#define key_type_from_name sshkey_type_from_name
+#define key_ecdsa_nid_from_name sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name
+#define key_type_is_cert sshkey_type_is_cert
+#define key_size sshkey_size
+#define key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid
+#define key_ecdsa_key_to_nid sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid
+#define key_is_cert sshkey_is_cert
+#define key_type_plain sshkey_type_plain
+#define key_curve_name_to_nid sshkey_curve_name_to_nid
+#define key_curve_nid_to_bits sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits
+#define key_curve_nid_to_name sshkey_curve_nid_to_name
+#define key_ec_nid_to_hash_alg sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg
+#define key_dump_ec_point sshkey_dump_ec_point
+#define key_dump_ec_key sshkey_dump_ec_key
+#endif
+
+void key_add_private(Key *);
+Key *key_new_private(int);
+void key_free(Key *);
+Key *key_demote(const Key *);
+int key_write(const Key *, FILE *);
+int key_read(Key *, char **);
+
+Key *key_generate(int, u_int);
+Key *key_from_private(const Key *);
+int key_to_certified(Key *);
+int key_drop_cert(Key *);
+int key_certify(Key *, Key *);
+void key_cert_copy(const Key *, Key *);
+int key_cert_check_authority(const Key *, int, int, const char *,
+ const char **);
+char *key_alg_list(int, int);
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+int key_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
+int key_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *);
+#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) */
+
+Key *key_from_blob(const u_char *, u_int);
+int key_to_blob(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *);
+
+int key_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int,
+ const char *);
+int key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
+
+void key_private_serialize(const Key *, struct sshbuf *);
+Key *key_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *);
+
+/* authfile.c */
+int key_save_private(Key *, const char *, const char *, const char *,
+ int, const char *, int);
+int key_load_file(int, const char *, struct sshbuf *);
+Key *key_load_cert(const char *);
+Key *key_load_public(const char *, char **);
+Key *key_load_private(const char *, const char *, char **);
+Key *key_load_private_cert(int, const char *, const char *, int *);
+Key *key_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *, char **, int *);
+int key_perm_ok(int, const char *);
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/krl.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/krl.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/krl.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1237 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.14 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h>
-#include <openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "authfile.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-
-#include "krl.h"
-
-/* #define DEBUG_KRL */
-#ifdef DEBUG_KRL
-# define KRL_DBG(x) debug3 x
-#else
-# define KRL_DBG(x)
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Trees of revoked serial numbers, key IDs and keys. This allows
- * quick searching, querying and producing lists in canonical order.
- */
-
-/* Tree of serial numbers. XXX make smarter: really need a real sparse bitmap */
-struct revoked_serial {
- u_int64_t lo, hi;
- RB_ENTRY(revoked_serial) tree_entry;
-};
-static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b);
-RB_HEAD(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial);
-RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial, tree_entry, serial_cmp);
-
-/* Tree of key IDs */
-struct revoked_key_id {
- char *key_id;
- RB_ENTRY(revoked_key_id) tree_entry;
-};
-static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b);
-RB_HEAD(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id);
-RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id, tree_entry, key_id_cmp);
-
-/* Tree of blobs (used for keys and fingerprints) */
-struct revoked_blob {
- u_char *blob;
- u_int len;
- RB_ENTRY(revoked_blob) tree_entry;
-};
-static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b);
-RB_HEAD(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob);
-RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob, tree_entry, blob_cmp);
-
-/* Tracks revoked certs for a single CA */
-struct revoked_certs {
- Key *ca_key;
- struct revoked_serial_tree revoked_serials;
- struct revoked_key_id_tree revoked_key_ids;
- TAILQ_ENTRY(revoked_certs) entry;
-};
-TAILQ_HEAD(revoked_certs_list, revoked_certs);
-
-struct ssh_krl {
- u_int64_t krl_version;
- u_int64_t generated_date;
- u_int64_t flags;
- char *comment;
- struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_keys;
- struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha1s;
- struct revoked_certs_list revoked_certs;
-};
-
-/* Return equal if a and b overlap */
-static int
-serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b)
-{
- if (a->hi >= b->lo && a->lo <= b->hi)
- return 0;
- return a->lo < b->lo ? -1 : 1;
-}
-
-static int
-key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b)
-{
- return strcmp(a->key_id, b->key_id);
-}
-
-static int
-blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b)
-{
- int r;
-
- if (a->len != b->len) {
- if ((r = memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, MIN(a->len, b->len))) != 0)
- return r;
- return a->len > b->len ? 1 : -1;
- } else
- return memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, a->len);
-}
-
-struct ssh_krl *
-ssh_krl_init(void)
-{
- struct ssh_krl *krl;
-
- if ((krl = calloc(1, sizeof(*krl))) == NULL)
- return NULL;
- RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_keys);
- RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha1s);
- TAILQ_INIT(&krl->revoked_certs);
- return krl;
-}
-
-static void
-revoked_certs_free(struct revoked_certs *rc)
-{
- struct revoked_serial *rs, *trs;
- struct revoked_key_id *rki, *trki;
-
- RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, trs) {
- RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs);
- free(rs);
- }
- RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, trki) {
- RB_REMOVE(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki);
- free(rki->key_id);
- free(rki);
- }
- if (rc->ca_key != NULL)
- key_free(rc->ca_key);
-}
-
-void
-ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl)
-{
- struct revoked_blob *rb, *trb;
- struct revoked_certs *rc, *trc;
-
- if (krl == NULL)
- return;
-
- free(krl->comment);
- RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, trb) {
- RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, rb);
- free(rb->blob);
- free(rb);
- }
- RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, trb) {
- RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, rb);
- free(rb->blob);
- free(rb);
- }
- TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry, trc) {
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry);
- revoked_certs_free(rc);
- }
-}
-
-void
-ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version)
-{
- krl->krl_version = version;
-}
-
-void
-ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment)
-{
- free(krl->comment);
- if ((krl->comment = strdup(comment)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: strdup", __func__);
-}
-
-/*
- * Find the revoked_certs struct for a CA key. If allow_create is set then
- * create a new one in the tree if one did not exist already.
- */
-static int
-revoked_certs_for_ca_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
- struct revoked_certs **rcp, int allow_create)
-{
- struct revoked_certs *rc;
-
- *rcp = NULL;
- TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) {
- if (key_equal(rc->ca_key, ca_key)) {
- *rcp = rc;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- if (!allow_create)
- return 0;
- /* If this CA doesn't exist in the list then add it now */
- if ((rc = calloc(1, sizeof(*rc))) == NULL)
- return -1;
- if ((rc->ca_key = key_from_private(ca_key)) == NULL) {
- free(rc);
- return -1;
- }
- RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_serials);
- RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_key_ids);
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry);
- debug3("%s: new CA %s", __func__, key_type(ca_key));
- *rcp = rc;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
-{
- struct revoked_serial rs, *ers, *crs, *irs;
-
- KRL_DBG(("%s: insert %llu:%llu", __func__, lo, hi));
- memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs));
- rs.lo = lo;
- rs.hi = hi;
- ers = RB_NFIND(revoked_serial_tree, rt, &rs);
- if (ers == NULL || serial_cmp(ers, &rs) != 0) {
- /* No entry matches. Just insert */
- if ((irs = malloc(sizeof(rs))) == NULL)
- return -1;
- memcpy(irs, &rs, sizeof(*irs));
- ers = RB_INSERT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, irs);
- if (ers != NULL) {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: bad: ers != NULL", __func__));
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- free(irs);
- return -1;
- }
- ers = irs;
- } else {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: overlap found %llu:%llu", __func__,
- ers->lo, ers->hi));
- /*
- * The inserted entry overlaps an existing one. Grow the
- * existing entry.
- */
- if (ers->lo > lo)
- ers->lo = lo;
- if (ers->hi < hi)
- ers->hi = hi;
- }
- /*
- * The inserted or revised range might overlap or abut adjacent ones;
- * coalesce as necessary.
- */
-
- /* Check predecessors */
- while ((crs = RB_PREV(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: pred %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi));
- if (ers->lo != 0 && crs->hi < ers->lo - 1)
- break;
- /* This entry overlaps. */
- if (crs->lo < ers->lo) {
- ers->lo = crs->lo;
- KRL_DBG(("%s: pred extend %llu:%llu", __func__,
- ers->lo, ers->hi));
- }
- RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs);
- free(crs);
- }
- /* Check successors */
- while ((crs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: succ %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi));
- if (ers->hi != (u_int64_t)-1 && crs->lo > ers->hi + 1)
- break;
- /* This entry overlaps. */
- if (crs->hi > ers->hi) {
- ers->hi = crs->hi;
- KRL_DBG(("%s: succ extend %llu:%llu", __func__,
- ers->lo, ers->hi));
- }
- RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs);
- free(crs);
- }
- KRL_DBG(("%s: done, final %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi));
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
- u_int64_t serial)
-{
- return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial, serial);
-}
-
-int
-ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
- u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
-{
- struct revoked_certs *rc;
-
- if (lo > hi || lo == 0)
- return -1;
- if (revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1) != 0)
- return -1;
- return insert_serial_range(&rc->revoked_serials, lo, hi);
-}
-
-int
-ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
- const char *key_id)
-{
- struct revoked_key_id *rki, *erki;
- struct revoked_certs *rc;
-
- if (revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1) != 0)
- return -1;
-
- debug3("%s: revoke %s", __func__, key_id);
- if ((rki = calloc(1, sizeof(*rki))) == NULL ||
- (rki->key_id = strdup(key_id)) == NULL) {
- free(rki);
- fatal("%s: strdup", __func__);
- }
- erki = RB_INSERT(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki);
- if (erki != NULL) {
- free(rki->key_id);
- free(rki);
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Convert "key" to a public key blob without any certificate information */
-static int
-plain_key_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blob, u_int *blen)
-{
- Key *kcopy;
- int r;
-
- if ((kcopy = key_from_private(key)) == NULL)
- return -1;
- if (key_is_cert(kcopy)) {
- if (key_drop_cert(kcopy) != 0) {
- error("%s: key_drop_cert", __func__);
- key_free(kcopy);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- r = key_to_blob(kcopy, blob, blen);
- free(kcopy);
- return r == 0 ? -1 : 0;
-}
-
-/* Revoke a key blob. Ownership of blob is transferred to the tree */
-static int
-revoke_blob(struct revoked_blob_tree *rbt, u_char *blob, u_int len)
-{
- struct revoked_blob *rb, *erb;
-
- if ((rb = calloc(1, sizeof(*rb))) == NULL)
- return -1;
- rb->blob = blob;
- rb->len = len;
- erb = RB_INSERT(revoked_blob_tree, rbt, rb);
- if (erb != NULL) {
- free(rb->blob);
- free(rb);
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
-{
- u_char *blob;
- u_int len;
-
- debug3("%s: revoke type %s", __func__, key_type(key));
- if (plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len) != 0)
- return -1;
- return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_keys, blob, len);
-}
-
-int
-ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
-{
- u_char *blob;
- u_int len;
-
- debug3("%s: revoke type %s by sha1", __func__, key_type(key));
- if ((blob = key_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_FP_SHA1, &len)) == NULL)
- return -1;
- return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_sha1s, blob, len);
-}
-
-int
-ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
-{
- if (!key_is_cert(key))
- return ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, key);
-
- if (key_cert_is_legacy(key) || key->cert->serial == 0) {
- return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl,
- key->cert->signature_key,
- key->cert->key_id);
- } else {
- return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
- key->cert->signature_key,
- key->cert->serial);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Select a copact next section type to emit in a KRL based on the
- * current section type, the run length of contiguous revoked serial
- * numbers and the gaps from the last and to the next revoked serial.
- * Applies a mostly-accurate bit cost model to select the section type
- * that will minimise the size of the resultant KRL.
- */
-static int
-choose_next_state(int current_state, u_int64_t contig, int final,
- u_int64_t last_gap, u_int64_t next_gap, int *force_new_section)
-{
- int new_state;
- u_int64_t cost, cost_list, cost_range, cost_bitmap, cost_bitmap_restart;
-
- /*
- * Avoid unsigned overflows.
- * The limits are high enough to avoid confusing the calculations.
- */
- contig = MIN(contig, 1ULL<<31);
- last_gap = MIN(last_gap, 1ULL<<31);
- next_gap = MIN(next_gap, 1ULL<<31);
-
- /*
- * Calculate the cost to switch from the current state to candidates.
- * NB. range sections only ever contain a single range, so their
- * switching cost is independent of the current_state.
- */
- cost_list = cost_bitmap = cost_bitmap_restart = 0;
- cost_range = 8;
- switch (current_state) {
- case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
- cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64;
- break;
- case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
- cost_list = 8;
- cost_bitmap_restart = 8 + 64;
- break;
- case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
- case 0:
- cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64;
- cost_list = 8;
- }
-
- /* Estimate base cost in bits of each section type */
- cost_list += 64 * contig + (final ? 0 : 8+64);
- cost_range += (2 * 64) + (final ? 0 : 8+64);
- cost_bitmap += last_gap + contig + (final ? 0 : MIN(next_gap, 8+64));
- cost_bitmap_restart += contig + (final ? 0 : MIN(next_gap, 8+64));
-
- /* Convert to byte costs for actual comparison */
- cost_list = (cost_list + 7) / 8;
- cost_bitmap = (cost_bitmap + 7) / 8;
- cost_bitmap_restart = (cost_bitmap_restart + 7) / 8;
- cost_range = (cost_range + 7) / 8;
-
- /* Now pick the best choice */
- *force_new_section = 0;
- new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP;
- cost = cost_bitmap;
- if (cost_range < cost) {
- new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE;
- cost = cost_range;
- }
- if (cost_list < cost) {
- new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST;
- cost = cost_list;
- }
- if (cost_bitmap_restart < cost) {
- new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP;
- *force_new_section = 1;
- cost = cost_bitmap_restart;
- }
- debug3("%s: contig %llu last_gap %llu next_gap %llu final %d, costs:"
- "list %llu range %llu bitmap %llu new bitmap %llu, "
- "selected 0x%02x%s", __func__, (long long unsigned)contig,
- (long long unsigned)last_gap, (long long unsigned)next_gap, final,
- (long long unsigned)cost_list, (long long unsigned)cost_range,
- (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap,
- (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap_restart, new_state,
- *force_new_section ? " restart" : "");
- return new_state;
-}
-
-/* Generate a KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES KRL section */
-static int
-revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, Buffer *buf)
-{
- int final, force_new_sect, r = -1;
- u_int64_t i, contig, gap, last = 0, bitmap_start = 0;
- struct revoked_serial *rs, *nrs;
- struct revoked_key_id *rki;
- int next_state, state = 0;
- Buffer sect;
- u_char *kblob = NULL;
- u_int klen;
- BIGNUM *bitmap = NULL;
-
- /* Prepare CA scope key blob if we have one supplied */
- if (key_to_blob(rc->ca_key, &kblob, &klen) == 0)
- return -1;
-
- buffer_init(§);
-
- /* Store the header */
- buffer_put_string(buf, kblob, klen);
- buffer_put_string(buf, NULL, 0); /* Reserved */
-
- free(kblob);
-
- /* Store the revoked serials. */
- for (rs = RB_MIN(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials);
- rs != NULL;
- rs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs)) {
- debug3("%s: serial %llu:%llu state 0x%02x", __func__,
- (long long unsigned)rs->lo, (long long unsigned)rs->hi,
- state);
-
- /* Check contiguous length and gap to next section (if any) */
- nrs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs);
- final = nrs == NULL;
- gap = nrs == NULL ? 0 : nrs->lo - rs->hi;
- contig = 1 + (rs->hi - rs->lo);
-
- /* Choose next state based on these */
- next_state = choose_next_state(state, contig, final,
- state == 0 ? 0 : rs->lo - last, gap, &force_new_sect);
-
- /*
- * If the current section is a range section or has a different
- * type to the next section, then finish it off now.
- */
- if (state != 0 && (force_new_sect || next_state != state ||
- state == KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE)) {
- debug3("%s: finish state 0x%02x", __func__, state);
- switch (state) {
- case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
- case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
- break;
- case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
- buffer_put_bignum2(§, bitmap);
- BN_free(bitmap);
- bitmap = NULL;
- break;
- }
- buffer_put_char(buf, state);
- buffer_put_string(buf,
- buffer_ptr(§), buffer_len(§));
- }
-
- /* If we are starting a new section then prepare it now */
- if (next_state != state || force_new_sect) {
- debug3("%s: start state 0x%02x", __func__, next_state);
- state = next_state;
- buffer_clear(§);
- switch (state) {
- case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
- case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
- break;
- case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
- if ((bitmap = BN_new()) == NULL)
- goto out;
- bitmap_start = rs->lo;
- buffer_put_int64(§, bitmap_start);
- break;
- }
- }
-
- /* Perform section-specific processing */
- switch (state) {
- case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
- for (i = 0; i < contig; i++)
- buffer_put_int64(§, rs->lo + i);
- break;
- case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
- buffer_put_int64(§, rs->lo);
- buffer_put_int64(§, rs->hi);
- break;
- case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
- if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) {
- error("%s: insane bitmap gap", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) {
- if (BN_set_bit(bitmap,
- rs->lo + i - bitmap_start) != 1)
- goto out;
- }
- break;
- }
- last = rs->hi;
- }
- /* Flush the remaining section, if any */
- if (state != 0) {
- debug3("%s: serial final flush for state 0x%02x",
- __func__, state);
- switch (state) {
- case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
- case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
- break;
- case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
- buffer_put_bignum2(§, bitmap);
- BN_free(bitmap);
- bitmap = NULL;
- break;
- }
- buffer_put_char(buf, state);
- buffer_put_string(buf,
- buffer_ptr(§), buffer_len(§));
- }
- debug3("%s: serial done ", __func__);
-
- /* Now output a section for any revocations by key ID */
- buffer_clear(§);
- RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) {
- debug3("%s: key ID %s", __func__, rki->key_id);
- buffer_put_cstring(§, rki->key_id);
- }
- if (buffer_len(§) != 0) {
- buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID);
- buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(§),
- buffer_len(§));
- }
- r = 0;
- out:
- if (bitmap != NULL)
- BN_free(bitmap);
- buffer_free(§);
- return r;
-}
-
-int
-ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, Buffer *buf, const Key **sign_keys,
- u_int nsign_keys)
-{
- int r = -1;
- struct revoked_certs *rc;
- struct revoked_blob *rb;
- Buffer sect;
- u_char *kblob = NULL, *sblob = NULL;
- u_int klen, slen, i;
-
- if (krl->generated_date == 0)
- krl->generated_date = time(NULL);
-
- buffer_init(§);
-
- /* Store the header */
- buffer_append(buf, KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1);
- buffer_put_int(buf, KRL_FORMAT_VERSION);
- buffer_put_int64(buf, krl->krl_version);
- buffer_put_int64(buf, krl->generated_date);
- buffer_put_int64(buf, krl->flags);
- buffer_put_string(buf, NULL, 0);
- buffer_put_cstring(buf, krl->comment ? krl->comment : "");
-
- /* Store sections for revoked certificates */
- TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) {
- if (revoked_certs_generate(rc, §) != 0)
- goto out;
- buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES);
- buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(§),
- buffer_len(§));
- }
-
- /* Finally, output sections for revocations by public key/hash */
- buffer_clear(§);
- RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) {
- debug3("%s: key len %u ", __func__, rb->len);
- buffer_put_string(§, rb->blob, rb->len);
- }
- if (buffer_len(§) != 0) {
- buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY);
- buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(§),
- buffer_len(§));
- }
- buffer_clear(§);
- RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) {
- debug3("%s: hash len %u ", __func__, rb->len);
- buffer_put_string(§, rb->blob, rb->len);
- }
- if (buffer_len(§) != 0) {
- buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1);
- buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(§),
- buffer_len(§));
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < nsign_keys; i++) {
- if (key_to_blob(sign_keys[i], &kblob, &klen) == 0)
- goto out;
-
- debug3("%s: signature key len %u", __func__, klen);
- buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE);
- buffer_put_string(buf, kblob, klen);
-
- if (key_sign(sign_keys[i], &sblob, &slen,
- buffer_ptr(buf), buffer_len(buf)) == -1)
- goto out;
- debug3("%s: signature sig len %u", __func__, slen);
- buffer_put_string(buf, sblob, slen);
- }
-
- r = 0;
- out:
- free(kblob);
- free(sblob);
- buffer_free(§);
- return r;
-}
-
-static void
-format_timestamp(u_int64_t timestamp, char *ts, size_t nts)
-{
- time_t t;
- struct tm *tm;
-
- t = timestamp;
- tm = localtime(&t);
- *ts = '\0';
- strftime(ts, nts, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S", tm);
-}
-
-static int
-parse_revoked_certs(Buffer *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl)
-{
- int ret = -1, nbits;
- u_char type, *blob;
- u_int blen;
- Buffer subsect;
- u_int64_t serial, serial_lo, serial_hi;
- BIGNUM *bitmap = NULL;
- char *key_id = NULL;
- Key *ca_key = NULL;
-
- buffer_init(&subsect);
-
- if ((blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(buf, &blen)) == NULL ||
- buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(buf, NULL) == NULL) { /* reserved */
- error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if ((ca_key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
- goto out;
-
- while (buffer_len(buf) > 0) {
- if (buffer_get_char_ret(&type, buf) != 0 ||
- (blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(buf, &blen)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- buffer_clear(&subsect);
- buffer_append(&subsect, blob, blen);
- debug3("%s: subsection type 0x%02x", __func__, type);
- /* buffer_dump(&subsect); */
-
- switch (type) {
- case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
- while (buffer_len(&subsect) > 0) {
- if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&serial,
- &subsect) != 0) {
- error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, ca_key,
- serial) != 0) {
- error("%s: update failed", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- }
- break;
- case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
- if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&serial_lo, &subsect) != 0 ||
- buffer_get_int64_ret(&serial_hi, &subsect) != 0) {
- error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key,
- serial_lo, serial_hi) != 0) {
- error("%s: update failed", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- break;
- case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
- if ((bitmap = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- error("%s: BN_new", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&serial_lo, &subsect) != 0 ||
- buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&subsect, bitmap) != 0) {
- error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if ((nbits = BN_num_bits(bitmap)) < 0) {
- error("%s: bitmap bits < 0", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- for (serial = 0; serial < (u_int)nbits; serial++) {
- if (serial > 0 && serial_lo + serial == 0) {
- error("%s: bitmap wraps u64", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if (!BN_is_bit_set(bitmap, serial))
- continue;
- if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, ca_key,
- serial_lo + serial) != 0) {
- error("%s: update failed", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- }
- BN_free(bitmap);
- bitmap = NULL;
- break;
- case KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID:
- while (buffer_len(&subsect) > 0) {
- if ((key_id = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&subsect,
- NULL)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca_key,
- key_id) != 0) {
- error("%s: update failed", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- free(key_id);
- key_id = NULL;
- }
- break;
- default:
- error("Unsupported KRL certificate section %u", type);
- goto out;
- }
- if (buffer_len(&subsect) > 0) {
- error("KRL certificate section contains unparsed data");
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- ret = 0;
- out:
- if (ca_key != NULL)
- key_free(ca_key);
- if (bitmap != NULL)
- BN_free(bitmap);
- free(key_id);
- buffer_free(&subsect);
- return ret;
-}
-
-
-/* Attempt to parse a KRL, checking its signature (if any) with sign_ca_keys. */
-int
-ssh_krl_from_blob(Buffer *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
- const Key **sign_ca_keys, u_int nsign_ca_keys)
-{
- Buffer copy, sect;
- struct ssh_krl *krl;
- char timestamp[64];
- int ret = -1, r, sig_seen;
- Key *key = NULL, **ca_used = NULL;
- u_char type, *blob, *rdata = NULL;
- u_int i, j, sig_off, sects_off, rlen, blen, format_version, nca_used;
-
- nca_used = 0;
- *krlp = NULL;
- if (buffer_len(buf) < sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1 ||
- memcmp(buffer_ptr(buf), KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) {
- debug3("%s: not a KRL", __func__);
- /*
- * Return success but a NULL *krlp here to signal that the
- * file might be a simple list of keys.
- */
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Take a copy of the KRL buffer so we can verify its signature later */
- buffer_init(©);
- buffer_append(©, buffer_ptr(buf), buffer_len(buf));
-
- buffer_init(§);
- buffer_consume(©, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1);
-
- if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) {
- error("%s: alloc failed", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (buffer_get_int_ret(&format_version, ©) != 0) {
- error("%s: KRL truncated", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if (format_version != KRL_FORMAT_VERSION) {
- error("%s: KRL unsupported format version %u",
- __func__, format_version);
- goto out;
- }
- if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&krl->krl_version, ©) != 0 ||
- buffer_get_int64_ret(&krl->generated_date, ©) != 0 ||
- buffer_get_int64_ret(&krl->flags, ©) != 0 ||
- buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(©, NULL) == NULL || /* reserved */
- (krl->comment = buffer_get_cstring_ret(©, NULL)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
-
- format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp));
- debug("KRL version %llu generated at %s%s%s",
- (long long unsigned)krl->krl_version, timestamp,
- *krl->comment ? ": " : "", krl->comment);
-
- /*
- * 1st pass: verify signatures, if any. This is done to avoid
- * detailed parsing of data whose provenance is unverified.
- */
- sig_seen = 0;
- sects_off = buffer_len(buf) - buffer_len(©);
- while (buffer_len(©) > 0) {
- if (buffer_get_char_ret(&type, ©) != 0 ||
- (blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(©, &blen)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- debug3("%s: first pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type);
- if (type != KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE) {
- if (sig_seen) {
- error("KRL contains non-signature section "
- "after signature");
- goto out;
- }
- /* Not interested for now. */
- continue;
- }
- sig_seen = 1;
- /* First string component is the signing key */
- if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: invalid signature key", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- sig_off = buffer_len(buf) - buffer_len(©);
- /* Second string component is the signature itself */
- if ((blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(©, &blen)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- /* Check signature over entire KRL up to this point */
- if (key_verify(key, blob, blen,
- buffer_ptr(buf), buffer_len(buf) - sig_off) != 1) {
- error("bad signaure on KRL");
- goto out;
- }
- /* Check if this key has already signed this KRL */
- for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) {
- if (key_equal(ca_used[i], key)) {
- error("KRL signed more than once with "
- "the same key");
- goto out;
- }
- }
- /* Record keys used to sign the KRL */
- ca_used = xrealloc(ca_used, nca_used + 1, sizeof(*ca_used));
- ca_used[nca_used++] = key;
- key = NULL;
- break;
- }
-
- /*
- * 2nd pass: parse and load the KRL, skipping the header to the point
- * where the section start.
- */
- buffer_append(©, (u_char*)buffer_ptr(buf) + sects_off,
- buffer_len(buf) - sects_off);
- while (buffer_len(©) > 0) {
- if (buffer_get_char_ret(&type, ©) != 0 ||
- (blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(©, &blen)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- debug3("%s: second pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type);
- buffer_clear(§);
- buffer_append(§, blob, blen);
-
- switch (type) {
- case KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES:
- if ((r = parse_revoked_certs(§, krl)) != 0)
- goto out;
- break;
- case KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY:
- case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1:
- while (buffer_len(§) > 0) {
- if ((rdata = buffer_get_string_ret(§,
- &rlen)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if (type == KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 &&
- rlen != 20) {
- error("%s: bad SHA1 length", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- if (revoke_blob(
- type == KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY ?
- &krl->revoked_keys : &krl->revoked_sha1s,
- rdata, rlen) != 0)
- goto out;
- rdata = NULL; /* revoke_blob frees blob */
- }
- break;
- case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE:
- /* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */
- buffer_clear(§);
- if ((blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(©,
- &blen)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- break;
- default:
- error("Unsupported KRL section %u", type);
- goto out;
- }
- if (buffer_len(§) > 0) {
- error("KRL section contains unparsed data");
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- /* Check that the key(s) used to sign the KRL weren't revoked */
- sig_seen = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) {
- if (ssh_krl_check_key(krl, ca_used[i]) == 0)
- sig_seen = 1;
- else {
- key_free(ca_used[i]);
- ca_used[i] = NULL;
- }
- }
- if (nca_used && !sig_seen) {
- error("All keys used to sign KRL were revoked");
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* If we have CA keys, then verify that one was used to sign the KRL */
- if (sig_seen && nsign_ca_keys != 0) {
- sig_seen = 0;
- for (i = 0; !sig_seen && i < nsign_ca_keys; i++) {
- for (j = 0; j < nca_used; j++) {
- if (ca_used[j] == NULL)
- continue;
- if (key_equal(ca_used[j], sign_ca_keys[i])) {
- sig_seen = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- if (!sig_seen) {
- error("KRL not signed with any trusted key");
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- *krlp = krl;
- ret = 0;
- out:
- if (ret != 0)
- ssh_krl_free(krl);
- for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) {
- if (ca_used[i] != NULL)
- key_free(ca_used[i]);
- }
- free(ca_used);
- free(rdata);
- if (key != NULL)
- key_free(key);
- buffer_free(©);
- buffer_free(§);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/* Checks whether a given key/cert is revoked. Does not check its CA */
-static int
-is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
-{
- struct revoked_blob rb, *erb;
- struct revoked_serial rs, *ers;
- struct revoked_key_id rki, *erki;
- struct revoked_certs *rc;
-
- /* Check explicitly revoked hashes first */
- memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
- if ((rb.blob = key_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_FP_SHA1, &rb.len)) == NULL)
- return -1;
- erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
- free(rb.blob);
- if (erb != NULL) {
- debug("%s: revoked by key SHA1", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Next, explicit keys */
- memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
- if (plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len) != 0)
- return -1;
- erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
- free(rb.blob);
- if (erb != NULL) {
- debug("%s: revoked by explicit key", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (!key_is_cert(key))
- return 0;
-
- /* Check cert revocation */
- if (revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, key->cert->signature_key,
- &rc, 0) != 0)
- return -1;
- if (rc == NULL)
- return 0; /* No entry for this CA */
-
- /* Check revocation by cert key ID */
- memset(&rki, 0, sizeof(rki));
- rki.key_id = key->cert->key_id;
- erki = RB_FIND(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, &rki);
- if (erki != NULL) {
- debug("%s: revoked by key ID", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /*
- * Legacy cert formats lack serial numbers. Zero serials numbers
- * are ignored (it's the default when the CA doesn't specify one).
- */
- if (key_cert_is_legacy(key) || key->cert->serial == 0)
- return 0;
-
- memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs));
- rs.lo = rs.hi = key->cert->serial;
- ers = RB_FIND(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, &rs);
- if (ers != NULL) {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: %llu matched %llu:%llu", __func__,
- key->cert->serial, ers->lo, ers->hi));
- debug("%s: revoked by serial", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
- KRL_DBG(("%s: %llu no match", __func__, key->cert->serial));
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
-{
- int r;
-
- debug2("%s: checking key", __func__);
- if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key)) != 0)
- return r;
- if (key_is_cert(key)) {
- debug2("%s: checking CA key", __func__);
- if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key->cert->signature_key)) != 0)
- return r;
- }
- debug3("%s: key okay", __func__);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error or key revoked, -2 if path is not a KRL */
-int
-ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const Key *key)
-{
- Buffer krlbuf;
- struct ssh_krl *krl;
- int revoked, fd;
-
- if (path == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
- error("open %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
- error("Revoked keys file not accessible - refusing public key "
- "authentication");
- return -1;
- }
- buffer_init(&krlbuf);
- if (!key_load_file(fd, path, &krlbuf)) {
- close(fd);
- buffer_free(&krlbuf);
- error("Revoked keys file not readable - refusing public key "
- "authentication");
- return -1;
- }
- close(fd);
- if (ssh_krl_from_blob(&krlbuf, &krl, NULL, 0) != 0) {
- buffer_free(&krlbuf);
- error("Invalid KRL, refusing public key "
- "authentication");
- return -1;
- }
- buffer_free(&krlbuf);
- if (krl == NULL) {
- debug3("%s: %s is not a KRL file", __func__, path);
- return -2;
- }
- debug2("%s: checking KRL %s", __func__, path);
- revoked = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key) != 0;
- ssh_krl_free(krl);
- return revoked ? -1 : 0;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/krl.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/krl.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/krl.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/krl.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1298 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.37 2015/12/31 00:33:52 djm Exp $ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h> /* MIN */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h>
+#include <openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "bitmap.h"
+
+#include "krl.h"
+
+/* #define DEBUG_KRL */
+#ifdef DEBUG_KRL
+# define KRL_DBG(x) debug3 x
+#else
+# define KRL_DBG(x)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Trees of revoked serial numbers, key IDs and keys. This allows
+ * quick searching, querying and producing lists in canonical order.
+ */
+
+/* Tree of serial numbers. XXX make smarter: really need a real sparse bitmap */
+struct revoked_serial {
+ u_int64_t lo, hi;
+ RB_ENTRY(revoked_serial) tree_entry;
+};
+static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b);
+RB_HEAD(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial);
+RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial, tree_entry, serial_cmp);
+
+/* Tree of key IDs */
+struct revoked_key_id {
+ char *key_id;
+ RB_ENTRY(revoked_key_id) tree_entry;
+};
+static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b);
+RB_HEAD(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id);
+RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id, tree_entry, key_id_cmp);
+
+/* Tree of blobs (used for keys and fingerprints) */
+struct revoked_blob {
+ u_char *blob;
+ size_t len;
+ RB_ENTRY(revoked_blob) tree_entry;
+};
+static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b);
+RB_HEAD(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob);
+RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob, tree_entry, blob_cmp);
+
+/* Tracks revoked certs for a single CA */
+struct revoked_certs {
+ struct sshkey *ca_key;
+ struct revoked_serial_tree revoked_serials;
+ struct revoked_key_id_tree revoked_key_ids;
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(revoked_certs) entry;
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(revoked_certs_list, revoked_certs);
+
+struct ssh_krl {
+ u_int64_t krl_version;
+ u_int64_t generated_date;
+ u_int64_t flags;
+ char *comment;
+ struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_keys;
+ struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha1s;
+ struct revoked_certs_list revoked_certs;
+};
+
+/* Return equal if a and b overlap */
+static int
+serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b)
+{
+ if (a->hi >= b->lo && a->lo <= b->hi)
+ return 0;
+ return a->lo < b->lo ? -1 : 1;
+}
+
+static int
+key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b)
+{
+ return strcmp(a->key_id, b->key_id);
+}
+
+static int
+blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (a->len != b->len) {
+ if ((r = memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, MIN(a->len, b->len))) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return a->len > b->len ? 1 : -1;
+ } else
+ return memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, a->len);
+}
+
+struct ssh_krl *
+ssh_krl_init(void)
+{
+ struct ssh_krl *krl;
+
+ if ((krl = calloc(1, sizeof(*krl))) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_keys);
+ RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha1s);
+ TAILQ_INIT(&krl->revoked_certs);
+ return krl;
+}
+
+static void
+revoked_certs_free(struct revoked_certs *rc)
+{
+ struct revoked_serial *rs, *trs;
+ struct revoked_key_id *rki, *trki;
+
+ RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, trs) {
+ RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs);
+ free(rs);
+ }
+ RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, trki) {
+ RB_REMOVE(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki);
+ free(rki->key_id);
+ free(rki);
+ }
+ sshkey_free(rc->ca_key);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl)
+{
+ struct revoked_blob *rb, *trb;
+ struct revoked_certs *rc, *trc;
+
+ if (krl == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ free(krl->comment);
+ RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, trb) {
+ RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, rb);
+ free(rb->blob);
+ free(rb);
+ }
+ RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, trb) {
+ RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, rb);
+ free(rb->blob);
+ free(rb);
+ }
+ TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry, trc) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry);
+ revoked_certs_free(rc);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version)
+{
+ krl->krl_version = version;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment)
+{
+ free(krl->comment);
+ if ((krl->comment = strdup(comment)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find the revoked_certs struct for a CA key. If allow_create is set then
+ * create a new one in the tree if one did not exist already.
+ */
+static int
+revoked_certs_for_ca_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
+ struct revoked_certs **rcp, int allow_create)
+{
+ struct revoked_certs *rc;
+ int r;
+
+ *rcp = NULL;
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) {
+ if ((ca_key == NULL && rc->ca_key == NULL) ||
+ sshkey_equal(rc->ca_key, ca_key)) {
+ *rcp = rc;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!allow_create)
+ return 0;
+ /* If this CA doesn't exist in the list then add it now */
+ if ((rc = calloc(1, sizeof(*rc))) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if (ca_key == NULL)
+ rc->ca_key = NULL;
+ else if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca_key, &rc->ca_key)) != 0) {
+ free(rc);
+ return r;
+ }
+ RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_serials);
+ RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_key_ids);
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry);
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: new CA %s", __func__,
+ ca_key == NULL ? "*" : sshkey_type(ca_key)));
+ *rcp = rc;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
+{
+ struct revoked_serial rs, *ers, *crs, *irs;
+
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: insert %llu:%llu", __func__, lo, hi));
+ memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs));
+ rs.lo = lo;
+ rs.hi = hi;
+ ers = RB_NFIND(revoked_serial_tree, rt, &rs);
+ if (ers == NULL || serial_cmp(ers, &rs) != 0) {
+ /* No entry matches. Just insert */
+ if ((irs = malloc(sizeof(rs))) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ memcpy(irs, &rs, sizeof(*irs));
+ ers = RB_INSERT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, irs);
+ if (ers != NULL) {
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: bad: ers != NULL", __func__));
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ free(irs);
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ ers = irs;
+ } else {
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: overlap found %llu:%llu", __func__,
+ ers->lo, ers->hi));
+ /*
+ * The inserted entry overlaps an existing one. Grow the
+ * existing entry.
+ */
+ if (ers->lo > lo)
+ ers->lo = lo;
+ if (ers->hi < hi)
+ ers->hi = hi;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The inserted or revised range might overlap or abut adjacent ones;
+ * coalesce as necessary.
+ */
+
+ /* Check predecessors */
+ while ((crs = RB_PREV(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) {
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: pred %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi));
+ if (ers->lo != 0 && crs->hi < ers->lo - 1)
+ break;
+ /* This entry overlaps. */
+ if (crs->lo < ers->lo) {
+ ers->lo = crs->lo;
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: pred extend %llu:%llu", __func__,
+ ers->lo, ers->hi));
+ }
+ RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs);
+ free(crs);
+ }
+ /* Check successors */
+ while ((crs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) {
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: succ %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi));
+ if (ers->hi != (u_int64_t)-1 && crs->lo > ers->hi + 1)
+ break;
+ /* This entry overlaps. */
+ if (crs->hi > ers->hi) {
+ ers->hi = crs->hi;
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: succ extend %llu:%llu", __func__,
+ ers->lo, ers->hi));
+ }
+ RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs);
+ free(crs);
+ }
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: done, final %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
+ u_int64_t serial)
+{
+ return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial, serial);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl,
+ const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
+{
+ struct revoked_certs *rc;
+ int r;
+
+ if (lo > hi || lo == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return insert_serial_range(&rc->revoked_serials, lo, hi);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
+ const char *key_id)
+{
+ struct revoked_key_id *rki, *erki;
+ struct revoked_certs *rc;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: revoke %s", __func__, key_id));
+ if ((rki = calloc(1, sizeof(*rki))) == NULL ||
+ (rki->key_id = strdup(key_id)) == NULL) {
+ free(rki);
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ erki = RB_INSERT(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki);
+ if (erki != NULL) {
+ free(rki->key_id);
+ free(rki);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Convert "key" to a public key blob without any certificate information */
+static int
+plain_key_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blob, size_t *blen)
+{
+ struct sshkey *kcopy;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &kcopy)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(kcopy)) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(kcopy)) != 0) {
+ sshkey_free(kcopy);
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+ r = sshkey_to_blob(kcopy, blob, blen);
+ sshkey_free(kcopy);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* Revoke a key blob. Ownership of blob is transferred to the tree */
+static int
+revoke_blob(struct revoked_blob_tree *rbt, u_char *blob, size_t len)
+{
+ struct revoked_blob *rb, *erb;
+
+ if ((rb = calloc(1, sizeof(*rb))) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ rb->blob = blob;
+ rb->len = len;
+ erb = RB_INSERT(revoked_blob_tree, rbt, rb);
+ if (erb != NULL) {
+ free(rb->blob);
+ free(rb);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+ u_char *blob;
+ size_t len;
+ int r;
+
+ debug3("%s: revoke type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key));
+ if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_keys, blob, len);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+ u_char *blob;
+ size_t len;
+ int r;
+
+ debug3("%s: revoke type %s by sha1", __func__, sshkey_type(key));
+ if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1,
+ &blob, &len)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_sha1s, blob, len);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+ if (!sshkey_is_cert(key))
+ return ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, key);
+
+ if (key->cert->serial == 0) {
+ return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl,
+ key->cert->signature_key,
+ key->cert->key_id);
+ } else {
+ return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
+ key->cert->signature_key,
+ key->cert->serial);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Select the most compact section type to emit next in a KRL based on
+ * the current section type, the run length of contiguous revoked serial
+ * numbers and the gaps from the last and to the next revoked serial.
+ * Applies a mostly-accurate bit cost model to select the section type
+ * that will minimise the size of the resultant KRL.
+ */
+static int
+choose_next_state(int current_state, u_int64_t contig, int final,
+ u_int64_t last_gap, u_int64_t next_gap, int *force_new_section)
+{
+ int new_state;
+ u_int64_t cost, cost_list, cost_range, cost_bitmap, cost_bitmap_restart;
+
+ /*
+ * Avoid unsigned overflows.
+ * The limits are high enough to avoid confusing the calculations.
+ */
+ contig = MIN(contig, 1ULL<<31);
+ last_gap = MIN(last_gap, 1ULL<<31);
+ next_gap = MIN(next_gap, 1ULL<<31);
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate the cost to switch from the current state to candidates.
+ * NB. range sections only ever contain a single range, so their
+ * switching cost is independent of the current_state.
+ */
+ cost_list = cost_bitmap = cost_bitmap_restart = 0;
+ cost_range = 8;
+ switch (current_state) {
+ case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
+ cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64;
+ break;
+ case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
+ cost_list = 8;
+ cost_bitmap_restart = 8 + 64;
+ break;
+ case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
+ case 0:
+ cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64;
+ cost_list = 8;
+ }
+
+ /* Estimate base cost in bits of each section type */
+ cost_list += 64 * contig + (final ? 0 : 8+64);
+ cost_range += (2 * 64) + (final ? 0 : 8+64);
+ cost_bitmap += last_gap + contig + (final ? 0 : MIN(next_gap, 8+64));
+ cost_bitmap_restart += contig + (final ? 0 : MIN(next_gap, 8+64));
+
+ /* Convert to byte costs for actual comparison */
+ cost_list = (cost_list + 7) / 8;
+ cost_bitmap = (cost_bitmap + 7) / 8;
+ cost_bitmap_restart = (cost_bitmap_restart + 7) / 8;
+ cost_range = (cost_range + 7) / 8;
+
+ /* Now pick the best choice */
+ *force_new_section = 0;
+ new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP;
+ cost = cost_bitmap;
+ if (cost_range < cost) {
+ new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE;
+ cost = cost_range;
+ }
+ if (cost_list < cost) {
+ new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST;
+ cost = cost_list;
+ }
+ if (cost_bitmap_restart < cost) {
+ new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP;
+ *force_new_section = 1;
+ cost = cost_bitmap_restart;
+ }
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: contig %llu last_gap %llu next_gap %llu final %d, costs:"
+ "list %llu range %llu bitmap %llu new bitmap %llu, "
+ "selected 0x%02x%s", __func__, (long long unsigned)contig,
+ (long long unsigned)last_gap, (long long unsigned)next_gap, final,
+ (long long unsigned)cost_list, (long long unsigned)cost_range,
+ (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap,
+ (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap_restart, new_state,
+ *force_new_section ? " restart" : ""));
+ return new_state;
+}
+
+static int
+put_bitmap(struct sshbuf *buf, struct bitmap *bitmap)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ u_char *blob;
+ int r;
+
+ len = bitmap_nbytes(bitmap);
+ if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if (bitmap_to_string(bitmap, blob, len) != 0) {
+ free(blob);
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(buf, blob, len);
+ free(blob);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* Generate a KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES KRL section */
+static int
+revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+ int final, force_new_sect, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ u_int64_t i, contig, gap, last = 0, bitmap_start = 0;
+ struct revoked_serial *rs, *nrs;
+ struct revoked_key_id *rki;
+ int next_state, state = 0;
+ struct sshbuf *sect;
+ struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL;
+
+ if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+ /* Store the header: optional CA scope key, reserved */
+ if (rc->ca_key == NULL) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ if ((r = sshkey_puts(rc->ca_key, buf)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Store the revoked serials. */
+ for (rs = RB_MIN(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials);
+ rs != NULL;
+ rs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs)) {
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: serial %llu:%llu state 0x%02x", __func__,
+ (long long unsigned)rs->lo, (long long unsigned)rs->hi,
+ state));
+
+ /* Check contiguous length and gap to next section (if any) */
+ nrs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs);
+ final = nrs == NULL;
+ gap = nrs == NULL ? 0 : nrs->lo - rs->hi;
+ contig = 1 + (rs->hi - rs->lo);
+
+ /* Choose next state based on these */
+ next_state = choose_next_state(state, contig, final,
+ state == 0 ? 0 : rs->lo - last, gap, &force_new_sect);
+
+ /*
+ * If the current section is a range section or has a different
+ * type to the next section, then finish it off now.
+ */
+ if (state != 0 && (force_new_sect || next_state != state ||
+ state == KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE)) {
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: finish state 0x%02x", __func__, state));
+ switch (state) {
+ case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
+ case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
+ break;
+ case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
+ if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ bitmap_free(bitmap);
+ bitmap = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ sshbuf_reset(sect);
+ }
+
+ /* If we are starting a new section then prepare it now */
+ if (next_state != state || force_new_sect) {
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: start state 0x%02x", __func__,
+ next_state));
+ state = next_state;
+ sshbuf_reset(sect);
+ switch (state) {
+ case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
+ case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
+ break;
+ case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
+ if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ bitmap_start = rs->lo;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect,
+ bitmap_start)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Perform section-specific processing */
+ switch (state) {
+ case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
+ for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo + i)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ break;
+ case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->hi)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
+ if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) {
+ error("%s: insane bitmap gap", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) {
+ if (bitmap_set_bit(bitmap,
+ rs->lo + i - bitmap_start) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ last = rs->hi;
+ }
+ /* Flush the remaining section, if any */
+ if (state != 0) {
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: serial final flush for state 0x%02x",
+ __func__, state));
+ switch (state) {
+ case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
+ case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
+ break;
+ case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
+ if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ bitmap_free(bitmap);
+ bitmap = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: serial done ", __func__));
+
+ /* Now output a section for any revocations by key ID */
+ sshbuf_reset(sect);
+ RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) {
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: key ID %s", __func__, rki->key_id));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, rki->key_id)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ bitmap_free(bitmap);
+ sshbuf_free(sect);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf,
+ const struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct revoked_certs *rc;
+ struct revoked_blob *rb;
+ struct sshbuf *sect;
+ u_char *sblob = NULL;
+ size_t slen, i;
+
+ if (krl->generated_date == 0)
+ krl->generated_date = time(NULL);
+
+ if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+ /* Store the header */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, KRL_FORMAT_VERSION)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->krl_version)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->generated_date)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buf, krl->comment)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Store sections for revoked certificates */
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) {
+ sshbuf_reset(sect);
+ if ((r = revoked_certs_generate(rc, sect)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Finally, output sections for revocations by public key/hash */
+ sshbuf_reset(sect);
+ RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) {
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: key len %zu ", __func__, rb->len));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sshbuf_reset(sect);
+ RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) {
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: hash len %zu ", __func__, rb->len));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf,
+ KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nsign_keys; i++) {
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: signature key %s", __func__,
+ sshkey_ssh_name(sign_keys[i])));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_puts(sign_keys[i], buf)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_keys[i], &sblob, &slen,
+ sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: signature sig len %zu", __func__, slen));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, sblob, slen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ free(sblob);
+ sshbuf_free(sect);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static void
+format_timestamp(u_int64_t timestamp, char *ts, size_t nts)
+{
+ time_t t;
+ struct tm *tm;
+
+ t = timestamp;
+ tm = localtime(&t);
+ if (tm == NULL)
+ strlcpy(ts, "<INVALID>", nts);
+ else {
+ *ts = '\0';
+ strftime(ts, nts, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S", tm);
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+parse_revoked_certs(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ u_char type;
+ const u_char *blob;
+ size_t blen, nbits;
+ struct sshbuf *subsect = NULL;
+ u_int64_t serial, serial_lo, serial_hi;
+ struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL;
+ char *key_id = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *ca_key = NULL;
+
+ if ((subsect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+ /* Header: key, reserved */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (blen != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &ca_key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ while (sshbuf_len(buf) > 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(subsect);
+ subsect = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &subsect)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: subsection type 0x%02x", __func__, type));
+ /* sshbuf_dump(subsect, stderr); */
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
+ while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
+ ca_key, serial)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ break;
+ case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_hi)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl,
+ ca_key, serial_lo, serial_hi)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
+ if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(subsect,
+ &blob, &blen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (bitmap_from_string(bitmap, blob, blen) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ nbits = bitmap_nbits(bitmap);
+ for (serial = 0; serial < (u_int64_t)nbits; serial++) {
+ if (serial > 0 && serial_lo + serial == 0) {
+ error("%s: bitmap wraps u64", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!bitmap_test_bit(bitmap, serial))
+ continue;
+ if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
+ ca_key, serial_lo + serial)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ bitmap_free(bitmap);
+ bitmap = NULL;
+ break;
+ case KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID:
+ while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(subsect,
+ &key_id, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl,
+ ca_key, key_id)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ free(key_id);
+ key_id = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("Unsupported KRL certificate section %u", type);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) {
+ error("KRL certificate section contains unparsed data");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ if (bitmap != NULL)
+ bitmap_free(bitmap);
+ free(key_id);
+ sshkey_free(ca_key);
+ sshbuf_free(subsect);
+ return r;
+}
+
+
+/* Attempt to parse a KRL, checking its signature (if any) with sign_ca_keys. */
+int
+ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
+ const struct sshkey **sign_ca_keys, size_t nsign_ca_keys)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *copy = NULL, *sect = NULL;
+ struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL;
+ char timestamp[64];
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, sig_seen;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL, **ca_used = NULL, **tmp_ca_used;
+ u_char type, *rdata = NULL;
+ const u_char *blob;
+ size_t i, j, sig_off, sects_off, rlen, blen, nca_used;
+ u_int format_version;
+
+ nca_used = 0;
+ *krlp = NULL;
+ if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1 ||
+ memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(buf), KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) {
+ debug3("%s: not a KRL", __func__);
+ return SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC;
+ }
+
+ /* Take a copy of the KRL buffer so we can verify its signature later */
+ if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: alloc failed", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, &format_version)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (format_version != KRL_FORMAT_VERSION) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->krl_version)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->generated_date)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &krl->comment, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp));
+ debug("KRL version %llu generated at %s%s%s",
+ (long long unsigned)krl->krl_version, timestamp,
+ *krl->comment ? ": " : "", krl->comment);
+
+ /*
+ * 1st pass: verify signatures, if any. This is done to avoid
+ * detailed parsing of data whose provenance is unverified.
+ */
+ sig_seen = 0;
+ if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sects_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy);
+ while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: first pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type));
+ if (type != KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE) {
+ if (sig_seen) {
+ error("KRL contains non-signature section "
+ "after signature");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Not interested for now. */
+ continue;
+ }
+ sig_seen = 1;
+ /* First string component is the signing key */
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sig_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy);
+ /* Second string component is the signature itself */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Check signature over entire KRL up to this point */
+ if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, blob, blen,
+ sshbuf_ptr(buf), sig_off, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* Check if this key has already signed this KRL */
+ for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) {
+ if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[i], key)) {
+ error("KRL signed more than once with "
+ "the same key");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Record keys used to sign the KRL */
+ tmp_ca_used = reallocarray(ca_used, nca_used + 1,
+ sizeof(*ca_used));
+ if (tmp_ca_used == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ca_used = tmp_ca_used;
+ ca_used[nca_used++] = key;
+ key = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (sshbuf_len(copy) != 0) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * 2nd pass: parse and load the KRL, skipping the header to the point
+ * where the section start.
+ */
+ sshbuf_free(copy);
+ if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sects_off)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(sect);
+ sect = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_froms(copy, §)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: second pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type));
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES:
+ if ((r = parse_revoked_certs(sect, krl)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY:
+ case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1:
+ while (sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(sect,
+ &rdata, &rlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (type == KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 &&
+ rlen != 20) {
+ error("%s: bad SHA1 length", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = revoke_blob(
+ type == KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY ?
+ &krl->revoked_keys : &krl->revoked_sha1s,
+ rdata, rlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ rdata = NULL; /* revoke_blob frees rdata */
+ }
+ break;
+ case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE:
+ /* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */
+ sshbuf_reset(sect);
+ sect = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("Unsupported KRL section %u", type);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sect != NULL && sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) {
+ error("KRL section contains unparsed data");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check that the key(s) used to sign the KRL weren't revoked */
+ sig_seen = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) {
+ if (ssh_krl_check_key(krl, ca_used[i]) == 0)
+ sig_seen = 1;
+ else {
+ sshkey_free(ca_used[i]);
+ ca_used[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (nca_used && !sig_seen) {
+ error("All keys used to sign KRL were revoked");
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* If we have CA keys, then verify that one was used to sign the KRL */
+ if (sig_seen && nsign_ca_keys != 0) {
+ sig_seen = 0;
+ for (i = 0; !sig_seen && i < nsign_ca_keys; i++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < nca_used; j++) {
+ if (ca_used[j] == NULL)
+ continue;
+ if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[j], sign_ca_keys[i])) {
+ sig_seen = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (!sig_seen) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ error("KRL not signed with any trusted key");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *krlp = krl;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ if (r != 0)
+ ssh_krl_free(krl);
+ for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++)
+ sshkey_free(ca_used[i]);
+ free(ca_used);
+ free(rdata);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ sshbuf_free(copy);
+ sshbuf_free(sect);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* Checks certificate serial number and key ID revocation */
+static int
+is_cert_revoked(const struct sshkey *key, struct revoked_certs *rc)
+{
+ struct revoked_serial rs, *ers;
+ struct revoked_key_id rki, *erki;
+
+ /* Check revocation by cert key ID */
+ memset(&rki, 0, sizeof(rki));
+ rki.key_id = key->cert->key_id;
+ erki = RB_FIND(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, &rki);
+ if (erki != NULL) {
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key ID", __func__));
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Zero serials numbers are ignored (it's the default when the
+ * CA doesn't specify one).
+ */
+ if (key->cert->serial == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs));
+ rs.lo = rs.hi = key->cert->serial;
+ ers = RB_FIND(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, &rs);
+ if (ers != NULL) {
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked serial %llu matched %llu:%llu", __func__,
+ key->cert->serial, ers->lo, ers->hi));
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Checks whether a given key/cert is revoked. Does not check its CA */
+static int
+is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+ struct revoked_blob rb, *erb;
+ struct revoked_certs *rc;
+ int r;
+
+ /* Check explicitly revoked hashes first */
+ memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
+ if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1,
+ &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
+ free(rb.blob);
+ if (erb != NULL) {
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key SHA1", __func__));
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+ }
+
+ /* Next, explicit keys */
+ memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
+ if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
+ free(rb.blob);
+ if (erb != NULL) {
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by explicit key", __func__));
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+ }
+
+ if (!sshkey_is_cert(key))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check cert revocation for the specified CA */
+ if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, key->cert->signature_key,
+ &rc, 0)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (rc != NULL) {
+ if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ /* Check cert revocation for the wildcard CA */
+ if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, NULL, &rc, 0)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (rc != NULL) {
+ if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: %llu no match", __func__, key->cert->serial));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: checking key", __func__));
+ if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+ debug2("%s: checking CA key", __func__);
+ if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key->cert->signature_key)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ KRL_DBG(("%s: key okay", __func__));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *krlbuf = NULL;
+ struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL;
+ int oerrno = 0, r, fd;
+
+ if (path == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((krlbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ oerrno = errno;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, krlbuf)) != 0) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, &krl, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ debug2("%s: checking KRL %s", __func__, path);
+ r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key);
+ out:
+ close(fd);
+ sshbuf_free(krlbuf);
+ ssh_krl_free(krl);
+ if (r != 0)
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return r;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/krl.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/krl.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/krl.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-/* $OpenBSD: krl.h,v 1.2 2013/01/18 00:24:58 djm Exp $ */
-
-#ifndef _KRL_H
-#define _KRL_H
-
-/* Functions to manage key revocation lists */
-
-#define KRL_MAGIC "SSHKRL\n\0"
-#define KRL_FORMAT_VERSION 1
-
-/* KRL section types */
-#define KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES 1
-#define KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY 2
-#define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 3
-#define KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE 4
-
-/* KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES subsection types */
-#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST 0x20
-#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE 0x21
-#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP 0x22
-#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID 0x23
-
-struct ssh_krl;
-
-struct ssh_krl *ssh_krl_init(void);
-void ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl);
-void ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version);
-void ssh_krl_set_sign_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *sign_key);
-void ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment);
-int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
- u_int64_t serial);
-int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
- u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi);
-int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
- const char *key_id);
-int ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key);
-int ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key);
-int ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key);
-int ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, Buffer *buf, const Key **sign_keys,
- u_int nsign_keys);
-int ssh_krl_from_blob(Buffer *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
- const Key **sign_ca_keys, u_int nsign_ca_keys);
-int ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key);
-int ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const Key *key);
-
-#endif /* _KRL_H */
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/krl.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/krl.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/krl.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/krl.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.h,v 1.5 2015/12/30 23:46:14 djm Exp $ */
+
+#ifndef _KRL_H
+#define _KRL_H
+
+/* Functions to manage key revocation lists */
+
+#define KRL_MAGIC "SSHKRL\n\0"
+#define KRL_FORMAT_VERSION 1
+
+/* KRL section types */
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES 1
+#define KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY 2
+#define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 3
+#define KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE 4
+
+/* KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES subsection types */
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST 0x20
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE 0x21
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP 0x22
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID 0x23
+
+struct sshkey;
+struct sshbuf;
+struct ssh_krl;
+
+struct ssh_krl *ssh_krl_init(void);
+void ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl);
+void ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version);
+int ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl,
+ const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t serial);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl,
+ const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl,
+ const struct sshkey *ca_key, const char *key_id);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key);
+int ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf,
+ const struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys);
+int ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
+ const struct sshkey **sign_ca_keys, size_t nsign_ca_keys);
+int ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key);
+int ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key);
+
+#endif /* _KRL_H */
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/log.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/log.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/log.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,461 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.45 2013/05/16 09:08:41 dtucker Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <syslog.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
-# include <vis.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
-static int log_on_stderr = 1;
-static int log_stderr_fd = STDERR_FILENO;
-static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
-static char *argv0;
-static log_handler_fn *log_handler;
-static void *log_handler_ctx;
-
-extern char *__progname;
-
-#define LOG_SYSLOG_VIS (VIS_CSTYLE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL)
-#define LOG_STDERR_VIS (VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL)
-
-/* textual representation of log-facilities/levels */
-
-static struct {
- const char *name;
- SyslogFacility val;
-} log_facilities[] = {
- { "DAEMON", SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON },
- { "USER", SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER },
- { "AUTH", SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH },
-#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
- { "AUTHPRIV", SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV },
-#endif
- { "LOCAL0", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0 },
- { "LOCAL1", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1 },
- { "LOCAL2", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2 },
- { "LOCAL3", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3 },
- { "LOCAL4", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4 },
- { "LOCAL5", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5 },
- { "LOCAL6", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6 },
- { "LOCAL7", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7 },
- { NULL, SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET }
-};
-
-static struct {
- const char *name;
- LogLevel val;
-} log_levels[] =
-{
- { "QUIET", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET },
- { "FATAL", SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL },
- { "ERROR", SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR },
- { "INFO", SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO },
- { "VERBOSE", SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE },
- { "DEBUG", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 },
- { "DEBUG1", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 },
- { "DEBUG2", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2 },
- { "DEBUG3", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 },
- { NULL, SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET }
-};
-
-SyslogFacility
-log_facility_number(char *name)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (name != NULL)
- for (i = 0; log_facilities[i].name; i++)
- if (strcasecmp(log_facilities[i].name, name) == 0)
- return log_facilities[i].val;
- return SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET;
-}
-
-const char *
-log_facility_name(SyslogFacility facility)
-{
- u_int i;
-
- for (i = 0; log_facilities[i].name; i++)
- if (log_facilities[i].val == facility)
- return log_facilities[i].name;
- return NULL;
-}
-
-LogLevel
-log_level_number(char *name)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (name != NULL)
- for (i = 0; log_levels[i].name; i++)
- if (strcasecmp(log_levels[i].name, name) == 0)
- return log_levels[i].val;
- return SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
-}
-
-const char *
-log_level_name(LogLevel level)
-{
- u_int i;
-
- for (i = 0; log_levels[i].name != NULL; i++)
- if (log_levels[i].val == level)
- return log_levels[i].name;
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/* Error messages that should be logged. */
-
-void
-error(const char *fmt,...)
-{
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
-}
-
-void
-sigdie(const char *fmt,...)
-{
-#ifdef DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
-#endif
- _exit(1);
-}
-
-
-/* Log this message (information that usually should go to the log). */
-
-void
-logit(const char *fmt,...)
-{
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
-}
-
-/* More detailed messages (information that does not need to go to the log). */
-
-void
-verbose(const char *fmt,...)
-{
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
-}
-
-/* Debugging messages that should not be logged during normal operation. */
-
-void
-debug(const char *fmt,...)
-{
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
-}
-
-void
-debug2(const char *fmt,...)
-{
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2, fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
-}
-
-void
-debug3(const char *fmt,...)
-{
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
-}
-
-/*
- * Initialize the log.
- */
-
-void
-log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
-{
-#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
- struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
-#endif
-
- argv0 = av0;
-
- switch (level) {
- case SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET:
- case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
- case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR:
- case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO:
- case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE:
- case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1:
- case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2:
- case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3:
- log_level = level;
- break;
- default:
- fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognized internal syslog level code %d\n",
- (int) level);
- exit(1);
- }
-
- log_handler = NULL;
- log_handler_ctx = NULL;
-
- log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
- if (on_stderr)
- return;
-
- switch (facility) {
- case SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON:
- log_facility = LOG_DAEMON;
- break;
- case SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER:
- log_facility = LOG_USER;
- break;
- case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH:
- log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
- break;
-#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
- case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV:
- log_facility = LOG_AUTHPRIV;
- break;
-#endif
- case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0:
- log_facility = LOG_LOCAL0;
- break;
- case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1:
- log_facility = LOG_LOCAL1;
- break;
- case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2:
- log_facility = LOG_LOCAL2;
- break;
- case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3:
- log_facility = LOG_LOCAL3;
- break;
- case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4:
- log_facility = LOG_LOCAL4;
- break;
- case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5:
- log_facility = LOG_LOCAL5;
- break;
- case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6:
- log_facility = LOG_LOCAL6;
- break;
- case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7:
- log_facility = LOG_LOCAL7;
- break;
- default:
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Unrecognized internal syslog facility code %d\n",
- (int) facility);
- exit(1);
- }
-
- /*
- * If an external library (eg libwrap) attempts to use syslog
- * immediately after reexec, syslog may be pointing to the wrong
- * facility, so we force an open/close of syslog here.
- */
-#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
- openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata);
- closelog_r(&sdata);
-#else
- openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
- closelog();
-#endif
-}
-
-void
-log_change_level(LogLevel new_log_level)
-{
- /* no-op if log_init has not been called */
- if (argv0 == NULL)
- return;
- log_init(argv0, new_log_level, log_facility, log_on_stderr);
-}
-
-int
-log_is_on_stderr(void)
-{
- return log_on_stderr;
-}
-
-/* redirect what would usually get written to stderr to specified file */
-void
-log_redirect_stderr_to(const char *logfile)
-{
- int fd;
-
- if ((fd = open(logfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_APPEND, 0600)) == -1) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open logfile %s: %s\n", logfile,
- strerror(errno));
- exit(1);
- }
- log_stderr_fd = fd;
-}
-
-#define MSGBUFSIZ 1024
-
-void
-set_log_handler(log_handler_fn *handler, void *ctx)
-{
- log_handler = handler;
- log_handler_ctx = ctx;
-}
-
-void
-do_log2(LogLevel level, const char *fmt,...)
-{
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- do_log(level, fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
-}
-
-void
-do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, va_list args)
-{
-#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
- struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
-#endif
- char msgbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
- char fmtbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
- char *txt = NULL;
- int pri = LOG_INFO;
- int saved_errno = errno;
- log_handler_fn *tmp_handler;
-
- if (level > log_level)
- return;
-
- switch (level) {
- case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
- if (!log_on_stderr)
- txt = "fatal";
- pri = LOG_CRIT;
- break;
- case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR:
- if (!log_on_stderr)
- txt = "error";
- pri = LOG_ERR;
- break;
- case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO:
- pri = LOG_INFO;
- break;
- case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE:
- pri = LOG_INFO;
- break;
- case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1:
- txt = "debug1";
- pri = LOG_DEBUG;
- break;
- case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2:
- txt = "debug2";
- pri = LOG_DEBUG;
- break;
- case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3:
- txt = "debug3";
- pri = LOG_DEBUG;
- break;
- default:
- txt = "internal error";
- pri = LOG_ERR;
- break;
- }
- if (txt != NULL && log_handler == NULL) {
- snprintf(fmtbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf), "%s: %s", txt, fmt);
- vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmtbuf, args);
- } else {
- vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmt, args);
- }
- strnvis(fmtbuf, msgbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf),
- log_on_stderr ? LOG_STDERR_VIS : LOG_SYSLOG_VIS);
- if (log_handler != NULL) {
- /* Avoid recursion */
- tmp_handler = log_handler;
- log_handler = NULL;
- tmp_handler(level, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx);
- log_handler = tmp_handler;
- } else if (log_on_stderr) {
- snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%s\r\n", fmtbuf);
- (void)write(log_stderr_fd, msgbuf, strlen(msgbuf));
- } else {
-#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
- openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata);
- syslog_r(pri, &sdata, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
- closelog_r(&sdata);
-#else
- openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
- syslog(pri, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
- closelog();
-#endif
- }
- errno = saved_errno;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/log.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/log.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/log.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/log.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,470 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.48 2016/07/15 05:01:58 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+# include <vis.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+static int log_on_stderr = 1;
+static int log_stderr_fd = STDERR_FILENO;
+static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
+static char *argv0;
+static log_handler_fn *log_handler;
+static void *log_handler_ctx;
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+#define LOG_SYSLOG_VIS (VIS_CSTYLE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL)
+#define LOG_STDERR_VIS (VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL)
+
+/* textual representation of log-facilities/levels */
+
+static struct {
+ const char *name;
+ SyslogFacility val;
+} log_facilities[] = {
+ { "DAEMON", SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON },
+ { "USER", SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER },
+ { "AUTH", SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH },
+#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
+ { "AUTHPRIV", SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV },
+#endif
+ { "LOCAL0", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0 },
+ { "LOCAL1", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1 },
+ { "LOCAL2", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2 },
+ { "LOCAL3", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3 },
+ { "LOCAL4", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4 },
+ { "LOCAL5", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5 },
+ { "LOCAL6", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6 },
+ { "LOCAL7", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7 },
+ { NULL, SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET }
+};
+
+static struct {
+ const char *name;
+ LogLevel val;
+} log_levels[] =
+{
+ { "QUIET", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET },
+ { "FATAL", SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL },
+ { "ERROR", SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR },
+ { "INFO", SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO },
+ { "VERBOSE", SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE },
+ { "DEBUG", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 },
+ { "DEBUG1", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 },
+ { "DEBUG2", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2 },
+ { "DEBUG3", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 },
+ { NULL, SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET }
+};
+
+SyslogFacility
+log_facility_number(char *name)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (name != NULL)
+ for (i = 0; log_facilities[i].name; i++)
+ if (strcasecmp(log_facilities[i].name, name) == 0)
+ return log_facilities[i].val;
+ return SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET;
+}
+
+const char *
+log_facility_name(SyslogFacility facility)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; log_facilities[i].name; i++)
+ if (log_facilities[i].val == facility)
+ return log_facilities[i].name;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+LogLevel
+log_level_number(char *name)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (name != NULL)
+ for (i = 0; log_levels[i].name; i++)
+ if (strcasecmp(log_levels[i].name, name) == 0)
+ return log_levels[i].val;
+ return SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
+}
+
+const char *
+log_level_name(LogLevel level)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; log_levels[i].name != NULL; i++)
+ if (log_levels[i].val == level)
+ return log_levels[i].name;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Error messages that should be logged. */
+
+void
+error(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+
+void
+sigdie(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+#ifdef DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+#endif
+ _exit(1);
+}
+
+void
+logdie(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+}
+
+/* Log this message (information that usually should go to the log). */
+
+void
+logit(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+
+/* More detailed messages (information that does not need to go to the log). */
+
+void
+verbose(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+
+/* Debugging messages that should not be logged during normal operation. */
+
+void
+debug(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+
+void
+debug2(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+
+void
+debug3(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the log.
+ */
+
+void
+log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+ struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
+#endif
+
+ argv0 = av0;
+
+ switch (level) {
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET:
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR:
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO:
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE:
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1:
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2:
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3:
+ log_level = level;
+ break;
+ default:
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognized internal syslog level code %d\n",
+ (int) level);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ log_handler = NULL;
+ log_handler_ctx = NULL;
+
+ log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
+ if (on_stderr)
+ return;
+
+ switch (facility) {
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON:
+ log_facility = LOG_DAEMON;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER:
+ log_facility = LOG_USER;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH:
+ log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
+ break;
+#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV:
+ log_facility = LOG_AUTHPRIV;
+ break;
+#endif
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0:
+ log_facility = LOG_LOCAL0;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1:
+ log_facility = LOG_LOCAL1;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2:
+ log_facility = LOG_LOCAL2;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3:
+ log_facility = LOG_LOCAL3;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4:
+ log_facility = LOG_LOCAL4;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5:
+ log_facility = LOG_LOCAL5;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6:
+ log_facility = LOG_LOCAL6;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7:
+ log_facility = LOG_LOCAL7;
+ break;
+ default:
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Unrecognized internal syslog facility code %d\n",
+ (int) facility);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If an external library (eg libwrap) attempts to use syslog
+ * immediately after reexec, syslog may be pointing to the wrong
+ * facility, so we force an open/close of syslog here.
+ */
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+ openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata);
+ closelog_r(&sdata);
+#else
+ openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
+ closelog();
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+log_change_level(LogLevel new_log_level)
+{
+ /* no-op if log_init has not been called */
+ if (argv0 == NULL)
+ return;
+ log_init(argv0, new_log_level, log_facility, log_on_stderr);
+}
+
+int
+log_is_on_stderr(void)
+{
+ return log_on_stderr && log_stderr_fd == STDERR_FILENO;
+}
+
+/* redirect what would usually get written to stderr to specified file */
+void
+log_redirect_stderr_to(const char *logfile)
+{
+ int fd;
+
+ if ((fd = open(logfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_APPEND, 0600)) == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open logfile %s: %s\n", logfile,
+ strerror(errno));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ log_stderr_fd = fd;
+}
+
+#define MSGBUFSIZ 1024
+
+void
+set_log_handler(log_handler_fn *handler, void *ctx)
+{
+ log_handler = handler;
+ log_handler_ctx = ctx;
+}
+
+void
+do_log2(LogLevel level, const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ do_log(level, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+
+void
+do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, va_list args)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+ struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
+#endif
+ char msgbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
+ char fmtbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
+ char *txt = NULL;
+ int pri = LOG_INFO;
+ int saved_errno = errno;
+ log_handler_fn *tmp_handler;
+
+ if (level > log_level)
+ return;
+
+ switch (level) {
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
+ if (!log_on_stderr)
+ txt = "fatal";
+ pri = LOG_CRIT;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR:
+ if (!log_on_stderr)
+ txt = "error";
+ pri = LOG_ERR;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO:
+ pri = LOG_INFO;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE:
+ pri = LOG_INFO;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1:
+ txt = "debug1";
+ pri = LOG_DEBUG;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2:
+ txt = "debug2";
+ pri = LOG_DEBUG;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3:
+ txt = "debug3";
+ pri = LOG_DEBUG;
+ break;
+ default:
+ txt = "internal error";
+ pri = LOG_ERR;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (txt != NULL && log_handler == NULL) {
+ snprintf(fmtbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf), "%s: %s", txt, fmt);
+ vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmtbuf, args);
+ } else {
+ vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmt, args);
+ }
+ strnvis(fmtbuf, msgbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf),
+ log_on_stderr ? LOG_STDERR_VIS : LOG_SYSLOG_VIS);
+ if (log_handler != NULL) {
+ /* Avoid recursion */
+ tmp_handler = log_handler;
+ log_handler = NULL;
+ tmp_handler(level, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx);
+ log_handler = tmp_handler;
+ } else if (log_on_stderr) {
+ snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%s\r\n", fmtbuf);
+ (void)write(log_stderr_fd, msgbuf, strlen(msgbuf));
+ } else {
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+ openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata);
+ syslog_r(pri, &sdata, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
+ closelog_r(&sdata);
+#else
+ openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
+ syslog(pri, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
+ closelog();
+#endif
+ }
+ errno = saved_errno;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/log.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/log.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/log.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: log.h,v 1.20 2013/04/07 02:10:33 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#ifndef SSH_LOG_H
-#define SSH_LOG_H
-
-/* Supported syslog facilities and levels. */
-typedef enum {
- SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON,
- SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER,
- SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH,
-#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
- SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV,
-#endif
- SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0,
- SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1,
- SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2,
- SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3,
- SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4,
- SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5,
- SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6,
- SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7,
- SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET = -1
-} SyslogFacility;
-
-typedef enum {
- SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET,
- SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
- SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
- SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
- SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE,
- SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1,
- SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2,
- SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3,
- SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET = -1
-} LogLevel;
-
-typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
-
-void log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
-void log_change_level(LogLevel);
-int log_is_on_stderr(void);
-void log_redirect_stderr_to(const char *);
-
-SyslogFacility log_facility_number(char *);
-const char * log_facility_name(SyslogFacility);
-LogLevel log_level_number(char *);
-const char * log_level_name(LogLevel);
-
-void fatal(const char *, ...) __attribute__((noreturn))
- __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-void error(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-void sigdie(const char *, ...) __attribute__((noreturn))
- __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-void logit(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-void verbose(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-void debug(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-void debug2(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-void debug3(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-
-
-void set_log_handler(log_handler_fn *, void *);
-void do_log2(LogLevel, const char *, ...)
- __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
-void do_log(LogLevel, const char *, va_list);
-void cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/log.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/log.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/log.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/log.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: log.h,v 1.21 2016/07/15 05:01:58 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef SSH_LOG_H
+#define SSH_LOG_H
+
+/* Supported syslog facilities and levels. */
+typedef enum {
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH,
+#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV,
+#endif
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET = -1
+} SyslogFacility;
+
+typedef enum {
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET,
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE,
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1,
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2,
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3,
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET = -1
+} LogLevel;
+
+typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
+
+void log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
+void log_change_level(LogLevel);
+int log_is_on_stderr(void);
+void log_redirect_stderr_to(const char *);
+
+SyslogFacility log_facility_number(char *);
+const char * log_facility_name(SyslogFacility);
+LogLevel log_level_number(char *);
+const char * log_level_name(LogLevel);
+
+void fatal(const char *, ...) __attribute__((noreturn))
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void error(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void sigdie(const char *, ...) __attribute__((noreturn))
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void logdie(const char *, ...) __attribute__((noreturn))
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void logit(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void verbose(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void debug(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void debug2(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void debug3(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+
+
+void set_log_handler(log_handler_fn *, void *);
+void do_log2(LogLevel, const char *, ...)
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+void do_log(LogLevel, const char *, va_list);
+void cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/loginrec.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/loginrec.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/loginrec.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1726 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas. All rights reserved.
- * Portions copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller
- * Portions copyright (c) 1996 Jason Downs
- * Portions copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-/*
- * The btmp logging code is derived from login.c from util-linux and is under
- * the the following license:
- *
- * Copyright (c) 1980, 1987, 1988 The Regents of the University of California.
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted
- * provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
- * duplicated in all such forms and that any documentation,
- * advertising materials, and other materials related to such
- * distribution and use acknowledge that the software was developed
- * by the University of California, Berkeley. The name of the
- * University may not be used to endorse or promote products derived
- * from this software without specific prior written permission.
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED
- * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
- */
-
-
-/**
- ** loginrec.c: platform-independent login recording and lastlog retrieval
- **/
-
-/*
- * The new login code explained
- * ============================
- *
- * This code attempts to provide a common interface to login recording
- * (utmp and friends) and last login time retrieval.
- *
- * Its primary means of achieving this is to use 'struct logininfo', a
- * union of all the useful fields in the various different types of
- * system login record structures one finds on UNIX variants.
- *
- * We depend on autoconf to define which recording methods are to be
- * used, and which fields are contained in the relevant data structures
- * on the local system. Many C preprocessor symbols affect which code
- * gets compiled here.
- *
- * The code is designed to make it easy to modify a particular
- * recording method, without affecting other methods nor requiring so
- * many nested conditional compilation blocks as were commonplace in
- * the old code.
- *
- * For login recording, we try to use the local system's libraries as
- * these are clearly most likely to work correctly. For utmp systems
- * this usually means login() and logout() or setutent() etc., probably
- * in libutil, along with logwtmp() etc. On these systems, we fall back
- * to writing the files directly if we have to, though this method
- * requires very thorough testing so we do not corrupt local auditing
- * information. These files and their access methods are very system
- * specific indeed.
- *
- * For utmpx systems, the corresponding library functions are
- * setutxent() etc. To the author's knowledge, all utmpx systems have
- * these library functions and so no direct write is attempted. If such
- * a system exists and needs support, direct analogues of the [uw]tmp
- * code should suffice.
- *
- * Retrieving the time of last login ('lastlog') is in some ways even
- * more problemmatic than login recording. Some systems provide a
- * simple table of all users which we seek based on uid and retrieve a
- * relatively standard structure. Others record the same information in
- * a directory with a separate file, and others don't record the
- * information separately at all. For systems in the latter category,
- * we look backwards in the wtmp or wtmpx file for the last login entry
- * for our user. Naturally this is slower and on busy systems could
- * incur a significant performance penalty.
- *
- * Calling the new code
- * --------------------
- *
- * In OpenSSH all login recording and retrieval is performed in
- * login.c. Here you'll find working examples. Also, in the logintest.c
- * program there are more examples.
- *
- * Internal handler calling method
- * -------------------------------
- *
- * When a call is made to login_login() or login_logout(), both
- * routines set a struct logininfo flag defining which action (log in,
- * or log out) is to be taken. They both then call login_write(), which
- * calls whichever of the many structure-specific handlers autoconf
- * selects for the local system.
- *
- * The handlers themselves handle system data structure specifics. Both
- * struct utmp and struct utmpx have utility functions (see
- * construct_utmp*()) to try to make it simpler to add extra systems
- * that introduce new features to either structure.
- *
- * While it may seem terribly wasteful to replicate so much similar
- * code for each method, experience has shown that maintaining code to
- * write both struct utmp and utmpx in one function, whilst maintaining
- * support for all systems whether they have library support or not, is
- * a difficult and time-consuming task.
- *
- * Lastlog support proceeds similarly. Functions login_get_lastlog()
- * (and its OpenSSH-tuned friend login_get_lastlog_time()) call
- * getlast_entry(), which tries one of three methods to find the last
- * login time. It uses local system lastlog support if it can,
- * otherwise it tries wtmp or wtmpx before giving up and returning 0,
- * meaning "tilt".
- *
- * Maintenance
- * -----------
- *
- * In many cases it's possible to tweak autoconf to select the correct
- * methods for a particular platform, either by improving the detection
- * code (best), or by presetting DISABLE_<method> or CONF_<method>_FILE
- * symbols for the platform.
- *
- * Use logintest to check which symbols are defined before modifying
- * configure.ac and loginrec.c. (You have to build logintest yourself
- * with 'make logintest' as it's not built by default.)
- *
- * Otherwise, patches to the specific method(s) are very helpful!
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "loginrec.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-
-#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
-# include <util.h>
-#endif
-
-/**
- ** prototypes for helper functions in this file
- **/
-
-#if HAVE_UTMP_H
-void set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut);
-void construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
-void set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut);
-void construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut);
-#endif
-
-int utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
-int utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
-int wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
-int wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
-int lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
-int syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
-
-int getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li);
-int lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
-int utmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
-int wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
-int wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
-
-extern Buffer loginmsg;
-
-/* pick the shortest string */
-#define MIN_SIZEOF(s1,s2) (sizeof(s1) < sizeof(s2) ? sizeof(s1) : sizeof(s2))
-
-/**
- ** platform-independent login functions
- **/
-
-/*
- * login_login(struct logininfo *) - Record a login
- *
- * Call with a pointer to a struct logininfo initialised with
- * login_init_entry() or login_alloc_entry()
- *
- * Returns:
- * >0 if successful
- * 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
- */
-int
-login_login(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN;
- return (login_write(li));
-}
-
-
-/*
- * login_logout(struct logininfo *) - Record a logout
- *
- * Call as with login_login()
- *
- * Returns:
- * >0 if successful
- * 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
- */
-int
-login_logout(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- li->type = LTYPE_LOGOUT;
- return (login_write(li));
-}
-
-/*
- * login_get_lastlog_time(int) - Retrieve the last login time
- *
- * Retrieve the last login time for the given uid. Will try to use the
- * system lastlog facilities if they are available, but will fall back
- * to looking in wtmp/wtmpx if necessary
- *
- * Returns:
- * 0 on failure, or if user has never logged in
- * Time in seconds from the epoch if successful
- *
- * Useful preprocessor symbols:
- * DISABLE_LASTLOG: If set, *never* even try to retrieve lastlog
- * info
- * USE_LASTLOG: If set, indicates the presence of system lastlog
- * facilities. If this and DISABLE_LASTLOG are not set,
- * try to retrieve lastlog information from wtmp/wtmpx.
- */
-unsigned int
-login_get_lastlog_time(const uid_t uid)
-{
- struct logininfo li;
-
- if (login_get_lastlog(&li, uid))
- return (li.tv_sec);
- else
- return (0);
-}
-
-/*
- * login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *, int) - Retrieve a lastlog entry
- *
- * Retrieve a logininfo structure populated (only partially) with
- * information from the system lastlog data, or from wtmp/wtmpx if no
- * system lastlog information exists.
- *
- * Note this routine must be given a pre-allocated logininfo.
- *
- * Returns:
- * >0: A pointer to your struct logininfo if successful
- * 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
- */
-struct logininfo *
-login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *li, const uid_t uid)
-{
- struct passwd *pw;
-
- memset(li, '\0', sizeof(*li));
- li->uid = uid;
-
- /*
- * If we don't have a 'real' lastlog, we need the username to
- * reliably search wtmp(x) for the last login (see
- * wtmp_get_entry().)
- */
- pw = getpwuid(uid);
- if (pw == NULL)
- fatal("%s: Cannot find account for uid %ld", __func__,
- (long)uid);
-
- if (strlcpy(li->username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(li->username)) >=
- sizeof(li->username)) {
- error("%s: username too long (%lu > max %lu)", __func__,
- (unsigned long)strlen(pw->pw_name),
- (unsigned long)sizeof(li->username) - 1);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (getlast_entry(li))
- return (li);
- else
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * login_alloc_entry(int, char*, char*, char*) - Allocate and initialise
- * a logininfo structure
- *
- * This function creates a new struct logininfo, a data structure
- * meant to carry the information required to portably record login info.
- *
- * Returns a pointer to a newly created struct logininfo. If memory
- * allocation fails, the program halts.
- */
-struct
-logininfo *login_alloc_entry(pid_t pid, const char *username,
- const char *hostname, const char *line)
-{
- struct logininfo *newli;
-
- newli = xmalloc(sizeof(*newli));
- login_init_entry(newli, pid, username, hostname, line);
- return (newli);
-}
-
-
-/* login_free_entry(struct logininfo *) - free struct memory */
-void
-login_free_entry(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- free(li);
-}
-
-
-/* login_init_entry(struct logininfo *, int, char*, char*, char*)
- * - initialise a struct logininfo
- *
- * Populates a new struct logininfo, a data structure meant to carry
- * the information required to portably record login info.
- *
- * Returns: 1
- */
-int
-login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, pid_t pid, const char *username,
- const char *hostname, const char *line)
-{
- struct passwd *pw;
-
- memset(li, 0, sizeof(*li));
-
- li->pid = pid;
-
- /* set the line information */
- if (line)
- line_fullname(li->line, line, sizeof(li->line));
-
- if (username) {
- strlcpy(li->username, username, sizeof(li->username));
- pw = getpwnam(li->username);
- if (pw == NULL) {
- fatal("%s: Cannot find user \"%s\"", __func__,
- li->username);
- }
- li->uid = pw->pw_uid;
- }
-
- if (hostname)
- strlcpy(li->hostname, hostname, sizeof(li->hostname));
-
- return (1);
-}
-
-/*
- * login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *) - set the current time
- *
- * Set the current time in a logininfo structure. This function is
- * meant to eliminate the need to deal with system dependencies for
- * time handling.
- */
-void
-login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- struct timeval tv;
-
- gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
-
- li->tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
- li->tv_usec = tv.tv_usec;
-}
-
-/* copy a sockaddr_* into our logininfo */
-void
-login_set_addr(struct logininfo *li, const struct sockaddr *sa,
- const unsigned int sa_size)
-{
- unsigned int bufsize = sa_size;
-
- /* make sure we don't overrun our union */
- if (sizeof(li->hostaddr) < sa_size)
- bufsize = sizeof(li->hostaddr);
-
- memcpy(&li->hostaddr.sa, sa, bufsize);
-}
-
-
-/**
- ** login_write: Call low-level recording functions based on autoconf
- ** results
- **/
-int
-login_write(struct logininfo *li)
-{
-#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
- if (geteuid() != 0) {
- logit("Attempt to write login records by non-root user (aborting)");
- return (1);
- }
-#endif
-
- /* set the timestamp */
- login_set_current_time(li);
-#ifdef USE_LOGIN
- syslogin_write_entry(li);
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
- if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN)
- lastlog_write_entry(li);
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_UTMP
- utmp_write_entry(li);
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_WTMP
- wtmp_write_entry(li);
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_UTMPX
- utmpx_write_entry(li);
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_WTMPX
- wtmpx_write_entry(li);
-#endif
-#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN
- if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN &&
- !sys_auth_record_login(li->username,li->hostname,li->line,
- &loginmsg))
- logit("Writing login record failed for %s", li->username);
-#endif
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN)
- audit_session_open(li);
- else if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
- audit_session_close(li);
-#endif
- return (0);
-}
-
-#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
-int
-login_utmp_only(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN;
- login_set_current_time(li);
-# ifdef USE_UTMP
- utmp_write_entry(li);
-# endif
-# ifdef USE_WTMP
- wtmp_write_entry(li);
-# endif
-# ifdef USE_UTMPX
- utmpx_write_entry(li);
-# endif
-# ifdef USE_WTMPX
- wtmpx_write_entry(li);
-# endif
- return (0);
-}
-#endif
-
-/**
- ** getlast_entry: Call low-level functions to retrieve the last login
- ** time.
- **/
-
-/* take the uid in li and return the last login time */
-int
-getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li)
-{
-#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
- return(lastlog_get_entry(li));
-#else /* !USE_LASTLOG */
-#if defined(USE_UTMPX) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXDB) && \
- defined(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN) && defined(HAVE_GETUTXUSER)
- return (utmpx_get_entry(li));
-#endif
-
-#if defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
- /* On some systems we shouldn't even try to obtain last login
- * time, e.g. AIX */
- return (0);
-# elif defined(USE_WTMP) && \
- (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP))
- /* retrieve last login time from utmp */
- return (wtmp_get_entry(li));
-# elif defined(USE_WTMPX) && \
- (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX))
- /* If wtmp isn't available, try wtmpx */
- return (wtmpx_get_entry(li));
-# else
- /* Give up: No means of retrieving last login time */
- return (0);
-# endif /* DISABLE_LASTLOG */
-#endif /* USE_LASTLOG */
-}
-
-
-
-/*
- * 'line' string utility functions
- *
- * These functions process the 'line' string into one of three forms:
- *
- * 1. The full filename (including '/dev')
- * 2. The stripped name (excluding '/dev')
- * 3. The abbreviated name (e.g. /dev/ttyp00 -> yp00
- * /dev/pts/1 -> ts/1 )
- *
- * Form 3 is used on some systems to identify a .tmp.? entry when
- * attempting to remove it. Typically both addition and removal is
- * performed by one application - say, sshd - so as long as the choice
- * uniquely identifies a terminal it's ok.
- */
-
-
-/*
- * line_fullname(): add the leading '/dev/' if it doesn't exist make
- * sure dst has enough space, if not just copy src (ugh)
- */
-char *
-line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, u_int dstsize)
-{
- memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
- if ((strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) || (dstsize < (strlen(src) + 5)))
- strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize);
- else {
- strlcpy(dst, "/dev/", dstsize);
- strlcat(dst, src, dstsize);
- }
- return (dst);
-}
-
-/* line_stripname(): strip the leading '/dev' if it exists, return dst */
-char *
-line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize)
-{
- memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
- if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
- strlcpy(dst, src + 5, dstsize);
- else
- strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize);
- return (dst);
-}
-
-/*
- * line_abbrevname(): Return the abbreviated (usually four-character)
- * form of the line (Just use the last <dstsize> characters of the
- * full name.)
- *
- * NOTE: use strncpy because we do NOT necessarily want zero
- * termination
- */
-char *
-line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize)
-{
- size_t len;
-
- memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
-
- /* Always skip prefix if present */
- if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
- src += 5;
-
-#ifdef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY
- if (strncmp(src, "tty", 3) == 0)
- src += 3;
-#endif
-
- len = strlen(src);
-
- if (len > 0) {
- if (((int)len - dstsize) > 0)
- src += ((int)len - dstsize);
-
- /* note: _don't_ change this to strlcpy */
- strncpy(dst, src, (size_t)dstsize);
- }
-
- return (dst);
-}
-
-/**
- ** utmp utility functions
- **
- ** These functions manipulate struct utmp, taking system differences
- ** into account.
- **/
-
-#if defined(USE_UTMP) || defined (USE_WTMP) || defined (USE_LOGIN)
-
-/* build the utmp structure */
-void
-set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
-{
-# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP)
- ut->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec;
- ut->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec;
-# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP)
- ut->ut_time = li->tv_sec;
-# endif
-}
-
-void
-construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
- struct utmp *ut)
-{
-# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
- struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
-# endif
-
- memset(ut, '\0', sizeof(*ut));
-
- /* First fill out fields used for both logins and logouts */
-
-# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP
- line_abbrevname(ut->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_id));
-# endif
-
-# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
- /* This is done here to keep utmp constants out of struct logininfo */
- switch (li->type) {
- case LTYPE_LOGIN:
- ut->ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
-#ifdef _UNICOS
- cray_set_tmpdir(ut);
-#endif
- break;
- case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
- ut->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
-#ifdef _UNICOS
- cray_retain_utmp(ut, li->pid);
-#endif
- break;
- }
-# endif
- set_utmp_time(li, ut);
-
- line_stripname(ut->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_line));
-
-# ifdef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP
- ut->ut_pid = li->pid;
-# endif
-
- /* If we're logging out, leave all other fields blank */
- if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
- return;
-
- /*
- * These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank
- * for logouts.
- */
-
- /* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
- strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
- MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
-# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
- strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
- MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
-# endif
-# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP
- /* this is just a 32-bit IP address */
- if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
- ut->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr;
-# endif
-# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
- /* this is just a 128-bit IPv6 address */
- if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
- sa6 = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&li->hostaddr.sa);
- memcpy(ut->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16);
- if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sa6->sin6_addr)) {
- ut->ut_addr_v6[0] = ut->ut_addr_v6[3];
- ut->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0;
- ut->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0;
- ut->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0;
- }
- }
-# endif
-}
-#endif /* USE_UTMP || USE_WTMP || USE_LOGIN */
-
-/**
- ** utmpx utility functions
- **
- ** These functions manipulate struct utmpx, accounting for system
- ** variations.
- **/
-
-#if defined(USE_UTMPX) || defined (USE_WTMPX)
-/* build the utmpx structure */
-void
-set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
-{
-# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX)
- utx->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec;
- utx->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec;
-# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX)
- utx->ut_time = li->tv_sec;
-# endif
-}
-
-void
-construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
-{
-# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
- struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
-# endif
- memset(utx, '\0', sizeof(*utx));
-
-# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
- line_abbrevname(utx->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_id));
-# endif
-
- /* this is done here to keep utmp constants out of loginrec.h */
- switch (li->type) {
- case LTYPE_LOGIN:
- utx->ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
- break;
- case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
- utx->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
- break;
- }
- line_stripname(utx->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_line));
- set_utmpx_time(li, utx);
- utx->ut_pid = li->pid;
-
- /* strncpy(): Don't necessarily want null termination */
- strncpy(utx->ut_user, li->username,
- MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_user, li->username));
-
- if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
- return;
-
- /*
- * These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank
- * for logouts.
- */
-
-# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX
- strncpy(utx->ut_host, li->hostname,
- MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_host, li->hostname));
-# endif
-# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX
- /* this is just a 32-bit IP address */
- if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
- utx->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr;
-# endif
-# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
- /* this is just a 128-bit IPv6 address */
- if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
- sa6 = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&li->hostaddr.sa);
- memcpy(ut->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16);
- if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sa6->sin6_addr)) {
- ut->ut_addr_v6[0] = ut->ut_addr_v6[3];
- ut->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0;
- ut->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0;
- ut->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0;
- }
- }
-# endif
-# ifdef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX
- /* ut_syslen is the length of the utx_host string */
- utx->ut_syslen = MIN(strlen(li->hostname), sizeof(utx->ut_host));
-# endif
-}
-#endif /* USE_UTMPX || USE_WTMPX */
-
-/**
- ** Low-level utmp functions
- **/
-
-/* FIXME: (ATL) utmp_write_direct needs testing */
-#ifdef USE_UTMP
-
-/* if we can, use pututline() etc. */
-# if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTENT) && \
- defined(HAVE_PUTUTLINE)
-# define UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
-# endif
-
-
-/* write a utmp entry with the system's help (pututline() and pals) */
-# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
-static int
-utmp_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
-{
- setutent();
- pututline(ut);
-# ifdef HAVE_ENDUTENT
- endutent();
-# endif
- return (1);
-}
-# else /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */
-
-/*
- * Write a utmp entry direct to the file
- * This is a slightly modification of code in OpenBSD's login.c
- */
-static int
-utmp_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
-{
- struct utmp old_ut;
- register int fd;
- int tty;
-
- /* FIXME: (ATL) ttyslot() needs local implementation */
-
-#if defined(HAVE_GETTTYENT)
- struct ttyent *ty;
-
- tty=0;
- setttyent();
- while (NULL != (ty = getttyent())) {
- tty++;
- if (!strncmp(ty->ty_name, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)))
- break;
- }
- endttyent();
-
- if (NULL == ty) {
- logit("%s: tty not found", __func__);
- return (0);
- }
-#else /* FIXME */
-
- tty = ttyslot(); /* seems only to work for /dev/ttyp? style names */
-
-#endif /* HAVE_GETTTYENT */
-
- if (tty > 0 && (fd = open(UTMP_FILE, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0644)) >= 0) {
- off_t pos, ret;
-
- pos = (off_t)tty * sizeof(struct utmp);
- if ((ret = lseek(fd, pos, SEEK_SET)) == -1) {
- logit("%s: lseek: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- close(fd);
- return (0);
- }
- if (ret != pos) {
- logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s",
- __func__, tty, UTMP_FILE);
- close(fd);
- return (0);
- }
- /*
- * Prevent luser from zero'ing out ut_host.
- * If the new ut_line is empty but the old one is not
- * and ut_line and ut_name match, preserve the old ut_line.
- */
- if (atomicio(read, fd, &old_ut, sizeof(old_ut)) == sizeof(old_ut) &&
- (ut->ut_host[0] == '\0') && (old_ut.ut_host[0] != '\0') &&
- (strncmp(old_ut.ut_line, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)) == 0) &&
- (strncmp(old_ut.ut_name, ut->ut_name, sizeof(ut->ut_name)) == 0))
- memcpy(ut->ut_host, old_ut.ut_host, sizeof(ut->ut_host));
-
- if ((ret = lseek(fd, pos, SEEK_SET)) == -1) {
- logit("%s: lseek: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- close(fd);
- return (0);
- }
- if (ret != pos) {
- logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s",
- __func__, tty, UTMP_FILE);
- close(fd);
- return (0);
- }
- if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) {
- logit("%s: error writing %s: %s", __func__,
- UTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
- close(fd);
- return (0);
- }
-
- close(fd);
- return (1);
- } else {
- return (0);
- }
-}
-# endif /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */
-
-static int
-utmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- struct utmp ut;
-
- construct_utmp(li, &ut);
-# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
- if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) {
- logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__);
- return (0);
- }
-# else
- if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
- logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__);
- return (0);
- }
-# endif
- return (1);
-}
-
-
-static int
-utmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- struct utmp ut;
-
- construct_utmp(li, &ut);
-# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
- if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) {
- logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__);
- return (0);
- }
-# else
- if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
- logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__);
- return (0);
- }
-# endif
- return (1);
-}
-
-
-int
-utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- switch(li->type) {
- case LTYPE_LOGIN:
- return (utmp_perform_login(li));
-
- case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
- return (utmp_perform_logout(li));
-
- default:
- logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
- return (0);
- }
-}
-#endif /* USE_UTMP */
-
-
-/**
- ** Low-level utmpx functions
- **/
-
-/* not much point if we don't want utmpx entries */
-#ifdef USE_UTMPX
-
-/* if we have the wherewithall, use pututxline etc. */
-# if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXENT) && \
- defined(HAVE_PUTUTXLINE)
-# define UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
-# endif
-
-
-/* write a utmpx entry with the system's help (pututxline() and pals) */
-# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
-static int
-utmpx_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
-{
- setutxent();
- pututxline(utx);
-
-# ifdef HAVE_ENDUTXENT
- endutxent();
-# endif
- return (1);
-}
-
-# else /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */
-
-/* write a utmp entry direct to the file */
-static int
-utmpx_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
-{
- logit("%s: not implemented!", __func__);
- return (0);
-}
-# endif /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */
-
-static int
-utmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- struct utmpx utx;
-
- construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
-# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
- if (!utmpx_write_library(li, &utx)) {
- logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__);
- return (0);
- }
-# else
- if (!utmpx_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
- logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__);
- return (0);
- }
-# endif
- return (1);
-}
-
-
-static int
-utmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- struct utmpx utx;
-
- construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
-# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
- line_abbrevname(utx.ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx.ut_id));
-# endif
-# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
- utx.ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
-# endif
-
-# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
- utmpx_write_library(li, &utx);
-# else
- utmpx_write_direct(li, &utx);
-# endif
- return (1);
-}
-
-int
-utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- switch(li->type) {
- case LTYPE_LOGIN:
- return (utmpx_perform_login(li));
- case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
- return (utmpx_perform_logout(li));
- default:
- logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
- return (0);
- }
-}
-#endif /* USE_UTMPX */
-
-
-/**
- ** Low-level wtmp functions
- **/
-
-#ifdef USE_WTMP
-
-/*
- * Write a wtmp entry direct to the end of the file
- * This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c
- */
-static int
-wtmp_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
-{
- struct stat buf;
- int fd, ret = 1;
-
- if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) {
- logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__,
- WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
- return (0);
- }
- if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0)
- if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) {
- ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size);
- logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__,
- WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
- ret = 0;
- }
- close(fd);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int
-wtmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- struct utmp ut;
-
- construct_utmp(li, &ut);
- return (wtmp_write(li, &ut));
-}
-
-
-static int
-wtmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- struct utmp ut;
-
- construct_utmp(li, &ut);
- return (wtmp_write(li, &ut));
-}
-
-
-int
-wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- switch(li->type) {
- case LTYPE_LOGIN:
- return (wtmp_perform_login(li));
- case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
- return (wtmp_perform_logout(li));
- default:
- logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
- return (0);
- }
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Notes on fetching login data from wtmp/wtmpx
- *
- * Logouts are usually recorded with (amongst other things) a blank
- * username on a given tty line. However, some systems (HP-UX is one)
- * leave all fields set, but change the ut_type field to DEAD_PROCESS.
- *
- * Since we're only looking for logins here, we know that the username
- * must be set correctly. On systems that leave it in, we check for
- * ut_type==USER_PROCESS (indicating a login.)
- *
- * Portability: Some systems may set something other than USER_PROCESS
- * to indicate a login process. I don't know of any as I write. Also,
- * it's possible that some systems may both leave the username in
- * place and not have ut_type.
- */
-
-/* return true if this wtmp entry indicates a login */
-static int
-wtmp_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
-{
- if (strncmp(li->username, ut->ut_name,
- MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, ut->ut_name)) == 0) {
-# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
- if (ut->ut_type & USER_PROCESS)
- return (1);
-# else
- return (1);
-# endif
- }
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- struct stat st;
- struct utmp ut;
- int fd, found = 0;
-
- /* Clear the time entries in our logininfo */
- li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0;
-
- if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
- logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
- WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
- return (0);
- }
- if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
- logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
- WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
- close(fd);
- return (0);
- }
-
- /* Seek to the start of the last struct utmp */
- if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmp), SEEK_END) == -1) {
- /* Looks like we've got a fresh wtmp file */
- close(fd);
- return (0);
- }
-
- while (!found) {
- if (atomicio(read, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut)) {
- logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__,
- WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
- close (fd);
- return (0);
- }
- if (wtmp_islogin(li, &ut) ) {
- found = 1;
- /*
- * We've already checked for a time in struct
- * utmp, in login_getlast()
- */
-# ifdef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP
- li->tv_sec = ut.ut_time;
-# else
-# if HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP
- li->tv_sec = ut.ut_tv.tv_sec;
-# endif
-# endif
- line_fullname(li->line, ut.ut_line,
- MIN_SIZEOF(li->line, ut.ut_line));
-# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
- strlcpy(li->hostname, ut.ut_host,
- MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ut.ut_host));
-# endif
- continue;
- }
- /* Seek back 2 x struct utmp */
- if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmp)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
- /* We've found the start of the file, so quit */
- close(fd);
- return (0);
- }
- }
-
- /* We found an entry. Tidy up and return */
- close(fd);
- return (1);
-}
-# endif /* USE_WTMP */
-
-
-/**
- ** Low-level wtmpx functions
- **/
-
-#ifdef USE_WTMPX
-/*
- * Write a wtmpx entry direct to the end of the file
- * This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c
- */
-static int
-wtmpx_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
-{
-#ifndef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
- struct stat buf;
- int fd, ret = 1;
-
- if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) {
- logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
- WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
- return (0);
- }
-
- if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0)
- if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, utx, sizeof(*utx)) != sizeof(*utx)) {
- ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size);
- logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__,
- WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
- ret = 0;
- }
- close(fd);
-
- return (ret);
-#else
- updwtmpx(WTMPX_FILE, utx);
- return (1);
-#endif
-}
-
-
-static int
-wtmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- struct utmpx utx;
-
- construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
- return (wtmpx_write(li, &utx));
-}
-
-
-static int
-wtmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- struct utmpx utx;
-
- construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
- return (wtmpx_write(li, &utx));
-}
-
-
-int
-wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- switch(li->type) {
- case LTYPE_LOGIN:
- return (wtmpx_perform_login(li));
- case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
- return (wtmpx_perform_logout(li));
- default:
- logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
- return (0);
- }
-}
-
-/* Please see the notes above wtmp_islogin() for information about the
- next two functions */
-
-/* Return true if this wtmpx entry indicates a login */
-static int
-wtmpx_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
-{
- if (strncmp(li->username, utx->ut_user,
- MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, utx->ut_user)) == 0 ) {
-# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
- if (utx->ut_type == USER_PROCESS)
- return (1);
-# else
- return (1);
-# endif
- }
- return (0);
-}
-
-
-int
-wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- struct stat st;
- struct utmpx utx;
- int fd, found=0;
-
- /* Clear the time entries */
- li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0;
-
- if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
- logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
- WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
- return (0);
- }
- if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
- logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
- WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
- close(fd);
- return (0);
- }
-
- /* Seek to the start of the last struct utmpx */
- if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmpx), SEEK_END) == -1 ) {
- /* probably a newly rotated wtmpx file */
- close(fd);
- return (0);
- }
-
- while (!found) {
- if (atomicio(read, fd, &utx, sizeof(utx)) != sizeof(utx)) {
- logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__,
- WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
- close (fd);
- return (0);
- }
- /*
- * Logouts are recorded as a blank username on a particular
- * line. So, we just need to find the username in struct utmpx
- */
- if (wtmpx_islogin(li, &utx)) {
- found = 1;
-# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX)
- li->tv_sec = utx.ut_tv.tv_sec;
-# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX)
- li->tv_sec = utx.ut_time;
-# endif
- line_fullname(li->line, utx.ut_line, sizeof(li->line));
-# if defined(HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX)
- strlcpy(li->hostname, utx.ut_host,
- MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, utx.ut_host));
-# endif
- continue;
- }
- if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmpx)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
- close(fd);
- return (0);
- }
- }
-
- close(fd);
- return (1);
-}
-#endif /* USE_WTMPX */
-
-/**
- ** Low-level libutil login() functions
- **/
-
-#ifdef USE_LOGIN
-static int
-syslogin_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- struct utmp *ut;
-
- ut = xmalloc(sizeof(*ut));
- construct_utmp(li, ut);
- login(ut);
- free(ut);
-
- return (1);
-}
-
-static int
-syslogin_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
-{
-# ifdef HAVE_LOGOUT
- char line[UT_LINESIZE];
-
- (void)line_stripname(line, li->line, sizeof(line));
-
- if (!logout(line))
- logit("%s: logout() returned an error", __func__);
-# ifdef HAVE_LOGWTMP
- else
- logwtmp(line, "", "");
-# endif
- /* FIXME: (ATL - if the need arises) What to do if we have
- * login, but no logout? what if logout but no logwtmp? All
- * routines are in libutil so they should all be there,
- * but... */
-# endif
- return (1);
-}
-
-int
-syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- switch (li->type) {
- case LTYPE_LOGIN:
- return (syslogin_perform_login(li));
- case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
- return (syslogin_perform_logout(li));
- default:
- logit("%s: Invalid type field", __func__);
- return (0);
- }
-}
-#endif /* USE_LOGIN */
-
-/* end of file log-syslogin.c */
-
-/**
- ** Low-level lastlog functions
- **/
-
-#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
-
-#if !defined(LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE) || !defined(HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME)
-/* open the file (using filemode) and seek to the login entry */
-static int
-lastlog_openseek(struct logininfo *li, int *fd, int filemode)
-{
- off_t offset;
- char lastlog_file[1024];
- struct stat st;
-
- if (stat(LASTLOG_FILE, &st) != 0) {
- logit("%s: Couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
- LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
- return (0);
- }
- if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
- snprintf(lastlog_file, sizeof(lastlog_file), "%s/%s",
- LASTLOG_FILE, li->username);
- } else if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
- strlcpy(lastlog_file, LASTLOG_FILE, sizeof(lastlog_file));
- } else {
- logit("%s: %.100s is not a file or directory!", __func__,
- LASTLOG_FILE);
- return (0);
- }
-
- *fd = open(lastlog_file, filemode, 0600);
- if (*fd < 0) {
- debug("%s: Couldn't open %s: %s", __func__,
- lastlog_file, strerror(errno));
- return (0);
- }
-
- if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
- /* find this uid's offset in the lastlog file */
- offset = (off_t) ((u_long)li->uid * sizeof(struct lastlog));
-
- if (lseek(*fd, offset, SEEK_SET) != offset) {
- logit("%s: %s->lseek(): %s", __func__,
- lastlog_file, strerror(errno));
- close(*fd);
- return (0);
- }
- }
-
- return (1);
-}
-#endif /* !LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE || !HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
-
-#ifdef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE
-int
-lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- switch(li->type) {
- case LTYPE_LOGIN:
- return 1; /* lastlog written by pututxline */
- default:
- logit("lastlog_write_entry: Invalid type field");
- return 0;
- }
-}
-#else /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */
-int
-lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- struct lastlog last;
- int fd;
-
- switch(li->type) {
- case LTYPE_LOGIN:
- /* create our struct lastlog */
- memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last));
- line_stripname(last.ll_line, li->line, sizeof(last.ll_line));
- strlcpy(last.ll_host, li->hostname,
- MIN_SIZEOF(last.ll_host, li->hostname));
- last.ll_time = li->tv_sec;
-
- if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDWR|O_CREAT))
- return (0);
-
- /* write the entry */
- if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &last, sizeof(last)) != sizeof(last)) {
- close(fd);
- logit("%s: Error writing to %s: %s", __func__,
- LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
- return (0);
- }
-
- close(fd);
- return (1);
- default:
- logit("%s: Invalid type field", __func__);
- return (0);
- }
-}
-#endif /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */
-
-#ifdef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME
-int
-lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- struct lastlogx l, *ll;
-
- if ((ll = getlastlogxbyname(li->username, &l)) == NULL) {
- memset(&l, '\0', sizeof(l));
- ll = &l;
- }
- line_fullname(li->line, ll->ll_line, sizeof(li->line));
- strlcpy(li->hostname, ll->ll_host,
- MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ll->ll_host));
- li->tv_sec = ll->ll_tv.tv_sec;
- li->tv_usec = ll->ll_tv.tv_usec;
- return (1);
-}
-#else /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
-int
-lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- struct lastlog last;
- int fd, ret;
-
- if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDONLY))
- return (0);
-
- ret = atomicio(read, fd, &last, sizeof(last));
- close(fd);
-
- switch (ret) {
- case 0:
- memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last));
- /* FALLTHRU */
- case sizeof(last):
- line_fullname(li->line, last.ll_line, sizeof(li->line));
- strlcpy(li->hostname, last.ll_host,
- MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, last.ll_host));
- li->tv_sec = last.ll_time;
- return (1);
- case -1:
- error("%s: Error reading from %s: %s", __func__,
- LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
- return (0);
- default:
- error("%s: Error reading from %s: Expecting %d, got %d",
- __func__, LASTLOG_FILE, (int)sizeof(last), ret);
- return (0);
- }
-
- /* NOTREACHED */
- return (0);
-}
-#endif /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
-#endif /* USE_LASTLOG */
-
-#if defined(USE_UTMPX) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXDB) && \
- defined(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN) && defined(HAVE_GETUTXUSER)
-int
-utmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
-{
- struct utmpx *utx;
-
- if (setutxdb(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN, NULL) != 0)
- return (0);
- utx = getutxuser(li->username);
- if (utx == NULL) {
- endutxent();
- return (0);
- }
-
- line_fullname(li->line, utx->ut_line,
- MIN_SIZEOF(li->line, utx->ut_line));
- strlcpy(li->hostname, utx->ut_host,
- MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, utx->ut_host));
- li->tv_sec = utx->ut_tv.tv_sec;
- li->tv_usec = utx->ut_tv.tv_usec;
- endutxent();
- return (1);
-}
-#endif /* USE_UTMPX && HAVE_SETUTXDB && UTXDB_LASTLOGIN && HAVE_GETUTXUSER */
-
-#ifdef USE_BTMP
- /*
- * Logs failed login attempts in _PATH_BTMP if that exists.
- * The most common login failure is to give password instead of username.
- * So the _PATH_BTMP file checked for the correct permission, so that
- * only root can read it.
- */
-
-void
-record_failed_login(const char *username, const char *hostname,
- const char *ttyn)
-{
- int fd;
- struct utmp ut;
- struct sockaddr_storage from;
- socklen_t fromlen = sizeof(from);
- struct sockaddr_in *a4;
- struct sockaddr_in6 *a6;
- time_t t;
- struct stat fst;
-
- if (geteuid() != 0)
- return;
- if ((fd = open(_PATH_BTMP, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND)) < 0) {
- debug("Unable to open the btmp file %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP,
- strerror(errno));
- return;
- }
- if (fstat(fd, &fst) < 0) {
- logit("%s: fstat of %s failed: %s", __func__, _PATH_BTMP,
- strerror(errno));
- goto out;
- }
- if((fst.st_mode & (S_IXGRP | S_IRWXO)) || (fst.st_uid != 0)){
- logit("Excess permission or bad ownership on file %s",
- _PATH_BTMP);
- goto out;
- }
-
- memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
- /* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
- strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
- strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line));
-
- time(&t);
- ut.ut_time = t; /* ut_time is not always a time_t */
- ut.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS;
- ut.ut_pid = getpid();
-
- /* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
- strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
-
- if (packet_connection_is_on_socket() &&
- getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == 0) {
- ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
- if (from.ss_family == AF_INET) {
- a4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&from;
- memcpy(&ut.ut_addr, &(a4->sin_addr),
- MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr, a4->sin_addr));
- }
-#ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
- if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) {
- a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&from;
- memcpy(&ut.ut_addr_v6, &(a6->sin6_addr),
- MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr_v6, a6->sin6_addr));
- }
-#endif
- }
-
- if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut))
- error("Failed to write to %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP,
- strerror(errno));
-
-out:
- close(fd);
-}
-#endif /* USE_BTMP */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/loginrec.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/loginrec.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/loginrec.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/loginrec.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1729 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas. All rights reserved.
+ * Portions copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller
+ * Portions copyright (c) 1996 Jason Downs
+ * Portions copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The btmp logging code is derived from login.c from util-linux and is under
+ * the the following license:
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1980, 1987, 1988 The Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted
+ * provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
+ * duplicated in all such forms and that any documentation,
+ * advertising materials, and other materials related to such
+ * distribution and use acknowledge that the software was developed
+ * by the University of California, Berkeley. The name of the
+ * University may not be used to endorse or promote products derived
+ * from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+ */
+
+
+/**
+ ** loginrec.c: platform-independent login recording and lastlog retrieval
+ **/
+
+/*
+ * The new login code explained
+ * ============================
+ *
+ * This code attempts to provide a common interface to login recording
+ * (utmp and friends) and last login time retrieval.
+ *
+ * Its primary means of achieving this is to use 'struct logininfo', a
+ * union of all the useful fields in the various different types of
+ * system login record structures one finds on UNIX variants.
+ *
+ * We depend on autoconf to define which recording methods are to be
+ * used, and which fields are contained in the relevant data structures
+ * on the local system. Many C preprocessor symbols affect which code
+ * gets compiled here.
+ *
+ * The code is designed to make it easy to modify a particular
+ * recording method, without affecting other methods nor requiring so
+ * many nested conditional compilation blocks as were commonplace in
+ * the old code.
+ *
+ * For login recording, we try to use the local system's libraries as
+ * these are clearly most likely to work correctly. For utmp systems
+ * this usually means login() and logout() or setutent() etc., probably
+ * in libutil, along with logwtmp() etc. On these systems, we fall back
+ * to writing the files directly if we have to, though this method
+ * requires very thorough testing so we do not corrupt local auditing
+ * information. These files and their access methods are very system
+ * specific indeed.
+ *
+ * For utmpx systems, the corresponding library functions are
+ * setutxent() etc. To the author's knowledge, all utmpx systems have
+ * these library functions and so no direct write is attempted. If such
+ * a system exists and needs support, direct analogues of the [uw]tmp
+ * code should suffice.
+ *
+ * Retrieving the time of last login ('lastlog') is in some ways even
+ * more problemmatic than login recording. Some systems provide a
+ * simple table of all users which we seek based on uid and retrieve a
+ * relatively standard structure. Others record the same information in
+ * a directory with a separate file, and others don't record the
+ * information separately at all. For systems in the latter category,
+ * we look backwards in the wtmp or wtmpx file for the last login entry
+ * for our user. Naturally this is slower and on busy systems could
+ * incur a significant performance penalty.
+ *
+ * Calling the new code
+ * --------------------
+ *
+ * In OpenSSH all login recording and retrieval is performed in
+ * login.c. Here you'll find working examples. Also, in the logintest.c
+ * program there are more examples.
+ *
+ * Internal handler calling method
+ * -------------------------------
+ *
+ * When a call is made to login_login() or login_logout(), both
+ * routines set a struct logininfo flag defining which action (log in,
+ * or log out) is to be taken. They both then call login_write(), which
+ * calls whichever of the many structure-specific handlers autoconf
+ * selects for the local system.
+ *
+ * The handlers themselves handle system data structure specifics. Both
+ * struct utmp and struct utmpx have utility functions (see
+ * construct_utmp*()) to try to make it simpler to add extra systems
+ * that introduce new features to either structure.
+ *
+ * While it may seem terribly wasteful to replicate so much similar
+ * code for each method, experience has shown that maintaining code to
+ * write both struct utmp and utmpx in one function, whilst maintaining
+ * support for all systems whether they have library support or not, is
+ * a difficult and time-consuming task.
+ *
+ * Lastlog support proceeds similarly. Functions login_get_lastlog()
+ * (and its OpenSSH-tuned friend login_get_lastlog_time()) call
+ * getlast_entry(), which tries one of three methods to find the last
+ * login time. It uses local system lastlog support if it can,
+ * otherwise it tries wtmp or wtmpx before giving up and returning 0,
+ * meaning "tilt".
+ *
+ * Maintenance
+ * -----------
+ *
+ * In many cases it's possible to tweak autoconf to select the correct
+ * methods for a particular platform, either by improving the detection
+ * code (best), or by presetting DISABLE_<method> or CONF_<method>_FILE
+ * symbols for the platform.
+ *
+ * Use logintest to check which symbols are defined before modifying
+ * configure.ac and loginrec.c. (You have to build logintest yourself
+ * with 'make logintest' as it's not built by default.)
+ *
+ * Otherwise, patches to the specific method(s) are very helpful!
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "loginrec.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif
+
+/**
+ ** prototypes for helper functions in this file
+ **/
+
+#if HAVE_UTMP_H
+void set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut);
+void construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+void set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut);
+void construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut);
+#endif
+
+int utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+
+int getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int utmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+
+/* pick the shortest string */
+#define MIN_SIZEOF(s1,s2) (sizeof(s1) < sizeof(s2) ? sizeof(s1) : sizeof(s2))
+
+/**
+ ** platform-independent login functions
+ **/
+
+/*
+ * login_login(struct logininfo *) - Record a login
+ *
+ * Call with a pointer to a struct logininfo initialised with
+ * login_init_entry() or login_alloc_entry()
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * >0 if successful
+ * 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
+ */
+int
+login_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN;
+ return (login_write(li));
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * login_logout(struct logininfo *) - Record a logout
+ *
+ * Call as with login_login()
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * >0 if successful
+ * 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
+ */
+int
+login_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ li->type = LTYPE_LOGOUT;
+ return (login_write(li));
+}
+
+/*
+ * login_get_lastlog_time(int) - Retrieve the last login time
+ *
+ * Retrieve the last login time for the given uid. Will try to use the
+ * system lastlog facilities if they are available, but will fall back
+ * to looking in wtmp/wtmpx if necessary
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0 on failure, or if user has never logged in
+ * Time in seconds from the epoch if successful
+ *
+ * Useful preprocessor symbols:
+ * DISABLE_LASTLOG: If set, *never* even try to retrieve lastlog
+ * info
+ * USE_LASTLOG: If set, indicates the presence of system lastlog
+ * facilities. If this and DISABLE_LASTLOG are not set,
+ * try to retrieve lastlog information from wtmp/wtmpx.
+ */
+unsigned int
+login_get_lastlog_time(const uid_t uid)
+{
+ struct logininfo li;
+
+ if (login_get_lastlog(&li, uid))
+ return (li.tv_sec);
+ else
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *, int) - Retrieve a lastlog entry
+ *
+ * Retrieve a logininfo structure populated (only partially) with
+ * information from the system lastlog data, or from wtmp/wtmpx if no
+ * system lastlog information exists.
+ *
+ * Note this routine must be given a pre-allocated logininfo.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * >0: A pointer to your struct logininfo if successful
+ * 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
+ */
+struct logininfo *
+login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *li, const uid_t uid)
+{
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+ memset(li, '\0', sizeof(*li));
+ li->uid = uid;
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a 'real' lastlog, we need the username to
+ * reliably search wtmp(x) for the last login (see
+ * wtmp_get_entry().)
+ */
+ pw = getpwuid(uid);
+ if (pw == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: Cannot find account for uid %ld", __func__,
+ (long)uid);
+
+ if (strlcpy(li->username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(li->username)) >=
+ sizeof(li->username)) {
+ error("%s: username too long (%lu > max %lu)", __func__,
+ (unsigned long)strlen(pw->pw_name),
+ (unsigned long)sizeof(li->username) - 1);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (getlast_entry(li))
+ return (li);
+ else
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * login_alloc_entry(int, char*, char*, char*) - Allocate and initialise
+ * a logininfo structure
+ *
+ * This function creates a new struct logininfo, a data structure
+ * meant to carry the information required to portably record login info.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to a newly created struct logininfo. If memory
+ * allocation fails, the program halts.
+ */
+struct
+logininfo *login_alloc_entry(pid_t pid, const char *username,
+ const char *hostname, const char *line)
+{
+ struct logininfo *newli;
+
+ newli = xmalloc(sizeof(*newli));
+ login_init_entry(newli, pid, username, hostname, line);
+ return (newli);
+}
+
+
+/* login_free_entry(struct logininfo *) - free struct memory */
+void
+login_free_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ free(li);
+}
+
+
+/* login_init_entry(struct logininfo *, int, char*, char*, char*)
+ * - initialise a struct logininfo
+ *
+ * Populates a new struct logininfo, a data structure meant to carry
+ * the information required to portably record login info.
+ *
+ * Returns: 1
+ */
+int
+login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, pid_t pid, const char *username,
+ const char *hostname, const char *line)
+{
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+ memset(li, 0, sizeof(*li));
+
+ li->pid = pid;
+
+ /* set the line information */
+ if (line)
+ line_fullname(li->line, line, sizeof(li->line));
+
+ if (username) {
+ strlcpy(li->username, username, sizeof(li->username));
+ pw = getpwnam(li->username);
+ if (pw == NULL) {
+ fatal("%s: Cannot find user \"%s\"", __func__,
+ li->username);
+ }
+ li->uid = pw->pw_uid;
+ }
+
+ if (hostname)
+ strlcpy(li->hostname, hostname, sizeof(li->hostname));
+
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *) - set the current time
+ *
+ * Set the current time in a logininfo structure. This function is
+ * meant to eliminate the need to deal with system dependencies for
+ * time handling.
+ */
+void
+login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct timeval tv;
+
+ gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
+
+ li->tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
+ li->tv_usec = tv.tv_usec;
+}
+
+/* copy a sockaddr_* into our logininfo */
+void
+login_set_addr(struct logininfo *li, const struct sockaddr *sa,
+ const unsigned int sa_size)
+{
+ unsigned int bufsize = sa_size;
+
+ /* make sure we don't overrun our union */
+ if (sizeof(li->hostaddr) < sa_size)
+ bufsize = sizeof(li->hostaddr);
+
+ memcpy(&li->hostaddr.sa, sa, bufsize);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ ** login_write: Call low-level recording functions based on autoconf
+ ** results
+ **/
+int
+login_write(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (geteuid() != 0) {
+ logit("Attempt to write login records by non-root user (aborting)");
+ return (1);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* set the timestamp */
+ login_set_current_time(li);
+#ifdef USE_LOGIN
+ syslogin_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
+ if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN)
+ lastlog_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_UTMP
+ utmp_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_WTMP
+ wtmp_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_UTMPX
+ utmpx_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_WTMPX
+ wtmpx_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN
+ if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN &&
+ !sys_auth_record_login(li->username,li->hostname,li->line,
+ &loginmsg))
+ logit("Writing login record failed for %s", li->username);
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN)
+ audit_session_open(li);
+ else if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
+ audit_session_close(li);
+#endif
+ return (0);
+}
+
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+int
+login_utmp_only(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN;
+ login_set_current_time(li);
+# ifdef USE_UTMP
+ utmp_write_entry(li);
+# endif
+# ifdef USE_WTMP
+ wtmp_write_entry(li);
+# endif
+# ifdef USE_UTMPX
+ utmpx_write_entry(li);
+# endif
+# ifdef USE_WTMPX
+ wtmpx_write_entry(li);
+# endif
+ return (0);
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ ** getlast_entry: Call low-level functions to retrieve the last login
+ ** time.
+ **/
+
+/* take the uid in li and return the last login time */
+int
+getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
+ return(lastlog_get_entry(li));
+#else /* !USE_LASTLOG */
+#if defined(USE_UTMPX) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXDB) && \
+ defined(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN) && defined(HAVE_GETUTXUSER)
+ return (utmpx_get_entry(li));
+#endif
+
+#if defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
+ /* On some systems we shouldn't even try to obtain last login
+ * time, e.g. AIX */
+ return (0);
+# elif defined(USE_WTMP) && \
+ (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP))
+ /* retrieve last login time from utmp */
+ return (wtmp_get_entry(li));
+# elif defined(USE_WTMPX) && \
+ (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX))
+ /* If wtmp isn't available, try wtmpx */
+ return (wtmpx_get_entry(li));
+# else
+ /* Give up: No means of retrieving last login time */
+ return (0);
+# endif /* DISABLE_LASTLOG */
+#endif /* USE_LASTLOG */
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * 'line' string utility functions
+ *
+ * These functions process the 'line' string into one of three forms:
+ *
+ * 1. The full filename (including '/dev')
+ * 2. The stripped name (excluding '/dev')
+ * 3. The abbreviated name (e.g. /dev/ttyp00 -> yp00
+ * /dev/pts/1 -> ts/1 )
+ *
+ * Form 3 is used on some systems to identify a .tmp.? entry when
+ * attempting to remove it. Typically both addition and removal is
+ * performed by one application - say, sshd - so as long as the choice
+ * uniquely identifies a terminal it's ok.
+ */
+
+
+/*
+ * line_fullname(): add the leading '/dev/' if it doesn't exist make
+ * sure dst has enough space, if not just copy src (ugh)
+ */
+char *
+line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, u_int dstsize)
+{
+ memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
+ if ((strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) || (dstsize < (strlen(src) + 5)))
+ strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize);
+ else {
+ strlcpy(dst, "/dev/", dstsize);
+ strlcat(dst, src, dstsize);
+ }
+ return (dst);
+}
+
+/* line_stripname(): strip the leading '/dev' if it exists, return dst */
+char *
+line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize)
+{
+ memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
+ if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
+ strlcpy(dst, src + 5, dstsize);
+ else
+ strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize);
+ return (dst);
+}
+
+/*
+ * line_abbrevname(): Return the abbreviated (usually four-character)
+ * form of the line (Just use the last <dstsize> characters of the
+ * full name.)
+ *
+ * NOTE: use strncpy because we do NOT necessarily want zero
+ * termination
+ */
+char *
+line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize)
+{
+ size_t len;
+
+ memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
+
+ /* Always skip prefix if present */
+ if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
+ src += 5;
+
+#ifdef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY
+ if (strncmp(src, "tty", 3) == 0)
+ src += 3;
+#endif
+
+ len = strlen(src);
+
+ if (len > 0) {
+ if (((int)len - dstsize) > 0)
+ src += ((int)len - dstsize);
+
+ /* note: _don't_ change this to strlcpy */
+ strncpy(dst, src, (size_t)dstsize);
+ }
+
+ return (dst);
+}
+
+/**
+ ** utmp utility functions
+ **
+ ** These functions manipulate struct utmp, taking system differences
+ ** into account.
+ **/
+
+#if defined(USE_UTMP) || defined (USE_WTMP) || defined (USE_LOGIN)
+
+/* build the utmp structure */
+void
+set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP)
+ ut->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec;
+ ut->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec;
+# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP)
+ ut->ut_time = li->tv_sec;
+# endif
+}
+
+void
+construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
+ struct utmp *ut)
+{
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
+# endif
+
+ memset(ut, '\0', sizeof(*ut));
+
+ /* First fill out fields used for both logins and logouts */
+
+# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP
+ line_abbrevname(ut->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_id));
+# endif
+
+# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
+ /* This is done here to keep utmp constants out of struct logininfo */
+ switch (li->type) {
+ case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+ ut->ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+ cray_set_tmpdir(ut);
+#endif
+ break;
+ case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+ ut->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+ cray_retain_utmp(ut, li->pid);
+#endif
+ break;
+ }
+# endif
+ set_utmp_time(li, ut);
+
+ line_stripname(ut->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_line));
+
+# ifdef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP
+ ut->ut_pid = li->pid;
+# endif
+
+ /* If we're logging out, leave all other fields blank */
+ if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank
+ * for logouts.
+ */
+
+ /* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
+ strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
+ MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
+# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
+ strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
+ MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP
+ /* this is just a 32-bit IP address */
+ if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
+ ut->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr;
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+ /* this is just a 128-bit IPv6 address */
+ if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
+ sa6 = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&li->hostaddr.sa);
+ memcpy(ut->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16);
+ if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sa6->sin6_addr)) {
+ ut->ut_addr_v6[0] = ut->ut_addr_v6[3];
+ ut->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0;
+ ut->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0;
+ ut->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMP || USE_WTMP || USE_LOGIN */
+
+/**
+ ** utmpx utility functions
+ **
+ ** These functions manipulate struct utmpx, accounting for system
+ ** variations.
+ **/
+
+#if defined(USE_UTMPX) || defined (USE_WTMPX)
+/* build the utmpx structure */
+void
+set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX)
+ utx->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec;
+ utx->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec;
+# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX)
+ utx->ut_time = li->tv_sec;
+# endif
+}
+
+void
+construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
+# endif
+ memset(utx, '\0', sizeof(*utx));
+
+# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
+ line_abbrevname(utx->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_id));
+# endif
+
+ /* this is done here to keep utmp constants out of loginrec.h */
+ switch (li->type) {
+ case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+ utx->ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
+ break;
+ case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+ utx->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
+ break;
+ }
+ line_stripname(utx->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_line));
+ set_utmpx_time(li, utx);
+ utx->ut_pid = li->pid;
+
+ /* strncpy(): Don't necessarily want null termination */
+ strncpy(utx->ut_user, li->username,
+ MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_user, li->username));
+
+ if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank
+ * for logouts.
+ */
+
+# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX
+ strncpy(utx->ut_host, li->hostname,
+ MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_host, li->hostname));
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX
+ /* this is just a 32-bit IP address */
+ if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
+ utx->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr;
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+ /* this is just a 128-bit IPv6 address */
+ if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
+ sa6 = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&li->hostaddr.sa);
+ memcpy(utx->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16);
+ if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sa6->sin6_addr)) {
+ utx->ut_addr_v6[0] = utx->ut_addr_v6[3];
+ utx->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0;
+ utx->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0;
+ utx->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX
+ /* ut_syslen is the length of the utx_host string */
+ utx->ut_syslen = MIN(strlen(li->hostname), sizeof(utx->ut_host));
+# endif
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMPX || USE_WTMPX */
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level utmp functions
+ **/
+
+/* FIXME: (ATL) utmp_write_direct needs testing */
+#ifdef USE_UTMP
+
+/* if we can, use pututline() etc. */
+# if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTENT) && \
+ defined(HAVE_PUTUTLINE)
+# define UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
+# endif
+
+
+/* write a utmp entry with the system's help (pututline() and pals) */
+# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
+static int
+utmp_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+ setutent();
+ pututline(ut);
+# ifdef HAVE_ENDUTENT
+ endutent();
+# endif
+ return (1);
+}
+# else /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */
+
+/*
+ * Write a utmp entry direct to the file
+ * This is a slightly modification of code in OpenBSD's login.c
+ */
+static int
+utmp_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+ struct utmp old_ut;
+ register int fd;
+ int tty;
+
+ /* FIXME: (ATL) ttyslot() needs local implementation */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GETTTYENT)
+ struct ttyent *ty;
+
+ tty=0;
+ setttyent();
+ while (NULL != (ty = getttyent())) {
+ tty++;
+ if (!strncmp(ty->ty_name, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)))
+ break;
+ }
+ endttyent();
+
+ if (NULL == ty) {
+ logit("%s: tty not found", __func__);
+ return (0);
+ }
+#else /* FIXME */
+
+ tty = ttyslot(); /* seems only to work for /dev/ttyp? style names */
+
+#endif /* HAVE_GETTTYENT */
+
+ if (tty > 0 && (fd = open(UTMP_FILE, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0644)) >= 0) {
+ off_t pos, ret;
+
+ pos = (off_t)tty * sizeof(struct utmp);
+ if ((ret = lseek(fd, pos, SEEK_SET)) == -1) {
+ logit("%s: lseek: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ close(fd);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (ret != pos) {
+ logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s",
+ __func__, tty, UTMP_FILE);
+ close(fd);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Prevent luser from zero'ing out ut_host.
+ * If the new ut_line is empty but the old one is not
+ * and ut_line and ut_name match, preserve the old ut_line.
+ */
+ if (atomicio(read, fd, &old_ut, sizeof(old_ut)) == sizeof(old_ut) &&
+ (ut->ut_host[0] == '\0') && (old_ut.ut_host[0] != '\0') &&
+ (strncmp(old_ut.ut_line, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)) == 0) &&
+ (strncmp(old_ut.ut_name, ut->ut_name, sizeof(ut->ut_name)) == 0))
+ memcpy(ut->ut_host, old_ut.ut_host, sizeof(ut->ut_host));
+
+ if ((ret = lseek(fd, pos, SEEK_SET)) == -1) {
+ logit("%s: lseek: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ close(fd);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (ret != pos) {
+ logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s",
+ __func__, tty, UTMP_FILE);
+ close(fd);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) {
+ logit("%s: error writing %s: %s", __func__,
+ UTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ close(fd);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ close(fd);
+ return (1);
+ } else {
+ return (0);
+ }
+}
+# endif /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */
+
+static int
+utmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct utmp ut;
+
+ construct_utmp(li, &ut);
+# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
+ if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) {
+ logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__);
+ return (0);
+ }
+# else
+ if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
+ logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__);
+ return (0);
+ }
+# endif
+ return (1);
+}
+
+
+static int
+utmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct utmp ut;
+
+ construct_utmp(li, &ut);
+# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
+ if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) {
+ logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__);
+ return (0);
+ }
+# else
+ if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
+ logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__);
+ return (0);
+ }
+# endif
+ return (1);
+}
+
+
+int
+utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ switch(li->type) {
+ case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+ return (utmp_perform_login(li));
+
+ case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+ return (utmp_perform_logout(li));
+
+ default:
+ logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
+ return (0);
+ }
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMP */
+
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level utmpx functions
+ **/
+
+/* not much point if we don't want utmpx entries */
+#ifdef USE_UTMPX
+
+/* if we have the wherewithall, use pututxline etc. */
+# if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXENT) && \
+ defined(HAVE_PUTUTXLINE)
+# define UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
+# endif
+
+
+/* write a utmpx entry with the system's help (pututxline() and pals) */
+# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
+static int
+utmpx_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+ setutxent();
+ pututxline(utx);
+
+# ifdef HAVE_ENDUTXENT
+ endutxent();
+# endif
+ return (1);
+}
+
+# else /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */
+
+/* write a utmp entry direct to the file */
+static int
+utmpx_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+ logit("%s: not implemented!", __func__);
+ return (0);
+}
+# endif /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */
+
+static int
+utmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct utmpx utx;
+
+ construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
+# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
+ if (!utmpx_write_library(li, &utx)) {
+ logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__);
+ return (0);
+ }
+# else
+ if (!utmpx_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
+ logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__);
+ return (0);
+ }
+# endif
+ return (1);
+}
+
+
+static int
+utmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct utmpx utx;
+
+ construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
+# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
+ line_abbrevname(utx.ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx.ut_id));
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
+ utx.ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
+# endif
+
+# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
+ utmpx_write_library(li, &utx);
+# else
+ utmpx_write_direct(li, &utx);
+# endif
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int
+utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ switch(li->type) {
+ case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+ return (utmpx_perform_login(li));
+ case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+ return (utmpx_perform_logout(li));
+ default:
+ logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
+ return (0);
+ }
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMPX */
+
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level wtmp functions
+ **/
+
+#ifdef USE_WTMP
+
+/*
+ * Write a wtmp entry direct to the end of the file
+ * This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c
+ */
+static int
+wtmp_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+ struct stat buf;
+ int fd, ret = 1;
+
+ if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) {
+ logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__,
+ WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0)
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) {
+ ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size);
+ logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__,
+ WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ close(fd);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int
+wtmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct utmp ut;
+
+ construct_utmp(li, &ut);
+ return (wtmp_write(li, &ut));
+}
+
+
+static int
+wtmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct utmp ut;
+
+ construct_utmp(li, &ut);
+ return (wtmp_write(li, &ut));
+}
+
+
+int
+wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ switch(li->type) {
+ case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+ return (wtmp_perform_login(li));
+ case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+ return (wtmp_perform_logout(li));
+ default:
+ logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
+ return (0);
+ }
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Notes on fetching login data from wtmp/wtmpx
+ *
+ * Logouts are usually recorded with (amongst other things) a blank
+ * username on a given tty line. However, some systems (HP-UX is one)
+ * leave all fields set, but change the ut_type field to DEAD_PROCESS.
+ *
+ * Since we're only looking for logins here, we know that the username
+ * must be set correctly. On systems that leave it in, we check for
+ * ut_type==USER_PROCESS (indicating a login.)
+ *
+ * Portability: Some systems may set something other than USER_PROCESS
+ * to indicate a login process. I don't know of any as I write. Also,
+ * it's possible that some systems may both leave the username in
+ * place and not have ut_type.
+ */
+
+/* return true if this wtmp entry indicates a login */
+static int
+wtmp_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+ if (strncmp(li->username, ut->ut_name,
+ MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, ut->ut_name)) == 0) {
+# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
+ if (ut->ut_type & USER_PROCESS)
+ return (1);
+# else
+ return (1);
+# endif
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+ struct utmp ut;
+ int fd, found = 0;
+
+ /* Clear the time entries in our logininfo */
+ li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0;
+
+ if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+ logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
+ WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
+ logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
+ WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ close(fd);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ /* Seek to the start of the last struct utmp */
+ if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmp), SEEK_END) == -1) {
+ /* Looks like we've got a fresh wtmp file */
+ close(fd);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ while (!found) {
+ if (atomicio(read, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut)) {
+ logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__,
+ WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ close (fd);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (wtmp_islogin(li, &ut) ) {
+ found = 1;
+ /*
+ * We've already checked for a time in struct
+ * utmp, in login_getlast()
+ */
+# ifdef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP
+ li->tv_sec = ut.ut_time;
+# else
+# if HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP
+ li->tv_sec = ut.ut_tv.tv_sec;
+# endif
+# endif
+ line_fullname(li->line, ut.ut_line,
+ MIN_SIZEOF(li->line, ut.ut_line));
+# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
+ strlcpy(li->hostname, ut.ut_host,
+ MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ut.ut_host));
+# endif
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Seek back 2 x struct utmp */
+ if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmp)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
+ /* We've found the start of the file, so quit */
+ close(fd);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* We found an entry. Tidy up and return */
+ close(fd);
+ return (1);
+}
+# endif /* USE_WTMP */
+
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level wtmpx functions
+ **/
+
+#ifdef USE_WTMPX
+/*
+ * Write a wtmpx entry direct to the end of the file
+ * This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c
+ */
+static int
+wtmpx_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+#ifndef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
+ struct stat buf;
+ int fd, ret = 1;
+
+ if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) {
+ logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
+ WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0)
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, utx, sizeof(*utx)) != sizeof(*utx)) {
+ ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size);
+ logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__,
+ WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ close(fd);
+
+ return (ret);
+#else
+ updwtmpx(WTMPX_FILE, utx);
+ return (1);
+#endif
+}
+
+
+static int
+wtmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct utmpx utx;
+
+ construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
+ return (wtmpx_write(li, &utx));
+}
+
+
+static int
+wtmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct utmpx utx;
+
+ construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
+ return (wtmpx_write(li, &utx));
+}
+
+
+int
+wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ switch(li->type) {
+ case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+ return (wtmpx_perform_login(li));
+ case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+ return (wtmpx_perform_logout(li));
+ default:
+ logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
+ return (0);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Please see the notes above wtmp_islogin() for information about the
+ next two functions */
+
+/* Return true if this wtmpx entry indicates a login */
+static int
+wtmpx_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+ if (strncmp(li->username, utx->ut_user,
+ MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, utx->ut_user)) == 0 ) {
+# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
+ if (utx->ut_type == USER_PROCESS)
+ return (1);
+# else
+ return (1);
+# endif
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+
+int
+wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+ struct utmpx utx;
+ int fd, found=0;
+
+ /* Clear the time entries */
+ li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0;
+
+ if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+ logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
+ WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
+ logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
+ WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ close(fd);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ /* Seek to the start of the last struct utmpx */
+ if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmpx), SEEK_END) == -1 ) {
+ /* probably a newly rotated wtmpx file */
+ close(fd);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ while (!found) {
+ if (atomicio(read, fd, &utx, sizeof(utx)) != sizeof(utx)) {
+ logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__,
+ WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ close (fd);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Logouts are recorded as a blank username on a particular
+ * line. So, we just need to find the username in struct utmpx
+ */
+ if (wtmpx_islogin(li, &utx)) {
+ found = 1;
+# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX)
+ li->tv_sec = utx.ut_tv.tv_sec;
+# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX)
+ li->tv_sec = utx.ut_time;
+# endif
+ line_fullname(li->line, utx.ut_line, sizeof(li->line));
+# if defined(HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX)
+ strlcpy(li->hostname, utx.ut_host,
+ MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, utx.ut_host));
+# endif
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmpx)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
+ close(fd);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ close(fd);
+ return (1);
+}
+#endif /* USE_WTMPX */
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level libutil login() functions
+ **/
+
+#ifdef USE_LOGIN
+static int
+syslogin_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct utmp *ut;
+
+ ut = xmalloc(sizeof(*ut));
+ construct_utmp(li, ut);
+ login(ut);
+ free(ut);
+
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+syslogin_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+# ifdef HAVE_LOGOUT
+ char line[UT_LINESIZE];
+
+ (void)line_stripname(line, li->line, sizeof(line));
+
+ if (!logout(line))
+ logit("%s: logout() returned an error", __func__);
+# ifdef HAVE_LOGWTMP
+ else
+ logwtmp(line, "", "");
+# endif
+ /* FIXME: (ATL - if the need arises) What to do if we have
+ * login, but no logout? what if logout but no logwtmp? All
+ * routines are in libutil so they should all be there,
+ * but... */
+# endif
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int
+syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ switch (li->type) {
+ case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+ return (syslogin_perform_login(li));
+ case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+ return (syslogin_perform_logout(li));
+ default:
+ logit("%s: Invalid type field", __func__);
+ return (0);
+ }
+}
+#endif /* USE_LOGIN */
+
+/* end of file log-syslogin.c */
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level lastlog functions
+ **/
+
+#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
+
+#if !defined(LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE) || !defined(HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME)
+/* open the file (using filemode) and seek to the login entry */
+static int
+lastlog_openseek(struct logininfo *li, int *fd, int filemode)
+{
+ off_t offset;
+ char lastlog_file[1024];
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (stat(LASTLOG_FILE, &st) != 0) {
+ logit("%s: Couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
+ LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
+ snprintf(lastlog_file, sizeof(lastlog_file), "%s/%s",
+ LASTLOG_FILE, li->username);
+ } else if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+ strlcpy(lastlog_file, LASTLOG_FILE, sizeof(lastlog_file));
+ } else {
+ logit("%s: %.100s is not a file or directory!", __func__,
+ LASTLOG_FILE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ *fd = open(lastlog_file, filemode, 0600);
+ if (*fd < 0) {
+ debug("%s: Couldn't open %s: %s", __func__,
+ lastlog_file, strerror(errno));
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+ /* find this uid's offset in the lastlog file */
+ offset = (off_t) ((u_long)li->uid * sizeof(struct lastlog));
+
+ if (lseek(*fd, offset, SEEK_SET) != offset) {
+ logit("%s: %s->lseek(): %s", __func__,
+ lastlog_file, strerror(errno));
+ close(*fd);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+}
+#endif /* !LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE || !HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
+
+#ifdef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE
+int
+lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ switch(li->type) {
+ case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+ return 1; /* lastlog written by pututxline */
+ default:
+ logit("lastlog_write_entry: Invalid type field");
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+#else /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */
+int
+lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct lastlog last;
+ int fd;
+
+ switch(li->type) {
+ case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+ /* create our struct lastlog */
+ memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last));
+ line_stripname(last.ll_line, li->line, sizeof(last.ll_line));
+ strlcpy(last.ll_host, li->hostname,
+ MIN_SIZEOF(last.ll_host, li->hostname));
+ last.ll_time = li->tv_sec;
+
+ if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDWR|O_CREAT))
+ return (0);
+
+ /* write the entry */
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &last, sizeof(last)) != sizeof(last)) {
+ close(fd);
+ logit("%s: Error writing to %s: %s", __func__,
+ LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ close(fd);
+ return (1);
+ default:
+ logit("%s: Invalid type field", __func__);
+ return (0);
+ }
+}
+#endif /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME
+int
+lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct lastlogx l, *ll;
+
+ if ((ll = getlastlogxbyname(li->username, &l)) == NULL) {
+ memset(&l, '\0', sizeof(l));
+ ll = &l;
+ }
+ line_fullname(li->line, ll->ll_line, sizeof(li->line));
+ strlcpy(li->hostname, ll->ll_host,
+ MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ll->ll_host));
+ li->tv_sec = ll->ll_tv.tv_sec;
+ li->tv_usec = ll->ll_tv.tv_usec;
+ return (1);
+}
+#else /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
+int
+lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct lastlog last;
+ int fd, ret;
+
+ if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDONLY))
+ return (0);
+
+ ret = atomicio(read, fd, &last, sizeof(last));
+ close(fd);
+
+ switch (ret) {
+ case 0:
+ memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last));
+ /* FALLTHRU */
+ case sizeof(last):
+ line_fullname(li->line, last.ll_line, sizeof(li->line));
+ strlcpy(li->hostname, last.ll_host,
+ MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, last.ll_host));
+ li->tv_sec = last.ll_time;
+ return (1);
+ case -1:
+ error("%s: Error reading from %s: %s", __func__,
+ LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ return (0);
+ default:
+ error("%s: Error reading from %s: Expecting %d, got %d",
+ __func__, LASTLOG_FILE, (int)sizeof(last), ret);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ return (0);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
+#endif /* USE_LASTLOG */
+
+#if defined(USE_UTMPX) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXDB) && \
+ defined(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN) && defined(HAVE_GETUTXUSER)
+int
+utmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct utmpx *utx;
+
+ if (setutxdb(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN, NULL) != 0)
+ return (0);
+ utx = getutxuser(li->username);
+ if (utx == NULL) {
+ endutxent();
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ line_fullname(li->line, utx->ut_line,
+ MIN_SIZEOF(li->line, utx->ut_line));
+ strlcpy(li->hostname, utx->ut_host,
+ MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, utx->ut_host));
+ li->tv_sec = utx->ut_tv.tv_sec;
+ li->tv_usec = utx->ut_tv.tv_usec;
+ endutxent();
+ return (1);
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMPX && HAVE_SETUTXDB && UTXDB_LASTLOGIN && HAVE_GETUTXUSER */
+
+#ifdef USE_BTMP
+ /*
+ * Logs failed login attempts in _PATH_BTMP if that exists.
+ * The most common login failure is to give password instead of username.
+ * So the _PATH_BTMP file checked for the correct permission, so that
+ * only root can read it.
+ */
+
+void
+record_failed_login(const char *username, const char *hostname,
+ const char *ttyn)
+{
+ int fd;
+ struct utmp ut;
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ socklen_t fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ struct sockaddr_in *a4;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *a6;
+ time_t t;
+ struct stat fst;
+
+ if (geteuid() != 0)
+ return;
+ if ((fd = open(_PATH_BTMP, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND)) < 0) {
+ debug("Unable to open the btmp file %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return;
+ }
+ if (fstat(fd, &fst) < 0) {
+ logit("%s: fstat of %s failed: %s", __func__, _PATH_BTMP,
+ strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if((fst.st_mode & (S_IXGRP | S_IRWXO)) || (fst.st_uid != 0)){
+ logit("Excess permission or bad ownership on file %s",
+ _PATH_BTMP);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
+ /* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
+ strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
+ strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line));
+
+ time(&t);
+ ut.ut_time = t; /* ut_time is not always a time_t */
+ ut.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS;
+ ut.ut_pid = getpid();
+
+ /* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
+ strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
+
+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket() &&
+ getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == 0) {
+ ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET) {
+ a4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&from;
+ memcpy(&ut.ut_addr, &(a4->sin_addr),
+ MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr, a4->sin_addr));
+ }
+#ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) {
+ a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&from;
+ memcpy(&ut.ut_addr_v6, &(a6->sin6_addr),
+ MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr_v6, a6->sin6_addr));
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut))
+ error("Failed to write to %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP,
+ strerror(errno));
+
+out:
+ close(fd);
+}
+#endif /* USE_BTMP */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/mac.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/mac.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/mac.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,246 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.28 2014/02/07 06:55:54 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "mac.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-
-#include "digest.h"
-#include "hmac.h"
-#include "umac.h"
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-
-#define SSH_DIGEST 1 /* SSH_DIGEST_XXX */
-#define SSH_UMAC 2 /* UMAC (not integrated with OpenSSL) */
-#define SSH_UMAC128 3
-
-struct macalg {
- char *name;
- int type;
- int alg;
- int truncatebits; /* truncate digest if != 0 */
- int key_len; /* just for UMAC */
- int len; /* just for UMAC */
- int etm; /* Encrypt-then-MAC */
-};
-
-static const struct macalg macs[] = {
- /* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */
- { "hmac-sha1", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
- { "hmac-sha1-96", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
-#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
- { "hmac-sha2-256", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
- { "hmac-sha2-512", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
-#endif
- { "hmac-md5", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
- { "hmac-md5-96", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
- { "hmac-ripemd160", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
- { "hmac-ripemd160 at openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
- { "umac-64 at openssh.com", SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 0 },
- { "umac-128 at openssh.com", SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 0 },
-
- /* Encrypt-then-MAC variants */
- { "hmac-sha1-etm at openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
- { "hmac-sha1-96-etm at openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 1 },
-#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
- { "hmac-sha2-256-etm at openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
- { "hmac-sha2-512-etm at openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
-#endif
- { "hmac-md5-etm at openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
- { "hmac-md5-96-etm at openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 1 },
- { "hmac-ripemd160-etm at openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
- { "umac-64-etm at openssh.com", SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 1 },
- { "umac-128-etm at openssh.com", SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 1 },
-
- { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
-};
-
-/* Returns a list of supported MACs separated by the specified char. */
-char *
-mac_alg_list(char sep)
-{
- char *ret = NULL;
- size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
- const struct macalg *m;
-
- for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
- if (ret != NULL)
- ret[rlen++] = sep;
- nlen = strlen(m->name);
- ret = xrealloc(ret, 1, rlen + nlen + 2);
- memcpy(ret + rlen, m->name, nlen + 1);
- rlen += nlen;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-static void
-mac_setup_by_alg(Mac *mac, const struct macalg *macalg)
-{
- mac->type = macalg->type;
- if (mac->type == SSH_DIGEST) {
- if ((mac->hmac_ctx = ssh_hmac_start(macalg->alg)) == NULL)
- fatal("ssh_hmac_start(alg=%d) failed", macalg->alg);
- mac->key_len = mac->mac_len = ssh_hmac_bytes(macalg->alg);
- } else {
- mac->mac_len = macalg->len / 8;
- mac->key_len = macalg->key_len / 8;
- mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
- }
- if (macalg->truncatebits != 0)
- mac->mac_len = macalg->truncatebits / 8;
- mac->etm = macalg->etm;
-}
-
-int
-mac_setup(Mac *mac, char *name)
-{
- const struct macalg *m;
-
- for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
- if (strcmp(name, m->name) != 0)
- continue;
- if (mac != NULL) {
- mac_setup_by_alg(mac, m);
- debug2("mac_setup: setup %s", name);
- }
- return (0);
- }
- debug2("mac_setup: unknown %s", name);
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int
-mac_init(Mac *mac)
-{
- if (mac->key == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no key", __func__);
- switch (mac->type) {
- case SSH_DIGEST:
- if (mac->hmac_ctx == NULL ||
- ssh_hmac_init(mac->hmac_ctx, mac->key, mac->key_len) < 0)
- return -1;
- return 0;
- case SSH_UMAC:
- mac->umac_ctx = umac_new(mac->key);
- return 0;
- case SSH_UMAC128:
- mac->umac_ctx = umac128_new(mac->key);
- return 0;
- default:
- return -1;
- }
-}
-
-u_char *
-mac_compute(Mac *mac, u_int32_t seqno, u_char *data, int datalen)
-{
- static union {
- u_char m[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- u_int64_t for_align;
- } u;
- u_char b[4], nonce[8];
-
- if (mac->mac_len > sizeof(u))
- fatal("mac_compute: mac too long %u %zu",
- mac->mac_len, sizeof(u));
-
- switch (mac->type) {
- case SSH_DIGEST:
- put_u32(b, seqno);
- /* reset HMAC context */
- if (ssh_hmac_init(mac->hmac_ctx, NULL, 0) < 0 ||
- ssh_hmac_update(mac->hmac_ctx, b, sizeof(b)) < 0 ||
- ssh_hmac_update(mac->hmac_ctx, data, datalen) < 0 ||
- ssh_hmac_final(mac->hmac_ctx, u.m, sizeof(u.m)) < 0)
- fatal("ssh_hmac failed");
- break;
- case SSH_UMAC:
- put_u64(nonce, seqno);
- umac_update(mac->umac_ctx, data, datalen);
- umac_final(mac->umac_ctx, u.m, nonce);
- break;
- case SSH_UMAC128:
- put_u64(nonce, seqno);
- umac128_update(mac->umac_ctx, data, datalen);
- umac128_final(mac->umac_ctx, u.m, nonce);
- break;
- default:
- fatal("mac_compute: unknown MAC type");
- }
- return (u.m);
-}
-
-void
-mac_clear(Mac *mac)
-{
- if (mac->type == SSH_UMAC) {
- if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL)
- umac_delete(mac->umac_ctx);
- } else if (mac->type == SSH_UMAC128) {
- if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL)
- umac128_delete(mac->umac_ctx);
- } else if (mac->hmac_ctx != NULL)
- ssh_hmac_free(mac->hmac_ctx);
- mac->hmac_ctx = NULL;
- mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
-}
-
-/* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
-#define MAC_SEP ","
-int
-mac_valid(const char *names)
-{
- char *maclist, *cp, *p;
-
- if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
- return (0);
- maclist = cp = xstrdup(names);
- for ((p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
- (p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP))) {
- if (mac_setup(NULL, p) < 0) {
- debug("bad mac %s [%s]", p, names);
- free(maclist);
- return (0);
- }
- }
- debug3("macs ok: [%s]", names);
- free(maclist);
- return (1);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/mac.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/mac.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/mac.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/mac.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.33 2016/07/08 03:44:42 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "hmac.h"
+#include "umac.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#define SSH_DIGEST 1 /* SSH_DIGEST_XXX */
+#define SSH_UMAC 2 /* UMAC (not integrated with OpenSSL) */
+#define SSH_UMAC128 3
+
+struct macalg {
+ char *name;
+ int type;
+ int alg;
+ int truncatebits; /* truncate digest if != 0 */
+ int key_len; /* just for UMAC */
+ int len; /* just for UMAC */
+ int etm; /* Encrypt-then-MAC */
+};
+
+static const struct macalg macs[] = {
+ /* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */
+ { "hmac-sha1", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+ { "hmac-sha1-96", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
+ { "hmac-sha2-256", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+ { "hmac-sha2-512", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+#endif
+ { "hmac-md5", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+ { "hmac-md5-96", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
+ { "hmac-ripemd160", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+ { "hmac-ripemd160 at openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+ { "umac-64 at openssh.com", SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 0 },
+ { "umac-128 at openssh.com", SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 0 },
+
+ /* Encrypt-then-MAC variants */
+ { "hmac-sha1-etm at openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+ { "hmac-sha1-96-etm at openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 1 },
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
+ { "hmac-sha2-256-etm at openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+ { "hmac-sha2-512-etm at openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+#endif
+ { "hmac-md5-etm at openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+ { "hmac-md5-96-etm at openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 1 },
+ { "hmac-ripemd160-etm at openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+ { "umac-64-etm at openssh.com", SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 1 },
+ { "umac-128-etm at openssh.com", SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 1 },
+
+ { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+};
+
+/* Returns a list of supported MACs separated by the specified char. */
+char *
+mac_alg_list(char sep)
+{
+ char *ret = NULL, *tmp;
+ size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
+ const struct macalg *m;
+
+ for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ ret[rlen++] = sep;
+ nlen = strlen(m->name);
+ if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
+ free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret = tmp;
+ memcpy(ret + rlen, m->name, nlen + 1);
+ rlen += nlen;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+mac_setup_by_alg(struct sshmac *mac, const struct macalg *macalg)
+{
+ mac->type = macalg->type;
+ if (mac->type == SSH_DIGEST) {
+ if ((mac->hmac_ctx = ssh_hmac_start(macalg->alg)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ mac->key_len = mac->mac_len = ssh_hmac_bytes(macalg->alg);
+ } else {
+ mac->mac_len = macalg->len / 8;
+ mac->key_len = macalg->key_len / 8;
+ mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ if (macalg->truncatebits != 0)
+ mac->mac_len = macalg->truncatebits / 8;
+ mac->etm = macalg->etm;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mac_setup(struct sshmac *mac, char *name)
+{
+ const struct macalg *m;
+
+ for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
+ if (strcmp(name, m->name) != 0)
+ continue;
+ if (mac != NULL)
+ return mac_setup_by_alg(mac, m);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+}
+
+int
+mac_init(struct sshmac *mac)
+{
+ if (mac->key == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ switch (mac->type) {
+ case SSH_DIGEST:
+ if (mac->hmac_ctx == NULL ||
+ ssh_hmac_init(mac->hmac_ctx, mac->key, mac->key_len) < 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ return 0;
+ case SSH_UMAC:
+ if ((mac->umac_ctx = umac_new(mac->key)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ return 0;
+ case SSH_UMAC128:
+ if ((mac->umac_ctx = umac128_new(mac->key)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+}
+
+int
+mac_compute(struct sshmac *mac, u_int32_t seqno,
+ const u_char *data, int datalen,
+ u_char *digest, size_t dlen)
+{
+ static union {
+ u_char m[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ u_int64_t for_align;
+ } u;
+ u_char b[4];
+ u_char nonce[8];
+
+ if (mac->mac_len > sizeof(u))
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ switch (mac->type) {
+ case SSH_DIGEST:
+ put_u32(b, seqno);
+ /* reset HMAC context */
+ if (ssh_hmac_init(mac->hmac_ctx, NULL, 0) < 0 ||
+ ssh_hmac_update(mac->hmac_ctx, b, sizeof(b)) < 0 ||
+ ssh_hmac_update(mac->hmac_ctx, data, datalen) < 0 ||
+ ssh_hmac_final(mac->hmac_ctx, u.m, sizeof(u.m)) < 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ break;
+ case SSH_UMAC:
+ POKE_U64(nonce, seqno);
+ umac_update(mac->umac_ctx, data, datalen);
+ umac_final(mac->umac_ctx, u.m, nonce);
+ break;
+ case SSH_UMAC128:
+ put_u64(nonce, seqno);
+ umac128_update(mac->umac_ctx, data, datalen);
+ umac128_final(mac->umac_ctx, u.m, nonce);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ if (digest != NULL) {
+ if (dlen > mac->mac_len)
+ dlen = mac->mac_len;
+ memcpy(digest, u.m, dlen);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mac_check(struct sshmac *mac, u_int32_t seqno,
+ const u_char *data, size_t dlen,
+ const u_char *theirmac, size_t mlen)
+{
+ u_char ourmac[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ int r;
+
+ if (mac->mac_len > mlen)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((r = mac_compute(mac, seqno, data, dlen,
+ ourmac, sizeof(ourmac))) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (timingsafe_bcmp(ourmac, theirmac, mac->mac_len) != 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+mac_clear(struct sshmac *mac)
+{
+ if (mac->type == SSH_UMAC) {
+ if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL)
+ umac_delete(mac->umac_ctx);
+ } else if (mac->type == SSH_UMAC128) {
+ if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL)
+ umac128_delete(mac->umac_ctx);
+ } else if (mac->hmac_ctx != NULL)
+ ssh_hmac_free(mac->hmac_ctx);
+ mac->hmac_ctx = NULL;
+ mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
+}
+
+/* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
+#define MAC_SEP ","
+int
+mac_valid(const char *names)
+{
+ char *maclist, *cp, *p;
+
+ if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if ((maclist = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
+ (p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP))) {
+ if (mac_setup(NULL, p) < 0) {
+ free(maclist);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ free(maclist);
+ return 1;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/mac.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/mac.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/mac.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: mac.h,v 1.8 2013/11/07 11:58:27 dtucker Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-int mac_valid(const char *);
-char *mac_alg_list(char);
-int mac_setup(Mac *, char *);
-int mac_init(Mac *);
-u_char *mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int);
-void mac_clear(Mac *);
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/mac.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/mac.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/mac.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/mac.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: mac.h,v 1.10 2016/07/08 03:44:42 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SSHMAC_H
+#define SSHMAC_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+struct sshmac {
+ char *name;
+ int enabled;
+ u_int mac_len;
+ u_char *key;
+ u_int key_len;
+ int type;
+ int etm; /* Encrypt-then-MAC */
+ struct ssh_hmac_ctx *hmac_ctx;
+ struct umac_ctx *umac_ctx;
+};
+
+int mac_valid(const char *);
+char *mac_alg_list(char);
+int mac_setup(struct sshmac *, char *);
+int mac_init(struct sshmac *);
+int mac_compute(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, int,
+ u_char *, size_t);
+int mac_check(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, size_t,
+ const u_char *, size_t);
+void mac_clear(struct sshmac *);
+
+#endif /* SSHMAC_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/match.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/match.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/match.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,279 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.29 2013/11/20 20:54:10 deraadt Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Simple pattern matching, with '*' and '?' as wildcards.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "match.h"
-
-/*
- * Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ?
- * and * as wildcards), and zero if it does not match.
- */
-
-int
-match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern)
-{
- for (;;) {
- /* If at end of pattern, accept if also at end of string. */
- if (!*pattern)
- return !*s;
-
- if (*pattern == '*') {
- /* Skip the asterisk. */
- pattern++;
-
- /* If at end of pattern, accept immediately. */
- if (!*pattern)
- return 1;
-
- /* If next character in pattern is known, optimize. */
- if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != '*') {
- /*
- * Look instances of the next character in
- * pattern, and try to match starting from
- * those.
- */
- for (; *s; s++)
- if (*s == *pattern &&
- match_pattern(s + 1, pattern + 1))
- return 1;
- /* Failed. */
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * Move ahead one character at a time and try to
- * match at each position.
- */
- for (; *s; s++)
- if (match_pattern(s, pattern))
- return 1;
- /* Failed. */
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * There must be at least one more character in the string.
- * If we are at the end, fail.
- */
- if (!*s)
- return 0;
-
- /* Check if the next character of the string is acceptable. */
- if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != *s)
- return 0;
-
- /* Move to the next character, both in string and in pattern. */
- s++;
- pattern++;
- }
- /* NOTREACHED */
-}
-
-/*
- * Tries to match the string against the
- * comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to
- * indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
- * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
- */
-
-int
-match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, u_int len,
- int dolower)
-{
- char sub[1024];
- int negated;
- int got_positive;
- u_int i, subi;
-
- got_positive = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < len;) {
- /* Check if the subpattern is negated. */
- if (pattern[i] == '!') {
- negated = 1;
- i++;
- } else
- negated = 0;
-
- /*
- * Extract the subpattern up to a comma or end. Convert the
- * subpattern to lowercase.
- */
- for (subi = 0;
- i < len && subi < sizeof(sub) - 1 && pattern[i] != ',';
- subi++, i++)
- sub[subi] = dolower && isupper((u_char)pattern[i]) ?
- tolower((u_char)pattern[i]) : pattern[i];
- /* If subpattern too long, return failure (no match). */
- if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1)
- return 0;
-
- /* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, skip the comma. */
- if (i < len && pattern[i] == ',')
- i++;
-
- /* Null-terminate the subpattern. */
- sub[subi] = '\0';
-
- /* Try to match the subpattern against the string. */
- if (match_pattern(string, sub)) {
- if (negated)
- return -1; /* Negative */
- else
- got_positive = 1; /* Positive */
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Return success if got a positive match. If there was a negative
- * match, we have already returned -1 and never get here.
- */
- return got_positive;
-}
-
-/*
- * Tries to match the host name (which must be in all lowercase) against the
- * comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to
- * indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
- * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
- */
-int
-match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern, u_int len)
-{
- return match_pattern_list(host, pattern, len, 1);
-}
-
-/*
- * returns 0 if we get a negative match for the hostname or the ip
- * or if we get no match at all. returns -1 on error, or 1 on
- * successful match.
- */
-int
-match_host_and_ip(const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
- const char *patterns)
-{
- int mhost, mip;
-
- /* error in ipaddr match */
- if ((mip = addr_match_list(ipaddr, patterns)) == -2)
- return -1;
- else if (mip == -1) /* negative ip address match */
- return 0;
-
- /* negative hostname match */
- if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns, strlen(patterns))) == -1)
- return 0;
- /* no match at all */
- if (mhost == 0 && mip == 0)
- return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * match user, user at host_or_ip, user at host_or_ip_list against pattern
- */
-int
-match_user(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
- const char *pattern)
-{
- char *p, *pat;
- int ret;
-
- if ((p = strchr(pattern,'@')) == NULL)
- return match_pattern(user, pattern);
-
- pat = xstrdup(pattern);
- p = strchr(pat, '@');
- *p++ = '\0';
-
- if ((ret = match_pattern(user, pat)) == 1)
- ret = match_host_and_ip(host, ipaddr, p);
- free(pat);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns first item from client-list that is also supported by server-list,
- * caller must free the returned string.
- */
-#define MAX_PROP 40
-#define SEP ","
-char *
-match_list(const char *client, const char *server, u_int *next)
-{
- char *sproposals[MAX_PROP];
- char *c, *s, *p, *ret, *cp, *sp;
- int i, j, nproposals;
-
- c = cp = xstrdup(client);
- s = sp = xstrdup(server);
-
- for ((p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0';
- (p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i++) {
- if (i < MAX_PROP)
- sproposals[i] = p;
- else
- break;
- }
- nproposals = i;
-
- for ((p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0';
- (p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i++) {
- for (j = 0; j < nproposals; j++) {
- if (strcmp(p, sproposals[j]) == 0) {
- ret = xstrdup(p);
- if (next != NULL)
- *next = (cp == NULL) ?
- strlen(c) : (u_int)(cp - c);
- free(c);
- free(s);
- return ret;
- }
- }
- }
- if (next != NULL)
- *next = strlen(c);
- free(c);
- free(s);
- return NULL;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/match.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/match.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/match.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/match.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.30 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Simple pattern matching, with '*' and '?' as wildcards.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ?
+ * and * as wildcards), and zero if it does not match.
+ */
+
+int
+match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern)
+{
+ for (;;) {
+ /* If at end of pattern, accept if also at end of string. */
+ if (!*pattern)
+ return !*s;
+
+ if (*pattern == '*') {
+ /* Skip the asterisk. */
+ pattern++;
+
+ /* If at end of pattern, accept immediately. */
+ if (!*pattern)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* If next character in pattern is known, optimize. */
+ if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != '*') {
+ /*
+ * Look instances of the next character in
+ * pattern, and try to match starting from
+ * those.
+ */
+ for (; *s; s++)
+ if (*s == *pattern &&
+ match_pattern(s + 1, pattern + 1))
+ return 1;
+ /* Failed. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Move ahead one character at a time and try to
+ * match at each position.
+ */
+ for (; *s; s++)
+ if (match_pattern(s, pattern))
+ return 1;
+ /* Failed. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * There must be at least one more character in the string.
+ * If we are at the end, fail.
+ */
+ if (!*s)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check if the next character of the string is acceptable. */
+ if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != *s)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Move to the next character, both in string and in pattern. */
+ s++;
+ pattern++;
+ }
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to match the string against the
+ * comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to
+ * indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
+ * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
+ */
+int
+match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, int dolower)
+{
+ char sub[1024];
+ int negated;
+ int got_positive;
+ u_int i, subi, len = strlen(pattern);
+
+ got_positive = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < len;) {
+ /* Check if the subpattern is negated. */
+ if (pattern[i] == '!') {
+ negated = 1;
+ i++;
+ } else
+ negated = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Extract the subpattern up to a comma or end. Convert the
+ * subpattern to lowercase.
+ */
+ for (subi = 0;
+ i < len && subi < sizeof(sub) - 1 && pattern[i] != ',';
+ subi++, i++)
+ sub[subi] = dolower && isupper((u_char)pattern[i]) ?
+ tolower((u_char)pattern[i]) : pattern[i];
+ /* If subpattern too long, return failure (no match). */
+ if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, skip the comma. */
+ if (i < len && pattern[i] == ',')
+ i++;
+
+ /* Null-terminate the subpattern. */
+ sub[subi] = '\0';
+
+ /* Try to match the subpattern against the string. */
+ if (match_pattern(string, sub)) {
+ if (negated)
+ return -1; /* Negative */
+ else
+ got_positive = 1; /* Positive */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Return success if got a positive match. If there was a negative
+ * match, we have already returned -1 and never get here.
+ */
+ return got_positive;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to match the host name (which must be in all lowercase) against the
+ * comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to
+ * indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
+ * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
+ */
+int
+match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern)
+{
+ return match_pattern_list(host, pattern, 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * returns 0 if we get a negative match for the hostname or the ip
+ * or if we get no match at all. returns -1 on error, or 1 on
+ * successful match.
+ */
+int
+match_host_and_ip(const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
+ const char *patterns)
+{
+ int mhost, mip;
+
+ /* error in ipaddr match */
+ if ((mip = addr_match_list(ipaddr, patterns)) == -2)
+ return -1;
+ else if (mip == -1) /* negative ip address match */
+ return 0;
+
+ /* negative hostname match */
+ if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns)) == -1)
+ return 0;
+ /* no match at all */
+ if (mhost == 0 && mip == 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * match user, user at host_or_ip, user at host_or_ip_list against pattern
+ */
+int
+match_user(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
+ const char *pattern)
+{
+ char *p, *pat;
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((p = strchr(pattern,'@')) == NULL)
+ return match_pattern(user, pattern);
+
+ pat = xstrdup(pattern);
+ p = strchr(pat, '@');
+ *p++ = '\0';
+
+ if ((ret = match_pattern(user, pat)) == 1)
+ ret = match_host_and_ip(host, ipaddr, p);
+ free(pat);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns first item from client-list that is also supported by server-list,
+ * caller must free the returned string.
+ */
+#define MAX_PROP 40
+#define SEP ","
+char *
+match_list(const char *client, const char *server, u_int *next)
+{
+ char *sproposals[MAX_PROP];
+ char *c, *s, *p, *ret, *cp, *sp;
+ int i, j, nproposals;
+
+ c = cp = xstrdup(client);
+ s = sp = xstrdup(server);
+
+ for ((p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0';
+ (p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i++) {
+ if (i < MAX_PROP)
+ sproposals[i] = p;
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+ nproposals = i;
+
+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0';
+ (p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < nproposals; j++) {
+ if (strcmp(p, sproposals[j]) == 0) {
+ ret = xstrdup(p);
+ if (next != NULL)
+ *next = (cp == NULL) ?
+ strlen(c) : (u_int)(cp - c);
+ free(c);
+ free(s);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (next != NULL)
+ *next = strlen(c);
+ free(c);
+ free(s);
+ return NULL;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/match.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/match.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/match.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.15 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-#ifndef MATCH_H
-#define MATCH_H
-
-int match_pattern(const char *, const char *);
-int match_pattern_list(const char *, const char *, u_int, int);
-int match_hostname(const char *, const char *, u_int);
-int match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *);
-int match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
-char *match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *);
-
-/* addrmatch.c */
-int addr_match_list(const char *, const char *);
-int addr_match_cidr_list(const char *, const char *);
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/match.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/match.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/match.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/match.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.16 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+#ifndef MATCH_H
+#define MATCH_H
+
+int match_pattern(const char *, const char *);
+int match_pattern_list(const char *, const char *, int);
+int match_hostname(const char *, const char *);
+int match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *);
+int match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+char *match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *);
+
+/* addrmatch.c */
+int addr_match_list(const char *, const char *);
+int addr_match_cidr_list(const char *, const char *);
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/misc.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/misc.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/misc.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1038 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.92 2013/10/14 23:28:23 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/ioctl.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
-#include <netinet/ip.h>
-#include <netinet/tcp.h>
-
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
-#include <net/if.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-
-/* remove newline at end of string */
-char *
-chop(char *s)
-{
- char *t = s;
- while (*t) {
- if (*t == '\n' || *t == '\r') {
- *t = '\0';
- return s;
- }
- t++;
- }
- return s;
-
-}
-
-/* set/unset filedescriptor to non-blocking */
-int
-set_nonblock(int fd)
-{
- int val;
-
- val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0);
- if (val < 0) {
- error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL, 0): %s", fd, strerror(errno));
- return (-1);
- }
- if (val & O_NONBLOCK) {
- debug3("fd %d is O_NONBLOCK", fd);
- return (0);
- }
- debug2("fd %d setting O_NONBLOCK", fd);
- val |= O_NONBLOCK;
- if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) {
- debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK): %s", fd,
- strerror(errno));
- return (-1);
- }
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-unset_nonblock(int fd)
-{
- int val;
-
- val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0);
- if (val < 0) {
- error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL, 0): %s", fd, strerror(errno));
- return (-1);
- }
- if (!(val & O_NONBLOCK)) {
- debug3("fd %d is not O_NONBLOCK", fd);
- return (0);
- }
- debug("fd %d clearing O_NONBLOCK", fd);
- val &= ~O_NONBLOCK;
- if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) {
- debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, ~O_NONBLOCK): %s",
- fd, strerror(errno));
- return (-1);
- }
- return (0);
-}
-
-const char *
-ssh_gai_strerror(int gaierr)
-{
- if (gaierr == EAI_SYSTEM && errno != 0)
- return strerror(errno);
- return gai_strerror(gaierr);
-}
-
-/* disable nagle on socket */
-void
-set_nodelay(int fd)
-{
- int opt;
- socklen_t optlen;
-
- optlen = sizeof opt;
- if (getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, &optlen) == -1) {
- debug("getsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- return;
- }
- if (opt == 1) {
- debug2("fd %d is TCP_NODELAY", fd);
- return;
- }
- opt = 1;
- debug2("fd %d setting TCP_NODELAY", fd);
- if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, sizeof opt) == -1)
- error("setsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-}
-
-/* Characters considered whitespace in strsep calls. */
-#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
-#define QUOTE "\""
-
-/* return next token in configuration line */
-char *
-strdelim(char **s)
-{
- char *old;
- int wspace = 0;
-
- if (*s == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- old = *s;
-
- *s = strpbrk(*s, WHITESPACE QUOTE "=");
- if (*s == NULL)
- return (old);
-
- if (*s[0] == '\"') {
- memmove(*s, *s + 1, strlen(*s)); /* move nul too */
- /* Find matching quote */
- if ((*s = strpbrk(*s, QUOTE)) == NULL) {
- return (NULL); /* no matching quote */
- } else {
- *s[0] = '\0';
- *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
- return (old);
- }
- }
-
- /* Allow only one '=' to be skipped */
- if (*s[0] == '=')
- wspace = 1;
- *s[0] = '\0';
-
- /* Skip any extra whitespace after first token */
- *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
- if (*s[0] == '=' && !wspace)
- *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
-
- return (old);
-}
-
-struct passwd *
-pwcopy(struct passwd *pw)
-{
- struct passwd *copy = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*copy));
-
- copy->pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
- copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd);
-#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
- copy->pw_gecos = xstrdup(pw->pw_gecos);
-#endif
- copy->pw_uid = pw->pw_uid;
- copy->pw_gid = pw->pw_gid;
-#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE
- copy->pw_expire = pw->pw_expire;
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE
- copy->pw_change = pw->pw_change;
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
- copy->pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class);
-#endif
- copy->pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
- copy->pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
- return copy;
-}
-
-/*
- * Convert ASCII string to TCP/IP port number.
- * Port must be >=0 and <=65535.
- * Return -1 if invalid.
- */
-int
-a2port(const char *s)
-{
- long long port;
- const char *errstr;
-
- port = strtonum(s, 0, 65535, &errstr);
- if (errstr != NULL)
- return -1;
- return (int)port;
-}
-
-int
-a2tun(const char *s, int *remote)
-{
- const char *errstr = NULL;
- char *sp, *ep;
- int tun;
-
- if (remote != NULL) {
- *remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
- sp = xstrdup(s);
- if ((ep = strchr(sp, ':')) == NULL) {
- free(sp);
- return (a2tun(s, NULL));
- }
- ep[0] = '\0'; ep++;
- *remote = a2tun(ep, NULL);
- tun = a2tun(sp, NULL);
- free(sp);
- return (*remote == SSH_TUNID_ERR ? *remote : tun);
- }
-
- if (strcasecmp(s, "any") == 0)
- return (SSH_TUNID_ANY);
-
- tun = strtonum(s, 0, SSH_TUNID_MAX, &errstr);
- if (errstr != NULL)
- return (SSH_TUNID_ERR);
-
- return (tun);
-}
-
-#define SECONDS 1
-#define MINUTES (SECONDS * 60)
-#define HOURS (MINUTES * 60)
-#define DAYS (HOURS * 24)
-#define WEEKS (DAYS * 7)
-
-/*
- * Convert a time string into seconds; format is
- * a sequence of:
- * time[qualifier]
- *
- * Valid time qualifiers are:
- * <none> seconds
- * s|S seconds
- * m|M minutes
- * h|H hours
- * d|D days
- * w|W weeks
- *
- * Examples:
- * 90m 90 minutes
- * 1h30m 90 minutes
- * 2d 2 days
- * 1w 1 week
- *
- * Return -1 if time string is invalid.
- */
-long
-convtime(const char *s)
-{
- long total, secs;
- const char *p;
- char *endp;
-
- errno = 0;
- total = 0;
- p = s;
-
- if (p == NULL || *p == '\0')
- return -1;
-
- while (*p) {
- secs = strtol(p, &endp, 10);
- if (p == endp ||
- (errno == ERANGE && (secs == LONG_MIN || secs == LONG_MAX)) ||
- secs < 0)
- return -1;
-
- switch (*endp++) {
- case '\0':
- endp--;
- break;
- case 's':
- case 'S':
- break;
- case 'm':
- case 'M':
- secs *= MINUTES;
- break;
- case 'h':
- case 'H':
- secs *= HOURS;
- break;
- case 'd':
- case 'D':
- secs *= DAYS;
- break;
- case 'w':
- case 'W':
- secs *= WEEKS;
- break;
- default:
- return -1;
- }
- total += secs;
- if (total < 0)
- return -1;
- p = endp;
- }
-
- return total;
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns a standardized host+port identifier string.
- * Caller must free returned string.
- */
-char *
-put_host_port(const char *host, u_short port)
-{
- char *hoststr;
-
- if (port == 0 || port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT)
- return(xstrdup(host));
- if (asprintf(&hoststr, "[%s]:%d", host, (int)port) < 0)
- fatal("put_host_port: asprintf: %s", strerror(errno));
- debug3("put_host_port: %s", hoststr);
- return hoststr;
-}
-
-/*
- * Search for next delimiter between hostnames/addresses and ports.
- * Argument may be modified (for termination).
- * Returns *cp if parsing succeeds.
- * *cp is set to the start of the next delimiter, if one was found.
- * If this is the last field, *cp is set to NULL.
- */
-char *
-hpdelim(char **cp)
-{
- char *s, *old;
-
- if (cp == NULL || *cp == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- old = s = *cp;
- if (*s == '[') {
- if ((s = strchr(s, ']')) == NULL)
- return NULL;
- else
- s++;
- } else if ((s = strpbrk(s, ":/")) == NULL)
- s = *cp + strlen(*cp); /* skip to end (see first case below) */
-
- switch (*s) {
- case '\0':
- *cp = NULL; /* no more fields*/
- break;
-
- case ':':
- case '/':
- *s = '\0'; /* terminate */
- *cp = s + 1;
- break;
-
- default:
- return NULL;
- }
-
- return old;
-}
-
-char *
-cleanhostname(char *host)
-{
- if (*host == '[' && host[strlen(host) - 1] == ']') {
- host[strlen(host) - 1] = '\0';
- return (host + 1);
- } else
- return host;
-}
-
-char *
-colon(char *cp)
-{
- int flag = 0;
-
- if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */
- return NULL;
- if (*cp == '[')
- flag = 1;
-
- for (; *cp; ++cp) {
- if (*cp == '@' && *(cp+1) == '[')
- flag = 1;
- if (*cp == ']' && *(cp+1) == ':' && flag)
- return (cp+1);
- if (*cp == ':' && !flag)
- return (cp);
- if (*cp == '/')
- return NULL;
- }
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/* function to assist building execv() arguments */
-void
-addargs(arglist *args, char *fmt, ...)
-{
- va_list ap;
- char *cp;
- u_int nalloc;
- int r;
-
- va_start(ap, fmt);
- r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap);
- va_end(ap);
- if (r == -1)
- fatal("addargs: argument too long");
-
- nalloc = args->nalloc;
- if (args->list == NULL) {
- nalloc = 32;
- args->num = 0;
- } else if (args->num+2 >= nalloc)
- nalloc *= 2;
-
- args->list = xrealloc(args->list, nalloc, sizeof(char *));
- args->nalloc = nalloc;
- args->list[args->num++] = cp;
- args->list[args->num] = NULL;
-}
-
-void
-replacearg(arglist *args, u_int which, char *fmt, ...)
-{
- va_list ap;
- char *cp;
- int r;
-
- va_start(ap, fmt);
- r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap);
- va_end(ap);
- if (r == -1)
- fatal("replacearg: argument too long");
-
- if (which >= args->num)
- fatal("replacearg: tried to replace invalid arg %d >= %d",
- which, args->num);
- free(args->list[which]);
- args->list[which] = cp;
-}
-
-void
-freeargs(arglist *args)
-{
- u_int i;
-
- if (args->list != NULL) {
- for (i = 0; i < args->num; i++)
- free(args->list[i]);
- free(args->list);
- args->nalloc = args->num = 0;
- args->list = NULL;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Expands tildes in the file name. Returns data allocated by xmalloc.
- * Warning: this calls getpw*.
- */
-char *
-tilde_expand_filename(const char *filename, uid_t uid)
-{
- const char *path, *sep;
- char user[128], *ret;
- struct passwd *pw;
- u_int len, slash;
-
- if (*filename != '~')
- return (xstrdup(filename));
- filename++;
-
- path = strchr(filename, '/');
- if (path != NULL && path > filename) { /* ~user/path */
- slash = path - filename;
- if (slash > sizeof(user) - 1)
- fatal("tilde_expand_filename: ~username too long");
- memcpy(user, filename, slash);
- user[slash] = '\0';
- if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL)
- fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such user %s", user);
- } else if ((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) /* ~/path */
- fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such uid %ld", (long)uid);
-
- /* Make sure directory has a trailing '/' */
- len = strlen(pw->pw_dir);
- if (len == 0 || pw->pw_dir[len - 1] != '/')
- sep = "/";
- else
- sep = "";
-
- /* Skip leading '/' from specified path */
- if (path != NULL)
- filename = path + 1;
-
- if (xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, sep, filename) >= MAXPATHLEN)
- fatal("tilde_expand_filename: Path too long");
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-/*
- * Expand a string with a set of %[char] escapes. A number of escapes may be
- * specified as (char *escape_chars, char *replacement) pairs. The list must
- * be terminated by a NULL escape_char. Returns replaced string in memory
- * allocated by xmalloc.
- */
-char *
-percent_expand(const char *string, ...)
-{
-#define EXPAND_MAX_KEYS 16
- u_int num_keys, i, j;
- struct {
- const char *key;
- const char *repl;
- } keys[EXPAND_MAX_KEYS];
- char buf[4096];
- va_list ap;
-
- /* Gather keys */
- va_start(ap, string);
- for (num_keys = 0; num_keys < EXPAND_MAX_KEYS; num_keys++) {
- keys[num_keys].key = va_arg(ap, char *);
- if (keys[num_keys].key == NULL)
- break;
- keys[num_keys].repl = va_arg(ap, char *);
- if (keys[num_keys].repl == NULL)
- fatal("%s: NULL replacement", __func__);
- }
- if (num_keys == EXPAND_MAX_KEYS && va_arg(ap, char *) != NULL)
- fatal("%s: too many keys", __func__);
- va_end(ap);
-
- /* Expand string */
- *buf = '\0';
- for (i = 0; *string != '\0'; string++) {
- if (*string != '%') {
- append:
- buf[i++] = *string;
- if (i >= sizeof(buf))
- fatal("%s: string too long", __func__);
- buf[i] = '\0';
- continue;
- }
- string++;
- /* %% case */
- if (*string == '%')
- goto append;
- for (j = 0; j < num_keys; j++) {
- if (strchr(keys[j].key, *string) != NULL) {
- i = strlcat(buf, keys[j].repl, sizeof(buf));
- if (i >= sizeof(buf))
- fatal("%s: string too long", __func__);
- break;
- }
- }
- if (j >= num_keys)
- fatal("%s: unknown key %%%c", __func__, *string);
- }
- return (xstrdup(buf));
-#undef EXPAND_MAX_KEYS
-}
-
-/*
- * Read an entire line from a public key file into a static buffer, discarding
- * lines that exceed the buffer size. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-int
-read_keyfile_line(FILE *f, const char *filename, char *buf, size_t bufsz,
- u_long *lineno)
-{
- while (fgets(buf, bufsz, f) != NULL) {
- if (buf[0] == '\0')
- continue;
- (*lineno)++;
- if (buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n' || feof(f)) {
- return 0;
- } else {
- debug("%s: %s line %lu exceeds size limit", __func__,
- filename, *lineno);
- /* discard remainder of line */
- while (fgetc(f) != '\n' && !feof(f))
- ; /* nothing */
- }
- }
- return -1;
-}
-
-int
-tun_open(int tun, int mode)
-{
-#if defined(CUSTOM_SYS_TUN_OPEN)
- return (sys_tun_open(tun, mode));
-#elif defined(SSH_TUN_OPENBSD)
- struct ifreq ifr;
- char name[100];
- int fd = -1, sock;
-
- /* Open the tunnel device */
- if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
- snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/tun%d", tun);
- fd = open(name, O_RDWR);
- } else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
- for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) {
- snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/tun%d", tun);
- if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0)
- break;
- }
- } else {
- debug("%s: invalid tunnel %u", __func__, tun);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- if (fd < 0) {
- debug("%s: %s open failed: %s", __func__, name, strerror(errno));
- return (-1);
- }
-
- debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, name, mode, fd);
-
- /* Set the tunnel device operation mode */
- snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "tun%d", tun);
- if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
- goto failed;
-
- if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
- goto failed;
-
- /* Set interface mode */
- ifr.ifr_flags &= ~IFF_UP;
- if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET)
- ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_LINK0;
- else
- ifr.ifr_flags &= ~IFF_LINK0;
- if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
- goto failed;
-
- /* Bring interface up */
- ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP;
- if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
- goto failed;
-
- close(sock);
- return (fd);
-
- failed:
- if (fd >= 0)
- close(fd);
- if (sock >= 0)
- close(sock);
- debug("%s: failed to set %s mode %d: %s", __func__, name,
- mode, strerror(errno));
- return (-1);
-#else
- error("Tunnel interfaces are not supported on this platform");
- return (-1);
-#endif
-}
-
-void
-sanitise_stdfd(void)
-{
- int nullfd, dupfd;
-
- if ((nullfd = dupfd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open /dev/null: %s\n",
- strerror(errno));
- exit(1);
- }
- while (++dupfd <= 2) {
- /* Only clobber closed fds */
- if (fcntl(dupfd, F_GETFL, 0) >= 0)
- continue;
- if (dup2(nullfd, dupfd) == -1) {
- fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno));
- exit(1);
- }
- }
- if (nullfd > 2)
- close(nullfd);
-}
-
-char *
-tohex(const void *vp, size_t l)
-{
- const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
- char b[3], *r;
- size_t i, hl;
-
- if (l > 65536)
- return xstrdup("tohex: length > 65536");
-
- hl = l * 2 + 1;
- r = xcalloc(1, hl);
- for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
- snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%02x", p[i]);
- strlcat(r, b, hl);
- }
- return (r);
-}
-
-u_int64_t
-get_u64(const void *vp)
-{
- const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
- u_int64_t v;
-
- v = (u_int64_t)p[0] << 56;
- v |= (u_int64_t)p[1] << 48;
- v |= (u_int64_t)p[2] << 40;
- v |= (u_int64_t)p[3] << 32;
- v |= (u_int64_t)p[4] << 24;
- v |= (u_int64_t)p[5] << 16;
- v |= (u_int64_t)p[6] << 8;
- v |= (u_int64_t)p[7];
-
- return (v);
-}
-
-u_int32_t
-get_u32(const void *vp)
-{
- const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
- u_int32_t v;
-
- v = (u_int32_t)p[0] << 24;
- v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 16;
- v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 8;
- v |= (u_int32_t)p[3];
-
- return (v);
-}
-
-u_int16_t
-get_u16(const void *vp)
-{
- const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
- u_int16_t v;
-
- v = (u_int16_t)p[0] << 8;
- v |= (u_int16_t)p[1];
-
- return (v);
-}
-
-void
-put_u64(void *vp, u_int64_t v)
-{
- u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
-
- p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 56) & 0xff;
- p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 48) & 0xff;
- p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 40) & 0xff;
- p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 32) & 0xff;
- p[4] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
- p[5] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
- p[6] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
- p[7] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
-}
-
-void
-put_u32(void *vp, u_int32_t v)
-{
- u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
-
- p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
- p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
- p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
- p[3] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
-}
-
-
-void
-put_u16(void *vp, u_int16_t v)
-{
- u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
-
- p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
- p[1] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
-}
-
-void
-ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *start, int *ms)
-{
- struct timeval diff, finish;
-
- gettimeofday(&finish, NULL);
- timersub(&finish, start, &diff);
- *ms -= (diff.tv_sec * 1000) + (diff.tv_usec / 1000);
-}
-
-void
-ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *tv, int ms)
-{
- if (ms < 0)
- ms = 0;
- tv->tv_sec = ms / 1000;
- tv->tv_usec = (ms % 1000) * 1000;
-}
-
-time_t
-monotime(void)
-{
-#if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC)
- struct timespec ts;
- static int gettime_failed = 0;
-
- if (!gettime_failed) {
- if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts) == 0)
- return (ts.tv_sec);
- debug3("clock_gettime: %s", strerror(errno));
- gettime_failed = 1;
- }
-#endif
-
- return time(NULL);
-}
-
-void
-bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *bw, u_int64_t kbps, size_t buflen)
-{
- bw->buflen = buflen;
- bw->rate = kbps;
- bw->thresh = bw->rate;
- bw->lamt = 0;
- timerclear(&bw->bwstart);
- timerclear(&bw->bwend);
-}
-
-/* Callback from read/write loop to insert bandwidth-limiting delays */
-void
-bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *bw, size_t read_len)
-{
- u_int64_t waitlen;
- struct timespec ts, rm;
-
- if (!timerisset(&bw->bwstart)) {
- gettimeofday(&bw->bwstart, NULL);
- return;
- }
-
- bw->lamt += read_len;
- if (bw->lamt < bw->thresh)
- return;
-
- gettimeofday(&bw->bwend, NULL);
- timersub(&bw->bwend, &bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend);
- if (!timerisset(&bw->bwend))
- return;
-
- bw->lamt *= 8;
- waitlen = (double)1000000L * bw->lamt / bw->rate;
-
- bw->bwstart.tv_sec = waitlen / 1000000L;
- bw->bwstart.tv_usec = waitlen % 1000000L;
-
- if (timercmp(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, >)) {
- timersub(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, &bw->bwend);
-
- /* Adjust the wait time */
- if (bw->bwend.tv_sec) {
- bw->thresh /= 2;
- if (bw->thresh < bw->buflen / 4)
- bw->thresh = bw->buflen / 4;
- } else if (bw->bwend.tv_usec < 10000) {
- bw->thresh *= 2;
- if (bw->thresh > bw->buflen * 8)
- bw->thresh = bw->buflen * 8;
- }
-
- TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&bw->bwend, &ts);
- while (nanosleep(&ts, &rm) == -1) {
- if (errno != EINTR)
- break;
- ts = rm;
- }
- }
-
- bw->lamt = 0;
- gettimeofday(&bw->bwstart, NULL);
-}
-
-/* Make a template filename for mk[sd]temp() */
-void
-mktemp_proto(char *s, size_t len)
-{
- const char *tmpdir;
- int r;
-
- if ((tmpdir = getenv("TMPDIR")) != NULL) {
- r = snprintf(s, len, "%s/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX", tmpdir);
- if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < len)
- return;
- }
- r = snprintf(s, len, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX");
- if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= len)
- fatal("%s: template string too short", __func__);
-}
-
-static const struct {
- const char *name;
- int value;
-} ipqos[] = {
- { "af11", IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 },
- { "af12", IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 },
- { "af13", IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 },
- { "af21", IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 },
- { "af22", IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 },
- { "af23", IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 },
- { "af31", IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 },
- { "af32", IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 },
- { "af33", IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 },
- { "af41", IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 },
- { "af42", IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 },
- { "af43", IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 },
- { "cs0", IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 },
- { "cs1", IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 },
- { "cs2", IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 },
- { "cs3", IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 },
- { "cs4", IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 },
- { "cs5", IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 },
- { "cs6", IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 },
- { "cs7", IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 },
- { "ef", IPTOS_DSCP_EF },
- { "lowdelay", IPTOS_LOWDELAY },
- { "throughput", IPTOS_THROUGHPUT },
- { "reliability", IPTOS_RELIABILITY },
- { NULL, -1 }
-};
-
-int
-parse_ipqos(const char *cp)
-{
- u_int i;
- char *ep;
- long val;
-
- if (cp == NULL)
- return -1;
- for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) {
- if (strcasecmp(cp, ipqos[i].name) == 0)
- return ipqos[i].value;
- }
- /* Try parsing as an integer */
- val = strtol(cp, &ep, 0);
- if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0' || val < 0 || val > 255)
- return -1;
- return val;
-}
-
-const char *
-iptos2str(int iptos)
-{
- int i;
- static char iptos_str[sizeof "0xff"];
-
- for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) {
- if (ipqos[i].value == iptos)
- return ipqos[i].name;
- }
- snprintf(iptos_str, sizeof iptos_str, "0x%02x", iptos);
- return iptos_str;
-}
-
-void
-lowercase(char *s)
-{
- for (; *s; s++)
- *s = tolower((u_char)*s);
-}
-void
-sock_set_v6only(int s)
-{
-#ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY
- int on = 1;
-
- debug3("%s: set socket %d IPV6_V6ONLY", __func__, s);
- if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
- error("setsockopt IPV6_V6ONLY: %s", strerror(errno));
-#endif
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/misc.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/misc.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/misc.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/misc.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1245 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.105 2016/07/15 00:24:30 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+#include <netinet/tcp.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
+#include <net/if.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+/* remove newline at end of string */
+char *
+chop(char *s)
+{
+ char *t = s;
+ while (*t) {
+ if (*t == '\n' || *t == '\r') {
+ *t = '\0';
+ return s;
+ }
+ t++;
+ }
+ return s;
+
+}
+
+/* set/unset filedescriptor to non-blocking */
+int
+set_nonblock(int fd)
+{
+ int val;
+
+ val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
+ if (val < 0) {
+ error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL): %s", fd, strerror(errno));
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (val & O_NONBLOCK) {
+ debug3("fd %d is O_NONBLOCK", fd);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ debug2("fd %d setting O_NONBLOCK", fd);
+ val |= O_NONBLOCK;
+ if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) {
+ debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK): %s", fd,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+unset_nonblock(int fd)
+{
+ int val;
+
+ val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
+ if (val < 0) {
+ error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL): %s", fd, strerror(errno));
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (!(val & O_NONBLOCK)) {
+ debug3("fd %d is not O_NONBLOCK", fd);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ debug("fd %d clearing O_NONBLOCK", fd);
+ val &= ~O_NONBLOCK;
+ if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) {
+ debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, ~O_NONBLOCK): %s",
+ fd, strerror(errno));
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+const char *
+ssh_gai_strerror(int gaierr)
+{
+ if (gaierr == EAI_SYSTEM && errno != 0)
+ return strerror(errno);
+ return gai_strerror(gaierr);
+}
+
+/* disable nagle on socket */
+void
+set_nodelay(int fd)
+{
+ int opt;
+ socklen_t optlen;
+
+ optlen = sizeof opt;
+ if (getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, &optlen) == -1) {
+ debug("getsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return;
+ }
+ if (opt == 1) {
+ debug2("fd %d is TCP_NODELAY", fd);
+ return;
+ }
+ opt = 1;
+ debug2("fd %d setting TCP_NODELAY", fd);
+ if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, sizeof opt) == -1)
+ error("setsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+}
+
+/* Characters considered whitespace in strsep calls. */
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+#define QUOTE "\""
+
+/* return next token in configuration line */
+char *
+strdelim(char **s)
+{
+ char *old;
+ int wspace = 0;
+
+ if (*s == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ old = *s;
+
+ *s = strpbrk(*s, WHITESPACE QUOTE "=");
+ if (*s == NULL)
+ return (old);
+
+ if (*s[0] == '\"') {
+ memmove(*s, *s + 1, strlen(*s)); /* move nul too */
+ /* Find matching quote */
+ if ((*s = strpbrk(*s, QUOTE)) == NULL) {
+ return (NULL); /* no matching quote */
+ } else {
+ *s[0] = '\0';
+ *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
+ return (old);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Allow only one '=' to be skipped */
+ if (*s[0] == '=')
+ wspace = 1;
+ *s[0] = '\0';
+
+ /* Skip any extra whitespace after first token */
+ *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
+ if (*s[0] == '=' && !wspace)
+ *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
+
+ return (old);
+}
+
+struct passwd *
+pwcopy(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ struct passwd *copy = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*copy));
+
+ copy->pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+ copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd);
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
+ copy->pw_gecos = xstrdup(pw->pw_gecos);
+#endif
+ copy->pw_uid = pw->pw_uid;
+ copy->pw_gid = pw->pw_gid;
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE
+ copy->pw_expire = pw->pw_expire;
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE
+ copy->pw_change = pw->pw_change;
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
+ copy->pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class);
+#endif
+ copy->pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
+ copy->pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
+ return copy;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert ASCII string to TCP/IP port number.
+ * Port must be >=0 and <=65535.
+ * Return -1 if invalid.
+ */
+int
+a2port(const char *s)
+{
+ long long port;
+ const char *errstr;
+
+ port = strtonum(s, 0, 65535, &errstr);
+ if (errstr != NULL)
+ return -1;
+ return (int)port;
+}
+
+int
+a2tun(const char *s, int *remote)
+{
+ const char *errstr = NULL;
+ char *sp, *ep;
+ int tun;
+
+ if (remote != NULL) {
+ *remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
+ sp = xstrdup(s);
+ if ((ep = strchr(sp, ':')) == NULL) {
+ free(sp);
+ return (a2tun(s, NULL));
+ }
+ ep[0] = '\0'; ep++;
+ *remote = a2tun(ep, NULL);
+ tun = a2tun(sp, NULL);
+ free(sp);
+ return (*remote == SSH_TUNID_ERR ? *remote : tun);
+ }
+
+ if (strcasecmp(s, "any") == 0)
+ return (SSH_TUNID_ANY);
+
+ tun = strtonum(s, 0, SSH_TUNID_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr != NULL)
+ return (SSH_TUNID_ERR);
+
+ return (tun);
+}
+
+#define SECONDS 1
+#define MINUTES (SECONDS * 60)
+#define HOURS (MINUTES * 60)
+#define DAYS (HOURS * 24)
+#define WEEKS (DAYS * 7)
+
+/*
+ * Convert a time string into seconds; format is
+ * a sequence of:
+ * time[qualifier]
+ *
+ * Valid time qualifiers are:
+ * <none> seconds
+ * s|S seconds
+ * m|M minutes
+ * h|H hours
+ * d|D days
+ * w|W weeks
+ *
+ * Examples:
+ * 90m 90 minutes
+ * 1h30m 90 minutes
+ * 2d 2 days
+ * 1w 1 week
+ *
+ * Return -1 if time string is invalid.
+ */
+long
+convtime(const char *s)
+{
+ long total, secs;
+ const char *p;
+ char *endp;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ total = 0;
+ p = s;
+
+ if (p == NULL || *p == '\0')
+ return -1;
+
+ while (*p) {
+ secs = strtol(p, &endp, 10);
+ if (p == endp ||
+ (errno == ERANGE && (secs == LONG_MIN || secs == LONG_MAX)) ||
+ secs < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ switch (*endp++) {
+ case '\0':
+ endp--;
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ case 'S':
+ break;
+ case 'm':
+ case 'M':
+ secs *= MINUTES;
+ break;
+ case 'h':
+ case 'H':
+ secs *= HOURS;
+ break;
+ case 'd':
+ case 'D':
+ secs *= DAYS;
+ break;
+ case 'w':
+ case 'W':
+ secs *= WEEKS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+ total += secs;
+ if (total < 0)
+ return -1;
+ p = endp;
+ }
+
+ return total;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a standardized host+port identifier string.
+ * Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+char *
+put_host_port(const char *host, u_short port)
+{
+ char *hoststr;
+
+ if (port == 0 || port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT)
+ return(xstrdup(host));
+ if (asprintf(&hoststr, "[%s]:%d", host, (int)port) < 0)
+ fatal("put_host_port: asprintf: %s", strerror(errno));
+ debug3("put_host_port: %s", hoststr);
+ return hoststr;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Search for next delimiter between hostnames/addresses and ports.
+ * Argument may be modified (for termination).
+ * Returns *cp if parsing succeeds.
+ * *cp is set to the start of the next delimiter, if one was found.
+ * If this is the last field, *cp is set to NULL.
+ */
+char *
+hpdelim(char **cp)
+{
+ char *s, *old;
+
+ if (cp == NULL || *cp == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ old = s = *cp;
+ if (*s == '[') {
+ if ((s = strchr(s, ']')) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ else
+ s++;
+ } else if ((s = strpbrk(s, ":/")) == NULL)
+ s = *cp + strlen(*cp); /* skip to end (see first case below) */
+
+ switch (*s) {
+ case '\0':
+ *cp = NULL; /* no more fields*/
+ break;
+
+ case ':':
+ case '/':
+ *s = '\0'; /* terminate */
+ *cp = s + 1;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return old;
+}
+
+char *
+cleanhostname(char *host)
+{
+ if (*host == '[' && host[strlen(host) - 1] == ']') {
+ host[strlen(host) - 1] = '\0';
+ return (host + 1);
+ } else
+ return host;
+}
+
+char *
+colon(char *cp)
+{
+ int flag = 0;
+
+ if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */
+ return NULL;
+ if (*cp == '[')
+ flag = 1;
+
+ for (; *cp; ++cp) {
+ if (*cp == '@' && *(cp+1) == '[')
+ flag = 1;
+ if (*cp == ']' && *(cp+1) == ':' && flag)
+ return (cp+1);
+ if (*cp == ':' && !flag)
+ return (cp);
+ if (*cp == '/')
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a [user@]host[:port] string.
+ * Caller must free returned user and host.
+ * Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking).
+ * If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL.
+ * If port was not specified then *portp will be -1.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+parse_user_host_port(const char *s, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp)
+{
+ char *sdup, *cp, *tmp;
+ char *user = NULL, *host = NULL;
+ int port = -1, ret = -1;
+
+ if (userp != NULL)
+ *userp = NULL;
+ if (hostp != NULL)
+ *hostp = NULL;
+ if (portp != NULL)
+ *portp = -1;
+
+ if ((sdup = tmp = strdup(s)) == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ /* Extract optional username */
+ if ((cp = strchr(tmp, '@')) != NULL) {
+ *cp = '\0';
+ if (*tmp == '\0')
+ goto out;
+ if ((user = strdup(tmp)) == NULL)
+ goto out;
+ tmp = cp + 1;
+ }
+ /* Extract mandatory hostname */
+ if ((cp = hpdelim(&tmp)) == NULL || *cp == '\0')
+ goto out;
+ host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(cp));
+ /* Convert and verify optional port */
+ if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') {
+ if ((port = a2port(tmp)) <= 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Success */
+ if (userp != NULL) {
+ *userp = user;
+ user = NULL;
+ }
+ if (hostp != NULL) {
+ *hostp = host;
+ host = NULL;
+ }
+ if (portp != NULL)
+ *portp = port;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ free(sdup);
+ free(user);
+ free(host);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* function to assist building execv() arguments */
+void
+addargs(arglist *args, char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ char *cp;
+ u_int nalloc;
+ int r;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ if (r == -1)
+ fatal("addargs: argument too long");
+
+ nalloc = args->nalloc;
+ if (args->list == NULL) {
+ nalloc = 32;
+ args->num = 0;
+ } else if (args->num+2 >= nalloc)
+ nalloc *= 2;
+
+ args->list = xreallocarray(args->list, nalloc, sizeof(char *));
+ args->nalloc = nalloc;
+ args->list[args->num++] = cp;
+ args->list[args->num] = NULL;
+}
+
+void
+replacearg(arglist *args, u_int which, char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ char *cp;
+ int r;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ if (r == -1)
+ fatal("replacearg: argument too long");
+
+ if (which >= args->num)
+ fatal("replacearg: tried to replace invalid arg %d >= %d",
+ which, args->num);
+ free(args->list[which]);
+ args->list[which] = cp;
+}
+
+void
+freeargs(arglist *args)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ if (args->list != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < args->num; i++)
+ free(args->list[i]);
+ free(args->list);
+ args->nalloc = args->num = 0;
+ args->list = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Expands tildes in the file name. Returns data allocated by xmalloc.
+ * Warning: this calls getpw*.
+ */
+char *
+tilde_expand_filename(const char *filename, uid_t uid)
+{
+ const char *path, *sep;
+ char user[128], *ret;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ u_int len, slash;
+
+ if (*filename != '~')
+ return (xstrdup(filename));
+ filename++;
+
+ path = strchr(filename, '/');
+ if (path != NULL && path > filename) { /* ~user/path */
+ slash = path - filename;
+ if (slash > sizeof(user) - 1)
+ fatal("tilde_expand_filename: ~username too long");
+ memcpy(user, filename, slash);
+ user[slash] = '\0';
+ if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL)
+ fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such user %s", user);
+ } else if ((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) /* ~/path */
+ fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such uid %ld", (long)uid);
+
+ /* Make sure directory has a trailing '/' */
+ len = strlen(pw->pw_dir);
+ if (len == 0 || pw->pw_dir[len - 1] != '/')
+ sep = "/";
+ else
+ sep = "";
+
+ /* Skip leading '/' from specified path */
+ if (path != NULL)
+ filename = path + 1;
+
+ if (xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, sep, filename) >= PATH_MAX)
+ fatal("tilde_expand_filename: Path too long");
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Expand a string with a set of %[char] escapes. A number of escapes may be
+ * specified as (char *escape_chars, char *replacement) pairs. The list must
+ * be terminated by a NULL escape_char. Returns replaced string in memory
+ * allocated by xmalloc.
+ */
+char *
+percent_expand(const char *string, ...)
+{
+#define EXPAND_MAX_KEYS 16
+ u_int num_keys, i, j;
+ struct {
+ const char *key;
+ const char *repl;
+ } keys[EXPAND_MAX_KEYS];
+ char buf[4096];
+ va_list ap;
+
+ /* Gather keys */
+ va_start(ap, string);
+ for (num_keys = 0; num_keys < EXPAND_MAX_KEYS; num_keys++) {
+ keys[num_keys].key = va_arg(ap, char *);
+ if (keys[num_keys].key == NULL)
+ break;
+ keys[num_keys].repl = va_arg(ap, char *);
+ if (keys[num_keys].repl == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: NULL replacement", __func__);
+ }
+ if (num_keys == EXPAND_MAX_KEYS && va_arg(ap, char *) != NULL)
+ fatal("%s: too many keys", __func__);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ /* Expand string */
+ *buf = '\0';
+ for (i = 0; *string != '\0'; string++) {
+ if (*string != '%') {
+ append:
+ buf[i++] = *string;
+ if (i >= sizeof(buf))
+ fatal("%s: string too long", __func__);
+ buf[i] = '\0';
+ continue;
+ }
+ string++;
+ /* %% case */
+ if (*string == '%')
+ goto append;
+ if (*string == '\0')
+ fatal("%s: invalid format", __func__);
+ for (j = 0; j < num_keys; j++) {
+ if (strchr(keys[j].key, *string) != NULL) {
+ i = strlcat(buf, keys[j].repl, sizeof(buf));
+ if (i >= sizeof(buf))
+ fatal("%s: string too long", __func__);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (j >= num_keys)
+ fatal("%s: unknown key %%%c", __func__, *string);
+ }
+ return (xstrdup(buf));
+#undef EXPAND_MAX_KEYS
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read an entire line from a public key file into a static buffer, discarding
+ * lines that exceed the buffer size. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+read_keyfile_line(FILE *f, const char *filename, char *buf, size_t bufsz,
+ u_long *lineno)
+{
+ while (fgets(buf, bufsz, f) != NULL) {
+ if (buf[0] == '\0')
+ continue;
+ (*lineno)++;
+ if (buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n' || feof(f)) {
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ debug("%s: %s line %lu exceeds size limit", __func__,
+ filename, *lineno);
+ /* discard remainder of line */
+ while (fgetc(f) != '\n' && !feof(f))
+ ; /* nothing */
+ }
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int
+tun_open(int tun, int mode)
+{
+#if defined(CUSTOM_SYS_TUN_OPEN)
+ return (sys_tun_open(tun, mode));
+#elif defined(SSH_TUN_OPENBSD)
+ struct ifreq ifr;
+ char name[100];
+ int fd = -1, sock;
+ const char *tunbase = "tun";
+
+ if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET)
+ tunbase = "tap";
+
+ /* Open the tunnel device */
+ if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
+ snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun);
+ fd = open(name, O_RDWR);
+ } else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
+ for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) {
+ snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d",
+ tunbase, tun);
+ if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ debug("%s: invalid tunnel %u", __func__, tun);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ debug("%s: %s open: %s", __func__, name, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, name, mode, fd);
+
+ /* Bring interface up if it is not already */
+ snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "%s%d", tunbase, tun);
+ if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
+ goto failed;
+
+ if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) {
+ debug("%s: get interface %s flags: %s", __func__,
+ ifr.ifr_name, strerror(errno));
+ goto failed;
+ }
+
+ if (!(ifr.ifr_flags & IFF_UP)) {
+ ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP;
+ if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) {
+ debug("%s: activate interface %s: %s", __func__,
+ ifr.ifr_name, strerror(errno));
+ goto failed;
+ }
+ }
+
+ close(sock);
+ return fd;
+
+ failed:
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ close(fd);
+ if (sock >= 0)
+ close(sock);
+ return -1;
+#else
+ error("Tunnel interfaces are not supported on this platform");
+ return (-1);
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+sanitise_stdfd(void)
+{
+ int nullfd, dupfd;
+
+ if ((nullfd = dupfd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open /dev/null: %s\n",
+ strerror(errno));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ while (++dupfd <= STDERR_FILENO) {
+ /* Only populate closed fds. */
+ if (fcntl(dupfd, F_GETFL) == -1 && errno == EBADF) {
+ if (dup2(nullfd, dupfd) == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO)
+ close(nullfd);
+}
+
+char *
+tohex(const void *vp, size_t l)
+{
+ const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
+ char b[3], *r;
+ size_t i, hl;
+
+ if (l > 65536)
+ return xstrdup("tohex: length > 65536");
+
+ hl = l * 2 + 1;
+ r = xcalloc(1, hl);
+ for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
+ snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%02x", p[i]);
+ strlcat(r, b, hl);
+ }
+ return (r);
+}
+
+u_int64_t
+get_u64(const void *vp)
+{
+ const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
+ u_int64_t v;
+
+ v = (u_int64_t)p[0] << 56;
+ v |= (u_int64_t)p[1] << 48;
+ v |= (u_int64_t)p[2] << 40;
+ v |= (u_int64_t)p[3] << 32;
+ v |= (u_int64_t)p[4] << 24;
+ v |= (u_int64_t)p[5] << 16;
+ v |= (u_int64_t)p[6] << 8;
+ v |= (u_int64_t)p[7];
+
+ return (v);
+}
+
+u_int32_t
+get_u32(const void *vp)
+{
+ const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
+ u_int32_t v;
+
+ v = (u_int32_t)p[0] << 24;
+ v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 16;
+ v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 8;
+ v |= (u_int32_t)p[3];
+
+ return (v);
+}
+
+u_int32_t
+get_u32_le(const void *vp)
+{
+ const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
+ u_int32_t v;
+
+ v = (u_int32_t)p[0];
+ v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 8;
+ v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 16;
+ v |= (u_int32_t)p[3] << 24;
+
+ return (v);
+}
+
+u_int16_t
+get_u16(const void *vp)
+{
+ const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
+ u_int16_t v;
+
+ v = (u_int16_t)p[0] << 8;
+ v |= (u_int16_t)p[1];
+
+ return (v);
+}
+
+void
+put_u64(void *vp, u_int64_t v)
+{
+ u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
+
+ p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 56) & 0xff;
+ p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 48) & 0xff;
+ p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 40) & 0xff;
+ p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 32) & 0xff;
+ p[4] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
+ p[5] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
+ p[6] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
+ p[7] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
+}
+
+void
+put_u32(void *vp, u_int32_t v)
+{
+ u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
+
+ p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
+ p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
+ p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
+ p[3] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
+}
+
+void
+put_u32_le(void *vp, u_int32_t v)
+{
+ u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
+
+ p[0] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
+ p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
+ p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
+ p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
+}
+
+void
+put_u16(void *vp, u_int16_t v)
+{
+ u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
+
+ p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
+ p[1] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
+}
+
+void
+ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *start, int *ms)
+{
+ struct timeval diff, finish;
+
+ gettimeofday(&finish, NULL);
+ timersub(&finish, start, &diff);
+ *ms -= (diff.tv_sec * 1000) + (diff.tv_usec / 1000);
+}
+
+void
+ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *tv, int ms)
+{
+ if (ms < 0)
+ ms = 0;
+ tv->tv_sec = ms / 1000;
+ tv->tv_usec = (ms % 1000) * 1000;
+}
+
+time_t
+monotime(void)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && \
+ (defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) || defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME))
+ struct timespec ts;
+ static int gettime_failed = 0;
+
+ if (!gettime_failed) {
+#if defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME)
+ if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts) == 0)
+ return (ts.tv_sec);
+#endif
+#if defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC)
+ if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts) == 0)
+ return (ts.tv_sec);
+#endif
+ debug3("clock_gettime: %s", strerror(errno));
+ gettime_failed = 1;
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME && (CLOCK_MONOTONIC || CLOCK_BOOTTIME */
+
+ return time(NULL);
+}
+
+double
+monotime_double(void)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && \
+ (defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) || defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME))
+ struct timespec ts;
+ static int gettime_failed = 0;
+
+ if (!gettime_failed) {
+#if defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME)
+ if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts) == 0)
+ return (ts.tv_sec + (double)ts.tv_nsec / 1000000000);
+#endif
+#if defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC)
+ if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts) == 0)
+ return (ts.tv_sec + (double)ts.tv_nsec / 1000000000);
+#endif
+ debug3("clock_gettime: %s", strerror(errno));
+ gettime_failed = 1;
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME && (CLOCK_MONOTONIC || CLOCK_BOOTTIME */
+
+ return (double)time(NULL);
+}
+
+void
+bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *bw, u_int64_t kbps, size_t buflen)
+{
+ bw->buflen = buflen;
+ bw->rate = kbps;
+ bw->thresh = bw->rate;
+ bw->lamt = 0;
+ timerclear(&bw->bwstart);
+ timerclear(&bw->bwend);
+}
+
+/* Callback from read/write loop to insert bandwidth-limiting delays */
+void
+bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *bw, size_t read_len)
+{
+ u_int64_t waitlen;
+ struct timespec ts, rm;
+
+ if (!timerisset(&bw->bwstart)) {
+ gettimeofday(&bw->bwstart, NULL);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ bw->lamt += read_len;
+ if (bw->lamt < bw->thresh)
+ return;
+
+ gettimeofday(&bw->bwend, NULL);
+ timersub(&bw->bwend, &bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend);
+ if (!timerisset(&bw->bwend))
+ return;
+
+ bw->lamt *= 8;
+ waitlen = (double)1000000L * bw->lamt / bw->rate;
+
+ bw->bwstart.tv_sec = waitlen / 1000000L;
+ bw->bwstart.tv_usec = waitlen % 1000000L;
+
+ if (timercmp(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, >)) {
+ timersub(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, &bw->bwend);
+
+ /* Adjust the wait time */
+ if (bw->bwend.tv_sec) {
+ bw->thresh /= 2;
+ if (bw->thresh < bw->buflen / 4)
+ bw->thresh = bw->buflen / 4;
+ } else if (bw->bwend.tv_usec < 10000) {
+ bw->thresh *= 2;
+ if (bw->thresh > bw->buflen * 8)
+ bw->thresh = bw->buflen * 8;
+ }
+
+ TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&bw->bwend, &ts);
+ while (nanosleep(&ts, &rm) == -1) {
+ if (errno != EINTR)
+ break;
+ ts = rm;
+ }
+ }
+
+ bw->lamt = 0;
+ gettimeofday(&bw->bwstart, NULL);
+}
+
+/* Make a template filename for mk[sd]temp() */
+void
+mktemp_proto(char *s, size_t len)
+{
+ const char *tmpdir;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((tmpdir = getenv("TMPDIR")) != NULL) {
+ r = snprintf(s, len, "%s/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX", tmpdir);
+ if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < len)
+ return;
+ }
+ r = snprintf(s, len, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX");
+ if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= len)
+ fatal("%s: template string too short", __func__);
+}
+
+static const struct {
+ const char *name;
+ int value;
+} ipqos[] = {
+ { "af11", IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 },
+ { "af12", IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 },
+ { "af13", IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 },
+ { "af21", IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 },
+ { "af22", IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 },
+ { "af23", IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 },
+ { "af31", IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 },
+ { "af32", IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 },
+ { "af33", IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 },
+ { "af41", IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 },
+ { "af42", IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 },
+ { "af43", IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 },
+ { "cs0", IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 },
+ { "cs1", IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 },
+ { "cs2", IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 },
+ { "cs3", IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 },
+ { "cs4", IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 },
+ { "cs5", IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 },
+ { "cs6", IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 },
+ { "cs7", IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 },
+ { "ef", IPTOS_DSCP_EF },
+ { "lowdelay", IPTOS_LOWDELAY },
+ { "throughput", IPTOS_THROUGHPUT },
+ { "reliability", IPTOS_RELIABILITY },
+ { NULL, -1 }
+};
+
+int
+parse_ipqos(const char *cp)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ char *ep;
+ long val;
+
+ if (cp == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) {
+ if (strcasecmp(cp, ipqos[i].name) == 0)
+ return ipqos[i].value;
+ }
+ /* Try parsing as an integer */
+ val = strtol(cp, &ep, 0);
+ if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0' || val < 0 || val > 255)
+ return -1;
+ return val;
+}
+
+const char *
+iptos2str(int iptos)
+{
+ int i;
+ static char iptos_str[sizeof "0xff"];
+
+ for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) {
+ if (ipqos[i].value == iptos)
+ return ipqos[i].name;
+ }
+ snprintf(iptos_str, sizeof iptos_str, "0x%02x", iptos);
+ return iptos_str;
+}
+
+void
+lowercase(char *s)
+{
+ for (; *s; s++)
+ *s = tolower((u_char)*s);
+}
+
+int
+unix_listener(const char *path, int backlog, int unlink_first)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+ int saved_errno, sock;
+
+ memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
+ sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ if (strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, path, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) {
+ error("%s: \"%s\" too long for Unix domain socket", __func__,
+ path);
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (sock < 0) {
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (unlink_first == 1) {
+ if (unlink(path) != 0 && errno != ENOENT)
+ error("unlink(%s): %.100s", path, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) {
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ error("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ close(sock);
+ error("%s: cannot bind to path: %s", __func__, path);
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (listen(sock, backlog) < 0) {
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ close(sock);
+ unlink(path);
+ error("%s: cannot listen on path: %s", __func__, path);
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return sock;
+}
+
+void
+sock_set_v6only(int s)
+{
+#if defined(IPV6_V6ONLY) && !defined(__OpenBSD__)
+ int on = 1;
+
+ debug3("%s: set socket %d IPV6_V6ONLY", __func__, s);
+ if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
+ error("setsockopt IPV6_V6ONLY: %s", strerror(errno));
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compares two strings that maybe be NULL. Returns non-zero if strings
+ * are both NULL or are identical, returns zero otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+strcmp_maybe_null(const char *a, const char *b)
+{
+ if ((a == NULL && b != NULL) || (a != NULL && b == NULL))
+ return 0;
+ if (a != NULL && strcmp(a, b) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare two forwards, returning non-zero if they are identical or
+ * zero otherwise.
+ */
+int
+forward_equals(const struct Forward *a, const struct Forward *b)
+{
+ if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->listen_host, b->listen_host) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port)
+ return 0;
+ if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->listen_path, b->listen_path) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->connect_host, b->connect_host) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port)
+ return 0;
+ if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->connect_path, b->connect_path) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* allocated_port and handle are not checked */
+ return 1;
+}
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/misc.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/misc.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/misc.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.50 2013/10/14 23:28:23 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#ifndef _MISC_H
-#define _MISC_H
-
-/* misc.c */
-
-char *chop(char *);
-char *strdelim(char **);
-int set_nonblock(int);
-int unset_nonblock(int);
-void set_nodelay(int);
-int a2port(const char *);
-int a2tun(const char *, int *);
-char *put_host_port(const char *, u_short);
-char *hpdelim(char **);
-char *cleanhostname(char *);
-char *colon(char *);
-long convtime(const char *);
-char *tilde_expand_filename(const char *, uid_t);
-char *percent_expand(const char *, ...) __attribute__((__sentinel__));
-char *tohex(const void *, size_t);
-void sanitise_stdfd(void);
-void ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *, int *);
-void ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *, int);
-time_t monotime(void);
-void lowercase(char *s);
-
-void sock_set_v6only(int);
-
-struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *);
-const char *ssh_gai_strerror(int);
-
-typedef struct arglist arglist;
-struct arglist {
- char **list;
- u_int num;
- u_int nalloc;
-};
-void addargs(arglist *, char *, ...)
- __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
-void replacearg(arglist *, u_int, char *, ...)
- __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)));
-void freeargs(arglist *);
-
-int tun_open(int, int);
-
-/* Common definitions for ssh tunnel device forwarding */
-#define SSH_TUNMODE_NO 0x00
-#define SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT 0x01
-#define SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET 0x02
-#define SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT
-#define SSH_TUNMODE_YES (SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT|SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET)
-
-#define SSH_TUNID_ANY 0x7fffffff
-#define SSH_TUNID_ERR (SSH_TUNID_ANY - 1)
-#define SSH_TUNID_MAX (SSH_TUNID_ANY - 2)
-
-/* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */
-u_int64_t get_u64(const void *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8)));
-u_int32_t get_u32(const void *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4)));
-u_int16_t get_u16(const void *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2)));
-void put_u64(void *, u_int64_t)
- __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8)));
-void put_u32(void *, u_int32_t)
- __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4)));
-void put_u16(void *, u_int16_t)
- __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2)));
-
-struct bwlimit {
- size_t buflen;
- u_int64_t rate, thresh, lamt;
- struct timeval bwstart, bwend;
-};
-
-void bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *, u_int64_t, size_t);
-void bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *, size_t);
-
-int parse_ipqos(const char *);
-const char *iptos2str(int);
-void mktemp_proto(char *, size_t);
-
-/* readpass.c */
-
-#define RP_ECHO 0x0001
-#define RP_ALLOW_STDIN 0x0002
-#define RP_ALLOW_EOF 0x0004
-#define RP_USE_ASKPASS 0x0008
-
-char *read_passphrase(const char *, int);
-int ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-int read_keyfile_line(FILE *, const char *, char *, size_t, u_long *);
-
-#endif /* _MISC_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/misc.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/misc.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/misc.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/misc.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.57 2016/07/15 00:24:30 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MISC_H
+#define _MISC_H
+
+/* Data structure for representing a forwarding request. */
+struct Forward {
+ char *listen_host; /* Host (address) to listen on. */
+ int listen_port; /* Port to forward. */
+ char *listen_path; /* Path to bind domain socket. */
+ char *connect_host; /* Host to connect. */
+ int connect_port; /* Port to connect on connect_host. */
+ char *connect_path; /* Path to connect domain socket. */
+ int allocated_port; /* Dynamically allocated listen port */
+ int handle; /* Handle for dynamic listen ports */
+};
+
+int forward_equals(const struct Forward *, const struct Forward *);
+
+/* Common server and client forwarding options. */
+struct ForwardOptions {
+ int gateway_ports; /* Allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */
+ mode_t streamlocal_bind_mask; /* umask for streamlocal binds */
+ int streamlocal_bind_unlink; /* unlink socket before bind */
+};
+
+/* misc.c */
+
+char *chop(char *);
+char *strdelim(char **);
+int set_nonblock(int);
+int unset_nonblock(int);
+void set_nodelay(int);
+int a2port(const char *);
+int a2tun(const char *, int *);
+char *put_host_port(const char *, u_short);
+char *hpdelim(char **);
+char *cleanhostname(char *);
+char *colon(char *);
+int parse_user_host_port(const char *, char **, char **, int *);
+long convtime(const char *);
+char *tilde_expand_filename(const char *, uid_t);
+char *percent_expand(const char *, ...) __attribute__((__sentinel__));
+char *tohex(const void *, size_t);
+void sanitise_stdfd(void);
+void ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *, int *);
+void ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *, int);
+time_t monotime(void);
+double monotime_double(void);
+void lowercase(char *s);
+int unix_listener(const char *, int, int);
+
+void sock_set_v6only(int);
+
+struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *);
+const char *ssh_gai_strerror(int);
+
+typedef struct arglist arglist;
+struct arglist {
+ char **list;
+ u_int num;
+ u_int nalloc;
+};
+void addargs(arglist *, char *, ...)
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+void replacearg(arglist *, u_int, char *, ...)
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)));
+void freeargs(arglist *);
+
+int tun_open(int, int);
+
+/* Common definitions for ssh tunnel device forwarding */
+#define SSH_TUNMODE_NO 0x00
+#define SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT 0x01
+#define SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET 0x02
+#define SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT
+#define SSH_TUNMODE_YES (SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT|SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET)
+
+#define SSH_TUNID_ANY 0x7fffffff
+#define SSH_TUNID_ERR (SSH_TUNID_ANY - 1)
+#define SSH_TUNID_MAX (SSH_TUNID_ANY - 2)
+
+/* Fake port to indicate that host field is really a path. */
+#define PORT_STREAMLOCAL -2
+
+/* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */
+u_int64_t get_u64(const void *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8)));
+u_int32_t get_u32(const void *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4)));
+u_int16_t get_u16(const void *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2)));
+void put_u64(void *, u_int64_t)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8)));
+void put_u32(void *, u_int32_t)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4)));
+void put_u16(void *, u_int16_t)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2)));
+
+/* Little-endian store/load, used by umac.c */
+u_int32_t get_u32_le(const void *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4)));
+void put_u32_le(void *, u_int32_t)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4)));
+
+struct bwlimit {
+ size_t buflen;
+ u_int64_t rate, thresh, lamt;
+ struct timeval bwstart, bwend;
+};
+
+void bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *, u_int64_t, size_t);
+void bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *, size_t);
+
+int parse_ipqos(const char *);
+const char *iptos2str(int);
+void mktemp_proto(char *, size_t);
+
+/* readpass.c */
+
+#define RP_ECHO 0x0001
+#define RP_ALLOW_STDIN 0x0002
+#define RP_ALLOW_EOF 0x0004
+#define RP_USE_ASKPASS 0x0008
+
+char *read_passphrase(const char *, int);
+int ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+int read_keyfile_line(FILE *, const char *, char *, size_t, u_long *);
+
+#endif /* _MISC_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/moduli
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/moduli 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/moduli 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,262 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.8 2012/08/29 05:06:54 dtucker Exp $
-# Time Type Tests Tries Size Generator Modulus
-20120821044040 2 6 100 1023 5 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A770E2EC9F
-20120821044046 2 6 100 1023 2 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A7711F2C6B
-20120821044047 2 6 100 1023 2 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A771225323
-20120821044048 2 6 100 1023 2 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A7712507AB
-20120821044050 2 6 100 1023 2 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A7712A2DB3
-20120821044051 2 6 100 1023 5 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A7712CACEF
-20120821044053 2 6 100 1023 2 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A7713959C3
-20120821044057 2 6 100 1023 2 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A7715BBA13
-20120821044103 2 6 100 1023 5 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A77191592F
-20120821044104 2 6 100 1023 5 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A771938E1F
-20120821044106 2 6 100 1023 5 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A771A1E127
-20120821044108 2 6 100 1023 2 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A771B3CDFB
-20120821044109 2 6 100 1023 2 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A771B71913
-20120821044111 2 6 100 1023 5 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A771C2759F
-20120821044113 2 6 100 1023 5 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A771CF8ABF
-20120821044114 2 6 100 1023 2 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A771D2B49B
-20120821044116 2 6 100 1023 2 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A771DF6193
-20120821044117 2 6 100 1023 2 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A771E67E33
-20120821044120 2 6 100 1023 2 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A771FA581B
-20120821044121 2 6 100 1023 2 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A772027DDB
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-20120821044124 2 6 100 1023 5 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A7720EEF6F
-20120821044125 2 6 100 1023 5 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A77216CAD7
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-20120821044129 2 6 100 1023 2 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A7722A0103
-20120821044130 2 6 100 1023 5 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A772343DBF
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-20120821044138 2 6 100 1023 2 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A772716D8B
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-20120821044143 2 6 100 1023 2 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A77297AA8B
-20120821044145 2 6 100 1023 2 D9277DAA27DB131C03B108D41A76B4DA8ACEECCCAE73D2E48CEDAAA70B09EF9F04FB020DCF36C51B8E485B26FABE0337E24232BE4F4E693548310244937433FB1A5758195DC73B84ADEF8237472C46747D79DC0A2CF8A57CE8DBD8F466A20F8551E7B1B824B2E4987A8816D9BC0741C2798F3EBAD3ADEBCC78FCE6A772A8794B
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE23445353B291F
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE2344537DF8F1B
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE2344538AF7C7B
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE23445392BB61F
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE234453BD5FE03
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE234453C6257EF
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE234453FBF1073
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE2344544BA2363
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE23445464ED33B
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE23445486B9E93
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE2344551AEBB1B
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE2344553053057
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE2344560200E33
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE23445620DCB9B
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE234456453E2C3
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE234456520F7B3
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE234456CC34FE7
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE234456DBB1643
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE234456FACFC3F
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE23445716EEFD3
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE2344574BD3B0F
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE234457918ED6F
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE23445857E1707
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE234458C6078E3
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE234458CA4E313
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE234459281E7B3
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE2344597A57CB3
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE23445987253DB
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE234459E124B2F
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE234459E442F5B
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE23445A1E0FD83
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE23445A6BDA473
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE23445ADCE429F
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE23445AE75FB83
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE23445AF5813A3
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE23445AFF92FDF
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE23445B0A9AF9F
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82CD256BC3B365896D80DC170BE23445B296E223
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/moduli (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/moduli)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/moduli (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/moduli 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+# $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.17 2016/03/01 04:23:08 dtucker Exp $
+# Time Type Tests Tries Size Generator Modulus
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185DBC29652E3F62A45D6BF990FB354D491D852F
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185DBC29652E3F62A45D6BF990FB354D4CAD7D8B
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/moduli.0
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/moduli.0 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/moduli.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-MODULI(5) OpenBSD Programmer's Manual MODULI(5)
-
-NAME
- moduli - Diffie-Hellman moduli
-
-DESCRIPTION
- The /etc/moduli file contains prime numbers and generators for use by
- sshd(8) in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method.
-
- New moduli may be generated with ssh-keygen(1) using a two-step process.
- An initial candidate generation pass, using ssh-keygen -G, calculates
- numbers that are likely to be useful. A second primality testing pass,
- using ssh-keygen -T, provides a high degree of assurance that the numbers
- are prime and are safe for use in Diffie-Hellman operations by sshd(8).
- This moduli format is used as the output from each pass.
-
- The file consists of newline-separated records, one per modulus,
- containing seven space-separated fields. These fields are as follows:
-
- timestamp The time that the modulus was last processed as
- YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.
-
- type Decimal number specifying the internal structure of
- the prime modulus. Supported types are:
-
- 0 Unknown, not tested.
- 2 "Safe" prime; (p-1)/2 is also prime.
- 4 Sophie Germain; 2p+1 is also prime.
-
- Moduli candidates initially produced by ssh-keygen(1)
- are Sophie Germain primes (type 4). Further primality
- testing with ssh-keygen(1) produces safe prime moduli
- (type 2) that are ready for use in sshd(8). Other
- types are not used by OpenSSH.
-
- tests Decimal number indicating the type of primality tests
- that the number has been subjected to represented as a
- bitmask of the following values:
-
- 0x00 Not tested.
- 0x01 Composite number - not prime.
- 0x02 Sieve of Eratosthenes.
- 0x04 Probabilistic Miller-Rabin primality tests.
-
- The ssh-keygen(1) moduli candidate generation uses the
- Sieve of Eratosthenes (flag 0x02). Subsequent
- ssh-keygen(1) primality tests are Miller-Rabin tests
- (flag 0x04).
-
- trials Decimal number indicating the number of primality
- trials that have been performed on the modulus.
-
- size Decimal number indicating the size of the prime in
- bits.
-
- generator The recommended generator for use with this modulus
- (hexadecimal).
-
- modulus The modulus itself in hexadecimal.
-
- When performing Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange, sshd(8) first estimates
- the size of the modulus required to produce enough Diffie-Hellman output
- to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher. sshd(8) then randomly
- selects a modulus from /etc/moduli that best meets the size requirement.
-
-SEE ALSO
- ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8)
-
-STANDARDS
- M. Friedl, N. Provos, and W. Simpson, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for
- the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006,
- 2006.
-
-OpenBSD 5.5 September 26, 2012 OpenBSD 5.5
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/moduli.0 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/moduli.0)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/moduli.0 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/moduli.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+MODULI(5) File Formats Manual MODULI(5)
+
+NAME
+ moduli M-bM-^@M-^S Diffie-Hellman moduli
+
+DESCRIPTION
+ The /etc/moduli file contains prime numbers and generators for use by
+ sshd(8) in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method.
+
+ New moduli may be generated with ssh-keygen(1) using a two-step process.
+ An initial candidate generation pass, using ssh-keygen -G, calculates
+ numbers that are likely to be useful. A second primality testing pass,
+ using ssh-keygen -T, provides a high degree of assurance that the numbers
+ are prime and are safe for use in Diffie-Hellman operations by sshd(8).
+ This moduli format is used as the output from each pass.
+
+ The file consists of newline-separated records, one per modulus,
+ containing seven space-separated fields. These fields are as follows:
+
+ timestamp The time that the modulus was last processed as
+ YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.
+
+ type Decimal number specifying the internal structure of
+ the prime modulus. Supported types are:
+
+ 0 Unknown, not tested.
+ 2 "Safe" prime; (p-1)/2 is also prime.
+ 4 Sophie Germain; 2p+1 is also prime.
+
+ Moduli candidates initially produced by ssh-keygen(1)
+ are Sophie Germain primes (type 4). Further primality
+ testing with ssh-keygen(1) produces safe prime moduli
+ (type 2) that are ready for use in sshd(8). Other
+ types are not used by OpenSSH.
+
+ tests Decimal number indicating the type of primality tests
+ that the number has been subjected to represented as a
+ bitmask of the following values:
+
+ 0x00 Not tested.
+ 0x01 Composite number M-bM-^@M-^S not prime.
+ 0x02 Sieve of Eratosthenes.
+ 0x04 Probabilistic Miller-Rabin primality tests.
+
+ The ssh-keygen(1) moduli candidate generation uses the
+ Sieve of Eratosthenes (flag 0x02). Subsequent
+ ssh-keygen(1) primality tests are Miller-Rabin tests
+ (flag 0x04).
+
+ trials Decimal number indicating the number of primality
+ trials that have been performed on the modulus.
+
+ size Decimal number indicating the size of the prime in
+ bits.
+
+ generator The recommended generator for use with this modulus
+ (hexadecimal).
+
+ modulus The modulus itself in hexadecimal.
+
+ When performing Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange, sshd(8) first estimates
+ the size of the modulus required to produce enough Diffie-Hellman output
+ to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher. sshd(8) then randomly
+ selects a modulus from /etc/moduli that best meets the size requirement.
+
+SEE ALSO
+ ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8)
+
+STANDARDS
+ M. Friedl, N. Provos, and W. Simpson, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for
+ the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006,
+ 2006.
+
+OpenBSD 6.0 September 26, 2012 OpenBSD 6.0
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/moduli.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/moduli.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/moduli.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,803 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: moduli.c,v 1.28 2013/10/24 00:49:49 dtucker Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright 1994 Phil Karn <karn at qualcomm.com>
- * Copyright 1996-1998, 2003 William Allen Simpson <wsimpson at greendragon.com>
- * Copyright 2000 Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-/*
- * Two-step process to generate safe primes for DHGEX
- *
- * Sieve candidates for "safe" primes,
- * suitable for use as Diffie-Hellman moduli;
- * that is, where q = (p-1)/2 is also prime.
- *
- * First step: generate candidate primes (memory intensive)
- * Second step: test primes' safety (processor intensive)
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "dh.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-
-/*
- * File output defines
- */
-
-/* need line long enough for largest moduli plus headers */
-#define QLINESIZE (100+8192)
-
-/*
- * Size: decimal.
- * Specifies the number of the most significant bit (0 to M).
- * WARNING: internally, usually 1 to N.
- */
-#define QSIZE_MINIMUM (511)
-
-/*
- * Prime sieving defines
- */
-
-/* Constant: assuming 8 bit bytes and 32 bit words */
-#define SHIFT_BIT (3)
-#define SHIFT_BYTE (2)
-#define SHIFT_WORD (SHIFT_BIT+SHIFT_BYTE)
-#define SHIFT_MEGABYTE (20)
-#define SHIFT_MEGAWORD (SHIFT_MEGABYTE-SHIFT_BYTE)
-
-/*
- * Using virtual memory can cause thrashing. This should be the largest
- * number that is supported without a large amount of disk activity --
- * that would increase the run time from hours to days or weeks!
- */
-#define LARGE_MINIMUM (8UL) /* megabytes */
-
-/*
- * Do not increase this number beyond the unsigned integer bit size.
- * Due to a multiple of 4, it must be LESS than 128 (yielding 2**30 bits).
- */
-#define LARGE_MAXIMUM (127UL) /* megabytes */
-
-/*
- * Constant: when used with 32-bit integers, the largest sieve prime
- * has to be less than 2**32.
- */
-#define SMALL_MAXIMUM (0xffffffffUL)
-
-/* Constant: can sieve all primes less than 2**32, as 65537**2 > 2**32-1. */
-#define TINY_NUMBER (1UL<<16)
-
-/* Ensure enough bit space for testing 2*q. */
-#define TEST_MAXIMUM (1UL<<16)
-#define TEST_MINIMUM (QSIZE_MINIMUM + 1)
-/* real TEST_MINIMUM (1UL << (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER)) */
-#define TEST_POWER (3) /* 2**n, n < SHIFT_WORD */
-
-/* bit operations on 32-bit words */
-#define BIT_CLEAR(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] &= ~(1L << ((n) & 31)))
-#define BIT_SET(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] |= (1L << ((n) & 31)))
-#define BIT_TEST(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] & (1L << ((n) & 31)))
-
-/*
- * Prime testing defines
- */
-
-/* Minimum number of primality tests to perform */
-#define TRIAL_MINIMUM (4)
-
-/*
- * Sieving data (XXX - move to struct)
- */
-
-/* sieve 2**16 */
-static u_int32_t *TinySieve, tinybits;
-
-/* sieve 2**30 in 2**16 parts */
-static u_int32_t *SmallSieve, smallbits, smallbase;
-
-/* sieve relative to the initial value */
-static u_int32_t *LargeSieve, largewords, largetries, largenumbers;
-static u_int32_t largebits, largememory; /* megabytes */
-static BIGNUM *largebase;
-
-int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *);
-int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long,
- unsigned long);
-
-/*
- * print moduli out in consistent form,
- */
-static int
-qfileout(FILE * ofile, u_int32_t otype, u_int32_t otests, u_int32_t otries,
- u_int32_t osize, u_int32_t ogenerator, BIGNUM * omodulus)
-{
- struct tm *gtm;
- time_t time_now;
- int res;
-
- time(&time_now);
- gtm = gmtime(&time_now);
-
- res = fprintf(ofile, "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d %u %u %u %u %x ",
- gtm->tm_year + 1900, gtm->tm_mon + 1, gtm->tm_mday,
- gtm->tm_hour, gtm->tm_min, gtm->tm_sec,
- otype, otests, otries, osize, ogenerator);
-
- if (res < 0)
- return (-1);
-
- if (BN_print_fp(ofile, omodulus) < 1)
- return (-1);
-
- res = fprintf(ofile, "\n");
- fflush(ofile);
-
- return (res > 0 ? 0 : -1);
-}
-
-
-/*
- ** Sieve p's and q's with small factors
- */
-static void
-sieve_large(u_int32_t s)
-{
- u_int32_t r, u;
-
- debug3("sieve_large %u", s);
- largetries++;
- /* r = largebase mod s */
- r = BN_mod_word(largebase, s);
- if (r == 0)
- u = 0; /* s divides into largebase exactly */
- else
- u = s - r; /* largebase+u is first entry divisible by s */
-
- if (u < largebits * 2) {
- /*
- * The sieve omits p's and q's divisible by 2, so ensure that
- * largebase+u is odd. Then, step through the sieve in
- * increments of 2*s
- */
- if (u & 0x1)
- u += s; /* Make largebase+u odd, and u even */
-
- /* Mark all multiples of 2*s */
- for (u /= 2; u < largebits; u += s)
- BIT_SET(LargeSieve, u);
- }
-
- /* r = p mod s */
- r = (2 * r + 1) % s;
- if (r == 0)
- u = 0; /* s divides p exactly */
- else
- u = s - r; /* p+u is first entry divisible by s */
-
- if (u < largebits * 4) {
- /*
- * The sieve omits p's divisible by 4, so ensure that
- * largebase+u is not. Then, step through the sieve in
- * increments of 4*s
- */
- while (u & 0x3) {
- if (SMALL_MAXIMUM - u < s)
- return;
- u += s;
- }
-
- /* Mark all multiples of 4*s */
- for (u /= 4; u < largebits; u += s)
- BIT_SET(LargeSieve, u);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * list candidates for Sophie-Germain primes (where q = (p-1)/2)
- * to standard output.
- * The list is checked against small known primes (less than 2**30).
- */
-int
-gen_candidates(FILE *out, u_int32_t memory, u_int32_t power, BIGNUM *start)
-{
- BIGNUM *q;
- u_int32_t j, r, s, t;
- u_int32_t smallwords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6;
- u_int32_t tinywords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6;
- time_t time_start, time_stop;
- u_int32_t i;
- int ret = 0;
-
- largememory = memory;
-
- if (memory != 0 &&
- (memory < LARGE_MINIMUM || memory > LARGE_MAXIMUM)) {
- error("Invalid memory amount (min %ld, max %ld)",
- LARGE_MINIMUM, LARGE_MAXIMUM);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- /*
- * Set power to the length in bits of the prime to be generated.
- * This is changed to 1 less than the desired safe prime moduli p.
- */
- if (power > TEST_MAXIMUM) {
- error("Too many bits: %u > %lu", power, TEST_MAXIMUM);
- return (-1);
- } else if (power < TEST_MINIMUM) {
- error("Too few bits: %u < %u", power, TEST_MINIMUM);
- return (-1);
- }
- power--; /* decrement before squaring */
-
- /*
- * The density of ordinary primes is on the order of 1/bits, so the
- * density of safe primes should be about (1/bits)**2. Set test range
- * to something well above bits**2 to be reasonably sure (but not
- * guaranteed) of catching at least one safe prime.
- */
- largewords = ((power * power) >> (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER));
-
- /*
- * Need idea of how much memory is available. We don't have to use all
- * of it.
- */
- if (largememory > LARGE_MAXIMUM) {
- logit("Limited memory: %u MB; limit %lu MB",
- largememory, LARGE_MAXIMUM);
- largememory = LARGE_MAXIMUM;
- }
-
- if (largewords <= (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD)) {
- logit("Increased memory: %u MB; need %u bytes",
- largememory, (largewords << SHIFT_BYTE));
- largewords = (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD);
- } else if (largememory > 0) {
- logit("Decreased memory: %u MB; want %u bytes",
- largememory, (largewords << SHIFT_BYTE));
- largewords = (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD);
- }
-
- TinySieve = xcalloc(tinywords, sizeof(u_int32_t));
- tinybits = tinywords << SHIFT_WORD;
-
- SmallSieve = xcalloc(smallwords, sizeof(u_int32_t));
- smallbits = smallwords << SHIFT_WORD;
-
- /*
- * dynamically determine available memory
- */
- while ((LargeSieve = calloc(largewords, sizeof(u_int32_t))) == NULL)
- largewords -= (1L << (SHIFT_MEGAWORD - 2)); /* 1/4 MB chunks */
-
- largebits = largewords << SHIFT_WORD;
- largenumbers = largebits * 2; /* even numbers excluded */
-
- /* validation check: count the number of primes tried */
- largetries = 0;
- if ((q = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("BN_new failed");
-
- /*
- * Generate random starting point for subprime search, or use
- * specified parameter.
- */
- if ((largebase = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("BN_new failed");
- if (start == NULL) {
- if (BN_rand(largebase, power, 1, 1) == 0)
- fatal("BN_rand failed");
- } else {
- if (BN_copy(largebase, start) == NULL)
- fatal("BN_copy: failed");
- }
-
- /* ensure odd */
- if (BN_set_bit(largebase, 0) == 0)
- fatal("BN_set_bit: failed");
-
- time(&time_start);
-
- logit("%.24s Sieve next %u plus %u-bit", ctime(&time_start),
- largenumbers, power);
- debug2("start point: 0x%s", BN_bn2hex(largebase));
-
- /*
- * TinySieve
- */
- for (i = 0; i < tinybits; i++) {
- if (BIT_TEST(TinySieve, i))
- continue; /* 2*i+3 is composite */
-
- /* The next tiny prime */
- t = 2 * i + 3;
-
- /* Mark all multiples of t */
- for (j = i + t; j < tinybits; j += t)
- BIT_SET(TinySieve, j);
-
- sieve_large(t);
- }
-
- /*
- * Start the small block search at the next possible prime. To avoid
- * fencepost errors, the last pass is skipped.
- */
- for (smallbase = TINY_NUMBER + 3;
- smallbase < (SMALL_MAXIMUM - TINY_NUMBER);
- smallbase += TINY_NUMBER) {
- for (i = 0; i < tinybits; i++) {
- if (BIT_TEST(TinySieve, i))
- continue; /* 2*i+3 is composite */
-
- /* The next tiny prime */
- t = 2 * i + 3;
- r = smallbase % t;
-
- if (r == 0) {
- s = 0; /* t divides into smallbase exactly */
- } else {
- /* smallbase+s is first entry divisible by t */
- s = t - r;
- }
-
- /*
- * The sieve omits even numbers, so ensure that
- * smallbase+s is odd. Then, step through the sieve
- * in increments of 2*t
- */
- if (s & 1)
- s += t; /* Make smallbase+s odd, and s even */
-
- /* Mark all multiples of 2*t */
- for (s /= 2; s < smallbits; s += t)
- BIT_SET(SmallSieve, s);
- }
-
- /*
- * SmallSieve
- */
- for (i = 0; i < smallbits; i++) {
- if (BIT_TEST(SmallSieve, i))
- continue; /* 2*i+smallbase is composite */
-
- /* The next small prime */
- sieve_large((2 * i) + smallbase);
- }
-
- memset(SmallSieve, 0, smallwords << SHIFT_BYTE);
- }
-
- time(&time_stop);
-
- logit("%.24s Sieved with %u small primes in %ld seconds",
- ctime(&time_stop), largetries, (long) (time_stop - time_start));
-
- for (j = r = 0; j < largebits; j++) {
- if (BIT_TEST(LargeSieve, j))
- continue; /* Definitely composite, skip */
-
- debug2("test q = largebase+%u", 2 * j);
- if (BN_set_word(q, 2 * j) == 0)
- fatal("BN_set_word failed");
- if (BN_add(q, q, largebase) == 0)
- fatal("BN_add failed");
- if (qfileout(out, MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN,
- MODULI_TESTS_SIEVE, largetries,
- (power - 1) /* MSB */, (0), q) == -1) {
- ret = -1;
- break;
- }
-
- r++; /* count q */
- }
-
- time(&time_stop);
-
- free(LargeSieve);
- free(SmallSieve);
- free(TinySieve);
-
- logit("%.24s Found %u candidates", ctime(&time_stop), r);
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static void
-write_checkpoint(char *cpfile, u_int32_t lineno)
-{
- FILE *fp;
- char tmp[MAXPATHLEN];
- int r;
-
- r = snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%s.XXXXXXXXXX", cpfile);
- if (r == -1 || r >= MAXPATHLEN) {
- logit("write_checkpoint: temp pathname too long");
- return;
- }
- if ((r = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1) {
- logit("mkstemp(%s): %s", tmp, strerror(errno));
- return;
- }
- if ((fp = fdopen(r, "w")) == NULL) {
- logit("write_checkpoint: fdopen: %s", strerror(errno));
- close(r);
- return;
- }
- if (fprintf(fp, "%lu\n", (unsigned long)lineno) > 0 && fclose(fp) == 0
- && rename(tmp, cpfile) == 0)
- debug3("wrote checkpoint line %lu to '%s'",
- (unsigned long)lineno, cpfile);
- else
- logit("failed to write to checkpoint file '%s': %s", cpfile,
- strerror(errno));
-}
-
-static unsigned long
-read_checkpoint(char *cpfile)
-{
- FILE *fp;
- unsigned long lineno = 0;
-
- if ((fp = fopen(cpfile, "r")) == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (fscanf(fp, "%lu\n", &lineno) < 1)
- logit("Failed to load checkpoint from '%s'", cpfile);
- else
- logit("Loaded checkpoint from '%s' line %lu", cpfile, lineno);
- fclose(fp);
- return lineno;
-}
-
-static unsigned long
-count_lines(FILE *f)
-{
- unsigned long count = 0;
- char lp[QLINESIZE + 1];
-
- if (fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET) != 0) {
- debug("input file is not seekable");
- return ULONG_MAX;
- }
- while (fgets(lp, QLINESIZE + 1, f) != NULL)
- count++;
- rewind(f);
- debug("input file has %lu lines", count);
- return count;
-}
-
-static char *
-fmt_time(time_t seconds)
-{
- int day, hr, min;
- static char buf[128];
-
- min = (seconds / 60) % 60;
- hr = (seconds / 60 / 60) % 24;
- day = seconds / 60 / 60 / 24;
- if (day > 0)
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%dd %d:%02d", day, hr, min);
- else
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%d:%02d", hr, min);
- return buf;
-}
-
-static void
-print_progress(unsigned long start_lineno, unsigned long current_lineno,
- unsigned long end_lineno)
-{
- static time_t time_start, time_prev;
- time_t time_now, elapsed;
- unsigned long num_to_process, processed, remaining, percent, eta;
- double time_per_line;
- char *eta_str;
-
- time_now = monotime();
- if (time_start == 0) {
- time_start = time_prev = time_now;
- return;
- }
- /* print progress after 1m then once per 5m */
- if (time_now - time_prev < 5 * 60)
- return;
- time_prev = time_now;
- elapsed = time_now - time_start;
- processed = current_lineno - start_lineno;
- remaining = end_lineno - current_lineno;
- num_to_process = end_lineno - start_lineno;
- time_per_line = (double)elapsed / processed;
- /* if we don't know how many we're processing just report count+time */
- time(&time_now);
- if (end_lineno == ULONG_MAX) {
- logit("%.24s processed %lu in %s", ctime(&time_now),
- processed, fmt_time(elapsed));
- return;
- }
- percent = 100 * processed / num_to_process;
- eta = time_per_line * remaining;
- eta_str = xstrdup(fmt_time(eta));
- logit("%.24s processed %lu of %lu (%lu%%) in %s, ETA %s",
- ctime(&time_now), processed, num_to_process, percent,
- fmt_time(elapsed), eta_str);
- free(eta_str);
-}
-
-/*
- * perform a Miller-Rabin primality test
- * on the list of candidates
- * (checking both q and p)
- * The result is a list of so-call "safe" primes
- */
-int
-prime_test(FILE *in, FILE *out, u_int32_t trials, u_int32_t generator_wanted,
- char *checkpoint_file, unsigned long start_lineno, unsigned long num_lines)
-{
- BIGNUM *q, *p, *a;
- BN_CTX *ctx;
- char *cp, *lp;
- u_int32_t count_in = 0, count_out = 0, count_possible = 0;
- u_int32_t generator_known, in_tests, in_tries, in_type, in_size;
- unsigned long last_processed = 0, end_lineno;
- time_t time_start, time_stop;
- int res;
-
- if (trials < TRIAL_MINIMUM) {
- error("Minimum primality trials is %d", TRIAL_MINIMUM);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- if (num_lines == 0)
- end_lineno = count_lines(in);
- else
- end_lineno = start_lineno + num_lines;
-
- time(&time_start);
-
- if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("BN_new failed");
- if ((q = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("BN_new failed");
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("BN_CTX_new failed");
-
- debug2("%.24s Final %u Miller-Rabin trials (%x generator)",
- ctime(&time_start), trials, generator_wanted);
-
- if (checkpoint_file != NULL)
- last_processed = read_checkpoint(checkpoint_file);
- last_processed = start_lineno = MAX(last_processed, start_lineno);
- if (end_lineno == ULONG_MAX)
- debug("process from line %lu from pipe", last_processed);
- else
- debug("process from line %lu to line %lu", last_processed,
- end_lineno);
-
- res = 0;
- lp = xmalloc(QLINESIZE + 1);
- while (fgets(lp, QLINESIZE + 1, in) != NULL && count_in < end_lineno) {
- count_in++;
- if (count_in <= last_processed) {
- debug3("skipping line %u, before checkpoint or "
- "specified start line", count_in);
- continue;
- }
- if (checkpoint_file != NULL)
- write_checkpoint(checkpoint_file, count_in);
- print_progress(start_lineno, count_in, end_lineno);
- if (strlen(lp) < 14 || *lp == '!' || *lp == '#') {
- debug2("%10u: comment or short line", count_in);
- continue;
- }
-
- /* XXX - fragile parser */
- /* time */
- cp = &lp[14]; /* (skip) */
-
- /* type */
- in_type = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
-
- /* tests */
- in_tests = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
-
- if (in_tests & MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE) {
- debug2("%10u: known composite", count_in);
- continue;
- }
-
- /* tries */
- in_tries = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
-
- /* size (most significant bit) */
- in_size = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
-
- /* generator (hex) */
- generator_known = strtoul(cp, &cp, 16);
-
- /* Skip white space */
- cp += strspn(cp, " ");
-
- /* modulus (hex) */
- switch (in_type) {
- case MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN:
- debug2("%10u: (%u) Sophie-Germain", count_in, in_type);
- a = q;
- if (BN_hex2bn(&a, cp) == 0)
- fatal("BN_hex2bn failed");
- /* p = 2*q + 1 */
- if (BN_lshift(p, q, 1) == 0)
- fatal("BN_lshift failed");
- if (BN_add_word(p, 1) == 0)
- fatal("BN_add_word failed");
- in_size += 1;
- generator_known = 0;
- break;
- case MODULI_TYPE_UNSTRUCTURED:
- case MODULI_TYPE_SAFE:
- case MODULI_TYPE_SCHNORR:
- case MODULI_TYPE_STRONG:
- case MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN:
- debug2("%10u: (%u)", count_in, in_type);
- a = p;
- if (BN_hex2bn(&a, cp) == 0)
- fatal("BN_hex2bn failed");
- /* q = (p-1) / 2 */
- if (BN_rshift(q, p, 1) == 0)
- fatal("BN_rshift failed");
- break;
- default:
- debug2("Unknown prime type");
- break;
- }
-
- /*
- * due to earlier inconsistencies in interpretation, check
- * the proposed bit size.
- */
- if ((u_int32_t)BN_num_bits(p) != (in_size + 1)) {
- debug2("%10u: bit size %u mismatch", count_in, in_size);
- continue;
- }
- if (in_size < QSIZE_MINIMUM) {
- debug2("%10u: bit size %u too short", count_in, in_size);
- continue;
- }
-
- if (in_tests & MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN)
- in_tries += trials;
- else
- in_tries = trials;
-
- /*
- * guess unknown generator
- */
- if (generator_known == 0) {
- if (BN_mod_word(p, 24) == 11)
- generator_known = 2;
- else if (BN_mod_word(p, 12) == 5)
- generator_known = 3;
- else {
- u_int32_t r = BN_mod_word(p, 10);
-
- if (r == 3 || r == 7)
- generator_known = 5;
- }
- }
- /*
- * skip tests when desired generator doesn't match
- */
- if (generator_wanted > 0 &&
- generator_wanted != generator_known) {
- debug2("%10u: generator %d != %d",
- count_in, generator_known, generator_wanted);
- continue;
- }
-
- /*
- * Primes with no known generator are useless for DH, so
- * skip those.
- */
- if (generator_known == 0) {
- debug2("%10u: no known generator", count_in);
- continue;
- }
-
- count_possible++;
-
- /*
- * The (1/4)^N performance bound on Miller-Rabin is
- * extremely pessimistic, so don't spend a lot of time
- * really verifying that q is prime until after we know
- * that p is also prime. A single pass will weed out the
- * vast majority of composite q's.
- */
- if (BN_is_prime_ex(q, 1, ctx, NULL) <= 0) {
- debug("%10u: q failed first possible prime test",
- count_in);
- continue;
- }
-
- /*
- * q is possibly prime, so go ahead and really make sure
- * that p is prime. If it is, then we can go back and do
- * the same for q. If p is composite, chances are that
- * will show up on the first Rabin-Miller iteration so it
- * doesn't hurt to specify a high iteration count.
- */
- if (!BN_is_prime_ex(p, trials, ctx, NULL)) {
- debug("%10u: p is not prime", count_in);
- continue;
- }
- debug("%10u: p is almost certainly prime", count_in);
-
- /* recheck q more rigorously */
- if (!BN_is_prime_ex(q, trials - 1, ctx, NULL)) {
- debug("%10u: q is not prime", count_in);
- continue;
- }
- debug("%10u: q is almost certainly prime", count_in);
-
- if (qfileout(out, MODULI_TYPE_SAFE,
- in_tests | MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN,
- in_tries, in_size, generator_known, p)) {
- res = -1;
- break;
- }
-
- count_out++;
- }
-
- time(&time_stop);
- free(lp);
- BN_free(p);
- BN_free(q);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-
- if (checkpoint_file != NULL)
- unlink(checkpoint_file);
-
- logit("%.24s Found %u safe primes of %u candidates in %ld seconds",
- ctime(&time_stop), count_out, count_possible,
- (long) (time_stop - time_start));
-
- return (res);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/moduli.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/moduli.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/moduli.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/moduli.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,809 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: moduli.c,v 1.30 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 1994 Phil Karn <karn at qualcomm.com>
+ * Copyright 1996-1998, 2003 William Allen Simpson <wsimpson at greendragon.com>
+ * Copyright 2000 Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Two-step process to generate safe primes for DHGEX
+ *
+ * Sieve candidates for "safe" primes,
+ * suitable for use as Diffie-Hellman moduli;
+ * that is, where q = (p-1)/2 is also prime.
+ *
+ * First step: generate candidate primes (memory intensive)
+ * Second step: test primes' safety (processor intensive)
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/param.h> /* MAX */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+/*
+ * File output defines
+ */
+
+/* need line long enough for largest moduli plus headers */
+#define QLINESIZE (100+8192)
+
+/*
+ * Size: decimal.
+ * Specifies the number of the most significant bit (0 to M).
+ * WARNING: internally, usually 1 to N.
+ */
+#define QSIZE_MINIMUM (511)
+
+/*
+ * Prime sieving defines
+ */
+
+/* Constant: assuming 8 bit bytes and 32 bit words */
+#define SHIFT_BIT (3)
+#define SHIFT_BYTE (2)
+#define SHIFT_WORD (SHIFT_BIT+SHIFT_BYTE)
+#define SHIFT_MEGABYTE (20)
+#define SHIFT_MEGAWORD (SHIFT_MEGABYTE-SHIFT_BYTE)
+
+/*
+ * Using virtual memory can cause thrashing. This should be the largest
+ * number that is supported without a large amount of disk activity --
+ * that would increase the run time from hours to days or weeks!
+ */
+#define LARGE_MINIMUM (8UL) /* megabytes */
+
+/*
+ * Do not increase this number beyond the unsigned integer bit size.
+ * Due to a multiple of 4, it must be LESS than 128 (yielding 2**30 bits).
+ */
+#define LARGE_MAXIMUM (127UL) /* megabytes */
+
+/*
+ * Constant: when used with 32-bit integers, the largest sieve prime
+ * has to be less than 2**32.
+ */
+#define SMALL_MAXIMUM (0xffffffffUL)
+
+/* Constant: can sieve all primes less than 2**32, as 65537**2 > 2**32-1. */
+#define TINY_NUMBER (1UL<<16)
+
+/* Ensure enough bit space for testing 2*q. */
+#define TEST_MAXIMUM (1UL<<16)
+#define TEST_MINIMUM (QSIZE_MINIMUM + 1)
+/* real TEST_MINIMUM (1UL << (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER)) */
+#define TEST_POWER (3) /* 2**n, n < SHIFT_WORD */
+
+/* bit operations on 32-bit words */
+#define BIT_CLEAR(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] &= ~(1L << ((n) & 31)))
+#define BIT_SET(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] |= (1L << ((n) & 31)))
+#define BIT_TEST(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] & (1L << ((n) & 31)))
+
+/*
+ * Prime testing defines
+ */
+
+/* Minimum number of primality tests to perform */
+#define TRIAL_MINIMUM (4)
+
+/*
+ * Sieving data (XXX - move to struct)
+ */
+
+/* sieve 2**16 */
+static u_int32_t *TinySieve, tinybits;
+
+/* sieve 2**30 in 2**16 parts */
+static u_int32_t *SmallSieve, smallbits, smallbase;
+
+/* sieve relative to the initial value */
+static u_int32_t *LargeSieve, largewords, largetries, largenumbers;
+static u_int32_t largebits, largememory; /* megabytes */
+static BIGNUM *largebase;
+
+int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *);
+int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long,
+ unsigned long);
+
+/*
+ * print moduli out in consistent form,
+ */
+static int
+qfileout(FILE * ofile, u_int32_t otype, u_int32_t otests, u_int32_t otries,
+ u_int32_t osize, u_int32_t ogenerator, BIGNUM * omodulus)
+{
+ struct tm *gtm;
+ time_t time_now;
+ int res;
+
+ time(&time_now);
+ gtm = gmtime(&time_now);
+
+ res = fprintf(ofile, "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d %u %u %u %u %x ",
+ gtm->tm_year + 1900, gtm->tm_mon + 1, gtm->tm_mday,
+ gtm->tm_hour, gtm->tm_min, gtm->tm_sec,
+ otype, otests, otries, osize, ogenerator);
+
+ if (res < 0)
+ return (-1);
+
+ if (BN_print_fp(ofile, omodulus) < 1)
+ return (-1);
+
+ res = fprintf(ofile, "\n");
+ fflush(ofile);
+
+ return (res > 0 ? 0 : -1);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ ** Sieve p's and q's with small factors
+ */
+static void
+sieve_large(u_int32_t s)
+{
+ u_int32_t r, u;
+
+ debug3("sieve_large %u", s);
+ largetries++;
+ /* r = largebase mod s */
+ r = BN_mod_word(largebase, s);
+ if (r == 0)
+ u = 0; /* s divides into largebase exactly */
+ else
+ u = s - r; /* largebase+u is first entry divisible by s */
+
+ if (u < largebits * 2) {
+ /*
+ * The sieve omits p's and q's divisible by 2, so ensure that
+ * largebase+u is odd. Then, step through the sieve in
+ * increments of 2*s
+ */
+ if (u & 0x1)
+ u += s; /* Make largebase+u odd, and u even */
+
+ /* Mark all multiples of 2*s */
+ for (u /= 2; u < largebits; u += s)
+ BIT_SET(LargeSieve, u);
+ }
+
+ /* r = p mod s */
+ r = (2 * r + 1) % s;
+ if (r == 0)
+ u = 0; /* s divides p exactly */
+ else
+ u = s - r; /* p+u is first entry divisible by s */
+
+ if (u < largebits * 4) {
+ /*
+ * The sieve omits p's divisible by 4, so ensure that
+ * largebase+u is not. Then, step through the sieve in
+ * increments of 4*s
+ */
+ while (u & 0x3) {
+ if (SMALL_MAXIMUM - u < s)
+ return;
+ u += s;
+ }
+
+ /* Mark all multiples of 4*s */
+ for (u /= 4; u < largebits; u += s)
+ BIT_SET(LargeSieve, u);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * list candidates for Sophie-Germain primes (where q = (p-1)/2)
+ * to standard output.
+ * The list is checked against small known primes (less than 2**30).
+ */
+int
+gen_candidates(FILE *out, u_int32_t memory, u_int32_t power, BIGNUM *start)
+{
+ BIGNUM *q;
+ u_int32_t j, r, s, t;
+ u_int32_t smallwords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6;
+ u_int32_t tinywords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6;
+ time_t time_start, time_stop;
+ u_int32_t i;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ largememory = memory;
+
+ if (memory != 0 &&
+ (memory < LARGE_MINIMUM || memory > LARGE_MAXIMUM)) {
+ error("Invalid memory amount (min %ld, max %ld)",
+ LARGE_MINIMUM, LARGE_MAXIMUM);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set power to the length in bits of the prime to be generated.
+ * This is changed to 1 less than the desired safe prime moduli p.
+ */
+ if (power > TEST_MAXIMUM) {
+ error("Too many bits: %u > %lu", power, TEST_MAXIMUM);
+ return (-1);
+ } else if (power < TEST_MINIMUM) {
+ error("Too few bits: %u < %u", power, TEST_MINIMUM);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ power--; /* decrement before squaring */
+
+ /*
+ * The density of ordinary primes is on the order of 1/bits, so the
+ * density of safe primes should be about (1/bits)**2. Set test range
+ * to something well above bits**2 to be reasonably sure (but not
+ * guaranteed) of catching at least one safe prime.
+ */
+ largewords = ((power * power) >> (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER));
+
+ /*
+ * Need idea of how much memory is available. We don't have to use all
+ * of it.
+ */
+ if (largememory > LARGE_MAXIMUM) {
+ logit("Limited memory: %u MB; limit %lu MB",
+ largememory, LARGE_MAXIMUM);
+ largememory = LARGE_MAXIMUM;
+ }
+
+ if (largewords <= (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD)) {
+ logit("Increased memory: %u MB; need %u bytes",
+ largememory, (largewords << SHIFT_BYTE));
+ largewords = (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD);
+ } else if (largememory > 0) {
+ logit("Decreased memory: %u MB; want %u bytes",
+ largememory, (largewords << SHIFT_BYTE));
+ largewords = (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD);
+ }
+
+ TinySieve = xcalloc(tinywords, sizeof(u_int32_t));
+ tinybits = tinywords << SHIFT_WORD;
+
+ SmallSieve = xcalloc(smallwords, sizeof(u_int32_t));
+ smallbits = smallwords << SHIFT_WORD;
+
+ /*
+ * dynamically determine available memory
+ */
+ while ((LargeSieve = calloc(largewords, sizeof(u_int32_t))) == NULL)
+ largewords -= (1L << (SHIFT_MEGAWORD - 2)); /* 1/4 MB chunks */
+
+ largebits = largewords << SHIFT_WORD;
+ largenumbers = largebits * 2; /* even numbers excluded */
+
+ /* validation check: count the number of primes tried */
+ largetries = 0;
+ if ((q = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("BN_new failed");
+
+ /*
+ * Generate random starting point for subprime search, or use
+ * specified parameter.
+ */
+ if ((largebase = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("BN_new failed");
+ if (start == NULL) {
+ if (BN_rand(largebase, power, 1, 1) == 0)
+ fatal("BN_rand failed");
+ } else {
+ if (BN_copy(largebase, start) == NULL)
+ fatal("BN_copy: failed");
+ }
+
+ /* ensure odd */
+ if (BN_set_bit(largebase, 0) == 0)
+ fatal("BN_set_bit: failed");
+
+ time(&time_start);
+
+ logit("%.24s Sieve next %u plus %u-bit", ctime(&time_start),
+ largenumbers, power);
+ debug2("start point: 0x%s", BN_bn2hex(largebase));
+
+ /*
+ * TinySieve
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < tinybits; i++) {
+ if (BIT_TEST(TinySieve, i))
+ continue; /* 2*i+3 is composite */
+
+ /* The next tiny prime */
+ t = 2 * i + 3;
+
+ /* Mark all multiples of t */
+ for (j = i + t; j < tinybits; j += t)
+ BIT_SET(TinySieve, j);
+
+ sieve_large(t);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Start the small block search at the next possible prime. To avoid
+ * fencepost errors, the last pass is skipped.
+ */
+ for (smallbase = TINY_NUMBER + 3;
+ smallbase < (SMALL_MAXIMUM - TINY_NUMBER);
+ smallbase += TINY_NUMBER) {
+ for (i = 0; i < tinybits; i++) {
+ if (BIT_TEST(TinySieve, i))
+ continue; /* 2*i+3 is composite */
+
+ /* The next tiny prime */
+ t = 2 * i + 3;
+ r = smallbase % t;
+
+ if (r == 0) {
+ s = 0; /* t divides into smallbase exactly */
+ } else {
+ /* smallbase+s is first entry divisible by t */
+ s = t - r;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The sieve omits even numbers, so ensure that
+ * smallbase+s is odd. Then, step through the sieve
+ * in increments of 2*t
+ */
+ if (s & 1)
+ s += t; /* Make smallbase+s odd, and s even */
+
+ /* Mark all multiples of 2*t */
+ for (s /= 2; s < smallbits; s += t)
+ BIT_SET(SmallSieve, s);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * SmallSieve
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < smallbits; i++) {
+ if (BIT_TEST(SmallSieve, i))
+ continue; /* 2*i+smallbase is composite */
+
+ /* The next small prime */
+ sieve_large((2 * i) + smallbase);
+ }
+
+ memset(SmallSieve, 0, smallwords << SHIFT_BYTE);
+ }
+
+ time(&time_stop);
+
+ logit("%.24s Sieved with %u small primes in %ld seconds",
+ ctime(&time_stop), largetries, (long) (time_stop - time_start));
+
+ for (j = r = 0; j < largebits; j++) {
+ if (BIT_TEST(LargeSieve, j))
+ continue; /* Definitely composite, skip */
+
+ debug2("test q = largebase+%u", 2 * j);
+ if (BN_set_word(q, 2 * j) == 0)
+ fatal("BN_set_word failed");
+ if (BN_add(q, q, largebase) == 0)
+ fatal("BN_add failed");
+ if (qfileout(out, MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN,
+ MODULI_TESTS_SIEVE, largetries,
+ (power - 1) /* MSB */, (0), q) == -1) {
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ r++; /* count q */
+ }
+
+ time(&time_stop);
+
+ free(LargeSieve);
+ free(SmallSieve);
+ free(TinySieve);
+
+ logit("%.24s Found %u candidates", ctime(&time_stop), r);
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static void
+write_checkpoint(char *cpfile, u_int32_t lineno)
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+ char tmp[PATH_MAX];
+ int r;
+
+ r = snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%s.XXXXXXXXXX", cpfile);
+ if (r == -1 || r >= PATH_MAX) {
+ logit("write_checkpoint: temp pathname too long");
+ return;
+ }
+ if ((r = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1) {
+ logit("mkstemp(%s): %s", tmp, strerror(errno));
+ return;
+ }
+ if ((fp = fdopen(r, "w")) == NULL) {
+ logit("write_checkpoint: fdopen: %s", strerror(errno));
+ unlink(tmp);
+ close(r);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (fprintf(fp, "%lu\n", (unsigned long)lineno) > 0 && fclose(fp) == 0
+ && rename(tmp, cpfile) == 0)
+ debug3("wrote checkpoint line %lu to '%s'",
+ (unsigned long)lineno, cpfile);
+ else
+ logit("failed to write to checkpoint file '%s': %s", cpfile,
+ strerror(errno));
+}
+
+static unsigned long
+read_checkpoint(char *cpfile)
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+ unsigned long lineno = 0;
+
+ if ((fp = fopen(cpfile, "r")) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (fscanf(fp, "%lu\n", &lineno) < 1)
+ logit("Failed to load checkpoint from '%s'", cpfile);
+ else
+ logit("Loaded checkpoint from '%s' line %lu", cpfile, lineno);
+ fclose(fp);
+ return lineno;
+}
+
+static unsigned long
+count_lines(FILE *f)
+{
+ unsigned long count = 0;
+ char lp[QLINESIZE + 1];
+
+ if (fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET) != 0) {
+ debug("input file is not seekable");
+ return ULONG_MAX;
+ }
+ while (fgets(lp, QLINESIZE + 1, f) != NULL)
+ count++;
+ rewind(f);
+ debug("input file has %lu lines", count);
+ return count;
+}
+
+static char *
+fmt_time(time_t seconds)
+{
+ int day, hr, min;
+ static char buf[128];
+
+ min = (seconds / 60) % 60;
+ hr = (seconds / 60 / 60) % 24;
+ day = seconds / 60 / 60 / 24;
+ if (day > 0)
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%dd %d:%02d", day, hr, min);
+ else
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%d:%02d", hr, min);
+ return buf;
+}
+
+static void
+print_progress(unsigned long start_lineno, unsigned long current_lineno,
+ unsigned long end_lineno)
+{
+ static time_t time_start, time_prev;
+ time_t time_now, elapsed;
+ unsigned long num_to_process, processed, remaining, percent, eta;
+ double time_per_line;
+ char *eta_str;
+
+ time_now = monotime();
+ if (time_start == 0) {
+ time_start = time_prev = time_now;
+ return;
+ }
+ /* print progress after 1m then once per 5m */
+ if (time_now - time_prev < 5 * 60)
+ return;
+ time_prev = time_now;
+ elapsed = time_now - time_start;
+ processed = current_lineno - start_lineno;
+ remaining = end_lineno - current_lineno;
+ num_to_process = end_lineno - start_lineno;
+ time_per_line = (double)elapsed / processed;
+ /* if we don't know how many we're processing just report count+time */
+ time(&time_now);
+ if (end_lineno == ULONG_MAX) {
+ logit("%.24s processed %lu in %s", ctime(&time_now),
+ processed, fmt_time(elapsed));
+ return;
+ }
+ percent = 100 * processed / num_to_process;
+ eta = time_per_line * remaining;
+ eta_str = xstrdup(fmt_time(eta));
+ logit("%.24s processed %lu of %lu (%lu%%) in %s, ETA %s",
+ ctime(&time_now), processed, num_to_process, percent,
+ fmt_time(elapsed), eta_str);
+ free(eta_str);
+}
+
+/*
+ * perform a Miller-Rabin primality test
+ * on the list of candidates
+ * (checking both q and p)
+ * The result is a list of so-call "safe" primes
+ */
+int
+prime_test(FILE *in, FILE *out, u_int32_t trials, u_int32_t generator_wanted,
+ char *checkpoint_file, unsigned long start_lineno, unsigned long num_lines)
+{
+ BIGNUM *q, *p, *a;
+ BN_CTX *ctx;
+ char *cp, *lp;
+ u_int32_t count_in = 0, count_out = 0, count_possible = 0;
+ u_int32_t generator_known, in_tests, in_tries, in_type, in_size;
+ unsigned long last_processed = 0, end_lineno;
+ time_t time_start, time_stop;
+ int res;
+
+ if (trials < TRIAL_MINIMUM) {
+ error("Minimum primality trials is %d", TRIAL_MINIMUM);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ if (num_lines == 0)
+ end_lineno = count_lines(in);
+ else
+ end_lineno = start_lineno + num_lines;
+
+ time(&time_start);
+
+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("BN_new failed");
+ if ((q = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("BN_new failed");
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("BN_CTX_new failed");
+
+ debug2("%.24s Final %u Miller-Rabin trials (%x generator)",
+ ctime(&time_start), trials, generator_wanted);
+
+ if (checkpoint_file != NULL)
+ last_processed = read_checkpoint(checkpoint_file);
+ last_processed = start_lineno = MAX(last_processed, start_lineno);
+ if (end_lineno == ULONG_MAX)
+ debug("process from line %lu from pipe", last_processed);
+ else
+ debug("process from line %lu to line %lu", last_processed,
+ end_lineno);
+
+ res = 0;
+ lp = xmalloc(QLINESIZE + 1);
+ while (fgets(lp, QLINESIZE + 1, in) != NULL && count_in < end_lineno) {
+ count_in++;
+ if (count_in <= last_processed) {
+ debug3("skipping line %u, before checkpoint or "
+ "specified start line", count_in);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (checkpoint_file != NULL)
+ write_checkpoint(checkpoint_file, count_in);
+ print_progress(start_lineno, count_in, end_lineno);
+ if (strlen(lp) < 14 || *lp == '!' || *lp == '#') {
+ debug2("%10u: comment or short line", count_in);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX - fragile parser */
+ /* time */
+ cp = &lp[14]; /* (skip) */
+
+ /* type */
+ in_type = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
+
+ /* tests */
+ in_tests = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
+
+ if (in_tests & MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE) {
+ debug2("%10u: known composite", count_in);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* tries */
+ in_tries = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
+
+ /* size (most significant bit) */
+ in_size = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
+
+ /* generator (hex) */
+ generator_known = strtoul(cp, &cp, 16);
+
+ /* Skip white space */
+ cp += strspn(cp, " ");
+
+ /* modulus (hex) */
+ switch (in_type) {
+ case MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN:
+ debug2("%10u: (%u) Sophie-Germain", count_in, in_type);
+ a = q;
+ if (BN_hex2bn(&a, cp) == 0)
+ fatal("BN_hex2bn failed");
+ /* p = 2*q + 1 */
+ if (BN_lshift(p, q, 1) == 0)
+ fatal("BN_lshift failed");
+ if (BN_add_word(p, 1) == 0)
+ fatal("BN_add_word failed");
+ in_size += 1;
+ generator_known = 0;
+ break;
+ case MODULI_TYPE_UNSTRUCTURED:
+ case MODULI_TYPE_SAFE:
+ case MODULI_TYPE_SCHNORR:
+ case MODULI_TYPE_STRONG:
+ case MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN:
+ debug2("%10u: (%u)", count_in, in_type);
+ a = p;
+ if (BN_hex2bn(&a, cp) == 0)
+ fatal("BN_hex2bn failed");
+ /* q = (p-1) / 2 */
+ if (BN_rshift(q, p, 1) == 0)
+ fatal("BN_rshift failed");
+ break;
+ default:
+ debug2("Unknown prime type");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * due to earlier inconsistencies in interpretation, check
+ * the proposed bit size.
+ */
+ if ((u_int32_t)BN_num_bits(p) != (in_size + 1)) {
+ debug2("%10u: bit size %u mismatch", count_in, in_size);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (in_size < QSIZE_MINIMUM) {
+ debug2("%10u: bit size %u too short", count_in, in_size);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (in_tests & MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN)
+ in_tries += trials;
+ else
+ in_tries = trials;
+
+ /*
+ * guess unknown generator
+ */
+ if (generator_known == 0) {
+ if (BN_mod_word(p, 24) == 11)
+ generator_known = 2;
+ else if (BN_mod_word(p, 12) == 5)
+ generator_known = 3;
+ else {
+ u_int32_t r = BN_mod_word(p, 10);
+
+ if (r == 3 || r == 7)
+ generator_known = 5;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * skip tests when desired generator doesn't match
+ */
+ if (generator_wanted > 0 &&
+ generator_wanted != generator_known) {
+ debug2("%10u: generator %d != %d",
+ count_in, generator_known, generator_wanted);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Primes with no known generator are useless for DH, so
+ * skip those.
+ */
+ if (generator_known == 0) {
+ debug2("%10u: no known generator", count_in);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ count_possible++;
+
+ /*
+ * The (1/4)^N performance bound on Miller-Rabin is
+ * extremely pessimistic, so don't spend a lot of time
+ * really verifying that q is prime until after we know
+ * that p is also prime. A single pass will weed out the
+ * vast majority of composite q's.
+ */
+ if (BN_is_prime_ex(q, 1, ctx, NULL) <= 0) {
+ debug("%10u: q failed first possible prime test",
+ count_in);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * q is possibly prime, so go ahead and really make sure
+ * that p is prime. If it is, then we can go back and do
+ * the same for q. If p is composite, chances are that
+ * will show up on the first Rabin-Miller iteration so it
+ * doesn't hurt to specify a high iteration count.
+ */
+ if (!BN_is_prime_ex(p, trials, ctx, NULL)) {
+ debug("%10u: p is not prime", count_in);
+ continue;
+ }
+ debug("%10u: p is almost certainly prime", count_in);
+
+ /* recheck q more rigorously */
+ if (!BN_is_prime_ex(q, trials - 1, ctx, NULL)) {
+ debug("%10u: q is not prime", count_in);
+ continue;
+ }
+ debug("%10u: q is almost certainly prime", count_in);
+
+ if (qfileout(out, MODULI_TYPE_SAFE,
+ in_tests | MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN,
+ in_tries, in_size, generator_known, p)) {
+ res = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ count_out++;
+ }
+
+ time(&time_stop);
+ free(lp);
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(q);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ if (checkpoint_file != NULL)
+ unlink(checkpoint_file);
+
+ logit("%.24s Found %u safe primes of %u candidates in %ld seconds",
+ ctime(&time_stop), count_out, count_possible,
+ (long) (time_stop - time_start));
+
+ return (res);
+}
+
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/monitor.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,2139 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.131 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>
- * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus at openbsd.org>
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-#include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
-#include <poll.h>
-#else
-# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
-# include <sys/poll.h>
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#ifdef SKEY
-#include <skey.h>
-#endif
-
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "dh.h"
-#ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC /* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */
-#undef TARGET_OS_MAC
-#include "zlib.h"
-#define TARGET_OS_MAC 1
-#else
-#include "zlib.h"
-#endif
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "sshpty.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "session.h"
-#include "sshlogin.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "monitor.h"
-#include "monitor_mm.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "roaming.h"
-#include "authfd.h"
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
-#endif
-
-/* Imports */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern u_int utmp_len;
-extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
-extern z_stream incoming_stream;
-extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
-extern u_char session_id[];
-extern Buffer auth_debug;
-extern int auth_debug_init;
-extern Buffer loginmsg;
-
-/* State exported from the child */
-
-struct {
- z_stream incoming;
- z_stream outgoing;
- u_char *keyin;
- u_int keyinlen;
- u_char *keyout;
- u_int keyoutlen;
- u_char *ivin;
- u_int ivinlen;
- u_char *ivout;
- u_int ivoutlen;
- u_char *ssh1key;
- u_int ssh1keylen;
- int ssh1cipher;
- int ssh1protoflags;
- u_char *input;
- u_int ilen;
- u_char *output;
- u_int olen;
- u_int64_t sent_bytes;
- u_int64_t recv_bytes;
-} child_state;
-
-/* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
-
-int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-int mm_answer_pam_start(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_pam_account(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_pam_query(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_pam_respond(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int, Buffer *);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
-#endif
-
-static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
-
-static Authctxt *authctxt;
-static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
-
-/* local state for key verify */
-static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
-static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
-static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
-static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
-static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
-static char *auth_method = "unknown";
-static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
-static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
-static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
-static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
-
-struct mon_table {
- enum monitor_reqtype type;
- int flags;
- int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
-};
-
-#define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
-#define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
-#define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
-#define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
-
-#define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
-
-#define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
-
-struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
- {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
-#endif
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-#endif
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
- {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
- {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
-#endif
-#ifdef SKEY
- {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
-#endif
- {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
- {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
-#ifdef GSSAPI
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
-#endif
- {0, 0, NULL}
-};
-
-struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
- {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
- {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
-#endif
- {0, 0, NULL}
-};
-
-struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
- {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
- {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
- {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
- {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
- {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
- {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
- {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
-#endif
-#ifdef SKEY
- {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
-#endif
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-#endif
- {0, 0, NULL}
-};
-
-struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
- {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
- {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
-#endif
- {0, 0, NULL}
-};
-
-struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
-
-/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
-
-static void
-monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
-{
- while (ent->f != NULL) {
- if (ent->type == type) {
- ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
- ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
- return;
- }
- ent++;
- }
-}
-
-static void
-monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
-{
- struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
-
- while (ent->f != NULL) {
- if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
- ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
- ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
- }
- ent++;
- }
-}
-
-void
-monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
-{
- struct mon_table *ent;
- int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
-
- debug3("preauth child monitor started");
-
- close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
- close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
- pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
-
- authctxt = _authctxt;
- memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
-
- authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
-
- if (compat20) {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
-
- /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
-
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
- }
-
- /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
- while (!authenticated) {
- partial = 0;
- auth_method = "unknown";
- auth_submethod = NULL;
- authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
-
- /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
- if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
- if (!compat20)
- fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
- "with SSH protocol 1");
- if (authenticated &&
- !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
- auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
- debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
- auth_method);
- authenticated = 0;
- partial = 1;
- }
- }
-
- if (authenticated) {
- if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
- fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
- __func__, ent->type);
- if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
- !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
- authenticated = 0;
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- /* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */
- if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
- Buffer m;
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
- authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
- buffer_free(&m);
- }
-#endif
- }
- if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
- auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
- auth_method, auth_submethod);
- if (!authenticated)
- authctxt->failures++;
- }
- }
-
- if (!authctxt->valid)
- fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
- if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
- fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
-
- debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
- __func__, authctxt->user);
-
- mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
-
- /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
- while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
- ;
-
- close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
- close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
- pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
-}
-
-static void
-monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
-{
- monitor_child_pid = pid;
-}
-
-static void
-monitor_child_handler(int sig)
-{
- kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
-}
-
-void
-monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
-{
- close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
- pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
-
- monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
- signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
- signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
- signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
-
- if (compat20) {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
-
- /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
- }
- if (!no_pty_flag) {
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
- }
-
- for (;;)
- monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
-}
-
-void
-monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
-{
- if (options.compression) {
- /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
- mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
- }
-}
-
-static int
-monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
-{
- Buffer logmsg;
- u_int len, level;
- char *msg;
-
- buffer_init(&logmsg);
-
- /* Read length */
- buffer_append_space(&logmsg, 4);
- if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
- buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) {
- if (errno == EPIPE) {
- buffer_free(&logmsg);
- debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
- close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
- pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
- return -1;
- }
- fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- }
- len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
- if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
- fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
-
- /* Read severity, message */
- buffer_clear(&logmsg);
- buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len);
- if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
- buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg))
- fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-
- /* Log it */
- level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
- msg = buffer_get_string(&logmsg, NULL);
- if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
- __func__, level);
- do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
-
- buffer_free(&logmsg);
- free(msg);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
- struct mon_table **pent)
-{
- Buffer m;
- int ret;
- u_char type;
- struct pollfd pfd[2];
-
- for (;;) {
- memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
- pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
- pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
- pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
- pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
- if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
- if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
- continue;
- fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- }
- if (pfd[1].revents) {
- /*
- * Drain all log messages before processing next
- * monitor request.
- */
- monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
- continue;
- }
- if (pfd[0].revents)
- break; /* Continues below */
- }
-
- buffer_init(&m);
-
- mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
- type = buffer_get_char(&m);
-
- debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
-
- while (ent->f != NULL) {
- if (ent->type == type)
- break;
- ent++;
- }
-
- if (ent->f != NULL) {
- if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
- fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
- type);
- ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
- if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
- debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
- type);
- ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
- }
-
- if (pent != NULL)
- *pent = ent;
-
- return ret;
- }
-
- fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
-
- /* NOTREACHED */
- return (-1);
-}
-
-/* allowed key state */
-static int
-monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
-{
- /* make sure key is allowed */
- if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
- timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
- return (0);
- return (1);
-}
-
-static void
-monitor_reset_key_state(void)
-{
- /* reset state */
- free(key_blob);
- free(hostbased_cuser);
- free(hostbased_chost);
- key_blob = NULL;
- key_bloblen = 0;
- key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
- hostbased_cuser = NULL;
- hostbased_chost = NULL;
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- DH *dh;
- int min, want, max;
-
- min = buffer_get_int(m);
- want = buffer_get_int(m);
- max = buffer_get_int(m);
-
- debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
- __func__, min, want, max);
- /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
- if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
- fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
- __func__, min, want, max);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
-
- dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
- if (dh == NULL) {
- buffer_put_char(m, 0);
- return (0);
- } else {
- /* Send first bignum */
- buffer_put_char(m, 1);
- buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
- buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
-
- DH_free(dh);
- }
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
- return (0);
-}
-
-extern AuthenticationConnection *auth_conn;
-
-int
-mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- Key *key;
- u_char *p;
- u_char *signature;
- u_int siglen, datlen;
- int keyid;
-
- debug3("%s", __func__);
-
- keyid = buffer_get_int(m);
- p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
-
- /*
- * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
- * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
- */
- if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64)
- fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen);
-
- /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
- if (session_id2_len == 0) {
- session_id2_len = datlen;
- session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
- memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
- }
-
- if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
- if (key_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0)
- fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__);
- } else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid)) != NULL &&
- auth_conn != NULL) {
- if (ssh_agent_sign(auth_conn, key, &signature, &siglen, p,
- datlen) < 0)
- fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed", __func__);
- } else
- fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
-
- debug3("%s: signature %p(%u)", __func__, signature, siglen);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_string(m, signature, siglen);
-
- free(p);
- free(signature);
-
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
-
- /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
-
-int
-mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- char *username;
- struct passwd *pwent;
- int allowed = 0;
- u_int i;
-
- debug3("%s", __func__);
-
- if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
- fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
-
- username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-
- pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
-
- authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
- setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
- free(username);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
-
- if (pwent == NULL) {
- buffer_put_char(m, 0);
- authctxt->pw = fakepw();
- goto out;
- }
-
- allowed = 1;
- authctxt->pw = pwent;
- authctxt->valid = 1;
-
- buffer_put_char(m, 1);
- buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
- buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
- buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
-#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
- buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
- buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
-#endif
- buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
- buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
-
- out:
- buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
-
-#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
- if (options.x != NULL) \
- buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x); \
- } while (0)
-#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
- for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \
- buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \
- } while (0)
- /* See comment in servconf.h */
- COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
-#undef M_CP_STROPT
-#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
-
- /* Create valid auth method lists */
- if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
- /*
- * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
- * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
- * authentication to succeed.
- */
- debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
- }
-
- debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
-
- /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
- if (!compat20)
- monitor_permit_authentications(1);
- else {
- /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
- }
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
-#endif
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- char *banner;
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- banner = auth2_read_banner();
- buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
- free(banner);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- monitor_permit_authentications(1);
-
- authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
- __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
-
- if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
- free(authctxt->style);
- authctxt->style = NULL;
- }
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- static int call_count;
- char *passwd;
- int authenticated;
- u_int plen;
-
- passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
- /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
- authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
- auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
- explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
- free(passwd);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
-
- debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
-
- call_count++;
- if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
- auth_method = "none";
- else
- auth_method = "password";
-
- /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
- return (authenticated);
-}
-
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-int
-mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- char *name, *infotxt;
- u_int numprompts;
- u_int *echo_on;
- char **prompts;
- u_int success;
-
- success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
- &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, success);
- if (success)
- buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
-
- debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
-
- if (success) {
- free(name);
- free(infotxt);
- free(prompts);
- free(echo_on);
- }
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- char *response;
- int authok;
-
- if (authctxt->as == 0)
- fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
-
- response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
- auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
- authctxt->as = NULL;
- debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
- free(response);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, authok);
-
- debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
-
- if (compat20) {
- auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
- auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
- } else
- auth_method = "bsdauth";
-
- return (authok != 0);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef SKEY
-int
-mm_answer_skeyquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- struct skey skey;
- char challenge[1024];
- u_int success;
-
- success = _compat_skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge,
- sizeof(challenge)) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, success);
- if (success)
- buffer_put_cstring(m, challenge);
-
- debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, m);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_skeyrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- char *response;
- int authok;
-
- response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-
- authok = (options.challenge_response_authentication &&
- authctxt->valid &&
- skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
- skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, response) != -1);
-
- free(response);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, authok);
-
- debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, m);
-
- auth_method = "skey";
-
- return (authok != 0);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-int
-mm_answer_pam_start(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- if (!options.use_pam)
- fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
-
- start_pam(authctxt);
-
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_pam_account(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- u_int ret;
-
- if (!options.use_pam)
- fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
-
- ret = do_pam_account();
-
- buffer_put_int(m, ret);
- buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
-
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static void *sshpam_ctxt, *sshpam_authok;
-extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
-
-int
-mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
-
- debug3("%s", __func__);
- authctxt->user = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
- sshpam_authok = NULL;
- buffer_clear(m);
- if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) {
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1);
- buffer_put_int(m, 1);
- } else {
- buffer_put_int(m, 0);
- }
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- char *name = NULL, *info = NULL, **prompts = NULL;
- u_int i, num = 0, *echo_on = 0;
- int ret;
-
- debug3("%s", __func__);
- sshpam_authok = NULL;
- ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info, &num, &prompts, &echo_on);
- if (ret == 0 && num == 0)
- sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
- if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL)
- ret = -1;
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, ret);
- buffer_put_cstring(m, name);
- free(name);
- buffer_put_cstring(m, info);
- free(info);
- buffer_put_int(m, num);
- for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
- buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[i]);
- free(prompts[i]);
- buffer_put_int(m, echo_on[i]);
- }
- free(prompts);
- free(echo_on);
- auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
- auth_submethod = "pam";
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- char **resp;
- u_int i, num;
- int ret;
-
- debug3("%s", __func__);
- sshpam_authok = NULL;
- num = buffer_get_int(m);
- if (num > 0) {
- resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *));
- for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
- resp[i] = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp);
- for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
- free(resp[i]);
- free(resp);
- } else {
- ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL);
- }
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, ret);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
- auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
- auth_submethod = "pam";
- if (ret == 0)
- sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
-
- debug3("%s", __func__);
- (sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
- buffer_clear(m);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
- auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
- auth_submethod = "pam";
- return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt);
-}
-#endif
-
-int
-mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- Key *key;
- char *cuser, *chost;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int bloblen;
- enum mm_keytype type = 0;
- int allowed = 0;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- type = buffer_get_int(m);
- cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
-
- key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
-
- if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
- (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
- fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
-
- debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
-
- if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
- switch (type) {
- case MM_USERKEY:
- allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
- user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
- pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
- auth_method = "publickey";
- if (options.pubkey_authentication && allowed != 1)
- auth_clear_options();
- break;
- case MM_HOSTKEY:
- allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
- hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
- cuser, chost, key);
- pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
- "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
- cuser, chost);
- auth_method = "hostbased";
- break;
- case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
- key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
- allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
- auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
- cuser, chost, key);
- if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
- auth_clear_options();
- auth_method = "rsa";
- break;
- default:
- fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
- break;
- }
- }
- if (key != NULL)
- key_free(key);
-
- /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
- monitor_reset_key_state();
-
- if (allowed) {
- /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
- key_blob = blob;
- key_bloblen = bloblen;
- key_blobtype = type;
- hostbased_cuser = cuser;
- hostbased_chost = chost;
- } else {
- /* Log failed attempt */
- auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
- free(blob);
- free(cuser);
- free(chost);
- }
-
- debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
- __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
- buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
-
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
-
- if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-static int
-monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
- Buffer b;
- char *p, *userstyle;
- u_int len;
- int fail = 0;
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
-
- if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
- p = buffer_ptr(&b);
- len = buffer_len(&b);
- if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
- (len < session_id2_len) ||
- (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
- fail++;
- buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
- } else {
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
- if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
- (len != session_id2_len) ||
- (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
- fail++;
- free(p);
- }
- if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
- fail++;
- p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
- xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
- authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
- authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
- if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
- logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
- userstyle, p);
- fail++;
- }
- free(userstyle);
- free(p);
- buffer_skip_string(&b);
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
- if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
- fail++;
- } else {
- p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
- if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
- fail++;
- free(p);
- if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
- fail++;
- buffer_skip_string(&b);
- }
- buffer_skip_string(&b);
- if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
- fail++;
- buffer_free(&b);
- return (fail == 0);
-}
-
-static int
-monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
- char *chost)
-{
- Buffer b;
- char *p, *userstyle;
- u_int len;
- int fail = 0;
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
-
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
- if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
- (len != session_id2_len) ||
- (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
- fail++;
- free(p);
-
- if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
- fail++;
- p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
- xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
- authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
- authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
- if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
- logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
- userstyle, p);
- fail++;
- }
- free(userstyle);
- free(p);
- buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */
- p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
- if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
- fail++;
- free(p);
- buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */
- buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */
-
- /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
- if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
- p[len - 1] = '\0';
- if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
- fail++;
- free(p);
-
- /* verify client user */
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
- if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
- fail++;
- free(p);
-
- if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
- fail++;
- buffer_free(&b);
- return (fail == 0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- Key *key;
- u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
- u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
- int verified = 0;
- int valid_data = 0;
-
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
- signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
- data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
-
- if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
- !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
- fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
-
- key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
- if (key == NULL)
- fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
-
- switch (key_blobtype) {
- case MM_USERKEY:
- valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
- break;
- case MM_HOSTKEY:
- valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
- hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
- break;
- default:
- valid_data = 0;
- break;
- }
- if (!valid_data)
- fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
-
- verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
- debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
- __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
-
- key_free(key);
- free(blob);
- free(signature);
- free(data);
-
- auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
-
- monitor_reset_key_state();
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, verified);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
-
- return (verified == 1);
-}
-
-static void
-mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
-{
- socklen_t fromlen;
- struct sockaddr_storage from;
-
- /*
- * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
- * the address be 0.0.0.0.
- */
- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- fromlen = sizeof(from);
- if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
- if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
- debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- }
- /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
- record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
- get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
- (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
-}
-
-static void
-mm_session_close(Session *s)
-{
- debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
- if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
- debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
- session_pty_cleanup2(s);
- }
- session_unused(s->self);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
- Session *s;
- int res, fd0;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- s = session_new();
- if (s == NULL)
- goto error;
- s->authctxt = authctxt;
- s->pw = authctxt->pw;
- s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
- res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
- if (res == 0)
- goto error;
- pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
-
- buffer_put_int(m, 1);
- buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
-
- /* We need to trick ttyslot */
- if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
- fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
-
- mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
-
- /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
- close(0);
-
- /* send messages generated by record_login */
- buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
- buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
-
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
-
- if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
- mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
- fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
-
- /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
- if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
- fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- if (fd0 != 0)
- error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
-
- /* slave is not needed */
- close(s->ttyfd);
- s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
- /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
- s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
-
- debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
-
- return (0);
-
- error:
- if (s != NULL)
- mm_session_close(s);
- buffer_put_int(m, 0);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- Session *s;
- char *tty;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
- mm_session_close(s);
- buffer_clear(m);
- free(tty);
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- BIGNUM *p;
- int rsafail;
-
- /* Turn off permissions */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
-
- if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-
- buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
-
- rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
- buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
-
- BN_clear_free(p);
-
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
-
- /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- int i;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
- fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
-
- /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- BIGNUM *client_n;
- Key *key = NULL;
- u_char *blob = NULL;
- u_int blen = 0;
- int allowed = 0;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- auth_method = "rsa";
- if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
- if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
- buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
- allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
- BN_clear_free(client_n);
- }
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
- buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
-
- /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
- monitor_reset_key_state();
-
- if (allowed && key != NULL) {
- key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */
- if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
- fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
- buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
-
- /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
- key_blob = blob;
- key_bloblen = blen;
- key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
- }
- if (key != NULL)
- key_free(key);
-
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
-
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- Key *key = NULL;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int blen;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- if (!authctxt->valid)
- fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
- if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
- fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
- if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
- fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
- if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
- if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
- fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
- key->type = KEY_RSA1;
- if (ssh1_challenge)
- BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
- ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
-
- debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
-
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
-
- free(blob);
- key_free(key);
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- Key *key = NULL;
- u_char *blob, *response;
- u_int blen, len;
- int success;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- if (!authctxt->valid)
- fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
- if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
-
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
- if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
- fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
- if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
- fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
- if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
- response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- if (len != 16)
- fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
- success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
-
- free(blob);
- key_free(key);
- free(response);
-
- auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
-
- /* reset state */
- BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
- ssh1_challenge = NULL;
- monitor_reset_key_state();
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, success);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
-
- return (success);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
-{
- extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
- int res, status;
-
- debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
-
- /* The child is terminating */
- session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
- sshpam_cleanup();
-#endif
-
- while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
- if (errno != EINTR)
- exit(1);
-
- res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
-
- /* Terminate process */
- exit(res);
-}
-
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-/* Report that an audit event occurred */
-int
-mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- ssh_audit_event_t event;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- event = buffer_get_int(m);
- switch(event) {
- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
- case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
- case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
- case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
- case SSH_INVALID_USER:
- audit_event(event);
- break;
- default:
- fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event);
- }
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- u_int len;
- char *cmd;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
- cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- /* sanity check command, if so how? */
- audit_run_command(cmd);
- free(cmd);
- return (0);
-}
-#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-
-void
-monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
-{
- if (compat20) {
- set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
- set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
- } else {
- packet_set_protocol_flags(child_state.ssh1protoflags);
- packet_set_encryption_key(child_state.ssh1key,
- child_state.ssh1keylen, child_state.ssh1cipher);
- free(child_state.ssh1key);
- }
-
- /* for rc4 and other stateful ciphers */
- packet_set_keycontext(MODE_OUT, child_state.keyout);
- free(child_state.keyout);
- packet_set_keycontext(MODE_IN, child_state.keyin);
- free(child_state.keyin);
-
- if (!compat20) {
- packet_set_iv(MODE_OUT, child_state.ivout);
- free(child_state.ivout);
- packet_set_iv(MODE_IN, child_state.ivin);
- free(child_state.ivin);
- }
-
- memcpy(&incoming_stream, &child_state.incoming,
- sizeof(incoming_stream));
- memcpy(&outgoing_stream, &child_state.outgoing,
- sizeof(outgoing_stream));
-
- /* Update with new address */
- if (options.compression)
- mm_init_compression(pmonitor->m_zlib);
-
- if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
- packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
- (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
-
- /* Network I/O buffers */
- /* XXX inefficient for large buffers, need: buffer_init_from_string */
- buffer_clear(packet_get_input());
- buffer_append(packet_get_input(), child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
- explicit_bzero(child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
- free(child_state.input);
-
- buffer_clear(packet_get_output());
- buffer_append(packet_get_output(), child_state.output,
- child_state.olen);
- explicit_bzero(child_state.output, child_state.olen);
- free(child_state.output);
-
- /* Roaming */
- if (compat20)
- roam_set_bytes(child_state.sent_bytes, child_state.recv_bytes);
-}
-
-static Kex *
-mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
-{
- Kex *kex;
- void *blob;
- u_int bloblen;
-
- kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
- kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len);
- if (session_id2 == NULL ||
- kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len ||
- timingsafe_bcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)
- fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id");
- kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m);
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
- kex->server = 1;
- kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
- kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
- buffer_init(&kex->my);
- buffer_append(&kex->my, blob, bloblen);
- free(blob);
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
- buffer_init(&kex->peer);
- buffer_append(&kex->peer, blob, bloblen);
- free(blob);
- kex->done = 1;
- kex->flags = buffer_get_int(m);
- kex->client_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- kex->server_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
- kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
- kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
- kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
-
- return (kex);
-}
-
-/* This function requries careful sanity checking */
-
-void
-mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
-{
- Buffer m;
- u_char *blob, *p;
- u_int bloblen, plen;
- u_int32_t seqnr, packets;
- u_int64_t blocks, bytes;
-
- debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
- if (!compat20) {
- child_state.ssh1protoflags = buffer_get_int(&m);
- child_state.ssh1cipher = buffer_get_int(&m);
- child_state.ssh1key = buffer_get_string(&m,
- &child_state.ssh1keylen);
- child_state.ivout = buffer_get_string(&m,
- &child_state.ivoutlen);
- child_state.ivin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ivinlen);
- goto skip;
- } else {
- /* Get the Kex for rekeying */
- *pmonitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m);
- }
-
- blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
- current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
- free(blob);
-
- debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
- blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
- current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
- free(blob);
-
- /* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
- seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
- blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
- packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
- bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
- packet_set_state(MODE_OUT, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
- seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
- blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
- packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
- bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
- packet_set_state(MODE_IN, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
-
- skip:
- /* Get the key context */
- child_state.keyout = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyoutlen);
- child_state.keyin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyinlen);
-
- debug3("%s: Getting compression state", __func__);
- /* Get compression state */
- p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
- if (plen != sizeof(child_state.outgoing))
- fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
- memcpy(&child_state.outgoing, p, sizeof(child_state.outgoing));
- free(p);
-
- p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
- if (plen != sizeof(child_state.incoming))
- fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
- memcpy(&child_state.incoming, p, sizeof(child_state.incoming));
- free(p);
-
- /* Network I/O buffers */
- debug3("%s: Getting Network I/O buffers", __func__);
- child_state.input = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ilen);
- child_state.output = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.olen);
-
- /* Roaming */
- if (compat20) {
- child_state.sent_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
- child_state.recv_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
- }
-
- buffer_free(&m);
-}
-
-
-/* Allocation functions for zlib */
-void *
-mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
-{
- size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
- void *address;
-
- if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_T_MAX / size)
- fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
-
- address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
-
- return (address);
-}
-
-void
-mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
-{
- mm_free(mm, address);
-}
-
-void
-mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *mm)
-{
- outgoing_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
- outgoing_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
- outgoing_stream.opaque = mm;
-
- incoming_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
- incoming_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
- incoming_stream.opaque = mm;
-}
-
-/* XXX */
-
-#define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
- if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
- fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
-} while (0)
-
-static void
-monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
-{
- int pair[2];
-
- if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
- fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
- FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
- mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
- mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
-
- if (do_logfds) {
- if (pipe(pair) == -1)
- fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
- FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
- mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
- mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
- } else
- mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
-}
-
-#define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
-
-struct monitor *
-monitor_init(void)
-{
- struct monitor *mon;
-
- mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
-
- monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
-
- /* Used to share zlib space across processes */
- if (options.compression) {
- mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
- mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
-
- /* Compression needs to share state across borders */
- mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib);
- }
-
- return mon;
-}
-
-void
-monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
-{
- monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
-}
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-int
-mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- gss_OID_desc goid;
- OM_uint32 major;
- u_int len;
-
- goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- goid.length = len;
-
- major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
-
- free(goid.elements);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, major);
-
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
-
- /* Now we have a context, enable the step */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- gss_buffer_desc in;
- gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- OM_uint32 major, minor;
- OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
- u_int len;
-
- in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- in.length = len;
- major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
- free(in.value);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, major);
- buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
- buffer_put_int(m, flags);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
-
- gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
-
- if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
- }
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
- OM_uint32 ret;
- u_int len;
-
- gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- gssbuf.length = len;
- mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- mic.length = len;
-
- ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
-
- free(gssbuf.value);
- free(mic.value);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, ret);
-
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
-
- if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- int authenticated;
-
- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
-
- debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
-
- auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
-
- /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
- return (authenticated);
-}
-#endif /* GSSAPI */
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/monitor.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,2073 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.161 2016/07/22 03:39:13 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>
+ * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus at openbsd.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+# include <sys/poll.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SKEY
+#include <skey.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "auth-pam.h"
+#ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC /* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */
+#undef TARGET_OS_MAC
+#include "zlib.h"
+#define TARGET_OS_MAC 1
+#else
+#include "zlib.h"
+#endif
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "sshlogin.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#include "monitor_mm.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
+#endif
+
+/* Imports */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern u_int utmp_len;
+extern u_char session_id[];
+extern Buffer auth_debug;
+extern int auth_debug_init;
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+
+/* State exported from the child */
+static struct sshbuf *child_state;
+
+/* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
+
+int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+int mm_answer_pam_start(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pam_account(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pam_query(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pam_respond(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
+#endif
+
+static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
+
+static Authctxt *authctxt;
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
+#endif
+
+/* local state for key verify */
+static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
+static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
+static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
+static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
+static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
+static char *auth_method = "unknown";
+static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
+static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
+static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
+static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
+
+struct mon_table {
+ enum monitor_reqtype type;
+ int flags;
+ int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
+};
+
+#define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
+#define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
+#define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
+#define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
+
+#define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
+
+#define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
+#endif
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+#endif
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
+#endif
+#ifdef SKEY
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
+#endif
+ {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
+#endif
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
+#endif
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
+#endif
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
+#endif
+#ifdef SKEY
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+#endif
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
+#endif
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
+
+/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
+
+static void
+monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
+{
+ while (ent->f != NULL) {
+ if (ent->type == type) {
+ ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
+ ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
+ return;
+ }
+ ent++;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
+{
+ struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
+
+ while (ent->f != NULL) {
+ if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
+ ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
+ ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
+ }
+ ent++;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+ struct mon_table *ent;
+ int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
+
+ debug3("preauth child monitor started");
+
+ close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+ close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
+ pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+
+ authctxt = _authctxt;
+ memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
+
+ authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
+
+ /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+ } else {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
+
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
+ }
+
+ /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
+ while (!authenticated) {
+ partial = 0;
+ auth_method = "unknown";
+ auth_submethod = NULL;
+ authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
+
+ /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
+ if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
+ if (!compat20)
+ fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
+ "with SSH protocol 1");
+ if (authenticated &&
+ !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
+ auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
+ debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
+ auth_method);
+ authenticated = 0;
+ partial = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (authenticated) {
+ if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
+ fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
+ __func__, ent->type);
+ if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+ !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
+ authenticated = 0;
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ /* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */
+ if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
+ Buffer m;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
+ authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
+ auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
+ auth_method, auth_submethod);
+ if (!partial && !authenticated)
+ authctxt->failures++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!authctxt->valid)
+ fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
+ if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
+ fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
+
+ debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
+ __func__, authctxt->user);
+
+ mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
+
+ /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ ;
+
+ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+ close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
+ pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
+}
+
+static void
+monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
+{
+ monitor_child_pid = pid;
+}
+
+static void
+monitor_child_handler(int sig)
+{
+ kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
+}
+
+void
+monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+ close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+ pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+
+ monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
+ signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
+ signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
+ signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
+#ifdef SIGXFSZ
+ signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN);
+#endif
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
+
+ /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+ } else {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+ }
+ if (!no_pty_flag) {
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
+ }
+
+ for (;;)
+ monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
+}
+
+void
+monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+ if (options.compression) {
+ /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
+ mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Allocation functions for zlib */
+static void *
+mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
+{
+ if (size == 0 || ncount == 0 || ncount > SIZE_MAX / size)
+ fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
+
+ return mm_malloc(mm, size * ncount);
+}
+
+static void
+mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
+{
+ mm_free(mm, address);
+}
+
+static int
+monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+ Buffer logmsg;
+ u_int len, level;
+ char *msg;
+
+ buffer_init(&logmsg);
+
+ /* Read length */
+ buffer_append_space(&logmsg, 4);
+ if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
+ buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) {
+ if (errno == EPIPE) {
+ buffer_free(&logmsg);
+ debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
+ close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
+ pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
+ if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
+ fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
+
+ /* Read severity, message */
+ buffer_clear(&logmsg);
+ buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len);
+ if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
+ buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg))
+ fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Log it */
+ level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
+ msg = buffer_get_string(&logmsg, NULL);
+ if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
+ __func__, level);
+ do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
+
+ buffer_free(&logmsg);
+ free(msg);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
+ struct mon_table **pent)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ int ret;
+ u_char type;
+ struct pollfd pfd[2];
+
+ for (;;) {
+ memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
+ pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
+ pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
+ pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
+ pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
+ if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
+ if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
+ continue;
+ fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (pfd[1].revents) {
+ /*
+ * Drain all log messages before processing next
+ * monitor request.
+ */
+ monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (pfd[0].revents)
+ break; /* Continues below */
+ }
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+
+ mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
+ type = buffer_get_char(&m);
+
+ debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
+
+ while (ent->f != NULL) {
+ if (ent->type == type)
+ break;
+ ent++;
+ }
+
+ if (ent->f != NULL) {
+ if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
+ fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
+ type);
+ ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
+ if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
+ debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
+ type);
+ ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
+ }
+
+ if (pent != NULL)
+ *pent = ent;
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
+
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+/* allowed key state */
+static int
+monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
+{
+ /* make sure key is allowed */
+ if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
+ timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
+ return (0);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static void
+monitor_reset_key_state(void)
+{
+ /* reset state */
+ free(key_blob);
+ free(hostbased_cuser);
+ free(hostbased_chost);
+ key_blob = NULL;
+ key_bloblen = 0;
+ key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
+ hostbased_cuser = NULL;
+ hostbased_chost = NULL;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+int
+mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ DH *dh;
+ int min, want, max;
+
+ min = buffer_get_int(m);
+ want = buffer_get_int(m);
+ max = buffer_get_int(m);
+
+ debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
+ __func__, min, want, max);
+ /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
+ if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
+ fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
+ __func__, min, want, max);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
+ if (dh == NULL) {
+ buffer_put_char(m, 0);
+ return (0);
+ } else {
+ /* Send first bignum */
+ buffer_put_char(m, 1);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
+
+ DH_free(dh);
+ }
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
+ return (0);
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */
+ struct sshkey *key;
+ struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
+ u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+ char *alg = NULL;
+ size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
+ int r, is_proof = 0;
+ u_int keyid;
+ const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00 at openssh.com";
+
+ debug3("%s", __func__);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (keyid > INT_MAX)
+ fatal("%s: invalid key ID", __func__);
+
+ /*
+ * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
+ * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
+ *
+ * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey
+ * proof.
+ *
+ * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too?
+ * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather
+ * than the full kex structure...
+ */
+ if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) {
+ /*
+ * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what
+ * the client sent us.
+ */
+ if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
+ fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen);
+ if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid);
+ if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
+ session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key "
+ "proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
+ memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
+ __func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
+ sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+ is_proof = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
+ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
+ session_id2_len = datlen;
+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
+ memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
+ }
+
+ if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
+ datafellows)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ } else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
+ auth_sock > 0) {
+ if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
+ p, datlen, alg, datafellows)) != 0) {
+ fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ } else
+ fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
+
+ debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__,
+ is_proof ? "KEX" : "hostkey proof", signature, siglen);
+
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ free(alg);
+ free(p);
+ free(signature);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
+
+ /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
+
+int
+mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char *username;
+ struct passwd *pwent;
+ int allowed = 0;
+ u_int i;
+
+ debug3("%s", __func__);
+
+ if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
+ fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
+
+ username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+
+ pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
+
+ authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
+ setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
+ free(username);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ if (pwent == NULL) {
+ buffer_put_char(m, 0);
+ authctxt->pw = fakepw();
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ allowed = 1;
+ authctxt->pw = pwent;
+ authctxt->valid = 1;
+
+ buffer_put_char(m, 1);
+ buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
+#endif
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
+
+ out:
+ buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
+
+#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
+ if (options.x != NULL) \
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x); \
+ } while (0)
+#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
+ for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \
+ } while (0)
+ /* See comment in servconf.h */
+ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
+#undef M_CP_STROPT
+#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
+
+ /* Create valid auth method lists */
+ if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
+ * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
+ * authentication to succeed.
+ */
+ debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
+ }
+
+ debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
+
+ /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
+ if (!compat20)
+ monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+ else {
+ /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
+ }
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
+#endif
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char *banner;
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ banner = auth2_read_banner();
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
+ free(banner);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+
+ authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
+ __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
+
+ if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
+ free(authctxt->style);
+ authctxt->style = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ static int call_count;
+ char *passwd;
+ int authenticated;
+ u_int plen;
+
+ passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
+ /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
+ authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
+ auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
+ explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
+ free(passwd);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ buffer_put_int(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached());
+#endif
+
+ debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
+
+ call_count++;
+ if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
+ auth_method = "none";
+ else
+ auth_method = "password";
+
+ /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
+ return (authenticated);
+}
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+int
+mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char *name, *infotxt;
+ u_int numprompts;
+ u_int *echo_on;
+ char **prompts;
+ u_int success;
+
+ success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
+ &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, success);
+ if (success)
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
+
+ if (success) {
+ free(name);
+ free(infotxt);
+ free(prompts);
+ free(echo_on);
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char *response;
+ int authok;
+
+ if (authctxt->as == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
+
+ response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
+ auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
+ authctxt->as = NULL;
+ debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
+ free(response);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, authok);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+ auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
+ } else
+ auth_method = "bsdauth";
+
+ return (authok != 0);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SKEY
+int
+mm_answer_skeyquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ struct skey skey;
+ char challenge[1024];
+ u_int success;
+
+ success = _compat_skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge,
+ sizeof(challenge)) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, success);
+ if (success)
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, challenge);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, m);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_skeyrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char *response;
+ int authok;
+
+ response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+
+ authok = (options.challenge_response_authentication &&
+ authctxt->valid &&
+ skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
+ skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, response) != -1);
+
+ free(response);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, authok);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, m);
+
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+ auth_submethod = "skey";
+
+ return (authok != 0);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+int
+mm_answer_pam_start(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ if (!options.use_pam)
+ fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
+
+ start_pam(authctxt);
+
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pam_account(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ u_int ret;
+
+ if (!options.use_pam)
+ fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
+
+ ret = do_pam_account();
+
+ buffer_put_int(m, ret);
+ buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static void *sshpam_ctxt, *sshpam_authok;
+extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
+
+int
+mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ debug3("%s", __func__);
+ sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
+ sshpam_authok = NULL;
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) {
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1);
+ buffer_put_int(m, 1);
+ } else {
+ buffer_put_int(m, 0);
+ }
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char *name = NULL, *info = NULL, **prompts = NULL;
+ u_int i, num = 0, *echo_on = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ debug3("%s", __func__);
+ sshpam_authok = NULL;
+ ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info, &num, &prompts, &echo_on);
+ if (ret == 0 && num == 0)
+ sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
+ if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL)
+ ret = -1;
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, ret);
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, name);
+ free(name);
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, info);
+ free(info);
+ buffer_put_int(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached());
+ buffer_put_int(m, num);
+ for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[i]);
+ free(prompts[i]);
+ buffer_put_int(m, echo_on[i]);
+ }
+ free(prompts);
+ free(echo_on);
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+ auth_submethod = "pam";
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char **resp;
+ u_int i, num;
+ int ret;
+
+ debug3("%s", __func__);
+ sshpam_authok = NULL;
+ num = buffer_get_int(m);
+ if (num > 0) {
+ resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *));
+ for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
+ resp[i] = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp);
+ for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
+ free(resp[i]);
+ free(resp);
+ } else {
+ ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL);
+ }
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, ret);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+ auth_submethod = "pam";
+ if (ret == 0)
+ sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int r = sshpam_authok != NULL && sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt;
+
+ debug3("%s", __func__);
+ (sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
+ sshpam_ctxt = sshpam_authok = NULL;
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+ auth_submethod = "pam";
+ return r;
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Key *key;
+ char *cuser, *chost;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int bloblen, pubkey_auth_attempt;
+ enum mm_keytype type = 0;
+ int allowed = 0;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ type = buffer_get_int(m);
+ cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+ pubkey_auth_attempt = buffer_get_int(m);
+
+ key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+
+ if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
+ (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
+ fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
+
+ debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
+
+ if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
+ /* These should not make it past the privsep child */
+ if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
+ (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__);
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case MM_USERKEY:
+ allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
+ !auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key) &&
+ match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+ options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
+ user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key,
+ pubkey_auth_attempt);
+ pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
+ auth_method = "publickey";
+ if (options.pubkey_authentication &&
+ (!pubkey_auth_attempt || allowed != 1))
+ auth_clear_options();
+ break;
+ case MM_HOSTKEY:
+ allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
+ match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+ options.hostbased_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
+ hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
+ cuser, chost, key);
+ pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
+ "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
+ cuser, chost);
+ auth_method = "hostbased";
+ break;
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
+ key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
+ allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
+ auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
+ cuser, chost, key);
+ if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
+ auth_clear_options();
+ auth_method = "rsa";
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
+ __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
+
+ if (key != NULL)
+ key_free(key);
+
+ /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
+ monitor_reset_key_state();
+
+ if (allowed) {
+ /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
+ key_blob = blob;
+ key_bloblen = bloblen;
+ key_blobtype = type;
+ hostbased_cuser = cuser;
+ hostbased_chost = chost;
+ } else {
+ /* Log failed attempt */
+ auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
+ free(blob);
+ free(cuser);
+ free(chost);
+ }
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
+ buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
+
+ if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ u_char *p;
+ char *userstyle, *cp;
+ u_int len;
+ int fail = 0;
+
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
+
+ if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
+ p = buffer_ptr(&b);
+ len = buffer_len(&b);
+ if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
+ (len < session_id2_len) ||
+ (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
+ fail++;
+ buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
+ } else {
+ p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
+ if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
+ (len != session_id2_len) ||
+ (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
+ fail++;
+ free(p);
+ }
+ if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+ fail++;
+ cp = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
+ xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+ authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+ if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
+ logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
+ "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
+ fail++;
+ }
+ free(userstyle);
+ free(cp);
+ buffer_skip_string(&b);
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
+ if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
+ fail++;
+ } else {
+ cp = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
+ if (strcmp("publickey", cp) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ free(cp);
+ if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
+ fail++;
+ buffer_skip_string(&b);
+ }
+ buffer_skip_string(&b);
+ if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ return (fail == 0);
+}
+
+static int
+monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
+ char *chost)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ char *p, *userstyle;
+ u_int len;
+ int fail = 0;
+
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
+
+ p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
+ if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
+ (len != session_id2_len) ||
+ (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
+ fail++;
+ free(p);
+
+ if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+ fail++;
+ p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
+ xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+ authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+ if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
+ logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
+ userstyle, p);
+ fail++;
+ }
+ free(userstyle);
+ free(p);
+ buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */
+ p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
+ if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
+ fail++;
+ free(p);
+ buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */
+ buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */
+
+ /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
+ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
+ p[len - 1] = '\0';
+ if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ free(p);
+
+ /* verify client user */
+ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ free(p);
+
+ if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ return (fail == 0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Key *key;
+ u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
+ u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
+ int verified = 0;
+ int valid_data = 0;
+
+ blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+ signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
+ data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
+
+ if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
+ !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
+ fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
+
+ key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+ if (key == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
+
+ switch (key_blobtype) {
+ case MM_USERKEY:
+ valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
+ break;
+ case MM_HOSTKEY:
+ valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
+ hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
+ break;
+ default:
+ valid_data = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!valid_data)
+ fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
+
+ verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
+ __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
+
+ /* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */
+ if (verified == 1 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
+ auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
+ else
+ key_free(key);
+
+ free(blob);
+ free(signature);
+ free(data);
+
+ auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
+
+ monitor_reset_key_state();
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, verified);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
+
+ return (verified == 1);
+}
+
+static void
+mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ socklen_t fromlen;
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+
+ if (options.use_login)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
+ * the address be 0.0.0.0.
+ */
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+ if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+ }
+ /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
+ record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
+ session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
+}
+
+static void
+mm_session_close(Session *s)
+{
+ debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
+ session_pty_cleanup2(s);
+ }
+ session_unused(s->self);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
+ Session *s;
+ int res, fd0;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ s = session_new();
+ if (s == NULL)
+ goto error;
+ s->authctxt = authctxt;
+ s->pw = authctxt->pw;
+ s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
+ res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
+ if (res == 0)
+ goto error;
+ pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
+
+ buffer_put_int(m, 1);
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
+
+ /* We need to trick ttyslot */
+ if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
+
+ mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
+
+ /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
+ close(0);
+
+ /* send messages generated by record_login */
+ buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
+ buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
+
+ if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
+ mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
+
+ /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
+ if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
+ fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (fd0 != 0)
+ error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
+
+ /* slave is not needed */
+ close(s->ttyfd);
+ s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
+ /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
+ s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
+
+ debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+
+ return (0);
+
+ error:
+ if (s != NULL)
+ mm_session_close(s);
+ buffer_put_int(m, 0);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Session *s;
+ char *tty;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
+ mm_session_close(s);
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ free(tty);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+int
+mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ BIGNUM *p;
+ int rsafail;
+
+ /* Turn off permissions */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
+
+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+
+ buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
+
+ rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
+
+ BN_clear_free(p);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
+
+ /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
+ fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
+
+ /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ BIGNUM *client_n;
+ Key *key = NULL;
+ u_char *blob = NULL;
+ u_int blen = 0;
+ int allowed = 0;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ auth_method = "rsa";
+ if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
+ if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
+ allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
+ BN_clear_free(client_n);
+ }
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
+ buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
+
+ /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
+ monitor_reset_key_state();
+
+ if (allowed && key != NULL) {
+ key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */
+ if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
+ fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
+ buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
+
+ /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
+ key_blob = blob;
+ key_bloblen = blen;
+ key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
+ }
+ if (key != NULL)
+ key_free(key);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
+
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Key *key = NULL;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int blen;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ if (!authctxt->valid)
+ fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
+ blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
+ if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
+ fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
+ if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
+ fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
+ if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
+ if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
+ fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
+ key->type = KEY_RSA1;
+ if (ssh1_challenge)
+ BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
+ ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
+
+ debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
+
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
+
+ free(blob);
+ key_free(key);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Key *key = NULL;
+ u_char *blob, *response;
+ u_int blen, len;
+ int success;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ if (!authctxt->valid)
+ fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
+ if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
+
+ blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
+ if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
+ fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
+ if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
+ fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
+ if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
+ response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ if (len != 16)
+ fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
+ success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
+
+ free(blob);
+ key_free(key);
+ free(response);
+
+ auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
+
+ /* reset state */
+ BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
+ ssh1_challenge = NULL;
+ monitor_reset_key_state();
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, success);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
+
+ return (success);
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
+{
+ extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
+ int res, status;
+
+ debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
+
+ /* The child is terminating */
+ session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+ sshpam_cleanup();
+#endif
+
+ while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+ if (errno != EINTR)
+ exit(1);
+
+ res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
+
+ /* Terminate process */
+ exit(res);
+}
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+/* Report that an audit event occurred */
+int
+mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ ssh_audit_event_t event;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ event = buffer_get_int(m);
+ switch(event) {
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
+ case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+ case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+ case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+ case SSH_INVALID_USER:
+ audit_event(event);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event);
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ u_int len;
+ char *cmd;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ /* sanity check command, if so how? */
+ audit_run_command(cmd);
+ free(cmd);
+ return (0);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+
+void
+monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ struct kex *kex;
+ int r;
+
+ debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__);
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ sshbuf_free(child_state);
+ child_state = NULL;
+
+ if ((kex = ssh->kex) != NULL) {
+ /* XXX set callbacks */
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
+# endif
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
+ kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
+ kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
+ kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
+ kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
+ }
+
+ /* Update with new address */
+ if (options.compression) {
+ ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, pmonitor->m_zlib,
+ (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
+ (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
+ }
+}
+
+/* This function requries careful sanity checking */
+
+void
+mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+ debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
+
+ if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
+ child_state);
+ debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__);
+}
+
+
+/* XXX */
+
+#define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
+ if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
+ fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
+} while (0)
+
+static void
+monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
+{
+ int pair[2];
+
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
+ FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
+ mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
+ mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
+
+ if (do_logfds) {
+ if (pipe(pair) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
+ FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
+ mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
+ mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
+ } else
+ mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
+}
+
+#define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
+
+struct monitor *
+monitor_init(void)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ struct monitor *mon;
+
+ mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
+
+ monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
+
+ /* Used to share zlib space across processes */
+ if (options.compression) {
+ mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
+ mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
+
+ /* Compression needs to share state across borders */
+ ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, mon->m_zlib,
+ (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
+ (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
+ }
+
+ return mon;
+}
+
+void
+monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
+{
+ monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
+}
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+int
+mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ gss_OID_desc goid;
+ OM_uint32 major;
+ u_int len;
+
+ goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ goid.length = len;
+
+ major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
+
+ free(goid.elements);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
+
+ /* Now we have a context, enable the step */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ gss_buffer_desc in;
+ gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
+ OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
+ u_int len;
+
+ in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ in.length = len;
+ major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
+ free(in.value);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
+ buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
+ buffer_put_int(m, flags);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
+
+ if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
+ OM_uint32 ret;
+ u_int len;
+
+ gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ gssbuf.length = len;
+ mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ mic.length = len;
+
+ ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
+
+ free(gssbuf.value);
+ free(mic.value);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, ret);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
+
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int authenticated;
+
+ authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
+
+ auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
+
+ /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
+ return (authenticated);
+}
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/monitor.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.18 2014/01/29 06:18:35 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#ifndef _MONITOR_H_
-#define _MONITOR_H_
-
-/* Please keep *_REQ_* values on even numbers and *_ANS_* on odd numbers */
-enum monitor_reqtype {
- MONITOR_REQ_MODULI = 0, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI = 1,
- MONITOR_REQ_FREE = 2,
- MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV = 4,
- MONITOR_REQ_SIGN = 6, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN = 7,
- MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM = 8, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM = 9,
- MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER = 10, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER = 11,
- MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD = 12, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD = 13,
- MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY = 14, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY = 15,
- MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND = 16, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND = 17,
- MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY = 18, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY = 19,
- MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND = 20, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND = 21,
- MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED = 22, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED = 23,
- MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY = 24, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY = 25,
- MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT = 26,
- MONITOR_REQ_PTY = 28, MONITOR_ANS_PTY = 29,
- MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP = 30,
- MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY = 32, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY = 33,
- MONITOR_REQ_SESSID = 34,
- MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED = 36, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED = 37,
- MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE = 38, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE = 39,
- MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE = 40, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE = 41,
- MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP = 42, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP = 43,
- MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP = 44, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP = 45,
- MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK = 46, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK = 47,
- MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
- MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
-
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
- MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
-
-};
-
-struct mm_master;
-struct monitor {
- int m_recvfd;
- int m_sendfd;
- int m_log_recvfd;
- int m_log_sendfd;
- struct mm_master *m_zback;
- struct mm_master *m_zlib;
- struct Kex **m_pkex;
- pid_t m_pid;
-};
-
-struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
-void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *);
-void monitor_sync(struct monitor *);
-
-struct Authctxt;
-void monitor_child_preauth(struct Authctxt *, struct monitor *);
-void monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *);
-
-struct mon_table;
-int monitor_read(struct monitor*, struct mon_table *, struct mon_table **);
-
-/* Prototypes for request sending and receiving */
-void mm_request_send(int, enum monitor_reqtype, Buffer *);
-void mm_request_receive(int, Buffer *);
-void mm_request_receive_expect(int, enum monitor_reqtype, Buffer *);
-
-#endif /* _MONITOR_H_ */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/monitor.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.19 2015/01/19 19:52:16 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MONITOR_H_
+#define _MONITOR_H_
+
+/* Please keep *_REQ_* values on even numbers and *_ANS_* on odd numbers */
+enum monitor_reqtype {
+ MONITOR_REQ_MODULI = 0, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI = 1,
+ MONITOR_REQ_FREE = 2,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV = 4,
+ MONITOR_REQ_SIGN = 6, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN = 7,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM = 8, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM = 9,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER = 10, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER = 11,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD = 12, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD = 13,
+ MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY = 14, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY = 15,
+ MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND = 16, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND = 17,
+ MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY = 18, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY = 19,
+ MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND = 20, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND = 21,
+ MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED = 22, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED = 23,
+ MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY = 24, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY = 25,
+ MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT = 26,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PTY = 28, MONITOR_ANS_PTY = 29,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP = 30,
+ MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY = 32, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY = 33,
+ MONITOR_REQ_SESSID = 34,
+ MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED = 36, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED = 37,
+ MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE = 38, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE = 39,
+ MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE = 40, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE = 41,
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP = 42, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP = 43,
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP = 44, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP = 45,
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK = 46, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK = 47,
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
+ MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
+
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
+
+};
+
+struct mm_master;
+struct monitor {
+ int m_recvfd;
+ int m_sendfd;
+ int m_log_recvfd;
+ int m_log_sendfd;
+ struct mm_master *m_zback;
+ struct mm_master *m_zlib;
+ struct kex **m_pkex;
+ pid_t m_pid;
+};
+
+struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
+void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *);
+void monitor_sync(struct monitor *);
+
+struct Authctxt;
+void monitor_child_preauth(struct Authctxt *, struct monitor *);
+void monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *);
+
+struct mon_table;
+int monitor_read(struct monitor*, struct mon_table *, struct mon_table **);
+
+/* Prototypes for request sending and receiving */
+void mm_request_send(int, enum monitor_reqtype, Buffer *);
+void mm_request_receive(int, Buffer *);
+void mm_request_receive_expect(int, enum monitor_reqtype, Buffer *);
+
+#endif /* _MONITOR_H_ */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_fdpass.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/monitor_fdpass.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_fdpass.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,182 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.c,v 1.19 2010/01/12 00:58:25 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright 2001 Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
-#include <sys/un.h>
-#endif
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
-#include <poll.h>
-#endif
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "log.h"
-#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
-
-int
-mm_send_fd(int sock, int fd)
-{
-#if defined(HAVE_SENDMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR))
- struct msghdr msg;
-#ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
- union {
- struct cmsghdr hdr;
- char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
- } cmsgbuf;
- struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
-#endif
- struct iovec vec;
- char ch = '\0';
- ssize_t n;
- struct pollfd pfd;
-
- memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
-#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
- msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&fd;
- msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(fd);
-#else
- msg.msg_control = (caddr_t)&cmsgbuf.buf;
- msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf);
- cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
- cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
- cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
- cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
- *(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg) = fd;
-#endif
-
- vec.iov_base = &ch;
- vec.iov_len = 1;
- msg.msg_iov = &vec;
- msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
-
- pfd.fd = sock;
- pfd.events = POLLOUT;
- while ((n = sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 &&
- (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) {
- debug3("%s: sendmsg(%d): %s", __func__, fd, strerror(errno));
- (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
- }
- if (n == -1) {
- error("%s: sendmsg(%d): %s", __func__, fd,
- strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (n != 1) {
- error("%s: sendmsg: expected sent 1 got %ld",
- __func__, (long)n);
- return -1;
- }
- return 0;
-#else
- error("%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__);
- return -1;
-#endif
-}
-
-int
-mm_receive_fd(int sock)
-{
-#if defined(HAVE_RECVMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR))
- struct msghdr msg;
-#ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
- union {
- struct cmsghdr hdr;
- char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
- } cmsgbuf;
- struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
-#endif
- struct iovec vec;
- ssize_t n;
- char ch;
- int fd;
- struct pollfd pfd;
-
- memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
- vec.iov_base = &ch;
- vec.iov_len = 1;
- msg.msg_iov = &vec;
- msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
-#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
- msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&fd;
- msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(fd);
-#else
- msg.msg_control = &cmsgbuf.buf;
- msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf);
-#endif
-
- pfd.fd = sock;
- pfd.events = POLLIN;
- while ((n = recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 &&
- (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) {
- debug3("%s: recvmsg: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
- }
- if (n == -1) {
- error("%s: recvmsg: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (n != 1) {
- error("%s: recvmsg: expected received 1 got %ld",
- __func__, (long)n);
- return -1;
- }
-
-#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
- if (msg.msg_accrightslen != sizeof(fd)) {
- error("%s: no fd", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-#else
- cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
- if (cmsg == NULL) {
- error("%s: no message header", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
-#ifndef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE
- if (cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS) {
- error("%s: expected type %d got %d", __func__,
- SCM_RIGHTS, cmsg->cmsg_type);
- return -1;
- }
-#endif
- fd = (*(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg));
-#endif
- return fd;
-#else
- error("%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__);
- return -1;
-#endif
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_fdpass.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/monitor_fdpass.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_fdpass.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_fdpass.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.c,v 1.21 2016/02/29 20:22:36 jca Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001 Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+# include <poll.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+# include <sys/poll.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+
+int
+mm_send_fd(int sock, int fd)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_SENDMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR))
+ struct msghdr msg;
+#ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+ union {
+ struct cmsghdr hdr;
+ char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
+ } cmsgbuf;
+ struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+#endif
+ struct iovec vec;
+ char ch = '\0';
+ ssize_t n;
+ struct pollfd pfd;
+
+ memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+ msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&fd;
+ msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(fd);
+#else
+ memset(&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof(cmsgbuf));
+ msg.msg_control = (caddr_t)&cmsgbuf.buf;
+ msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf);
+ cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+ cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
+ cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
+ cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
+ *(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg) = fd;
+#endif
+
+ vec.iov_base = &ch;
+ vec.iov_len = 1;
+ msg.msg_iov = &vec;
+ msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+
+ pfd.fd = sock;
+ pfd.events = POLLOUT;
+ while ((n = sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 &&
+ (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) {
+ debug3("%s: sendmsg(%d): %s", __func__, fd, strerror(errno));
+ (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
+ }
+ if (n == -1) {
+ error("%s: sendmsg(%d): %s", __func__, fd,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (n != 1) {
+ error("%s: sendmsg: expected sent 1 got %zd", __func__, n);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+#else
+ error("%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__);
+ return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+int
+mm_receive_fd(int sock)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_RECVMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR))
+ struct msghdr msg;
+#ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+ union {
+ struct cmsghdr hdr;
+ char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
+ } cmsgbuf;
+ struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+#endif
+ struct iovec vec;
+ ssize_t n;
+ char ch;
+ int fd;
+ struct pollfd pfd;
+
+ memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+ vec.iov_base = &ch;
+ vec.iov_len = 1;
+ msg.msg_iov = &vec;
+ msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+ msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&fd;
+ msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(fd);
+#else
+ memset(&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof(cmsgbuf));
+ msg.msg_control = &cmsgbuf.buf;
+ msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf);
+#endif
+
+ pfd.fd = sock;
+ pfd.events = POLLIN;
+ while ((n = recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 &&
+ (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) {
+ debug3("%s: recvmsg: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
+ }
+ if (n == -1) {
+ error("%s: recvmsg: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (n != 1) {
+ error("%s: recvmsg: expected received 1 got %zd", __func__, n);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+ if (msg.msg_accrightslen != sizeof(fd)) {
+ error("%s: no fd", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#else
+ cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+ if (cmsg == NULL) {
+ error("%s: no message header", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+#ifndef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE
+ if (cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS) {
+ error("%s: expected type %d got %d", __func__,
+ SCM_RIGHTS, cmsg->cmsg_type);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+ fd = (*(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg));
+#endif
+ return fd;
+#else
+ error("%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__);
+ return -1;
+#endif
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_mm.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/monitor_mm.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_mm.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,355 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_mm.c,v 1.19 2014/01/04 17:50:55 tedu Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
-#include <sys/mman.h>
-#endif
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stddef.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "monitor_mm.h"
-
-static int
-mm_compare(struct mm_share *a, struct mm_share *b)
-{
- ptrdiff_t diff = (char *)a->address - (char *)b->address;
-
- if (diff == 0)
- return (0);
- else if (diff < 0)
- return (-1);
- else
- return (1);
-}
-
-RB_GENERATE(mmtree, mm_share, next, mm_compare)
-
-static struct mm_share *
-mm_make_entry(struct mm_master *mm, struct mmtree *head,
- void *address, size_t size)
-{
- struct mm_share *tmp, *tmp2;
-
- if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
- tmp = xcalloc(1, sizeof(struct mm_share));
- else
- tmp = mm_xmalloc(mm->mmalloc, sizeof(struct mm_share));
- tmp->address = address;
- tmp->size = size;
-
- tmp2 = RB_INSERT(mmtree, head, tmp);
- if (tmp2 != NULL)
- fatal("mm_make_entry(%p): double address %p->%p(%zu)",
- mm, tmp2, address, size);
-
- return (tmp);
-}
-
-/* Creates a shared memory area of a certain size */
-
-struct mm_master *
-mm_create(struct mm_master *mmalloc, size_t size)
-{
- void *address;
- struct mm_master *mm;
-
- if (mmalloc == NULL)
- mm = xcalloc(1, sizeof(struct mm_master));
- else
- mm = mm_xmalloc(mmalloc, sizeof(struct mm_master));
-
- /*
- * If the memory map has a mm_master it can be completely
- * shared including authentication between the child
- * and the client.
- */
- mm->mmalloc = mmalloc;
-
- address = xmmap(size);
- if (address == (void *)MAP_FAILED)
- fatal("mmap(%zu): %s", size, strerror(errno));
-
- mm->address = address;
- mm->size = size;
-
- RB_INIT(&mm->rb_free);
- RB_INIT(&mm->rb_allocated);
-
- mm_make_entry(mm, &mm->rb_free, address, size);
-
- return (mm);
-}
-
-/* Frees either the allocated or the free list */
-
-static void
-mm_freelist(struct mm_master *mmalloc, struct mmtree *head)
-{
- struct mm_share *mms, *next;
-
- for (mms = RB_ROOT(head); mms; mms = next) {
- next = RB_NEXT(mmtree, head, mms);
- RB_REMOVE(mmtree, head, mms);
- if (mmalloc == NULL)
- free(mms);
- else
- mm_free(mmalloc, mms);
- }
-}
-
-/* Destroys a memory mapped area */
-
-void
-mm_destroy(struct mm_master *mm)
-{
- mm_freelist(mm->mmalloc, &mm->rb_free);
- mm_freelist(mm->mmalloc, &mm->rb_allocated);
-
-#ifdef HAVE_MMAP
- if (munmap(mm->address, mm->size) == -1)
- fatal("munmap(%p, %zu): %s", mm->address, mm->size,
- strerror(errno));
-#else
- fatal("%s: UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes and Compression=yes not supported",
- __func__);
-#endif
- if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
- free(mm);
- else
- mm_free(mm->mmalloc, mm);
-}
-
-void *
-mm_xmalloc(struct mm_master *mm, size_t size)
-{
- void *address;
-
- address = mm_malloc(mm, size);
- if (address == NULL)
- fatal("%s: mm_malloc(%zu)", __func__, size);
- memset(address, 0, size);
- return (address);
-}
-
-
-/* Allocates data from a memory mapped area */
-
-void *
-mm_malloc(struct mm_master *mm, size_t size)
-{
- struct mm_share *mms, *tmp;
-
- if (size == 0)
- fatal("mm_malloc: try to allocate 0 space");
- if (size > SIZE_T_MAX - MM_MINSIZE + 1)
- fatal("mm_malloc: size too big");
-
- size = ((size + (MM_MINSIZE - 1)) / MM_MINSIZE) * MM_MINSIZE;
-
- RB_FOREACH(mms, mmtree, &mm->rb_free) {
- if (mms->size >= size)
- break;
- }
-
- if (mms == NULL)
- return (NULL);
-
- /* Debug */
- memset(mms->address, 0xd0, size);
-
- tmp = mm_make_entry(mm, &mm->rb_allocated, mms->address, size);
-
- /* Does not change order in RB tree */
- mms->size -= size;
- mms->address = (char *)mms->address + size;
-
- if (mms->size == 0) {
- RB_REMOVE(mmtree, &mm->rb_free, mms);
- if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
- free(mms);
- else
- mm_free(mm->mmalloc, mms);
- }
-
- return (tmp->address);
-}
-
-/* Frees memory in a memory mapped area */
-
-void
-mm_free(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
-{
- struct mm_share *mms, *prev, tmp;
-
- tmp.address = address;
- mms = RB_FIND(mmtree, &mm->rb_allocated, &tmp);
- if (mms == NULL)
- fatal("mm_free(%p): can not find %p", mm, address);
-
- /* Debug */
- memset(mms->address, 0xd0, mms->size);
-
- /* Remove from allocated list and insert in free list */
- RB_REMOVE(mmtree, &mm->rb_allocated, mms);
- if (RB_INSERT(mmtree, &mm->rb_free, mms) != NULL)
- fatal("mm_free(%p): double address %p", mm, address);
-
- /* Find previous entry */
- prev = mms;
- if (RB_LEFT(prev, next)) {
- prev = RB_LEFT(prev, next);
- while (RB_RIGHT(prev, next))
- prev = RB_RIGHT(prev, next);
- } else {
- if (RB_PARENT(prev, next) &&
- (prev == RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(prev, next), next)))
- prev = RB_PARENT(prev, next);
- else {
- while (RB_PARENT(prev, next) &&
- (prev == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(prev, next), next)))
- prev = RB_PARENT(prev, next);
- prev = RB_PARENT(prev, next);
- }
- }
-
- /* Check if range does not overlap */
- if (prev != NULL && MM_ADDRESS_END(prev) > address)
- fatal("mm_free: memory corruption: %p(%zu) > %p",
- prev->address, prev->size, address);
-
- /* See if we can merge backwards */
- if (prev != NULL && MM_ADDRESS_END(prev) == address) {
- prev->size += mms->size;
- RB_REMOVE(mmtree, &mm->rb_free, mms);
- if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
- free(mms);
- else
- mm_free(mm->mmalloc, mms);
- } else
- prev = mms;
-
- if (prev == NULL)
- return;
-
- /* Check if we can merge forwards */
- mms = RB_NEXT(mmtree, &mm->rb_free, prev);
- if (mms == NULL)
- return;
-
- if (MM_ADDRESS_END(prev) > mms->address)
- fatal("mm_free: memory corruption: %p < %p(%zu)",
- mms->address, prev->address, prev->size);
- if (MM_ADDRESS_END(prev) != mms->address)
- return;
-
- prev->size += mms->size;
- RB_REMOVE(mmtree, &mm->rb_free, mms);
-
- if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
- free(mms);
- else
- mm_free(mm->mmalloc, mms);
-}
-
-static void
-mm_sync_list(struct mmtree *oldtree, struct mmtree *newtree,
- struct mm_master *mm, struct mm_master *mmold)
-{
- struct mm_master *mmalloc = mm->mmalloc;
- struct mm_share *mms, *new;
-
- /* Sync free list */
- RB_FOREACH(mms, mmtree, oldtree) {
- /* Check the values */
- mm_memvalid(mmold, mms, sizeof(struct mm_share));
- mm_memvalid(mm, mms->address, mms->size);
-
- new = mm_xmalloc(mmalloc, sizeof(struct mm_share));
- memcpy(new, mms, sizeof(struct mm_share));
- RB_INSERT(mmtree, newtree, new);
- }
-}
-
-void
-mm_share_sync(struct mm_master **pmm, struct mm_master **pmmalloc)
-{
- struct mm_master *mm;
- struct mm_master *mmalloc;
- struct mm_master *mmold;
- struct mmtree rb_free, rb_allocated;
-
- debug3("%s: Share sync", __func__);
-
- mm = *pmm;
- mmold = mm->mmalloc;
- mm_memvalid(mmold, mm, sizeof(*mm));
-
- mmalloc = mm_create(NULL, mm->size);
- mm = mm_xmalloc(mmalloc, sizeof(struct mm_master));
- memcpy(mm, *pmm, sizeof(struct mm_master));
- mm->mmalloc = mmalloc;
-
- rb_free = mm->rb_free;
- rb_allocated = mm->rb_allocated;
-
- RB_INIT(&mm->rb_free);
- RB_INIT(&mm->rb_allocated);
-
- mm_sync_list(&rb_free, &mm->rb_free, mm, mmold);
- mm_sync_list(&rb_allocated, &mm->rb_allocated, mm, mmold);
-
- mm_destroy(mmold);
-
- *pmm = mm;
- *pmmalloc = mmalloc;
-
- debug3("%s: Share sync end", __func__);
-}
-
-void
-mm_memvalid(struct mm_master *mm, void *address, size_t size)
-{
- void *end = (char *)address + size;
-
- if (address < mm->address)
- fatal("mm_memvalid: address too small: %p", address);
- if (end < address)
- fatal("mm_memvalid: end < address: %p < %p", end, address);
- if (end > MM_ADDRESS_END(mm))
- fatal("mm_memvalid: address too large: %p", address);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_mm.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/monitor_mm.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_mm.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_mm.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_mm.c,v 1.21 2015/02/06 23:21:59 millert Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#endif
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "monitor_mm.h"
+
+static int
+mm_compare(struct mm_share *a, struct mm_share *b)
+{
+ ptrdiff_t diff = (char *)a->address - (char *)b->address;
+
+ if (diff == 0)
+ return (0);
+ else if (diff < 0)
+ return (-1);
+ else
+ return (1);
+}
+
+RB_GENERATE(mmtree, mm_share, next, mm_compare)
+
+static struct mm_share *
+mm_make_entry(struct mm_master *mm, struct mmtree *head,
+ void *address, size_t size)
+{
+ struct mm_share *tmp, *tmp2;
+
+ if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
+ tmp = xcalloc(1, sizeof(struct mm_share));
+ else
+ tmp = mm_xmalloc(mm->mmalloc, sizeof(struct mm_share));
+ tmp->address = address;
+ tmp->size = size;
+
+ tmp2 = RB_INSERT(mmtree, head, tmp);
+ if (tmp2 != NULL)
+ fatal("mm_make_entry(%p): double address %p->%p(%zu)",
+ mm, tmp2, address, size);
+
+ return (tmp);
+}
+
+/* Creates a shared memory area of a certain size */
+
+struct mm_master *
+mm_create(struct mm_master *mmalloc, size_t size)
+{
+ void *address;
+ struct mm_master *mm;
+
+ if (mmalloc == NULL)
+ mm = xcalloc(1, sizeof(struct mm_master));
+ else
+ mm = mm_xmalloc(mmalloc, sizeof(struct mm_master));
+
+ /*
+ * If the memory map has a mm_master it can be completely
+ * shared including authentication between the child
+ * and the client.
+ */
+ mm->mmalloc = mmalloc;
+
+ address = xmmap(size);
+ if (address == (void *)MAP_FAILED)
+ fatal("mmap(%zu): %s", size, strerror(errno));
+
+ mm->address = address;
+ mm->size = size;
+
+ RB_INIT(&mm->rb_free);
+ RB_INIT(&mm->rb_allocated);
+
+ mm_make_entry(mm, &mm->rb_free, address, size);
+
+ return (mm);
+}
+
+/* Frees either the allocated or the free list */
+
+static void
+mm_freelist(struct mm_master *mmalloc, struct mmtree *head)
+{
+ struct mm_share *mms, *next;
+
+ for (mms = RB_ROOT(head); mms; mms = next) {
+ next = RB_NEXT(mmtree, head, mms);
+ RB_REMOVE(mmtree, head, mms);
+ if (mmalloc == NULL)
+ free(mms);
+ else
+ mm_free(mmalloc, mms);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Destroys a memory mapped area */
+
+void
+mm_destroy(struct mm_master *mm)
+{
+ mm_freelist(mm->mmalloc, &mm->rb_free);
+ mm_freelist(mm->mmalloc, &mm->rb_allocated);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_MMAP
+ if (munmap(mm->address, mm->size) == -1)
+ fatal("munmap(%p, %zu): %s", mm->address, mm->size,
+ strerror(errno));
+#else
+ fatal("%s: UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes and Compression=yes not supported",
+ __func__);
+#endif
+ if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
+ free(mm);
+ else
+ mm_free(mm->mmalloc, mm);
+}
+
+void *
+mm_xmalloc(struct mm_master *mm, size_t size)
+{
+ void *address;
+
+ address = mm_malloc(mm, size);
+ if (address == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: mm_malloc(%zu)", __func__, size);
+ memset(address, 0, size);
+ return (address);
+}
+
+
+/* Allocates data from a memory mapped area */
+
+void *
+mm_malloc(struct mm_master *mm, size_t size)
+{
+ struct mm_share *mms, *tmp;
+
+ if (size == 0)
+ fatal("mm_malloc: try to allocate 0 space");
+ if (size > SIZE_MAX - MM_MINSIZE + 1)
+ fatal("mm_malloc: size too big");
+
+ size = ((size + (MM_MINSIZE - 1)) / MM_MINSIZE) * MM_MINSIZE;
+
+ RB_FOREACH(mms, mmtree, &mm->rb_free) {
+ if (mms->size >= size)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (mms == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ /* Debug */
+ memset(mms->address, 0xd0, size);
+
+ tmp = mm_make_entry(mm, &mm->rb_allocated, mms->address, size);
+
+ /* Does not change order in RB tree */
+ mms->size -= size;
+ mms->address = (char *)mms->address + size;
+
+ if (mms->size == 0) {
+ RB_REMOVE(mmtree, &mm->rb_free, mms);
+ if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
+ free(mms);
+ else
+ mm_free(mm->mmalloc, mms);
+ }
+
+ return (tmp->address);
+}
+
+/* Frees memory in a memory mapped area */
+
+void
+mm_free(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
+{
+ struct mm_share *mms, *prev, tmp;
+
+ tmp.address = address;
+ mms = RB_FIND(mmtree, &mm->rb_allocated, &tmp);
+ if (mms == NULL)
+ fatal("mm_free(%p): can not find %p", mm, address);
+
+ /* Debug */
+ memset(mms->address, 0xd0, mms->size);
+
+ /* Remove from allocated list and insert in free list */
+ RB_REMOVE(mmtree, &mm->rb_allocated, mms);
+ if (RB_INSERT(mmtree, &mm->rb_free, mms) != NULL)
+ fatal("mm_free(%p): double address %p", mm, address);
+
+ /* Find previous entry */
+ prev = mms;
+ if (RB_LEFT(prev, next)) {
+ prev = RB_LEFT(prev, next);
+ while (RB_RIGHT(prev, next))
+ prev = RB_RIGHT(prev, next);
+ } else {
+ if (RB_PARENT(prev, next) &&
+ (prev == RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(prev, next), next)))
+ prev = RB_PARENT(prev, next);
+ else {
+ while (RB_PARENT(prev, next) &&
+ (prev == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(prev, next), next)))
+ prev = RB_PARENT(prev, next);
+ prev = RB_PARENT(prev, next);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check if range does not overlap */
+ if (prev != NULL && MM_ADDRESS_END(prev) > address)
+ fatal("mm_free: memory corruption: %p(%zu) > %p",
+ prev->address, prev->size, address);
+
+ /* See if we can merge backwards */
+ if (prev != NULL && MM_ADDRESS_END(prev) == address) {
+ prev->size += mms->size;
+ RB_REMOVE(mmtree, &mm->rb_free, mms);
+ if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
+ free(mms);
+ else
+ mm_free(mm->mmalloc, mms);
+ } else
+ prev = mms;
+
+ if (prev == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ /* Check if we can merge forwards */
+ mms = RB_NEXT(mmtree, &mm->rb_free, prev);
+ if (mms == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (MM_ADDRESS_END(prev) > mms->address)
+ fatal("mm_free: memory corruption: %p < %p(%zu)",
+ mms->address, prev->address, prev->size);
+ if (MM_ADDRESS_END(prev) != mms->address)
+ return;
+
+ prev->size += mms->size;
+ RB_REMOVE(mmtree, &mm->rb_free, mms);
+
+ if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
+ free(mms);
+ else
+ mm_free(mm->mmalloc, mms);
+}
+
+static void
+mm_sync_list(struct mmtree *oldtree, struct mmtree *newtree,
+ struct mm_master *mm, struct mm_master *mmold)
+{
+ struct mm_master *mmalloc = mm->mmalloc;
+ struct mm_share *mms, *new;
+
+ /* Sync free list */
+ RB_FOREACH(mms, mmtree, oldtree) {
+ /* Check the values */
+ mm_memvalid(mmold, mms, sizeof(struct mm_share));
+ mm_memvalid(mm, mms->address, mms->size);
+
+ new = mm_xmalloc(mmalloc, sizeof(struct mm_share));
+ memcpy(new, mms, sizeof(struct mm_share));
+ RB_INSERT(mmtree, newtree, new);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+mm_share_sync(struct mm_master **pmm, struct mm_master **pmmalloc)
+{
+ struct mm_master *mm;
+ struct mm_master *mmalloc;
+ struct mm_master *mmold;
+ struct mmtree rb_free, rb_allocated;
+
+ debug3("%s: Share sync", __func__);
+
+ mm = *pmm;
+ mmold = mm->mmalloc;
+ mm_memvalid(mmold, mm, sizeof(*mm));
+
+ mmalloc = mm_create(NULL, mm->size);
+ mm = mm_xmalloc(mmalloc, sizeof(struct mm_master));
+ memcpy(mm, *pmm, sizeof(struct mm_master));
+ mm->mmalloc = mmalloc;
+
+ rb_free = mm->rb_free;
+ rb_allocated = mm->rb_allocated;
+
+ RB_INIT(&mm->rb_free);
+ RB_INIT(&mm->rb_allocated);
+
+ mm_sync_list(&rb_free, &mm->rb_free, mm, mmold);
+ mm_sync_list(&rb_allocated, &mm->rb_allocated, mm, mmold);
+
+ mm_destroy(mmold);
+
+ *pmm = mm;
+ *pmmalloc = mmalloc;
+
+ debug3("%s: Share sync end", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+mm_memvalid(struct mm_master *mm, void *address, size_t size)
+{
+ void *end = (char *)address + size;
+
+ if (address < mm->address)
+ fatal("mm_memvalid: address too small: %p", address);
+ if (end < address)
+ fatal("mm_memvalid: end < address: %p < %p", end, address);
+ if (end > MM_ADDRESS_END(mm))
+ fatal("mm_memvalid: address too large: %p", address);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_wrap.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/monitor_wrap.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_wrap.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1292 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.79 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>
- * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus at openbsd.org>
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "dh.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "mac.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC /* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */
-#undef TARGET_OS_MAC
-#include "zlib.h"
-#define TARGET_OS_MAC 1
-#else
-#include "zlib.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "uuencode.h"
-
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "session.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "roaming.h"
-
-/* Imports */
-extern int compat20;
-extern z_stream incoming_stream;
-extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
-extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
-extern Buffer loginmsg;
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-void
-mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx)
-{
- Buffer log_msg;
- struct monitor *mon = (struct monitor *)ctx;
-
- if (mon->m_log_sendfd == -1)
- fatal("%s: no log channel", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&log_msg);
- /*
- * Placeholder for packet length. Will be filled in with the actual
- * packet length once the packet has been constucted. This saves
- * fragile math.
- */
- buffer_put_int(&log_msg, 0);
-
- buffer_put_int(&log_msg, level);
- buffer_put_cstring(&log_msg, msg);
- put_u32(buffer_ptr(&log_msg), buffer_len(&log_msg) - 4);
- if (atomicio(vwrite, mon->m_log_sendfd, buffer_ptr(&log_msg),
- buffer_len(&log_msg)) != buffer_len(&log_msg))
- fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- buffer_free(&log_msg);
-}
-
-int
-mm_is_monitor(void)
-{
- /*
- * m_pid is only set in the privileged part, and
- * points to the unprivileged child.
- */
- return (pmonitor && pmonitor->m_pid > 0);
-}
-
-void
-mm_request_send(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
-{
- u_int mlen = buffer_len(m);
- u_char buf[5];
-
- debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type);
-
- put_u32(buf, mlen + 1);
- buf[4] = (u_char) type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
- if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf))
- fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buffer_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen)
- fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-}
-
-void
-mm_request_receive(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- u_char buf[4];
- u_int msg_len;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
- if (errno == EPIPE)
- cleanup_exit(255);
- fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- }
- msg_len = get_u32(buf);
- if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
- fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_append_space(m, msg_len);
- if (atomicio(read, sock, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len)
- fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-}
-
-void
-mm_request_receive_expect(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
-{
- u_char rtype;
-
- debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type);
-
- mm_request_receive(sock, m);
- rtype = buffer_get_char(m);
- if (rtype != type)
- fatal("%s: read: rtype %d != type %d", __func__,
- rtype, type);
-}
-
-DH *
-mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max)
-{
- BIGNUM *p, *g;
- int success = 0;
- Buffer m;
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_int(&m, min);
- buffer_put_int(&m, nbits);
- buffer_put_int(&m, max);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, &m);
-
- debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_MODULI", __func__);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, &m);
-
- success = buffer_get_char(&m);
- if (success == 0)
- fatal("%s: MONITOR_ANS_MODULI failed", __func__);
-
- if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
- if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
- buffer_get_bignum2(&m, p);
- buffer_get_bignum2(&m, g);
-
- debug3("%s: remaining %d", __func__, buffer_len(&m));
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- return (dh_new_group(g, p));
-}
-
-int
-mm_key_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
- Kex *kex = *pmonitor->m_pkex;
- Buffer m;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_int(&m, kex->host_key_index(key));
- buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, &m);
-
- debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_SIGN", __func__);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, &m);
- *sigp = buffer_get_string(&m, lenp);
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-struct passwd *
-mm_getpwnamallow(const char *username)
-{
- Buffer m;
- struct passwd *pw;
- u_int len, i;
- ServerOptions *newopts;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, username);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, &m);
-
- debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM", __func__);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, &m);
-
- if (buffer_get_char(&m) == 0) {
- pw = NULL;
- goto out;
- }
- pw = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
- if (len != sizeof(struct passwd))
- fatal("%s: struct passwd size mismatch", __func__);
- pw->pw_name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- pw->pw_passwd = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
-#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
- pw->pw_gecos = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
- pw->pw_class = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
-#endif
- pw->pw_dir = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- pw->pw_shell = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
-
-out:
- /* copy options block as a Match directive may have changed some */
- newopts = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
- if (len != sizeof(*newopts))
- fatal("%s: option block size mismatch", __func__);
-
-#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
- if (newopts->x != NULL) \
- newopts->x = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); \
- } while (0)
-#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
- for (i = 0; i < newopts->nx; i++) \
- newopts->x[i] = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); \
- } while (0)
- /* See comment in servconf.h */
- COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
-#undef M_CP_STROPT
-#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
-
- copy_set_server_options(&options, newopts, 1);
- free(newopts);
-
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- return (pw);
-}
-
-char *
-mm_auth2_read_banner(void)
-{
- Buffer m;
- char *banner;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, &m);
- buffer_clear(&m);
-
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
- MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, &m);
- banner = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- /* treat empty banner as missing banner */
- if (strlen(banner) == 0) {
- free(banner);
- banner = NULL;
- }
- return (banner);
-}
-
-/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
-
-void
-mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
-{
- Buffer m;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, service);
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, style ? style : "");
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, &m);
-
- buffer_free(&m);
-}
-
-/* Do the password authentication */
-int
-mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
-{
- Buffer m;
- int authenticated = 0;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, password);
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, &m);
-
- debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD", __func__);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, &m);
-
- authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m);
-
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",
- __func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
- return (authenticated);
-}
-
-int
-mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
-{
- return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key));
-}
-
-int
-mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user, char *host,
- Key *key)
-{
- return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key));
-}
-
-int
-mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user,
- char *host, Key *key)
-{
- int ret;
-
- key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX hack for key_to_blob */
- ret = mm_key_allowed(MM_RSAHOSTKEY, user, host, key);
- key->type = KEY_RSA1;
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int
-mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host, Key *key)
-{
- Buffer m;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int len;
- int allowed = 0, have_forced = 0;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- /* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */
- if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len))
- return (0);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_int(&m, type);
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, user ? user : "");
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, host ? host : "");
- buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
- free(blob);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, &m);
-
- debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED", __func__);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, &m);
-
- allowed = buffer_get_int(&m);
-
- /* fake forced command */
- auth_clear_options();
- have_forced = buffer_get_int(&m);
- forced_command = have_forced ? xstrdup("true") : NULL;
-
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- return (allowed);
-}
-
-/*
- * This key verify needs to send the key type along, because the
- * privileged parent makes the decision if the key is allowed
- * for authentication.
- */
-
-int
-mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
- Buffer m;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int len;
- int verified = 0;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- /* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */
- if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len))
- return (0);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
- buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen);
- buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
- free(blob);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, &m);
-
- debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __func__);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, &m);
-
- verified = buffer_get_int(&m);
-
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- return (verified);
-}
-
-/* Export key state after authentication */
-Newkeys *
-mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen)
-{
- Buffer b;
- u_int len;
- Newkeys *newkey = NULL;
- Enc *enc;
- Mac *mac;
- Comp *comp;
-
- debug3("%s: %p(%d)", __func__, blob, blen);
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
- dump_base64(stderr, blob, blen);
-#endif
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, blob, blen);
-
- newkey = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*newkey));
- enc = &newkey->enc;
- mac = &newkey->mac;
- comp = &newkey->comp;
-
- /* Enc structure */
- enc->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
- buffer_get(&b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher));
- enc->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b);
- enc->block_size = buffer_get_int(&b);
- enc->key = buffer_get_string(&b, &enc->key_len);
- enc->iv = buffer_get_string(&b, &enc->iv_len);
-
- if (enc->name == NULL || cipher_by_name(enc->name) != enc->cipher)
- fatal("%s: bad cipher name %s or pointer %p", __func__,
- enc->name, enc->cipher);
-
- /* Mac structure */
- if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
- mac->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
- if (mac->name == NULL || mac_setup(mac, mac->name) == -1)
- fatal("%s: can not setup mac %s", __func__, mac->name);
- mac->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b);
- mac->key = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
- if (len > mac->key_len)
- fatal("%s: bad mac key length: %u > %d", __func__, len,
- mac->key_len);
- mac->key_len = len;
- }
-
- /* Comp structure */
- comp->type = buffer_get_int(&b);
- comp->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b);
- comp->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
-
- len = buffer_len(&b);
- if (len != 0)
- error("newkeys_from_blob: remaining bytes in blob %u", len);
- buffer_free(&b);
- return (newkey);
-}
-
-int
-mm_newkeys_to_blob(int mode, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
-{
- Buffer b;
- int len;
- Enc *enc;
- Mac *mac;
- Comp *comp;
- Newkeys *newkey = (Newkeys *)packet_get_newkeys(mode);
-
- debug3("%s: converting %p", __func__, newkey);
-
- if (newkey == NULL) {
- error("%s: newkey == NULL", __func__);
- return 0;
- }
- enc = &newkey->enc;
- mac = &newkey->mac;
- comp = &newkey->comp;
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- /* Enc structure */
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, enc->name);
- /* The cipher struct is constant and shared, you export pointer */
- buffer_append(&b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher));
- buffer_put_int(&b, enc->enabled);
- buffer_put_int(&b, enc->block_size);
- buffer_put_string(&b, enc->key, enc->key_len);
- packet_get_keyiv(mode, enc->iv, enc->iv_len);
- buffer_put_string(&b, enc->iv, enc->iv_len);
-
- /* Mac structure */
- if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, mac->name);
- buffer_put_int(&b, mac->enabled);
- buffer_put_string(&b, mac->key, mac->key_len);
- }
-
- /* Comp structure */
- buffer_put_int(&b, comp->type);
- buffer_put_int(&b, comp->enabled);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, comp->name);
-
- len = buffer_len(&b);
- if (lenp != NULL)
- *lenp = len;
- if (blobp != NULL) {
- *blobp = xmalloc(len);
- memcpy(*blobp, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
- }
- explicit_bzero(buffer_ptr(&b), len);
- buffer_free(&b);
- return len;
-}
-
-static void
-mm_send_kex(Buffer *m, Kex *kex)
-{
- buffer_put_string(m, kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len);
- buffer_put_int(m, kex->we_need);
- buffer_put_int(m, kex->hostkey_type);
- buffer_put_int(m, kex->kex_type);
- buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my));
- buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer));
- buffer_put_int(m, kex->flags);
- buffer_put_cstring(m, kex->client_version_string);
- buffer_put_cstring(m, kex->server_version_string);
-}
-
-void
-mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor)
-{
- Buffer m, *input, *output;
- u_char *blob, *p;
- u_int bloblen, plen;
- u_int32_t seqnr, packets;
- u_int64_t blocks, bytes;
-
- buffer_init(&m);
-
- if (!compat20) {
- u_char iv[24];
- u_char *key;
- u_int ivlen, keylen;
-
- buffer_put_int(&m, packet_get_protocol_flags());
-
- buffer_put_int(&m, packet_get_ssh1_cipher());
-
- debug3("%s: Sending ssh1 KEY+IV", __func__);
- keylen = packet_get_encryption_key(NULL);
- key = xmalloc(keylen+1); /* add 1 if keylen == 0 */
- keylen = packet_get_encryption_key(key);
- buffer_put_string(&m, key, keylen);
- explicit_bzero(key, keylen);
- free(key);
-
- ivlen = packet_get_keyiv_len(MODE_OUT);
- packet_get_keyiv(MODE_OUT, iv, ivlen);
- buffer_put_string(&m, iv, ivlen);
- ivlen = packet_get_keyiv_len(MODE_IN);
- packet_get_keyiv(MODE_IN, iv, ivlen);
- buffer_put_string(&m, iv, ivlen);
- goto skip;
- } else {
- /* Kex for rekeying */
- mm_send_kex(&m, *monitor->m_pkex);
- }
-
- debug3("%s: Sending new keys: %p %p",
- __func__, packet_get_newkeys(MODE_OUT),
- packet_get_newkeys(MODE_IN));
-
- /* Keys from Kex */
- if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_OUT, &blob, &bloblen))
- fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
-
- buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
- free(blob);
-
- if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen))
- fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
-
- buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
- free(blob);
-
- packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes);
- buffer_put_int(&m, seqnr);
- buffer_put_int64(&m, blocks);
- buffer_put_int(&m, packets);
- buffer_put_int64(&m, bytes);
- packet_get_state(MODE_IN, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes);
- buffer_put_int(&m, seqnr);
- buffer_put_int64(&m, blocks);
- buffer_put_int(&m, packets);
- buffer_put_int64(&m, bytes);
-
- debug3("%s: New keys have been sent", __func__);
- skip:
- /* More key context */
- plen = packet_get_keycontext(MODE_OUT, NULL);
- p = xmalloc(plen+1);
- packet_get_keycontext(MODE_OUT, p);
- buffer_put_string(&m, p, plen);
- free(p);
-
- plen = packet_get_keycontext(MODE_IN, NULL);
- p = xmalloc(plen+1);
- packet_get_keycontext(MODE_IN, p);
- buffer_put_string(&m, p, plen);
- free(p);
-
- /* Compression state */
- debug3("%s: Sending compression state", __func__);
- buffer_put_string(&m, &outgoing_stream, sizeof(outgoing_stream));
- buffer_put_string(&m, &incoming_stream, sizeof(incoming_stream));
-
- /* Network I/O buffers */
- input = (Buffer *)packet_get_input();
- output = (Buffer *)packet_get_output();
- buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(input), buffer_len(input));
- buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(output), buffer_len(output));
-
- /* Roaming */
- if (compat20) {
- buffer_put_int64(&m, get_sent_bytes());
- buffer_put_int64(&m, get_recv_bytes());
- }
-
- mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
- debug3("%s: Finished sending state", __func__);
-
- buffer_free(&m);
-}
-
-int
-mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen)
-{
- Buffer m;
- char *p, *msg;
- int success = 0, tmp1 = -1, tmp2 = -1;
-
- /* Kludge: ensure there are fds free to receive the pty/tty */
- if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
- (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
- error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
- if (tmp1 > 0)
- close(tmp1);
- if (tmp2 > 0)
- close(tmp2);
- return 0;
- }
- close(tmp1);
- close(tmp2);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, &m);
-
- debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PTY", __func__);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, &m);
-
- success = buffer_get_int(&m);
- if (success == 0) {
- debug3("%s: pty alloc failed", __func__);
- buffer_free(&m);
- return (0);
- }
- p = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- msg = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- strlcpy(namebuf, p, namebuflen); /* Possible truncation */
- free(p);
-
- buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
- free(msg);
-
- if ((*ptyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
- (*ttyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1)
- fatal("%s: receive fds failed", __func__);
-
- /* Success */
- return (1);
-}
-
-void
-mm_session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
-{
- Buffer m;
-
- if (s->ttyfd == -1)
- return;
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, s->tty);
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, &m);
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- /* closed dup'ed master */
- if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) < 0)
- error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s",
- s->ptymaster, strerror(errno));
-
- /* unlink pty from session */
- s->ttyfd = -1;
-}
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-void
-mm_start_pam(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- Buffer m;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
- if (!options.use_pam)
- fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, &m);
-
- buffer_free(&m);
-}
-
-u_int
-mm_do_pam_account(void)
-{
- Buffer m;
- u_int ret;
- char *msg;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
- if (!options.use_pam)
- fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
-
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
- MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
- ret = buffer_get_int(&m);
- msg = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
- free(msg);
-
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- debug3("%s returning %d", __func__, ret);
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-void *
-mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- Buffer m;
- int success;
-
- debug3("%s", __func__);
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, authctxt->user);
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);
- debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);
- success = buffer_get_int(&m);
- if (success == 0) {
- debug3("%s: pam_init_ctx failed", __func__);
- buffer_free(&m);
- return (NULL);
- }
- buffer_free(&m);
- return (authctxt);
-}
-
-int
-mm_sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
- u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
-{
- Buffer m;
- u_int i;
- int ret;
-
- debug3("%s", __func__);
- buffer_init(&m);
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, &m);
- debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY", __func__);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, &m);
- ret = buffer_get_int(&m);
- debug3("%s: pam_query returned %d", __func__, ret);
- *name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- *info = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- *num = buffer_get_int(&m);
- if (*num > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
- fatal("%s: recieved %u PAM messages, expected <= %u",
- __func__, *num, PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG);
- *prompts = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(char *));
- *echo_on = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(u_int));
- for (i = 0; i < *num; ++i) {
- (*prompts)[i] = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- (*echo_on)[i] = buffer_get_int(&m);
- }
- buffer_free(&m);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int
-mm_sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
-{
- Buffer m;
- u_int i;
- int ret;
-
- debug3("%s", __func__);
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_int(&m, num);
- for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, resp[i]);
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, &m);
- debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND", __func__);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, &m);
- ret = buffer_get_int(&m);
- debug3("%s: pam_respond returned %d", __func__, ret);
- buffer_free(&m);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-void
-mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp)
-{
- Buffer m;
-
- debug3("%s", __func__);
- buffer_init(&m);
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, &m);
- debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX", __func__);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, &m);
- buffer_free(&m);
-}
-#endif /* USE_PAM */
-
-/* Request process termination */
-
-void
-mm_terminate(void)
-{
- Buffer m;
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, &m);
- buffer_free(&m);
-}
-
-int
-mm_ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *num)
-{
- int rsafail;
- Buffer m;
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&m, num);
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, &m);
-
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, &m);
-
- rsafail = buffer_get_int(&m);
- buffer_get_bignum2(&m, num);
-
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- return (rsafail);
-}
-
-static void
-mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts,
- char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
-{
- *name = xstrdup("");
- *infotxt = xstrdup("");
- *numprompts = 1;
- *prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
- *echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
- (*echo_on)[0] = 0;
-}
-
-int
-mm_bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
- u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
-{
- Buffer m;
- u_int success;
- char *challenge;
-
- debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, &m);
-
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY,
- &m);
- success = buffer_get_int(&m);
- if (success == 0) {
- debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__);
- buffer_free(&m);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- /* Get the challenge, and format the response */
- challenge = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on);
- (*prompts)[0] = challenge;
-
- debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
-{
- Buffer m;
- int authok;
-
- debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
- if (numresponses != 1)
- return (-1);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, responses[0]);
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, &m);
-
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
- MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, &m);
-
- authok = buffer_get_int(&m);
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0);
-}
-
-#ifdef SKEY
-int
-mm_skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
- u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
-{
- Buffer m;
- u_int success;
- char *challenge;
-
- debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, &m);
-
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY,
- &m);
- success = buffer_get_int(&m);
- if (success == 0) {
- debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__);
- buffer_free(&m);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- /* Get the challenge, and format the response */
- challenge = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge);
-
- mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on);
-
- xasprintf(*prompts, "%s%s", challenge, SKEY_PROMPT);
- free(challenge);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_skey_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
-{
- Buffer m;
- int authok;
-
- debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
- if (numresponses != 1)
- return (-1);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, responses[0]);
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, &m);
-
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
- MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, &m);
-
- authok = buffer_get_int(&m);
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0);
-}
-#endif /* SKEY */
-
-void
-mm_ssh1_session_id(u_char session_id[16])
-{
- Buffer m;
- int i;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- buffer_put_char(&m, session_id[i]);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, &m);
- buffer_free(&m);
-}
-
-int
-mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
-{
- Buffer m;
- Key *key;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int blen;
- int allowed = 0, have_forced = 0;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&m, client_n);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, &m);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, &m);
-
- allowed = buffer_get_int(&m);
-
- /* fake forced command */
- auth_clear_options();
- have_forced = buffer_get_int(&m);
- forced_command = have_forced ? xstrdup("true") : NULL;
-
- if (allowed && rkey != NULL) {
- blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &blen);
- if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: key_from_blob failed", __func__);
- *rkey = key;
- free(blob);
- }
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- return (allowed);
-}
-
-BIGNUM *
-mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key)
-{
- Buffer m;
- BIGNUM *challenge;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int blen;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
-
- key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */
- if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
- fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
- key->type = KEY_RSA1;
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen);
- free(blob);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, &m);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, &m);
-
- buffer_get_bignum2(&m, challenge);
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- return (challenge);
-}
-
-int
-mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *p, u_char response[16])
-{
- Buffer m;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int blen;
- int success = 0;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */
- if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
- fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
- key->type = KEY_RSA1;
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen);
- buffer_put_string(&m, response, 16);
- free(blob);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, &m);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, &m);
-
- success = buffer_get_int(&m);
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- return (success);
-}
-
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-void
-mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
-{
- Buffer m;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_int(&m, event);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, &m);
- buffer_free(&m);
-}
-
-void
-mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
-{
- Buffer m;
-
- debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
- buffer_free(&m);
-}
-#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-OM_uint32
-mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid)
-{
- Buffer m;
- OM_uint32 major;
-
- /* Client doesn't get to see the context */
- *ctx = NULL;
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_string(&m, goid->elements, goid->length);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, &m);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, &m);
-
- major = buffer_get_int(&m);
-
- buffer_free(&m);
- return (major);
-}
-
-OM_uint32
-mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *in,
- gss_buffer_desc *out, OM_uint32 *flags)
-{
- Buffer m;
- OM_uint32 major;
- u_int len;
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_string(&m, in->value, in->length);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, &m);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, &m);
-
- major = buffer_get_int(&m);
- out->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
- out->length = len;
- if (flags)
- *flags = buffer_get_int(&m);
-
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- return (major);
-}
-
-OM_uint32
-mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
-{
- Buffer m;
- OM_uint32 major;
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_string(&m, gssbuf->value, gssbuf->length);
- buffer_put_string(&m, gssmic->value, gssmic->length);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, &m);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC,
- &m);
-
- major = buffer_get_int(&m);
- buffer_free(&m);
- return(major);
-}
-
-int
-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
-{
- Buffer m;
- int authenticated = 0;
-
- buffer_init(&m);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, &m);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK,
- &m);
-
- authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m);
-
- buffer_free(&m);
- debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
- return (authenticated);
-}
-#endif /* GSSAPI */
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_wrap.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/monitor_wrap.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_wrap.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_wrap.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1094 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.88 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>
+ * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus at openbsd.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include "dh.h"
+#endif
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "auth-pam.h"
+#ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC /* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */
+#undef TARGET_OS_MAC
+#include "zlib.h"
+#define TARGET_OS_MAC 1
+#else
+#include "zlib.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "uuencode.h"
+
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+/* Imports */
+extern int compat20;
+extern z_stream incoming_stream;
+extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
+extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+void
+mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx)
+{
+ Buffer log_msg;
+ struct monitor *mon = (struct monitor *)ctx;
+
+ if (mon->m_log_sendfd == -1)
+ fatal("%s: no log channel", __func__);
+
+ buffer_init(&log_msg);
+ /*
+ * Placeholder for packet length. Will be filled in with the actual
+ * packet length once the packet has been constucted. This saves
+ * fragile math.
+ */
+ buffer_put_int(&log_msg, 0);
+
+ buffer_put_int(&log_msg, level);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&log_msg, msg);
+ put_u32(buffer_ptr(&log_msg), buffer_len(&log_msg) - 4);
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, mon->m_log_sendfd, buffer_ptr(&log_msg),
+ buffer_len(&log_msg)) != buffer_len(&log_msg))
+ fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ buffer_free(&log_msg);
+}
+
+int
+mm_is_monitor(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * m_pid is only set in the privileged part, and
+ * points to the unprivileged child.
+ */
+ return (pmonitor && pmonitor->m_pid > 0);
+}
+
+void
+mm_request_send(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
+{
+ u_int mlen = buffer_len(m);
+ u_char buf[5];
+
+ debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type);
+
+ put_u32(buf, mlen + 1);
+ buf[4] = (u_char) type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf))
+ fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buffer_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen)
+ fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+}
+
+void
+mm_request_receive(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ u_char buf[4];
+ u_int msg_len;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
+ if (errno == EPIPE)
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ msg_len = get_u32(buf);
+ if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
+ fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_append_space(m, msg_len);
+ if (atomicio(read, sock, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len)
+ fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+}
+
+void
+mm_request_receive_expect(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
+{
+ u_char rtype;
+
+ debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type);
+
+ mm_request_receive(sock, m);
+ rtype = buffer_get_char(m);
+ if (rtype != type)
+ fatal("%s: read: rtype %d != type %d", __func__,
+ rtype, type);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+DH *
+mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max)
+{
+ BIGNUM *p, *g;
+ int success = 0;
+ Buffer m;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, min);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, nbits);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, max);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, &m);
+
+ debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_MODULI", __func__);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, &m);
+
+ success = buffer_get_char(&m);
+ if (success == 0)
+ fatal("%s: MONITOR_ANS_MODULI failed", __func__);
+
+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&m, p);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&m, g);
+
+ debug3("%s: remaining %d", __func__, buffer_len(&m));
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (dh_new_group(g, p));
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+mm_key_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, u_int datalen, const char *hostkey_alg)
+{
+ struct kex *kex = *pmonitor->m_pkex;
+ Buffer m;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, kex->host_key_index(key, 0, active_state));
+ buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, hostkey_alg);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, &m);
+
+ debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_SIGN", __func__);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, &m);
+ *sigp = buffer_get_string(&m, lenp);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+struct passwd *
+mm_getpwnamallow(const char *username)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ u_int len, i;
+ ServerOptions *newopts;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, username);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, &m);
+
+ debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM", __func__);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, &m);
+
+ if (buffer_get_char(&m) == 0) {
+ pw = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ pw = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
+ if (len != sizeof(struct passwd))
+ fatal("%s: struct passwd size mismatch", __func__);
+ pw->pw_name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ pw->pw_passwd = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
+ pw->pw_gecos = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
+ pw->pw_class = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+#endif
+ pw->pw_dir = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ pw->pw_shell = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+
+out:
+ /* copy options block as a Match directive may have changed some */
+ newopts = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
+ if (len != sizeof(*newopts))
+ fatal("%s: option block size mismatch", __func__);
+
+#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
+ if (newopts->x != NULL) \
+ newopts->x = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); \
+ } while (0)
+#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
+ for (i = 0; i < newopts->nx; i++) \
+ newopts->x[i] = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); \
+ } while (0)
+ /* See comment in servconf.h */
+ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
+#undef M_CP_STROPT
+#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
+
+ copy_set_server_options(&options, newopts, 1);
+ free(newopts);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (pw);
+}
+
+char *
+mm_auth2_read_banner(void)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ char *banner;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, &m);
+ buffer_clear(&m);
+
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+ MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, &m);
+ banner = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ /* treat empty banner as missing banner */
+ if (strlen(banner) == 0) {
+ free(banner);
+ banner = NULL;
+ }
+ return (banner);
+}
+
+/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
+
+void
+mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, service);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, style ? style : "");
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, &m);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+/* Do the password authentication */
+int
+mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, password);
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, &m);
+
+ debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD", __func__);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, &m);
+
+ authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m);
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(buffer_get_int(&m));
+#endif
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",
+ __func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+ return (authenticated);
+}
+
+int
+mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt)
+{
+ return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key,
+ pubkey_auth_attempt));
+}
+
+int
+mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *user, const char *host,
+ Key *key)
+{
+ return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0));
+}
+
+int
+mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *user,
+ const char *host, Key *key)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX hack for key_to_blob */
+ ret = mm_key_allowed(MM_RSAHOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0);
+ key->type = KEY_RSA1;
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int
+mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, const char *user, const char *host,
+ Key *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int len;
+ int allowed = 0, have_forced = 0;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ /* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */
+ if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len))
+ return (0);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, type);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, user ? user : "");
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, host ? host : "");
+ buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, pubkey_auth_attempt);
+ free(blob);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, &m);
+
+ debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED", __func__);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, &m);
+
+ allowed = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+ /* fake forced command */
+ auth_clear_options();
+ have_forced = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ forced_command = have_forced ? xstrdup("true") : NULL;
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (allowed);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This key verify needs to send the key type along, because the
+ * privileged parent makes the decision if the key is allowed
+ * for authentication.
+ */
+
+int
+mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int len;
+ int verified = 0;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ /* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */
+ if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len))
+ return (0);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
+ free(blob);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, &m);
+
+ debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __func__);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, &m);
+
+ verified = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (verified);
+}
+
+void
+mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ struct sshbuf *m;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_get_state(ssh, m)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: get_state failed: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, m);
+ debug3("%s: Finished sending state", __func__);
+ sshbuf_free(m);
+}
+
+int
+mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ char *p, *msg;
+ int success = 0, tmp1 = -1, tmp2 = -1;
+
+ /* Kludge: ensure there are fds free to receive the pty/tty */
+ if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
+ (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
+ error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
+ if (tmp1 > 0)
+ close(tmp1);
+ if (tmp2 > 0)
+ close(tmp2);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ close(tmp1);
+ close(tmp2);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, &m);
+
+ debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PTY", __func__);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, &m);
+
+ success = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ if (success == 0) {
+ debug3("%s: pty alloc failed", __func__);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ p = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ msg = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ strlcpy(namebuf, p, namebuflen); /* Possible truncation */
+ free(p);
+
+ buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
+ free(msg);
+
+ if ((*ptyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
+ (*ttyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: receive fds failed", __func__);
+
+ /* Success */
+ return (1);
+}
+
+void
+mm_session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ if (s->ttyfd == -1)
+ return;
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, s->tty);
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ /* closed dup'ed master */
+ if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) < 0)
+ error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s",
+ s->ptymaster, strerror(errno));
+
+ /* unlink pty from session */
+ s->ttyfd = -1;
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+void
+mm_start_pam(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ if (!options.use_pam)
+ fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, &m);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+u_int
+mm_do_pam_account(void)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ u_int ret;
+ char *msg;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ if (!options.use_pam)
+ fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
+
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+ MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
+ ret = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ msg = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
+ free(msg);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ debug3("%s returning %d", __func__, ret);
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+void *
+mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ int success;
+
+ debug3("%s", __func__);
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);
+ debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);
+ success = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ if (success == 0) {
+ debug3("%s: pam_init_ctx failed", __func__);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ return (authctxt);
+}
+
+int
+mm_sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
+ u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ u_int i;
+ int ret;
+
+ debug3("%s", __func__);
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, &m);
+ debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY", __func__);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, &m);
+ ret = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ debug3("%s: pam_query returned %d", __func__, ret);
+ *name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ *info = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(buffer_get_int(&m));
+ *num = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ if (*num > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+ fatal("%s: recieved %u PAM messages, expected <= %u",
+ __func__, *num, PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG);
+ *prompts = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(char *));
+ *echo_on = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(u_int));
+ for (i = 0; i < *num; ++i) {
+ (*prompts)[i] = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ (*echo_on)[i] = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ }
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int
+mm_sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ u_int i;
+ int ret;
+
+ debug3("%s", __func__);
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, num);
+ for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, resp[i]);
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, &m);
+ debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND", __func__);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, &m);
+ ret = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ debug3("%s: pam_respond returned %d", __func__, ret);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+void
+mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ debug3("%s", __func__);
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, &m);
+ debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX", __func__);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+/* Request process termination */
+
+void
+mm_terminate(void)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+int
+mm_ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *num)
+{
+ int rsafail;
+ Buffer m;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&m, num);
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, &m);
+
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, &m);
+
+ rsafail = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&m, num);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (rsafail);
+}
+#endif
+
+static void
+mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts,
+ char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+ *name = xstrdup("");
+ *infotxt = xstrdup("");
+ *numprompts = 1;
+ *prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
+ *echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
+ (*echo_on)[0] = 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
+ u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ u_int success;
+ char *challenge;
+
+ debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, &m);
+
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY,
+ &m);
+ success = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ if (success == 0) {
+ debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /* Get the challenge, and format the response */
+ challenge = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on);
+ (*prompts)[0] = challenge;
+
+ debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ int authok;
+
+ debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+ if (numresponses != 1)
+ return (-1);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, responses[0]);
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, &m);
+
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+ MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, &m);
+
+ authok = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0);
+}
+
+#ifdef SKEY
+int
+mm_skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
+ u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ u_int success;
+ char *challenge;
+
+ debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, &m);
+
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY,
+ &m);
+ success = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ if (success == 0) {
+ debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /* Get the challenge, and format the response */
+ challenge = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge);
+
+ mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on);
+
+ xasprintf(*prompts, "%s%s", challenge, SKEY_PROMPT);
+ free(challenge);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_skey_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ int authok;
+
+ debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+ if (numresponses != 1)
+ return (-1);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, responses[0]);
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, &m);
+
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+ MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, &m);
+
+ authok = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0);
+}
+#endif /* SKEY */
+
+void
+mm_ssh1_session_id(u_char session_id[16])
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ int i;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ buffer_put_char(&m, session_id[i]);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+int
+mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ Key *key;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int blen;
+ int allowed = 0, have_forced = 0;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&m, client_n);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, &m);
+
+ allowed = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+ /* fake forced command */
+ auth_clear_options();
+ have_forced = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ forced_command = have_forced ? xstrdup("true") : NULL;
+
+ if (allowed && rkey != NULL) {
+ blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &blen);
+ if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: key_from_blob failed", __func__);
+ *rkey = key;
+ free(blob);
+ }
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (allowed);
+}
+
+BIGNUM *
+mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ BIGNUM *challenge;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int blen;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+
+ key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */
+ if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
+ fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
+ key->type = KEY_RSA1;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen);
+ free(blob);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, &m);
+
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&m, challenge);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (challenge);
+}
+
+int
+mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *p, u_char response[16])
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int blen;
+ int success = 0;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */
+ if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
+ fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
+ key->type = KEY_RSA1;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, response, 16);
+ free(blob);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, &m);
+
+ success = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (success);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+void
+mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, event);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+void
+mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+OM_uint32
+mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ OM_uint32 major;
+
+ /* Client doesn't get to see the context */
+ *ctx = NULL;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, goid->elements, goid->length);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, &m);
+
+ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ return (major);
+}
+
+OM_uint32
+mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *in,
+ gss_buffer_desc *out, OM_uint32 *flags)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ OM_uint32 major;
+ u_int len;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, in->value, in->length);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, &m);
+
+ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ out->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
+ out->length = len;
+ if (flags)
+ *flags = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (major);
+}
+
+OM_uint32
+mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ OM_uint32 major;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, gssbuf->value, gssbuf->length);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, gssmic->value, gssmic->length);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC,
+ &m);
+
+ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ return(major);
+}
+
+int
+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK,
+ &m);
+
+ authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+ return (authenticated);
+}
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_wrap.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/monitor_wrap.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_wrap.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.24 2014/01/29 06:18:35 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#ifndef _MM_WRAP_H_
-#define _MM_WRAP_H_
-
-extern int use_privsep;
-#define PRIVSEP(x) (use_privsep ? mm_##x : x)
-
-enum mm_keytype {MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY, MM_RSAHOSTKEY, MM_RSAUSERKEY};
-
-struct monitor;
-struct mm_master;
-struct Authctxt;
-
-void mm_log_handler(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
-int mm_is_monitor(void);
-DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
-int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
-void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
-struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
-char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
-int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
-int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *);
-int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
-int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
-int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
-int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
-int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
-int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);
-BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
-OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
- gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
-OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-void mm_start_pam(struct Authctxt *);
-u_int mm_do_pam_account(void);
-void *mm_sshpam_init_ctx(struct Authctxt *);
-int mm_sshpam_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
-int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
-void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-#include "audit.h"
-void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
-void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
-#endif
-
-struct Session;
-void mm_terminate(void);
-int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
-void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
-
-/* SSHv1 interfaces */
-void mm_ssh1_session_id(u_char *);
-int mm_ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
-
-/* Key export functions */
-struct Newkeys *mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *, int);
-int mm_newkeys_to_blob(int, u_char **, u_int *);
-
-void monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *);
-void mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *);
-void mm_send_keystate(struct monitor*);
-
-/* bsdauth */
-int mm_bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
-int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
-
-/* skey */
-int mm_skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
-int mm_skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
-
-/* zlib allocation hooks */
-
-void *mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *, u_int, u_int);
-void mm_zfree(struct mm_master *, void *);
-void mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *);
-
-#endif /* _MM_WRAP_H_ */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_wrap.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/monitor_wrap.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_wrap.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/monitor_wrap.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.30 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MM_WRAP_H_
+#define _MM_WRAP_H_
+
+extern int use_privsep;
+#define PRIVSEP(x) (use_privsep ? mm_##x : x)
+
+enum mm_keytype {MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY, MM_RSAHOSTKEY, MM_RSAUSERKEY};
+
+struct monitor;
+struct mm_master;
+struct Authctxt;
+
+void mm_log_handler(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
+int mm_is_monitor(void);
+DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int, const char *);
+void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
+struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
+char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
+int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
+int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, const char *, const char *, Key *, int);
+int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *, int);
+int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *,
+ const char *, Key *);
+int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *,
+ const char *, Key *);
+int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
+int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
+int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);
+BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
+ gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+void mm_start_pam(struct Authctxt *);
+u_int mm_do_pam_account(void);
+void *mm_sshpam_init_ctx(struct Authctxt *);
+int mm_sshpam_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
+int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
+void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+#include "audit.h"
+void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+#endif
+
+struct Session;
+void mm_terminate(void);
+int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
+void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
+
+/* SSHv1 interfaces */
+void mm_ssh1_session_id(u_char *);
+int mm_ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
+
+/* Key export functions */
+struct newkeys *mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *, int);
+int mm_newkeys_to_blob(int, u_char **, u_int *);
+
+void monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *);
+void mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *);
+void mm_send_keystate(struct monitor*);
+
+/* bsdauth */
+int mm_bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
+int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
+
+/* skey */
+int mm_skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
+int mm_skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
+
+/* zlib allocation hooks */
+void mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *);
+
+#endif /* _MM_WRAP_H_ */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/msg.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/msg.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/msg.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.15 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "msg.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-
-int
-ssh_msg_send(int fd, u_char type, Buffer *m)
-{
- u_char buf[5];
- u_int mlen = buffer_len(m);
-
- debug3("ssh_msg_send: type %u", (unsigned int)type & 0xff);
-
- put_u32(buf, mlen + 1);
- buf[4] = type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
- if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
- error("ssh_msg_send: write");
- return (-1);
- }
- if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buffer_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen) {
- error("ssh_msg_send: write");
- return (-1);
- }
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-ssh_msg_recv(int fd, Buffer *m)
-{
- u_char buf[4];
- u_int msg_len;
-
- debug3("ssh_msg_recv entering");
-
- if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
- if (errno != EPIPE)
- error("ssh_msg_recv: read: header");
- return (-1);
- }
- msg_len = get_u32(buf);
- if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
- error("ssh_msg_recv: read: bad msg_len %u", msg_len);
- return (-1);
- }
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_append_space(m, msg_len);
- if (atomicio(read, fd, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
- error("ssh_msg_recv: read: %s", strerror(errno));
- return (-1);
- }
- return (0);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/msg.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/msg.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/msg.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/msg.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.16 2015/01/15 09:40:00 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+int
+ssh_msg_send(int fd, u_char type, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+ u_char buf[5];
+ u_int mlen = sshbuf_len(m);
+
+ debug3("ssh_msg_send: type %u", (unsigned int)type & 0xff);
+
+ put_u32(buf, mlen + 1);
+ buf[4] = type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
+ error("ssh_msg_send: write");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen) {
+ error("ssh_msg_send: write");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_msg_recv(int fd, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+ u_char buf[4], *p;
+ u_int msg_len;
+ int r;
+
+ debug3("ssh_msg_recv entering");
+
+ if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
+ if (errno != EPIPE)
+ error("ssh_msg_recv: read: header");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ msg_len = get_u32(buf);
+ if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
+ error("ssh_msg_recv: read: bad msg_len %u", msg_len);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (atomicio(read, fd, p, msg_len) != msg_len) {
+ error("ssh_msg_recv: read: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/msg.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/msg.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/msg.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: msg.h,v 1.4 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-#ifndef SSH_MSG_H
-#define SSH_MSG_H
-
-int ssh_msg_send(int, u_char, Buffer *);
-int ssh_msg_recv(int, Buffer *);
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/msg.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/msg.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/msg.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/msg.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: msg.h,v 1.5 2015/01/15 09:40:00 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef SSH_MSG_H
+#define SSH_MSG_H
+
+struct sshbuf;
+int ssh_msg_send(int, u_char, struct sshbuf *);
+int ssh_msg_recv(int, struct sshbuf *);
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/mux.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/mux.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/mux.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,2102 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.44 2013/07/12 00:19:58 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller <djm at openbsd.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-/* ssh session multiplexing support */
-
-/*
- * TODO:
- * - Better signalling from master to slave, especially passing of
- * error messages
- * - Better fall-back from mux slave error to new connection.
- * - ExitOnForwardingFailure
- * - Maybe extension mechanisms for multi-X11/multi-agent forwarding
- * - Support ~^Z in mux slaves.
- * - Inspect or control sessions in master.
- * - If we ever support the "signal" channel request, send signals on
- * sessions in master.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/un.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stddef.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-#include <paths.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
-#include <poll.h>
-#else
-# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
-# include <sys/poll.h>
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
-# include <util.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "msg.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
-#include "sshpty.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "readconf.h"
-#include "clientloop.h"
-
-/* from ssh.c */
-extern int tty_flag;
-extern Options options;
-extern int stdin_null_flag;
-extern char *host;
-extern int subsystem_flag;
-extern Buffer command;
-extern volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending;
-extern char *stdio_forward_host;
-extern int stdio_forward_port;
-
-/* Context for session open confirmation callback */
-struct mux_session_confirm_ctx {
- u_int want_tty;
- u_int want_subsys;
- u_int want_x_fwd;
- u_int want_agent_fwd;
- Buffer cmd;
- char *term;
- struct termios tio;
- char **env;
- u_int rid;
-};
-
-/* Context for global channel callback */
-struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx {
- u_int cid; /* channel id */
- u_int rid; /* request id */
- int fid; /* forward id */
-};
-
-/* fd to control socket */
-int muxserver_sock = -1;
-
-/* client request id */
-u_int muxclient_request_id = 0;
-
-/* Multiplexing control command */
-u_int muxclient_command = 0;
-
-/* Set when signalled. */
-static volatile sig_atomic_t muxclient_terminate = 0;
-
-/* PID of multiplex server */
-static u_int muxserver_pid = 0;
-
-static Channel *mux_listener_channel = NULL;
-
-struct mux_master_state {
- int hello_rcvd;
-};
-
-/* mux protocol messages */
-#define MUX_MSG_HELLO 0x00000001
-#define MUX_C_NEW_SESSION 0x10000002
-#define MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK 0x10000004
-#define MUX_C_TERMINATE 0x10000005
-#define MUX_C_OPEN_FWD 0x10000006
-#define MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD 0x10000007
-#define MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD 0x10000008
-#define MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING 0x10000009
-#define MUX_S_OK 0x80000001
-#define MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED 0x80000002
-#define MUX_S_FAILURE 0x80000003
-#define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE 0x80000004
-#define MUX_S_ALIVE 0x80000005
-#define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED 0x80000006
-#define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT 0x80000007
-#define MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL 0x80000008
-
-/* type codes for MUX_C_OPEN_FWD and MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD */
-#define MUX_FWD_LOCAL 1
-#define MUX_FWD_REMOTE 2
-#define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC 3
-
-static void mux_session_confirm(int, int, void *);
-
-static int process_mux_master_hello(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
-static int process_mux_new_session(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
-static int process_mux_alive_check(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
-static int process_mux_terminate(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
-static int process_mux_open_fwd(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
-static int process_mux_close_fwd(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
-static int process_mux_stdio_fwd(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
-static int process_mux_stop_listening(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
-
-static const struct {
- u_int type;
- int (*handler)(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
-} mux_master_handlers[] = {
- { MUX_MSG_HELLO, process_mux_master_hello },
- { MUX_C_NEW_SESSION, process_mux_new_session },
- { MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK, process_mux_alive_check },
- { MUX_C_TERMINATE, process_mux_terminate },
- { MUX_C_OPEN_FWD, process_mux_open_fwd },
- { MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD, process_mux_close_fwd },
- { MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD, process_mux_stdio_fwd },
- { MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING, process_mux_stop_listening },
- { 0, NULL }
-};
-
-/* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _session_ channel */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void
-mux_master_session_cleanup_cb(int cid, void *unused)
-{
- Channel *cc, *c = channel_by_id(cid);
-
- debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid);
- if (c == NULL)
- fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid);
- if (c->ctl_chan != -1) {
- if ((cc = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: channel %d missing control channel %d",
- __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan);
- c->ctl_chan = -1;
- cc->remote_id = -1;
- chan_rcvd_oclose(cc);
- }
- channel_cancel_cleanup(c->self);
-}
-
-/* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _control_ channel */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void
-mux_master_control_cleanup_cb(int cid, void *unused)
-{
- Channel *sc, *c = channel_by_id(cid);
-
- debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid);
- if (c == NULL)
- fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid);
- if (c->remote_id != -1) {
- if ((sc = channel_by_id(c->remote_id)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: channel %d missing session channel %d",
- __func__, c->self, c->remote_id);
- c->remote_id = -1;
- sc->ctl_chan = -1;
- if (sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
- sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) {
- debug2("%s: channel %d: not open", __func__, sc->self);
- chan_mark_dead(sc);
- } else {
- if (sc->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN)
- chan_read_failed(sc);
- if (sc->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN)
- chan_write_failed(sc);
- }
- }
- channel_cancel_cleanup(c->self);
-}
-
-/* Check mux client environment variables before passing them to mux master. */
-static int
-env_permitted(char *env)
-{
- int i, ret;
- char name[1024], *cp;
-
- if ((cp = strchr(env, '=')) == NULL || cp == env)
- return 0;
- ret = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%.*s", (int)(cp - env), env);
- if (ret <= 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(name)) {
- error("env_permitted: name '%.100s...' too long", env);
- return 0;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_send_env; i++)
- if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[i]))
- return 1;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Mux master protocol message handlers */
-
-static int
-process_mux_master_hello(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
-{
- u_int ver;
- struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx;
-
- if (state == NULL)
- fatal("%s: channel %d: c->mux_ctx == NULL", __func__, c->self);
- if (state->hello_rcvd) {
- error("%s: HELLO received twice", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
- if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ver, m) != 0) {
- malf:
- error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
- if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) {
- error("Unsupported multiplexing protocol version %d "
- "(expected %d)", ver, SSHMUX_VER);
- return -1;
- }
- debug2("%s: channel %d slave version %u", __func__, c->self, ver);
-
- /* No extensions are presently defined */
- while (buffer_len(m) > 0) {
- char *name = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL);
- char *value = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL);
-
- if (name == NULL || value == NULL) {
- free(name);
- free(value);
- goto malf;
- }
- debug2("Unrecognised slave extension \"%s\"", name);
- free(name);
- free(value);
- }
- state->hello_rcvd = 1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-process_mux_new_session(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
-{
- Channel *nc;
- struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx;
- char *reserved, *cmd, *cp;
- u_int i, j, len, env_len, escape_char, window, packetmax;
- int new_fd[3];
-
- /* Reply for SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN */
- cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx));
- cctx->term = NULL;
- cctx->rid = rid;
- cmd = reserved = NULL;
- cctx->env = NULL;
- env_len = 0;
- if ((reserved = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
- buffer_get_int_ret(&cctx->want_tty, m) != 0 ||
- buffer_get_int_ret(&cctx->want_x_fwd, m) != 0 ||
- buffer_get_int_ret(&cctx->want_agent_fwd, m) != 0 ||
- buffer_get_int_ret(&cctx->want_subsys, m) != 0 ||
- buffer_get_int_ret(&escape_char, m) != 0 ||
- (cctx->term = buffer_get_string_ret(m, &len)) == NULL ||
- (cmd = buffer_get_string_ret(m, &len)) == NULL) {
- malf:
- free(cmd);
- free(reserved);
- for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++)
- free(cctx->env[j]);
- free(cctx->env);
- free(cctx->term);
- free(cctx);
- error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
- free(reserved);
- reserved = NULL;
-
- while (buffer_len(m) > 0) {
-#define MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS 4096
- if ((cp = buffer_get_string_ret(m, &len)) == NULL)
- goto malf;
- if (!env_permitted(cp)) {
- free(cp);
- continue;
- }
- cctx->env = xrealloc(cctx->env, env_len + 2,
- sizeof(*cctx->env));
- cctx->env[env_len++] = cp;
- cctx->env[env_len] = NULL;
- if (env_len > MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS) {
- error(">%d environment variables received, ignoring "
- "additional", MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS);
- break;
- }
- }
-
- debug2("%s: channel %d: request tty %d, X %d, agent %d, subsys %d, "
- "term \"%s\", cmd \"%s\", env %u", __func__, c->self,
- cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_x_fwd, cctx->want_agent_fwd,
- cctx->want_subsys, cctx->term, cmd, env_len);
-
- buffer_init(&cctx->cmd);
- buffer_append(&cctx->cmd, cmd, strlen(cmd));
- free(cmd);
- cmd = NULL;
-
- /* Gather fds from client */
- for(i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
- if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) {
- error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from slave",
- __func__, i);
- for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
- close(new_fd[j]);
- for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++)
- free(cctx->env[j]);
- free(cctx->env);
- free(cctx->term);
- buffer_free(&cctx->cmd);
- free(cctx);
-
- /* prepare reply */
- buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
- buffer_put_int(r, rid);
- buffer_put_cstring(r,
- "did not receive file descriptors");
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- debug3("%s: got fds stdin %d, stdout %d, stderr %d", __func__,
- new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2]);
-
- /* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */
- if (c->remote_id != -1) {
- debug2("%s: session already open", __func__);
- /* prepare reply */
- buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
- buffer_put_int(r, rid);
- buffer_put_cstring(r, "Multiple sessions not supported");
- cleanup:
- close(new_fd[0]);
- close(new_fd[1]);
- close(new_fd[2]);
- free(cctx->term);
- if (env_len != 0) {
- for (i = 0; i < env_len; i++)
- free(cctx->env[i]);
- free(cctx->env);
- }
- buffer_free(&cctx->cmd);
- free(cctx);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
- options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
- if (!ask_permission("Allow shared connection to %s? ", host)) {
- debug2("%s: session refused by user", __func__);
- /* prepare reply */
- buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED);
- buffer_put_int(r, rid);
- buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied");
- goto cleanup;
- }
- }
-
- /* Try to pick up ttymodes from client before it goes raw */
- if (cctx->want_tty && tcgetattr(new_fd[0], &cctx->tio) == -1)
- error("%s: tcgetattr: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-
- /* enable nonblocking unless tty */
- if (!isatty(new_fd[0]))
- set_nonblock(new_fd[0]);
- if (!isatty(new_fd[1]))
- set_nonblock(new_fd[1]);
- if (!isatty(new_fd[2]))
- set_nonblock(new_fd[2]);
-
- window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
- packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
- if (cctx->want_tty) {
- window >>= 1;
- packetmax >>= 1;
- }
-
- nc = channel_new("session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING,
- new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2], window, packetmax,
- CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
-
- nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */
- c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */
-
- if (cctx->want_tty && escape_char != 0xffffffff) {
- channel_register_filter(nc->self,
- client_simple_escape_filter, NULL,
- client_filter_cleanup,
- client_new_escape_filter_ctx((int)escape_char));
- }
-
- debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d",
- __func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan);
-
- channel_send_open(nc->self);
- channel_register_open_confirm(nc->self, mux_session_confirm, cctx);
- c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */
- channel_register_cleanup(nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1);
-
- /* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-process_mux_alive_check(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
-{
- debug2("%s: channel %d: alive check", __func__, c->self);
-
- /* prepare reply */
- buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_ALIVE);
- buffer_put_int(r, rid);
- buffer_put_int(r, (u_int)getpid());
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-process_mux_terminate(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
-{
- debug2("%s: channel %d: terminate request", __func__, c->self);
-
- if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
- options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
- if (!ask_permission("Terminate shared connection to %s? ",
- host)) {
- debug2("%s: termination refused by user", __func__);
- buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED);
- buffer_put_int(r, rid);
- buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied");
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- quit_pending = 1;
- buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK);
- buffer_put_int(r, rid);
- /* XXX exit happens too soon - message never makes it to client */
- return 0;
-}
-
-static char *
-format_forward(u_int ftype, Forward *fwd)
-{
- char *ret;
-
- switch (ftype) {
- case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
- xasprintf(&ret, "local forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d",
- (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
- (options.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
- fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port,
- fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port);
- break;
- case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
- xasprintf(&ret, "dynamic forward %.200s:%d -> *",
- (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
- (options.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
- fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port);
- break;
- case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
- xasprintf(&ret, "remote forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d",
- (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
- "LOCALHOST" : fwd->listen_host,
- fwd->listen_port,
- fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port);
- break;
- default:
- fatal("%s: unknown forward type %u", __func__, ftype);
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int
-compare_host(const char *a, const char *b)
-{
- if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
- return 1;
- if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
- return 0;
- return strcmp(a, b) == 0;
-}
-
-static int
-compare_forward(Forward *a, Forward *b)
-{
- if (!compare_host(a->listen_host, b->listen_host))
- return 0;
- if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port)
- return 0;
- if (!compare_host(a->connect_host, b->connect_host))
- return 0;
- if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port)
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void
-mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx = ctxt;
- char *failmsg = NULL;
- Forward *rfwd;
- Channel *c;
- Buffer out;
-
- if ((c = channel_by_id(fctx->cid)) == NULL) {
- /* no channel for reply */
- error("%s: unknown channel", __func__);
- return;
- }
- buffer_init(&out);
- if (fctx->fid >= options.num_remote_forwards) {
- xasprintf(&failmsg, "unknown forwarding id %d", fctx->fid);
- goto fail;
- }
- rfwd = &options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid];
- debug("%s: %s for: listen %d, connect %s:%d", __func__,
- type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
- rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
- if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
- if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) {
- rfwd->allocated_port = packet_get_int();
- logit("Allocated port %u for mux remote forward"
- " to %s:%d", rfwd->allocated_port,
- rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
- buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT);
- buffer_put_int(&out, fctx->rid);
- buffer_put_int(&out, rfwd->allocated_port);
- channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle,
- rfwd->allocated_port);
- } else {
- buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_OK);
- buffer_put_int(&out, fctx->rid);
- }
- goto out;
- } else {
- if (rfwd->listen_port == 0)
- channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle, -1);
- xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for "
- "listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
- }
- fail:
- error("%s: %s", __func__, failmsg);
- buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_FAILURE);
- buffer_put_int(&out, fctx->rid);
- buffer_put_cstring(&out, failmsg);
- free(failmsg);
- out:
- buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out), buffer_len(&out));
- buffer_free(&out);
- if (c->mux_pause <= 0)
- fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, c->mux_pause);
- c->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
-}
-
-static int
-process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
-{
- Forward fwd;
- char *fwd_desc = NULL;
- u_int ftype;
- u_int lport, cport;
- int i, ret = 0, freefwd = 1;
-
- fwd.listen_host = fwd.connect_host = NULL;
- if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ftype, m) != 0 ||
- (fwd.listen_host = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
- buffer_get_int_ret(&lport, m) != 0 ||
- (fwd.connect_host = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
- buffer_get_int_ret(&cport, m) != 0 ||
- lport > 65535 || cport > 65535) {
- error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
- ret = -1;
- goto out;
- }
- fwd.listen_port = lport;
- fwd.connect_port = cport;
- if (*fwd.listen_host == '\0') {
- free(fwd.listen_host);
- fwd.listen_host = NULL;
- }
- if (*fwd.connect_host == '\0') {
- free(fwd.connect_host);
- fwd.connect_host = NULL;
- }
-
- debug2("%s: channel %d: request %s", __func__, c->self,
- (fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd)));
-
- if (ftype != MUX_FWD_LOCAL && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE &&
- ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) {
- logit("%s: invalid forwarding type %u", __func__, ftype);
- invalid:
- free(fwd.listen_host);
- free(fwd.connect_host);
- buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
- buffer_put_int(r, rid);
- buffer_put_cstring(r, "Invalid forwarding request");
- return 0;
- }
- if (fwd.listen_port >= 65536) {
- logit("%s: invalid listen port %u", __func__,
- fwd.listen_port);
- goto invalid;
- }
- if (fwd.connect_port >= 65536 || (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC &&
- ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE && fwd.connect_port == 0)) {
- logit("%s: invalid connect port %u", __func__,
- fwd.connect_port);
- goto invalid;
- }
- if (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.connect_host == NULL) {
- logit("%s: missing connect host", __func__);
- goto invalid;
- }
-
- /* Skip forwards that have already been requested */
- switch (ftype) {
- case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
- case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
- if (compare_forward(&fwd,
- options.local_forwards + i)) {
- exists:
- debug2("%s: found existing forwarding",
- __func__);
- buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK);
- buffer_put_int(r, rid);
- goto out;
- }
- }
- break;
- case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
- if (compare_forward(&fwd,
- options.remote_forwards + i)) {
- if (fwd.listen_port != 0)
- goto exists;
- debug2("%s: found allocated port",
- __func__);
- buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT);
- buffer_put_int(r, rid);
- buffer_put_int(r,
- options.remote_forwards[i].allocated_port);
- goto out;
- }
- }
- break;
- }
-
- if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
- options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
- if (!ask_permission("Open %s on %s?", fwd_desc, host)) {
- debug2("%s: forwarding refused by user", __func__);
- buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED);
- buffer_put_int(r, rid);
- buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied");
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- if (ftype == MUX_FWD_LOCAL || ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) {
- if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(fwd.listen_host,
- fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_host, fwd.connect_port,
- options.gateway_ports)) {
- fail:
- logit("slave-requested %s failed", fwd_desc);
- buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
- buffer_put_int(r, rid);
- buffer_put_cstring(r, "Port forwarding failed");
- goto out;
- }
- add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
- freefwd = 0;
- } else {
- struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx;
-
- fwd.handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(fwd.listen_host,
- fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_host, fwd.connect_port);
- if (fwd.handle < 0)
- goto fail;
- add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd);
- fctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*fctx));
- fctx->cid = c->self;
- fctx->rid = rid;
- fctx->fid = options.num_remote_forwards - 1;
- client_register_global_confirm(mux_confirm_remote_forward,
- fctx);
- freefwd = 0;
- c->mux_pause = 1; /* wait for mux_confirm_remote_forward */
- /* delayed reply in mux_confirm_remote_forward */
- goto out;
- }
- buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK);
- buffer_put_int(r, rid);
- out:
- free(fwd_desc);
- if (freefwd) {
- free(fwd.listen_host);
- free(fwd.connect_host);
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int
-process_mux_close_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
-{
- Forward fwd, *found_fwd;
- char *fwd_desc = NULL;
- const char *error_reason = NULL;
- u_int ftype;
- int i, listen_port, ret = 0;
- u_int lport, cport;
-
- fwd.listen_host = fwd.connect_host = NULL;
- if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ftype, m) != 0 ||
- (fwd.listen_host = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
- buffer_get_int_ret(&lport, m) != 0 ||
- (fwd.connect_host = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
- buffer_get_int_ret(&cport, m) != 0 ||
- lport > 65535 || cport > 65535) {
- error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
- ret = -1;
- goto out;
- }
- fwd.listen_port = lport;
- fwd.connect_port = cport;
-
- if (*fwd.listen_host == '\0') {
- free(fwd.listen_host);
- fwd.listen_host = NULL;
- }
- if (*fwd.connect_host == '\0') {
- free(fwd.connect_host);
- fwd.connect_host = NULL;
- }
-
- debug2("%s: channel %d: request cancel %s", __func__, c->self,
- (fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd)));
-
- /* make sure this has been requested */
- found_fwd = NULL;
- switch (ftype) {
- case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
- case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
- if (compare_forward(&fwd,
- options.local_forwards + i)) {
- found_fwd = options.local_forwards + i;
- break;
- }
- }
- break;
- case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
- if (compare_forward(&fwd,
- options.remote_forwards + i)) {
- found_fwd = options.remote_forwards + i;
- break;
- }
- }
- break;
- }
-
- if (found_fwd == NULL)
- error_reason = "port not forwarded";
- else if (ftype == MUX_FWD_REMOTE) {
- /*
- * This shouldn't fail unless we confused the host/port
- * between options.remote_forwards and permitted_opens.
- * However, for dynamic allocated listen ports we need
- * to lookup the actual listen port.
- */
- listen_port = (fwd.listen_port == 0) ?
- found_fwd->allocated_port : fwd.listen_port;
- if (channel_request_rforward_cancel(fwd.listen_host,
- listen_port) == -1)
- error_reason = "port not in permitted opens";
- } else { /* local and dynamic forwards */
- /* Ditto */
- if (channel_cancel_lport_listener(fwd.listen_host,
- fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_port,
- options.gateway_ports) == -1)
- error_reason = "port not found";
- }
-
- if (error_reason == NULL) {
- buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK);
- buffer_put_int(r, rid);
-
- free(found_fwd->listen_host);
- free(found_fwd->connect_host);
- found_fwd->listen_host = found_fwd->connect_host = NULL;
- found_fwd->listen_port = found_fwd->connect_port = 0;
- } else {
- buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
- buffer_put_int(r, rid);
- buffer_put_cstring(r, error_reason);
- }
- out:
- free(fwd_desc);
- free(fwd.listen_host);
- free(fwd.connect_host);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int
-process_mux_stdio_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
-{
- Channel *nc;
- char *reserved, *chost;
- u_int cport, i, j;
- int new_fd[2];
-
- chost = reserved = NULL;
- if ((reserved = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
- (chost = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
- buffer_get_int_ret(&cport, m) != 0) {
- free(reserved);
- free(chost);
- error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
- free(reserved);
-
- debug2("%s: channel %d: request stdio fwd to %s:%u",
- __func__, c->self, chost, cport);
-
- /* Gather fds from client */
- for(i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
- if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) {
- error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from slave",
- __func__, i);
- for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
- close(new_fd[j]);
- free(chost);
-
- /* prepare reply */
- buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
- buffer_put_int(r, rid);
- buffer_put_cstring(r,
- "did not receive file descriptors");
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- debug3("%s: got fds stdin %d, stdout %d", __func__,
- new_fd[0], new_fd[1]);
-
- /* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */
- if (c->remote_id != -1) {
- debug2("%s: session already open", __func__);
- /* prepare reply */
- buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
- buffer_put_int(r, rid);
- buffer_put_cstring(r, "Multiple sessions not supported");
- cleanup:
- close(new_fd[0]);
- close(new_fd[1]);
- free(chost);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
- options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
- if (!ask_permission("Allow forward to %s:%u? ",
- chost, cport)) {
- debug2("%s: stdio fwd refused by user", __func__);
- /* prepare reply */
- buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED);
- buffer_put_int(r, rid);
- buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied");
- goto cleanup;
- }
- }
-
- /* enable nonblocking unless tty */
- if (!isatty(new_fd[0]))
- set_nonblock(new_fd[0]);
- if (!isatty(new_fd[1]))
- set_nonblock(new_fd[1]);
-
- nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]);
-
- nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */
- c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */
-
- debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d",
- __func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan);
-
- channel_register_cleanup(nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1);
-
- /* prepare reply */
- /* XXX defer until channel confirmed */
- buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED);
- buffer_put_int(r, rid);
- buffer_put_int(r, nc->self);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-process_mux_stop_listening(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
-{
- debug("%s: channel %d: stop listening", __func__, c->self);
-
- if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
- options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
- if (!ask_permission("Disable further multiplexing on shared "
- "connection to %s? ", host)) {
- debug2("%s: stop listen refused by user", __func__);
- buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED);
- buffer_put_int(r, rid);
- buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied");
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (mux_listener_channel != NULL) {
- channel_free(mux_listener_channel);
- client_stop_mux();
- free(options.control_path);
- options.control_path = NULL;
- mux_listener_channel = NULL;
- muxserver_sock = -1;
- }
-
- /* prepare reply */
- buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK);
- buffer_put_int(r, rid);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Channel callbacks fired on read/write from mux slave fd */
-static int
-mux_master_read_cb(Channel *c)
-{
- struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx;
- Buffer in, out;
- void *ptr;
- u_int type, rid, have, i;
- int ret = -1;
-
- /* Setup ctx and */
- if (c->mux_ctx == NULL) {
- state = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*state));
- c->mux_ctx = state;
- channel_register_cleanup(c->self,
- mux_master_control_cleanup_cb, 0);
-
- /* Send hello */
- buffer_init(&out);
- buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_MSG_HELLO);
- buffer_put_int(&out, SSHMUX_VER);
- /* no extensions */
- buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out),
- buffer_len(&out));
- buffer_free(&out);
- debug3("%s: channel %d: hello sent", __func__, c->self);
- return 0;
- }
-
- buffer_init(&in);
- buffer_init(&out);
-
- /* Channel code ensures that we receive whole packets */
- if ((ptr = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&c->input, &have)) == NULL) {
- malf:
- error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- buffer_append(&in, ptr, have);
-
- if (buffer_get_int_ret(&type, &in) != 0)
- goto malf;
- debug3("%s: channel %d packet type 0x%08x len %u",
- __func__, c->self, type, buffer_len(&in));
-
- if (type == MUX_MSG_HELLO)
- rid = 0;
- else {
- if (!state->hello_rcvd) {
- error("%s: expected MUX_MSG_HELLO(0x%08x), "
- "received 0x%08x", __func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type);
- goto out;
- }
- if (buffer_get_int_ret(&rid, &in) != 0)
- goto malf;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; mux_master_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) {
- if (type == mux_master_handlers[i].type) {
- ret = mux_master_handlers[i].handler(rid, c, &in, &out);
- break;
- }
- }
- if (mux_master_handlers[i].handler == NULL) {
- error("%s: unsupported mux message 0x%08x", __func__, type);
- buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_FAILURE);
- buffer_put_int(&out, rid);
- buffer_put_cstring(&out, "unsupported request");
- ret = 0;
- }
- /* Enqueue reply packet */
- if (buffer_len(&out) != 0) {
- buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out),
- buffer_len(&out));
- }
- out:
- buffer_free(&in);
- buffer_free(&out);
- return ret;
-}
-
-void
-mux_exit_message(Channel *c, int exitval)
-{
- Buffer m;
- Channel *mux_chan;
-
- debug3("%s: channel %d: exit message, exitval %d", __func__, c->self,
- exitval);
-
- if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d",
- __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan);
-
- /* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE);
- buffer_put_int(&m, c->self);
- buffer_put_int(&m, exitval);
-
- buffer_put_string(&mux_chan->output, buffer_ptr(&m), buffer_len(&m));
- buffer_free(&m);
-}
-
-void
-mux_tty_alloc_failed(Channel *c)
-{
- Buffer m;
- Channel *mux_chan;
-
- debug3("%s: channel %d: TTY alloc failed", __func__, c->self);
-
- if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d",
- __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan);
-
- /* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL);
- buffer_put_int(&m, c->self);
-
- buffer_put_string(&mux_chan->output, buffer_ptr(&m), buffer_len(&m));
- buffer_free(&m);
-}
-
-/* Prepare a mux master to listen on a Unix domain socket. */
-void
-muxserver_listen(void)
-{
- struct sockaddr_un addr;
- socklen_t sun_len;
- mode_t old_umask;
- char *orig_control_path = options.control_path;
- char rbuf[16+1];
- u_int i, r;
-
- if (options.control_path == NULL ||
- options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO)
- return;
-
- debug("setting up multiplex master socket");
-
- /*
- * Use a temporary path before listen so we can pseudo-atomically
- * establish the listening socket in its final location to avoid
- * other processes racing in between bind() and listen() and hitting
- * an unready socket.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rbuf) - 1; i++) {
- r = arc4random_uniform(26+26+10);
- rbuf[i] = (r < 26) ? 'a' + r :
- (r < 26*2) ? 'A' + r - 26 :
- '0' + r - 26 - 26;
- }
- rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] = '\0';
- options.control_path = NULL;
- xasprintf(&options.control_path, "%s.%s", orig_control_path, rbuf);
- debug3("%s: temporary control path %s", __func__, options.control_path);
-
- memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
- addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
- sun_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
- strlen(options.control_path) + 1;
-
- if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, options.control_path,
- sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path)) {
- error("ControlPath \"%s\" too long for Unix domain socket",
- options.control_path);
- goto disable_mux_master;
- }
-
- if ((muxserver_sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
- fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-
- old_umask = umask(0177);
- if (bind(muxserver_sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sun_len) == -1) {
- if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EADDRINUSE) {
- error("ControlSocket %s already exists, "
- "disabling multiplexing", options.control_path);
- disable_mux_master:
- if (muxserver_sock != -1) {
- close(muxserver_sock);
- muxserver_sock = -1;
- }
- free(orig_control_path);
- free(options.control_path);
- options.control_path = NULL;
- options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
- return;
- } else
- fatal("%s bind(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- }
- umask(old_umask);
-
- if (listen(muxserver_sock, 64) == -1)
- fatal("%s listen(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-
- /* Now atomically "move" the mux socket into position */
- if (link(options.control_path, orig_control_path) != 0) {
- if (errno != EEXIST) {
- fatal("%s: link mux listener %s => %s: %s", __func__,
- options.control_path, orig_control_path,
- strerror(errno));
- }
- error("ControlSocket %s already exists, disabling multiplexing",
- orig_control_path);
- unlink(options.control_path);
- goto disable_mux_master;
- }
- unlink(options.control_path);
- free(options.control_path);
- options.control_path = orig_control_path;
-
- set_nonblock(muxserver_sock);
-
- mux_listener_channel = channel_new("mux listener",
- SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER, muxserver_sock, muxserver_sock, -1,
- CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
- 0, options.control_path, 1);
- mux_listener_channel->mux_rcb = mux_master_read_cb;
- debug3("%s: mux listener channel %d fd %d", __func__,
- mux_listener_channel->self, mux_listener_channel->sock);
-}
-
-/* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux client session. */
-static void
-mux_session_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg)
-{
- struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg;
- const char *display;
- Channel *c, *cc;
- int i;
- Buffer reply;
-
- if (cctx == NULL)
- fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__);
- if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id);
- if ((cc = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__,
- id, c->ctl_chan);
-
- if (!success) {
- debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__);
- /* prepare reply */
- buffer_init(&reply);
- buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_FAILURE);
- buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid);
- buffer_put_cstring(&reply, "Session open refused by peer");
- goto done;
- }
-
- display = getenv("DISPLAY");
- if (cctx->want_x_fwd && options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
- char *proto, *data;
-
- /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
- client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
- options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout,
- &proto, &data);
- /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
- debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
- "spoofing.");
- x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto,
- data, 1);
- client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN);
- /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
- }
-
- if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) {
- debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
- channel_request_start(id, "auth-agent-req at openssh.com", 0);
- packet_send();
- }
-
- client_session2_setup(id, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys,
- cctx->term, &cctx->tio, c->rfd, &cctx->cmd, cctx->env);
-
- debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__);
- /* prepare reply */
- buffer_init(&reply);
- buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED);
- buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid);
- buffer_put_int(&reply, c->self);
-
- done:
- /* Send reply */
- buffer_put_string(&cc->output, buffer_ptr(&reply), buffer_len(&reply));
- buffer_free(&reply);
-
- if (cc->mux_pause <= 0)
- fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause);
- cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
- c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL;
- buffer_free(&cctx->cmd);
- free(cctx->term);
- if (cctx->env != NULL) {
- for (i = 0; cctx->env[i] != NULL; i++)
- free(cctx->env[i]);
- free(cctx->env);
- }
- free(cctx);
-}
-
-/* ** Multiplexing client support */
-
-/* Exit signal handler */
-static void
-control_client_sighandler(int signo)
-{
- muxclient_terminate = signo;
-}
-
-/*
- * Relay signal handler - used to pass some signals from mux client to
- * mux master.
- */
-static void
-control_client_sigrelay(int signo)
-{
- int save_errno = errno;
-
- if (muxserver_pid > 1)
- kill(muxserver_pid, signo);
-
- errno = save_errno;
-}
-
-static int
-mux_client_read(int fd, Buffer *b, u_int need)
-{
- u_int have;
- ssize_t len;
- u_char *p;
- struct pollfd pfd;
-
- pfd.fd = fd;
- pfd.events = POLLIN;
- p = buffer_append_space(b, need);
- for (have = 0; have < need; ) {
- if (muxclient_terminate) {
- errno = EINTR;
- return -1;
- }
- len = read(fd, p + have, need - have);
- if (len < 0) {
- switch (errno) {
-#if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN)
- case EWOULDBLOCK:
-#endif
- case EAGAIN:
- (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case EINTR:
- continue;
- default:
- return -1;
- }
- }
- if (len == 0) {
- errno = EPIPE;
- return -1;
- }
- have += (u_int)len;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-mux_client_write_packet(int fd, Buffer *m)
-{
- Buffer queue;
- u_int have, need;
- int oerrno, len;
- u_char *ptr;
- struct pollfd pfd;
-
- pfd.fd = fd;
- pfd.events = POLLOUT;
- buffer_init(&queue);
- buffer_put_string(&queue, buffer_ptr(m), buffer_len(m));
-
- need = buffer_len(&queue);
- ptr = buffer_ptr(&queue);
-
- for (have = 0; have < need; ) {
- if (muxclient_terminate) {
- buffer_free(&queue);
- errno = EINTR;
- return -1;
- }
- len = write(fd, ptr + have, need - have);
- if (len < 0) {
- switch (errno) {
-#if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN)
- case EWOULDBLOCK:
-#endif
- case EAGAIN:
- (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case EINTR:
- continue;
- default:
- oerrno = errno;
- buffer_free(&queue);
- errno = oerrno;
- return -1;
- }
- }
- if (len == 0) {
- buffer_free(&queue);
- errno = EPIPE;
- return -1;
- }
- have += (u_int)len;
- }
- buffer_free(&queue);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-mux_client_read_packet(int fd, Buffer *m)
-{
- Buffer queue;
- u_int need, have;
- void *ptr;
- int oerrno;
-
- buffer_init(&queue);
- if (mux_client_read(fd, &queue, 4) != 0) {
- if ((oerrno = errno) == EPIPE)
- debug3("%s: read header failed: %s", __func__,
- strerror(errno));
- buffer_free(&queue);
- errno = oerrno;
- return -1;
- }
- need = get_u32(buffer_ptr(&queue));
- if (mux_client_read(fd, &queue, need) != 0) {
- oerrno = errno;
- debug3("%s: read body failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- buffer_free(&queue);
- errno = oerrno;
- return -1;
- }
- ptr = buffer_get_string_ptr(&queue, &have);
- buffer_append(m, ptr, have);
- buffer_free(&queue);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-mux_client_hello_exchange(int fd)
-{
- Buffer m;
- u_int type, ver;
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_MSG_HELLO);
- buffer_put_int(&m, SSHMUX_VER);
- /* no extensions */
-
- if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
- fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-
- buffer_clear(&m);
-
- /* Read their HELLO */
- if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) {
- buffer_free(&m);
- return -1;
- }
-
- type = buffer_get_int(&m);
- if (type != MUX_MSG_HELLO)
- fatal("%s: expected HELLO (%u) received %u",
- __func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type);
- ver = buffer_get_int(&m);
- if (ver != SSHMUX_VER)
- fatal("Unsupported multiplexing protocol version %d "
- "(expected %d)", ver, SSHMUX_VER);
- debug2("%s: master version %u", __func__, ver);
- /* No extensions are presently defined */
- while (buffer_len(&m) > 0) {
- char *name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- char *value = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
-
- debug2("Unrecognised master extension \"%s\"", name);
- free(name);
- free(value);
- }
- buffer_free(&m);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static u_int
-mux_client_request_alive(int fd)
-{
- Buffer m;
- char *e;
- u_int pid, type, rid;
-
- debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK);
- buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id);
-
- if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
- fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-
- buffer_clear(&m);
-
- /* Read their reply */
- if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) {
- buffer_free(&m);
- return 0;
- }
-
- type = buffer_get_int(&m);
- if (type != MUX_S_ALIVE) {
- e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e);
- }
-
- if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id)
- fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
- __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
- pid = buffer_get_int(&m);
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- debug3("%s: done pid = %u", __func__, pid);
-
- muxclient_request_id++;
-
- return pid;
-}
-
-static void
-mux_client_request_terminate(int fd)
-{
- Buffer m;
- char *e;
- u_int type, rid;
-
- debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_TERMINATE);
- buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id);
-
- if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
- fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-
- buffer_clear(&m);
-
- /* Read their reply */
- if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) {
- /* Remote end exited already */
- if (errno == EPIPE) {
- buffer_free(&m);
- return;
- }
- fatal("%s: read from master failed: %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
- }
-
- type = buffer_get_int(&m);
- if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id)
- fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
- __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
- switch (type) {
- case MUX_S_OK:
- break;
- case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
- e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- fatal("Master refused termination request: %s", e);
- case MUX_S_FAILURE:
- e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- fatal("%s: termination request failed: %s", __func__, e);
- default:
- fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
- __func__, type);
- }
- buffer_free(&m);
- muxclient_request_id++;
-}
-
-static int
-mux_client_forward(int fd, int cancel_flag, u_int ftype, Forward *fwd)
-{
- Buffer m;
- char *e, *fwd_desc;
- u_int type, rid;
-
- fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, fwd);
- debug("Requesting %s %s",
- cancel_flag ? "cancellation of" : "forwarding of", fwd_desc);
- free(fwd_desc);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_int(&m, cancel_flag ? MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD : MUX_C_OPEN_FWD);
- buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id);
- buffer_put_int(&m, ftype);
- buffer_put_cstring(&m,
- fwd->listen_host == NULL ? "" : fwd->listen_host);
- buffer_put_int(&m, fwd->listen_port);
- buffer_put_cstring(&m,
- fwd->connect_host == NULL ? "" : fwd->connect_host);
- buffer_put_int(&m, fwd->connect_port);
-
- if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
- fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-
- buffer_clear(&m);
-
- /* Read their reply */
- if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) {
- buffer_free(&m);
- return -1;
- }
-
- type = buffer_get_int(&m);
- if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id)
- fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
- __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
- switch (type) {
- case MUX_S_OK:
- break;
- case MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT:
- if (cancel_flag)
- fatal("%s: got MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT for cancel", __func__);
- fwd->allocated_port = buffer_get_int(&m);
- logit("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d",
- fwd->allocated_port,
- fwd->connect_host ? fwd->connect_host : "",
- fwd->connect_port);
- if (muxclient_command == SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD)
- fprintf(stdout, "%u\n", fwd->allocated_port);
- break;
- case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
- e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- buffer_free(&m);
- error("Master refused forwarding request: %s", e);
- return -1;
- case MUX_S_FAILURE:
- e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- buffer_free(&m);
- error("%s: forwarding request failed: %s", __func__, e);
- return -1;
- default:
- fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
- __func__, type);
- }
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- muxclient_request_id++;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-mux_client_forwards(int fd, int cancel_flag)
-{
- int i, ret = 0;
-
- debug3("%s: %s forwardings: %d local, %d remote", __func__,
- cancel_flag ? "cancel" : "request",
- options.num_local_forwards, options.num_remote_forwards);
-
- /* XXX ExitOnForwardingFailure */
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
- if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag,
- options.local_forwards[i].connect_port == 0 ?
- MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC : MUX_FWD_LOCAL,
- options.local_forwards + i) != 0)
- ret = -1;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
- if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag, MUX_FWD_REMOTE,
- options.remote_forwards + i) != 0)
- ret = -1;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int
-mux_client_request_session(int fd)
-{
- Buffer m;
- char *e, *term;
- u_int i, rid, sid, esid, exitval, type, exitval_seen;
- extern char **environ;
- int devnull, rawmode;
-
- debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
-
- if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) {
- error("%s: master alive request failed", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-
- if (stdin_null_flag) {
- if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
- fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
- if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
- fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
- close(devnull);
- }
-
- term = getenv("TERM");
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_NEW_SESSION);
- buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id);
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, ""); /* reserved */
- buffer_put_int(&m, tty_flag);
- buffer_put_int(&m, options.forward_x11);
- buffer_put_int(&m, options.forward_agent);
- buffer_put_int(&m, subsystem_flag);
- buffer_put_int(&m, options.escape_char == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE ?
- 0xffffffff : (u_int)options.escape_char);
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, term == NULL ? "" : term);
- buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(&command), buffer_len(&command));
-
- if (options.num_send_env > 0 && environ != NULL) {
- /* Pass environment */
- for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
- if (env_permitted(environ[i])) {
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, environ[i]);
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
- fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-
- /* Send the stdio file descriptors */
- if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
- mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 ||
- mm_send_fd(fd, STDERR_FILENO) == -1)
- fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
-
- debug3("%s: session request sent", __func__);
-
- /* Read their reply */
- buffer_clear(&m);
- if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) {
- error("%s: read from master failed: %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
- buffer_free(&m);
- return -1;
- }
-
- type = buffer_get_int(&m);
- if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id)
- fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
- __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
- switch (type) {
- case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED:
- sid = buffer_get_int(&m);
- debug("%s: master session id: %u", __func__, sid);
- break;
- case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
- e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- buffer_free(&m);
- error("Master refused session request: %s", e);
- return -1;
- case MUX_S_FAILURE:
- e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- buffer_free(&m);
- error("%s: session request failed: %s", __func__, e);
- return -1;
- default:
- buffer_free(&m);
- error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
- __func__, type);
- return -1;
- }
- muxclient_request_id++;
-
- signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler);
- signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler);
- signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler);
- signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay);
-
- rawmode = tty_flag;
- if (tty_flag)
- enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
-
- /*
- * Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd.
- * Before it does, it is expected to write an exit message.
- * This process must read the value and wait for the closure of
- * the client_fd; if this one closes early, the multiplex master will
- * terminate early too (possibly losing data).
- */
- for (exitval = 255, exitval_seen = 0;;) {
- buffer_clear(&m);
- if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
- break;
- type = buffer_get_int(&m);
- switch (type) {
- case MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL:
- if ((esid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != sid)
- fatal("%s: tty alloc fail on unknown session: "
- "my id %u theirs %u",
- __func__, sid, esid);
- leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty ==
- REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
- rawmode = 0;
- continue;
- case MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE:
- if ((esid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != sid)
- fatal("%s: exit on unknown session: "
- "my id %u theirs %u",
- __func__, sid, esid);
- if (exitval_seen)
- fatal("%s: exitval sent twice", __func__);
- exitval = buffer_get_int(&m);
- exitval_seen = 1;
- continue;
- default:
- e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e);
- }
- }
-
- close(fd);
- if (rawmode)
- leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
-
- if (muxclient_terminate) {
- debug2("Exiting on signal %d", muxclient_terminate);
- exitval = 255;
- } else if (!exitval_seen) {
- debug2("Control master terminated unexpectedly");
- exitval = 255;
- } else
- debug2("Received exit status from master %d", exitval);
-
- if (tty_flag && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
- fprintf(stderr, "Shared connection to %s closed.\r\n", host);
-
- exit(exitval);
-}
-
-static int
-mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(int fd)
-{
- Buffer m;
- char *e;
- u_int type, rid, sid;
- int devnull;
-
- debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
-
- if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) {
- error("%s: master alive request failed", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-
- if (stdin_null_flag) {
- if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
- fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
- if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
- fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
- close(devnull);
- }
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD);
- buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id);
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, ""); /* reserved */
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, stdio_forward_host);
- buffer_put_int(&m, stdio_forward_port);
-
- if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
- fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-
- /* Send the stdio file descriptors */
- if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
- mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
- fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
-
- debug3("%s: stdio forward request sent", __func__);
-
- /* Read their reply */
- buffer_clear(&m);
-
- if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) {
- error("%s: read from master failed: %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
- buffer_free(&m);
- return -1;
- }
-
- type = buffer_get_int(&m);
- if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id)
- fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
- __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
- switch (type) {
- case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED:
- sid = buffer_get_int(&m);
- debug("%s: master session id: %u", __func__, sid);
- break;
- case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
- e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- buffer_free(&m);
- fatal("Master refused stdio forwarding request: %s", e);
- case MUX_S_FAILURE:
- e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- buffer_free(&m);
- fatal("%s: stdio forwarding request failed: %s", __func__, e);
- default:
- buffer_free(&m);
- error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
- __func__, type);
- return -1;
- }
- muxclient_request_id++;
-
- signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler);
- signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler);
- signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler);
- signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay);
-
- /*
- * Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd.
- */
- buffer_clear(&m);
- if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) {
- if (errno == EPIPE ||
- (errno == EINTR && muxclient_terminate != 0))
- return 0;
- fatal("%s: mux_client_read_packet: %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
- }
- fatal("%s: master returned unexpected message %u", __func__, type);
-}
-
-static void
-mux_client_request_stop_listening(int fd)
-{
- Buffer m;
- char *e;
- u_int type, rid;
-
- debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING);
- buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id);
-
- if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
- fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-
- buffer_clear(&m);
-
- /* Read their reply */
- if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
- fatal("%s: read from master failed: %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
-
- type = buffer_get_int(&m);
- if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id)
- fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
- __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
- switch (type) {
- case MUX_S_OK:
- break;
- case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
- e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- fatal("Master refused stop listening request: %s", e);
- case MUX_S_FAILURE:
- e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
- fatal("%s: stop listening request failed: %s", __func__, e);
- default:
- fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
- __func__, type);
- }
- buffer_free(&m);
- muxclient_request_id++;
-}
-
-/* Multiplex client main loop. */
-void
-muxclient(const char *path)
-{
- struct sockaddr_un addr;
- socklen_t sun_len;
- int sock;
- u_int pid;
-
- if (muxclient_command == 0) {
- if (stdio_forward_host != NULL)
- muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD;
- else
- muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN;
- }
-
- switch (options.control_master) {
- case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO:
- case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK:
- debug("auto-mux: Trying existing master");
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case SSHCTL_MASTER_NO:
- break;
- default:
- return;
- }
-
- memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
- addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
- sun_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
- strlen(path) + 1;
-
- if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path,
- sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path))
- fatal("ControlPath too long");
-
- if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
- fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-
- if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sun_len) == -1) {
- switch (muxclient_command) {
- case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN:
- case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD:
- break;
- default:
- fatal("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
- strerror(errno));
- }
- if (errno == ECONNREFUSED &&
- options.control_master != SSHCTL_MASTER_NO) {
- debug("Stale control socket %.100s, unlinking", path);
- unlink(path);
- } else if (errno == ENOENT) {
- debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path);
- } else {
- error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
- strerror(errno));
- }
- close(sock);
- return;
- }
- set_nonblock(sock);
-
- if (mux_client_hello_exchange(sock) != 0) {
- error("%s: master hello exchange failed", __func__);
- close(sock);
- return;
- }
-
- switch (muxclient_command) {
- case SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK:
- if ((pid = mux_client_request_alive(sock)) == 0)
- fatal("%s: master alive check failed", __func__);
- fprintf(stderr, "Master running (pid=%d)\r\n", pid);
- exit(0);
- case SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE:
- mux_client_request_terminate(sock);
- fprintf(stderr, "Exit request sent.\r\n");
- exit(0);
- case SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD:
- if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0)
- fatal("%s: master forward request failed", __func__);
- exit(0);
- case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN:
- if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0) {
- error("%s: master forward request failed", __func__);
- return;
- }
- mux_client_request_session(sock);
- return;
- case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD:
- mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(sock);
- exit(0);
- case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP:
- mux_client_request_stop_listening(sock);
- fprintf(stderr, "Stop listening request sent.\r\n");
- exit(0);
- case SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD:
- if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 1) != 0)
- error("%s: master cancel forward request failed",
- __func__);
- exit(0);
- default:
- fatal("unrecognised muxclient_command %d", muxclient_command);
- }
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/mux.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/mux.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/mux.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/mux.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,2212 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.60 2016/06/03 03:14:41 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller <djm at openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* ssh session multiplexing support */
+
+/*
+ * TODO:
+ * - Better signalling from master to slave, especially passing of
+ * error messages
+ * - Better fall-back from mux slave error to new connection.
+ * - ExitOnForwardingFailure
+ * - Maybe extension mechanisms for multi-X11/multi-agent forwarding
+ * - Support ~^Z in mux slaves.
+ * - Inspect or control sessions in master.
+ * - If we ever support the "signal" channel request, send signals on
+ * sessions in master.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+# include <sys/poll.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "clientloop.h"
+
+/* from ssh.c */
+extern int tty_flag;
+extern Options options;
+extern int stdin_null_flag;
+extern char *host;
+extern int subsystem_flag;
+extern Buffer command;
+extern volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending;
+
+/* Context for session open confirmation callback */
+struct mux_session_confirm_ctx {
+ u_int want_tty;
+ u_int want_subsys;
+ u_int want_x_fwd;
+ u_int want_agent_fwd;
+ Buffer cmd;
+ char *term;
+ struct termios tio;
+ char **env;
+ u_int rid;
+};
+
+/* Context for stdio fwd open confirmation callback */
+struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx {
+ u_int rid;
+};
+
+/* Context for global channel callback */
+struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx {
+ u_int cid; /* channel id */
+ u_int rid; /* request id */
+ int fid; /* forward id */
+};
+
+/* fd to control socket */
+int muxserver_sock = -1;
+
+/* client request id */
+u_int muxclient_request_id = 0;
+
+/* Multiplexing control command */
+u_int muxclient_command = 0;
+
+/* Set when signalled. */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t muxclient_terminate = 0;
+
+/* PID of multiplex server */
+static u_int muxserver_pid = 0;
+
+static Channel *mux_listener_channel = NULL;
+
+struct mux_master_state {
+ int hello_rcvd;
+};
+
+/* mux protocol messages */
+#define MUX_MSG_HELLO 0x00000001
+#define MUX_C_NEW_SESSION 0x10000002
+#define MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK 0x10000004
+#define MUX_C_TERMINATE 0x10000005
+#define MUX_C_OPEN_FWD 0x10000006
+#define MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD 0x10000007
+#define MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD 0x10000008
+#define MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING 0x10000009
+#define MUX_S_OK 0x80000001
+#define MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED 0x80000002
+#define MUX_S_FAILURE 0x80000003
+#define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE 0x80000004
+#define MUX_S_ALIVE 0x80000005
+#define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED 0x80000006
+#define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT 0x80000007
+#define MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL 0x80000008
+
+/* type codes for MUX_C_OPEN_FWD and MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD */
+#define MUX_FWD_LOCAL 1
+#define MUX_FWD_REMOTE 2
+#define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC 3
+
+static void mux_session_confirm(int, int, void *);
+static void mux_stdio_confirm(int, int, void *);
+
+static int process_mux_master_hello(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
+static int process_mux_new_session(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
+static int process_mux_alive_check(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
+static int process_mux_terminate(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
+static int process_mux_open_fwd(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
+static int process_mux_close_fwd(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
+static int process_mux_stdio_fwd(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
+static int process_mux_stop_listening(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
+
+static const struct {
+ u_int type;
+ int (*handler)(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
+} mux_master_handlers[] = {
+ { MUX_MSG_HELLO, process_mux_master_hello },
+ { MUX_C_NEW_SESSION, process_mux_new_session },
+ { MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK, process_mux_alive_check },
+ { MUX_C_TERMINATE, process_mux_terminate },
+ { MUX_C_OPEN_FWD, process_mux_open_fwd },
+ { MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD, process_mux_close_fwd },
+ { MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD, process_mux_stdio_fwd },
+ { MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING, process_mux_stop_listening },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+/* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _session_ channel */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+mux_master_session_cleanup_cb(int cid, void *unused)
+{
+ Channel *cc, *c = channel_by_id(cid);
+
+ debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid);
+ if (c == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid);
+ if (c->ctl_chan != -1) {
+ if ((cc = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: channel %d missing control channel %d",
+ __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan);
+ c->ctl_chan = -1;
+ cc->remote_id = -1;
+ chan_rcvd_oclose(cc);
+ }
+ channel_cancel_cleanup(c->self);
+}
+
+/* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _control_ channel */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+mux_master_control_cleanup_cb(int cid, void *unused)
+{
+ Channel *sc, *c = channel_by_id(cid);
+
+ debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid);
+ if (c == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid);
+ if (c->remote_id != -1) {
+ if ((sc = channel_by_id(c->remote_id)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: channel %d missing session channel %d",
+ __func__, c->self, c->remote_id);
+ c->remote_id = -1;
+ sc->ctl_chan = -1;
+ if (sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
+ sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) {
+ debug2("%s: channel %d: not open", __func__, sc->self);
+ chan_mark_dead(sc);
+ } else {
+ if (sc->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN)
+ chan_read_failed(sc);
+ if (sc->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN)
+ chan_write_failed(sc);
+ }
+ }
+ channel_cancel_cleanup(c->self);
+}
+
+/* Check mux client environment variables before passing them to mux master. */
+static int
+env_permitted(char *env)
+{
+ int i, ret;
+ char name[1024], *cp;
+
+ if ((cp = strchr(env, '=')) == NULL || cp == env)
+ return 0;
+ ret = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%.*s", (int)(cp - env), env);
+ if (ret <= 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(name)) {
+ error("env_permitted: name '%.100s...' too long", env);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_send_env; i++)
+ if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[i]))
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Mux master protocol message handlers */
+
+static int
+process_mux_master_hello(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
+{
+ u_int ver;
+ struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx;
+
+ if (state == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: channel %d: c->mux_ctx == NULL", __func__, c->self);
+ if (state->hello_rcvd) {
+ error("%s: HELLO received twice", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ver, m) != 0) {
+ malf:
+ error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) {
+ error("Unsupported multiplexing protocol version %d "
+ "(expected %d)", ver, SSHMUX_VER);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ debug2("%s: channel %d slave version %u", __func__, c->self, ver);
+
+ /* No extensions are presently defined */
+ while (buffer_len(m) > 0) {
+ char *name = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL);
+ char *value = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL);
+
+ if (name == NULL || value == NULL) {
+ free(name);
+ free(value);
+ goto malf;
+ }
+ debug2("Unrecognised slave extension \"%s\"", name);
+ free(name);
+ free(value);
+ }
+ state->hello_rcvd = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+process_mux_new_session(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
+{
+ Channel *nc;
+ struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx;
+ char *reserved, *cmd, *cp;
+ u_int i, j, len, env_len, escape_char, window, packetmax;
+ int new_fd[3];
+
+ /* Reply for SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN */
+ cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx));
+ cctx->term = NULL;
+ cctx->rid = rid;
+ cmd = reserved = NULL;
+ cctx->env = NULL;
+ env_len = 0;
+ if ((reserved = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
+ buffer_get_int_ret(&cctx->want_tty, m) != 0 ||
+ buffer_get_int_ret(&cctx->want_x_fwd, m) != 0 ||
+ buffer_get_int_ret(&cctx->want_agent_fwd, m) != 0 ||
+ buffer_get_int_ret(&cctx->want_subsys, m) != 0 ||
+ buffer_get_int_ret(&escape_char, m) != 0 ||
+ (cctx->term = buffer_get_string_ret(m, &len)) == NULL ||
+ (cmd = buffer_get_string_ret(m, &len)) == NULL) {
+ malf:
+ free(cmd);
+ free(reserved);
+ for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++)
+ free(cctx->env[j]);
+ free(cctx->env);
+ free(cctx->term);
+ free(cctx);
+ error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ free(reserved);
+ reserved = NULL;
+
+ while (buffer_len(m) > 0) {
+#define MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS 4096
+ if ((cp = buffer_get_string_ret(m, &len)) == NULL)
+ goto malf;
+ if (!env_permitted(cp)) {
+ free(cp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ cctx->env = xreallocarray(cctx->env, env_len + 2,
+ sizeof(*cctx->env));
+ cctx->env[env_len++] = cp;
+ cctx->env[env_len] = NULL;
+ if (env_len > MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS) {
+ error(">%d environment variables received, ignoring "
+ "additional", MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ debug2("%s: channel %d: request tty %d, X %d, agent %d, subsys %d, "
+ "term \"%s\", cmd \"%s\", env %u", __func__, c->self,
+ cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_x_fwd, cctx->want_agent_fwd,
+ cctx->want_subsys, cctx->term, cmd, env_len);
+
+ buffer_init(&cctx->cmd);
+ buffer_append(&cctx->cmd, cmd, strlen(cmd));
+ free(cmd);
+ cmd = NULL;
+
+ /* Gather fds from client */
+ for(i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) {
+ error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from slave",
+ __func__, i);
+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
+ close(new_fd[j]);
+ for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++)
+ free(cctx->env[j]);
+ free(cctx->env);
+ free(cctx->term);
+ buffer_free(&cctx->cmd);
+ free(cctx);
+
+ /* prepare reply */
+ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
+ buffer_put_int(r, rid);
+ buffer_put_cstring(r,
+ "did not receive file descriptors");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ debug3("%s: got fds stdin %d, stdout %d, stderr %d", __func__,
+ new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2]);
+
+ /* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */
+ if (c->remote_id != -1) {
+ debug2("%s: session already open", __func__);
+ /* prepare reply */
+ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
+ buffer_put_int(r, rid);
+ buffer_put_cstring(r, "Multiple sessions not supported");
+ cleanup:
+ close(new_fd[0]);
+ close(new_fd[1]);
+ close(new_fd[2]);
+ free(cctx->term);
+ if (env_len != 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < env_len; i++)
+ free(cctx->env[i]);
+ free(cctx->env);
+ }
+ buffer_free(&cctx->cmd);
+ free(cctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
+ options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
+ if (!ask_permission("Allow shared connection to %s? ", host)) {
+ debug2("%s: session refused by user", __func__);
+ /* prepare reply */
+ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED);
+ buffer_put_int(r, rid);
+ buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Try to pick up ttymodes from client before it goes raw */
+ if (cctx->want_tty && tcgetattr(new_fd[0], &cctx->tio) == -1)
+ error("%s: tcgetattr: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+ /* enable nonblocking unless tty */
+ if (!isatty(new_fd[0]))
+ set_nonblock(new_fd[0]);
+ if (!isatty(new_fd[1]))
+ set_nonblock(new_fd[1]);
+ if (!isatty(new_fd[2]))
+ set_nonblock(new_fd[2]);
+
+ window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
+ packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
+ if (cctx->want_tty) {
+ window >>= 1;
+ packetmax >>= 1;
+ }
+
+ nc = channel_new("session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING,
+ new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2], window, packetmax,
+ CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
+
+ nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */
+ c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */
+
+ if (cctx->want_tty && escape_char != 0xffffffff) {
+ channel_register_filter(nc->self,
+ client_simple_escape_filter, NULL,
+ client_filter_cleanup,
+ client_new_escape_filter_ctx((int)escape_char));
+ }
+
+ debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d",
+ __func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan);
+
+ channel_send_open(nc->self);
+ channel_register_open_confirm(nc->self, mux_session_confirm, cctx);
+ c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */
+ channel_register_cleanup(nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1);
+
+ /* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+process_mux_alive_check(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
+{
+ debug2("%s: channel %d: alive check", __func__, c->self);
+
+ /* prepare reply */
+ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_ALIVE);
+ buffer_put_int(r, rid);
+ buffer_put_int(r, (u_int)getpid());
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+process_mux_terminate(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
+{
+ debug2("%s: channel %d: terminate request", __func__, c->self);
+
+ if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
+ options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
+ if (!ask_permission("Terminate shared connection to %s? ",
+ host)) {
+ debug2("%s: termination refused by user", __func__);
+ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED);
+ buffer_put_int(r, rid);
+ buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ quit_pending = 1;
+ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK);
+ buffer_put_int(r, rid);
+ /* XXX exit happens too soon - message never makes it to client */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static char *
+format_forward(u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd)
+{
+ char *ret;
+
+ switch (ftype) {
+ case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
+ xasprintf(&ret, "local forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d",
+ (fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path :
+ (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
+ (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
+ fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port,
+ (fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path :
+ fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port);
+ break;
+ case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
+ xasprintf(&ret, "dynamic forward %.200s:%d -> *",
+ (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
+ (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
+ fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port);
+ break;
+ case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
+ xasprintf(&ret, "remote forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d",
+ (fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path :
+ (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
+ "LOCALHOST" : fwd->listen_host,
+ fwd->listen_port,
+ (fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path :
+ fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: unknown forward type %u", __func__, ftype);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+compare_host(const char *a, const char *b)
+{
+ if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return strcmp(a, b) == 0;
+}
+
+static int
+compare_forward(struct Forward *a, struct Forward *b)
+{
+ if (!compare_host(a->listen_host, b->listen_host))
+ return 0;
+ if (!compare_host(a->listen_path, b->listen_path))
+ return 0;
+ if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port)
+ return 0;
+ if (!compare_host(a->connect_host, b->connect_host))
+ return 0;
+ if (!compare_host(a->connect_path, b->connect_path))
+ return 0;
+ if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx = ctxt;
+ char *failmsg = NULL;
+ struct Forward *rfwd;
+ Channel *c;
+ Buffer out;
+
+ if ((c = channel_by_id(fctx->cid)) == NULL) {
+ /* no channel for reply */
+ error("%s: unknown channel", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+ buffer_init(&out);
+ if (fctx->fid >= options.num_remote_forwards ||
+ (options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_path == NULL &&
+ options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_host == NULL)) {
+ xasprintf(&failmsg, "unknown forwarding id %d", fctx->fid);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ rfwd = &options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid];
+ debug("%s: %s for: listen %d, connect %s:%d", __func__,
+ type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
+ rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path :
+ rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
+ if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) {
+ rfwd->allocated_port = packet_get_int();
+ debug("Allocated port %u for mux remote forward"
+ " to %s:%d", rfwd->allocated_port,
+ rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
+ buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT);
+ buffer_put_int(&out, fctx->rid);
+ buffer_put_int(&out, rfwd->allocated_port);
+ channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle,
+ rfwd->allocated_port);
+ } else {
+ buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_OK);
+ buffer_put_int(&out, fctx->rid);
+ }
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ if (rfwd->listen_port == 0)
+ channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle, -1);
+ if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL)
+ xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for "
+ "listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path);
+ else
+ xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for "
+ "listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
+
+ debug2("%s: clearing registered forwarding for listen %d, "
+ "connect %s:%d", __func__, rfwd->listen_port,
+ rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path :
+ rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
+
+ free(rfwd->listen_host);
+ free(rfwd->listen_path);
+ free(rfwd->connect_host);
+ free(rfwd->connect_path);
+ memset(rfwd, 0, sizeof(*rfwd));
+ }
+ fail:
+ error("%s: %s", __func__, failmsg);
+ buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_FAILURE);
+ buffer_put_int(&out, fctx->rid);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&out, failmsg);
+ free(failmsg);
+ out:
+ buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out), buffer_len(&out));
+ buffer_free(&out);
+ if (c->mux_pause <= 0)
+ fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, c->mux_pause);
+ c->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
+}
+
+static int
+process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
+{
+ struct Forward fwd;
+ char *fwd_desc = NULL;
+ char *listen_addr, *connect_addr;
+ u_int ftype;
+ u_int lport, cport;
+ int i, ret = 0, freefwd = 1;
+
+ memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
+
+ /* XXX - lport/cport check redundant */
+ if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ftype, m) != 0 ||
+ (listen_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
+ buffer_get_int_ret(&lport, m) != 0 ||
+ (connect_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
+ buffer_get_int_ret(&cport, m) != 0 ||
+ (lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) ||
+ (cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) {
+ error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (*listen_addr == '\0') {
+ free(listen_addr);
+ listen_addr = NULL;
+ }
+ if (*connect_addr == '\0') {
+ free(connect_addr);
+ connect_addr = NULL;
+ }
+
+ memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
+ fwd.listen_port = lport;
+ if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
+ fwd.listen_path = listen_addr;
+ else
+ fwd.listen_host = listen_addr;
+ fwd.connect_port = cport;
+ if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
+ fwd.connect_path = connect_addr;
+ else
+ fwd.connect_host = connect_addr;
+
+ debug2("%s: channel %d: request %s", __func__, c->self,
+ (fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd)));
+
+ if (ftype != MUX_FWD_LOCAL && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE &&
+ ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) {
+ logit("%s: invalid forwarding type %u", __func__, ftype);
+ invalid:
+ free(listen_addr);
+ free(connect_addr);
+ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
+ buffer_put_int(r, rid);
+ buffer_put_cstring(r, "Invalid forwarding request");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.listen_path) {
+ logit("%s: streamlocal and dynamic forwards "
+ "are mutually exclusive", __func__);
+ goto invalid;
+ }
+ if (fwd.listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.listen_port >= 65536) {
+ logit("%s: invalid listen port %u", __func__,
+ fwd.listen_port);
+ goto invalid;
+ }
+ if ((fwd.connect_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.connect_port >= 65536)
+ || (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE && fwd.connect_port == 0)) {
+ logit("%s: invalid connect port %u", __func__,
+ fwd.connect_port);
+ goto invalid;
+ }
+ if (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.connect_host == NULL && fwd.connect_path == NULL) {
+ logit("%s: missing connect host", __func__);
+ goto invalid;
+ }
+
+ /* Skip forwards that have already been requested */
+ switch (ftype) {
+ case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
+ case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
+ if (compare_forward(&fwd,
+ options.local_forwards + i)) {
+ exists:
+ debug2("%s: found existing forwarding",
+ __func__);
+ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK);
+ buffer_put_int(r, rid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+ if (compare_forward(&fwd,
+ options.remote_forwards + i)) {
+ if (fwd.listen_port != 0)
+ goto exists;
+ debug2("%s: found allocated port",
+ __func__);
+ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT);
+ buffer_put_int(r, rid);
+ buffer_put_int(r,
+ options.remote_forwards[i].allocated_port);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
+ options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
+ if (!ask_permission("Open %s on %s?", fwd_desc, host)) {
+ debug2("%s: forwarding refused by user", __func__);
+ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED);
+ buffer_put_int(r, rid);
+ buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ftype == MUX_FWD_LOCAL || ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) {
+ if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(&fwd,
+ &options.fwd_opts)) {
+ fail:
+ logit("slave-requested %s failed", fwd_desc);
+ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
+ buffer_put_int(r, rid);
+ buffer_put_cstring(r, "Port forwarding failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
+ freefwd = 0;
+ } else {
+ struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx;
+
+ fwd.handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(&fwd);
+ if (fwd.handle < 0)
+ goto fail;
+ add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd);
+ fctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*fctx));
+ fctx->cid = c->self;
+ fctx->rid = rid;
+ fctx->fid = options.num_remote_forwards - 1;
+ client_register_global_confirm(mux_confirm_remote_forward,
+ fctx);
+ freefwd = 0;
+ c->mux_pause = 1; /* wait for mux_confirm_remote_forward */
+ /* delayed reply in mux_confirm_remote_forward */
+ goto out;
+ }
+ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK);
+ buffer_put_int(r, rid);
+ out:
+ free(fwd_desc);
+ if (freefwd) {
+ free(fwd.listen_host);
+ free(fwd.listen_path);
+ free(fwd.connect_host);
+ free(fwd.connect_path);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+process_mux_close_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
+{
+ struct Forward fwd, *found_fwd;
+ char *fwd_desc = NULL;
+ const char *error_reason = NULL;
+ char *listen_addr = NULL, *connect_addr = NULL;
+ u_int ftype;
+ int i, ret = 0;
+ u_int lport, cport;
+
+ memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
+
+ if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ftype, m) != 0 ||
+ (listen_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
+ buffer_get_int_ret(&lport, m) != 0 ||
+ (connect_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
+ buffer_get_int_ret(&cport, m) != 0 ||
+ (lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) ||
+ (cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) {
+ error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (*listen_addr == '\0') {
+ free(listen_addr);
+ listen_addr = NULL;
+ }
+ if (*connect_addr == '\0') {
+ free(connect_addr);
+ connect_addr = NULL;
+ }
+
+ memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
+ fwd.listen_port = lport;
+ if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
+ fwd.listen_path = listen_addr;
+ else
+ fwd.listen_host = listen_addr;
+ fwd.connect_port = cport;
+ if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
+ fwd.connect_path = connect_addr;
+ else
+ fwd.connect_host = connect_addr;
+
+ debug2("%s: channel %d: request cancel %s", __func__, c->self,
+ (fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd)));
+
+ /* make sure this has been requested */
+ found_fwd = NULL;
+ switch (ftype) {
+ case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
+ case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
+ if (compare_forward(&fwd,
+ options.local_forwards + i)) {
+ found_fwd = options.local_forwards + i;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+ if (compare_forward(&fwd,
+ options.remote_forwards + i)) {
+ found_fwd = options.remote_forwards + i;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (found_fwd == NULL)
+ error_reason = "port not forwarded";
+ else if (ftype == MUX_FWD_REMOTE) {
+ /*
+ * This shouldn't fail unless we confused the host/port
+ * between options.remote_forwards and permitted_opens.
+ * However, for dynamic allocated listen ports we need
+ * to use the actual listen port.
+ */
+ if (channel_request_rforward_cancel(found_fwd) == -1)
+ error_reason = "port not in permitted opens";
+ } else { /* local and dynamic forwards */
+ /* Ditto */
+ if (channel_cancel_lport_listener(&fwd, fwd.connect_port,
+ &options.fwd_opts) == -1)
+ error_reason = "port not found";
+ }
+
+ if (error_reason == NULL) {
+ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK);
+ buffer_put_int(r, rid);
+
+ free(found_fwd->listen_host);
+ free(found_fwd->listen_path);
+ free(found_fwd->connect_host);
+ free(found_fwd->connect_path);
+ found_fwd->listen_host = found_fwd->connect_host = NULL;
+ found_fwd->listen_path = found_fwd->connect_path = NULL;
+ found_fwd->listen_port = found_fwd->connect_port = 0;
+ } else {
+ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
+ buffer_put_int(r, rid);
+ buffer_put_cstring(r, error_reason);
+ }
+ out:
+ free(fwd_desc);
+ free(listen_addr);
+ free(connect_addr);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+process_mux_stdio_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
+{
+ Channel *nc;
+ char *reserved, *chost;
+ u_int cport, i, j;
+ int new_fd[2];
+ struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx;
+
+ chost = reserved = NULL;
+ if ((reserved = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
+ (chost = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
+ buffer_get_int_ret(&cport, m) != 0) {
+ free(reserved);
+ free(chost);
+ error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ free(reserved);
+
+ debug2("%s: channel %d: request stdio fwd to %s:%u",
+ __func__, c->self, chost, cport);
+
+ /* Gather fds from client */
+ for(i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+ if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) {
+ error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from slave",
+ __func__, i);
+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
+ close(new_fd[j]);
+ free(chost);
+
+ /* prepare reply */
+ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
+ buffer_put_int(r, rid);
+ buffer_put_cstring(r,
+ "did not receive file descriptors");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ debug3("%s: got fds stdin %d, stdout %d", __func__,
+ new_fd[0], new_fd[1]);
+
+ /* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */
+ if (c->remote_id != -1) {
+ debug2("%s: session already open", __func__);
+ /* prepare reply */
+ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
+ buffer_put_int(r, rid);
+ buffer_put_cstring(r, "Multiple sessions not supported");
+ cleanup:
+ close(new_fd[0]);
+ close(new_fd[1]);
+ free(chost);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
+ options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
+ if (!ask_permission("Allow forward to %s:%u? ",
+ chost, cport)) {
+ debug2("%s: stdio fwd refused by user", __func__);
+ /* prepare reply */
+ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED);
+ buffer_put_int(r, rid);
+ buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* enable nonblocking unless tty */
+ if (!isatty(new_fd[0]))
+ set_nonblock(new_fd[0]);
+ if (!isatty(new_fd[1]))
+ set_nonblock(new_fd[1]);
+
+ nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]);
+
+ nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */
+ c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */
+
+ debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d",
+ __func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan);
+
+ channel_register_cleanup(nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1);
+
+ cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx));
+ cctx->rid = rid;
+ channel_register_open_confirm(nc->self, mux_stdio_confirm, cctx);
+ c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */
+
+ /* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux stdio fwd session. */
+static void
+mux_stdio_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg)
+{
+ struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg;
+ Channel *c, *cc;
+ Buffer reply;
+
+ if (cctx == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__);
+ if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id);
+ if ((cc = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__,
+ id, c->ctl_chan);
+
+ if (!success) {
+ debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__);
+ /* prepare reply */
+ buffer_init(&reply);
+ buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_FAILURE);
+ buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&reply, "Session open refused by peer");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__);
+ /* prepare reply */
+ buffer_init(&reply);
+ buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED);
+ buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid);
+ buffer_put_int(&reply, c->self);
+
+ done:
+ /* Send reply */
+ buffer_put_string(&cc->output, buffer_ptr(&reply), buffer_len(&reply));
+ buffer_free(&reply);
+
+ if (cc->mux_pause <= 0)
+ fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause);
+ cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
+ c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL;
+ free(cctx);
+}
+
+static int
+process_mux_stop_listening(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
+{
+ debug("%s: channel %d: stop listening", __func__, c->self);
+
+ if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
+ options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
+ if (!ask_permission("Disable further multiplexing on shared "
+ "connection to %s? ", host)) {
+ debug2("%s: stop listen refused by user", __func__);
+ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED);
+ buffer_put_int(r, rid);
+ buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (mux_listener_channel != NULL) {
+ channel_free(mux_listener_channel);
+ client_stop_mux();
+ free(options.control_path);
+ options.control_path = NULL;
+ mux_listener_channel = NULL;
+ muxserver_sock = -1;
+ }
+
+ /* prepare reply */
+ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK);
+ buffer_put_int(r, rid);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Channel callbacks fired on read/write from mux slave fd */
+static int
+mux_master_read_cb(Channel *c)
+{
+ struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx;
+ Buffer in, out;
+ const u_char *ptr;
+ u_int type, rid, have, i;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ /* Setup ctx and */
+ if (c->mux_ctx == NULL) {
+ state = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*state));
+ c->mux_ctx = state;
+ channel_register_cleanup(c->self,
+ mux_master_control_cleanup_cb, 0);
+
+ /* Send hello */
+ buffer_init(&out);
+ buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_MSG_HELLO);
+ buffer_put_int(&out, SSHMUX_VER);
+ /* no extensions */
+ buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out),
+ buffer_len(&out));
+ buffer_free(&out);
+ debug3("%s: channel %d: hello sent", __func__, c->self);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ buffer_init(&in);
+ buffer_init(&out);
+
+ /* Channel code ensures that we receive whole packets */
+ if ((ptr = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&c->input, &have)) == NULL) {
+ malf:
+ error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ buffer_append(&in, ptr, have);
+
+ if (buffer_get_int_ret(&type, &in) != 0)
+ goto malf;
+ debug3("%s: channel %d packet type 0x%08x len %u",
+ __func__, c->self, type, buffer_len(&in));
+
+ if (type == MUX_MSG_HELLO)
+ rid = 0;
+ else {
+ if (!state->hello_rcvd) {
+ error("%s: expected MUX_MSG_HELLO(0x%08x), "
+ "received 0x%08x", __func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (buffer_get_int_ret(&rid, &in) != 0)
+ goto malf;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; mux_master_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) {
+ if (type == mux_master_handlers[i].type) {
+ ret = mux_master_handlers[i].handler(rid, c, &in, &out);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (mux_master_handlers[i].handler == NULL) {
+ error("%s: unsupported mux message 0x%08x", __func__, type);
+ buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_FAILURE);
+ buffer_put_int(&out, rid);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&out, "unsupported request");
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ /* Enqueue reply packet */
+ if (buffer_len(&out) != 0) {
+ buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out),
+ buffer_len(&out));
+ }
+ out:
+ buffer_free(&in);
+ buffer_free(&out);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void
+mux_exit_message(Channel *c, int exitval)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ Channel *mux_chan;
+
+ debug3("%s: channel %d: exit message, exitval %d", __func__, c->self,
+ exitval);
+
+ if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d",
+ __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan);
+
+ /* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, c->self);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, exitval);
+
+ buffer_put_string(&mux_chan->output, buffer_ptr(&m), buffer_len(&m));
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+void
+mux_tty_alloc_failed(Channel *c)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ Channel *mux_chan;
+
+ debug3("%s: channel %d: TTY alloc failed", __func__, c->self);
+
+ if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d",
+ __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan);
+
+ /* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, c->self);
+
+ buffer_put_string(&mux_chan->output, buffer_ptr(&m), buffer_len(&m));
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+/* Prepare a mux master to listen on a Unix domain socket. */
+void
+muxserver_listen(void)
+{
+ mode_t old_umask;
+ char *orig_control_path = options.control_path;
+ char rbuf[16+1];
+ u_int i, r;
+ int oerrno;
+
+ if (options.control_path == NULL ||
+ options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO)
+ return;
+
+ debug("setting up multiplex master socket");
+
+ /*
+ * Use a temporary path before listen so we can pseudo-atomically
+ * establish the listening socket in its final location to avoid
+ * other processes racing in between bind() and listen() and hitting
+ * an unready socket.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rbuf) - 1; i++) {
+ r = arc4random_uniform(26+26+10);
+ rbuf[i] = (r < 26) ? 'a' + r :
+ (r < 26*2) ? 'A' + r - 26 :
+ '0' + r - 26 - 26;
+ }
+ rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] = '\0';
+ options.control_path = NULL;
+ xasprintf(&options.control_path, "%s.%s", orig_control_path, rbuf);
+ debug3("%s: temporary control path %s", __func__, options.control_path);
+
+ old_umask = umask(0177);
+ muxserver_sock = unix_listener(options.control_path, 64, 0);
+ oerrno = errno;
+ umask(old_umask);
+ if (muxserver_sock < 0) {
+ if (oerrno == EINVAL || oerrno == EADDRINUSE) {
+ error("ControlSocket %s already exists, "
+ "disabling multiplexing", options.control_path);
+ disable_mux_master:
+ if (muxserver_sock != -1) {
+ close(muxserver_sock);
+ muxserver_sock = -1;
+ }
+ free(orig_control_path);
+ free(options.control_path);
+ options.control_path = NULL;
+ options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
+ return;
+ } else {
+ /* unix_listener() logs the error */
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Now atomically "move" the mux socket into position */
+ if (link(options.control_path, orig_control_path) != 0) {
+ if (errno != EEXIST) {
+ fatal("%s: link mux listener %s => %s: %s", __func__,
+ options.control_path, orig_control_path,
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ error("ControlSocket %s already exists, disabling multiplexing",
+ orig_control_path);
+ unlink(options.control_path);
+ goto disable_mux_master;
+ }
+ unlink(options.control_path);
+ free(options.control_path);
+ options.control_path = orig_control_path;
+
+ set_nonblock(muxserver_sock);
+
+ mux_listener_channel = channel_new("mux listener",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER, muxserver_sock, muxserver_sock, -1,
+ CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+ 0, options.control_path, 1);
+ mux_listener_channel->mux_rcb = mux_master_read_cb;
+ debug3("%s: mux listener channel %d fd %d", __func__,
+ mux_listener_channel->self, mux_listener_channel->sock);
+}
+
+/* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux client session. */
+static void
+mux_session_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg)
+{
+ struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg;
+ const char *display;
+ Channel *c, *cc;
+ int i;
+ Buffer reply;
+
+ if (cctx == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__);
+ if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id);
+ if ((cc = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__,
+ id, c->ctl_chan);
+
+ if (!success) {
+ debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__);
+ /* prepare reply */
+ buffer_init(&reply);
+ buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_FAILURE);
+ buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&reply, "Session open refused by peer");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+ if (cctx->want_x_fwd && options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
+ char *proto, *data;
+
+ /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
+ if (client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
+ options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout,
+ &proto, &data) == 0) {
+ /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
+ "spoofing.");
+ x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto,
+ data, 1);
+ /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
+ client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding",
+ CONFIRM_WARN);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) {
+ debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
+ channel_request_start(id, "auth-agent-req at openssh.com", 0);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+
+ client_session2_setup(id, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys,
+ cctx->term, &cctx->tio, c->rfd, &cctx->cmd, cctx->env);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__);
+ /* prepare reply */
+ buffer_init(&reply);
+ buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED);
+ buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid);
+ buffer_put_int(&reply, c->self);
+
+ done:
+ /* Send reply */
+ buffer_put_string(&cc->output, buffer_ptr(&reply), buffer_len(&reply));
+ buffer_free(&reply);
+
+ if (cc->mux_pause <= 0)
+ fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause);
+ cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
+ c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL;
+ buffer_free(&cctx->cmd);
+ free(cctx->term);
+ if (cctx->env != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; cctx->env[i] != NULL; i++)
+ free(cctx->env[i]);
+ free(cctx->env);
+ }
+ free(cctx);
+}
+
+/* ** Multiplexing client support */
+
+/* Exit signal handler */
+static void
+control_client_sighandler(int signo)
+{
+ muxclient_terminate = signo;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Relay signal handler - used to pass some signals from mux client to
+ * mux master.
+ */
+static void
+control_client_sigrelay(int signo)
+{
+ int save_errno = errno;
+
+ if (muxserver_pid > 1)
+ kill(muxserver_pid, signo);
+
+ errno = save_errno;
+}
+
+static int
+mux_client_read(int fd, Buffer *b, u_int need)
+{
+ u_int have;
+ ssize_t len;
+ u_char *p;
+ struct pollfd pfd;
+
+ pfd.fd = fd;
+ pfd.events = POLLIN;
+ p = buffer_append_space(b, need);
+ for (have = 0; have < need; ) {
+ if (muxclient_terminate) {
+ errno = EINTR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ len = read(fd, p + have, need - have);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ switch (errno) {
+#if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN)
+ case EWOULDBLOCK:
+#endif
+ case EAGAIN:
+ (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case EINTR:
+ continue;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (len == 0) {
+ errno = EPIPE;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ have += (u_int)len;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+mux_client_write_packet(int fd, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Buffer queue;
+ u_int have, need;
+ int oerrno, len;
+ u_char *ptr;
+ struct pollfd pfd;
+
+ pfd.fd = fd;
+ pfd.events = POLLOUT;
+ buffer_init(&queue);
+ buffer_put_string(&queue, buffer_ptr(m), buffer_len(m));
+
+ need = buffer_len(&queue);
+ ptr = buffer_ptr(&queue);
+
+ for (have = 0; have < need; ) {
+ if (muxclient_terminate) {
+ buffer_free(&queue);
+ errno = EINTR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ len = write(fd, ptr + have, need - have);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ switch (errno) {
+#if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN)
+ case EWOULDBLOCK:
+#endif
+ case EAGAIN:
+ (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case EINTR:
+ continue;
+ default:
+ oerrno = errno;
+ buffer_free(&queue);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (len == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&queue);
+ errno = EPIPE;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ have += (u_int)len;
+ }
+ buffer_free(&queue);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+mux_client_read_packet(int fd, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Buffer queue;
+ u_int need, have;
+ const u_char *ptr;
+ int oerrno;
+
+ buffer_init(&queue);
+ if (mux_client_read(fd, &queue, 4) != 0) {
+ if ((oerrno = errno) == EPIPE)
+ debug3("%s: read header failed: %s", __func__,
+ strerror(errno));
+ buffer_free(&queue);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ need = get_u32(buffer_ptr(&queue));
+ if (mux_client_read(fd, &queue, need) != 0) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ debug3("%s: read body failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ buffer_free(&queue);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ptr = buffer_get_string_ptr(&queue, &have);
+ buffer_append(m, ptr, have);
+ buffer_free(&queue);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+mux_client_hello_exchange(int fd)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ u_int type, ver;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_MSG_HELLO);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, SSHMUX_VER);
+ /* no extensions */
+
+ if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+ buffer_clear(&m);
+
+ /* Read their HELLO */
+ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) {
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ type = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ if (type != MUX_MSG_HELLO)
+ fatal("%s: expected HELLO (%u) received %u",
+ __func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type);
+ ver = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ if (ver != SSHMUX_VER)
+ fatal("Unsupported multiplexing protocol version %d "
+ "(expected %d)", ver, SSHMUX_VER);
+ debug2("%s: master version %u", __func__, ver);
+ /* No extensions are presently defined */
+ while (buffer_len(&m) > 0) {
+ char *name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ char *value = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+
+ debug2("Unrecognised master extension \"%s\"", name);
+ free(name);
+ free(value);
+ }
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u_int
+mux_client_request_alive(int fd)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ char *e;
+ u_int pid, type, rid;
+
+ debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id);
+
+ if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+ buffer_clear(&m);
+
+ /* Read their reply */
+ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) {
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ type = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ if (type != MUX_S_ALIVE) {
+ e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e);
+ }
+
+ if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id)
+ fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
+ __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
+ pid = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ debug3("%s: done pid = %u", __func__, pid);
+
+ muxclient_request_id++;
+
+ return pid;
+}
+
+static void
+mux_client_request_terminate(int fd)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ char *e;
+ u_int type, rid;
+
+ debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_TERMINATE);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id);
+
+ if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+ buffer_clear(&m);
+
+ /* Read their reply */
+ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) {
+ /* Remote end exited already */
+ if (errno == EPIPE) {
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ return;
+ }
+ fatal("%s: read from master failed: %s",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+ }
+
+ type = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id)
+ fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
+ __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
+ switch (type) {
+ case MUX_S_OK:
+ break;
+ case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
+ e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ fatal("Master refused termination request: %s", e);
+ case MUX_S_FAILURE:
+ e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ fatal("%s: termination request failed: %s", __func__, e);
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
+ __func__, type);
+ }
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ muxclient_request_id++;
+}
+
+static int
+mux_client_forward(int fd, int cancel_flag, u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ char *e, *fwd_desc;
+ u_int type, rid;
+
+ fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, fwd);
+ debug("Requesting %s %s",
+ cancel_flag ? "cancellation of" : "forwarding of", fwd_desc);
+ free(fwd_desc);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, cancel_flag ? MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD : MUX_C_OPEN_FWD);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, ftype);
+ if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, fwd->listen_path);
+ } else {
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m,
+ fwd->listen_host == NULL ? "" :
+ (*fwd->listen_host == '\0' ? "*" : fwd->listen_host));
+ }
+ buffer_put_int(&m, fwd->listen_port);
+ if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, fwd->connect_path);
+ } else {
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m,
+ fwd->connect_host == NULL ? "" : fwd->connect_host);
+ }
+ buffer_put_int(&m, fwd->connect_port);
+
+ if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+ buffer_clear(&m);
+
+ /* Read their reply */
+ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) {
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ type = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id)
+ fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
+ __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
+ switch (type) {
+ case MUX_S_OK:
+ break;
+ case MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT:
+ if (cancel_flag)
+ fatal("%s: got MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT for cancel", __func__);
+ fwd->allocated_port = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ verbose("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d",
+ fwd->allocated_port,
+ fwd->connect_host ? fwd->connect_host : "",
+ fwd->connect_port);
+ if (muxclient_command == SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD)
+ fprintf(stdout, "%i\n", fwd->allocated_port);
+ break;
+ case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
+ e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ error("Master refused forwarding request: %s", e);
+ return -1;
+ case MUX_S_FAILURE:
+ e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ error("%s: forwarding request failed: %s", __func__, e);
+ return -1;
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
+ __func__, type);
+ }
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ muxclient_request_id++;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+mux_client_forwards(int fd, int cancel_flag)
+{
+ int i, ret = 0;
+
+ debug3("%s: %s forwardings: %d local, %d remote", __func__,
+ cancel_flag ? "cancel" : "request",
+ options.num_local_forwards, options.num_remote_forwards);
+
+ /* XXX ExitOnForwardingFailure */
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
+ if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag,
+ options.local_forwards[i].connect_port == 0 ?
+ MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC : MUX_FWD_LOCAL,
+ options.local_forwards + i) != 0)
+ ret = -1;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+ if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag, MUX_FWD_REMOTE,
+ options.remote_forwards + i) != 0)
+ ret = -1;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+mux_client_request_session(int fd)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ char *e, *term;
+ u_int i, rid, sid, esid, exitval, type, exitval_seen;
+ extern char **environ;
+ int devnull, rawmode;
+
+ debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+
+ if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) {
+ error("%s: master alive request failed", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
+ if (stdin_null_flag) {
+ if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+ fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
+ fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
+ close(devnull);
+ }
+
+ term = getenv("TERM");
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_NEW_SESSION);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, ""); /* reserved */
+ buffer_put_int(&m, tty_flag);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, options.forward_x11);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, options.forward_agent);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, subsystem_flag);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, options.escape_char == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE ?
+ 0xffffffff : (u_int)options.escape_char);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, term == NULL ? "" : term);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(&command), buffer_len(&command));
+
+ if (options.num_send_env > 0 && environ != NULL) {
+ /* Pass environment */
+ for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ if (env_permitted(environ[i])) {
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, environ[i]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Send the stdio file descriptors */
+ if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
+ mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 ||
+ mm_send_fd(fd, STDERR_FILENO) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
+
+ debug3("%s: session request sent", __func__);
+
+ /* Read their reply */
+ buffer_clear(&m);
+ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) {
+ error("%s: read from master failed: %s",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ type = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id)
+ fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
+ __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
+ switch (type) {
+ case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED:
+ sid = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ debug("%s: master session id: %u", __func__, sid);
+ break;
+ case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
+ e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ error("Master refused session request: %s", e);
+ return -1;
+ case MUX_S_FAILURE:
+ e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ error("%s: session request failed: %s", __func__, e);
+ return -1;
+ default:
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
+ __func__, type);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ muxclient_request_id++;
+
+ if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1)
+ fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ platform_pledge_mux();
+
+ signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler);
+ signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler);
+ signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler);
+ signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay);
+
+ rawmode = tty_flag;
+ if (tty_flag)
+ enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+
+ /*
+ * Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd.
+ * Before it does, it is expected to write an exit message.
+ * This process must read the value and wait for the closure of
+ * the client_fd; if this one closes early, the multiplex master will
+ * terminate early too (possibly losing data).
+ */
+ for (exitval = 255, exitval_seen = 0;;) {
+ buffer_clear(&m);
+ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
+ break;
+ type = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ switch (type) {
+ case MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL:
+ if ((esid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != sid)
+ fatal("%s: tty alloc fail on unknown session: "
+ "my id %u theirs %u",
+ __func__, sid, esid);
+ leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty ==
+ REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+ rawmode = 0;
+ continue;
+ case MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE:
+ if ((esid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != sid)
+ fatal("%s: exit on unknown session: "
+ "my id %u theirs %u",
+ __func__, sid, esid);
+ if (exitval_seen)
+ fatal("%s: exitval sent twice", __func__);
+ exitval = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ exitval_seen = 1;
+ continue;
+ default:
+ e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e);
+ }
+ }
+
+ close(fd);
+ if (rawmode)
+ leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+
+ if (muxclient_terminate) {
+ debug2("Exiting on signal %d", muxclient_terminate);
+ exitval = 255;
+ } else if (!exitval_seen) {
+ debug2("Control master terminated unexpectedly");
+ exitval = 255;
+ } else
+ debug2("Received exit status from master %d", exitval);
+
+ if (tty_flag && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Shared connection to %s closed.\r\n", host);
+
+ exit(exitval);
+}
+
+static int
+mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(int fd)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ char *e;
+ u_int type, rid, sid;
+ int devnull;
+
+ debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+
+ if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) {
+ error("%s: master alive request failed", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
+ if (stdin_null_flag) {
+ if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+ fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
+ fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
+ close(devnull);
+ }
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, ""); /* reserved */
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, options.stdio_forward_host);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, options.stdio_forward_port);
+
+ if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Send the stdio file descriptors */
+ if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
+ mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
+
+ if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1)
+ fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ platform_pledge_mux();
+
+ debug3("%s: stdio forward request sent", __func__);
+
+ /* Read their reply */
+ buffer_clear(&m);
+
+ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) {
+ error("%s: read from master failed: %s",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ type = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id)
+ fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
+ __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
+ switch (type) {
+ case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED:
+ sid = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ debug("%s: master session id: %u", __func__, sid);
+ break;
+ case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
+ e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ fatal("Master refused stdio forwarding request: %s", e);
+ case MUX_S_FAILURE:
+ e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ fatal("Stdio forwarding request failed: %s", e);
+ default:
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
+ __func__, type);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ muxclient_request_id++;
+
+ signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler);
+ signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler);
+ signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler);
+ signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay);
+
+ /*
+ * Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd.
+ */
+ buffer_clear(&m);
+ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) {
+ if (errno == EPIPE ||
+ (errno == EINTR && muxclient_terminate != 0))
+ return 0;
+ fatal("%s: mux_client_read_packet: %s",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ fatal("%s: master returned unexpected message %u", __func__, type);
+}
+
+static void
+mux_client_request_stop_listening(int fd)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ char *e;
+ u_int type, rid;
+
+ debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id);
+
+ if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+ buffer_clear(&m);
+
+ /* Read their reply */
+ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: read from master failed: %s",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+ type = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id)
+ fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
+ __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
+ switch (type) {
+ case MUX_S_OK:
+ break;
+ case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
+ e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ fatal("Master refused stop listening request: %s", e);
+ case MUX_S_FAILURE:
+ e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ fatal("%s: stop listening request failed: %s", __func__, e);
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
+ __func__, type);
+ }
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ muxclient_request_id++;
+}
+
+/* Multiplex client main loop. */
+void
+muxclient(const char *path)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_un addr;
+ socklen_t sun_len;
+ int sock;
+ u_int pid;
+
+ if (muxclient_command == 0) {
+ if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL)
+ muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD;
+ else
+ muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN;
+ }
+
+ switch (options.control_master) {
+ case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO:
+ case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK:
+ debug("auto-mux: Trying existing master");
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case SSHCTL_MASTER_NO:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return;
+ }
+
+ memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
+ addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ sun_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
+ strlen(path) + 1;
+
+ if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path,
+ sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path))
+ fatal("ControlPath too long");
+
+ if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
+ fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sun_len) == -1) {
+ switch (muxclient_command) {
+ case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN:
+ case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD:
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (errno == ECONNREFUSED &&
+ options.control_master != SSHCTL_MASTER_NO) {
+ debug("Stale control socket %.100s, unlinking", path);
+ unlink(path);
+ } else if (errno == ENOENT) {
+ debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path);
+ } else {
+ error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ close(sock);
+ return;
+ }
+ set_nonblock(sock);
+
+ if (mux_client_hello_exchange(sock) != 0) {
+ error("%s: master hello exchange failed", __func__);
+ close(sock);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ switch (muxclient_command) {
+ case SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK:
+ if ((pid = mux_client_request_alive(sock)) == 0)
+ fatal("%s: master alive check failed", __func__);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Master running (pid=%u)\r\n", pid);
+ exit(0);
+ case SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE:
+ mux_client_request_terminate(sock);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Exit request sent.\r\n");
+ exit(0);
+ case SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD:
+ if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: master forward request failed", __func__);
+ exit(0);
+ case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN:
+ if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0) {
+ error("%s: master forward request failed", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+ mux_client_request_session(sock);
+ return;
+ case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD:
+ mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(sock);
+ exit(0);
+ case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP:
+ mux_client_request_stop_listening(sock);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Stop listening request sent.\r\n");
+ exit(0);
+ case SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD:
+ if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 1) != 0)
+ error("%s: master cancel forward request failed",
+ __func__);
+ exit(0);
+ default:
+ fatal("unrecognised muxclient_command %d", muxclient_command);
+ }
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/myproposal.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/myproposal.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/myproposal.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,148 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.35 2013/12/06 13:39:49 markus Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-
-/* conditional algorithm support */
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
-# define KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
- "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
- "ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
- "ecdh-sha2-nistp521,"
-# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com," \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com," \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com,"
-# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,"
-#else
-# define KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
- "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
- "ecdh-sha2-nistp384,"
-# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com," \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com,"
-# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,"
-#endif
-#else
-# define KEX_ECDH_METHODS
-# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS
-# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS
-#endif
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
-# define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES \
- "aes128-gcm at openssh.com,aes256-gcm at openssh.com,"
-#else
-# define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-# define KEX_SHA256_METHODS \
- "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
-#define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS \
- "curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org,"
-#define SHA2_HMAC_MODES \
- "hmac-sha2-256," \
- "hmac-sha2-512,"
-#else
-# define KEX_SHA256_METHODS
-# define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS
-# define SHA2_HMAC_MODES
-#endif
-
-# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \
- KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS \
- KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
- KEX_SHA256_METHODS \
- "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
- "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \
- "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
-
-#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \
- HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
- "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com," \
- "ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com," \
- "ssh-dss-cert-v01 at openssh.com," \
- "ssh-rsa-cert-v00 at openssh.com," \
- "ssh-dss-cert-v00 at openssh.com," \
- HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
- "ssh-ed25519," \
- "ssh-rsa," \
- "ssh-dss"
-
-/* the actual algorithms */
-
-#define KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT \
- "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
- "arcfour256,arcfour128," \
- AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES \
- "chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com," \
- "aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc," \
- "aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,arcfour,rijndael-cbc at lysator.liu.se"
-
-#define KEX_DEFAULT_MAC \
- "hmac-md5-etm at openssh.com," \
- "hmac-sha1-etm at openssh.com," \
- "umac-64-etm at openssh.com," \
- "umac-128-etm at openssh.com," \
- "hmac-sha2-256-etm at openssh.com," \
- "hmac-sha2-512-etm at openssh.com," \
- "hmac-ripemd160-etm at openssh.com," \
- "hmac-sha1-96-etm at openssh.com," \
- "hmac-md5-96-etm at openssh.com," \
- "hmac-md5," \
- "hmac-sha1," \
- "umac-64 at openssh.com," \
- "umac-128 at openssh.com," \
- SHA2_HMAC_MODES \
- "hmac-ripemd160," \
- "hmac-ripemd160 at openssh.com," \
- "hmac-sha1-96," \
- "hmac-md5-96"
-
-#define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib at openssh.com,zlib"
-#define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG ""
-
-
-static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
- KEX_DEFAULT_KEX,
- KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG,
- KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT,
- KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT,
- KEX_DEFAULT_MAC,
- KEX_DEFAULT_MAC,
- KEX_DEFAULT_COMP,
- KEX_DEFAULT_COMP,
- KEX_DEFAULT_LANG,
- KEX_DEFAULT_LANG
-};
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/myproposal.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/myproposal.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/myproposal.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/myproposal.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.50 2016/02/09 05:30:04 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+/* conditional algorithm support */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+# define KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
+ "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
+ "ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
+ "ecdh-sha2-nistp521,"
+# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com,"
+# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,"
+#else
+# define KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
+ "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
+ "ecdh-sha2-nistp384,"
+# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com,"
+# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,"
+#endif
+#else
+# define KEX_ECDH_METHODS
+# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS
+# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
+# define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES \
+ ",aes128-gcm at openssh.com,aes256-gcm at openssh.com"
+#else
+# define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
+# define KEX_SHA2_METHODS \
+ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
+ "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \
+ "diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,"
+# define KEX_SHA2_GROUP14 \
+ "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,"
+#define SHA2_HMAC_MODES \
+ "hmac-sha2-256," \
+ "hmac-sha2-512,"
+#else
+# define KEX_SHA2_METHODS
+# define KEX_SHA2_GROUP14
+# define SHA2_HMAC_MODES
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
+# define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS "curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org,"
+# else
+# define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS ""
+# endif
+#define KEX_COMMON_KEX \
+ KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS \
+ KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
+ KEX_SHA2_METHODS
+
+#define KEX_SERVER_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \
+ KEX_SHA2_GROUP14 \
+ "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" \
+
+#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \
+ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
+ KEX_SHA2_GROUP14 \
+ "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
+
+#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \
+ HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
+ "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com," \
+ "ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com," \
+ HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
+ "ssh-ed25519," \
+ "rsa-sha2-512," \
+ "rsa-sha2-256," \
+ "ssh-rsa"
+
+/* the actual algorithms */
+
+#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
+ "chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com," \
+ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" \
+ AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
+
+#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT "," \
+ "aes128-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,3des-cbc"
+
+#define KEX_SERVER_MAC \
+ "umac-64-etm at openssh.com," \
+ "umac-128-etm at openssh.com," \
+ "hmac-sha2-256-etm at openssh.com," \
+ "hmac-sha2-512-etm at openssh.com," \
+ "hmac-sha1-etm at openssh.com," \
+ "umac-64 at openssh.com," \
+ "umac-128 at openssh.com," \
+ "hmac-sha2-256," \
+ "hmac-sha2-512," \
+ "hmac-sha1"
+
+#define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
+
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#define KEX_SERVER_KEX \
+ "curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org"
+#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \
+ "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com," \
+ "ssh-ed25519"
+#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
+ "chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com," \
+ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr"
+#define KEX_SERVER_MAC \
+ "umac-64-etm at openssh.com," \
+ "umac-128-etm at openssh.com," \
+ "hmac-sha2-256-etm at openssh.com," \
+ "hmac-sha2-512-etm at openssh.com," \
+ "hmac-sha1-etm at openssh.com," \
+ "umac-64 at openssh.com," \
+ "umac-128 at openssh.com," \
+ "hmac-sha2-256," \
+ "hmac-sha2-512," \
+ "hmac-sha1"
+
+#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_SERVER_KEX
+#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT
+#define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
+
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib at openssh.com,zlib"
+#define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG ""
+
+#define KEX_CLIENT \
+ KEX_CLIENT_KEX, \
+ KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \
+ KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \
+ KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \
+ KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \
+ KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \
+ KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
+ KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
+ KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \
+ KEX_DEFAULT_LANG
+
+#define KEX_SERVER \
+ KEX_SERVER_KEX, \
+ KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \
+ KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \
+ KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \
+ KEX_SERVER_MAC, \
+ KEX_SERVER_MAC, \
+ KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
+ KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
+ KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \
+ KEX_DEFAULT_LANG
+
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/opacket.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/opacket.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/opacket.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/opacket.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
+/* Written by Markus Friedl. Placed in the public domain. */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+struct ssh *active_state, *backup_state;
+
+/* Map old to new API */
+
+void
+ssh_packet_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_put_char(struct ssh *ssh, int value)
+{
+ u_char ch = value;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, ch)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_put_int(struct ssh *ssh, u_int value)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, value)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_put_int64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t value)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u64(ssh, value)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *buf, u_int len)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, buf, len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const char *str)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, str)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_put_raw(struct ssh *ssh, const void *buf, u_int len)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put(ssh, buf, len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+void
+ssh_packet_put_bignum(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM * value)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_bignum1(ssh, value)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+void
+ssh_packet_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM * value)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, value)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+void
+ssh_packet_put_ecpoint(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_GROUP *curve,
+ const EC_POINT *point)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_ec(ssh, point, curve)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+# endif
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+void
+ssh_packet_send(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+u_int
+ssh_packet_get_char(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ u_char ch;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &ch)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return ch;
+}
+
+u_int
+ssh_packet_get_int(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ u_int val;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &val)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return val;
+}
+
+u_int64_t
+ssh_packet_get_int64(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ u_int64_t val;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u64(ssh, &val)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return val;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+void
+ssh_packet_get_bignum(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM * value)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum1(ssh, value)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+void
+ssh_packet_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM * value)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, value)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+void
+ssh_packet_get_ecpoint(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_GROUP *curve, EC_POINT *point)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_ec(ssh, point, curve)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+# endif
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+void *
+ssh_packet_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_int *length_ptr)
+{
+ int r;
+ size_t len;
+ u_char *val;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &val, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (length_ptr != NULL)
+ *length_ptr = (u_int)len;
+ return val;
+}
+
+const void *
+ssh_packet_get_string_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, u_int *length_ptr)
+{
+ int r;
+ size_t len;
+ const u_char *val;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &val, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (length_ptr != NULL)
+ *length_ptr = (u_int)len;
+ return val;
+}
+
+char *
+ssh_packet_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, u_int *length_ptr)
+{
+ int r;
+ size_t len;
+ char *val;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &val, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (length_ptr != NULL)
+ *length_ptr = (u_int)len;
+ return val;
+}
+
+/* Old API, that had to be reimplemented */
+
+void
+packet_set_connection(int fd_in, int fd_out)
+{
+ active_state = ssh_packet_set_connection(active_state, fd_in, fd_out);
+ if (active_state == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: ssh_packet_set_connection failed", __func__);
+}
+
+u_int
+packet_get_char(void)
+{
+ return (ssh_packet_get_char(active_state));
+}
+
+u_int
+packet_get_int(void)
+{
+ return (ssh_packet_get_int(active_state));
+}
+
+int
+packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr)
+{
+ u_char type;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(active_state, &type, seqnr)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r);
+ return type;
+}
+
+int
+packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr)
+{
+ u_char type;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(active_state, &type, seqnr)))
+ sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r);
+ return type;
+}
+
+void
+packet_close(void)
+{
+ ssh_packet_close(active_state);
+ active_state = NULL;
+}
+
+void
+packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(active_state, buf, len)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r);
+}
+
+void
+packet_write_wait(void)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(active_state)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r);
+}
+
+void
+packet_write_poll(void)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(active_state)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r);
+}
+
+void
+packet_read_expect(int expected_type)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_read_expect(active_state, expected_type)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r);
+}
+
+void
+packet_disconnect(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ char buf[1024];
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(active_state, "%s", buf);
+}
+
+void
+packet_send_debug(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ char buf[1024];
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ ssh_packet_send_debug(active_state, "%s", buf);
+}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/opacket.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/opacket.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/opacket.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/opacket.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+#ifndef _OPACKET_H
+/* Written by Markus Friedl. Placed in the public domain. */
+
+/* Map old to new API */
+void ssh_packet_start(struct ssh *, u_char);
+void ssh_packet_put_char(struct ssh *, int ch);
+void ssh_packet_put_int(struct ssh *, u_int value);
+void ssh_packet_put_int64(struct ssh *, u_int64_t value);
+void ssh_packet_put_bignum(struct ssh *, BIGNUM * value);
+void ssh_packet_put_bignum2(struct ssh *, BIGNUM * value);
+void ssh_packet_put_ecpoint(struct ssh *, const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
+void ssh_packet_put_string(struct ssh *, const void *buf, u_int len);
+void ssh_packet_put_cstring(struct ssh *, const char *str);
+void ssh_packet_put_raw(struct ssh *, const void *buf, u_int len);
+void ssh_packet_send(struct ssh *);
+
+u_int ssh_packet_get_char(struct ssh *);
+u_int ssh_packet_get_int(struct ssh *);
+u_int64_t ssh_packet_get_int64(struct ssh *);
+void ssh_packet_get_bignum(struct ssh *, BIGNUM * value);
+void ssh_packet_get_bignum2(struct ssh *, BIGNUM * value);
+void ssh_packet_get_ecpoint(struct ssh *, const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *);
+void *ssh_packet_get_string(struct ssh *, u_int *length_ptr);
+char *ssh_packet_get_cstring(struct ssh *, u_int *length_ptr);
+
+/* don't allow remaining bytes after the end of the message */
+#define ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh) \
+do { \
+ int _len = ssh_packet_remaining(ssh); \
+ if (_len > 0) { \
+ logit("Packet integrity error (%d bytes remaining) at %s:%d", \
+ _len ,__FILE__, __LINE__); \
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, \
+ "Packet integrity error."); \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
+/* old API */
+void packet_close(void);
+u_int packet_get_char(void);
+u_int packet_get_int(void);
+void packet_set_connection(int, int);
+int packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *);
+int packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *);
+void packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len);
+void packet_write_wait(void);
+void packet_write_poll(void);
+void packet_read_expect(int expected_type);
+#define packet_set_timeout(timeout, count) \
+ ssh_packet_set_timeout(active_state, (timeout), (count))
+#define packet_connection_is_on_socket() \
+ ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(active_state)
+#define packet_set_nonblocking() \
+ ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(active_state)
+#define packet_get_connection_in() \
+ ssh_packet_get_connection_in(active_state)
+#define packet_get_connection_out() \
+ ssh_packet_get_connection_out(active_state)
+#define packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags) \
+ ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(active_state, (protocol_flags))
+#define packet_get_protocol_flags() \
+ ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(active_state)
+#define packet_start_compression(level) \
+ ssh_packet_start_compression(active_state, (level))
+#define packet_set_encryption_key(key, keylen, number) \
+ ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(active_state, (key), (keylen), (number))
+#define packet_start(type) \
+ ssh_packet_start(active_state, (type))
+#define packet_put_char(value) \
+ ssh_packet_put_char(active_state, (value))
+#define packet_put_int(value) \
+ ssh_packet_put_int(active_state, (value))
+#define packet_put_int64(value) \
+ ssh_packet_put_int64(active_state, (value))
+#define packet_put_string( buf, len) \
+ ssh_packet_put_string(active_state, (buf), (len))
+#define packet_put_cstring(str) \
+ ssh_packet_put_cstring(active_state, (str))
+#define packet_put_raw(buf, len) \
+ ssh_packet_put_raw(active_state, (buf), (len))
+#define packet_put_bignum(value) \
+ ssh_packet_put_bignum(active_state, (value))
+#define packet_put_bignum2(value) \
+ ssh_packet_put_bignum2(active_state, (value))
+#define packet_send() \
+ ssh_packet_send(active_state)
+#define packet_read() \
+ ssh_packet_read(active_state)
+#define packet_get_int64() \
+ ssh_packet_get_int64(active_state)
+#define packet_get_bignum(value) \
+ ssh_packet_get_bignum(active_state, (value))
+#define packet_get_bignum2(value) \
+ ssh_packet_get_bignum2(active_state, (value))
+#define packet_remaining() \
+ ssh_packet_remaining(active_state)
+#define packet_get_string(length_ptr) \
+ ssh_packet_get_string(active_state, (length_ptr))
+#define packet_get_string_ptr(length_ptr) \
+ ssh_packet_get_string_ptr(active_state, (length_ptr))
+#define packet_get_cstring(length_ptr) \
+ ssh_packet_get_cstring(active_state, (length_ptr))
+void packet_send_debug(const char *, ...)
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void packet_disconnect(const char *, ...)
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)))
+ __attribute__((noreturn));
+#define packet_have_data_to_write() \
+ ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(active_state)
+#define packet_not_very_much_data_to_write() \
+ ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(active_state)
+#define packet_set_interactive(interactive, qos_interactive, qos_bulk) \
+ ssh_packet_set_interactive(active_state, (interactive), (qos_interactive), (qos_bulk))
+#define packet_is_interactive() \
+ ssh_packet_is_interactive(active_state)
+#define packet_set_maxsize(s) \
+ ssh_packet_set_maxsize(active_state, (s))
+#define packet_inc_alive_timeouts() \
+ ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(active_state)
+#define packet_set_alive_timeouts(ka) \
+ ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(active_state, (ka))
+#define packet_get_maxsize() \
+ ssh_packet_get_maxsize(active_state)
+#define packet_add_padding(pad) \
+ sshpkt_add_padding(active_state, (pad))
+#define packet_send_ignore(nbytes) \
+ ssh_packet_send_ignore(active_state, (nbytes))
+#define packet_set_server() \
+ ssh_packet_set_server(active_state)
+#define packet_set_authenticated() \
+ ssh_packet_set_authenticated(active_state)
+#define packet_get_input() \
+ ssh_packet_get_input(active_state)
+#define packet_get_output() \
+ ssh_packet_get_output(active_state)
+#define packet_set_compress_hooks(ctx, allocfunc, freefunc) \
+ ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(active_state, ctx, \
+ allocfunc, freefunc);
+#define packet_check_eom() \
+ ssh_packet_check_eom(active_state)
+#define set_newkeys(mode) \
+ ssh_set_newkeys(active_state, (mode))
+#define packet_get_state(m) \
+ ssh_packet_get_state(active_state, m)
+#define packet_set_state(m) \
+ ssh_packet_set_state(active_state, m)
+#define packet_get_raw(lenp) \
+ sshpkt_ptr(active_state, lenp)
+#define packet_get_ecpoint(c,p) \
+ ssh_packet_get_ecpoint(active_state, c, p)
+#define packet_put_ecpoint(c,p) \
+ ssh_packet_put_ecpoint(active_state, c, p)
+#define packet_get_rekey_timeout() \
+ ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(active_state)
+#define packet_set_rekey_limits(x,y) \
+ ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(active_state, x, y)
+#define packet_get_bytes(x,y) \
+ ssh_packet_get_bytes(active_state, x, y)
+
+#endif /* _OPACKET_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.55 2014/02/04 00:37:50 djm Exp $
-
-sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
-piddir=@piddir@
-srcdir=@srcdir@
-top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
-
-VPATH=@srcdir@
-CC=@CC@
-LD=@LD@
-CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
-CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@
-LIBS=@LIBS@
-AR=@AR@
-RANLIB=@RANLIB@
-INSTALL=@INSTALL@
-LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@
-
-OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt_long.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha2.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strnlen.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o strtoull.o timingsafe_bcmp.o vis.o blowfish.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o explicit_bzero.o
-
-COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
-
-PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
-
-.c.o:
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
-
-all: libopenbsd-compat.a
-
-$(COMPAT): ../config.h
-$(OPENBSD): ../config.h
-$(PORTS): ../config.h
-
-libopenbsd-compat.a: $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) $(PORTS)
- $(AR) rv $@ $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) $(PORTS)
- $(RANLIB) $@
-
-clean:
- rm -f *.o *.a core
-
-distclean: clean
- rm -f Makefile *~
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.56 2014/09/30 23:43:08 djm Exp $
+
+sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
+piddir=@piddir@
+srcdir=@srcdir@
+top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
+
+VPATH=@srcdir@
+CC=@CC@
+LD=@LD@
+CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@
+LIBS=@LIBS@
+AR=@AR@
+RANLIB=@RANLIB@
+INSTALL=@INSTALL@
+LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@
+
+OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt_long.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o reallocarray.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha1.o sha2.o rmd160.o md5.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strnlen.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o strtoull.o timingsafe_bcmp.o vis.o blowfish.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o explicit_bzero.o
+
+COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-err.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o kludge-fd_set.o
+
+PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
+
+.c.o:
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+
+all: libopenbsd-compat.a
+
+$(COMPAT): ../config.h
+$(OPENBSD): ../config.h
+$(PORTS): ../config.h
+
+libopenbsd-compat.a: $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) $(PORTS)
+ $(AR) rv $@ $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) $(PORTS)
+ $(RANLIB) $@
+
+clean:
+ rm -f *.o *.a core
+
+distclean: clean
+ rm -f Makefile *~
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,294 +0,0 @@
-/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/crypto/arc4random.c */
-
-/* $OpenBSD: arc4random.c,v 1.25 2013/10/01 18:34:57 markus Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres <dm at uun.org>
- * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller <djm at openbsd.org>
- * Copyright (c) 2013, Markus Friedl <markus at openbsd.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-/*
- * ChaCha based random number generator for OpenBSD.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
-
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-#include "log.h"
-
-#define KEYSTREAM_ONLY
-#include "chacha_private.h"
-
-#ifdef __GNUC__
-#define inline __inline
-#else /* !__GNUC__ */
-#define inline
-#endif /* !__GNUC__ */
-
-/* OpenSSH isn't multithreaded */
-#define _ARC4_LOCK()
-#define _ARC4_UNLOCK()
-
-#define KEYSZ 32
-#define IVSZ 8
-#define BLOCKSZ 64
-#define RSBUFSZ (16*BLOCKSZ)
-static int rs_initialized;
-static pid_t rs_stir_pid;
-static chacha_ctx rs; /* chacha context for random keystream */
-static u_char rs_buf[RSBUFSZ]; /* keystream blocks */
-static size_t rs_have; /* valid bytes at end of rs_buf */
-static size_t rs_count; /* bytes till reseed */
-
-static inline void _rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen);
-
-static inline void
-_rs_init(u_char *buf, size_t n)
-{
- if (n < KEYSZ + IVSZ)
- return;
- chacha_keysetup(&rs, buf, KEYSZ * 8, 0);
- chacha_ivsetup(&rs, buf + KEYSZ);
-}
-
-static void
-_rs_stir(void)
-{
- u_char rnd[KEYSZ + IVSZ];
-
- if (RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd)) <= 0)
- fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)",
- ERR_get_error());
-
- if (!rs_initialized) {
- rs_initialized = 1;
- _rs_init(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
- } else
- _rs_rekey(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
- memset(rnd, 0, sizeof(rnd));
-
- /* invalidate rs_buf */
- rs_have = 0;
- memset(rs_buf, 0, RSBUFSZ);
-
- rs_count = 1600000;
-}
-
-static inline void
-_rs_stir_if_needed(size_t len)
-{
- pid_t pid = getpid();
-
- if (rs_count <= len || !rs_initialized || rs_stir_pid != pid) {
- rs_stir_pid = pid;
- _rs_stir();
- } else
- rs_count -= len;
-}
-
-static inline void
-_rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen)
-{
-#ifndef KEYSTREAM_ONLY
- memset(rs_buf, 0,RSBUFSZ);
-#endif
- /* fill rs_buf with the keystream */
- chacha_encrypt_bytes(&rs, rs_buf, rs_buf, RSBUFSZ);
- /* mix in optional user provided data */
- if (dat) {
- size_t i, m;
-
- m = MIN(datlen, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
- for (i = 0; i < m; i++)
- rs_buf[i] ^= dat[i];
- }
- /* immediately reinit for backtracking resistance */
- _rs_init(rs_buf, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
- memset(rs_buf, 0, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
- rs_have = RSBUFSZ - KEYSZ - IVSZ;
-}
-
-static inline void
-_rs_random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n)
-{
- u_char *buf = (u_char *)_buf;
- size_t m;
-
- _rs_stir_if_needed(n);
- while (n > 0) {
- if (rs_have > 0) {
- m = MIN(n, rs_have);
- memcpy(buf, rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, m);
- memset(rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, 0, m);
- buf += m;
- n -= m;
- rs_have -= m;
- }
- if (rs_have == 0)
- _rs_rekey(NULL, 0);
- }
-}
-
-static inline void
-_rs_random_u32(u_int32_t *val)
-{
- _rs_stir_if_needed(sizeof(*val));
- if (rs_have < sizeof(*val))
- _rs_rekey(NULL, 0);
- memcpy(val, rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, sizeof(*val));
- memset(rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, 0, sizeof(*val));
- rs_have -= sizeof(*val);
- return;
-}
-
-void
-arc4random_stir(void)
-{
- _ARC4_LOCK();
- _rs_stir();
- _ARC4_UNLOCK();
-}
-
-void
-arc4random_addrandom(u_char *dat, int datlen)
-{
- int m;
-
- _ARC4_LOCK();
- if (!rs_initialized)
- _rs_stir();
- while (datlen > 0) {
- m = MIN(datlen, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
- _rs_rekey(dat, m);
- dat += m;
- datlen -= m;
- }
- _ARC4_UNLOCK();
-}
-
-u_int32_t
-arc4random(void)
-{
- u_int32_t val;
-
- _ARC4_LOCK();
- _rs_random_u32(&val);
- _ARC4_UNLOCK();
- return val;
-}
-
-/*
- * If we are providing arc4random, then we can provide a more efficient
- * arc4random_buf().
- */
-# ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
-void
-arc4random_buf(void *buf, size_t n)
-{
- _ARC4_LOCK();
- _rs_random_buf(buf, n);
- _ARC4_UNLOCK();
-}
-# endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF */
-#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
-
-/* arc4random_buf() that uses platform arc4random() */
-#if !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM)
-void
-arc4random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n)
-{
- size_t i;
- u_int32_t r = 0;
- char *buf = (char *)_buf;
-
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- if (i % 4 == 0)
- r = arc4random();
- buf[i] = r & 0xff;
- r >>= 8;
- }
- i = r = 0;
-}
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
-/*
- * Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound
- * avoiding "modulo bias".
- *
- * Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one
- * returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound). This
- * guarantees the selected random number will be inside
- * [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound)
- * after reduction modulo upper_bound.
- */
-u_int32_t
-arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t upper_bound)
-{
- u_int32_t r, min;
-
- if (upper_bound < 2)
- return 0;
-
- /* 2**32 % x == (2**32 - x) % x */
- min = -upper_bound % upper_bound;
-
- /*
- * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has
- * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a
- * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need
- * to re-roll.
- */
- for (;;) {
- r = arc4random();
- if (r >= min)
- break;
- }
-
- return r % upper_bound;
-}
-#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM */
-
-#if 0
-/*-------- Test code for i386 --------*/
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <machine/pctr.h>
-int
-main(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- const int iter = 1000000;
- int i;
- pctrval v;
-
- v = rdtsc();
- for (i = 0; i < iter; i++)
- arc4random();
- v = rdtsc() - v;
- v /= iter;
-
- printf("%qd cycles\n", v);
- exit(0);
-}
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/crypto/arc4random.c */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: arc4random.c,v 1.25 2013/10/01 18:34:57 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres <dm at uun.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller <djm at openbsd.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2013, Markus Friedl <markus at openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * ChaCha based random number generator for OpenBSD.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+#define KEYSTREAM_ONLY
+#include "chacha_private.h"
+
+#ifdef __GNUC__
+#define inline __inline
+#else /* !__GNUC__ */
+#define inline
+#endif /* !__GNUC__ */
+
+/* OpenSSH isn't multithreaded */
+#define _ARC4_LOCK()
+#define _ARC4_UNLOCK()
+
+#define KEYSZ 32
+#define IVSZ 8
+#define BLOCKSZ 64
+#define RSBUFSZ (16*BLOCKSZ)
+static int rs_initialized;
+static pid_t rs_stir_pid;
+static chacha_ctx rs; /* chacha context for random keystream */
+static u_char rs_buf[RSBUFSZ]; /* keystream blocks */
+static size_t rs_have; /* valid bytes at end of rs_buf */
+static size_t rs_count; /* bytes till reseed */
+
+static inline void _rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen);
+
+static inline void
+_rs_init(u_char *buf, size_t n)
+{
+ if (n < KEYSZ + IVSZ)
+ return;
+ chacha_keysetup(&rs, buf, KEYSZ * 8, 0);
+ chacha_ivsetup(&rs, buf + KEYSZ);
+}
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+#define SSH_RANDOM_DEV "/dev/urandom"
+/* XXX use getrandom() if supported on Linux */
+static void
+getrnd(u_char *s, size_t len)
+{
+ int fd;
+ ssize_t r;
+ size_t o = 0;
+
+ if ((fd = open(SSH_RANDOM_DEV, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+ fatal("Couldn't open %s: %s", SSH_RANDOM_DEV, strerror(errno));
+ while (o < len) {
+ r = read(fd, s + o, len - o);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR ||
+ errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+ continue;
+ fatal("read %s: %s", SSH_RANDOM_DEV, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ o += r;
+ }
+ close(fd);
+}
+#endif
+
+static void
+_rs_stir(void)
+{
+ u_char rnd[KEYSZ + IVSZ];
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ if (RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd)) <= 0)
+ fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error 0x%lx)",
+ (unsigned long)ERR_get_error());
+#else
+ getrnd(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+#endif
+
+ if (!rs_initialized) {
+ rs_initialized = 1;
+ _rs_init(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+ } else
+ _rs_rekey(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+ explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+
+ /* invalidate rs_buf */
+ rs_have = 0;
+ memset(rs_buf, 0, RSBUFSZ);
+
+ rs_count = 1600000;
+}
+
+static inline void
+_rs_stir_if_needed(size_t len)
+{
+ pid_t pid = getpid();
+
+ if (rs_count <= len || !rs_initialized || rs_stir_pid != pid) {
+ rs_stir_pid = pid;
+ _rs_stir();
+ } else
+ rs_count -= len;
+}
+
+static inline void
+_rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen)
+{
+#ifndef KEYSTREAM_ONLY
+ memset(rs_buf, 0,RSBUFSZ);
+#endif
+ /* fill rs_buf with the keystream */
+ chacha_encrypt_bytes(&rs, rs_buf, rs_buf, RSBUFSZ);
+ /* mix in optional user provided data */
+ if (dat) {
+ size_t i, m;
+
+ m = MIN(datlen, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
+ for (i = 0; i < m; i++)
+ rs_buf[i] ^= dat[i];
+ }
+ /* immediately reinit for backtracking resistance */
+ _rs_init(rs_buf, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
+ memset(rs_buf, 0, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
+ rs_have = RSBUFSZ - KEYSZ - IVSZ;
+}
+
+static inline void
+_rs_random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n)
+{
+ u_char *buf = (u_char *)_buf;
+ size_t m;
+
+ _rs_stir_if_needed(n);
+ while (n > 0) {
+ if (rs_have > 0) {
+ m = MIN(n, rs_have);
+ memcpy(buf, rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, m);
+ memset(rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, 0, m);
+ buf += m;
+ n -= m;
+ rs_have -= m;
+ }
+ if (rs_have == 0)
+ _rs_rekey(NULL, 0);
+ }
+}
+
+static inline void
+_rs_random_u32(u_int32_t *val)
+{
+ _rs_stir_if_needed(sizeof(*val));
+ if (rs_have < sizeof(*val))
+ _rs_rekey(NULL, 0);
+ memcpy(val, rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, sizeof(*val));
+ memset(rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, 0, sizeof(*val));
+ rs_have -= sizeof(*val);
+ return;
+}
+
+void
+arc4random_stir(void)
+{
+ _ARC4_LOCK();
+ _rs_stir();
+ _ARC4_UNLOCK();
+}
+
+void
+arc4random_addrandom(u_char *dat, int datlen)
+{
+ int m;
+
+ _ARC4_LOCK();
+ if (!rs_initialized)
+ _rs_stir();
+ while (datlen > 0) {
+ m = MIN(datlen, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
+ _rs_rekey(dat, m);
+ dat += m;
+ datlen -= m;
+ }
+ _ARC4_UNLOCK();
+}
+
+u_int32_t
+arc4random(void)
+{
+ u_int32_t val;
+
+ _ARC4_LOCK();
+ _rs_random_u32(&val);
+ _ARC4_UNLOCK();
+ return val;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If we are providing arc4random, then we can provide a more efficient
+ * arc4random_buf().
+ */
+# ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
+void
+arc4random_buf(void *buf, size_t n)
+{
+ _ARC4_LOCK();
+ _rs_random_buf(buf, n);
+ _ARC4_UNLOCK();
+}
+# endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF */
+#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
+
+/* arc4random_buf() that uses platform arc4random() */
+#if !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM)
+void
+arc4random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ u_int32_t r = 0;
+ char *buf = (char *)_buf;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ if (i % 4 == 0)
+ r = arc4random();
+ buf[i] = r & 0xff;
+ r >>= 8;
+ }
+ explicit_bzero(&r, sizeof(r));
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
+/*
+ * Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound
+ * avoiding "modulo bias".
+ *
+ * Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one
+ * returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound). This
+ * guarantees the selected random number will be inside
+ * [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound)
+ * after reduction modulo upper_bound.
+ */
+u_int32_t
+arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t upper_bound)
+{
+ u_int32_t r, min;
+
+ if (upper_bound < 2)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* 2**32 % x == (2**32 - x) % x */
+ min = -upper_bound % upper_bound;
+
+ /*
+ * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has
+ * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a
+ * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need
+ * to re-roll.
+ */
+ for (;;) {
+ r = arc4random();
+ if (r >= min)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return r % upper_bound;
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM */
+
+#if 0
+/*-------- Test code for i386 --------*/
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <machine/pctr.h>
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ const int iter = 1000000;
+ int i;
+ pctrval v;
+
+ v = rdtsc();
+ for (i = 0; i < iter; i++)
+ arc4random();
+ v = rdtsc() - v;
+ v /= iter;
+
+ printf("%qd cycles\n", v);
+ exit(0);
+}
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: bcrypt_pbkdf.c,v 1.4 2013/07/29 00:55:53 tedu Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2013 Ted Unangst <tedu at openbsd.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-
-#ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H
-# include <stdlib.h>
-#endif
-#include <string.h>
-
-#ifdef HAVE_BLF_H
-# include <blf.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "crypto_api.h"
-#define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES
-
-/*
- * pkcs #5 pbkdf2 implementation using the "bcrypt" hash
- *
- * The bcrypt hash function is derived from the bcrypt password hashing
- * function with the following modifications:
- * 1. The input password and salt are preprocessed with SHA512.
- * 2. The output length is expanded to 256 bits.
- * 3. Subsequently the magic string to be encrypted is lengthened and modifed
- * to "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite"
- * 4. The hash function is defined to perform 64 rounds of initial state
- * expansion. (More rounds are performed by iterating the hash.)
- *
- * Note that this implementation pulls the SHA512 operations into the caller
- * as a performance optimization.
- *
- * One modification from official pbkdf2. Instead of outputting key material
- * linearly, we mix it. pbkdf2 has a known weakness where if one uses it to
- * generate (i.e.) 512 bits of key material for use as two 256 bit keys, an
- * attacker can merely run once through the outer loop below, but the user
- * always runs it twice. Shuffling output bytes requires computing the
- * entirety of the key material to assemble any subkey. This is something a
- * wise caller could do; we just do it for you.
- */
-
-#define BCRYPT_BLOCKS 8
-#define BCRYPT_HASHSIZE (BCRYPT_BLOCKS * 4)
-
-static void
-bcrypt_hash(u_int8_t *sha2pass, u_int8_t *sha2salt, u_int8_t *out)
-{
- blf_ctx state;
- u_int8_t ciphertext[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE] =
- "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite";
- uint32_t cdata[BCRYPT_BLOCKS];
- int i;
- uint16_t j;
- size_t shalen = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-
- /* key expansion */
- Blowfish_initstate(&state);
- Blowfish_expandstate(&state, sha2salt, shalen, sha2pass, shalen);
- for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
- Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2salt, shalen);
- Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2pass, shalen);
- }
-
- /* encryption */
- j = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_BLOCKS; i++)
- cdata[i] = Blowfish_stream2word(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext),
- &j);
- for (i = 0; i < 64; i++)
- blf_enc(&state, cdata, sizeof(cdata) / sizeof(uint64_t));
-
- /* copy out */
- for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_BLOCKS; i++) {
- out[4 * i + 3] = (cdata[i] >> 24) & 0xff;
- out[4 * i + 2] = (cdata[i] >> 16) & 0xff;
- out[4 * i + 1] = (cdata[i] >> 8) & 0xff;
- out[4 * i + 0] = cdata[i] & 0xff;
- }
-
- /* zap */
- memset(ciphertext, 0, sizeof(ciphertext));
- memset(cdata, 0, sizeof(cdata));
- memset(&state, 0, sizeof(state));
-}
-
-int
-bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *pass, size_t passlen, const u_int8_t *salt, size_t saltlen,
- u_int8_t *key, size_t keylen, unsigned int rounds)
-{
- u_int8_t sha2pass[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- u_int8_t sha2salt[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- u_int8_t out[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
- u_int8_t tmpout[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
- u_int8_t *countsalt;
- size_t i, j, amt, stride;
- uint32_t count;
-
- /* nothing crazy */
- if (rounds < 1)
- return -1;
- if (passlen == 0 || saltlen == 0 || keylen == 0 ||
- keylen > sizeof(out) * sizeof(out) || saltlen > 1<<20)
- return -1;
- if ((countsalt = calloc(1, saltlen + 4)) == NULL)
- return -1;
- stride = (keylen + sizeof(out) - 1) / sizeof(out);
- amt = (keylen + stride - 1) / stride;
-
- memcpy(countsalt, salt, saltlen);
-
- /* collapse password */
- crypto_hash_sha512(sha2pass, pass, passlen);
-
- /* generate key, sizeof(out) at a time */
- for (count = 1; keylen > 0; count++) {
- countsalt[saltlen + 0] = (count >> 24) & 0xff;
- countsalt[saltlen + 1] = (count >> 16) & 0xff;
- countsalt[saltlen + 2] = (count >> 8) & 0xff;
- countsalt[saltlen + 3] = count & 0xff;
-
- /* first round, salt is salt */
- crypto_hash_sha512(sha2salt, countsalt, saltlen + 4);
-
- bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout);
- memcpy(out, tmpout, sizeof(out));
-
- for (i = 1; i < rounds; i++) {
- /* subsequent rounds, salt is previous output */
- crypto_hash_sha512(sha2salt, tmpout, sizeof(tmpout));
- bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout);
- for (j = 0; j < sizeof(out); j++)
- out[j] ^= tmpout[j];
- }
-
- /*
- * pbkdf2 deviation: ouput the key material non-linearly.
- */
- amt = MIN(amt, keylen);
- for (i = 0; i < amt; i++)
- key[i * stride + (count - 1)] = out[i];
- keylen -= amt;
- }
-
- /* zap */
- memset(out, 0, sizeof(out));
- memset(countsalt, 0, saltlen + 4);
- free(countsalt);
-
- return 0;
-}
-#endif /* HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: bcrypt_pbkdf.c,v 1.13 2015/01/12 03:20:04 tedu Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Ted Unangst <tedu at openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H
+# include <stdlib.h>
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_BLF_H
+# include <blf.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+#ifdef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
+# undef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
+#endif
+#define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES
+
+#define MINIMUM(a,b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
+
+/*
+ * pkcs #5 pbkdf2 implementation using the "bcrypt" hash
+ *
+ * The bcrypt hash function is derived from the bcrypt password hashing
+ * function with the following modifications:
+ * 1. The input password and salt are preprocessed with SHA512.
+ * 2. The output length is expanded to 256 bits.
+ * 3. Subsequently the magic string to be encrypted is lengthened and modifed
+ * to "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite"
+ * 4. The hash function is defined to perform 64 rounds of initial state
+ * expansion. (More rounds are performed by iterating the hash.)
+ *
+ * Note that this implementation pulls the SHA512 operations into the caller
+ * as a performance optimization.
+ *
+ * One modification from official pbkdf2. Instead of outputting key material
+ * linearly, we mix it. pbkdf2 has a known weakness where if one uses it to
+ * generate (e.g.) 512 bits of key material for use as two 256 bit keys, an
+ * attacker can merely run once through the outer loop, but the user
+ * always runs it twice. Shuffling output bytes requires computing the
+ * entirety of the key material to assemble any subkey. This is something a
+ * wise caller could do; we just do it for you.
+ */
+
+#define BCRYPT_WORDS 8
+#define BCRYPT_HASHSIZE (BCRYPT_WORDS * 4)
+
+static void
+bcrypt_hash(u_int8_t *sha2pass, u_int8_t *sha2salt, u_int8_t *out)
+{
+ blf_ctx state;
+ u_int8_t ciphertext[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE] =
+ "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite";
+ uint32_t cdata[BCRYPT_WORDS];
+ int i;
+ uint16_t j;
+ size_t shalen = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+
+ /* key expansion */
+ Blowfish_initstate(&state);
+ Blowfish_expandstate(&state, sha2salt, shalen, sha2pass, shalen);
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2salt, shalen);
+ Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2pass, shalen);
+ }
+
+ /* encryption */
+ j = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++)
+ cdata[i] = Blowfish_stream2word(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext),
+ &j);
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++)
+ blf_enc(&state, cdata, sizeof(cdata) / sizeof(uint64_t));
+
+ /* copy out */
+ for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++) {
+ out[4 * i + 3] = (cdata[i] >> 24) & 0xff;
+ out[4 * i + 2] = (cdata[i] >> 16) & 0xff;
+ out[4 * i + 1] = (cdata[i] >> 8) & 0xff;
+ out[4 * i + 0] = cdata[i] & 0xff;
+ }
+
+ /* zap */
+ explicit_bzero(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext));
+ explicit_bzero(cdata, sizeof(cdata));
+ explicit_bzero(&state, sizeof(state));
+}
+
+int
+bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *pass, size_t passlen, const u_int8_t *salt, size_t saltlen,
+ u_int8_t *key, size_t keylen, unsigned int rounds)
+{
+ u_int8_t sha2pass[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ u_int8_t sha2salt[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ u_int8_t out[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
+ u_int8_t tmpout[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
+ u_int8_t *countsalt;
+ size_t i, j, amt, stride;
+ uint32_t count;
+ size_t origkeylen = keylen;
+
+ /* nothing crazy */
+ if (rounds < 1)
+ return -1;
+ if (passlen == 0 || saltlen == 0 || keylen == 0 ||
+ keylen > sizeof(out) * sizeof(out) || saltlen > 1<<20)
+ return -1;
+ if ((countsalt = calloc(1, saltlen + 4)) == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ stride = (keylen + sizeof(out) - 1) / sizeof(out);
+ amt = (keylen + stride - 1) / stride;
+
+ memcpy(countsalt, salt, saltlen);
+
+ /* collapse password */
+ crypto_hash_sha512(sha2pass, pass, passlen);
+
+ /* generate key, sizeof(out) at a time */
+ for (count = 1; keylen > 0; count++) {
+ countsalt[saltlen + 0] = (count >> 24) & 0xff;
+ countsalt[saltlen + 1] = (count >> 16) & 0xff;
+ countsalt[saltlen + 2] = (count >> 8) & 0xff;
+ countsalt[saltlen + 3] = count & 0xff;
+
+ /* first round, salt is salt */
+ crypto_hash_sha512(sha2salt, countsalt, saltlen + 4);
+
+ bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout);
+ memcpy(out, tmpout, sizeof(out));
+
+ for (i = 1; i < rounds; i++) {
+ /* subsequent rounds, salt is previous output */
+ crypto_hash_sha512(sha2salt, tmpout, sizeof(tmpout));
+ bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout);
+ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(out); j++)
+ out[j] ^= tmpout[j];
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * pbkdf2 deviation: output the key material non-linearly.
+ */
+ amt = MINIMUM(amt, keylen);
+ for (i = 0; i < amt; i++) {
+ size_t dest = i * stride + (count - 1);
+ if (dest >= origkeylen)
+ break;
+ key[dest] = out[i];
+ }
+ keylen -= i;
+ }
+
+ /* zap */
+ explicit_bzero(out, sizeof(out));
+ free(countsalt);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,118 +0,0 @@
-/* This file has be substantially modified from the original OpenBSD source */
-
-/* $OpenBSD: bindresvport.c,v 1.17 2005/12/21 01:40:22 millert Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright 1996, Jason Downs. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright 1998, Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright 2000, Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/rpc/bindresvport.c */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#define STARTPORT 600
-#define ENDPORT (IPPORT_RESERVED - 1)
-#define NPORTS (ENDPORT - STARTPORT + 1)
-
-/*
- * Bind a socket to a privileged IP port
- */
-int
-bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa)
-{
- int error, af;
- struct sockaddr_storage myaddr;
- struct sockaddr_in *in;
- struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
- u_int16_t *portp;
- u_int16_t port;
- socklen_t salen;
- int i;
-
- if (sa == NULL) {
- memset(&myaddr, 0, sizeof(myaddr));
- sa = (struct sockaddr *)&myaddr;
-
- if (getsockname(sd, sa, &salen) == -1)
- return -1; /* errno is correctly set */
-
- af = sa->sa_family;
- memset(&myaddr, 0, salen);
- } else
- af = sa->sa_family;
-
- if (af == AF_INET) {
- in = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
- salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
- portp = &in->sin_port;
- } else if (af == AF_INET6) {
- in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
- salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
- portp = &in6->sin6_port;
- } else {
- errno = EPFNOSUPPORT;
- return (-1);
- }
- sa->sa_family = af;
-
- port = ntohs(*portp);
- if (port == 0)
- port = arc4random_uniform(NPORTS) + STARTPORT;
-
- /* Avoid warning */
- error = -1;
-
- for(i = 0; i < NPORTS; i++) {
- *portp = htons(port);
-
- error = bind(sd, sa, salen);
-
- /* Terminate on success */
- if (error == 0)
- break;
-
- /* Terminate on errors, except "address already in use" */
- if ((error < 0) && !((errno == EADDRINUSE) || (errno == EINVAL)))
- break;
-
- port++;
- if (port > ENDPORT)
- port = STARTPORT;
- }
-
- return (error);
-}
-
-#endif /* HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+/* This file has be substantially modified from the original OpenBSD source */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: bindresvport.c,v 1.17 2005/12/21 01:40:22 millert Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 1996, Jason Downs. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 1998, Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2000, Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/rpc/bindresvport.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#define STARTPORT 600
+#define ENDPORT (IPPORT_RESERVED - 1)
+#define NPORTS (ENDPORT - STARTPORT + 1)
+
+/*
+ * Bind a socket to a privileged IP port
+ */
+int
+bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa)
+{
+ int error, af;
+ struct sockaddr_storage myaddr;
+ struct sockaddr_in *in;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
+ u_int16_t *portp;
+ u_int16_t port;
+ socklen_t salen;
+ int i;
+
+ if (sa == NULL) {
+ memset(&myaddr, 0, sizeof(myaddr));
+ sa = (struct sockaddr *)&myaddr;
+ salen = sizeof(myaddr);
+
+ if (getsockname(sd, sa, &salen) == -1)
+ return -1; /* errno is correctly set */
+
+ af = sa->sa_family;
+ memset(&myaddr, 0, salen);
+ } else
+ af = sa->sa_family;
+
+ if (af == AF_INET) {
+ in = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
+ salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+ portp = &in->sin_port;
+ } else if (af == AF_INET6) {
+ in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
+ salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+ portp = &in6->sin6_port;
+ } else {
+ errno = EPFNOSUPPORT;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ sa->sa_family = af;
+
+ port = ntohs(*portp);
+ if (port == 0)
+ port = arc4random_uniform(NPORTS) + STARTPORT;
+
+ /* Avoid warning */
+ error = -1;
+
+ for(i = 0; i < NPORTS; i++) {
+ *portp = htons(port);
+
+ error = bind(sd, sa, salen);
+
+ /* Terminate on success */
+ if (error == 0)
+ break;
+
+ /* Terminate on errors, except "address already in use" */
+ if ((error < 0) && !((errno == EADDRINUSE) || (errno == EINVAL)))
+ break;
+
+ port++;
+ if (port > ENDPORT)
+ port = STARTPORT;
+ }
+
+ return (error);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/blowfish.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/blowfish.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/blowfish.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,694 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: blowfish.c,v 1.18 2004/11/02 17:23:26 hshoexer Exp $ */
-/*
- * Blowfish block cipher for OpenBSD
- * Copyright 1997 Niels Provos <provos at physnet.uni-hamburg.de>
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Implementation advice by David Mazieres <dm at lcs.mit.edu>.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * This product includes software developed by Niels Provos.
- * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
- * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-/*
- * This code is derived from section 14.3 and the given source
- * in section V of Applied Cryptography, second edition.
- * Blowfish is an unpatented fast block cipher designed by
- * Bruce Schneier.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && (!defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE) || \
- !defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE) || !defined(HAVE_BLF_ENC))
-
-#if 0
-#include <stdio.h> /* used for debugging */
-#include <string.h>
-#endif
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <blf.h>
-
-#undef inline
-#ifdef __GNUC__
-#define inline __inline
-#else /* !__GNUC__ */
-#define inline
-#endif /* !__GNUC__ */
-
-/* Function for Feistel Networks */
-
-#define F(s, x) ((((s)[ (((x)>>24)&0xFF)] \
- + (s)[0x100 + (((x)>>16)&0xFF)]) \
- ^ (s)[0x200 + (((x)>> 8)&0xFF)]) \
- + (s)[0x300 + ( (x) &0xFF)])
-
-#define BLFRND(s,p,i,j,n) (i ^= F(s,j) ^ (p)[n])
-
-void
-Blowfish_encipher(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *xl, u_int32_t *xr)
-{
- u_int32_t Xl;
- u_int32_t Xr;
- u_int32_t *s = c->S[0];
- u_int32_t *p = c->P;
-
- Xl = *xl;
- Xr = *xr;
-
- Xl ^= p[0];
- BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 1); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 2);
- BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 3); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 4);
- BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 5); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 6);
- BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 7); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 8);
- BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 9); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 10);
- BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 11); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 12);
- BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 13); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 14);
- BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 15); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 16);
-
- *xl = Xr ^ p[17];
- *xr = Xl;
-}
-
-void
-Blowfish_decipher(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *xl, u_int32_t *xr)
-{
- u_int32_t Xl;
- u_int32_t Xr;
- u_int32_t *s = c->S[0];
- u_int32_t *p = c->P;
-
- Xl = *xl;
- Xr = *xr;
-
- Xl ^= p[17];
- BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 16); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 15);
- BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 14); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 13);
- BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 12); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 11);
- BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 10); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 9);
- BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 8); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 7);
- BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 6); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 5);
- BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 4); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 3);
- BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 2); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 1);
-
- *xl = Xr ^ p[0];
- *xr = Xl;
-}
-
-void
-Blowfish_initstate(blf_ctx *c)
-{
- /* P-box and S-box tables initialized with digits of Pi */
-
- static const blf_ctx initstate =
- { {
- {
- 0xd1310ba6, 0x98dfb5ac, 0x2ffd72db, 0xd01adfb7,
- 0xb8e1afed, 0x6a267e96, 0xba7c9045, 0xf12c7f99,
- 0x24a19947, 0xb3916cf7, 0x0801f2e2, 0x858efc16,
- 0x636920d8, 0x71574e69, 0xa458fea3, 0xf4933d7e,
- 0x0d95748f, 0x728eb658, 0x718bcd58, 0x82154aee,
- 0x7b54a41d, 0xc25a59b5, 0x9c30d539, 0x2af26013,
- 0xc5d1b023, 0x286085f0, 0xca417918, 0xb8db38ef,
- 0x8e79dcb0, 0x603a180e, 0x6c9e0e8b, 0xb01e8a3e,
- 0xd71577c1, 0xbd314b27, 0x78af2fda, 0x55605c60,
- 0xe65525f3, 0xaa55ab94, 0x57489862, 0x63e81440,
- 0x55ca396a, 0x2aab10b6, 0xb4cc5c34, 0x1141e8ce,
- 0xa15486af, 0x7c72e993, 0xb3ee1411, 0x636fbc2a,
- 0x2ba9c55d, 0x741831f6, 0xce5c3e16, 0x9b87931e,
- 0xafd6ba33, 0x6c24cf5c, 0x7a325381, 0x28958677,
- 0x3b8f4898, 0x6b4bb9af, 0xc4bfe81b, 0x66282193,
- 0x61d809cc, 0xfb21a991, 0x487cac60, 0x5dec8032,
- 0xef845d5d, 0xe98575b1, 0xdc262302, 0xeb651b88,
- 0x23893e81, 0xd396acc5, 0x0f6d6ff3, 0x83f44239,
- 0x2e0b4482, 0xa4842004, 0x69c8f04a, 0x9e1f9b5e,
- 0x21c66842, 0xf6e96c9a, 0x670c9c61, 0xabd388f0,
- 0x6a51a0d2, 0xd8542f68, 0x960fa728, 0xab5133a3,
- 0x6eef0b6c, 0x137a3be4, 0xba3bf050, 0x7efb2a98,
- 0xa1f1651d, 0x39af0176, 0x66ca593e, 0x82430e88,
- 0x8cee8619, 0x456f9fb4, 0x7d84a5c3, 0x3b8b5ebe,
- 0xe06f75d8, 0x85c12073, 0x401a449f, 0x56c16aa6,
- 0x4ed3aa62, 0x363f7706, 0x1bfedf72, 0x429b023d,
- 0x37d0d724, 0xd00a1248, 0xdb0fead3, 0x49f1c09b,
- 0x075372c9, 0x80991b7b, 0x25d479d8, 0xf6e8def7,
- 0xe3fe501a, 0xb6794c3b, 0x976ce0bd, 0x04c006ba,
- 0xc1a94fb6, 0x409f60c4, 0x5e5c9ec2, 0x196a2463,
- 0x68fb6faf, 0x3e6c53b5, 0x1339b2eb, 0x3b52ec6f,
- 0x6dfc511f, 0x9b30952c, 0xcc814544, 0xaf5ebd09,
- 0xbee3d004, 0xde334afd, 0x660f2807, 0x192e4bb3,
- 0xc0cba857, 0x45c8740f, 0xd20b5f39, 0xb9d3fbdb,
- 0x5579c0bd, 0x1a60320a, 0xd6a100c6, 0x402c7279,
- 0x679f25fe, 0xfb1fa3cc, 0x8ea5e9f8, 0xdb3222f8,
- 0x3c7516df, 0xfd616b15, 0x2f501ec8, 0xad0552ab,
- 0x323db5fa, 0xfd238760, 0x53317b48, 0x3e00df82,
- 0x9e5c57bb, 0xca6f8ca0, 0x1a87562e, 0xdf1769db,
- 0xd542a8f6, 0x287effc3, 0xac6732c6, 0x8c4f5573,
- 0x695b27b0, 0xbbca58c8, 0xe1ffa35d, 0xb8f011a0,
- 0x10fa3d98, 0xfd2183b8, 0x4afcb56c, 0x2dd1d35b,
- 0x9a53e479, 0xb6f84565, 0xd28e49bc, 0x4bfb9790,
- 0xe1ddf2da, 0xa4cb7e33, 0x62fb1341, 0xcee4c6e8,
- 0xef20cada, 0x36774c01, 0xd07e9efe, 0x2bf11fb4,
- 0x95dbda4d, 0xae909198, 0xeaad8e71, 0x6b93d5a0,
- 0xd08ed1d0, 0xafc725e0, 0x8e3c5b2f, 0x8e7594b7,
- 0x8ff6e2fb, 0xf2122b64, 0x8888b812, 0x900df01c,
- 0x4fad5ea0, 0x688fc31c, 0xd1cff191, 0xb3a8c1ad,
- 0x2f2f2218, 0xbe0e1777, 0xea752dfe, 0x8b021fa1,
- 0xe5a0cc0f, 0xb56f74e8, 0x18acf3d6, 0xce89e299,
- 0xb4a84fe0, 0xfd13e0b7, 0x7cc43b81, 0xd2ada8d9,
- 0x165fa266, 0x80957705, 0x93cc7314, 0x211a1477,
- 0xe6ad2065, 0x77b5fa86, 0xc75442f5, 0xfb9d35cf,
- 0xebcdaf0c, 0x7b3e89a0, 0xd6411bd3, 0xae1e7e49,
- 0x00250e2d, 0x2071b35e, 0x226800bb, 0x57b8e0af,
- 0x2464369b, 0xf009b91e, 0x5563911d, 0x59dfa6aa,
- 0x78c14389, 0xd95a537f, 0x207d5ba2, 0x02e5b9c5,
- 0x83260376, 0x6295cfa9, 0x11c81968, 0x4e734a41,
- 0xb3472dca, 0x7b14a94a, 0x1b510052, 0x9a532915,
- 0xd60f573f, 0xbc9bc6e4, 0x2b60a476, 0x81e67400,
- 0x08ba6fb5, 0x571be91f, 0xf296ec6b, 0x2a0dd915,
- 0xb6636521, 0xe7b9f9b6, 0xff34052e, 0xc5855664,
- 0x53b02d5d, 0xa99f8fa1, 0x08ba4799, 0x6e85076a},
- {
- 0x4b7a70e9, 0xb5b32944, 0xdb75092e, 0xc4192623,
- 0xad6ea6b0, 0x49a7df7d, 0x9cee60b8, 0x8fedb266,
- 0xecaa8c71, 0x699a17ff, 0x5664526c, 0xc2b19ee1,
- 0x193602a5, 0x75094c29, 0xa0591340, 0xe4183a3e,
- 0x3f54989a, 0x5b429d65, 0x6b8fe4d6, 0x99f73fd6,
- 0xa1d29c07, 0xefe830f5, 0x4d2d38e6, 0xf0255dc1,
- 0x4cdd2086, 0x8470eb26, 0x6382e9c6, 0x021ecc5e,
- 0x09686b3f, 0x3ebaefc9, 0x3c971814, 0x6b6a70a1,
- 0x687f3584, 0x52a0e286, 0xb79c5305, 0xaa500737,
- 0x3e07841c, 0x7fdeae5c, 0x8e7d44ec, 0x5716f2b8,
- 0xb03ada37, 0xf0500c0d, 0xf01c1f04, 0x0200b3ff,
- 0xae0cf51a, 0x3cb574b2, 0x25837a58, 0xdc0921bd,
- 0xd19113f9, 0x7ca92ff6, 0x94324773, 0x22f54701,
- 0x3ae5e581, 0x37c2dadc, 0xc8b57634, 0x9af3dda7,
- 0xa9446146, 0x0fd0030e, 0xecc8c73e, 0xa4751e41,
- 0xe238cd99, 0x3bea0e2f, 0x3280bba1, 0x183eb331,
- 0x4e548b38, 0x4f6db908, 0x6f420d03, 0xf60a04bf,
- 0x2cb81290, 0x24977c79, 0x5679b072, 0xbcaf89af,
- 0xde9a771f, 0xd9930810, 0xb38bae12, 0xdccf3f2e,
- 0x5512721f, 0x2e6b7124, 0x501adde6, 0x9f84cd87,
- 0x7a584718, 0x7408da17, 0xbc9f9abc, 0xe94b7d8c,
- 0xec7aec3a, 0xdb851dfa, 0x63094366, 0xc464c3d2,
- 0xef1c1847, 0x3215d908, 0xdd433b37, 0x24c2ba16,
- 0x12a14d43, 0x2a65c451, 0x50940002, 0x133ae4dd,
- 0x71dff89e, 0x10314e55, 0x81ac77d6, 0x5f11199b,
- 0x043556f1, 0xd7a3c76b, 0x3c11183b, 0x5924a509,
- 0xf28fe6ed, 0x97f1fbfa, 0x9ebabf2c, 0x1e153c6e,
- 0x86e34570, 0xeae96fb1, 0x860e5e0a, 0x5a3e2ab3,
- 0x771fe71c, 0x4e3d06fa, 0x2965dcb9, 0x99e71d0f,
- 0x803e89d6, 0x5266c825, 0x2e4cc978, 0x9c10b36a,
- 0xc6150eba, 0x94e2ea78, 0xa5fc3c53, 0x1e0a2df4,
- 0xf2f74ea7, 0x361d2b3d, 0x1939260f, 0x19c27960,
- 0x5223a708, 0xf71312b6, 0xebadfe6e, 0xeac31f66,
- 0xe3bc4595, 0xa67bc883, 0xb17f37d1, 0x018cff28,
- 0xc332ddef, 0xbe6c5aa5, 0x65582185, 0x68ab9802,
- 0xeecea50f, 0xdb2f953b, 0x2aef7dad, 0x5b6e2f84,
- 0x1521b628, 0x29076170, 0xecdd4775, 0x619f1510,
- 0x13cca830, 0xeb61bd96, 0x0334fe1e, 0xaa0363cf,
- 0xb5735c90, 0x4c70a239, 0xd59e9e0b, 0xcbaade14,
- 0xeecc86bc, 0x60622ca7, 0x9cab5cab, 0xb2f3846e,
- 0x648b1eaf, 0x19bdf0ca, 0xa02369b9, 0x655abb50,
- 0x40685a32, 0x3c2ab4b3, 0x319ee9d5, 0xc021b8f7,
- 0x9b540b19, 0x875fa099, 0x95f7997e, 0x623d7da8,
- 0xf837889a, 0x97e32d77, 0x11ed935f, 0x16681281,
- 0x0e358829, 0xc7e61fd6, 0x96dedfa1, 0x7858ba99,
- 0x57f584a5, 0x1b227263, 0x9b83c3ff, 0x1ac24696,
- 0xcdb30aeb, 0x532e3054, 0x8fd948e4, 0x6dbc3128,
- 0x58ebf2ef, 0x34c6ffea, 0xfe28ed61, 0xee7c3c73,
- 0x5d4a14d9, 0xe864b7e3, 0x42105d14, 0x203e13e0,
- 0x45eee2b6, 0xa3aaabea, 0xdb6c4f15, 0xfacb4fd0,
- 0xc742f442, 0xef6abbb5, 0x654f3b1d, 0x41cd2105,
- 0xd81e799e, 0x86854dc7, 0xe44b476a, 0x3d816250,
- 0xcf62a1f2, 0x5b8d2646, 0xfc8883a0, 0xc1c7b6a3,
- 0x7f1524c3, 0x69cb7492, 0x47848a0b, 0x5692b285,
- 0x095bbf00, 0xad19489d, 0x1462b174, 0x23820e00,
- 0x58428d2a, 0x0c55f5ea, 0x1dadf43e, 0x233f7061,
- 0x3372f092, 0x8d937e41, 0xd65fecf1, 0x6c223bdb,
- 0x7cde3759, 0xcbee7460, 0x4085f2a7, 0xce77326e,
- 0xa6078084, 0x19f8509e, 0xe8efd855, 0x61d99735,
- 0xa969a7aa, 0xc50c06c2, 0x5a04abfc, 0x800bcadc,
- 0x9e447a2e, 0xc3453484, 0xfdd56705, 0x0e1e9ec9,
- 0xdb73dbd3, 0x105588cd, 0x675fda79, 0xe3674340,
- 0xc5c43465, 0x713e38d8, 0x3d28f89e, 0xf16dff20,
- 0x153e21e7, 0x8fb03d4a, 0xe6e39f2b, 0xdb83adf7},
- {
- 0xe93d5a68, 0x948140f7, 0xf64c261c, 0x94692934,
- 0x411520f7, 0x7602d4f7, 0xbcf46b2e, 0xd4a20068,
- 0xd4082471, 0x3320f46a, 0x43b7d4b7, 0x500061af,
- 0x1e39f62e, 0x97244546, 0x14214f74, 0xbf8b8840,
- 0x4d95fc1d, 0x96b591af, 0x70f4ddd3, 0x66a02f45,
- 0xbfbc09ec, 0x03bd9785, 0x7fac6dd0, 0x31cb8504,
- 0x96eb27b3, 0x55fd3941, 0xda2547e6, 0xabca0a9a,
- 0x28507825, 0x530429f4, 0x0a2c86da, 0xe9b66dfb,
- 0x68dc1462, 0xd7486900, 0x680ec0a4, 0x27a18dee,
- 0x4f3ffea2, 0xe887ad8c, 0xb58ce006, 0x7af4d6b6,
- 0xaace1e7c, 0xd3375fec, 0xce78a399, 0x406b2a42,
- 0x20fe9e35, 0xd9f385b9, 0xee39d7ab, 0x3b124e8b,
- 0x1dc9faf7, 0x4b6d1856, 0x26a36631, 0xeae397b2,
- 0x3a6efa74, 0xdd5b4332, 0x6841e7f7, 0xca7820fb,
- 0xfb0af54e, 0xd8feb397, 0x454056ac, 0xba489527,
- 0x55533a3a, 0x20838d87, 0xfe6ba9b7, 0xd096954b,
- 0x55a867bc, 0xa1159a58, 0xcca92963, 0x99e1db33,
- 0xa62a4a56, 0x3f3125f9, 0x5ef47e1c, 0x9029317c,
- 0xfdf8e802, 0x04272f70, 0x80bb155c, 0x05282ce3,
- 0x95c11548, 0xe4c66d22, 0x48c1133f, 0xc70f86dc,
- 0x07f9c9ee, 0x41041f0f, 0x404779a4, 0x5d886e17,
- 0x325f51eb, 0xd59bc0d1, 0xf2bcc18f, 0x41113564,
- 0x257b7834, 0x602a9c60, 0xdff8e8a3, 0x1f636c1b,
- 0x0e12b4c2, 0x02e1329e, 0xaf664fd1, 0xcad18115,
- 0x6b2395e0, 0x333e92e1, 0x3b240b62, 0xeebeb922,
- 0x85b2a20e, 0xe6ba0d99, 0xde720c8c, 0x2da2f728,
- 0xd0127845, 0x95b794fd, 0x647d0862, 0xe7ccf5f0,
- 0x5449a36f, 0x877d48fa, 0xc39dfd27, 0xf33e8d1e,
- 0x0a476341, 0x992eff74, 0x3a6f6eab, 0xf4f8fd37,
- 0xa812dc60, 0xa1ebddf8, 0x991be14c, 0xdb6e6b0d,
- 0xc67b5510, 0x6d672c37, 0x2765d43b, 0xdcd0e804,
- 0xf1290dc7, 0xcc00ffa3, 0xb5390f92, 0x690fed0b,
- 0x667b9ffb, 0xcedb7d9c, 0xa091cf0b, 0xd9155ea3,
- 0xbb132f88, 0x515bad24, 0x7b9479bf, 0x763bd6eb,
- 0x37392eb3, 0xcc115979, 0x8026e297, 0xf42e312d,
- 0x6842ada7, 0xc66a2b3b, 0x12754ccc, 0x782ef11c,
- 0x6a124237, 0xb79251e7, 0x06a1bbe6, 0x4bfb6350,
- 0x1a6b1018, 0x11caedfa, 0x3d25bdd8, 0xe2e1c3c9,
- 0x44421659, 0x0a121386, 0xd90cec6e, 0xd5abea2a,
- 0x64af674e, 0xda86a85f, 0xbebfe988, 0x64e4c3fe,
- 0x9dbc8057, 0xf0f7c086, 0x60787bf8, 0x6003604d,
- 0xd1fd8346, 0xf6381fb0, 0x7745ae04, 0xd736fccc,
- 0x83426b33, 0xf01eab71, 0xb0804187, 0x3c005e5f,
- 0x77a057be, 0xbde8ae24, 0x55464299, 0xbf582e61,
- 0x4e58f48f, 0xf2ddfda2, 0xf474ef38, 0x8789bdc2,
- 0x5366f9c3, 0xc8b38e74, 0xb475f255, 0x46fcd9b9,
- 0x7aeb2661, 0x8b1ddf84, 0x846a0e79, 0x915f95e2,
- 0x466e598e, 0x20b45770, 0x8cd55591, 0xc902de4c,
- 0xb90bace1, 0xbb8205d0, 0x11a86248, 0x7574a99e,
- 0xb77f19b6, 0xe0a9dc09, 0x662d09a1, 0xc4324633,
- 0xe85a1f02, 0x09f0be8c, 0x4a99a025, 0x1d6efe10,
- 0x1ab93d1d, 0x0ba5a4df, 0xa186f20f, 0x2868f169,
- 0xdcb7da83, 0x573906fe, 0xa1e2ce9b, 0x4fcd7f52,
- 0x50115e01, 0xa70683fa, 0xa002b5c4, 0x0de6d027,
- 0x9af88c27, 0x773f8641, 0xc3604c06, 0x61a806b5,
- 0xf0177a28, 0xc0f586e0, 0x006058aa, 0x30dc7d62,
- 0x11e69ed7, 0x2338ea63, 0x53c2dd94, 0xc2c21634,
- 0xbbcbee56, 0x90bcb6de, 0xebfc7da1, 0xce591d76,
- 0x6f05e409, 0x4b7c0188, 0x39720a3d, 0x7c927c24,
- 0x86e3725f, 0x724d9db9, 0x1ac15bb4, 0xd39eb8fc,
- 0xed545578, 0x08fca5b5, 0xd83d7cd3, 0x4dad0fc4,
- 0x1e50ef5e, 0xb161e6f8, 0xa28514d9, 0x6c51133c,
- 0x6fd5c7e7, 0x56e14ec4, 0x362abfce, 0xddc6c837,
- 0xd79a3234, 0x92638212, 0x670efa8e, 0x406000e0},
- {
- 0x3a39ce37, 0xd3faf5cf, 0xabc27737, 0x5ac52d1b,
- 0x5cb0679e, 0x4fa33742, 0xd3822740, 0x99bc9bbe,
- 0xd5118e9d, 0xbf0f7315, 0xd62d1c7e, 0xc700c47b,
- 0xb78c1b6b, 0x21a19045, 0xb26eb1be, 0x6a366eb4,
- 0x5748ab2f, 0xbc946e79, 0xc6a376d2, 0x6549c2c8,
- 0x530ff8ee, 0x468dde7d, 0xd5730a1d, 0x4cd04dc6,
- 0x2939bbdb, 0xa9ba4650, 0xac9526e8, 0xbe5ee304,
- 0xa1fad5f0, 0x6a2d519a, 0x63ef8ce2, 0x9a86ee22,
- 0xc089c2b8, 0x43242ef6, 0xa51e03aa, 0x9cf2d0a4,
- 0x83c061ba, 0x9be96a4d, 0x8fe51550, 0xba645bd6,
- 0x2826a2f9, 0xa73a3ae1, 0x4ba99586, 0xef5562e9,
- 0xc72fefd3, 0xf752f7da, 0x3f046f69, 0x77fa0a59,
- 0x80e4a915, 0x87b08601, 0x9b09e6ad, 0x3b3ee593,
- 0xe990fd5a, 0x9e34d797, 0x2cf0b7d9, 0x022b8b51,
- 0x96d5ac3a, 0x017da67d, 0xd1cf3ed6, 0x7c7d2d28,
- 0x1f9f25cf, 0xadf2b89b, 0x5ad6b472, 0x5a88f54c,
- 0xe029ac71, 0xe019a5e6, 0x47b0acfd, 0xed93fa9b,
- 0xe8d3c48d, 0x283b57cc, 0xf8d56629, 0x79132e28,
- 0x785f0191, 0xed756055, 0xf7960e44, 0xe3d35e8c,
- 0x15056dd4, 0x88f46dba, 0x03a16125, 0x0564f0bd,
- 0xc3eb9e15, 0x3c9057a2, 0x97271aec, 0xa93a072a,
- 0x1b3f6d9b, 0x1e6321f5, 0xf59c66fb, 0x26dcf319,
- 0x7533d928, 0xb155fdf5, 0x03563482, 0x8aba3cbb,
- 0x28517711, 0xc20ad9f8, 0xabcc5167, 0xccad925f,
- 0x4de81751, 0x3830dc8e, 0x379d5862, 0x9320f991,
- 0xea7a90c2, 0xfb3e7bce, 0x5121ce64, 0x774fbe32,
- 0xa8b6e37e, 0xc3293d46, 0x48de5369, 0x6413e680,
- 0xa2ae0810, 0xdd6db224, 0x69852dfd, 0x09072166,
- 0xb39a460a, 0x6445c0dd, 0x586cdecf, 0x1c20c8ae,
- 0x5bbef7dd, 0x1b588d40, 0xccd2017f, 0x6bb4e3bb,
- 0xdda26a7e, 0x3a59ff45, 0x3e350a44, 0xbcb4cdd5,
- 0x72eacea8, 0xfa6484bb, 0x8d6612ae, 0xbf3c6f47,
- 0xd29be463, 0x542f5d9e, 0xaec2771b, 0xf64e6370,
- 0x740e0d8d, 0xe75b1357, 0xf8721671, 0xaf537d5d,
- 0x4040cb08, 0x4eb4e2cc, 0x34d2466a, 0x0115af84,
- 0xe1b00428, 0x95983a1d, 0x06b89fb4, 0xce6ea048,
- 0x6f3f3b82, 0x3520ab82, 0x011a1d4b, 0x277227f8,
- 0x611560b1, 0xe7933fdc, 0xbb3a792b, 0x344525bd,
- 0xa08839e1, 0x51ce794b, 0x2f32c9b7, 0xa01fbac9,
- 0xe01cc87e, 0xbcc7d1f6, 0xcf0111c3, 0xa1e8aac7,
- 0x1a908749, 0xd44fbd9a, 0xd0dadecb, 0xd50ada38,
- 0x0339c32a, 0xc6913667, 0x8df9317c, 0xe0b12b4f,
- 0xf79e59b7, 0x43f5bb3a, 0xf2d519ff, 0x27d9459c,
- 0xbf97222c, 0x15e6fc2a, 0x0f91fc71, 0x9b941525,
- 0xfae59361, 0xceb69ceb, 0xc2a86459, 0x12baa8d1,
- 0xb6c1075e, 0xe3056a0c, 0x10d25065, 0xcb03a442,
- 0xe0ec6e0e, 0x1698db3b, 0x4c98a0be, 0x3278e964,
- 0x9f1f9532, 0xe0d392df, 0xd3a0342b, 0x8971f21e,
- 0x1b0a7441, 0x4ba3348c, 0xc5be7120, 0xc37632d8,
- 0xdf359f8d, 0x9b992f2e, 0xe60b6f47, 0x0fe3f11d,
- 0xe54cda54, 0x1edad891, 0xce6279cf, 0xcd3e7e6f,
- 0x1618b166, 0xfd2c1d05, 0x848fd2c5, 0xf6fb2299,
- 0xf523f357, 0xa6327623, 0x93a83531, 0x56cccd02,
- 0xacf08162, 0x5a75ebb5, 0x6e163697, 0x88d273cc,
- 0xde966292, 0x81b949d0, 0x4c50901b, 0x71c65614,
- 0xe6c6c7bd, 0x327a140a, 0x45e1d006, 0xc3f27b9a,
- 0xc9aa53fd, 0x62a80f00, 0xbb25bfe2, 0x35bdd2f6,
- 0x71126905, 0xb2040222, 0xb6cbcf7c, 0xcd769c2b,
- 0x53113ec0, 0x1640e3d3, 0x38abbd60, 0x2547adf0,
- 0xba38209c, 0xf746ce76, 0x77afa1c5, 0x20756060,
- 0x85cbfe4e, 0x8ae88dd8, 0x7aaaf9b0, 0x4cf9aa7e,
- 0x1948c25c, 0x02fb8a8c, 0x01c36ae4, 0xd6ebe1f9,
- 0x90d4f869, 0xa65cdea0, 0x3f09252d, 0xc208e69f,
- 0xb74e6132, 0xce77e25b, 0x578fdfe3, 0x3ac372e6}
- },
- {
- 0x243f6a88, 0x85a308d3, 0x13198a2e, 0x03707344,
- 0xa4093822, 0x299f31d0, 0x082efa98, 0xec4e6c89,
- 0x452821e6, 0x38d01377, 0xbe5466cf, 0x34e90c6c,
- 0xc0ac29b7, 0xc97c50dd, 0x3f84d5b5, 0xb5470917,
- 0x9216d5d9, 0x8979fb1b
- } };
-
- *c = initstate;
-}
-
-u_int32_t
-Blowfish_stream2word(const u_int8_t *data, u_int16_t databytes,
- u_int16_t *current)
-{
- u_int8_t i;
- u_int16_t j;
- u_int32_t temp;
-
- temp = 0x00000000;
- j = *current;
-
- for (i = 0; i < 4; i++, j++) {
- if (j >= databytes)
- j = 0;
- temp = (temp << 8) | data[j];
- }
-
- *current = j;
- return temp;
-}
-
-void
-Blowfish_expand0state(blf_ctx *c, const u_int8_t *key, u_int16_t keybytes)
-{
- u_int16_t i;
- u_int16_t j;
- u_int16_t k;
- u_int32_t temp;
- u_int32_t datal;
- u_int32_t datar;
-
- j = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i++) {
- /* Extract 4 int8 to 1 int32 from keystream */
- temp = Blowfish_stream2word(key, keybytes, &j);
- c->P[i] = c->P[i] ^ temp;
- }
-
- j = 0;
- datal = 0x00000000;
- datar = 0x00000000;
- for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i += 2) {
- Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar);
-
- c->P[i] = datal;
- c->P[i + 1] = datar;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
- for (k = 0; k < 256; k += 2) {
- Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar);
-
- c->S[i][k] = datal;
- c->S[i][k + 1] = datar;
- }
- }
-}
-
-
-void
-Blowfish_expandstate(blf_ctx *c, const u_int8_t *data, u_int16_t databytes,
- const u_int8_t *key, u_int16_t keybytes)
-{
- u_int16_t i;
- u_int16_t j;
- u_int16_t k;
- u_int32_t temp;
- u_int32_t datal;
- u_int32_t datar;
-
- j = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i++) {
- /* Extract 4 int8 to 1 int32 from keystream */
- temp = Blowfish_stream2word(key, keybytes, &j);
- c->P[i] = c->P[i] ^ temp;
- }
-
- j = 0;
- datal = 0x00000000;
- datar = 0x00000000;
- for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i += 2) {
- datal ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j);
- datar ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j);
- Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar);
-
- c->P[i] = datal;
- c->P[i + 1] = datar;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
- for (k = 0; k < 256; k += 2) {
- datal ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j);
- datar ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j);
- Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar);
-
- c->S[i][k] = datal;
- c->S[i][k + 1] = datar;
- }
- }
-
-}
-
-void
-blf_key(blf_ctx *c, const u_int8_t *k, u_int16_t len)
-{
- /* Initialize S-boxes and subkeys with Pi */
- Blowfish_initstate(c);
-
- /* Transform S-boxes and subkeys with key */
- Blowfish_expand0state(c, k, len);
-}
-
-void
-blf_enc(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *data, u_int16_t blocks)
-{
- u_int32_t *d;
- u_int16_t i;
-
- d = data;
- for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++) {
- Blowfish_encipher(c, d, d + 1);
- d += 2;
- }
-}
-
-void
-blf_dec(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *data, u_int16_t blocks)
-{
- u_int32_t *d;
- u_int16_t i;
-
- d = data;
- for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++) {
- Blowfish_decipher(c, d, d + 1);
- d += 2;
- }
-}
-
-void
-blf_ecb_encrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len)
-{
- u_int32_t l, r;
- u_int32_t i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) {
- l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3];
- r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7];
- Blowfish_encipher(c, &l, &r);
- data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff;
- data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff;
- data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff;
- data[3] = l & 0xff;
- data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff;
- data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff;
- data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff;
- data[7] = r & 0xff;
- data += 8;
- }
-}
-
-void
-blf_ecb_decrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len)
-{
- u_int32_t l, r;
- u_int32_t i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) {
- l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3];
- r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7];
- Blowfish_decipher(c, &l, &r);
- data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff;
- data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff;
- data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff;
- data[3] = l & 0xff;
- data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff;
- data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff;
- data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff;
- data[7] = r & 0xff;
- data += 8;
- }
-}
-
-void
-blf_cbc_encrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *iv, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len)
-{
- u_int32_t l, r;
- u_int32_t i, j;
-
- for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) {
- for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
- data[j] ^= iv[j];
- l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3];
- r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7];
- Blowfish_encipher(c, &l, &r);
- data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff;
- data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff;
- data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff;
- data[3] = l & 0xff;
- data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff;
- data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff;
- data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff;
- data[7] = r & 0xff;
- iv = data;
- data += 8;
- }
-}
-
-void
-blf_cbc_decrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *iva, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len)
-{
- u_int32_t l, r;
- u_int8_t *iv;
- u_int32_t i, j;
-
- iv = data + len - 16;
- data = data + len - 8;
- for (i = len - 8; i >= 8; i -= 8) {
- l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3];
- r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7];
- Blowfish_decipher(c, &l, &r);
- data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff;
- data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff;
- data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff;
- data[3] = l & 0xff;
- data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff;
- data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff;
- data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff;
- data[7] = r & 0xff;
- for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
- data[j] ^= iv[j];
- iv -= 8;
- data -= 8;
- }
- l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3];
- r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7];
- Blowfish_decipher(c, &l, &r);
- data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff;
- data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff;
- data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff;
- data[3] = l & 0xff;
- data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff;
- data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff;
- data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff;
- data[7] = r & 0xff;
- for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
- data[j] ^= iva[j];
-}
-
-#if 0
-void
-report(u_int32_t data[], u_int16_t len)
-{
- u_int16_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < len; i += 2)
- printf("Block %0hd: %08lx %08lx.\n",
- i / 2, data[i], data[i + 1]);
-}
-void
-main(void)
-{
-
- blf_ctx c;
- char key[] = "AAAAA";
- char key2[] = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
-
- u_int32_t data[10];
- u_int32_t data2[] =
- {0x424c4f57l, 0x46495348l};
-
- u_int16_t i;
-
- /* First test */
- for (i = 0; i < 10; i++)
- data[i] = i;
-
- blf_key(&c, (u_int8_t *) key, 5);
- blf_enc(&c, data, 5);
- blf_dec(&c, data, 1);
- blf_dec(&c, data + 2, 4);
- printf("Should read as 0 - 9.\n");
- report(data, 10);
-
- /* Second test */
- blf_key(&c, (u_int8_t *) key2, strlen(key2));
- blf_enc(&c, data2, 1);
- printf("\nShould read as: 0x324ed0fe 0xf413a203.\n");
- report(data2, 2);
- blf_dec(&c, data2, 1);
- report(data2, 2);
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && (!defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE) || \
- !defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE) || !defined(HAVE_BLF_ENC)) */
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/blowfish.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/blowfish.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/blowfish.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/blowfish.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,696 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: blowfish.c,v 1.18 2004/11/02 17:23:26 hshoexer Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Blowfish block cipher for OpenBSD
+ * Copyright 1997 Niels Provos <provos at physnet.uni-hamburg.de>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Implementation advice by David Mazieres <dm at lcs.mit.edu>.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by Niels Provos.
+ * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This code is derived from section 14.3 and the given source
+ * in section V of Applied Cryptography, second edition.
+ * Blowfish is an unpatented fast block cipher designed by
+ * Bruce Schneier.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && (!defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE) || \
+ !defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE) || !defined(HAVE_BLF_ENC))
+
+#if 0
+#include <stdio.h> /* used for debugging */
+#include <string.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_BLF_H
+#include <blf.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef inline
+#ifdef __GNUC__
+#define inline __inline
+#else /* !__GNUC__ */
+#define inline
+#endif /* !__GNUC__ */
+
+/* Function for Feistel Networks */
+
+#define F(s, x) ((((s)[ (((x)>>24)&0xFF)] \
+ + (s)[0x100 + (((x)>>16)&0xFF)]) \
+ ^ (s)[0x200 + (((x)>> 8)&0xFF)]) \
+ + (s)[0x300 + ( (x) &0xFF)])
+
+#define BLFRND(s,p,i,j,n) (i ^= F(s,j) ^ (p)[n])
+
+void
+Blowfish_encipher(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *xl, u_int32_t *xr)
+{
+ u_int32_t Xl;
+ u_int32_t Xr;
+ u_int32_t *s = c->S[0];
+ u_int32_t *p = c->P;
+
+ Xl = *xl;
+ Xr = *xr;
+
+ Xl ^= p[0];
+ BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 1); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 2);
+ BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 3); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 4);
+ BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 5); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 6);
+ BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 7); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 8);
+ BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 9); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 10);
+ BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 11); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 12);
+ BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 13); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 14);
+ BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 15); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 16);
+
+ *xl = Xr ^ p[17];
+ *xr = Xl;
+}
+
+void
+Blowfish_decipher(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *xl, u_int32_t *xr)
+{
+ u_int32_t Xl;
+ u_int32_t Xr;
+ u_int32_t *s = c->S[0];
+ u_int32_t *p = c->P;
+
+ Xl = *xl;
+ Xr = *xr;
+
+ Xl ^= p[17];
+ BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 16); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 15);
+ BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 14); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 13);
+ BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 12); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 11);
+ BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 10); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 9);
+ BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 8); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 7);
+ BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 6); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 5);
+ BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 4); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 3);
+ BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 2); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 1);
+
+ *xl = Xr ^ p[0];
+ *xr = Xl;
+}
+
+void
+Blowfish_initstate(blf_ctx *c)
+{
+ /* P-box and S-box tables initialized with digits of Pi */
+
+ static const blf_ctx initstate =
+ { {
+ {
+ 0xd1310ba6, 0x98dfb5ac, 0x2ffd72db, 0xd01adfb7,
+ 0xb8e1afed, 0x6a267e96, 0xba7c9045, 0xf12c7f99,
+ 0x24a19947, 0xb3916cf7, 0x0801f2e2, 0x858efc16,
+ 0x636920d8, 0x71574e69, 0xa458fea3, 0xf4933d7e,
+ 0x0d95748f, 0x728eb658, 0x718bcd58, 0x82154aee,
+ 0x7b54a41d, 0xc25a59b5, 0x9c30d539, 0x2af26013,
+ 0xc5d1b023, 0x286085f0, 0xca417918, 0xb8db38ef,
+ 0x8e79dcb0, 0x603a180e, 0x6c9e0e8b, 0xb01e8a3e,
+ 0xd71577c1, 0xbd314b27, 0x78af2fda, 0x55605c60,
+ 0xe65525f3, 0xaa55ab94, 0x57489862, 0x63e81440,
+ 0x55ca396a, 0x2aab10b6, 0xb4cc5c34, 0x1141e8ce,
+ 0xa15486af, 0x7c72e993, 0xb3ee1411, 0x636fbc2a,
+ 0x2ba9c55d, 0x741831f6, 0xce5c3e16, 0x9b87931e,
+ 0xafd6ba33, 0x6c24cf5c, 0x7a325381, 0x28958677,
+ 0x3b8f4898, 0x6b4bb9af, 0xc4bfe81b, 0x66282193,
+ 0x61d809cc, 0xfb21a991, 0x487cac60, 0x5dec8032,
+ 0xef845d5d, 0xe98575b1, 0xdc262302, 0xeb651b88,
+ 0x23893e81, 0xd396acc5, 0x0f6d6ff3, 0x83f44239,
+ 0x2e0b4482, 0xa4842004, 0x69c8f04a, 0x9e1f9b5e,
+ 0x21c66842, 0xf6e96c9a, 0x670c9c61, 0xabd388f0,
+ 0x6a51a0d2, 0xd8542f68, 0x960fa728, 0xab5133a3,
+ 0x6eef0b6c, 0x137a3be4, 0xba3bf050, 0x7efb2a98,
+ 0xa1f1651d, 0x39af0176, 0x66ca593e, 0x82430e88,
+ 0x8cee8619, 0x456f9fb4, 0x7d84a5c3, 0x3b8b5ebe,
+ 0xe06f75d8, 0x85c12073, 0x401a449f, 0x56c16aa6,
+ 0x4ed3aa62, 0x363f7706, 0x1bfedf72, 0x429b023d,
+ 0x37d0d724, 0xd00a1248, 0xdb0fead3, 0x49f1c09b,
+ 0x075372c9, 0x80991b7b, 0x25d479d8, 0xf6e8def7,
+ 0xe3fe501a, 0xb6794c3b, 0x976ce0bd, 0x04c006ba,
+ 0xc1a94fb6, 0x409f60c4, 0x5e5c9ec2, 0x196a2463,
+ 0x68fb6faf, 0x3e6c53b5, 0x1339b2eb, 0x3b52ec6f,
+ 0x6dfc511f, 0x9b30952c, 0xcc814544, 0xaf5ebd09,
+ 0xbee3d004, 0xde334afd, 0x660f2807, 0x192e4bb3,
+ 0xc0cba857, 0x45c8740f, 0xd20b5f39, 0xb9d3fbdb,
+ 0x5579c0bd, 0x1a60320a, 0xd6a100c6, 0x402c7279,
+ 0x679f25fe, 0xfb1fa3cc, 0x8ea5e9f8, 0xdb3222f8,
+ 0x3c7516df, 0xfd616b15, 0x2f501ec8, 0xad0552ab,
+ 0x323db5fa, 0xfd238760, 0x53317b48, 0x3e00df82,
+ 0x9e5c57bb, 0xca6f8ca0, 0x1a87562e, 0xdf1769db,
+ 0xd542a8f6, 0x287effc3, 0xac6732c6, 0x8c4f5573,
+ 0x695b27b0, 0xbbca58c8, 0xe1ffa35d, 0xb8f011a0,
+ 0x10fa3d98, 0xfd2183b8, 0x4afcb56c, 0x2dd1d35b,
+ 0x9a53e479, 0xb6f84565, 0xd28e49bc, 0x4bfb9790,
+ 0xe1ddf2da, 0xa4cb7e33, 0x62fb1341, 0xcee4c6e8,
+ 0xef20cada, 0x36774c01, 0xd07e9efe, 0x2bf11fb4,
+ 0x95dbda4d, 0xae909198, 0xeaad8e71, 0x6b93d5a0,
+ 0xd08ed1d0, 0xafc725e0, 0x8e3c5b2f, 0x8e7594b7,
+ 0x8ff6e2fb, 0xf2122b64, 0x8888b812, 0x900df01c,
+ 0x4fad5ea0, 0x688fc31c, 0xd1cff191, 0xb3a8c1ad,
+ 0x2f2f2218, 0xbe0e1777, 0xea752dfe, 0x8b021fa1,
+ 0xe5a0cc0f, 0xb56f74e8, 0x18acf3d6, 0xce89e299,
+ 0xb4a84fe0, 0xfd13e0b7, 0x7cc43b81, 0xd2ada8d9,
+ 0x165fa266, 0x80957705, 0x93cc7314, 0x211a1477,
+ 0xe6ad2065, 0x77b5fa86, 0xc75442f5, 0xfb9d35cf,
+ 0xebcdaf0c, 0x7b3e89a0, 0xd6411bd3, 0xae1e7e49,
+ 0x00250e2d, 0x2071b35e, 0x226800bb, 0x57b8e0af,
+ 0x2464369b, 0xf009b91e, 0x5563911d, 0x59dfa6aa,
+ 0x78c14389, 0xd95a537f, 0x207d5ba2, 0x02e5b9c5,
+ 0x83260376, 0x6295cfa9, 0x11c81968, 0x4e734a41,
+ 0xb3472dca, 0x7b14a94a, 0x1b510052, 0x9a532915,
+ 0xd60f573f, 0xbc9bc6e4, 0x2b60a476, 0x81e67400,
+ 0x08ba6fb5, 0x571be91f, 0xf296ec6b, 0x2a0dd915,
+ 0xb6636521, 0xe7b9f9b6, 0xff34052e, 0xc5855664,
+ 0x53b02d5d, 0xa99f8fa1, 0x08ba4799, 0x6e85076a},
+ {
+ 0x4b7a70e9, 0xb5b32944, 0xdb75092e, 0xc4192623,
+ 0xad6ea6b0, 0x49a7df7d, 0x9cee60b8, 0x8fedb266,
+ 0xecaa8c71, 0x699a17ff, 0x5664526c, 0xc2b19ee1,
+ 0x193602a5, 0x75094c29, 0xa0591340, 0xe4183a3e,
+ 0x3f54989a, 0x5b429d65, 0x6b8fe4d6, 0x99f73fd6,
+ 0xa1d29c07, 0xefe830f5, 0x4d2d38e6, 0xf0255dc1,
+ 0x4cdd2086, 0x8470eb26, 0x6382e9c6, 0x021ecc5e,
+ 0x09686b3f, 0x3ebaefc9, 0x3c971814, 0x6b6a70a1,
+ 0x687f3584, 0x52a0e286, 0xb79c5305, 0xaa500737,
+ 0x3e07841c, 0x7fdeae5c, 0x8e7d44ec, 0x5716f2b8,
+ 0xb03ada37, 0xf0500c0d, 0xf01c1f04, 0x0200b3ff,
+ 0xae0cf51a, 0x3cb574b2, 0x25837a58, 0xdc0921bd,
+ 0xd19113f9, 0x7ca92ff6, 0x94324773, 0x22f54701,
+ 0x3ae5e581, 0x37c2dadc, 0xc8b57634, 0x9af3dda7,
+ 0xa9446146, 0x0fd0030e, 0xecc8c73e, 0xa4751e41,
+ 0xe238cd99, 0x3bea0e2f, 0x3280bba1, 0x183eb331,
+ 0x4e548b38, 0x4f6db908, 0x6f420d03, 0xf60a04bf,
+ 0x2cb81290, 0x24977c79, 0x5679b072, 0xbcaf89af,
+ 0xde9a771f, 0xd9930810, 0xb38bae12, 0xdccf3f2e,
+ 0x5512721f, 0x2e6b7124, 0x501adde6, 0x9f84cd87,
+ 0x7a584718, 0x7408da17, 0xbc9f9abc, 0xe94b7d8c,
+ 0xec7aec3a, 0xdb851dfa, 0x63094366, 0xc464c3d2,
+ 0xef1c1847, 0x3215d908, 0xdd433b37, 0x24c2ba16,
+ 0x12a14d43, 0x2a65c451, 0x50940002, 0x133ae4dd,
+ 0x71dff89e, 0x10314e55, 0x81ac77d6, 0x5f11199b,
+ 0x043556f1, 0xd7a3c76b, 0x3c11183b, 0x5924a509,
+ 0xf28fe6ed, 0x97f1fbfa, 0x9ebabf2c, 0x1e153c6e,
+ 0x86e34570, 0xeae96fb1, 0x860e5e0a, 0x5a3e2ab3,
+ 0x771fe71c, 0x4e3d06fa, 0x2965dcb9, 0x99e71d0f,
+ 0x803e89d6, 0x5266c825, 0x2e4cc978, 0x9c10b36a,
+ 0xc6150eba, 0x94e2ea78, 0xa5fc3c53, 0x1e0a2df4,
+ 0xf2f74ea7, 0x361d2b3d, 0x1939260f, 0x19c27960,
+ 0x5223a708, 0xf71312b6, 0xebadfe6e, 0xeac31f66,
+ 0xe3bc4595, 0xa67bc883, 0xb17f37d1, 0x018cff28,
+ 0xc332ddef, 0xbe6c5aa5, 0x65582185, 0x68ab9802,
+ 0xeecea50f, 0xdb2f953b, 0x2aef7dad, 0x5b6e2f84,
+ 0x1521b628, 0x29076170, 0xecdd4775, 0x619f1510,
+ 0x13cca830, 0xeb61bd96, 0x0334fe1e, 0xaa0363cf,
+ 0xb5735c90, 0x4c70a239, 0xd59e9e0b, 0xcbaade14,
+ 0xeecc86bc, 0x60622ca7, 0x9cab5cab, 0xb2f3846e,
+ 0x648b1eaf, 0x19bdf0ca, 0xa02369b9, 0x655abb50,
+ 0x40685a32, 0x3c2ab4b3, 0x319ee9d5, 0xc021b8f7,
+ 0x9b540b19, 0x875fa099, 0x95f7997e, 0x623d7da8,
+ 0xf837889a, 0x97e32d77, 0x11ed935f, 0x16681281,
+ 0x0e358829, 0xc7e61fd6, 0x96dedfa1, 0x7858ba99,
+ 0x57f584a5, 0x1b227263, 0x9b83c3ff, 0x1ac24696,
+ 0xcdb30aeb, 0x532e3054, 0x8fd948e4, 0x6dbc3128,
+ 0x58ebf2ef, 0x34c6ffea, 0xfe28ed61, 0xee7c3c73,
+ 0x5d4a14d9, 0xe864b7e3, 0x42105d14, 0x203e13e0,
+ 0x45eee2b6, 0xa3aaabea, 0xdb6c4f15, 0xfacb4fd0,
+ 0xc742f442, 0xef6abbb5, 0x654f3b1d, 0x41cd2105,
+ 0xd81e799e, 0x86854dc7, 0xe44b476a, 0x3d816250,
+ 0xcf62a1f2, 0x5b8d2646, 0xfc8883a0, 0xc1c7b6a3,
+ 0x7f1524c3, 0x69cb7492, 0x47848a0b, 0x5692b285,
+ 0x095bbf00, 0xad19489d, 0x1462b174, 0x23820e00,
+ 0x58428d2a, 0x0c55f5ea, 0x1dadf43e, 0x233f7061,
+ 0x3372f092, 0x8d937e41, 0xd65fecf1, 0x6c223bdb,
+ 0x7cde3759, 0xcbee7460, 0x4085f2a7, 0xce77326e,
+ 0xa6078084, 0x19f8509e, 0xe8efd855, 0x61d99735,
+ 0xa969a7aa, 0xc50c06c2, 0x5a04abfc, 0x800bcadc,
+ 0x9e447a2e, 0xc3453484, 0xfdd56705, 0x0e1e9ec9,
+ 0xdb73dbd3, 0x105588cd, 0x675fda79, 0xe3674340,
+ 0xc5c43465, 0x713e38d8, 0x3d28f89e, 0xf16dff20,
+ 0x153e21e7, 0x8fb03d4a, 0xe6e39f2b, 0xdb83adf7},
+ {
+ 0xe93d5a68, 0x948140f7, 0xf64c261c, 0x94692934,
+ 0x411520f7, 0x7602d4f7, 0xbcf46b2e, 0xd4a20068,
+ 0xd4082471, 0x3320f46a, 0x43b7d4b7, 0x500061af,
+ 0x1e39f62e, 0x97244546, 0x14214f74, 0xbf8b8840,
+ 0x4d95fc1d, 0x96b591af, 0x70f4ddd3, 0x66a02f45,
+ 0xbfbc09ec, 0x03bd9785, 0x7fac6dd0, 0x31cb8504,
+ 0x96eb27b3, 0x55fd3941, 0xda2547e6, 0xabca0a9a,
+ 0x28507825, 0x530429f4, 0x0a2c86da, 0xe9b66dfb,
+ 0x68dc1462, 0xd7486900, 0x680ec0a4, 0x27a18dee,
+ 0x4f3ffea2, 0xe887ad8c, 0xb58ce006, 0x7af4d6b6,
+ 0xaace1e7c, 0xd3375fec, 0xce78a399, 0x406b2a42,
+ 0x20fe9e35, 0xd9f385b9, 0xee39d7ab, 0x3b124e8b,
+ 0x1dc9faf7, 0x4b6d1856, 0x26a36631, 0xeae397b2,
+ 0x3a6efa74, 0xdd5b4332, 0x6841e7f7, 0xca7820fb,
+ 0xfb0af54e, 0xd8feb397, 0x454056ac, 0xba489527,
+ 0x55533a3a, 0x20838d87, 0xfe6ba9b7, 0xd096954b,
+ 0x55a867bc, 0xa1159a58, 0xcca92963, 0x99e1db33,
+ 0xa62a4a56, 0x3f3125f9, 0x5ef47e1c, 0x9029317c,
+ 0xfdf8e802, 0x04272f70, 0x80bb155c, 0x05282ce3,
+ 0x95c11548, 0xe4c66d22, 0x48c1133f, 0xc70f86dc,
+ 0x07f9c9ee, 0x41041f0f, 0x404779a4, 0x5d886e17,
+ 0x325f51eb, 0xd59bc0d1, 0xf2bcc18f, 0x41113564,
+ 0x257b7834, 0x602a9c60, 0xdff8e8a3, 0x1f636c1b,
+ 0x0e12b4c2, 0x02e1329e, 0xaf664fd1, 0xcad18115,
+ 0x6b2395e0, 0x333e92e1, 0x3b240b62, 0xeebeb922,
+ 0x85b2a20e, 0xe6ba0d99, 0xde720c8c, 0x2da2f728,
+ 0xd0127845, 0x95b794fd, 0x647d0862, 0xe7ccf5f0,
+ 0x5449a36f, 0x877d48fa, 0xc39dfd27, 0xf33e8d1e,
+ 0x0a476341, 0x992eff74, 0x3a6f6eab, 0xf4f8fd37,
+ 0xa812dc60, 0xa1ebddf8, 0x991be14c, 0xdb6e6b0d,
+ 0xc67b5510, 0x6d672c37, 0x2765d43b, 0xdcd0e804,
+ 0xf1290dc7, 0xcc00ffa3, 0xb5390f92, 0x690fed0b,
+ 0x667b9ffb, 0xcedb7d9c, 0xa091cf0b, 0xd9155ea3,
+ 0xbb132f88, 0x515bad24, 0x7b9479bf, 0x763bd6eb,
+ 0x37392eb3, 0xcc115979, 0x8026e297, 0xf42e312d,
+ 0x6842ada7, 0xc66a2b3b, 0x12754ccc, 0x782ef11c,
+ 0x6a124237, 0xb79251e7, 0x06a1bbe6, 0x4bfb6350,
+ 0x1a6b1018, 0x11caedfa, 0x3d25bdd8, 0xe2e1c3c9,
+ 0x44421659, 0x0a121386, 0xd90cec6e, 0xd5abea2a,
+ 0x64af674e, 0xda86a85f, 0xbebfe988, 0x64e4c3fe,
+ 0x9dbc8057, 0xf0f7c086, 0x60787bf8, 0x6003604d,
+ 0xd1fd8346, 0xf6381fb0, 0x7745ae04, 0xd736fccc,
+ 0x83426b33, 0xf01eab71, 0xb0804187, 0x3c005e5f,
+ 0x77a057be, 0xbde8ae24, 0x55464299, 0xbf582e61,
+ 0x4e58f48f, 0xf2ddfda2, 0xf474ef38, 0x8789bdc2,
+ 0x5366f9c3, 0xc8b38e74, 0xb475f255, 0x46fcd9b9,
+ 0x7aeb2661, 0x8b1ddf84, 0x846a0e79, 0x915f95e2,
+ 0x466e598e, 0x20b45770, 0x8cd55591, 0xc902de4c,
+ 0xb90bace1, 0xbb8205d0, 0x11a86248, 0x7574a99e,
+ 0xb77f19b6, 0xe0a9dc09, 0x662d09a1, 0xc4324633,
+ 0xe85a1f02, 0x09f0be8c, 0x4a99a025, 0x1d6efe10,
+ 0x1ab93d1d, 0x0ba5a4df, 0xa186f20f, 0x2868f169,
+ 0xdcb7da83, 0x573906fe, 0xa1e2ce9b, 0x4fcd7f52,
+ 0x50115e01, 0xa70683fa, 0xa002b5c4, 0x0de6d027,
+ 0x9af88c27, 0x773f8641, 0xc3604c06, 0x61a806b5,
+ 0xf0177a28, 0xc0f586e0, 0x006058aa, 0x30dc7d62,
+ 0x11e69ed7, 0x2338ea63, 0x53c2dd94, 0xc2c21634,
+ 0xbbcbee56, 0x90bcb6de, 0xebfc7da1, 0xce591d76,
+ 0x6f05e409, 0x4b7c0188, 0x39720a3d, 0x7c927c24,
+ 0x86e3725f, 0x724d9db9, 0x1ac15bb4, 0xd39eb8fc,
+ 0xed545578, 0x08fca5b5, 0xd83d7cd3, 0x4dad0fc4,
+ 0x1e50ef5e, 0xb161e6f8, 0xa28514d9, 0x6c51133c,
+ 0x6fd5c7e7, 0x56e14ec4, 0x362abfce, 0xddc6c837,
+ 0xd79a3234, 0x92638212, 0x670efa8e, 0x406000e0},
+ {
+ 0x3a39ce37, 0xd3faf5cf, 0xabc27737, 0x5ac52d1b,
+ 0x5cb0679e, 0x4fa33742, 0xd3822740, 0x99bc9bbe,
+ 0xd5118e9d, 0xbf0f7315, 0xd62d1c7e, 0xc700c47b,
+ 0xb78c1b6b, 0x21a19045, 0xb26eb1be, 0x6a366eb4,
+ 0x5748ab2f, 0xbc946e79, 0xc6a376d2, 0x6549c2c8,
+ 0x530ff8ee, 0x468dde7d, 0xd5730a1d, 0x4cd04dc6,
+ 0x2939bbdb, 0xa9ba4650, 0xac9526e8, 0xbe5ee304,
+ 0xa1fad5f0, 0x6a2d519a, 0x63ef8ce2, 0x9a86ee22,
+ 0xc089c2b8, 0x43242ef6, 0xa51e03aa, 0x9cf2d0a4,
+ 0x83c061ba, 0x9be96a4d, 0x8fe51550, 0xba645bd6,
+ 0x2826a2f9, 0xa73a3ae1, 0x4ba99586, 0xef5562e9,
+ 0xc72fefd3, 0xf752f7da, 0x3f046f69, 0x77fa0a59,
+ 0x80e4a915, 0x87b08601, 0x9b09e6ad, 0x3b3ee593,
+ 0xe990fd5a, 0x9e34d797, 0x2cf0b7d9, 0x022b8b51,
+ 0x96d5ac3a, 0x017da67d, 0xd1cf3ed6, 0x7c7d2d28,
+ 0x1f9f25cf, 0xadf2b89b, 0x5ad6b472, 0x5a88f54c,
+ 0xe029ac71, 0xe019a5e6, 0x47b0acfd, 0xed93fa9b,
+ 0xe8d3c48d, 0x283b57cc, 0xf8d56629, 0x79132e28,
+ 0x785f0191, 0xed756055, 0xf7960e44, 0xe3d35e8c,
+ 0x15056dd4, 0x88f46dba, 0x03a16125, 0x0564f0bd,
+ 0xc3eb9e15, 0x3c9057a2, 0x97271aec, 0xa93a072a,
+ 0x1b3f6d9b, 0x1e6321f5, 0xf59c66fb, 0x26dcf319,
+ 0x7533d928, 0xb155fdf5, 0x03563482, 0x8aba3cbb,
+ 0x28517711, 0xc20ad9f8, 0xabcc5167, 0xccad925f,
+ 0x4de81751, 0x3830dc8e, 0x379d5862, 0x9320f991,
+ 0xea7a90c2, 0xfb3e7bce, 0x5121ce64, 0x774fbe32,
+ 0xa8b6e37e, 0xc3293d46, 0x48de5369, 0x6413e680,
+ 0xa2ae0810, 0xdd6db224, 0x69852dfd, 0x09072166,
+ 0xb39a460a, 0x6445c0dd, 0x586cdecf, 0x1c20c8ae,
+ 0x5bbef7dd, 0x1b588d40, 0xccd2017f, 0x6bb4e3bb,
+ 0xdda26a7e, 0x3a59ff45, 0x3e350a44, 0xbcb4cdd5,
+ 0x72eacea8, 0xfa6484bb, 0x8d6612ae, 0xbf3c6f47,
+ 0xd29be463, 0x542f5d9e, 0xaec2771b, 0xf64e6370,
+ 0x740e0d8d, 0xe75b1357, 0xf8721671, 0xaf537d5d,
+ 0x4040cb08, 0x4eb4e2cc, 0x34d2466a, 0x0115af84,
+ 0xe1b00428, 0x95983a1d, 0x06b89fb4, 0xce6ea048,
+ 0x6f3f3b82, 0x3520ab82, 0x011a1d4b, 0x277227f8,
+ 0x611560b1, 0xe7933fdc, 0xbb3a792b, 0x344525bd,
+ 0xa08839e1, 0x51ce794b, 0x2f32c9b7, 0xa01fbac9,
+ 0xe01cc87e, 0xbcc7d1f6, 0xcf0111c3, 0xa1e8aac7,
+ 0x1a908749, 0xd44fbd9a, 0xd0dadecb, 0xd50ada38,
+ 0x0339c32a, 0xc6913667, 0x8df9317c, 0xe0b12b4f,
+ 0xf79e59b7, 0x43f5bb3a, 0xf2d519ff, 0x27d9459c,
+ 0xbf97222c, 0x15e6fc2a, 0x0f91fc71, 0x9b941525,
+ 0xfae59361, 0xceb69ceb, 0xc2a86459, 0x12baa8d1,
+ 0xb6c1075e, 0xe3056a0c, 0x10d25065, 0xcb03a442,
+ 0xe0ec6e0e, 0x1698db3b, 0x4c98a0be, 0x3278e964,
+ 0x9f1f9532, 0xe0d392df, 0xd3a0342b, 0x8971f21e,
+ 0x1b0a7441, 0x4ba3348c, 0xc5be7120, 0xc37632d8,
+ 0xdf359f8d, 0x9b992f2e, 0xe60b6f47, 0x0fe3f11d,
+ 0xe54cda54, 0x1edad891, 0xce6279cf, 0xcd3e7e6f,
+ 0x1618b166, 0xfd2c1d05, 0x848fd2c5, 0xf6fb2299,
+ 0xf523f357, 0xa6327623, 0x93a83531, 0x56cccd02,
+ 0xacf08162, 0x5a75ebb5, 0x6e163697, 0x88d273cc,
+ 0xde966292, 0x81b949d0, 0x4c50901b, 0x71c65614,
+ 0xe6c6c7bd, 0x327a140a, 0x45e1d006, 0xc3f27b9a,
+ 0xc9aa53fd, 0x62a80f00, 0xbb25bfe2, 0x35bdd2f6,
+ 0x71126905, 0xb2040222, 0xb6cbcf7c, 0xcd769c2b,
+ 0x53113ec0, 0x1640e3d3, 0x38abbd60, 0x2547adf0,
+ 0xba38209c, 0xf746ce76, 0x77afa1c5, 0x20756060,
+ 0x85cbfe4e, 0x8ae88dd8, 0x7aaaf9b0, 0x4cf9aa7e,
+ 0x1948c25c, 0x02fb8a8c, 0x01c36ae4, 0xd6ebe1f9,
+ 0x90d4f869, 0xa65cdea0, 0x3f09252d, 0xc208e69f,
+ 0xb74e6132, 0xce77e25b, 0x578fdfe3, 0x3ac372e6}
+ },
+ {
+ 0x243f6a88, 0x85a308d3, 0x13198a2e, 0x03707344,
+ 0xa4093822, 0x299f31d0, 0x082efa98, 0xec4e6c89,
+ 0x452821e6, 0x38d01377, 0xbe5466cf, 0x34e90c6c,
+ 0xc0ac29b7, 0xc97c50dd, 0x3f84d5b5, 0xb5470917,
+ 0x9216d5d9, 0x8979fb1b
+ } };
+
+ *c = initstate;
+}
+
+u_int32_t
+Blowfish_stream2word(const u_int8_t *data, u_int16_t databytes,
+ u_int16_t *current)
+{
+ u_int8_t i;
+ u_int16_t j;
+ u_int32_t temp;
+
+ temp = 0x00000000;
+ j = *current;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++, j++) {
+ if (j >= databytes)
+ j = 0;
+ temp = (temp << 8) | data[j];
+ }
+
+ *current = j;
+ return temp;
+}
+
+void
+Blowfish_expand0state(blf_ctx *c, const u_int8_t *key, u_int16_t keybytes)
+{
+ u_int16_t i;
+ u_int16_t j;
+ u_int16_t k;
+ u_int32_t temp;
+ u_int32_t datal;
+ u_int32_t datar;
+
+ j = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i++) {
+ /* Extract 4 int8 to 1 int32 from keystream */
+ temp = Blowfish_stream2word(key, keybytes, &j);
+ c->P[i] = c->P[i] ^ temp;
+ }
+
+ j = 0;
+ datal = 0x00000000;
+ datar = 0x00000000;
+ for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i += 2) {
+ Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar);
+
+ c->P[i] = datal;
+ c->P[i + 1] = datar;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+ for (k = 0; k < 256; k += 2) {
+ Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar);
+
+ c->S[i][k] = datal;
+ c->S[i][k + 1] = datar;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+void
+Blowfish_expandstate(blf_ctx *c, const u_int8_t *data, u_int16_t databytes,
+ const u_int8_t *key, u_int16_t keybytes)
+{
+ u_int16_t i;
+ u_int16_t j;
+ u_int16_t k;
+ u_int32_t temp;
+ u_int32_t datal;
+ u_int32_t datar;
+
+ j = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i++) {
+ /* Extract 4 int8 to 1 int32 from keystream */
+ temp = Blowfish_stream2word(key, keybytes, &j);
+ c->P[i] = c->P[i] ^ temp;
+ }
+
+ j = 0;
+ datal = 0x00000000;
+ datar = 0x00000000;
+ for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i += 2) {
+ datal ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j);
+ datar ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j);
+ Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar);
+
+ c->P[i] = datal;
+ c->P[i + 1] = datar;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+ for (k = 0; k < 256; k += 2) {
+ datal ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j);
+ datar ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j);
+ Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar);
+
+ c->S[i][k] = datal;
+ c->S[i][k + 1] = datar;
+ }
+ }
+
+}
+
+void
+blf_key(blf_ctx *c, const u_int8_t *k, u_int16_t len)
+{
+ /* Initialize S-boxes and subkeys with Pi */
+ Blowfish_initstate(c);
+
+ /* Transform S-boxes and subkeys with key */
+ Blowfish_expand0state(c, k, len);
+}
+
+void
+blf_enc(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *data, u_int16_t blocks)
+{
+ u_int32_t *d;
+ u_int16_t i;
+
+ d = data;
+ for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++) {
+ Blowfish_encipher(c, d, d + 1);
+ d += 2;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+blf_dec(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *data, u_int16_t blocks)
+{
+ u_int32_t *d;
+ u_int16_t i;
+
+ d = data;
+ for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++) {
+ Blowfish_decipher(c, d, d + 1);
+ d += 2;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+blf_ecb_encrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len)
+{
+ u_int32_t l, r;
+ u_int32_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) {
+ l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3];
+ r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7];
+ Blowfish_encipher(c, &l, &r);
+ data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff;
+ data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff;
+ data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff;
+ data[3] = l & 0xff;
+ data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff;
+ data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff;
+ data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff;
+ data[7] = r & 0xff;
+ data += 8;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+blf_ecb_decrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len)
+{
+ u_int32_t l, r;
+ u_int32_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) {
+ l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3];
+ r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7];
+ Blowfish_decipher(c, &l, &r);
+ data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff;
+ data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff;
+ data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff;
+ data[3] = l & 0xff;
+ data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff;
+ data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff;
+ data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff;
+ data[7] = r & 0xff;
+ data += 8;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+blf_cbc_encrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *iv, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len)
+{
+ u_int32_t l, r;
+ u_int32_t i, j;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) {
+ for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
+ data[j] ^= iv[j];
+ l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3];
+ r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7];
+ Blowfish_encipher(c, &l, &r);
+ data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff;
+ data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff;
+ data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff;
+ data[3] = l & 0xff;
+ data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff;
+ data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff;
+ data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff;
+ data[7] = r & 0xff;
+ iv = data;
+ data += 8;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+blf_cbc_decrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *iva, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len)
+{
+ u_int32_t l, r;
+ u_int8_t *iv;
+ u_int32_t i, j;
+
+ iv = data + len - 16;
+ data = data + len - 8;
+ for (i = len - 8; i >= 8; i -= 8) {
+ l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3];
+ r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7];
+ Blowfish_decipher(c, &l, &r);
+ data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff;
+ data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff;
+ data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff;
+ data[3] = l & 0xff;
+ data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff;
+ data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff;
+ data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff;
+ data[7] = r & 0xff;
+ for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
+ data[j] ^= iv[j];
+ iv -= 8;
+ data -= 8;
+ }
+ l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3];
+ r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7];
+ Blowfish_decipher(c, &l, &r);
+ data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff;
+ data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff;
+ data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff;
+ data[3] = l & 0xff;
+ data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff;
+ data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff;
+ data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff;
+ data[7] = r & 0xff;
+ for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
+ data[j] ^= iva[j];
+}
+
+#if 0
+void
+report(u_int32_t data[], u_int16_t len)
+{
+ u_int16_t i;
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i += 2)
+ printf("Block %0hd: %08lx %08lx.\n",
+ i / 2, data[i], data[i + 1]);
+}
+void
+main(void)
+{
+
+ blf_ctx c;
+ char key[] = "AAAAA";
+ char key2[] = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
+
+ u_int32_t data[10];
+ u_int32_t data2[] =
+ {0x424c4f57l, 0x46495348l};
+
+ u_int16_t i;
+
+ /* First test */
+ for (i = 0; i < 10; i++)
+ data[i] = i;
+
+ blf_key(&c, (u_int8_t *) key, 5);
+ blf_enc(&c, data, 5);
+ blf_dec(&c, data, 1);
+ blf_dec(&c, data + 2, 4);
+ printf("Should read as 0 - 9.\n");
+ report(data, 10);
+
+ /* Second test */
+ blf_key(&c, (u_int8_t *) key2, strlen(key2));
+ blf_enc(&c, data2, 1);
+ printf("\nShould read as: 0x324ed0fe 0xf413a203.\n");
+ report(data2, 2);
+ blf_dec(&c, data2, 1);
+ report(data2, 2);
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && (!defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE) || \
+ !defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE) || !defined(HAVE_BLF_ENC)) */
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1999,2000,2004 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "log.h"
-
-#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
-
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/rc4.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-/* Size of key to use */
-#define SEED_SIZE 20
-
-/* Number of bytes to reseed after */
-#define REKEY_BYTES (1 << 24)
-
-static int rc4_ready = 0;
-static RC4_KEY rc4;
-
-unsigned int
-arc4random(void)
-{
- unsigned int r = 0;
- static int first_time = 1;
-
- if (rc4_ready <= 0) {
- if (first_time)
- seed_rng();
- first_time = 0;
- arc4random_stir();
- }
-
- RC4(&rc4, sizeof(r), (unsigned char *)&r, (unsigned char *)&r);
-
- rc4_ready -= sizeof(r);
-
- return(r);
-}
-
-void
-arc4random_stir(void)
-{
- unsigned char rand_buf[SEED_SIZE];
- int i;
-
- memset(&rc4, 0, sizeof(rc4));
- if (RAND_bytes(rand_buf, sizeof(rand_buf)) <= 0)
- fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)",
- ERR_get_error());
- RC4_set_key(&rc4, sizeof(rand_buf), rand_buf);
-
- /*
- * Discard early keystream, as per recommendations in:
- * http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~itsik/RC4/Papers/Rc4_ksa.ps
- */
- for(i = 0; i <= 256; i += sizeof(rand_buf))
- RC4(&rc4, sizeof(rand_buf), rand_buf, rand_buf);
-
- memset(rand_buf, 0, sizeof(rand_buf));
-
- rc4_ready = REKEY_BYTES;
-}
-#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
-void
-arc4random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n)
-{
- size_t i;
- u_int32_t r = 0;
- char *buf = (char *)_buf;
-
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- if (i % 4 == 0)
- r = arc4random();
- buf[i] = r & 0xff;
- r >>= 8;
- }
- i = r = 0;
-}
-#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
-/*
- * Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound
- * avoiding "modulo bias".
- *
- * Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one
- * returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound). This
- * guarantees the selected random number will be inside
- * [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound)
- * after reduction modulo upper_bound.
- */
-u_int32_t
-arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t upper_bound)
-{
- u_int32_t r, min;
-
- if (upper_bound < 2)
- return 0;
-
-#if (ULONG_MAX > 0xffffffffUL)
- min = 0x100000000UL % upper_bound;
-#else
- /* Calculate (2**32 % upper_bound) avoiding 64-bit math */
- if (upper_bound > 0x80000000)
- min = 1 + ~upper_bound; /* 2**32 - upper_bound */
- else {
- /* (2**32 - (x * 2)) % x == 2**32 % x when x <= 2**31 */
- min = ((0xffffffff - (upper_bound * 2)) + 1) % upper_bound;
- }
-#endif
-
- /*
- * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has
- * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a
- * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need
- * to re-roll.
- */
- for (;;) {
- r = arc4random();
- if (r >= min)
- break;
- }
-
- return r % upper_bound;
-}
-#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004 Darren Tucker.
- *
- * Based originally on asprintf.c from OpenBSD:
- * Copyright (c) 1997 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller at courtesan.com>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-
-#ifndef VA_COPY
-# ifdef HAVE_VA_COPY
-# define VA_COPY(dest, src) va_copy(dest, src)
-# else
-# ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY
-# define VA_COPY(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src)
-# else
-# define VA_COPY(dest, src) (dest) = (src)
-# endif
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#define INIT_SZ 128
-
-int
-vasprintf(char **str, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
-{
- int ret = -1;
- va_list ap2;
- char *string, *newstr;
- size_t len;
-
- VA_COPY(ap2, ap);
- if ((string = malloc(INIT_SZ)) == NULL)
- goto fail;
-
- ret = vsnprintf(string, INIT_SZ, fmt, ap2);
- if (ret >= 0 && ret < INIT_SZ) { /* succeeded with initial alloc */
- *str = string;
- } else if (ret == INT_MAX || ret < 0) { /* Bad length */
- free(string);
- goto fail;
- } else { /* bigger than initial, realloc allowing for nul */
- len = (size_t)ret + 1;
- if ((newstr = realloc(string, len)) == NULL) {
- free(string);
- goto fail;
- } else {
- va_end(ap2);
- VA_COPY(ap2, ap);
- ret = vsnprintf(newstr, len, fmt, ap2);
- if (ret >= 0 && (size_t)ret < len) {
- *str = newstr;
- } else { /* failed with realloc'ed string, give up */
- free(newstr);
- goto fail;
- }
- }
- }
- va_end(ap2);
- return (ret);
-
-fail:
- *str = NULL;
- errno = ENOMEM;
- va_end(ap2);
- return (-1);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF
-int asprintf(char **str, const char *fmt, ...)
-{
- va_list ap;
- int ret;
-
- *str = NULL;
- va_start(ap, fmt);
- ret = vasprintf(str, fmt, ap);
- va_end(ap);
-
- return ret;
-}
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 Darren Tucker.
+ *
+ * Based originally on asprintf.c from OpenBSD:
+ * Copyright (c) 1997 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller at courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#define INIT_SZ 128
+
+int
+vasprintf(char **str, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ va_list ap2;
+ char *string, *newstr;
+ size_t len;
+
+ VA_COPY(ap2, ap);
+ if ((string = malloc(INIT_SZ)) == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+
+ ret = vsnprintf(string, INIT_SZ, fmt, ap2);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret < INIT_SZ) { /* succeeded with initial alloc */
+ *str = string;
+ } else if (ret == INT_MAX || ret < 0) { /* Bad length */
+ free(string);
+ goto fail;
+ } else { /* bigger than initial, realloc allowing for nul */
+ len = (size_t)ret + 1;
+ if ((newstr = realloc(string, len)) == NULL) {
+ free(string);
+ goto fail;
+ } else {
+ va_end(ap2);
+ VA_COPY(ap2, ap);
+ ret = vsnprintf(newstr, len, fmt, ap2);
+ if (ret >= 0 && (size_t)ret < len) {
+ *str = newstr;
+ } else { /* failed with realloc'ed string, give up */
+ free(newstr);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ va_end(ap2);
+ return (ret);
+
+fail:
+ *str = NULL;
+ errno = ENOMEM;
+ va_end(ap2);
+ return (-1);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF
+int asprintf(char **str, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ int ret;
+
+ *str = NULL;
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ ret = vasprintf(str, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2011, 2013 Corinna Vinschen <vinschen at redhat.com>
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv
- *
- * This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to
- * binary mode on Windows systems.
- */
-
-#define NO_BINARY_OPEN /* Avoid redefining open to binary_open for this file */
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-
-int
-binary_open(const char *filename, int flags, ...)
-{
- va_list ap;
- mode_t mode;
-
- va_start(ap, flags);
- mode = va_arg(ap, mode_t);
- va_end(ap);
- return (open(filename, flags | O_BINARY, mode));
-}
-
-int
-check_ntsec(const char *filename)
-{
- return (pathconf(filename, _PC_POSIX_PERMISSIONS));
-}
-
-#define NL(x) x, (sizeof (x) - 1)
-#define WENV_SIZ (sizeof (wenv_arr) / sizeof (wenv_arr[0]))
-
-static struct wenv {
- const char *name;
- size_t namelen;
-} wenv_arr[] = {
- { NL("ALLUSERSPROFILE=") },
- { NL("COMPUTERNAME=") },
- { NL("COMSPEC=") },
- { NL("CYGWIN=") },
- { NL("OS=") },
- { NL("PATH=") },
- { NL("PATHEXT=") },
- { NL("PROGRAMFILES=") },
- { NL("SYSTEMDRIVE=") },
- { NL("SYSTEMROOT=") },
- { NL("WINDIR=") }
-};
-
-char **
-fetch_windows_environment(void)
-{
- char **e, **p;
- unsigned int i, idx = 0;
-
- p = xcalloc(WENV_SIZ + 1, sizeof(char *));
- for (e = environ; *e != NULL; ++e) {
- for (i = 0; i < WENV_SIZ; ++i) {
- if (!strncmp(*e, wenv_arr[i].name, wenv_arr[i].namelen))
- p[idx++] = *e;
- }
- }
- p[idx] = NULL;
- return p;
-}
-
-void
-free_windows_environment(char **p)
-{
- free(p);
-}
-
-#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2011, 2013 Corinna Vinschen <vinschen at redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv
+ *
+ * This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to
+ * binary mode on Windows systems.
+ */
+
+#define NO_BINARY_OPEN /* Avoid redefining open to binary_open for this file */
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+int
+binary_open(const char *filename, int flags, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ mode_t mode;
+
+ va_start(ap, flags);
+ mode = va_arg(ap, mode_t);
+ va_end(ap);
+ return (open(filename, flags | O_BINARY, mode));
+}
+
+int
+check_ntsec(const char *filename)
+{
+ return (pathconf(filename, _PC_POSIX_PERMISSIONS));
+}
+
+const char *
+cygwin_ssh_privsep_user()
+{
+ static char cyg_privsep_user[DNLEN + UNLEN + 2];
+
+ if (!cyg_privsep_user[0])
+ {
+#ifdef CW_CYGNAME_FROM_WINNAME
+ if (cygwin_internal (CW_CYGNAME_FROM_WINNAME, "sshd", cyg_privsep_user,
+ sizeof cyg_privsep_user) != 0)
+#endif
+ strlcpy(cyg_privsep_user, "sshd", sizeof(cyg_privsep_user));
+ }
+ return cyg_privsep_user;
+}
+
+#define NL(x) x, (sizeof (x) - 1)
+#define WENV_SIZ (sizeof (wenv_arr) / sizeof (wenv_arr[0]))
+
+static struct wenv {
+ const char *name;
+ size_t namelen;
+} wenv_arr[] = {
+ { NL("ALLUSERSPROFILE=") },
+ { NL("COMPUTERNAME=") },
+ { NL("COMSPEC=") },
+ { NL("CYGWIN=") },
+ { NL("OS=") },
+ { NL("PATH=") },
+ { NL("PATHEXT=") },
+ { NL("PROGRAMFILES=") },
+ { NL("SYSTEMDRIVE=") },
+ { NL("SYSTEMROOT=") },
+ { NL("WINDIR=") }
+};
+
+char **
+fetch_windows_environment(void)
+{
+ char **e, **p;
+ unsigned int i, idx = 0;
+
+ p = xcalloc(WENV_SIZ + 1, sizeof(char *));
+ for (e = environ; *e != NULL; ++e) {
+ for (i = 0; i < WENV_SIZ; ++i) {
+ if (!strncmp(*e, wenv_arr[i].name, wenv_arr[i].namelen))
+ p[idx++] = *e;
+ }
+ }
+ p[idx] = NULL;
+ return p;
+}
+
+void
+free_windows_environment(char **p)
+{
+ free(p);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: bsd-cygwin_util.h,v 1.17 2014/01/18 10:04:00 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2011, 2013 Corinna Vinschen <vinschen at redhat.com>
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv
- *
- * This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to
- * binary mode on Windows systems.
- */
-
-#ifndef _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H
-#define _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H
-
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
-
-#undef ERROR
-
-/* Avoid including windows headers. */
-typedef void *HANDLE;
-#define INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE ((HANDLE) -1)
-
-/* Cygwin functions for which declarations are only available when including
- windows headers, so we have to define them here explicitely. */
-extern HANDLE cygwin_logon_user (const struct passwd *, const char *);
-extern void cygwin_set_impersonation_token (const HANDLE);
-
-#include <sys/cygwin.h>
-#include <io.h>
-
-
-int binary_open(const char *, int , ...);
-int check_ntsec(const char *);
-char **fetch_windows_environment(void);
-void free_windows_environment(char **);
-
-#ifndef NO_BINARY_OPEN
-#define open binary_open
-#endif
-
-#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
-
-#endif /* _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-cygwin_util.h,v 1.18 2014/05/27 04:34:43 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2011, 2013 Corinna Vinschen <vinschen at redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv
+ *
+ * This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to
+ * binary mode on Windows systems.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H
+#define _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+
+#undef ERROR
+
+/* Avoid including windows headers. */
+typedef void *HANDLE;
+#define INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE ((HANDLE) -1)
+#define DNLEN 16
+#define UNLEN 256
+
+/* Cygwin functions for which declarations are only available when including
+ windows headers, so we have to define them here explicitely. */
+extern HANDLE cygwin_logon_user (const struct passwd *, const char *);
+extern void cygwin_set_impersonation_token (const HANDLE);
+
+#include <sys/cygwin.h>
+#include <io.h>
+
+#define CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER (cygwin_ssh_privsep_user())
+const char *cygwin_ssh_privsep_user();
+
+int binary_open(const char *, int , ...);
+int check_ntsec(const char *);
+char **fetch_windows_environment(void);
+void free_windows_environment(char **);
+
+#ifndef NO_BINARY_OPEN
+#define open binary_open
+#endif
+
+#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-err.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-err.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-err.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-err.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Tim Rice <tim at multitalents.net>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ERR
+void
+err(int r, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", strerror(errno));
+ vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
+ fputc('\n', stderr);
+ va_end(args);
+ exit(r);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ERRX
+void
+errx(int r, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
+ fputc('\n', stderr);
+ va_end(args);
+ exit(r);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_WARN
+void
+warn(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", strerror(errno));
+ vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
+ fputc('\n', stderr);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,278 +0,0 @@
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
-# include <sys/select.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-
-#ifndef HAVE___PROGNAME
-char *__progname;
-#endif
-
-/*
- * NB. duplicate __progname in case it is an alias for argv[0]
- * Otherwise it may get clobbered by setproctitle()
- */
-char *ssh_get_progname(char *argv0)
-{
-#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
- extern char *__progname;
-
- return xstrdup(__progname);
-#else
- char *p;
-
- if (argv0 == NULL)
- return ("unknown"); /* XXX */
- p = strrchr(argv0, '/');
- if (p == NULL)
- p = argv0;
- else
- p++;
-
- return (xstrdup(p));
-#endif
-}
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN
-int setlogin(const char *name)
-{
- return (0);
-}
-#endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR
-int innetgr(const char *netgroup, const char *host,
- const char *user, const char *domain)
-{
- return (0);
-}
-#endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID)
-int seteuid(uid_t euid)
-{
- return (setreuid(-1, euid));
-}
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID)
-int setegid(uid_t egid)
-{
- return(setresgid(-1, egid, -1));
-}
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR)
-const char *strerror(int e)
-{
- extern int sys_nerr;
- extern char *sys_errlist[];
-
- if ((e >= 0) && (e < sys_nerr))
- return (sys_errlist[e]);
-
- return ("unlisted error");
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_UTIMES
-int utimes(char *filename, struct timeval *tvp)
-{
- struct utimbuf ub;
-
- ub.actime = tvp[0].tv_sec;
- ub.modtime = tvp[1].tv_sec;
-
- return (utime(filename, &ub));
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_TRUNCATE
-int truncate(const char *path, off_t length)
-{
- int fd, ret, saverrno;
-
- fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
- if (fd < 0)
- return (-1);
-
- ret = ftruncate(fd, length);
- saverrno = errno;
- close(fd);
- if (ret == -1)
- errno = saverrno;
-
- return(ret);
-}
-#endif /* HAVE_TRUNCATE */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
-int nanosleep(const struct timespec *req, struct timespec *rem)
-{
- int rc, saverrno;
- extern int errno;
- struct timeval tstart, tstop, tremain, time2wait;
-
- TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(&time2wait, req)
- (void) gettimeofday(&tstart, NULL);
- rc = select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, &time2wait);
- if (rc == -1) {
- saverrno = errno;
- (void) gettimeofday (&tstop, NULL);
- errno = saverrno;
- tremain.tv_sec = time2wait.tv_sec -
- (tstop.tv_sec - tstart.tv_sec);
- tremain.tv_usec = time2wait.tv_usec -
- (tstop.tv_usec - tstart.tv_usec);
- tremain.tv_sec += tremain.tv_usec / 1000000L;
- tremain.tv_usec %= 1000000L;
- } else {
- tremain.tv_sec = 0;
- tremain.tv_usec = 0;
- }
- if (rem != NULL)
- TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&tremain, rem)
-
- return(rc);
-}
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_USLEEP)
-int usleep(unsigned int useconds)
-{
- struct timespec ts;
-
- ts.tv_sec = useconds / 1000000;
- ts.tv_nsec = (useconds % 1000000) * 1000;
- return nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
-pid_t
-tcgetpgrp(int fd)
-{
- int ctty_pgrp;
-
- if (ioctl(fd, TIOCGPGRP, &ctty_pgrp) == -1)
- return(-1);
- else
- return(ctty_pgrp);
-}
-#endif /* HAVE_TCGETPGRP */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK
-int
-tcsendbreak(int fd, int duration)
-{
-# if defined(TIOCSBRK) && defined(TIOCCBRK)
- struct timeval sleepytime;
-
- sleepytime.tv_sec = 0;
- sleepytime.tv_usec = 400000;
- if (ioctl(fd, TIOCSBRK, 0) == -1)
- return (-1);
- (void)select(0, 0, 0, 0, &sleepytime);
- if (ioctl(fd, TIOCCBRK, 0) == -1)
- return (-1);
- return (0);
-# else
- return -1;
-# endif
-}
-#endif /* HAVE_TCSENDBREAK */
-
-mysig_t
-mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act)
-{
-#ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION
- struct sigaction sa, osa;
-
- if (sigaction(sig, NULL, &osa) == -1)
- return (mysig_t) -1;
- if (osa.sa_handler != act) {
- memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
- sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
- sa.sa_flags = 0;
-#ifdef SA_INTERRUPT
- if (sig == SIGALRM)
- sa.sa_flags |= SA_INTERRUPT;
-#endif
- sa.sa_handler = act;
- if (sigaction(sig, &sa, NULL) == -1)
- return (mysig_t) -1;
- }
- return (osa.sa_handler);
-#else
- #undef signal
- return (signal(sig, act));
-#endif
-}
-
-#ifndef HAVE_STRDUP
-char *
-strdup(const char *str)
-{
- size_t len;
- char *cp;
-
- len = strlen(str) + 1;
- cp = malloc(len);
- if (cp != NULL)
- return(memcpy(cp, str, len));
- return NULL;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_ISBLANK
-int
-isblank(int c)
-{
- return (c == ' ' || c == '\t');
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_GETPGID
-pid_t
-getpgid(pid_t pid)
-{
-#if defined(HAVE_GETPGRP) && !defined(GETPGRP_VOID)
- return getpgrp(pid);
-#elif defined(HAVE_GETPGRP)
- if (pid == 0)
- return getpgrp();
-#endif
-
- errno = ESRCH;
- return -1;
-}
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifndef HAVE___PROGNAME
+char *__progname;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * NB. duplicate __progname in case it is an alias for argv[0]
+ * Otherwise it may get clobbered by setproctitle()
+ */
+char *ssh_get_progname(char *argv0)
+{
+ char *p, *q;
+#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
+ extern char *__progname;
+
+ p = __progname;
+#else
+ if (argv0 == NULL)
+ return ("unknown"); /* XXX */
+ p = strrchr(argv0, '/');
+ if (p == NULL)
+ p = argv0;
+ else
+ p++;
+#endif
+ if ((q = strdup(p)) == NULL) {
+ perror("strdup");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ return q;
+}
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN
+int setlogin(const char *name)
+{
+ return (0);
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR
+int innetgr(const char *netgroup, const char *host,
+ const char *user, const char *domain)
+{
+ return (0);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID)
+int seteuid(uid_t euid)
+{
+ return (setreuid(-1, euid));
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID)
+int setegid(uid_t egid)
+{
+ return(setresgid(-1, egid, -1));
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR)
+const char *strerror(int e)
+{
+ extern int sys_nerr;
+ extern char *sys_errlist[];
+
+ if ((e >= 0) && (e < sys_nerr))
+ return (sys_errlist[e]);
+
+ return ("unlisted error");
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UTIMES
+int utimes(char *filename, struct timeval *tvp)
+{
+ struct utimbuf ub;
+
+ ub.actime = tvp[0].tv_sec;
+ ub.modtime = tvp[1].tv_sec;
+
+ return (utime(filename, &ub));
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TRUNCATE
+int truncate(const char *path, off_t length)
+{
+ int fd, ret, saverrno;
+
+ fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return (-1);
+
+ ret = ftruncate(fd, length);
+ saverrno = errno;
+ close(fd);
+ if (ret == -1)
+ errno = saverrno;
+
+ return(ret);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_TRUNCATE */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
+int nanosleep(const struct timespec *req, struct timespec *rem)
+{
+ int rc, saverrno;
+ extern int errno;
+ struct timeval tstart, tstop, tremain, time2wait;
+
+ TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(&time2wait, req)
+ (void) gettimeofday(&tstart, NULL);
+ rc = select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, &time2wait);
+ if (rc == -1) {
+ saverrno = errno;
+ (void) gettimeofday (&tstop, NULL);
+ errno = saverrno;
+ tremain.tv_sec = time2wait.tv_sec -
+ (tstop.tv_sec - tstart.tv_sec);
+ tremain.tv_usec = time2wait.tv_usec -
+ (tstop.tv_usec - tstart.tv_usec);
+ tremain.tv_sec += tremain.tv_usec / 1000000L;
+ tremain.tv_usec %= 1000000L;
+ } else {
+ tremain.tv_sec = 0;
+ tremain.tv_usec = 0;
+ }
+ if (rem != NULL)
+ TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&tremain, rem)
+
+ return(rc);
+}
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_USLEEP)
+int usleep(unsigned int useconds)
+{
+ struct timespec ts;
+
+ ts.tv_sec = useconds / 1000000;
+ ts.tv_nsec = (useconds % 1000000) * 1000;
+ return nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
+pid_t
+tcgetpgrp(int fd)
+{
+ int ctty_pgrp;
+
+ if (ioctl(fd, TIOCGPGRP, &ctty_pgrp) == -1)
+ return(-1);
+ else
+ return(ctty_pgrp);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_TCGETPGRP */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK
+int
+tcsendbreak(int fd, int duration)
+{
+# if defined(TIOCSBRK) && defined(TIOCCBRK)
+ struct timeval sleepytime;
+
+ sleepytime.tv_sec = 0;
+ sleepytime.tv_usec = 400000;
+ if (ioctl(fd, TIOCSBRK, 0) == -1)
+ return (-1);
+ (void)select(0, 0, 0, 0, &sleepytime);
+ if (ioctl(fd, TIOCCBRK, 0) == -1)
+ return (-1);
+ return (0);
+# else
+ return -1;
+# endif
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_TCSENDBREAK */
+
+mysig_t
+mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION
+ struct sigaction sa, osa;
+
+ if (sigaction(sig, NULL, &osa) == -1)
+ return (mysig_t) -1;
+ if (osa.sa_handler != act) {
+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+ sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+ sa.sa_flags = 0;
+#ifdef SA_INTERRUPT
+ if (sig == SIGALRM)
+ sa.sa_flags |= SA_INTERRUPT;
+#endif
+ sa.sa_handler = act;
+ if (sigaction(sig, &sa, NULL) == -1)
+ return (mysig_t) -1;
+ }
+ return (osa.sa_handler);
+#else
+ #undef signal
+ return (signal(sig, act));
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRDUP
+char *
+strdup(const char *str)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ char *cp;
+
+ len = strlen(str) + 1;
+ cp = malloc(len);
+ if (cp != NULL)
+ return(memcpy(cp, str, len));
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ISBLANK
+int
+isblank(int c)
+{
+ return (c == ' ' || c == '\t');
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETPGID
+pid_t
+getpgid(pid_t pid)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_GETPGRP) && !defined(GETPGRP_VOID)
+ return getpgrp(pid);
+#elif defined(HAVE_GETPGRP)
+ if (pid == 0)
+ return getpgrp();
+#endif
+
+ errno = ESRCH;
+ return -1;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_PLEDGE
+int
+pledge(const char *promises, const char *paths[])
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_MBTOWC
+/* a mbtowc that only supports ASCII */
+int
+mbtowc(wchar_t *pwc, const char *s, size_t n)
+{
+ if (s == NULL || *s == '\0')
+ return 0; /* ASCII is not state-dependent */
+ if (*s < 0 || *s > 0x7f || n < 1) {
+ errno = EOPNOTSUPP;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (pwc != NULL)
+ *pwc = *s;
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: bsd-misc.h,v 1.25 2013/08/04 11:48:41 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#ifndef _BSD_MISC_H
-#define _BSD_MISC_H
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-char *ssh_get_progname(char *);
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SETSID
-#define setsid() setpgrp(0, getpid())
-#endif /* !HAVE_SETSID */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
-int setenv(const char *, const char *, int);
-#endif /* !HAVE_SETENV */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN
-int setlogin(const char *);
-#endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR
-int innetgr(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
-#endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID)
-int seteuid(uid_t);
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID)
-int setegid(uid_t);
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR)
-const char *strerror(int);
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_SETLINEBUF)
-#define setlinebuf(a) (setvbuf((a), NULL, _IOLBF, 0))
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_UTIMES
-#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL
-struct timeval {
- long tv_sec;
- long tv_usec;
-}
-#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL */
-
-int utimes(char *, struct timeval *);
-#endif /* HAVE_UTIMES */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_TRUNCATE
-int truncate (const char *, off_t);
-#endif /* HAVE_TRUNCATE */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
-#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC
-struct timespec {
- time_t tv_sec;
- long tv_nsec;
-};
-#endif
-int nanosleep(const struct timespec *, struct timespec *);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_USLEEP
-int usleep(unsigned int useconds);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
-pid_t tcgetpgrp(int);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK
-int tcsendbreak(int, int);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_UNSETENV
-int unsetenv(const char *);
-#endif
-
-/* wrapper for signal interface */
-typedef void (*mysig_t)(int);
-mysig_t mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act);
-
-#define signal(a,b) mysignal(a,b)
-
-#ifndef HAVE_ISBLANK
-int isblank(int);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_GETPGID
-pid_t getpgid(pid_t);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_ENDGRENT
-# define endgrent() {}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE
-# define krb5_get_error_message krb5_get_err_text
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE
-# define krb5_free_error_message(a,b) while(0)
-#endif
-
-#endif /* _BSD_MISC_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-misc.h,v 1.25 2013/08/04 11:48:41 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_MISC_H
+#define _BSD_MISC_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+char *ssh_get_progname(char *);
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETSID
+#define setsid() setpgrp(0, getpid())
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETSID */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
+int setenv(const char *, const char *, int);
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETENV */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN
+int setlogin(const char *);
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR
+int innetgr(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+#endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID)
+int seteuid(uid_t);
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID)
+int setegid(uid_t);
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR)
+const char *strerror(int);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETLINEBUF)
+#define setlinebuf(a) (setvbuf((a), NULL, _IOLBF, 0))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UTIMES
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL
+struct timeval {
+ long tv_sec;
+ long tv_usec;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL */
+
+int utimes(char *, struct timeval *);
+#endif /* HAVE_UTIMES */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TRUNCATE
+int truncate (const char *, off_t);
+#endif /* HAVE_TRUNCATE */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC
+struct timespec {
+ time_t tv_sec;
+ long tv_nsec;
+};
+#endif
+int nanosleep(const struct timespec *, struct timespec *);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_USLEEP
+int usleep(unsigned int useconds);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
+pid_t tcgetpgrp(int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK
+int tcsendbreak(int, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UNSETENV
+int unsetenv(const char *);
+#endif
+
+/* wrapper for signal interface */
+typedef void (*mysig_t)(int);
+mysig_t mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act);
+
+#define signal(a,b) mysignal(a,b)
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ISBLANK
+int isblank(int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETPGID
+pid_t getpgid(pid_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ENDGRENT
+# define endgrent() do { } while(0)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE
+# define krb5_get_error_message krb5_get_err_text
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE
+# define krb5_free_error_message(a,b) do { } while(0)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_PLEDGE
+int pledge(const char *promises, const char *paths[]);
+#endif
+
+/* bsd-err.h */
+#ifndef HAVE_ERR
+void err(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_ERRX
+void errx(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_WARN
+void warn(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _BSD_MISC_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: poll.h,v 1.11 2003/12/10 23:10:08 millert Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/poll.h */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_POLL) && !defined(HAVE_POLL_H)
-#ifndef _COMPAT_POLL_H_
-#define _COMPAT_POLL_H_
-
-typedef struct pollfd {
- int fd;
- short events;
- short revents;
-} pollfd_t;
-
-typedef unsigned int nfds_t;
-
-#define POLLIN 0x0001
-#define POLLOUT 0x0004
-#define POLLERR 0x0008
-#if 0
-/* the following are currently not implemented */
-#define POLLPRI 0x0002
-#define POLLHUP 0x0010
-#define POLLNVAL 0x0020
-#define POLLRDNORM 0x0040
-#define POLLNORM POLLRDNORM
-#define POLLWRNORM POLLOUT
-#define POLLRDBAND 0x0080
-#define POLLWRBAND 0x0100
-#endif
-
-#define INFTIM (-1) /* not standard */
-
-int poll(struct pollfd *, nfds_t, int);
-#endif /* !_COMPAT_POLL_H_ */
-#endif /* !HAVE_POLL_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: poll.h,v 1.11 2003/12/10 23:10:08 millert Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/poll.h */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_POLL) && !defined(HAVE_POLL_H)
+#ifndef _COMPAT_POLL_H_
+#define _COMPAT_POLL_H_
+
+typedef struct pollfd {
+ int fd;
+ short events;
+ short revents;
+} pollfd_t;
+
+typedef unsigned int nfds_t;
+
+#define POLLIN 0x0001
+#define POLLOUT 0x0004
+#define POLLERR 0x0008
+#define POLLHUP 0x0010
+#define POLLNVAL 0x0020
+#if 0
+/* the following are currently not implemented */
+#define POLLPRI 0x0002
+#define POLLRDNORM 0x0040
+#define POLLNORM POLLRDNORM
+#define POLLWRNORM POLLOUT
+#define POLLRDBAND 0x0080
+#define POLLWRBAND 0x0100
+#endif
+
+#define INFTIM (-1) /* not standard */
+
+int poll(struct pollfd *, nfds_t, int);
+#endif /* !_COMPAT_POLL_H_ */
+#endif /* !HAVE_POLL_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,892 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright Patrick Powell 1995
- * This code is based on code written by Patrick Powell (papowell at astart.com)
- * It may be used for any purpose as long as this notice remains intact
- * on all source code distributions
- */
-
-/**************************************************************
- * Original:
- * Patrick Powell Tue Apr 11 09:48:21 PDT 1995
- * A bombproof version of doprnt (dopr) included.
- * Sigh. This sort of thing is always nasty do deal with. Note that
- * the version here does not include floating point...
- *
- * snprintf() is used instead of sprintf() as it does limit checks
- * for string length. This covers a nasty loophole.
- *
- * The other functions are there to prevent NULL pointers from
- * causing nast effects.
- *
- * More Recently:
- * Brandon Long <blong at fiction.net> 9/15/96 for mutt 0.43
- * This was ugly. It is still ugly. I opted out of floating point
- * numbers, but the formatter understands just about everything
- * from the normal C string format, at least as far as I can tell from
- * the Solaris 2.5 printf(3S) man page.
- *
- * Brandon Long <blong at fiction.net> 10/22/97 for mutt 0.87.1
- * Ok, added some minimal floating point support, which means this
- * probably requires libm on most operating systems. Don't yet
- * support the exponent (e,E) and sigfig (g,G). Also, fmtint()
- * was pretty badly broken, it just wasn't being exercised in ways
- * which showed it, so that's been fixed. Also, formated the code
- * to mutt conventions, and removed dead code left over from the
- * original. Also, there is now a builtin-test, just compile with:
- * gcc -DTEST_SNPRINTF -o snprintf snprintf.c -lm
- * and run snprintf for results.
- *
- * Thomas Roessler <roessler at guug.de> 01/27/98 for mutt 0.89i
- * The PGP code was using unsigned hexadecimal formats.
- * Unfortunately, unsigned formats simply didn't work.
- *
- * Michael Elkins <me at cs.hmc.edu> 03/05/98 for mutt 0.90.8
- * The original code assumed that both snprintf() and vsnprintf() were
- * missing. Some systems only have snprintf() but not vsnprintf(), so
- * the code is now broken down under HAVE_SNPRINTF and HAVE_VSNPRINTF.
- *
- * Andrew Tridgell (tridge at samba.org) Oct 1998
- * fixed handling of %.0f
- * added test for HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE
- *
- * tridge at samba.org, idra at samba.org, April 2001
- * got rid of fcvt code (twas buggy and made testing harder)
- * added C99 semantics
- *
- * date: 2002/12/19 19:56:31; author: herb; state: Exp; lines: +2 -0
- * actually print args for %g and %e
- *
- * date: 2002/06/03 13:37:52; author: jmcd; state: Exp; lines: +8 -0
- * Since includes.h isn't included here, VA_COPY has to be defined here. I don't
- * see any include file that is guaranteed to be here, so I'm defining it
- * locally. Fixes AIX and Solaris builds.
- *
- * date: 2002/06/03 03:07:24; author: tridge; state: Exp; lines: +5 -13
- * put the ifdef for HAVE_VA_COPY in one place rather than in lots of
- * functions
- *
- * date: 2002/05/17 14:51:22; author: jmcd; state: Exp; lines: +21 -4
- * Fix usage of va_list passed as an arg. Use __va_copy before using it
- * when it exists.
- *
- * date: 2002/04/16 22:38:04; author: idra; state: Exp; lines: +20 -14
- * Fix incorrect zpadlen handling in fmtfp.
- * Thanks to Ollie Oldham <ollie.oldham at metro-optix.com> for spotting it.
- * few mods to make it easier to compile the tests.
- * addedd the "Ollie" test to the floating point ones.
- *
- * Martin Pool (mbp at samba.org) April 2003
- * Remove NO_CONFIG_H so that the test case can be built within a source
- * tree with less trouble.
- * Remove unnecessary SAFE_FREE() definition.
- *
- * Martin Pool (mbp at samba.org) May 2003
- * Put in a prototype for dummy_snprintf() to quiet compiler warnings.
- *
- * Move #endif to make sure VA_COPY, LDOUBLE, etc are defined even
- * if the C library has some snprintf functions already.
- *
- * Damien Miller (djm at mindrot.org) Jan 2007
- * Fix integer overflows in return value.
- * Make formatting quite a bit faster by inlining dopr_outch()
- *
- **************************************************************/
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#if defined(BROKEN_SNPRINTF) /* For those with broken snprintf() */
-# undef HAVE_SNPRINTF
-# undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
-#endif
-
-#ifndef VA_COPY
-# ifdef HAVE_VA_COPY
-# define VA_COPY(dest, src) va_copy(dest, src)
-# else
-# ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY
-# define VA_COPY(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src)
-# else
-# define VA_COPY(dest, src) (dest) = (src)
-# endif
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
-
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-
-#ifdef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE
-# define LDOUBLE long double
-#else
-# define LDOUBLE double
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG
-# define LLONG long long
-#else
-# define LLONG long
-#endif
-
-/*
- * dopr(): poor man's version of doprintf
- */
-
-/* format read states */
-#define DP_S_DEFAULT 0
-#define DP_S_FLAGS 1
-#define DP_S_MIN 2
-#define DP_S_DOT 3
-#define DP_S_MAX 4
-#define DP_S_MOD 5
-#define DP_S_CONV 6
-#define DP_S_DONE 7
-
-/* format flags - Bits */
-#define DP_F_MINUS (1 << 0)
-#define DP_F_PLUS (1 << 1)
-#define DP_F_SPACE (1 << 2)
-#define DP_F_NUM (1 << 3)
-#define DP_F_ZERO (1 << 4)
-#define DP_F_UP (1 << 5)
-#define DP_F_UNSIGNED (1 << 6)
-
-/* Conversion Flags */
-#define DP_C_SHORT 1
-#define DP_C_LONG 2
-#define DP_C_LDOUBLE 3
-#define DP_C_LLONG 4
-#define DP_C_SIZE 5
-#define DP_C_INTMAX 6
-
-#define char_to_int(p) ((p)- '0')
-#ifndef MAX
-# define MAX(p,q) (((p) >= (q)) ? (p) : (q))
-#endif
-
-#define DOPR_OUTCH(buf, pos, buflen, thechar) \
- do { \
- if (pos + 1 >= INT_MAX) { \
- errno = ERANGE; \
- return -1; \
- } \
- if (pos < buflen) \
- buf[pos] = thechar; \
- (pos)++; \
- } while (0)
-
-static int dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format,
- va_list args_in);
-static int fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
- char *value, int flags, int min, int max);
-static int fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
- intmax_t value, int base, int min, int max, int flags);
-static int fmtfp(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
- LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags);
-
-static int
-dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, va_list args_in)
-{
- char ch;
- intmax_t value;
- LDOUBLE fvalue;
- char *strvalue;
- int min;
- int max;
- int state;
- int flags;
- int cflags;
- size_t currlen;
- va_list args;
-
- VA_COPY(args, args_in);
-
- state = DP_S_DEFAULT;
- currlen = flags = cflags = min = 0;
- max = -1;
- ch = *format++;
-
- while (state != DP_S_DONE) {
- if (ch == '\0')
- state = DP_S_DONE;
-
- switch(state) {
- case DP_S_DEFAULT:
- if (ch == '%')
- state = DP_S_FLAGS;
- else
- DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ch);
- ch = *format++;
- break;
- case DP_S_FLAGS:
- switch (ch) {
- case '-':
- flags |= DP_F_MINUS;
- ch = *format++;
- break;
- case '+':
- flags |= DP_F_PLUS;
- ch = *format++;
- break;
- case ' ':
- flags |= DP_F_SPACE;
- ch = *format++;
- break;
- case '#':
- flags |= DP_F_NUM;
- ch = *format++;
- break;
- case '0':
- flags |= DP_F_ZERO;
- ch = *format++;
- break;
- default:
- state = DP_S_MIN;
- break;
- }
- break;
- case DP_S_MIN:
- if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) {
- min = 10*min + char_to_int (ch);
- ch = *format++;
- } else if (ch == '*') {
- min = va_arg (args, int);
- ch = *format++;
- state = DP_S_DOT;
- } else {
- state = DP_S_DOT;
- }
- break;
- case DP_S_DOT:
- if (ch == '.') {
- state = DP_S_MAX;
- ch = *format++;
- } else {
- state = DP_S_MOD;
- }
- break;
- case DP_S_MAX:
- if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) {
- if (max < 0)
- max = 0;
- max = 10*max + char_to_int (ch);
- ch = *format++;
- } else if (ch == '*') {
- max = va_arg (args, int);
- ch = *format++;
- state = DP_S_MOD;
- } else {
- state = DP_S_MOD;
- }
- break;
- case DP_S_MOD:
- switch (ch) {
- case 'h':
- cflags = DP_C_SHORT;
- ch = *format++;
- break;
- case 'j':
- cflags = DP_C_INTMAX;
- ch = *format++;
- break;
- case 'l':
- cflags = DP_C_LONG;
- ch = *format++;
- if (ch == 'l') { /* It's a long long */
- cflags = DP_C_LLONG;
- ch = *format++;
- }
- break;
- case 'L':
- cflags = DP_C_LDOUBLE;
- ch = *format++;
- break;
- case 'z':
- cflags = DP_C_SIZE;
- ch = *format++;
- break;
- default:
- break;
- }
- state = DP_S_CONV;
- break;
- case DP_S_CONV:
- switch (ch) {
- case 'd':
- case 'i':
- if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
- value = va_arg (args, int);
- else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
- value = va_arg (args, long int);
- else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
- value = va_arg (args, LLONG);
- else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE)
- value = va_arg (args, ssize_t);
- else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX)
- value = va_arg (args, intmax_t);
- else
- value = va_arg (args, int);
- if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
- value, 10, min, max, flags) == -1)
- return -1;
- break;
- case 'o':
- flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
- if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
- value = va_arg (args, unsigned int);
- else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
- value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int);
- else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
- value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG);
- else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE)
- value = va_arg (args, size_t);
-#ifdef notyet
- else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX)
- value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t);
-#endif
- else
- value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int);
- if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
- 8, min, max, flags) == -1)
- return -1;
- break;
- case 'u':
- flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
- if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
- value = va_arg (args, unsigned int);
- else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
- value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int);
- else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
- value = (LLONG)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG);
- else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE)
- value = va_arg (args, size_t);
-#ifdef notyet
- else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX)
- value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t);
-#endif
- else
- value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int);
- if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
- 10, min, max, flags) == -1)
- return -1;
- break;
- case 'X':
- flags |= DP_F_UP;
- case 'x':
- flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
- if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
- value = va_arg (args, unsigned int);
- else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
- value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int);
- else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
- value = (LLONG)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG);
- else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE)
- value = va_arg (args, size_t);
-#ifdef notyet
- else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX)
- value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t);
-#endif
- else
- value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int);
- if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
- 16, min, max, flags) == -1)
- return -1;
- break;
- case 'f':
- if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
- fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE);
- else
- fvalue = va_arg (args, double);
- if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue,
- min, max, flags) == -1)
- return -1;
- break;
- case 'E':
- flags |= DP_F_UP;
- case 'e':
- if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
- fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE);
- else
- fvalue = va_arg (args, double);
- if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue,
- min, max, flags) == -1)
- return -1;
- break;
- case 'G':
- flags |= DP_F_UP;
- case 'g':
- if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
- fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE);
- else
- fvalue = va_arg (args, double);
- if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue,
- min, max, flags) == -1)
- return -1;
- break;
- case 'c':
- DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen,
- va_arg (args, int));
- break;
- case 's':
- strvalue = va_arg (args, char *);
- if (!strvalue) strvalue = "(NULL)";
- if (max == -1) {
- max = strlen(strvalue);
- }
- if (min > 0 && max >= 0 && min > max) max = min;
- if (fmtstr(buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
- strvalue, flags, min, max) == -1)
- return -1;
- break;
- case 'p':
- strvalue = va_arg (args, void *);
- if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
- (long) strvalue, 16, min, max, flags) == -1)
- return -1;
- break;
-#if we_dont_want_this_in_openssh
- case 'n':
- if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) {
- short int *num;
- num = va_arg (args, short int *);
- *num = currlen;
- } else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) {
- long int *num;
- num = va_arg (args, long int *);
- *num = (long int)currlen;
- } else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) {
- LLONG *num;
- num = va_arg (args, LLONG *);
- *num = (LLONG)currlen;
- } else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) {
- ssize_t *num;
- num = va_arg (args, ssize_t *);
- *num = (ssize_t)currlen;
- } else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) {
- intmax_t *num;
- num = va_arg (args, intmax_t *);
- *num = (intmax_t)currlen;
- } else {
- int *num;
- num = va_arg (args, int *);
- *num = currlen;
- }
- break;
-#endif
- case '%':
- DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ch);
- break;
- case 'w':
- /* not supported yet, treat as next char */
- ch = *format++;
- break;
- default:
- /* Unknown, skip */
- break;
- }
- ch = *format++;
- state = DP_S_DEFAULT;
- flags = cflags = min = 0;
- max = -1;
- break;
- case DP_S_DONE:
- break;
- default:
- /* hmm? */
- break; /* some picky compilers need this */
- }
- }
- if (maxlen != 0) {
- if (currlen < maxlen - 1)
- buffer[currlen] = '\0';
- else if (maxlen > 0)
- buffer[maxlen - 1] = '\0';
- }
-
- return currlen < INT_MAX ? (int)currlen : -1;
-}
-
-static int
-fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
- char *value, int flags, int min, int max)
-{
- int padlen, strln; /* amount to pad */
- int cnt = 0;
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF
- printf("fmtstr min=%d max=%d s=[%s]\n", min, max, value);
-#endif
- if (value == 0) {
- value = "<NULL>";
- }
-
- for (strln = 0; strln < max && value[strln]; ++strln); /* strlen */
- padlen = min - strln;
- if (padlen < 0)
- padlen = 0;
- if (flags & DP_F_MINUS)
- padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justify */
-
- while ((padlen > 0) && (cnt < max)) {
- DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
- --padlen;
- ++cnt;
- }
- while (*value && (cnt < max)) {
- DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, *value);
- *value++;
- ++cnt;
- }
- while ((padlen < 0) && (cnt < max)) {
- DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
- ++padlen;
- ++cnt;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Have to handle DP_F_NUM (ie 0x and 0 alternates) */
-
-static int
-fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
- LLONG value, int base, int min, int max, int flags)
-{
- int signvalue = 0;
- unsigned LLONG uvalue;
- char convert[20];
- int place = 0;
- int spadlen = 0; /* amount to space pad */
- int zpadlen = 0; /* amount to zero pad */
- int caps = 0;
-
- if (max < 0)
- max = 0;
-
- uvalue = value;
-
- if(!(flags & DP_F_UNSIGNED)) {
- if( value < 0 ) {
- signvalue = '-';
- uvalue = -value;
- } else {
- if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) /* Do a sign (+/i) */
- signvalue = '+';
- else if (flags & DP_F_SPACE)
- signvalue = ' ';
- }
- }
-
- if (flags & DP_F_UP) caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */
-
- do {
- convert[place++] =
- (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")
- [uvalue % (unsigned)base ];
- uvalue = (uvalue / (unsigned)base );
- } while(uvalue && (place < 20));
- if (place == 20) place--;
- convert[place] = 0;
-
- zpadlen = max - place;
- spadlen = min - MAX (max, place) - (signvalue ? 1 : 0);
- if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0;
- if (spadlen < 0) spadlen = 0;
- if (flags & DP_F_ZERO) {
- zpadlen = MAX(zpadlen, spadlen);
- spadlen = 0;
- }
- if (flags & DP_F_MINUS)
- spadlen = -spadlen; /* Left Justifty */
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF
- printf("zpad: %d, spad: %d, min: %d, max: %d, place: %d\n",
- zpadlen, spadlen, min, max, place);
-#endif
-
- /* Spaces */
- while (spadlen > 0) {
- DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
- --spadlen;
- }
-
- /* Sign */
- if (signvalue)
- DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
-
- /* Zeros */
- if (zpadlen > 0) {
- while (zpadlen > 0) {
- DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0');
- --zpadlen;
- }
- }
-
- /* Digits */
- while (place > 0) {
- --place;
- DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, convert[place]);
- }
-
- /* Left Justified spaces */
- while (spadlen < 0) {
- DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
- ++spadlen;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static LDOUBLE abs_val(LDOUBLE value)
-{
- LDOUBLE result = value;
-
- if (value < 0)
- result = -value;
-
- return result;
-}
-
-static LDOUBLE POW10(int val)
-{
- LDOUBLE result = 1;
-
- while (val) {
- result *= 10;
- val--;
- }
-
- return result;
-}
-
-static LLONG ROUND(LDOUBLE value)
-{
- LLONG intpart;
-
- intpart = (LLONG)value;
- value = value - intpart;
- if (value >= 0.5) intpart++;
-
- return intpart;
-}
-
-/* a replacement for modf that doesn't need the math library. Should
- be portable, but slow */
-static double my_modf(double x0, double *iptr)
-{
- int i;
- long l;
- double x = x0;
- double f = 1.0;
-
- for (i=0;i<100;i++) {
- l = (long)x;
- if (l <= (x+1) && l >= (x-1)) break;
- x *= 0.1;
- f *= 10.0;
- }
-
- if (i == 100) {
- /*
- * yikes! the number is beyond what we can handle.
- * What do we do?
- */
- (*iptr) = 0;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (i != 0) {
- double i2;
- double ret;
-
- ret = my_modf(x0-l*f, &i2);
- (*iptr) = l*f + i2;
- return ret;
- }
-
- (*iptr) = l;
- return x - (*iptr);
-}
-
-
-static int
-fmtfp (char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
- LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags)
-{
- int signvalue = 0;
- double ufvalue;
- char iconvert[311];
- char fconvert[311];
- int iplace = 0;
- int fplace = 0;
- int padlen = 0; /* amount to pad */
- int zpadlen = 0;
- int caps = 0;
- int idx;
- double intpart;
- double fracpart;
- double temp;
-
- /*
- * AIX manpage says the default is 0, but Solaris says the default
- * is 6, and sprintf on AIX defaults to 6
- */
- if (max < 0)
- max = 6;
-
- ufvalue = abs_val (fvalue);
-
- if (fvalue < 0) {
- signvalue = '-';
- } else {
- if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) { /* Do a sign (+/i) */
- signvalue = '+';
- } else {
- if (flags & DP_F_SPACE)
- signvalue = ' ';
- }
- }
-
-#if 0
- if (flags & DP_F_UP) caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */
-#endif
-
-#if 0
- if (max == 0) ufvalue += 0.5; /* if max = 0 we must round */
-#endif
-
- /*
- * Sorry, we only support 16 digits past the decimal because of our
- * conversion method
- */
- if (max > 16)
- max = 16;
-
- /* We "cheat" by converting the fractional part to integer by
- * multiplying by a factor of 10
- */
-
- temp = ufvalue;
- my_modf(temp, &intpart);
-
- fracpart = ROUND((POW10(max)) * (ufvalue - intpart));
-
- if (fracpart >= POW10(max)) {
- intpart++;
- fracpart -= POW10(max);
- }
-
- /* Convert integer part */
- do {
- temp = intpart*0.1;
- my_modf(temp, &intpart);
- idx = (int) ((temp -intpart +0.05)* 10.0);
- /* idx = (int) (((double)(temp*0.1) -intpart +0.05) *10.0); */
- /* printf ("%llf, %f, %x\n", temp, intpart, idx); */
- iconvert[iplace++] =
- (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[idx];
- } while (intpart && (iplace < 311));
- if (iplace == 311) iplace--;
- iconvert[iplace] = 0;
-
- /* Convert fractional part */
- if (fracpart)
- {
- do {
- temp = fracpart*0.1;
- my_modf(temp, &fracpart);
- idx = (int) ((temp -fracpart +0.05)* 10.0);
- /* idx = (int) ((((temp/10) -fracpart) +0.05) *10); */
- /* printf ("%lf, %lf, %ld\n", temp, fracpart, idx ); */
- fconvert[fplace++] =
- (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[idx];
- } while(fracpart && (fplace < 311));
- if (fplace == 311) fplace--;
- }
- fconvert[fplace] = 0;
-
- /* -1 for decimal point, another -1 if we are printing a sign */
- padlen = min - iplace - max - 1 - ((signvalue) ? 1 : 0);
- zpadlen = max - fplace;
- if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0;
- if (padlen < 0)
- padlen = 0;
- if (flags & DP_F_MINUS)
- padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justifty */
-
- if ((flags & DP_F_ZERO) && (padlen > 0)) {
- if (signvalue) {
- DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
- --padlen;
- signvalue = 0;
- }
- while (padlen > 0) {
- DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0');
- --padlen;
- }
- }
- while (padlen > 0) {
- DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
- --padlen;
- }
- if (signvalue)
- DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
-
- while (iplace > 0) {
- --iplace;
- DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, iconvert[iplace]);
- }
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF
- printf("fmtfp: fplace=%d zpadlen=%d\n", fplace, zpadlen);
-#endif
-
- /*
- * Decimal point. This should probably use locale to find the correct
- * char to print out.
- */
- if (max > 0) {
- DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '.');
-
- while (zpadlen > 0) {
- DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0');
- --zpadlen;
- }
-
- while (fplace > 0) {
- --fplace;
- DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, fconvert[fplace]);
- }
- }
-
- while (padlen < 0) {
- DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
- ++padlen;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
-int
-vsnprintf (char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, va_list args)
-{
- return dopr(str, count, fmt, args);
-}
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF)
-int
-snprintf(char *str, size_t count, SNPRINTF_CONST char *fmt, ...)
-{
- size_t ret;
- va_list ap;
-
- va_start(ap, fmt);
- ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
- va_end(ap);
- return ret;
-}
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,880 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright Patrick Powell 1995
+ * This code is based on code written by Patrick Powell (papowell at astart.com)
+ * It may be used for any purpose as long as this notice remains intact
+ * on all source code distributions
+ */
+
+/**************************************************************
+ * Original:
+ * Patrick Powell Tue Apr 11 09:48:21 PDT 1995
+ * A bombproof version of doprnt (dopr) included.
+ * Sigh. This sort of thing is always nasty do deal with. Note that
+ * the version here does not include floating point...
+ *
+ * snprintf() is used instead of sprintf() as it does limit checks
+ * for string length. This covers a nasty loophole.
+ *
+ * The other functions are there to prevent NULL pointers from
+ * causing nast effects.
+ *
+ * More Recently:
+ * Brandon Long <blong at fiction.net> 9/15/96 for mutt 0.43
+ * This was ugly. It is still ugly. I opted out of floating point
+ * numbers, but the formatter understands just about everything
+ * from the normal C string format, at least as far as I can tell from
+ * the Solaris 2.5 printf(3S) man page.
+ *
+ * Brandon Long <blong at fiction.net> 10/22/97 for mutt 0.87.1
+ * Ok, added some minimal floating point support, which means this
+ * probably requires libm on most operating systems. Don't yet
+ * support the exponent (e,E) and sigfig (g,G). Also, fmtint()
+ * was pretty badly broken, it just wasn't being exercised in ways
+ * which showed it, so that's been fixed. Also, formated the code
+ * to mutt conventions, and removed dead code left over from the
+ * original. Also, there is now a builtin-test, just compile with:
+ * gcc -DTEST_SNPRINTF -o snprintf snprintf.c -lm
+ * and run snprintf for results.
+ *
+ * Thomas Roessler <roessler at guug.de> 01/27/98 for mutt 0.89i
+ * The PGP code was using unsigned hexadecimal formats.
+ * Unfortunately, unsigned formats simply didn't work.
+ *
+ * Michael Elkins <me at cs.hmc.edu> 03/05/98 for mutt 0.90.8
+ * The original code assumed that both snprintf() and vsnprintf() were
+ * missing. Some systems only have snprintf() but not vsnprintf(), so
+ * the code is now broken down under HAVE_SNPRINTF and HAVE_VSNPRINTF.
+ *
+ * Andrew Tridgell (tridge at samba.org) Oct 1998
+ * fixed handling of %.0f
+ * added test for HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE
+ *
+ * tridge at samba.org, idra at samba.org, April 2001
+ * got rid of fcvt code (twas buggy and made testing harder)
+ * added C99 semantics
+ *
+ * date: 2002/12/19 19:56:31; author: herb; state: Exp; lines: +2 -0
+ * actually print args for %g and %e
+ *
+ * date: 2002/06/03 13:37:52; author: jmcd; state: Exp; lines: +8 -0
+ * Since includes.h isn't included here, VA_COPY has to be defined here. I don't
+ * see any include file that is guaranteed to be here, so I'm defining it
+ * locally. Fixes AIX and Solaris builds.
+ *
+ * date: 2002/06/03 03:07:24; author: tridge; state: Exp; lines: +5 -13
+ * put the ifdef for HAVE_VA_COPY in one place rather than in lots of
+ * functions
+ *
+ * date: 2002/05/17 14:51:22; author: jmcd; state: Exp; lines: +21 -4
+ * Fix usage of va_list passed as an arg. Use __va_copy before using it
+ * when it exists.
+ *
+ * date: 2002/04/16 22:38:04; author: idra; state: Exp; lines: +20 -14
+ * Fix incorrect zpadlen handling in fmtfp.
+ * Thanks to Ollie Oldham <ollie.oldham at metro-optix.com> for spotting it.
+ * few mods to make it easier to compile the tests.
+ * addedd the "Ollie" test to the floating point ones.
+ *
+ * Martin Pool (mbp at samba.org) April 2003
+ * Remove NO_CONFIG_H so that the test case can be built within a source
+ * tree with less trouble.
+ * Remove unnecessary SAFE_FREE() definition.
+ *
+ * Martin Pool (mbp at samba.org) May 2003
+ * Put in a prototype for dummy_snprintf() to quiet compiler warnings.
+ *
+ * Move #endif to make sure VA_COPY, LDOUBLE, etc are defined even
+ * if the C library has some snprintf functions already.
+ *
+ * Damien Miller (djm at mindrot.org) Jan 2007
+ * Fix integer overflows in return value.
+ * Make formatting quite a bit faster by inlining dopr_outch()
+ *
+ **************************************************************/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_SNPRINTF) /* For those with broken snprintf() */
+# undef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+# undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE
+# define LDOUBLE long double
+#else
+# define LDOUBLE double
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG
+# define LLONG long long
+#else
+# define LLONG long
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * dopr(): poor man's version of doprintf
+ */
+
+/* format read states */
+#define DP_S_DEFAULT 0
+#define DP_S_FLAGS 1
+#define DP_S_MIN 2
+#define DP_S_DOT 3
+#define DP_S_MAX 4
+#define DP_S_MOD 5
+#define DP_S_CONV 6
+#define DP_S_DONE 7
+
+/* format flags - Bits */
+#define DP_F_MINUS (1 << 0)
+#define DP_F_PLUS (1 << 1)
+#define DP_F_SPACE (1 << 2)
+#define DP_F_NUM (1 << 3)
+#define DP_F_ZERO (1 << 4)
+#define DP_F_UP (1 << 5)
+#define DP_F_UNSIGNED (1 << 6)
+
+/* Conversion Flags */
+#define DP_C_SHORT 1
+#define DP_C_LONG 2
+#define DP_C_LDOUBLE 3
+#define DP_C_LLONG 4
+#define DP_C_SIZE 5
+#define DP_C_INTMAX 6
+
+#define char_to_int(p) ((p)- '0')
+#ifndef MAX
+# define MAX(p,q) (((p) >= (q)) ? (p) : (q))
+#endif
+
+#define DOPR_OUTCH(buf, pos, buflen, thechar) \
+ do { \
+ if (pos + 1 >= INT_MAX) { \
+ errno = ERANGE; \
+ return -1; \
+ } \
+ if (pos < buflen) \
+ buf[pos] = thechar; \
+ (pos)++; \
+ } while (0)
+
+static int dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format,
+ va_list args_in);
+static int fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+ char *value, int flags, int min, int max);
+static int fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+ intmax_t value, int base, int min, int max, int flags);
+static int fmtfp(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+ LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags);
+
+static int
+dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, va_list args_in)
+{
+ char ch;
+ intmax_t value;
+ LDOUBLE fvalue;
+ char *strvalue;
+ int min;
+ int max;
+ int state;
+ int flags;
+ int cflags;
+ size_t currlen;
+ va_list args;
+
+ VA_COPY(args, args_in);
+
+ state = DP_S_DEFAULT;
+ currlen = flags = cflags = min = 0;
+ max = -1;
+ ch = *format++;
+
+ while (state != DP_S_DONE) {
+ if (ch == '\0')
+ state = DP_S_DONE;
+
+ switch(state) {
+ case DP_S_DEFAULT:
+ if (ch == '%')
+ state = DP_S_FLAGS;
+ else
+ DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ch);
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ case DP_S_FLAGS:
+ switch (ch) {
+ case '-':
+ flags |= DP_F_MINUS;
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ case '+':
+ flags |= DP_F_PLUS;
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ case ' ':
+ flags |= DP_F_SPACE;
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ case '#':
+ flags |= DP_F_NUM;
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ case '0':
+ flags |= DP_F_ZERO;
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ default:
+ state = DP_S_MIN;
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case DP_S_MIN:
+ if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) {
+ min = 10*min + char_to_int (ch);
+ ch = *format++;
+ } else if (ch == '*') {
+ min = va_arg (args, int);
+ ch = *format++;
+ state = DP_S_DOT;
+ } else {
+ state = DP_S_DOT;
+ }
+ break;
+ case DP_S_DOT:
+ if (ch == '.') {
+ state = DP_S_MAX;
+ ch = *format++;
+ } else {
+ state = DP_S_MOD;
+ }
+ break;
+ case DP_S_MAX:
+ if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) {
+ if (max < 0)
+ max = 0;
+ max = 10*max + char_to_int (ch);
+ ch = *format++;
+ } else if (ch == '*') {
+ max = va_arg (args, int);
+ ch = *format++;
+ state = DP_S_MOD;
+ } else {
+ state = DP_S_MOD;
+ }
+ break;
+ case DP_S_MOD:
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'h':
+ cflags = DP_C_SHORT;
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ case 'j':
+ cflags = DP_C_INTMAX;
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ case 'l':
+ cflags = DP_C_LONG;
+ ch = *format++;
+ if (ch == 'l') { /* It's a long long */
+ cflags = DP_C_LLONG;
+ ch = *format++;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'L':
+ cflags = DP_C_LDOUBLE;
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ case 'z':
+ cflags = DP_C_SIZE;
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ state = DP_S_CONV;
+ break;
+ case DP_S_CONV:
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'd':
+ case 'i':
+ if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
+ value = va_arg (args, int);
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
+ value = va_arg (args, long int);
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
+ value = va_arg (args, LLONG);
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE)
+ value = va_arg (args, ssize_t);
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX)
+ value = va_arg (args, intmax_t);
+ else
+ value = va_arg (args, int);
+ if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+ value, 10, min, max, flags) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case 'o':
+ flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
+ if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
+ value = va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
+ value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int);
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
+ value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG);
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE)
+ value = va_arg (args, size_t);
+#ifdef notyet
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX)
+ value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t);
+#endif
+ else
+ value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+ if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
+ 8, min, max, flags) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case 'u':
+ flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
+ if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
+ value = va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
+ value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int);
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
+ value = (LLONG)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG);
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE)
+ value = va_arg (args, size_t);
+#ifdef notyet
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX)
+ value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t);
+#endif
+ else
+ value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+ if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
+ 10, min, max, flags) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case 'X':
+ flags |= DP_F_UP;
+ case 'x':
+ flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
+ if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
+ value = va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
+ value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int);
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
+ value = (LLONG)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG);
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE)
+ value = va_arg (args, size_t);
+#ifdef notyet
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX)
+ value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t);
+#endif
+ else
+ value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+ if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
+ 16, min, max, flags) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case 'f':
+ if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
+ fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE);
+ else
+ fvalue = va_arg (args, double);
+ if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue,
+ min, max, flags) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case 'E':
+ flags |= DP_F_UP;
+ case 'e':
+ if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
+ fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE);
+ else
+ fvalue = va_arg (args, double);
+ if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue,
+ min, max, flags) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case 'G':
+ flags |= DP_F_UP;
+ case 'g':
+ if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
+ fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE);
+ else
+ fvalue = va_arg (args, double);
+ if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue,
+ min, max, flags) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case 'c':
+ DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen,
+ va_arg (args, int));
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ strvalue = va_arg (args, char *);
+ if (!strvalue) strvalue = "(NULL)";
+ if (max == -1) {
+ max = strlen(strvalue);
+ }
+ if (min > 0 && max >= 0 && min > max) max = min;
+ if (fmtstr(buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+ strvalue, flags, min, max) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ strvalue = va_arg (args, void *);
+ if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+ (long) strvalue, 16, min, max, flags) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+#if we_dont_want_this_in_openssh
+ case 'n':
+ if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) {
+ short int *num;
+ num = va_arg (args, short int *);
+ *num = currlen;
+ } else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) {
+ long int *num;
+ num = va_arg (args, long int *);
+ *num = (long int)currlen;
+ } else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) {
+ LLONG *num;
+ num = va_arg (args, LLONG *);
+ *num = (LLONG)currlen;
+ } else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) {
+ ssize_t *num;
+ num = va_arg (args, ssize_t *);
+ *num = (ssize_t)currlen;
+ } else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) {
+ intmax_t *num;
+ num = va_arg (args, intmax_t *);
+ *num = (intmax_t)currlen;
+ } else {
+ int *num;
+ num = va_arg (args, int *);
+ *num = currlen;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+ case '%':
+ DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ch);
+ break;
+ case 'w':
+ /* not supported yet, treat as next char */
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Unknown, skip */
+ break;
+ }
+ ch = *format++;
+ state = DP_S_DEFAULT;
+ flags = cflags = min = 0;
+ max = -1;
+ break;
+ case DP_S_DONE:
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* hmm? */
+ break; /* some picky compilers need this */
+ }
+ }
+ if (maxlen != 0) {
+ if (currlen < maxlen - 1)
+ buffer[currlen] = '\0';
+ else if (maxlen > 0)
+ buffer[maxlen - 1] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ return currlen < INT_MAX ? (int)currlen : -1;
+}
+
+static int
+fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+ char *value, int flags, int min, int max)
+{
+ int padlen, strln; /* amount to pad */
+ int cnt = 0;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF
+ printf("fmtstr min=%d max=%d s=[%s]\n", min, max, value);
+#endif
+ if (value == 0) {
+ value = "<NULL>";
+ }
+
+ for (strln = 0; strln < max && value[strln]; ++strln); /* strlen */
+ padlen = min - strln;
+ if (padlen < 0)
+ padlen = 0;
+ if (flags & DP_F_MINUS)
+ padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justify */
+
+ while ((padlen > 0) && (cnt < max)) {
+ DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+ --padlen;
+ ++cnt;
+ }
+ while (*value && (cnt < max)) {
+ DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, *value);
+ value++;
+ ++cnt;
+ }
+ while ((padlen < 0) && (cnt < max)) {
+ DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+ ++padlen;
+ ++cnt;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Have to handle DP_F_NUM (ie 0x and 0 alternates) */
+
+static int
+fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+ intmax_t value, int base, int min, int max, int flags)
+{
+ int signvalue = 0;
+ unsigned LLONG uvalue;
+ char convert[20];
+ int place = 0;
+ int spadlen = 0; /* amount to space pad */
+ int zpadlen = 0; /* amount to zero pad */
+ int caps = 0;
+
+ if (max < 0)
+ max = 0;
+
+ uvalue = value;
+
+ if(!(flags & DP_F_UNSIGNED)) {
+ if( value < 0 ) {
+ signvalue = '-';
+ uvalue = -value;
+ } else {
+ if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) /* Do a sign (+/i) */
+ signvalue = '+';
+ else if (flags & DP_F_SPACE)
+ signvalue = ' ';
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (flags & DP_F_UP) caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */
+
+ do {
+ convert[place++] =
+ (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")
+ [uvalue % (unsigned)base ];
+ uvalue = (uvalue / (unsigned)base );
+ } while(uvalue && (place < 20));
+ if (place == 20) place--;
+ convert[place] = 0;
+
+ zpadlen = max - place;
+ spadlen = min - MAX (max, place) - (signvalue ? 1 : 0);
+ if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0;
+ if (spadlen < 0) spadlen = 0;
+ if (flags & DP_F_ZERO) {
+ zpadlen = MAX(zpadlen, spadlen);
+ spadlen = 0;
+ }
+ if (flags & DP_F_MINUS)
+ spadlen = -spadlen; /* Left Justifty */
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF
+ printf("zpad: %d, spad: %d, min: %d, max: %d, place: %d\n",
+ zpadlen, spadlen, min, max, place);
+#endif
+
+ /* Spaces */
+ while (spadlen > 0) {
+ DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+ --spadlen;
+ }
+
+ /* Sign */
+ if (signvalue)
+ DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
+
+ /* Zeros */
+ if (zpadlen > 0) {
+ while (zpadlen > 0) {
+ DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0');
+ --zpadlen;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Digits */
+ while (place > 0) {
+ --place;
+ DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, convert[place]);
+ }
+
+ /* Left Justified spaces */
+ while (spadlen < 0) {
+ DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+ ++spadlen;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static LDOUBLE abs_val(LDOUBLE value)
+{
+ LDOUBLE result = value;
+
+ if (value < 0)
+ result = -value;
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+static LDOUBLE POW10(int val)
+{
+ LDOUBLE result = 1;
+
+ while (val) {
+ result *= 10;
+ val--;
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+static LLONG ROUND(LDOUBLE value)
+{
+ LLONG intpart;
+
+ intpart = (LLONG)value;
+ value = value - intpart;
+ if (value >= 0.5) intpart++;
+
+ return intpart;
+}
+
+/* a replacement for modf that doesn't need the math library. Should
+ be portable, but slow */
+static double my_modf(double x0, double *iptr)
+{
+ int i;
+ long l;
+ double x = x0;
+ double f = 1.0;
+
+ for (i=0;i<100;i++) {
+ l = (long)x;
+ if (l <= (x+1) && l >= (x-1)) break;
+ x *= 0.1;
+ f *= 10.0;
+ }
+
+ if (i == 100) {
+ /*
+ * yikes! the number is beyond what we can handle.
+ * What do we do?
+ */
+ (*iptr) = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (i != 0) {
+ double i2;
+ double ret;
+
+ ret = my_modf(x0-l*f, &i2);
+ (*iptr) = l*f + i2;
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ (*iptr) = l;
+ return x - (*iptr);
+}
+
+
+static int
+fmtfp (char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+ LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags)
+{
+ int signvalue = 0;
+ double ufvalue;
+ char iconvert[311];
+ char fconvert[311];
+ int iplace = 0;
+ int fplace = 0;
+ int padlen = 0; /* amount to pad */
+ int zpadlen = 0;
+ int caps = 0;
+ int idx;
+ double intpart;
+ double fracpart;
+ double temp;
+
+ /*
+ * AIX manpage says the default is 0, but Solaris says the default
+ * is 6, and sprintf on AIX defaults to 6
+ */
+ if (max < 0)
+ max = 6;
+
+ ufvalue = abs_val (fvalue);
+
+ if (fvalue < 0) {
+ signvalue = '-';
+ } else {
+ if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) { /* Do a sign (+/i) */
+ signvalue = '+';
+ } else {
+ if (flags & DP_F_SPACE)
+ signvalue = ' ';
+ }
+ }
+
+#if 0
+ if (flags & DP_F_UP) caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */
+#endif
+
+#if 0
+ if (max == 0) ufvalue += 0.5; /* if max = 0 we must round */
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Sorry, we only support 16 digits past the decimal because of our
+ * conversion method
+ */
+ if (max > 16)
+ max = 16;
+
+ /* We "cheat" by converting the fractional part to integer by
+ * multiplying by a factor of 10
+ */
+
+ temp = ufvalue;
+ my_modf(temp, &intpart);
+
+ fracpart = ROUND((POW10(max)) * (ufvalue - intpart));
+
+ if (fracpart >= POW10(max)) {
+ intpart++;
+ fracpart -= POW10(max);
+ }
+
+ /* Convert integer part */
+ do {
+ temp = intpart*0.1;
+ my_modf(temp, &intpart);
+ idx = (int) ((temp -intpart +0.05)* 10.0);
+ /* idx = (int) (((double)(temp*0.1) -intpart +0.05) *10.0); */
+ /* printf ("%llf, %f, %x\n", temp, intpart, idx); */
+ iconvert[iplace++] =
+ (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[idx];
+ } while (intpart && (iplace < 311));
+ if (iplace == 311) iplace--;
+ iconvert[iplace] = 0;
+
+ /* Convert fractional part */
+ if (fracpart)
+ {
+ do {
+ temp = fracpart*0.1;
+ my_modf(temp, &fracpart);
+ idx = (int) ((temp -fracpart +0.05)* 10.0);
+ /* idx = (int) ((((temp/10) -fracpart) +0.05) *10); */
+ /* printf ("%lf, %lf, %ld\n", temp, fracpart, idx ); */
+ fconvert[fplace++] =
+ (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[idx];
+ } while(fracpart && (fplace < 311));
+ if (fplace == 311) fplace--;
+ }
+ fconvert[fplace] = 0;
+
+ /* -1 for decimal point, another -1 if we are printing a sign */
+ padlen = min - iplace - max - 1 - ((signvalue) ? 1 : 0);
+ zpadlen = max - fplace;
+ if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0;
+ if (padlen < 0)
+ padlen = 0;
+ if (flags & DP_F_MINUS)
+ padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justifty */
+
+ if ((flags & DP_F_ZERO) && (padlen > 0)) {
+ if (signvalue) {
+ DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
+ --padlen;
+ signvalue = 0;
+ }
+ while (padlen > 0) {
+ DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0');
+ --padlen;
+ }
+ }
+ while (padlen > 0) {
+ DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+ --padlen;
+ }
+ if (signvalue)
+ DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
+
+ while (iplace > 0) {
+ --iplace;
+ DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, iconvert[iplace]);
+ }
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF
+ printf("fmtfp: fplace=%d zpadlen=%d\n", fplace, zpadlen);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Decimal point. This should probably use locale to find the correct
+ * char to print out.
+ */
+ if (max > 0) {
+ DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '.');
+
+ while (zpadlen > 0) {
+ DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0');
+ --zpadlen;
+ }
+
+ while (fplace > 0) {
+ --fplace;
+ DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, fconvert[fplace]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ while (padlen < 0) {
+ DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+ ++padlen;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
+int
+vsnprintf (char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, va_list args)
+{
+ return dopr(str, count, fmt, args);
+}
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF)
+int
+snprintf(char *str, size_t count, SNPRINTF_CONST char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ size_t ret;
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/explicit_bzero.c */
-/* $OpenBSD: explicit_bzero.c,v 1.1 2014/01/22 21:06:45 tedu Exp $ */
-/*
- * Public domain.
- * Written by Ted Unangst
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
-
-/*
- * explicit_bzero - don't let the compiler optimize away bzero
- */
-void
-explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n)
-{
- bzero(p, n);
-}
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/explicit_bzero.c */
+/* $OpenBSD: explicit_bzero.c,v 1.1 2014/01/22 21:06:45 tedu Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Public domain.
+ * Written by Ted Unangst
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+/*
+ * explicit_bzero - don't let the compiler optimize away bzero
+ */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
+
+#ifdef HAVE_MEMSET_S
+
+void
+explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n)
+{
+ (void)memset_s(p, n, 0, n);
+}
+
+#else /* HAVE_MEMSET_S */
+
+/*
+ * Indirect bzero through a volatile pointer to hopefully avoid
+ * dead-store optimisation eliminating the call.
+ */
+static void (* volatile ssh_bzero)(void *, size_t) = bzero;
+
+void
+explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n)
+{
+ ssh_bzero(p, n);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_MEMSET_S */
+
+#endif /* HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: fake-rfc2553.h,v 1.16 2008/07/14 11:37:37 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2000-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 1999 WIDE Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
- * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
- * without specific prior written permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-/*
- * Pseudo-implementation of RFC2553 name / address resolution functions
- *
- * But these functions are not implemented correctly. The minimum subset
- * is implemented for ssh use only. For example, this routine assumes
- * that ai_family is AF_INET. Don't use it for another purpose.
- */
-
-#ifndef _FAKE_RFC2553_H
-#define _FAKE_RFC2553_H
-
-#include "includes.h"
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H)
-# include <netdb.h>
-#endif
-
-/*
- * First, socket and INET6 related definitions
- */
-#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE
-# define _SS_MAXSIZE 128 /* Implementation specific max size */
-# define _SS_PADSIZE (_SS_MAXSIZE - sizeof (struct sockaddr))
-struct sockaddr_storage {
- struct sockaddr ss_sa;
- char __ss_pad2[_SS_PADSIZE];
-};
-# define ss_family ss_sa.sa_family
-#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE */
-
-#ifndef IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK
-# define IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(a) \
- (((u_int32_t *)(a))[0] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *)(a))[1] == 0 && \
- ((u_int32_t *)(a))[2] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *)(a))[3] == htonl(1))
-#endif /* !IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR
-struct in6_addr {
- u_int8_t s6_addr[16];
-};
-#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6
-struct sockaddr_in6 {
- unsigned short sin6_family;
- u_int16_t sin6_port;
- u_int32_t sin6_flowinfo;
- struct in6_addr sin6_addr;
- u_int32_t sin6_scope_id;
-};
-#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 */
-
-#ifndef AF_INET6
-/* Define it to something that should never appear */
-#define AF_INET6 AF_MAX
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Next, RFC2553 name / address resolution API
- */
-
-#ifndef NI_NUMERICHOST
-# define NI_NUMERICHOST (1)
-#endif
-#ifndef NI_NAMEREQD
-# define NI_NAMEREQD (1<<1)
-#endif
-#ifndef NI_NUMERICSERV
-# define NI_NUMERICSERV (1<<2)
-#endif
-
-#ifndef AI_PASSIVE
-# define AI_PASSIVE (1)
-#endif
-#ifndef AI_CANONNAME
-# define AI_CANONNAME (1<<1)
-#endif
-#ifndef AI_NUMERICHOST
-# define AI_NUMERICHOST (1<<2)
-#endif
-
-#ifndef NI_MAXSERV
-# define NI_MAXSERV 32
-#endif /* !NI_MAXSERV */
-#ifndef NI_MAXHOST
-# define NI_MAXHOST 1025
-#endif /* !NI_MAXHOST */
-
-#ifndef EAI_NODATA
-# define EAI_NODATA (INT_MAX - 1)
-#endif
-#ifndef EAI_MEMORY
-# define EAI_MEMORY (INT_MAX - 2)
-#endif
-#ifndef EAI_NONAME
-# define EAI_NONAME (INT_MAX - 3)
-#endif
-#ifndef EAI_SYSTEM
-# define EAI_SYSTEM (INT_MAX - 4)
-#endif
-#ifndef EAI_FAMILY
-# define EAI_FAMILY (INT_MAX - 5)
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO
-struct addrinfo {
- int ai_flags; /* AI_PASSIVE, AI_CANONNAME */
- int ai_family; /* PF_xxx */
- int ai_socktype; /* SOCK_xxx */
- int ai_protocol; /* 0 or IPPROTO_xxx for IPv4 and IPv6 */
- size_t ai_addrlen; /* length of ai_addr */
- char *ai_canonname; /* canonical name for hostname */
- struct sockaddr *ai_addr; /* binary address */
- struct addrinfo *ai_next; /* next structure in linked list */
-};
-#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
-#ifdef getaddrinfo
-# undef getaddrinfo
-#endif
-#define getaddrinfo(a,b,c,d) (ssh_getaddrinfo(a,b,c,d))
-int getaddrinfo(const char *, const char *,
- const struct addrinfo *, struct addrinfo **);
-#endif /* !HAVE_GETADDRINFO */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR) && !defined(HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO)
-#define gai_strerror(a) (_ssh_compat_gai_strerror(a))
-char *gai_strerror(int);
-#endif /* !HAVE_GAI_STRERROR */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
-#define freeaddrinfo(a) (ssh_freeaddrinfo(a))
-void freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *);
-#endif /* !HAVE_FREEADDRINFO */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO
-#define getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g) (ssh_getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g))
-int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *, size_t, char *, size_t,
- char *, size_t, int);
-#endif /* !HAVE_GETNAMEINFO */
-
-#endif /* !_FAKE_RFC2553_H */
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+/* $Id: fake-rfc2553.h,v 1.16 2008/07/14 11:37:37 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2000-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 1999 WIDE Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Pseudo-implementation of RFC2553 name / address resolution functions
+ *
+ * But these functions are not implemented correctly. The minimum subset
+ * is implemented for ssh use only. For example, this routine assumes
+ * that ai_family is AF_INET. Don't use it for another purpose.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _FAKE_RFC2553_H
+#define _FAKE_RFC2553_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H)
+# include <netdb.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * First, socket and INET6 related definitions
+ */
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE
+# define _SS_MAXSIZE 128 /* Implementation specific max size */
+# define _SS_PADSIZE (_SS_MAXSIZE - sizeof (struct sockaddr))
+struct sockaddr_storage {
+ struct sockaddr ss_sa;
+ char __ss_pad2[_SS_PADSIZE];
+};
+# define ss_family ss_sa.sa_family
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE */
+
+#ifndef IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK
+# define IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(a) \
+ (((u_int32_t *)(a))[0] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *)(a))[1] == 0 && \
+ ((u_int32_t *)(a))[2] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *)(a))[3] == htonl(1))
+#endif /* !IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR
+struct in6_addr {
+ u_int8_t s6_addr[16];
+};
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6
+struct sockaddr_in6 {
+ unsigned short sin6_family;
+ u_int16_t sin6_port;
+ u_int32_t sin6_flowinfo;
+ struct in6_addr sin6_addr;
+ u_int32_t sin6_scope_id;
+};
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 */
+
+#ifndef AF_INET6
+/* Define it to something that should never appear */
+#define AF_INET6 AF_MAX
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Next, RFC2553 name / address resolution API
+ */
+
+#ifndef NI_NUMERICHOST
+# define NI_NUMERICHOST (1)
+#endif
+#ifndef NI_NAMEREQD
+# define NI_NAMEREQD (1<<1)
+#endif
+#ifndef NI_NUMERICSERV
+# define NI_NUMERICSERV (1<<2)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef AI_PASSIVE
+# define AI_PASSIVE (1)
+#endif
+#ifndef AI_CANONNAME
+# define AI_CANONNAME (1<<1)
+#endif
+#ifndef AI_NUMERICHOST
+# define AI_NUMERICHOST (1<<2)
+#endif
+#ifndef AI_NUMERICSERV
+# define AI_NUMERICSERV (1<<3)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef NI_MAXSERV
+# define NI_MAXSERV 32
+#endif /* !NI_MAXSERV */
+#ifndef NI_MAXHOST
+# define NI_MAXHOST 1025
+#endif /* !NI_MAXHOST */
+
+#ifndef EAI_NODATA
+# define EAI_NODATA (INT_MAX - 1)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_MEMORY
+# define EAI_MEMORY (INT_MAX - 2)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_NONAME
+# define EAI_NONAME (INT_MAX - 3)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_SYSTEM
+# define EAI_SYSTEM (INT_MAX - 4)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_FAMILY
+# define EAI_FAMILY (INT_MAX - 5)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO
+struct addrinfo {
+ int ai_flags; /* AI_PASSIVE, AI_CANONNAME */
+ int ai_family; /* PF_xxx */
+ int ai_socktype; /* SOCK_xxx */
+ int ai_protocol; /* 0 or IPPROTO_xxx for IPv4 and IPv6 */
+ size_t ai_addrlen; /* length of ai_addr */
+ char *ai_canonname; /* canonical name for hostname */
+ struct sockaddr *ai_addr; /* binary address */
+ struct addrinfo *ai_next; /* next structure in linked list */
+};
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+#ifdef getaddrinfo
+# undef getaddrinfo
+#endif
+#define getaddrinfo(a,b,c,d) (ssh_getaddrinfo(a,b,c,d))
+int getaddrinfo(const char *, const char *,
+ const struct addrinfo *, struct addrinfo **);
+#endif /* !HAVE_GETADDRINFO */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR) && !defined(HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO)
+#define gai_strerror(a) (_ssh_compat_gai_strerror(a))
+char *gai_strerror(int);
+#endif /* !HAVE_GAI_STRERROR */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
+#define freeaddrinfo(a) (ssh_freeaddrinfo(a))
+void freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *);
+#endif /* !HAVE_FREEADDRINFO */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO
+#define getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g) (ssh_getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g))
+int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *, size_t, char *, size_t,
+ char *, size_t, int);
+#endif /* !HAVE_GETNAMEINFO */
+
+#endif /* !_FAKE_RFC2553_H */
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,284 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: getrrsetbyname.c,v 1.10 2005/03/30 02:58:28 tedu Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2007 Simon Vallet / Genoscope <svallet at genoscope.cns.fr>
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-/*
- * Portions Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Internet Software Consortium.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM
- * DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL
- * INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT,
- * INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING
- * FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT,
- * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION
- * WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#if !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && defined (HAVE_LDNS)
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <ldns/ldns.h>
-
-#include "getrrsetbyname.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-
-#define malloc(x) (xmalloc(x))
-#define calloc(x, y) (xcalloc((x),(y)))
-
-int
-getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
- unsigned int rdtype, unsigned int flags,
- struct rrsetinfo **res)
-{
- int result;
- unsigned int i, j, index_ans, index_sig;
- struct rrsetinfo *rrset = NULL;
- struct rdatainfo *rdata;
- size_t len;
- ldns_resolver *ldns_res;
- ldns_rdf *domain = NULL;
- ldns_pkt *pkt = NULL;
- ldns_rr_list *rrsigs = NULL, *rrdata = NULL;
- ldns_status err;
- ldns_rr *rr;
-
- /* check for invalid class and type */
- if (rdclass > 0xffff || rdtype > 0xffff) {
- result = ERRSET_INVAL;
- goto fail;
- }
-
- /* don't allow queries of class or type ANY */
- if (rdclass == 0xff || rdtype == 0xff) {
- result = ERRSET_INVAL;
- goto fail;
- }
-
- /* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */
- if (flags) {
- result = ERRSET_INVAL;
- goto fail;
- }
-
- /* Initialize resolver from resolv.conf */
- domain = ldns_dname_new_frm_str(hostname);
- if ((err = ldns_resolver_new_frm_file(&ldns_res, NULL)) != \
- LDNS_STATUS_OK) {
- result = ERRSET_FAIL;
- goto fail;
- }
-
-#ifdef LDNS_DEBUG
- ldns_resolver_set_debug(ldns_res, true);
-#endif /* LDNS_DEBUG */
-
- ldns_resolver_set_dnssec(ldns_res, true); /* Use DNSSEC */
-
- /* make query */
- pkt = ldns_resolver_query(ldns_res, domain, rdtype, rdclass, LDNS_RD);
-
- /*** TODO: finer errcodes -- see original **/
- if (!pkt || ldns_pkt_ancount(pkt) < 1) {
- result = ERRSET_FAIL;
- goto fail;
- }
-
- /* initialize rrset */
- rrset = calloc(1, sizeof(struct rrsetinfo));
- if (rrset == NULL) {
- result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
- goto fail;
- }
-
- rrdata = ldns_pkt_rr_list_by_type(pkt, rdtype, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER);
- rrset->rri_nrdatas = ldns_rr_list_rr_count(rrdata);
- if (!rrset->rri_nrdatas) {
- result = ERRSET_NODATA;
- goto fail;
- }
-
- /* copy name from answer section */
- len = ldns_rdf_size(ldns_rr_owner(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0)));
- if ((rrset->rri_name = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
- result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
- goto fail;
- }
- memcpy(rrset->rri_name,
- ldns_rdf_data(ldns_rr_owner(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0))), len);
-
- rrset->rri_rdclass = ldns_rr_get_class(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0));
- rrset->rri_rdtype = ldns_rr_get_type(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0));
- rrset->rri_ttl = ldns_rr_ttl(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0));
-
- debug2("ldns: got %u answers from DNS", rrset->rri_nrdatas);
-
- /* Check for authenticated data */
- if (ldns_pkt_ad(pkt)) {
- rrset->rri_flags |= RRSET_VALIDATED;
- } else { /* AD is not set, try autonomous validation */
- ldns_rr_list * trusted_keys = ldns_rr_list_new();
-
- debug2("ldns: trying to validate RRset");
- /* Get eventual sigs */
- rrsigs = ldns_pkt_rr_list_by_type(pkt, LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG,
- LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER);
-
- rrset->rri_nsigs = ldns_rr_list_rr_count(rrsigs);
- debug2("ldns: got %u signature(s) (RRTYPE %u) from DNS",
- rrset->rri_nsigs, LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG);
-
- if ((err = ldns_verify_trusted(ldns_res, rrdata, rrsigs,
- trusted_keys)) == LDNS_STATUS_OK) {
- rrset->rri_flags |= RRSET_VALIDATED;
- debug2("ldns: RRset is signed with a valid key");
- } else {
- debug2("ldns: RRset validation failed: %s",
- ldns_get_errorstr_by_id(err));
- }
-
- ldns_rr_list_deep_free(trusted_keys);
- }
-
- /* allocate memory for answers */
- rrset->rri_rdatas = calloc(rrset->rri_nrdatas,
- sizeof(struct rdatainfo));
-
- if (rrset->rri_rdatas == NULL) {
- result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
- goto fail;
- }
-
- /* allocate memory for signatures */
- if (rrset->rri_nsigs > 0) {
- rrset->rri_sigs = calloc(rrset->rri_nsigs,
- sizeof(struct rdatainfo));
-
- if (rrset->rri_sigs == NULL) {
- result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
- goto fail;
- }
- }
-
- /* copy answers & signatures */
- for (i=0, index_ans=0, index_sig=0; i< pkt->_header->_ancount; i++) {
- rdata = NULL;
- rr = ldns_rr_list_rr(ldns_pkt_answer(pkt), i);
-
- if (ldns_rr_get_class(rr) == rrset->rri_rdclass &&
- ldns_rr_get_type(rr) == rrset->rri_rdtype) {
- rdata = &rrset->rri_rdatas[index_ans++];
- }
-
- if (rr->_rr_class == rrset->rri_rdclass &&
- rr->_rr_type == LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG &&
- rrset->rri_sigs) {
- rdata = &rrset->rri_sigs[index_sig++];
- }
-
- if (rdata) {
- size_t rdata_offset = 0;
-
- rdata->rdi_length = 0;
- for (j=0; j< rr->_rd_count; j++) {
- rdata->rdi_length +=
- ldns_rdf_size(ldns_rr_rdf(rr, j));
- }
-
- rdata->rdi_data = malloc(rdata->rdi_length);
- if (rdata->rdi_data == NULL) {
- result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
- goto fail;
- }
-
- /* Re-create the raw DNS RDATA */
- for (j=0; j< rr->_rd_count; j++) {
- len = ldns_rdf_size(ldns_rr_rdf(rr, j));
- memcpy(rdata->rdi_data + rdata_offset,
- ldns_rdf_data(ldns_rr_rdf(rr, j)), len);
- rdata_offset += len;
- }
- }
- }
-
- *res = rrset;
- result = ERRSET_SUCCESS;
-
-fail:
- /* freerrset(rrset); */
- ldns_rdf_deep_free(domain);
- ldns_pkt_free(pkt);
- ldns_rr_list_deep_free(rrsigs);
- ldns_rr_list_deep_free(rrdata);
- ldns_resolver_deep_free(ldns_res);
-
- return result;
-}
-
-
-void
-freerrset(struct rrsetinfo *rrset)
-{
- u_int16_t i;
-
- if (rrset == NULL)
- return;
-
- if (rrset->rri_rdatas) {
- for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nrdatas; i++) {
- if (rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data == NULL)
- break;
- free(rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data);
- }
- free(rrset->rri_rdatas);
- }
-
- if (rrset->rri_sigs) {
- for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nsigs; i++) {
- if (rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data == NULL)
- break;
- free(rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data);
- }
- free(rrset->rri_sigs);
- }
-
- if (rrset->rri_name)
- free(rrset->rri_name);
- free(rrset);
-}
-
-
-#endif /* !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && defined (HAVE_LDNS) */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: getrrsetbyname.c,v 1.10 2005/03/30 02:58:28 tedu Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2007 Simon Vallet / Genoscope <svallet at genoscope.cns.fr>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Internet Software Consortium.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM
+ * DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+ * INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING
+ * FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT,
+ * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION
+ * WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && defined (HAVE_LDNS)
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <ldns/ldns.h>
+
+#include "getrrsetbyname.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+#define malloc(x) (xmalloc(x))
+#define calloc(x, y) (xcalloc((x),(y)))
+
+int
+getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
+ unsigned int rdtype, unsigned int flags,
+ struct rrsetinfo **res)
+{
+ int result;
+ unsigned int i, j, index_ans, index_sig;
+ struct rrsetinfo *rrset = NULL;
+ struct rdatainfo *rdata;
+ size_t len;
+ ldns_resolver *ldns_res = NULL;
+ ldns_rdf *domain = NULL;
+ ldns_pkt *pkt = NULL;
+ ldns_rr_list *rrsigs = NULL, *rrdata = NULL;
+ ldns_status err;
+ ldns_rr *rr;
+
+ /* check for invalid class and type */
+ if (rdclass > 0xffff || rdtype > 0xffff) {
+ result = ERRSET_INVAL;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* don't allow queries of class or type ANY */
+ if (rdclass == 0xff || rdtype == 0xff) {
+ result = ERRSET_INVAL;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */
+ if (flags) {
+ result = ERRSET_INVAL;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize resolver from resolv.conf */
+ domain = ldns_dname_new_frm_str(hostname);
+ if ((err = ldns_resolver_new_frm_file(&ldns_res, NULL)) != \
+ LDNS_STATUS_OK) {
+ result = ERRSET_FAIL;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+#ifdef LDNS_DEBUG
+ ldns_resolver_set_debug(ldns_res, true);
+#endif /* LDNS_DEBUG */
+
+ ldns_resolver_set_dnssec(ldns_res, true); /* Use DNSSEC */
+
+ /* make query */
+ pkt = ldns_resolver_query(ldns_res, domain, rdtype, rdclass, LDNS_RD);
+
+ /*** TODO: finer errcodes -- see original **/
+ if (!pkt || ldns_pkt_ancount(pkt) < 1) {
+ result = ERRSET_FAIL;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* initialize rrset */
+ rrset = calloc(1, sizeof(struct rrsetinfo));
+ if (rrset == NULL) {
+ result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ rrdata = ldns_pkt_rr_list_by_type(pkt, rdtype, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER);
+ rrset->rri_nrdatas = ldns_rr_list_rr_count(rrdata);
+ if (!rrset->rri_nrdatas) {
+ result = ERRSET_NODATA;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* copy name from answer section */
+ len = ldns_rdf_size(ldns_rr_owner(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0)));
+ if ((rrset->rri_name = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ memcpy(rrset->rri_name,
+ ldns_rdf_data(ldns_rr_owner(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0))), len);
+
+ rrset->rri_rdclass = ldns_rr_get_class(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0));
+ rrset->rri_rdtype = ldns_rr_get_type(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0));
+ rrset->rri_ttl = ldns_rr_ttl(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0));
+
+ debug2("ldns: got %u answers from DNS", rrset->rri_nrdatas);
+
+ /* Check for authenticated data */
+ if (ldns_pkt_ad(pkt)) {
+ rrset->rri_flags |= RRSET_VALIDATED;
+ } else { /* AD is not set, try autonomous validation */
+ ldns_rr_list * trusted_keys = ldns_rr_list_new();
+
+ debug2("ldns: trying to validate RRset");
+ /* Get eventual sigs */
+ rrsigs = ldns_pkt_rr_list_by_type(pkt, LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG,
+ LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER);
+
+ rrset->rri_nsigs = ldns_rr_list_rr_count(rrsigs);
+ debug2("ldns: got %u signature(s) (RRTYPE %u) from DNS",
+ rrset->rri_nsigs, LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG);
+
+ if ((err = ldns_verify_trusted(ldns_res, rrdata, rrsigs,
+ trusted_keys)) == LDNS_STATUS_OK) {
+ rrset->rri_flags |= RRSET_VALIDATED;
+ debug2("ldns: RRset is signed with a valid key");
+ } else {
+ debug2("ldns: RRset validation failed: %s",
+ ldns_get_errorstr_by_id(err));
+ }
+
+ ldns_rr_list_deep_free(trusted_keys);
+ }
+
+ /* allocate memory for answers */
+ rrset->rri_rdatas = calloc(rrset->rri_nrdatas,
+ sizeof(struct rdatainfo));
+
+ if (rrset->rri_rdatas == NULL) {
+ result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* allocate memory for signatures */
+ if (rrset->rri_nsigs > 0) {
+ rrset->rri_sigs = calloc(rrset->rri_nsigs,
+ sizeof(struct rdatainfo));
+
+ if (rrset->rri_sigs == NULL) {
+ result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* copy answers & signatures */
+ for (i=0, index_ans=0, index_sig=0; i< pkt->_header->_ancount; i++) {
+ rdata = NULL;
+ rr = ldns_rr_list_rr(ldns_pkt_answer(pkt), i);
+
+ if (ldns_rr_get_class(rr) == rrset->rri_rdclass &&
+ ldns_rr_get_type(rr) == rrset->rri_rdtype) {
+ rdata = &rrset->rri_rdatas[index_ans++];
+ }
+
+ if (rr->_rr_class == rrset->rri_rdclass &&
+ rr->_rr_type == LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG &&
+ rrset->rri_sigs) {
+ rdata = &rrset->rri_sigs[index_sig++];
+ }
+
+ if (rdata) {
+ size_t rdata_offset = 0;
+
+ rdata->rdi_length = 0;
+ for (j=0; j< rr->_rd_count; j++) {
+ rdata->rdi_length +=
+ ldns_rdf_size(ldns_rr_rdf(rr, j));
+ }
+
+ rdata->rdi_data = malloc(rdata->rdi_length);
+ if (rdata->rdi_data == NULL) {
+ result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* Re-create the raw DNS RDATA */
+ for (j=0; j< rr->_rd_count; j++) {
+ len = ldns_rdf_size(ldns_rr_rdf(rr, j));
+ memcpy(rdata->rdi_data + rdata_offset,
+ ldns_rdf_data(ldns_rr_rdf(rr, j)), len);
+ rdata_offset += len;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ *res = rrset;
+ result = ERRSET_SUCCESS;
+
+fail:
+ /* freerrset(rrset); */
+ ldns_rdf_deep_free(domain);
+ ldns_pkt_free(pkt);
+ ldns_rr_list_deep_free(rrsigs);
+ ldns_rr_list_deep_free(rrdata);
+ ldns_resolver_deep_free(ldns_res);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+
+void
+freerrset(struct rrsetinfo *rrset)
+{
+ u_int16_t i;
+
+ if (rrset == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (rrset->rri_rdatas) {
+ for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nrdatas; i++) {
+ if (rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data == NULL)
+ break;
+ free(rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data);
+ }
+ free(rrset->rri_rdatas);
+ }
+
+ if (rrset->rri_sigs) {
+ for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nsigs; i++) {
+ if (rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data == NULL)
+ break;
+ free(rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data);
+ }
+ free(rrset->rri_sigs);
+ }
+
+ if (rrset->rri_name)
+ free(rrset->rri_name);
+ free(rrset);
+}
+
+
+#endif /* !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && defined (HAVE_LDNS) */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/glob.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/glob.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/glob.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1065 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: glob.c,v 1.38 2011/09/22 06:27:29 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
- * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
- *
- * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
- * Guido van Rossum.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
- * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
- * without specific prior written permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/glob.c */
-
-/*
- * glob(3) -- a superset of the one defined in POSIX 1003.2.
- *
- * The [!...] convention to negate a range is supported (SysV, Posix, ksh).
- *
- * Optional extra services, controlled by flags not defined by POSIX:
- *
- * GLOB_QUOTE:
- * Escaping convention: \ inhibits any special meaning the following
- * character might have (except \ at end of string is retained).
- * GLOB_MAGCHAR:
- * Set in gl_flags if pattern contained a globbing character.
- * GLOB_NOMAGIC:
- * Same as GLOB_NOCHECK, but it will only append pattern if it did
- * not contain any magic characters. [Used in csh style globbing]
- * GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC:
- * Use alternately specified directory access functions.
- * GLOB_TILDE:
- * expand ~user/foo to the /home/dir/of/user/foo
- * GLOB_BRACE:
- * expand {1,2}{a,b} to 1a 1b 2a 2b
- * gl_matchc:
- * Number of matches in the current invocation of glob.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-
-#include <dirent.h>
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \
- !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) || \
- !defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0 || \
- defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
-
-#include "charclass.h"
-
-#define DOLLAR '$'
-#define DOT '.'
-#define EOS '\0'
-#define LBRACKET '['
-#define NOT '!'
-#define QUESTION '?'
-#define QUOTE '\\'
-#define RANGE '-'
-#define RBRACKET ']'
-#define SEP '/'
-#define STAR '*'
-#define TILDE '~'
-#define UNDERSCORE '_'
-#define LBRACE '{'
-#define RBRACE '}'
-#define SLASH '/'
-#define COMMA ','
-
-#ifndef DEBUG
-
-#define M_QUOTE 0x8000
-#define M_PROTECT 0x4000
-#define M_MASK 0xffff
-#define M_ASCII 0x00ff
-
-typedef u_short Char;
-
-#else
-
-#define M_QUOTE 0x80
-#define M_PROTECT 0x40
-#define M_MASK 0xff
-#define M_ASCII 0x7f
-
-typedef char Char;
-
-#endif
-
-
-#define CHAR(c) ((Char)((c)&M_ASCII))
-#define META(c) ((Char)((c)|M_QUOTE))
-#define M_ALL META('*')
-#define M_END META(']')
-#define M_NOT META('!')
-#define M_ONE META('?')
-#define M_RNG META('-')
-#define M_SET META('[')
-#define M_CLASS META(':')
-#define ismeta(c) (((c)&M_QUOTE) != 0)
-
-#define GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC 65536
-#define GLOB_LIMIT_STAT 128
-#define GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR 16384
-
-/* Limit of recursion during matching attempts. */
-#define GLOB_LIMIT_RECUR 64
-
-struct glob_lim {
- size_t glim_malloc;
- size_t glim_stat;
- size_t glim_readdir;
-};
-
-struct glob_path_stat {
- char *gps_path;
- struct stat *gps_stat;
-};
-
-static int compare(const void *, const void *);
-static int compare_gps(const void *, const void *);
-static int g_Ctoc(const Char *, char *, u_int);
-static int g_lstat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *);
-static DIR *g_opendir(Char *, glob_t *);
-static Char *g_strchr(const Char *, int);
-static int g_strncmp(const Char *, const char *, size_t);
-static int g_stat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *);
-static int glob0(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
-static int glob1(Char *, Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
-static int glob2(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *,
- glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
-static int glob3(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *,
- Char *, Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
-static int globextend(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *,
- struct stat *);
-static const Char *
- globtilde(const Char *, Char *, size_t, glob_t *);
-static int globexp1(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
-static int globexp2(const Char *, const Char *, glob_t *,
- struct glob_lim *);
-static int match(Char *, Char *, Char *, int);
-#ifdef DEBUG
-static void qprintf(const char *, Char *);
-#endif
-
-int
-glob(const char *pattern, int flags, int (*errfunc)(const char *, int),
- glob_t *pglob)
-{
- const u_char *patnext;
- int c;
- Char *bufnext, *bufend, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
- struct glob_lim limit = { 0, 0, 0 };
-
- if (strnlen(pattern, PATH_MAX) == PATH_MAX)
- return(GLOB_NOMATCH);
-
- patnext = (u_char *) pattern;
- if (!(flags & GLOB_APPEND)) {
- pglob->gl_pathc = 0;
- pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
- pglob->gl_statv = NULL;
- if (!(flags & GLOB_DOOFFS))
- pglob->gl_offs = 0;
- }
- pglob->gl_flags = flags & ~GLOB_MAGCHAR;
- pglob->gl_errfunc = errfunc;
- pglob->gl_matchc = 0;
-
- if (pglob->gl_offs < 0 || pglob->gl_pathc < 0 ||
- pglob->gl_offs >= INT_MAX || pglob->gl_pathc >= INT_MAX ||
- pglob->gl_pathc >= INT_MAX - pglob->gl_offs - 1)
- return GLOB_NOSPACE;
-
- bufnext = patbuf;
- bufend = bufnext + MAXPATHLEN - 1;
- if (flags & GLOB_NOESCAPE)
- while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS)
- *bufnext++ = c;
- else {
- /* Protect the quoted characters. */
- while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS)
- if (c == QUOTE) {
- if ((c = *patnext++) == EOS) {
- c = QUOTE;
- --patnext;
- }
- *bufnext++ = c | M_PROTECT;
- } else
- *bufnext++ = c;
- }
- *bufnext = EOS;
-
- if (flags & GLOB_BRACE)
- return globexp1(patbuf, pglob, &limit);
- else
- return glob0(patbuf, pglob, &limit);
-}
-
-/*
- * Expand recursively a glob {} pattern. When there is no more expansion
- * invoke the standard globbing routine to glob the rest of the magic
- * characters
- */
-static int
-globexp1(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
-{
- const Char* ptr = pattern;
-
- /* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */
- if (pattern[0] == LBRACE && pattern[1] == RBRACE && pattern[2] == EOS)
- return glob0(pattern, pglob, limitp);
-
- if ((ptr = (const Char *) g_strchr(ptr, LBRACE)) != NULL)
- return globexp2(ptr, pattern, pglob, limitp);
-
- return glob0(pattern, pglob, limitp);
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Recursive brace globbing helper. Tries to expand a single brace.
- * If it succeeds then it invokes globexp1 with the new pattern.
- * If it fails then it tries to glob the rest of the pattern and returns.
- */
-static int
-globexp2(const Char *ptr, const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob,
- struct glob_lim *limitp)
-{
- int i, rv;
- Char *lm, *ls;
- const Char *pe, *pm, *pl;
- Char patbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
-
- /* copy part up to the brace */
- for (lm = patbuf, pm = pattern; pm != ptr; *lm++ = *pm++)
- ;
- *lm = EOS;
- ls = lm;
-
- /* Find the balanced brace */
- for (i = 0, pe = ++ptr; *pe; pe++)
- if (*pe == LBRACKET) {
- /* Ignore everything between [] */
- for (pm = pe++; *pe != RBRACKET && *pe != EOS; pe++)
- ;
- if (*pe == EOS) {
- /*
- * We could not find a matching RBRACKET.
- * Ignore and just look for RBRACE
- */
- pe = pm;
- }
- } else if (*pe == LBRACE)
- i++;
- else if (*pe == RBRACE) {
- if (i == 0)
- break;
- i--;
- }
-
- /* Non matching braces; just glob the pattern */
- if (i != 0 || *pe == EOS)
- return glob0(patbuf, pglob, limitp);
-
- for (i = 0, pl = pm = ptr; pm <= pe; pm++) {
- switch (*pm) {
- case LBRACKET:
- /* Ignore everything between [] */
- for (pl = pm++; *pm != RBRACKET && *pm != EOS; pm++)
- ;
- if (*pm == EOS) {
- /*
- * We could not find a matching RBRACKET.
- * Ignore and just look for RBRACE
- */
- pm = pl;
- }
- break;
-
- case LBRACE:
- i++;
- break;
-
- case RBRACE:
- if (i) {
- i--;
- break;
- }
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case COMMA:
- if (i && *pm == COMMA)
- break;
- else {
- /* Append the current string */
- for (lm = ls; (pl < pm); *lm++ = *pl++)
- ;
-
- /*
- * Append the rest of the pattern after the
- * closing brace
- */
- for (pl = pe + 1; (*lm++ = *pl++) != EOS; )
- ;
-
- /* Expand the current pattern */
-#ifdef DEBUG
- qprintf("globexp2:", patbuf);
-#endif
- rv = globexp1(patbuf, pglob, limitp);
- if (rv && rv != GLOB_NOMATCH)
- return rv;
-
- /* move after the comma, to the next string */
- pl = pm + 1;
- }
- break;
-
- default:
- break;
- }
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-
-
-/*
- * expand tilde from the passwd file.
- */
-static const Char *
-globtilde(const Char *pattern, Char *patbuf, size_t patbuf_len, glob_t *pglob)
-{
- struct passwd *pwd;
- char *h;
- const Char *p;
- Char *b, *eb;
-
- if (*pattern != TILDE || !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_TILDE))
- return pattern;
-
- /* Copy up to the end of the string or / */
- eb = &patbuf[patbuf_len - 1];
- for (p = pattern + 1, h = (char *) patbuf;
- h < (char *)eb && *p && *p != SLASH; *h++ = *p++)
- ;
-
- *h = EOS;
-
-#if 0
- if (h == (char *)eb)
- return what;
-#endif
-
- if (((char *) patbuf)[0] == EOS) {
- /*
- * handle a plain ~ or ~/ by expanding $HOME
- * first and then trying the password file
- */
-#if 0
- if (issetugid() != 0 || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) {
-#endif
- if ((getuid() != geteuid()) || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) {
- if ((pwd = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL)
- return pattern;
- else
- h = pwd->pw_dir;
- }
- } else {
- /*
- * Expand a ~user
- */
- if ((pwd = getpwnam((char*) patbuf)) == NULL)
- return pattern;
- else
- h = pwd->pw_dir;
- }
-
- /* Copy the home directory */
- for (b = patbuf; b < eb && *h; *b++ = *h++)
- ;
-
- /* Append the rest of the pattern */
- while (b < eb && (*b++ = *p++) != EOS)
- ;
- *b = EOS;
-
- return patbuf;
-}
-
-static int
-g_strncmp(const Char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n)
-{
- int rv = 0;
-
- while (n--) {
- rv = *(Char *)s1 - *(const unsigned char *)s2++;
- if (rv)
- break;
- if (*s1++ == '\0')
- break;
- }
- return rv;
-}
-
-static int
-g_charclass(const Char **patternp, Char **bufnextp)
-{
- const Char *pattern = *patternp + 1;
- Char *bufnext = *bufnextp;
- const Char *colon;
- struct cclass *cc;
- size_t len;
-
- if ((colon = g_strchr(pattern, ':')) == NULL || colon[1] != ']')
- return 1; /* not a character class */
-
- len = (size_t)(colon - pattern);
- for (cc = cclasses; cc->name != NULL; cc++) {
- if (!g_strncmp(pattern, cc->name, len) && cc->name[len] == '\0')
- break;
- }
- if (cc->name == NULL)
- return -1; /* invalid character class */
- *bufnext++ = M_CLASS;
- *bufnext++ = (Char)(cc - &cclasses[0]);
- *bufnextp = bufnext;
- *patternp += len + 3;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * The main glob() routine: compiles the pattern (optionally processing
- * quotes), calls glob1() to do the real pattern matching, and finally
- * sorts the list (unless unsorted operation is requested). Returns 0
- * if things went well, nonzero if errors occurred. It is not an error
- * to find no matches.
- */
-static int
-glob0(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
-{
- const Char *qpatnext;
- int c, err, oldpathc;
- Char *bufnext, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
-
- qpatnext = globtilde(pattern, patbuf, MAXPATHLEN, pglob);
- oldpathc = pglob->gl_pathc;
- bufnext = patbuf;
-
- /* We don't need to check for buffer overflow any more. */
- while ((c = *qpatnext++) != EOS) {
- switch (c) {
- case LBRACKET:
- c = *qpatnext;
- if (c == NOT)
- ++qpatnext;
- if (*qpatnext == EOS ||
- g_strchr(qpatnext+1, RBRACKET) == NULL) {
- *bufnext++ = LBRACKET;
- if (c == NOT)
- --qpatnext;
- break;
- }
- *bufnext++ = M_SET;
- if (c == NOT)
- *bufnext++ = M_NOT;
- c = *qpatnext++;
- do {
- if (c == LBRACKET && *qpatnext == ':') {
- do {
- err = g_charclass(&qpatnext,
- &bufnext);
- if (err)
- break;
- c = *qpatnext++;
- } while (c == LBRACKET && *qpatnext == ':');
- if (err == -1 &&
- !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK))
- return GLOB_NOMATCH;
- if (c == RBRACKET)
- break;
- }
- *bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
- if (*qpatnext == RANGE &&
- (c = qpatnext[1]) != RBRACKET) {
- *bufnext++ = M_RNG;
- *bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
- qpatnext += 2;
- }
- } while ((c = *qpatnext++) != RBRACKET);
- pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
- *bufnext++ = M_END;
- break;
- case QUESTION:
- pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
- *bufnext++ = M_ONE;
- break;
- case STAR:
- pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
- /* collapse adjacent stars to one,
- * to avoid exponential behavior
- */
- if (bufnext == patbuf || bufnext[-1] != M_ALL)
- *bufnext++ = M_ALL;
- break;
- default:
- *bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
- break;
- }
- }
- *bufnext = EOS;
-#ifdef DEBUG
- qprintf("glob0:", patbuf);
-#endif
-
- if ((err = glob1(patbuf, patbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1, pglob, limitp)) != 0)
- return(err);
-
- /*
- * If there was no match we are going to append the pattern
- * if GLOB_NOCHECK was specified or if GLOB_NOMAGIC was specified
- * and the pattern did not contain any magic characters
- * GLOB_NOMAGIC is there just for compatibility with csh.
- */
- if (pglob->gl_pathc == oldpathc) {
- if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK) ||
- ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOMAGIC) &&
- !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MAGCHAR)))
- return(globextend(pattern, pglob, limitp, NULL));
- else
- return(GLOB_NOMATCH);
- }
- if (!(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOSORT)) {
- if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT)) {
- /* Keep the paths and stat info synced during sort */
- struct glob_path_stat *path_stat;
- int i;
- int n = pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc;
- int o = pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc;
-
- if ((path_stat = calloc(n, sizeof(*path_stat))) == NULL)
- return GLOB_NOSPACE;
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- path_stat[i].gps_path = pglob->gl_pathv[o + i];
- path_stat[i].gps_stat = pglob->gl_statv[o + i];
- }
- qsort(path_stat, n, sizeof(*path_stat), compare_gps);
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- pglob->gl_pathv[o + i] = path_stat[i].gps_path;
- pglob->gl_statv[o + i] = path_stat[i].gps_stat;
- }
- free(path_stat);
- } else {
- qsort(pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc,
- pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc, sizeof(char *),
- compare);
- }
- }
- return(0);
-}
-
-static int
-compare(const void *p, const void *q)
-{
- return(strcmp(*(char **)p, *(char **)q));
-}
-
-static int
-compare_gps(const void *_p, const void *_q)
-{
- const struct glob_path_stat *p = (const struct glob_path_stat *)_p;
- const struct glob_path_stat *q = (const struct glob_path_stat *)_q;
-
- return(strcmp(p->gps_path, q->gps_path));
-}
-
-static int
-glob1(Char *pattern, Char *pattern_last, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
-{
- Char pathbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
-
- /* A null pathname is invalid -- POSIX 1003.1 sect. 2.4. */
- if (*pattern == EOS)
- return(0);
- return(glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1,
- pathbuf, pathbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1,
- pattern, pattern_last, pglob, limitp));
-}
-
-/*
- * The functions glob2 and glob3 are mutually recursive; there is one level
- * of recursion for each segment in the pattern that contains one or more
- * meta characters.
- */
-static int
-glob2(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathbuf_last, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last,
- Char *pattern, Char *pattern_last, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
-{
- struct stat sb;
- Char *p, *q;
- int anymeta;
-
- /*
- * Loop over pattern segments until end of pattern or until
- * segment with meta character found.
- */
- for (anymeta = 0;;) {
- if (*pattern == EOS) { /* End of pattern? */
- *pathend = EOS;
- if (g_lstat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob))
- return(0);
-
- if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
- limitp->glim_stat++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_STAT) {
- errno = 0;
- *pathend++ = SEP;
- *pathend = EOS;
- return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
- }
-
- if (((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MARK) &&
- pathend[-1] != SEP) && (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode) ||
- (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode) &&
- (g_stat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob) == 0) &&
- S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)))) {
- if (pathend+1 > pathend_last)
- return (1);
- *pathend++ = SEP;
- *pathend = EOS;
- }
- ++pglob->gl_matchc;
- return(globextend(pathbuf, pglob, limitp, &sb));
- }
-
- /* Find end of next segment, copy tentatively to pathend. */
- q = pathend;
- p = pattern;
- while (*p != EOS && *p != SEP) {
- if (ismeta(*p))
- anymeta = 1;
- if (q+1 > pathend_last)
- return (1);
- *q++ = *p++;
- }
-
- if (!anymeta) { /* No expansion, do next segment. */
- pathend = q;
- pattern = p;
- while (*pattern == SEP) {
- if (pathend+1 > pathend_last)
- return (1);
- *pathend++ = *pattern++;
- }
- } else
- /* Need expansion, recurse. */
- return(glob3(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, pathend,
- pathend_last, pattern, p, pattern_last,
- pglob, limitp));
- }
- /* NOTREACHED */
-}
-
-static int
-glob3(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathbuf_last, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last,
- Char *pattern, Char *restpattern, Char *restpattern_last, glob_t *pglob,
- struct glob_lim *limitp)
-{
- struct dirent *dp;
- DIR *dirp;
- int err;
- char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
-
- /*
- * The readdirfunc declaration can't be prototyped, because it is
- * assigned, below, to two functions which are prototyped in glob.h
- * and dirent.h as taking pointers to differently typed opaque
- * structures.
- */
- struct dirent *(*readdirfunc)(void *);
-
- if (pathend > pathend_last)
- return (1);
- *pathend = EOS;
- errno = 0;
-
- if ((dirp = g_opendir(pathbuf, pglob)) == NULL) {
- /* TODO: don't call for ENOENT or ENOTDIR? */
- if (pglob->gl_errfunc) {
- if (g_Ctoc(pathbuf, buf, sizeof(buf)))
- return(GLOB_ABORTED);
- if (pglob->gl_errfunc(buf, errno) ||
- pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ERR)
- return(GLOB_ABORTED);
- }
- return(0);
- }
-
- err = 0;
-
- /* Search directory for matching names. */
- if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
- readdirfunc = pglob->gl_readdir;
- else
- readdirfunc = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))readdir;
- while ((dp = (*readdirfunc)(dirp))) {
- u_char *sc;
- Char *dc;
-
- if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
- limitp->glim_readdir++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR) {
- errno = 0;
- *pathend++ = SEP;
- *pathend = EOS;
- err = GLOB_NOSPACE;
- break;
- }
-
- /* Initial DOT must be matched literally. */
- if (dp->d_name[0] == DOT && *pattern != DOT)
- continue;
- dc = pathend;
- sc = (u_char *) dp->d_name;
- while (dc < pathend_last && (*dc++ = *sc++) != EOS)
- ;
- if (dc >= pathend_last) {
- *dc = EOS;
- err = 1;
- break;
- }
-
- if (!match(pathend, pattern, restpattern, GLOB_LIMIT_RECUR)) {
- *pathend = EOS;
- continue;
- }
- err = glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, --dc, pathend_last,
- restpattern, restpattern_last, pglob, limitp);
- if (err)
- break;
- }
-
- if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
- (*pglob->gl_closedir)(dirp);
- else
- closedir(dirp);
- return(err);
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Extend the gl_pathv member of a glob_t structure to accommodate a new item,
- * add the new item, and update gl_pathc.
- *
- * This assumes the BSD realloc, which only copies the block when its size
- * crosses a power-of-two boundary; for v7 realloc, this would cause quadratic
- * behavior.
- *
- * Return 0 if new item added, error code if memory couldn't be allocated.
- *
- * Invariant of the glob_t structure:
- * Either gl_pathc is zero and gl_pathv is NULL; or gl_pathc > 0 and
- * gl_pathv points to (gl_offs + gl_pathc + 1) items.
- */
-static int
-globextend(const Char *path, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp,
- struct stat *sb)
-{
- char **pathv;
- ssize_t i;
- size_t newn, len;
- char *copy = NULL;
- const Char *p;
- struct stat **statv;
-
- newn = 2 + pglob->gl_pathc + pglob->gl_offs;
- if (pglob->gl_offs >= INT_MAX ||
- pglob->gl_pathc >= INT_MAX ||
- newn >= INT_MAX ||
- SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*pathv) <= newn ||
- SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*statv) <= newn) {
- nospace:
- for (i = pglob->gl_offs; i < (ssize_t)(newn - 2); i++) {
- if (pglob->gl_pathv && pglob->gl_pathv[i])
- free(pglob->gl_pathv[i]);
- if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT) != 0 &&
- pglob->gl_pathv && pglob->gl_pathv[i])
- free(pglob->gl_statv[i]);
- }
- if (pglob->gl_pathv) {
- free(pglob->gl_pathv);
- pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
- }
- if (pglob->gl_statv) {
- free(pglob->gl_statv);
- pglob->gl_statv = NULL;
- }
- return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
- }
-
- pathv = realloc(pglob->gl_pathv, newn * sizeof(*pathv));
- if (pathv == NULL)
- goto nospace;
- if (pglob->gl_pathv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) {
- /* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */
- pathv += pglob->gl_offs;
- for (i = pglob->gl_offs; --i >= 0; )
- *--pathv = NULL;
- }
- pglob->gl_pathv = pathv;
-
- if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT) != 0) {
- statv = realloc(pglob->gl_statv, newn * sizeof(*statv));
- if (statv == NULL)
- goto nospace;
- if (pglob->gl_statv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) {
- /* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */
- statv += pglob->gl_offs;
- for (i = pglob->gl_offs; --i >= 0; )
- *--statv = NULL;
- }
- pglob->gl_statv = statv;
- if (sb == NULL)
- statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL;
- else {
- limitp->glim_malloc += sizeof(**statv);
- if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
- limitp->glim_malloc >= GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC) {
- errno = 0;
- return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
- }
- if ((statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] =
- malloc(sizeof(**statv))) == NULL)
- goto copy_error;
- memcpy(statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc], sb,
- sizeof(*sb));
- }
- statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc + 1] = NULL;
- }
-
- for (p = path; *p++;)
- ;
- len = (size_t)(p - path);
- limitp->glim_malloc += len;
- if ((copy = malloc(len)) != NULL) {
- if (g_Ctoc(path, copy, len)) {
- free(copy);
- return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
- }
- pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc++] = copy;
- }
- pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL;
-
- if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
- (newn * sizeof(*pathv)) + limitp->glim_malloc >
- GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC) {
- errno = 0;
- return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
- }
- copy_error:
- return(copy == NULL ? GLOB_NOSPACE : 0);
-}
-
-
-/*
- * pattern matching function for filenames. Each occurrence of the *
- * pattern causes a recursion level.
- */
-static int
-match(Char *name, Char *pat, Char *patend, int recur)
-{
- int ok, negate_range;
- Char c, k;
-
- if (recur-- == 0)
- return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
-
- while (pat < patend) {
- c = *pat++;
- switch (c & M_MASK) {
- case M_ALL:
- while (pat < patend && (*pat & M_MASK) == M_ALL)
- pat++; /* eat consecutive '*' */
- if (pat == patend)
- return(1);
- do {
- if (match(name, pat, patend, recur))
- return(1);
- } while (*name++ != EOS);
- return(0);
- case M_ONE:
- if (*name++ == EOS)
- return(0);
- break;
- case M_SET:
- ok = 0;
- if ((k = *name++) == EOS)
- return(0);
- if ((negate_range = ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_NOT)) != EOS)
- ++pat;
- while (((c = *pat++) & M_MASK) != M_END) {
- if ((c & M_MASK) == M_CLASS) {
- Char idx = *pat & M_MASK;
- if (idx < NCCLASSES &&
- cclasses[idx].isctype(k))
- ok = 1;
- ++pat;
- }
- if ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_RNG) {
- if (c <= k && k <= pat[1])
- ok = 1;
- pat += 2;
- } else if (c == k)
- ok = 1;
- }
- if (ok == negate_range)
- return(0);
- break;
- default:
- if (*name++ != c)
- return(0);
- break;
- }
- }
- return(*name == EOS);
-}
-
-/* Free allocated data belonging to a glob_t structure. */
-void
-globfree(glob_t *pglob)
-{
- int i;
- char **pp;
-
- if (pglob->gl_pathv != NULL) {
- pp = pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs;
- for (i = pglob->gl_pathc; i--; ++pp)
- if (*pp)
- free(*pp);
- free(pglob->gl_pathv);
- pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
- }
- if (pglob->gl_statv != NULL) {
- for (i = 0; i < pglob->gl_pathc; i++) {
- if (pglob->gl_statv[i] != NULL)
- free(pglob->gl_statv[i]);
- }
- free(pglob->gl_statv);
- pglob->gl_statv = NULL;
- }
-}
-
-static DIR *
-g_opendir(Char *str, glob_t *pglob)
-{
- char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
-
- if (!*str)
- strlcpy(buf, ".", sizeof buf);
- else {
- if (g_Ctoc(str, buf, sizeof(buf)))
- return(NULL);
- }
-
- if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
- return((*pglob->gl_opendir)(buf));
-
- return(opendir(buf));
-}
-
-static int
-g_lstat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob)
-{
- char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
-
- if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf)))
- return(-1);
- if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
- return((*pglob->gl_lstat)(buf, sb));
- return(lstat(buf, sb));
-}
-
-static int
-g_stat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob)
-{
- char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
-
- if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf)))
- return(-1);
- if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
- return((*pglob->gl_stat)(buf, sb));
- return(stat(buf, sb));
-}
-
-static Char *
-g_strchr(const Char *str, int ch)
-{
- do {
- if (*str == ch)
- return ((Char *)str);
- } while (*str++);
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-static int
-g_Ctoc(const Char *str, char *buf, u_int len)
-{
-
- while (len--) {
- if ((*buf++ = *str++) == EOS)
- return (0);
- }
- return (1);
-}
-
-#ifdef DEBUG
-static void
-qprintf(const char *str, Char *s)
-{
- Char *p;
-
- (void)printf("%s:\n", str);
- for (p = s; *p; p++)
- (void)printf("%c", CHAR(*p));
- (void)printf("\n");
- for (p = s; *p; p++)
- (void)printf("%c", *p & M_PROTECT ? '"' : ' ');
- (void)printf("\n");
- for (p = s; *p; p++)
- (void)printf("%c", ismeta(*p) ? '_' : ' ');
- (void)printf("\n");
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) ||
- !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/glob.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/glob.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/glob.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/glob.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1066 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: glob.c,v 1.38 2011/09/22 06:27:29 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
+ * Guido van Rossum.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/glob.c */
+
+/*
+ * glob(3) -- a superset of the one defined in POSIX 1003.2.
+ *
+ * The [!...] convention to negate a range is supported (SysV, Posix, ksh).
+ *
+ * Optional extra services, controlled by flags not defined by POSIX:
+ *
+ * GLOB_QUOTE:
+ * Escaping convention: \ inhibits any special meaning the following
+ * character might have (except \ at end of string is retained).
+ * GLOB_MAGCHAR:
+ * Set in gl_flags if pattern contained a globbing character.
+ * GLOB_NOMAGIC:
+ * Same as GLOB_NOCHECK, but it will only append pattern if it did
+ * not contain any magic characters. [Used in csh style globbing]
+ * GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC:
+ * Use alternately specified directory access functions.
+ * GLOB_TILDE:
+ * expand ~user/foo to the /home/dir/of/user/foo
+ * GLOB_BRACE:
+ * expand {1,2}{a,b} to 1a 1b 2a 2b
+ * gl_matchc:
+ * Number of matches in the current invocation of glob.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "glob.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \
+ !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) || \
+ !defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0 || \
+ defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
+
+#include "charclass.h"
+
+#define DOLLAR '$'
+#define DOT '.'
+#define EOS '\0'
+#define LBRACKET '['
+#define NOT '!'
+#define QUESTION '?'
+#define QUOTE '\\'
+#define RANGE '-'
+#define RBRACKET ']'
+#define SEP '/'
+#define STAR '*'
+#define TILDE '~'
+#define UNDERSCORE '_'
+#define LBRACE '{'
+#define RBRACE '}'
+#define SLASH '/'
+#define COMMA ','
+
+#ifndef DEBUG
+
+#define M_QUOTE 0x8000
+#define M_PROTECT 0x4000
+#define M_MASK 0xffff
+#define M_ASCII 0x00ff
+
+typedef u_short Char;
+
+#else
+
+#define M_QUOTE 0x80
+#define M_PROTECT 0x40
+#define M_MASK 0xff
+#define M_ASCII 0x7f
+
+typedef char Char;
+
+#endif
+
+
+#define CHAR(c) ((Char)((c)&M_ASCII))
+#define META(c) ((Char)((c)|M_QUOTE))
+#define M_ALL META('*')
+#define M_END META(']')
+#define M_NOT META('!')
+#define M_ONE META('?')
+#define M_RNG META('-')
+#define M_SET META('[')
+#define M_CLASS META(':')
+#define ismeta(c) (((c)&M_QUOTE) != 0)
+
+#define GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC 65536
+#define GLOB_LIMIT_STAT 128
+#define GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR 16384
+
+/* Limit of recursion during matching attempts. */
+#define GLOB_LIMIT_RECUR 64
+
+struct glob_lim {
+ size_t glim_malloc;
+ size_t glim_stat;
+ size_t glim_readdir;
+};
+
+struct glob_path_stat {
+ char *gps_path;
+ struct stat *gps_stat;
+};
+
+static int compare(const void *, const void *);
+static int compare_gps(const void *, const void *);
+static int g_Ctoc(const Char *, char *, u_int);
+static int g_lstat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *);
+static DIR *g_opendir(Char *, glob_t *);
+static Char *g_strchr(const Char *, int);
+static int g_strncmp(const Char *, const char *, size_t);
+static int g_stat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *);
+static int glob0(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
+static int glob1(Char *, Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
+static int glob2(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *,
+ glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
+static int glob3(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *,
+ Char *, Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
+static int globextend(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *,
+ struct stat *);
+static const Char *
+ globtilde(const Char *, Char *, size_t, glob_t *);
+static int globexp1(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
+static int globexp2(const Char *, const Char *, glob_t *,
+ struct glob_lim *);
+static int match(Char *, Char *, Char *, int);
+#ifdef DEBUG
+static void qprintf(const char *, Char *);
+#endif
+
+int
+glob(const char *pattern, int flags, int (*errfunc)(const char *, int),
+ glob_t *pglob)
+{
+ const u_char *patnext;
+ int c;
+ Char *bufnext, *bufend, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ struct glob_lim limit = { 0, 0, 0 };
+
+ if (strnlen(pattern, PATH_MAX) == PATH_MAX)
+ return(GLOB_NOMATCH);
+
+ patnext = (u_char *) pattern;
+ if (!(flags & GLOB_APPEND)) {
+ pglob->gl_pathc = 0;
+ pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
+ pglob->gl_statv = NULL;
+ if (!(flags & GLOB_DOOFFS))
+ pglob->gl_offs = 0;
+ }
+ pglob->gl_flags = flags & ~GLOB_MAGCHAR;
+ pglob->gl_errfunc = errfunc;
+ pglob->gl_matchc = 0;
+
+ if (pglob->gl_offs < 0 || pglob->gl_pathc < 0 ||
+ pglob->gl_offs >= INT_MAX || pglob->gl_pathc >= INT_MAX ||
+ pglob->gl_pathc >= INT_MAX - pglob->gl_offs - 1)
+ return GLOB_NOSPACE;
+
+ bufnext = patbuf;
+ bufend = bufnext + MAXPATHLEN - 1;
+ if (flags & GLOB_NOESCAPE)
+ while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS)
+ *bufnext++ = c;
+ else {
+ /* Protect the quoted characters. */
+ while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS)
+ if (c == QUOTE) {
+ if ((c = *patnext++) == EOS) {
+ c = QUOTE;
+ --patnext;
+ }
+ *bufnext++ = c | M_PROTECT;
+ } else
+ *bufnext++ = c;
+ }
+ *bufnext = EOS;
+
+ if (flags & GLOB_BRACE)
+ return globexp1(patbuf, pglob, &limit);
+ else
+ return glob0(patbuf, pglob, &limit);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Expand recursively a glob {} pattern. When there is no more expansion
+ * invoke the standard globbing routine to glob the rest of the magic
+ * characters
+ */
+static int
+globexp1(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
+{
+ const Char* ptr = pattern;
+
+ /* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */
+ if (pattern[0] == LBRACE && pattern[1] == RBRACE && pattern[2] == EOS)
+ return glob0(pattern, pglob, limitp);
+
+ if ((ptr = (const Char *) g_strchr(ptr, LBRACE)) != NULL)
+ return globexp2(ptr, pattern, pglob, limitp);
+
+ return glob0(pattern, pglob, limitp);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Recursive brace globbing helper. Tries to expand a single brace.
+ * If it succeeds then it invokes globexp1 with the new pattern.
+ * If it fails then it tries to glob the rest of the pattern and returns.
+ */
+static int
+globexp2(const Char *ptr, const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob,
+ struct glob_lim *limitp)
+{
+ int i, rv;
+ Char *lm, *ls;
+ const Char *pe, *pm, *pl;
+ Char patbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ /* copy part up to the brace */
+ for (lm = patbuf, pm = pattern; pm != ptr; *lm++ = *pm++)
+ ;
+ *lm = EOS;
+ ls = lm;
+
+ /* Find the balanced brace */
+ for (i = 0, pe = ++ptr; *pe; pe++)
+ if (*pe == LBRACKET) {
+ /* Ignore everything between [] */
+ for (pm = pe++; *pe != RBRACKET && *pe != EOS; pe++)
+ ;
+ if (*pe == EOS) {
+ /*
+ * We could not find a matching RBRACKET.
+ * Ignore and just look for RBRACE
+ */
+ pe = pm;
+ }
+ } else if (*pe == LBRACE)
+ i++;
+ else if (*pe == RBRACE) {
+ if (i == 0)
+ break;
+ i--;
+ }
+
+ /* Non matching braces; just glob the pattern */
+ if (i != 0 || *pe == EOS)
+ return glob0(patbuf, pglob, limitp);
+
+ for (i = 0, pl = pm = ptr; pm <= pe; pm++) {
+ switch (*pm) {
+ case LBRACKET:
+ /* Ignore everything between [] */
+ for (pl = pm++; *pm != RBRACKET && *pm != EOS; pm++)
+ ;
+ if (*pm == EOS) {
+ /*
+ * We could not find a matching RBRACKET.
+ * Ignore and just look for RBRACE
+ */
+ pm = pl;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case LBRACE:
+ i++;
+ break;
+
+ case RBRACE:
+ if (i) {
+ i--;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case COMMA:
+ if (i && *pm == COMMA)
+ break;
+ else {
+ /* Append the current string */
+ for (lm = ls; (pl < pm); *lm++ = *pl++)
+ ;
+
+ /*
+ * Append the rest of the pattern after the
+ * closing brace
+ */
+ for (pl = pe + 1; (*lm++ = *pl++) != EOS; )
+ ;
+
+ /* Expand the current pattern */
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ qprintf("globexp2:", patbuf);
+#endif
+ rv = globexp1(patbuf, pglob, limitp);
+ if (rv && rv != GLOB_NOMATCH)
+ return rv;
+
+ /* move after the comma, to the next string */
+ pl = pm + 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * expand tilde from the passwd file.
+ */
+static const Char *
+globtilde(const Char *pattern, Char *patbuf, size_t patbuf_len, glob_t *pglob)
+{
+ struct passwd *pwd;
+ char *h;
+ const Char *p;
+ Char *b, *eb;
+
+ if (*pattern != TILDE || !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_TILDE))
+ return pattern;
+
+ /* Copy up to the end of the string or / */
+ eb = &patbuf[patbuf_len - 1];
+ for (p = pattern + 1, h = (char *) patbuf;
+ h < (char *)eb && *p && *p != SLASH; *h++ = *p++)
+ ;
+
+ *h = EOS;
+
+#if 0
+ if (h == (char *)eb)
+ return what;
+#endif
+
+ if (((char *) patbuf)[0] == EOS) {
+ /*
+ * handle a plain ~ or ~/ by expanding $HOME
+ * first and then trying the password file
+ */
+#if 0
+ if (issetugid() != 0 || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) {
+#endif
+ if ((getuid() != geteuid()) || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) {
+ if ((pwd = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL)
+ return pattern;
+ else
+ h = pwd->pw_dir;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Expand a ~user
+ */
+ if ((pwd = getpwnam((char*) patbuf)) == NULL)
+ return pattern;
+ else
+ h = pwd->pw_dir;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy the home directory */
+ for (b = patbuf; b < eb && *h; *b++ = *h++)
+ ;
+
+ /* Append the rest of the pattern */
+ while (b < eb && (*b++ = *p++) != EOS)
+ ;
+ *b = EOS;
+
+ return patbuf;
+}
+
+static int
+g_strncmp(const Char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n)
+{
+ int rv = 0;
+
+ while (n--) {
+ rv = *(Char *)s1 - *(const unsigned char *)s2++;
+ if (rv)
+ break;
+ if (*s1++ == '\0')
+ break;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static int
+g_charclass(const Char **patternp, Char **bufnextp)
+{
+ const Char *pattern = *patternp + 1;
+ Char *bufnext = *bufnextp;
+ const Char *colon;
+ struct cclass *cc;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if ((colon = g_strchr(pattern, ':')) == NULL || colon[1] != ']')
+ return 1; /* not a character class */
+
+ len = (size_t)(colon - pattern);
+ for (cc = cclasses; cc->name != NULL; cc++) {
+ if (!g_strncmp(pattern, cc->name, len) && cc->name[len] == '\0')
+ break;
+ }
+ if (cc->name == NULL)
+ return -1; /* invalid character class */
+ *bufnext++ = M_CLASS;
+ *bufnext++ = (Char)(cc - &cclasses[0]);
+ *bufnextp = bufnext;
+ *patternp += len + 3;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The main glob() routine: compiles the pattern (optionally processing
+ * quotes), calls glob1() to do the real pattern matching, and finally
+ * sorts the list (unless unsorted operation is requested). Returns 0
+ * if things went well, nonzero if errors occurred. It is not an error
+ * to find no matches.
+ */
+static int
+glob0(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
+{
+ const Char *qpatnext;
+ int c, err, oldpathc;
+ Char *bufnext, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ qpatnext = globtilde(pattern, patbuf, MAXPATHLEN, pglob);
+ oldpathc = pglob->gl_pathc;
+ bufnext = patbuf;
+
+ /* We don't need to check for buffer overflow any more. */
+ while ((c = *qpatnext++) != EOS) {
+ switch (c) {
+ case LBRACKET:
+ c = *qpatnext;
+ if (c == NOT)
+ ++qpatnext;
+ if (*qpatnext == EOS ||
+ g_strchr(qpatnext+1, RBRACKET) == NULL) {
+ *bufnext++ = LBRACKET;
+ if (c == NOT)
+ --qpatnext;
+ break;
+ }
+ *bufnext++ = M_SET;
+ if (c == NOT)
+ *bufnext++ = M_NOT;
+ c = *qpatnext++;
+ do {
+ if (c == LBRACKET && *qpatnext == ':') {
+ do {
+ err = g_charclass(&qpatnext,
+ &bufnext);
+ if (err)
+ break;
+ c = *qpatnext++;
+ } while (c == LBRACKET && *qpatnext == ':');
+ if (err == -1 &&
+ !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK))
+ return GLOB_NOMATCH;
+ if (c == RBRACKET)
+ break;
+ }
+ *bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
+ if (*qpatnext == RANGE &&
+ (c = qpatnext[1]) != RBRACKET) {
+ *bufnext++ = M_RNG;
+ *bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
+ qpatnext += 2;
+ }
+ } while ((c = *qpatnext++) != RBRACKET);
+ pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
+ *bufnext++ = M_END;
+ break;
+ case QUESTION:
+ pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
+ *bufnext++ = M_ONE;
+ break;
+ case STAR:
+ pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
+ /* collapse adjacent stars to one,
+ * to avoid exponential behavior
+ */
+ if (bufnext == patbuf || bufnext[-1] != M_ALL)
+ *bufnext++ = M_ALL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ *bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ *bufnext = EOS;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ qprintf("glob0:", patbuf);
+#endif
+
+ if ((err = glob1(patbuf, patbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1, pglob, limitp)) != 0)
+ return(err);
+
+ /*
+ * If there was no match we are going to append the pattern
+ * if GLOB_NOCHECK was specified or if GLOB_NOMAGIC was specified
+ * and the pattern did not contain any magic characters
+ * GLOB_NOMAGIC is there just for compatibility with csh.
+ */
+ if (pglob->gl_pathc == oldpathc) {
+ if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK) ||
+ ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOMAGIC) &&
+ !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MAGCHAR)))
+ return(globextend(pattern, pglob, limitp, NULL));
+ else
+ return(GLOB_NOMATCH);
+ }
+ if (!(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOSORT)) {
+ if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT)) {
+ /* Keep the paths and stat info synced during sort */
+ struct glob_path_stat *path_stat;
+ int i;
+ int n = pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc;
+ int o = pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc;
+
+ if ((path_stat = calloc(n, sizeof(*path_stat))) == NULL)
+ return GLOB_NOSPACE;
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ path_stat[i].gps_path = pglob->gl_pathv[o + i];
+ path_stat[i].gps_stat = pglob->gl_statv[o + i];
+ }
+ qsort(path_stat, n, sizeof(*path_stat), compare_gps);
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ pglob->gl_pathv[o + i] = path_stat[i].gps_path;
+ pglob->gl_statv[o + i] = path_stat[i].gps_stat;
+ }
+ free(path_stat);
+ } else {
+ qsort(pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc,
+ pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc, sizeof(char *),
+ compare);
+ }
+ }
+ return(0);
+}
+
+static int
+compare(const void *p, const void *q)
+{
+ return(strcmp(*(char **)p, *(char **)q));
+}
+
+static int
+compare_gps(const void *_p, const void *_q)
+{
+ const struct glob_path_stat *p = (const struct glob_path_stat *)_p;
+ const struct glob_path_stat *q = (const struct glob_path_stat *)_q;
+
+ return(strcmp(p->gps_path, q->gps_path));
+}
+
+static int
+glob1(Char *pattern, Char *pattern_last, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
+{
+ Char pathbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ /* A null pathname is invalid -- POSIX 1003.1 sect. 2.4. */
+ if (*pattern == EOS)
+ return(0);
+ return(glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1,
+ pathbuf, pathbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1,
+ pattern, pattern_last, pglob, limitp));
+}
+
+/*
+ * The functions glob2 and glob3 are mutually recursive; there is one level
+ * of recursion for each segment in the pattern that contains one or more
+ * meta characters.
+ */
+static int
+glob2(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathbuf_last, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last,
+ Char *pattern, Char *pattern_last, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
+{
+ struct stat sb;
+ Char *p, *q;
+ int anymeta;
+
+ /*
+ * Loop over pattern segments until end of pattern or until
+ * segment with meta character found.
+ */
+ for (anymeta = 0;;) {
+ if (*pattern == EOS) { /* End of pattern? */
+ *pathend = EOS;
+ if (g_lstat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob))
+ return(0);
+
+ if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
+ limitp->glim_stat++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_STAT) {
+ errno = 0;
+ *pathend++ = SEP;
+ *pathend = EOS;
+ return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+ }
+
+ if (((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MARK) &&
+ pathend[-1] != SEP) && (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode) ||
+ (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode) &&
+ (g_stat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob) == 0) &&
+ S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)))) {
+ if (pathend+1 > pathend_last)
+ return (1);
+ *pathend++ = SEP;
+ *pathend = EOS;
+ }
+ ++pglob->gl_matchc;
+ return(globextend(pathbuf, pglob, limitp, &sb));
+ }
+
+ /* Find end of next segment, copy tentatively to pathend. */
+ q = pathend;
+ p = pattern;
+ while (*p != EOS && *p != SEP) {
+ if (ismeta(*p))
+ anymeta = 1;
+ if (q+1 > pathend_last)
+ return (1);
+ *q++ = *p++;
+ }
+
+ if (!anymeta) { /* No expansion, do next segment. */
+ pathend = q;
+ pattern = p;
+ while (*pattern == SEP) {
+ if (pathend+1 > pathend_last)
+ return (1);
+ *pathend++ = *pattern++;
+ }
+ } else
+ /* Need expansion, recurse. */
+ return(glob3(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, pathend,
+ pathend_last, pattern, p, pattern_last,
+ pglob, limitp));
+ }
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+static int
+glob3(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathbuf_last, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last,
+ Char *pattern, Char *restpattern, Char *restpattern_last, glob_t *pglob,
+ struct glob_lim *limitp)
+{
+ struct dirent *dp;
+ DIR *dirp;
+ int err;
+ char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ /*
+ * The readdirfunc declaration can't be prototyped, because it is
+ * assigned, below, to two functions which are prototyped in glob.h
+ * and dirent.h as taking pointers to differently typed opaque
+ * structures.
+ */
+ struct dirent *(*readdirfunc)(void *);
+
+ if (pathend > pathend_last)
+ return (1);
+ *pathend = EOS;
+ errno = 0;
+
+ if ((dirp = g_opendir(pathbuf, pglob)) == NULL) {
+ /* TODO: don't call for ENOENT or ENOTDIR? */
+ if (pglob->gl_errfunc) {
+ if (g_Ctoc(pathbuf, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+ return(GLOB_ABORTED);
+ if (pglob->gl_errfunc(buf, errno) ||
+ pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ERR)
+ return(GLOB_ABORTED);
+ }
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ err = 0;
+
+ /* Search directory for matching names. */
+ if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+ readdirfunc = pglob->gl_readdir;
+ else
+ readdirfunc = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))readdir;
+ while ((dp = (*readdirfunc)(dirp))) {
+ u_char *sc;
+ Char *dc;
+
+ if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
+ limitp->glim_readdir++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR) {
+ errno = 0;
+ *pathend++ = SEP;
+ *pathend = EOS;
+ err = GLOB_NOSPACE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Initial DOT must be matched literally. */
+ if (dp->d_name[0] == DOT && *pattern != DOT)
+ continue;
+ dc = pathend;
+ sc = (u_char *) dp->d_name;
+ while (dc < pathend_last && (*dc++ = *sc++) != EOS)
+ ;
+ if (dc >= pathend_last) {
+ *dc = EOS;
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!match(pathend, pattern, restpattern, GLOB_LIMIT_RECUR)) {
+ *pathend = EOS;
+ continue;
+ }
+ err = glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, --dc, pathend_last,
+ restpattern, restpattern_last, pglob, limitp);
+ if (err)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+ (*pglob->gl_closedir)(dirp);
+ else
+ closedir(dirp);
+ return(err);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Extend the gl_pathv member of a glob_t structure to accommodate a new item,
+ * add the new item, and update gl_pathc.
+ *
+ * This assumes the BSD realloc, which only copies the block when its size
+ * crosses a power-of-two boundary; for v7 realloc, this would cause quadratic
+ * behavior.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if new item added, error code if memory couldn't be allocated.
+ *
+ * Invariant of the glob_t structure:
+ * Either gl_pathc is zero and gl_pathv is NULL; or gl_pathc > 0 and
+ * gl_pathv points to (gl_offs + gl_pathc + 1) items.
+ */
+static int
+globextend(const Char *path, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp,
+ struct stat *sb)
+{
+ char **pathv;
+ ssize_t i;
+ size_t newn, len;
+ char *copy = NULL;
+ const Char *p;
+ struct stat **statv;
+
+ newn = 2 + pglob->gl_pathc + pglob->gl_offs;
+ if (pglob->gl_offs >= INT_MAX ||
+ pglob->gl_pathc >= INT_MAX ||
+ newn >= INT_MAX ||
+ SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*pathv) <= newn ||
+ SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*statv) <= newn) {
+ nospace:
+ for (i = pglob->gl_offs; i < (ssize_t)(newn - 2); i++) {
+ if (pglob->gl_pathv && pglob->gl_pathv[i])
+ free(pglob->gl_pathv[i]);
+ if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT) != 0 &&
+ pglob->gl_pathv && pglob->gl_pathv[i])
+ free(pglob->gl_statv[i]);
+ }
+ if (pglob->gl_pathv) {
+ free(pglob->gl_pathv);
+ pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
+ }
+ if (pglob->gl_statv) {
+ free(pglob->gl_statv);
+ pglob->gl_statv = NULL;
+ }
+ return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+ }
+
+ pathv = realloc(pglob->gl_pathv, newn * sizeof(*pathv));
+ if (pathv == NULL)
+ goto nospace;
+ if (pglob->gl_pathv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) {
+ /* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */
+ pathv += pglob->gl_offs;
+ for (i = pglob->gl_offs; --i >= 0; )
+ *--pathv = NULL;
+ }
+ pglob->gl_pathv = pathv;
+
+ if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT) != 0) {
+ statv = realloc(pglob->gl_statv, newn * sizeof(*statv));
+ if (statv == NULL)
+ goto nospace;
+ if (pglob->gl_statv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) {
+ /* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */
+ statv += pglob->gl_offs;
+ for (i = pglob->gl_offs; --i >= 0; )
+ *--statv = NULL;
+ }
+ pglob->gl_statv = statv;
+ if (sb == NULL)
+ statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL;
+ else {
+ limitp->glim_malloc += sizeof(**statv);
+ if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
+ limitp->glim_malloc >= GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC) {
+ errno = 0;
+ return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+ }
+ if ((statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] =
+ malloc(sizeof(**statv))) == NULL)
+ goto copy_error;
+ memcpy(statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc], sb,
+ sizeof(*sb));
+ }
+ statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc + 1] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ for (p = path; *p++;)
+ ;
+ len = (size_t)(p - path);
+ limitp->glim_malloc += len;
+ if ((copy = malloc(len)) != NULL) {
+ if (g_Ctoc(path, copy, len)) {
+ free(copy);
+ return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+ }
+ pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc++] = copy;
+ }
+ pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL;
+
+ if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
+ (newn * sizeof(*pathv)) + limitp->glim_malloc >
+ GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC) {
+ errno = 0;
+ return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+ }
+ copy_error:
+ return(copy == NULL ? GLOB_NOSPACE : 0);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * pattern matching function for filenames. Each occurrence of the *
+ * pattern causes a recursion level.
+ */
+static int
+match(Char *name, Char *pat, Char *patend, int recur)
+{
+ int ok, negate_range;
+ Char c, k;
+
+ if (recur-- == 0)
+ return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+
+ while (pat < patend) {
+ c = *pat++;
+ switch (c & M_MASK) {
+ case M_ALL:
+ while (pat < patend && (*pat & M_MASK) == M_ALL)
+ pat++; /* eat consecutive '*' */
+ if (pat == patend)
+ return(1);
+ do {
+ if (match(name, pat, patend, recur))
+ return(1);
+ } while (*name++ != EOS);
+ return(0);
+ case M_ONE:
+ if (*name++ == EOS)
+ return(0);
+ break;
+ case M_SET:
+ ok = 0;
+ if ((k = *name++) == EOS)
+ return(0);
+ if ((negate_range = ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_NOT)) != EOS)
+ ++pat;
+ while (((c = *pat++) & M_MASK) != M_END) {
+ if ((c & M_MASK) == M_CLASS) {
+ Char idx = *pat & M_MASK;
+ if (idx < NCCLASSES &&
+ cclasses[idx].isctype(k))
+ ok = 1;
+ ++pat;
+ }
+ if ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_RNG) {
+ if (c <= k && k <= pat[1])
+ ok = 1;
+ pat += 2;
+ } else if (c == k)
+ ok = 1;
+ }
+ if (ok == negate_range)
+ return(0);
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (*name++ != c)
+ return(0);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return(*name == EOS);
+}
+
+/* Free allocated data belonging to a glob_t structure. */
+void
+globfree(glob_t *pglob)
+{
+ int i;
+ char **pp;
+
+ if (pglob->gl_pathv != NULL) {
+ pp = pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs;
+ for (i = pglob->gl_pathc; i--; ++pp)
+ if (*pp)
+ free(*pp);
+ free(pglob->gl_pathv);
+ pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
+ }
+ if (pglob->gl_statv != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < pglob->gl_pathc; i++) {
+ if (pglob->gl_statv[i] != NULL)
+ free(pglob->gl_statv[i]);
+ }
+ free(pglob->gl_statv);
+ pglob->gl_statv = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+static DIR *
+g_opendir(Char *str, glob_t *pglob)
+{
+ char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ if (!*str)
+ strlcpy(buf, ".", sizeof buf);
+ else {
+ if (g_Ctoc(str, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+ if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+ return((*pglob->gl_opendir)(buf));
+
+ return(opendir(buf));
+}
+
+static int
+g_lstat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob)
+{
+ char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+ return(-1);
+ if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+ return((*pglob->gl_lstat)(buf, sb));
+ return(lstat(buf, sb));
+}
+
+static int
+g_stat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob)
+{
+ char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+ return(-1);
+ if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+ return((*pglob->gl_stat)(buf, sb));
+ return(stat(buf, sb));
+}
+
+static Char *
+g_strchr(const Char *str, int ch)
+{
+ do {
+ if (*str == ch)
+ return ((Char *)str);
+ } while (*str++);
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+static int
+g_Ctoc(const Char *str, char *buf, u_int len)
+{
+
+ while (len--) {
+ if ((*buf++ = *str++) == EOS)
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+static void
+qprintf(const char *str, Char *s)
+{
+ Char *p;
+
+ (void)printf("%s:\n", str);
+ for (p = s; *p; p++)
+ (void)printf("%c", CHAR(*p));
+ (void)printf("\n");
+ for (p = s; *p; p++)
+ (void)printf("%c", *p & M_PROTECT ? '"' : ' ');
+ (void)printf("\n");
+ for (p = s; *p; p++)
+ (void)printf("%c", ismeta(*p) ? '_' : ' ');
+ (void)printf("\n");
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) ||
+ !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/glob.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/glob.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/glob.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: glob.h,v 1.11 2010/09/24 13:32:55 djm Exp $ */
-/* $NetBSD: glob.h,v 1.5 1994/10/26 00:55:56 cgd Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
- * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
- *
- * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
- * Guido van Rossum.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
- * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
- * without specific prior written permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * @(#)glob.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93
- */
-
-/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/glob.h */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \
- !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) || \
- !defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0 || \
- defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
-
-#ifndef _GLOB_H_
-#define _GLOB_H_
-
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-
-struct stat;
-typedef struct {
- int gl_pathc; /* Count of total paths so far. */
- int gl_matchc; /* Count of paths matching pattern. */
- int gl_offs; /* Reserved at beginning of gl_pathv. */
- int gl_flags; /* Copy of flags parameter to glob. */
- char **gl_pathv; /* List of paths matching pattern. */
- struct stat **gl_statv; /* Stat entries corresponding to gl_pathv */
- /* Copy of errfunc parameter to glob. */
- int (*gl_errfunc)(const char *, int);
-
- /*
- * Alternate filesystem access methods for glob; replacement
- * versions of closedir(3), readdir(3), opendir(3), stat(2)
- * and lstat(2).
- */
- void (*gl_closedir)(void *);
- struct dirent *(*gl_readdir)(void *);
- void *(*gl_opendir)(const char *);
- int (*gl_lstat)(const char *, struct stat *);
- int (*gl_stat)(const char *, struct stat *);
-} glob_t;
-
-#define GLOB_APPEND 0x0001 /* Append to output from previous call. */
-#define GLOB_DOOFFS 0x0002 /* Use gl_offs. */
-#define GLOB_ERR 0x0004 /* Return on error. */
-#define GLOB_MARK 0x0008 /* Append / to matching directories. */
-#define GLOB_NOCHECK 0x0010 /* Return pattern itself if nothing matches. */
-#define GLOB_NOSORT 0x0020 /* Don't sort. */
-#define GLOB_NOESCAPE 0x1000 /* Disable backslash escaping. */
-
-#define GLOB_NOSPACE (-1) /* Malloc call failed. */
-#define GLOB_ABORTED (-2) /* Unignored error. */
-#define GLOB_NOMATCH (-3) /* No match and GLOB_NOCHECK not set. */
-#define GLOB_NOSYS (-4) /* Function not supported. */
-
-#define GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC 0x0040 /* Use alternately specified directory funcs. */
-#define GLOB_BRACE 0x0080 /* Expand braces ala csh. */
-#define GLOB_MAGCHAR 0x0100 /* Pattern had globbing characters. */
-#define GLOB_NOMAGIC 0x0200 /* GLOB_NOCHECK without magic chars (csh). */
-#define GLOB_QUOTE 0x0400 /* Quote special chars with \. */
-#define GLOB_TILDE 0x0800 /* Expand tilde names from the passwd file. */
-#define GLOB_LIMIT 0x2000 /* Limit pattern match output to ARG_MAX */
-#define GLOB_KEEPSTAT 0x4000 /* Retain stat data for paths in gl_statv. */
-#define GLOB_ABEND GLOB_ABORTED /* backward compatibility */
-
-int glob(const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *);
-void globfree(glob_t *);
-
-#endif /* !_GLOB_H_ */
-
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) ||
- !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOH_HAS_GL_STATV) */
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/glob.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/glob.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/glob.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/glob.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: glob.h,v 1.11 2010/09/24 13:32:55 djm Exp $ */
+/* $NetBSD: glob.h,v 1.5 1994/10/26 00:55:56 cgd Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
+ * Guido van Rossum.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * @(#)glob.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/glob.h */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \
+ !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) || \
+ !defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0 || \
+ defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
+
+#ifndef _COMPAT_GLOB_H_
+#define _COMPAT_GLOB_H_
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+# define glob_t _ssh_compat_glob_t
+# define glob(a, b, c, d) _ssh__compat_glob(a, b, c, d)
+# define globfree(a) _ssh__compat_globfree(a)
+
+struct stat;
+typedef struct {
+ int gl_pathc; /* Count of total paths so far. */
+ int gl_matchc; /* Count of paths matching pattern. */
+ int gl_offs; /* Reserved at beginning of gl_pathv. */
+ int gl_flags; /* Copy of flags parameter to glob. */
+ char **gl_pathv; /* List of paths matching pattern. */
+ struct stat **gl_statv; /* Stat entries corresponding to gl_pathv */
+ /* Copy of errfunc parameter to glob. */
+ int (*gl_errfunc)(const char *, int);
+
+ /*
+ * Alternate filesystem access methods for glob; replacement
+ * versions of closedir(3), readdir(3), opendir(3), stat(2)
+ * and lstat(2).
+ */
+ void (*gl_closedir)(void *);
+ struct dirent *(*gl_readdir)(void *);
+ void *(*gl_opendir)(const char *);
+ int (*gl_lstat)(const char *, struct stat *);
+ int (*gl_stat)(const char *, struct stat *);
+} glob_t;
+
+#define GLOB_APPEND 0x0001 /* Append to output from previous call. */
+#define GLOB_DOOFFS 0x0002 /* Use gl_offs. */
+#define GLOB_ERR 0x0004 /* Return on error. */
+#define GLOB_MARK 0x0008 /* Append / to matching directories. */
+#define GLOB_NOCHECK 0x0010 /* Return pattern itself if nothing matches. */
+#define GLOB_NOSORT 0x0020 /* Don't sort. */
+#define GLOB_NOESCAPE 0x1000 /* Disable backslash escaping. */
+
+#define GLOB_NOSPACE (-1) /* Malloc call failed. */
+#define GLOB_ABORTED (-2) /* Unignored error. */
+#define GLOB_NOMATCH (-3) /* No match and GLOB_NOCHECK not set. */
+#define GLOB_NOSYS (-4) /* Function not supported. */
+
+#define GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC 0x0040 /* Use alternately specified directory funcs. */
+#define GLOB_BRACE 0x0080 /* Expand braces ala csh. */
+#define GLOB_MAGCHAR 0x0100 /* Pattern had globbing characters. */
+#define GLOB_NOMAGIC 0x0200 /* GLOB_NOCHECK without magic chars (csh). */
+#define GLOB_QUOTE 0x0400 /* Quote special chars with \. */
+#define GLOB_TILDE 0x0800 /* Expand tilde names from the passwd file. */
+#define GLOB_LIMIT 0x2000 /* Limit pattern match output to ARG_MAX */
+#define GLOB_KEEPSTAT 0x4000 /* Retain stat data for paths in gl_statv. */
+#define GLOB_ABEND GLOB_ABORTED /* backward compatibility */
+
+int glob(const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *);
+void globfree(glob_t *);
+
+#endif /* !_GLOB_H_ */
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) ||
+ !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOH_HAS_GL_STATV) */
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: inet_addr.c,v 1.9 2005/08/06 20:30:03 espie Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1993
- * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
- * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
- * without specific prior written permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * -
- * Portions Copyright (c) 1993 by Digital Equipment Corporation.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies, and that
- * the name of Digital Equipment Corporation not be used in advertising or
- * publicity pertaining to distribution of the document or software without
- * specific, written prior permission.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORP. DISCLAIMS ALL
- * WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL DIGITAL EQUIPMENT
- * CORPORATION BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
- * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS
- * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
- * SOFTWARE.
- * -
- * --Copyright--
- */
-
-/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/inet_addr.c */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_INET_ATON)
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-#include <ctype.h>
-
-#if 0
-/*
- * Ascii internet address interpretation routine.
- * The value returned is in network order.
- */
-in_addr_t
-inet_addr(const char *cp)
-{
- struct in_addr val;
-
- if (inet_aton(cp, &val))
- return (val.s_addr);
- return (INADDR_NONE);
-}
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Check whether "cp" is a valid ascii representation
- * of an Internet address and convert to a binary address.
- * Returns 1 if the address is valid, 0 if not.
- * This replaces inet_addr, the return value from which
- * cannot distinguish between failure and a local broadcast address.
- */
-int
-inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr)
-{
- u_int32_t val;
- int base, n;
- char c;
- u_int parts[4];
- u_int *pp = parts;
-
- c = *cp;
- for (;;) {
- /*
- * Collect number up to ``.''.
- * Values are specified as for C:
- * 0x=hex, 0=octal, isdigit=decimal.
- */
- if (!isdigit(c))
- return (0);
- val = 0; base = 10;
- if (c == '0') {
- c = *++cp;
- if (c == 'x' || c == 'X')
- base = 16, c = *++cp;
- else
- base = 8;
- }
- for (;;) {
- if (isascii(c) && isdigit(c)) {
- val = (val * base) + (c - '0');
- c = *++cp;
- } else if (base == 16 && isascii(c) && isxdigit(c)) {
- val = (val << 4) |
- (c + 10 - (islower(c) ? 'a' : 'A'));
- c = *++cp;
- } else
- break;
- }
- if (c == '.') {
- /*
- * Internet format:
- * a.b.c.d
- * a.b.c (with c treated as 16 bits)
- * a.b (with b treated as 24 bits)
- */
- if (pp >= parts + 3)
- return (0);
- *pp++ = val;
- c = *++cp;
- } else
- break;
- }
- /*
- * Check for trailing characters.
- */
- if (c != '\0' && (!isascii(c) || !isspace(c)))
- return (0);
- /*
- * Concoct the address according to
- * the number of parts specified.
- */
- n = pp - parts + 1;
- switch (n) {
-
- case 0:
- return (0); /* initial nondigit */
-
- case 1: /* a -- 32 bits */
- break;
-
- case 2: /* a.b -- 8.24 bits */
- if ((val > 0xffffff) || (parts[0] > 0xff))
- return (0);
- val |= parts[0] << 24;
- break;
-
- case 3: /* a.b.c -- 8.8.16 bits */
- if ((val > 0xffff) || (parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff))
- return (0);
- val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16);
- break;
-
- case 4: /* a.b.c.d -- 8.8.8.8 bits */
- if ((val > 0xff) || (parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff) || (parts[2] > 0xff))
- return (0);
- val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16) | (parts[2] << 8);
- break;
- }
- if (addr)
- addr->s_addr = htonl(val);
- return (1);
-}
-
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_INET_ATON) */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: inet_addr.c,v 1.9 2005/08/06 20:30:03 espie Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1993
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * -
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1993 by Digital Equipment Corporation.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies, and that
+ * the name of Digital Equipment Corporation not be used in advertising or
+ * publicity pertaining to distribution of the document or software without
+ * specific, written prior permission.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORP. DISCLAIMS ALL
+ * WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL DIGITAL EQUIPMENT
+ * CORPORATION BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
+ * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS
+ * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ * -
+ * --Copyright--
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/inet_addr.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_INET_ATON)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#if 0
+/*
+ * Ascii internet address interpretation routine.
+ * The value returned is in network order.
+ */
+in_addr_t
+inet_addr(const char *cp)
+{
+ struct in_addr val;
+
+ if (inet_aton(cp, &val))
+ return (val.s_addr);
+ return (INADDR_NONE);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Check whether "cp" is a valid ascii representation
+ * of an Internet address and convert to a binary address.
+ * Returns 1 if the address is valid, 0 if not.
+ * This replaces inet_addr, the return value from which
+ * cannot distinguish between failure and a local broadcast address.
+ */
+int
+inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr)
+{
+ u_int32_t val;
+ int base, n;
+ char c;
+ u_int parts[4];
+ u_int *pp = parts;
+
+ c = *cp;
+ for (;;) {
+ /*
+ * Collect number up to ``.''.
+ * Values are specified as for C:
+ * 0x=hex, 0=octal, isdigit=decimal.
+ */
+ if (!isdigit(c))
+ return (0);
+ val = 0; base = 10;
+ if (c == '0') {
+ c = *++cp;
+ if (c == 'x' || c == 'X')
+ base = 16, c = *++cp;
+ else
+ base = 8;
+ }
+ for (;;) {
+ if (isascii(c) && isdigit(c)) {
+ val = (val * base) + (c - '0');
+ c = *++cp;
+ } else if (base == 16 && isascii(c) && isxdigit(c)) {
+ val = (val << 4) |
+ (c + 10 - (islower(c) ? 'a' : 'A'));
+ c = *++cp;
+ } else
+ break;
+ }
+ if (c == '.') {
+ /*
+ * Internet format:
+ * a.b.c.d
+ * a.b.c (with c treated as 16 bits)
+ * a.b (with b treated as 24 bits)
+ */
+ if (pp >= parts + 3)
+ return (0);
+ *pp++ = val;
+ c = *++cp;
+ } else
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Check for trailing characters.
+ */
+ if (c != '\0' && (!isascii(c) || !isspace(c)))
+ return (0);
+ /*
+ * Concoct the address according to
+ * the number of parts specified.
+ */
+ n = pp - parts + 1;
+ switch (n) {
+
+ case 0:
+ return (0); /* initial nondigit */
+
+ case 1: /* a -- 32 bits */
+ break;
+
+ case 2: /* a.b -- 8.24 bits */
+ if ((val > 0xffffff) || (parts[0] > 0xff))
+ return (0);
+ val |= parts[0] << 24;
+ break;
+
+ case 3: /* a.b.c -- 8.8.16 bits */
+ if ((val > 0xffff) || (parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff))
+ return (0);
+ val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16);
+ break;
+
+ case 4: /* a.b.c.d -- 8.8.8.8 bits */
+ if ((val > 0xff) || (parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff) || (parts[2] > 0xff))
+ return (0);
+ val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16) | (parts[2] << 8);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (addr)
+ addr->s_addr = htonl(val);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_INET_ATON) */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* Placed in the public domain. */
+
+/*
+ * _FORTIFY_SOURCE includes a misguided check for FD_SET(n)/FD_ISSET(b)
+ * where n > FD_SETSIZE. This breaks OpenSSH and other programs that
+ * explicitly allocate fd_sets. To avoid this, we wrap FD_SET in a
+ * function compiled without _FORTIFY_SOURCE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#if defined(HAVE_FEATURES_H) && defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
+# include <features.h>
+# if defined(__GNU_LIBRARY__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
+# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0)
+# undef _FORTIFY_SOURCE
+# undef __USE_FORTIFY_LEVEL
+# include <sys/socket.h>
+void kludge_FD_SET(int n, fd_set *set) {
+ FD_SET(n, set);
+}
+int kludge_FD_ISSET(int n, fd_set *set) {
+ return FD_ISSET(n, set);
+}
+# endif /* __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) */
+# endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ && __GLIBC_PREREQ */
+#endif /* HAVE_FEATURES_H && _FORTIFY_SOURCE */
+
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/md5.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/md5.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/md5.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/md5.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: md5.c,v 1.9 2014/01/08 06:14:57 tedu Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * This code implements the MD5 message-digest algorithm.
+ * The algorithm is due to Ron Rivest. This code was
+ * written by Colin Plumb in 1993, no copyright is claimed.
+ * This code is in the public domain; do with it what you wish.
+ *
+ * Equivalent code is available from RSA Data Security, Inc.
+ * This code has been tested against that, and is equivalent,
+ * except that you don't need to include two pages of legalese
+ * with every copy.
+ *
+ * To compute the message digest of a chunk of bytes, declare an
+ * MD5Context structure, pass it to MD5Init, call MD5Update as
+ * needed on buffers full of bytes, and then call MD5Final, which
+ * will fill a supplied 16-byte array with the digest.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "md5.h"
+
+#define PUT_64BIT_LE(cp, value) do { \
+ (cp)[7] = (value) >> 56; \
+ (cp)[6] = (value) >> 48; \
+ (cp)[5] = (value) >> 40; \
+ (cp)[4] = (value) >> 32; \
+ (cp)[3] = (value) >> 24; \
+ (cp)[2] = (value) >> 16; \
+ (cp)[1] = (value) >> 8; \
+ (cp)[0] = (value); } while (0)
+
+#define PUT_32BIT_LE(cp, value) do { \
+ (cp)[3] = (value) >> 24; \
+ (cp)[2] = (value) >> 16; \
+ (cp)[1] = (value) >> 8; \
+ (cp)[0] = (value); } while (0)
+
+static u_int8_t PADDING[MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH] = {
+ 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+};
+
+/*
+ * Start MD5 accumulation. Set bit count to 0 and buffer to mysterious
+ * initialization constants.
+ */
+void
+MD5Init(MD5_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->count = 0;
+ ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301;
+ ctx->state[1] = 0xefcdab89;
+ ctx->state[2] = 0x98badcfe;
+ ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update context to reflect the concatenation of another buffer full
+ * of bytes.
+ */
+void
+MD5Update(MD5_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t have, need;
+
+ /* Check how many bytes we already have and how many more we need. */
+ have = (size_t)((ctx->count >> 3) & (MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH - 1));
+ need = MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH - have;
+
+ /* Update bitcount */
+ ctx->count += (u_int64_t)len << 3;
+
+ if (len >= need) {
+ if (have != 0) {
+ memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input, need);
+ MD5Transform(ctx->state, ctx->buffer);
+ input += need;
+ len -= need;
+ have = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Process data in MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH-byte chunks. */
+ while (len >= MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+ MD5Transform(ctx->state, input);
+ input += MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+ len -= MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Handle any remaining bytes of data. */
+ if (len != 0)
+ memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input, len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Pad pad to 64-byte boundary with the bit pattern
+ * 1 0* (64-bit count of bits processed, MSB-first)
+ */
+void
+MD5Pad(MD5_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ u_int8_t count[8];
+ size_t padlen;
+
+ /* Convert count to 8 bytes in little endian order. */
+ PUT_64BIT_LE(count, ctx->count);
+
+ /* Pad out to 56 mod 64. */
+ padlen = MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH -
+ ((ctx->count >> 3) & (MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH - 1));
+ if (padlen < 1 + 8)
+ padlen += MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+ MD5Update(ctx, PADDING, padlen - 8); /* padlen - 8 <= 64 */
+ MD5Update(ctx, count, 8);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Final wrapup--call MD5Pad, fill in digest and zero out ctx.
+ */
+void
+MD5Final(unsigned char digest[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH], MD5_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ MD5Pad(ctx);
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ PUT_32BIT_LE(digest + i * 4, ctx->state[i]);
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+
+/* The four core functions - F1 is optimized somewhat */
+
+/* #define F1(x, y, z) (x & y | ~x & z) */
+#define F1(x, y, z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z)))
+#define F2(x, y, z) F1(z, x, y)
+#define F3(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z)
+#define F4(x, y, z) (y ^ (x | ~z))
+
+/* This is the central step in the MD5 algorithm. */
+#define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, data, s) \
+ ( w += f(x, y, z) + data, w = w<<s | w>>(32-s), w += x )
+
+/*
+ * The core of the MD5 algorithm, this alters an existing MD5 hash to
+ * reflect the addition of 16 longwords of new data. MD5Update blocks
+ * the data and converts bytes into longwords for this routine.
+ */
+void
+MD5Transform(u_int32_t state[4], const u_int8_t block[MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+ u_int32_t a, b, c, d, in[MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH / 4];
+
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ memcpy(in, block, sizeof(in));
+#else
+ for (a = 0; a < MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH / 4; a++) {
+ in[a] = (u_int32_t)(
+ (u_int32_t)(block[a * 4 + 0]) |
+ (u_int32_t)(block[a * 4 + 1]) << 8 |
+ (u_int32_t)(block[a * 4 + 2]) << 16 |
+ (u_int32_t)(block[a * 4 + 3]) << 24);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ a = state[0];
+ b = state[1];
+ c = state[2];
+ d = state[3];
+
+ MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + 0xd76aa478, 7);
+ MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 1] + 0xe8c7b756, 12);
+ MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[ 2] + 0x242070db, 17);
+ MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[ 3] + 0xc1bdceee, 22);
+ MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + 0xf57c0faf, 7);
+ MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 5] + 0x4787c62a, 12);
+ MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[ 6] + 0xa8304613, 17);
+ MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + 0xfd469501, 22);
+ MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 8] + 0x698098d8, 7);
+ MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 9] + 0x8b44f7af, 12);
+ MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffff5bb1, 17);
+ MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[11] + 0x895cd7be, 22);
+ MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x6b901122, 7);
+ MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[13] + 0xfd987193, 12);
+ MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xa679438e, 17);
+ MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[15] + 0x49b40821, 22);
+
+ MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + 0xf61e2562, 5);
+ MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[ 6] + 0xc040b340, 9);
+ MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x265e5a51, 14);
+ MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 0] + 0xe9b6c7aa, 20);
+ MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 5] + 0xd62f105d, 5);
+ MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[10] + 0x02441453, 9);
+ MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0xd8a1e681, 14);
+ MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 4] + 0xe7d3fbc8, 20);
+ MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + 0x21e1cde6, 5);
+ MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[14] + 0xc33707d6, 9);
+ MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[ 3] + 0xf4d50d87, 14);
+ MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 8] + 0x455a14ed, 20);
+ MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0xa9e3e905, 5);
+ MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[ 2] + 0xfcefa3f8, 9);
+ MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[ 7] + 0x676f02d9, 14);
+ MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[12] + 0x8d2a4c8a, 20);
+
+ MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 5] + 0xfffa3942, 4);
+ MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 8] + 0x8771f681, 11);
+ MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x6d9d6122, 16);
+ MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[14] + 0xfde5380c, 23);
+ MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + 0xa4beea44, 4);
+ MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 4] + 0x4bdecfa9, 11);
+ MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[ 7] + 0xf6bb4b60, 16);
+ MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[10] + 0xbebfbc70, 23);
+ MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0x289b7ec6, 4);
+ MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 0] + 0xeaa127fa, 11);
+ MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[ 3] + 0xd4ef3085, 16);
+ MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[ 6] + 0x04881d05, 23);
+ MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + 0xd9d4d039, 4);
+ MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[12] + 0xe6db99e5, 11);
+ MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0x1fa27cf8, 16);
+ MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[2 ] + 0xc4ac5665, 23);
+
+ MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + 0xf4292244, 6);
+ MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[7 ] + 0x432aff97, 10);
+ MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xab9423a7, 15);
+ MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[5 ] + 0xfc93a039, 21);
+ MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x655b59c3, 6);
+ MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[3 ] + 0x8f0ccc92, 10);
+ MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffeff47d, 15);
+ MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[1 ] + 0x85845dd1, 21);
+ MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[8 ] + 0x6fa87e4f, 6);
+ MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[15] + 0xfe2ce6e0, 10);
+ MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[6 ] + 0xa3014314, 15);
+ MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[13] + 0x4e0811a1, 21);
+ MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[4 ] + 0xf7537e82, 6);
+ MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[11] + 0xbd3af235, 10);
+ MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[2 ] + 0x2ad7d2bb, 15);
+ MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[9 ] + 0xeb86d391, 21);
+
+ state[0] += a;
+ state[1] += b;
+ state[2] += c;
+ state[3] += d;
+}
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/md5.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/md5.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/md5.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/md5.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: md5.h,v 1.17 2012/12/05 23:19:57 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * This code implements the MD5 message-digest algorithm.
+ * The algorithm is due to Ron Rivest. This code was
+ * written by Colin Plumb in 1993, no copyright is claimed.
+ * This code is in the public domain; do with it what you wish.
+ *
+ * Equivalent code is available from RSA Data Security, Inc.
+ * This code has been tested against that, and is equivalent,
+ * except that you don't need to include two pages of legalese
+ * with every copy.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MD5_H_
+#define _MD5_H_
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#define MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH 64
+#define MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH 16
+#define MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+
+typedef struct MD5Context {
+ u_int32_t state[4]; /* state */
+ u_int64_t count; /* number of bits, mod 2^64 */
+ u_int8_t buffer[MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH]; /* input buffer */
+} MD5_CTX;
+
+void MD5Init(MD5_CTX *);
+void MD5Update(MD5_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void MD5Pad(MD5_CTX *);
+void MD5Final(u_int8_t [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH], MD5_CTX *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+void MD5Transform(u_int32_t [4], const u_int8_t [MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,4)))
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH)));
+char *MD5End(MD5_CTX *, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *MD5File(const char *, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *MD5FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *MD5Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#endif /* _MD5_H_ */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,271 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.61 2014/02/04 00:18:23 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2003 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2002 Tim Rice. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#ifndef _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H
-#define _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-/* OpenBSD function replacements */
-#include "base64.h"
-#include "sigact.h"
-#include "glob.h"
-#include "readpassphrase.h"
-#include "vis.h"
-#include "getrrsetbyname.h"
-#include "sha2.h"
-#include "blf.h"
-
-#ifndef HAVE_BASENAME
-char *basename(const char *path);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
-int bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM
-void closefrom(int);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_GETCWD
-char *getcwd(char *pt, size_t size);
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH)
-char *realpath(const char *path, char *resolved);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF
-int rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY
-/* #include <sys/types.h> XXX Still needed? */
-size_t strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT
-/* #include <sys/types.h> XXX Still needed? */
-size_t strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
-int setenv(register const char *name, register const char *value, int rewrite);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_STRMODE
-void strmode(int mode, char *p);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_STRPTIME
-#include <time.h>
-char *strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm);
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP)
-int mkstemps(char *path, int slen);
-int mkstemp(char *path);
-char *mkdtemp(char *path);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON
-int daemon(int nochdir, int noclose);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME
-char *dirname(const char *path);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_FMT_SCALED
-#define FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE 7
-int fmt_scaled(long long number, char *result);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED
-int scan_scaled(char *, long long *);
-#endif
-
-#if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA)
-char *inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP
-const char *inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON
-int inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_STRSEP
-char *strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
-void setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...);
-void compat_init_setproctitle(int argc, char *argv[]);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
-/* #include <grp.h> XXXX Still needed ? */
-int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *);
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET)
-int BSDgetopt(int argc, char * const *argv, const char *opts);
-#include "openbsd-compat/getopt.h"
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HAVE_DECL_WRITEV) && HAVE_DECL_WRITEV == 0
-# include <sys/types.h>
-# include <sys/uio.h>
-int writev(int, struct iovec *, int);
-#endif
-
-/* Home grown routines */
-#include "bsd-misc.h"
-#include "bsd-setres_id.h"
-#include "bsd-statvfs.h"
-#include "bsd-waitpid.h"
-#include "bsd-poll.h"
-
-#ifndef HAVE_GETPEEREID
-int getpeereid(int , uid_t *, gid_t *);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
-# ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR
-# define arc4random_stir()
-# endif
-#else
-unsigned int arc4random(void);
-void arc4random_stir(void);
-#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
-void arc4random_buf(void *, size_t);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
-u_int32_t arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF
-int asprintf(char **, const char *, ...);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_OPENPTY
-# include <sys/ioctl.h> /* for struct winsize */
-int openpty(int *, int *, char *, struct termios *, struct winsize *);
-#endif /* HAVE_OPENPTY */
-
-/* #include <sys/types.h> XXX needed? For size_t */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF
-int snprintf(char *, size_t, SNPRINTF_CONST char *, ...);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_STRTOLL
-long long strtoll(const char *, char **, int);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_STRTOUL
-unsigned long strtoul(const char *, char **, int);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_STRTOULL
-unsigned long long strtoull(const char *, char **, int);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM
-long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **);
-#endif
-
-/* multibyte character support */
-#ifndef HAVE_MBLEN
-# define mblen(x, y) 1
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_VASPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
-# include <stdarg.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF
-int vasprintf(char **, const char *, va_list);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
-int vsnprintf(char *, size_t, const char *, va_list);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID
-char *user_from_uid(uid_t, int);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID
-char *group_from_gid(gid_t, int);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP
-int timingsafe_bcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF
-int bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *, size_t, const u_int8_t *, size_t,
- u_int8_t *, size_t, unsigned int);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
-void explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n);
-#endif
-
-void *xmmap(size_t size);
-char *xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt);
-char *shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw);
-
-/* rfc2553 socket API replacements */
-#include "fake-rfc2553.h"
-
-/* Routines for a single OS platform */
-#include "bsd-cray.h"
-#include "bsd-cygwin_util.h"
-
-#include "port-aix.h"
-#include "port-irix.h"
-#include "port-linux.h"
-#include "port-solaris.h"
-#include "port-tun.h"
-#include "port-uw.h"
-
-#endif /* _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
+/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.62 2014/09/30 23:43:08 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Tim Rice. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H
+#define _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <stddef.h> /* for wchar_t */
+
+/* OpenBSD function replacements */
+#include "base64.h"
+#include "sigact.h"
+#include "readpassphrase.h"
+#include "vis.h"
+#include "getrrsetbyname.h"
+#include "sha1.h"
+#include "sha2.h"
+#include "rmd160.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "blf.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BASENAME
+char *basename(const char *path);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
+int bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM
+void closefrom(int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETCWD
+char *getcwd(char *pt, size_t size);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY
+void *reallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH)
+/*
+ * glibc's FORTIFY_SOURCE can redefine this and prevent us picking up the
+ * compat version.
+ */
+# ifdef BROKEN_REALPATH
+# define realpath(x, y) _ssh_compat_realpath(x, y)
+# endif
+
+char *realpath(const char *path, char *resolved);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF
+int rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY
+/* #include <sys/types.h> XXX Still needed? */
+size_t strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT
+/* #include <sys/types.h> XXX Still needed? */
+size_t strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
+int setenv(register const char *name, register const char *value, int rewrite);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRMODE
+void strmode(int mode, char *p);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRPTIME
+#include <time.h>
+char *strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP)
+int mkstemps(char *path, int slen);
+int mkstemp(char *path);
+char *mkdtemp(char *path);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON
+int daemon(int nochdir, int noclose);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME
+char *dirname(const char *path);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FMT_SCALED
+#define FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE 7
+int fmt_scaled(long long number, char *result);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED
+int scan_scaled(char *, long long *);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA)
+char *inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP
+const char *inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON
+int inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRSEP
+char *strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+void setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...);
+void compat_init_setproctitle(int argc, char *argv[]);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
+/* #include <grp.h> XXXX Still needed ? */
+int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET)
+int BSDgetopt(int argc, char * const *argv, const char *opts);
+#include "openbsd-compat/getopt.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_WRITEV) && HAVE_DECL_WRITEV == 0
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/uio.h>
+int writev(int, struct iovec *, int);
+#endif
+
+/* Home grown routines */
+#include "bsd-misc.h"
+#include "bsd-setres_id.h"
+#include "bsd-statvfs.h"
+#include "bsd-waitpid.h"
+#include "bsd-poll.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETPEEREID
+int getpeereid(int , uid_t *, gid_t *);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
+# ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR
+# define arc4random_stir()
+# endif
+#else
+unsigned int arc4random(void);
+void arc4random_stir(void);
+#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
+void arc4random_buf(void *, size_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
+u_int32_t arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF
+int asprintf(char **, const char *, ...);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_OPENPTY
+# include <sys/ioctl.h> /* for struct winsize */
+int openpty(int *, int *, char *, struct termios *, struct winsize *);
+#endif /* HAVE_OPENPTY */
+
+/* #include <sys/types.h> XXX needed? For size_t */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+int snprintf(char *, size_t, SNPRINTF_CONST char *, ...);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOLL
+long long strtoll(const char *, char **, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOUL
+unsigned long strtoul(const char *, char **, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOULL
+unsigned long long strtoull(const char *, char **, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM
+long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **);
+#endif
+
+/* multibyte character support */
+#ifndef HAVE_MBLEN
+# define mblen(x, y) (1)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_WCWIDTH
+# define wcwidth(x) (((x) >= 0x20 && (x) <= 0x7e) ? 1 : -1)
+/* force our no-op nl_langinfo and mbtowc */
+# undef HAVE_NL_LANGINFO
+# undef HAVE_MBTOWC
+# undef HAVE_LANGINFO_H
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_NL_LANGINFO
+# define nl_langinfo(x) ""
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_MBTOWC
+int mbtowc(wchar_t *, const char*, size_t);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_VASPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
+# include <stdarg.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Some platforms unconditionally undefine va_copy() so we define VA_COPY()
+ * instead. This is known to be the case on at least some configurations of
+ * AIX with the xlc compiler.
+ */
+#ifndef VA_COPY
+# ifdef HAVE_VA_COPY
+# define VA_COPY(dest, src) va_copy(dest, src)
+# else
+# ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY
+# define VA_COPY(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src)
+# else
+# define VA_COPY(dest, src) (dest) = (src)
+# endif
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF
+int vasprintf(char **, const char *, va_list);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
+int vsnprintf(char *, size_t, const char *, va_list);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID
+char *user_from_uid(uid_t, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID
+char *group_from_gid(gid_t, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP
+int timingsafe_bcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF
+int bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *, size_t, const u_int8_t *, size_t,
+ u_int8_t *, size_t, unsigned int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
+void explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n);
+#endif
+
+void *xmmap(size_t size);
+char *xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt);
+char *shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw);
+
+/* rfc2553 socket API replacements */
+#include "fake-rfc2553.h"
+
+/* Routines for a single OS platform */
+#include "bsd-cray.h"
+#include "bsd-cygwin_util.h"
+
+#include "port-aix.h"
+#include "port-irix.h"
+#include "port-linux.h"
+#include "port-solaris.h"
+#include "port-tun.h"
+#include "port-uw.h"
+
+/* _FORTIFY_SOURCE breaks FD_ISSET(n)/FD_SET(n) for n > FD_SETSIZE. Avoid. */
+#if defined(HAVE_FEATURES_H) && defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
+# include <features.h>
+# if defined(__GNU_LIBRARY__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
+# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0)
+# include <sys/socket.h> /* Ensure include guard is defined */
+# undef FD_SET
+# undef FD_ISSET
+# define FD_SET(n, set) kludge_FD_SET(n, set)
+# define FD_ISSET(n, set) kludge_FD_ISSET(n, set)
+void kludge_FD_SET(int, fd_set *);
+int kludge_FD_ISSET(int, fd_set *);
+# endif /* __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) */
+# endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ && __GLIBC_PREREQ */
+#endif /* HAVE_FEATURES_H && _FORTIFY_SOURCE */
+
+#endif /* _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,182 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: openssl-compat.c,v 1.17 2014/02/13 05:38:33 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
- * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
- * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
-# include <openssl/engine.h>
-# include <openssl/conf.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD
-# include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "log.h"
-
-#define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS
-#include "openssl-compat.h"
-
-#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
-int
-ssh_EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
- unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-{
- EVP_CipherInit(evp, type, key, iv, enc);
- return 1;
-}
-
-int
-ssh_EVP_Cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, char *dst, char *src, int len)
-{
- EVP_Cipher(evp, dst, src, len);
- return 1;
-}
-
-int
-ssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp)
-{
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(evp);
- return 1;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX
-int
-EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md, void *engine)
-{
- if (engine != NULL)
- fatal("%s: ENGINE is not supported", __func__);
-# ifdef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
- EVP_DigestInit(ctx, md);
- return 1;
-# else
- return EVP_DigestInit(ctx, md);
-# endif
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTFINAL_EX
-int
-EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *s)
-{
-# ifdef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
- EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, md, s);
- return 1;
-# else
- return EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, md, s);
-# endif
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
-int
-ssh_EVP_DigestUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, unsigned int cnt)
-{
- EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, d, cnt);
- return 1;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX
-int
-EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in)
-{
- return EVP_MD_CTX_copy(out, in);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_BN_IS_PRIME_EX
-int
-BN_is_prime_ex(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks, BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb)
-{
- if (cb != NULL)
- fatal("%s: callback args not supported", __func__);
- return BN_is_prime(p, nchecks, NULL, ctx, NULL);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX
-int
-RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *bn_e, void *cb)
-{
- RSA *new_rsa, tmp_rsa;
- unsigned long e;
-
- if (cb != NULL)
- fatal("%s: callback args not supported", __func__);
- e = BN_get_word(bn_e);
- if (e == 0xffffffffL)
- fatal("%s: value of e too large", __func__);
- new_rsa = RSA_generate_key(bits, e, NULL, NULL);
- if (new_rsa == NULL)
- return 0;
- /* swap rsa/new_rsa then free new_rsa */
- tmp_rsa = *rsa;
- *rsa = *new_rsa;
- *new_rsa = tmp_rsa;
- RSA_free(new_rsa);
- return 1;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX
-int
-DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *dsa, int bits, const unsigned char *seed,
- int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, void *cb)
-{
- DSA *new_dsa, tmp_dsa;
-
- if (cb != NULL)
- fatal("%s: callback args not supported", __func__);
- new_dsa = DSA_generate_parameters(bits, (unsigned char *)seed, seed_len,
- counter_ret, h_ret, NULL, NULL);
- if (new_dsa == NULL)
- return 0;
- /* swap dsa/new_dsa then free new_dsa */
- tmp_dsa = *dsa;
- *dsa = *new_dsa;
- *new_dsa = tmp_dsa;
- DSA_free(new_dsa);
- return 1;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD
-RSA_METHOD *
-RSA_get_default_method(void)
-{
- return RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
-void
-ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void)
-{
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
-
- /* Enable use of crypto hardware */
- ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
- ENGINE_register_all_complete();
- OPENSSL_config(NULL);
-}
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/* $Id: openssl-compat.c,v 1.19 2014/07/02 05:28:07 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
+ * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+# include <openssl/conf.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+#include "openssl-compat.h"
+
+/*
+ * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
+ * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
+ * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
+ * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
+ * within a patch series.
+ */
+
+int
+ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver)
+{
+ long mask, hfix, lfix;
+
+ /* exact match is always OK */
+ if (headerver == libver)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* for versions < 1.0.0, major,minor,fix,status must match */
+ if (headerver < 0x1000000f) {
+ mask = 0xfffff00fL; /* major,minor,fix,status */
+ return (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
+ * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
+ */
+ mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
+ hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
+ lfix = (libver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
+ if ( (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask) && lfix >= hfix)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+void
+ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void)
+{
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+
+ /* Enable use of crypto hardware */
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+ ENGINE_register_all_complete();
+ OPENSSL_config(NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,182 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.26 2014/02/13 05:38:33 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
- * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
- * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-
-/* Only in 0.9.8 */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
-# define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
-# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 16384
-#endif
-
-/* OPENSSL_free() is Free() in versions before OpenSSL 0.9.6 */
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090600f)
-# define OPENSSL_free(x) Free(x)
-#endif
-
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00906000L
-# define SSH_OLD_EVP
-# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(e) ((e)->app_data)
-#endif
-
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000001L
-# define LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE unsigned int
-#else
-# define LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE size_t
-#endif
-
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L) || defined(OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES)
-# define USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
-#endif
-
-#ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
-# include "rijndael.h"
-# define AES_KEY rijndael_ctx
-# define AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16
-# define AES_encrypt(a, b, c) rijndael_encrypt(c, a, b)
-# define AES_set_encrypt_key(a, b, c) rijndael_set_key(c, (char *)a, b, 1)
-# define EVP_aes_128_cbc evp_rijndael
-# define EVP_aes_192_cbc evp_rijndael
-# define EVP_aes_256_cbc evp_rijndael
-const EVP_CIPHER *evp_rijndael(void);
-void ssh_rijndael_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
-#define EVP_aes_128_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
-#define EVP_aes_192_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
-#define EVP_aes_256_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
-const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_128_ctr(void);
-void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, size_t);
-#endif
-
-/* Avoid some #ifdef. Code that uses these is unreachable without GCM */
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM) && !defined(EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED)
-# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED -1
-# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN -1
-# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG -1
-# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG -1
-#endif
-
-/* Replace missing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() with something that returns failure */
-#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL
-# ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
-# error AES-GCM enabled without EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl /* shouldn't happen */
-# else
-# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(a,b,c,d) (0)
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
-#define EVP_X_STATE(evp) &(evp).c
-#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp) sizeof((evp).c)
-#else
-#define EVP_X_STATE(evp) (evp).cipher_data
-#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp) (evp).cipher->ctx_size
-#endif
-
-/* OpenSSL 0.9.8e returns cipher key len not context key len */
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x0090805fL)
-# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(c) ((c)->key_len)
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD
-RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void);
-#endif
-
-/*
- * We overload some of the OpenSSL crypto functions with ssh_* equivalents
- * which cater for older and/or less featureful OpenSSL version.
- *
- * In order for the compat library to call the real functions, it must
- * define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS before including this file and
- * implement the ssh_* equivalents.
- */
-#ifndef SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS
-
-# ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
-# ifdef EVP_Cipher
-# undef EVP_Cipher
-# endif
-# define EVP_CipherInit(a,b,c,d,e) ssh_EVP_CipherInit((a),(b),(c),(d),(e))
-# define EVP_Cipher(a,b,c,d) ssh_EVP_Cipher((a),(b),(c),(d))
-# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(a) ssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup((a))
-# endif /* SSH_OLD_EVP */
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
-# define EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c) ssh_EVP_DigestUpdate((a),(b),(c))
-# endif
-
-# ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
-# ifdef OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms
-# undef OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms
-# endif
-# define OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms()
-# endif
-
-# ifndef HAVE_BN_IS_PRIME_EX
-int BN_is_prime_ex(const BIGNUM *, int, BN_CTX *, void *);
-# endif
-
-# ifndef HAVE_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX
-int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *, int, const unsigned char *, int, int *,
- unsigned long *, void *);
-# endif
-
-# ifndef HAVE_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX
-int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *, int, BIGNUM *, void *);
-# endif
-
-# ifndef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX
-int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *, const EVP_MD *, void *);
-# endif
-
-# ifndef HAVE_EVP_DISESTFINAL_EX
-int EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *, unsigned char *, unsigned int *);
-# endif
-
-# ifndef EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX
-int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *, const EVP_MD_CTX *);
-# endif
-
-int ssh_EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, const EVP_CIPHER *, unsigned char *,
- unsigned char *, int);
-int ssh_EVP_Cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, char *, char *, int);
-int ssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
-void ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void);
-
-# ifndef HAVE_HMAC_CTX_INIT
-# define HMAC_CTX_init(a)
-# endif
-
-# ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_INIT
-# define EVP_MD_CTX_init(a)
-# endif
-
-# ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_CLEANUP
-# define EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(a)
-# endif
-
-#endif /* SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS */
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.31 2014/08/29 18:18:29 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
+ * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H
+#define _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+int ssh_compatible_openssl(long, long);
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x0090805fL)
+# error OpenSSL 0.9.8f or greater is required
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000001L
+# define LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE unsigned int
+#else
+# define LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE size_t
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 16384
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
+# define EVP_aes_128_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
+# define EVP_aes_192_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
+# define EVP_aes_256_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
+const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_128_ctr(void);
+void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, size_t);
+#endif
+
+/* Avoid some #ifdef. Code that uses these is unreachable without GCM */
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM) && !defined(EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED)
+# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED -1
+# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN -1
+# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG -1
+# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG -1
+#endif
+
+/* Replace missing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() with something that returns failure */
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
+# error AES-GCM enabled without EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl /* shouldn't happen */
+# else
+# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(a,b,c,d) (0)
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * We overload some of the OpenSSL crypto functions with ssh_* equivalents
+ * to automatically handle OpenSSL engine initialisation.
+ *
+ * In order for the compat library to call the real functions, it must
+ * define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS before including this file and
+ * implement the ssh_* equivalents.
+ */
+#ifndef SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS
+
+# ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+# ifdef OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms
+# undef OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms
+# endif
+# define OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms()
+# endif
+
+void ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void);
+
+#endif /* SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS */
+
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+#endif /* _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,311 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.18 2013/06/01 22:07:32 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com>
- * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller <djm at openbsd.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-/*
- * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support at present
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST)
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-#include "log.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "port-linux.h"
-
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-#include <selinux/selinux.h>
-#include <selinux/flask.h>
-#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
-
-#ifndef SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE
-# define SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE ":unconfined_t:"
-#endif
-
-/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
-int
-ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
-{
- static int enabled = -1;
-
- if (enabled == -1) {
- enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1);
- debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
- }
-
- return (enabled);
-}
-
-/* Return the default security context for the given username */
-static security_context_t
-ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
-{
- security_context_t sc = NULL;
- char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
- int r;
-
-#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
- if (getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl) != 0)
- return NULL;
-#else
- sename = pwname;
- lvl = NULL;
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
- r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
-#else
- r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
-#endif
-
- if (r != 0) {
- switch (security_getenforce()) {
- case -1:
- fatal("%s: ssh_selinux_getctxbyname: "
- "security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
- case 0:
- error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
- "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
- sc = NULL;
- break;
- default:
- fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
- "context for %s (in enforcing mode)",
- __func__, pwname);
- }
- }
-
-#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
- free(sename);
- free(lvl);
-#endif
-
- return sc;
-}
-
-/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
-void
-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
-{
- security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
-
- if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
- return;
-
- debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
-
- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
- if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
- switch (security_getenforce()) {
- case -1:
- fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
- case 0:
- error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
- "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
- break;
- default:
- fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
- "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
- }
- }
- if (user_ctx != NULL)
- freecon(user_ctx);
-
- debug3("%s: done", __func__);
-}
-
-/* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
-void
-ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
-{
- security_context_t new_tty_ctx = NULL;
- security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
- security_context_t old_tty_ctx = NULL;
-
- if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
- return;
-
- debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
-
- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
-
- /* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
-
- if (getfilecon(tty, &old_tty_ctx) == -1) {
- error("%s: getfilecon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (security_compute_relabel(user_ctx, old_tty_ctx,
- SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, &new_tty_ctx) != 0) {
- error("%s: security_compute_relabel: %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (setfilecon(tty, new_tty_ctx) != 0)
- error("%s: setfilecon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- out:
- if (new_tty_ctx != NULL)
- freecon(new_tty_ctx);
- if (old_tty_ctx != NULL)
- freecon(old_tty_ctx);
- if (user_ctx != NULL)
- freecon(user_ctx);
- debug3("%s: done", __func__);
-}
-
-void
-ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
-{
- int len, newlen;
- char *oldctx, *newctx, *cx;
- void (*switchlog) (const char *fmt,...) = logit;
-
- if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
- return;
-
- if (getcon((security_context_t *)&oldctx) < 0) {
- logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- return;
- }
- if ((cx = index(oldctx, ':')) == NULL || (cx = index(cx + 1, ':')) ==
- NULL) {
- logit ("%s: unparseable context %s", __func__, oldctx);
- return;
- }
-
- /*
- * Check whether we are attempting to switch away from an unconfined
- * security context.
- */
- if (strncmp(cx, SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE,
- sizeof(SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE) - 1) == 0)
- switchlog = debug3;
-
- newlen = strlen(oldctx) + strlen(newname) + 1;
- newctx = xmalloc(newlen);
- len = cx - oldctx + 1;
- memcpy(newctx, oldctx, len);
- strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len);
- if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
- strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
- debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
- oldctx, newctx);
- if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
- switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__,
- newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
- free(oldctx);
- free(newctx);
-}
-
-void
-ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *path)
-{
- security_context_t context;
-
- if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
- return;
- if (path == NULL) {
- setfscreatecon(NULL);
- return;
- }
- if (matchpathcon(path, 0700, &context) == 0)
- setfscreatecon(context);
-}
-
-#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
-
-#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-/*
- * The magic "don't kill me" values, old and new, as documented in eg:
- * http://lxr.linux.no/#linux+v2.6.32/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
- * http://lxr.linux.no/#linux+v2.6.36/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
- */
-
-static int oom_adj_save = INT_MIN;
-static char *oom_adj_path = NULL;
-struct {
- char *path;
- int value;
-} oom_adjust[] = {
- {"/proc/self/oom_score_adj", -1000}, /* kernels >= 2.6.36 */
- {"/proc/self/oom_adj", -17}, /* kernels <= 2.6.35 */
- {NULL, 0},
-};
-
-/*
- * Tell the kernel's out-of-memory killer to avoid sshd.
- * Returns the previous oom_adj value or zero.
- */
-void
-oom_adjust_setup(void)
-{
- int i, value;
- FILE *fp;
-
- debug3("%s", __func__);
- for (i = 0; oom_adjust[i].path != NULL; i++) {
- oom_adj_path = oom_adjust[i].path;
- value = oom_adjust[i].value;
- if ((fp = fopen(oom_adj_path, "r+")) != NULL) {
- if (fscanf(fp, "%d", &oom_adj_save) != 1)
- verbose("error reading %s: %s", oom_adj_path,
- strerror(errno));
- else {
- rewind(fp);
- if (fprintf(fp, "%d\n", value) <= 0)
- verbose("error writing %s: %s",
- oom_adj_path, strerror(errno));
- else
- verbose("Set %s from %d to %d",
- oom_adj_path, oom_adj_save, value);
- }
- fclose(fp);
- return;
- }
- }
- oom_adj_path = NULL;
-}
-
-/* Restore the saved OOM adjustment */
-void
-oom_adjust_restore(void)
-{
- FILE *fp;
-
- debug3("%s", __func__);
- if (oom_adj_save == INT_MIN || oom_adj_path == NULL ||
- (fp = fopen(oom_adj_path, "w")) == NULL)
- return;
-
- if (fprintf(fp, "%d\n", oom_adj_save) <= 0)
- verbose("error writing %s: %s", oom_adj_path, strerror(errno));
- else
- verbose("Set %s to %d", oom_adj_path, oom_adj_save);
-
- fclose(fp);
- return;
-}
-#endif /* LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */
-#endif /* WITH_SELINUX || LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.18 2013/06/01 22:07:32 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller <djm at openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support at present
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST)
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "port-linux.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#include <selinux/flask.h>
+#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
+
+#ifndef SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE
+# define SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE ":unconfined_t:"
+#endif
+
+/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
+int
+ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
+{
+ static int enabled = -1;
+
+ if (enabled == -1) {
+ enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1);
+ debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
+ }
+
+ return (enabled);
+}
+
+/* Return the default security context for the given username */
+static security_context_t
+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+{
+ security_context_t sc = NULL;
+ char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+ if (getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl) != 0)
+ return NULL;
+#else
+ sename = pwname;
+ lvl = NULL;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+#else
+ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
+#endif
+
+ if (r != 0) {
+ switch (security_getenforce()) {
+ case -1:
+ fatal("%s: ssh_selinux_getctxbyname: "
+ "security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+ case 0:
+ error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+ "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+ sc = NULL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+ "context for %s (in enforcing mode)",
+ __func__, pwname);
+ }
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+ free(sename);
+ free(lvl);
+#endif
+
+ return sc;
+}
+
+/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+void
+ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+{
+ security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+
+ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+ return;
+
+ debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+
+ user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+ if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
+ switch (security_getenforce()) {
+ case -1:
+ fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+ case 0:
+ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
+ "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
+ "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
+ }
+ }
+ if (user_ctx != NULL)
+ freecon(user_ctx);
+
+ debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+}
+
+/* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
+void
+ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+{
+ security_context_t new_tty_ctx = NULL;
+ security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+ security_context_t old_tty_ctx = NULL;
+
+ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+ return;
+
+ debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
+
+ user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+
+ /* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
+
+ if (getfilecon(tty, &old_tty_ctx) == -1) {
+ error("%s: getfilecon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (security_compute_relabel(user_ctx, old_tty_ctx,
+ SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, &new_tty_ctx) != 0) {
+ error("%s: security_compute_relabel: %s",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (setfilecon(tty, new_tty_ctx) != 0)
+ error("%s: setfilecon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ out:
+ if (new_tty_ctx != NULL)
+ freecon(new_tty_ctx);
+ if (old_tty_ctx != NULL)
+ freecon(old_tty_ctx);
+ if (user_ctx != NULL)
+ freecon(user_ctx);
+ debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
+{
+ int len, newlen;
+ char *oldctx, *newctx, *cx;
+ void (*switchlog) (const char *fmt,...) = logit;
+
+ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+ return;
+
+ if (getcon((security_context_t *)&oldctx) < 0) {
+ logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ return;
+ }
+ if ((cx = index(oldctx, ':')) == NULL || (cx = index(cx + 1, ':')) ==
+ NULL) {
+ logit ("%s: unparseable context %s", __func__, oldctx);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check whether we are attempting to switch away from an unconfined
+ * security context.
+ */
+ if (strncmp(cx, SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE,
+ sizeof(SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE) - 1) == 0)
+ switchlog = debug3;
+
+ newlen = strlen(oldctx) + strlen(newname) + 1;
+ newctx = xmalloc(newlen);
+ len = cx - oldctx + 1;
+ memcpy(newctx, oldctx, len);
+ strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len);
+ if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
+ strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
+ debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
+ oldctx, newctx);
+ if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
+ switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__,
+ newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
+ free(oldctx);
+ free(newctx);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *path)
+{
+ security_context_t context;
+
+ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+ return;
+ if (path == NULL) {
+ setfscreatecon(NULL);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (matchpathcon(path, 0700, &context) == 0)
+ setfscreatecon(context);
+}
+
+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
+
+#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+/*
+ * The magic "don't kill me" values, old and new, as documented in eg:
+ * http://lxr.linux.no/#linux+v2.6.32/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
+ * http://lxr.linux.no/#linux+v2.6.36/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
+ */
+
+static int oom_adj_save = INT_MIN;
+static char *oom_adj_path = NULL;
+struct {
+ char *path;
+ int value;
+} oom_adjust[] = {
+ {"/proc/self/oom_score_adj", -1000}, /* kernels >= 2.6.36 */
+ {"/proc/self/oom_adj", -17}, /* kernels <= 2.6.35 */
+ {NULL, 0},
+};
+
+/*
+ * Tell the kernel's out-of-memory killer to avoid sshd.
+ * Returns the previous oom_adj value or zero.
+ */
+void
+oom_adjust_setup(void)
+{
+ int i, value;
+ FILE *fp;
+
+ debug3("%s", __func__);
+ for (i = 0; oom_adjust[i].path != NULL; i++) {
+ oom_adj_path = oom_adjust[i].path;
+ value = oom_adjust[i].value;
+ if ((fp = fopen(oom_adj_path, "r+")) != NULL) {
+ if (fscanf(fp, "%d", &oom_adj_save) != 1)
+ verbose("error reading %s: %s", oom_adj_path,
+ strerror(errno));
+ else {
+ rewind(fp);
+ if (fprintf(fp, "%d\n", value) <= 0)
+ verbose("error writing %s: %s",
+ oom_adj_path, strerror(errno));
+ else
+ debug("Set %s from %d to %d",
+ oom_adj_path, oom_adj_save, value);
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ oom_adj_path = NULL;
+}
+
+/* Restore the saved OOM adjustment */
+void
+oom_adjust_restore(void)
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+
+ debug3("%s", __func__);
+ if (oom_adj_save == INT_MIN || oom_adj_path == NULL ||
+ (fp = fopen(oom_adj_path, "w")) == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (fprintf(fp, "%d\n", oom_adj_save) <= 0)
+ verbose("error writing %s: %s", oom_adj_path, strerror(errno));
+ else
+ debug("Set %s to %d", oom_adj_path, oom_adj_save);
+
+ fclose(fp);
+ return;
+}
+#endif /* LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */
+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX || LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,229 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: port-solaris.c,v 1.4 2010/11/05 01:03:05 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "config.h"
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
-# include <fcntl.h>
-#endif
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include <libcontract.h>
-#include <sys/contract/process.h>
-#include <sys/ctfs.h>
-
-#include "log.h"
-
-#define CT_TEMPLATE CTFS_ROOT "/process/template"
-#define CT_LATEST CTFS_ROOT "/process/latest"
-
-static int tmpl_fd = -1;
-
-/* Lookup the latest process contract */
-static ctid_t
-get_active_process_contract_id(void)
-{
- int stat_fd;
- ctid_t ctid = -1;
- ct_stathdl_t stathdl;
-
- if ((stat_fd = open64(CT_LATEST, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
- error("%s: Error opening 'latest' process "
- "contract: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- if (ct_status_read(stat_fd, CTD_COMMON, &stathdl) != 0) {
- error("%s: Error reading process contract "
- "status: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- goto out;
- }
- if ((ctid = ct_status_get_id(stathdl)) < 0) {
- error("%s: Error getting process contract id: %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
- goto out;
- }
-
- ct_status_free(stathdl);
- out:
- close(stat_fd);
- return ctid;
-}
-
-void
-solaris_contract_pre_fork(void)
-{
- if ((tmpl_fd = open64(CT_TEMPLATE, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
- error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__,
- CT_TEMPLATE, strerror(errno));
- return;
- }
-
- debug2("%s: setting up process contract template on fd %d",
- __func__, tmpl_fd);
-
- /* First we set the template parameters and event sets. */
- if (ct_pr_tmpl_set_param(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_PGRPONLY) != 0) {
- error("%s: Error setting process contract parameter set "
- "(pgrponly): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- goto fail;
- }
- if (ct_pr_tmpl_set_fatal(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_EV_HWERR) != 0) {
- error("%s: Error setting process contract template "
- "fatal events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- goto fail;
- }
- if (ct_tmpl_set_critical(tmpl_fd, 0) != 0) {
- error("%s: Error setting process contract template "
- "critical events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- goto fail;
- }
- if (ct_tmpl_set_informative(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_EV_HWERR) != 0) {
- error("%s: Error setting process contract template "
- "informative events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- goto fail;
- }
-
- /* Now make this the active template for this process. */
- if (ct_tmpl_activate(tmpl_fd) != 0) {
- error("%s: Error activating process contract "
- "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- goto fail;
- }
- return;
-
- fail:
- if (tmpl_fd != -1) {
- close(tmpl_fd);
- tmpl_fd = -1;
- }
-}
-
-void
-solaris_contract_post_fork_child()
-{
- debug2("%s: clearing process contract template on fd %d",
- __func__, tmpl_fd);
-
- /* Clear the active template. */
- if (ct_tmpl_clear(tmpl_fd) != 0)
- error("%s: Error clearing active process contract "
- "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-
- close(tmpl_fd);
- tmpl_fd = -1;
-}
-
-void
-solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(pid_t pid)
-{
- ctid_t ctid;
- char ctl_path[256];
- int r, ctl_fd = -1, stat_fd = -1;
-
- debug2("%s: clearing template (fd %d)", __func__, tmpl_fd);
-
- if (tmpl_fd == -1)
- return;
-
- /* First clear the active template. */
- if ((r = ct_tmpl_clear(tmpl_fd)) != 0)
- error("%s: Error clearing active process contract "
- "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-
- close(tmpl_fd);
- tmpl_fd = -1;
-
- /*
- * If either the fork didn't succeed (pid < 0), or clearing
- * th active contract failed (r != 0), then we have nothing
- * more do.
- */
- if (r != 0 || pid <= 0)
- return;
-
- /* Now lookup and abandon the contract we've created. */
- ctid = get_active_process_contract_id();
-
- debug2("%s: abandoning contract id %ld", __func__, ctid);
-
- snprintf(ctl_path, sizeof(ctl_path),
- CTFS_ROOT "/process/%ld/ctl", ctid);
- if ((ctl_fd = open64(ctl_path, O_WRONLY)) < 0) {
- error("%s: Error opening process contract "
- "ctl file: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- goto fail;
- }
- if (ct_ctl_abandon(ctl_fd) < 0) {
- error("%s: Error abandoning process contract: %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
- goto fail;
- }
- close(ctl_fd);
- return;
-
- fail:
- if (tmpl_fd != -1) {
- close(tmpl_fd);
- tmpl_fd = -1;
- }
- if (stat_fd != -1)
- close(stat_fd);
- if (ctl_fd != -1)
- close(ctl_fd);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
-#include <sys/task.h>
-#include <project.h>
-
-/*
- * Get/set solaris default project.
- * If we fail, just run along gracefully.
- */
-void
-solaris_set_default_project(struct passwd *pw)
-{
- struct project *defaultproject;
- struct project tempproject;
- char buf[1024];
-
- /* get default project, if we fail just return gracefully */
- if ((defaultproject = getdefaultproj(pw->pw_name, &tempproject, &buf,
- sizeof(buf))) > 0) {
- /* set default project */
- if (setproject(defaultproject->pj_name, pw->pw_name,
- TASK_NORMAL) != 0)
- debug("setproject(%s): %s", defaultproject->pj_name,
- strerror(errno));
- } else {
- /* debug on getdefaultproj() error */
- debug("getdefaultproj(%s): %s", pw->pw_name, strerror(errno));
- }
-}
-#endif /* USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
+/* $Id: port-solaris.c,v 1.4 2010/11/05 01:03:05 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <libcontract.h>
+#include <sys/contract/process.h>
+#include <sys/ctfs.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+#define CT_TEMPLATE CTFS_ROOT "/process/template"
+#define CT_LATEST CTFS_ROOT "/process/latest"
+
+static int tmpl_fd = -1;
+
+/* Lookup the latest process contract */
+static ctid_t
+get_active_process_contract_id(void)
+{
+ int stat_fd;
+ ctid_t ctid = -1;
+ ct_stathdl_t stathdl;
+
+ if ((stat_fd = open64(CT_LATEST, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
+ error("%s: Error opening 'latest' process "
+ "contract: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ct_status_read(stat_fd, CTD_COMMON, &stathdl) != 0) {
+ error("%s: Error reading process contract "
+ "status: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ctid = ct_status_get_id(stathdl)) < 0) {
+ error("%s: Error getting process contract id: %s",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ct_status_free(stathdl);
+ out:
+ close(stat_fd);
+ return ctid;
+}
+
+void
+solaris_contract_pre_fork(void)
+{
+ if ((tmpl_fd = open64(CT_TEMPLATE, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+ error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__,
+ CT_TEMPLATE, strerror(errno));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ debug2("%s: setting up process contract template on fd %d",
+ __func__, tmpl_fd);
+
+ /* First we set the template parameters and event sets. */
+ if (ct_pr_tmpl_set_param(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_PGRPONLY) != 0) {
+ error("%s: Error setting process contract parameter set "
+ "(pgrponly): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (ct_pr_tmpl_set_fatal(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_EV_HWERR) != 0) {
+ error("%s: Error setting process contract template "
+ "fatal events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (ct_tmpl_set_critical(tmpl_fd, 0) != 0) {
+ error("%s: Error setting process contract template "
+ "critical events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (ct_tmpl_set_informative(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_EV_HWERR) != 0) {
+ error("%s: Error setting process contract template "
+ "informative events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* Now make this the active template for this process. */
+ if (ct_tmpl_activate(tmpl_fd) != 0) {
+ error("%s: Error activating process contract "
+ "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ return;
+
+ fail:
+ if (tmpl_fd != -1) {
+ close(tmpl_fd);
+ tmpl_fd = -1;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+solaris_contract_post_fork_child()
+{
+ debug2("%s: clearing process contract template on fd %d",
+ __func__, tmpl_fd);
+
+ /* Clear the active template. */
+ if (ct_tmpl_clear(tmpl_fd) != 0)
+ error("%s: Error clearing active process contract "
+ "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+ close(tmpl_fd);
+ tmpl_fd = -1;
+}
+
+void
+solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(pid_t pid)
+{
+ ctid_t ctid;
+ char ctl_path[256];
+ int r, ctl_fd = -1, stat_fd = -1;
+
+ debug2("%s: clearing template (fd %d)", __func__, tmpl_fd);
+
+ if (tmpl_fd == -1)
+ return;
+
+ /* First clear the active template. */
+ if ((r = ct_tmpl_clear(tmpl_fd)) != 0)
+ error("%s: Error clearing active process contract "
+ "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+ close(tmpl_fd);
+ tmpl_fd = -1;
+
+ /*
+ * If either the fork didn't succeed (pid < 0), or clearing
+ * th active contract failed (r != 0), then we have nothing
+ * more do.
+ */
+ if (r != 0 || pid <= 0)
+ return;
+
+ /* Now lookup and abandon the contract we've created. */
+ ctid = get_active_process_contract_id();
+
+ debug2("%s: abandoning contract id %ld", __func__, ctid);
+
+ snprintf(ctl_path, sizeof(ctl_path),
+ CTFS_ROOT "/process/%ld/ctl", ctid);
+ if ((ctl_fd = open64(ctl_path, O_WRONLY)) < 0) {
+ error("%s: Error opening process contract "
+ "ctl file: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (ct_ctl_abandon(ctl_fd) < 0) {
+ error("%s: Error abandoning process contract: %s",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ close(ctl_fd);
+ return;
+
+ fail:
+ if (tmpl_fd != -1) {
+ close(tmpl_fd);
+ tmpl_fd = -1;
+ }
+ if (stat_fd != -1)
+ close(stat_fd);
+ if (ctl_fd != -1)
+ close(ctl_fd);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
+#include <sys/task.h>
+#include <project.h>
+
+/*
+ * Get/set solaris default project.
+ * If we fail, just run along gracefully.
+ */
+void
+solaris_set_default_project(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ struct project *defaultproject;
+ struct project tempproject;
+ char buf[1024];
+
+ /* get default project, if we fail just return gracefully */
+ if ((defaultproject = getdefaultproj(pw->pw_name, &tempproject, &buf,
+ sizeof(buf))) > 0) {
+ /* set default project */
+ if (setproject(defaultproject->pj_name, pw->pw_name,
+ TASK_NORMAL) != 0)
+ debug("setproject(%s): %s", defaultproject->pj_name,
+ strerror(errno));
+ } else {
+ /* debug on getdefaultproj() error */
+ debug("getdefaultproj(%s): %s", pw->pw_name, strerror(errno));
+ }
+}
+#endif /* USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS */
+
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
+# ifdef HAVE_PRIV_H
+# include <priv.h>
+# endif
+
+priv_set_t *
+solaris_basic_privset(void)
+{
+ priv_set_t *pset;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PRIV_BASICSET
+ if ((pset = priv_allocset()) == NULL) {
+ error("priv_allocset: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ priv_basicset(pset);
+#else
+ if ((pset = priv_str_to_set("basic", ",", NULL)) == NULL) {
+ error("priv_str_to_set: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ return pset;
+}
+
+void
+solaris_drop_privs_pinfo_net_fork_exec(void)
+{
+ priv_set_t *pset = NULL, *npset = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Note: this variant avoids dropping DAC filesystem rights, in case
+ * the process calling it is running as root and should have the
+ * ability to read/write/chown any file on the system.
+ *
+ * We start with the basic set, then *add* the DAC rights to it while
+ * taking away other parts of BASIC we don't need. Then we intersect
+ * this with our existing PERMITTED set. In this way we keep any
+ * DAC rights we had before, while otherwise reducing ourselves to
+ * the minimum set of privileges we need to proceed.
+ *
+ * This also means we drop any other parts of "root" that we don't
+ * need (e.g. the ability to kill any process, create new device nodes
+ * etc etc).
+ */
+
+ if ((pset = priv_allocset()) == NULL)
+ fatal("priv_allocset: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if ((npset = solaris_basic_privset()) == NULL)
+ fatal("solaris_basic_privset: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ if (priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_CHOWN) != 0 ||
+ priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_DAC_READ) != 0 ||
+ priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_DAC_SEARCH) != 0 ||
+ priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_DAC_WRITE) != 0 ||
+ priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_OWNER) != 0)
+ fatal("priv_addset: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ if (priv_delset(npset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 ||
+#ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS
+ priv_delset(npset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 ||
+#endif
+ priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_EXEC) != 0 ||
+ priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_FORK) != 0 ||
+ priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0 ||
+ priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_SESSION) != 0)
+ fatal("priv_delset: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ if (getppriv(PRIV_PERMITTED, pset) != 0)
+ fatal("getppriv: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ priv_intersect(pset, npset);
+
+ if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, npset) != 0 ||
+ setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, npset) != 0 ||
+ setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, npset) != 0)
+ fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ priv_freeset(pset);
+ priv_freeset(npset);
+}
+
+void
+solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net(void)
+{
+ priv_set_t *pset = NULL;
+
+ /* Start with "basic" and drop everything we don't need. */
+ if ((pset = solaris_basic_privset()) == NULL)
+ fatal("solaris_basic_privset: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ if (priv_delset(pset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 ||
+#ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS
+ priv_delset(pset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 ||
+#endif
+ priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0 ||
+ priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_SESSION) != 0)
+ fatal("priv_delset: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, pset) != 0 ||
+ setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, pset) != 0 ||
+ setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, pset) != 0)
+ fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ priv_freeset(pset);
+}
+
+void
+solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net_exec(void)
+{
+ priv_set_t *pset = NULL;
+
+
+ /* Start with "basic" and drop everything we don't need. */
+ if ((pset = solaris_basic_privset()) == NULL)
+ fatal("solaris_basic_privset: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ if (priv_delset(pset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 ||
+#ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS
+ priv_delset(pset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 ||
+#endif
+ priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_EXEC) != 0 ||
+ priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0 ||
+ priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_SESSION) != 0)
+ fatal("priv_delset: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, pset) != 0 ||
+ setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, pset) != 0 ||
+ setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, pset) != 0)
+ fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ priv_freeset(pset);
+}
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: port-solaris.h,v 1.2 2010/11/05 01:03:05 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#ifndef _PORT_SOLARIS_H
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <pwd.h>
-
-void solaris_contract_pre_fork(void);
-void solaris_contract_post_fork_child(void);
-void solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(pid_t pid);
-void solaris_set_default_project(struct passwd *);
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/* $Id: port-solaris.h,v 1.2 2010/11/05 01:03:05 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PORT_SOLARIS_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+void solaris_contract_pre_fork(void);
+void solaris_contract_post_fork_child(void);
+void solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(pid_t pid);
+void solaris_set_default_project(struct passwd *);
+# ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
+#include <priv.h>
+priv_set_t *solaris_basic_privset(void);
+void solaris_drop_privs_pinfo_net_fork_exec(void);
+void solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net(void);
+void solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net_exec(void);
+# endif /* USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS */
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,273 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2005 Reyk Floeter <reyk at openbsd.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/ioctl.h>
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-#include <netinet/ip.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-
-/*
- * This is the portable version of the SSH tunnel forwarding, it
- * uses some preprocessor definitions for various platform-specific
- * settings.
- *
- * SSH_TUN_LINUX Use the (newer) Linux tun/tap device
- * SSH_TUN_FREEBSD Use the FreeBSD tun/tap device
- * SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF Translate the OpenBSD address family
- * SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF Prepend/remove the address family
- */
-
-/*
- * System-specific tunnel open function
- */
-
-#if defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX)
-#include <linux/if.h>
-#include <linux/if_tun.h>
-
-int
-sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode)
-{
- struct ifreq ifr;
- int fd = -1;
- const char *name = NULL;
-
- if ((fd = open("/dev/net/tun", O_RDWR)) == -1) {
- debug("%s: failed to open tunnel control interface: %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
- return (-1);
- }
-
- bzero(&ifr, sizeof(ifr));
-
- if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) {
- ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TAP;
- name = "tap%d";
- } else {
- ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TUN;
- name = "tun%d";
- }
- ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_NO_PI;
-
- if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
- if (tun > SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
- debug("%s: invalid tunnel id %x: %s", __func__,
- tun, strerror(errno));
- goto failed;
- }
- snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), name, tun);
- }
-
- if (ioctl(fd, TUNSETIFF, &ifr) == -1) {
- debug("%s: failed to configure tunnel (mode %d): %s", __func__,
- mode, strerror(errno));
- goto failed;
- }
-
- if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY)
- debug("%s: tunnel mode %d fd %d", __func__, mode, fd);
- else
- debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, ifr.ifr_name, mode, fd);
-
- return (fd);
-
- failed:
- close(fd);
- return (-1);
-}
-#endif /* SSH_TUN_LINUX */
-
-#ifdef SSH_TUN_FREEBSD
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <net/if.h>
-
-#ifdef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H
-#include <net/if_tun.h>
-#endif
-
-int
-sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode)
-{
- struct ifreq ifr;
- char name[100];
- int fd = -1, sock, flag;
- const char *tunbase = "tun";
-
- if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) {
-#ifdef SSH_TUN_NO_L2
- debug("%s: no layer 2 tunnelling support", __func__);
- return (-1);
-#else
- tunbase = "tap";
-#endif
- }
-
- /* Open the tunnel device */
- if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
- snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun);
- fd = open(name, O_RDWR);
- } else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
- for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) {
- snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d",
- tunbase, tun);
- if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0)
- break;
- }
- } else {
- debug("%s: invalid tunnel %u\n", __func__, tun);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- if (fd < 0) {
- debug("%s: %s open failed: %s", __func__, name,
- strerror(errno));
- return (-1);
- }
-
- /* Turn on tunnel headers */
- flag = 1;
-#if defined(TUNSIFHEAD) && !defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
- if (mode != SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET &&
- ioctl(fd, TUNSIFHEAD, &flag) == -1) {
- debug("%s: ioctl(%d, TUNSIFHEAD, 1): %s", __func__, fd,
- strerror(errno));
- close(fd);
- }
-#endif
-
- debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, name, mode, fd);
-
- /* Set the tunnel device operation mode */
- snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "%s%d", tunbase, tun);
- if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
- goto failed;
-
- if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
- goto failed;
- if ((ifr.ifr_flags & IFF_UP) == 0) {
- ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP;
- if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
- goto failed;
- }
-
- close(sock);
- return (fd);
-
- failed:
- if (fd >= 0)
- close(fd);
- if (sock >= 0)
- close(sock);
- debug("%s: failed to set %s mode %d: %s", __func__, name,
- mode, strerror(errno));
- return (-1);
-}
-#endif /* SSH_TUN_FREEBSD */
-
-/*
- * System-specific channel filters
- */
-
-#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
-#define OPENBSD_AF_INET 2
-#define OPENBSD_AF_INET6 24
-
-int
-sys_tun_infilter(struct Channel *c, char *buf, int len)
-{
-#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
- char rbuf[CHAN_RBUF];
- struct ip *iph;
-#endif
- u_int32_t *af;
- char *ptr = buf;
-
-#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
- if (len <= 0 || len > (int)(sizeof(rbuf) - sizeof(*af)))
- return (-1);
- ptr = (char *)&rbuf[0];
- bcopy(buf, ptr + sizeof(u_int32_t), len);
- len += sizeof(u_int32_t);
- af = (u_int32_t *)ptr;
-
- iph = (struct ip *)(ptr + sizeof(u_int32_t));
- switch (iph->ip_v) {
- case 6:
- *af = AF_INET6;
- break;
- case 4:
- default:
- *af = AF_INET;
- break;
- }
-#endif
-
-#if defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF)
- if (len < (int)sizeof(u_int32_t))
- return (-1);
-
- af = (u_int32_t *)ptr;
- if (*af == htonl(AF_INET6))
- *af = htonl(OPENBSD_AF_INET6);
- else
- *af = htonl(OPENBSD_AF_INET);
-#endif
-
- buffer_put_string(&c->input, ptr, len);
- return (0);
-}
-
-u_char *
-sys_tun_outfilter(struct Channel *c, u_char **data, u_int *dlen)
-{
- u_char *buf;
- u_int32_t *af;
-
- *data = buffer_get_string(&c->output, dlen);
- if (*dlen < sizeof(*af))
- return (NULL);
- buf = *data;
-
-#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
- *dlen -= sizeof(u_int32_t);
- buf = *data + sizeof(u_int32_t);
-#elif defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF)
- af = ntohl(*(u_int32_t *)buf);
- if (*af == OPENBSD_AF_INET6)
- *af = htonl(AF_INET6);
- else
- *af = htonl(AF_INET);
-#endif
-
- return (buf);
-}
-#endif /* SSH_TUN_FILTER */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Reyk Floeter <reyk at openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+/*
+ * This is the portable version of the SSH tunnel forwarding, it
+ * uses some preprocessor definitions for various platform-specific
+ * settings.
+ *
+ * SSH_TUN_LINUX Use the (newer) Linux tun/tap device
+ * SSH_TUN_FREEBSD Use the FreeBSD tun/tap device
+ * SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF Translate the OpenBSD address family
+ * SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF Prepend/remove the address family
+ */
+
+/*
+ * System-specific tunnel open function
+ */
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX)
+#include <linux/if.h>
+#include <linux/if_tun.h>
+
+int
+sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode)
+{
+ struct ifreq ifr;
+ int fd = -1;
+ const char *name = NULL;
+
+ if ((fd = open("/dev/net/tun", O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+ debug("%s: failed to open tunnel control interface: %s",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ bzero(&ifr, sizeof(ifr));
+
+ if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) {
+ ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TAP;
+ name = "tap%d";
+ } else {
+ ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TUN;
+ name = "tun%d";
+ }
+ ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_NO_PI;
+
+ if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
+ if (tun > SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
+ debug("%s: invalid tunnel id %x: %s", __func__,
+ tun, strerror(errno));
+ goto failed;
+ }
+ snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), name, tun);
+ }
+
+ if (ioctl(fd, TUNSETIFF, &ifr) == -1) {
+ debug("%s: failed to configure tunnel (mode %d): %s", __func__,
+ mode, strerror(errno));
+ goto failed;
+ }
+
+ if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY)
+ debug("%s: tunnel mode %d fd %d", __func__, mode, fd);
+ else
+ debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, ifr.ifr_name, mode, fd);
+
+ return (fd);
+
+ failed:
+ close(fd);
+ return (-1);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_TUN_LINUX */
+
+#ifdef SSH_TUN_FREEBSD
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <net/if.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H
+#include <net/if_tun.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode)
+{
+ struct ifreq ifr;
+ char name[100];
+ int fd = -1, sock, flag;
+ const char *tunbase = "tun";
+
+ if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) {
+#ifdef SSH_TUN_NO_L2
+ debug("%s: no layer 2 tunnelling support", __func__);
+ return (-1);
+#else
+ tunbase = "tap";
+#endif
+ }
+
+ /* Open the tunnel device */
+ if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
+ snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun);
+ fd = open(name, O_RDWR);
+ } else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
+ for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) {
+ snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d",
+ tunbase, tun);
+ if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ debug("%s: invalid tunnel %u\n", __func__, tun);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ debug("%s: %s open failed: %s", __func__, name,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /* Turn on tunnel headers */
+ flag = 1;
+#if defined(TUNSIFHEAD) && !defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+ if (mode != SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET &&
+ ioctl(fd, TUNSIFHEAD, &flag) == -1) {
+ debug("%s: ioctl(%d, TUNSIFHEAD, 1): %s", __func__, fd,
+ strerror(errno));
+ close(fd);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, name, mode, fd);
+
+ /* Set the tunnel device operation mode */
+ snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "%s%d", tunbase, tun);
+ if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
+ goto failed;
+
+ if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
+ goto failed;
+ if ((ifr.ifr_flags & IFF_UP) == 0) {
+ ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP;
+ if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
+ goto failed;
+ }
+
+ close(sock);
+ return (fd);
+
+ failed:
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ close(fd);
+ if (sock >= 0)
+ close(sock);
+ debug("%s: failed to set %s mode %d: %s", __func__, name,
+ mode, strerror(errno));
+ return (-1);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_TUN_FREEBSD */
+
+/*
+ * System-specific channel filters
+ */
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
+#define OPENBSD_AF_INET 2
+#define OPENBSD_AF_INET6 24
+
+int
+sys_tun_infilter(struct Channel *c, char *buf, int len)
+{
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+ char rbuf[CHAN_RBUF];
+ struct ip *iph;
+#endif
+ u_int32_t *af;
+ char *ptr = buf;
+ int r;
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+ if (len <= 0 || len > (int)(sizeof(rbuf) - sizeof(*af)))
+ return (-1);
+ ptr = (char *)&rbuf[0];
+ bcopy(buf, ptr + sizeof(u_int32_t), len);
+ len += sizeof(u_int32_t);
+ af = (u_int32_t *)ptr;
+
+ iph = (struct ip *)(ptr + sizeof(u_int32_t));
+ switch (iph->ip_v) {
+ case 6:
+ *af = AF_INET6;
+ break;
+ case 4:
+ default:
+ *af = AF_INET;
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF)
+ if (len < (int)sizeof(u_int32_t))
+ return (-1);
+
+ af = (u_int32_t *)ptr;
+ if (*af == htonl(AF_INET6))
+ *af = htonl(OPENBSD_AF_INET6);
+ else
+ *af = htonl(OPENBSD_AF_INET);
+#endif
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(&c->input, ptr, len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return (0);
+}
+
+u_char *
+sys_tun_outfilter(struct Channel *c, u_char **data, u_int *dlen)
+{
+ u_char *buf;
+ u_int32_t *af;
+ int r;
+ size_t xxx_dlen;
+
+ /* XXX new API is incompatible with this signature. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(&c->output, data, &xxx_dlen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (dlen != NULL)
+ *dlen = xxx_dlen;
+ if (*dlen < sizeof(*af))
+ return (NULL);
+ buf = *data;
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+ *dlen -= sizeof(u_int32_t);
+ buf = *data + sizeof(u_int32_t);
+#elif defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF)
+ af = ntohl(*(u_int32_t *)buf);
+ if (*af == OPENBSD_AF_INET6)
+ *af = htonl(AF_INET6);
+ else
+ *af = htonl(AF_INET);
+#endif
+
+ return (buf);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_TUN_FILTER */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2005 The SCO Group. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2005 Tim Rice. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
-# include <crypt.h>
-#endif
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-
-int nischeck(char *);
-
-int
-sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
-{
- struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
- char *salt;
- int result;
-
- /* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */
- char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
-
- /* Check for users with no password. */
- if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0)
- return (1);
-
- /* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */
- salt = (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx";
-
- /*
- * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
- * are identical.
- */
-#ifdef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS
- if (!nischeck(pw->pw_name)) {
- result = ((strcmp(bigcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0)
- || (strcmp(osr5bigcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0));
- }
- else
-#endif /* UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */
- result = (strcmp(xcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0);
-
-#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
- if (authctxt->valid)
- free(pw_password);
-#endif
- return(result);
-}
-
-#ifdef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS
-int
-nischeck(char *namep)
-{
- char password_file[] = "/etc/passwd";
- FILE *fd;
- struct passwd *ent = NULL;
-
- if ((fd = fopen (password_file, "r")) == NULL) {
- /*
- * If the passwd file has dissapeared we are in a bad state.
- * However, returning 0 will send us back through the
- * authentication scheme that has checked the ia database for
- * passwords earlier.
- */
- return(0);
- }
-
- /*
- * fgetpwent() only reads from password file, so we know for certain
- * that the user is local.
- */
- while (ent = fgetpwent(fd)) {
- if (strcmp (ent->pw_name, namep) == 0) {
- /* Local user */
- fclose (fd);
- return(0);
- }
- }
-
- fclose (fd);
- return (1);
-}
-
-#endif /* UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */
-
-/*
- NOTE: ia_get_logpwd() allocates memory for arg 2
- functions that call shadow_pw() will need to free
- */
-
-#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
-char *
-get_iaf_password(struct passwd *pw)
-{
- char *pw_password = NULL;
-
- uinfo_t uinfo;
- if (!ia_openinfo(pw->pw_name,&uinfo)) {
- ia_get_logpwd(uinfo, &pw_password);
- if (pw_password == NULL)
- fatal("ia_get_logpwd: Unable to get the shadow passwd");
- ia_closeinfo(uinfo);
- return pw_password;
- }
- else
- fatal("ia_openinfo: Unable to open the shadow passwd file");
-}
-#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
-#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF and not HAVE_SECUREWARE */
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 The SCO Group. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Tim Rice. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
+# include <crypt.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+int nischeck(char *);
+
+int
+sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+{
+ struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
+ char *salt;
+ int result;
+
+ /* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */
+ char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
+
+ /* Check for users with no password. */
+ if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0)
+ return (1);
+
+ /* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */
+ salt = (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx";
+
+ /*
+ * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
+ * are identical.
+ */
+#ifdef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS
+ if (!nischeck(pw->pw_name)) {
+ result = ((strcmp(bigcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0)
+ || (strcmp(osr5bigcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0));
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */
+ result = (strcmp(xcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0);
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+ if (authctxt->valid)
+ free(pw_password);
+#endif
+ return(result);
+}
+
+#ifdef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS
+int
+nischeck(char *namep)
+{
+ char password_file[] = "/etc/passwd";
+ FILE *fd;
+ struct passwd *ent = NULL;
+
+ if ((fd = fopen (password_file, "r")) == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * If the passwd file has dissapeared we are in a bad state.
+ * However, returning 0 will send us back through the
+ * authentication scheme that has checked the ia database for
+ * passwords earlier.
+ */
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * fgetpwent() only reads from password file, so we know for certain
+ * that the user is local.
+ */
+ while (ent = fgetpwent(fd)) {
+ if (strcmp (ent->pw_name, namep) == 0) {
+ /* Local user */
+ fclose (fd);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ fclose (fd);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+#endif /* UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */
+
+/*
+ NOTE: ia_get_logpwd() allocates memory for arg 2
+ functions that call shadow_pw() will need to free
+ */
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+char *
+get_iaf_password(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ char *pw_password = NULL;
+
+ uinfo_t uinfo;
+ if (!ia_openinfo(pw->pw_name,&uinfo)) {
+ ia_get_logpwd(uinfo, &pw_password);
+ if (pw_password == NULL)
+ fatal("ia_get_logpwd: Unable to get the shadow passwd");
+ ia_closeinfo(uinfo);
+ return pw_password;
+ }
+ else
+ fatal("ia_openinfo: Unable to open the shadow passwd file");
+}
+#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
+#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF and not HAVE_SECUREWARE */
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,205 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readpassphrase.c,v 1.22 2010/01/13 10:20:54 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2002, 2007 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller at courtesan.com>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- *
- * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
- * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
- * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
- */
-
-/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/readpassphrase.c */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifndef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE
-
-#include <termios.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <readpassphrase.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#ifdef TCSASOFT
-# define _T_FLUSH (TCSAFLUSH|TCSASOFT)
-#else
-# define _T_FLUSH (TCSAFLUSH)
-#endif
-
-/* SunOS 4.x which lacks _POSIX_VDISABLE, but has VDISABLE */
-#if !defined(_POSIX_VDISABLE) && defined(VDISABLE)
-# define _POSIX_VDISABLE VDISABLE
-#endif
-
-static volatile sig_atomic_t signo[_NSIG];
-
-static void handler(int);
-
-char *
-readpassphrase(const char *prompt, char *buf, size_t bufsiz, int flags)
-{
- ssize_t nr;
- int input, output, save_errno, i, need_restart;
- char ch, *p, *end;
- struct termios term, oterm;
- struct sigaction sa, savealrm, saveint, savehup, savequit, saveterm;
- struct sigaction savetstp, savettin, savettou, savepipe;
-
- /* I suppose we could alloc on demand in this case (XXX). */
- if (bufsiz == 0) {
- errno = EINVAL;
- return(NULL);
- }
-
-restart:
- for (i = 0; i < _NSIG; i++)
- signo[i] = 0;
- nr = -1;
- save_errno = 0;
- need_restart = 0;
- /*
- * Read and write to /dev/tty if available. If not, read from
- * stdin and write to stderr unless a tty is required.
- */
- if ((flags & RPP_STDIN) ||
- (input = output = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
- if (flags & RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) {
- errno = ENOTTY;
- return(NULL);
- }
- input = STDIN_FILENO;
- output = STDERR_FILENO;
- }
-
- /*
- * Catch signals that would otherwise cause the user to end
- * up with echo turned off in the shell. Don't worry about
- * things like SIGXCPU and SIGVTALRM for now.
- */
- sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
- sa.sa_flags = 0; /* don't restart system calls */
- sa.sa_handler = handler;
- (void)sigaction(SIGALRM, &sa, &savealrm);
- (void)sigaction(SIGHUP, &sa, &savehup);
- (void)sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, &saveint);
- (void)sigaction(SIGPIPE, &sa, &savepipe);
- (void)sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, &savequit);
- (void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, &saveterm);
- (void)sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, &savetstp);
- (void)sigaction(SIGTTIN, &sa, &savettin);
- (void)sigaction(SIGTTOU, &sa, &savettou);
-
- /* Turn off echo if possible. */
- if (input != STDIN_FILENO && tcgetattr(input, &oterm) == 0) {
- memcpy(&term, &oterm, sizeof(term));
- if (!(flags & RPP_ECHO_ON))
- term.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ECHONL);
-#ifdef VSTATUS
- if (term.c_cc[VSTATUS] != _POSIX_VDISABLE)
- term.c_cc[VSTATUS] = _POSIX_VDISABLE;
-#endif
- (void)tcsetattr(input, _T_FLUSH, &term);
- } else {
- memset(&term, 0, sizeof(term));
- term.c_lflag |= ECHO;
- memset(&oterm, 0, sizeof(oterm));
- oterm.c_lflag |= ECHO;
- }
-
- /* No I/O if we are already backgrounded. */
- if (signo[SIGTTOU] != 1 && signo[SIGTTIN] != 1) {
- if (!(flags & RPP_STDIN))
- (void)write(output, prompt, strlen(prompt));
- end = buf + bufsiz - 1;
- p = buf;
- while ((nr = read(input, &ch, 1)) == 1 && ch != '\n' && ch != '\r') {
- if (p < end) {
- if ((flags & RPP_SEVENBIT))
- ch &= 0x7f;
- if (isalpha(ch)) {
- if ((flags & RPP_FORCELOWER))
- ch = (char)tolower(ch);
- if ((flags & RPP_FORCEUPPER))
- ch = (char)toupper(ch);
- }
- *p++ = ch;
- }
- }
- *p = '\0';
- save_errno = errno;
- if (!(term.c_lflag & ECHO))
- (void)write(output, "\n", 1);
- }
-
- /* Restore old terminal settings and signals. */
- if (memcmp(&term, &oterm, sizeof(term)) != 0) {
- while (tcsetattr(input, _T_FLUSH, &oterm) == -1 &&
- errno == EINTR)
- continue;
- }
- (void)sigaction(SIGALRM, &savealrm, NULL);
- (void)sigaction(SIGHUP, &savehup, NULL);
- (void)sigaction(SIGINT, &saveint, NULL);
- (void)sigaction(SIGQUIT, &savequit, NULL);
- (void)sigaction(SIGPIPE, &savepipe, NULL);
- (void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &saveterm, NULL);
- (void)sigaction(SIGTSTP, &savetstp, NULL);
- (void)sigaction(SIGTTIN, &savettin, NULL);
- (void)sigaction(SIGTTOU, &savettou, NULL);
- if (input != STDIN_FILENO)
- (void)close(input);
-
- /*
- * If we were interrupted by a signal, resend it to ourselves
- * now that we have restored the signal handlers.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < _NSIG; i++) {
- if (signo[i]) {
- kill(getpid(), i);
- switch (i) {
- case SIGTSTP:
- case SIGTTIN:
- case SIGTTOU:
- need_restart = 1;
- }
- }
- }
- if (need_restart)
- goto restart;
-
- if (save_errno)
- errno = save_errno;
- return(nr == -1 ? NULL : buf);
-}
-
-#if 0
-char *
-getpass(const char *prompt)
-{
- static char buf[_PASSWORD_LEN + 1];
-
- return(readpassphrase(prompt, buf, sizeof(buf), RPP_ECHO_OFF));
-}
-#endif
-
-static void handler(int s)
-{
-
- signo[s] = 1;
-}
-#endif /* HAVE_READPASSPHRASE */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: readpassphrase.c,v 1.22 2010/01/13 10:20:54 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2002, 2007 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller at courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
+ * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
+ * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/readpassphrase.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE
+
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <readpassphrase.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef TCSASOFT
+# define _T_FLUSH (TCSAFLUSH|TCSASOFT)
+#else
+# define _T_FLUSH (TCSAFLUSH)
+#endif
+
+/* SunOS 4.x which lacks _POSIX_VDISABLE, but has VDISABLE */
+#if !defined(_POSIX_VDISABLE) && defined(VDISABLE)
+# define _POSIX_VDISABLE VDISABLE
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _NSIG
+# ifdef NSIG
+# define _NSIG NSIG
+# else
+# define _NSIG 128
+# endif
+#endif
+
+static volatile sig_atomic_t signo[_NSIG];
+
+static void handler(int);
+
+char *
+readpassphrase(const char *prompt, char *buf, size_t bufsiz, int flags)
+{
+ ssize_t nr;
+ int input, output, save_errno, i, need_restart;
+ char ch, *p, *end;
+ struct termios term, oterm;
+ struct sigaction sa, savealrm, saveint, savehup, savequit, saveterm;
+ struct sigaction savetstp, savettin, savettou, savepipe;
+
+ /* I suppose we could alloc on demand in this case (XXX). */
+ if (bufsiz == 0) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+restart:
+ for (i = 0; i < _NSIG; i++)
+ signo[i] = 0;
+ nr = -1;
+ save_errno = 0;
+ need_restart = 0;
+ /*
+ * Read and write to /dev/tty if available. If not, read from
+ * stdin and write to stderr unless a tty is required.
+ */
+ if ((flags & RPP_STDIN) ||
+ (input = output = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+ if (flags & RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) {
+ errno = ENOTTY;
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+ input = STDIN_FILENO;
+ output = STDERR_FILENO;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Catch signals that would otherwise cause the user to end
+ * up with echo turned off in the shell. Don't worry about
+ * things like SIGXCPU and SIGVTALRM for now.
+ */
+ sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+ sa.sa_flags = 0; /* don't restart system calls */
+ sa.sa_handler = handler;
+ (void)sigaction(SIGALRM, &sa, &savealrm);
+ (void)sigaction(SIGHUP, &sa, &savehup);
+ (void)sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, &saveint);
+ (void)sigaction(SIGPIPE, &sa, &savepipe);
+ (void)sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, &savequit);
+ (void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, &saveterm);
+ (void)sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, &savetstp);
+ (void)sigaction(SIGTTIN, &sa, &savettin);
+ (void)sigaction(SIGTTOU, &sa, &savettou);
+
+ /* Turn off echo if possible. */
+ if (input != STDIN_FILENO && tcgetattr(input, &oterm) == 0) {
+ memcpy(&term, &oterm, sizeof(term));
+ if (!(flags & RPP_ECHO_ON))
+ term.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ECHONL);
+#ifdef VSTATUS
+ if (term.c_cc[VSTATUS] != _POSIX_VDISABLE)
+ term.c_cc[VSTATUS] = _POSIX_VDISABLE;
+#endif
+ (void)tcsetattr(input, _T_FLUSH, &term);
+ } else {
+ memset(&term, 0, sizeof(term));
+ term.c_lflag |= ECHO;
+ memset(&oterm, 0, sizeof(oterm));
+ oterm.c_lflag |= ECHO;
+ }
+
+ /* No I/O if we are already backgrounded. */
+ if (signo[SIGTTOU] != 1 && signo[SIGTTIN] != 1) {
+ if (!(flags & RPP_STDIN))
+ (void)write(output, prompt, strlen(prompt));
+ end = buf + bufsiz - 1;
+ p = buf;
+ while ((nr = read(input, &ch, 1)) == 1 && ch != '\n' && ch != '\r') {
+ if (p < end) {
+ if ((flags & RPP_SEVENBIT))
+ ch &= 0x7f;
+ if (isalpha(ch)) {
+ if ((flags & RPP_FORCELOWER))
+ ch = (char)tolower(ch);
+ if ((flags & RPP_FORCEUPPER))
+ ch = (char)toupper(ch);
+ }
+ *p++ = ch;
+ }
+ }
+ *p = '\0';
+ save_errno = errno;
+ if (!(term.c_lflag & ECHO))
+ (void)write(output, "\n", 1);
+ }
+
+ /* Restore old terminal settings and signals. */
+ if (memcmp(&term, &oterm, sizeof(term)) != 0) {
+ while (tcsetattr(input, _T_FLUSH, &oterm) == -1 &&
+ errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ }
+ (void)sigaction(SIGALRM, &savealrm, NULL);
+ (void)sigaction(SIGHUP, &savehup, NULL);
+ (void)sigaction(SIGINT, &saveint, NULL);
+ (void)sigaction(SIGQUIT, &savequit, NULL);
+ (void)sigaction(SIGPIPE, &savepipe, NULL);
+ (void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &saveterm, NULL);
+ (void)sigaction(SIGTSTP, &savetstp, NULL);
+ (void)sigaction(SIGTTIN, &savettin, NULL);
+ (void)sigaction(SIGTTOU, &savettou, NULL);
+ if (input != STDIN_FILENO)
+ (void)close(input);
+
+ /*
+ * If we were interrupted by a signal, resend it to ourselves
+ * now that we have restored the signal handlers.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < _NSIG; i++) {
+ if (signo[i]) {
+ kill(getpid(), i);
+ switch (i) {
+ case SIGTSTP:
+ case SIGTTIN:
+ case SIGTTOU:
+ need_restart = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (need_restart)
+ goto restart;
+
+ if (save_errno)
+ errno = save_errno;
+ return(nr == -1 ? NULL : buf);
+}
+
+#if 0
+char *
+getpass(const char *prompt)
+{
+ static char buf[_PASSWORD_LEN + 1];
+
+ return(readpassphrase(prompt, buf, sizeof(buf), RPP_ECHO_OFF));
+}
+#endif
+
+static void handler(int s)
+{
+
+ signo[s] = 1;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_READPASSPHRASE */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/reallocarray.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/reallocarray.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/reallocarray.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/reallocarray.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: reallocarray.c,v 1.2 2014/12/08 03:45:00 bcook Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Otto Moerbeek <otto at drijf.net>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/reallocarray.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/*
+ * This is sqrt(SIZE_MAX+1), as s1*s2 <= SIZE_MAX
+ * if both s1 < MUL_NO_OVERFLOW and s2 < MUL_NO_OVERFLOW
+ */
+#define MUL_NO_OVERFLOW ((size_t)1 << (sizeof(size_t) * 4))
+
+void *
+reallocarray(void *optr, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
+{
+ if ((nmemb >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW || size >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW) &&
+ nmemb > 0 && SIZE_MAX / nmemb < size) {
+ errno = ENOMEM;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return realloc(optr, size * nmemb);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_REALLOCARRAY */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/realpath.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/realpath.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/realpath.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,197 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: realpath.c,v 1.13 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2003 Constantin S. Svintsoff <kostik at iclub.nsu.ru>
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
- * products derived from this software without specific prior written
- * permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/realpath.c */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH)
-
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-/*
- * char *realpath(const char *path, char resolved[PATH_MAX]);
- *
- * Find the real name of path, by removing all ".", ".." and symlink
- * components. Returns (resolved) on success, or (NULL) on failure,
- * in which case the path which caused trouble is left in (resolved).
- */
-char *
-realpath(const char *path, char resolved[PATH_MAX])
-{
- struct stat sb;
- char *p, *q, *s;
- size_t left_len, resolved_len;
- unsigned symlinks;
- int serrno, slen;
- char left[PATH_MAX], next_token[PATH_MAX], symlink[PATH_MAX];
-
- serrno = errno;
- symlinks = 0;
- if (path[0] == '/') {
- resolved[0] = '/';
- resolved[1] = '\0';
- if (path[1] == '\0')
- return (resolved);
- resolved_len = 1;
- left_len = strlcpy(left, path + 1, sizeof(left));
- } else {
- if (getcwd(resolved, PATH_MAX) == NULL) {
- strlcpy(resolved, ".", PATH_MAX);
- return (NULL);
- }
- resolved_len = strlen(resolved);
- left_len = strlcpy(left, path, sizeof(left));
- }
- if (left_len >= sizeof(left) || resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
- errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
- return (NULL);
- }
-
- /*
- * Iterate over path components in `left'.
- */
- while (left_len != 0) {
- /*
- * Extract the next path component and adjust `left'
- * and its length.
- */
- p = strchr(left, '/');
- s = p ? p : left + left_len;
- if (s - left >= sizeof(next_token)) {
- errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
- return (NULL);
- }
- memcpy(next_token, left, s - left);
- next_token[s - left] = '\0';
- left_len -= s - left;
- if (p != NULL)
- memmove(left, s + 1, left_len + 1);
- if (resolved[resolved_len - 1] != '/') {
- if (resolved_len + 1 >= PATH_MAX) {
- errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
- return (NULL);
- }
- resolved[resolved_len++] = '/';
- resolved[resolved_len] = '\0';
- }
- if (next_token[0] == '\0')
- continue;
- else if (strcmp(next_token, ".") == 0)
- continue;
- else if (strcmp(next_token, "..") == 0) {
- /*
- * Strip the last path component except when we have
- * single "/"
- */
- if (resolved_len > 1) {
- resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
- q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
- *q = '\0';
- resolved_len = q - resolved;
- }
- continue;
- }
-
- /*
- * Append the next path component and lstat() it. If
- * lstat() fails we still can return successfully if
- * there are no more path components left.
- */
- resolved_len = strlcat(resolved, next_token, PATH_MAX);
- if (resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
- errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
- return (NULL);
- }
- if (lstat(resolved, &sb) != 0) {
- if (errno == ENOENT && p == NULL) {
- errno = serrno;
- return (resolved);
- }
- return (NULL);
- }
- if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) {
- if (symlinks++ > MAXSYMLINKS) {
- errno = ELOOP;
- return (NULL);
- }
- slen = readlink(resolved, symlink, sizeof(symlink) - 1);
- if (slen < 0)
- return (NULL);
- symlink[slen] = '\0';
- if (symlink[0] == '/') {
- resolved[1] = 0;
- resolved_len = 1;
- } else if (resolved_len > 1) {
- /* Strip the last path component. */
- resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
- q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
- *q = '\0';
- resolved_len = q - resolved;
- }
-
- /*
- * If there are any path components left, then
- * append them to symlink. The result is placed
- * in `left'.
- */
- if (p != NULL) {
- if (symlink[slen - 1] != '/') {
- if (slen + 1 >= sizeof(symlink)) {
- errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
- return (NULL);
- }
- symlink[slen] = '/';
- symlink[slen + 1] = 0;
- }
- left_len = strlcat(symlink, left, sizeof(left));
- if (left_len >= sizeof(left)) {
- errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
- return (NULL);
- }
- }
- left_len = strlcpy(left, symlink, sizeof(left));
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Remove trailing slash except when the resolved pathname
- * is a single "/".
- */
- if (resolved_len > 1 && resolved[resolved_len - 1] == '/')
- resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
- return (resolved);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/realpath.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/realpath.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/realpath.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/realpath.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: realpath.c,v 1.20 2015/10/13 20:55:37 millert Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Constantin S. Svintsoff <kostik at iclub.nsu.ru>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior written
+ * permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/realpath.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#ifndef SYMLOOP_MAX
+# define SYMLOOP_MAX 32
+#endif
+
+/* A slightly modified copy of this file exists in libexec/ld.so */
+
+/*
+ * char *realpath(const char *path, char resolved[PATH_MAX]);
+ *
+ * Find the real name of path, by removing all ".", ".." and symlink
+ * components. Returns (resolved) on success, or (NULL) on failure,
+ * in which case the path which caused trouble is left in (resolved).
+ */
+char *
+realpath(const char *path, char *resolved)
+{
+ struct stat sb;
+ char *p, *q, *s;
+ size_t left_len, resolved_len;
+ unsigned symlinks;
+ int serrno, slen, mem_allocated;
+ char left[PATH_MAX], next_token[PATH_MAX], symlink[PATH_MAX];
+
+ if (path[0] == '\0') {
+ errno = ENOENT;
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ serrno = errno;
+
+ if (resolved == NULL) {
+ resolved = malloc(PATH_MAX);
+ if (resolved == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ mem_allocated = 1;
+ } else
+ mem_allocated = 0;
+
+ symlinks = 0;
+ if (path[0] == '/') {
+ resolved[0] = '/';
+ resolved[1] = '\0';
+ if (path[1] == '\0')
+ return (resolved);
+ resolved_len = 1;
+ left_len = strlcpy(left, path + 1, sizeof(left));
+ } else {
+ if (getcwd(resolved, PATH_MAX) == NULL) {
+ if (mem_allocated)
+ free(resolved);
+ else
+ strlcpy(resolved, ".", PATH_MAX);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ resolved_len = strlen(resolved);
+ left_len = strlcpy(left, path, sizeof(left));
+ }
+ if (left_len >= sizeof(left) || resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Iterate over path components in `left'.
+ */
+ while (left_len != 0) {
+ /*
+ * Extract the next path component and adjust `left'
+ * and its length.
+ */
+ p = strchr(left, '/');
+ s = p ? p : left + left_len;
+ if (s - left >= (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(next_token)) {
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(next_token, left, s - left);
+ next_token[s - left] = '\0';
+ left_len -= s - left;
+ if (p != NULL)
+ memmove(left, s + 1, left_len + 1);
+ if (resolved[resolved_len - 1] != '/') {
+ if (resolved_len + 1 >= PATH_MAX) {
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ resolved[resolved_len++] = '/';
+ resolved[resolved_len] = '\0';
+ }
+ if (next_token[0] == '\0')
+ continue;
+ else if (strcmp(next_token, ".") == 0)
+ continue;
+ else if (strcmp(next_token, "..") == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Strip the last path component except when we have
+ * single "/"
+ */
+ if (resolved_len > 1) {
+ resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
+ q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
+ *q = '\0';
+ resolved_len = q - resolved;
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Append the next path component and lstat() it. If
+ * lstat() fails we still can return successfully if
+ * there are no more path components left.
+ */
+ resolved_len = strlcat(resolved, next_token, PATH_MAX);
+ if (resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (lstat(resolved, &sb) != 0) {
+ if (errno == ENOENT && p == NULL) {
+ errno = serrno;
+ return (resolved);
+ }
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) {
+ if (symlinks++ > SYMLOOP_MAX) {
+ errno = ELOOP;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ slen = readlink(resolved, symlink, sizeof(symlink) - 1);
+ if (slen < 0)
+ goto err;
+ symlink[slen] = '\0';
+ if (symlink[0] == '/') {
+ resolved[1] = 0;
+ resolved_len = 1;
+ } else if (resolved_len > 1) {
+ /* Strip the last path component. */
+ resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
+ q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
+ *q = '\0';
+ resolved_len = q - resolved;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If there are any path components left, then
+ * append them to symlink. The result is placed
+ * in `left'.
+ */
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ if (symlink[slen - 1] != '/') {
+ if (slen + 1 >=
+ (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(symlink)) {
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ symlink[slen] = '/';
+ symlink[slen + 1] = 0;
+ }
+ left_len = strlcat(symlink, left, sizeof(symlink));
+ if (left_len >= sizeof(symlink)) {
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ left_len = strlcpy(left, symlink, sizeof(left));
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Remove trailing slash except when the resolved pathname
+ * is a single "/".
+ */
+ if (resolved_len > 1 && resolved[resolved_len - 1] == '/')
+ resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
+ return (resolved);
+
+err:
+ if (mem_allocated)
+ free(resolved);
+ return (NULL);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.4 2006/08/19 09:12:14 dtucker Exp $
-
-sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
-piddir=@piddir@
-srcdir=@srcdir@
-top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
-
-VPATH=@srcdir@
-CC=@CC@
-LD=@LD@
-CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
-CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@
-EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
-LIBCOMPAT=../libopenbsd-compat.a
-LIBS=@LIBS@
-LDFLAGS=@LDFLAGS@ $(LIBCOMPAT)
-
-TESTPROGS=closefromtest$(EXEEXT) snprintftest$(EXEEXT) strduptest$(EXEEXT) \
- strtonumtest$(EXEEXT)
-
-all: t-exec ${OTHERTESTS}
-
-%$(EXEEXT): %.c
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< $(LIBCOMPAT) $(LIBS)
-
-t-exec: $(TESTPROGS)
- @echo running compat regress tests
- @for TEST in ""$?; do \
- echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
- ./$${TEST}$(EXEEXT) || exit $$? ; \
- done
- @echo finished compat regress tests
-
-clean:
- rm -f *.o *.a core $(TESTPROGS) valid.out
-
-distclean: clean
- rm -f Makefile *~
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.5 2014/06/17 13:06:08 dtucker Exp $
+
+sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
+piddir=@piddir@
+srcdir=@srcdir@
+top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
+
+VPATH=@srcdir@
+CC=@CC@
+LD=@LD@
+CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@
+EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+LIBCOMPAT=../libopenbsd-compat.a
+LIBS=@LIBS@
+LDFLAGS=@LDFLAGS@ $(LIBCOMPAT)
+
+TESTPROGS=closefromtest$(EXEEXT) snprintftest$(EXEEXT) strduptest$(EXEEXT) \
+ strtonumtest$(EXEEXT) opensslvertest$(EXEEXT)
+
+all: t-exec ${OTHERTESTS}
+
+%$(EXEEXT): %.c $(LIBCOMPAT)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< $(LIBCOMPAT) $(LIBS)
+
+t-exec: $(TESTPROGS)
+ @echo running compat regress tests
+ @for TEST in ""$?; do \
+ echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
+ ./$${TEST}$(EXEEXT) || exit $$? ; \
+ done
+ @echo finished compat regress tests
+
+clean:
+ rm -f *.o *.a core $(TESTPROGS) valid.out
+
+distclean: clean
+ rm -f Makefile *~
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Darren Tucker
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int ssh_compatible_openssl(long, long);
+
+struct version_test {
+ long headerver;
+ long libver;
+ int result;
+} version_tests[] = {
+ /* built with 0.9.8b release headers */
+ { 0x0090802fL, 0x0090802fL, 1}, /* exact match */
+ { 0x0090802fL, 0x0090804fL, 1}, /* newer library fix version: ok */
+ { 0x0090802fL, 0x0090801fL, 1}, /* older library fix version: ok */
+ { 0x0090802fL, 0x0090702fL, 0}, /* older library minor version: NO */
+ { 0x0090802fL, 0x0090902fL, 0}, /* newer library minor version: NO */
+ { 0x0090802fL, 0x0080802fL, 0}, /* older library major version: NO */
+ { 0x0090802fL, 0x1000100fL, 0}, /* newer library major version: NO */
+
+ /* built with 1.0.1b release headers */
+ { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000101fL, 1},/* exact match */
+ { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000102fL, 1}, /* newer library patch version: ok */
+ { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000100fL, 1}, /* older library patch version: ok */
+ { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000201fL, 1}, /* newer library fix version: ok */
+ { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000001fL, 0}, /* older library fix version: NO */
+ { 0x1000101fL, 0x1010101fL, 0}, /* newer library minor version: NO */
+ { 0x1000101fL, 0x0000101fL, 0}, /* older library major version: NO */
+ { 0x1000101fL, 0x2000101fL, 0}, /* newer library major version: NO */
+};
+
+void
+fail(long hver, long lver, int result)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "opensslver: header %lx library %lx != %d \n", hver, lver, result);
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(void)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ int res;
+ long hver, lver;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(version_tests) / sizeof(version_tests[0]); i++) {
+ hver = version_tests[i].headerver;
+ lver = version_tests[i].libver;
+ res = version_tests[i].result;
+ if (ssh_compatible_openssl(hver, lver) != res)
+ fail(hver, lver, res);
+ }
+ exit(0);
+}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+/*
+ * Preneel, Bosselaers, Dobbertin, "The Cryptographic Hash Function RIPEMD-160",
+ * RSA Laboratories, CryptoBytes, Volume 3, Number 2, Autumn 1997,
+ * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/cryptobytes/crypto3n2.pdf
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
+#include <endian.h>
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+#include <rmd160.h>
+
+#define PUT_64BIT_LE(cp, value) do { \
+ (cp)[7] = (value) >> 56; \
+ (cp)[6] = (value) >> 48; \
+ (cp)[5] = (value) >> 40; \
+ (cp)[4] = (value) >> 32; \
+ (cp)[3] = (value) >> 24; \
+ (cp)[2] = (value) >> 16; \
+ (cp)[1] = (value) >> 8; \
+ (cp)[0] = (value); } while (0)
+
+#define PUT_32BIT_LE(cp, value) do { \
+ (cp)[3] = (value) >> 24; \
+ (cp)[2] = (value) >> 16; \
+ (cp)[1] = (value) >> 8; \
+ (cp)[0] = (value); } while (0)
+
+#define H0 0x67452301U
+#define H1 0xEFCDAB89U
+#define H2 0x98BADCFEU
+#define H3 0x10325476U
+#define H4 0xC3D2E1F0U
+
+#define K0 0x00000000U
+#define K1 0x5A827999U
+#define K2 0x6ED9EBA1U
+#define K3 0x8F1BBCDCU
+#define K4 0xA953FD4EU
+
+#define KK0 0x50A28BE6U
+#define KK1 0x5C4DD124U
+#define KK2 0x6D703EF3U
+#define KK3 0x7A6D76E9U
+#define KK4 0x00000000U
+
+/* rotate x left n bits. */
+#define ROL(n, x) (((x) << (n)) | ((x) >> (32-(n))))
+
+#define F0(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))
+#define F1(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~x) & (z)))
+#define F2(x, y, z) (((x) | (~y)) ^ (z))
+#define F3(x, y, z) (((x) & (z)) | ((y) & (~z)))
+#define F4(x, y, z) ((x) ^ ((y) | (~z)))
+
+#define R(a, b, c, d, e, Fj, Kj, sj, rj) \
+ do { \
+ a = ROL(sj, a + Fj(b,c,d) + X(rj) + Kj) + e; \
+ c = ROL(10, c); \
+ } while(0)
+
+#define X(i) x[i]
+
+static u_int8_t PADDING[RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH] = {
+ 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+};
+
+void
+RMD160Init(RMD160_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->count = 0;
+ ctx->state[0] = H0;
+ ctx->state[1] = H1;
+ ctx->state[2] = H2;
+ ctx->state[3] = H3;
+ ctx->state[4] = H4;
+}
+
+void
+RMD160Update(RMD160_CTX *ctx, const u_int8_t *input, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t have, off, need;
+
+ have = (ctx->count / 8) % RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+ need = RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH - have;
+ ctx->count += 8 * len;
+ off = 0;
+
+ if (len >= need) {
+ if (have) {
+ memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input, need);
+ RMD160Transform(ctx->state, ctx->buffer);
+ off = need;
+ have = 0;
+ }
+ /* now the buffer is empty */
+ while (off + RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH <= len) {
+ RMD160Transform(ctx->state, input+off);
+ off += RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+ }
+ }
+ if (off < len)
+ memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input+off, len-off);
+}
+
+void
+RMD160Pad(RMD160_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ u_int8_t size[8];
+ size_t padlen;
+
+ PUT_64BIT_LE(size, ctx->count);
+
+ /*
+ * pad to RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH byte blocks, at least one byte from
+ * PADDING plus 8 bytes for the size
+ */
+ padlen = RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH - ((ctx->count / 8) % RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+ if (padlen < 1 + 8)
+ padlen += RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+ RMD160Update(ctx, PADDING, padlen - 8); /* padlen - 8 <= 64 */
+ RMD160Update(ctx, size, 8);
+}
+
+void
+RMD160Final(u_int8_t digest[RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH], RMD160_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ RMD160Pad(ctx);
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
+ PUT_32BIT_LE(digest + i*4, ctx->state[i]);
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof (*ctx));
+}
+
+void
+RMD160Transform(u_int32_t state[5], const u_int8_t block[RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+ u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e, aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, t, x[16];
+
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ memcpy(x, block, RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+#else
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ x[i] = (u_int32_t)(
+ (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 0]) |
+ (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 1]) << 8 |
+ (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 2]) << 16 |
+ (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 3]) << 24);
+#endif
+
+ a = state[0];
+ b = state[1];
+ c = state[2];
+ d = state[3];
+ e = state[4];
+
+ /* Round 1 */
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 11, 0);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, K0, 14, 1);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, K0, 15, 2);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, K0, 12, 3);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, K0, 5, 4);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 8, 5);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, K0, 7, 6);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, K0, 9, 7);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, K0, 11, 8);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, K0, 13, 9);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 14, 10);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, K0, 15, 11);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, K0, 6, 12);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, K0, 7, 13);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, K0, 9, 14);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 8, 15); /* #15 */
+ /* Round 2 */
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 7, 7);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, K1, 6, 4);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, K1, 8, 13);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, K1, 13, 1);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, 11, 10);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 9, 6);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, K1, 7, 15);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, K1, 15, 3);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, K1, 7, 12);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, 12, 0);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 15, 9);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, K1, 9, 5);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, K1, 11, 2);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, K1, 7, 14);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, 13, 11);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 12, 8); /* #31 */
+ /* Round 3 */
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 11, 3);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, K2, 13, 10);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, K2, 6, 14);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, K2, 7, 4);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, K2, 14, 9);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 9, 15);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, K2, 13, 8);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, K2, 15, 1);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, K2, 14, 2);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, K2, 8, 7);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 13, 0);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, K2, 6, 6);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, K2, 5, 13);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, K2, 12, 11);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, K2, 7, 5);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 5, 12); /* #47 */
+ /* Round 4 */
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 11, 1);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, K3, 12, 9);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, K3, 14, 11);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, K3, 15, 10);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, K3, 14, 0);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 15, 8);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, K3, 9, 12);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, K3, 8, 4);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, K3, 9, 13);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, K3, 14, 3);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 5, 7);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, K3, 6, 15);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, K3, 8, 14);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, K3, 6, 5);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, K3, 5, 6);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 12, 2); /* #63 */
+ /* Round 5 */
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 9, 4);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, K4, 15, 0);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, K4, 5, 5);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, K4, 11, 9);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, K4, 6, 7);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 8, 12);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, K4, 13, 2);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, K4, 12, 10);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, K4, 5, 14);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, K4, 12, 1);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 13, 3);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, K4, 14, 8);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, K4, 11, 11);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, K4, 8, 6);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, K4, 5, 15);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 6, 13); /* #79 */
+
+ aa = a ; bb = b; cc = c; dd = d; ee = e;
+
+ a = state[0];
+ b = state[1];
+ c = state[2];
+ d = state[3];
+ e = state[4];
+
+ /* Parallel round 1 */
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 8, 5);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, KK0, 9, 14);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, KK0, 9, 7);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, KK0, 11, 0);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, KK0, 13, 9);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 15, 2);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, KK0, 15, 11);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, KK0, 5, 4);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, KK0, 7, 13);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, KK0, 7, 6);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 8, 15);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, KK0, 11, 8);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, KK0, 14, 1);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, KK0, 14, 10);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, KK0, 12, 3);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 6, 12); /* #15 */
+ /* Parallel round 2 */
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 9, 6);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, KK1, 13, 11);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, KK1, 15, 3);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, KK1, 7, 7);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, KK1, 12, 0);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 8, 13);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, KK1, 9, 5);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, KK1, 11, 10);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, KK1, 7, 14);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, KK1, 7, 15);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 12, 8);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, KK1, 7, 12);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, KK1, 6, 4);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, KK1, 15, 9);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, KK1, 13, 1);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 11, 2); /* #31 */
+ /* Parallel round 3 */
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 9, 15);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, KK2, 7, 5);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, KK2, 15, 1);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, KK2, 11, 3);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, KK2, 8, 7);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 6, 14);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, KK2, 6, 6);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, KK2, 14, 9);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, KK2, 12, 11);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, KK2, 13, 8);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 5, 12);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, KK2, 14, 2);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, KK2, 13, 10);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, KK2, 13, 0);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, KK2, 7, 4);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 5, 13); /* #47 */
+ /* Parallel round 4 */
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 15, 8);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, KK3, 5, 6);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, KK3, 8, 4);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, KK3, 11, 1);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, KK3, 14, 3);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 14, 11);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, KK3, 6, 15);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, KK3, 14, 0);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, KK3, 6, 5);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, KK3, 9, 12);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 12, 2);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, KK3, 9, 13);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, KK3, 12, 9);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, KK3, 5, 7);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, KK3, 15, 10);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 8, 14); /* #63 */
+ /* Parallel round 5 */
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 8, 12);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, KK4, 5, 15);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, KK4, 12, 10);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, KK4, 9, 4);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, KK4, 12, 1);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 5, 5);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, KK4, 14, 8);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, KK4, 6, 7);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, KK4, 8, 6);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, KK4, 13, 2);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 6, 13);
+ R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, KK4, 5, 14);
+ R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, KK4, 15, 0);
+ R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, KK4, 13, 3);
+ R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, KK4, 11, 9);
+ R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 11, 11); /* #79 */
+
+ t = state[1] + cc + d;
+ state[1] = state[2] + dd + e;
+ state[2] = state[3] + ee + a;
+ state[3] = state[4] + aa + b;
+ state[4] = state[0] + bb + c;
+ state[0] = t;
+}
+
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/rmd160.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/rmd160.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/rmd160.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/rmd160.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: rmd160.h,v 1.17 2012/12/05 23:19:57 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef _RMD160_H
+#define _RMD160_H
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#define RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH 64
+#define RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH 20
+#define RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+
+/* RMD160 context. */
+typedef struct RMD160Context {
+ u_int32_t state[5]; /* state */
+ u_int64_t count; /* number of bits, mod 2^64 */
+ u_int8_t buffer[RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH]; /* input buffer */
+} RMD160_CTX;
+
+void RMD160Init(RMD160_CTX *);
+void RMD160Transform(u_int32_t [5], const u_int8_t [RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,5)))
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH)));
+void RMD160Update(RMD160_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void RMD160Pad(RMD160_CTX *);
+void RMD160Final(u_int8_t [RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH], RMD160_CTX *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *RMD160End(RMD160_CTX *, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *RMD160File(const char *, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *RMD160FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *RMD160Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
+#endif /* _RMD160_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha1.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sha1.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha1.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha1.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sha1.c,v 1.23 2014/01/08 06:14:57 tedu Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * SHA-1 in C
+ * By Steve Reid <steve at edmweb.com>
+ * 100% Public Domain
+ *
+ * Test Vectors (from FIPS PUB 180-1)
+ * "abc"
+ * A9993E36 4706816A BA3E2571 7850C26C 9CD0D89D
+ * "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq"
+ * 84983E44 1C3BD26E BAAE4AA1 F95129E5 E54670F1
+ * A million repetitions of "a"
+ * 34AA973C D4C4DAA4 F61EEB2B DBAD2731 6534016F
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#define rol(value, bits) (((value) << (bits)) | ((value) >> (32 - (bits))))
+
+/*
+ * blk0() and blk() perform the initial expand.
+ * I got the idea of expanding during the round function from SSLeay
+ */
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+# define blk0(i) (block->l[i] = (rol(block->l[i],24)&0xFF00FF00) \
+ |(rol(block->l[i],8)&0x00FF00FF))
+#else
+# define blk0(i) block->l[i]
+#endif
+#define blk(i) (block->l[i&15] = rol(block->l[(i+13)&15]^block->l[(i+8)&15] \
+ ^block->l[(i+2)&15]^block->l[i&15],1))
+
+/*
+ * (R0+R1), R2, R3, R4 are the different operations (rounds) used in SHA1
+ */
+#define R0(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=((w&(x^y))^y)+blk0(i)+0x5A827999+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+#define R1(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=((w&(x^y))^y)+blk(i)+0x5A827999+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+#define R2(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(w^x^y)+blk(i)+0x6ED9EBA1+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+#define R3(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(((w|x)&y)|(w&x))+blk(i)+0x8F1BBCDC+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+#define R4(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(w^x^y)+blk(i)+0xCA62C1D6+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+
+typedef union {
+ u_int8_t c[64];
+ u_int32_t l[16];
+} CHAR64LONG16;
+
+/*
+ * Hash a single 512-bit block. This is the core of the algorithm.
+ */
+void
+SHA1Transform(u_int32_t state[5], const u_int8_t buffer[SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+ u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e;
+ u_int8_t workspace[SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+ CHAR64LONG16 *block = (CHAR64LONG16 *)workspace;
+
+ (void)memcpy(block, buffer, SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+
+ /* Copy context->state[] to working vars */
+ a = state[0];
+ b = state[1];
+ c = state[2];
+ d = state[3];
+ e = state[4];
+
+ /* 4 rounds of 20 operations each. Loop unrolled. */
+ R0(a,b,c,d,e, 0); R0(e,a,b,c,d, 1); R0(d,e,a,b,c, 2); R0(c,d,e,a,b, 3);
+ R0(b,c,d,e,a, 4); R0(a,b,c,d,e, 5); R0(e,a,b,c,d, 6); R0(d,e,a,b,c, 7);
+ R0(c,d,e,a,b, 8); R0(b,c,d,e,a, 9); R0(a,b,c,d,e,10); R0(e,a,b,c,d,11);
+ R0(d,e,a,b,c,12); R0(c,d,e,a,b,13); R0(b,c,d,e,a,14); R0(a,b,c,d,e,15);
+ R1(e,a,b,c,d,16); R1(d,e,a,b,c,17); R1(c,d,e,a,b,18); R1(b,c,d,e,a,19);
+ R2(a,b,c,d,e,20); R2(e,a,b,c,d,21); R2(d,e,a,b,c,22); R2(c,d,e,a,b,23);
+ R2(b,c,d,e,a,24); R2(a,b,c,d,e,25); R2(e,a,b,c,d,26); R2(d,e,a,b,c,27);
+ R2(c,d,e,a,b,28); R2(b,c,d,e,a,29); R2(a,b,c,d,e,30); R2(e,a,b,c,d,31);
+ R2(d,e,a,b,c,32); R2(c,d,e,a,b,33); R2(b,c,d,e,a,34); R2(a,b,c,d,e,35);
+ R2(e,a,b,c,d,36); R2(d,e,a,b,c,37); R2(c,d,e,a,b,38); R2(b,c,d,e,a,39);
+ R3(a,b,c,d,e,40); R3(e,a,b,c,d,41); R3(d,e,a,b,c,42); R3(c,d,e,a,b,43);
+ R3(b,c,d,e,a,44); R3(a,b,c,d,e,45); R3(e,a,b,c,d,46); R3(d,e,a,b,c,47);
+ R3(c,d,e,a,b,48); R3(b,c,d,e,a,49); R3(a,b,c,d,e,50); R3(e,a,b,c,d,51);
+ R3(d,e,a,b,c,52); R3(c,d,e,a,b,53); R3(b,c,d,e,a,54); R3(a,b,c,d,e,55);
+ R3(e,a,b,c,d,56); R3(d,e,a,b,c,57); R3(c,d,e,a,b,58); R3(b,c,d,e,a,59);
+ R4(a,b,c,d,e,60); R4(e,a,b,c,d,61); R4(d,e,a,b,c,62); R4(c,d,e,a,b,63);
+ R4(b,c,d,e,a,64); R4(a,b,c,d,e,65); R4(e,a,b,c,d,66); R4(d,e,a,b,c,67);
+ R4(c,d,e,a,b,68); R4(b,c,d,e,a,69); R4(a,b,c,d,e,70); R4(e,a,b,c,d,71);
+ R4(d,e,a,b,c,72); R4(c,d,e,a,b,73); R4(b,c,d,e,a,74); R4(a,b,c,d,e,75);
+ R4(e,a,b,c,d,76); R4(d,e,a,b,c,77); R4(c,d,e,a,b,78); R4(b,c,d,e,a,79);
+
+ /* Add the working vars back into context.state[] */
+ state[0] += a;
+ state[1] += b;
+ state[2] += c;
+ state[3] += d;
+ state[4] += e;
+
+ /* Wipe variables */
+ a = b = c = d = e = 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * SHA1Init - Initialize new context
+ */
+void
+SHA1Init(SHA1_CTX *context)
+{
+
+ /* SHA1 initialization constants */
+ context->count = 0;
+ context->state[0] = 0x67452301;
+ context->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89;
+ context->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE;
+ context->state[3] = 0x10325476;
+ context->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Run your data through this.
+ */
+void
+SHA1Update(SHA1_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t i, j;
+
+ j = (size_t)((context->count >> 3) & 63);
+ context->count += (len << 3);
+ if ((j + len) > 63) {
+ (void)memcpy(&context->buffer[j], data, (i = 64-j));
+ SHA1Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+ for ( ; i + 63 < len; i += 64)
+ SHA1Transform(context->state, (u_int8_t *)&data[i]);
+ j = 0;
+ } else {
+ i = 0;
+ }
+ (void)memcpy(&context->buffer[j], &data[i], len - i);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Add padding and return the message digest.
+ */
+void
+SHA1Pad(SHA1_CTX *context)
+{
+ u_int8_t finalcount[8];
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ finalcount[i] = (u_int8_t)((context->count >>
+ ((7 - (i & 7)) * 8)) & 255); /* Endian independent */
+ }
+ SHA1Update(context, (u_int8_t *)"\200", 1);
+ while ((context->count & 504) != 448)
+ SHA1Update(context, (u_int8_t *)"\0", 1);
+ SHA1Update(context, finalcount, 8); /* Should cause a SHA1Transform() */
+}
+
+void
+SHA1Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA1_CTX *context)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ SHA1Pad(context);
+ for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) {
+ digest[i] = (u_int8_t)
+ ((context->state[i>>2] >> ((3-(i & 3)) * 8) ) & 255);
+ }
+ memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
+}
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha1.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sha1.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha1.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha1.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sha1.h,v 1.24 2012/12/05 23:19:57 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * SHA-1 in C
+ * By Steve Reid <steve at edmweb.com>
+ * 100% Public Domain
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SHA1_H
+#define _SHA1_H
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#define SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH 64
+#define SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH 20
+#define SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+
+typedef struct {
+ u_int32_t state[5];
+ u_int64_t count;
+ u_int8_t buffer[SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+} SHA1_CTX;
+
+void SHA1Init(SHA1_CTX *);
+void SHA1Pad(SHA1_CTX *);
+void SHA1Transform(u_int32_t [5], const u_int8_t [SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,5)))
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH)));
+void SHA1Update(SHA1_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA1Final(u_int8_t [SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA1_CTX *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA1End(SHA1_CTX *, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA1File(const char *, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA1FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA1Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+
+#define HTONDIGEST(x) do { \
+ x[0] = htonl(x[0]); \
+ x[1] = htonl(x[1]); \
+ x[2] = htonl(x[2]); \
+ x[3] = htonl(x[3]); \
+ x[4] = htonl(x[4]); } while (0)
+
+#define NTOHDIGEST(x) do { \
+ x[0] = ntohl(x[0]); \
+ x[1] = ntohl(x[1]); \
+ x[2] = ntohl(x[2]); \
+ x[3] = ntohl(x[3]); \
+ x[4] = ntohl(x[4]); } while (0)
+
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
+#endif /* _SHA1_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha2.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sha2.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha2.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,882 +0,0 @@
-/* from OpenBSD: sha2.c,v 1.11 2005/08/08 08:05:35 espie Exp */
-
-/*
- * FILE: sha2.c
- * AUTHOR: Aaron D. Gifford <me at aarongifford.com>
- *
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Aaron D. Gifford
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of contributors
- * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
- * without specific prior written permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTOR(S) BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $From: sha2.c,v 1.1 2001/11/08 00:01:51 adg Exp adg $
- */
-
-/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/hash/sha2.c */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) && \
- (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include "sha2.h"
-
-/*
- * UNROLLED TRANSFORM LOOP NOTE:
- * You can define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM to use the unrolled transform
- * loop version for the hash transform rounds (defined using macros
- * later in this file). Either define on the command line, for example:
- *
- * cc -DSHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM -o sha2 sha2.c sha2prog.c
- *
- * or define below:
- *
- * #define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
- *
- */
-
-/*** SHA-256/384/512 Machine Architecture Definitions *****************/
-/*
- * BYTE_ORDER NOTE:
- *
- * Please make sure that your system defines BYTE_ORDER. If your
- * architecture is little-endian, make sure it also defines
- * LITTLE_ENDIAN and that the two (BYTE_ORDER and LITTLE_ENDIAN) are
- * equivilent.
- *
- * If your system does not define the above, then you can do so by
- * hand like this:
- *
- * #define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234
- * #define BIG_ENDIAN 4321
- *
- * And for little-endian machines, add:
- *
- * #define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN
- *
- * Or for big-endian machines:
- *
- * #define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN
- *
- * The FreeBSD machine this was written on defines BYTE_ORDER
- * appropriately by including <sys/types.h> (which in turn includes
- * <machine/endian.h> where the appropriate definitions are actually
- * made).
- */
-#if !defined(BYTE_ORDER) || (BYTE_ORDER != LITTLE_ENDIAN && BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN)
-#error Define BYTE_ORDER to be equal to either LITTLE_ENDIAN or BIG_ENDIAN
-#endif
-
-
-/*** SHA-256/384/512 Various Length Definitions ***********************/
-/* NOTE: Most of these are in sha2.h */
-#define SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH (SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - 8)
-#define SHA384_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH (SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH - 16)
-#define SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH (SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - 16)
-
-/*** ENDIAN SPECIFIC COPY MACROS **************************************/
-#define BE_8_TO_32(dst, cp) do { \
- (dst) = (u_int32_t)(cp)[3] | ((u_int32_t)(cp)[2] << 8) | \
- ((u_int32_t)(cp)[1] << 16) | ((u_int32_t)(cp)[0] << 24); \
-} while(0)
-
-#define BE_8_TO_64(dst, cp) do { \
- (dst) = (u_int64_t)(cp)[7] | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[6] << 8) | \
- ((u_int64_t)(cp)[5] << 16) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[4] << 24) | \
- ((u_int64_t)(cp)[3] << 32) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[2] << 40) | \
- ((u_int64_t)(cp)[1] << 48) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[0] << 56); \
-} while (0)
-
-#define BE_64_TO_8(cp, src) do { \
- (cp)[0] = (src) >> 56; \
- (cp)[1] = (src) >> 48; \
- (cp)[2] = (src) >> 40; \
- (cp)[3] = (src) >> 32; \
- (cp)[4] = (src) >> 24; \
- (cp)[5] = (src) >> 16; \
- (cp)[6] = (src) >> 8; \
- (cp)[7] = (src); \
-} while (0)
-
-#define BE_32_TO_8(cp, src) do { \
- (cp)[0] = (src) >> 24; \
- (cp)[1] = (src) >> 16; \
- (cp)[2] = (src) >> 8; \
- (cp)[3] = (src); \
-} while (0)
-
-/*
- * Macro for incrementally adding the unsigned 64-bit integer n to the
- * unsigned 128-bit integer (represented using a two-element array of
- * 64-bit words):
- */
-#define ADDINC128(w,n) do { \
- (w)[0] += (u_int64_t)(n); \
- if ((w)[0] < (n)) { \
- (w)[1]++; \
- } \
-} while (0)
-
-/*** THE SIX LOGICAL FUNCTIONS ****************************************/
-/*
- * Bit shifting and rotation (used by the six SHA-XYZ logical functions:
- *
- * NOTE: The naming of R and S appears backwards here (R is a SHIFT and
- * S is a ROTATION) because the SHA-256/384/512 description document
- * (see http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/shs/sha256-384-512.pdf) uses this
- * same "backwards" definition.
- */
-/* Shift-right (used in SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512): */
-#define R(b,x) ((x) >> (b))
-/* 32-bit Rotate-right (used in SHA-256): */
-#define S32(b,x) (((x) >> (b)) | ((x) << (32 - (b))))
-/* 64-bit Rotate-right (used in SHA-384 and SHA-512): */
-#define S64(b,x) (((x) >> (b)) | ((x) << (64 - (b))))
-
-/* Two of six logical functions used in SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512: */
-#define Ch(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((~(x)) & (z)))
-#define Maj(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((x) & (z)) ^ ((y) & (z)))
-
-/* Four of six logical functions used in SHA-256: */
-#define Sigma0_256(x) (S32(2, (x)) ^ S32(13, (x)) ^ S32(22, (x)))
-#define Sigma1_256(x) (S32(6, (x)) ^ S32(11, (x)) ^ S32(25, (x)))
-#define sigma0_256(x) (S32(7, (x)) ^ S32(18, (x)) ^ R(3 , (x)))
-#define sigma1_256(x) (S32(17, (x)) ^ S32(19, (x)) ^ R(10, (x)))
-
-/* Four of six logical functions used in SHA-384 and SHA-512: */
-#define Sigma0_512(x) (S64(28, (x)) ^ S64(34, (x)) ^ S64(39, (x)))
-#define Sigma1_512(x) (S64(14, (x)) ^ S64(18, (x)) ^ S64(41, (x)))
-#define sigma0_512(x) (S64( 1, (x)) ^ S64( 8, (x)) ^ R( 7, (x)))
-#define sigma1_512(x) (S64(19, (x)) ^ S64(61, (x)) ^ R( 6, (x)))
-
-
-/*** SHA-XYZ INITIAL HASH VALUES AND CONSTANTS ************************/
-/* Hash constant words K for SHA-256: */
-const static u_int32_t K256[64] = {
- 0x428a2f98UL, 0x71374491UL, 0xb5c0fbcfUL, 0xe9b5dba5UL,
- 0x3956c25bUL, 0x59f111f1UL, 0x923f82a4UL, 0xab1c5ed5UL,
- 0xd807aa98UL, 0x12835b01UL, 0x243185beUL, 0x550c7dc3UL,
- 0x72be5d74UL, 0x80deb1feUL, 0x9bdc06a7UL, 0xc19bf174UL,
- 0xe49b69c1UL, 0xefbe4786UL, 0x0fc19dc6UL, 0x240ca1ccUL,
- 0x2de92c6fUL, 0x4a7484aaUL, 0x5cb0a9dcUL, 0x76f988daUL,
- 0x983e5152UL, 0xa831c66dUL, 0xb00327c8UL, 0xbf597fc7UL,
- 0xc6e00bf3UL, 0xd5a79147UL, 0x06ca6351UL, 0x14292967UL,
- 0x27b70a85UL, 0x2e1b2138UL, 0x4d2c6dfcUL, 0x53380d13UL,
- 0x650a7354UL, 0x766a0abbUL, 0x81c2c92eUL, 0x92722c85UL,
- 0xa2bfe8a1UL, 0xa81a664bUL, 0xc24b8b70UL, 0xc76c51a3UL,
- 0xd192e819UL, 0xd6990624UL, 0xf40e3585UL, 0x106aa070UL,
- 0x19a4c116UL, 0x1e376c08UL, 0x2748774cUL, 0x34b0bcb5UL,
- 0x391c0cb3UL, 0x4ed8aa4aUL, 0x5b9cca4fUL, 0x682e6ff3UL,
- 0x748f82eeUL, 0x78a5636fUL, 0x84c87814UL, 0x8cc70208UL,
- 0x90befffaUL, 0xa4506cebUL, 0xbef9a3f7UL, 0xc67178f2UL
-};
-
-/* Initial hash value H for SHA-256: */
-const static u_int32_t sha256_initial_hash_value[8] = {
- 0x6a09e667UL,
- 0xbb67ae85UL,
- 0x3c6ef372UL,
- 0xa54ff53aUL,
- 0x510e527fUL,
- 0x9b05688cUL,
- 0x1f83d9abUL,
- 0x5be0cd19UL
-};
-
-/* Hash constant words K for SHA-384 and SHA-512: */
-const static u_int64_t K512[80] = {
- 0x428a2f98d728ae22ULL, 0x7137449123ef65cdULL,
- 0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2fULL, 0xe9b5dba58189dbbcULL,
- 0x3956c25bf348b538ULL, 0x59f111f1b605d019ULL,
- 0x923f82a4af194f9bULL, 0xab1c5ed5da6d8118ULL,
- 0xd807aa98a3030242ULL, 0x12835b0145706fbeULL,
- 0x243185be4ee4b28cULL, 0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2ULL,
- 0x72be5d74f27b896fULL, 0x80deb1fe3b1696b1ULL,
- 0x9bdc06a725c71235ULL, 0xc19bf174cf692694ULL,
- 0xe49b69c19ef14ad2ULL, 0xefbe4786384f25e3ULL,
- 0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5ULL, 0x240ca1cc77ac9c65ULL,
- 0x2de92c6f592b0275ULL, 0x4a7484aa6ea6e483ULL,
- 0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4ULL, 0x76f988da831153b5ULL,
- 0x983e5152ee66dfabULL, 0xa831c66d2db43210ULL,
- 0xb00327c898fb213fULL, 0xbf597fc7beef0ee4ULL,
- 0xc6e00bf33da88fc2ULL, 0xd5a79147930aa725ULL,
- 0x06ca6351e003826fULL, 0x142929670a0e6e70ULL,
- 0x27b70a8546d22ffcULL, 0x2e1b21385c26c926ULL,
- 0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aedULL, 0x53380d139d95b3dfULL,
- 0x650a73548baf63deULL, 0x766a0abb3c77b2a8ULL,
- 0x81c2c92e47edaee6ULL, 0x92722c851482353bULL,
- 0xa2bfe8a14cf10364ULL, 0xa81a664bbc423001ULL,
- 0xc24b8b70d0f89791ULL, 0xc76c51a30654be30ULL,
- 0xd192e819d6ef5218ULL, 0xd69906245565a910ULL,
- 0xf40e35855771202aULL, 0x106aa07032bbd1b8ULL,
- 0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8ULL, 0x1e376c085141ab53ULL,
- 0x2748774cdf8eeb99ULL, 0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8ULL,
- 0x391c0cb3c5c95a63ULL, 0x4ed8aa4ae3418acbULL,
- 0x5b9cca4f7763e373ULL, 0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3ULL,
- 0x748f82ee5defb2fcULL, 0x78a5636f43172f60ULL,
- 0x84c87814a1f0ab72ULL, 0x8cc702081a6439ecULL,
- 0x90befffa23631e28ULL, 0xa4506cebde82bde9ULL,
- 0xbef9a3f7b2c67915ULL, 0xc67178f2e372532bULL,
- 0xca273eceea26619cULL, 0xd186b8c721c0c207ULL,
- 0xeada7dd6cde0eb1eULL, 0xf57d4f7fee6ed178ULL,
- 0x06f067aa72176fbaULL, 0x0a637dc5a2c898a6ULL,
- 0x113f9804bef90daeULL, 0x1b710b35131c471bULL,
- 0x28db77f523047d84ULL, 0x32caab7b40c72493ULL,
- 0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebcULL, 0x431d67c49c100d4cULL,
- 0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6ULL, 0x597f299cfc657e2aULL,
- 0x5fcb6fab3ad6faecULL, 0x6c44198c4a475817ULL
-};
-
-/* Initial hash value H for SHA-384 */
-const static u_int64_t sha384_initial_hash_value[8] = {
- 0xcbbb9d5dc1059ed8ULL,
- 0x629a292a367cd507ULL,
- 0x9159015a3070dd17ULL,
- 0x152fecd8f70e5939ULL,
- 0x67332667ffc00b31ULL,
- 0x8eb44a8768581511ULL,
- 0xdb0c2e0d64f98fa7ULL,
- 0x47b5481dbefa4fa4ULL
-};
-
-/* Initial hash value H for SHA-512 */
-const static u_int64_t sha512_initial_hash_value[8] = {
- 0x6a09e667f3bcc908ULL,
- 0xbb67ae8584caa73bULL,
- 0x3c6ef372fe94f82bULL,
- 0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1ULL,
- 0x510e527fade682d1ULL,
- 0x9b05688c2b3e6c1fULL,
- 0x1f83d9abfb41bd6bULL,
- 0x5be0cd19137e2179ULL
-};
-
-
-/*** SHA-256: *********************************************************/
-void
-SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *context)
-{
- if (context == NULL)
- return;
- memcpy(context->state, sha256_initial_hash_value,
- sizeof(sha256_initial_hash_value));
- memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
- context->bitcount = 0;
-}
-
-#ifdef SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
-
-/* Unrolled SHA-256 round macros: */
-
-#define ROUND256_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \
- BE_8_TO_32(W256[j], data); \
- data += 4; \
- T1 = (h) + Sigma1_256((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K256[j] + W256[j]; \
- (d) += T1; \
- (h) = T1 + Sigma0_256((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \
- j++; \
-} while(0)
-
-#define ROUND256(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \
- s0 = W256[(j+1)&0x0f]; \
- s0 = sigma0_256(s0); \
- s1 = W256[(j+14)&0x0f]; \
- s1 = sigma1_256(s1); \
- T1 = (h) + Sigma1_256((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K256[j] + \
- (W256[j&0x0f] += s1 + W256[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0); \
- (d) += T1; \
- (h) = T1 + Sigma0_256((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \
- j++; \
-} while(0)
-
-void
-SHA256_Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH])
-{
- u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
- u_int32_t T1, W256[16];
- int j;
-
- /* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
- a = state[0];
- b = state[1];
- c = state[2];
- d = state[3];
- e = state[4];
- f = state[5];
- g = state[6];
- h = state[7];
-
- j = 0;
- do {
- /* Rounds 0 to 15 (unrolled): */
- ROUND256_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
- ROUND256_0_TO_15(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
- ROUND256_0_TO_15(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
- ROUND256_0_TO_15(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
- ROUND256_0_TO_15(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
- ROUND256_0_TO_15(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
- ROUND256_0_TO_15(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
- ROUND256_0_TO_15(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
- } while (j < 16);
-
- /* Now for the remaining rounds up to 63: */
- do {
- ROUND256(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
- ROUND256(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
- ROUND256(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
- ROUND256(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
- ROUND256(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
- ROUND256(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
- ROUND256(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
- ROUND256(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
- } while (j < 64);
-
- /* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
- state[0] += a;
- state[1] += b;
- state[2] += c;
- state[3] += d;
- state[4] += e;
- state[5] += f;
- state[6] += g;
- state[7] += h;
-
- /* Clean up */
- a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = 0;
-}
-
-#else /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
-
-void
-SHA256_Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH])
-{
- u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
- u_int32_t T1, T2, W256[16];
- int j;
-
- /* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
- a = state[0];
- b = state[1];
- c = state[2];
- d = state[3];
- e = state[4];
- f = state[5];
- g = state[6];
- h = state[7];
-
- j = 0;
- do {
- BE_8_TO_32(W256[j], data);
- data += 4;
- /* Apply the SHA-256 compression function to update a..h */
- T1 = h + Sigma1_256(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[j] + W256[j];
- T2 = Sigma0_256(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
- h = g;
- g = f;
- f = e;
- e = d + T1;
- d = c;
- c = b;
- b = a;
- a = T1 + T2;
-
- j++;
- } while (j < 16);
-
- do {
- /* Part of the message block expansion: */
- s0 = W256[(j+1)&0x0f];
- s0 = sigma0_256(s0);
- s1 = W256[(j+14)&0x0f];
- s1 = sigma1_256(s1);
-
- /* Apply the SHA-256 compression function to update a..h */
- T1 = h + Sigma1_256(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[j] +
- (W256[j&0x0f] += s1 + W256[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);
- T2 = Sigma0_256(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
- h = g;
- g = f;
- f = e;
- e = d + T1;
- d = c;
- c = b;
- b = a;
- a = T1 + T2;
-
- j++;
- } while (j < 64);
-
- /* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
- state[0] += a;
- state[1] += b;
- state[2] += c;
- state[3] += d;
- state[4] += e;
- state[5] += f;
- state[6] += g;
- state[7] += h;
-
- /* Clean up */
- a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = T2 = 0;
-}
-
-#endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
-
-void
-SHA256_Update(SHA256_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
-{
- size_t freespace, usedspace;
-
- /* Calling with no data is valid (we do nothing) */
- if (len == 0)
- return;
-
- usedspace = (context->bitcount >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
- if (usedspace > 0) {
- /* Calculate how much free space is available in the buffer */
- freespace = SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace;
-
- if (len >= freespace) {
- /* Fill the buffer completely and process it */
- memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, freespace);
- context->bitcount += freespace << 3;
- len -= freespace;
- data += freespace;
- SHA256_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
- } else {
- /* The buffer is not yet full */
- memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, len);
- context->bitcount += len << 3;
- /* Clean up: */
- usedspace = freespace = 0;
- return;
- }
- }
- while (len >= SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
- /* Process as many complete blocks as we can */
- SHA256_Transform(context->state, data);
- context->bitcount += SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH << 3;
- len -= SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
- data += SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
- }
- if (len > 0) {
- /* There's left-overs, so save 'em */
- memcpy(context->buffer, data, len);
- context->bitcount += len << 3;
- }
- /* Clean up: */
- usedspace = freespace = 0;
-}
-
-void
-SHA256_Pad(SHA256_CTX *context)
-{
- unsigned int usedspace;
-
- usedspace = (context->bitcount >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
- if (usedspace > 0) {
- /* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
- context->buffer[usedspace++] = 0x80;
-
- if (usedspace <= SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
- /* Set-up for the last transform: */
- memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0,
- SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
- } else {
- if (usedspace < SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
- memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0,
- SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
- }
- /* Do second-to-last transform: */
- SHA256_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
-
- /* Prepare for last transform: */
- memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
- }
- } else {
- /* Set-up for the last transform: */
- memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
-
- /* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
- *context->buffer = 0x80;
- }
- /* Store the length of input data (in bits) in big endian format: */
- BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH],
- context->bitcount);
-
- /* Final transform: */
- SHA256_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
-
- /* Clean up: */
- usedspace = 0;
-}
-
-void
-SHA256_Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA256_CTX *context)
-{
- SHA256_Pad(context);
-
- /* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
- if (digest != NULL) {
-#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
- int i;
-
- /* Convert TO host byte order */
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
- BE_32_TO_8(digest + i * 4, context->state[i]);
-#else
- memcpy(digest, context->state, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-#endif
- memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
- }
-}
-
-
-/*** SHA-512: *********************************************************/
-void
-SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *context)
-{
- if (context == NULL)
- return;
- memcpy(context->state, sha512_initial_hash_value,
- sizeof(sha512_initial_hash_value));
- memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
- context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] = 0;
-}
-
-#ifdef SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
-
-/* Unrolled SHA-512 round macros: */
-
-#define ROUND512_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \
- BE_8_TO_64(W512[j], data); \
- data += 8; \
- T1 = (h) + Sigma1_512((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K512[j] + W512[j]; \
- (d) += T1; \
- (h) = T1 + Sigma0_512((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \
- j++; \
-} while(0)
-
-
-#define ROUND512(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \
- s0 = W512[(j+1)&0x0f]; \
- s0 = sigma0_512(s0); \
- s1 = W512[(j+14)&0x0f]; \
- s1 = sigma1_512(s1); \
- T1 = (h) + Sigma1_512((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K512[j] + \
- (W512[j&0x0f] += s1 + W512[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0); \
- (d) += T1; \
- (h) = T1 + Sigma0_512((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \
- j++; \
-} while(0)
-
-void
-SHA512_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
-{
- u_int64_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
- u_int64_t T1, W512[16];
- int j;
-
- /* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
- a = state[0];
- b = state[1];
- c = state[2];
- d = state[3];
- e = state[4];
- f = state[5];
- g = state[6];
- h = state[7];
-
- j = 0;
- do {
- /* Rounds 0 to 15 (unrolled): */
- ROUND512_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
- ROUND512_0_TO_15(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
- ROUND512_0_TO_15(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
- ROUND512_0_TO_15(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
- ROUND512_0_TO_15(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
- ROUND512_0_TO_15(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
- ROUND512_0_TO_15(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
- ROUND512_0_TO_15(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
- } while (j < 16);
-
- /* Now for the remaining rounds up to 79: */
- do {
- ROUND512(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
- ROUND512(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
- ROUND512(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
- ROUND512(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
- ROUND512(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
- ROUND512(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
- ROUND512(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
- ROUND512(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
- } while (j < 80);
-
- /* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
- state[0] += a;
- state[1] += b;
- state[2] += c;
- state[3] += d;
- state[4] += e;
- state[5] += f;
- state[6] += g;
- state[7] += h;
-
- /* Clean up */
- a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = 0;
-}
-
-#else /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
-
-void
-SHA512_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
-{
- u_int64_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
- u_int64_t T1, T2, W512[16];
- int j;
-
- /* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
- a = state[0];
- b = state[1];
- c = state[2];
- d = state[3];
- e = state[4];
- f = state[5];
- g = state[6];
- h = state[7];
-
- j = 0;
- do {
- BE_8_TO_64(W512[j], data);
- data += 8;
- /* Apply the SHA-512 compression function to update a..h */
- T1 = h + Sigma1_512(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[j] + W512[j];
- T2 = Sigma0_512(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
- h = g;
- g = f;
- f = e;
- e = d + T1;
- d = c;
- c = b;
- b = a;
- a = T1 + T2;
-
- j++;
- } while (j < 16);
-
- do {
- /* Part of the message block expansion: */
- s0 = W512[(j+1)&0x0f];
- s0 = sigma0_512(s0);
- s1 = W512[(j+14)&0x0f];
- s1 = sigma1_512(s1);
-
- /* Apply the SHA-512 compression function to update a..h */
- T1 = h + Sigma1_512(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[j] +
- (W512[j&0x0f] += s1 + W512[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);
- T2 = Sigma0_512(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
- h = g;
- g = f;
- f = e;
- e = d + T1;
- d = c;
- c = b;
- b = a;
- a = T1 + T2;
-
- j++;
- } while (j < 80);
-
- /* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
- state[0] += a;
- state[1] += b;
- state[2] += c;
- state[3] += d;
- state[4] += e;
- state[5] += f;
- state[6] += g;
- state[7] += h;
-
- /* Clean up */
- a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = T2 = 0;
-}
-
-#endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
-
-void
-SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
-{
- size_t freespace, usedspace;
-
- /* Calling with no data is valid (we do nothing) */
- if (len == 0)
- return;
-
- usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
- if (usedspace > 0) {
- /* Calculate how much free space is available in the buffer */
- freespace = SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace;
-
- if (len >= freespace) {
- /* Fill the buffer completely and process it */
- memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, freespace);
- ADDINC128(context->bitcount, freespace << 3);
- len -= freespace;
- data += freespace;
- SHA512_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
- } else {
- /* The buffer is not yet full */
- memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, len);
- ADDINC128(context->bitcount, len << 3);
- /* Clean up: */
- usedspace = freespace = 0;
- return;
- }
- }
- while (len >= SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
- /* Process as many complete blocks as we can */
- SHA512_Transform(context->state, data);
- ADDINC128(context->bitcount, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH << 3);
- len -= SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
- data += SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
- }
- if (len > 0) {
- /* There's left-overs, so save 'em */
- memcpy(context->buffer, data, len);
- ADDINC128(context->bitcount, len << 3);
- }
- /* Clean up: */
- usedspace = freespace = 0;
-}
-
-void
-SHA512_Pad(SHA512_CTX *context)
-{
- unsigned int usedspace;
-
- usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
- if (usedspace > 0) {
- /* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
- context->buffer[usedspace++] = 0x80;
-
- if (usedspace <= SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
- /* Set-up for the last transform: */
- memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
- } else {
- if (usedspace < SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
- memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
- }
- /* Do second-to-last transform: */
- SHA512_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
-
- /* And set-up for the last transform: */
- memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - 2);
- }
- } else {
- /* Prepare for final transform: */
- memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
-
- /* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
- *context->buffer = 0x80;
- }
- /* Store the length of input data (in bits) in big endian format: */
- BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH],
- context->bitcount[1]);
- BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH + 8],
- context->bitcount[0]);
-
- /* Final transform: */
- SHA512_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
-
- /* Clean up: */
- usedspace = 0;
-}
-
-void
-SHA512_Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA512_CTX *context)
-{
- SHA512_Pad(context);
-
- /* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
- if (digest != NULL) {
-#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
- int i;
-
- /* Convert TO host byte order */
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
- BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state[i]);
-#else
- memcpy(digest, context->state, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-#endif
- memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
- }
-}
-
-
-#if 0
-/*** SHA-384: *********************************************************/
-void
-SHA384_Init(SHA384_CTX *context)
-{
- if (context == NULL)
- return;
- memcpy(context->state, sha384_initial_hash_value,
- sizeof(sha384_initial_hash_value));
- memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
- context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] = 0;
-}
-
-__weak_alias(SHA384_Transform, SHA512_Transform);
-__weak_alias(SHA384_Update, SHA512_Update);
-__weak_alias(SHA384_Pad, SHA512_Pad);
-
-void
-SHA384_Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA384_CTX *context)
-{
- SHA384_Pad(context);
-
- /* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
- if (digest != NULL) {
-#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
- int i;
-
- /* Convert TO host byte order */
- for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
- BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state[i]);
-#else
- memcpy(digest, context->state, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-#endif
- }
-
- /* Zero out state data */
- memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) && \
- (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L) */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha2.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sha2.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha2.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha2.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,904 @@
+/* from OpenBSD: sha2.c,v 1.11 2005/08/08 08:05:35 espie Exp */
+
+/*
+ * FILE: sha2.c
+ * AUTHOR: Aaron D. Gifford <me at aarongifford.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Aaron D. Gifford
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTOR(S) BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $From: sha2.c,v 1.1 2001/11/08 00:01:51 adg Exp adg $
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/hash/sha2.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+# if !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+# define _NEED_SHA2 1
+# endif
+#else
+# define _NEED_SHA2 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(_NEED_SHA2) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE)
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+/*
+ * UNROLLED TRANSFORM LOOP NOTE:
+ * You can define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM to use the unrolled transform
+ * loop version for the hash transform rounds (defined using macros
+ * later in this file). Either define on the command line, for example:
+ *
+ * cc -DSHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM -o sha2 sha2.c sha2prog.c
+ *
+ * or define below:
+ *
+ * #define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
+ *
+ */
+
+/*** SHA-256/384/512 Machine Architecture Definitions *****************/
+/*
+ * BYTE_ORDER NOTE:
+ *
+ * Please make sure that your system defines BYTE_ORDER. If your
+ * architecture is little-endian, make sure it also defines
+ * LITTLE_ENDIAN and that the two (BYTE_ORDER and LITTLE_ENDIAN) are
+ * equivilent.
+ *
+ * If your system does not define the above, then you can do so by
+ * hand like this:
+ *
+ * #define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234
+ * #define BIG_ENDIAN 4321
+ *
+ * And for little-endian machines, add:
+ *
+ * #define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ *
+ * Or for big-endian machines:
+ *
+ * #define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN
+ *
+ * The FreeBSD machine this was written on defines BYTE_ORDER
+ * appropriately by including <sys/types.h> (which in turn includes
+ * <machine/endian.h> where the appropriate definitions are actually
+ * made).
+ */
+#if !defined(BYTE_ORDER) || (BYTE_ORDER != LITTLE_ENDIAN && BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN)
+#error Define BYTE_ORDER to be equal to either LITTLE_ENDIAN or BIG_ENDIAN
+#endif
+
+
+/*** SHA-256/384/512 Various Length Definitions ***********************/
+/* NOTE: Most of these are in sha2.h */
+#define SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH (SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - 8)
+#define SHA384_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH (SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH - 16)
+#define SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH (SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - 16)
+
+/*** ENDIAN SPECIFIC COPY MACROS **************************************/
+#define BE_8_TO_32(dst, cp) do { \
+ (dst) = (u_int32_t)(cp)[3] | ((u_int32_t)(cp)[2] << 8) | \
+ ((u_int32_t)(cp)[1] << 16) | ((u_int32_t)(cp)[0] << 24); \
+} while(0)
+
+#define BE_8_TO_64(dst, cp) do { \
+ (dst) = (u_int64_t)(cp)[7] | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[6] << 8) | \
+ ((u_int64_t)(cp)[5] << 16) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[4] << 24) | \
+ ((u_int64_t)(cp)[3] << 32) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[2] << 40) | \
+ ((u_int64_t)(cp)[1] << 48) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[0] << 56); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define BE_64_TO_8(cp, src) do { \
+ (cp)[0] = (src) >> 56; \
+ (cp)[1] = (src) >> 48; \
+ (cp)[2] = (src) >> 40; \
+ (cp)[3] = (src) >> 32; \
+ (cp)[4] = (src) >> 24; \
+ (cp)[5] = (src) >> 16; \
+ (cp)[6] = (src) >> 8; \
+ (cp)[7] = (src); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define BE_32_TO_8(cp, src) do { \
+ (cp)[0] = (src) >> 24; \
+ (cp)[1] = (src) >> 16; \
+ (cp)[2] = (src) >> 8; \
+ (cp)[3] = (src); \
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Macro for incrementally adding the unsigned 64-bit integer n to the
+ * unsigned 128-bit integer (represented using a two-element array of
+ * 64-bit words):
+ */
+#define ADDINC128(w,n) do { \
+ (w)[0] += (u_int64_t)(n); \
+ if ((w)[0] < (n)) { \
+ (w)[1]++; \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
+/*** THE SIX LOGICAL FUNCTIONS ****************************************/
+/*
+ * Bit shifting and rotation (used by the six SHA-XYZ logical functions:
+ *
+ * NOTE: The naming of R and S appears backwards here (R is a SHIFT and
+ * S is a ROTATION) because the SHA-256/384/512 description document
+ * (see http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/shs/sha256-384-512.pdf) uses this
+ * same "backwards" definition.
+ */
+/* Shift-right (used in SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512): */
+#define R(b,x) ((x) >> (b))
+/* 32-bit Rotate-right (used in SHA-256): */
+#define S32(b,x) (((x) >> (b)) | ((x) << (32 - (b))))
+/* 64-bit Rotate-right (used in SHA-384 and SHA-512): */
+#define S64(b,x) (((x) >> (b)) | ((x) << (64 - (b))))
+
+/* Two of six logical functions used in SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512: */
+#define Ch(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((~(x)) & (z)))
+#define Maj(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((x) & (z)) ^ ((y) & (z)))
+
+/* Four of six logical functions used in SHA-256: */
+#define Sigma0_256(x) (S32(2, (x)) ^ S32(13, (x)) ^ S32(22, (x)))
+#define Sigma1_256(x) (S32(6, (x)) ^ S32(11, (x)) ^ S32(25, (x)))
+#define sigma0_256(x) (S32(7, (x)) ^ S32(18, (x)) ^ R(3 , (x)))
+#define sigma1_256(x) (S32(17, (x)) ^ S32(19, (x)) ^ R(10, (x)))
+
+/* Four of six logical functions used in SHA-384 and SHA-512: */
+#define Sigma0_512(x) (S64(28, (x)) ^ S64(34, (x)) ^ S64(39, (x)))
+#define Sigma1_512(x) (S64(14, (x)) ^ S64(18, (x)) ^ S64(41, (x)))
+#define sigma0_512(x) (S64( 1, (x)) ^ S64( 8, (x)) ^ R( 7, (x)))
+#define sigma1_512(x) (S64(19, (x)) ^ S64(61, (x)) ^ R( 6, (x)))
+
+
+/*** SHA-XYZ INITIAL HASH VALUES AND CONSTANTS ************************/
+/* Hash constant words K for SHA-256: */
+const static u_int32_t K256[64] = {
+ 0x428a2f98UL, 0x71374491UL, 0xb5c0fbcfUL, 0xe9b5dba5UL,
+ 0x3956c25bUL, 0x59f111f1UL, 0x923f82a4UL, 0xab1c5ed5UL,
+ 0xd807aa98UL, 0x12835b01UL, 0x243185beUL, 0x550c7dc3UL,
+ 0x72be5d74UL, 0x80deb1feUL, 0x9bdc06a7UL, 0xc19bf174UL,
+ 0xe49b69c1UL, 0xefbe4786UL, 0x0fc19dc6UL, 0x240ca1ccUL,
+ 0x2de92c6fUL, 0x4a7484aaUL, 0x5cb0a9dcUL, 0x76f988daUL,
+ 0x983e5152UL, 0xa831c66dUL, 0xb00327c8UL, 0xbf597fc7UL,
+ 0xc6e00bf3UL, 0xd5a79147UL, 0x06ca6351UL, 0x14292967UL,
+ 0x27b70a85UL, 0x2e1b2138UL, 0x4d2c6dfcUL, 0x53380d13UL,
+ 0x650a7354UL, 0x766a0abbUL, 0x81c2c92eUL, 0x92722c85UL,
+ 0xa2bfe8a1UL, 0xa81a664bUL, 0xc24b8b70UL, 0xc76c51a3UL,
+ 0xd192e819UL, 0xd6990624UL, 0xf40e3585UL, 0x106aa070UL,
+ 0x19a4c116UL, 0x1e376c08UL, 0x2748774cUL, 0x34b0bcb5UL,
+ 0x391c0cb3UL, 0x4ed8aa4aUL, 0x5b9cca4fUL, 0x682e6ff3UL,
+ 0x748f82eeUL, 0x78a5636fUL, 0x84c87814UL, 0x8cc70208UL,
+ 0x90befffaUL, 0xa4506cebUL, 0xbef9a3f7UL, 0xc67178f2UL
+};
+
+/* Initial hash value H for SHA-256: */
+const static u_int32_t sha256_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+ 0x6a09e667UL,
+ 0xbb67ae85UL,
+ 0x3c6ef372UL,
+ 0xa54ff53aUL,
+ 0x510e527fUL,
+ 0x9b05688cUL,
+ 0x1f83d9abUL,
+ 0x5be0cd19UL
+};
+
+/* Hash constant words K for SHA-384 and SHA-512: */
+const static u_int64_t K512[80] = {
+ 0x428a2f98d728ae22ULL, 0x7137449123ef65cdULL,
+ 0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2fULL, 0xe9b5dba58189dbbcULL,
+ 0x3956c25bf348b538ULL, 0x59f111f1b605d019ULL,
+ 0x923f82a4af194f9bULL, 0xab1c5ed5da6d8118ULL,
+ 0xd807aa98a3030242ULL, 0x12835b0145706fbeULL,
+ 0x243185be4ee4b28cULL, 0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2ULL,
+ 0x72be5d74f27b896fULL, 0x80deb1fe3b1696b1ULL,
+ 0x9bdc06a725c71235ULL, 0xc19bf174cf692694ULL,
+ 0xe49b69c19ef14ad2ULL, 0xefbe4786384f25e3ULL,
+ 0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5ULL, 0x240ca1cc77ac9c65ULL,
+ 0x2de92c6f592b0275ULL, 0x4a7484aa6ea6e483ULL,
+ 0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4ULL, 0x76f988da831153b5ULL,
+ 0x983e5152ee66dfabULL, 0xa831c66d2db43210ULL,
+ 0xb00327c898fb213fULL, 0xbf597fc7beef0ee4ULL,
+ 0xc6e00bf33da88fc2ULL, 0xd5a79147930aa725ULL,
+ 0x06ca6351e003826fULL, 0x142929670a0e6e70ULL,
+ 0x27b70a8546d22ffcULL, 0x2e1b21385c26c926ULL,
+ 0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aedULL, 0x53380d139d95b3dfULL,
+ 0x650a73548baf63deULL, 0x766a0abb3c77b2a8ULL,
+ 0x81c2c92e47edaee6ULL, 0x92722c851482353bULL,
+ 0xa2bfe8a14cf10364ULL, 0xa81a664bbc423001ULL,
+ 0xc24b8b70d0f89791ULL, 0xc76c51a30654be30ULL,
+ 0xd192e819d6ef5218ULL, 0xd69906245565a910ULL,
+ 0xf40e35855771202aULL, 0x106aa07032bbd1b8ULL,
+ 0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8ULL, 0x1e376c085141ab53ULL,
+ 0x2748774cdf8eeb99ULL, 0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8ULL,
+ 0x391c0cb3c5c95a63ULL, 0x4ed8aa4ae3418acbULL,
+ 0x5b9cca4f7763e373ULL, 0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3ULL,
+ 0x748f82ee5defb2fcULL, 0x78a5636f43172f60ULL,
+ 0x84c87814a1f0ab72ULL, 0x8cc702081a6439ecULL,
+ 0x90befffa23631e28ULL, 0xa4506cebde82bde9ULL,
+ 0xbef9a3f7b2c67915ULL, 0xc67178f2e372532bULL,
+ 0xca273eceea26619cULL, 0xd186b8c721c0c207ULL,
+ 0xeada7dd6cde0eb1eULL, 0xf57d4f7fee6ed178ULL,
+ 0x06f067aa72176fbaULL, 0x0a637dc5a2c898a6ULL,
+ 0x113f9804bef90daeULL, 0x1b710b35131c471bULL,
+ 0x28db77f523047d84ULL, 0x32caab7b40c72493ULL,
+ 0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebcULL, 0x431d67c49c100d4cULL,
+ 0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6ULL, 0x597f299cfc657e2aULL,
+ 0x5fcb6fab3ad6faecULL, 0x6c44198c4a475817ULL
+};
+
+/* Initial hash value H for SHA-384 */
+const static u_int64_t sha384_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+ 0xcbbb9d5dc1059ed8ULL,
+ 0x629a292a367cd507ULL,
+ 0x9159015a3070dd17ULL,
+ 0x152fecd8f70e5939ULL,
+ 0x67332667ffc00b31ULL,
+ 0x8eb44a8768581511ULL,
+ 0xdb0c2e0d64f98fa7ULL,
+ 0x47b5481dbefa4fa4ULL
+};
+
+/* Initial hash value H for SHA-512 */
+const static u_int64_t sha512_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+ 0x6a09e667f3bcc908ULL,
+ 0xbb67ae8584caa73bULL,
+ 0x3c6ef372fe94f82bULL,
+ 0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1ULL,
+ 0x510e527fade682d1ULL,
+ 0x9b05688c2b3e6c1fULL,
+ 0x1f83d9abfb41bd6bULL,
+ 0x5be0cd19137e2179ULL
+};
+
+
+/*** SHA-256: *********************************************************/
+void
+SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *context)
+{
+ if (context == NULL)
+ return;
+ memcpy(context->state, sha256_initial_hash_value,
+ sizeof(sha256_initial_hash_value));
+ memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
+ context->bitcount = 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
+
+/* Unrolled SHA-256 round macros: */
+
+#define ROUND256_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \
+ BE_8_TO_32(W256[j], data); \
+ data += 4; \
+ T1 = (h) + Sigma1_256((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K256[j] + W256[j]; \
+ (d) += T1; \
+ (h) = T1 + Sigma0_256((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \
+ j++; \
+} while(0)
+
+#define ROUND256(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \
+ s0 = W256[(j+1)&0x0f]; \
+ s0 = sigma0_256(s0); \
+ s1 = W256[(j+14)&0x0f]; \
+ s1 = sigma1_256(s1); \
+ T1 = (h) + Sigma1_256((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K256[j] + \
+ (W256[j&0x0f] += s1 + W256[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0); \
+ (d) += T1; \
+ (h) = T1 + Sigma0_256((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \
+ j++; \
+} while(0)
+
+void
+SHA256_Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+ u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
+ u_int32_t T1, W256[16];
+ int j;
+
+ /* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
+ a = state[0];
+ b = state[1];
+ c = state[2];
+ d = state[3];
+ e = state[4];
+ f = state[5];
+ g = state[6];
+ h = state[7];
+
+ j = 0;
+ do {
+ /* Rounds 0 to 15 (unrolled): */
+ ROUND256_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+ ROUND256_0_TO_15(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+ ROUND256_0_TO_15(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+ ROUND256_0_TO_15(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+ ROUND256_0_TO_15(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+ ROUND256_0_TO_15(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+ ROUND256_0_TO_15(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+ ROUND256_0_TO_15(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+ } while (j < 16);
+
+ /* Now for the remaining rounds up to 63: */
+ do {
+ ROUND256(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+ ROUND256(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+ ROUND256(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+ ROUND256(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+ ROUND256(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+ ROUND256(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+ ROUND256(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+ ROUND256(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+ } while (j < 64);
+
+ /* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
+ state[0] += a;
+ state[1] += b;
+ state[2] += c;
+ state[3] += d;
+ state[4] += e;
+ state[5] += f;
+ state[6] += g;
+ state[7] += h;
+
+ /* Clean up */
+ a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = 0;
+}
+
+#else /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+
+void
+SHA256_Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+ u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
+ u_int32_t T1, T2, W256[16];
+ int j;
+
+ /* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
+ a = state[0];
+ b = state[1];
+ c = state[2];
+ d = state[3];
+ e = state[4];
+ f = state[5];
+ g = state[6];
+ h = state[7];
+
+ j = 0;
+ do {
+ BE_8_TO_32(W256[j], data);
+ data += 4;
+ /* Apply the SHA-256 compression function to update a..h */
+ T1 = h + Sigma1_256(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[j] + W256[j];
+ T2 = Sigma0_256(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+ h = g;
+ g = f;
+ f = e;
+ e = d + T1;
+ d = c;
+ c = b;
+ b = a;
+ a = T1 + T2;
+
+ j++;
+ } while (j < 16);
+
+ do {
+ /* Part of the message block expansion: */
+ s0 = W256[(j+1)&0x0f];
+ s0 = sigma0_256(s0);
+ s1 = W256[(j+14)&0x0f];
+ s1 = sigma1_256(s1);
+
+ /* Apply the SHA-256 compression function to update a..h */
+ T1 = h + Sigma1_256(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[j] +
+ (W256[j&0x0f] += s1 + W256[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);
+ T2 = Sigma0_256(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+ h = g;
+ g = f;
+ f = e;
+ e = d + T1;
+ d = c;
+ c = b;
+ b = a;
+ a = T1 + T2;
+
+ j++;
+ } while (j < 64);
+
+ /* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
+ state[0] += a;
+ state[1] += b;
+ state[2] += c;
+ state[3] += d;
+ state[4] += e;
+ state[5] += f;
+ state[6] += g;
+ state[7] += h;
+
+ /* Clean up */
+ a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = T2 = 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+
+void
+SHA256_Update(SHA256_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t freespace, usedspace;
+
+ /* Calling with no data is valid (we do nothing) */
+ if (len == 0)
+ return;
+
+ usedspace = (context->bitcount >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+ if (usedspace > 0) {
+ /* Calculate how much free space is available in the buffer */
+ freespace = SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace;
+
+ if (len >= freespace) {
+ /* Fill the buffer completely and process it */
+ memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, freespace);
+ context->bitcount += freespace << 3;
+ len -= freespace;
+ data += freespace;
+ SHA256_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+ } else {
+ /* The buffer is not yet full */
+ memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, len);
+ context->bitcount += len << 3;
+ /* Clean up: */
+ usedspace = freespace = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ while (len >= SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+ /* Process as many complete blocks as we can */
+ SHA256_Transform(context->state, data);
+ context->bitcount += SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH << 3;
+ len -= SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+ data += SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+ }
+ if (len > 0) {
+ /* There's left-overs, so save 'em */
+ memcpy(context->buffer, data, len);
+ context->bitcount += len << 3;
+ }
+ /* Clean up: */
+ usedspace = freespace = 0;
+}
+
+void
+SHA256_Pad(SHA256_CTX *context)
+{
+ unsigned int usedspace;
+
+ usedspace = (context->bitcount >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+ if (usedspace > 0) {
+ /* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
+ context->buffer[usedspace++] = 0x80;
+
+ if (usedspace <= SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+ /* Set-up for the last transform: */
+ memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0,
+ SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
+ } else {
+ if (usedspace < SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+ memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0,
+ SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
+ }
+ /* Do second-to-last transform: */
+ SHA256_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+
+ /* Prepare for last transform: */
+ memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Set-up for the last transform: */
+ memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+
+ /* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
+ *context->buffer = 0x80;
+ }
+ /* Store the length of input data (in bits) in big endian format: */
+ BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH],
+ context->bitcount);
+
+ /* Final transform: */
+ SHA256_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+
+ /* Clean up: */
+ usedspace = 0;
+}
+
+void
+SHA256_Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA256_CTX *context)
+{
+ SHA256_Pad(context);
+
+ /* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
+ if (digest != NULL) {
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ int i;
+
+ /* Convert TO host byte order */
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ BE_32_TO_8(digest + i * 4, context->state[i]);
+#else
+ memcpy(digest, context->state, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+#endif
+ memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
+ }
+}
+
+
+/*** SHA-512: *********************************************************/
+void
+SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *context)
+{
+ if (context == NULL)
+ return;
+ memcpy(context->state, sha512_initial_hash_value,
+ sizeof(sha512_initial_hash_value));
+ memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
+ context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] = 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
+
+/* Unrolled SHA-512 round macros: */
+
+#define ROUND512_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \
+ BE_8_TO_64(W512[j], data); \
+ data += 8; \
+ T1 = (h) + Sigma1_512((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K512[j] + W512[j]; \
+ (d) += T1; \
+ (h) = T1 + Sigma0_512((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \
+ j++; \
+} while(0)
+
+
+#define ROUND512(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \
+ s0 = W512[(j+1)&0x0f]; \
+ s0 = sigma0_512(s0); \
+ s1 = W512[(j+14)&0x0f]; \
+ s1 = sigma1_512(s1); \
+ T1 = (h) + Sigma1_512((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K512[j] + \
+ (W512[j&0x0f] += s1 + W512[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0); \
+ (d) += T1; \
+ (h) = T1 + Sigma0_512((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \
+ j++; \
+} while(0)
+
+void
+SHA512_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+ u_int64_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
+ u_int64_t T1, W512[16];
+ int j;
+
+ /* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
+ a = state[0];
+ b = state[1];
+ c = state[2];
+ d = state[3];
+ e = state[4];
+ f = state[5];
+ g = state[6];
+ h = state[7];
+
+ j = 0;
+ do {
+ /* Rounds 0 to 15 (unrolled): */
+ ROUND512_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+ ROUND512_0_TO_15(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+ ROUND512_0_TO_15(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+ ROUND512_0_TO_15(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+ ROUND512_0_TO_15(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+ ROUND512_0_TO_15(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+ ROUND512_0_TO_15(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+ ROUND512_0_TO_15(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+ } while (j < 16);
+
+ /* Now for the remaining rounds up to 79: */
+ do {
+ ROUND512(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+ ROUND512(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+ ROUND512(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+ ROUND512(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+ ROUND512(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+ ROUND512(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+ ROUND512(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+ ROUND512(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+ } while (j < 80);
+
+ /* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
+ state[0] += a;
+ state[1] += b;
+ state[2] += c;
+ state[3] += d;
+ state[4] += e;
+ state[5] += f;
+ state[6] += g;
+ state[7] += h;
+
+ /* Clean up */
+ a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = 0;
+}
+
+#else /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+
+void
+SHA512_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+ u_int64_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
+ u_int64_t T1, T2, W512[16];
+ int j;
+
+ /* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
+ a = state[0];
+ b = state[1];
+ c = state[2];
+ d = state[3];
+ e = state[4];
+ f = state[5];
+ g = state[6];
+ h = state[7];
+
+ j = 0;
+ do {
+ BE_8_TO_64(W512[j], data);
+ data += 8;
+ /* Apply the SHA-512 compression function to update a..h */
+ T1 = h + Sigma1_512(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[j] + W512[j];
+ T2 = Sigma0_512(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+ h = g;
+ g = f;
+ f = e;
+ e = d + T1;
+ d = c;
+ c = b;
+ b = a;
+ a = T1 + T2;
+
+ j++;
+ } while (j < 16);
+
+ do {
+ /* Part of the message block expansion: */
+ s0 = W512[(j+1)&0x0f];
+ s0 = sigma0_512(s0);
+ s1 = W512[(j+14)&0x0f];
+ s1 = sigma1_512(s1);
+
+ /* Apply the SHA-512 compression function to update a..h */
+ T1 = h + Sigma1_512(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[j] +
+ (W512[j&0x0f] += s1 + W512[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);
+ T2 = Sigma0_512(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+ h = g;
+ g = f;
+ f = e;
+ e = d + T1;
+ d = c;
+ c = b;
+ b = a;
+ a = T1 + T2;
+
+ j++;
+ } while (j < 80);
+
+ /* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
+ state[0] += a;
+ state[1] += b;
+ state[2] += c;
+ state[3] += d;
+ state[4] += e;
+ state[5] += f;
+ state[6] += g;
+ state[7] += h;
+
+ /* Clean up */
+ a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = T2 = 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+
+void
+SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t freespace, usedspace;
+
+ /* Calling with no data is valid (we do nothing) */
+ if (len == 0)
+ return;
+
+ usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+ if (usedspace > 0) {
+ /* Calculate how much free space is available in the buffer */
+ freespace = SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace;
+
+ if (len >= freespace) {
+ /* Fill the buffer completely and process it */
+ memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, freespace);
+ ADDINC128(context->bitcount, freespace << 3);
+ len -= freespace;
+ data += freespace;
+ SHA512_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+ } else {
+ /* The buffer is not yet full */
+ memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, len);
+ ADDINC128(context->bitcount, len << 3);
+ /* Clean up: */
+ usedspace = freespace = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ while (len >= SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+ /* Process as many complete blocks as we can */
+ SHA512_Transform(context->state, data);
+ ADDINC128(context->bitcount, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH << 3);
+ len -= SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+ data += SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+ }
+ if (len > 0) {
+ /* There's left-overs, so save 'em */
+ memcpy(context->buffer, data, len);
+ ADDINC128(context->bitcount, len << 3);
+ }
+ /* Clean up: */
+ usedspace = freespace = 0;
+}
+
+void
+SHA512_Pad(SHA512_CTX *context)
+{
+ unsigned int usedspace;
+
+ usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+ if (usedspace > 0) {
+ /* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
+ context->buffer[usedspace++] = 0x80;
+
+ if (usedspace <= SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+ /* Set-up for the last transform: */
+ memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
+ } else {
+ if (usedspace < SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+ memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
+ }
+ /* Do second-to-last transform: */
+ SHA512_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+
+ /* And set-up for the last transform: */
+ memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - 2);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Prepare for final transform: */
+ memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+
+ /* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
+ *context->buffer = 0x80;
+ }
+ /* Store the length of input data (in bits) in big endian format: */
+ BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH],
+ context->bitcount[1]);
+ BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH + 8],
+ context->bitcount[0]);
+
+ /* Final transform: */
+ SHA512_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+
+ /* Clean up: */
+ usedspace = 0;
+}
+
+void
+SHA512_Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA512_CTX *context)
+{
+ SHA512_Pad(context);
+
+ /* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
+ if (digest != NULL) {
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ int i;
+
+ /* Convert TO host byte order */
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state[i]);
+#else
+ memcpy(digest, context->state, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+#endif
+ memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
+ }
+}
+
+
+/*** SHA-384: *********************************************************/
+void
+SHA384_Init(SHA384_CTX *context)
+{
+ if (context == NULL)
+ return;
+ memcpy(context->state, sha384_initial_hash_value,
+ sizeof(sha384_initial_hash_value));
+ memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
+ context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] = 0;
+}
+
+#if 0
+__weak_alias(SHA384_Transform, SHA512_Transform);
+__weak_alias(SHA384_Update, SHA512_Update);
+__weak_alias(SHA384_Pad, SHA512_Pad);
+#endif
+
+void
+SHA384_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+ return SHA512_Transform(state, data);
+}
+
+void
+SHA384_Update(SHA512_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+ SHA512_Update(context, data, len);
+}
+
+void
+SHA384_Pad(SHA512_CTX *context)
+{
+ SHA512_Pad(context);
+}
+
+void
+SHA384_Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA384_CTX *context)
+{
+ SHA384_Pad(context);
+
+ /* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
+ if (digest != NULL) {
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ int i;
+
+ /* Convert TO host byte order */
+ for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
+ BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state[i]);
+#else
+ memcpy(digest, context->state, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ /* Zero out state data */
+ memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(_NEED_SHA2) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha2.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sha2.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha2.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
-/* OpenBSD: sha2.h,v 1.6 2004/06/22 01:57:30 jfb Exp */
-
-/*
- * FILE: sha2.h
- * AUTHOR: Aaron D. Gifford <me at aarongifford.com>
- *
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Aaron D. Gifford
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of contributors
- * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
- * without specific prior written permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTOR(S) BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $From: sha2.h,v 1.1 2001/11/08 00:02:01 adg Exp adg $
- */
-
-/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/sha2.h */
-
-#ifndef _SSHSHA2_H
-#define _SSHSHA2_H
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) && \
- (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
-
-/*** SHA-256/384/512 Various Length Definitions ***********************/
-#define SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH 64
-#define SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH 32
-#define SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
-#define SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH 128
-#define SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH 48
-#define SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
-#define SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH 128
-#define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH 64
-#define SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
-
-
-/*** SHA-256/384/512 Context Structures *******************************/
-typedef struct _SHA256_CTX {
- u_int32_t state[8];
- u_int64_t bitcount;
- u_int8_t buffer[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH];
-} SHA256_CTX;
-typedef struct _SHA512_CTX {
- u_int64_t state[8];
- u_int64_t bitcount[2];
- u_int8_t buffer[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH];
-} SHA512_CTX;
-
-#if 0
-typedef SHA512_CTX SHA384_CTX;
-#endif
-
-void SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *);
-void SHA256_Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
-void SHA256_Update(SHA256_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
-void SHA256_Pad(SHA256_CTX *);
-void SHA256_Final(u_int8_t [SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA256_CTX *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA256_End(SHA256_CTX *, char *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA256_File(const char *, char *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA256_FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA256_Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-
-#if 0
-void SHA384_Init(SHA384_CTX *);
-void SHA384_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
-void SHA384_Update(SHA384_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
-void SHA384_Pad(SHA384_CTX *);
-void SHA384_Final(u_int8_t [SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA384_CTX *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA384_End(SHA384_CTX *, char *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA384_File(const char *, char *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA384_FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA384_Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-#endif /* 0 */
-
-void SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *);
-void SHA512_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
-void SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
-void SHA512_Pad(SHA512_CTX *);
-void SHA512_Final(u_int8_t [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA512_CTX *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA512_End(SHA512_CTX *, char *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA512_File(const char *, char *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA512_FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA512_Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) && \
- (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L) */
-
-#endif /* _SSHSHA2_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha2.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sha2.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha2.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/sha2.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+/* OpenBSD: sha2.h,v 1.6 2004/06/22 01:57:30 jfb Exp */
+
+/*
+ * FILE: sha2.h
+ * AUTHOR: Aaron D. Gifford <me at aarongifford.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Aaron D. Gifford
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTOR(S) BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $From: sha2.h,v 1.1 2001/11/08 00:02:01 adg Exp adg $
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/sha2.h */
+
+#ifndef _SSHSHA2_H
+#define _SSHSHA2_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+# if !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+# define _NEED_SHA2 1
+# endif
+#else
+# define _NEED_SHA2 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(_NEED_SHA2) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE)
+
+/*** SHA-256/384/512 Various Length Definitions ***********************/
+#define SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH 64
+#define SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH 32
+#define SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+#define SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH 128
+#define SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH 48
+#define SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+#define SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH 128
+#define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH 64
+#define SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+
+
+/*** SHA-256/384/512 Context Structures *******************************/
+typedef struct _SHA256_CTX {
+ u_int32_t state[8];
+ u_int64_t bitcount;
+ u_int8_t buffer[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+} SHA256_CTX;
+typedef struct _SHA512_CTX {
+ u_int64_t state[8];
+ u_int64_t bitcount[2];
+ u_int8_t buffer[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+} SHA512_CTX;
+
+typedef SHA512_CTX SHA384_CTX;
+
+void SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *);
+void SHA256_Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA256_Update(SHA256_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA256_Pad(SHA256_CTX *);
+void SHA256_Final(u_int8_t [SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA256_CTX *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA256_End(SHA256_CTX *, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA256_File(const char *, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA256_FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA256_Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+
+void SHA384_Init(SHA384_CTX *);
+void SHA384_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA384_Update(SHA384_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA384_Pad(SHA384_CTX *);
+void SHA384_Final(u_int8_t [SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA384_CTX *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA384_End(SHA384_CTX *, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA384_File(const char *, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA384_FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA384_Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+
+void SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *);
+void SHA512_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA512_Pad(SHA512_CTX *);
+void SHA512_Final(u_int8_t [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA512_CTX *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_End(SHA512_CTX *, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_File(const char *, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+
+#endif /* defined(_NEED_SHA2) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) */
+
+#endif /* _SSHSHA2_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/vis.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/vis.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/vis.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,225 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: vis.c,v 1.19 2005/09/01 17:15:49 millert Exp $ */
-/*-
- * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
- * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
- * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
- * without specific prior written permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/vis.c */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-#if !defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) || defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
-
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "vis.h"
-
-#define isoctal(c) (((u_char)(c)) >= '0' && ((u_char)(c)) <= '7')
-#define isvisible(c) \
- (((u_int)(c) <= UCHAR_MAX && isascii((u_char)(c)) && \
- (((c) != '*' && (c) != '?' && (c) != '[' && (c) != '#') || \
- (flag & VIS_GLOB) == 0) && isgraph((u_char)(c))) || \
- ((flag & VIS_SP) == 0 && (c) == ' ') || \
- ((flag & VIS_TAB) == 0 && (c) == '\t') || \
- ((flag & VIS_NL) == 0 && (c) == '\n') || \
- ((flag & VIS_SAFE) && ((c) == '\b' || \
- (c) == '\007' || (c) == '\r' || \
- isgraph((u_char)(c)))))
-
-/*
- * vis - visually encode characters
- */
-char *
-vis(char *dst, int c, int flag, int nextc)
-{
- if (isvisible(c)) {
- *dst++ = c;
- if (c == '\\' && (flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0)
- *dst++ = '\\';
- *dst = '\0';
- return (dst);
- }
-
- if (flag & VIS_CSTYLE) {
- switch(c) {
- case '\n':
- *dst++ = '\\';
- *dst++ = 'n';
- goto done;
- case '\r':
- *dst++ = '\\';
- *dst++ = 'r';
- goto done;
- case '\b':
- *dst++ = '\\';
- *dst++ = 'b';
- goto done;
- case '\a':
- *dst++ = '\\';
- *dst++ = 'a';
- goto done;
- case '\v':
- *dst++ = '\\';
- *dst++ = 'v';
- goto done;
- case '\t':
- *dst++ = '\\';
- *dst++ = 't';
- goto done;
- case '\f':
- *dst++ = '\\';
- *dst++ = 'f';
- goto done;
- case ' ':
- *dst++ = '\\';
- *dst++ = 's';
- goto done;
- case '\0':
- *dst++ = '\\';
- *dst++ = '0';
- if (isoctal(nextc)) {
- *dst++ = '0';
- *dst++ = '0';
- }
- goto done;
- }
- }
- if (((c & 0177) == ' ') || (flag & VIS_OCTAL) ||
- ((flag & VIS_GLOB) && (c == '*' || c == '?' || c == '[' || c == '#'))) {
- *dst++ = '\\';
- *dst++ = ((u_char)c >> 6 & 07) + '0';
- *dst++ = ((u_char)c >> 3 & 07) + '0';
- *dst++ = ((u_char)c & 07) + '0';
- goto done;
- }
- if ((flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0)
- *dst++ = '\\';
- if (c & 0200) {
- c &= 0177;
- *dst++ = 'M';
- }
- if (iscntrl((u_char)c)) {
- *dst++ = '^';
- if (c == 0177)
- *dst++ = '?';
- else
- *dst++ = c + '@';
- } else {
- *dst++ = '-';
- *dst++ = c;
- }
-done:
- *dst = '\0';
- return (dst);
-}
-
-/*
- * strvis, strnvis, strvisx - visually encode characters from src into dst
- *
- * Dst must be 4 times the size of src to account for possible
- * expansion. The length of dst, not including the trailing NULL,
- * is returned.
- *
- * Strnvis will write no more than siz-1 bytes (and will NULL terminate).
- * The number of bytes needed to fully encode the string is returned.
- *
- * Strvisx encodes exactly len bytes from src into dst.
- * This is useful for encoding a block of data.
- */
-int
-strvis(char *dst, const char *src, int flag)
-{
- char c;
- char *start;
-
- for (start = dst; (c = *src);)
- dst = vis(dst, c, flag, *++src);
- *dst = '\0';
- return (dst - start);
-}
-
-int
-strnvis(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz, int flag)
-{
- char *start, *end;
- char tbuf[5];
- int c, i;
-
- i = 0;
- for (start = dst, end = start + siz - 1; (c = *src) && dst < end; ) {
- if (isvisible(c)) {
- i = 1;
- *dst++ = c;
- if (c == '\\' && (flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0) {
- /* need space for the extra '\\' */
- if (dst < end)
- *dst++ = '\\';
- else {
- dst--;
- i = 2;
- break;
- }
- }
- src++;
- } else {
- i = vis(tbuf, c, flag, *++src) - tbuf;
- if (dst + i <= end) {
- memcpy(dst, tbuf, i);
- dst += i;
- } else {
- src--;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- if (siz > 0)
- *dst = '\0';
- if (dst + i > end) {
- /* adjust return value for truncation */
- while ((c = *src))
- dst += vis(tbuf, c, flag, *++src) - tbuf;
- }
- return (dst - start);
-}
-
-int
-strvisx(char *dst, const char *src, size_t len, int flag)
-{
- char c;
- char *start;
-
- for (start = dst; len > 1; len--) {
- c = *src;
- dst = vis(dst, c, flag, *++src);
- }
- if (len)
- dst = vis(dst, *src, flag, '\0');
- *dst = '\0';
- return (dst - start);
-}
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/vis.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/vis.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/vis.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/vis.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: vis.c,v 1.25 2015/09/13 11:32:51 guenther Exp $ */
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/vis.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) || defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+
+/*
+ * We want these to override in the BROKEN_STRNVIS case. TO avoid future sync
+ * problems no-op out the weak symbol definition rather than remove it.
+ */
+#define DEF_WEAK(x)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "vis.h"
+
+#define isoctal(c) (((u_char)(c)) >= '0' && ((u_char)(c)) <= '7')
+#define isvisible(c,flag) \
+ (((c) == '\\' || (flag & VIS_ALL) == 0) && \
+ (((u_int)(c) <= UCHAR_MAX && isascii((u_char)(c)) && \
+ (((c) != '*' && (c) != '?' && (c) != '[' && (c) != '#') || \
+ (flag & VIS_GLOB) == 0) && isgraph((u_char)(c))) || \
+ ((flag & VIS_SP) == 0 && (c) == ' ') || \
+ ((flag & VIS_TAB) == 0 && (c) == '\t') || \
+ ((flag & VIS_NL) == 0 && (c) == '\n') || \
+ ((flag & VIS_SAFE) && ((c) == '\b' || \
+ (c) == '\007' || (c) == '\r' || \
+ isgraph((u_char)(c))))))
+
+/*
+ * vis - visually encode characters
+ */
+char *
+vis(char *dst, int c, int flag, int nextc)
+{
+ if (isvisible(c, flag)) {
+ if ((c == '"' && (flag & VIS_DQ) != 0) ||
+ (c == '\\' && (flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0))
+ *dst++ = '\\';
+ *dst++ = c;
+ *dst = '\0';
+ return (dst);
+ }
+
+ if (flag & VIS_CSTYLE) {
+ switch(c) {
+ case '\n':
+ *dst++ = '\\';
+ *dst++ = 'n';
+ goto done;
+ case '\r':
+ *dst++ = '\\';
+ *dst++ = 'r';
+ goto done;
+ case '\b':
+ *dst++ = '\\';
+ *dst++ = 'b';
+ goto done;
+ case '\a':
+ *dst++ = '\\';
+ *dst++ = 'a';
+ goto done;
+ case '\v':
+ *dst++ = '\\';
+ *dst++ = 'v';
+ goto done;
+ case '\t':
+ *dst++ = '\\';
+ *dst++ = 't';
+ goto done;
+ case '\f':
+ *dst++ = '\\';
+ *dst++ = 'f';
+ goto done;
+ case ' ':
+ *dst++ = '\\';
+ *dst++ = 's';
+ goto done;
+ case '\0':
+ *dst++ = '\\';
+ *dst++ = '0';
+ if (isoctal(nextc)) {
+ *dst++ = '0';
+ *dst++ = '0';
+ }
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+ if (((c & 0177) == ' ') || (flag & VIS_OCTAL) ||
+ ((flag & VIS_GLOB) && (c == '*' || c == '?' || c == '[' || c == '#'))) {
+ *dst++ = '\\';
+ *dst++ = ((u_char)c >> 6 & 07) + '0';
+ *dst++ = ((u_char)c >> 3 & 07) + '0';
+ *dst++ = ((u_char)c & 07) + '0';
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0)
+ *dst++ = '\\';
+ if (c & 0200) {
+ c &= 0177;
+ *dst++ = 'M';
+ }
+ if (iscntrl((u_char)c)) {
+ *dst++ = '^';
+ if (c == 0177)
+ *dst++ = '?';
+ else
+ *dst++ = c + '@';
+ } else {
+ *dst++ = '-';
+ *dst++ = c;
+ }
+done:
+ *dst = '\0';
+ return (dst);
+}
+DEF_WEAK(vis);
+
+/*
+ * strvis, strnvis, strvisx - visually encode characters from src into dst
+ *
+ * Dst must be 4 times the size of src to account for possible
+ * expansion. The length of dst, not including the trailing NULL,
+ * is returned.
+ *
+ * Strnvis will write no more than siz-1 bytes (and will NULL terminate).
+ * The number of bytes needed to fully encode the string is returned.
+ *
+ * Strvisx encodes exactly len bytes from src into dst.
+ * This is useful for encoding a block of data.
+ */
+int
+strvis(char *dst, const char *src, int flag)
+{
+ char c;
+ char *start;
+
+ for (start = dst; (c = *src);)
+ dst = vis(dst, c, flag, *++src);
+ *dst = '\0';
+ return (dst - start);
+}
+DEF_WEAK(strvis);
+
+int
+strnvis(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz, int flag)
+{
+ char *start, *end;
+ char tbuf[5];
+ int c, i;
+
+ i = 0;
+ for (start = dst, end = start + siz - 1; (c = *src) && dst < end; ) {
+ if (isvisible(c, flag)) {
+ if ((c == '"' && (flag & VIS_DQ) != 0) ||
+ (c == '\\' && (flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0)) {
+ /* need space for the extra '\\' */
+ if (dst + 1 >= end) {
+ i = 2;
+ break;
+ }
+ *dst++ = '\\';
+ }
+ i = 1;
+ *dst++ = c;
+ src++;
+ } else {
+ i = vis(tbuf, c, flag, *++src) - tbuf;
+ if (dst + i <= end) {
+ memcpy(dst, tbuf, i);
+ dst += i;
+ } else {
+ src--;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (siz > 0)
+ *dst = '\0';
+ if (dst + i > end) {
+ /* adjust return value for truncation */
+ while ((c = *src))
+ dst += vis(tbuf, c, flag, *++src) - tbuf;
+ }
+ return (dst - start);
+}
+
+int
+stravis(char **outp, const char *src, int flag)
+{
+ char *buf;
+ int len, serrno;
+
+ buf = reallocarray(NULL, 4, strlen(src) + 1);
+ if (buf == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ len = strvis(buf, src, flag);
+ serrno = errno;
+ *outp = realloc(buf, len + 1);
+ if (*outp == NULL) {
+ *outp = buf;
+ errno = serrno;
+ }
+ return (len);
+}
+
+int
+strvisx(char *dst, const char *src, size_t len, int flag)
+{
+ char c;
+ char *start;
+
+ for (start = dst; len > 1; len--) {
+ c = *src;
+ dst = vis(dst, c, flag, *++src);
+ }
+ if (len)
+ dst = vis(dst, *src, flag, '\0');
+ *dst = '\0';
+ return (dst - start);
+}
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/vis.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/vis.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/vis.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: vis.h,v 1.11 2005/08/09 19:38:31 millert Exp $ */
-/* $NetBSD: vis.h,v 1.4 1994/10/26 00:56:41 cgd Exp $ */
-
-/*-
- * Copyright (c) 1990 The Regents of the University of California.
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
- * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
- * without specific prior written permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * @(#)vis.h 5.9 (Berkeley) 4/3/91
- */
-
-/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/vis.h */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-#if !defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) || defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
-
-#ifndef _VIS_H_
-#define _VIS_H_
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-
-/*
- * to select alternate encoding format
- */
-#define VIS_OCTAL 0x01 /* use octal \ddd format */
-#define VIS_CSTYLE 0x02 /* use \[nrft0..] where appropriate */
-
-/*
- * to alter set of characters encoded (default is to encode all
- * non-graphic except space, tab, and newline).
- */
-#define VIS_SP 0x04 /* also encode space */
-#define VIS_TAB 0x08 /* also encode tab */
-#define VIS_NL 0x10 /* also encode newline */
-#define VIS_WHITE (VIS_SP | VIS_TAB | VIS_NL)
-#define VIS_SAFE 0x20 /* only encode "unsafe" characters */
-
-/*
- * other
- */
-#define VIS_NOSLASH 0x40 /* inhibit printing '\' */
-#define VIS_GLOB 0x100 /* encode glob(3) magics and '#' */
-
-/*
- * unvis return codes
- */
-#define UNVIS_VALID 1 /* character valid */
-#define UNVIS_VALIDPUSH 2 /* character valid, push back passed char */
-#define UNVIS_NOCHAR 3 /* valid sequence, no character produced */
-#define UNVIS_SYNBAD -1 /* unrecognized escape sequence */
-#define UNVIS_ERROR -2 /* decoder in unknown state (unrecoverable) */
-
-/*
- * unvis flags
- */
-#define UNVIS_END 1 /* no more characters */
-
-char *vis(char *, int, int, int);
-int strvis(char *, const char *, int);
-int strnvis(char *, const char *, size_t, int)
- __attribute__ ((__bounded__(__string__,1,3)));
-int strvisx(char *, const char *, size_t, int)
- __attribute__ ((__bounded__(__string__,1,3)));
-int strunvis(char *, const char *);
-int unvis(char *, char, int *, int);
-ssize_t strnunvis(char *, const char *, size_t)
- __attribute__ ((__bounded__(__string__,1,3)));
-
-#endif /* !_VIS_H_ */
-
-#endif /* !HAVE_STRNVIS || BROKEN_STRNVIS */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/vis.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/vis.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/vis.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/vis.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: vis.h,v 1.15 2015/07/20 01:52:27 millert Exp $ */
+/* $NetBSD: vis.h,v 1.4 1994/10/26 00:56:41 cgd Exp $ */
+
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1990 The Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * @(#)vis.h 5.9 (Berkeley) 4/3/91
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/vis.h */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) || defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+
+#ifndef _VIS_H_
+#define _VIS_H_
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+/*
+ * to select alternate encoding format
+ */
+#define VIS_OCTAL 0x01 /* use octal \ddd format */
+#define VIS_CSTYLE 0x02 /* use \[nrft0..] where appropriate */
+
+/*
+ * to alter set of characters encoded (default is to encode all
+ * non-graphic except space, tab, and newline).
+ */
+#define VIS_SP 0x04 /* also encode space */
+#define VIS_TAB 0x08 /* also encode tab */
+#define VIS_NL 0x10 /* also encode newline */
+#define VIS_WHITE (VIS_SP | VIS_TAB | VIS_NL)
+#define VIS_SAFE 0x20 /* only encode "unsafe" characters */
+#define VIS_DQ 0x200 /* backslash-escape double quotes */
+#define VIS_ALL 0x400 /* encode all characters */
+
+/*
+ * other
+ */
+#define VIS_NOSLASH 0x40 /* inhibit printing '\' */
+#define VIS_GLOB 0x100 /* encode glob(3) magics and '#' */
+
+/*
+ * unvis return codes
+ */
+#define UNVIS_VALID 1 /* character valid */
+#define UNVIS_VALIDPUSH 2 /* character valid, push back passed char */
+#define UNVIS_NOCHAR 3 /* valid sequence, no character produced */
+#define UNVIS_SYNBAD -1 /* unrecognized escape sequence */
+#define UNVIS_ERROR -2 /* decoder in unknown state (unrecoverable) */
+
+/*
+ * unvis flags
+ */
+#define UNVIS_END 1 /* no more characters */
+
+char *vis(char *, int, int, int);
+int strvis(char *, const char *, int);
+int stravis(char **, const char *, int);
+int strnvis(char *, const char *, size_t, int)
+ __attribute__ ((__bounded__(__string__,1,3)));
+int strvisx(char *, const char *, size_t, int)
+ __attribute__ ((__bounded__(__string__,1,3)));
+int strunvis(char *, const char *);
+int unvis(char *, char, int *, int);
+ssize_t strnunvis(char *, const char *, size_t)
+ __attribute__ ((__bounded__(__string__,1,3)));
+
+#endif /* !_VIS_H_ */
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRNVIS || BROKEN_STRNVIS */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2003 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-
-# if defined(HAVE_CRYPT_H) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
-# include <crypt.h>
-# endif
-
-# ifdef __hpux
-# include <hpsecurity.h>
-# include <prot.h>
-# endif
-
-# ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
-# include <sys/security.h>
-# include <sys/audit.h>
-# include <prot.h>
-# endif
-
-# if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
-# include <shadow.h>
-# endif
-
-# if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
-# include <sys/label.h>
-# include <sys/audit.h>
-# include <pwdadj.h>
-# endif
-
-# if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT)
-# include "md5crypt.h"
-# endif
-
-# if !defined(HAVE_CRYPT) && defined(HAVE_DES_CRYPT)
-# include <openssl/des.h>
-# define crypt DES_crypt
-# endif
-
-char *
-xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt)
-{
- char *crypted;
-
-# ifdef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS
- if (is_md5_salt(salt))
- crypted = md5_crypt(password, salt);
- else
- crypted = crypt(password, salt);
-# elif defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
- if (iscomsec())
- crypted = bigcrypt(password, salt);
- else
- crypted = crypt(password, salt);
-# elif defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
- crypted = bigcrypt(password, salt);
-# else
- crypted = crypt(password, salt);
-# endif
-
- return crypted;
-}
-
-/*
- * Handle shadowed password systems in a cleaner way for portable
- * version.
- */
-
-char *
-shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw)
-{
- char *pw_password = pw->pw_passwd;
-
-# if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
- struct spwd *spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
-
- if (spw != NULL)
- pw_password = spw->sp_pwdp;
-# endif
-
-#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
- return(get_iaf_password(pw));
-#endif
-
-# if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
- struct passwd_adjunct *spw;
- if (issecure() && (spw = getpwanam(pw->pw_name)) != NULL)
- pw_password = spw->pwa_passwd;
-# elif defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
- struct pr_passwd *spw = getprpwnam(pw->pw_name);
-
- if (spw != NULL)
- pw_password = spw->ufld.fd_encrypt;
-# endif
-
- return pw_password;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+# if defined(HAVE_CRYPT_H) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+# include <crypt.h>
+# endif
+
+# ifdef __hpux
+# include <hpsecurity.h>
+# include <prot.h>
+# endif
+
+# ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+# include <sys/security.h>
+# include <sys/audit.h>
+# include <prot.h>
+# endif
+
+# if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+# include <shadow.h>
+# endif
+
+# if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+# include <sys/label.h>
+# include <sys/audit.h>
+# include <pwdadj.h>
+# endif
+
+# if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT)
+# include "md5crypt.h"
+# endif
+
+# if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(HAVE_CRYPT) && defined(HAVE_DES_CRYPT)
+# include <openssl/des.h>
+# define crypt DES_crypt
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * Pick an appropriate password encryption type and salt for the running
+ * system by searching through accounts until we find one that has a valid
+ * salt. Usually this will be root unless the root account is locked out.
+ * If we don't find one we return a traditional DES-based salt.
+ */
+static const char *
+pick_salt(void)
+{
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ char *passwd, *p;
+ size_t typelen;
+ static char salt[32];
+
+ if (salt[0] != '\0')
+ return salt;
+ strlcpy(salt, "xx", sizeof(salt));
+ setpwent();
+ while ((pw = getpwent()) != NULL) {
+ passwd = shadow_pw(pw);
+ if (passwd[0] == '$' && (p = strrchr(passwd+1, '$')) != NULL) {
+ typelen = p - passwd + 1;
+ strlcpy(salt, passwd, MIN(typelen, sizeof(salt)));
+ explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ out:
+ endpwent();
+ return salt;
+}
+
+char *
+xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt)
+{
+ char *crypted;
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a salt we are encrypting a fake password for
+ * for timing purposes. Pick an appropriate salt.
+ */
+ if (salt == NULL)
+ salt = pick_salt();
+
+# ifdef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS
+ if (is_md5_salt(salt))
+ crypted = md5_crypt(password, salt);
+ else
+ crypted = crypt(password, salt);
+# elif defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+ if (iscomsec())
+ crypted = bigcrypt(password, salt);
+ else
+ crypted = crypt(password, salt);
+# elif defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+ crypted = bigcrypt(password, salt);
+# else
+ crypted = crypt(password, salt);
+# endif
+
+ return crypted;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle shadowed password systems in a cleaner way for portable
+ * version.
+ */
+
+char *
+shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ char *pw_password = pw->pw_passwd;
+
+# if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+ struct spwd *spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
+
+ if (spw != NULL)
+ pw_password = spw->sp_pwdp;
+# endif
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+ return(get_iaf_password(pw));
+#endif
+
+# if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+ struct passwd_adjunct *spw;
+ if (issecure() && (spw = getpwanam(pw->pw_name)) != NULL)
+ pw_password = spw->pwa_passwd;
+# elif defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+ struct pr_passwd *spw = getprpwnam(pw->pw_name);
+
+ if (spw != NULL)
+ pw_password = spw->ufld.fd_encrypt;
+# endif
+
+ return pw_password;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/opensshd.init.in
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/opensshd.init.in 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/opensshd.init.in 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-#!@STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL@
-# Donated code that was put under PD license.
-#
-# Stripped PRNGd out of it for the time being.
-
-umask 022
-
-CAT=@CAT@
-KILL=@KILL@
-
-prefix=@prefix@
-sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
-piddir=@piddir@
-
-SSHD=$prefix/sbin/sshd
-PIDFILE=$piddir/sshd.pid
-PidFile=`grep "^PidFile" ${sysconfdir}/sshd_config | tr "=" " " | awk '{print $2}'`
-[ X$PidFile = X ] || PIDFILE=$PidFile
-SSH_KEYGEN=$prefix/bin/ssh-keygen
-HOST_KEY_RSA1=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_key
-HOST_KEY_DSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_dsa_key
-HOST_KEY_RSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_rsa_key
- at COMMENT_OUT_ECC@HOST_KEY_ECDSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
-
-
-checkkeys() {
- if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_RSA1 ]; then
- ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t rsa1 -f ${HOST_KEY_RSA1} -N ""
- fi
- if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_DSA ]; then
- ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t dsa -f ${HOST_KEY_DSA} -N ""
- fi
- if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_RSA ]; then
- ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t rsa -f ${HOST_KEY_RSA} -N ""
- fi
- at COMMENT_OUT_ECC@ if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_ECDSA ]; then
- at COMMENT_OUT_ECC@ ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t ecdsa -f ${HOST_KEY_ECDSA} -N ""
- at COMMENT_OUT_ECC@ fi
-}
-
-stop_service() {
- if [ -r $PIDFILE -a ! -z ${PIDFILE} ]; then
- PID=`${CAT} ${PIDFILE}`
- fi
- if [ ${PID:=0} -gt 1 -a ! "X$PID" = "X " ]; then
- ${KILL} ${PID}
- else
- echo "Unable to read PID file"
- fi
-}
-
-start_service() {
- # XXX We really should check if the service is already going, but
- # XXX we will opt out at this time. - Bal
-
- # Check to see if we have keys that need to be made
- checkkeys
-
- # Start SSHD
- echo "starting $SSHD... \c" ; $SSHD
-
- sshd_rc=$?
- if [ $sshd_rc -ne 0 ]; then
- echo "$0: Error ${sshd_rc} starting ${SSHD}... bailing."
- exit $sshd_rc
- fi
- echo done.
-}
-
-case $1 in
-
-'start')
- start_service
- ;;
-
-'stop')
- stop_service
- ;;
-
-'restart')
- stop_service
- start_service
- ;;
-
-*)
- echo "$0: usage: $0 {start|stop|restart}"
- ;;
-esac
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/opensshd.init.in (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/opensshd.init.in)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/opensshd.init.in (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/opensshd.init.in 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+#!@STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL@
+# Donated code that was put under PD license.
+#
+# Stripped PRNGd out of it for the time being.
+
+umask 022
+
+CAT=@CAT@
+KILL=@KILL@
+
+prefix=@prefix@
+sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
+piddir=@piddir@
+
+SSHD=$prefix/sbin/sshd
+PIDFILE=$piddir/sshd.pid
+PidFile=`grep "^PidFile" ${sysconfdir}/sshd_config | tr "=" " " | awk '{print $2}'`
+[ X$PidFile = X ] || PIDFILE=$PidFile
+SSH_KEYGEN=$prefix/bin/ssh-keygen
+HOST_KEY_RSA1=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_key
+HOST_KEY_DSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_dsa_key
+HOST_KEY_RSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_rsa_key
+ at COMMENT_OUT_ECC@HOST_KEY_ECDSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+HOST_KEY_ED25519=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+
+
+checkkeys() {
+ if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_RSA1 ]; then
+ ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t rsa1 -f ${HOST_KEY_RSA1} -N ""
+ fi
+ if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_DSA ]; then
+ ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t dsa -f ${HOST_KEY_DSA} -N ""
+ fi
+ if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_RSA ]; then
+ ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t rsa -f ${HOST_KEY_RSA} -N ""
+ fi
+ at COMMENT_OUT_ECC@ if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_ECDSA ]; then
+ at COMMENT_OUT_ECC@ ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t ecdsa -f ${HOST_KEY_ECDSA} -N ""
+ at COMMENT_OUT_ECC@ fi
+ if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_ED25519 ]; then
+ ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t ed25519 -f ${HOST_KEY_ED25519} -N ""
+ fi
+}
+
+stop_service() {
+ if [ -r $PIDFILE -a ! -z ${PIDFILE} ]; then
+ PID=`${CAT} ${PIDFILE}`
+ fi
+ if [ ${PID:=0} -gt 1 -a ! "X$PID" = "X " ]; then
+ ${KILL} ${PID}
+ else
+ echo "Unable to read PID file"
+ fi
+}
+
+start_service() {
+ # XXX We really should check if the service is already going, but
+ # XXX we will opt out at this time. - Bal
+
+ # Check to see if we have keys that need to be made
+ checkkeys
+
+ # Start SSHD
+ echo "starting $SSHD... \c" ; $SSHD
+
+ sshd_rc=$?
+ if [ $sshd_rc -ne 0 ]; then
+ echo "$0: Error ${sshd_rc} starting ${SSHD}... bailing."
+ exit $sshd_rc
+ fi
+ echo done.
+}
+
+case $1 in
+
+'start')
+ start_service
+ ;;
+
+'stop')
+ stop_service
+ ;;
+
+'restart')
+ stop_service
+ start_service
+ ;;
+
+*)
+ echo "$0: usage: $0 {start|stop|restart}"
+ ;;
+esac
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/packet.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/packet.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/packet.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,2057 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.192 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * This file contains code implementing the packet protocol and communication
- * with the other side. This same code is used both on client and server side.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- *
- * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl.
- * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <netinet/ip.h>
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <time.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "crc32.h"
-#include "compress.h"
-#include "deattack.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "mac.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "roaming.h"
-
-#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
-#define DBG(x) x
-#else
-#define DBG(x)
-#endif
-
-#define PACKET_MAX_SIZE (256 * 1024)
-
-struct packet_state {
- u_int32_t seqnr;
- u_int32_t packets;
- u_int64_t blocks;
- u_int64_t bytes;
-};
-
-struct packet {
- TAILQ_ENTRY(packet) next;
- u_char type;
- Buffer payload;
-};
-
-struct session_state {
- /*
- * This variable contains the file descriptors used for
- * communicating with the other side. connection_in is used for
- * reading; connection_out for writing. These can be the same
- * descriptor, in which case it is assumed to be a socket.
- */
- int connection_in;
- int connection_out;
-
- /* Protocol flags for the remote side. */
- u_int remote_protocol_flags;
-
- /* Encryption context for receiving data. Only used for decryption. */
- CipherContext receive_context;
-
- /* Encryption context for sending data. Only used for encryption. */
- CipherContext send_context;
-
- /* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */
- Buffer input;
-
- /* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */
- Buffer output;
-
- /* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */
- Buffer outgoing_packet;
-
- /* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */
- Buffer incoming_packet;
-
- /* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */
- Buffer compression_buffer;
- int compression_buffer_ready;
-
- /*
- * Flag indicating whether packet compression/decompression is
- * enabled.
- */
- int packet_compression;
-
- /* default maximum packet size */
- u_int max_packet_size;
-
- /* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */
- int initialized;
-
- /* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */
- int interactive_mode;
-
- /* Set to true if we are the server side. */
- int server_side;
-
- /* Set to true if we are authenticated. */
- int after_authentication;
-
- int keep_alive_timeouts;
-
- /* The maximum time that we will wait to send or receive a packet */
- int packet_timeout_ms;
-
- /* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */
- Newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
- struct packet_state p_read, p_send;
-
- /* Volume-based rekeying */
- u_int64_t max_blocks_in, max_blocks_out;
- u_int32_t rekey_limit;
-
- /* Time-based rekeying */
- time_t rekey_interval; /* how often in seconds */
- time_t rekey_time; /* time of last rekeying */
-
- /* Session key for protocol v1 */
- u_char ssh1_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
- u_int ssh1_keylen;
-
- /* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */
- u_char extra_pad;
-
- /* XXX discard incoming data after MAC error */
- u_int packet_discard;
- Mac *packet_discard_mac;
-
- /* Used in packet_read_poll2() */
- u_int packlen;
-
- /* Used in packet_send2 */
- int rekeying;
-
- /* Used in packet_set_interactive */
- int set_interactive_called;
-
- /* Used in packet_set_maxsize */
- int set_maxsize_called;
-
- TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
-};
-
-static struct session_state *active_state, *backup_state;
-
-static struct session_state *
-alloc_session_state(void)
-{
- struct session_state *s = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*s));
-
- s->connection_in = -1;
- s->connection_out = -1;
- s->max_packet_size = 32768;
- s->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
- return s;
-}
-
-/*
- * Sets the descriptors used for communication. Disables encryption until
- * packet_set_encryption_key is called.
- */
-void
-packet_set_connection(int fd_in, int fd_out)
-{
- const Cipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
-
- if (none == NULL)
- fatal("packet_set_connection: cannot load cipher 'none'");
- if (active_state == NULL)
- active_state = alloc_session_state();
- active_state->connection_in = fd_in;
- active_state->connection_out = fd_out;
- cipher_init(&active_state->send_context, none, (const u_char *)"",
- 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
- cipher_init(&active_state->receive_context, none, (const u_char *)"",
- 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT);
- active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
- if (!active_state->initialized) {
- active_state->initialized = 1;
- buffer_init(&active_state->input);
- buffer_init(&active_state->output);
- buffer_init(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
- buffer_init(&active_state->incoming_packet);
- TAILQ_INIT(&active_state->outgoing);
- active_state->p_send.packets = active_state->p_read.packets = 0;
- }
-}
-
-void
-packet_set_timeout(int timeout, int count)
-{
- if (timeout <= 0 || count <= 0) {
- active_state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
- return;
- }
- if ((INT_MAX / 1000) / count < timeout)
- active_state->packet_timeout_ms = INT_MAX;
- else
- active_state->packet_timeout_ms = timeout * count * 1000;
-}
-
-static void
-packet_stop_discard(void)
-{
- if (active_state->packet_discard_mac) {
- char buf[1024];
-
- memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf));
- while (buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet) <
- PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
- buffer_append(&active_state->incoming_packet, buf,
- sizeof(buf));
- (void) mac_compute(active_state->packet_discard_mac,
- active_state->p_read.seqnr,
- buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet),
- PACKET_MAX_SIZE);
- }
- logit("Finished discarding for %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
- cleanup_exit(255);
-}
-
-static void
-packet_start_discard(Enc *enc, Mac *mac, u_int packet_length, u_int discard)
-{
- if (enc == NULL || !cipher_is_cbc(enc->cipher) || (mac && mac->etm))
- packet_disconnect("Packet corrupt");
- if (packet_length != PACKET_MAX_SIZE && mac && mac->enabled)
- active_state->packet_discard_mac = mac;
- if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) >= discard)
- packet_stop_discard();
- active_state->packet_discard = discard -
- buffer_len(&active_state->input);
-}
-
-/* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */
-
-int
-packet_connection_is_on_socket(void)
-{
- struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
- socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
-
- /* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
- if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out)
- return 1;
- fromlen = sizeof(from);
- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- if (getpeername(active_state->connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
- &fromlen) < 0)
- return 0;
- tolen = sizeof(to);
- memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
- if (getpeername(active_state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to,
- &tolen) < 0)
- return 0;
- if (fromlen != tolen || memcmp(&from, &to, fromlen) != 0)
- return 0;
- if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6)
- return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Exports an IV from the CipherContext required to export the key
- * state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent
- * process.
- */
-
-void
-packet_get_keyiv(int mode, u_char *iv, u_int len)
-{
- CipherContext *cc;
-
- if (mode == MODE_OUT)
- cc = &active_state->send_context;
- else
- cc = &active_state->receive_context;
-
- cipher_get_keyiv(cc, iv, len);
-}
-
-int
-packet_get_keycontext(int mode, u_char *dat)
-{
- CipherContext *cc;
-
- if (mode == MODE_OUT)
- cc = &active_state->send_context;
- else
- cc = &active_state->receive_context;
-
- return (cipher_get_keycontext(cc, dat));
-}
-
-void
-packet_set_keycontext(int mode, u_char *dat)
-{
- CipherContext *cc;
-
- if (mode == MODE_OUT)
- cc = &active_state->send_context;
- else
- cc = &active_state->receive_context;
-
- cipher_set_keycontext(cc, dat);
-}
-
-int
-packet_get_keyiv_len(int mode)
-{
- CipherContext *cc;
-
- if (mode == MODE_OUT)
- cc = &active_state->send_context;
- else
- cc = &active_state->receive_context;
-
- return (cipher_get_keyiv_len(cc));
-}
-
-void
-packet_set_iv(int mode, u_char *dat)
-{
- CipherContext *cc;
-
- if (mode == MODE_OUT)
- cc = &active_state->send_context;
- else
- cc = &active_state->receive_context;
-
- cipher_set_keyiv(cc, dat);
-}
-
-int
-packet_get_ssh1_cipher(void)
-{
- return (cipher_get_number(active_state->receive_context.cipher));
-}
-
-void
-packet_get_state(int mode, u_int32_t *seqnr, u_int64_t *blocks,
- u_int32_t *packets, u_int64_t *bytes)
-{
- struct packet_state *state;
-
- state = (mode == MODE_IN) ?
- &active_state->p_read : &active_state->p_send;
- if (seqnr)
- *seqnr = state->seqnr;
- if (blocks)
- *blocks = state->blocks;
- if (packets)
- *packets = state->packets;
- if (bytes)
- *bytes = state->bytes;
-}
-
-void
-packet_set_state(int mode, u_int32_t seqnr, u_int64_t blocks, u_int32_t packets,
- u_int64_t bytes)
-{
- struct packet_state *state;
-
- state = (mode == MODE_IN) ?
- &active_state->p_read : &active_state->p_send;
- state->seqnr = seqnr;
- state->blocks = blocks;
- state->packets = packets;
- state->bytes = bytes;
-}
-
-static int
-packet_connection_af(void)
-{
- struct sockaddr_storage to;
- socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to);
-
- memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
- if (getsockname(active_state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to,
- &tolen) < 0)
- return 0;
-#ifdef IPV4_IN_IPV6
- if (to.ss_family == AF_INET6 &&
- IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&to)->sin6_addr))
- return AF_INET;
-#endif
- return to.ss_family;
-}
-
-/* Sets the connection into non-blocking mode. */
-
-void
-packet_set_nonblocking(void)
-{
- /* Set the socket into non-blocking mode. */
- set_nonblock(active_state->connection_in);
-
- if (active_state->connection_out != active_state->connection_in)
- set_nonblock(active_state->connection_out);
-}
-
-/* Returns the socket used for reading. */
-
-int
-packet_get_connection_in(void)
-{
- return active_state->connection_in;
-}
-
-/* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */
-
-int
-packet_get_connection_out(void)
-{
- return active_state->connection_out;
-}
-
-/* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
-
-void
-packet_close(void)
-{
- if (!active_state->initialized)
- return;
- active_state->initialized = 0;
- if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
- shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
- close(active_state->connection_out);
- } else {
- close(active_state->connection_in);
- close(active_state->connection_out);
- }
- buffer_free(&active_state->input);
- buffer_free(&active_state->output);
- buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
- buffer_free(&active_state->incoming_packet);
- if (active_state->compression_buffer_ready) {
- buffer_free(&active_state->compression_buffer);
- buffer_compress_uninit();
- }
- cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
- cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
-}
-
-/* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
-
-void
-packet_set_protocol_flags(u_int protocol_flags)
-{
- active_state->remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags;
-}
-
-/* Returns the remote protocol flags set earlier by the above function. */
-
-u_int
-packet_get_protocol_flags(void)
-{
- return active_state->remote_protocol_flags;
-}
-
-/*
- * Starts packet compression from the next packet on in both directions.
- * Level is compression level 1 (fastest) - 9 (slow, best) as in gzip.
- */
-
-static void
-packet_init_compression(void)
-{
- if (active_state->compression_buffer_ready == 1)
- return;
- active_state->compression_buffer_ready = 1;
- buffer_init(&active_state->compression_buffer);
-}
-
-void
-packet_start_compression(int level)
-{
- if (active_state->packet_compression && !compat20)
- fatal("Compression already enabled.");
- active_state->packet_compression = 1;
- packet_init_compression();
- buffer_compress_init_send(level);
- buffer_compress_init_recv();
-}
-
-/*
- * Causes any further packets to be encrypted using the given key. The same
- * key is used for both sending and reception. However, both directions are
- * encrypted independently of each other.
- */
-
-void
-packet_set_encryption_key(const u_char *key, u_int keylen, int number)
-{
- const Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_number(number);
-
- if (cipher == NULL)
- fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: unknown cipher number %d", number);
- if (keylen < 20)
- fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: keylen too small: %d", keylen);
- if (keylen > SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH)
- fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: keylen too big: %d", keylen);
- memcpy(active_state->ssh1_key, key, keylen);
- active_state->ssh1_keylen = keylen;
- cipher_init(&active_state->send_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL,
- 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
- cipher_init(&active_state->receive_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL,
- 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT);
-}
-
-u_int
-packet_get_encryption_key(u_char *key)
-{
- if (key == NULL)
- return (active_state->ssh1_keylen);
- memcpy(key, active_state->ssh1_key, active_state->ssh1_keylen);
- return (active_state->ssh1_keylen);
-}
-
-/* Start constructing a packet to send. */
-void
-packet_start(u_char type)
-{
- u_char buf[9];
- int len;
-
- DBG(debug("packet_start[%d]", type));
- len = compat20 ? 6 : 9;
- memset(buf, 0, len - 1);
- buf[len - 1] = type;
- buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
- buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, len);
-}
-
-/* Append payload. */
-void
-packet_put_char(int value)
-{
- char ch = value;
-
- buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, &ch, 1);
-}
-
-void
-packet_put_int(u_int value)
-{
- buffer_put_int(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value);
-}
-
-void
-packet_put_int64(u_int64_t value)
-{
- buffer_put_int64(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value);
-}
-
-void
-packet_put_string(const void *buf, u_int len)
-{
- buffer_put_string(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, len);
-}
-
-void
-packet_put_cstring(const char *str)
-{
- buffer_put_cstring(&active_state->outgoing_packet, str);
-}
-
-void
-packet_put_raw(const void *buf, u_int len)
-{
- buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, len);
-}
-
-void
-packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value)
-{
- buffer_put_bignum(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value);
-}
-
-void
-packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value)
-{
- buffer_put_bignum2(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value);
-}
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-void
-packet_put_ecpoint(const EC_GROUP *curve, const EC_POINT *point)
-{
- buffer_put_ecpoint(&active_state->outgoing_packet, curve, point);
-}
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Finalizes and sends the packet. If the encryption key has been set,
- * encrypts the packet before sending.
- */
-
-static void
-packet_send1(void)
-{
- u_char buf[8], *cp;
- int i, padding, len;
- u_int checksum;
- u_int32_t rnd = 0;
-
- /*
- * If using packet compression, compress the payload of the outgoing
- * packet.
- */
- if (active_state->packet_compression) {
- buffer_clear(&active_state->compression_buffer);
- /* Skip padding. */
- buffer_consume(&active_state->outgoing_packet, 8);
- /* padding */
- buffer_append(&active_state->compression_buffer,
- "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8);
- buffer_compress(&active_state->outgoing_packet,
- &active_state->compression_buffer);
- buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
- buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet,
- buffer_ptr(&active_state->compression_buffer),
- buffer_len(&active_state->compression_buffer));
- }
- /* Compute packet length without padding (add checksum, remove padding). */
- len = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet) + 4 - 8;
-
- /* Insert padding. Initialized to zero in packet_start1() */
- padding = 8 - len % 8;
- if (!active_state->send_context.plaintext) {
- cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
- for (i = 0; i < padding; i++) {
- if (i % 4 == 0)
- rnd = arc4random();
- cp[7 - i] = rnd & 0xff;
- rnd >>= 8;
- }
- }
- buffer_consume(&active_state->outgoing_packet, 8 - padding);
-
- /* Add check bytes. */
- checksum = ssh_crc32(buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet),
- buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
- put_u32(buf, checksum);
- buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, 4);
-
-#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "packet_send plain: ");
- buffer_dump(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
-#endif
-
- /* Append to output. */
- put_u32(buf, len);
- buffer_append(&active_state->output, buf, 4);
- cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->output,
- buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
- if (cipher_crypt(&active_state->send_context, 0, cp,
- buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet),
- buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet), 0, 0) != 0)
- fatal("%s: cipher_crypt failed", __func__);
-
-#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
- buffer_dump(&active_state->output);
-#endif
- active_state->p_send.packets++;
- active_state->p_send.bytes += len +
- buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
- buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
-
- /*
- * Note that the packet is now only buffered in output. It won't be
- * actually sent until packet_write_wait or packet_write_poll is
- * called.
- */
-}
-
-void
-set_newkeys(int mode)
-{
- Enc *enc;
- Mac *mac;
- Comp *comp;
- CipherContext *cc;
- u_int64_t *max_blocks;
- int crypt_type;
-
- debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode);
-
- if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
- cc = &active_state->send_context;
- crypt_type = CIPHER_ENCRYPT;
- active_state->p_send.packets = active_state->p_send.blocks = 0;
- max_blocks = &active_state->max_blocks_out;
- } else {
- cc = &active_state->receive_context;
- crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT;
- active_state->p_read.packets = active_state->p_read.blocks = 0;
- max_blocks = &active_state->max_blocks_in;
- }
- if (active_state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
- debug("set_newkeys: rekeying");
- cipher_cleanup(cc);
- enc = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
- mac = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
- comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
- mac_clear(mac);
- explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->iv_len);
- explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len);
- explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len);
- free(enc->name);
- free(enc->iv);
- free(enc->key);
- free(mac->name);
- free(mac->key);
- free(comp->name);
- free(active_state->newkeys[mode]);
- }
- active_state->newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode);
- if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
- fatal("newkeys: no keys for mode %d", mode);
- enc = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
- mac = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
- comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
- if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0 && mac_init(mac) == 0)
- mac->enabled = 1;
- DBG(debug("cipher_init_context: %d", mode));
- cipher_init(cc, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len,
- enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type);
- /* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */
- /* explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->block_size);
- explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len);
- explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len); */
- if ((comp->type == COMP_ZLIB ||
- (comp->type == COMP_DELAYED &&
- active_state->after_authentication)) && comp->enabled == 0) {
- packet_init_compression();
- if (mode == MODE_OUT)
- buffer_compress_init_send(6);
- else
- buffer_compress_init_recv();
- comp->enabled = 1;
- }
- /*
- * The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES,
- * blowfish, etc, so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes.
- */
- if (enc->block_size >= 16)
- *max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2);
- else
- *max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size;
- if (active_state->rekey_limit)
- *max_blocks = MIN(*max_blocks,
- active_state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size);
-}
-
-/*
- * Delayed compression for SSH2 is enabled after authentication:
- * This happens on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent,
- * and on the client side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is received.
- */
-static void
-packet_enable_delayed_compress(void)
-{
- Comp *comp = NULL;
- int mode;
-
- /*
- * Remember that we are past the authentication step, so rekeying
- * with COMP_DELAYED will turn on compression immediately.
- */
- active_state->after_authentication = 1;
- for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
- /* protocol error: USERAUTH_SUCCESS received before NEWKEYS */
- if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
- continue;
- comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
- if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) {
- packet_init_compression();
- if (mode == MODE_OUT)
- buffer_compress_init_send(6);
- else
- buffer_compress_init_recv();
- comp->enabled = 1;
- }
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Finalize packet in SSH2 format (compress, mac, encrypt, enqueue)
- */
-static void
-packet_send2_wrapped(void)
-{
- u_char type, *cp, *macbuf = NULL;
- u_char padlen, pad = 0;
- u_int i, len, authlen = 0, aadlen = 0;
- u_int32_t rnd = 0;
- Enc *enc = NULL;
- Mac *mac = NULL;
- Comp *comp = NULL;
- int block_size;
-
- if (active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) {
- enc = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc;
- mac = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac;
- comp = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp;
- /* disable mac for authenticated encryption */
- if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0)
- mac = NULL;
- }
- block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
- aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0;
-
- cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
- type = cp[5];
-
-#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "plain: ");
- buffer_dump(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
-#endif
-
- if (comp && comp->enabled) {
- len = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
- /* skip header, compress only payload */
- buffer_consume(&active_state->outgoing_packet, 5);
- buffer_clear(&active_state->compression_buffer);
- buffer_compress(&active_state->outgoing_packet,
- &active_state->compression_buffer);
- buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
- buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, "\0\0\0\0\0", 5);
- buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet,
- buffer_ptr(&active_state->compression_buffer),
- buffer_len(&active_state->compression_buffer));
- DBG(debug("compression: raw %d compressed %d", len,
- buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet)));
- }
-
- /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload) */
- len = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
-
- /*
- * calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data,
- * minimum padding is 4 bytes
- */
- len -= aadlen; /* packet length is not encrypted for EtM modes */
- padlen = block_size - (len % block_size);
- if (padlen < 4)
- padlen += block_size;
- if (active_state->extra_pad) {
- /* will wrap if extra_pad+padlen > 255 */
- active_state->extra_pad =
- roundup(active_state->extra_pad, block_size);
- pad = active_state->extra_pad -
- ((len + padlen) % active_state->extra_pad);
- debug3("packet_send2: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)",
- pad, len, padlen, active_state->extra_pad);
- padlen += pad;
- active_state->extra_pad = 0;
- }
- cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->outgoing_packet, padlen);
- if (enc && !active_state->send_context.plaintext) {
- /* random padding */
- for (i = 0; i < padlen; i++) {
- if (i % 4 == 0)
- rnd = arc4random();
- cp[i] = rnd & 0xff;
- rnd >>= 8;
- }
- } else {
- /* clear padding */
- explicit_bzero(cp, padlen);
- }
- /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload + padding) */
- len = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
- cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
- /* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */
- put_u32(cp, len - 4);
- cp[4] = padlen;
- DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d, aadlen %d)",
- len, padlen, aadlen));
-
- /* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */
- if (mac && mac->enabled && !mac->etm) {
- macbuf = mac_compute(mac, active_state->p_send.seqnr,
- buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet), len);
- DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", active_state->p_send.seqnr));
- }
- /* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */
- cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->output, len + authlen);
- if (cipher_crypt(&active_state->send_context, active_state->p_send.seqnr,
- cp, buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet),
- len - aadlen, aadlen, authlen) != 0)
- fatal("%s: cipher_crypt failed", __func__);
- /* append unencrypted MAC */
- if (mac && mac->enabled) {
- if (mac->etm) {
- /* EtM: compute mac over aadlen + cipher text */
- macbuf = mac_compute(mac,
- active_state->p_send.seqnr, cp, len);
- DBG(debug("done calc MAC(EtM) out #%d",
- active_state->p_send.seqnr));
- }
- buffer_append(&active_state->output, macbuf, mac->mac_len);
- }
-#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
- buffer_dump(&active_state->output);
-#endif
- /* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
- if (++active_state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
- logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
- if (++active_state->p_send.packets == 0)
- if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
- fatal("XXX too many packets with same key");
- active_state->p_send.blocks += len / block_size;
- active_state->p_send.bytes += len;
- buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
-
- if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
- set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
- else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && active_state->server_side)
- packet_enable_delayed_compress();
-}
-
-static void
-packet_send2(void)
-{
- struct packet *p;
- u_char type, *cp;
-
- cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
- type = cp[5];
-
- /* during rekeying we can only send key exchange messages */
- if (active_state->rekeying) {
- if ((type < SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN) ||
- (type > SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX) ||
- (type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST) ||
- (type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)) {
- debug("enqueue packet: %u", type);
- p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p));
- p->type = type;
- memcpy(&p->payload, &active_state->outgoing_packet,
- sizeof(Buffer));
- buffer_init(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&active_state->outgoing, p, next);
- return;
- }
- }
-
- /* rekeying starts with sending KEXINIT */
- if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)
- active_state->rekeying = 1;
-
- packet_send2_wrapped();
-
- /* after a NEWKEYS message we can send the complete queue */
- if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
- active_state->rekeying = 0;
- active_state->rekey_time = monotime();
- while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&active_state->outgoing))) {
- type = p->type;
- debug("dequeue packet: %u", type);
- buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
- memcpy(&active_state->outgoing_packet, &p->payload,
- sizeof(Buffer));
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&active_state->outgoing, p, next);
- free(p);
- packet_send2_wrapped();
- }
- }
-}
-
-void
-packet_send(void)
-{
- if (compat20)
- packet_send2();
- else
- packet_send1();
- DBG(debug("packet_send done"));
-}
-
-/*
- * Waits until a packet has been received, and returns its type. Note that
- * no other data is processed until this returns, so this function should not
- * be used during the interactive session.
- */
-
-int
-packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
-{
- int type, len, ret, cont, ms_remain = 0;
- fd_set *setp;
- char buf[8192];
- struct timeval timeout, start, *timeoutp = NULL;
-
- DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
-
- setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(active_state->connection_in + 1,
- NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
-
- /* Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have been sent. */
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
- for (;;) {
- /* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
- type = packet_read_poll_seqnr(seqnr_p);
- if (!compat20 && (
- type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS
- || type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE
- || type == SSH_CMSG_EOF
- || type == SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION))
- packet_check_eom();
- /* If we got a packet, return it. */
- if (type != SSH_MSG_NONE) {
- free(setp);
- return type;
- }
- /*
- * Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the
- * buffer, and try again.
- */
- memset(setp, 0, howmany(active_state->connection_in + 1,
- NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
- FD_SET(active_state->connection_in, setp);
-
- if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
- ms_remain = active_state->packet_timeout_ms;
- timeoutp = &timeout;
- }
- /* Wait for some data to arrive. */
- for (;;) {
- if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
- ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
- gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
- }
- if ((ret = select(active_state->connection_in + 1, setp,
- NULL, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
- break;
- if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
- errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
- break;
- if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
- continue;
- ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
- if (ms_remain <= 0) {
- ret = 0;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (ret == 0) {
- logit("Connection to %.200s timed out while "
- "waiting to read", get_remote_ipaddr());
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- /* Read data from the socket. */
- do {
- cont = 0;
- len = roaming_read(active_state->connection_in, buf,
- sizeof(buf), &cont);
- } while (len == 0 && cont);
- if (len == 0) {
- logit("Connection closed by %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- if (len < 0)
- fatal("Read from socket failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- /* Append it to the buffer. */
- packet_process_incoming(buf, len);
- }
- /* NOTREACHED */
-}
-
-int
-packet_read(void)
-{
- return packet_read_seqnr(NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches
- * that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch.
- */
-
-void
-packet_read_expect(int expected_type)
-{
- int type;
-
- type = packet_read();
- if (type != expected_type)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error: expected packet type %d, got %d",
- expected_type, type);
-}
-
-/* Checks if a full packet is available in the data received so far via
- * packet_process_incoming. If so, reads the packet; otherwise returns
- * SSH_MSG_NONE. This does not wait for data from the connection.
- *
- * SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT is handled specially here. Also,
- * SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages are skipped by this function and are never returned
- * to higher levels.
- */
-
-static int
-packet_read_poll1(void)
-{
- u_int len, padded_len;
- u_char *cp, type;
- u_int checksum, stored_checksum;
-
- /* Check if input size is less than minimum packet size. */
- if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < 4 + 8)
- return SSH_MSG_NONE;
- /* Get length of incoming packet. */
- cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->input);
- len = get_u32(cp);
- if (len < 1 + 2 + 2 || len > 256 * 1024)
- packet_disconnect("Bad packet length %u.", len);
- padded_len = (len + 8) & ~7;
-
- /* Check if the packet has been entirely received. */
- if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < 4 + padded_len)
- return SSH_MSG_NONE;
-
- /* The entire packet is in buffer. */
-
- /* Consume packet length. */
- buffer_consume(&active_state->input, 4);
-
- /*
- * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh
- * (C)1998 CORE-SDI, Buenos Aires Argentina
- * Ariel Futoransky(futo at core-sdi.com)
- */
- if (!active_state->receive_context.plaintext) {
- switch (detect_attack(buffer_ptr(&active_state->input),
- padded_len)) {
- case DEATTACK_DETECTED:
- packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: "
- "network attack detected");
- case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED:
- packet_disconnect("deattack denial of "
- "service detected");
- }
- }
-
- /* Decrypt data to incoming_packet. */
- buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet);
- cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet, padded_len);
- if (cipher_crypt(&active_state->receive_context, 0, cp,
- buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), padded_len, 0, 0) != 0)
- fatal("%s: cipher_crypt failed", __func__);
-
- buffer_consume(&active_state->input, padded_len);
-
-#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "read_poll plain: ");
- buffer_dump(&active_state->incoming_packet);
-#endif
-
- /* Compute packet checksum. */
- checksum = ssh_crc32(buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet),
- buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet) - 4);
-
- /* Skip padding. */
- buffer_consume(&active_state->incoming_packet, 8 - len % 8);
-
- /* Test check bytes. */
- if (len != buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet))
- packet_disconnect("packet_read_poll1: len %d != buffer_len %d.",
- len, buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet));
-
- cp = (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet) + len - 4;
- stored_checksum = get_u32(cp);
- if (checksum != stored_checksum)
- packet_disconnect("Corrupted check bytes on input.");
- buffer_consume_end(&active_state->incoming_packet, 4);
-
- if (active_state->packet_compression) {
- buffer_clear(&active_state->compression_buffer);
- buffer_uncompress(&active_state->incoming_packet,
- &active_state->compression_buffer);
- buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet);
- buffer_append(&active_state->incoming_packet,
- buffer_ptr(&active_state->compression_buffer),
- buffer_len(&active_state->compression_buffer));
- }
- active_state->p_read.packets++;
- active_state->p_read.bytes += padded_len + 4;
- type = buffer_get_char(&active_state->incoming_packet);
- if (type < SSH_MSG_MIN || type > SSH_MSG_MAX)
- packet_disconnect("Invalid ssh1 packet type: %d", type);
- return type;
-}
-
-static int
-packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
-{
- u_int padlen, need;
- u_char *macbuf = NULL, *cp, type;
- u_int maclen, authlen = 0, aadlen = 0, block_size;
- Enc *enc = NULL;
- Mac *mac = NULL;
- Comp *comp = NULL;
-
- if (active_state->packet_discard)
- return SSH_MSG_NONE;
-
- if (active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) {
- enc = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc;
- mac = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac;
- comp = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp;
- /* disable mac for authenticated encryption */
- if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0)
- mac = NULL;
- }
- maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0;
- block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
- aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0;
-
- if (aadlen && active_state->packlen == 0) {
- if (cipher_get_length(&active_state->receive_context,
- &active_state->packlen,
- active_state->p_read.seqnr,
- buffer_ptr(&active_state->input),
- buffer_len(&active_state->input)) != 0)
- return SSH_MSG_NONE;
- if (active_state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
- active_state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
-#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
- buffer_dump(&active_state->input);
-#endif
- logit("Bad packet length %u.", active_state->packlen);
- packet_disconnect("Packet corrupt");
- }
- buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet);
- } else if (active_state->packlen == 0) {
- /*
- * check if input size is less than the cipher block size,
- * decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet
- */
- if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < block_size)
- return SSH_MSG_NONE;
- buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet);
- cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet,
- block_size);
- if (cipher_crypt(&active_state->receive_context,
- active_state->p_read.seqnr, cp,
- buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), block_size, 0, 0) != 0)
- fatal("Decryption integrity check failed");
- cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet);
- active_state->packlen = get_u32(cp);
- if (active_state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
- active_state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
-#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
- buffer_dump(&active_state->incoming_packet);
-#endif
- logit("Bad packet length %u.", active_state->packlen);
- packet_start_discard(enc, mac, active_state->packlen,
- PACKET_MAX_SIZE);
- return SSH_MSG_NONE;
- }
- buffer_consume(&active_state->input, block_size);
- }
- DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", active_state->packlen+4));
- if (aadlen) {
- /* only the payload is encrypted */
- need = active_state->packlen;
- } else {
- /*
- * the payload size and the payload are encrypted, but we
- * have a partial packet of block_size bytes
- */
- need = 4 + active_state->packlen - block_size;
- }
- DBG(debug("partial packet: block %d, need %d, maclen %d, authlen %d,"
- " aadlen %d", block_size, need, maclen, authlen, aadlen));
- if (need % block_size != 0) {
- logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d",
- need, block_size, need % block_size);
- packet_start_discard(enc, mac, active_state->packlen,
- PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size);
- return SSH_MSG_NONE;
- }
- /*
- * check if the entire packet has been received and
- * decrypt into incoming_packet:
- * 'aadlen' bytes are unencrypted, but authenticated.
- * 'need' bytes are encrypted, followed by either
- * 'authlen' bytes of authentication tag or
- * 'maclen' bytes of message authentication code.
- */
- if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < aadlen + need + authlen + maclen)
- return SSH_MSG_NONE;
-#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: ");
- buffer_dump(&active_state->input);
-#endif
- /* EtM: compute mac over encrypted input */
- if (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm)
- macbuf = mac_compute(mac, active_state->p_read.seqnr,
- buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), aadlen + need);
- cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet, aadlen + need);
- if (cipher_crypt(&active_state->receive_context,
- active_state->p_read.seqnr, cp,
- buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), need, aadlen, authlen) != 0)
- fatal("Decryption integrity check failed");
- buffer_consume(&active_state->input, aadlen + need + authlen);
- /*
- * compute MAC over seqnr and packet,
- * increment sequence number for incoming packet
- */
- if (mac && mac->enabled) {
- if (!mac->etm)
- macbuf = mac_compute(mac, active_state->p_read.seqnr,
- buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet),
- buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet));
- if (timingsafe_bcmp(macbuf, buffer_ptr(&active_state->input),
- mac->mac_len) != 0) {
- logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
- if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
- fatal("internal error need %d", need);
- packet_start_discard(enc, mac, active_state->packlen,
- PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need);
- return SSH_MSG_NONE;
- }
-
- DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", active_state->p_read.seqnr));
- buffer_consume(&active_state->input, mac->mac_len);
- }
- /* XXX now it's safe to use fatal/packet_disconnect */
- if (seqnr_p != NULL)
- *seqnr_p = active_state->p_read.seqnr;
- if (++active_state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
- logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
- if (++active_state->p_read.packets == 0)
- if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
- fatal("XXX too many packets with same key");
- active_state->p_read.blocks += (active_state->packlen + 4) / block_size;
- active_state->p_read.bytes += active_state->packlen + 4;
-
- /* get padlen */
- cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet);
- padlen = cp[4];
- DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen));
- if (padlen < 4)
- packet_disconnect("Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen);
-
- /* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */
- buffer_consume(&active_state->incoming_packet, 4 + 1);
- buffer_consume_end(&active_state->incoming_packet, padlen);
-
- DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %d",
- buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet)));
- if (comp && comp->enabled) {
- buffer_clear(&active_state->compression_buffer);
- buffer_uncompress(&active_state->incoming_packet,
- &active_state->compression_buffer);
- buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet);
- buffer_append(&active_state->incoming_packet,
- buffer_ptr(&active_state->compression_buffer),
- buffer_len(&active_state->compression_buffer));
- DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %d",
- buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet)));
- }
- /*
- * get packet type, implies consume.
- * return length of payload (without type field)
- */
- type = buffer_get_char(&active_state->incoming_packet);
- if (type < SSH2_MSG_MIN || type >= SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN)
- packet_disconnect("Invalid ssh2 packet type: %d", type);
- if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
- set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
- else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS &&
- !active_state->server_side)
- packet_enable_delayed_compress();
-#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", type);
- buffer_dump(&active_state->incoming_packet);
-#endif
- /* reset for next packet */
- active_state->packlen = 0;
- return type;
-}
-
-int
-packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
-{
- u_int reason, seqnr;
- u_char type;
- char *msg;
-
- for (;;) {
- if (compat20) {
- type = packet_read_poll2(seqnr_p);
- if (type) {
- active_state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
- DBG(debug("received packet type %d", type));
- }
- switch (type) {
- case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
- debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
- break;
- case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG:
- packet_get_char();
- msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
- debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
- free(msg);
- msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
- free(msg);
- break;
- case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
- reason = packet_get_int();
- msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
- /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
- do_log2(active_state->server_side &&
- reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
- SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
- "Received disconnect from %s: %u: %.400s",
- get_remote_ipaddr(), reason, msg);
- free(msg);
- cleanup_exit(255);
- break;
- case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
- seqnr = packet_get_int();
- debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %u",
- seqnr);
- break;
- default:
- return type;
- }
- } else {
- type = packet_read_poll1();
- switch (type) {
- case SSH_MSG_NONE:
- return SSH_MSG_NONE;
- case SSH_MSG_IGNORE:
- break;
- case SSH_MSG_DEBUG:
- msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
- debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
- free(msg);
- break;
- case SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT:
- msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
- error("Received disconnect from %s: %.400s",
- get_remote_ipaddr(), msg);
- cleanup_exit(255);
- break;
- default:
- DBG(debug("received packet type %d", type));
- return type;
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Buffers the given amount of input characters. This is intended to be used
- * together with packet_read_poll.
- */
-
-void
-packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len)
-{
- if (active_state->packet_discard) {
- active_state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */
- if (len >= active_state->packet_discard)
- packet_stop_discard();
- active_state->packet_discard -= len;
- return;
- }
- buffer_append(&active_state->input, buf, len);
-}
-
-/* Returns a character from the packet. */
-
-u_int
-packet_get_char(void)
-{
- char ch;
-
- buffer_get(&active_state->incoming_packet, &ch, 1);
- return (u_char) ch;
-}
-
-/* Returns an integer from the packet data. */
-
-u_int
-packet_get_int(void)
-{
- return buffer_get_int(&active_state->incoming_packet);
-}
-
-/* Returns an 64 bit integer from the packet data. */
-
-u_int64_t
-packet_get_int64(void)
-{
- return buffer_get_int64(&active_state->incoming_packet);
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns an arbitrary precision integer from the packet data. The integer
- * must have been initialized before this call.
- */
-
-void
-packet_get_bignum(BIGNUM * value)
-{
- buffer_get_bignum(&active_state->incoming_packet, value);
-}
-
-void
-packet_get_bignum2(BIGNUM * value)
-{
- buffer_get_bignum2(&active_state->incoming_packet, value);
-}
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-void
-packet_get_ecpoint(const EC_GROUP *curve, EC_POINT *point)
-{
- buffer_get_ecpoint(&active_state->incoming_packet, curve, point);
-}
-#endif
-
-void *
-packet_get_raw(u_int *length_ptr)
-{
- u_int bytes = buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet);
-
- if (length_ptr != NULL)
- *length_ptr = bytes;
- return buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet);
-}
-
-int
-packet_remaining(void)
-{
- return buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet);
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns a string from the packet data. The string is allocated using
- * xmalloc; it is the responsibility of the calling program to free it when
- * no longer needed. The length_ptr argument may be NULL, or point to an
- * integer into which the length of the string is stored.
- */
-
-void *
-packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr)
-{
- return buffer_get_string(&active_state->incoming_packet, length_ptr);
-}
-
-void *
-packet_get_string_ptr(u_int *length_ptr)
-{
- return buffer_get_string_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet, length_ptr);
-}
-
-/* Ensures the returned string has no embedded \0 characters in it. */
-char *
-packet_get_cstring(u_int *length_ptr)
-{
- return buffer_get_cstring(&active_state->incoming_packet, length_ptr);
-}
-
-/*
- * Sends a diagnostic message from the server to the client. This message
- * can be sent at any time (but not while constructing another message). The
- * message is printed immediately, but only if the client is being executed
- * in verbose mode. These messages are primarily intended to ease debugging
- * authentication problems. The length of the formatted message must not
- * exceed 1024 bytes. This will automatically call packet_write_wait.
- */
-
-void
-packet_send_debug(const char *fmt,...)
-{
- char buf[1024];
- va_list args;
-
- if (compat20 && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DEBUG))
- return;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
-
- if (compat20) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG);
- packet_put_char(0); /* bool: always display */
- packet_put_cstring(buf);
- packet_put_cstring("");
- } else {
- packet_start(SSH_MSG_DEBUG);
- packet_put_cstring(buf);
- }
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-}
-
-/*
- * Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the
- * connection, and exits. This function never returns. The error message
- * should not contain a newline. The length of the formatted message must
- * not exceed 1024 bytes.
- */
-
-void
-packet_disconnect(const char *fmt,...)
-{
- char buf[1024];
- va_list args;
- static int disconnecting = 0;
-
- if (disconnecting) /* Guard against recursive invocations. */
- fatal("packet_disconnect called recursively.");
- disconnecting = 1;
-
- /*
- * Format the message. Note that the caller must make sure the
- * message is of limited size.
- */
- va_start(args, fmt);
- vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
-
- /* Display the error locally */
- logit("Disconnecting: %.100s", buf);
-
- /* Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait for it to get sent. */
- if (compat20) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
- packet_put_int(SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
- packet_put_cstring(buf);
- packet_put_cstring("");
- } else {
- packet_start(SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT);
- packet_put_cstring(buf);
- }
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Stop listening for connections. */
- channel_close_all();
-
- /* Close the connection. */
- packet_close();
- cleanup_exit(255);
-}
-
-/* Checks if there is any buffered output, and tries to write some of the output. */
-
-void
-packet_write_poll(void)
-{
- int len = buffer_len(&active_state->output);
- int cont;
-
- if (len > 0) {
- cont = 0;
- len = roaming_write(active_state->connection_out,
- buffer_ptr(&active_state->output), len, &cont);
- if (len == -1) {
- if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
- errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
- return;
- fatal("Write failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- }
- if (len == 0 && !cont)
- fatal("Write connection closed");
- buffer_consume(&active_state->output, len);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Calls packet_write_poll repeatedly until all pending output data has been
- * written.
- */
-
-void
-packet_write_wait(void)
-{
- fd_set *setp;
- int ret, ms_remain = 0;
- struct timeval start, timeout, *timeoutp = NULL;
-
- setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(active_state->connection_out + 1,
- NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
- packet_write_poll();
- while (packet_have_data_to_write()) {
- memset(setp, 0, howmany(active_state->connection_out + 1,
- NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
- FD_SET(active_state->connection_out, setp);
-
- if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
- ms_remain = active_state->packet_timeout_ms;
- timeoutp = &timeout;
- }
- for (;;) {
- if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
- ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
- gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
- }
- if ((ret = select(active_state->connection_out + 1,
- NULL, setp, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
- break;
- if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
- errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
- break;
- if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
- continue;
- ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
- if (ms_remain <= 0) {
- ret = 0;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (ret == 0) {
- logit("Connection to %.200s timed out while "
- "waiting to write", get_remote_ipaddr());
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- packet_write_poll();
- }
- free(setp);
-}
-
-/* Returns true if there is buffered data to write to the connection. */
-
-int
-packet_have_data_to_write(void)
-{
- return buffer_len(&active_state->output) != 0;
-}
-
-/* Returns true if there is not too much data to write to the connection. */
-
-int
-packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(void)
-{
- if (active_state->interactive_mode)
- return buffer_len(&active_state->output) < 16384;
- else
- return buffer_len(&active_state->output) < 128 * 1024;
-}
-
-static void
-packet_set_tos(int tos)
-{
-#ifndef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN
- if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket())
- return;
- switch (packet_connection_af()) {
-# ifdef IP_TOS
- case AF_INET:
- debug3("%s: set IP_TOS 0x%02x", __func__, tos);
- if (setsockopt(active_state->connection_in,
- IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) < 0)
- error("setsockopt IP_TOS %d: %.100s:",
- tos, strerror(errno));
- break;
-# endif /* IP_TOS */
-# ifdef IPV6_TCLASS
- case AF_INET6:
- debug3("%s: set IPV6_TCLASS 0x%02x", __func__, tos);
- if (setsockopt(active_state->connection_in,
- IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) < 0)
- error("setsockopt IPV6_TCLASS %d: %.100s:",
- tos, strerror(errno));
- break;
-# endif /* IPV6_TCLASS */
- }
-#endif /* IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN */
-}
-
-/* Informs that the current session is interactive. Sets IP flags for that. */
-
-void
-packet_set_interactive(int interactive, int qos_interactive, int qos_bulk)
-{
- if (active_state->set_interactive_called)
- return;
- active_state->set_interactive_called = 1;
-
- /* Record that we are in interactive mode. */
- active_state->interactive_mode = interactive;
-
- /* Only set socket options if using a socket. */
- if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket())
- return;
- set_nodelay(active_state->connection_in);
- packet_set_tos(interactive ? qos_interactive : qos_bulk);
-}
-
-/* Returns true if the current connection is interactive. */
-
-int
-packet_is_interactive(void)
-{
- return active_state->interactive_mode;
-}
-
-int
-packet_set_maxsize(u_int s)
-{
- if (active_state->set_maxsize_called) {
- logit("packet_set_maxsize: called twice: old %d new %d",
- active_state->max_packet_size, s);
- return -1;
- }
- if (s < 4 * 1024 || s > 1024 * 1024) {
- logit("packet_set_maxsize: bad size %d", s);
- return -1;
- }
- active_state->set_maxsize_called = 1;
- debug("packet_set_maxsize: setting to %d", s);
- active_state->max_packet_size = s;
- return s;
-}
-
-int
-packet_inc_alive_timeouts(void)
-{
- return ++active_state->keep_alive_timeouts;
-}
-
-void
-packet_set_alive_timeouts(int ka)
-{
- active_state->keep_alive_timeouts = ka;
-}
-
-u_int
-packet_get_maxsize(void)
-{
- return active_state->max_packet_size;
-}
-
-/* roundup current message to pad bytes */
-void
-packet_add_padding(u_char pad)
-{
- active_state->extra_pad = pad;
-}
-
-/*
- * 9.2. Ignored Data Message
- *
- * byte SSH_MSG_IGNORE
- * string data
- *
- * All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any
- * time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is
- * required to send them. This message can be used as an additional
- * protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques.
- */
-void
-packet_send_ignore(int nbytes)
-{
- u_int32_t rnd = 0;
- int i;
-
- packet_start(compat20 ? SSH2_MSG_IGNORE : SSH_MSG_IGNORE);
- packet_put_int(nbytes);
- for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) {
- if (i % 4 == 0)
- rnd = arc4random();
- packet_put_char((u_char)rnd & 0xff);
- rnd >>= 8;
- }
-}
-
-#define MAX_PACKETS (1U<<31)
-int
-packet_need_rekeying(void)
-{
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
- return 0;
- return
- (active_state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS) ||
- (active_state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS) ||
- (active_state->max_blocks_out &&
- (active_state->p_send.blocks > active_state->max_blocks_out)) ||
- (active_state->max_blocks_in &&
- (active_state->p_read.blocks > active_state->max_blocks_in)) ||
- (active_state->rekey_interval != 0 && active_state->rekey_time +
- active_state->rekey_interval <= monotime());
-}
-
-void
-packet_set_rekey_limits(u_int32_t bytes, time_t seconds)
-{
- debug3("rekey after %lld bytes, %d seconds", (long long)bytes,
- (int)seconds);
- active_state->rekey_limit = bytes;
- active_state->rekey_interval = seconds;
- /*
- * We set the time here so that in post-auth privsep slave we count
- * from the completion of the authentication.
- */
- active_state->rekey_time = monotime();
-}
-
-time_t
-packet_get_rekey_timeout(void)
-{
- time_t seconds;
-
- seconds = active_state->rekey_time + active_state->rekey_interval -
- monotime();
- return (seconds <= 0 ? 1 : seconds);
-}
-
-void
-packet_set_server(void)
-{
- active_state->server_side = 1;
-}
-
-void
-packet_set_authenticated(void)
-{
- active_state->after_authentication = 1;
-}
-
-void *
-packet_get_input(void)
-{
- return (void *)&active_state->input;
-}
-
-void *
-packet_get_output(void)
-{
- return (void *)&active_state->output;
-}
-
-void *
-packet_get_newkeys(int mode)
-{
- return (void *)active_state->newkeys[mode];
-}
-
-/*
- * Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when
- * resuming a suspended connection.
- */
-void
-packet_backup_state(void)
-{
- struct session_state *tmp;
-
- close(active_state->connection_in);
- active_state->connection_in = -1;
- close(active_state->connection_out);
- active_state->connection_out = -1;
- if (backup_state)
- tmp = backup_state;
- else
- tmp = alloc_session_state();
- backup_state = active_state;
- active_state = tmp;
-}
-
-/*
- * Swap in the old state when resuming a connecion.
- */
-void
-packet_restore_state(void)
-{
- struct session_state *tmp;
- void *buf;
- u_int len;
-
- tmp = backup_state;
- backup_state = active_state;
- active_state = tmp;
- active_state->connection_in = backup_state->connection_in;
- backup_state->connection_in = -1;
- active_state->connection_out = backup_state->connection_out;
- backup_state->connection_out = -1;
- len = buffer_len(&backup_state->input);
- if (len > 0) {
- buf = buffer_ptr(&backup_state->input);
- buffer_append(&active_state->input, buf, len);
- buffer_clear(&backup_state->input);
- add_recv_bytes(len);
- }
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/packet.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/packet.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/packet.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/packet.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,3016 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.234 2016/07/18 11:35:33 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * This file contains code implementing the packet protocol and communication
+ * with the other side. This same code is used both on client and server side.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h> /* MIN roundup */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include <zlib.h>
+
+#include "buffer.h" /* typedefs XXX */
+#include "key.h" /* typedefs XXX */
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "crc32.h"
+#include "deattack.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+#define DBG(x) x
+#else
+#define DBG(x)
+#endif
+
+#define PACKET_MAX_SIZE (256 * 1024)
+
+struct packet_state {
+ u_int32_t seqnr;
+ u_int32_t packets;
+ u_int64_t blocks;
+ u_int64_t bytes;
+};
+
+struct packet {
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(packet) next;
+ u_char type;
+ struct sshbuf *payload;
+};
+
+struct session_state {
+ /*
+ * This variable contains the file descriptors used for
+ * communicating with the other side. connection_in is used for
+ * reading; connection_out for writing. These can be the same
+ * descriptor, in which case it is assumed to be a socket.
+ */
+ int connection_in;
+ int connection_out;
+
+ /* Protocol flags for the remote side. */
+ u_int remote_protocol_flags;
+
+ /* Encryption context for receiving data. Only used for decryption. */
+ struct sshcipher_ctx receive_context;
+
+ /* Encryption context for sending data. Only used for encryption. */
+ struct sshcipher_ctx send_context;
+
+ /* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */
+ struct sshbuf *input;
+
+ /* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */
+ struct sshbuf *output;
+
+ /* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */
+ struct sshbuf *outgoing_packet;
+
+ /* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */
+ struct sshbuf *incoming_packet;
+
+ /* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */
+ struct sshbuf *compression_buffer;
+
+ /* Incoming/outgoing compression dictionaries */
+ z_stream compression_in_stream;
+ z_stream compression_out_stream;
+ int compression_in_started;
+ int compression_out_started;
+ int compression_in_failures;
+ int compression_out_failures;
+
+ /*
+ * Flag indicating whether packet compression/decompression is
+ * enabled.
+ */
+ int packet_compression;
+
+ /* default maximum packet size */
+ u_int max_packet_size;
+
+ /* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */
+ int initialized;
+
+ /* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */
+ int interactive_mode;
+
+ /* Set to true if we are the server side. */
+ int server_side;
+
+ /* Set to true if we are authenticated. */
+ int after_authentication;
+
+ int keep_alive_timeouts;
+
+ /* The maximum time that we will wait to send or receive a packet */
+ int packet_timeout_ms;
+
+ /* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */
+ struct newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
+ struct packet_state p_read, p_send;
+
+ /* Volume-based rekeying */
+ u_int64_t max_blocks_in, max_blocks_out, rekey_limit;
+
+ /* Time-based rekeying */
+ u_int32_t rekey_interval; /* how often in seconds */
+ time_t rekey_time; /* time of last rekeying */
+
+ /* Session key for protocol v1 */
+ u_char ssh1_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
+ u_int ssh1_keylen;
+
+ /* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */
+ u_char extra_pad;
+
+ /* XXX discard incoming data after MAC error */
+ u_int packet_discard;
+ size_t packet_discard_mac_already;
+ struct sshmac *packet_discard_mac;
+
+ /* Used in packet_read_poll2() */
+ u_int packlen;
+
+ /* Used in packet_send2 */
+ int rekeying;
+
+ /* Used in packet_set_interactive */
+ int set_interactive_called;
+
+ /* Used in packet_set_maxsize */
+ int set_maxsize_called;
+
+ /* One-off warning about weak ciphers */
+ int cipher_warning_done;
+
+ /* SSH1 CRC compensation attack detector */
+ struct deattack_ctx deattack;
+
+ TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
+};
+
+struct ssh *
+ssh_alloc_session_state(void)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
+ struct session_state *state = NULL;
+
+ if ((ssh = calloc(1, sizeof(*ssh))) == NULL ||
+ (state = calloc(1, sizeof(*state))) == NULL ||
+ (state->input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (state->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (state->incoming_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+ TAILQ_INIT(&state->outgoing);
+ TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->private_keys);
+ TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->public_keys);
+ state->connection_in = -1;
+ state->connection_out = -1;
+ state->max_packet_size = 32768;
+ state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
+ state->p_send.packets = state->p_read.packets = 0;
+ state->initialized = 1;
+ /*
+ * ssh_packet_send2() needs to queue packets until
+ * we've done the initial key exchange.
+ */
+ state->rekeying = 1;
+ ssh->state = state;
+ return ssh;
+ fail:
+ if (state) {
+ sshbuf_free(state->input);
+ sshbuf_free(state->output);
+ sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet);
+ sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
+ free(state);
+ }
+ free(ssh);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Returns nonzero if rekeying is in progress */
+int
+ssh_packet_is_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ return compat20 &&
+ (ssh->state->rekeying || (ssh->kex != NULL && ssh->kex->done == 0));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets the descriptors used for communication. Disables encryption until
+ * packet_set_encryption_key is called.
+ */
+struct ssh *
+ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out)
+{
+ struct session_state *state;
+ const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
+ int r;
+
+ if (none == NULL) {
+ error("%s: cannot load cipher 'none'", __func__);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (ssh == NULL)
+ ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state();
+ if (ssh == NULL) {
+ error("%s: cound not allocate state", __func__);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ state = ssh->state;
+ state->connection_in = fd_in;
+ state->connection_out = fd_out;
+ if ((r = cipher_init(&state->send_context, none,
+ (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, none,
+ (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: cipher_init failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ free(ssh); /* XXX need ssh_free_session_state? */
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
+ deattack_init(&state->deattack);
+ /*
+ * Cache the IP address of the remote connection for use in error
+ * messages that might be generated after the connection has closed.
+ */
+ (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ return ssh;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_timeout(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout, int count)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+
+ if (timeout <= 0 || count <= 0) {
+ state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
+ return;
+ }
+ if ((INT_MAX / 1000) / count < timeout)
+ state->packet_timeout_ms = INT_MAX;
+ else
+ state->packet_timeout_ms = timeout * count * 1000;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ int r;
+
+ if (state->packet_discard_mac) {
+ char buf[1024];
+ size_t dlen = PACKET_MAX_SIZE;
+
+ if (dlen > state->packet_discard_mac_already)
+ dlen -= state->packet_discard_mac_already;
+ memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf));
+ while (sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet) < dlen)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->incoming_packet, buf,
+ sizeof(buf))) != 0)
+ return r;
+ (void) mac_compute(state->packet_discard_mac,
+ state->p_read.seqnr,
+ sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet), dlen,
+ NULL, 0);
+ }
+ logit("Finished discarding for %.200s port %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_packet_start_discard(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshenc *enc,
+ struct sshmac *mac, size_t mac_already, u_int discard)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ int r;
+
+ if (enc == NULL || !cipher_is_cbc(enc->cipher) || (mac && mac->etm)) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Record number of bytes over which the mac has already
+ * been computed in order to minimize timing attacks.
+ */
+ if (mac && mac->enabled) {
+ state->packet_discard_mac = mac;
+ state->packet_discard_mac_already = mac_already;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(state->input) >= discard)
+ return ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh);
+ state->packet_discard = discard - sshbuf_len(state->input);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */
+
+int
+ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
+ socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
+
+ if (state->connection_in == -1 || state->connection_out == -1)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
+ if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out)
+ return 1;
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ if (getpeername(state->connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
+ &fromlen) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ tolen = sizeof(to);
+ memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
+ if (getpeername(state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to,
+ &tolen) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (fromlen != tolen || memcmp(&from, &to, fromlen) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_get_bytes(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *ibytes, u_int64_t *obytes)
+{
+ if (ibytes)
+ *ibytes = ssh->state->p_read.bytes;
+ if (obytes)
+ *obytes = ssh->state->p_send.bytes;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_connection_af(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage to;
+ socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to);
+
+ memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
+ if (getsockname(ssh->state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to,
+ &tolen) < 0)
+ return 0;
+#ifdef IPV4_IN_IPV6
+ if (to.ss_family == AF_INET6 &&
+ IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&to)->sin6_addr))
+ return AF_INET;
+#endif
+ return to.ss_family;
+}
+
+/* Sets the connection into non-blocking mode. */
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ /* Set the socket into non-blocking mode. */
+ set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_in);
+
+ if (ssh->state->connection_out != ssh->state->connection_in)
+ set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_out);
+}
+
+/* Returns the socket used for reading. */
+
+int
+ssh_packet_get_connection_in(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ return ssh->state->connection_in;
+}
+
+/* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */
+
+int
+ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ return ssh->state->connection_out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned
+ * string must not be freed.
+ */
+
+const char *
+ssh_remote_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ const int sock = ssh->state->connection_in;
+
+ /* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */
+ if (ssh->remote_ipaddr == NULL) {
+ if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
+ ssh->remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(sock);
+ ssh->remote_port = get_peer_port(sock);
+ ssh->local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock);
+ ssh->local_port = get_local_port(sock);
+ } else {
+ ssh->remote_ipaddr = strdup("UNKNOWN");
+ ssh->remote_port = 65535;
+ ssh->local_ipaddr = strdup("UNKNOWN");
+ ssh->local_port = 65535;
+ }
+ }
+ return ssh->remote_ipaddr;
+}
+
+/* Returns the port number of the remote host. */
+
+int
+ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */
+ return ssh->remote_port;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the IP-address of the local host as a string. The returned
+ * string must not be freed.
+ */
+
+const char *
+ssh_local_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */
+ return ssh->local_ipaddr;
+}
+
+/* Returns the port number of the local host. */
+
+int
+ssh_local_port(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */
+ return ssh->local_port;
+}
+
+/* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
+
+void
+ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ int r;
+ u_int mode;
+
+ if (!state->initialized)
+ return;
+ state->initialized = 0;
+ if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) {
+ shutdown(state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
+ close(state->connection_out);
+ } else {
+ close(state->connection_in);
+ close(state->connection_out);
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(state->input);
+ sshbuf_free(state->output);
+ sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
+ sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet);
+ for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++)
+ kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]);
+ if (state->compression_buffer) {
+ sshbuf_free(state->compression_buffer);
+ if (state->compression_out_started) {
+ z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream;
+ debug("compress outgoing: "
+ "raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
+ (unsigned long long)stream->total_in,
+ (unsigned long long)stream->total_out,
+ stream->total_in == 0 ? 0.0 :
+ (double) stream->total_out / stream->total_in);
+ if (state->compression_out_failures == 0)
+ deflateEnd(stream);
+ }
+ if (state->compression_in_started) {
+ z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream;
+ debug("compress incoming: "
+ "raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
+ (unsigned long long)stream->total_out,
+ (unsigned long long)stream->total_in,
+ stream->total_out == 0 ? 0.0 :
+ (double) stream->total_in / stream->total_out);
+ if (state->compression_in_failures == 0)
+ inflateEnd(stream);
+ }
+ }
+ if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context)) != 0)
+ error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context)) != 0)
+ error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ free(ssh->remote_ipaddr);
+ ssh->remote_ipaddr = NULL;
+ free(ssh->state);
+ ssh->state = NULL;
+}
+
+/* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh, u_int protocol_flags)
+{
+ ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags;
+}
+
+/* Returns the remote protocol flags set earlier by the above function. */
+
+u_int
+ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ return ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Starts packet compression from the next packet on in both directions.
+ * Level is compression level 1 (fastest) - 9 (slow, best) as in gzip.
+ */
+
+static int
+ssh_packet_init_compression(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ if (!ssh->state->compression_buffer &&
+ ((ssh->state->compression_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL))
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh, int level)
+{
+ if (level < 1 || level > 9)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ debug("Enabling compression at level %d.", level);
+ if (ssh->state->compression_out_started == 1)
+ deflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream);
+ switch (deflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream, level)) {
+ case Z_OK:
+ ssh->state->compression_out_started = 1;
+ break;
+ case Z_MEM_ERROR:
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+start_compression_in(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ if (ssh->state->compression_in_started == 1)
+ inflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream);
+ switch (inflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream)) {
+ case Z_OK:
+ ssh->state->compression_in_started = 1;
+ break;
+ case Z_MEM_ERROR:
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_start_compression(struct ssh *ssh, int level)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (ssh->state->packet_compression && !compat20)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ ssh->state->packet_compression = 1;
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0 ||
+ (r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0 ||
+ (r = start_compression_out(ssh, level)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* XXX remove need for separate compression buffer */
+static int
+compress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
+{
+ u_char buf[4096];
+ int r, status;
+
+ if (ssh->state->compression_out_started != 1)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ /* This case is not handled below. */
+ if (sshbuf_len(in) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Input is the contents of the input buffer. */
+ if ((ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_in =
+ sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in);
+
+ /* Loop compressing until deflate() returns with avail_out != 0. */
+ do {
+ /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
+ ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_out = buf;
+ ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
+
+ /* Compress as much data into the buffer as possible. */
+ status = deflate(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream,
+ Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
+ switch (status) {
+ case Z_MEM_ERROR:
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ case Z_OK:
+ /* Append compressed data to output_buffer. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) -
+ ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ break;
+ case Z_STREAM_ERROR:
+ default:
+ ssh->state->compression_out_failures++;
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ }
+ } while (ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out == 0);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+uncompress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
+{
+ u_char buf[4096];
+ int r, status;
+
+ if (ssh->state->compression_in_started != 1)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if ((ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_in =
+ sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in);
+
+ for (;;) {
+ /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
+ ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_out = buf;
+ ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
+
+ status = inflate(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream,
+ Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
+ switch (status) {
+ case Z_OK:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) -
+ ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ break;
+ case Z_BUF_ERROR:
+ /*
+ * Comments in zlib.h say that we should keep calling
+ * inflate() until we get an error. This appears to
+ * be the error that we get.
+ */
+ return 0;
+ case Z_DATA_ERROR:
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ case Z_MEM_ERROR:
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ case Z_STREAM_ERROR:
+ default:
+ ssh->state->compression_in_failures++;
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+/* Serialise compression state into a blob for privsep */
+static int
+ssh_packet_get_compress_state(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if (state->compression_in_started) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, &state->compression_in_stream,
+ sizeof(state->compression_in_stream))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ } else if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (state->compression_out_started) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, &state->compression_out_stream,
+ sizeof(state->compression_out_stream))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ } else if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b);
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* Deserialise compression state from a blob for privsep */
+static int
+ssh_packet_set_compress_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ int r;
+ const u_char *inblob, *outblob;
+ size_t inl, outl;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &inblob, &inl)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &outblob, &outl)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (inl == 0)
+ state->compression_in_started = 0;
+ else if (inl != sizeof(state->compression_in_stream)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ state->compression_in_started = 1;
+ memcpy(&state->compression_in_stream, inblob, inl);
+ }
+ if (outl == 0)
+ state->compression_out_started = 0;
+ else if (outl != sizeof(state->compression_out_stream)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ state->compression_out_started = 1;
+ memcpy(&state->compression_out_stream, outblob, outl);
+ }
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(struct ssh *ssh, void *ctx,
+ void *(*allocfunc)(void *, u_int, u_int),
+ void (*freefunc)(void *, void *))
+{
+ ssh->state->compression_out_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)allocfunc;
+ ssh->state->compression_out_stream.zfree = (free_func)freefunc;
+ ssh->state->compression_out_stream.opaque = ctx;
+ ssh->state->compression_in_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)allocfunc;
+ ssh->state->compression_in_stream.zfree = (free_func)freefunc;
+ ssh->state->compression_in_stream.opaque = ctx;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Causes any further packets to be encrypted using the given key. The same
+ * key is used for both sending and reception. However, both directions are
+ * encrypted independently of each other.
+ */
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *key, u_int keylen, int number)
+{
+#ifndef WITH_SSH1
+ fatal("no SSH protocol 1 support");
+#else /* WITH_SSH1 */
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ const struct sshcipher *cipher = cipher_by_number(number);
+ int r;
+ const char *wmsg;
+
+ if (cipher == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: unknown cipher number %d", __func__, number);
+ if (keylen < 20)
+ fatal("%s: keylen too small: %d", __func__, keylen);
+ if (keylen > SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH)
+ fatal("%s: keylen too big: %d", __func__, keylen);
+ memcpy(state->ssh1_key, key, keylen);
+ state->ssh1_keylen = keylen;
+ if ((r = cipher_init(&state->send_context, cipher, key, keylen,
+ NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, cipher, key, keylen,
+ NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT) != 0))
+ fatal("%s: cipher_init failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (!state->cipher_warning_done &&
+ ((wmsg = cipher_warning_message(&state->send_context)) != NULL ||
+ (wmsg = cipher_warning_message(&state->send_context)) != NULL)) {
+ error("Warning: %s", wmsg);
+ state->cipher_warning_done = 1;
+ }
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finalizes and sends the packet. If the encryption key has been set,
+ * encrypts the packet before sending.
+ */
+
+int
+ssh_packet_send1(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ u_char buf[8], *cp;
+ int r, padding, len;
+ u_int checksum;
+
+ /*
+ * If using packet compression, compress the payload of the outgoing
+ * packet.
+ */
+ if (state->packet_compression) {
+ sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
+ /* Skip padding. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 8)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* padding */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->compression_buffer,
+ "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = compress_buffer(ssh, state->outgoing_packet,
+ state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->outgoing_packet,
+ state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Compute packet length without padding (add checksum, remove padding). */
+ len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) + 4 - 8;
+
+ /* Insert padding. Initialized to zero in packet_start1() */
+ padding = 8 - len % 8;
+ if (!state->send_context.plaintext) {
+ cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet);
+ if (cp == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ arc4random_buf(cp + 8 - padding, padding);
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 8 - padding)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Add check bytes. */
+ checksum = ssh_crc32(sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet),
+ sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet));
+ POKE_U32(buf, checksum);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->outgoing_packet, buf, 4)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "packet_send plain: ");
+ sshbuf_dump(state->outgoing_packet, stderr);
+#endif
+
+ /* Append to output. */
+ POKE_U32(buf, len);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->output, buf, 4)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->output,
+ sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet), &cp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->send_context, 0, cp,
+ sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet),
+ sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet), 0, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
+ sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
+#endif
+ state->p_send.packets++;
+ state->p_send.bytes += len +
+ sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
+ sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
+
+ /*
+ * Note that the packet is now only buffered in output. It won't be
+ * actually sent until ssh_packet_write_wait or ssh_packet_write_poll
+ * is called.
+ */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ struct sshenc *enc;
+ struct sshmac *mac;
+ struct sshcomp *comp;
+ struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
+ u_int64_t *max_blocks;
+ const char *wmsg;
+ int r, crypt_type;
+
+ debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode);
+
+ if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
+ cc = &state->send_context;
+ crypt_type = CIPHER_ENCRYPT;
+ state->p_send.packets = state->p_send.blocks = 0;
+ max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_out;
+ } else {
+ cc = &state->receive_context;
+ crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT;
+ state->p_read.packets = state->p_read.blocks = 0;
+ max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_in;
+ }
+ if (state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
+ debug("set_newkeys: rekeying, input %llu bytes %llu blocks, "
+ "output %llu bytes %llu blocks",
+ (unsigned long long)state->p_read.bytes,
+ (unsigned long long)state->p_read.blocks,
+ (unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes,
+ (unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks);
+ if ((r = cipher_cleanup(cc)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ enc = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
+ mac = &state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
+ comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
+ mac_clear(mac);
+ explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->iv_len);
+ explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len);
+ explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len);
+ free(enc->name);
+ free(enc->iv);
+ free(enc->key);
+ free(mac->name);
+ free(mac->key);
+ free(comp->name);
+ free(state->newkeys[mode]);
+ }
+ /* move newkeys from kex to state */
+ if ((state->newkeys[mode] = ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
+ enc = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
+ mac = &state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
+ comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
+ if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
+ if ((r = mac_init(mac)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ mac->enabled = 1;
+ DBG(debug("cipher_init_context: %d", mode));
+ if ((r = cipher_init(cc, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len,
+ enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (!state->cipher_warning_done &&
+ (wmsg = cipher_warning_message(cc)) != NULL) {
+ error("Warning: %s", wmsg);
+ state->cipher_warning_done = 1;
+ }
+ /* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */
+ /* explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->block_size);
+ explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len);
+ explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len); */
+ if ((comp->type == COMP_ZLIB ||
+ (comp->type == COMP_DELAYED &&
+ state->after_authentication)) && comp->enabled == 0) {
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
+ if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ } else {
+ if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ comp->enabled = 1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES,
+ * blowfish, etc, so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes.
+ */
+ if (enc->block_size >= 16)
+ *max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2);
+ else
+ *max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size;
+ if (state->rekey_limit)
+ *max_blocks = MIN(*max_blocks,
+ state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size);
+ debug("rekey after %llu blocks", (unsigned long long)*max_blocks);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define MAX_PACKETS (1U<<31)
+static int
+ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ u_int32_t out_blocks;
+
+ /* XXX client can't cope with rekeying pre-auth */
+ if (!state->after_authentication)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Haven't keyed yet or KEX in progress. */
+ if (ssh->kex == NULL || ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Peer can't rekey */
+ if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Permit one packet in or out per rekey - this allows us to
+ * make progress when rekey limits are very small.
+ */
+ if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Time-based rekeying */
+ if (state->rekey_interval != 0 &&
+ state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Always rekey when MAX_PACKETS sent in either direction */
+ if (state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS ||
+ state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Rekey after (cipher-specific) maxiumum blocks */
+ out_blocks = roundup(outbound_packet_len,
+ state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc.block_size);
+ return (state->max_blocks_out &&
+ (state->p_send.blocks + out_blocks > state->max_blocks_out)) ||
+ (state->max_blocks_in &&
+ (state->p_read.blocks > state->max_blocks_in));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Delayed compression for SSH2 is enabled after authentication:
+ * This happens on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent,
+ * and on the client side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is received.
+ */
+static int
+ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
+ int r, mode;
+
+ /*
+ * Remember that we are past the authentication step, so rekeying
+ * with COMP_DELAYED will turn on compression immediately.
+ */
+ state->after_authentication = 1;
+ for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+ /* protocol error: USERAUTH_SUCCESS received before NEWKEYS */
+ if (state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
+ continue;
+ comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
+ if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) {
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
+ if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ } else {
+ if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ comp->enabled = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Used to mute debug logging for noisy packet types */
+static int
+ssh_packet_log_type(u_char type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA:
+ case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA:
+ case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST:
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finalize packet in SSH2 format (compress, mac, encrypt, enqueue)
+ */
+int
+ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ u_char type, *cp, macbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ u_char tmp, padlen, pad = 0;
+ u_int authlen = 0, aadlen = 0;
+ u_int len;
+ struct sshenc *enc = NULL;
+ struct sshmac *mac = NULL;
+ struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
+ int r, block_size;
+
+ if (state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) {
+ enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc;
+ mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac;
+ comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp;
+ /* disable mac for authenticated encryption */
+ if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0)
+ mac = NULL;
+ }
+ block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
+ aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0;
+
+ type = (sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet))[5];
+ if (ssh_packet_log_type(type))
+ debug3("send packet: type %u", type);
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "plain: ");
+ sshbuf_dump(state->outgoing_packet, stderr);
+#endif
+
+ if (comp && comp->enabled) {
+ len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
+ /* skip header, compress only payload */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 5)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
+ if ((r = compress_buffer(ssh, state->outgoing_packet,
+ state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->outgoing_packet,
+ "\0\0\0\0\0", 5)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_putb(state->outgoing_packet,
+ state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ DBG(debug("compression: raw %d compressed %zd", len,
+ sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet)));
+ }
+
+ /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload) */
+ len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
+
+ /*
+ * calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data,
+ * minimum padding is 4 bytes
+ */
+ len -= aadlen; /* packet length is not encrypted for EtM modes */
+ padlen = block_size - (len % block_size);
+ if (padlen < 4)
+ padlen += block_size;
+ if (state->extra_pad) {
+ tmp = state->extra_pad;
+ state->extra_pad =
+ roundup(state->extra_pad, block_size);
+ /* check if roundup overflowed */
+ if (state->extra_pad < tmp)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ tmp = (len + padlen) % state->extra_pad;
+ /* Check whether pad calculation below will underflow */
+ if (tmp > state->extra_pad)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ pad = state->extra_pad - tmp;
+ DBG(debug3("%s: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)",
+ __func__, pad, len, padlen, state->extra_pad));
+ tmp = padlen;
+ padlen += pad;
+ /* Check whether padlen calculation overflowed */
+ if (padlen < tmp)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* overflow */
+ state->extra_pad = 0;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->outgoing_packet, padlen, &cp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (enc && !state->send_context.plaintext) {
+ /* random padding */
+ arc4random_buf(cp, padlen);
+ } else {
+ /* clear padding */
+ explicit_bzero(cp, padlen);
+ }
+ /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload + padding) */
+ len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
+ cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet);
+ if (cp == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */
+ POKE_U32(cp, len - 4);
+ cp[4] = padlen;
+ DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d, aadlen %d)",
+ len, padlen, aadlen));
+
+ /* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */
+ if (mac && mac->enabled && !mac->etm) {
+ if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr,
+ sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), len,
+ macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", state->p_send.seqnr));
+ }
+ /* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->output,
+ sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) + authlen, &cp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->send_context, state->p_send.seqnr, cp,
+ sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet),
+ len - aadlen, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* append unencrypted MAC */
+ if (mac && mac->enabled) {
+ if (mac->etm) {
+ /* EtM: compute mac over aadlen + cipher text */
+ if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr,
+ cp, len, macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ DBG(debug("done calc MAC(EtM) out #%d",
+ state->p_send.seqnr));
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->output, macbuf, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
+ sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
+#endif
+ /* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
+ if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
+ logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
+ if (++state->p_send.packets == 0)
+ if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
+ return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
+ state->p_send.blocks += len / block_size;
+ state->p_send.bytes += len;
+ sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
+
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
+ r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
+ else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side)
+ r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh);
+ else
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* returns non-zero if the specified packet type is usec by KEX */
+static int
+ssh_packet_type_is_kex(u_char type)
+{
+ return
+ type >= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN &&
+ type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX &&
+ type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST &&
+ type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT &&
+ type != SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ struct packet *p;
+ u_char type;
+ int r, need_rekey;
+
+ if (sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) < 6)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ type = sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet)[5];
+ need_rekey = !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type) &&
+ ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet));
+
+ /*
+ * During rekeying we can only send key exchange messages.
+ * Queue everything else.
+ */
+ if ((need_rekey || state->rekeying) && !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type)) {
+ if (need_rekey)
+ debug3("%s: rekex triggered", __func__);
+ debug("enqueue packet: %u", type);
+ p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p));
+ if (p == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ p->type = type;
+ p->payload = state->outgoing_packet;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&state->outgoing, p, next);
+ state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new();
+ if (state->outgoing_packet == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if (need_rekey) {
+ /*
+ * This packet triggered a rekey, so send the
+ * KEXINIT now.
+ * NB. reenters this function via kex_start_rekex().
+ */
+ return kex_start_rekex(ssh);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* rekeying starts with sending KEXINIT */
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)
+ state->rekeying = 1;
+
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
+ /* after a NEWKEYS message we can send the complete queue */
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
+ state->rekeying = 0;
+ state->rekey_time = monotime();
+ while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&state->outgoing))) {
+ type = p->type;
+ /*
+ * If this packet triggers a rekex, then skip the
+ * remaining packets in the queue for now.
+ * NB. re-enters this function via kex_start_rekex.
+ */
+ if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh,
+ sshbuf_len(p->payload))) {
+ debug3("%s: queued packet triggered rekex",
+ __func__);
+ return kex_start_rekex(ssh);
+ }
+ debug("dequeue packet: %u", type);
+ sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
+ state->outgoing_packet = p->payload;
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&state->outgoing, p, next);
+ memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
+ free(p);
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Waits until a packet has been received, and returns its type. Note that
+ * no other data is processed until this returns, so this function should not
+ * be used during the interactive session.
+ */
+
+int
+ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ int len, r, ms_remain;
+ fd_set *setp;
+ char buf[8192];
+ struct timeval timeout, start, *timeoutp = NULL;
+
+ DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
+
+ setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_in + 1,
+ NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
+ if (setp == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+ /*
+ * Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have
+ * been sent.
+ */
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
+ for (;;) {
+ /* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
+ r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
+ if (r != 0)
+ break;
+ if (!compat20 && (
+ *typep == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS
+ || *typep == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE
+ || *typep == SSH_CMSG_EOF
+ || *typep == SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION))
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ break;
+ /* If we got a packet, return it. */
+ if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
+ break;
+ /*
+ * Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the
+ * buffer, and try again.
+ */
+ memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_in + 1,
+ NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
+ FD_SET(state->connection_in, setp);
+
+ if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
+ ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms;
+ timeoutp = &timeout;
+ }
+ /* Wait for some data to arrive. */
+ for (;;) {
+ if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
+ ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
+ gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
+ }
+ if ((r = select(state->connection_in + 1, setp,
+ NULL, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
+ break;
+ if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
+ errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
+ break;
+ if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
+ continue;
+ ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
+ if (ms_remain <= 0) {
+ r = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (r == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
+ /* Read data from the socket. */
+ len = read(state->connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (len == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (len < 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Append it to the buffer. */
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ out:
+ free(setp);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ u_char type;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return type;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches
+ * that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch.
+ */
+
+int
+ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *ssh, u_int expected_type)
+{
+ int r;
+ u_char type;
+
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (type != expected_type) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
+ "Protocol error: expected packet type %d, got %d",
+ expected_type, type)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Checks if a full packet is available in the data received so far via
+ * packet_process_incoming. If so, reads the packet; otherwise returns
+ * SSH_MSG_NONE. This does not wait for data from the connection.
+ *
+ * SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT is handled specially here. Also,
+ * SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages are skipped by this function and are never returned
+ * to higher levels.
+ */
+
+int
+ssh_packet_read_poll1(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ u_int len, padded_len;
+ const char *emsg;
+ const u_char *cp;
+ u_char *p;
+ u_int checksum, stored_checksum;
+ int r;
+
+ *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
+
+ /* Check if input size is less than minimum packet size. */
+ if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + 8)
+ return 0;
+ /* Get length of incoming packet. */
+ len = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->input));
+ if (len < 1 + 2 + 2 || len > 256 * 1024) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Bad packet length %u",
+ len)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
+ }
+ padded_len = (len + 8) & ~7;
+
+ /* Check if the packet has been entirely received. */
+ if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + padded_len)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* The entire packet is in buffer. */
+
+ /* Consume packet length. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, 4)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh
+ * (C)1998 CORE-SDI, Buenos Aires Argentina
+ * Ariel Futoransky(futo at core-sdi.com)
+ */
+ if (!state->receive_context.plaintext) {
+ emsg = NULL;
+ switch (detect_attack(&state->deattack,
+ sshbuf_ptr(state->input), padded_len)) {
+ case DEATTACK_OK:
+ break;
+ case DEATTACK_DETECTED:
+ emsg = "crc32 compensation attack detected";
+ break;
+ case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED:
+ emsg = "deattack denial of service detected";
+ break;
+ default:
+ emsg = "deattack error";
+ break;
+ }
+ if (emsg != NULL) {
+ error("%s", emsg);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "%s", emsg)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Decrypt data to incoming_packet. */
+ sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, padded_len, &p)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->receive_context, 0, p,
+ sshbuf_ptr(state->input), padded_len, 0, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, padded_len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "read_poll plain: ");
+ sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
+#endif
+
+ /* Compute packet checksum. */
+ checksum = ssh_crc32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet),
+ sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet) - 4);
+
+ /* Skip padding. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 8 - len % 8)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Test check bytes. */
+ if (len != sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)) {
+ error("%s: len %d != sshbuf_len %zd", __func__,
+ len, sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet));
+ if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid packet length")) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
+ }
+
+ cp = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet) + len - 4;
+ stored_checksum = PEEK_U32(cp);
+ if (checksum != stored_checksum) {
+ error("Corrupted check bytes on input");
+ if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "connection corrupted")) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, 4)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (state->packet_compression) {
+ sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
+ if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet,
+ state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet,
+ state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ state->p_read.packets++;
+ state->p_read.bytes += padded_len + 4;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (*typep < SSH_MSG_MIN || *typep > SSH_MSG_MAX) {
+ error("Invalid ssh1 packet type: %d", *typep);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid packet type")) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ u_int padlen, need;
+ u_char *cp;
+ u_int maclen, aadlen = 0, authlen = 0, block_size;
+ struct sshenc *enc = NULL;
+ struct sshmac *mac = NULL;
+ struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
+
+ if (state->packet_discard)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) {
+ enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc;
+ mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac;
+ comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp;
+ /* disable mac for authenticated encryption */
+ if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0)
+ mac = NULL;
+ }
+ maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0;
+ block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
+ aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0;
+
+ if (aadlen && state->packlen == 0) {
+ if (cipher_get_length(&state->receive_context,
+ &state->packlen, state->p_read.seqnr,
+ sshbuf_ptr(state->input), sshbuf_len(state->input)) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
+ state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+ sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
+#endif
+ logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
+ }
+ sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
+ } else if (state->packlen == 0) {
+ /*
+ * check if input size is less than the cipher block size,
+ * decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet
+ */
+ if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < block_size)
+ return 0;
+ sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, block_size,
+ &cp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->receive_context,
+ state->p_send.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->input),
+ block_size, 0, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ state->packlen = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet));
+ if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
+ state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "input: \n");
+ sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
+ fprintf(stderr, "incoming_packet: \n");
+ sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
+#endif
+ logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen);
+ return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0,
+ PACKET_MAX_SIZE);
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, block_size)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", state->packlen+4));
+
+ if (aadlen) {
+ /* only the payload is encrypted */
+ need = state->packlen;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * the payload size and the payload are encrypted, but we
+ * have a partial packet of block_size bytes
+ */
+ need = 4 + state->packlen - block_size;
+ }
+ DBG(debug("partial packet: block %d, need %d, maclen %d, authlen %d,"
+ " aadlen %d", block_size, need, maclen, authlen, aadlen));
+ if (need % block_size != 0) {
+ logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d",
+ need, block_size, need % block_size);
+ return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0,
+ PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size);
+ }
+ /*
+ * check if the entire packet has been received and
+ * decrypt into incoming_packet:
+ * 'aadlen' bytes are unencrypted, but authenticated.
+ * 'need' bytes are encrypted, followed by either
+ * 'authlen' bytes of authentication tag or
+ * 'maclen' bytes of message authentication code.
+ */
+ if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < aadlen + need + authlen + maclen)
+ return 0; /* packet is incomplete */
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: ");
+ sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
+#endif
+ /* EtM: check mac over encrypted input */
+ if (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) {
+ if ((r = mac_check(mac, state->p_read.seqnr,
+ sshbuf_ptr(state->input), aadlen + need,
+ sshbuf_ptr(state->input) + aadlen + need + authlen,
+ maclen)) != 0) {
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
+ logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, aadlen + need,
+ &cp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->receive_context, state->p_read.seqnr, cp,
+ sshbuf_ptr(state->input), need, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, aadlen + need + authlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (mac && mac->enabled) {
+ /* Not EtM: check MAC over cleartext */
+ if (!mac->etm && (r = mac_check(mac, state->p_read.seqnr,
+ sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet),
+ sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
+ sshbuf_ptr(state->input), maclen)) != 0) {
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
+ goto out;
+ logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
+ if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac,
+ sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
+ PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need);
+ }
+ /* Remove MAC from input buffer */
+ DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (seqnr_p != NULL)
+ *seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
+ if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
+ logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
+ if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
+ if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
+ return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
+ state->p_read.blocks += (state->packlen + 4) / block_size;
+ state->p_read.bytes += state->packlen + 4;
+
+ /* get padlen */
+ padlen = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet)[4];
+ DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen));
+ if (padlen < 4) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
+ "Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
+ }
+
+ /* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 4 + 1)) != 0 ||
+ ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, padlen)) != 0))
+ goto out;
+
+ DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %zd",
+ sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)));
+ if (comp && comp->enabled) {
+ sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
+ if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet,
+ state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet,
+ state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %zd",
+ sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)));
+ }
+ /*
+ * get packet type, implies consume.
+ * return length of payload (without type field)
+ */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (ssh_packet_log_type(*typep))
+ debug3("receive packet: type %u", *typep);
+ if (*typep < SSH2_MSG_MIN || *typep >= SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
+ "Invalid ssh2 packet type: %d", *typep)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
+ r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN);
+ else if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !state->server_side)
+ r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh);
+ else
+ r = 0;
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", *typep);
+ sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
+#endif
+ /* reset for next packet */
+ state->packlen = 0;
+
+ /* do we need to rekey? */
+ if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0)) {
+ debug3("%s: rekex triggered", __func__);
+ if ((r = kex_start_rekex(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ out:
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ u_int reason, seqnr;
+ int r;
+ u_char *msg;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ msg = NULL;
+ if (compat20) {
+ r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
+ if (r != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (*typep) {
+ state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+ DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
+ }
+ switch (*typep) {
+ case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
+ debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
+ break;
+ case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG:
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
+ free(msg);
+ return r;
+ }
+ debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
+ free(msg);
+ break;
+ case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
+ do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
+ reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+ "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
+ "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
+ free(msg);
+ return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
+ case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %u",
+ seqnr);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ r = ssh_packet_read_poll1(ssh, typep);
+ switch (*typep) {
+ case SSH_MSG_NONE:
+ return SSH_MSG_NONE;
+ case SSH_MSG_IGNORE:
+ break;
+ case SSH_MSG_DEBUG:
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
+ free(msg);
+ break;
+ case SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT:
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ error("Received disconnect from %s port %d: "
+ "%.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh), msg);
+ free(msg);
+ return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
+ default:
+ DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Buffers the given amount of input characters. This is intended to be used
+ * together with packet_read_poll.
+ */
+
+int
+ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *ssh, const char *buf, u_int len)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ int r;
+
+ if (state->packet_discard) {
+ state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */
+ if (len >= state->packet_discard) {
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ state->packet_discard -= len;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh->state->input, buf, len)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_remaining(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sends a diagnostic message from the server to the client. This message
+ * can be sent at any time (but not while constructing another message). The
+ * message is printed immediately, but only if the client is being executed
+ * in verbose mode. These messages are primarily intended to ease debugging
+ * authentication problems. The length of the formatted message must not
+ * exceed 1024 bytes. This will automatically call ssh_packet_write_wait.
+ */
+void
+ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ char buf[1024];
+ va_list args;
+ int r;
+
+ if (compat20 && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DEBUG))
+ return;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DEBUG)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* always display */
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ } else {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH_MSG_DEBUG)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Pretty-print connection-terminating errors and exit.
+ */
+void
+sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r)
+{
+ switch (r) {
+ case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
+ logdie("Connection closed by %.200s port %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
+ logdie("Connection %s %.200s port %d timed out",
+ ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
+ logdie("Disconnected from %.200s port %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
+ if (errno == ECONNRESET)
+ logdie("Connection reset by %.200s port %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH:
+ case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH:
+ case SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH:
+ case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH:
+ case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH:
+ if (ssh && ssh->kex && ssh->kex->failed_choice) {
+ logdie("Unable to negotiate with %.200s port %d: %s. "
+ "Their offer: %s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh), ssh_err(r),
+ ssh->kex->failed_choice);
+ }
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ logdie("%s%sConnection %s %.200s port %d: %s",
+ tag != NULL ? tag : "", tag != NULL ? ": " : "",
+ ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), ssh_err(r));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the
+ * connection, and exits. This function never returns. The error message
+ * should not contain a newline. The length of the formatted message must
+ * not exceed 1024 bytes.
+ */
+void
+ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ char buf[1024];
+ va_list args;
+ static int disconnecting = 0;
+ int r;
+
+ if (disconnecting) /* Guard against recursive invocations. */
+ fatal("packet_disconnect called recursively.");
+ disconnecting = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Format the message. Note that the caller must make sure the
+ * message is of limited size.
+ */
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+
+ /* Display the error locally */
+ logit("Disconnecting: %.100s", buf);
+
+ /*
+ * Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait
+ * for it to get sent.
+ */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "%s", buf)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r);
+
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r);
+
+ /* Close the connection. */
+ ssh_packet_close(ssh);
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks if there is any buffered output, and tries to write some of
+ * the output.
+ */
+int
+ssh_packet_write_poll(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ int len = sshbuf_len(state->output);
+ int r;
+
+ if (len > 0) {
+ len = write(state->connection_out,
+ sshbuf_ptr(state->output), len);
+ if (len == -1) {
+ if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
+ errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+ return 0;
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (len == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->output, len)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calls packet_write_poll repeatedly until all pending output data has been
+ * written.
+ */
+int
+ssh_packet_write_wait(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ fd_set *setp;
+ int ret, r, ms_remain = 0;
+ struct timeval start, timeout, *timeoutp = NULL;
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+
+ setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_out + 1,
+ NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
+ if (setp == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
+ free(setp);
+ return r;
+ }
+ while (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) {
+ memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_out + 1,
+ NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
+ FD_SET(state->connection_out, setp);
+
+ if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
+ ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms;
+ timeoutp = &timeout;
+ }
+ for (;;) {
+ if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
+ ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
+ gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
+ }
+ if ((ret = select(state->connection_out + 1,
+ NULL, setp, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
+ break;
+ if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
+ errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
+ break;
+ if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
+ continue;
+ ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
+ if (ms_remain <= 0) {
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ free(setp);
+ return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
+ }
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
+ free(setp);
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+ free(setp);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Returns true if there is buffered data to write to the connection. */
+
+int
+ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) != 0;
+}
+
+/* Returns true if there is not too much data to write to the connection. */
+
+int
+ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ if (ssh->state->interactive_mode)
+ return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 16384;
+ else
+ return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 128 * 1024;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_tos(struct ssh *ssh, int tos)
+{
+#ifndef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN
+ if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh))
+ return;
+ switch (ssh_packet_connection_af(ssh)) {
+# ifdef IP_TOS
+ case AF_INET:
+ debug3("%s: set IP_TOS 0x%02x", __func__, tos);
+ if (setsockopt(ssh->state->connection_in,
+ IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) < 0)
+ error("setsockopt IP_TOS %d: %.100s:",
+ tos, strerror(errno));
+ break;
+# endif /* IP_TOS */
+# ifdef IPV6_TCLASS
+ case AF_INET6:
+ debug3("%s: set IPV6_TCLASS 0x%02x", __func__, tos);
+ if (setsockopt(ssh->state->connection_in,
+ IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) < 0)
+ error("setsockopt IPV6_TCLASS %d: %.100s:",
+ tos, strerror(errno));
+ break;
+# endif /* IPV6_TCLASS */
+ }
+#endif /* IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN */
+}
+
+/* Informs that the current session is interactive. Sets IP flags for that. */
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_interactive(struct ssh *ssh, int interactive, int qos_interactive, int qos_bulk)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+
+ if (state->set_interactive_called)
+ return;
+ state->set_interactive_called = 1;
+
+ /* Record that we are in interactive mode. */
+ state->interactive_mode = interactive;
+
+ /* Only set socket options if using a socket. */
+ if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh))
+ return;
+ set_nodelay(state->connection_in);
+ ssh_packet_set_tos(ssh, interactive ? qos_interactive :
+ qos_bulk);
+}
+
+/* Returns true if the current connection is interactive. */
+
+int
+ssh_packet_is_interactive(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ return ssh->state->interactive_mode;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh, u_int s)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+
+ if (state->set_maxsize_called) {
+ logit("packet_set_maxsize: called twice: old %d new %d",
+ state->max_packet_size, s);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (s < 4 * 1024 || s > 1024 * 1024) {
+ logit("packet_set_maxsize: bad size %d", s);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ state->set_maxsize_called = 1;
+ debug("packet_set_maxsize: setting to %d", s);
+ state->max_packet_size = s;
+ return s;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ return ++ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh, int ka)
+{
+ ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts = ka;
+}
+
+u_int
+ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ return ssh->state->max_packet_size;
+}
+
+/*
+ * 9.2. Ignored Data Message
+ *
+ * byte SSH_MSG_IGNORE
+ * string data
+ *
+ * All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any
+ * time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is
+ * required to send them. This message can be used as an additional
+ * protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques.
+ */
+void
+ssh_packet_send_ignore(struct ssh *ssh, int nbytes)
+{
+ u_int32_t rnd = 0;
+ int r, i;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, compat20 ?
+ SSH2_MSG_IGNORE : SSH_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbytes)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) {
+ if (i % 4 == 0)
+ rnd = arc4random();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, (u_char)rnd & 0xff)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ rnd >>= 8;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t bytes, time_t seconds)
+{
+ debug3("rekey after %llu bytes, %d seconds", (unsigned long long)bytes,
+ (int)seconds);
+ ssh->state->rekey_limit = bytes;
+ ssh->state->rekey_interval = seconds;
+}
+
+time_t
+ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ time_t seconds;
+
+ seconds = ssh->state->rekey_time + ssh->state->rekey_interval -
+ monotime();
+ return (seconds <= 0 ? 1 : seconds);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ ssh->state->server_side = 1;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ ssh->state->after_authentication = 1;
+}
+
+void *
+ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ return (void *)ssh->state->input;
+}
+
+void *
+ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ return (void *)ssh->state->output;
+}
+
+/* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */
+static int
+ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct sshcomp *comp;
+ int r, mode;
+
+ debug("%s: called", __func__);
+ /* This was set in net child, but is not visible in user child */
+ ssh->state->after_authentication = 1;
+ ssh->state->rekeying = 0;
+ for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+ if (ssh->state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
+ continue;
+ comp = &ssh->state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
+ if (comp && comp->enabled &&
+ (r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Packet state (de-)serialization for privsep */
+
+/* turn kex into a blob for packet state serialization */
+static int
+kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, kex->session_id,
+ kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->we_need)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, kex->client_version_string)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, kex->server_version_string)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* turn key exchange results into a blob for packet state serialization */
+static int
+newkeys_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
+ struct sshcomp *comp;
+ struct sshenc *enc;
+ struct sshmac *mac;
+ struct newkeys *newkey;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((newkey = ssh->state->newkeys[mode]) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ enc = &newkey->enc;
+ mac = &newkey->mac;
+ comp = &newkey->comp;
+ cc = (mode == MODE_OUT) ? &ssh->state->send_context :
+ &ssh->state->receive_context;
+ if ((r = cipher_get_keyiv(cc, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ /* The cipher struct is constant and shared, you export pointer */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, enc->name)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->enabled)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->block_size)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->key, enc->key_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, mac->name)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, mac->enabled)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, mac->key, mac->key_len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, comp->type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, comp->enabled)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comp->name)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b);
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* serialize packet state into a blob */
+int
+ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ u_char *p;
+ size_t slen, rlen;
+ int r, ssh1cipher;
+
+ if (!compat20) {
+ ssh1cipher = cipher_get_number(state->receive_context.cipher);
+ slen = cipher_get_keyiv_len(&state->send_context);
+ rlen = cipher_get_keyiv_len(&state->receive_context);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->remote_protocol_flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ssh1cipher)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, state->ssh1_key, state->ssh1_keylen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, slen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, slen, &p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = cipher_get_keyiv(&state->send_context, p, slen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, rlen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, rlen, &p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = cipher_get_keyiv(&state->receive_context, p, rlen)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ } else {
+ if ((r = kex_to_blob(m, ssh->kex)) != 0 ||
+ (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->rekey_limit)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->rekey_interval)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.packets)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.packets)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.bytes)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ slen = cipher_get_keycontext(&state->send_context, NULL);
+ rlen = cipher_get_keycontext(&state->receive_context, NULL);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, slen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, slen, &p)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (cipher_get_keycontext(&state->send_context, p) != (int)slen)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, rlen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, rlen, &p)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (cipher_get_keycontext(&state->receive_context, p) != (int)rlen)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_get_compress_state(m, ssh)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->input)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->output)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* restore key exchange results from blob for packet state de-serialization */
+static int
+newkeys_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ struct sshcomp *comp;
+ struct sshenc *enc;
+ struct sshmac *mac;
+ struct newkeys *newkey = NULL;
+ size_t keylen, ivlen, maclen;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((newkey = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkey))) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
+#endif
+ enc = &newkey->enc;
+ mac = &newkey->mac;
+ comp = &newkey->comp;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &enc->name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get(b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&enc->enabled)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &enc->block_size)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->key, &keylen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->iv, &ivlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &mac->name, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = mac_setup(mac, mac->name)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&mac->enabled)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &mac->key, &maclen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (maclen > mac->key_len) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ mac->key_len = maclen;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &comp->type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&comp->enabled)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &comp->name, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (enc->name == NULL ||
+ cipher_by_name(enc->name) != enc->cipher) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ enc->key_len = keylen;
+ enc->iv_len = ivlen;
+ ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = newkey;
+ newkey = NULL;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ free(newkey);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* restore kex from blob for packet state de-serialization */
+static int
+kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp)
+{
+ struct kex *kex;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((kex = calloc(1, sizeof(struct kex))) == NULL ||
+ (kex->my = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (kex->peer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &kex->session_id, &kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->we_need)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &kex->client_version_string, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &kex->server_version_string, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ kex->server = 1;
+ kex->done = 1;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ if (r != 0 || kexp == NULL) {
+ if (kex != NULL) {
+ sshbuf_free(kex->my);
+ sshbuf_free(kex->peer);
+ free(kex);
+ }
+ if (kexp != NULL)
+ *kexp = NULL;
+ } else {
+ *kexp = kex;
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restore packet state from content of blob 'm' (de-serialization).
+ * Note that 'm' will be partially consumed on parsing or any other errors.
+ */
+int
+ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ const u_char *ssh1key, *ivin, *ivout, *keyin, *keyout, *input, *output;
+ size_t ssh1keylen, rlen, slen, ilen, olen;
+ int r;
+ u_int ssh1cipher = 0;
+
+ if (!compat20) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->remote_protocol_flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ssh1cipher)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ssh1key, &ssh1keylen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ivout, &slen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ivin, &rlen)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (ssh1cipher > INT_MAX)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
+ ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(ssh, ssh1key, ssh1keylen,
+ (int)ssh1cipher);
+ if (cipher_get_keyiv_len(&state->send_context) != (int)slen ||
+ cipher_get_keyiv_len(&state->receive_context) != (int)rlen)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ if ((r = cipher_set_keyiv(&state->send_context, ivout)) != 0 ||
+ (r = cipher_set_keyiv(&state->receive_context, ivin)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ } else {
+ if ((r = kex_from_blob(m, &ssh->kex)) != 0 ||
+ (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->rekey_limit)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->rekey_interval)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.packets)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.packets)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.bytes)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ /*
+ * We set the time here so that in post-auth privsep slave we
+ * count from the completion of the authentication.
+ */
+ state->rekey_time = monotime();
+ /* XXX ssh_set_newkeys overrides p_read.packets? XXX */
+ if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &keyout, &slen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &keyin, &rlen)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (cipher_get_keycontext(&state->send_context, NULL) != (int)slen ||
+ cipher_get_keycontext(&state->receive_context, NULL) != (int)rlen)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ cipher_set_keycontext(&state->send_context, keyout);
+ cipher_set_keycontext(&state->receive_context, keyin);
+
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_set_compress_state(ssh, m)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_packet_set_postauth(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
+ sshbuf_reset(state->input);
+ sshbuf_reset(state->output);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &input, &ilen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &output, &olen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(state->input, input, ilen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(state->output, output, olen)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (sshbuf_len(m))
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* NEW API */
+
+/* put data to the outgoing packet */
+
+int
+sshpkt_put(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len)
+{
+ return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_putb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+ return sshbuf_putb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, b);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_put_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char val)
+{
+ return sshbuf_put_u8(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_put_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t val)
+{
+ return sshbuf_put_u32(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_put_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t val)
+{
+ return sshbuf_put_u64(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len)
+{
+ return sshbuf_put_string(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v)
+{
+ return sshbuf_put_cstring(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_put_stringb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *v)
+{
+ return sshbuf_put_stringb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+int
+sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
+{
+ return sshbuf_put_ec(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, g);
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+int
+sshpkt_put_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v)
+{
+ return sshbuf_put_bignum1(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+
+int
+sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v)
+{
+ return sshbuf_put_bignum2(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+/* fetch data from the incoming packet */
+
+int
+sshpkt_get(struct ssh *ssh, void *valp, size_t len)
+{
+ return sshbuf_get(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, len);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_get_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *valp)
+{
+ return sshbuf_get_u8(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_get_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t *valp)
+{
+ return sshbuf_get_u32(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_get_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *valp)
+{
+ return sshbuf_get_u64(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+ return sshbuf_get_string(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_get_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+ return sshbuf_get_string_direct(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+ return sshbuf_get_cstring(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+int
+sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
+{
+ return sshbuf_get_ec(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v, g);
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+int
+sshpkt_get_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v)
+{
+ return sshbuf_get_bignum1(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+
+int
+sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v)
+{
+ return sshbuf_get_bignum2(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+int
+sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ if (sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet) > 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+const u_char *
+sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp)
+{
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet);
+ return sshbuf_ptr(ssh->state->incoming_packet);
+}
+
+/* start a new packet */
+
+int
+sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type)
+{
+ u_char buf[9];
+ int len;
+
+ DBG(debug("packet_start[%d]", type));
+ len = compat20 ? 6 : 9;
+ memset(buf, 0, len - 1);
+ buf[len - 1] = type;
+ sshbuf_reset(ssh->state->outgoing_packet);
+ return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, buf, len);
+}
+
+/* send it */
+
+int
+sshpkt_send(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ if (compat20)
+ return ssh_packet_send2(ssh);
+ else
+ return ssh_packet_send1(ssh);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ char buf[1024];
+ va_list args;
+ int r;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ } else {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* roundup current message to pad bytes */
+int
+sshpkt_add_padding(struct ssh *ssh, u_char pad)
+{
+ ssh->state->extra_pad = pad;
+ return 0;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/packet.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/packet.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/packet.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.59 2013/07/12 00:19:59 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Interface for the packet protocol functions.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#ifndef PACKET_H
-#define PACKET_H
-
-#include <termios.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-#endif
-
-void packet_set_connection(int, int);
-void packet_set_timeout(int, int);
-void packet_set_nonblocking(void);
-int packet_get_connection_in(void);
-int packet_get_connection_out(void);
-void packet_close(void);
-void packet_set_encryption_key(const u_char *, u_int, int);
-u_int packet_get_encryption_key(u_char *);
-void packet_set_protocol_flags(u_int);
-u_int packet_get_protocol_flags(void);
-void packet_start_compression(int);
-void packet_set_interactive(int, int, int);
-int packet_is_interactive(void);
-void packet_set_server(void);
-void packet_set_authenticated(void);
-
-void packet_start(u_char);
-void packet_put_char(int ch);
-void packet_put_int(u_int value);
-void packet_put_int64(u_int64_t value);
-void packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value);
-void packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-void packet_put_ecpoint(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
-#endif
-void packet_put_string(const void *buf, u_int len);
-void packet_put_cstring(const char *str);
-void packet_put_raw(const void *buf, u_int len);
-void packet_send(void);
-
-int packet_read(void);
-void packet_read_expect(int type);
-void packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len);
-int packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p);
-int packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p);
-
-u_int packet_get_char(void);
-u_int packet_get_int(void);
-u_int64_t packet_get_int64(void);
-void packet_get_bignum(BIGNUM * value);
-void packet_get_bignum2(BIGNUM * value);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-void packet_get_ecpoint(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *);
-#endif
-void *packet_get_raw(u_int *length_ptr);
-void *packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr);
-char *packet_get_cstring(u_int *length_ptr);
-void *packet_get_string_ptr(u_int *length_ptr);
-void packet_disconnect(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((noreturn)) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-void packet_send_debug(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-
-void set_newkeys(int mode);
-int packet_get_keyiv_len(int);
-void packet_get_keyiv(int, u_char *, u_int);
-int packet_get_keycontext(int, u_char *);
-void packet_set_keycontext(int, u_char *);
-void packet_get_state(int, u_int32_t *, u_int64_t *, u_int32_t *, u_int64_t *);
-void packet_set_state(int, u_int32_t, u_int64_t, u_int32_t, u_int64_t);
-int packet_get_ssh1_cipher(void);
-void packet_set_iv(int, u_char *);
-void *packet_get_newkeys(int);
-
-void packet_write_poll(void);
-void packet_write_wait(void);
-int packet_have_data_to_write(void);
-int packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(void);
-
-int packet_connection_is_on_socket(void);
-int packet_remaining(void);
-void packet_send_ignore(int);
-void packet_add_padding(u_char);
-
-void tty_make_modes(int, struct termios *);
-void tty_parse_modes(int, int *);
-
-void packet_set_alive_timeouts(int);
-int packet_inc_alive_timeouts(void);
-int packet_set_maxsize(u_int);
-u_int packet_get_maxsize(void);
-
-/* don't allow remaining bytes after the end of the message */
-#define packet_check_eom() \
-do { \
- int _len = packet_remaining(); \
- if (_len > 0) { \
- logit("Packet integrity error (%d bytes remaining) at %s:%d", \
- _len ,__FILE__, __LINE__); \
- packet_disconnect("Packet integrity error."); \
- } \
-} while (0)
-
-int packet_need_rekeying(void);
-void packet_set_rekey_limits(u_int32_t, time_t);
-time_t packet_get_rekey_timeout(void);
-
-void packet_backup_state(void);
-void packet_restore_state(void);
-
-void *packet_get_input(void);
-void *packet_get_output(void);
-
-#endif /* PACKET_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/packet.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/packet.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/packet.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/packet.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.71 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Interface for the packet protocol functions.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef PACKET_H
+#define PACKET_H
+
+#include <termios.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+# else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+# define EC_KEY void
+# define EC_GROUP void
+# define EC_POINT void
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+# define BIGNUM void
+# define EC_KEY void
+# define EC_GROUP void
+# define EC_POINT void
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+struct kex;
+struct sshkey;
+struct sshbuf;
+struct session_state; /* private session data */
+
+#include "dispatch.h" /* typedef, DISPATCH_MAX */
+
+struct key_entry {
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(key_entry) next;
+ struct sshkey *key;
+};
+
+struct ssh {
+ /* Session state */
+ struct session_state *state;
+
+ /* Key exchange */
+ struct kex *kex;
+
+ /* cached local and remote ip addresses and ports */
+ char *remote_ipaddr;
+ int remote_port;
+ char *local_ipaddr;
+ int local_port;
+
+ /* Dispatcher table */
+ dispatch_fn *dispatch[DISPATCH_MAX];
+ /* number of packets to ignore in the dispatcher */
+ int dispatch_skip_packets;
+
+ /* datafellows */
+ int compat;
+
+ /* Lists for private and public keys */
+ TAILQ_HEAD(, key_entry) private_keys;
+ TAILQ_HEAD(, key_entry) public_keys;
+
+ /* APP data */
+ void *app_data;
+};
+
+struct ssh *ssh_alloc_session_state(void);
+struct ssh *ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *, int, int);
+void ssh_packet_set_timeout(struct ssh *, int, int);
+int ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *);
+int ssh_packet_connection_af(struct ssh *);
+void ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(struct ssh *);
+int ssh_packet_get_connection_in(struct ssh *);
+int ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *);
+void ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *);
+void ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(struct ssh *, const u_char *, u_int, int);
+int ssh_packet_is_rekeying(struct ssh *);
+void ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(struct ssh *, u_int);
+u_int ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(struct ssh *);
+int ssh_packet_start_compression(struct ssh *, int);
+void ssh_packet_set_tos(struct ssh *, int);
+void ssh_packet_set_interactive(struct ssh *, int, int, int);
+int ssh_packet_is_interactive(struct ssh *);
+void ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *);
+void ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *);
+
+int ssh_packet_send1(struct ssh *);
+int ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *);
+int ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *);
+
+int ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *);
+int ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *, u_int type);
+int ssh_packet_read_poll(struct ssh *);
+int ssh_packet_read_poll1(struct ssh *, u_char *);
+int ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p);
+int ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *, const char *buf, u_int len);
+int ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p);
+int ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p);
+
+const void *ssh_packet_get_string_ptr(struct ssh *, u_int *length_ptr);
+void ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *, const char *fmt, ...)
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)))
+ __attribute__((noreturn));
+void ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *, const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+
+int ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *, int mode);
+void ssh_packet_get_bytes(struct ssh *, u_int64_t *, u_int64_t *);
+
+typedef void *(ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func)(void *, u_int, u_int);
+typedef void (ssh_packet_comp_free_func)(void *, void *);
+void ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(struct ssh *, void *,
+ ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *, ssh_packet_comp_free_func *);
+
+int ssh_packet_write_poll(struct ssh *);
+int ssh_packet_write_wait(struct ssh *);
+int ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(struct ssh *);
+int ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(struct ssh *);
+
+int ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *);
+int ssh_packet_remaining(struct ssh *);
+void ssh_packet_send_ignore(struct ssh *, int);
+
+void tty_make_modes(int, struct termios *);
+void tty_parse_modes(int, int *);
+
+void ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *, int);
+int ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *);
+int ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *, u_int);
+u_int ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *);
+
+int ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
+int ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
+
+const char *ssh_remote_ipaddr(struct ssh *);
+int ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *);
+const char *ssh_local_ipaddr(struct ssh *);
+int ssh_local_port(struct ssh *);
+
+void ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *, u_int64_t, time_t);
+time_t ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *);
+
+void *ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *);
+void *ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *);
+
+/* new API */
+int sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type);
+int sshpkt_send(struct ssh *ssh);
+int sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *, const char *fmt, ...)
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+int sshpkt_add_padding(struct ssh *, u_char);
+void sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r);
+
+int sshpkt_put(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len);
+int sshpkt_putb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *b);
+int sshpkt_put_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char val);
+int sshpkt_put_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t val);
+int sshpkt_put_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t val);
+int sshpkt_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len);
+int sshpkt_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v);
+int sshpkt_put_stringb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *v);
+int sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g);
+int sshpkt_put_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v);
+int sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v);
+
+int sshpkt_get(struct ssh *ssh, void *valp, size_t len);
+int sshpkt_get_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *valp);
+int sshpkt_get_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t *valp);
+int sshpkt_get_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *valp);
+int sshpkt_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp);
+int sshpkt_get_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp);
+int sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp);
+int sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g);
+int sshpkt_get_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v);
+int sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v);
+int sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh);
+const u_char *sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, size_t *lenp);
+
+/* OLD API */
+extern struct ssh *active_state;
+#include "opacket.h"
+
+#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+# undef BIGNUM
+# undef EC_KEY
+# undef EC_GROUP
+# undef EC_POINT
+#elif !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+# undef EC_KEY
+# undef EC_GROUP
+# undef EC_POINT
+#endif
+
+#endif /* PACKET_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/pathnames.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/pathnames.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/pathnames.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,183 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.24 2013/12/06 13:39:49 markus Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#define ETCDIR "/etc"
-
-#ifndef SSHDIR
-#define SSHDIR ETCDIR "/ssh"
-#endif
-
-#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR
-#define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/var/run"
-#endif
-
-/*
- * System-wide file containing host keys of known hosts. This file should be
- * world-readable.
- */
-#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE SSHDIR "/ssh_known_hosts"
-/* backward compat for protocol 2 */
-#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2 SSHDIR "/ssh_known_hosts2"
-
-/*
- * Of these, ssh_host_key must be readable only by root, whereas ssh_config
- * should be world-readable.
- */
-#define _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE SSHDIR "/sshd_config"
-#define _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_config"
-#define _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_key"
-#define _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_dsa_key"
-#define _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_ecdsa_key"
-#define _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_ed25519_key"
-#define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key"
-#define _PATH_DH_MODULI SSHDIR "/moduli"
-/* Backwards compatibility */
-#define _PATH_DH_PRIMES SSHDIR "/primes"
-
-#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM
-#define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM "/usr/bin/ssh"
-#endif
-
-/*
- * The process id of the daemon listening for connections is saved here to
- * make it easier to kill the correct daemon when necessary.
- */
-#define _PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/sshd.pid"
-
-/*
- * The directory in user's home directory in which the files reside. The
- * directory should be world-readable (though not all files are).
- */
-#define _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR ".ssh"
-
-/*
- * Per-user file containing host keys of known hosts. This file need not be
- * readable by anyone except the user him/herself, though this does not
- * contain anything particularly secret.
- */
-#define _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE "~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/known_hosts"
-/* backward compat for protocol 2 */
-#define _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2 "~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/known_hosts2"
-
-/*
- * Name of the default file containing client-side authentication key. This
- * file should only be readable by the user him/herself.
- */
-#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/identity"
-#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_dsa"
-#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ecdsa"
-#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_rsa"
-#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519 _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ed25519"
-
-/*
- * Configuration file in user's home directory. This file need not be
- * readable by anyone but the user him/herself, but does not contain anything
- * particularly secret. If the user's home directory resides on an NFS
- * volume where root is mapped to nobody, this may need to be world-readable.
- */
-#define _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/config"
-
-/*
- * File containing a list of those rsa keys that permit logging in as this
- * user. This file need not be readable by anyone but the user him/herself,
- * but does not contain anything particularly secret. If the user's home
- * directory resides on an NFS volume where root is mapped to nobody, this
- * may need to be world-readable. (This file is read by the daemon which is
- * running as root.)
- */
-#define _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/authorized_keys"
-
-/* backward compat for protocol v2 */
-#define _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2 _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/authorized_keys2"
-
-/*
- * Per-user and system-wide ssh "rc" files. These files are executed with
- * /bin/sh before starting the shell or command if they exist. They will be
- * passed "proto cookie" as arguments if X11 forwarding with spoofing is in
- * use. xauth will be run if neither of these exists.
- */
-#define _PATH_SSH_USER_RC _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/rc"
-#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC SSHDIR "/sshrc"
-
-/*
- * Ssh-only version of /etc/hosts.equiv. Additionally, the daemon may use
- * ~/.rhosts and /etc/hosts.equiv if rhosts authentication is enabled.
- */
-#define _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV SSHDIR "/shosts.equiv"
-#define _PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV "/etc/hosts.equiv"
-
-/*
- * Default location of askpass
- */
-#ifndef _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT
-#define _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT "/usr/X11R6/bin/ssh-askpass"
-#endif
-
-/* Location of ssh-keysign for hostbased authentication */
-#ifndef _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN
-#define _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN "/usr/libexec/ssh-keysign"
-#endif
-
-/* Location of ssh-pkcs11-helper to support keys in tokens */
-#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER
-#define _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER "/usr/libexec/ssh-pkcs11-helper"
-#endif
-
-/* xauth for X11 forwarding */
-#ifndef _PATH_XAUTH
-#define _PATH_XAUTH "/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth"
-#endif
-
-/* UNIX domain socket for X11 server; displaynum will replace %u */
-#ifndef _PATH_UNIX_X
-#define _PATH_UNIX_X "/tmp/.X11-unix/X%u"
-#endif
-
-/* for scp */
-#ifndef _PATH_CP
-#define _PATH_CP "cp"
-#endif
-
-/* for sftp */
-#ifndef _PATH_SFTP_SERVER
-#define _PATH_SFTP_SERVER "/usr/libexec/sftp-server"
-#endif
-
-/* chroot directory for unprivileged user when UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes */
-#ifndef _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR
-#define _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR "/var/empty"
-#endif
-
-/* for passwd change */
-#ifndef _PATH_PASSWD_PROG
-#define _PATH_PASSWD_PROG "/usr/bin/passwd"
-#endif
-
-#ifndef _PATH_LS
-#define _PATH_LS "ls"
-#endif
-
-/* path to login program */
-#ifndef LOGIN_PROGRAM
-# ifdef LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK
-# define LOGIN_PROGRAM LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK
-# else
-# define LOGIN_PROGRAM "/usr/bin/login"
-# endif
-#endif /* LOGIN_PROGRAM */
-
-/* Askpass program define */
-#ifndef ASKPASS_PROGRAM
-#define ASKPASS_PROGRAM "/usr/lib/ssh/ssh-askpass"
-#endif /* ASKPASS_PROGRAM */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/pathnames.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/pathnames.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/pathnames.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/pathnames.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.25 2016/03/31 05:24:06 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#define ETCDIR "/etc"
+
+#ifndef SSHDIR
+#define SSHDIR ETCDIR "/ssh"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR
+#define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/var/run"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * System-wide file containing host keys of known hosts. This file should be
+ * world-readable.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE SSHDIR "/ssh_known_hosts"
+/* backward compat for protocol 2 */
+#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2 SSHDIR "/ssh_known_hosts2"
+
+/*
+ * Of these, ssh_host_key must be readable only by root, whereas ssh_config
+ * should be world-readable.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE SSHDIR "/sshd_config"
+#define _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_config"
+#define _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_key"
+#define _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_dsa_key"
+#define _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_ecdsa_key"
+#define _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_ed25519_key"
+#define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key"
+#define _PATH_DH_MODULI SSHDIR "/moduli"
+
+#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM
+#define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM "/usr/bin/ssh"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The process id of the daemon listening for connections is saved here to
+ * make it easier to kill the correct daemon when necessary.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/sshd.pid"
+
+/*
+ * The directory in user's home directory in which the files reside. The
+ * directory should be world-readable (though not all files are).
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR ".ssh"
+
+/*
+ * Per-user file containing host keys of known hosts. This file need not be
+ * readable by anyone except the user him/herself, though this does not
+ * contain anything particularly secret.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE "~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/known_hosts"
+/* backward compat for protocol 2 */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2 "~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/known_hosts2"
+
+/*
+ * Name of the default file containing client-side authentication key. This
+ * file should only be readable by the user him/herself.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/identity"
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_dsa"
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ecdsa"
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_rsa"
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519 _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ed25519"
+
+/*
+ * Configuration file in user's home directory. This file need not be
+ * readable by anyone but the user him/herself, but does not contain anything
+ * particularly secret. If the user's home directory resides on an NFS
+ * volume where root is mapped to nobody, this may need to be world-readable.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/config"
+
+/*
+ * File containing a list of those rsa keys that permit logging in as this
+ * user. This file need not be readable by anyone but the user him/herself,
+ * but does not contain anything particularly secret. If the user's home
+ * directory resides on an NFS volume where root is mapped to nobody, this
+ * may need to be world-readable. (This file is read by the daemon which is
+ * running as root.)
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/authorized_keys"
+
+/* backward compat for protocol v2 */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2 _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/authorized_keys2"
+
+/*
+ * Per-user and system-wide ssh "rc" files. These files are executed with
+ * /bin/sh before starting the shell or command if they exist. They will be
+ * passed "proto cookie" as arguments if X11 forwarding with spoofing is in
+ * use. xauth will be run if neither of these exists.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_RC _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/rc"
+#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC SSHDIR "/sshrc"
+
+/*
+ * Ssh-only version of /etc/hosts.equiv. Additionally, the daemon may use
+ * ~/.rhosts and /etc/hosts.equiv if rhosts authentication is enabled.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV SSHDIR "/shosts.equiv"
+#define _PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV "/etc/hosts.equiv"
+
+/*
+ * Default location of askpass
+ */
+#ifndef _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT
+#define _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT "/usr/X11R6/bin/ssh-askpass"
+#endif
+
+/* Location of ssh-keysign for hostbased authentication */
+#ifndef _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN
+#define _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN "/usr/libexec/ssh-keysign"
+#endif
+
+/* Location of ssh-pkcs11-helper to support keys in tokens */
+#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER
+#define _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER "/usr/libexec/ssh-pkcs11-helper"
+#endif
+
+/* xauth for X11 forwarding */
+#ifndef _PATH_XAUTH
+#define _PATH_XAUTH "/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth"
+#endif
+
+/* UNIX domain socket for X11 server; displaynum will replace %u */
+#ifndef _PATH_UNIX_X
+#define _PATH_UNIX_X "/tmp/.X11-unix/X%u"
+#endif
+
+/* for scp */
+#ifndef _PATH_CP
+#define _PATH_CP "cp"
+#endif
+
+/* for sftp */
+#ifndef _PATH_SFTP_SERVER
+#define _PATH_SFTP_SERVER "/usr/libexec/sftp-server"
+#endif
+
+/* chroot directory for unprivileged user when UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes */
+#ifndef _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR
+#define _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR "/var/empty"
+#endif
+
+/* for passwd change */
+#ifndef _PATH_PASSWD_PROG
+#define _PATH_PASSWD_PROG "/usr/bin/passwd"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _PATH_LS
+#define _PATH_LS "ls"
+#endif
+
+/* path to login program */
+#ifndef LOGIN_PROGRAM
+# ifdef LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK
+# define LOGIN_PROGRAM LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK
+# else
+# define LOGIN_PROGRAM "/usr/bin/login"
+# endif
+#endif /* LOGIN_PROGRAM */
+
+/* Askpass program define */
+#ifndef ASKPASS_PROGRAM
+#define ASKPASS_PROGRAM "/usr/lib/ssh/ssh-askpass"
+#endif /* ASKPASS_PROGRAM */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform-pledge.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/platform-pledge.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform-pledge.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform-pledge.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Joyent, Inc
+ * Author: Alex Wilson <alex.wilson at joyent.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "platform.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
+
+/*
+ * Drop any fine-grained privileges that are not needed for post-startup
+ * operation of ssh-agent
+ *
+ * Should be as close as possible to pledge("stdio cpath unix id proc exec", ...)
+ */
+void
+platform_pledge_agent(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
+ /*
+ * Note: Solaris priv dropping is closer to tame() than pledge(), but
+ * we will use what we have.
+ */
+ solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net();
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Drop any fine-grained privileges that are not needed for post-startup
+ * operation of sftp-server
+ */
+void
+platform_pledge_sftp_server(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
+ solaris_drop_privs_pinfo_net_fork_exec();
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Drop any fine-grained privileges that are not needed for the post-startup
+ * operation of the SSH client mux
+ *
+ * Should be as close as possible to pledge("stdio proc tty", ...)
+ */
+void
+platform_pledge_mux(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
+ solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net_exec();
+#endif
+}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform-tracing.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/platform-tracing.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform-tracing.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform-tracing.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H)
+#include <sys/prctl.h> /* For prctl() and PR_SET_DUMPABLE */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PRIV_H
+#include <priv.h> /* For setpflags() and __PROC_PROTECT */
+#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+void
+platform_disable_tracing(int strict)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE)
+ /* Disable ptrace on Linux without sgid bit */
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) != 0 && strict)
+ fatal("unable to make the process undumpable");
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_SETPFLAGS) && defined(__PROC_PROTECT)
+ /* On Solaris, we should make this process untraceable */
+ if (setpflags(__PROC_PROTECT, 1) != 0 && strict)
+ fatal("unable to make the process untraceable");
+#endif
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/platform.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,214 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: platform.c,v 1.21 2014/01/21 01:59:29 tim Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "auth-pam.h"
-#include "platform.h"
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
-
-extern int use_privsep;
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-void
-platform_pre_listen(void)
-{
-#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
- /* Adjust out-of-memory killer so listening process is not killed */
- oom_adjust_setup();
-#endif
-}
-
-void
-platform_pre_fork(void)
-{
-#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
- solaris_contract_pre_fork();
-#endif
-}
-
-void
-platform_pre_restart(void)
-{
-#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
- oom_adjust_restore();
-#endif
-}
-
-void
-platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid)
-{
-#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
- solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(child_pid);
-#endif
-}
-
-void
-platform_post_fork_child(void)
-{
-#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
- solaris_contract_post_fork_child();
-#endif
-#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
- oom_adjust_restore();
-#endif
-}
-
-/* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */
-int
-platform_privileged_uidswap(void)
-{
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- /* uid 0 is not special on Cygwin so always try */
- return 1;
-#else
- return (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0);
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * This gets called before switching UIDs, and is called even when sshd is
- * not running as root.
- */
-void
-platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
-{
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- /* Cache selinux status for later use */
- (void)ssh_selinux_enabled();
-#endif
-
-#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
- /* if solaris projects were detected, set the default now */
- if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
- solaris_set_default_project(pw);
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined (__bsdi__)
- if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
- setpgid(0, 0);
-# endif
-
-#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
- /*
- * If we have both LOGIN_CAP and PAM, we want to establish creds
- * before calling setusercontext (in session.c:do_setusercontext).
- */
- if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
- if (options.use_pam) {
- do_pam_setcred(use_privsep);
- }
- }
-# endif /* USE_PAM */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(HAVE_GETLUID) && defined(HAVE_SETLUID)
- if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
- /* Sets login uid for accounting */
- if (getluid() == -1 && setluid(pw->pw_uid) == -1)
- error("setluid: %s", strerror(errno));
- }
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * This gets called after we've established the user's groups, and is only
- * called if sshd is running as root.
- */
-void
-platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
-{
-#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
- /*
- * PAM credentials may take the form of supplementary groups.
- * These will have been wiped by the above initgroups() call.
- * Reestablish them here.
- */
- if (options.use_pam) {
- do_pam_setcred(use_privsep);
- }
-#endif /* USE_PAM */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && (defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || \
- defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY))
- irix_setusercontext(pw);
-#endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */
-
-#ifdef _AIX
- aix_usrinfo(pw);
-#endif /* _AIX */
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SETPCRED
- /*
- * If we have a chroot directory, we set all creds except real
- * uid which we will need for chroot. If we don't have a
- * chroot directory, we don't override anything.
- */
- {
- char **creds = NULL, *chroot_creds[] =
- { "REAL_USER=root", NULL };
-
- if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
- strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0)
- creds = chroot_creds;
-
- if (setpcred(pw->pw_name, creds) == -1)
- fatal("Failed to set process credentials");
- }
-#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
-#endif
-}
-
-char *
-platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *pw_name)
-{
-#ifdef USE_AIX_KRB_NAME
- return aix_krb5_get_principal_name(pw_name);
-#else
- return NULL;
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * return 1 if the specified uid is a uid that may own a system directory
- * otherwise 0.
- */
-int
-platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid)
-{
- if (uid == 0)
- return 1;
-#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
- if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID)
- return 1;
-#endif
- return 0;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/platform.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+/* $Id: platform.c,v 1.22 2014/07/18 04:11:26 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-pam.h"
+#include "platform.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
+
+extern int use_privsep;
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+void
+platform_pre_listen(void)
+{
+#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+ /* Adjust out-of-memory killer so listening process is not killed */
+ oom_adjust_setup();
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+platform_pre_fork(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+ solaris_contract_pre_fork();
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+platform_pre_restart(void)
+{
+#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+ oom_adjust_restore();
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+ solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(child_pid);
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+platform_post_fork_child(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+ solaris_contract_post_fork_child();
+#endif
+#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+ oom_adjust_restore();
+#endif
+}
+
+/* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */
+int
+platform_privileged_uidswap(void)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ /* uid 0 is not special on Cygwin so always try */
+ return 1;
+#else
+ return (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * This gets called before switching UIDs, and is called even when sshd is
+ * not running as root.
+ */
+void
+platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ /* Cache selinux status for later use */
+ (void)ssh_selinux_enabled();
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
+ /*
+ * If solaris projects were detected, set the default now, unless
+ * we are using PAM in which case it is the responsibility of the
+ * PAM stack.
+ */
+ if (!options.use_pam && (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0))
+ solaris_set_default_project(pw);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined (__bsdi__)
+ if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
+ setpgid(0, 0);
+# endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
+ /*
+ * If we have both LOGIN_CAP and PAM, we want to establish creds
+ * before calling setusercontext (in session.c:do_setusercontext).
+ */
+ if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
+ if (options.use_pam) {
+ do_pam_setcred(use_privsep);
+ }
+ }
+# endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(HAVE_GETLUID) && defined(HAVE_SETLUID)
+ if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
+ /* Sets login uid for accounting */
+ if (getluid() == -1 && setluid(pw->pw_uid) == -1)
+ error("setluid: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * This gets called after we've established the user's groups, and is only
+ * called if sshd is running as root.
+ */
+void
+platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
+ /*
+ * PAM credentials may take the form of supplementary groups.
+ * These will have been wiped by the above initgroups() call.
+ * Reestablish them here.
+ */
+ if (options.use_pam) {
+ do_pam_setcred(use_privsep);
+ }
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && (defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || \
+ defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY))
+ irix_setusercontext(pw);
+#endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */
+
+#ifdef _AIX
+ aix_usrinfo(pw);
+#endif /* _AIX */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETPCRED
+ /*
+ * If we have a chroot directory, we set all creds except real
+ * uid which we will need for chroot. If we don't have a
+ * chroot directory, we don't override anything.
+ */
+ {
+ char **creds = NULL, *chroot_creds[] =
+ { "REAL_USER=root", NULL };
+
+ if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+ strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0)
+ creds = chroot_creds;
+
+ if (setpcred(pw->pw_name, creds) == -1)
+ fatal("Failed to set process credentials");
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+#endif
+}
+
+char *
+platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *pw_name)
+{
+#ifdef USE_AIX_KRB_NAME
+ return aix_krb5_get_principal_name(pw_name);
+#else
+ return NULL;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * return 1 if the specified uid is a uid that may own a system directory
+ * otherwise 0.
+ */
+int
+platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid)
+{
+ if (uid == 0)
+ return 1;
+#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
+ if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID)
+ return 1;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/platform.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: platform.h,v 1.9 2013/09/22 09:02:40 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <pwd.h>
-
-void platform_pre_listen(void);
-void platform_pre_fork(void);
-void platform_pre_restart(void);
-void platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid);
-void platform_post_fork_child(void);
-int platform_privileged_uidswap(void);
-void platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
-void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *);
-char *platform_get_krb5_client(const char *);
-char *platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *);
-int platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t);
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/platform.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/platform.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/* $Id: platform.h,v 1.9 2013/09/22 09:02:40 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+void platform_pre_listen(void);
+void platform_pre_fork(void);
+void platform_pre_restart(void);
+void platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid);
+void platform_post_fork_child(void);
+int platform_privileged_uidswap(void);
+void platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
+void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *);
+char *platform_get_krb5_client(const char *);
+char *platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *);
+int platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t);
+void platform_disable_tracing(int);
+
+/* in platform-pledge.c */
+void platform_pledge_agent(void);
+void platform_pledge_sftp_server(void);
+void platform_pledge_mux(void);
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/poly1305.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/poly1305.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/poly1305.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: poly1305.h,v 1.2 2013/12/19 22:57:13 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Public Domain poly1305 from Andrew Moon
- * poly1305-donna-unrolled.c from https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna
- */
-
-#ifndef POLY1305_H
-#define POLY1305_H
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#define POLY1305_KEYLEN 32
-#define POLY1305_TAGLEN 16
-
-void poly1305_auth(u_char out[POLY1305_TAGLEN], const u_char *m, size_t inlen,
- const u_char key[POLY1305_KEYLEN])
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, POLY1305_TAGLEN)))
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)))
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 4, POLY1305_KEYLEN)));
-
-#endif /* POLY1305_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/poly1305.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/poly1305.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/poly1305.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/poly1305.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: poly1305.h,v 1.4 2014/05/02 03:27:54 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Public Domain poly1305 from Andrew Moon
+ * poly1305-donna-unrolled.c from https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna
+ */
+
+#ifndef POLY1305_H
+#define POLY1305_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#define POLY1305_KEYLEN 32
+#define POLY1305_TAGLEN 16
+
+void poly1305_auth(u_char out[POLY1305_TAGLEN], const u_char *m, size_t inlen,
+ const u_char key[POLY1305_KEYLEN])
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, POLY1305_TAGLEN)))
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)))
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 4, POLY1305_KEYLEN)));
+
+#endif /* POLY1305_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/progressmeter.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/progressmeter.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/progressmeter.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,307 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.40 2013/09/19 00:24:52 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2003 Nils Nordman. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/ioctl.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "progressmeter.h"
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-
-#define DEFAULT_WINSIZE 80
-#define MAX_WINSIZE 512
-#define PADDING 1 /* padding between the progress indicators */
-#define UPDATE_INTERVAL 1 /* update the progress meter every second */
-#define STALL_TIME 5 /* we're stalled after this many seconds */
-
-/* determines whether we can output to the terminal */
-static int can_output(void);
-
-/* formats and inserts the specified size into the given buffer */
-static void format_size(char *, int, off_t);
-static void format_rate(char *, int, off_t);
-
-/* window resizing */
-static void sig_winch(int);
-static void setscreensize(void);
-
-/* updates the progressmeter to reflect the current state of the transfer */
-void refresh_progress_meter(void);
-
-/* signal handler for updating the progress meter */
-static void update_progress_meter(int);
-
-static time_t start; /* start progress */
-static time_t last_update; /* last progress update */
-static char *file; /* name of the file being transferred */
-static off_t start_pos; /* initial position of transfer */
-static off_t end_pos; /* ending position of transfer */
-static off_t cur_pos; /* transfer position as of last refresh */
-static volatile off_t *counter; /* progress counter */
-static long stalled; /* how long we have been stalled */
-static int bytes_per_second; /* current speed in bytes per second */
-static int win_size; /* terminal window size */
-static volatile sig_atomic_t win_resized; /* for window resizing */
-
-/* units for format_size */
-static const char unit[] = " KMGT";
-
-static int
-can_output(void)
-{
- return (getpgrp() == tcgetpgrp(STDOUT_FILENO));
-}
-
-static void
-format_rate(char *buf, int size, off_t bytes)
-{
- int i;
-
- bytes *= 100;
- for (i = 0; bytes >= 100*1000 && unit[i] != 'T'; i++)
- bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024;
- if (i == 0) {
- i++;
- bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024;
- }
- snprintf(buf, size, "%3lld.%1lld%c%s",
- (long long) (bytes + 5) / 100,
- (long long) (bytes + 5) / 10 % 10,
- unit[i],
- i ? "B" : " ");
-}
-
-static void
-format_size(char *buf, int size, off_t bytes)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; bytes >= 10000 && unit[i] != 'T'; i++)
- bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024;
- snprintf(buf, size, "%4lld%c%s",
- (long long) bytes,
- unit[i],
- i ? "B" : " ");
-}
-
-void
-refresh_progress_meter(void)
-{
- char buf[MAX_WINSIZE + 1];
- time_t now;
- off_t transferred;
- double elapsed;
- int percent;
- off_t bytes_left;
- int cur_speed;
- int hours, minutes, seconds;
- int i, len;
- int file_len;
-
- transferred = *counter - (cur_pos ? cur_pos : start_pos);
- cur_pos = *counter;
- now = monotime();
- bytes_left = end_pos - cur_pos;
-
- if (bytes_left > 0)
- elapsed = now - last_update;
- else {
- elapsed = now - start;
- /* Calculate true total speed when done */
- transferred = end_pos - start_pos;
- bytes_per_second = 0;
- }
-
- /* calculate speed */
- if (elapsed != 0)
- cur_speed = (transferred / elapsed);
- else
- cur_speed = transferred;
-
-#define AGE_FACTOR 0.9
- if (bytes_per_second != 0) {
- bytes_per_second = (bytes_per_second * AGE_FACTOR) +
- (cur_speed * (1.0 - AGE_FACTOR));
- } else
- bytes_per_second = cur_speed;
-
- /* filename */
- buf[0] = '\0';
- file_len = win_size - 35;
- if (file_len > 0) {
- len = snprintf(buf, file_len + 1, "\r%s", file);
- if (len < 0)
- len = 0;
- if (len >= file_len + 1)
- len = file_len;
- for (i = len; i < file_len; i++)
- buf[i] = ' ';
- buf[file_len] = '\0';
- }
-
- /* percent of transfer done */
- if (end_pos != 0)
- percent = ((float)cur_pos / end_pos) * 100;
- else
- percent = 100;
- snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
- " %3d%% ", percent);
-
- /* amount transferred */
- format_size(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
- cur_pos);
- strlcat(buf, " ", win_size);
-
- /* bandwidth usage */
- format_rate(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
- (off_t)bytes_per_second);
- strlcat(buf, "/s ", win_size);
-
- /* ETA */
- if (!transferred)
- stalled += elapsed;
- else
- stalled = 0;
-
- if (stalled >= STALL_TIME)
- strlcat(buf, "- stalled -", win_size);
- else if (bytes_per_second == 0 && bytes_left)
- strlcat(buf, " --:-- ETA", win_size);
- else {
- if (bytes_left > 0)
- seconds = bytes_left / bytes_per_second;
- else
- seconds = elapsed;
-
- hours = seconds / 3600;
- seconds -= hours * 3600;
- minutes = seconds / 60;
- seconds -= minutes * 60;
-
- if (hours != 0)
- snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
- "%d:%02d:%02d", hours, minutes, seconds);
- else
- snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
- " %02d:%02d", minutes, seconds);
-
- if (bytes_left > 0)
- strlcat(buf, " ETA", win_size);
- else
- strlcat(buf, " ", win_size);
- }
-
- atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, buf, win_size - 1);
- last_update = now;
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static void
-update_progress_meter(int ignore)
-{
- int save_errno;
-
- save_errno = errno;
-
- if (win_resized) {
- setscreensize();
- win_resized = 0;
- }
- if (can_output())
- refresh_progress_meter();
-
- signal(SIGALRM, update_progress_meter);
- alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL);
- errno = save_errno;
-}
-
-void
-start_progress_meter(char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
-{
- start = last_update = monotime();
- file = f;
- start_pos = *ctr;
- end_pos = filesize;
- cur_pos = 0;
- counter = ctr;
- stalled = 0;
- bytes_per_second = 0;
-
- setscreensize();
- if (can_output())
- refresh_progress_meter();
-
- signal(SIGALRM, update_progress_meter);
- signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
- alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL);
-}
-
-void
-stop_progress_meter(void)
-{
- alarm(0);
-
- if (!can_output())
- return;
-
- /* Ensure we complete the progress */
- if (cur_pos != end_pos)
- refresh_progress_meter();
-
- atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, "\n", 1);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static void
-sig_winch(int sig)
-{
- win_resized = 1;
-}
-
-static void
-setscreensize(void)
-{
- struct winsize winsize;
-
- if (ioctl(STDOUT_FILENO, TIOCGWINSZ, &winsize) != -1 &&
- winsize.ws_col != 0) {
- if (winsize.ws_col > MAX_WINSIZE)
- win_size = MAX_WINSIZE;
- else
- win_size = winsize.ws_col;
- } else
- win_size = DEFAULT_WINSIZE;
- win_size += 1; /* trailing \0 */
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/progressmeter.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/progressmeter.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/progressmeter.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/progressmeter.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.45 2016/06/30 05:17:05 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Nils Nordman. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "progressmeter.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#define DEFAULT_WINSIZE 80
+#define MAX_WINSIZE 512
+#define PADDING 1 /* padding between the progress indicators */
+#define UPDATE_INTERVAL 1 /* update the progress meter every second */
+#define STALL_TIME 5 /* we're stalled after this many seconds */
+
+/* determines whether we can output to the terminal */
+static int can_output(void);
+
+/* formats and inserts the specified size into the given buffer */
+static void format_size(char *, int, off_t);
+static void format_rate(char *, int, off_t);
+
+/* window resizing */
+static void sig_winch(int);
+static void setscreensize(void);
+
+/* updates the progressmeter to reflect the current state of the transfer */
+void refresh_progress_meter(void);
+
+/* signal handler for updating the progress meter */
+static void update_progress_meter(int);
+
+static double start; /* start progress */
+static double last_update; /* last progress update */
+static const char *file; /* name of the file being transferred */
+static off_t start_pos; /* initial position of transfer */
+static off_t end_pos; /* ending position of transfer */
+static off_t cur_pos; /* transfer position as of last refresh */
+static volatile off_t *counter; /* progress counter */
+static long stalled; /* how long we have been stalled */
+static int bytes_per_second; /* current speed in bytes per second */
+static int win_size; /* terminal window size */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t win_resized; /* for window resizing */
+
+/* units for format_size */
+static const char unit[] = " KMGT";
+
+static int
+can_output(void)
+{
+ return (getpgrp() == tcgetpgrp(STDOUT_FILENO));
+}
+
+static void
+format_rate(char *buf, int size, off_t bytes)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ bytes *= 100;
+ for (i = 0; bytes >= 100*1000 && unit[i] != 'T'; i++)
+ bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024;
+ if (i == 0) {
+ i++;
+ bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024;
+ }
+ snprintf(buf, size, "%3lld.%1lld%c%s",
+ (long long) (bytes + 5) / 100,
+ (long long) (bytes + 5) / 10 % 10,
+ unit[i],
+ i ? "B" : " ");
+}
+
+static void
+format_size(char *buf, int size, off_t bytes)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; bytes >= 10000 && unit[i] != 'T'; i++)
+ bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024;
+ snprintf(buf, size, "%4lld%c%s",
+ (long long) bytes,
+ unit[i],
+ i ? "B" : " ");
+}
+
+void
+refresh_progress_meter(void)
+{
+ char buf[MAX_WINSIZE + 1];
+ off_t transferred;
+ double elapsed, now;
+ int percent;
+ off_t bytes_left;
+ int cur_speed;
+ int hours, minutes, seconds;
+ int i, len;
+ int file_len;
+
+ transferred = *counter - (cur_pos ? cur_pos : start_pos);
+ cur_pos = *counter;
+ now = monotime_double();
+ bytes_left = end_pos - cur_pos;
+
+ if (bytes_left > 0)
+ elapsed = now - last_update;
+ else {
+ elapsed = now - start;
+ /* Calculate true total speed when done */
+ transferred = end_pos - start_pos;
+ bytes_per_second = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* calculate speed */
+ if (elapsed != 0)
+ cur_speed = (transferred / elapsed);
+ else
+ cur_speed = transferred;
+
+#define AGE_FACTOR 0.9
+ if (bytes_per_second != 0) {
+ bytes_per_second = (bytes_per_second * AGE_FACTOR) +
+ (cur_speed * (1.0 - AGE_FACTOR));
+ } else
+ bytes_per_second = cur_speed;
+
+ /* filename */
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ file_len = win_size - 35;
+ if (file_len > 0) {
+ len = snprintf(buf, file_len + 1, "\r%s", file);
+ if (len < 0)
+ len = 0;
+ if (len >= file_len + 1)
+ len = file_len;
+ for (i = len; i < file_len; i++)
+ buf[i] = ' ';
+ buf[file_len] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ /* percent of transfer done */
+ if (end_pos == 0 || cur_pos == end_pos)
+ percent = 100;
+ else
+ percent = ((float)cur_pos / end_pos) * 100;
+ snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
+ " %3d%% ", percent);
+
+ /* amount transferred */
+ format_size(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
+ cur_pos);
+ strlcat(buf, " ", win_size);
+
+ /* bandwidth usage */
+ format_rate(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
+ (off_t)bytes_per_second);
+ strlcat(buf, "/s ", win_size);
+
+ /* ETA */
+ if (!transferred)
+ stalled += elapsed;
+ else
+ stalled = 0;
+
+ if (stalled >= STALL_TIME)
+ strlcat(buf, "- stalled -", win_size);
+ else if (bytes_per_second == 0 && bytes_left)
+ strlcat(buf, " --:-- ETA", win_size);
+ else {
+ if (bytes_left > 0)
+ seconds = bytes_left / bytes_per_second;
+ else
+ seconds = elapsed;
+
+ hours = seconds / 3600;
+ seconds -= hours * 3600;
+ minutes = seconds / 60;
+ seconds -= minutes * 60;
+
+ if (hours != 0)
+ snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
+ "%d:%02d:%02d", hours, minutes, seconds);
+ else
+ snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
+ " %02d:%02d", minutes, seconds);
+
+ if (bytes_left > 0)
+ strlcat(buf, " ETA", win_size);
+ else
+ strlcat(buf, " ", win_size);
+ }
+
+ atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, buf, win_size - 1);
+ last_update = now;
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+update_progress_meter(int ignore)
+{
+ int save_errno;
+
+ save_errno = errno;
+
+ if (win_resized) {
+ setscreensize();
+ win_resized = 0;
+ }
+ if (can_output())
+ refresh_progress_meter();
+
+ signal(SIGALRM, update_progress_meter);
+ alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL);
+ errno = save_errno;
+}
+
+void
+start_progress_meter(const char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
+{
+ start = last_update = monotime_double();
+ file = f;
+ start_pos = *ctr;
+ end_pos = filesize;
+ cur_pos = 0;
+ counter = ctr;
+ stalled = 0;
+ bytes_per_second = 0;
+
+ setscreensize();
+ if (can_output())
+ refresh_progress_meter();
+
+ signal(SIGALRM, update_progress_meter);
+ signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
+ alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL);
+}
+
+void
+stop_progress_meter(void)
+{
+ alarm(0);
+
+ if (!can_output())
+ return;
+
+ /* Ensure we complete the progress */
+ if (cur_pos != end_pos)
+ refresh_progress_meter();
+
+ atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, "\n", 1);
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+sig_winch(int sig)
+{
+ win_resized = 1;
+}
+
+static void
+setscreensize(void)
+{
+ struct winsize winsize;
+
+ if (ioctl(STDOUT_FILENO, TIOCGWINSZ, &winsize) != -1 &&
+ winsize.ws_col != 0) {
+ if (winsize.ws_col > MAX_WINSIZE)
+ win_size = MAX_WINSIZE;
+ else
+ win_size = winsize.ws_col;
+ } else
+ win_size = DEFAULT_WINSIZE;
+ win_size += 1; /* trailing \0 */
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/progressmeter.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/progressmeter.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/progressmeter.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.h,v 1.2 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2002 Nils Nordman. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-void start_progress_meter(char *, off_t, off_t *);
-void stop_progress_meter(void);
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/progressmeter.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/progressmeter.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/progressmeter.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/progressmeter.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.h,v 1.3 2015/01/14 13:54:13 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Nils Nordman. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+void start_progress_meter(const char *, off_t, off_t *);
+void stop_progress_meter(void);
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/readconf.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/readconf.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/readconf.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1852 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.218 2014/02/23 20:11:36 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Functions for reading the configuration files.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
-#include <netinet/ip.h>
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
-#include <util.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "readconf.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "mac.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-
-/* Format of the configuration file:
-
- # Configuration data is parsed as follows:
- # 1. command line options
- # 2. user-specific file
- # 3. system-wide file
- # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
- # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
- # configuration file, and defaults at the end.
-
- # Host-specific declarations. These may override anything above. A single
- # host may match multiple declarations; these are processed in the order
- # that they are given in.
-
- Host *.ngs.fi ngs.fi
- User foo
-
- Host fake.com
- HostName another.host.name.real.org
- User blaah
- Port 34289
- ForwardX11 no
- ForwardAgent no
-
- Host books.com
- RemoteForward 9999 shadows.cs.hut.fi:9999
- Cipher 3des
-
- Host fascist.blob.com
- Port 23123
- User tylonen
- PasswordAuthentication no
-
- Host puukko.hut.fi
- User t35124p
- ProxyCommand ssh-proxy %h %p
-
- Host *.fr
- PublicKeyAuthentication no
-
- Host *.su
- Cipher none
- PasswordAuthentication no
-
- Host vpn.fake.com
- Tunnel yes
- TunnelDevice 3
-
- # Defaults for various options
- Host *
- ForwardAgent no
- ForwardX11 no
- PasswordAuthentication yes
- RSAAuthentication yes
- RhostsRSAAuthentication yes
- StrictHostKeyChecking yes
- TcpKeepAlive no
- IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity
- Port 22
- EscapeChar ~
-
-*/
-
-/* Keyword tokens. */
-
-typedef enum {
- oBadOption,
- oHost, oMatch,
- oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oForwardX11Trusted, oForwardX11Timeout,
- oGatewayPorts, oExitOnForwardFailure,
- oPasswordAuthentication, oRSAAuthentication,
- oChallengeResponseAuthentication, oXAuthLocation,
- oIdentityFile, oHostName, oPort, oCipher, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward,
- oUser, oEscapeChar, oRhostsRSAAuthentication, oProxyCommand,
- oGlobalKnownHostsFile, oUserKnownHostsFile, oConnectionAttempts,
- oBatchMode, oCheckHostIP, oStrictHostKeyChecking, oCompression,
- oCompressionLevel, oTCPKeepAlive, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts,
- oUsePrivilegedPort, oLogLevel, oCiphers, oProtocol, oMacs,
- oGlobalKnownHostsFile2, oUserKnownHostsFile2, oPubkeyAuthentication,
- oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias,
- oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication,
- oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oPKCS11Provider,
- oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
- oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
- oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
- oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
- oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
- oHashKnownHosts,
- oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
- oVisualHostKey, oUseRoaming,
- oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
- oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots,
- oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs,
- oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
-} OpCodes;
-
-/* Textual representations of the tokens. */
-
-static struct {
- const char *name;
- OpCodes opcode;
-} keywords[] = {
- { "forwardagent", oForwardAgent },
- { "forwardx11", oForwardX11 },
- { "forwardx11trusted", oForwardX11Trusted },
- { "forwardx11timeout", oForwardX11Timeout },
- { "exitonforwardfailure", oExitOnForwardFailure },
- { "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation },
- { "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts },
- { "useprivilegedport", oUsePrivilegedPort },
- { "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated },
- { "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication },
- { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication },
- { "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices },
- { "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication },
- { "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },
- { "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */
- { "rhostsrsaauthentication", oRhostsRSAAuthentication },
- { "hostbasedauthentication", oHostbasedAuthentication },
- { "challengeresponseauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication },
- { "skeyauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
- { "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
- { "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported },
- { "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported },
- { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
-#if defined(GSSAPI)
- { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
- { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
-#else
- { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
- { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
-#endif
- { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
- { "usersh", oDeprecated },
- { "identityfile", oIdentityFile },
- { "identityfile2", oIdentityFile }, /* obsolete */
- { "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly },
- { "hostname", oHostName },
- { "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias },
- { "proxycommand", oProxyCommand },
- { "port", oPort },
- { "cipher", oCipher },
- { "ciphers", oCiphers },
- { "macs", oMacs },
- { "protocol", oProtocol },
- { "remoteforward", oRemoteForward },
- { "localforward", oLocalForward },
- { "user", oUser },
- { "host", oHost },
- { "match", oMatch },
- { "escapechar", oEscapeChar },
- { "globalknownhostsfile", oGlobalKnownHostsFile },
- { "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
- { "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile },
- { "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
- { "connectionattempts", oConnectionAttempts },
- { "batchmode", oBatchMode },
- { "checkhostip", oCheckHostIP },
- { "stricthostkeychecking", oStrictHostKeyChecking },
- { "compression", oCompression },
- { "compressionlevel", oCompressionLevel },
- { "tcpkeepalive", oTCPKeepAlive },
- { "keepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, /* obsolete */
- { "numberofpasswordprompts", oNumberOfPasswordPrompts },
- { "loglevel", oLogLevel },
- { "dynamicforward", oDynamicForward },
- { "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications },
- { "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms },
- { "bindaddress", oBindAddress },
-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- { "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider },
- { "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
-#else
- { "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported },
- { "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported },
-#endif
- { "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings },
- { "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign },
- { "verifyhostkeydns", oVerifyHostKeyDNS },
- { "nohostauthenticationforlocalhost", oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost },
- { "rekeylimit", oRekeyLimit },
- { "connecttimeout", oConnectTimeout },
- { "addressfamily", oAddressFamily },
- { "serveraliveinterval", oServerAliveInterval },
- { "serveralivecountmax", oServerAliveCountMax },
- { "sendenv", oSendEnv },
- { "controlpath", oControlPath },
- { "controlmaster", oControlMaster },
- { "controlpersist", oControlPersist },
- { "hashknownhosts", oHashKnownHosts },
- { "tunnel", oTunnel },
- { "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice },
- { "localcommand", oLocalCommand },
- { "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand },
- { "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey },
- { "useroaming", oUseRoaming },
- { "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
- { "ipqos", oIPQoS },
- { "requesttty", oRequestTTY },
- { "proxyusefdpass", oProxyUseFdpass },
- { "canonicaldomains", oCanonicalDomains },
- { "canonicalizefallbacklocal", oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal },
- { "canonicalizehostname", oCanonicalizeHostname },
- { "canonicalizemaxdots", oCanonicalizeMaxDots },
- { "canonicalizepermittedcnames", oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs },
- { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
-
- { NULL, oBadOption }
-};
-
-/*
- * Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is an
- * error.
- */
-
-void
-add_local_forward(Options *options, const Forward *newfwd)
-{
- Forward *fwd;
-#ifndef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT
- extern uid_t original_real_uid;
- if (newfwd->listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED && original_real_uid != 0)
- fatal("Privileged ports can only be forwarded by root.");
-#endif
- options->local_forwards = xrealloc(options->local_forwards,
- options->num_local_forwards + 1,
- sizeof(*options->local_forwards));
- fwd = &options->local_forwards[options->num_local_forwards++];
-
- fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host;
- fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port;
- fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host;
- fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port;
-}
-
-/*
- * Adds a remote TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is
- * an error.
- */
-
-void
-add_remote_forward(Options *options, const Forward *newfwd)
-{
- Forward *fwd;
-
- options->remote_forwards = xrealloc(options->remote_forwards,
- options->num_remote_forwards + 1,
- sizeof(*options->remote_forwards));
- fwd = &options->remote_forwards[options->num_remote_forwards++];
-
- fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host;
- fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port;
- fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host;
- fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port;
- fwd->handle = newfwd->handle;
- fwd->allocated_port = 0;
-}
-
-static void
-clear_forwardings(Options *options)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) {
- free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_host);
- free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_host);
- }
- if (options->num_local_forwards > 0) {
- free(options->local_forwards);
- options->local_forwards = NULL;
- }
- options->num_local_forwards = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) {
- free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_host);
- free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_host);
- }
- if (options->num_remote_forwards > 0) {
- free(options->remote_forwards);
- options->remote_forwards = NULL;
- }
- options->num_remote_forwards = 0;
- options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
-}
-
-void
-add_identity_file(Options *options, const char *dir, const char *filename,
- int userprovided)
-{
- char *path;
-
- if (options->num_identity_files >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
- fatal("Too many identity files specified (max %d)",
- SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES);
-
- if (dir == NULL) /* no dir, filename is absolute */
- path = xstrdup(filename);
- else
- (void)xasprintf(&path, "%.100s%.100s", dir, filename);
-
- options->identity_file_userprovided[options->num_identity_files] =
- userprovided;
- options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++] = path;
-}
-
-int
-default_ssh_port(void)
-{
- static int port;
- struct servent *sp;
-
- if (port == 0) {
- sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp");
- port = sp ? ntohs(sp->s_port) : SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
- }
- return port;
-}
-
-/*
- * Execute a command in a shell.
- * Return its exit status or -1 on abnormal exit.
- */
-static int
-execute_in_shell(const char *cmd)
-{
- char *shell, *command_string;
- pid_t pid;
- int devnull, status;
- extern uid_t original_real_uid;
-
- if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL)
- shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
-
- /*
- * Use "exec" to avoid "sh -c" processes on some platforms
- * (e.g. Solaris)
- */
- xasprintf(&command_string, "exec %s", cmd);
-
- /* Need this to redirect subprocess stdin/out */
- if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1)
- fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
-
- debug("Executing command: '%.500s'", cmd);
-
- /* Fork and execute the command. */
- if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
- char *argv[4];
-
- /* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */
- permanently_drop_suid(original_real_uid);
-
- /* Redirect child stdin and stdout. Leave stderr */
- if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
- fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
- fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
- close(devnull);
- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
-
- argv[0] = shell;
- argv[1] = "-c";
- argv[2] = command_string;
- argv[3] = NULL;
-
- execv(argv[0], argv);
- error("Unable to execute '%.100s': %s", cmd, strerror(errno));
- /* Die with signal to make this error apparent to parent. */
- signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
- kill(getpid(), SIGTERM);
- _exit(1);
- }
- /* Parent. */
- if (pid < 0)
- fatal("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-
- close(devnull);
- free(command_string);
-
- while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
- if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN)
- fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- }
- if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
- error("command '%.100s' exited abnormally", cmd);
- return -1;
- }
- debug3("command returned status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
- return WEXITSTATUS(status);
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse and execute a Match directive.
- */
-static int
-match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw,
- const char *host_arg, const char *filename, int linenum)
-{
- char *arg, *attrib, *cmd, *cp = *condition, *host;
- const char *ruser;
- int r, port, result = 1, attributes = 0;
- size_t len;
- char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV];
-
- /*
- * Configuration is likely to be incomplete at this point so we
- * must be prepared to use default values.
- */
- port = options->port <= 0 ? default_ssh_port() : options->port;
- ruser = options->user == NULL ? pw->pw_name : options->user;
- if (options->hostname != NULL) {
- /* NB. Please keep in sync with ssh.c:main() */
- host = percent_expand(options->hostname,
- "h", host_arg, (char *)NULL);
- } else
- host = xstrdup(host_arg);
-
- debug3("checking match for '%s' host %s", cp, host);
- while ((attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') {
- attributes++;
- if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) {
- if (attributes != 1 ||
- ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')) {
- error("'all' cannot be combined with other "
- "Match attributes");
- result = -1;
- goto out;
- }
- *condition = cp;
- result = 1;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') {
- error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
- result = -1;
- goto out;
- }
- len = strlen(arg);
- if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
- if (match_hostname(host, arg, len) != 1)
- result = 0;
- else
- debug("%.200s line %d: matched 'Host %.100s' ",
- filename, linenum, host);
- } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "originalhost") == 0) {
- if (match_hostname(host_arg, arg, len) != 1)
- result = 0;
- else
- debug("%.200s line %d: matched "
- "'OriginalHost %.100s' ",
- filename, linenum, host_arg);
- } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
- if (match_pattern_list(ruser, arg, len, 0) != 1)
- result = 0;
- else
- debug("%.200s line %d: matched 'User %.100s' ",
- filename, linenum, ruser);
- } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localuser") == 0) {
- if (match_pattern_list(pw->pw_name, arg, len, 0) != 1)
- result = 0;
- else
- debug("%.200s line %d: matched "
- "'LocalUser %.100s' ",
- filename, linenum, pw->pw_name);
- } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "exec") == 0) {
- if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
- fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
- strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost));
- shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0';
- snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", port);
-
- cmd = percent_expand(arg,
- "L", shorthost,
- "d", pw->pw_dir,
- "h", host,
- "l", thishost,
- "n", host_arg,
- "p", portstr,
- "r", ruser,
- "u", pw->pw_name,
- (char *)NULL);
- if (result != 1) {
- /* skip execution if prior predicate failed */
- debug("%.200s line %d: skipped exec \"%.100s\"",
- filename, linenum, cmd);
- } else {
- r = execute_in_shell(cmd);
- if (r == -1) {
- fatal("%.200s line %d: match exec "
- "'%.100s' error", filename,
- linenum, cmd);
- } else if (r == 0) {
- debug("%.200s line %d: matched "
- "'exec \"%.100s\"'", filename,
- linenum, cmd);
- } else {
- debug("%.200s line %d: no match "
- "'exec \"%.100s\"'", filename,
- linenum, cmd);
- result = 0;
- }
- }
- free(cmd);
- } else {
- error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib);
- result = -1;
- goto out;
- }
- }
- if (attributes == 0) {
- error("One or more attributes required for Match");
- result = -1;
- goto out;
- }
- debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
- *condition = cp;
- out:
- free(host);
- return result;
-}
-
-/* Check and prepare a domain name: removes trailing '.' and lowercases */
-static void
-valid_domain(char *name, const char *filename, int linenum)
-{
- size_t i, l = strlen(name);
- u_char c, last = '\0';
-
- if (l == 0)
- fatal("%s line %d: empty hostname suffix", filename, linenum);
- if (!isalpha((u_char)name[0]) && !isdigit((u_char)name[0]))
- fatal("%s line %d: hostname suffix \"%.100s\" "
- "starts with invalid character", filename, linenum, name);
- for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
- c = tolower((u_char)name[i]);
- name[i] = (char)c;
- if (last == '.' && c == '.')
- fatal("%s line %d: hostname suffix \"%.100s\" contains "
- "consecutive separators", filename, linenum, name);
- if (c != '.' && c != '-' && !isalnum(c) &&
- c != '_') /* technically invalid, but common */
- fatal("%s line %d: hostname suffix \"%.100s\" contains "
- "invalid characters", filename, linenum, name);
- last = c;
- }
- if (name[l - 1] == '.')
- name[l - 1] = '\0';
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or oBadOption.
- */
-static OpCodes
-parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum,
- const char *ignored_unknown)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
- if (strcmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0)
- return keywords[i].opcode;
- if (ignored_unknown != NULL && match_pattern_list(cp, ignored_unknown,
- strlen(ignored_unknown), 1) == 1)
- return oIgnoredUnknownOption;
- error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s",
- filename, linenum, cp);
- return oBadOption;
-}
-
-/* Multistate option parsing */
-struct multistate {
- char *key;
- int value;
-};
-static const struct multistate multistate_flag[] = {
- { "true", 1 },
- { "false", 0 },
- { "yes", 1 },
- { "no", 0 },
- { NULL, -1 }
-};
-static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoask[] = {
- { "true", 1 },
- { "false", 0 },
- { "yes", 1 },
- { "no", 0 },
- { "ask", 2 },
- { NULL, -1 }
-};
-static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = {
- { "inet", AF_INET },
- { "inet6", AF_INET6 },
- { "any", AF_UNSPEC },
- { NULL, -1 }
-};
-static const struct multistate multistate_controlmaster[] = {
- { "true", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES },
- { "yes", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES },
- { "false", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO },
- { "no", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO },
- { "auto", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO },
- { "ask", SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK },
- { "autoask", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK },
- { NULL, -1 }
-};
-static const struct multistate multistate_tunnel[] = {
- { "ethernet", SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET },
- { "point-to-point", SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT },
- { "true", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT },
- { "yes", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT },
- { "false", SSH_TUNMODE_NO },
- { "no", SSH_TUNMODE_NO },
- { NULL, -1 }
-};
-static const struct multistate multistate_requesttty[] = {
- { "true", REQUEST_TTY_YES },
- { "yes", REQUEST_TTY_YES },
- { "false", REQUEST_TTY_NO },
- { "no", REQUEST_TTY_NO },
- { "force", REQUEST_TTY_FORCE },
- { "auto", REQUEST_TTY_AUTO },
- { NULL, -1 }
-};
-static const struct multistate multistate_canonicalizehostname[] = {
- { "true", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES },
- { "false", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO },
- { "yes", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES },
- { "no", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO },
- { "always", SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS },
- { NULL, -1 }
-};
-
-/*
- * Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This
- * only sets those values that have not already been set.
- */
-#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
-int
-process_config_line(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
- char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, int userconfig)
-{
- char *s, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg, *arg2;
- char **cpptr, fwdarg[256];
- u_int i, *uintptr, max_entries = 0;
- int negated, opcode, *intptr, value, value2, cmdline = 0;
- LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
- long long val64;
- size_t len;
- Forward fwd;
- const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;
- struct allowed_cname *cname;
-
- if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */
- cmdline = 1;
- activep = &cmdline;
- }
-
- /* Strip trailing whitespace */
- for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) {
- if (strchr(WHITESPACE, line[len]) == NULL)
- break;
- line[len] = '\0';
- }
-
- s = line;
- /* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */
- if ((keyword = strdelim(&s)) == NULL)
- return 0;
- /* Ignore leading whitespace. */
- if (*keyword == '\0')
- keyword = strdelim(&s);
- if (keyword == NULL || !*keyword || *keyword == '\n' || *keyword == '#')
- return 0;
- /* Match lowercase keyword */
- lowercase(keyword);
-
- opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum,
- options->ignored_unknown);
-
- switch (opcode) {
- case oBadOption:
- /* don't panic, but count bad options */
- return -1;
- /* NOTREACHED */
- case oIgnoredUnknownOption:
- debug("%s line %d: Ignored unknown option \"%s\"",
- filename, linenum, keyword);
- return 0;
- case oConnectTimeout:
- intptr = &options->connection_timeout;
-parse_time:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.",
- filename, linenum);
- if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1)
- fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
- filename, linenum);
- if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
- *intptr = value;
- break;
-
- case oForwardAgent:
- intptr = &options->forward_agent;
- parse_flag:
- multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
- parse_multistate:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.",
- filename, linenum);
- value = -1;
- for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) {
- if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) {
- value = multistate_ptr[i].value;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (value == -1)
- fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".",
- filename, linenum, arg);
- if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
- *intptr = value;
- break;
-
- case oForwardX11:
- intptr = &options->forward_x11;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oForwardX11Trusted:
- intptr = &options->forward_x11_trusted;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oForwardX11Timeout:
- intptr = &options->forward_x11_timeout;
- goto parse_time;
-
- case oGatewayPorts:
- intptr = &options->gateway_ports;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oExitOnForwardFailure:
- intptr = &options->exit_on_forward_failure;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oUsePrivilegedPort:
- intptr = &options->use_privileged_port;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oPasswordAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->password_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oKbdInteractiveDevices:
- charptr = &options->kbd_interactive_devices;
- goto parse_string;
-
- case oPubkeyAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oRSAAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->rsa_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oRhostsRSAAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->rhosts_rsa_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oHostbasedAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oChallengeResponseAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oGssAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oGssDelegateCreds:
- intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oBatchMode:
- intptr = &options->batch_mode;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oCheckHostIP:
- intptr = &options->check_host_ip;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oVerifyHostKeyDNS:
- intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns;
- multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask;
- goto parse_multistate;
-
- case oStrictHostKeyChecking:
- intptr = &options->strict_host_key_checking;
- multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask;
- goto parse_multistate;
-
- case oCompression:
- intptr = &options->compression;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oTCPKeepAlive:
- intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost:
- intptr = &options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oNumberOfPasswordPrompts:
- intptr = &options->number_of_password_prompts;
- goto parse_int;
-
- case oCompressionLevel:
- intptr = &options->compression_level;
- goto parse_int;
-
- case oRekeyLimit:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
- linenum);
- if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) {
- val64 = 0;
- } else {
- if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s",
- filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno));
- /* check for too-large or too-small limits */
- if (val64 > UINT_MAX)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too large",
- filename, linenum);
- if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small",
- filename, linenum);
- }
- if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1)
- options->rekey_limit = (u_int32_t)val64;
- if (s != NULL) { /* optional rekey interval present */
- if (strcmp(s, "none") == 0) {
- (void)strdelim(&s); /* discard */
- break;
- }
- intptr = &options->rekey_interval;
- goto parse_time;
- }
- break;
-
- case oIdentityFile:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
- if (*activep) {
- intptr = &options->num_identity_files;
- if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many identity files specified (max %d).",
- filename, linenum, SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES);
- add_identity_file(options, NULL, arg, userconfig);
- }
- break;
-
- case oXAuthLocation:
- charptr=&options->xauth_location;
- goto parse_string;
-
- case oUser:
- charptr = &options->user;
-parse_string:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
- filename, linenum);
- if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
- *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
- break;
-
- case oGlobalKnownHostsFile:
- cpptr = (char **)&options->system_hostfiles;
- uintptr = &options->num_system_hostfiles;
- max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES;
-parse_char_array:
- if (*activep && *uintptr == 0) {
- while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
- if ((*uintptr) >= max_entries)
- fatal("%s line %d: "
- "too many authorized keys files.",
- filename, linenum);
- cpptr[(*uintptr)++] = xstrdup(arg);
- }
- }
- return 0;
-
- case oUserKnownHostsFile:
- cpptr = (char **)&options->user_hostfiles;
- uintptr = &options->num_user_hostfiles;
- max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES;
- goto parse_char_array;
-
- case oHostName:
- charptr = &options->hostname;
- goto parse_string;
-
- case oHostKeyAlias:
- charptr = &options->host_key_alias;
- goto parse_string;
-
- case oPreferredAuthentications:
- charptr = &options->preferred_authentications;
- goto parse_string;
-
- case oBindAddress:
- charptr = &options->bind_address;
- goto parse_string;
-
- case oPKCS11Provider:
- charptr = &options->pkcs11_provider;
- goto parse_string;
-
- case oProxyCommand:
- charptr = &options->proxy_command;
-parse_command:
- if (s == NULL)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
- len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE "=");
- if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
- *charptr = xstrdup(s + len);
- return 0;
-
- case oPort:
- intptr = &options->port;
-parse_int:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
- if (arg[0] < '0' || arg[0] > '9')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum);
-
- /* Octal, decimal, or hex format? */
- value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 0);
- if (arg == endofnumber)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum);
- if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
- *intptr = value;
- break;
-
- case oConnectionAttempts:
- intptr = &options->connection_attempts;
- goto parse_int;
-
- case oCipher:
- intptr = &options->cipher;
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
- value = cipher_number(arg);
- if (value == -1)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad cipher '%s'.",
- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
- if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
- *intptr = value;
- break;
-
- case oCiphers:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
- if (!ciphers_valid(arg))
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
- if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL)
- options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
- break;
-
- case oMacs:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
- if (!mac_valid(arg))
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 Mac spec '%s'.",
- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
- if (*activep && options->macs == NULL)
- options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
- break;
-
- case oKexAlgorithms:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
- filename, linenum);
- if (!kex_names_valid(arg))
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
- if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
- options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
- break;
-
- case oHostKeyAlgorithms:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
- if (!key_names_valid2(arg))
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad protocol 2 host key algorithms '%s'.",
- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
- if (*activep && options->hostkeyalgorithms == NULL)
- options->hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup(arg);
- break;
-
- case oProtocol:
- intptr = &options->protocol;
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
- value = proto_spec(arg);
- if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.",
- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
- if (*activep && *intptr == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
- *intptr = value;
- break;
-
- case oLogLevel:
- log_level_ptr = &options->log_level;
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- value = log_level_number(arg);
- if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'",
- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
- if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
- *log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value;
- break;
-
- case oLocalForward:
- case oRemoteForward:
- case oDynamicForward:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing port argument.",
- filename, linenum);
-
- if (opcode == oLocalForward ||
- opcode == oRemoteForward) {
- arg2 = strdelim(&s);
- if (arg2 == NULL || *arg2 == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing target argument.",
- filename, linenum);
-
- /* construct a string for parse_forward */
- snprintf(fwdarg, sizeof(fwdarg), "%s:%s", arg, arg2);
- } else if (opcode == oDynamicForward) {
- strlcpy(fwdarg, arg, sizeof(fwdarg));
- }
-
- if (parse_forward(&fwd, fwdarg,
- opcode == oDynamicForward ? 1 : 0,
- opcode == oRemoteForward ? 1 : 0) == 0)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.",
- filename, linenum);
-
- if (*activep) {
- if (opcode == oLocalForward ||
- opcode == oDynamicForward)
- add_local_forward(options, &fwd);
- else if (opcode == oRemoteForward)
- add_remote_forward(options, &fwd);
- }
- break;
-
- case oClearAllForwardings:
- intptr = &options->clear_forwardings;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oHost:
- if (cmdline)
- fatal("Host directive not supported as a command-line "
- "option");
- *activep = 0;
- arg2 = NULL;
- while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
- negated = *arg == '!';
- if (negated)
- arg++;
- if (match_pattern(host, arg)) {
- if (negated) {
- debug("%.200s line %d: Skipping Host "
- "block because of negated match "
- "for %.100s", filename, linenum,
- arg);
- *activep = 0;
- break;
- }
- if (!*activep)
- arg2 = arg; /* logged below */
- *activep = 1;
- }
- }
- if (*activep)
- debug("%.200s line %d: Applying options for %.100s",
- filename, linenum, arg2);
- /* Avoid garbage check below, as strdelim is done. */
- return 0;
-
- case oMatch:
- if (cmdline)
- fatal("Host directive not supported as a command-line "
- "option");
- value = match_cfg_line(options, &s, pw, host,
- filename, linenum);
- if (value < 0)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
- linenum);
- *activep = value;
- break;
-
- case oEscapeChar:
- intptr = &options->escape_char;
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
- if (arg[0] == '^' && arg[2] == 0 &&
- (u_char) arg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) arg[1] < 128)
- value = (u_char) arg[1] & 31;
- else if (strlen(arg) == 1)
- value = (u_char) arg[0];
- else if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0)
- value = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE;
- else {
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad escape character.",
- filename, linenum);
- /* NOTREACHED */
- value = 0; /* Avoid compiler warning. */
- }
- if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
- *intptr = value;
- break;
-
- case oAddressFamily:
- intptr = &options->address_family;
- multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily;
- goto parse_multistate;
-
- case oEnableSSHKeysign:
- intptr = &options->enable_ssh_keysign;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oIdentitiesOnly:
- intptr = &options->identities_only;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oServerAliveInterval:
- intptr = &options->server_alive_interval;
- goto parse_time;
-
- case oServerAliveCountMax:
- intptr = &options->server_alive_count_max;
- goto parse_int;
-
- case oSendEnv:
- while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
- if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL)
- fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.",
- filename, linenum);
- if (!*activep)
- continue;
- if (options->num_send_env >= MAX_SEND_ENV)
- fatal("%s line %d: too many send env.",
- filename, linenum);
- options->send_env[options->num_send_env++] =
- xstrdup(arg);
- }
- break;
-
- case oControlPath:
- charptr = &options->control_path;
- goto parse_string;
-
- case oControlMaster:
- intptr = &options->control_master;
- multistate_ptr = multistate_controlmaster;
- goto parse_multistate;
-
- case oControlPersist:
- /* no/false/yes/true, or a time spec */
- intptr = &options->control_persist;
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing ControlPersist"
- " argument.", filename, linenum);
- value = 0;
- value2 = 0; /* timeout */
- if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0)
- value = 0;
- else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0)
- value = 1;
- else if ((value2 = convtime(arg)) >= 0)
- value = 1;
- else
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad ControlPersist argument.",
- filename, linenum);
- if (*activep && *intptr == -1) {
- *intptr = value;
- options->control_persist_timeout = value2;
- }
- break;
-
- case oHashKnownHosts:
- intptr = &options->hash_known_hosts;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oTunnel:
- intptr = &options->tun_open;
- multistate_ptr = multistate_tunnel;
- goto parse_multistate;
-
- case oTunnelDevice:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
- value = a2tun(arg, &value2);
- if (value == SSH_TUNID_ERR)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad tun device.", filename, linenum);
- if (*activep) {
- options->tun_local = value;
- options->tun_remote = value2;
- }
- break;
-
- case oLocalCommand:
- charptr = &options->local_command;
- goto parse_command;
-
- case oPermitLocalCommand:
- intptr = &options->permit_local_command;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oVisualHostKey:
- intptr = &options->visual_host_key;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oIPQoS:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
- fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
- filename, linenum, arg);
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (arg == NULL)
- value2 = value;
- else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
- fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
- filename, linenum, arg);
- if (*activep) {
- options->ip_qos_interactive = value;
- options->ip_qos_bulk = value2;
- }
- break;
-
- case oUseRoaming:
- intptr = &options->use_roaming;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oRequestTTY:
- intptr = &options->request_tty;
- multistate_ptr = multistate_requesttty;
- goto parse_multistate;
-
- case oIgnoreUnknown:
- charptr = &options->ignored_unknown;
- goto parse_string;
-
- case oProxyUseFdpass:
- intptr = &options->proxy_use_fdpass;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oCanonicalDomains:
- value = options->num_canonical_domains != 0;
- while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
- valid_domain(arg, filename, linenum);
- if (!*activep || value)
- continue;
- if (options->num_canonical_domains >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS)
- fatal("%s line %d: too many hostname suffixes.",
- filename, linenum);
- options->canonical_domains[
- options->num_canonical_domains++] = xstrdup(arg);
- }
- break;
-
- case oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs:
- value = options->num_permitted_cnames != 0;
- while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
- /* Either '*' for everything or 'list:list' */
- if (strcmp(arg, "*") == 0)
- arg2 = arg;
- else {
- lowercase(arg);
- if ((arg2 = strchr(arg, ':')) == NULL ||
- arg2[1] == '\0') {
- fatal("%s line %d: "
- "Invalid permitted CNAME \"%s\"",
- filename, linenum, arg);
- }
- *arg2 = '\0';
- arg2++;
- }
- if (!*activep || value)
- continue;
- if (options->num_permitted_cnames >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS)
- fatal("%s line %d: too many permitted CNAMEs.",
- filename, linenum);
- cname = options->permitted_cnames +
- options->num_permitted_cnames++;
- cname->source_list = xstrdup(arg);
- cname->target_list = xstrdup(arg2);
- }
- break;
-
- case oCanonicalizeHostname:
- intptr = &options->canonicalize_hostname;
- multistate_ptr = multistate_canonicalizehostname;
- goto parse_multistate;
-
- case oCanonicalizeMaxDots:
- intptr = &options->canonicalize_max_dots;
- goto parse_int;
-
- case oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal:
- intptr = &options->canonicalize_fallback_local;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case oDeprecated:
- debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"",
- filename, linenum, keyword);
- return 0;
-
- case oUnsupported:
- error("%s line %d: Unsupported option \"%s\"",
- filename, linenum, keyword);
- return 0;
-
- default:
- fatal("process_config_line: Unimplemented opcode %d", opcode);
- }
-
- /* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */
- if ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
- fatal("%.200s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".",
- filename, linenum, arg);
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Reads the config file and modifies the options accordingly. Options
- * should already be initialized before this call. This never returns if
- * there is an error. If the file does not exist, this returns 0.
- */
-
-int
-read_config_file(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
- Options *options, int flags)
-{
- FILE *f;
- char line[1024];
- int active, linenum;
- int bad_options = 0;
-
- if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if (flags & SSHCONF_CHECKPERM) {
- struct stat sb;
-
- if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1)
- fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
- if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) ||
- (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0))
- fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename);
- }
-
- debug("Reading configuration data %.200s", filename);
-
- /*
- * Mark that we are now processing the options. This flag is turned
- * on/off by Host specifications.
- */
- active = 1;
- linenum = 0;
- while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
- /* Update line number counter. */
- linenum++;
- if (process_config_line(options, pw, host, line, filename,
- linenum, &active, flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF) != 0)
- bad_options++;
- }
- fclose(f);
- if (bad_options > 0)
- fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
- filename, bad_options);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
-int
-option_clear_or_none(const char *o)
-{
- return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet
- * been set. Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options
- * are processed in the following order: command line, user config file,
- * system config file. Last, fill_default_options is called.
- */
-
-void
-initialize_options(Options * options)
-{
- memset(options, 'X', sizeof(*options));
- options->forward_agent = -1;
- options->forward_x11 = -1;
- options->forward_x11_trusted = -1;
- options->forward_x11_timeout = -1;
- options->exit_on_forward_failure = -1;
- options->xauth_location = NULL;
- options->gateway_ports = -1;
- options->use_privileged_port = -1;
- options->rsa_authentication = -1;
- options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
- options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
- options->gss_authentication = -1;
- options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
- options->password_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
- options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1;
- options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
- options->batch_mode = -1;
- options->check_host_ip = -1;
- options->strict_host_key_checking = -1;
- options->compression = -1;
- options->tcp_keep_alive = -1;
- options->compression_level = -1;
- options->port = -1;
- options->address_family = -1;
- options->connection_attempts = -1;
- options->connection_timeout = -1;
- options->number_of_password_prompts = -1;
- options->cipher = -1;
- options->ciphers = NULL;
- options->macs = NULL;
- options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
- options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL;
- options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
- options->num_identity_files = 0;
- options->hostname = NULL;
- options->host_key_alias = NULL;
- options->proxy_command = NULL;
- options->user = NULL;
- options->escape_char = -1;
- options->num_system_hostfiles = 0;
- options->num_user_hostfiles = 0;
- options->local_forwards = NULL;
- options->num_local_forwards = 0;
- options->remote_forwards = NULL;
- options->num_remote_forwards = 0;
- options->clear_forwardings = -1;
- options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
- options->preferred_authentications = NULL;
- options->bind_address = NULL;
- options->pkcs11_provider = NULL;
- options->enable_ssh_keysign = - 1;
- options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = - 1;
- options->identities_only = - 1;
- options->rekey_limit = - 1;
- options->rekey_interval = -1;
- options->verify_host_key_dns = -1;
- options->server_alive_interval = -1;
- options->server_alive_count_max = -1;
- options->num_send_env = 0;
- options->control_path = NULL;
- options->control_master = -1;
- options->control_persist = -1;
- options->control_persist_timeout = 0;
- options->hash_known_hosts = -1;
- options->tun_open = -1;
- options->tun_local = -1;
- options->tun_remote = -1;
- options->local_command = NULL;
- options->permit_local_command = -1;
- options->use_roaming = -1;
- options->visual_host_key = -1;
- options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
- options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
- options->request_tty = -1;
- options->proxy_use_fdpass = -1;
- options->ignored_unknown = NULL;
- options->num_canonical_domains = 0;
- options->num_permitted_cnames = 0;
- options->canonicalize_max_dots = -1;
- options->canonicalize_fallback_local = -1;
- options->canonicalize_hostname = -1;
-}
-
-/*
- * A petite version of fill_default_options() that just fills the options
- * needed for hostname canonicalization to proceed.
- */
-void
-fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *options)
-{
- if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1)
- options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1;
- if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1)
- options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1;
- if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1)
- options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO;
-}
-
-/*
- * Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those
- * options for which no value has been specified with their default values.
- */
-void
-fill_default_options(Options * options)
-{
- if (options->forward_agent == -1)
- options->forward_agent = 0;
- if (options->forward_x11 == -1)
- options->forward_x11 = 0;
- if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1)
- options->forward_x11_trusted = 0;
- if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1)
- options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200;
- if (options->exit_on_forward_failure == -1)
- options->exit_on_forward_failure = 0;
- if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
- options->xauth_location = _PATH_XAUTH;
- if (options->gateway_ports == -1)
- options->gateway_ports = 0;
- if (options->use_privileged_port == -1)
- options->use_privileged_port = 0;
- if (options->rsa_authentication == -1)
- options->rsa_authentication = 1;
- if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
- options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
- if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
- options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
- if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- options->gss_authentication = 0;
- if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
- options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
- if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- options->password_authentication = 1;
- if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
- options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
- if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1)
- options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0;
- if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
- options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
- if (options->batch_mode == -1)
- options->batch_mode = 0;
- if (options->check_host_ip == -1)
- options->check_host_ip = 1;
- if (options->strict_host_key_checking == -1)
- options->strict_host_key_checking = 2; /* 2 is default */
- if (options->compression == -1)
- options->compression = 0;
- if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1)
- options->tcp_keep_alive = 1;
- if (options->compression_level == -1)
- options->compression_level = 6;
- if (options->port == -1)
- options->port = 0; /* Filled in ssh_connect. */
- if (options->address_family == -1)
- options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
- if (options->connection_attempts == -1)
- options->connection_attempts = 1;
- if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1)
- options->number_of_password_prompts = 3;
- /* Selected in ssh_login(). */
- if (options->cipher == -1)
- options->cipher = SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET;
- /* options->ciphers, default set in myproposals.h */
- /* options->macs, default set in myproposals.h */
- /* options->kex_algorithms, default set in myproposals.h */
- /* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */
- if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
- options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
- if (options->num_identity_files == 0) {
- if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
- add_identity_file(options, "~/",
- _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY, 0);
- }
- if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
- add_identity_file(options, "~/",
- _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, 0);
- add_identity_file(options, "~/",
- _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, 0);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- add_identity_file(options, "~/",
- _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, 0);
-#endif
- add_identity_file(options, "~/",
- _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, 0);
- }
- }
- if (options->escape_char == -1)
- options->escape_char = '~';
- if (options->num_system_hostfiles == 0) {
- options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] =
- xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE);
- options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] =
- xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2);
- }
- if (options->num_user_hostfiles == 0) {
- options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] =
- xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
- options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] =
- xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
- }
- if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
- options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
- if (options->clear_forwardings == 1)
- clear_forwardings(options);
- if (options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost == - 1)
- options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = 0;
- if (options->identities_only == -1)
- options->identities_only = 0;
- if (options->enable_ssh_keysign == -1)
- options->enable_ssh_keysign = 0;
- if (options->rekey_limit == -1)
- options->rekey_limit = 0;
- if (options->rekey_interval == -1)
- options->rekey_interval = 0;
- if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1)
- options->verify_host_key_dns = 0;
- if (options->server_alive_interval == -1)
- options->server_alive_interval = 0;
- if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
- options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
- if (options->control_master == -1)
- options->control_master = 0;
- if (options->control_persist == -1) {
- options->control_persist = 0;
- options->control_persist_timeout = 0;
- }
- if (options->hash_known_hosts == -1)
- options->hash_known_hosts = 0;
- if (options->tun_open == -1)
- options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
- if (options->tun_local == -1)
- options->tun_local = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
- if (options->tun_remote == -1)
- options->tun_remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
- if (options->permit_local_command == -1)
- options->permit_local_command = 0;
- if (options->use_roaming == -1)
- options->use_roaming = 1;
- if (options->visual_host_key == -1)
- options->visual_host_key = 0;
- if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
- options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_LOWDELAY;
- if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
- options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT;
- if (options->request_tty == -1)
- options->request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_AUTO;
- if (options->proxy_use_fdpass == -1)
- options->proxy_use_fdpass = 0;
- if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1)
- options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1;
- if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1)
- options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1;
- if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1)
- options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO;
-#define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \
- do { \
- if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \
- free(v); \
- v = NULL; \
- } \
- } while(0)
- CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->local_command);
- CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->proxy_command);
- CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->control_path);
- /* options->user will be set in the main program if appropriate */
- /* options->hostname will be set in the main program if appropriate */
- /* options->host_key_alias should not be set by default */
- /* options->preferred_authentications will be set in ssh */
-}
-
-/*
- * parse_forward
- * parses a string containing a port forwarding specification of the form:
- * dynamicfwd == 0
- * [listenhost:]listenport:connecthost:connectport
- * dynamicfwd == 1
- * [listenhost:]listenport
- * returns number of arguments parsed or zero on error
- */
-int
-parse_forward(Forward *fwd, const char *fwdspec, int dynamicfwd, int remotefwd)
-{
- int i;
- char *p, *cp, *fwdarg[4];
-
- memset(fwd, '\0', sizeof(*fwd));
-
- cp = p = xstrdup(fwdspec);
-
- /* skip leading spaces */
- while (isspace((u_char)*cp))
- cp++;
-
- for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
- if ((fwdarg[i] = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
- break;
-
- /* Check for trailing garbage */
- if (cp != NULL)
- i = 0; /* failure */
-
- switch (i) {
- case 1:
- fwd->listen_host = NULL;
- fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdarg[0]);
- fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks");
- break;
-
- case 2:
- fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(fwdarg[0]));
- fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdarg[1]);
- fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks");
- break;
-
- case 3:
- fwd->listen_host = NULL;
- fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdarg[0]);
- fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(fwdarg[1]));
- fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdarg[2]);
- break;
-
- case 4:
- fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(fwdarg[0]));
- fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdarg[1]);
- fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(fwdarg[2]));
- fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdarg[3]);
- break;
- default:
- i = 0; /* failure */
- }
-
- free(p);
-
- if (dynamicfwd) {
- if (!(i == 1 || i == 2))
- goto fail_free;
- } else {
- if (!(i == 3 || i == 4))
- goto fail_free;
- if (fwd->connect_port <= 0)
- goto fail_free;
- }
-
- if (fwd->listen_port < 0 || (!remotefwd && fwd->listen_port == 0))
- goto fail_free;
-
- if (fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
- strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST)
- goto fail_free;
- if (fwd->listen_host != NULL &&
- strlen(fwd->listen_host) >= NI_MAXHOST)
- goto fail_free;
-
-
- return (i);
-
- fail_free:
- free(fwd->connect_host);
- fwd->connect_host = NULL;
- free(fwd->listen_host);
- fwd->listen_host = NULL;
- return (0);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/readconf.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/readconf.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/readconf.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/readconf.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,2662 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.259 2016/07/22 03:35:11 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Functions for reading the configuration files.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
+# include <glob.h>
+#else
+# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h"
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+#include <util.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+# include <vis.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+/* Format of the configuration file:
+
+ # Configuration data is parsed as follows:
+ # 1. command line options
+ # 2. user-specific file
+ # 3. system-wide file
+ # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
+ # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
+ # configuration file, and defaults at the end.
+
+ # Host-specific declarations. These may override anything above. A single
+ # host may match multiple declarations; these are processed in the order
+ # that they are given in.
+
+ Host *.ngs.fi ngs.fi
+ User foo
+
+ Host fake.com
+ HostName another.host.name.real.org
+ User blaah
+ Port 34289
+ ForwardX11 no
+ ForwardAgent no
+
+ Host books.com
+ RemoteForward 9999 shadows.cs.hut.fi:9999
+ Cipher 3des
+
+ Host fascist.blob.com
+ Port 23123
+ User tylonen
+ PasswordAuthentication no
+
+ Host puukko.hut.fi
+ User t35124p
+ ProxyCommand ssh-proxy %h %p
+
+ Host *.fr
+ PublicKeyAuthentication no
+
+ Host *.su
+ Cipher none
+ PasswordAuthentication no
+
+ Host vpn.fake.com
+ Tunnel yes
+ TunnelDevice 3
+
+ # Defaults for various options
+ Host *
+ ForwardAgent no
+ ForwardX11 no
+ PasswordAuthentication yes
+ RSAAuthentication yes
+ RhostsRSAAuthentication yes
+ StrictHostKeyChecking yes
+ TcpKeepAlive no
+ IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity
+ Port 22
+ EscapeChar ~
+
+*/
+
+static int read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
+ const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options,
+ int flags, int *activep, int depth);
+static int process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw,
+ const char *host, const char *original_host, char *line,
+ const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, int flags, int depth);
+
+/* Keyword tokens. */
+
+typedef enum {
+ oBadOption,
+ oHost, oMatch, oInclude,
+ oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oForwardX11Trusted, oForwardX11Timeout,
+ oGatewayPorts, oExitOnForwardFailure,
+ oPasswordAuthentication, oRSAAuthentication,
+ oChallengeResponseAuthentication, oXAuthLocation,
+ oIdentityFile, oHostName, oPort, oCipher, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward,
+ oCertificateFile, oAddKeysToAgent, oIdentityAgent,
+ oUser, oEscapeChar, oRhostsRSAAuthentication, oProxyCommand,
+ oGlobalKnownHostsFile, oUserKnownHostsFile, oConnectionAttempts,
+ oBatchMode, oCheckHostIP, oStrictHostKeyChecking, oCompression,
+ oCompressionLevel, oTCPKeepAlive, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts,
+ oUsePrivilegedPort, oLogLevel, oCiphers, oProtocol, oMacs,
+ oPubkeyAuthentication,
+ oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias,
+ oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication,
+ oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oPKCS11Provider,
+ oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+ oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+ oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
+ oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+ oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+ oHashKnownHosts,
+ oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
+ oVisualHostKey,
+ oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
+ oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots,
+ oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs,
+ oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
+ oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes,
+ oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, oProxyJump,
+ oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
+} OpCodes;
+
+/* Textual representations of the tokens. */
+
+static struct {
+ const char *name;
+ OpCodes opcode;
+} keywords[] = {
+ { "forwardagent", oForwardAgent },
+ { "forwardx11", oForwardX11 },
+ { "forwardx11trusted", oForwardX11Trusted },
+ { "forwardx11timeout", oForwardX11Timeout },
+ { "exitonforwardfailure", oExitOnForwardFailure },
+ { "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation },
+ { "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts },
+ { "useprivilegedport", oUsePrivilegedPort },
+ { "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated },
+ { "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication },
+ { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication },
+ { "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices },
+ { "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication },
+ { "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },
+ { "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */
+ { "rhostsrsaauthentication", oRhostsRSAAuthentication },
+ { "hostbasedauthentication", oHostbasedAuthentication },
+ { "challengeresponseauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication },
+ { "skeyauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
+ { "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
+ { "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported },
+ { "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported },
+ { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
+#if defined(GSSAPI)
+ { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
+ { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
+#else
+ { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+ { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
+#endif
+ { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+ { "usersh", oDeprecated },
+ { "identityfile", oIdentityFile },
+ { "identityfile2", oIdentityFile }, /* obsolete */
+ { "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly },
+ { "certificatefile", oCertificateFile },
+ { "addkeystoagent", oAddKeysToAgent },
+ { "identityagent", oIdentityAgent },
+ { "hostname", oHostName },
+ { "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias },
+ { "proxycommand", oProxyCommand },
+ { "port", oPort },
+ { "cipher", oCipher },
+ { "ciphers", oCiphers },
+ { "macs", oMacs },
+ { "protocol", oProtocol },
+ { "remoteforward", oRemoteForward },
+ { "localforward", oLocalForward },
+ { "user", oUser },
+ { "host", oHost },
+ { "match", oMatch },
+ { "escapechar", oEscapeChar },
+ { "globalknownhostsfile", oGlobalKnownHostsFile },
+ { "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
+ { "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile },
+ { "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
+ { "connectionattempts", oConnectionAttempts },
+ { "batchmode", oBatchMode },
+ { "checkhostip", oCheckHostIP },
+ { "stricthostkeychecking", oStrictHostKeyChecking },
+ { "compression", oCompression },
+ { "compressionlevel", oCompressionLevel },
+ { "tcpkeepalive", oTCPKeepAlive },
+ { "keepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, /* obsolete */
+ { "numberofpasswordprompts", oNumberOfPasswordPrompts },
+ { "loglevel", oLogLevel },
+ { "dynamicforward", oDynamicForward },
+ { "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications },
+ { "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms },
+ { "bindaddress", oBindAddress },
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ { "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider },
+ { "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
+#else
+ { "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported },
+ { "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported },
+#endif
+ { "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings },
+ { "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign },
+ { "verifyhostkeydns", oVerifyHostKeyDNS },
+ { "nohostauthenticationforlocalhost", oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost },
+ { "rekeylimit", oRekeyLimit },
+ { "connecttimeout", oConnectTimeout },
+ { "addressfamily", oAddressFamily },
+ { "serveraliveinterval", oServerAliveInterval },
+ { "serveralivecountmax", oServerAliveCountMax },
+ { "sendenv", oSendEnv },
+ { "controlpath", oControlPath },
+ { "controlmaster", oControlMaster },
+ { "controlpersist", oControlPersist },
+ { "hashknownhosts", oHashKnownHosts },
+ { "include", oInclude },
+ { "tunnel", oTunnel },
+ { "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice },
+ { "localcommand", oLocalCommand },
+ { "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand },
+ { "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey },
+ { "useroaming", oDeprecated },
+ { "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
+ { "ipqos", oIPQoS },
+ { "requesttty", oRequestTTY },
+ { "proxyusefdpass", oProxyUseFdpass },
+ { "canonicaldomains", oCanonicalDomains },
+ { "canonicalizefallbacklocal", oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal },
+ { "canonicalizehostname", oCanonicalizeHostname },
+ { "canonicalizemaxdots", oCanonicalizeMaxDots },
+ { "canonicalizepermittedcnames", oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs },
+ { "streamlocalbindmask", oStreamLocalBindMask },
+ { "streamlocalbindunlink", oStreamLocalBindUnlink },
+ { "revokedhostkeys", oRevokedHostKeys },
+ { "fingerprinthash", oFingerprintHash },
+ { "updatehostkeys", oUpdateHostkeys },
+ { "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedKeyTypes },
+ { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes },
+ { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
+ { "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
+
+ { NULL, oBadOption }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is an
+ * error.
+ */
+
+void
+add_local_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd)
+{
+ struct Forward *fwd;
+ extern uid_t original_real_uid;
+ int i;
+
+ if (newfwd->listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED && original_real_uid != 0 &&
+ newfwd->listen_path == NULL)
+ fatal("Privileged ports can only be forwarded by root.");
+ /* Don't add duplicates */
+ for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) {
+ if (forward_equals(newfwd, options->local_forwards + i))
+ return;
+ }
+ options->local_forwards = xreallocarray(options->local_forwards,
+ options->num_local_forwards + 1,
+ sizeof(*options->local_forwards));
+ fwd = &options->local_forwards[options->num_local_forwards++];
+
+ fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host;
+ fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port;
+ fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path;
+ fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host;
+ fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port;
+ fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Adds a remote TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is
+ * an error.
+ */
+
+void
+add_remote_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd)
+{
+ struct Forward *fwd;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Don't add duplicates */
+ for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+ if (forward_equals(newfwd, options->remote_forwards + i))
+ return;
+ }
+ options->remote_forwards = xreallocarray(options->remote_forwards,
+ options->num_remote_forwards + 1,
+ sizeof(*options->remote_forwards));
+ fwd = &options->remote_forwards[options->num_remote_forwards++];
+
+ fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host;
+ fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port;
+ fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path;
+ fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host;
+ fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port;
+ fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path;
+ fwd->handle = newfwd->handle;
+ fwd->allocated_port = 0;
+}
+
+static void
+clear_forwardings(Options *options)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) {
+ free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_host);
+ free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_path);
+ free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_host);
+ free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_path);
+ }
+ if (options->num_local_forwards > 0) {
+ free(options->local_forwards);
+ options->local_forwards = NULL;
+ }
+ options->num_local_forwards = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+ free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_host);
+ free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_path);
+ free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_host);
+ free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_path);
+ }
+ if (options->num_remote_forwards > 0) {
+ free(options->remote_forwards);
+ options->remote_forwards = NULL;
+ }
+ options->num_remote_forwards = 0;
+ options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
+}
+
+void
+add_certificate_file(Options *options, const char *path, int userprovided)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (options->num_certificate_files >= SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES)
+ fatal("Too many certificate files specified (max %d)",
+ SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES);
+
+ /* Avoid registering duplicates */
+ for (i = 0; i < options->num_certificate_files; i++) {
+ if (options->certificate_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided &&
+ strcmp(options->certificate_files[i], path) == 0) {
+ debug2("%s: ignoring duplicate key %s", __func__, path);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ options->certificate_file_userprovided[options->num_certificate_files] =
+ userprovided;
+ options->certificate_files[options->num_certificate_files++] =
+ xstrdup(path);
+}
+
+void
+add_identity_file(Options *options, const char *dir, const char *filename,
+ int userprovided)
+{
+ char *path;
+ int i;
+
+ if (options->num_identity_files >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
+ fatal("Too many identity files specified (max %d)",
+ SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES);
+
+ if (dir == NULL) /* no dir, filename is absolute */
+ path = xstrdup(filename);
+ else
+ (void)xasprintf(&path, "%.100s%.100s", dir, filename);
+
+ /* Avoid registering duplicates */
+ for (i = 0; i < options->num_identity_files; i++) {
+ if (options->identity_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided &&
+ strcmp(options->identity_files[i], path) == 0) {
+ debug2("%s: ignoring duplicate key %s", __func__, path);
+ free(path);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ options->identity_file_userprovided[options->num_identity_files] =
+ userprovided;
+ options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++] = path;
+}
+
+int
+default_ssh_port(void)
+{
+ static int port;
+ struct servent *sp;
+
+ if (port == 0) {
+ sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp");
+ port = sp ? ntohs(sp->s_port) : SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+ }
+ return port;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Execute a command in a shell.
+ * Return its exit status or -1 on abnormal exit.
+ */
+static int
+execute_in_shell(const char *cmd)
+{
+ char *shell;
+ pid_t pid;
+ int devnull, status;
+ extern uid_t original_real_uid;
+
+ if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL)
+ shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
+
+ /* Need this to redirect subprocess stdin/out */
+ if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1)
+ fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ debug("Executing command: '%.500s'", cmd);
+
+ /* Fork and execute the command. */
+ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
+ char *argv[4];
+
+ /* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */
+ permanently_drop_suid(original_real_uid);
+
+ /* Redirect child stdin and stdout. Leave stderr */
+ if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
+ fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
+ fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
+ close(devnull);
+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
+ argv[0] = shell;
+ argv[1] = "-c";
+ argv[2] = xstrdup(cmd);
+ argv[3] = NULL;
+
+ execv(argv[0], argv);
+ error("Unable to execute '%.100s': %s", cmd, strerror(errno));
+ /* Die with signal to make this error apparent to parent. */
+ signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
+ kill(getpid(), SIGTERM);
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Parent. */
+ if (pid < 0)
+ fatal("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+ close(devnull);
+
+ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+ if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN)
+ fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
+ error("command '%.100s' exited abnormally", cmd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ debug3("command returned status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ return WEXITSTATUS(status);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse and execute a Match directive.
+ */
+static int
+match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw,
+ const char *host_arg, const char *original_host, int post_canon,
+ const char *filename, int linenum)
+{
+ char *arg, *oattrib, *attrib, *cmd, *cp = *condition, *host, *criteria;
+ const char *ruser;
+ int r, port, this_result, result = 1, attributes = 0, negate;
+ char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV];
+
+ /*
+ * Configuration is likely to be incomplete at this point so we
+ * must be prepared to use default values.
+ */
+ port = options->port <= 0 ? default_ssh_port() : options->port;
+ ruser = options->user == NULL ? pw->pw_name : options->user;
+ if (post_canon) {
+ host = xstrdup(options->hostname);
+ } else if (options->hostname != NULL) {
+ /* NB. Please keep in sync with ssh.c:main() */
+ host = percent_expand(options->hostname,
+ "h", host_arg, (char *)NULL);
+ } else {
+ host = xstrdup(host_arg);
+ }
+
+ debug2("checking match for '%s' host %s originally %s",
+ cp, host, original_host);
+ while ((oattrib = attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') {
+ criteria = NULL;
+ this_result = 1;
+ if ((negate = attrib[0] == '!'))
+ attrib++;
+ /* criteria "all" and "canonical" have no argument */
+ if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) {
+ if (attributes > 1 ||
+ ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: '%s' cannot be combined "
+ "with other Match attributes",
+ filename, linenum, oattrib);
+ result = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (result)
+ result = negate ? 0 : 1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ attributes++;
+ if (strcasecmp(attrib, "canonical") == 0) {
+ r = !!post_canon; /* force bitmask member to boolean */
+ if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
+ this_result = result = 0;
+ debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s'",
+ filename, linenum,
+ this_result ? "" : "not ", oattrib);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* All other criteria require an argument */
+ if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
+ result = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
+ criteria = xstrdup(host);
+ r = match_hostname(host, arg) == 1;
+ if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
+ this_result = result = 0;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "originalhost") == 0) {
+ criteria = xstrdup(original_host);
+ r = match_hostname(original_host, arg) == 1;
+ if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
+ this_result = result = 0;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
+ criteria = xstrdup(ruser);
+ r = match_pattern_list(ruser, arg, 0) == 1;
+ if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
+ this_result = result = 0;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localuser") == 0) {
+ criteria = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+ r = match_pattern_list(pw->pw_name, arg, 0) == 1;
+ if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
+ this_result = result = 0;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "exec") == 0) {
+ if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
+ fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
+ strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost));
+ shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0';
+ snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", port);
+
+ cmd = percent_expand(arg,
+ "L", shorthost,
+ "d", pw->pw_dir,
+ "h", host,
+ "l", thishost,
+ "n", original_host,
+ "p", portstr,
+ "r", ruser,
+ "u", pw->pw_name,
+ (char *)NULL);
+ if (result != 1) {
+ /* skip execution if prior predicate failed */
+ debug3("%.200s line %d: skipped exec "
+ "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, cmd);
+ free(cmd);
+ continue;
+ }
+ r = execute_in_shell(cmd);
+ if (r == -1) {
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: match exec "
+ "'%.100s' error", filename,
+ linenum, cmd);
+ }
+ criteria = xstrdup(cmd);
+ free(cmd);
+ /* Force exit status to boolean */
+ r = r == 0;
+ if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
+ this_result = result = 0;
+ } else {
+ error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib);
+ result = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s \"%.100s\"' ",
+ filename, linenum, this_result ? "": "not ",
+ oattrib, criteria);
+ free(criteria);
+ }
+ if (attributes == 0) {
+ error("One or more attributes required for Match");
+ result = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ out:
+ if (result != -1)
+ debug2("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
+ *condition = cp;
+ free(host);
+ return result;
+}
+
+/* Check and prepare a domain name: removes trailing '.' and lowercases */
+static void
+valid_domain(char *name, const char *filename, int linenum)
+{
+ size_t i, l = strlen(name);
+ u_char c, last = '\0';
+
+ if (l == 0)
+ fatal("%s line %d: empty hostname suffix", filename, linenum);
+ if (!isalpha((u_char)name[0]) && !isdigit((u_char)name[0]))
+ fatal("%s line %d: hostname suffix \"%.100s\" "
+ "starts with invalid character", filename, linenum, name);
+ for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
+ c = tolower((u_char)name[i]);
+ name[i] = (char)c;
+ if (last == '.' && c == '.')
+ fatal("%s line %d: hostname suffix \"%.100s\" contains "
+ "consecutive separators", filename, linenum, name);
+ if (c != '.' && c != '-' && !isalnum(c) &&
+ c != '_') /* technically invalid, but common */
+ fatal("%s line %d: hostname suffix \"%.100s\" contains "
+ "invalid characters", filename, linenum, name);
+ last = c;
+ }
+ if (name[l - 1] == '.')
+ name[l - 1] = '\0';
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or oBadOption.
+ */
+static OpCodes
+parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum,
+ const char *ignored_unknown)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
+ if (strcmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0)
+ return keywords[i].opcode;
+ if (ignored_unknown != NULL &&
+ match_pattern_list(cp, ignored_unknown, 1) == 1)
+ return oIgnoredUnknownOption;
+ error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s",
+ filename, linenum, cp);
+ return oBadOption;
+}
+
+/* Multistate option parsing */
+struct multistate {
+ char *key;
+ int value;
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_flag[] = {
+ { "true", 1 },
+ { "false", 0 },
+ { "yes", 1 },
+ { "no", 0 },
+ { NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoask[] = {
+ { "true", 1 },
+ { "false", 0 },
+ { "yes", 1 },
+ { "no", 0 },
+ { "ask", 2 },
+ { NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoaskconfirm[] = {
+ { "true", 1 },
+ { "false", 0 },
+ { "yes", 1 },
+ { "no", 0 },
+ { "ask", 2 },
+ { "confirm", 3 },
+ { NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = {
+ { "inet", AF_INET },
+ { "inet6", AF_INET6 },
+ { "any", AF_UNSPEC },
+ { NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_controlmaster[] = {
+ { "true", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES },
+ { "yes", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES },
+ { "false", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO },
+ { "no", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO },
+ { "auto", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO },
+ { "ask", SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK },
+ { "autoask", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK },
+ { NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_tunnel[] = {
+ { "ethernet", SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET },
+ { "point-to-point", SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT },
+ { "true", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT },
+ { "yes", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT },
+ { "false", SSH_TUNMODE_NO },
+ { "no", SSH_TUNMODE_NO },
+ { NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_requesttty[] = {
+ { "true", REQUEST_TTY_YES },
+ { "yes", REQUEST_TTY_YES },
+ { "false", REQUEST_TTY_NO },
+ { "no", REQUEST_TTY_NO },
+ { "force", REQUEST_TTY_FORCE },
+ { "auto", REQUEST_TTY_AUTO },
+ { NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_canonicalizehostname[] = {
+ { "true", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES },
+ { "false", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO },
+ { "yes", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES },
+ { "no", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO },
+ { "always", SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS },
+ { NULL, -1 }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This
+ * only sets those values that have not already been set.
+ */
+int
+process_config_line(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
+ const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename,
+ int linenum, int *activep, int flags)
+{
+ return process_config_line_depth(options, pw, host, original_host,
+ line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, 0);
+}
+
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+static int
+process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
+ const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename,
+ int linenum, int *activep, int flags, int depth)
+{
+ char *s, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg, *arg2;
+ char **cpptr, fwdarg[256];
+ u_int i, *uintptr, max_entries = 0;
+ int r, oactive, negated, opcode, *intptr, value, value2, cmdline = 0;
+ LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
+ long long val64;
+ size_t len;
+ struct Forward fwd;
+ const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;
+ struct allowed_cname *cname;
+ glob_t gl;
+
+ if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */
+ cmdline = 1;
+ activep = &cmdline;
+ }
+
+ /* Strip trailing whitespace */
+ if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ for (len--; len > 0; len--) {
+ if (strchr(WHITESPACE, line[len]) == NULL)
+ break;
+ line[len] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ s = line;
+ /* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */
+ if ((keyword = strdelim(&s)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ /* Ignore leading whitespace. */
+ if (*keyword == '\0')
+ keyword = strdelim(&s);
+ if (keyword == NULL || !*keyword || *keyword == '\n' || *keyword == '#')
+ return 0;
+ /* Match lowercase keyword */
+ lowercase(keyword);
+
+ opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum,
+ options->ignored_unknown);
+
+ switch (opcode) {
+ case oBadOption:
+ /* don't panic, but count bad options */
+ return -1;
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ case oIgnoredUnknownOption:
+ debug("%s line %d: Ignored unknown option \"%s\"",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ return 0;
+ case oConnectTimeout:
+ intptr = &options->connection_timeout;
+parse_time:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0)
+ value = -1;
+ else if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1)
+ fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case oForwardAgent:
+ intptr = &options->forward_agent;
+ parse_flag:
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
+ parse_multistate:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ value = -1;
+ for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) {
+ if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) {
+ value = multistate_ptr[i].value;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (value == -1)
+ fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case oForwardX11:
+ intptr = &options->forward_x11;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oForwardX11Trusted:
+ intptr = &options->forward_x11_trusted;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oForwardX11Timeout:
+ intptr = &options->forward_x11_timeout;
+ goto parse_time;
+
+ case oGatewayPorts:
+ intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oExitOnForwardFailure:
+ intptr = &options->exit_on_forward_failure;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oUsePrivilegedPort:
+ intptr = &options->use_privileged_port;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oPasswordAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oKbdInteractiveDevices:
+ charptr = &options->kbd_interactive_devices;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oPubkeyAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oRSAAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->rsa_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oRhostsRSAAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->rhosts_rsa_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oHostbasedAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oChallengeResponseAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oGssAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oGssDelegateCreds:
+ intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oBatchMode:
+ intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oCheckHostIP:
+ intptr = &options->check_host_ip;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oVerifyHostKeyDNS:
+ intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask;
+ goto parse_multistate;
+
+ case oStrictHostKeyChecking:
+ intptr = &options->strict_host_key_checking;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask;
+ goto parse_multistate;
+
+ case oCompression:
+ intptr = &options->compression;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oTCPKeepAlive:
+ intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost:
+ intptr = &options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oNumberOfPasswordPrompts:
+ intptr = &options->number_of_password_prompts;
+ goto parse_int;
+
+ case oCompressionLevel:
+ intptr = &options->compression_level;
+ goto parse_int;
+
+ case oRekeyLimit:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
+ linenum);
+ if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) {
+ val64 = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s",
+ filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno));
+ if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small",
+ filename, linenum);
+ }
+ if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1)
+ options->rekey_limit = val64;
+ if (s != NULL) { /* optional rekey interval present */
+ if (strcmp(s, "none") == 0) {
+ (void)strdelim(&s); /* discard */
+ break;
+ }
+ intptr = &options->rekey_interval;
+ goto parse_time;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case oIdentityFile:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep) {
+ intptr = &options->num_identity_files;
+ if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many identity files specified (max %d).",
+ filename, linenum, SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES);
+ add_identity_file(options, NULL,
+ arg, flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case oCertificateFile:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep) {
+ intptr = &options->num_certificate_files;
+ if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES) {
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many certificate "
+ "files specified (max %d).",
+ filename, linenum,
+ SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES);
+ }
+ add_certificate_file(options, arg,
+ flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case oXAuthLocation:
+ charptr=&options->xauth_location;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oUser:
+ charptr = &options->user;
+parse_string:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+ *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
+ case oGlobalKnownHostsFile:
+ cpptr = (char **)&options->system_hostfiles;
+ uintptr = &options->num_system_hostfiles;
+ max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES;
+parse_char_array:
+ if (*activep && *uintptr == 0) {
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
+ if ((*uintptr) >= max_entries)
+ fatal("%s line %d: "
+ "too many authorized keys files.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ cpptr[(*uintptr)++] = xstrdup(arg);
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ case oUserKnownHostsFile:
+ cpptr = (char **)&options->user_hostfiles;
+ uintptr = &options->num_user_hostfiles;
+ max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES;
+ goto parse_char_array;
+
+ case oHostName:
+ charptr = &options->hostname;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oHostKeyAlias:
+ charptr = &options->host_key_alias;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oPreferredAuthentications:
+ charptr = &options->preferred_authentications;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oBindAddress:
+ charptr = &options->bind_address;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oPKCS11Provider:
+ charptr = &options->pkcs11_provider;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oProxyCommand:
+ charptr = &options->proxy_command;
+ /* Ignore ProxyCommand if ProxyJump already specified */
+ if (options->jump_host != NULL)
+ charptr = &options->jump_host; /* Skip below */
+parse_command:
+ if (s == NULL)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE "=");
+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+ *charptr = xstrdup(s + len);
+ return 0;
+
+ case oProxyJump:
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ }
+ len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE "=");
+ if (parse_jump(s + len, options, *activep) == -1) {
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid ProxyJump \"%s\"",
+ filename, linenum, s + len);
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ case oPort:
+ intptr = &options->port;
+parse_int:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (arg[0] < '0' || arg[0] > '9')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum);
+
+ /* Octal, decimal, or hex format? */
+ value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 0);
+ if (arg == endofnumber)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case oConnectionAttempts:
+ intptr = &options->connection_attempts;
+ goto parse_int;
+
+ case oCipher:
+ intptr = &options->cipher;
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ value = cipher_number(arg);
+ if (value == -1)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad cipher '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case oCiphers:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL)
+ options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
+ case oMacs:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (!mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 Mac spec '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*activep && options->macs == NULL)
+ options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
+ case oKexAlgorithms:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
+ options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
+ case oHostKeyAlgorithms:
+ charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms;
+parse_keytypes:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+ *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
+ case oProtocol:
+ intptr = &options->protocol;
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ value = proto_spec(arg);
+ if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*activep && *intptr == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case oLogLevel:
+ log_level_ptr = &options->log_level;
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ value = log_level_number(arg);
+ if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
+ *log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value;
+ break;
+
+ case oLocalForward:
+ case oRemoteForward:
+ case oDynamicForward:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing port argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+
+ if (opcode == oLocalForward ||
+ opcode == oRemoteForward) {
+ arg2 = strdelim(&s);
+ if (arg2 == NULL || *arg2 == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing target argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+
+ /* construct a string for parse_forward */
+ snprintf(fwdarg, sizeof(fwdarg), "%s:%s", arg, arg2);
+ } else if (opcode == oDynamicForward) {
+ strlcpy(fwdarg, arg, sizeof(fwdarg));
+ }
+
+ if (parse_forward(&fwd, fwdarg,
+ opcode == oDynamicForward ? 1 : 0,
+ opcode == oRemoteForward ? 1 : 0) == 0)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.",
+ filename, linenum);
+
+ if (*activep) {
+ if (opcode == oLocalForward ||
+ opcode == oDynamicForward)
+ add_local_forward(options, &fwd);
+ else if (opcode == oRemoteForward)
+ add_remote_forward(options, &fwd);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case oClearAllForwardings:
+ intptr = &options->clear_forwardings;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oHost:
+ if (cmdline)
+ fatal("Host directive not supported as a command-line "
+ "option");
+ *activep = 0;
+ arg2 = NULL;
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
+ if ((flags & SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH) != 0)
+ break;
+ negated = *arg == '!';
+ if (negated)
+ arg++;
+ if (match_pattern(host, arg)) {
+ if (negated) {
+ debug("%.200s line %d: Skipping Host "
+ "block because of negated match "
+ "for %.100s", filename, linenum,
+ arg);
+ *activep = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!*activep)
+ arg2 = arg; /* logged below */
+ *activep = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (*activep)
+ debug("%.200s line %d: Applying options for %.100s",
+ filename, linenum, arg2);
+ /* Avoid garbage check below, as strdelim is done. */
+ return 0;
+
+ case oMatch:
+ if (cmdline)
+ fatal("Host directive not supported as a command-line "
+ "option");
+ value = match_cfg_line(options, &s, pw, host, original_host,
+ flags & SSHCONF_POSTCANON, filename, linenum);
+ if (value < 0)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
+ linenum);
+ *activep = (flags & SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value;
+ break;
+
+ case oEscapeChar:
+ intptr = &options->escape_char;
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0)
+ value = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE;
+ else if (arg[1] == '\0')
+ value = (u_char) arg[0];
+ else if (arg[0] == '^' && arg[2] == 0 &&
+ (u_char) arg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) arg[1] < 128)
+ value = (u_char) arg[1] & 31;
+ else {
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad escape character.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ value = 0; /* Avoid compiler warning. */
+ }
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case oAddressFamily:
+ intptr = &options->address_family;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily;
+ goto parse_multistate;
+
+ case oEnableSSHKeysign:
+ intptr = &options->enable_ssh_keysign;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oIdentitiesOnly:
+ intptr = &options->identities_only;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oServerAliveInterval:
+ intptr = &options->server_alive_interval;
+ goto parse_time;
+
+ case oServerAliveCountMax:
+ intptr = &options->server_alive_count_max;
+ goto parse_int;
+
+ case oSendEnv:
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
+ if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (!*activep)
+ continue;
+ if (options->num_send_env >= MAX_SEND_ENV)
+ fatal("%s line %d: too many send env.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ options->send_env[options->num_send_env++] =
+ xstrdup(arg);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case oControlPath:
+ charptr = &options->control_path;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oControlMaster:
+ intptr = &options->control_master;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_controlmaster;
+ goto parse_multistate;
+
+ case oControlPersist:
+ /* no/false/yes/true, or a time spec */
+ intptr = &options->control_persist;
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing ControlPersist"
+ " argument.", filename, linenum);
+ value = 0;
+ value2 = 0; /* timeout */
+ if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0)
+ value = 0;
+ else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0)
+ value = 1;
+ else if ((value2 = convtime(arg)) >= 0)
+ value = 1;
+ else
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad ControlPersist argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1) {
+ *intptr = value;
+ options->control_persist_timeout = value2;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case oHashKnownHosts:
+ intptr = &options->hash_known_hosts;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oTunnel:
+ intptr = &options->tun_open;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_tunnel;
+ goto parse_multistate;
+
+ case oTunnelDevice:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ value = a2tun(arg, &value2);
+ if (value == SSH_TUNID_ERR)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad tun device.", filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep) {
+ options->tun_local = value;
+ options->tun_remote = value2;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case oLocalCommand:
+ charptr = &options->local_command;
+ goto parse_command;
+
+ case oPermitLocalCommand:
+ intptr = &options->permit_local_command;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oVisualHostKey:
+ intptr = &options->visual_host_key;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oInclude:
+ if (cmdline)
+ fatal("Include directive not supported as a "
+ "command-line option");
+ value = 0;
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
+ /*
+ * Ensure all paths are anchored. User configuration
+ * files may begin with '~/' but system configurations
+ * must not. If the path is relative, then treat it
+ * as living in ~/.ssh for user configurations or
+ * /etc/ssh for system ones.
+ */
+ if (*arg == '~' && (flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF) == 0)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: bad include path %s.",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (*arg != '/' && *arg != '~') {
+ xasprintf(&arg2, "%s/%s",
+ (flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF) ?
+ "~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR : SSHDIR, arg);
+ } else
+ arg2 = xstrdup(arg);
+ memset(&gl, 0, sizeof(gl));
+ r = glob(arg2, GLOB_TILDE, NULL, &gl);
+ if (r == GLOB_NOMATCH) {
+ debug("%.200s line %d: include %s matched no "
+ "files",filename, linenum, arg2);
+ continue;
+ } else if (r != 0 || gl.gl_pathc < 0)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
+ filename, linenum, arg2);
+ free(arg2);
+ oactive = *activep;
+ for (i = 0; i < (u_int)gl.gl_pathc; i++) {
+ debug3("%.200s line %d: Including file %s "
+ "depth %d%s", filename, linenum,
+ gl.gl_pathv[i], depth,
+ oactive ? "" : " (parse only)");
+ r = read_config_file_depth(gl.gl_pathv[i],
+ pw, host, original_host, options,
+ flags | SSHCONF_CHECKPERM |
+ (oactive ? 0 : SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH),
+ activep, depth + 1);
+ /*
+ * don't let Match in includes clobber the
+ * containing file's Match state.
+ */
+ *activep = oactive;
+ if (r != 1)
+ value = -1;
+ }
+ globfree(&gl);
+ }
+ if (value != 0)
+ return value;
+ break;
+
+ case oIPQoS:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (arg == NULL)
+ value2 = value;
+ else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (*activep) {
+ options->ip_qos_interactive = value;
+ options->ip_qos_bulk = value2;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case oRequestTTY:
+ intptr = &options->request_tty;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_requesttty;
+ goto parse_multistate;
+
+ case oIgnoreUnknown:
+ charptr = &options->ignored_unknown;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oProxyUseFdpass:
+ intptr = &options->proxy_use_fdpass;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oCanonicalDomains:
+ value = options->num_canonical_domains != 0;
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
+ valid_domain(arg, filename, linenum);
+ if (!*activep || value)
+ continue;
+ if (options->num_canonical_domains >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS)
+ fatal("%s line %d: too many hostname suffixes.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ options->canonical_domains[
+ options->num_canonical_domains++] = xstrdup(arg);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs:
+ value = options->num_permitted_cnames != 0;
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
+ /* Either '*' for everything or 'list:list' */
+ if (strcmp(arg, "*") == 0)
+ arg2 = arg;
+ else {
+ lowercase(arg);
+ if ((arg2 = strchr(arg, ':')) == NULL ||
+ arg2[1] == '\0') {
+ fatal("%s line %d: "
+ "Invalid permitted CNAME \"%s\"",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ }
+ *arg2 = '\0';
+ arg2++;
+ }
+ if (!*activep || value)
+ continue;
+ if (options->num_permitted_cnames >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS)
+ fatal("%s line %d: too many permitted CNAMEs.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ cname = options->permitted_cnames +
+ options->num_permitted_cnames++;
+ cname->source_list = xstrdup(arg);
+ cname->target_list = xstrdup(arg2);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case oCanonicalizeHostname:
+ intptr = &options->canonicalize_hostname;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_canonicalizehostname;
+ goto parse_multistate;
+
+ case oCanonicalizeMaxDots:
+ intptr = &options->canonicalize_max_dots;
+ goto parse_int;
+
+ case oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal:
+ intptr = &options->canonicalize_fallback_local;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oStreamLocalBindMask:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing StreamLocalBindMask argument.", filename, linenum);
+ /* Parse mode in octal format */
+ value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 8);
+ if (arg == endofnumber || value < 0 || value > 0777)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum);
+ options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value;
+ break;
+
+ case oStreamLocalBindUnlink:
+ intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oRevokedHostKeys:
+ charptr = &options->revoked_host_keys;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oFingerprintHash:
+ intptr = &options->fingerprint_hash;
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case oUpdateHostkeys:
+ intptr = &options->update_hostkeys;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask;
+ goto parse_multistate;
+
+ case oHostbasedKeyTypes:
+ charptr = &options->hostbased_key_types;
+ goto parse_keytypes;
+
+ case oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes:
+ charptr = &options->pubkey_key_types;
+ goto parse_keytypes;
+
+ case oAddKeysToAgent:
+ intptr = &options->add_keys_to_agent;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoaskconfirm;
+ goto parse_multistate;
+
+ case oIdentityAgent:
+ charptr = &options->identity_agent;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oDeprecated:
+ debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ return 0;
+
+ case oUnsupported:
+ error("%s line %d: Unsupported option \"%s\"",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ return 0;
+
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: Unimplemented opcode %d", __func__, opcode);
+ }
+
+ /* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */
+ if ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads the config file and modifies the options accordingly. Options
+ * should already be initialized before this call. This never returns if
+ * there is an error. If the file does not exist, this returns 0.
+ */
+int
+read_config_file(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
+ const char *original_host, Options *options, int flags)
+{
+ int active = 1;
+
+ return read_config_file_depth(filename, pw, host, original_host,
+ options, flags, &active, 0);
+}
+
+#define READCONF_MAX_DEPTH 16
+static int
+read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
+ const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options,
+ int flags, int *activep, int depth)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char line[1024];
+ int linenum;
+ int bad_options = 0;
+
+ if (depth < 0 || depth > READCONF_MAX_DEPTH)
+ fatal("Too many recursive configuration includes");
+
+ if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (flags & SSHCONF_CHECKPERM) {
+ struct stat sb;
+
+ if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1)
+ fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
+ if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) ||
+ (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0))
+ fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename);
+ }
+
+ debug("Reading configuration data %.200s", filename);
+
+ /*
+ * Mark that we are now processing the options. This flag is turned
+ * on/off by Host specifications.
+ */
+ linenum = 0;
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+ /* Update line number counter. */
+ linenum++;
+ if (process_config_line_depth(options, pw, host, original_host,
+ line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, depth) != 0)
+ bad_options++;
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+ if (bad_options > 0)
+ fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
+ filename, bad_options);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
+int
+option_clear_or_none(const char *o)
+{
+ return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet
+ * been set. Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options
+ * are processed in the following order: command line, user config file,
+ * system config file. Last, fill_default_options is called.
+ */
+
+void
+initialize_options(Options * options)
+{
+ memset(options, 'X', sizeof(*options));
+ options->forward_agent = -1;
+ options->forward_x11 = -1;
+ options->forward_x11_trusted = -1;
+ options->forward_x11_timeout = -1;
+ options->stdio_forward_host = NULL;
+ options->stdio_forward_port = 0;
+ options->clear_forwardings = -1;
+ options->exit_on_forward_failure = -1;
+ options->xauth_location = NULL;
+ options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1;
+ options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1;
+ options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1;
+ options->use_privileged_port = -1;
+ options->rsa_authentication = -1;
+ options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+ options->gss_authentication = -1;
+ options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
+ options->password_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+ options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1;
+ options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
+ options->batch_mode = -1;
+ options->check_host_ip = -1;
+ options->strict_host_key_checking = -1;
+ options->compression = -1;
+ options->tcp_keep_alive = -1;
+ options->compression_level = -1;
+ options->port = -1;
+ options->address_family = -1;
+ options->connection_attempts = -1;
+ options->connection_timeout = -1;
+ options->number_of_password_prompts = -1;
+ options->cipher = -1;
+ options->ciphers = NULL;
+ options->macs = NULL;
+ options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
+ options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL;
+ options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
+ options->num_identity_files = 0;
+ options->num_certificate_files = 0;
+ options->hostname = NULL;
+ options->host_key_alias = NULL;
+ options->proxy_command = NULL;
+ options->jump_user = NULL;
+ options->jump_host = NULL;
+ options->jump_port = -1;
+ options->jump_extra = NULL;
+ options->user = NULL;
+ options->escape_char = -1;
+ options->num_system_hostfiles = 0;
+ options->num_user_hostfiles = 0;
+ options->local_forwards = NULL;
+ options->num_local_forwards = 0;
+ options->remote_forwards = NULL;
+ options->num_remote_forwards = 0;
+ options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
+ options->preferred_authentications = NULL;
+ options->bind_address = NULL;
+ options->pkcs11_provider = NULL;
+ options->enable_ssh_keysign = - 1;
+ options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = - 1;
+ options->identities_only = - 1;
+ options->rekey_limit = - 1;
+ options->rekey_interval = -1;
+ options->verify_host_key_dns = -1;
+ options->server_alive_interval = -1;
+ options->server_alive_count_max = -1;
+ options->num_send_env = 0;
+ options->control_path = NULL;
+ options->control_master = -1;
+ options->control_persist = -1;
+ options->control_persist_timeout = 0;
+ options->hash_known_hosts = -1;
+ options->tun_open = -1;
+ options->tun_local = -1;
+ options->tun_remote = -1;
+ options->local_command = NULL;
+ options->permit_local_command = -1;
+ options->add_keys_to_agent = -1;
+ options->identity_agent = NULL;
+ options->visual_host_key = -1;
+ options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
+ options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+ options->request_tty = -1;
+ options->proxy_use_fdpass = -1;
+ options->ignored_unknown = NULL;
+ options->num_canonical_domains = 0;
+ options->num_permitted_cnames = 0;
+ options->canonicalize_max_dots = -1;
+ options->canonicalize_fallback_local = -1;
+ options->canonicalize_hostname = -1;
+ options->revoked_host_keys = NULL;
+ options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
+ options->update_hostkeys = -1;
+ options->hostbased_key_types = NULL;
+ options->pubkey_key_types = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * A petite version of fill_default_options() that just fills the options
+ * needed for hostname canonicalization to proceed.
+ */
+void
+fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *options)
+{
+ if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1)
+ options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1;
+ if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1)
+ options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1;
+ if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1)
+ options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those
+ * options for which no value has been specified with their default values.
+ */
+void
+fill_default_options(Options * options)
+{
+ if (options->forward_agent == -1)
+ options->forward_agent = 0;
+ if (options->forward_x11 == -1)
+ options->forward_x11 = 0;
+ if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1)
+ options->forward_x11_trusted = 0;
+ if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1)
+ options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200;
+ /*
+ * stdio forwarding (-W) changes the default for these but we defer
+ * setting the values so they can be overridden.
+ */
+ if (options->exit_on_forward_failure == -1)
+ options->exit_on_forward_failure =
+ options->stdio_forward_host != NULL ? 1 : 0;
+ if (options->clear_forwardings == -1)
+ options->clear_forwardings =
+ options->stdio_forward_host != NULL ? 1 : 0;
+ if (options->clear_forwardings == 1)
+ clear_forwardings(options);
+
+ if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
+ options->xauth_location = _PATH_XAUTH;
+ if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1)
+ options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0;
+ if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
+ options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
+ if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
+ options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0;
+ if (options->use_privileged_port == -1)
+ options->use_privileged_port = 0;
+ if (options->rsa_authentication == -1)
+ options->rsa_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
+ options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+ options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
+ if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ options->password_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1)
+ options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0;
+ if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
+ options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
+ if (options->batch_mode == -1)
+ options->batch_mode = 0;
+ if (options->check_host_ip == -1)
+ options->check_host_ip = 1;
+ if (options->strict_host_key_checking == -1)
+ options->strict_host_key_checking = 2; /* 2 is default */
+ if (options->compression == -1)
+ options->compression = 0;
+ if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1)
+ options->tcp_keep_alive = 1;
+ if (options->compression_level == -1)
+ options->compression_level = 6;
+ if (options->port == -1)
+ options->port = 0; /* Filled in ssh_connect. */
+ if (options->address_family == -1)
+ options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+ if (options->connection_attempts == -1)
+ options->connection_attempts = 1;
+ if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1)
+ options->number_of_password_prompts = 3;
+ /* Selected in ssh_login(). */
+ if (options->cipher == -1)
+ options->cipher = SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET;
+ /* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */
+ if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
+ if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1)
+ options->add_keys_to_agent = 0;
+ if (options->num_identity_files == 0) {
+ if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
+ add_identity_file(options, "~/",
+ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY, 0);
+ }
+ if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
+ add_identity_file(options, "~/",
+ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, 0);
+ add_identity_file(options, "~/",
+ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, 0);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ add_identity_file(options, "~/",
+ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, 0);
+#endif
+ add_identity_file(options, "~/",
+ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, 0);
+ }
+ }
+ if (options->escape_char == -1)
+ options->escape_char = '~';
+ if (options->num_system_hostfiles == 0) {
+ options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] =
+ xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE);
+ options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] =
+ xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2);
+ }
+ if (options->num_user_hostfiles == 0) {
+ options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] =
+ xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
+ options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] =
+ xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
+ }
+ if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
+ options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+ if (options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost == - 1)
+ options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = 0;
+ if (options->identities_only == -1)
+ options->identities_only = 0;
+ if (options->enable_ssh_keysign == -1)
+ options->enable_ssh_keysign = 0;
+ if (options->rekey_limit == -1)
+ options->rekey_limit = 0;
+ if (options->rekey_interval == -1)
+ options->rekey_interval = 0;
+ if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1)
+ options->verify_host_key_dns = 0;
+ if (options->server_alive_interval == -1)
+ options->server_alive_interval = 0;
+ if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
+ options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
+ if (options->control_master == -1)
+ options->control_master = 0;
+ if (options->control_persist == -1) {
+ options->control_persist = 0;
+ options->control_persist_timeout = 0;
+ }
+ if (options->hash_known_hosts == -1)
+ options->hash_known_hosts = 0;
+ if (options->tun_open == -1)
+ options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
+ if (options->tun_local == -1)
+ options->tun_local = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
+ if (options->tun_remote == -1)
+ options->tun_remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
+ if (options->permit_local_command == -1)
+ options->permit_local_command = 0;
+ if (options->visual_host_key == -1)
+ options->visual_host_key = 0;
+ if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
+ options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_LOWDELAY;
+ if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
+ options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT;
+ if (options->request_tty == -1)
+ options->request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_AUTO;
+ if (options->proxy_use_fdpass == -1)
+ options->proxy_use_fdpass = 0;
+ if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1)
+ options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1;
+ if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1)
+ options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1;
+ if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1)
+ options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO;
+ if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1)
+ options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
+ if (options->update_hostkeys == -1)
+ options->update_hostkeys = 0;
+ if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, &options->ciphers) != 0 ||
+ kex_assemble_names(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, &options->macs) != 0 ||
+ kex_assemble_names(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, &options->kex_algorithms) != 0 ||
+ kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG,
+ &options->hostbased_key_types) != 0 ||
+ kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG,
+ &options->pubkey_key_types) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: kex_assemble_names failed", __func__);
+
+#define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \
+ do { \
+ if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \
+ free(v); \
+ v = NULL; \
+ } \
+ } while(0)
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->local_command);
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->proxy_command);
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->control_path);
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_host_keys);
+ /* options->identity_agent distinguishes NULL from 'none' */
+ /* options->user will be set in the main program if appropriate */
+ /* options->hostname will be set in the main program if appropriate */
+ /* options->host_key_alias should not be set by default */
+ /* options->preferred_authentications will be set in ssh */
+}
+
+struct fwdarg {
+ char *arg;
+ int ispath;
+};
+
+/*
+ * parse_fwd_field
+ * parses the next field in a port forwarding specification.
+ * sets fwd to the parsed field and advances p past the colon
+ * or sets it to NULL at end of string.
+ * returns 0 on success, else non-zero.
+ */
+static int
+parse_fwd_field(char **p, struct fwdarg *fwd)
+{
+ char *ep, *cp = *p;
+ int ispath = 0;
+
+ if (*cp == '\0') {
+ *p = NULL;
+ return -1; /* end of string */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * A field escaped with square brackets is used literally.
+ * XXX - allow ']' to be escaped via backslash?
+ */
+ if (*cp == '[') {
+ /* find matching ']' */
+ for (ep = cp + 1; *ep != ']' && *ep != '\0'; ep++) {
+ if (*ep == '/')
+ ispath = 1;
+ }
+ /* no matching ']' or not at end of field. */
+ if (ep[0] != ']' || (ep[1] != ':' && ep[1] != '\0'))
+ return -1;
+ /* NUL terminate the field and advance p past the colon */
+ *ep++ = '\0';
+ if (*ep != '\0')
+ *ep++ = '\0';
+ fwd->arg = cp + 1;
+ fwd->ispath = ispath;
+ *p = ep;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (cp = *p; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
+ switch (*cp) {
+ case '\\':
+ memmove(cp, cp + 1, strlen(cp + 1) + 1);
+ if (*cp == '\0')
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case '/':
+ ispath = 1;
+ break;
+ case ':':
+ *cp++ = '\0';
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+done:
+ fwd->arg = *p;
+ fwd->ispath = ispath;
+ *p = cp;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * parse_forward
+ * parses a string containing a port forwarding specification of the form:
+ * dynamicfwd == 0
+ * [listenhost:]listenport|listenpath:connecthost:connectport|connectpath
+ * listenpath:connectpath
+ * dynamicfwd == 1
+ * [listenhost:]listenport
+ * returns number of arguments parsed or zero on error
+ */
+int
+parse_forward(struct Forward *fwd, const char *fwdspec, int dynamicfwd, int remotefwd)
+{
+ struct fwdarg fwdargs[4];
+ char *p, *cp;
+ int i;
+
+ memset(fwd, 0, sizeof(*fwd));
+ memset(fwdargs, 0, sizeof(fwdargs));
+
+ cp = p = xstrdup(fwdspec);
+
+ /* skip leading spaces */
+ while (isspace((u_char)*cp))
+ cp++;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+ if (parse_fwd_field(&cp, &fwdargs[i]) != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Check for trailing garbage */
+ if (cp != NULL && *cp != '\0') {
+ i = 0; /* failure */
+ }
+
+ switch (i) {
+ case 1:
+ if (fwdargs[0].ispath) {
+ fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
+ fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+ } else {
+ fwd->listen_host = NULL;
+ fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg);
+ }
+ fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks");
+ break;
+
+ case 2:
+ if (fwdargs[0].ispath && fwdargs[1].ispath) {
+ fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
+ fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+ fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg);
+ fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+ } else if (fwdargs[1].ispath) {
+ fwd->listen_host = NULL;
+ fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg);
+ fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg);
+ fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+ } else {
+ fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
+ fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg);
+ fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks");
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case 3:
+ if (fwdargs[0].ispath) {
+ fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
+ fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+ fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg);
+ fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg);
+ } else if (fwdargs[2].ispath) {
+ fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
+ fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg);
+ fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg);
+ fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+ } else {
+ fwd->listen_host = NULL;
+ fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg);
+ fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg);
+ fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case 4:
+ fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
+ fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg);
+ fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg);
+ fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[3].arg);
+ break;
+ default:
+ i = 0; /* failure */
+ }
+
+ free(p);
+
+ if (dynamicfwd) {
+ if (!(i == 1 || i == 2))
+ goto fail_free;
+ } else {
+ if (!(i == 3 || i == 4)) {
+ if (fwd->connect_path == NULL &&
+ fwd->listen_path == NULL)
+ goto fail_free;
+ }
+ if (fwd->connect_port <= 0 && fwd->connect_path == NULL)
+ goto fail_free;
+ }
+
+ if ((fwd->listen_port < 0 && fwd->listen_path == NULL) ||
+ (!remotefwd && fwd->listen_port == 0))
+ goto fail_free;
+ if (fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
+ strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST)
+ goto fail_free;
+ /* XXX - if connecting to a remote socket, max sun len may not match this host */
+ if (fwd->connect_path != NULL &&
+ strlen(fwd->connect_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN)
+ goto fail_free;
+ if (fwd->listen_host != NULL &&
+ strlen(fwd->listen_host) >= NI_MAXHOST)
+ goto fail_free;
+ if (fwd->listen_path != NULL &&
+ strlen(fwd->listen_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN)
+ goto fail_free;
+
+ return (i);
+
+ fail_free:
+ free(fwd->connect_host);
+ fwd->connect_host = NULL;
+ free(fwd->connect_path);
+ fwd->connect_path = NULL;
+ free(fwd->listen_host);
+ fwd->listen_host = NULL;
+ free(fwd->listen_path);
+ fwd->listen_path = NULL;
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+parse_jump(const char *s, Options *o, int active)
+{
+ char *orig, *sdup, *cp;
+ char *host = NULL, *user = NULL;
+ int ret = -1, port = -1, first;
+
+ active &= o->proxy_command == NULL && o->jump_host == NULL;
+
+ orig = sdup = xstrdup(s);
+ first = active;
+ do {
+ if ((cp = strrchr(sdup, ',')) == NULL)
+ cp = sdup; /* last */
+ else
+ *cp++ = '\0';
+
+ if (first) {
+ /* First argument and configuration is active */
+ if (parse_user_host_port(cp, &user, &host, &port) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ /* Subsequent argument or inactive configuration */
+ if (parse_user_host_port(cp, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ first = 0; /* only check syntax for subsequent hosts */
+ } while (cp != sdup);
+ /* success */
+ if (active) {
+ o->jump_user = user;
+ o->jump_host = host;
+ o->jump_port = port;
+ o->proxy_command = xstrdup("none");
+ user = host = NULL;
+ if ((cp = strrchr(s, ',')) != NULL && cp != s) {
+ o->jump_extra = xstrdup(s);
+ o->jump_extra[cp - s] = '\0';
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ free(orig);
+ free(user);
+ free(host);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* XXX the following is a near-vebatim copy from servconf.c; refactor */
+static const char *
+fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) {
+ if (m[i].value == val)
+ return m[i].key;
+ }
+ return "UNKNOWN";
+}
+
+static const char *
+fmt_intarg(OpCodes code, int val)
+{
+ if (val == -1)
+ return "unset";
+ switch (code) {
+ case oAddressFamily:
+ return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily);
+ case oVerifyHostKeyDNS:
+ case oStrictHostKeyChecking:
+ case oUpdateHostkeys:
+ return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoask);
+ case oControlMaster:
+ return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_controlmaster);
+ case oTunnel:
+ return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tunnel);
+ case oRequestTTY:
+ return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_requesttty);
+ case oCanonicalizeHostname:
+ return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_canonicalizehostname);
+ case oFingerprintHash:
+ return ssh_digest_alg_name(val);
+ case oProtocol:
+ switch (val) {
+ case SSH_PROTO_1:
+ return "1";
+ case SSH_PROTO_2:
+ return "2";
+ case (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2):
+ return "2,1";
+ default:
+ return "UNKNOWN";
+ }
+ default:
+ switch (val) {
+ case 0:
+ return "no";
+ case 1:
+ return "yes";
+ default:
+ return "UNKNOWN";
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static const char *
+lookup_opcode_name(OpCodes code)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++)
+ if (keywords[i].opcode == code)
+ return(keywords[i].name);
+ return "UNKNOWN";
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_int(OpCodes code, int val)
+{
+ printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_fmtint(OpCodes code, int val)
+{
+ printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val));
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_string(OpCodes code, const char *val)
+{
+ if (val == NULL)
+ return;
+ printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_strarray(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+ printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]);
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+ printf(" %s", vals[i]);
+ printf("\n");
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_forwards(OpCodes code, u_int count, const struct Forward *fwds)
+{
+ const struct Forward *fwd;
+ u_int i;
+
+ /* oDynamicForward */
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ fwd = &fwds[i];
+ if (code == oDynamicForward &&
+ strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") != 0)
+ continue;
+ if (code == oLocalForward &&
+ strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") == 0)
+ continue;
+ printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
+ if (fwd->listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
+ printf(" %s", fwd->listen_path);
+ else if (fwd->listen_host == NULL)
+ printf(" %d", fwd->listen_port);
+ else {
+ printf(" [%s]:%d",
+ fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port);
+ }
+ if (code != oDynamicForward) {
+ if (fwd->connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
+ printf(" %s", fwd->connect_path);
+ else if (fwd->connect_host == NULL)
+ printf(" %d", fwd->connect_port);
+ else {
+ printf(" [%s]:%d",
+ fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port);
+ }
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+}
+
+void
+dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
+{
+ int i;
+ char buf[8];
+
+ /* This is normally prepared in ssh_kex2 */
+ if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, &o->hostkeyalgorithms) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: kex_assemble_names failed", __func__);
+
+ /* Most interesting options first: user, host, port */
+ dump_cfg_string(oUser, o->user);
+ dump_cfg_string(oHostName, host);
+ dump_cfg_int(oPort, o->port);
+
+ /* Flag options */
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oAddressFamily, o->address_family);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oBatchMode, o->batch_mode);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, o->canonicalize_fallback_local);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeHostname, o->canonicalize_hostname);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oChallengeResponseAuthentication, o->challenge_response_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oCheckHostIP, o->check_host_ip);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oCompression, o->compression);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlMaster, o->control_master);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oEnableSSHKeysign, o->enable_ssh_keysign);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oClearAllForwardings, o->clear_forwardings);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oExitOnForwardFailure, o->exit_on_forward_failure);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11, o->forward_x11);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11Trusted, o->forward_x11_trusted);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssDelegateCreds, o->gss_deleg_creds);
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oIdentitiesOnly, o->identities_only);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, o->kbd_interactive_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, o->no_host_authentication_for_localhost);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oPermitLocalCommand, o->permit_local_command);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oProtocol, o->protocol);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oProxyUseFdpass, o->proxy_use_fdpass);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oRequestTTY, o->request_tty);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oRhostsRSAAuthentication, o->rhosts_rsa_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oRSAAuthentication, o->rsa_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oStrictHostKeyChecking, o->strict_host_key_checking);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oTunnel, o->tun_open);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oUsePrivilegedPort, o->use_privileged_port);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oVerifyHostKeyDNS, o->verify_host_key_dns);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oVisualHostKey, o->visual_host_key);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oUpdateHostkeys, o->update_hostkeys);
+
+ /* Integer options */
+ dump_cfg_int(oCanonicalizeMaxDots, o->canonicalize_max_dots);
+ dump_cfg_int(oCompressionLevel, o->compression_level);
+ dump_cfg_int(oConnectionAttempts, o->connection_attempts);
+ dump_cfg_int(oForwardX11Timeout, o->forward_x11_timeout);
+ dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts);
+ dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveCountMax, o->server_alive_count_max);
+ dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveInterval, o->server_alive_interval);
+
+ /* String options */
+ dump_cfg_string(oBindAddress, o->bind_address);
+ dump_cfg_string(oCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT);
+ dump_cfg_string(oControlPath, o->control_path);
+ dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms);
+ dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlias, o->host_key_alias);
+ dump_cfg_string(oHostbasedKeyTypes, o->hostbased_key_types);
+ dump_cfg_string(oIdentityAgent, o->identity_agent);
+ dump_cfg_string(oKbdInteractiveDevices, o->kbd_interactive_devices);
+ dump_cfg_string(oKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms : KEX_CLIENT_KEX);
+ dump_cfg_string(oLocalCommand, o->local_command);
+ dump_cfg_string(oLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
+ dump_cfg_string(oMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_CLIENT_MAC);
+ dump_cfg_string(oPKCS11Provider, o->pkcs11_provider);
+ dump_cfg_string(oPreferredAuthentications, o->preferred_authentications);
+ dump_cfg_string(oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types);
+ dump_cfg_string(oRevokedHostKeys, o->revoked_host_keys);
+ dump_cfg_string(oXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
+
+ /* Forwards */
+ dump_cfg_forwards(oDynamicForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards);
+ dump_cfg_forwards(oLocalForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards);
+ dump_cfg_forwards(oRemoteForward, o->num_remote_forwards, o->remote_forwards);
+
+ /* String array options */
+ dump_cfg_strarray(oIdentityFile, o->num_identity_files, o->identity_files);
+ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oCanonicalDomains, o->num_canonical_domains, o->canonical_domains);
+ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oGlobalKnownHostsFile, o->num_system_hostfiles, o->system_hostfiles);
+ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oUserKnownHostsFile, o->num_user_hostfiles, o->user_hostfiles);
+ dump_cfg_strarray(oSendEnv, o->num_send_env, o->send_env);
+
+ /* Special cases */
+
+ /* oConnectTimeout */
+ if (o->connection_timeout == -1)
+ printf("connecttimeout none\n");
+ else
+ dump_cfg_int(oConnectTimeout, o->connection_timeout);
+
+ /* oTunnelDevice */
+ printf("tunneldevice");
+ if (o->tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ANY)
+ printf(" any");
+ else
+ printf(" %d", o->tun_local);
+ if (o->tun_remote == SSH_TUNID_ANY)
+ printf(":any");
+ else
+ printf(":%d", o->tun_remote);
+ printf("\n");
+
+ /* oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs */
+ if ( o->num_permitted_cnames > 0) {
+ printf("canonicalizePermittedcnames");
+ for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_cnames; i++) {
+ printf(" %s:%s", o->permitted_cnames[i].source_list,
+ o->permitted_cnames[i].target_list);
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+
+ /* oCipher */
+ if (o->cipher != SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET)
+ printf("Cipher %s\n", cipher_name(o->cipher));
+
+ /* oControlPersist */
+ if (o->control_persist == 0 || o->control_persist_timeout == 0)
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlPersist, o->control_persist);
+ else
+ dump_cfg_int(oControlPersist, o->control_persist_timeout);
+
+ /* oEscapeChar */
+ if (o->escape_char == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE)
+ printf("escapechar none\n");
+ else {
+ vis(buf, o->escape_char, VIS_WHITE, 0);
+ printf("escapechar %s\n", buf);
+ }
+
+ /* oIPQoS */
+ printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive));
+ printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk));
+
+ /* oRekeyLimit */
+ printf("rekeylimit %llu %d\n",
+ (unsigned long long)o->rekey_limit, o->rekey_interval);
+
+ /* oStreamLocalBindMask */
+ printf("streamlocalbindmask 0%o\n",
+ o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask);
+
+ /* oProxyCommand / oProxyJump */
+ if (o->jump_host == NULL)
+ dump_cfg_string(oProxyCommand, o->proxy_command);
+ else {
+ /* Check for numeric addresses */
+ i = strchr(o->jump_host, ':') != NULL ||
+ strspn(o->jump_host, "1234567890.") == strlen(o->jump_host);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", o->jump_port);
+ printf("proxyjump %s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+ /* optional additional jump spec */
+ o->jump_extra == NULL ? "" : o->jump_extra,
+ o->jump_extra == NULL ? "" : ",",
+ /* optional user */
+ o->jump_user == NULL ? "" : o->jump_user,
+ o->jump_user == NULL ? "" : "@",
+ /* opening [ if hostname is numeric */
+ i ? "[" : "",
+ /* mandatory hostname */
+ o->jump_host,
+ /* closing ] if hostname is numeric */
+ i ? "]" : "",
+ /* optional port number */
+ o->jump_port <= 0 ? "" : ":",
+ o->jump_port <= 0 ? "" : buf);
+ }
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/readconf.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/readconf.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/readconf.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,192 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.101 2014/02/23 20:11:36 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Functions for reading the configuration file.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#ifndef READCONF_H
-#define READCONF_H
-
-/* Data structure for representing a forwarding request. */
-
-typedef struct {
- char *listen_host; /* Host (address) to listen on. */
- int listen_port; /* Port to forward. */
- char *connect_host; /* Host to connect. */
- int connect_port; /* Port to connect on connect_host. */
- int allocated_port; /* Dynamically allocated listen port */
- int handle; /* Handle for dynamic listen ports */
-} Forward;
-/* Data structure for representing option data. */
-
-#define MAX_SEND_ENV 256
-#define SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES 32
-#define MAX_CANON_DOMAINS 32
-
-struct allowed_cname {
- char *source_list;
- char *target_list;
-};
-
-typedef struct {
- int forward_agent; /* Forward authentication agent. */
- int forward_x11; /* Forward X11 display. */
- int forward_x11_timeout; /* Expiration for Cookies */
- int forward_x11_trusted; /* Trust Forward X11 display. */
- int exit_on_forward_failure; /* Exit if bind(2) fails for -L/-R */
- char *xauth_location; /* Location for xauth program */
- int gateway_ports; /* Allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */
- int use_privileged_port; /* Don't use privileged port if false. */
- int rhosts_rsa_authentication; /* Try rhosts with RSA
- * authentication. */
- int rsa_authentication; /* Try RSA authentication. */
- int pubkey_authentication; /* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
- int hostbased_authentication; /* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */
- int challenge_response_authentication;
- /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
- int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
- int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
- int password_authentication; /* Try password
- * authentication. */
- int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
- char *kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */
- int batch_mode; /* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */
- int check_host_ip; /* Also keep track of keys for IP address */
- int strict_host_key_checking; /* Strict host key checking. */
- int compression; /* Compress packets in both directions. */
- int compression_level; /* Compression level 1 (fast) to 9
- * (best). */
- int tcp_keep_alive; /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
- int ip_qos_interactive; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */
- int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */
- LogLevel log_level; /* Level for logging. */
-
- int port; /* Port to connect. */
- int address_family;
- int connection_attempts; /* Max attempts (seconds) before
- * giving up */
- int connection_timeout; /* Max time (seconds) before
- * aborting connection attempt */
- int number_of_password_prompts; /* Max number of password
- * prompts. */
- int cipher; /* Cipher to use. */
- char *ciphers; /* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */
- char *macs; /* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */
- char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */
- char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
- int protocol; /* Protocol in order of preference. */
- char *hostname; /* Real host to connect. */
- char *host_key_alias; /* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */
- char *proxy_command; /* Proxy command for connecting the host. */
- char *user; /* User to log in as. */
- int escape_char; /* Escape character; -2 = none */
-
- u_int num_system_hostfiles; /* Paths for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts */
- char *system_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES];
- u_int num_user_hostfiles; /* Path for $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts */
- char *user_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES];
- char *preferred_authentications;
- char *bind_address; /* local socket address for connection to sshd */
- char *pkcs11_provider; /* PKCS#11 provider */
- int verify_host_key_dns; /* Verify host key using DNS */
-
- int num_identity_files; /* Number of files for RSA/DSA identities. */
- char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
- int identity_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
- Key *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
-
- /* Local TCP/IP forward requests. */
- int num_local_forwards;
- Forward *local_forwards;
-
- /* Remote TCP/IP forward requests. */
- int num_remote_forwards;
- Forward *remote_forwards;
- int clear_forwardings;
-
- int enable_ssh_keysign;
- int64_t rekey_limit;
- int rekey_interval;
- int no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
- int identities_only;
- int server_alive_interval;
- int server_alive_count_max;
-
- int num_send_env;
- char *send_env[MAX_SEND_ENV];
-
- char *control_path;
- int control_master;
- int control_persist; /* ControlPersist flag */
- int control_persist_timeout; /* ControlPersist timeout (seconds) */
-
- int hash_known_hosts;
-
- int tun_open; /* tun(4) */
- int tun_local; /* force tun device (optional) */
- int tun_remote; /* force tun device (optional) */
-
- char *local_command;
- int permit_local_command;
- int visual_host_key;
-
- int use_roaming;
-
- int request_tty;
-
- int proxy_use_fdpass;
-
- int num_canonical_domains;
- char *canonical_domains[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS];
- int canonicalize_hostname;
- int canonicalize_max_dots;
- int canonicalize_fallback_local;
- int num_permitted_cnames;
- struct allowed_cname permitted_cnames[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS];
-
- char *ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */
-} Options;
-
-#define SSH_CANONICALISE_NO 0
-#define SSH_CANONICALISE_YES 1
-#define SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS 2
-
-#define SSHCTL_MASTER_NO 0
-#define SSHCTL_MASTER_YES 1
-#define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO 2
-#define SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK 3
-#define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK 4
-
-#define REQUEST_TTY_AUTO 0
-#define REQUEST_TTY_NO 1
-#define REQUEST_TTY_YES 2
-#define REQUEST_TTY_FORCE 3
-
-#define SSHCONF_CHECKPERM 1 /* check permissions on config file */
-#define SSHCONF_USERCONF 2 /* user provided config file not system */
-
-void initialize_options(Options *);
-void fill_default_options(Options *);
-void fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *);
-int process_config_line(Options *, struct passwd *, const char *, char *,
- const char *, int, int *, int);
-int read_config_file(const char *, struct passwd *, const char *,
- Options *, int);
-int parse_forward(Forward *, const char *, int, int);
-int default_ssh_port(void);
-int option_clear_or_none(const char *);
-
-void add_local_forward(Options *, const Forward *);
-void add_remote_forward(Options *, const Forward *);
-void add_identity_file(Options *, const char *, const char *, int);
-
-#endif /* READCONF_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/readconf.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/readconf.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/readconf.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/readconf.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.117 2016/07/15 00:24:30 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Functions for reading the configuration file.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef READCONF_H
+#define READCONF_H
+
+/* Data structure for representing option data. */
+
+#define MAX_SEND_ENV 256
+#define SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES 32
+#define MAX_CANON_DOMAINS 32
+#define PATH_MAX_SUN (sizeof((struct sockaddr_un *)0)->sun_path)
+
+struct allowed_cname {
+ char *source_list;
+ char *target_list;
+};
+
+typedef struct {
+ int forward_agent; /* Forward authentication agent. */
+ int forward_x11; /* Forward X11 display. */
+ int forward_x11_timeout; /* Expiration for Cookies */
+ int forward_x11_trusted; /* Trust Forward X11 display. */
+ int exit_on_forward_failure; /* Exit if bind(2) fails for -L/-R */
+ char *xauth_location; /* Location for xauth program */
+ struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */
+ int use_privileged_port; /* Don't use privileged port if false. */
+ int rhosts_rsa_authentication; /* Try rhosts with RSA
+ * authentication. */
+ int rsa_authentication; /* Try RSA authentication. */
+ int pubkey_authentication; /* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
+ int hostbased_authentication; /* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */
+ int challenge_response_authentication;
+ /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+ int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
+ int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
+ int password_authentication; /* Try password
+ * authentication. */
+ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+ char *kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */
+ int batch_mode; /* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */
+ int check_host_ip; /* Also keep track of keys for IP address */
+ int strict_host_key_checking; /* Strict host key checking. */
+ int compression; /* Compress packets in both directions. */
+ int compression_level; /* Compression level 1 (fast) to 9
+ * (best). */
+ int tcp_keep_alive; /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
+ int ip_qos_interactive; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */
+ int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */
+ LogLevel log_level; /* Level for logging. */
+
+ int port; /* Port to connect. */
+ int address_family;
+ int connection_attempts; /* Max attempts (seconds) before
+ * giving up */
+ int connection_timeout; /* Max time (seconds) before
+ * aborting connection attempt */
+ int number_of_password_prompts; /* Max number of password
+ * prompts. */
+ int cipher; /* Cipher to use. */
+ char *ciphers; /* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */
+ char *macs; /* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */
+ char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */
+ char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
+ int protocol; /* Protocol in order of preference. */
+ char *hostname; /* Real host to connect. */
+ char *host_key_alias; /* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */
+ char *proxy_command; /* Proxy command for connecting the host. */
+ char *user; /* User to log in as. */
+ int escape_char; /* Escape character; -2 = none */
+
+ u_int num_system_hostfiles; /* Paths for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts */
+ char *system_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES];
+ u_int num_user_hostfiles; /* Path for $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts */
+ char *user_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES];
+ char *preferred_authentications;
+ char *bind_address; /* local socket address for connection to sshd */
+ char *pkcs11_provider; /* PKCS#11 provider */
+ int verify_host_key_dns; /* Verify host key using DNS */
+
+ int num_identity_files; /* Number of files for RSA/DSA identities. */
+ char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
+ int identity_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
+ struct sshkey *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
+
+ int num_certificate_files; /* Number of extra certificates for ssh. */
+ char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
+ int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
+ struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
+
+ int add_keys_to_agent;
+ char *identity_agent; /* Optional path to ssh-agent socket */
+
+ /* Local TCP/IP forward requests. */
+ int num_local_forwards;
+ struct Forward *local_forwards;
+
+ /* Remote TCP/IP forward requests. */
+ int num_remote_forwards;
+ struct Forward *remote_forwards;
+ int clear_forwardings;
+
+ /* stdio forwarding (-W) host and port */
+ char *stdio_forward_host;
+ int stdio_forward_port;
+
+ int enable_ssh_keysign;
+ int64_t rekey_limit;
+ int rekey_interval;
+ int no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
+ int identities_only;
+ int server_alive_interval;
+ int server_alive_count_max;
+
+ int num_send_env;
+ char *send_env[MAX_SEND_ENV];
+
+ char *control_path;
+ int control_master;
+ int control_persist; /* ControlPersist flag */
+ int control_persist_timeout; /* ControlPersist timeout (seconds) */
+
+ int hash_known_hosts;
+
+ int tun_open; /* tun(4) */
+ int tun_local; /* force tun device (optional) */
+ int tun_remote; /* force tun device (optional) */
+
+ char *local_command;
+ int permit_local_command;
+ int visual_host_key;
+
+ int request_tty;
+
+ int proxy_use_fdpass;
+
+ int num_canonical_domains;
+ char *canonical_domains[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS];
+ int canonicalize_hostname;
+ int canonicalize_max_dots;
+ int canonicalize_fallback_local;
+ int num_permitted_cnames;
+ struct allowed_cname permitted_cnames[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS];
+
+ char *revoked_host_keys;
+
+ int fingerprint_hash;
+
+ int update_hostkeys; /* one of SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_* */
+
+ char *hostbased_key_types;
+ char *pubkey_key_types;
+
+ char *jump_user;
+ char *jump_host;
+ int jump_port;
+ char *jump_extra;
+
+ char *ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */
+} Options;
+
+#define SSH_CANONICALISE_NO 0
+#define SSH_CANONICALISE_YES 1
+#define SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS 2
+
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_NO 0
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_YES 1
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO 2
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK 3
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK 4
+
+#define REQUEST_TTY_AUTO 0
+#define REQUEST_TTY_NO 1
+#define REQUEST_TTY_YES 2
+#define REQUEST_TTY_FORCE 3
+
+#define SSHCONF_CHECKPERM 1 /* check permissions on config file */
+#define SSHCONF_USERCONF 2 /* user provided config file not system */
+#define SSHCONF_POSTCANON 4 /* After hostname canonicalisation */
+#define SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH 8 /* Match/Host never matches; internal only */
+
+#define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_NO 0
+#define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_YES 1
+#define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK 2
+
+void initialize_options(Options *);
+void fill_default_options(Options *);
+void fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *);
+int process_config_line(Options *, struct passwd *, const char *,
+ const char *, char *, const char *, int, int *, int);
+int read_config_file(const char *, struct passwd *, const char *,
+ const char *, Options *, int);
+int parse_forward(struct Forward *, const char *, int, int);
+int parse_jump(const char *, Options *, int);
+int default_ssh_port(void);
+int option_clear_or_none(const char *);
+void dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host);
+
+void add_local_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *);
+void add_remote_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *);
+void add_identity_file(Options *, const char *, const char *, int);
+void add_certificate_file(Options *, const char *, int);
+
+#endif /* READCONF_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/readpass.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/readpass.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/readpass.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,193 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.50 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-
-static char *
-ssh_askpass(char *askpass, const char *msg)
-{
- pid_t pid, ret;
- size_t len;
- char *pass;
- int p[2], status;
- char buf[1024];
- void (*osigchld)(int);
-
- if (fflush(stdout) != 0)
- error("ssh_askpass: fflush: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (askpass == NULL)
- fatal("internal error: askpass undefined");
- if (pipe(p) < 0) {
- error("ssh_askpass: pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
- return NULL;
- }
- osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
- if ((pid = fork()) < 0) {
- error("ssh_askpass: fork: %s", strerror(errno));
- signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
- return NULL;
- }
- if (pid == 0) {
- permanently_drop_suid(getuid());
- close(p[0]);
- if (dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
- fatal("ssh_askpass: dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
- execlp(askpass, askpass, msg, (char *) 0);
- fatal("ssh_askpass: exec(%s): %s", askpass, strerror(errno));
- }
- close(p[1]);
-
- len = 0;
- do {
- ssize_t r = read(p[0], buf + len, sizeof(buf) - 1 - len);
-
- if (r == -1 && errno == EINTR)
- continue;
- if (r <= 0)
- break;
- len += r;
- } while (sizeof(buf) - 1 - len > 0);
- buf[len] = '\0';
-
- close(p[0]);
- while ((ret = waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) < 0)
- if (errno != EINTR)
- break;
- signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
- if (ret == -1 || !WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
- explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
- return NULL;
- }
-
- buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0';
- pass = xstrdup(buf);
- explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
- return pass;
-}
-
-/*
- * Reads a passphrase from /dev/tty with echo turned off/on. Returns the
- * passphrase (allocated with xmalloc). Exits if EOF is encountered. If
- * RP_ALLOW_STDIN is set, the passphrase will be read from stdin if no
- * tty is available
- */
-char *
-read_passphrase(const char *prompt, int flags)
-{
- char *askpass = NULL, *ret, buf[1024];
- int rppflags, use_askpass = 0, ttyfd;
-
- rppflags = (flags & RP_ECHO) ? RPP_ECHO_ON : RPP_ECHO_OFF;
- if (flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS)
- use_askpass = 1;
- else if (flags & RP_ALLOW_STDIN) {
- if (!isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
- debug("read_passphrase: stdin is not a tty");
- use_askpass = 1;
- }
- } else {
- rppflags |= RPP_REQUIRE_TTY;
- ttyfd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR);
- if (ttyfd >= 0)
- close(ttyfd);
- else {
- debug("read_passphrase: can't open %s: %s", _PATH_TTY,
- strerror(errno));
- use_askpass = 1;
- }
- }
-
- if ((flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS) && getenv("DISPLAY") == NULL)
- return (flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF) ? NULL : xstrdup("");
-
- if (use_askpass && getenv("DISPLAY")) {
- if (getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV))
- askpass = getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV);
- else
- askpass = _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT;
- if ((ret = ssh_askpass(askpass, prompt)) == NULL)
- if (!(flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF))
- return xstrdup("");
- return ret;
- }
-
- if (readpassphrase(prompt, buf, sizeof buf, rppflags) == NULL) {
- if (flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF)
- return NULL;
- return xstrdup("");
- }
-
- ret = xstrdup(buf);
- explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
- return ret;
-}
-
-int
-ask_permission(const char *fmt, ...)
-{
- va_list args;
- char *p, prompt[1024];
- int allowed = 0;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- vsnprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
-
- p = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_USE_ASKPASS|RP_ALLOW_EOF);
- if (p != NULL) {
- /*
- * Accept empty responses and responses consisting
- * of the word "yes" as affirmative.
- */
- if (*p == '\0' || *p == '\n' ||
- strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0)
- allowed = 1;
- free(p);
- }
-
- return (allowed);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/readpass.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/readpass.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/readpass.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/readpass.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.51 2015/12/11 00:20:04 mmcc Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+
+static char *
+ssh_askpass(char *askpass, const char *msg)
+{
+ pid_t pid, ret;
+ size_t len;
+ char *pass;
+ int p[2], status;
+ char buf[1024];
+ void (*osigchld)(int);
+
+ if (fflush(stdout) != 0)
+ error("ssh_askpass: fflush: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (askpass == NULL)
+ fatal("internal error: askpass undefined");
+ if (pipe(p) < 0) {
+ error("ssh_askpass: pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ if ((pid = fork()) < 0) {
+ error("ssh_askpass: fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+ signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ permanently_drop_suid(getuid());
+ close(p[0]);
+ if (dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
+ fatal("ssh_askpass: dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+ execlp(askpass, askpass, msg, (char *)NULL);
+ fatal("ssh_askpass: exec(%s): %s", askpass, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ close(p[1]);
+
+ len = 0;
+ do {
+ ssize_t r = read(p[0], buf + len, sizeof(buf) - 1 - len);
+
+ if (r == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ if (r <= 0)
+ break;
+ len += r;
+ } while (sizeof(buf) - 1 - len > 0);
+ buf[len] = '\0';
+
+ close(p[0]);
+ while ((ret = waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) < 0)
+ if (errno != EINTR)
+ break;
+ signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ if (ret == -1 || !WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0';
+ pass = xstrdup(buf);
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ return pass;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads a passphrase from /dev/tty with echo turned off/on. Returns the
+ * passphrase (allocated with xmalloc). Exits if EOF is encountered. If
+ * RP_ALLOW_STDIN is set, the passphrase will be read from stdin if no
+ * tty is available
+ */
+char *
+read_passphrase(const char *prompt, int flags)
+{
+ char *askpass = NULL, *ret, buf[1024];
+ int rppflags, use_askpass = 0, ttyfd;
+
+ rppflags = (flags & RP_ECHO) ? RPP_ECHO_ON : RPP_ECHO_OFF;
+ if (flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS)
+ use_askpass = 1;
+ else if (flags & RP_ALLOW_STDIN) {
+ if (!isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
+ debug("read_passphrase: stdin is not a tty");
+ use_askpass = 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ rppflags |= RPP_REQUIRE_TTY;
+ ttyfd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR);
+ if (ttyfd >= 0)
+ close(ttyfd);
+ else {
+ debug("read_passphrase: can't open %s: %s", _PATH_TTY,
+ strerror(errno));
+ use_askpass = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS) && getenv("DISPLAY") == NULL)
+ return (flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF) ? NULL : xstrdup("");
+
+ if (use_askpass && getenv("DISPLAY")) {
+ if (getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV))
+ askpass = getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV);
+ else
+ askpass = _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT;
+ if ((ret = ssh_askpass(askpass, prompt)) == NULL)
+ if (!(flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF))
+ return xstrdup("");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (readpassphrase(prompt, buf, sizeof buf, rppflags) == NULL) {
+ if (flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF)
+ return NULL;
+ return xstrdup("");
+ }
+
+ ret = xstrdup(buf);
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+ask_permission(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+ char *p, prompt[1024];
+ int allowed = 0;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ vsnprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+
+ p = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_USE_ASKPASS|RP_ALLOW_EOF);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Accept empty responses and responses consisting
+ * of the word "yes" as affirmative.
+ */
+ if (*p == '\0' || *p == '\n' ||
+ strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0)
+ allowed = 1;
+ free(p);
+ }
+
+ return (allowed);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/Makefile
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/Makefile 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/Makefile 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,182 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.68 2014/01/25 04:35:32 dtucker Exp $
-
-REGRESS_TARGETS= t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t-exec
-tests: $(REGRESS_TARGETS)
-
-# Interop tests are not run by default
-interop interop-tests: t-exec-interop
-
-clean:
- for F in $(CLEANFILES); do rm -f $(OBJ)$$F; done
- test -z "${SUDO}" || ${SUDO} rm -f ${SUDO_CLEAN}
- rm -rf $(OBJ).putty
-
-distclean: clean
-
-LTESTS= connect \
- proxy-connect \
- connect-privsep \
- proto-version \
- proto-mismatch \
- exit-status \
- envpass \
- transfer \
- banner \
- rekey \
- stderr-data \
- stderr-after-eof \
- broken-pipe \
- try-ciphers \
- yes-head \
- login-timeout \
- agent \
- agent-getpeereid \
- agent-timeout \
- agent-ptrace \
- keyscan \
- keygen-change \
- keygen-convert \
- key-options \
- scp \
- sftp \
- sftp-chroot \
- sftp-cmds \
- sftp-badcmds \
- sftp-batch \
- sftp-glob \
- sftp-perm \
- reconfigure \
- dynamic-forward \
- forwarding \
- multiplex \
- reexec \
- brokenkeys \
- cfgmatch \
- addrmatch \
- localcommand \
- forcecommand \
- portnum \
- keytype \
- kextype \
- cert-hostkey \
- cert-userkey \
- host-expand \
- keys-command \
- forward-control \
- integrity \
- krl
-# dhgex \
-
-INTEROP_TESTS= putty-transfer putty-ciphers putty-kex conch-ciphers
-#INTEROP_TESTS+=ssh-com ssh-com-client ssh-com-keygen ssh-com-sftp
-
-#LTESTS= cipher-speed
-
-USER!= id -un
-CLEANFILES= t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub copy.1 copy.2 \
- t8.out t8.out.pub t9.out t9.out.pub t10.out t10.out.pub \
- authorized_keys_${USER} known_hosts pidfile testdata \
- ssh_config sshd_config.orig ssh_proxy sshd_config sshd_proxy \
- rsa.pub rsa rsa1.pub rsa1 host.rsa host.rsa1 \
- rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa1-agent rsa1-agent.pub \
- ls.copy banner.in banner.out empty.in \
- scp-ssh-wrapper.scp ssh_proxy_envpass remote_pid \
- sshd_proxy_bak rsa_ssh2_cr.prv rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv \
- known_hosts-cert host_ca_key* cert_host_key* cert_user_key* \
- putty.rsa2 sshd_proxy_orig ssh_proxy_bak \
- key.rsa-* key.dsa-* key.ecdsa-* \
- authorized_principals_${USER} expect actual ready \
- sshd_proxy.* authorized_keys_${USER}.* modpipe revoked-* krl-* \
- ssh.log failed-ssh.log sshd.log failed-sshd.log \
- regress.log failed-regress.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh \
- sftp-server.sh sftp-server.log sftp.log setuid-allowed \
- data ed25519-agent ed25519-agent.pub key.ed25519-512 \
- key.ed25519-512.pub
-
-SUDO_CLEAN+= /var/run/testdata_${USER} /var/run/keycommand_${USER}
-
-# Enable all malloc(3) randomisations and checks
-TEST_ENV= "MALLOC_OPTIONS=AFGJPRX"
-
-TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN?=ssh-keygen
-
-CPPFLAGS=-I..
-
-t1:
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
- tr '\n' '\r' <${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
- awk '{print $$0 "\r"}' ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
-
-t2:
- cat ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv > $(OBJ)/t2.out
- chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t2.out
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t2.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub
-
-t3:
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -ef ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub >$(OBJ)/t3.out
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if $(OBJ)/t3.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub
-
-t4:
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\
- awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t4.ok
-
-t5:
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\
- awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t5.ok
-
-t6:
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.prv > $(OBJ)/t6.out1
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.pub > $(OBJ)/t6.out2
- chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t6.out1
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t6.out1 | diff - $(OBJ)/t6.out2
-
-$(OBJ)/t7.out:
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t rsa -N '' -f $@
-
-t7: $(OBJ)/t7.out
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null
-
-$(OBJ)/t8.out:
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t dsa -N '' -f $@
-
-t8: $(OBJ)/t8.out
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null
-
-$(OBJ)/t9.out:
- test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ecdsa -N '' -f $@
-
-t9: $(OBJ)/t9.out
- test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null
- test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null
-
-
-$(OBJ)/t10.out:
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -f $@
-
-t10: $(OBJ)/t10.out
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null
- ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null
-
-t-exec: ${LTESTS:=.sh}
- @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
- for TEST in ""$?; do \
- echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
- (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
- done
-
-t-exec-interop: ${INTEROP_TESTS:=.sh}
- @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
- for TEST in ""$?; do \
- echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
- (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
- done
-
-# Not run by default
-interop: ${INTEROP_TARGETS}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/Makefile (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/Makefile)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/Makefile (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/Makefile 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.88 2016/06/03 04:10:41 dtucker Exp $
+
+REGRESS_TARGETS= unit t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12 t-exec
+tests: prep $(REGRESS_TARGETS)
+
+# Interop tests are not run by default
+interop interop-tests: t-exec-interop
+
+prep:
+ test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || mkdir -p $(OBJ)/valgrind-out
+
+clean:
+ for F in $(CLEANFILES); do rm -f $(OBJ)$$F; done
+ test -z "${SUDO}" || ${SUDO} rm -f ${SUDO_CLEAN}
+ rm -rf $(OBJ).putty
+
+distclean: clean
+
+LTESTS= connect \
+ proxy-connect \
+ connect-privsep \
+ proto-version \
+ proto-mismatch \
+ exit-status \
+ envpass \
+ transfer \
+ banner \
+ rekey \
+ stderr-data \
+ stderr-after-eof \
+ broken-pipe \
+ try-ciphers \
+ yes-head \
+ login-timeout \
+ agent \
+ agent-getpeereid \
+ agent-timeout \
+ agent-ptrace \
+ keyscan \
+ keygen-change \
+ keygen-convert \
+ key-options \
+ scp \
+ sftp \
+ sftp-chroot \
+ sftp-cmds \
+ sftp-badcmds \
+ sftp-batch \
+ sftp-glob \
+ sftp-perm \
+ reconfigure \
+ dynamic-forward \
+ forwarding \
+ multiplex \
+ reexec \
+ brokenkeys \
+ sshcfgparse \
+ cfgparse \
+ cfgmatch \
+ addrmatch \
+ localcommand \
+ forcecommand \
+ portnum \
+ keytype \
+ kextype \
+ cert-hostkey \
+ cert-userkey \
+ host-expand \
+ keys-command \
+ forward-control \
+ integrity \
+ krl \
+ multipubkey \
+ limit-keytype \
+ hostkey-agent \
+ keygen-knownhosts \
+ hostkey-rotate \
+ principals-command \
+ cert-file \
+ cfginclude
+
+
+# dhgex \
+
+INTEROP_TESTS= putty-transfer putty-ciphers putty-kex conch-ciphers
+#INTEROP_TESTS+=ssh-com ssh-com-client ssh-com-keygen ssh-com-sftp
+
+#LTESTS= cipher-speed
+
+USER!= id -un
+CLEANFILES= *.core actual agent-key.* authorized_keys_${USER} \
+ authorized_keys_${USER}.* authorized_principals_${USER} \
+ banner.in banner.out cert_host_key* cert_user_key* \
+ copy.1 copy.2 data ed25519-agent ed25519-agent* \
+ ed25519-agent.pub empty.in expect failed-regress.log \
+ failed-ssh.log failed-sshd.log hkr.* host.rsa host.rsa1 \
+ host_* host_ca_key* host_krl_* host_revoked_* key.* \
+ key.dsa-* key.ecdsa-* key.ed25519-512 key.ed25519-512.pub \
+ key.rsa-* keys-command-args kh.* known_hosts \
+ known_hosts-cert known_hosts.* krl-* ls.copy modpipe \
+ netcat pidfile putty.rsa2 ready regress.log remote_pid \
+ revoked-* rsa rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa.pub rsa1 \
+ rsa1-agent rsa1-agent.pub rsa1.pub rsa_ssh2_cr.prv \
+ rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv scp-ssh-wrapper.exe \
+ scp-ssh-wrapper.scp setuid-allowed sftp-server.log \
+ sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \
+ ssh_config ssh_config.* ssh_proxy ssh_proxy_bak \
+ ssh_proxy_envpass sshd.log sshd_config sshd_config.orig \
+ sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak sshd_proxy_orig \
+ t10.out t10.out.pub t12.out t12.out.pub t2.out t3.out \
+ t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub t8.out t8.out.pub \
+ t9.out t9.out.pub testdata user_*key* user_ca* user_key*
+
+SUDO_CLEAN+= /var/run/testdata_${USER} /var/run/keycommand_${USER}
+
+# Enable all malloc(3) randomisations and checks
+TEST_ENV= "MALLOC_OPTIONS=AFGJPRX"
+
+TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN?=ssh-keygen
+
+CPPFLAGS=-I..
+
+t1:
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
+ tr '\n' '\r' <${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
+ awk '{print $$0 "\r"}' ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
+
+t2:
+ cat ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv > $(OBJ)/t2.out
+ chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t2.out
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t2.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub
+
+t3:
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -ef ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub >$(OBJ)/t3.out
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if $(OBJ)/t3.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub
+
+t4:
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E md5 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\
+ awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t4.ok
+
+t5:
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\
+ awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t5.ok
+
+t6:
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.prv > $(OBJ)/t6.out1
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.pub > $(OBJ)/t6.out2
+ chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t6.out1
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t6.out1 | diff - $(OBJ)/t6.out2
+
+$(OBJ)/t7.out:
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t rsa -N '' -f $@
+
+t7: $(OBJ)/t7.out
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null
+
+$(OBJ)/t8.out:
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t dsa -N '' -f $@
+
+t8: $(OBJ)/t8.out
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null
+
+$(OBJ)/t9.out:
+ test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ecdsa -N '' -f $@
+
+t9: $(OBJ)/t9.out
+ test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null
+ test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null
+
+
+$(OBJ)/t10.out:
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -f $@
+
+t10: $(OBJ)/t10.out
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null
+
+t11:
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E sha256 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\
+ awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t11.ok
+
+$(OBJ)/t12.out:
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -C 'test-comment-1234' -f $@
+
+t12: $(OBJ)/t12.out
+ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t12.out.pub | grep test-comment-1234 >/dev/null
+
+t-exec: ${LTESTS:=.sh}
+ @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
+ for TEST in ""$?; do \
+ echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
+ (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
+ done
+
+t-exec-interop: ${INTEROP_TESTS:=.sh}
+ @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
+ for TEST in ""$?; do \
+ echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
+ (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
+ done
+
+# Not run by default
+interop: ${INTEROP_TARGETS}
+
+# Unit tests, built by top-level Makefile
+unit:
+ set -e ; if test -z "${SKIP_UNIT}" ; then \
+ V="" ; \
+ test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || \
+ V=${.CURDIR}/valgrind-unit.sh ; \
+ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \
+ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \
+ -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \
+ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap ; \
+ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/kex/test_kex ; \
+ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys \
+ -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/testdata ; \
+ fi
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/README.regress
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/README.regress 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/README.regress 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-Overview.
-
-$ ./configure && make tests
-
-You'll see some progress info. A failure will cause either the make to
-abort or the driver script to report a "FATAL" failure.
-
-The test consists of 2 parts. The first is the file-based tests which is
-driven by the Makefile, and the second is a set of network or proxycommand
-based tests, which are driven by a driver script (test-exec.sh) which is
-called multiple times by the Makefile.
-
-Failures in the first part will cause the Makefile to return an error.
-Failures in the second part will print a "FATAL" message for the failed
-test and continue.
-
-OpenBSD has a system-wide regression test suite. OpenSSH Portable's test
-suite is based on OpenBSD's with modifications.
-
-
-Environment variables.
-
-SUDO: path to sudo command, if desired. Note that some systems (notably
- systems using PAM) require sudo to execute some tests.
-TEST_SSH_TRACE: set to "yes" for verbose output from tests
-TEST_SSH_QUIET: set to "yes" to suppress non-fatal output.
-TEST_SSH_x: path to "ssh" command under test, where x=SSH,SSHD,SSHAGENT,SSHADD
- SSHKEYGEN,SSHKEYSCAN,SFTP,SFTPSERVER
-OBJ: used by test scripts to access build dir.
-TEST_SHELL: shell used for running the test scripts.
-TEST_SSH_PORT: TCP port to be used for the listening tests.
-TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS: Configuration directives to be added to ssh_config
- before running each test.
-TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOTPS: Configuration directives to be added to sshd_config
- before running each test.
-
-
-Individual tests.
-
-You can run an individual test from the top-level Makefile, eg:
-$ make tests LTESTS=agent-timeout
-
-If you need to manipulate the environment more you can invoke test-exec.sh
-directly if you set up the path to find the binaries under test and the
-test scripts themselves, for example:
-
-$ cd regress
-$ PATH=`pwd`/..:$PATH:. TEST_SHELL=/bin/sh sh test-exec.sh `pwd` \
- agent-timeout.sh
-ok agent timeout test
-
-
-Files.
-
-test-exec.sh: the main test driver. Sets environment, creates config files
-and keys and runs the specified test.
-
-At the time of writing, the individual tests are:
-agent-timeout.sh: agent timeout test
-agent.sh: simple agent test
-broken-pipe.sh: broken pipe test
-connect-privsep.sh: proxy connect with privsep
-connect.sh: simple connect
-exit-status.sh: remote exit status
-forwarding.sh: local and remote forwarding
-keygen-change.sh: change passphrase for key
-keyscan.sh: keyscan
-proto-mismatch.sh: protocol version mismatch
-proto-version.sh: sshd version with different protocol combinations
-proxy-connect.sh: proxy connect
-sftp.sh: basic sftp put/get
-ssh-com-client.sh: connect with ssh.com client
-ssh-com-keygen.sh: ssh.com key import
-ssh-com-sftp.sh: basic sftp put/get with ssh.com server
-ssh-com.sh: connect to ssh.com server
-stderr-after-eof.sh: stderr data after eof
-stderr-data.sh: stderr data transfer
-transfer.sh: transfer data
-try-ciphers.sh: try ciphers
-yes-head.sh: yes pipe head
-
-
-Problems?
-
-Run the failing test with shell tracing (-x) turned on:
-$ PATH=`pwd`/..:$PATH:. sh -x test-exec.sh `pwd` agent-timeout.sh
-
-Failed tests can be difficult to diagnose. Suggestions:
-- run the individual test via ./test-exec.sh `pwd` [testname]
-- set LogLevel to VERBOSE in test-exec.sh and enable syslogging of
- auth.debug (eg to /var/log/authlog).
-
-
-Known Issues.
-
-- Similarly, if you do not have "scp" in your system's $PATH then the
- multiplex scp tests will fail (since the system's shell startup scripts
- will determine where the shell started by sshd will look for scp).
-
-- Recent GNU coreutils deprecate "head -[n]": this will cause the yes-head
- test to fail. The old behaviour can be restored by setting (and
- exporting) _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 before running the tests.
-
-$Id: README.regress,v 1.12 2011/05/05 03:48:42 djm Exp $
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/README.regress (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/README.regress)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/README.regress (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/README.regress 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+Overview.
+
+$ ./configure && make tests
+
+You'll see some progress info. A failure will cause either the make to
+abort or the driver script to report a "FATAL" failure.
+
+The test consists of 2 parts. The first is the file-based tests which is
+driven by the Makefile, and the second is a set of network or proxycommand
+based tests, which are driven by a driver script (test-exec.sh) which is
+called multiple times by the Makefile.
+
+Failures in the first part will cause the Makefile to return an error.
+Failures in the second part will print a "FATAL" message for the failed
+test and continue.
+
+OpenBSD has a system-wide regression test suite. OpenSSH Portable's test
+suite is based on OpenBSD's with modifications.
+
+
+Environment variables.
+
+SUDO: path to sudo command, if desired. Note that some systems (notably
+ systems using PAM) require sudo to execute some tests.
+TEST_SSH_TRACE: set to "yes" for verbose output from tests
+TEST_SSH_QUIET: set to "yes" to suppress non-fatal output.
+TEST_SSH_x: path to "ssh" command under test, where x=SSH,SSHD,SSHAGENT,SSHADD
+ SSHKEYGEN,SSHKEYSCAN,SFTP,SFTPSERVER
+OBJ: used by test scripts to access build dir.
+TEST_SHELL: shell used for running the test scripts.
+TEST_SSH_PORT: TCP port to be used for the listening tests.
+TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS: Configuration directives to be added to ssh_config
+ before running each test.
+TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS: Configuration directives to be added to sshd_config
+ before running each test.
+
+
+Individual tests.
+
+You can run an individual test from the top-level Makefile, eg:
+$ make tests LTESTS=agent-timeout
+
+If you need to manipulate the environment more you can invoke test-exec.sh
+directly if you set up the path to find the binaries under test and the
+test scripts themselves, for example:
+
+$ cd regress
+$ PATH=`pwd`/..:$PATH:. TEST_SHELL=/bin/sh sh test-exec.sh `pwd` \
+ agent-timeout.sh
+ok agent timeout test
+
+
+Files.
+
+test-exec.sh: the main test driver. Sets environment, creates config files
+and keys and runs the specified test.
+
+At the time of writing, the individual tests are:
+agent-timeout.sh: agent timeout test
+agent.sh: simple agent test
+broken-pipe.sh: broken pipe test
+connect-privsep.sh: proxy connect with privsep
+connect.sh: simple connect
+exit-status.sh: remote exit status
+forwarding.sh: local and remote forwarding
+keygen-change.sh: change passphrase for key
+keyscan.sh: keyscan
+proto-mismatch.sh: protocol version mismatch
+proto-version.sh: sshd version with different protocol combinations
+proxy-connect.sh: proxy connect
+sftp.sh: basic sftp put/get
+ssh-com-client.sh: connect with ssh.com client
+ssh-com-keygen.sh: ssh.com key import
+ssh-com-sftp.sh: basic sftp put/get with ssh.com server
+ssh-com.sh: connect to ssh.com server
+stderr-after-eof.sh: stderr data after eof
+stderr-data.sh: stderr data transfer
+transfer.sh: transfer data
+try-ciphers.sh: try ciphers
+yes-head.sh: yes pipe head
+
+
+Problems?
+
+Run the failing test with shell tracing (-x) turned on:
+$ PATH=`pwd`/..:$PATH:. sh -x test-exec.sh `pwd` agent-timeout.sh
+
+Failed tests can be difficult to diagnose. Suggestions:
+- run the individual test via ./test-exec.sh `pwd` [testname]
+- set LogLevel to VERBOSE in test-exec.sh and enable syslogging of
+ auth.debug (eg to /var/log/authlog).
+
+
+Known Issues.
+
+- Similarly, if you do not have "scp" in your system's $PATH then the
+ multiplex scp tests will fail (since the system's shell startup scripts
+ will determine where the shell started by sshd will look for scp).
+
+- Recent GNU coreutils deprecate "head -[n]": this will cause the yes-head
+ test to fail. The old behaviour can be restored by setting (and
+ exporting) _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 before running the tests.
+
+$Id: README.regress,v 1.12 2011/05/05 03:48:42 djm Exp $
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.5 2013/05/17 10:33:09 dtucker Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="disallow agent attach from other uid"
-
-UNPRIV=nobody
-ASOCK=${OBJ}/agent
-SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent
-
-if config_defined HAVE_GETPEEREID HAVE_GETPEERUCRED HAVE_SO_PEERCRED ; then
- :
-else
- echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)"
- exit 0
-fi
-if [ -z "$SUDO" ]; then
- echo "skipped: need SUDO to switch to uid $UNPRIV"
- exit 0
-fi
-
-trace "start agent"
-eval `${SSHAGENT} -s -a ${ASOCK}` > /dev/null
-r=$?
-if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
-else
- chmod 644 ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK}
-
- ssh-add -l > /dev/null 2>&1
- r=$?
- if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then
- fail "ssh-add failed with $r != 1"
- fi
-
- < /dev/null ${SUDO} -S -u ${UNPRIV} ssh-add -l 2>/dev/null
- r=$?
- if [ $r -lt 2 ]; then
- fail "ssh-add did not fail for ${UNPRIV}: $r < 2"
- fi
-
- trace "kill agent"
- ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
-fi
-
-rm -f ${OBJ}/agent
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+# $OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.6 2016/05/03 14:41:04 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="disallow agent attach from other uid"
+
+UNPRIV=nobody
+ASOCK=${OBJ}/agent
+SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent
+
+if config_defined HAVE_GETPEEREID HAVE_GETPEERUCRED HAVE_SO_PEERCRED ; then
+ :
+else
+ echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)"
+ exit 0
+fi
+case "x$SUDO" in
+ xsudo) sudo=1;;
+ xdoas) ;;
+ x)
+ echo "need SUDO to switch to uid $UNPRIV"
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *)
+ echo "unsupported $SUDO - "doas" and "sudo" are allowed"
+ exit 0 ;;
+esac
+
+trace "start agent"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} -s -a ${ASOCK}` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+else
+ chmod 644 ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK}
+
+ ssh-add -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add failed with $r != 1"
+ fi
+ if test -z "$sudo" ; then
+ # doas
+ ${SUDO} -n -u ${UNPRIV} ssh-add -l 2>/dev/null
+ else
+ # sudo
+ < /dev/null ${SUDO} -S -u ${UNPRIV} ssh-add -l 2>/dev/null
+ fi
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -lt 2 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add did not fail for ${UNPRIV}: $r < 2"
+ fi
+
+ trace "kill agent"
+ ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+fi
+
+rm -f ${OBJ}/agent
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: agent-pkcs11.sh,v 1.1 2010/02/08 10:52:47 markus Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="pkcs11 agent test"
-
-TEST_SSH_PIN=""
-TEST_SSH_PKCS11=/usr/local/lib/soft-pkcs11.so.0.0
-
-# setup environment for soft-pkcs11 token
-SOFTPKCS11RC=$OBJ/pkcs11.info
-export SOFTPKCS11RC
-# prevent ssh-agent from calling ssh-askpass
-SSH_ASKPASS=/usr/bin/true
-export SSH_ASKPASS
-unset DISPLAY
-
-# start command w/o tty, so ssh-add accepts pin from stdin
-notty() {
- perl -e 'use POSIX; POSIX::setsid();
- if (fork) { wait; exit($? >> 8); } else { exec(@ARGV) }' "$@"
-}
-
-trace "start agent"
-eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
-r=$?
-if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
-else
- trace "generating key/cert"
- rm -f $OBJ/pkcs11.key $OBJ/pkcs11.crt
- openssl genrsa -out $OBJ/pkcs11.key 2048 > /dev/null 2>&1
- chmod 600 $OBJ/pkcs11.key
- openssl req -key $OBJ/pkcs11.key -new -x509 \
- -out $OBJ/pkcs11.crt -text -subj '/CN=pkcs11 test' > /dev/null
- printf "a\ta\t$OBJ/pkcs11.crt\t$OBJ/pkcs11.key" > $SOFTPKCS11RC
- # add to authorized keys
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -y -f $OBJ/pkcs11.key > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-
- trace "add pkcs11 key to agent"
- echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} -s ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1
- r=$?
- if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh-add -s failed: exit code $r"
- fi
-
- trace "pkcs11 list via agent"
- ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
- r=$?
- if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r"
- fi
-
- trace "pkcs11 connect via agent"
- ${SSH} -2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5
- r=$?
- if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then
- fail "ssh connect failed (exit code $r)"
- fi
-
- trace "remove pkcs11 keys"
- echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} -e ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1
- r=$?
- if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh-add -e failed: exit code $r"
- fi
-
- trace "kill agent"
- ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
-fi
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+# $OpenBSD: agent-pkcs11.sh,v 1.2 2015/01/12 11:46:32 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="pkcs11 agent test"
+
+TEST_SSH_PIN=""
+TEST_SSH_PKCS11=/usr/local/lib/soft-pkcs11.so.0.0
+
+test -f "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11" || fatal "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11 does not exist"
+
+# setup environment for soft-pkcs11 token
+SOFTPKCS11RC=$OBJ/pkcs11.info
+export SOFTPKCS11RC
+# prevent ssh-agent from calling ssh-askpass
+SSH_ASKPASS=/usr/bin/true
+export SSH_ASKPASS
+unset DISPLAY
+
+# start command w/o tty, so ssh-add accepts pin from stdin
+notty() {
+ perl -e 'use POSIX; POSIX::setsid();
+ if (fork) { wait; exit($? >> 8); } else { exec(@ARGV) }' "$@"
+}
+
+trace "start agent"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+else
+ trace "generating key/cert"
+ rm -f $OBJ/pkcs11.key $OBJ/pkcs11.crt
+ openssl genrsa -out $OBJ/pkcs11.key 2048 > /dev/null 2>&1
+ chmod 600 $OBJ/pkcs11.key
+ openssl req -key $OBJ/pkcs11.key -new -x509 \
+ -out $OBJ/pkcs11.crt -text -subj '/CN=pkcs11 test' > /dev/null
+ printf "a\ta\t$OBJ/pkcs11.crt\t$OBJ/pkcs11.key" > $SOFTPKCS11RC
+ # add to authorized keys
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -y -f $OBJ/pkcs11.key > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+
+ trace "add pkcs11 key to agent"
+ echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} -s ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -s failed: exit code $r"
+ fi
+
+ trace "pkcs11 list via agent"
+ ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r"
+ fi
+
+ trace "pkcs11 connect via agent"
+ ${SSH} -2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then
+ fail "ssh connect failed (exit code $r)"
+ fi
+
+ trace "remove pkcs11 keys"
+ echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} -e ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -e failed: exit code $r"
+ fi
+
+ trace "kill agent"
+ ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+fi
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-ptrace.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/agent-ptrace.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-ptrace.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: agent-ptrace.sh,v 1.2 2014/02/27 21:21:25 djm Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="disallow agent ptrace attach"
-
-if have_prog uname ; then
- case `uname` in
- AIX|CYGWIN*|OSF1)
- echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)"
- exit 0
- ;;
- esac
-fi
-
-if have_prog gdb ; then
- : ok
-else
- echo "skipped (gdb not found)"
- exit 0
-fi
-
-if $OBJ/setuid-allowed ${SSHAGENT} ; then
- : ok
-else
- echo "skipped (${SSHAGENT} is mounted on a no-setuid filesystem)"
- exit 0
-fi
-
-if test -z "$SUDO" ; then
- echo "skipped (SUDO not set)"
- exit 0
-else
- $SUDO chown 0 ${SSHAGENT}
- $SUDO chgrp 0 ${SSHAGENT}
- $SUDO chmod 2755 ${SSHAGENT}
-fi
-
-trace "start agent"
-eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
-r=$?
-if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
-else
- # ls -l ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK}
- gdb ${SSHAGENT} ${SSH_AGENT_PID} > ${OBJ}/gdb.out 2>&1 << EOF
- quit
-EOF
- r=$?
- if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "gdb failed: exit code $r"
- fi
- egrep 'ptrace: Operation not permitted.|procfs:.*Permission denied.|ttrace.*Permission denied.|procfs:.*: Invalid argument.|Unable to access task ' >/dev/null ${OBJ}/gdb.out
- r=$?
- rm -f ${OBJ}/gdb.out
- if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ptrace succeeded?: exit code $r"
- fi
-
- trace "kill agent"
- ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
-fi
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-ptrace.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/agent-ptrace.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-ptrace.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-ptrace.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+# $OpenBSD: agent-ptrace.sh,v 1.2 2014/02/27 21:21:25 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="disallow agent ptrace attach"
+
+if have_prog uname ; then
+ case `uname` in
+ AIX|CYGWIN*|OSF1)
+ echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)"
+ exit 0
+ ;;
+ esac
+fi
+
+if [ "x$USER" = "xroot" ]; then
+ echo "Skipped: running as root"
+ exit 0
+fi
+
+if have_prog gdb ; then
+ : ok
+else
+ echo "skipped (gdb not found)"
+ exit 0
+fi
+
+if $OBJ/setuid-allowed ${SSHAGENT} ; then
+ : ok
+else
+ echo "skipped (${SSHAGENT} is mounted on a no-setuid filesystem)"
+ exit 0
+fi
+
+if test -z "$SUDO" ; then
+ echo "skipped (SUDO not set)"
+ exit 0
+else
+ $SUDO chown 0 ${SSHAGENT}
+ $SUDO chgrp 0 ${SSHAGENT}
+ $SUDO chmod 2755 ${SSHAGENT}
+fi
+
+trace "start agent"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+else
+ # ls -l ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK}
+ gdb ${SSHAGENT} ${SSH_AGENT_PID} > ${OBJ}/gdb.out 2>&1 << EOF
+ quit
+EOF
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "gdb failed: exit code $r"
+ fi
+ egrep 'ptrace: Operation not permitted.|procfs:.*Permission denied.|ttrace.*Permission denied.|procfs:.*: Invalid argument.|Unable to access task ' >/dev/null ${OBJ}/gdb.out
+ r=$?
+ rm -f ${OBJ}/gdb.out
+ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ptrace succeeded?: exit code $r"
+ fi
+
+ trace "kill agent"
+ ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+fi
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-timeout.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/agent-timeout.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-timeout.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: agent-timeout.sh,v 1.2 2013/05/17 01:16:09 dtucker Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="agent timeout test"
-
-SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT=10
-
-trace "start agent"
-eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
-r=$?
-if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
-else
- trace "add keys with timeout"
- for t in rsa rsa1; do
- ${SSHADD} -t ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT} $OBJ/$t > /dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh-add did succeed exit code 0"
- fi
- done
- n=`${SSHADD} -l 2> /dev/null | wc -l`
- trace "agent has $n keys"
- if [ $n -ne 2 ]; then
- fail "ssh-add -l did not return 2 keys: $n"
- fi
- trace "sleeping 2*${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT} seconds"
- sleep ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT}
- sleep ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT}
- ${SSHADD} -l 2> /dev/null | grep 'The agent has no identities.' >/dev/null
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh-add -l still returns keys after timeout"
- fi
-
- trace "kill agent"
- ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
-fi
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-timeout.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/agent-timeout.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-timeout.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent-timeout.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# $OpenBSD: agent-timeout.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="agent timeout test"
+
+SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT=10
+
+trace "start agent"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+else
+ trace "add keys with timeout"
+ for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+ ${SSHADD} -t ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT} $OBJ/$t > /dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add did succeed exit code 0"
+ fi
+ done
+ n=`${SSHADD} -l 2> /dev/null | wc -l`
+ trace "agent has $n keys"
+ if [ $n -ne 2 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -l did not return 2 keys: $n"
+ fi
+ trace "sleeping 2*${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT} seconds"
+ sleep ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT}
+ sleep ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT}
+ ${SSHADD} -l 2> /dev/null | grep 'The agent has no identities.' >/dev/null
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -l still returns keys after timeout"
+ fi
+
+ trace "kill agent"
+ ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+fi
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/agent.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: agent.sh,v 1.10 2014/02/27 21:21:25 djm Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="simple agent test"
-
-SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
-if [ $? -ne 2 ]; then
- fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 2"
-fi
-
-trace "start agent"
-eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
-r=$?
-if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
-else
- ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? -ne 1 ]; then
- fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 1"
- fi
- trace "overwrite authorized keys"
- printf '' > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
- for t in ed25519 rsa rsa1; do
- # generate user key for agent
- rm -f $OBJ/$t-agent
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-agent ||\
- fail "ssh-keygen for $t-agent failed"
- # add to authorized keys
- cat $OBJ/$t-agent.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
- # add privat key to agent
- ${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent > /dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh-add did succeed exit code 0"
- fi
- done
- ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
- r=$?
- if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r"
- fi
- # the same for full pubkey output
- ${SSHADD} -L > /dev/null 2>&1
- r=$?
- if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh-add -L failed: exit code $r"
- fi
-
- trace "simple connect via agent"
- for p in 1 2; do
- ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5$p
- r=$?
- if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then
- fail "ssh connect with protocol $p failed (exit code $r)"
- fi
- done
-
- trace "agent forwarding"
- for p in 1 2; do
- ${SSH} -A -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
- r=$?
- if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh-add -l via agent fwd proto $p failed (exit code $r)"
- fi
- ${SSH} -A -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost \
- "${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5$p"
- r=$?
- if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then
- fail "agent fwd proto $p failed (exit code $r)"
- fi
- done
-
- trace "delete all agent keys"
- ${SSHADD} -D > /dev/null 2>&1
- r=$?
- if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh-add -D failed: exit code $r"
- fi
-
- trace "kill agent"
- ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
-fi
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/agent.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/agent.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+# $OpenBSD: agent.sh,v 1.11 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="simple agent test"
+
+SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -ne 2 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 2"
+fi
+
+trace "start agent"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+else
+ ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -ne 1 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 1"
+ fi
+ trace "overwrite authorized keys"
+ printf '' > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+ # generate user key for agent
+ rm -f $OBJ/$t-agent
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-agent ||\
+ fail "ssh-keygen for $t-agent failed"
+ # add to authorized keys
+ cat $OBJ/$t-agent.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ # add privat key to agent
+ ${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent > /dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add did succeed exit code 0"
+ fi
+ done
+ ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r"
+ fi
+ # the same for full pubkey output
+ ${SSHADD} -L > /dev/null 2>&1
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -L failed: exit code $r"
+ fi
+
+ trace "simple connect via agent"
+ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5$p
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then
+ fail "ssh connect with protocol $p failed (exit code $r)"
+ fi
+ done
+
+ trace "agent forwarding"
+ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ ${SSH} -A -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -l via agent fwd proto $p failed (exit code $r)"
+ fi
+ ${SSH} -A -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost \
+ "${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5$p"
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then
+ fail "agent fwd proto $p failed (exit code $r)"
+ fi
+ done
+
+ trace "delete all agent keys"
+ ${SSHADD} -D > /dev/null 2>&1
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -D failed: exit code $r"
+ fi
+
+ trace "kill agent"
+ ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+fi
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/broken-pipe.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/broken-pipe.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/broken-pipe.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: broken-pipe.sh,v 1.4 2002/03/15 13:08:56 markus Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="broken pipe test"
-
-for p in 1 2; do
- trace "protocol $p"
- for i in 1 2 3 4; do
- ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config_config nexthost echo $i 2> /dev/null | true
- r=$?
- if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "broken pipe returns $r for protocol $p"
- fi
- done
-done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/broken-pipe.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/broken-pipe.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/broken-pipe.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/broken-pipe.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# $OpenBSD: broken-pipe.sh,v 1.5 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="broken pipe test"
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ trace "protocol $p"
+ for i in 1 2 3 4; do
+ ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config_config nexthost echo $i 2> /dev/null | true
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "broken pipe returns $r for protocol $p"
+ fi
+ done
+done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cert-file.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/cert-file.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cert-file.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cert-file.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+# $OpenBSD: cert-file.sh,v 1.2 2015/09/24 07:15:39 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="ssh with certificates"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key*
+rm -f $OBJ/cert_user_key*
+
+# Create a CA key
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key1 ||\
+ fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key2 ||\
+ fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+
+# Make some keys and certificates.
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \
+ fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \
+ fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+# Move the certificate to a different address to better control
+# when it is offered.
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+ -z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key1 ||
+ fail "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key1"
+mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key2 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+ -z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key1 ||
+ fail "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key2"
+mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub
+
+trace 'try with identity files'
+opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes"
+opts2="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key2"
+echo "cert-authority $(cat $OBJ/user_ca_key1.pub)" > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ # Just keys should fail
+ ${SSH} $opts2 somehost exit 5$p
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -eq 5$p ]; then
+ fail "ssh succeeded with no certs in protocol $p"
+ fi
+
+ # Keys with untrusted cert should fail.
+ opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub"
+ ${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -eq 5$p ]; then
+ fail "ssh succeeded with bad cert in protocol $p"
+ fi
+
+ # Good cert with bad key should fail.
+ opts3="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key2"
+ opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
+ ${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -eq 5$p ]; then
+ fail "ssh succeeded with no matching key in protocol $p"
+ fi
+
+ # Keys with one trusted cert, should succeed.
+ opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
+ ${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then
+ fail "ssh failed with trusted cert and key in protocol $p"
+ fi
+
+ # Multiple certs and keys, with one trusted cert, should succeed.
+ opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub"
+ opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
+ ${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then
+ fail "ssh failed with multiple certs in protocol $p"
+ fi
+
+ #Keys with trusted certificate specified in config options, should succeed.
+ opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
+ ${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then
+ fail "ssh failed with trusted cert in config in protocol $p"
+ fi
+done
+
+#next, using an agent in combination with the keys
+SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -ne 2 ]; then
+ fatal "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 2"
+fi
+
+trace "start agent"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+fi
+
+# add private keys to agent
+${SSHADD} -k $OBJ/user_key2 > /dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fatal "ssh-add did not succeed with exit code 0"
+fi
+${SSHADD} -k $OBJ/user_key1 > /dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fatal "ssh-add did not succeed with exit code 0"
+fi
+
+# try ssh with the agent and certificates
+# note: ssh agent only uses certificates in protocol 2
+opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+# with no certificates, shoud fail
+${SSH} -2 $opts somehost exit 52
+if [ $? -eq 52 ]; then
+ fail "ssh connect with agent in protocol 2 succeeded with no cert"
+fi
+
+#with an untrusted certificate, should fail
+opts="$opts -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub"
+${SSH} -2 $opts somehost exit 52
+if [ $? -eq 52 ]; then
+ fail "ssh connect with agent in protocol 2 succeeded with bad cert"
+fi
+
+#with an additional trusted certificate, should succeed
+opts="$opts -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
+${SSH} -2 $opts somehost exit 52
+if [ $? -ne 52 ]; then
+ fail "ssh connect with agent in protocol 2 failed with good cert"
+fi
+
+trace "kill agent"
+${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+
+#cleanup
+rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key*
+rm -f $OBJ/cert_user_key*
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/cert-hostkey.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cert-hostkey.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,244 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: cert-hostkey.sh,v 1.9 2014/01/26 10:22:10 djm Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="certified host keys"
-
-rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert $OBJ/host_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_host_key*
-cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
-
-HOSTS='localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1'
-
-# Create a CA key and add it to known hosts
-${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/host_ca_key ||\
- fail "ssh-keygen of host_ca_key failed"
-(
- printf '@cert-authority '
- printf "$HOSTS "
- cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub
-) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
-
-PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/g;s/^ssh-//'`
-
-type_has_legacy() {
- case $1 in
- ed25519*|ecdsa*) return 1 ;;
- esac
- return 0
-}
-
-# Generate and sign host keys
-for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
- verbose "$tid: sign host ${ktype} cert"
- # Generate and sign a host key
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} \
- -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || \
- fail "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${ktype} failed"
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -h -q -s $OBJ/host_ca_key \
- -I "regress host key for $USER" \
- -n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} ||
- fail "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}"
- type_has_legacy $ktype || continue
- cp $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}_v00
- cp $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}_v00.pub
- verbose "$tid: sign host ${ktype}_v00 cert"
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -t v00 -h -q -s $OBJ/host_ca_key \
- -I "regress host key for $USER" \
- -n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}_v00 ||
- fail "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}_v00"
-done
-
-# Basic connect tests
-for privsep in yes no ; do
- for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES rsa_v00 dsa_v00; do
- verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} cert connect privsep $privsep"
- (
- cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
- echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
- echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
- echo UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep
- ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
- ${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
- -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect failed"
- fi
- done
-done
-
-# Revoked certificates with key present
-(
- printf '@cert-authority '
- printf "$HOSTS "
- cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub
- for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES rsa_v00 dsa_v00; do
- test -f "$OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub" || fatal "no pubkey"
- printf "@revoked * `cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub`\n"
- done
-) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
-for privsep in yes no ; do
- for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES rsa_v00 dsa_v00; do
- verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} revoked cert privsep $privsep"
- (
- cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
- echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
- echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
- echo UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep
- ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
- ${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
- -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
- fi
- done
-done
-
-# Revoked CA
-(
- printf '@cert-authority '
- printf "$HOSTS "
- cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub
- printf '@revoked '
- printf "* "
- cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub
-) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
-for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES rsa_v00 dsa_v00 ; do
- verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} revoked cert"
- (
- cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
- echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
- echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
- ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
- ${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
- -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
- fi
-done
-
-# Create a CA key and add it to known hosts
-(
- printf '@cert-authority '
- printf "$HOSTS "
- cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub
-) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
-
-test_one() {
- ident=$1
- result=$2
- sign_opts=$3
-
- for kt in rsa rsa_v00 ; do
- case $kt in
- *_v00) args="-t v00" ;;
- *) args="" ;;
- esac
-
- verbose "$tid: host cert connect $ident $kt expect $result"
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/host_ca_key \
- -I "regress host key for $USER" \
- $sign_opts $args \
- $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} ||
- fail "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${kt}"
- (
- cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
- echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}
- echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}-cert.pub
- ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
- ${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
- -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
- rc=$?
- if [ "x$result" = "xsuccess" ] ; then
- if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect $ident failed unexpectedly"
- fi
- else
- if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
- fi
- fi
- done
-}
-
-test_one "user-certificate" failure "-n $HOSTS"
-test_one "empty principals" success "-h"
-test_one "wrong principals" failure "-h -n foo"
-test_one "cert not yet valid" failure "-h -V20200101:20300101"
-test_one "cert expired" failure "-h -V19800101:19900101"
-test_one "cert valid interval" success "-h -V-1w:+2w"
-test_one "cert has constraints" failure "-h -Oforce-command=false"
-
-# Check downgrade of cert to raw key when no CA found
-for v in v01 v00 ; do
- for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
- type_has_legacy $ktype || continue
- rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert $OBJ/cert_host_key*
- verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} ${v} cert downgrade to raw key"
- # Generate and sign a host key
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} \
- -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || \
- fail "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${ktype} failed"
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -t ${v} -h -q -s $OBJ/host_ca_key \
- -I "regress host key for $USER" \
- -n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} ||
- fail "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}"
- (
- printf "$HOSTS "
- cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub
- ) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
- (
- cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
- echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
- echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
- ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
- ${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
- -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect failed"
- fi
- done
-done
-
-# Wrong certificate
-(
- printf '@cert-authority '
- printf "$HOSTS "
- cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub
-) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
-for v in v01 v00 ; do
- for kt in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
- type_has_legacy $kt || continue
- rm -f $OBJ/cert_host_key*
- # Self-sign key
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${kt} \
- -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} || \
- fail "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${kt} failed"
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -t ${v} -h -q -s $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} \
- -I "regress host key for $USER" \
- -n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} ||
- fail "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${kt}"
- verbose "$tid: host ${kt} connect wrong cert"
- (
- cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
- echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}
- echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}-cert.pub
- ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
- ${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
- -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -q somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
- fi
- done
-done
-
-rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert $OBJ/host_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_host_key*
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cert-hostkey.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/cert-hostkey.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cert-hostkey.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cert-hostkey.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
+# $OpenBSD: cert-hostkey.sh,v 1.14 2016/05/02 09:52:00 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="certified host keys"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert* $OBJ/host_ca_key* $OBJ/host_revoked_*
+rm -f $OBJ/cert_host_key* $OBJ/host_krl_*
+
+# Allow all hostkey/pubkey types, prefer certs for the client
+types=""
+for i in `$SSH -Q key`; do
+ if [ -z "$types" ]; then
+ types="$i"
+ continue
+ fi
+ case "$i" in
+ *cert*) types="$i,$types";;
+ *) types="$types,$i";;
+ esac
+done
+(
+ echo "HostKeyAlgorithms ${types}"
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes *"
+) >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+(
+ echo "HostKeyAlgorithms *"
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes *"
+) >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+HOSTS='localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1'
+
+kh_ca() {
+ for k in "$@" ; do
+ printf "@cert-authority $HOSTS "
+ cat $OBJ/$k || fatal "couldn't cat $k"
+ done
+}
+kh_revoke() {
+ for k in "$@" ; do
+ printf "@revoked * "
+ cat $OBJ/$k || fatal "couldn't cat $k"
+ done
+}
+
+# Create a CA key and add it to known hosts. Ed25519 chosen for speed.
+# RSA for testing RSA/SHA2 signatures.
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/host_ca_key ||\
+ fail "ssh-keygen of host_ca_key failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/host_ca_key2 ||\
+ fail "ssh-keygen of host_ca_key failed"
+
+kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
+cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+
+# Plain text revocation files
+touch $OBJ/host_revoked_empty
+touch $OBJ/host_revoked_plain
+touch $OBJ/host_revoked_cert
+cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub $OBJ/host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/host_revoked_ca
+
+PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/g;s/^ssh-//'`
+
+if echo "$PLAIN_TYPES" | grep '^rsa$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+ PLAIN_TYPES="$PLAIN_TYPES rsa-sha2-256 rsa-sha2-512"
+fi
+
+# Prepare certificate, plain key and CA KRLs
+${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_empty || fatal "KRL init failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_plain || fatal "KRL init failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_cert || fatal "KRL init failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_ca $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub $OBJ/host_ca_key2.pub \
+ || fatal "KRL init failed"
+
+# Generate and sign host keys
+serial=1
+for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
+ verbose "$tid: sign host ${ktype} cert"
+ # Generate and sign a host key
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} \
+ -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || \
+ fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${ktype} failed"
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -ukf $OBJ/host_krl_plain \
+ $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub || fatal "KRL update failed"
+ cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub >> $OBJ/host_revoked_plain
+ case $ktype in
+ rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $ktype"; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key2" ;;
+ *) tflag=""; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key" ;;
+ esac
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -h -q -s $ca -z $serial $tflag \
+ -I "regress host key for $USER" \
+ -n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} ||
+ fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}"
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -ukf $OBJ/host_krl_cert \
+ $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub || \
+ fatal "KRL update failed"
+ cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub >> $OBJ/host_revoked_cert
+ serial=`expr $serial + 1`
+done
+
+attempt_connect() {
+ _ident="$1"
+ _expect_success="$2"
+ shift; shift
+ verbose "$tid: $_ident expect success $_expect_success"
+ cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+ ${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+ -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+ "$@" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+ _r=$?
+ if [ "x$_expect_success" = "xyes" ] ; then
+ if [ $_r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect $_ident failed"
+ fi
+ else
+ if [ $_r -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect $_ident succeeded unexpectedly"
+ fi
+ fi
+}
+
+# Basic connect and revocation tests.
+for privsep in yes no ; do
+ for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
+ verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} cert connect privsep $privsep"
+ (
+ cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+ echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
+ echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
+ echo UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep
+ ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+ # test name expect success
+ attempt_connect "$ktype basic connect" "yes"
+ attempt_connect "$ktype empty KRL" "yes" \
+ -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_empty
+ attempt_connect "$ktype KRL w/ plain key revoked" "no" \
+ -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_plain
+ attempt_connect "$ktype KRL w/ cert revoked" "no" \
+ -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_cert
+ attempt_connect "$ktype KRL w/ CA revoked" "no" \
+ -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_ca
+ attempt_connect "$ktype empty plaintext revocation" "yes" \
+ -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_empty
+ attempt_connect "$ktype plain key plaintext revocation" "no" \
+ -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_plain
+ attempt_connect "$ktype cert plaintext revocation" "no" \
+ -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_cert
+ attempt_connect "$ktype CA plaintext revocation" "no" \
+ -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_ca
+ done
+done
+
+# Revoked certificates with key present
+kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
+for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
+ test -f "$OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub" || fatal "no pubkey"
+ kh_revoke cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub >> $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
+done
+cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+for privsep in yes no ; do
+ for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
+ verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} revoked cert privsep $privsep"
+ (
+ cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+ echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
+ echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
+ echo UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep
+ ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+ cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+ ${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+ -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+ fi
+ done
+done
+
+# Revoked CA
+kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
+kh_revoke host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub >> $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
+cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
+ verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} revoked cert"
+ (
+ cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+ echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
+ echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
+ ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+ ${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+ -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+ fi
+done
+
+# Create a CA key and add it to known hosts
+kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
+cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+
+test_one() {
+ ident=$1
+ result=$2
+ sign_opts=$3
+
+ for kt in rsa ed25519 ; do
+ case $ktype in
+ rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $ktype"; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key2" ;;
+ *) tflag=""; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key" ;;
+ esac
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $ca $tflag -I "regress host key for $USER" \
+ $sign_opts $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} ||
+ fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${kt}"
+ (
+ cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+ echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}
+ echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}-cert.pub
+ ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+ cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+ ${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+ -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ rc=$?
+ if [ "x$result" = "xsuccess" ] ; then
+ if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect $ident failed unexpectedly"
+ fi
+ else
+ if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
+ fi
+ fi
+ done
+}
+
+test_one "user-certificate" failure "-n $HOSTS"
+test_one "empty principals" success "-h"
+test_one "wrong principals" failure "-h -n foo"
+test_one "cert not yet valid" failure "-h -V20200101:20300101"
+test_one "cert expired" failure "-h -V19800101:19900101"
+test_one "cert valid interval" success "-h -V-1w:+2w"
+test_one "cert has constraints" failure "-h -Oforce-command=false"
+
+# Check downgrade of cert to raw key when no CA found
+for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
+ rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert $OBJ/cert_host_key*
+ verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} ${v} cert downgrade to raw key"
+ # Generate and sign a host key
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || \
+ fail "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${ktype} failed"
+ case $ktype in
+ rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $ktype"; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key2" ;;
+ *) tflag=""; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key" ;;
+ esac
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -h -q $tflag -s $ca $tflag \
+ -I "regress host key for $USER" \
+ -n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} ||
+ fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}"
+ (
+ printf "$HOSTS "
+ cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub
+ ) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+ (
+ cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+ echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
+ echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
+ ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+ ${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+ -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+ fi
+done
+
+# Wrong certificate
+kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
+cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+for kt in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
+ verbose "$tid: host ${kt} connect wrong cert"
+ rm -f $OBJ/cert_host_key*
+ # Self-sign key
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${kt} -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} || \
+ fail "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${kt} failed"
+ case $kt in
+ rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $kt" ;;
+ *) tflag="" ;;
+ esac
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} $tflag -h -q -s $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} \
+ -I "regress host key for $USER" \
+ -n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} ||
+ fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${kt}"
+ (
+ cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+ echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}
+ echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}-cert.pub
+ ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+ cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+ ${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+ -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -q somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
+ fi
+done
+
+rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert* $OBJ/host_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_host_key*
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/cert-userkey.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,358 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: cert-userkey.sh,v 1.12 2013/12/06 13:52:46 markus Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="certified user keys"
-
-rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key*
-cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
-
-PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
-
-type_has_legacy() {
- case $1 in
- ed25519*|ecdsa*) return 1 ;;
- esac
- return 0
-}
-
-# Create a CA key
-${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\
- fail "ssh-keygen of user_ca_key failed"
-
-# Generate and sign user keys
-for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
- verbose "$tid: sign user ${ktype} cert"
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} \
- -f $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} || \
- fail "ssh-keygen of cert_user_key_${ktype} failed"
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \
- -z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} ||
- fail "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
- type_has_legacy $ktype || continue
- cp $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}_v00
- cp $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}_v00.pub
- verbose "$tid: sign host ${ktype}_v00 cert"
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -t v00 -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I \
- "regress user key for $USER" \
- -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}_v00 ||
- fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}_v00"
-done
-
-# Test explicitly-specified principals
-for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES rsa_v00 dsa_v00 ; do
- for privsep in yes no ; do
- _prefix="${ktype} privsep $privsep"
-
- # Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
- rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
- (
- cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
- echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
- echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile " \
- "$OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
- echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
- ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
- # Missing authorized_principals
- verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} missing authorized_principals"
- rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
- ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
- fi
-
- # Empty authorized_principals
- verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals"
- echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
- ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
- fi
-
- # Wrong authorized_principals
- verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals"
- echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
- ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
- fi
-
- # Correct authorized_principals
- verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals"
- echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
- ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect failed"
- fi
-
- # authorized_principals with bad key option
- verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt"
- echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
- ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
- fi
-
- # authorized_principals with command=false
- verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false"
- echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \
- $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
- ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
- fi
-
-
- # authorized_principals with command=true
- verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true"
- echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \
- $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
- ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect failed"
- fi
-
- # Setup for principals= key option
- rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
- (
- cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
- echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
- ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
- # Wrong principals list
- verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong principals key option"
- (
- printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" '
- cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
- ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
- ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
- fi
-
- # Correct principals list
- verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct principals key option"
- (
- printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" '
- cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
- ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
- ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect failed"
- fi
- done
-done
-
-basic_tests() {
- auth=$1
- if test "x$auth" = "xauthorized_keys" ; then
- # Add CA to authorized_keys
- (
- printf 'cert-authority '
- cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
- ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
- else
- echo > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
- extra_sshd="TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
- fi
-
- for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES rsa_v00 dsa_v00 ; do
- for privsep in yes no ; do
- _prefix="${ktype} privsep $privsep $auth"
- # Simple connect
- verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} connect"
- (
- cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
- echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
- echo "$extra_sshd"
- ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
- ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect failed"
- fi
-
- # Revoked keys
- verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} revoked key"
- (
- cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
- echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
- echo "RevokedKeys $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked"
- echo "$extra_sshd"
- ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
- cp $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub \
- $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked
- ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly"
- fi
- verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} revoked via KRL"
- rm $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -kqf $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked \
- $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub
- ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly"
- fi
- verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty KRL"
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -kqf $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked
- ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect failed"
- fi
- done
-
- # Revoked CA
- verbose "$tid: ${ktype} $auth revoked CA key"
- (
- cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
- echo "RevokedKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
- echo "$extra_sshd"
- ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
- ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
- somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly"
- fi
- done
-
- verbose "$tid: $auth CA does not authenticate"
- (
- cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
- echo "$extra_sshd"
- ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
- verbose "$tid: ensure CA key does not authenticate user"
- ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/user_ca_key \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect with CA key succeeded unexpectedly"
- fi
-}
-
-basic_tests authorized_keys
-basic_tests TrustedUserCAKeys
-
-test_one() {
- ident=$1
- result=$2
- sign_opts=$3
- auth_choice=$4
- auth_opt=$5
-
- if test "x$auth_choice" = "x" ; then
- auth_choice="authorized_keys TrustedUserCAKeys"
- fi
-
- for auth in $auth_choice ; do
- for ktype in rsa rsa_v00 ; do
- case $ktype in
- *_v00) keyv="-t v00" ;;
- *) keyv="" ;;
- esac
-
- cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
- if test "x$auth" = "xauthorized_keys" ; then
- # Add CA to authorized_keys
- (
- printf "cert-authority${auth_opt} "
- cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
- ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
- else
- echo > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
- echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" \
- >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
- if test "x$auth_opt" != "x" ; then
- echo $auth_opt >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
- fi
- fi
-
- verbose "$tid: $ident auth $auth expect $result $ktype"
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key \
- -I "regress user key for $USER" \
- $sign_opts $keyv \
- $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} ||
- fail "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
-
- ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
- rc=$?
- if [ "x$result" = "xsuccess" ] ; then
- if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "$ident failed unexpectedly"
- fi
- else
- if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then
- fail "$ident succeeded unexpectedly"
- fi
- fi
- done
- done
-}
-
-test_one "correct principal" success "-n ${USER}"
-test_one "host-certificate" failure "-n ${USER} -h"
-test_one "wrong principals" failure "-n foo"
-test_one "cert not yet valid" failure "-n ${USER} -V20200101:20300101"
-test_one "cert expired" failure "-n ${USER} -V19800101:19900101"
-test_one "cert valid interval" success "-n ${USER} -V-1w:+2w"
-test_one "wrong source-address" failure "-n ${USER} -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8"
-test_one "force-command" failure "-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=false"
-
-# Behaviour is different here: TrustedUserCAKeys doesn't allow empty principals
-test_one "empty principals" success "" authorized_keys
-test_one "empty principals" failure "" TrustedUserCAKeys
-
-# Check explicitly-specified principals: an empty principals list in the cert
-# should always be refused.
-
-# AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
-rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
-test_one "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile principals" success "-n mekmitasdigoat" \
- TrustedUserCAKeys "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
-test_one "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile no principals" failure "" \
- TrustedUserCAKeys "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
-
-# principals= key option
-rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
-test_one "principals key option principals" success "-n mekmitasdigoat" \
- authorized_keys ',principals="mekmitasdigoat"'
-test_one "principals key option no principals" failure "" \
- authorized_keys ',principals="mekmitasdigoat"'
-
-# Wrong certificate
-cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES rsa_v00 dsa_v00 ; do
- case $ktype in
- *_v00) args="-t v00" ;;
- *) args="" ;;
- esac
- # Self-sign
- ${SSHKEYGEN} $args -q -s $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -I \
- "regress user key for $USER" \
- -n $USER $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} ||
- fail "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
- verbose "$tid: user ${ktype} connect wrong cert"
- ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
- somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
- if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
- fi
-done
-
-rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key*
-rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/cert-userkey.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,376 @@
+# $OpenBSD: cert-userkey.sh,v 1.16 2016/05/03 12:15:49 dtucker Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="certified user keys"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key*
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+
+PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
+
+if echo "$PLAIN_TYPES" | grep '^rsa$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+ PLAIN_TYPES="$PLAIN_TYPES rsa-sha2-256 rsa-sha2-512"
+fi
+
+kname() {
+ case $ktype in
+ rsa-sha2-*) ;;
+ # subshell because some seds will add a newline
+ *) n=$(echo $1 | sed 's/^dsa/ssh-dss/;s/^rsa/ssh-rsa/;s/^ed/ssh-ed/') ;;
+ esac
+ echo "$n*,ssh-rsa*,ssh-ed25519*"
+}
+
+# Create a CA key
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\
+ fail "ssh-keygen of user_ca_key failed"
+
+# Generate and sign user keys
+for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES $EXTRA_TYPES ; do
+ verbose "$tid: sign user ${ktype} cert"
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} \
+ -f $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} || \
+ fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_user_key_${ktype} failed"
+ # Generate RSA/SHA2 certs for rsa-sha2* keys.
+ case $ktype in
+ rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $ktype" ;;
+ *) tflag="" ;;
+ esac
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -z $$ \
+ -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $tflag $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} || \
+ fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
+done
+
+# Test explicitly-specified principals
+for ktype in $EXTRA_TYPES $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
+ t=$(kname $ktype)
+ for privsep in yes no ; do
+ _prefix="${ktype} privsep $privsep"
+
+ # Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+ rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ (
+ cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+ echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
+ echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile " \
+ "$OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
+ echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+ ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ (
+ cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+ ) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+ # Missing authorized_principals
+ verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} missing authorized_principals"
+ rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+ fi
+
+ # Empty authorized_principals
+ verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals"
+ echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+ fi
+
+ # Wrong authorized_principals
+ verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals"
+ echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+ fi
+
+ # Correct authorized_principals
+ verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals"
+ echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+ fi
+
+ # authorized_principals with bad key option
+ verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt"
+ echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+ fi
+
+ # authorized_principals with command=false
+ verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false"
+ echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \
+ $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+ fi
+
+
+ # authorized_principals with command=true
+ verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true"
+ echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \
+ $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+ fi
+
+ # Setup for principals= key option
+ rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+ (
+ cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+ echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+ ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ (
+ cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+ ) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+ # Wrong principals list
+ verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong principals key option"
+ (
+ printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" '
+ cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+ ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+ fi
+
+ # Correct principals list
+ verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct principals key option"
+ (
+ printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" '
+ cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+ ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+ fi
+ done
+done
+
+basic_tests() {
+ auth=$1
+ if test "x$auth" = "xauthorized_keys" ; then
+ # Add CA to authorized_keys
+ (
+ printf 'cert-authority '
+ cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+ ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ else
+ echo > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ extra_sshd="TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
+ fi
+
+ for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
+ t=$(kname $ktype)
+ for privsep in yes no ; do
+ _prefix="${ktype} privsep $privsep $auth"
+ # Simple connect
+ verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} connect"
+ (
+ cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+ echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+ echo "$extra_sshd"
+ ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ (
+ cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+ ) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+ fi
+
+ # Revoked keys
+ verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} revoked key"
+ (
+ cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+ echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
+ echo "RevokedKeys $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked"
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+ echo "$extra_sshd"
+ ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ cp $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub \
+ $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly"
+ fi
+ verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} revoked via KRL"
+ rm $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -kqf $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked \
+ $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly"
+ fi
+ verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty KRL"
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -kqf $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+ fi
+ done
+
+ # Revoked CA
+ verbose "$tid: ${ktype} $auth revoked CA key"
+ (
+ cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+ echo "RevokedKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+ echo "$extra_sshd"
+ ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
+ somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly"
+ fi
+ done
+
+ verbose "$tid: $auth CA does not authenticate"
+ (
+ cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+ echo "$extra_sshd"
+ ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ verbose "$tid: ensure CA key does not authenticate user"
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/user_ca_key \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect with CA key succeeded unexpectedly"
+ fi
+}
+
+basic_tests authorized_keys
+basic_tests TrustedUserCAKeys
+
+test_one() {
+ ident=$1
+ result=$2
+ sign_opts=$3
+ auth_choice=$4
+ auth_opt=$5
+
+ if test "x$auth_choice" = "x" ; then
+ auth_choice="authorized_keys TrustedUserCAKeys"
+ fi
+
+ for auth in $auth_choice ; do
+ for ktype in rsa ed25519 ; do
+ cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ if test "x$auth" = "xauthorized_keys" ; then
+ # Add CA to authorized_keys
+ (
+ printf "cert-authority${auth_opt} "
+ cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+ ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ else
+ echo > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" \
+ >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}*" \
+ >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ if test "x$auth_opt" != "x" ; then
+ echo $auth_opt >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ fi
+ fi
+
+ verbose "$tid: $ident auth $auth expect $result $ktype"
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key \
+ -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+ $sign_opts $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} ||
+ fail "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
+
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ rc=$?
+ if [ "x$result" = "xsuccess" ] ; then
+ if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "$ident failed unexpectedly"
+ fi
+ else
+ if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "$ident succeeded unexpectedly"
+ fi
+ fi
+ done
+ done
+}
+
+test_one "correct principal" success "-n ${USER}"
+test_one "host-certificate" failure "-n ${USER} -h"
+test_one "wrong principals" failure "-n foo"
+test_one "cert not yet valid" failure "-n ${USER} -V20200101:20300101"
+test_one "cert expired" failure "-n ${USER} -V19800101:19900101"
+test_one "cert valid interval" success "-n ${USER} -V-1w:+2w"
+test_one "wrong source-address" failure "-n ${USER} -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8"
+test_one "force-command" failure "-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=false"
+
+# Behaviour is different here: TrustedUserCAKeys doesn't allow empty principals
+test_one "empty principals" success "" authorized_keys
+test_one "empty principals" failure "" TrustedUserCAKeys
+
+# Check explicitly-specified principals: an empty principals list in the cert
+# should always be refused.
+
+# AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+test_one "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile principals" success "-n mekmitasdigoat" \
+ TrustedUserCAKeys "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
+test_one "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile no principals" failure "" \
+ TrustedUserCAKeys "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
+
+# principals= key option
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+test_one "principals key option principals" success "-n mekmitasdigoat" \
+ authorized_keys ',principals="mekmitasdigoat"'
+test_one "principals key option no principals" failure "" \
+ authorized_keys ',principals="mekmitasdigoat"'
+
+# Wrong certificate
+cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
+ t=$(kname $ktype)
+ # Self-sign
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -I \
+ "regress user key for $USER" \
+ -n $USER $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} ||
+ fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
+ verbose "$tid: user ${ktype} connect wrong cert"
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
+ somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
+ fi
+done
+
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key*
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cfginclude.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/cfginclude.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cfginclude.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cfginclude.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+# $OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.2 2016/05/03 15:30:46 dtucker Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="config include"
+
+# to appease StrictModes
+umask 022
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF
+Match host a
+ Hostname aa
+
+Match host b
+ Hostname bb
+ Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+
+Match host c
+ Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+ Hostname cc
+
+Match host m
+ Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+
+Host d
+ Hostname dd
+
+Host e
+ Hostname ee
+ Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+
+Host f
+ Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+ Hostname ff
+
+Host n
+ Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.0 << _EOF
+Match host xxxxxx
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.1 << _EOF
+Match host a
+ Hostname aaa
+
+Match host b
+ Hostname bbb
+
+Match host c
+ Hostname ccc
+
+Host d
+ Hostname ddd
+
+Host e
+ Hostname eee
+
+Host f
+ Hostname fff
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.2 << _EOF
+Match host a
+ Hostname aaaa
+
+Match host b
+ Hostname bbbb
+
+Match host c
+ Hostname cccc
+
+Host d
+ Hostname dddd
+
+Host e
+ Hostname eeee
+
+Host f
+ Hostname ffff
+
+Match all
+ Hostname xxxx
+_EOF
+
+trial() {
+ _host="$1"
+ _exp="$2"
+ ${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G "$_host" > $OBJ/ssh_config.out ||
+ fatal "ssh config parse failed"
+ _got=`grep -i '^hostname ' $OBJ/ssh_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
+ if test "x$_exp" != "x$_got" ; then
+ fail "host $_host include fail: expected $_exp got $_got"
+ fi
+}
+
+trial a aa
+trial b bb
+trial c ccc
+trial d dd
+trial e ee
+trial f fff
+trial m xxxx
+trial n xxxx
+trial x x
+
+# Prepare an included config with an error.
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.3 << _EOF
+Hostname xxxx
+ Junk
+_EOF
+
+${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G a 2>/dev/null && \
+ fail "ssh include allowed invalid config"
+
+${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G x 2>/dev/null && \
+ fail "ssh include allowed invalid config"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+
+# Ensure that a missing include is not fatal.
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF
+Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+Hostname aa
+_EOF
+
+trial a aa
+
+# Ensure that Match/Host in an included config does not affect parent.
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.x << _EOF
+Match host x
+_EOF
+
+trial a aa
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.x << _EOF
+Host x
+_EOF
+
+trial a aa
+
+# cleanup
+rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* $OBJ/ssh_config.out
+# $OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.2 2016/05/03 15:30:46 dtucker Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="config include"
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF
+Match host a
+ Hostname aa
+
+Match host b
+ Hostname bb
+ Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+
+Match host c
+ Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+ Hostname cc
+
+Match host m
+ Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+
+Host d
+ Hostname dd
+
+Host e
+ Hostname ee
+ Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+
+Host f
+ Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+ Hostname ff
+
+Host n
+ Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.0 << _EOF
+Match host xxxxxx
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.1 << _EOF
+Match host a
+ Hostname aaa
+
+Match host b
+ Hostname bbb
+
+Match host c
+ Hostname ccc
+
+Host d
+ Hostname ddd
+
+Host e
+ Hostname eee
+
+Host f
+ Hostname fff
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.2 << _EOF
+Match host a
+ Hostname aaaa
+
+Match host b
+ Hostname bbbb
+
+Match host c
+ Hostname cccc
+
+Host d
+ Hostname dddd
+
+Host e
+ Hostname eeee
+
+Host f
+ Hostname ffff
+
+Match all
+ Hostname xxxx
+_EOF
+
+trial() {
+ _host="$1"
+ _exp="$2"
+ ${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G "$_host" > $OBJ/ssh_config.out ||
+ fatal "ssh config parse failed"
+ _got=`grep -i '^hostname ' $OBJ/ssh_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
+ if test "x$_exp" != "x$_got" ; then
+ fail "host $_host include fail: expected $_exp got $_got"
+ fi
+}
+
+trial a aa
+trial b bb
+trial c ccc
+trial d dd
+trial e ee
+trial f fff
+trial m xxxx
+trial n xxxx
+trial x x
+
+# Prepare an included config with an error.
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.3 << _EOF
+Hostname xxxx
+ Junk
+_EOF
+
+${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G a 2>/dev/null && \
+ fail "ssh include allowed invalid config"
+
+${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G x 2>/dev/null && \
+ fail "ssh include allowed invalid config"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+
+# Ensure that a missing include is not fatal.
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF
+Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+Hostname aa
+_EOF
+
+trial a aa
+
+# Ensure that Match/Host in an included config does not affect parent.
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.x << _EOF
+Match host x
+_EOF
+
+trial a aa
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.x << _EOF
+Host x
+_EOF
+
+trial a aa
+
+# Ensure that recursive includes are bounded.
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF
+Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i
+_EOF
+
+${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G a 2>/dev/null && \
+ fail "ssh include allowed infinite recursion?" # or hang...
+
+# cleanup
+rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* $OBJ/ssh_config.out
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cfgmatch.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/cfgmatch.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cfgmatch.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: cfgmatch.sh,v 1.8 2013/05/17 00:37:40 dtucker Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="sshd_config match"
-
-pidfile=$OBJ/remote_pid
-fwdport=3301
-fwd="-L $fwdport:127.0.0.1:$PORT"
-
-echo "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
-echo "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
-
-start_client()
-{
- rm -f $pidfile
- ${SSH} -q -$p $fwd "$@" somehost \
- exec sh -c \'"echo \$\$ > $pidfile; exec sleep 100"\' \
- >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 &
- client_pid=$!
- # Wait for remote end
- n=0
- while test ! -f $pidfile ; do
- sleep 1
- n=`expr $n + 1`
- if test $n -gt 60; then
- kill $client_pid
- fatal "timeout waiting for background ssh"
- fi
- done
-}
-
-stop_client()
-{
- pid=`cat $pidfile`
- if [ ! -z "$pid" ]; then
- kill $pid
- fi
- wait
-}
-
-cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
-echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
-echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
-echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
-
-grep -v AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-echo "AuthorizedKeysFile /dev/null" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
-echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
-echo "Match user $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
-echo "AuthorizedKeysFile /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_%u" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
-echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
-echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
-start_sshd
-
-#set -x
-
-# Test Match + PermitOpen in sshd_config. This should be permitted
-for p in 1 2; do
- trace "match permitopen localhost proto $p"
- start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_config
- ${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
- fail "match permitopen permit proto $p"
- stop_client
-done
-
-# Same but from different source. This should not be permitted
-for p in 1 2; do
- trace "match permitopen proxy proto $p"
- start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
- ${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \
- fail "match permitopen deny proto $p"
- stop_client
-done
-
-# Retry previous with key option, should also be denied.
-printf 'permitopen="127.0.0.1:'$PORT'" ' >$OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-cat $OBJ/rsa.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-printf 'permitopen="127.0.0.1:'$PORT'" ' >>$OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-cat $OBJ/rsa1.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-for p in 1 2; do
- trace "match permitopen proxy w/key opts proto $p"
- start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
- ${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \
- fail "match permitopen deny w/key opt proto $p"
- stop_client
-done
-
-# Test both sshd_config and key options permitting the same dst/port pair.
-# Should be permitted.
-for p in 1 2; do
- trace "match permitopen localhost proto $p"
- start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_config
- ${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
- fail "match permitopen permit proto $p"
- stop_client
-done
-
-cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:$PORT 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
-echo "Match User $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
-echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
-# Test that a Match overrides a PermitOpen in the global section
-for p in 1 2; do
- trace "match permitopen proxy w/key opts proto $p"
- start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
- ${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \
- fail "match override permitopen proto $p"
- stop_client
-done
-
-cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:$PORT 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
-echo "Match User NoSuchUser" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
-echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
-# Test that a rule that doesn't match doesn't override, plus test a
-# PermitOpen entry that's not at the start of the list
-for p in 1 2; do
- trace "nomatch permitopen proxy w/key opts proto $p"
- start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
- ${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
- fail "nomatch override permitopen proto $p"
- stop_client
-done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cfgmatch.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/cfgmatch.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cfgmatch.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cfgmatch.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+# $OpenBSD: cfgmatch.sh,v 1.9 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sshd_config match"
+
+pidfile=$OBJ/remote_pid
+fwdport=3301
+fwd="-L $fwdport:127.0.0.1:$PORT"
+
+echo "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
+echo "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+start_client()
+{
+ rm -f $pidfile
+ ${SSH} -q -$p $fwd "$@" somehost \
+ exec sh -c \'"echo \$\$ > $pidfile; exec sleep 100"\' \
+ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 &
+ client_pid=$!
+ # Wait for remote end
+ n=0
+ while test ! -f $pidfile ; do
+ sleep 1
+ n=`expr $n + 1`
+ if test $n -gt 60; then
+ kill $client_pid
+ fatal "timeout waiting for background ssh"
+ fi
+ done
+}
+
+stop_client()
+{
+ pid=`cat $pidfile`
+ if [ ! -z "$pid" ]; then
+ kill $pid
+ fi
+ wait
+}
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
+echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
+
+grep -v AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "AuthorizedKeysFile /dev/null" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match user $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "AuthorizedKeysFile /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_%u" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+start_sshd
+
+#set -x
+
+# Test Match + PermitOpen in sshd_config. This should be permitted
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ trace "match permitopen localhost proto $p"
+ start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_config
+ ${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
+ fail "match permitopen permit proto $p"
+ stop_client
+done
+
+# Same but from different source. This should not be permitted
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ trace "match permitopen proxy proto $p"
+ start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+ ${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \
+ fail "match permitopen deny proto $p"
+ stop_client
+done
+
+# Retry previous with key option, should also be denied.
+cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+ printf 'permitopen="127.0.0.1:'$PORT'" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+done
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ trace "match permitopen proxy w/key opts proto $p"
+ start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+ ${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \
+ fail "match permitopen deny w/key opt proto $p"
+ stop_client
+done
+
+# Test both sshd_config and key options permitting the same dst/port pair.
+# Should be permitted.
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ trace "match permitopen localhost proto $p"
+ start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_config
+ ${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
+ fail "match permitopen permit proto $p"
+ stop_client
+done
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:$PORT 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match User $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+# Test that a Match overrides a PermitOpen in the global section
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ trace "match permitopen proxy w/key opts proto $p"
+ start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+ ${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \
+ fail "match override permitopen proto $p"
+ stop_client
+done
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:$PORT 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match User NoSuchUser" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+# Test that a rule that doesn't match doesn't override, plus test a
+# PermitOpen entry that's not at the start of the list
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ trace "nomatch permitopen proxy w/key opts proto $p"
+ start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+ ${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
+ fail "nomatch override permitopen proto $p"
+ stop_client
+done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cfgparse.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/cfgparse.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cfgparse.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cfgparse.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# $OpenBSD: cfgparse.sh,v 1.6 2016/06/03 03:47:59 dtucker Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sshd config parse"
+
+# This is a reasonable proxy for IPv6 support.
+if ! config_defined HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR ; then
+ SKIP_IPV6=yes
+fi
+
+# We need to use the keys generated for the regression test because sshd -T
+# will fail if we're not running with SUDO (no permissions for real keys) or
+# if we are # running tests on a system that has never had sshd installed
+# (keys won't exist).
+
+grep "HostKey " $OBJ/sshd_config > $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal
+SSHD_KEYS="`cat $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal`"
+
+verbose "reparse minimal config"
+($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal >$OBJ/sshd_config.1 &&
+ $SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 &&
+ diff $OBJ/sshd_config.1 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || fail "reparse minimal config"
+
+verbose "reparse regress config"
+($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config >$OBJ/sshd_config.1 &&
+ $SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 &&
+ diff $OBJ/sshd_config.1 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || fail "reparse regress config"
+
+verbose "listenaddress order"
+# expected output
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.0 <<EOD
+listenaddress 1.2.3.4:1234
+listenaddress 1.2.3.4:5678
+EOD
+[ X${SKIP_IPV6} = Xyes ] || cat >> $OBJ/sshd_config.0 <<EOD
+listenaddress [::1]:1234
+listenaddress [::1]:5678
+EOD
+
+# test input sets. should all result in the output above.
+# test 1: addressfamily and port first
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <<EOD
+${SSHD_KEYS}
+addressfamily any
+port 1234
+port 5678
+listenaddress 1.2.3.4
+EOD
+[ X${SKIP_IPV6} = Xyes ] || cat >> $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <<EOD
+listenaddress ::1
+EOD
+
+($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 | \
+ grep 'listenaddress ' >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 &&
+ diff $OBJ/sshd_config.0 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || \
+ fail "listenaddress order 1"
+# test 2: listenaddress first
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <<EOD
+${SSHD_KEYS}
+listenaddress 1.2.3.4
+port 1234
+port 5678
+addressfamily any
+EOD
+[ X${SKIP_IPV6} = Xyes ] || cat >> $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <<EOD
+listenaddress ::1
+EOD
+
+($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 | \
+ grep 'listenaddress ' >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 &&
+ diff $OBJ/sshd_config.0 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || \
+ fail "listenaddress order 2"
+
+# cleanup
+rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.[012]
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/check-perm.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/check-perm.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/check-perm.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/check-perm.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+/*
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: modpipe.c,v 1.6 2013/11/21 03:16:47 djm Exp $ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
+#include <libgen.h>
+#endif
+
+static void
+fatal(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
+ fputc('\n', stderr);
+ va_end(args);
+ exit(1);
+}
+/* Based on session.c. NB. keep tests in sync */
+static void
+safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
+{
+ const char *cp;
+ char component[PATH_MAX];
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (*path != '/')
+ fatal("chroot path does not begin at root");
+ if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component))
+ fatal("chroot path too long");
+
+ /*
+ * Descend the path, checking that each component is a
+ * root-owned directory with strict permissions.
+ */
+ for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) {
+ if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL)
+ strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component));
+ else {
+ cp++;
+ memcpy(component, path, cp - path);
+ component[cp - path] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ /* debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component); */
+
+ if (stat(component, &st) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
+ component, strerror(errno));
+ if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)
+ fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot "
+ "directory %s\"%s\"",
+ cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
+ if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
+ fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory",
+ cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
+
+ }
+
+ if (chdir(path) == -1)
+ fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": "
+ "%s", path, strerror(errno));
+}
+
+/* from platform.c */
+int
+platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid)
+{
+ if (uid == 0)
+ return 1;
+#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
+ if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID)
+ return 1;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* from auth.c */
+int
+auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
+ uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
+{
+ char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX];
+ char *cp;
+ int comparehome = 0;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
+ snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
+ comparehome = 1;
+
+ if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
+ snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
+ (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+ snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
+ buf);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
+ for (;;) {
+ if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
+ snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
+
+ if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
+ (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
+ (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+ snprintf(err, errlen,
+ "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
+ if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
+ * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
+ */
+ if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
+ break;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "check-perm -m [chroot | keys-command] [path]\n");
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ const char *path = ".";
+ char errmsg[256];
+ int ch, mode = -1;
+ extern char *optarg;
+ extern int optind;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hm:")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'm':
+ if (strcasecmp(optarg, "chroot") == 0)
+ mode = 1;
+ else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "keys-command") == 0)
+ mode = 2;
+ else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid -m option\n"),
+ usage();
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ usage();
+ }
+ }
+ argc -= optind;
+ argv += optind;
+
+ if (argc > 1)
+ usage();
+ else if (argc == 1)
+ path = argv[0];
+
+ if (mode == 1)
+ safely_chroot(path, getuid());
+ else if (mode == 2) {
+ if (stat(path, &st) < 0)
+ fatal("Could not stat %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+ if (auth_secure_path(path, &st, NULL, 0,
+ errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0)
+ fatal("Unsafe %s: %s", path, errmsg);
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mode\n");
+ usage();
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cipher-speed.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/cipher-speed.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cipher-speed.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: cipher-speed.sh,v 1.11 2013/11/21 03:18:51 djm Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="cipher speed"
-
-getbytes ()
-{
- sed -n -e '/transferred/s/.*secs (\(.* bytes.sec\).*/\1/p' \
- -e '/copied/s/.*s, \(.* MB.s\).*/\1/p'
-}
-
-tries="1 2"
-
-for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do n=0; for m in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do
- trace "proto 2 cipher $c mac $m"
- for x in $tries; do
- printf "%-60s" "$c/$m:"
- ( ${SSH} -o 'compression no' \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -2 -m $m -c $c somehost \
- exec sh -c \'"dd of=/dev/null obs=32k"\' \
- < ${DATA} ) 2>&1 | getbytes
-
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh -2 failed with mac $m cipher $c"
- fi
- done
- # No point trying all MACs for AEAD ciphers since they are ignored.
- if ssh -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
- break
- fi
- n=`expr $n + 1`
-done; done
-
-ciphers="3des blowfish"
-for c in $ciphers; do
- trace "proto 1 cipher $c"
- for x in $tries; do
- printf "%-60s" "$c:"
- ( ${SSH} -o 'compression no' \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -1 -c $c somehost \
- exec sh -c \'"dd of=/dev/null obs=32k"\' \
- < ${DATA} ) 2>&1 | getbytes
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh -1 failed with cipher $c"
- fi
- done
-done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cipher-speed.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/cipher-speed.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cipher-speed.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/cipher-speed.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# $OpenBSD: cipher-speed.sh,v 1.13 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="cipher speed"
+
+getbytes ()
+{
+ sed -n -e '/transferred/s/.*secs (\(.* bytes.sec\).*/\1/p' \
+ -e '/copied/s/.*s, \(.* MB.s\).*/\1/p'
+}
+
+tries="1 2"
+
+for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do n=0; for m in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do
+ trace "proto 2 cipher $c mac $m"
+ for x in $tries; do
+ printf "%-60s" "$c/$m:"
+ ( ${SSH} -o 'compression no' \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -2 -m $m -c $c somehost \
+ exec sh -c \'"dd of=/dev/null obs=32k"\' \
+ < ${DATA} ) 2>&1 | getbytes
+
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh -2 failed with mac $m cipher $c"
+ fi
+ done
+ # No point trying all MACs for AEAD ciphers since they are ignored.
+ if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+ break
+ fi
+ n=`expr $n + 1`
+done; done
+
+if ssh_version 1; then
+ ciphers="3des blowfish"
+else
+ ciphers=""
+fi
+for c in $ciphers; do
+ trace "proto 1 cipher $c"
+ for x in $tries; do
+ printf "%-60s" "$c:"
+ ( ${SSH} -o 'compression no' \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -1 -c $c somehost \
+ exec sh -c \'"dd of=/dev/null obs=32k"\' \
+ < ${DATA} ) 2>&1 | getbytes
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh -1 failed with cipher $c"
+ fi
+ done
+done
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/connect-privsep.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/connect-privsep.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/connect-privsep.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: connect-privsep.sh,v 1.4 2012/07/02 14:37:06 dtucker Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="proxy connect with privsep"
-
-cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
-echo 'UsePrivilegeSeparation yes' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
-for p in 1 2; do
- ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh privsep+proxyconnect protocol $p failed"
- fi
-done
-
-cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-echo 'UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
-for p in 1 2; do
- ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- # XXX replace this with fail once sandbox has stabilised
- warn "ssh privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect protocol $p failed"
- fi
-done
-
-# Because sandbox is sensitive to changes in libc, especially malloc, retest
-# with every malloc.conf option (and none).
-for m in '' A F G H J P R S X Z '<' '>'; do
- for p in 1 2; do
- env MALLOC_OPTIONS="$m" ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect protocol $p mopt '$m' failed"
- fi
- done
-done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/connect-privsep.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/connect-privsep.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/connect-privsep.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/connect-privsep.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# $OpenBSD: connect-privsep.sh,v 1.6 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="proxy connect with privsep"
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+echo 'UsePrivilegeSeparation yes' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh privsep+proxyconnect protocol $p failed"
+ fi
+done
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo 'UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ # XXX replace this with fail once sandbox has stabilised
+ warn "ssh privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect protocol $p failed"
+ fi
+done
+
+# Because sandbox is sensitive to changes in libc, especially malloc, retest
+# with every malloc.conf option (and none).
+if [ -z "TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS" ]; then
+ mopts="A F G H J P R S X < >"
+else
+ mopts=`echo $TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS | sed 's/./& /g'`
+fi
+for m in '' $mopts ; do
+ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ env MALLOC_OPTIONS="$m" ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect protocol $p mopt '$m' failed"
+ fi
+ done
+done
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/connect.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/connect.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/connect.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: connect.sh,v 1.4 2002/03/15 13:08:56 markus Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="simple connect"
-
-start_sshd
-
-for p in 1 2; do
- ${SSH} -o "Protocol=$p" -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh connect with protocol $p failed"
- fi
-done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/connect.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/connect.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/connect.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/connect.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# $OpenBSD: connect.sh,v 1.5 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="simple connect"
+
+start_sshd
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ ${SSH} -o "Protocol=$p" -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh connect with protocol $p failed"
+ fi
+done
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/dhgex.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/dhgex.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/dhgex.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: dhgex.sh,v 1.1 2014/01/25 04:35:32 dtucker Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="dhgex"
-
-LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE}
-rm -f ${LOG}
-
-kexs=`${SSH} -Q kex | grep diffie-hellman-group-exchange`
-
-ssh_test_dhgex()
-{
- bits="$1"; shift
- cipher="$1"; shift
- kex="$1"; shift
-
- rm -f ${LOG}
- opts="-oKexAlgorithms=$kex -oCiphers=$cipher"
- groupsz="1024<$bits<8192"
- verbose "$tid bits $bits $kex $cipher"
- ${SSH} ${opts} $@ -vvv -F ${OBJ}/ssh_proxy somehost true
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh failed ($@)"
- fi
- # check what we request
- grep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST($groupsz) sent" ${LOG} >/dev/null
- if [ $? != 0 ]; then
- got=`egrep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(.*) sent" ${LOG}`
- fail "$tid unexpected GEX sizes, expected $groupsz, got $got"
- fi
- # check what we got (depends on contents of system moduli file)
- gotbits="`awk '/bits set:/{print $4}' ${LOG} | head -1 | cut -f2 -d/`"
- if [ "$gotbits" -lt "$bits" ]; then
- fatal "$tid expected $bits bit group, got $gotbits"
- fi
-}
-
-check()
-{
- bits="$1"; shift
-
- for c in $@; do
- for k in $kexs; do
- ssh_test_dhgex $bits $c $k
- done
- done
-}
-
-#check 2048 3des-cbc
-check 3072 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 128`
-check 3072 arcfour blowfish-cbc
-check 7680 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 192`
-check 8192 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 256`
-check 8192 rijndael-cbc at lysator.liu.se chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/dhgex.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/dhgex.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/dhgex.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/dhgex.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+# $OpenBSD: dhgex.sh,v 1.3 2015/10/23 02:22:01 dtucker Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="dhgex"
+
+LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE}
+rm -f ${LOG}
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+kexs=`${SSH} -Q kex | grep diffie-hellman-group-exchange`
+
+ssh_test_dhgex()
+{
+ bits="$1"; shift
+ cipher="$1"; shift
+ kex="$1"; shift
+
+ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ echo "KexAlgorithms=$kex" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ echo "Ciphers=$cipher" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ rm -f ${LOG}
+ opts="-oKexAlgorithms=$kex -oCiphers=$cipher"
+ min=2048
+ max=8192
+ groupsz="$min<$bits<$max"
+ verbose "$tid bits $bits $kex $cipher"
+ ${SSH} ${opts} $@ -vvv -F ${OBJ}/ssh_proxy somehost true
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh failed ($@)"
+ fi
+ # check what we request
+ grep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST($groupsz) sent" ${LOG} >/dev/null
+ if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+ got=`egrep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(.*) sent" ${LOG}`
+ fail "$tid unexpected GEX sizes, expected $groupsz, got $got"
+ fi
+ # check what we got (depends on contents of system moduli file)
+ gotbits="`awk '/bits set:/{print $4}' ${LOG} | head -1 | cut -f2 -d/`"
+ if [ "$gotbits" -lt "$bits" ]; then
+ fatal "$tid expected $bits bit group, got $gotbits"
+ fi
+}
+
+check()
+{
+ bits="$1"; shift
+
+ for c in $@; do
+ for k in $kexs; do
+ ssh_test_dhgex $bits $c $k
+ done
+ done
+}
+
+#check 2048 3des-cbc
+check 3072 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 128`
+check 3072 arcfour blowfish-cbc
+check 7680 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 192`
+check 8192 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 256`
+check 8192 rijndael-cbc at lysator.liu.se chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/dynamic-forward.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/dynamic-forward.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/dynamic-forward.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: dynamic-forward.sh,v 1.10 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="dynamic forwarding"
-
-FWDPORT=`expr $PORT + 1`
-
-if have_prog nc && nc -h 2>&1 | grep "proxy address" >/dev/null; then
- proxycmd="nc -x 127.0.0.1:$FWDPORT -X"
-elif have_prog connect; then
- proxycmd="connect -S 127.0.0.1:$FWDPORT -"
-else
- echo "skipped (no suitable ProxyCommand found)"
- exit 0
-fi
-trace "will use ProxyCommand $proxycmd"
-
-start_sshd
-
-for p in 1 2; do
- n=0
- error="1"
- trace "start dynamic forwarding, fork to background"
- while [ "$error" -ne 0 -a "$n" -lt 3 ]; do
- n=`expr $n + 1`
- ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f -D $FWDPORT -q \
- -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost exec sh -c \
- \'"echo \$\$ > $OBJ/remote_pid; exec sleep 444"\'
- error=$?
- if [ "$error" -ne 0 ]; then
- trace "forward failed proto $p attempt $n err $error"
- sleep $n
- fi
- done
- if [ "$error" -ne 0 ]; then
- fatal "failed to start dynamic forwarding proto $p"
- fi
-
- for s in 4 5; do
- for h in 127.0.0.1 localhost; do
- trace "testing ssh protocol $p socks version $s host $h"
- ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config \
- -o "ProxyCommand ${proxycmd}${s} $h $PORT" \
- somehost cat $DATA > $OBJ/ls.copy
- test -f $OBJ/ls.copy || fail "failed copy $DATA"
- cmp $DATA $OBJ/ls.copy || fail "corrupted copy of $DATA"
- done
- done
-
- if [ -f $OBJ/remote_pid ]; then
- remote=`cat $OBJ/remote_pid`
- trace "terminate remote shell, pid $remote"
- if [ $remote -gt 1 ]; then
- kill -HUP $remote
- fi
- else
- fail "no pid file: $OBJ/remote_pid"
- fi
-done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/dynamic-forward.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/dynamic-forward.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/dynamic-forward.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/dynamic-forward.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+# $OpenBSD: dynamic-forward.sh,v 1.11 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="dynamic forwarding"
+
+FWDPORT=`expr $PORT + 1`
+
+if have_prog nc && nc -h 2>&1 | grep "proxy address" >/dev/null; then
+ proxycmd="nc -x 127.0.0.1:$FWDPORT -X"
+elif have_prog connect; then
+ proxycmd="connect -S 127.0.0.1:$FWDPORT -"
+else
+ echo "skipped (no suitable ProxyCommand found)"
+ exit 0
+fi
+trace "will use ProxyCommand $proxycmd"
+
+start_sshd
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ n=0
+ error="1"
+ trace "start dynamic forwarding, fork to background"
+ while [ "$error" -ne 0 -a "$n" -lt 3 ]; do
+ n=`expr $n + 1`
+ ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f -D $FWDPORT -q \
+ -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost exec sh -c \
+ \'"echo \$\$ > $OBJ/remote_pid; exec sleep 444"\'
+ error=$?
+ if [ "$error" -ne 0 ]; then
+ trace "forward failed proto $p attempt $n err $error"
+ sleep $n
+ fi
+ done
+ if [ "$error" -ne 0 ]; then
+ fatal "failed to start dynamic forwarding proto $p"
+ fi
+
+ for s in 4 5; do
+ for h in 127.0.0.1 localhost; do
+ trace "testing ssh protocol $p socks version $s host $h"
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config \
+ -o "ProxyCommand ${proxycmd}${s} $h $PORT" \
+ somehost cat $DATA > $OBJ/ls.copy
+ test -f $OBJ/ls.copy || fail "failed copy $DATA"
+ cmp $DATA $OBJ/ls.copy || fail "corrupted copy of $DATA"
+ done
+ done
+
+ if [ -f $OBJ/remote_pid ]; then
+ remote=`cat $OBJ/remote_pid`
+ trace "terminate remote shell, pid $remote"
+ if [ $remote -gt 1 ]; then
+ kill -HUP $remote
+ fi
+ else
+ fail "no pid file: $OBJ/remote_pid"
+ fi
+done
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/exit-status.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/exit-status.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/exit-status.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: exit-status.sh,v 1.6 2002/03/15 13:08:56 markus Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="remote exit status"
-
-for p in 1 2; do
- for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do
- trace "proto $p status $s"
- verbose "test $tid: proto $p status $s"
- ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost exit $s
- r=$?
- if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
- fail "exit code mismatch for protocol $p: $r != $s"
- fi
-
- # same with early close of stdout/err
- ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -n otherhost \
- exec sh -c \'"sleep 2; exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 3; exit $s"\'
- r=$?
- if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
- fail "exit code (with sleep) mismatch for protocol $p: $r != $s"
- fi
- done
-done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/exit-status.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/exit-status.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/exit-status.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/exit-status.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# $OpenBSD: exit-status.sh,v 1.7 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="remote exit status"
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do
+ trace "proto $p status $s"
+ verbose "test $tid: proto $p status $s"
+ ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost exit $s
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
+ fail "exit code mismatch for protocol $p: $r != $s"
+ fi
+
+ # same with early close of stdout/err
+ ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -n otherhost \
+ exec sh -c \'"sleep 2; exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 3; exit $s"\'
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
+ fail "exit code (with sleep) mismatch for protocol $p: $r != $s"
+ fi
+ done
+done
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/forcecommand.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/forcecommand.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/forcecommand.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: forcecommand.sh,v 1.2 2013/05/17 00:37:40 dtucker Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="forced command"
-
-cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
-
-printf 'command="true" ' >$OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-cat $OBJ/rsa.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-printf 'command="true" ' >>$OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-cat $OBJ/rsa1.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-
-for p in 1 2; do
- trace "forced command in key option proto $p"
- ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false \ ||
- fail "forced command in key proto $p"
-done
-
-printf 'command="false" ' >$OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-cat $OBJ/rsa.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-printf 'command="false" ' >>$OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-cat $OBJ/rsa1.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-
-cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-echo "ForceCommand true" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
-for p in 1 2; do
- trace "forced command in sshd_config overrides key option proto $p"
- ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false \ ||
- fail "forced command in key proto $p"
-done
-
-cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-echo "ForceCommand false" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-echo "Match User $USER" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-echo " ForceCommand true" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
-for p in 1 2; do
- trace "forced command with match proto $p"
- ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false \ ||
- fail "forced command in key proto $p"
-done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/forcecommand.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/forcecommand.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/forcecommand.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/forcecommand.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# $OpenBSD: forcecommand.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="forced command"
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+ printf 'command="true" ' >>$OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+done
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ trace "forced command in key option proto $p"
+ ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false \ ||
+ fail "forced command in key proto $p"
+done
+
+cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+ printf 'command="false" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+done
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "ForceCommand true" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ trace "forced command in sshd_config overrides key option proto $p"
+ ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false \ ||
+ fail "forced command in key proto $p"
+done
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "ForceCommand false" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match User $USER" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo " ForceCommand true" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ trace "forced command with match proto $p"
+ ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false \ ||
+ fail "forced command in key proto $p"
+done
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/forward-control.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/forward-control.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/forward-control.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: forward-control.sh,v 1.2 2013/11/18 05:09:32 naddy Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="sshd control of local and remote forwarding"
-
-LFWD_PORT=3320
-RFWD_PORT=3321
-CTL=$OBJ/ctl-sock
-READY=$OBJ/ready
-
-wait_for_file_to_appear() {
- _path=$1
- _n=0
- while test ! -f $_path ; do
- test $_n -eq 1 && trace "waiting for $_path to appear"
- _n=`expr $_n + 1`
- test $_n -ge 20 && return 1
- sleep 1
- done
- return 0
-}
-
-wait_for_process_to_exit() {
- _pid=$1
- _n=0
- while kill -0 $_pid 2>/dev/null ; do
- test $_n -eq 1 && trace "waiting for $_pid to exit"
- _n=`expr $_n + 1`
- test $_n -ge 20 && return 1
- sleep 1
- done
- return 0
-}
-
-# usage: check_lfwd protocol Y|N message
-check_lfwd() {
- _proto=$1
- _expected=$2
- _message=$3
- rm -f $READY
- ${SSH} -oProtocol=$_proto -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
- -L$LFWD_PORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
- -o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes \
- -n host exec sh -c \'"sleep 60 & echo \$! > $READY ; wait "\' \
- >/dev/null 2>&1 &
- _sshpid=$!
- wait_for_file_to_appear $READY || \
- fatal "check_lfwd ssh fail: $_message"
- ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p $LFWD_PORT \
- -oConnectionAttempts=4 host true >/dev/null 2>&1
- _result=$?
- kill $_sshpid `cat $READY` 2>/dev/null
- wait_for_process_to_exit $_sshpid
- if test "x$_expected" = "xY" -a $_result -ne 0 ; then
- fail "check_lfwd failed (expecting success): $_message"
- elif test "x$_expected" = "xN" -a $_result -eq 0 ; then
- fail "check_lfwd succeeded (expecting failure): $_message"
- elif test "x$_expected" != "xY" -a "x$_expected" != "xN" ; then
- fatal "check_lfwd invalid argument \"$_expected\""
- else
- verbose "check_lfwd done (expecting $_expected): $_message"
- fi
-}
-
-# usage: check_rfwd protocol Y|N message
-check_rfwd() {
- _proto=$1
- _expected=$2
- _message=$3
- rm -f $READY
- ${SSH} -oProtocol=$_proto -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
- -R$RFWD_PORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
- -o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes \
- -n host exec sh -c \'"sleep 60 & echo \$! > $READY ; wait "\' \
- >/dev/null 2>&1 &
- _sshpid=$!
- wait_for_file_to_appear $READY
- _result=$?
- if test $_result -eq 0 ; then
- ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p $RFWD_PORT \
- -oConnectionAttempts=4 host true >/dev/null 2>&1
- _result=$?
- kill $_sshpid `cat $READY` 2>/dev/null
- wait_for_process_to_exit $_sshpid
- fi
- if test "x$_expected" = "xY" -a $_result -ne 0 ; then
- fail "check_rfwd failed (expecting success): $_message"
- elif test "x$_expected" = "xN" -a $_result -eq 0 ; then
- fail "check_rfwd succeeded (expecting failure): $_message"
- elif test "x$_expected" != "xY" -a "x$_expected" != "xN" ; then
- fatal "check_rfwd invalid argument \"$_expected\""
- else
- verbose "check_rfwd done (expecting $_expected): $_message"
- fi
-}
-
-start_sshd
-cp ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak
-cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak
-
-# Sanity check: ensure the default config allows forwarding
-for p in 1 2 ; do
- check_lfwd $p Y "proto $p, default configuration"
- check_rfwd $p Y "proto $p, default configuration"
-done
-
-# Usage: all_tests yes|local|remote|no Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N
-all_tests() {
- _tcpfwd=$1
- _plain_lfwd=$2
- _plain_rfwd=$3
- _nopermit_lfwd=$4
- _nopermit_rfwd=$5
- _permit_lfwd=$6
- _permit_rfwd=$7
- _badfwd=127.0.0.1:22
- _goodfwd=127.0.0.1:${PORT}
- for _proto in 1 2 ; do
- cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
- ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}
- _prefix="proto $_proto, AllowTcpForwarding=$_tcpfwd"
- # No PermitOpen
- ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
- echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
- > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
- check_lfwd $_proto $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix"
- check_rfwd $_proto $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix"
- # PermitOpen via sshd_config that doesn't match
- ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
- echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ;
- echo "PermitOpen $_badfwd" ) \
- > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
- check_lfwd $_proto $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !PermitOpen"
- check_rfwd $_proto $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !PermitOpen"
- # PermitOpen via sshd_config that does match
- ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
- echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ;
- echo "PermitOpen $_badfwd $_goodfwd" ) \
- > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
- # NB. permitopen via authorized_keys should have same
- # success/fail as via sshd_config
- # permitopen via authorized_keys that doesn't match
- sed "s/^/permitopen=\"$_badfwd\" /" \
- < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
- > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 1 fail"
- ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
- echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
- > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
- check_lfwd $_proto $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !permitopen"
- check_rfwd $_proto $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !permitopen"
- # permitopen via authorized_keys that does match
- sed "s/^/permitopen=\"$_badfwd\",permitopen=\"$_goodfwd\" /" \
- < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
- > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 2 fail"
- ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
- echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
- > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
- check_lfwd $_proto $_permit_lfwd "$_prefix, permitopen"
- check_rfwd $_proto $_permit_rfwd "$_prefix, permitopen"
- done
-}
-
-# no-permitopen mismatch-permitopen match-permitopen
-# AllowTcpForwarding local remote local remote local remote
-all_tests yes Y Y N Y Y Y
-all_tests local Y N N N Y N
-all_tests remote N Y N Y N Y
-all_tests no N N N N N N
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/forward-control.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/forward-control.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/forward-control.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/forward-control.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+# $OpenBSD: forward-control.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sshd control of local and remote forwarding"
+
+LFWD_PORT=3320
+RFWD_PORT=3321
+CTL=$OBJ/ctl-sock
+READY=$OBJ/ready
+
+wait_for_file_to_appear() {
+ _path=$1
+ _n=0
+ while test ! -f $_path ; do
+ test $_n -eq 1 && trace "waiting for $_path to appear"
+ _n=`expr $_n + 1`
+ test $_n -ge 20 && return 1
+ sleep 1
+ done
+ return 0
+}
+
+wait_for_process_to_exit() {
+ _pid=$1
+ _n=0
+ while kill -0 $_pid 2>/dev/null ; do
+ test $_n -eq 1 && trace "waiting for $_pid to exit"
+ _n=`expr $_n + 1`
+ test $_n -ge 20 && return 1
+ sleep 1
+ done
+ return 0
+}
+
+# usage: check_lfwd protocol Y|N message
+check_lfwd() {
+ _proto=$1
+ _expected=$2
+ _message=$3
+ rm -f $READY
+ ${SSH} -oProtocol=$_proto -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
+ -L$LFWD_PORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+ -o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes \
+ -n host exec sh -c \'"sleep 60 & echo \$! > $READY ; wait "\' \
+ >/dev/null 2>&1 &
+ _sshpid=$!
+ wait_for_file_to_appear $READY || \
+ fatal "check_lfwd ssh fail: $_message"
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p $LFWD_PORT \
+ -oConnectionAttempts=4 host true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ _result=$?
+ kill $_sshpid `cat $READY` 2>/dev/null
+ wait_for_process_to_exit $_sshpid
+ if test "x$_expected" = "xY" -a $_result -ne 0 ; then
+ fail "check_lfwd failed (expecting success): $_message"
+ elif test "x$_expected" = "xN" -a $_result -eq 0 ; then
+ fail "check_lfwd succeeded (expecting failure): $_message"
+ elif test "x$_expected" != "xY" -a "x$_expected" != "xN" ; then
+ fatal "check_lfwd invalid argument \"$_expected\""
+ else
+ verbose "check_lfwd done (expecting $_expected): $_message"
+ fi
+}
+
+# usage: check_rfwd protocol Y|N message
+check_rfwd() {
+ _proto=$1
+ _expected=$2
+ _message=$3
+ rm -f $READY
+ ${SSH} -oProtocol=$_proto -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
+ -R$RFWD_PORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+ -o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes \
+ -n host exec sh -c \'"sleep 60 & echo \$! > $READY ; wait "\' \
+ >/dev/null 2>&1 &
+ _sshpid=$!
+ wait_for_file_to_appear $READY
+ _result=$?
+ if test $_result -eq 0 ; then
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p $RFWD_PORT \
+ -oConnectionAttempts=4 host true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ _result=$?
+ kill $_sshpid `cat $READY` 2>/dev/null
+ wait_for_process_to_exit $_sshpid
+ fi
+ if test "x$_expected" = "xY" -a $_result -ne 0 ; then
+ fail "check_rfwd failed (expecting success): $_message"
+ elif test "x$_expected" = "xN" -a $_result -eq 0 ; then
+ fail "check_rfwd succeeded (expecting failure): $_message"
+ elif test "x$_expected" != "xY" -a "x$_expected" != "xN" ; then
+ fatal "check_rfwd invalid argument \"$_expected\""
+ else
+ verbose "check_rfwd done (expecting $_expected): $_message"
+ fi
+}
+
+start_sshd
+cp ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak
+cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak
+
+# Sanity check: ensure the default config allows forwarding
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS} ; do
+ check_lfwd $p Y "proto $p, default configuration"
+ check_rfwd $p Y "proto $p, default configuration"
+done
+
+# Usage: all_tests yes|local|remote|no Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N
+all_tests() {
+ _tcpfwd=$1
+ _plain_lfwd=$2
+ _plain_rfwd=$3
+ _nopermit_lfwd=$4
+ _nopermit_rfwd=$5
+ _permit_lfwd=$6
+ _permit_rfwd=$7
+ _badfwd=127.0.0.1:22
+ _goodfwd=127.0.0.1:${PORT}
+ for _proto in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS} ; do
+ cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
+ ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}
+ _prefix="proto $_proto, AllowTcpForwarding=$_tcpfwd"
+ # No PermitOpen
+ ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+ echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
+ > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+ check_lfwd $_proto $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix"
+ check_rfwd $_proto $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix"
+ # PermitOpen via sshd_config that doesn't match
+ ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+ echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ;
+ echo "PermitOpen $_badfwd" ) \
+ > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+ check_lfwd $_proto $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !PermitOpen"
+ check_rfwd $_proto $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !PermitOpen"
+ # PermitOpen via sshd_config that does match
+ ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+ echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ;
+ echo "PermitOpen $_badfwd $_goodfwd" ) \
+ > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+ # NB. permitopen via authorized_keys should have same
+ # success/fail as via sshd_config
+ # permitopen via authorized_keys that doesn't match
+ sed "s/^/permitopen=\"$_badfwd\" /" \
+ < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
+ > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 1 fail"
+ ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+ echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
+ > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+ check_lfwd $_proto $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !permitopen"
+ check_rfwd $_proto $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !permitopen"
+ # permitopen via authorized_keys that does match
+ sed "s/^/permitopen=\"$_badfwd\",permitopen=\"$_goodfwd\" /" \
+ < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
+ > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 2 fail"
+ ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+ echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
+ > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+ check_lfwd $_proto $_permit_lfwd "$_prefix, permitopen"
+ check_rfwd $_proto $_permit_rfwd "$_prefix, permitopen"
+ done
+}
+
+# no-permitopen mismatch-permitopen match-permitopen
+# AllowTcpForwarding local remote local remote local remote
+all_tests yes Y Y N Y Y Y
+all_tests local Y N N N Y N
+all_tests remote N Y N Y N Y
+all_tests no N N N N N N
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/forwarding.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/forwarding.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/forwarding.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.11 2013/06/10 21:56:43 dtucker Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="local and remote forwarding"
-
-DATA=/bin/ls${EXEEXT}
-
-start_sshd
-
-base=33
-last=$PORT
-fwd=""
-for j in 0 1 2; do
- for i in 0 1 2; do
- a=$base$j$i
- b=`expr $a + 50`
- c=$last
- # fwd chain: $a -> $b -> $c
- fwd="$fwd -L$a:127.0.0.1:$b -R$b:127.0.0.1:$c"
- last=$a
- done
-done
-for p in 1 2; do
- q=`expr 3 - $p`
- trace "start forwarding, fork to background"
- ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f $fwd somehost sleep 10
-
- trace "transfer over forwarded channels and check result"
- ${SSH} -$q -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$last -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \
- somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
- test -f ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}"
- cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
-
- sleep 10
-done
-
-for p in 1 2; do
-for d in L R; do
- trace "exit on -$d forward failure, proto $p"
-
- # this one should succeed
- ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config \
- -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
- -$d ${base}02:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
- -$d ${base}03:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
- -$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
- -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true
- if [ $? != 0 ]; then
- fail "connection failed, should not"
- else
- # this one should fail
- ${SSH} -q -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config \
- -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
- -$d ${base}02:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
- -$d ${base}03:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
- -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
- -$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
- -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true
- r=$?
- if [ $r != 255 ]; then
- fail "connection not termintated, but should ($r)"
- fi
- fi
-done
-done
-
-for p in 1 2; do
- trace "simple clear forwarding proto $p"
- ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost true
-
- trace "clear local forward proto $p"
- ${SSH} -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
- -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10
- if [ $? != 0 ]; then
- fail "connection failed with cleared local forwarding"
- else
- # this one should fail
- ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 true \
- >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \
- fail "local forwarding not cleared"
- fi
- sleep 10
-
- trace "clear remote forward proto $p"
- ${SSH} -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
- -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10
- if [ $? != 0 ]; then
- fail "connection failed with cleared remote forwarding"
- else
- # this one should fail
- ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 true \
- >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \
- fail "remote forwarding not cleared"
- fi
- sleep 10
-done
-
-for p in 2; do
- trace "stdio forwarding proto $p"
- cmd="${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config"
- $cmd -o "ProxyCommand $cmd -q -W localhost:$PORT somehost" \
- somehost true
- if [ $? != 0 ]; then
- fail "stdio forwarding proto $p"
- fi
-done
-
-echo "LocalForward ${base}01 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
-echo "RemoteForward ${base}02 127.0.0.1:${base}01" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
-for p in 1 2; do
- trace "config file: start forwarding, fork to background"
- ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f somehost sleep 10
-
- trace "config file: transfer over forwarded channels and check result"
- ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}02 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \
- somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
- test -f ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}"
- cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
-
- wait
-done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/forwarding.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/forwarding.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/forwarding.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/forwarding.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+# $OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.16 2016/04/14 23:57:17 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="local and remote forwarding"
+
+DATA=/bin/ls${EXEEXT}
+
+start_sshd
+
+base=33
+last=$PORT
+fwd=""
+CTL=$OBJ/ctl-sock
+rm -f $CTL
+
+for j in 0 1 2; do
+ for i in 0 1 2; do
+ a=$base$j$i
+ b=`expr $a + 50`
+ c=$last
+ # fwd chain: $a -> $b -> $c
+ fwd="$fwd -L$a:127.0.0.1:$b -R$b:127.0.0.1:$c"
+ last=$a
+ done
+done
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ q=`expr 3 - $p`
+ if ! ssh_version $q; then
+ q=$p
+ fi
+ trace "start forwarding, fork to background"
+ ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f $fwd somehost sleep 10
+
+ trace "transfer over forwarded channels and check result"
+ ${SSH} -$q -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$last -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \
+ somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+ test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}"
+ cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+
+ sleep 10
+done
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+for d in L R; do
+ trace "exit on -$d forward failure, proto $p"
+
+ # this one should succeed
+ ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config \
+ -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+ -$d ${base}02:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+ -$d ${base}03:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+ -$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+ -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true
+ if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+ fail "connection failed, should not"
+ else
+ # this one should fail
+ ${SSH} -q -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config \
+ -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+ -$d ${base}02:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+ -$d ${base}03:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+ -$d ${base}01:localhost:$PORT \
+ -$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+ -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r != 255 ]; then
+ fail "connection not termintated, but should ($r)"
+ fi
+ fi
+done
+done
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ trace "simple clear forwarding proto $p"
+ ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost true
+
+ trace "clear local forward proto $p"
+ ${SSH} -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+ -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10
+ if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+ fail "connection failed with cleared local forwarding"
+ else
+ # this one should fail
+ ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 true \
+ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \
+ fail "local forwarding not cleared"
+ fi
+ sleep 10
+
+ trace "clear remote forward proto $p"
+ ${SSH} -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+ -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10
+ if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+ fail "connection failed with cleared remote forwarding"
+ else
+ # this one should fail
+ ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 true \
+ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \
+ fail "remote forwarding not cleared"
+ fi
+ sleep 10
+done
+
+for p in 2; do
+ trace "stdio forwarding proto $p"
+ cmd="${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config"
+ $cmd -o "ProxyCommand $cmd -q -W localhost:$PORT somehost" \
+ somehost true
+ if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+ fail "stdio forwarding proto $p"
+ fi
+done
+
+echo "LocalForward ${base}01 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
+echo "RemoteForward ${base}02 127.0.0.1:${base}01" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ trace "config file: start forwarding, fork to background"
+ ${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f somehost sleep 10
+
+ trace "config file: transfer over forwarded channels and check result"
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}02 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \
+ somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+ test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}"
+ cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+
+ ${SSH} -S $CTL -O exit somehost
+done
+
+for p in 2; do
+ trace "transfer over chained unix domain socket forwards and check result"
+ rm -f $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd
+ ${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R${base}01:[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd] somehost sleep 10
+ ${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd] somehost sleep 10
+ ${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd] somehost sleep 10
+ ${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd]:127.0.0.1:$PORT somehost sleep 10
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}01 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \
+ somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+ test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy ${DATA}"
+ cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+
+ #wait
+ sleep 10
+done
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/host-expand.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/host-expand.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/host-expand.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: host-expand.sh,v 1.3 2014/02/27 23:17:41 djm Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="expand %h and %n"
-
-echo 'PermitLocalCommand yes' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
-printf 'LocalCommand printf "%%%%s\\n" "%%n" "%%h"\n' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
-
-cat >$OBJ/expect <<EOE
-somehost
-127.0.0.1
-EOE
-
-for p in 1 2; do
- verbose "test $tid: proto $p"
- ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -$p somehost true >$OBJ/actual
- diff $OBJ/expect $OBJ/actual || fail "$tid proto $p"
-done
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/host-expand.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/host-expand.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/host-expand.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/host-expand.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# $OpenBSD: host-expand.sh,v 1.4 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="expand %h and %n"
+
+echo 'PermitLocalCommand yes' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+printf 'LocalCommand printf "%%%%s\\n" "%%n" "%%h"\n' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+cat >$OBJ/expect <<EOE
+somehost
+127.0.0.1
+EOE
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ verbose "test $tid: proto $p"
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -$p somehost true >$OBJ/actual
+ diff $OBJ/expect $OBJ/actual || fail "$tid proto $p"
+done
+
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/hostkey-agent.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# $OpenBSD: hostkey-agent.sh,v 1.6 2015/07/10 06:23:25 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="hostkey agent"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/agent-key.* $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig $OBJ/known_hosts.orig
+
+trace "start agent"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+[ $r -ne 0 ] && fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+
+grep -vi 'hostkey' $OBJ/sshd_proxy > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+echo "HostKeyAgent $SSH_AUTH_SOCK" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+
+trace "load hostkeys"
+for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
+ (
+ printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
+ cat $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub
+ ) >> $OBJ/known_hosts.orig
+ ${SSHADD} $OBJ/agent-key.$k >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+ fatal "couldn't load key $OBJ/agent-key.$k"
+ echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+ # Remove private key so the server can't use it.
+ rm $OBJ/agent-key.$k || fatal "couldn't rm $OBJ/agent-key.$k"
+done
+cp $OBJ/known_hosts.orig $OBJ/known_hosts
+
+unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+
+for ps in no yes; do
+ for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do
+ verbose "key type $k privsep=$ps"
+ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $ps" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $k" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+ cp $OBJ/known_hosts.orig $OBJ/known_hosts
+ SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "protocol $p privsep=$ps failed"
+ fi
+ if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then
+ fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION key type $k privsep=$ps"
+ fi
+ done
+done
+
+trace "kill agent"
+${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+# $OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.5 2015/09/04 04:23:10 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="hostkey rotate"
+
+# Need full names here since they are used in HostKeyAlgorithms
+HOSTKEY_TYPES="ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 ssh-ed25519 ssh-rsa ssh-dss"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/hkr.* $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig
+
+grep -vi 'hostkey' $OBJ/sshd_proxy > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+echo "UpdateHostkeys=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+rm $OBJ/known_hosts
+
+trace "prepare hostkeys"
+nkeys=0
+all_algs=""
+for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/hkr.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
+ echo "Hostkey $OBJ/hkr.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+ nkeys=`expr $nkeys + 1`
+ test "x$all_algs" = "x" || all_algs="${all_algs},"
+ all_algs="${all_algs}$k"
+done
+
+dossh() {
+ # All ssh should succeed in this test
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy "$@" x true || fail "ssh $@ failed"
+}
+
+expect_nkeys() {
+ _expected=$1
+ _message=$2
+ _n=`wc -l $OBJ/known_hosts | awk '{ print $1 }'` || fatal "wc failed"
+ [ "x$_n" = "x$_expected" ] || fail "$_message (got $_n wanted $_expected)"
+}
+
+check_key_present() {
+ _type=$1
+ _kfile=$2
+ test "x$_kfile" = "x" && _kfile="$OBJ/hkr.${_type}.pub"
+ _kpub=`awk "/$_type /"' { print $2 }' < $_kfile` || \
+ fatal "awk failed"
+ fgrep "$_kpub" $OBJ/known_hosts > /dev/null
+}
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+# Connect to sshd with StrictHostkeyChecking=no
+verbose "learn hostkey with StrictHostKeyChecking=no"
+>$OBJ/known_hosts
+dossh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-ed25519 -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no
+# Verify no additional keys learned
+expect_nkeys 1 "unstrict connect keys"
+check_key_present ssh-ed25519 || fail "unstrict didn't learn key"
+
+# Connect to sshd as usual
+verbose "learn additional hostkeys"
+dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$all_algs
+# Check that other keys learned
+expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys"
+check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn keys"
+
+# Check each key type
+for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do
+ verbose "learn additional hostkeys, type=$k"
+ dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k,$all_algs
+ expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys $k"
+ check_key_present $k || fail "didn't learn $k"
+done
+
+# Change one hostkey (non primary) and relearn
+verbose "learn changed non-primary hostkey"
+mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old
+rm -f $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ssh-rsa -f $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
+dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$all_algs
+# Check that the key was replaced
+expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys"
+check_key_present ssh-rsa $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old && fail "old key present"
+check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn changed key"
+
+# Add new hostkey (primary type) to sshd and connect
+verbose "learn new primary hostkey"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ssh-rsa -f $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
+( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig ; echo HostKey $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new ) \
+ > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+# Check new hostkey added
+dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa,$all_algs
+expect_nkeys `expr $nkeys + 1` "learn hostkeys"
+check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "current key missing"
+check_key_present ssh-rsa $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new.pub || fail "new key missing"
+
+# Remove old hostkey (primary type) from sshd
+verbose "rotate primary hostkey"
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old
+mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new.pub $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub
+mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa
+# Check old hostkey removed
+dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa,$all_algs
+expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys"
+check_key_present ssh-rsa $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old && fail "old key present"
+check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn changed key"
+
+# Connect again, forcing rotated key
+verbose "check rotate primary hostkey"
+dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa
+expect_nkeys 1 "learn hostkeys"
+check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn changed key"
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/integrity.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/integrity.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/integrity.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.12 2013/11/21 03:18:51 djm Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="integrity"
-
-# start at byte 2900 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets
-# XXX the test hangs if we modify the low bytes of the packet length
-# XXX and ssh tries to read...
-tries=10
-startoffset=2900
-macs=`${SSH} -Q mac`
-# The following are not MACs, but ciphers with integrated integrity. They are
-# handled specially below.
-macs="$macs `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`"
-
-# avoid DH group exchange as the extra traffic makes it harder to get the
-# offset into the stream right.
-echo "KexAlgorithms diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" \
- >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
-
-# sshd-command for proxy (see test-exec.sh)
-cmd="$SUDO sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${SSHD} ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy"
-
-for m in $macs; do
- trace "test $tid: mac $m"
- elen=0
- epad=0
- emac=0
- ecnt=0
- skip=0
- for off in `jot $tries $startoffset`; do
- skip=`expr $skip - 1`
- if [ $skip -gt 0 ]; then
- # avoid modifying the high bytes of the length
- continue
- fi
- # modify output from sshd at offset $off
- pxy="proxycommand=$cmd | $OBJ/modpipe -wm xor:$off:1"
- if ssh -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${m}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
- macopt="-c $m"
- else
- macopt="-m $m -c aes128-ctr"
- fi
- verbose "test $tid: $m @$off"
- ${SSH} $macopt -2F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o "$pxy" \
- -oServerAliveInterval=1 -oServerAliveCountMax=30 \
- 999.999.999.999 'printf "%4096s" " "' >/dev/null
- if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh -m $m succeeds with bit-flip at $off"
- fi
- ecnt=`expr $ecnt + 1`
- output=$(tail -2 $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE | egrep -v "^debug" | \
- tr -s '\r\n' '.')
- case "$output" in
- Bad?packet*) elen=`expr $elen + 1`; skip=3;;
- Corrupted?MAC* | Decryption?integrity?check?failed*)
- emac=`expr $emac + 1`; skip=0;;
- padding*) epad=`expr $epad + 1`; skip=0;;
- *) fail "unexpected error mac $m at $off";;
- esac
- done
- verbose "test $tid: $ecnt errors: mac $emac padding $epad length $elen"
- if [ $emac -eq 0 ]; then
- fail "$m: no mac errors"
- fi
- expect=`expr $ecnt - $epad - $elen`
- if [ $emac -ne $expect ]; then
- fail "$m: expected $expect mac errors, got $emac"
- fi
-done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/integrity.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/integrity.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/integrity.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/integrity.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.18 2016/03/04 02:48:06 dtucker Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="integrity"
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+# start at byte 2900 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets
+# XXX the test hangs if we modify the low bytes of the packet length
+# XXX and ssh tries to read...
+tries=10
+startoffset=2900
+macs=`${SSH} -Q mac`
+# The following are not MACs, but ciphers with integrated integrity. They are
+# handled specially below.
+macs="$macs `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`"
+
+# avoid DH group exchange as the extra traffic makes it harder to get the
+# offset into the stream right.
+echo "KexAlgorithms diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" \
+ >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+# sshd-command for proxy (see test-exec.sh)
+cmd="$SUDO sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy"
+
+for m in $macs; do
+ trace "test $tid: mac $m"
+ elen=0
+ epad=0
+ emac=0
+ ecnt=0
+ skip=0
+ for off in `jot $tries $startoffset`; do
+ skip=`expr $skip - 1`
+ if [ $skip -gt 0 ]; then
+ # avoid modifying the high bytes of the length
+ continue
+ fi
+ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ # modify output from sshd at offset $off
+ pxy="proxycommand=$cmd | $OBJ/modpipe -wm xor:$off:1"
+ if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${m}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+ echo "Ciphers=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ macopt="-c $m"
+ else
+ echo "Ciphers=aes128-ctr" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ echo "MACs=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ macopt="-m $m -c aes128-ctr"
+ fi
+ verbose "test $tid: $m @$off"
+ ${SSH} $macopt -2F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o "$pxy" \
+ -oServerAliveInterval=1 -oServerAliveCountMax=30 \
+ 999.999.999.999 'printf "%4096s" " "' >/dev/null
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh -m $m succeeds with bit-flip at $off"
+ fi
+ ecnt=`expr $ecnt + 1`
+ out=$(egrep -v "^debug" $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE | tail -2 | \
+ tr -s '\r\n' '.')
+ case "$out" in
+ Bad?packet*) elen=`expr $elen + 1`; skip=3;;
+ Corrupted?MAC* | *message?authentication?code?incorrect*)
+ emac=`expr $emac + 1`; skip=0;;
+ padding*) epad=`expr $epad + 1`; skip=0;;
+ *) fail "unexpected error mac $m at $off: $out";;
+ esac
+ done
+ verbose "test $tid: $ecnt errors: mac $emac padding $epad length $elen"
+ if [ $emac -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "$m: no mac errors"
+ fi
+ expect=`expr $ecnt - $epad - $elen`
+ if [ $emac -ne $expect ]; then
+ fail "$m: expected $expect mac errors, got $emac"
+ fi
+done
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/kextype.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/kextype.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/kextype.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: kextype.sh,v 1.4 2013/11/07 04:26:56 dtucker Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="login with different key exchange algorithms"
-
-TIME=/usr/bin/time
-cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
-cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
-
-tries="1 2 3 4"
-for k in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
- verbose "kex $k"
- for i in $tries; do
- ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o KexAlgorithms=$k x true
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh kex $k"
- fi
- done
-done
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/kextype.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/kextype.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/kextype.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/kextype.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# $OpenBSD: kextype.sh,v 1.6 2015/03/24 20:19:15 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="login with different key exchange algorithms"
+
+TIME=/usr/bin/time
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+
+# Make server accept all key exchanges.
+ALLKEX=`${SSH} -Q kex`
+KEXOPT=`echo $ALLKEX | tr ' ' ,`
+echo "KexAlgorithms=$KEXOPT" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+tries="1 2 3 4"
+for k in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
+ verbose "kex $k"
+ for i in $tries; do
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o KexAlgorithms=$k x true
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh kex $k"
+ fi
+ done
+done
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/key-options.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/key-options.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/key-options.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: key-options.sh,v 1.2 2008/06/30 08:07:34 djm Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="key options"
-
-origkeys="$OBJ/authkeys_orig"
-authkeys="$OBJ/authorized_keys_${USER}"
-cp $authkeys $origkeys
-
-# Test command= forced command
-for p in 1 2; do
- for c in 'command="echo bar"' 'no-pty,command="echo bar"'; do
- sed "s/.*/$c &/" $origkeys >$authkeys
- verbose "key option proto $p $c"
- r=`${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost echo foo`
- if [ "$r" = "foo" ]; then
- fail "key option forced command not restricted"
- fi
- if [ "$r" != "bar" ]; then
- fail "key option forced command not executed"
- fi
- done
-done
-
-# Test no-pty
-sed 's/.*/no-pty &/' $origkeys >$authkeys
-for p in 1 2; do
- verbose "key option proto $p no-pty"
- r=`${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost tty`
- if [ -f "$r" ]; then
- fail "key option failed proto $p no-pty (pty $r)"
- fi
-done
-
-# Test environment=
-echo 'PermitUserEnvironment yes' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-sed 's/.*/environment="FOO=bar" &/' $origkeys >$authkeys
-for p in 1 2; do
- verbose "key option proto $p environment"
- r=`${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost 'echo $FOO'`
- if [ "$r" != "bar" ]; then
- fail "key option environment not set"
- fi
-done
-
-# Test from= restriction
-start_sshd
-for p in 1 2; do
- for f in 127.0.0.1 '127.0.0.0\/8'; do
- cat $origkeys >$authkeys
- ${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "key option proto $p failed without restriction"
- fi
-
- sed 's/.*/from="'"$f"'" &/' $origkeys >$authkeys
- from=`head -1 $authkeys | cut -f1 -d ' '`
- verbose "key option proto $p $from"
- r=`${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost 'echo true'`
- if [ "$r" = "true" ]; then
- fail "key option proto $p $from not restricted"
- fi
-
- r=`${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost 'echo true'`
- if [ "$r" != "true" ]; then
- fail "key option proto $p $from not allowed but should be"
- fi
- done
-done
-
-rm -f "$origkeys"
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/key-options.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/key-options.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/key-options.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/key-options.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+# $OpenBSD: key-options.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="key options"
+
+origkeys="$OBJ/authkeys_orig"
+authkeys="$OBJ/authorized_keys_${USER}"
+cp $authkeys $origkeys
+
+# Test command= forced command
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ for c in 'command="echo bar"' 'no-pty,command="echo bar"'; do
+ sed "s/.*/$c &/" $origkeys >$authkeys
+ verbose "key option proto $p $c"
+ r=`${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost echo foo`
+ if [ "$r" = "foo" ]; then
+ fail "key option forced command not restricted"
+ fi
+ if [ "$r" != "bar" ]; then
+ fail "key option forced command not executed"
+ fi
+ done
+done
+
+# Test no-pty
+sed 's/.*/no-pty &/' $origkeys >$authkeys
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ verbose "key option proto $p no-pty"
+ r=`${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost tty`
+ if [ -f "$r" ]; then
+ fail "key option failed proto $p no-pty (pty $r)"
+ fi
+done
+
+# Test environment=
+echo 'PermitUserEnvironment yes' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+sed 's/.*/environment="FOO=bar" &/' $origkeys >$authkeys
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ verbose "key option proto $p environment"
+ r=`${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost 'echo $FOO'`
+ if [ "$r" != "bar" ]; then
+ fail "key option environment not set"
+ fi
+done
+
+# Test from= restriction
+start_sshd
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ for f in 127.0.0.1 '127.0.0.0\/8'; do
+ cat $origkeys >$authkeys
+ ${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "key option proto $p failed without restriction"
+ fi
+
+ sed 's/.*/from="'"$f"'" &/' $origkeys >$authkeys
+ from=`head -1 $authkeys | cut -f1 -d ' '`
+ verbose "key option proto $p $from"
+ r=`${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost 'echo true'`
+ if [ "$r" = "true" ]; then
+ fail "key option proto $p $from not restricted"
+ fi
+
+ r=`${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost 'echo true'`
+ if [ "$r" != "true" ]; then
+ fail "key option proto $p $from not allowed but should be"
+ fi
+ done
+done
+
+rm -f "$origkeys"
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keygen-change.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/keygen-change.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keygen-change.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: keygen-change.sh,v 1.2 2002/07/16 09:15:55 markus Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="change passphrase for key"
-
-S1="secret1"
-S2="2secret"
-
-for t in rsa dsa rsa1; do
- # generate user key for agent
- trace "generating $t key"
- rm -f $OBJ/$t-key
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N ${S1} -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-key
- if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -p -P ${S1} -N ${S2} -f $OBJ/$t-key > /dev/null
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh-keygen -p failed for $t-key"
- fi
- else
- fail "ssh-keygen for $t-key failed"
- fi
- rm -f $OBJ/$t-key $OBJ/$t-key.pub
-done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keygen-change.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/keygen-change.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keygen-change.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keygen-change.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# $OpenBSD: keygen-change.sh,v 1.5 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="change passphrase for key"
+
+S1="secret1"
+S2="2secret"
+
+KEYTYPES=`${SSH} -Q key-plain`
+if ssh_version 1; then
+ KEYTYPES="${KEYTYPES} rsa1"
+fi
+
+for t in $KEYTYPES; do
+ # generate user key for agent
+ trace "generating $t key"
+ rm -f $OBJ/$t-key
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N ${S1} -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-key
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -p -P ${S1} -N ${S2} -f $OBJ/$t-key > /dev/null
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-keygen -p failed for $t-key"
+ fi
+ else
+ fail "ssh-keygen for $t-key failed"
+ fi
+ rm -f $OBJ/$t-key $OBJ/$t-key.pub
+done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keygen-knownhosts.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/keygen-knownhosts.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keygen-knownhosts.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keygen-knownhosts.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+# $OpenBSD: keygen-knownhosts.sh,v 1.3 2015/07/17 03:34:27 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="ssh-keygen known_hosts"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.*
+
+# Generate some keys for testing (just ed25519 for speed) and make a hosts file.
+for x in host-a host-b host-c host-d host-e host-f host-a2 host-b2; do
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ed25519 -f $OBJ/kh.$x -C "$x" -N "" || \
+ fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+ # Add a comment that we expect should be preserved.
+ echo "# $x" >> $OBJ/kh.hosts
+ (
+ case "$x" in
+ host-a|host-b) printf "$x " ;;
+ host-c) printf "@cert-authority $x " ;;
+ host-d) printf "@revoked $x " ;;
+ host-e) printf "host-e* " ;;
+ host-f) printf "host-f,host-g,host-h " ;;
+ host-a2) printf "host-a " ;;
+ host-b2) printf "host-b " ;;
+ esac
+ cat $OBJ/kh.${x}.pub
+ # Blank line should be preserved.
+ echo "" >> $OBJ/kh.hosts
+ ) >> $OBJ/kh.hosts
+done
+
+# Generate a variant with an invalid line. We'll use this for most tests,
+# because keygen should be able to cope and it should be preserved in any
+# output file.
+cat $OBJ/kh.hosts >> $OBJ/kh.invalid
+echo "host-i " >> $OBJ/kh.invalid
+
+cp $OBJ/kh.invalid $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig
+
+expect_key() {
+ _host=$1
+ _hosts=$2
+ _key=$3
+ _line=$4
+ _mark=$5
+ _marker=""
+ test "x$_mark" = "xCA" && _marker="@cert-authority "
+ test "x$_mark" = "xREVOKED" && _marker="@revoked "
+ test "x$_line" != "x" &&
+ echo "# Host $_host found: line $_line $_mark" >> $OBJ/kh.expect
+ printf "${_marker}$_hosts " >> $OBJ/kh.expect
+ cat $OBJ/kh.${_key}.pub >> $OBJ/kh.expect ||
+ fatal "${_key}.pub missing"
+}
+
+check_find() {
+ _host=$1
+ _name=$2
+ _keygenopt=$3
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} $_keygenopt -f $OBJ/kh.invalid -F $_host > $OBJ/kh.result
+ if ! diff -w $OBJ/kh.expect $OBJ/kh.result ; then
+ fail "didn't find $_name"
+ fi
+}
+
+# Find key
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-a host-a host-a 2
+expect_key host-a host-a host-a2 20
+check_find host-a "simple find"
+
+# find CA key
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-c host-c host-c 8 CA
+check_find host-c "find CA key"
+
+# find revoked key
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-d host-d host-d 11 REVOKED
+check_find host-d "find revoked key"
+
+# find key with wildcard
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-e.somedomain "host-e*" host-e 14
+check_find host-e.somedomain "find wildcard key"
+
+# find key among multiple hosts
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-h "host-f,host-g,host-h " host-f 17
+check_find host-h "find multiple hosts"
+
+check_hashed_find() {
+ _host=$1
+ _name=$2
+ _file=$3
+ test "x$_file" = "x" && _file=$OBJ/kh.invalid
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -f $_file -HF $_host | grep '|1|' | \
+ sed "s/^[^ ]*/$_host/" > $OBJ/kh.result
+ if ! diff -w $OBJ/kh.expect $OBJ/kh.result ; then
+ fail "didn't find $_name"
+ fi
+}
+
+# Find key and hash
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-a host-a host-a
+expect_key host-a host-a host-a2
+check_hashed_find host-a "find simple and hash"
+
+# Find CA key and hash
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-c host-c host-c "" CA
+# CA key output is not hashed.
+check_find host-c "find simple and hash" -H
+
+# Find revoked key and hash
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-d host-d host-d "" REVOKED
+# Revoked key output is not hashed.
+check_find host-d "find simple and hash" -H
+
+# find key with wildcard and hash
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-e "host-e*" host-e ""
+# Key with wildcard hostname should not be hashed.
+check_find host-e "find wildcard key" -H
+
+# find key among multiple hosts
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+# Comma-separated hostnames should be expanded and hashed.
+expect_key host-f "host-h " host-f
+expect_key host-g "host-h " host-f
+expect_key host-h "host-h " host-f
+check_hashed_find host-h "find multiple hosts"
+
+# Attempt remove key on invalid file.
+cp $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig $OBJ/kh.invalid
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.invalid -R host-a 2>/dev/null
+diff $OBJ/kh.invalid $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig || fail "remove on invalid succeeded"
+
+# Remove key
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-a 2>/dev/null
+grep -v "^host-a " $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig > $OBJ/kh.expect
+diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.expect || fail "remove simple"
+
+# Remove CA key
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-c 2>/dev/null
+# CA key should not be removed.
+diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig || fail "remove CA"
+
+# Remove revoked key
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-d 2>/dev/null
+# revoked key should not be removed.
+diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig || fail "remove revoked"
+
+# Remove wildcard
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-e.blahblah 2>/dev/null
+grep -v "^host-e[*] " $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig > $OBJ/kh.expect
+diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.expect || fail "remove wildcard"
+
+# Remove multiple
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-h 2>/dev/null
+grep -v "^host-f," $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig > $OBJ/kh.expect
+diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.expect || fail "remove wildcard"
+
+# Attempt hash on invalid file
+cp $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig $OBJ/kh.invalid
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.invalid -H 2>/dev/null && fail "hash invalid succeeded"
+diff $OBJ/kh.invalid $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig || fail "invalid file modified"
+
+# Hash valid file
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -H 2>/dev/null || fail "hash failed"
+diff $OBJ/kh.hosts.old $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig || fail "backup differs"
+grep "^host-[abfgh]" $OBJ/kh.hosts && fail "original hostnames persist"
+
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.hashed.orig
+
+# Test lookup
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-a host-a host-a
+expect_key host-a host-a host-a2
+check_hashed_find host-a "find simple in hashed" $OBJ/kh.hosts
+
+# Test multiple expanded
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-h host-h host-f
+check_hashed_find host-h "find simple in hashed" $OBJ/kh.hosts
+
+# Test remove
+cp $OBJ/kh.hashed.orig $OBJ/kh.hashed
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hashed -R host-a 2>/dev/null
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hashed -F host-a && fail "found key after hashed remove"
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keys-command.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/keys-command.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keys-command.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: keys-command.sh,v 1.2 2012/12/06 06:06:54 dtucker Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="authorized keys from command"
-
-if test -z "$SUDO" ; then
- echo "skipped (SUDO not set)"
- echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without"
- exit 0
-fi
-
-# Establish a AuthorizedKeysCommand in /var/run where it will have
-# acceptable directory permissions.
-KEY_COMMAND="/var/run/keycommand_${LOGNAME}"
-cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "cat > '$KEY_COMMAND'"
-#!/bin/sh
-test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1
-exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_keys_${LOGNAME}"
-_EOF
-$SUDO chmod 0755 "$KEY_COMMAND"
-
-cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
-(
- grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
- echo AuthorizedKeysFile none
- echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND
- echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME}
-) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
-if [ -x $KEY_COMMAND ]; then
- ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "connect failed"
- fi
-else
- echo "SKIPPED: $KEY_COMMAND not executable (/var/run mounted noexec?)"
-fi
-
-$SUDO rm -f $KEY_COMMAND
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keys-command.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/keys-command.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keys-command.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keys-command.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+# $OpenBSD: keys-command.sh,v 1.3 2015/05/21 06:40:02 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="authorized keys from command"
+
+if test -z "$SUDO" ; then
+ echo "skipped (SUDO not set)"
+ echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without"
+ exit 0
+fi
+
+rm -f $OBJ/keys-command-args
+
+touch $OBJ/keys-command-args
+chmod a+rw $OBJ/keys-command-args
+
+expected_key_text=`awk '{ print $2 }' < $OBJ/rsa.pub`
+expected_key_fp=`$SSHKEYGEN -lf $OBJ/rsa.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'`
+
+# Establish a AuthorizedKeysCommand in /var/run where it will have
+# acceptable directory permissions.
+KEY_COMMAND="/var/run/keycommand_${LOGNAME}"
+cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "rm -f '$KEY_COMMAND' ; cat > '$KEY_COMMAND'"
+#!/bin/sh
+echo args: "\$@" >> $OBJ/keys-command-args
+echo "$PATH" | grep -q mekmitasdigoat && exit 7
+test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1
+if test $# -eq 6 ; then
+ test "x\$2" != "xblah" && exit 2
+ test "x\$3" != "x${expected_key_text}" && exit 3
+ test "x\$4" != "xssh-rsa" && exit 4
+ test "x\$5" != "x${expected_key_fp}" && exit 5
+ test "x\$6" != "xblah" && exit 6
+fi
+exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_keys_${LOGNAME}"
+_EOF
+$SUDO chmod 0755 "$KEY_COMMAND"
+
+if ! $OBJ/check-perm -m keys-command $KEY_COMMAND ; then
+ echo "skipping: $KEY_COMMAND is unsuitable as AuthorizedKeysCommand"
+ $SUDO rm -f $KEY_COMMAND
+ exit 0
+fi
+
+if [ -x $KEY_COMMAND ]; then
+ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
+
+ verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand with arguments"
+ (
+ grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
+ echo AuthorizedKeysFile none
+ echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND %u blah %k %t %f blah
+ echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME}
+ ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+ # Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd
+ env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "connect failed"
+ fi
+
+ verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand without arguments"
+ # Check legacy behavior of no-args resulting in username being passed.
+ (
+ grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
+ echo AuthorizedKeysFile none
+ echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND
+ echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME}
+ ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+ # Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd
+ env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "connect failed"
+ fi
+else
+ echo "SKIPPED: $KEY_COMMAND not executable (/var/run mounted noexec?)"
+fi
+
+$SUDO rm -f $KEY_COMMAND
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keyscan.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/keyscan.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keyscan.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: keyscan.sh,v 1.3 2002/03/15 13:08:56 markus Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="keyscan"
-
-# remove DSA hostkey
-rm -f ${OBJ}/host.dsa
-
-start_sshd
-
-for t in rsa1 rsa dsa; do
- trace "keyscan type $t"
- ${SSHKEYSCAN} -t $t -p $PORT 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 \
- > /dev/null 2>&1
- r=$?
- if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh-keyscan -t $t failed with: $r"
- fi
-done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keyscan.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/keyscan.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keyscan.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keyscan.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# $OpenBSD: keyscan.sh,v 1.5 2015/09/11 03:44:21 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="keyscan"
+
+# remove DSA hostkey
+rm -f ${OBJ}/host.dsa
+
+start_sshd
+
+KEYTYPES=`${SSH} -Q key-plain`
+if ssh_version 1; then
+ KEYTYPES="${KEYTYPES} rsa1"
+fi
+
+for t in $KEYTYPES; do
+ trace "keyscan type $t"
+ ${SSHKEYSCAN} -t $t -p $PORT 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 \
+ > /dev/null 2>&1
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-keyscan -t $t failed with: $r"
+ fi
+done
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keytype.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/keytype.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keytype.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: keytype.sh,v 1.3 2013/12/06 13:52:46 markus Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="login with different key types"
-
-TIME=`which time 2>/dev/null`
-if test ! -x "$TIME"; then
- TIME=""
-fi
-
-cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
-cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
-
-# Traditional and builtin key types.
-ktypes="dsa-1024 rsa-2048 rsa-3072 ed25519-512"
-# Types not present in all OpenSSL versions.
-for i in `$SSH -Q key`; do
- case "$i" in
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp256) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-256" ;;
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp384) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-384" ;;
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp521) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-521" ;;
- esac
-done
-
-for kt in $ktypes; do
- rm -f $OBJ/key.$kt
- bits=`echo ${kt} | awk -F- '{print $2}'`
- type=`echo ${kt} | awk -F- '{print $1}'`
- printf "keygen $type, $bits bits:\t"
- ${TIME} ${SSHKEYGEN} -b $bits -q -N '' -t $type -f $OBJ/key.$kt ||\
- fail "ssh-keygen for type $type, $bits bits failed"
-done
-
-tries="1 2 3"
-for ut in $ktypes; do
- htypes=$ut
- #htypes=$ktypes
- for ht in $htypes; do
- trace "ssh connect, userkey $ut, hostkey $ht"
- (
- grep -v HostKey $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
- echo HostKey $OBJ/key.$ht
- ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
- (
- grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
- echo IdentityFile $OBJ/key.$ut
- ) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
- (
- printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
- cat $OBJ/key.$ht.pub
- ) > $OBJ/known_hosts
- cat $OBJ/key.$ut.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
- for i in $tries; do
- printf "userkey $ut, hostkey ${ht}:\t"
- ${TIME} ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh userkey $ut, hostkey $ht failed"
- fi
- done
- done
-done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keytype.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/keytype.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keytype.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/keytype.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+# $OpenBSD: keytype.sh,v 1.4 2015/07/10 06:23:25 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="login with different key types"
+
+TIME=`which time 2>/dev/null`
+if test ! -x "$TIME"; then
+ TIME=""
+fi
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+
+# Traditional and builtin key types.
+ktypes="dsa-1024 rsa-2048 rsa-3072 ed25519-512"
+# Types not present in all OpenSSL versions.
+for i in `$SSH -Q key`; do
+ case "$i" in
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-256" ;;
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-384" ;;
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-521" ;;
+ esac
+done
+
+for kt in $ktypes; do
+ rm -f $OBJ/key.$kt
+ bits=`echo ${kt} | awk -F- '{print $2}'`
+ type=`echo ${kt} | awk -F- '{print $1}'`
+ printf "keygen $type, $bits bits:\t"
+ ${TIME} ${SSHKEYGEN} -b $bits -q -N '' -t $type -f $OBJ/key.$kt ||\
+ fail "ssh-keygen for type $type, $bits bits failed"
+done
+
+tries="1 2 3"
+for ut in $ktypes; do
+ htypes=$ut
+ #htypes=$ktypes
+ for ht in $htypes; do
+ case $ht in
+ dsa-1024) t=ssh-dss;;
+ ecdsa-256) t=ecdsa-sha2-nistp256;;
+ ecdsa-384) t=ecdsa-sha2-nistp384;;
+ ecdsa-521) t=ecdsa-sha2-nistp521;;
+ ed25519-512) t=ssh-ed25519;;
+ rsa-*) t=ssh-rsa;;
+ esac
+ trace "ssh connect, userkey $ut, hostkey $ht"
+ (
+ grep -v HostKey $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+ echo HostKey $OBJ/key.$ht
+ echo PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes $t
+ echo HostKeyAlgorithms $t
+ ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ (
+ grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+ echo IdentityFile $OBJ/key.$ut
+ echo PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes $t
+ echo HostKeyAlgorithms $t
+ ) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+ (
+ printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
+ cat $OBJ/key.$ht.pub
+ ) > $OBJ/known_hosts
+ cat $OBJ/key.$ut.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ for i in $tries; do
+ printf "userkey $ut, hostkey ${ht}:\t"
+ ${TIME} ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh userkey $ut, hostkey $ht failed"
+ fi
+ done
+ done
+done
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/krl.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/krl.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/krl.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,160 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: krl.sh,v 1.2 2013/11/21 03:15:46 djm Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="key revocation lists"
-
-# If we don't support ecdsa keys then this tell will be much slower.
-ECDSA=ecdsa
-if test "x$TEST_SSH_ECC" != "xyes"; then
- ECDSA=rsa
-fi
-
-# Do most testing with ssh-keygen; it uses the same verification code as sshd.
-
-# Old keys will interfere with ssh-keygen.
-rm -f $OBJ/revoked-* $OBJ/krl-*
-
-# Generate a CA key
-$SSHKEYGEN -t $ECDSA -f $OBJ/revoked-ca -C "" -N "" > /dev/null ||
- fatal "$SSHKEYGEN CA failed"
-
-# A specification that revokes some certificates by serial numbers
-# The serial pattern is chosen to ensure the KRL includes list, range and
-# bitmap sections.
-cat << EOF >> $OBJ/revoked-serials
-serial: 1-4
-serial: 10
-serial: 15
-serial: 30
-serial: 50
-serial: 999
-# The following sum to 500-799
-serial: 500
-serial: 501
-serial: 502
-serial: 503-600
-serial: 700-797
-serial: 798
-serial: 799
-serial: 599-701
-EOF
-
-# A specification that revokes some certificated by key ID.
-touch $OBJ/revoked-keyid
-for n in 1 2 3 4 10 15 30 50 `jot 500 300` 999 1000 1001 1002; do
- # Fill in by-ID revocation spec.
- echo "id: revoked $n" >> $OBJ/revoked-keyid
-done
-
-keygen() {
- N=$1
- f=$OBJ/revoked-`printf "%04d" $N`
- # Vary the keytype. We use mostly ECDSA since this is fastest by far.
- keytype=$ECDSA
- case $N in
- 2 | 10 | 510 | 1001) keytype=rsa;;
- 4 | 30 | 520 | 1002) keytype=dsa;;
- esac
- $SSHKEYGEN -t $keytype -f $f -C "" -N "" > /dev/null \
- || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN failed"
- # Sign cert
- $SSHKEYGEN -s $OBJ/revoked-ca -z $n -I "revoked $N" $f >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN sign failed"
- echo $f
-}
-
-# Generate some keys.
-verbose "$tid: generating test keys"
-REVOKED_SERIALS="1 4 10 50 500 510 520 799 999"
-for n in $REVOKED_SERIALS ; do
- f=`keygen $n`
- REVOKED_KEYS="$REVOKED_KEYS ${f}.pub"
- REVOKED_CERTS="$REVOKED_CERTS ${f}-cert.pub"
-done
-NOTREVOKED_SERIALS="5 9 14 16 29 30 49 51 499 800 1000 1001"
-NOTREVOKED=""
-for n in $NOTREVOKED_SERIALS ; do
- NOTREVOKED_KEYS="$NOTREVOKED_KEYS ${f}.pub"
- NOTREVOKED_CERTS="$NOTREVOKED_CERTS ${f}-cert.pub"
-done
-
-genkrls() {
- OPTS=$1
-$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-empty - </dev/null \
- >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
-$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keys $REVOKED_KEYS \
- >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
-$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-cert $REVOKED_CERTS \
- >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
-$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-all $REVOKED_KEYS $REVOKED_CERTS \
- >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
-$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-ca $OBJ/revoked-ca.pub \
- >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
-# KRLs from serial/key-id spec need the CA specified.
-$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial $OBJ/revoked-serials \
- >/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL succeeded unexpectedly"
-$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid $OBJ/revoked-keyid \
- >/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL succeeded unexpectedly"
-$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial -s $OBJ/revoked-ca $OBJ/revoked-serials \
- >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
-$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid -s $OBJ/revoked-ca.pub $OBJ/revoked-keyid \
- >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
-}
-
-## XXX dump with trace and grep for set cert serials
-## XXX test ranges near (u64)-1, etc.
-
-verbose "$tid: generating KRLs"
-genkrls
-
-check_krl() {
- KEY=$1
- KRL=$2
- EXPECT_REVOKED=$3
- TAG=$4
- $SSHKEYGEN -Qf $KRL $KEY >/dev/null
- result=$?
- if test "x$EXPECT_REVOKED" = "xyes" -a $result -eq 0 ; then
- fatal "key $KEY not revoked by KRL $KRL: $TAG"
- elif test "x$EXPECT_REVOKED" = "xno" -a $result -ne 0 ; then
- fatal "key $KEY unexpectedly revoked by KRL $KRL: $TAG"
- fi
-}
-test_all() {
- FILES=$1
- TAG=$2
- KEYS_RESULT=$3
- ALL_RESULT=$4
- SERIAL_RESULT=$5
- KEYID_RESULT=$6
- CERTS_RESULT=$7
- CA_RESULT=$8
- verbose "$tid: checking revocations for $TAG"
- for f in $FILES ; do
- check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-empty no "$TAG"
- check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keys $KEYS_RESULT "$TAG"
- check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-all $ALL_RESULT "$TAG"
- check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-serial $SERIAL_RESULT "$TAG"
- check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keyid $KEYID_RESULT "$TAG"
- check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-cert $CERTS_RESULT "$TAG"
- check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-ca $CA_RESULT "$TAG"
- done
-}
-# keys all serial keyid certs CA
-test_all "$REVOKED_KEYS" "revoked keys" yes yes no no no no
-test_all "$UNREVOKED_KEYS" "unrevoked keys" no no no no no no
-test_all "$REVOKED_CERTS" "revoked certs" yes yes yes yes yes yes
-test_all "$UNREVOKED_CERTS" "unrevoked certs" no no no no no yes
-
-# Check update. Results should be identical.
-verbose "$tid: testing KRL update"
-for f in $OBJ/krl-keys $OBJ/krl-cert $OBJ/krl-all \
- $OBJ/krl-ca $OBJ/krl-serial $OBJ/krl-keyid ; do
- cp -f $OBJ/krl-empty $f
- genkrls -u
-done
-# keys all serial keyid certs CA
-test_all "$REVOKED_KEYS" "revoked keys" yes yes no no no no
-test_all "$UNREVOKED_KEYS" "unrevoked keys" no no no no no no
-test_all "$REVOKED_CERTS" "revoked certs" yes yes yes yes yes yes
-test_all "$UNREVOKED_CERTS" "unrevoked certs" no no no no no yes
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/krl.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/krl.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/krl.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/krl.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+# $OpenBSD: krl.sh,v 1.6 2015/01/30 01:11:39 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="key revocation lists"
+
+# If we don't support ecdsa keys then this tell will be much slower.
+ECDSA=ecdsa
+if test "x$TEST_SSH_ECC" != "xyes"; then
+ ECDSA=rsa
+fi
+
+# Do most testing with ssh-keygen; it uses the same verification code as sshd.
+
+# Old keys will interfere with ssh-keygen.
+rm -f $OBJ/revoked-* $OBJ/krl-*
+
+# Generate a CA key
+$SSHKEYGEN -t $ECDSA -f $OBJ/revoked-ca -C "" -N "" > /dev/null ||
+ fatal "$SSHKEYGEN CA failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/revoked-ca2 -C "" -N "" > /dev/null ||
+ fatal "$SSHKEYGEN CA2 failed"
+
+# A specification that revokes some certificates by serial numbers
+# The serial pattern is chosen to ensure the KRL includes list, range and
+# bitmap sections.
+cat << EOF >> $OBJ/revoked-serials
+serial: 1-4
+serial: 10
+serial: 15
+serial: 30
+serial: 50
+serial: 999
+# The following sum to 500-799
+serial: 500
+serial: 501
+serial: 502
+serial: 503-600
+serial: 700-797
+serial: 798
+serial: 799
+serial: 599-701
+# Some multiple consecutive serial number ranges
+serial: 10000-20000
+serial: 30000-40000
+EOF
+
+# A specification that revokes some certificated by key ID.
+touch $OBJ/revoked-keyid
+for n in 1 2 3 4 10 15 30 50 `jot 500 300` 999 1000 1001 1002; do
+ test "x$n" = "x499" && continue
+ # Fill in by-ID revocation spec.
+ echo "id: revoked $n" >> $OBJ/revoked-keyid
+done
+
+keygen() {
+ N=$1
+ f=$OBJ/revoked-`printf "%04d" $N`
+ # Vary the keytype. We use mostly ECDSA since this is fastest by far.
+ keytype=$ECDSA
+ case $N in
+ 2 | 10 | 510 | 1001) keytype=rsa;;
+ 4 | 30 | 520 | 1002) keytype=ed25519;;
+ esac
+ $SSHKEYGEN -t $keytype -f $f -C "" -N "" > /dev/null \
+ || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN failed"
+ # Sign cert
+ $SSHKEYGEN -s $OBJ/revoked-ca -z $n -I "revoked $N" $f >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+ || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN sign failed"
+ echo $f
+}
+
+# Generate some keys.
+verbose "$tid: generating test keys"
+REVOKED_SERIALS="1 4 10 50 500 510 520 799 999"
+for n in $REVOKED_SERIALS ; do
+ f=`keygen $n`
+ RKEYS="$RKEYS ${f}.pub"
+ RCERTS="$RCERTS ${f}-cert.pub"
+done
+UNREVOKED_SERIALS="5 9 14 16 29 49 51 499 800 1010 1011"
+UNREVOKED=""
+for n in $UNREVOKED_SERIALS ; do
+ f=`keygen $n`
+ UKEYS="$UKEYS ${f}.pub"
+ UCERTS="$UCERTS ${f}-cert.pub"
+done
+
+genkrls() {
+ OPTS=$1
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-empty - </dev/null \
+ >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keys $RKEYS \
+ >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-cert $RCERTS \
+ >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-all $RKEYS $RCERTS \
+ >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-ca $OBJ/revoked-ca.pub \
+ >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+# This should fail as KRLs from serial/key-id spec need the CA specified.
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial $OBJ/revoked-serials \
+ >/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL succeeded unexpectedly"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid $OBJ/revoked-keyid \
+ >/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL succeeded unexpectedly"
+# These should succeed; they specify an explicit CA key.
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial -s $OBJ/revoked-ca \
+ $OBJ/revoked-serials >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid -s $OBJ/revoked-ca.pub \
+ $OBJ/revoked-keyid >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+# These should succeed; they specify an wildcard CA key.
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial-wild -s NONE $OBJ/revoked-serials \
+ >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid-wild -s NONE $OBJ/revoked-keyid \
+ >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+# Revoke the same serials with the second CA key to ensure a multi-CA
+# KRL is generated.
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial -u -s $OBJ/revoked-ca2 \
+ $OBJ/revoked-serials >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+}
+
+## XXX dump with trace and grep for set cert serials
+## XXX test ranges near (u64)-1, etc.
+
+verbose "$tid: generating KRLs"
+genkrls
+
+check_krl() {
+ KEY=$1
+ KRL=$2
+ EXPECT_REVOKED=$3
+ TAG=$4
+ $SSHKEYGEN -Qf $KRL $KEY >/dev/null
+ result=$?
+ if test "x$EXPECT_REVOKED" = "xyes" -a $result -eq 0 ; then
+ fatal "key $KEY not revoked by KRL $KRL: $TAG"
+ elif test "x$EXPECT_REVOKED" = "xno" -a $result -ne 0 ; then
+ fatal "key $KEY unexpectedly revoked by KRL $KRL: $TAG"
+ fi
+}
+test_rev() {
+ FILES=$1
+ TAG=$2
+ KEYS_RESULT=$3
+ ALL_RESULT=$4
+ SERIAL_RESULT=$5
+ KEYID_RESULT=$6
+ CERTS_RESULT=$7
+ CA_RESULT=$8
+ SERIAL_WRESULT=$9
+ KEYID_WRESULT=$10
+ verbose "$tid: checking revocations for $TAG"
+ for f in $FILES ; do
+ check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-empty no "$TAG"
+ check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keys $KEYS_RESULT "$TAG"
+ check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-all $ALL_RESULT "$TAG"
+ check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-serial $SERIAL_RESULT "$TAG"
+ check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keyid $KEYID_RESULT "$TAG"
+ check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-cert $CERTS_RESULT "$TAG"
+ check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-ca $CA_RESULT "$TAG"
+ check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-serial-wild $SERIAL_WRESULT "$TAG"
+ check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keyid-wild $KEYID_WRESULT "$TAG"
+ done
+}
+
+test_all() {
+ # wildcard
+ # keys all sr# k.ID cert CA sr.# k.ID
+ test_rev "$RKEYS" "revoked keys" yes yes no no no no no no
+ test_rev "$UKEYS" "unrevoked keys" no no no no no no no no
+ test_rev "$RCERTS" "revoked certs" yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
+ test_rev "$UCERTS" "unrevoked certs" no no no no no yes no no
+}
+
+test_all
+
+# Check update. Results should be identical.
+verbose "$tid: testing KRL update"
+for f in $OBJ/krl-keys $OBJ/krl-cert $OBJ/krl-all \
+ $OBJ/krl-ca $OBJ/krl-serial $OBJ/krl-keyid \
+ $OBJ/krl-serial-wild $OBJ/krl-keyid-wild; do
+ cp -f $OBJ/krl-empty $f
+ genkrls -u
+done
+
+test_all
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/limit-keytype.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/limit-keytype.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/limit-keytype.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/limit-keytype.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+# $OpenBSD: limit-keytype.sh,v 1.4 2015/10/29 08:05:17 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="restrict pubkey type"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key*
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER $OBJ/cert_user_key*
+
+mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig
+
+# Create a CA key
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\
+ fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+
+# Make some keys and a certificate.
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \
+ fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \
+ fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/user_key3 || \
+ fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t dsa -f $OBJ/user_key4 || \
+ fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+ -z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/user_key3 ||
+ fatal "couldn't sign user_key1"
+# Copy the private key alongside the cert to allow better control of when
+# it is offered.
+mv $OBJ/user_key3-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key3.pub
+
+grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+opts="-oProtocol=2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes"
+certopts="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key3.pub"
+
+echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+cat $OBJ/user_key2.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+
+prepare_config() {
+ (
+ grep -v "Protocol" $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+ echo "Protocol 2"
+ echo "AuthenticationMethods publickey"
+ echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
+ echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
+ for x in "$@" ; do
+ echo "$x"
+ done
+ ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+}
+
+prepare_config
+
+# Check we can log in with all key types.
+${SSH} $certopts proxy true || fatal "cert failed"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed"
+
+# Allow plain Ed25519 and RSA. The certificate should fail.
+verbose "allow rsa,ed25519"
+prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ssh-rsa,ssh-ed25519"
+${SSH} $certopts proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed"
+
+# Allow Ed25519 only.
+verbose "allow ed25519"
+prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ssh-ed25519"
+${SSH} $certopts proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true && fatal "key2 succeeded"
+
+# Allow all certs. Plain keys should fail.
+verbose "allow cert only"
+prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ssh-*-cert-v01 at openssh.com"
+${SSH} $certopts proxy true || fatal "cert failed"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true && fatal "key1 succeeded"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true && fatal "key2 succeeded"
+
+# Allow RSA in main config, Ed25519 for non-existent user.
+verbose "match w/ no match"
+prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ssh-rsa" \
+ "Match user x$USER" "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +ssh-ed25519"
+${SSH} $certopts proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true && fatal "key1 succeeded"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed"
+
+# Allow only DSA in main config, Ed25519 for user.
+verbose "match w/ matching"
+prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ssh-dss" \
+ "Match user $USER" "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +ssh-ed25519"
+${SSH} $certopts proxy true || fatal "cert failed"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key4 proxy true && fatal "key4 succeeded"
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/localcommand.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/localcommand.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/localcommand.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: localcommand.sh,v 1.2 2013/05/17 10:24:48 dtucker Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="localcommand"
-
-echo 'PermitLocalCommand yes' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
-echo 'LocalCommand echo foo' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
-
-for p in 1 2; do
- verbose "test $tid: proto $p localcommand"
- a=`${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -$p somehost true`
- if [ "$a" != "foo" ] ; then
- fail "$tid proto $p"
- fi
-done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/localcommand.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/localcommand.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/localcommand.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/localcommand.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# $OpenBSD: localcommand.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="localcommand"
+
+echo 'PermitLocalCommand yes' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+echo 'LocalCommand echo foo' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ verbose "test $tid: proto $p localcommand"
+ a=`${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -$p somehost true`
+ if [ "$a" != "foo" ] ; then
+ fail "$tid proto $p"
+ fi
+done
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/login-timeout.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/login-timeout.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/login-timeout.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: login-timeout.sh,v 1.6 2014/02/27 20:04:16 djm Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="connect after login grace timeout"
-
-trace "test login grace with privsep"
-cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_config.orig
-grep -vi LoginGraceTime $OBJ/sshd_config.orig > $OBJ/sshd_config
-echo "LoginGraceTime 10s" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
-echo "MaxStartups 1" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
-start_sshd
-
-(echo SSH-2.0-fake; sleep 60) | telnet 127.0.0.1 ${PORT} >/dev/null 2>&1 &
-sleep 15
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
-if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh connect after login grace timeout failed with privsep"
-fi
-
-$SUDO kill `$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
-
-trace "test login grace without privsep"
-echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
-start_sshd
-
-(echo SSH-2.0-fake; sleep 60) | telnet 127.0.0.1 ${PORT} >/dev/null 2>&1 &
-sleep 15
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
-if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh connect after login grace timeout failed without privsep"
-fi
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/login-timeout.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/login-timeout.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/login-timeout.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/login-timeout.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# $OpenBSD: login-timeout.sh,v 1.7 2014/03/13 20:44:49 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="connect after login grace timeout"
+
+trace "test login grace with privsep"
+cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_config.orig
+grep -vi LoginGraceTime $OBJ/sshd_config.orig > $OBJ/sshd_config
+echo "LoginGraceTime 10s" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+echo "MaxStartups 1" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+start_sshd
+
+(echo SSH-2.0-fake; sleep 60) | telnet 127.0.0.1 ${PORT} >/dev/null 2>&1 &
+sleep 15
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh connect after login grace timeout failed with privsep"
+fi
+
+$SUDO kill `$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
+
+trace "test login grace without privsep"
+echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+start_sshd
+sleep 1
+
+(echo SSH-2.0-fake; sleep 60) | telnet 127.0.0.1 ${PORT} >/dev/null 2>&1 &
+sleep 15
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh connect after login grace timeout failed without privsep"
+fi
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/modpipe.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/modpipe.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/modpipe.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-/* $OpenBSD: modpipe.c,v 1.6 2013/11/21 03:16:47 djm Exp $ */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include "openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c"
-
-static void err(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
-static void errx(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
-
-static void
-err(int r, const char *fmt, ...)
-{
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", strerror(errno));
- vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
- fputc('\n', stderr);
- va_end(args);
- exit(r);
-}
-
-static void
-errx(int r, const char *fmt, ...)
-{
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
- fputc('\n', stderr);
- va_end(args);
- exit(r);
-}
-
-static void
-usage(void)
-{
- fprintf(stderr, "Usage: modpipe -w [-m modspec ...] < in > out\n");
- fprintf(stderr, "modspec is one of:\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " xor:offset:value - XOR \"value\" at \"offset\"\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " andor:offset:val1:val2 - AND \"val1\" then OR \"val2\" at \"offset\"\n");
- exit(1);
-}
-
-#define MAX_MODIFICATIONS 256
-struct modification {
- enum { MOD_XOR, MOD_AND_OR } what;
- unsigned long long offset;
- u_int8_t m1, m2;
-};
-
-static void
-parse_modification(const char *s, struct modification *m)
-{
- char what[16+1];
- int n, m1, m2;
-
- bzero(m, sizeof(*m));
- if ((n = sscanf(s, "%16[^:]%*[:]%llu%*[:]%i%*[:]%i",
- what, &m->offset, &m1, &m2)) < 3)
- errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s);
- if (strcasecmp(what, "xor") == 0) {
- if (n > 3)
- errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s);
- if (m1 < 0 || m1 > 0xff)
- errx(1, "Invalid XOR modification value");
- m->what = MOD_XOR;
- m->m1 = m1;
- } else if (strcasecmp(what, "andor") == 0) {
- if (n != 4)
- errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s);
- if (m1 < 0 || m1 > 0xff)
- errx(1, "Invalid AND modification value");
- if (m2 < 0 || m2 > 0xff)
- errx(1, "Invalid OR modification value");
- m->what = MOD_AND_OR;
- m->m1 = m1;
- m->m2 = m2;
- } else
- errx(1, "Invalid modification type \"%s\"", what);
-}
-
-int
-main(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- int ch;
- u_char buf[8192];
- size_t total;
- ssize_t r, s, o;
- struct modification mods[MAX_MODIFICATIONS];
- u_int i, wflag = 0, num_mods = 0;
-
- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "wm:")) != -1) {
- switch (ch) {
- case 'm':
- if (num_mods >= MAX_MODIFICATIONS)
- errx(1, "Too many modifications");
- parse_modification(optarg, &(mods[num_mods++]));
- break;
- case 'w':
- wflag = 1;
- break;
- default:
- usage();
- /* NOTREACHED */
- }
- }
- for (total = 0;;) {
- r = s = read(STDIN_FILENO, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (r == 0)
- break;
- if (r < 0) {
- if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
- continue;
- err(1, "read");
- }
- for (i = 0; i < num_mods; i++) {
- if (mods[i].offset < total ||
- mods[i].offset >= total + s)
- continue;
- switch (mods[i].what) {
- case MOD_XOR:
- buf[mods[i].offset - total] ^= mods[i].m1;
- break;
- case MOD_AND_OR:
- buf[mods[i].offset - total] &= mods[i].m1;
- buf[mods[i].offset - total] |= mods[i].m2;
- break;
- }
- }
- for (o = 0; o < s; o += r) {
- r = write(STDOUT_FILENO, buf, s - o);
- if (r == 0)
- break;
- if (r < 0) {
- if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
- continue;
- err(1, "write");
- }
- }
- total += s;
- }
- /* Warn if modifications not reached in input stream */
- r = 0;
- for (i = 0; wflag && i < num_mods; i++) {
- if (mods[i].offset < total)
- continue;
- r = 1;
- fprintf(stderr, "modpipe: warning - mod %u not reached\n", i);
- }
- return r;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/modpipe.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/modpipe.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/modpipe.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/modpipe.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: modpipe.c,v 1.6 2013/11/21 03:16:47 djm Exp $ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H
+# include <err.h>
+#endif
+#include "openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c"
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: modpipe -w [-m modspec ...] < in > out\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "modspec is one of:\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " xor:offset:value - XOR \"value\" at \"offset\"\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " andor:offset:val1:val2 - AND \"val1\" then OR \"val2\" at \"offset\"\n");
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+#define MAX_MODIFICATIONS 256
+struct modification {
+ enum { MOD_XOR, MOD_AND_OR } what;
+ unsigned long long offset;
+ u_int8_t m1, m2;
+};
+
+static void
+parse_modification(const char *s, struct modification *m)
+{
+ char what[16+1];
+ int n, m1, m2;
+
+ bzero(m, sizeof(*m));
+ if ((n = sscanf(s, "%16[^:]%*[:]%llu%*[:]%i%*[:]%i",
+ what, &m->offset, &m1, &m2)) < 3)
+ errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s);
+ if (strcasecmp(what, "xor") == 0) {
+ if (n > 3)
+ errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s);
+ if (m1 < 0 || m1 > 0xff)
+ errx(1, "Invalid XOR modification value");
+ m->what = MOD_XOR;
+ m->m1 = m1;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(what, "andor") == 0) {
+ if (n != 4)
+ errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s);
+ if (m1 < 0 || m1 > 0xff)
+ errx(1, "Invalid AND modification value");
+ if (m2 < 0 || m2 > 0xff)
+ errx(1, "Invalid OR modification value");
+ m->what = MOD_AND_OR;
+ m->m1 = m1;
+ m->m2 = m2;
+ } else
+ errx(1, "Invalid modification type \"%s\"", what);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ int ch;
+ u_char buf[8192];
+ size_t total;
+ ssize_t r, s, o;
+ struct modification mods[MAX_MODIFICATIONS];
+ u_int i, wflag = 0, num_mods = 0;
+
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "wm:")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'm':
+ if (num_mods >= MAX_MODIFICATIONS)
+ errx(1, "Too many modifications");
+ parse_modification(optarg, &(mods[num_mods++]));
+ break;
+ case 'w':
+ wflag = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ usage();
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ }
+ }
+ for (total = 0;;) {
+ r = s = read(STDIN_FILENO, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (r == 0)
+ break;
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ err(1, "read");
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < num_mods; i++) {
+ if (mods[i].offset < total ||
+ mods[i].offset >= total + s)
+ continue;
+ switch (mods[i].what) {
+ case MOD_XOR:
+ buf[mods[i].offset - total] ^= mods[i].m1;
+ break;
+ case MOD_AND_OR:
+ buf[mods[i].offset - total] &= mods[i].m1;
+ buf[mods[i].offset - total] |= mods[i].m2;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ for (o = 0; o < s; o += r) {
+ r = write(STDOUT_FILENO, buf, s - o);
+ if (r == 0)
+ break;
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ err(1, "write");
+ }
+ }
+ total += s;
+ }
+ /* Warn if modifications not reached in input stream */
+ r = 0;
+ for (i = 0; wflag && i < num_mods; i++) {
+ if (mods[i].offset < total)
+ continue;
+ r = 1;
+ fprintf(stderr, "modpipe: warning - mod %u not reached\n", i);
+ }
+ return r;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/multiplex.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/multiplex.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/multiplex.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.21 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-CTL=/tmp/openssh.regress.ctl-sock.$$
-
-tid="connection multiplexing"
-
-if config_defined DISABLE_FD_PASSING ; then
- echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)"
- exit 0
-fi
-
-P=3301 # test port
-
-wait_for_mux_master_ready()
-{
- for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do
- ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost \
- >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0
- sleep $i
- done
- fatal "mux master never becomes ready"
-}
-
-start_sshd
-
-start_mux_master()
-{
- trace "start master, fork to background"
- ${SSH} -Nn2 -MS$CTL -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" somehost \
- -E $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 &
- MASTER_PID=$!
- wait_for_mux_master_ready
-}
-
-start_mux_master
-
-verbose "test $tid: envpass"
-trace "env passing over multiplexed connection"
-_XXX_TEST=blah ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" -S$CTL otherhost sh << 'EOF'
- test X"$_XXX_TEST" = X"blah"
-EOF
-if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "environment not found"
-fi
-
-verbose "test $tid: transfer"
-rm -f ${COPY}
-trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S$CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
-test -f ${COPY} || fail "ssh -Sctl: failed copy ${DATA}"
-cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh -Sctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
-
-rm -f ${COPY}
-trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
-test -f ${COPY} || fail "ssh -S ctl: failed copy ${DATA}"
-cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh -S ctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
-
-rm -f ${COPY}
-trace "sftp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
-echo "get ${DATA} ${COPY}" | \
- ${SFTP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1
-test -f ${COPY} || fail "sftp: failed copy ${DATA}"
-cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "sftp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
-
-rm -f ${COPY}
-trace "scp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
-${SCP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost:${DATA} ${COPY} >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1
-test -f ${COPY} || fail "scp: failed copy ${DATA}"
-cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "scp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
-
-rm -f ${COPY}
-
-for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do
- trace "exit status $s over multiplexed connection"
- verbose "test $tid: status $s"
- ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost exit $s
- r=$?
- if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
- fail "exit code mismatch for protocol $p: $r != $s"
- fi
-
- # same with early close of stdout/err
- trace "exit status $s with early close over multiplexed connection"
- ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -n otherhost \
- exec sh -c \'"sleep 2; exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 3; exit $s"\'
- r=$?
- if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
- fail "exit code (with sleep) mismatch for protocol $p: $r != $s"
- fi
-done
-
-verbose "test $tid: cmd check"
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
- || fail "check command failed"
-
-verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local"
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
- || fail "request local forward failed"
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
- || fail "connect to local forward port failed"
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
- || fail "cancel local forward failed"
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
- && fail "local forward port still listening"
-
-verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote"
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
- || fail "request remote forward failed"
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
- || fail "connect to remote forwarded port failed"
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
- || fail "cancel remote forward failed"
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
- && fail "remote forward port still listening"
-
-verbose "test $tid: cmd exit"
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oexit otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
- || fail "send exit command failed"
-
-# Wait for master to exit
-wait $MASTER_PID
-kill -0 $MASTER_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "exit command failed"
-
-# Restart master and test -O stop command with master using -N
-verbose "test $tid: cmd stop"
-trace "restart master, fork to background"
-start_mux_master
-
-# start a long-running command then immediately request a stop
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost "sleep 10; exit 0" \
- >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 &
-SLEEP_PID=$!
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ostop otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
- || fail "send stop command failed"
-
-# wait until both long-running command and master have exited.
-wait $SLEEP_PID
-[ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for concurrent command"
-wait $MASTER_PID
-[ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for master stop"
-kill -0 $MASTER_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "stop command failed"
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/multiplex.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/multiplex.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/multiplex.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/multiplex.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+# $OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.27 2014/12/22 06:14:29 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+CTL=/tmp/openssh.regress.ctl-sock.$$
+
+tid="connection multiplexing"
+
+NC=$OBJ/netcat
+
+trace "will use ProxyCommand $proxycmd"
+if config_defined DISABLE_FD_PASSING ; then
+ echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)"
+ exit 0
+fi
+
+P=3301 # test port
+
+wait_for_mux_master_ready()
+{
+ for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost \
+ >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0
+ sleep $i
+ done
+ fatal "mux master never becomes ready"
+}
+
+start_sshd
+
+start_mux_master()
+{
+ trace "start master, fork to background"
+ ${SSH} -Nn2 -MS$CTL -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" somehost \
+ -E $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 &
+ # NB. $SSH_PID will be killed by test-exec.sh:cleanup on fatal errors.
+ SSH_PID=$!
+ wait_for_mux_master_ready
+}
+
+start_mux_master
+
+verbose "test $tid: envpass"
+trace "env passing over multiplexed connection"
+_XXX_TEST=blah ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" -S$CTL otherhost sh << 'EOF'
+ test X"$_XXX_TEST" = X"blah"
+EOF
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "environment not found"
+fi
+
+verbose "test $tid: transfer"
+rm -f ${COPY}
+trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S$CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+test -f ${COPY} || fail "ssh -Sctl: failed copy ${DATA}"
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh -Sctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+test -f ${COPY} || fail "ssh -S ctl: failed copy ${DATA}"
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh -S ctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+trace "sftp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
+echo "get ${DATA} ${COPY}" | \
+ ${SFTP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1
+test -f ${COPY} || fail "sftp: failed copy ${DATA}"
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "sftp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+trace "scp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
+${SCP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost:${DATA} ${COPY} >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1
+test -f ${COPY} || fail "scp: failed copy ${DATA}"
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "scp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+verbose "test $tid: forward"
+trace "forward over TCP/IP and check result"
+$NC -N -l 127.0.0.1 $((${PORT} + 1)) < ${DATA} > /dev/null &
+netcat_pid=$!
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L127.0.0.1:$((${PORT} + 2)):127.0.0.1:$((${PORT} + 1)) otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1
+$NC 127.0.0.1 $((${PORT} + 2)) < /dev/null > ${COPY}
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+kill $netcat_pid 2>/dev/null
+rm -f ${COPY} $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd
+
+trace "forward over UNIX and check result"
+$NC -N -Ul $OBJ/unix-1.fwd < ${DATA} > /dev/null &
+netcat_pid=$!
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L$OBJ/unix-2.fwd:$OBJ/unix-1.fwd otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R$OBJ/unix-3.fwd:$OBJ/unix-2.fwd otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1
+$NC -U $OBJ/unix-3.fwd < /dev/null > ${COPY} 2>/dev/null
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+kill $netcat_pid 2>/dev/null
+rm -f ${COPY} $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd
+
+for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do
+ trace "exit status $s over multiplexed connection"
+ verbose "test $tid: status $s"
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost exit $s
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
+ fail "exit code mismatch for protocol $p: $r != $s"
+ fi
+
+ # same with early close of stdout/err
+ trace "exit status $s with early close over multiplexed connection"
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -n otherhost \
+ exec sh -c \'"sleep 2; exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 3; exit $s"\'
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
+ fail "exit code (with sleep) mismatch for protocol $p: $r != $s"
+ fi
+done
+
+verbose "test $tid: cmd check"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
+ || fail "check command failed"
+
+verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local (TCP)"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+ || fail "request local forward failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
+ || fail "connect to local forward port failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+ || fail "cancel local forward failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
+ && fail "local forward port still listening"
+
+verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote (TCP)"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+ || fail "request remote forward failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
+ || fail "connect to remote forwarded port failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+ || fail "cancel remote forward failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
+ && fail "remote forward port still listening"
+
+verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local (UNIX)"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+ || fail "request local forward failed"
+echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | grep "Protocol mismatch" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+ || fail "connect to local forward path failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -L $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+ || fail "cancel local forward failed"
+N=$(echo "xyzzy" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd 2>&1 | grep "xyzzy" | wc -l)
+test ${N} -eq 0 || fail "local forward path still listening"
+rm -f $OBJ/unix-1.fwd
+
+verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote (UNIX)"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+ || fail "request remote forward failed"
+echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | grep "Protocol mismatch" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+ || fail "connect to remote forwarded path failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -R $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+ || fail "cancel remote forward failed"
+N=$(echo "xyzzy" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd 2>&1 | grep "xyzzy" | wc -l)
+test ${N} -eq 0 || fail "remote forward path still listening"
+rm -f $OBJ/unix-1.fwd
+
+verbose "test $tid: cmd exit"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oexit otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
+ || fail "send exit command failed"
+
+# Wait for master to exit
+wait $SSH_PID
+kill -0 $SSH_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "exit command failed"
+
+# Restart master and test -O stop command with master using -N
+verbose "test $tid: cmd stop"
+trace "restart master, fork to background"
+start_mux_master
+
+# start a long-running command then immediately request a stop
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost "sleep 10; exit 0" \
+ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 &
+SLEEP_PID=$!
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ostop otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
+ || fail "send stop command failed"
+
+# wait until both long-running command and master have exited.
+wait $SLEEP_PID
+[ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for concurrent command"
+wait $SSH_PID
+[ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for master stop"
+kill -0 $SSH_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "stop command failed"
+SSH_PID="" # Already gone, so don't kill in cleanup
+
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/multipubkey.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/multipubkey.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/multipubkey.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/multipubkey.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+# $OpenBSD: multipubkey.sh,v 1.1 2014/12/22 08:06:03 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="multiple pubkey"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key*
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER $OBJ/cert_user_key*
+
+mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig
+
+# Create a CA key
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\
+ fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+
+# Make some keys and a certificate.
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \
+ fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \
+ fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+ -z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/user_key1 ||
+ fail "couldn't sign user_key1"
+# Copy the private key alongside the cert to allow better control of when
+# it is offered.
+mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1.pub
+cp -p $OBJ/user_key1 $OBJ/cert_user_key1
+
+grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+opts="-oProtocol=2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes"
+opts="$opts -i $OBJ/cert_user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key2"
+
+for privsep in no yes; do
+ (
+ grep -v "Protocol" $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+ echo "Protocol 2"
+ echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
+ echo "AuthenticationMethods publickey,publickey"
+ echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
+ echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
+ ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+ # Single key should fail.
+ rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+ cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ ${SSH} $opts proxy true && fail "ssh succeeded with key"
+
+ # Single key with same-public cert should fail.
+ echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+ cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ ${SSH} $opts proxy true && fail "ssh succeeded with key+cert"
+
+ # Multiple plain keys should succeed.
+ rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+ cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub $OBJ/user_key2.pub > \
+ $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ ${SSH} $opts proxy true || fail "ssh failed with multiple keys"
+ # Cert and different key should succeed
+
+ # Key and different-public cert should succeed.
+ echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+ cat $OBJ/user_key2.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ ${SSH} $opts proxy true || fail "ssh failed with key/cert"
+done
+
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/netcat.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/netcat.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/netcat.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/netcat.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1659 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: netcat.c,v 1.126 2014/10/30 16:08:31 tedu Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Eric Jackson <ericj at monkey.org>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Re-written nc(1) for OpenBSD. Original implementation by
+ * *Hobbit* <hobbit at avian.org>.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/tcp.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+# include <sys/poll.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H
+# include <err.h>
+#endif
+
+/* Telnet options from arpa/telnet.h */
+#define IAC 255
+#define DONT 254
+#define DO 253
+#define WONT 252
+#define WILL 251
+
+#ifndef SUN_LEN
+#define SUN_LEN(su) \
+ (sizeof(*(su)) - sizeof((su)->sun_path) + strlen((su)->sun_path))
+#endif
+
+#define PORT_MAX 65535
+#define PORT_MAX_LEN 6
+#define UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE 19
+
+#define POLL_STDIN 0
+#define POLL_NETOUT 1
+#define POLL_NETIN 2
+#define POLL_STDOUT 3
+#define BUFSIZE 16384
+
+/* Command Line Options */
+int dflag; /* detached, no stdin */
+int Fflag; /* fdpass sock to stdout */
+unsigned int iflag; /* Interval Flag */
+int kflag; /* More than one connect */
+int lflag; /* Bind to local port */
+int Nflag; /* shutdown() network socket */
+int nflag; /* Don't do name look up */
+char *Pflag; /* Proxy username */
+char *pflag; /* Localport flag */
+int rflag; /* Random ports flag */
+char *sflag; /* Source Address */
+int tflag; /* Telnet Emulation */
+int uflag; /* UDP - Default to TCP */
+int vflag; /* Verbosity */
+int xflag; /* Socks proxy */
+int zflag; /* Port Scan Flag */
+int Dflag; /* sodebug */
+int Iflag; /* TCP receive buffer size */
+int Oflag; /* TCP send buffer size */
+int Sflag; /* TCP MD5 signature option */
+int Tflag = -1; /* IP Type of Service */
+int rtableid = -1;
+
+int timeout = -1;
+int family = AF_UNSPEC;
+char *portlist[PORT_MAX+1];
+char *unix_dg_tmp_socket;
+
+void atelnet(int, unsigned char *, unsigned int);
+void build_ports(char *);
+void help(void);
+int local_listen(char *, char *, struct addrinfo);
+void readwrite(int);
+void fdpass(int nfd) __attribute__((noreturn));
+int remote_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo);
+int timeout_connect(int, const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t);
+int socks_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo,
+ const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, int, const char *);
+int udptest(int);
+int unix_bind(char *);
+int unix_connect(char *);
+int unix_listen(char *);
+void set_common_sockopts(int);
+int map_tos(char *, int *);
+void report_connect(const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t);
+void usage(int);
+ssize_t drainbuf(int, unsigned char *, size_t *);
+ssize_t fillbuf(int, unsigned char *, size_t *);
+
+
+int
+main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ int ch, s, ret, socksv;
+ char *host, *uport;
+ struct addrinfo hints;
+ struct servent *sv;
+ socklen_t len;
+ struct sockaddr_storage cliaddr;
+ char *proxy = NULL;
+ const char *errstr, *proxyhost = "", *proxyport = NULL;
+ struct addrinfo proxyhints;
+ char unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf[UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE];
+
+ ret = 1;
+ s = 0;
+ socksv = 5;
+ host = NULL;
+ uport = NULL;
+ sv = NULL;
+
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
+ "46DdFhI:i:klNnO:P:p:rSs:tT:UuV:vw:X:x:z")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ case '4':
+ family = AF_INET;
+ break;
+ case '6':
+ family = AF_INET6;
+ break;
+ case 'U':
+ family = AF_UNIX;
+ break;
+ case 'X':
+ if (strcasecmp(optarg, "connect") == 0)
+ socksv = -1; /* HTTP proxy CONNECT */
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "4") == 0)
+ socksv = 4; /* SOCKS v.4 */
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "5") == 0)
+ socksv = 5; /* SOCKS v.5 */
+ else
+ errx(1, "unsupported proxy protocol");
+ break;
+ case 'd':
+ dflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'F':
+ Fflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'h':
+ help();
+ break;
+ case 'i':
+ iflag = strtonum(optarg, 0, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr)
+ errx(1, "interval %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'k':
+ kflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'l':
+ lflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'N':
+ Nflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'n':
+ nflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'P':
+ Pflag = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ pflag = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'r':
+ rflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ sflag = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 't':
+ tflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'u':
+ uflag = 1;
+ break;
+#ifdef SO_RTABLE
+ case 'V':
+ rtableid = (int)strtonum(optarg, 0,
+ RT_TABLEID_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr)
+ errx(1, "rtable %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case 'v':
+ vflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'w':
+ timeout = strtonum(optarg, 0, INT_MAX / 1000, &errstr);
+ if (errstr)
+ errx(1, "timeout %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
+ timeout *= 1000;
+ break;
+ case 'x':
+ xflag = 1;
+ if ((proxy = strdup(optarg)) == NULL)
+ errx(1, "strdup");
+ break;
+ case 'z':
+ zflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'D':
+ Dflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'I':
+ Iflag = strtonum(optarg, 1, 65536 << 14, &errstr);
+ if (errstr != NULL)
+ errx(1, "TCP receive window %s: %s",
+ errstr, optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'O':
+ Oflag = strtonum(optarg, 1, 65536 << 14, &errstr);
+ if (errstr != NULL)
+ errx(1, "TCP send window %s: %s",
+ errstr, optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'S':
+ Sflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'T':
+ errstr = NULL;
+ errno = 0;
+ if (map_tos(optarg, &Tflag))
+ break;
+ if (strlen(optarg) > 1 && optarg[0] == '0' &&
+ optarg[1] == 'x')
+ Tflag = (int)strtol(optarg, NULL, 16);
+ else
+ Tflag = (int)strtonum(optarg, 0, 255,
+ &errstr);
+ if (Tflag < 0 || Tflag > 255 || errstr || errno)
+ errx(1, "illegal tos value %s", optarg);
+ break;
+ default:
+ usage(1);
+ }
+ }
+ argc -= optind;
+ argv += optind;
+
+ /* Cruft to make sure options are clean, and used properly. */
+ if (argv[0] && !argv[1] && family == AF_UNIX) {
+ host = argv[0];
+ uport = NULL;
+ } else if (argv[0] && !argv[1]) {
+ if (!lflag)
+ usage(1);
+ uport = argv[0];
+ host = NULL;
+ } else if (argv[0] && argv[1]) {
+ host = argv[0];
+ uport = argv[1];
+ } else
+ usage(1);
+
+ if (lflag && sflag)
+ errx(1, "cannot use -s and -l");
+ if (lflag && pflag)
+ errx(1, "cannot use -p and -l");
+ if (lflag && zflag)
+ errx(1, "cannot use -z and -l");
+ if (!lflag && kflag)
+ errx(1, "must use -l with -k");
+
+ /* Get name of temporary socket for unix datagram client */
+ if ((family == AF_UNIX) && uflag && !lflag) {
+ if (sflag) {
+ unix_dg_tmp_socket = sflag;
+ } else {
+ strlcpy(unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf, "/tmp/nc.XXXXXXXXXX",
+ UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE);
+ if (mktemp(unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf) == NULL)
+ err(1, "mktemp");
+ unix_dg_tmp_socket = unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize addrinfo structure. */
+ if (family != AF_UNIX) {
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
+ hints.ai_family = family;
+ hints.ai_socktype = uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM;
+ hints.ai_protocol = uflag ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP;
+ if (nflag)
+ hints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICHOST;
+ }
+
+ if (xflag) {
+ if (uflag)
+ errx(1, "no proxy support for UDP mode");
+
+ if (lflag)
+ errx(1, "no proxy support for listen");
+
+ if (family == AF_UNIX)
+ errx(1, "no proxy support for unix sockets");
+
+ /* XXX IPv6 transport to proxy would probably work */
+ if (family == AF_INET6)
+ errx(1, "no proxy support for IPv6");
+
+ if (sflag)
+ errx(1, "no proxy support for local source address");
+
+ proxyhost = strsep(&proxy, ":");
+ proxyport = proxy;
+
+ memset(&proxyhints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
+ proxyhints.ai_family = family;
+ proxyhints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ proxyhints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
+ if (nflag)
+ proxyhints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICHOST;
+ }
+
+ if (lflag) {
+ int connfd;
+ ret = 0;
+
+ if (family == AF_UNIX) {
+ if (uflag)
+ s = unix_bind(host);
+ else
+ s = unix_listen(host);
+ }
+
+ /* Allow only one connection at a time, but stay alive. */
+ for (;;) {
+ if (family != AF_UNIX)
+ s = local_listen(host, uport, hints);
+ if (s < 0)
+ err(1, "local_listen");
+ /*
+ * For UDP and -k, don't connect the socket, let it
+ * receive datagrams from multiple socket pairs.
+ */
+ if (uflag && kflag)
+ readwrite(s);
+ /*
+ * For UDP and not -k, we will use recvfrom() initially
+ * to wait for a caller, then use the regular functions
+ * to talk to the caller.
+ */
+ else if (uflag && !kflag) {
+ int rv, plen;
+ char buf[16384];
+ struct sockaddr_storage z;
+
+ len = sizeof(z);
+ plen = 2048;
+ rv = recvfrom(s, buf, plen, MSG_PEEK,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&z, &len);
+ if (rv < 0)
+ err(1, "recvfrom");
+
+ rv = connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&z, len);
+ if (rv < 0)
+ err(1, "connect");
+
+ if (vflag)
+ report_connect((struct sockaddr *)&z, len);
+
+ readwrite(s);
+ } else {
+ len = sizeof(cliaddr);
+ connfd = accept(s, (struct sockaddr *)&cliaddr,
+ &len);
+ if (connfd == -1) {
+ /* For now, all errnos are fatal */
+ err(1, "accept");
+ }
+ if (vflag)
+ report_connect((struct sockaddr *)&cliaddr, len);
+
+ readwrite(connfd);
+ close(connfd);
+ }
+
+ if (family != AF_UNIX)
+ close(s);
+ else if (uflag) {
+ if (connect(s, NULL, 0) < 0)
+ err(1, "connect");
+ }
+
+ if (!kflag)
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if (family == AF_UNIX) {
+ ret = 0;
+
+ if ((s = unix_connect(host)) > 0 && !zflag) {
+ readwrite(s);
+ close(s);
+ } else
+ ret = 1;
+
+ if (uflag)
+ unlink(unix_dg_tmp_socket);
+ exit(ret);
+
+ } else {
+ int i = 0;
+
+ /* Construct the portlist[] array. */
+ build_ports(uport);
+
+ /* Cycle through portlist, connecting to each port. */
+ for (i = 0; portlist[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ if (s)
+ close(s);
+
+ if (xflag)
+ s = socks_connect(host, portlist[i], hints,
+ proxyhost, proxyport, proxyhints, socksv,
+ Pflag);
+ else
+ s = remote_connect(host, portlist[i], hints);
+
+ if (s < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ ret = 0;
+ if (vflag || zflag) {
+ /* For UDP, make sure we are connected. */
+ if (uflag) {
+ if (udptest(s) == -1) {
+ ret = 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Don't look up port if -n. */
+ if (nflag)
+ sv = NULL;
+ else {
+ sv = getservbyport(
+ ntohs(atoi(portlist[i])),
+ uflag ? "udp" : "tcp");
+ }
+
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Connection to %s %s port [%s/%s] "
+ "succeeded!\n", host, portlist[i],
+ uflag ? "udp" : "tcp",
+ sv ? sv->s_name : "*");
+ }
+ if (Fflag)
+ fdpass(s);
+ else if (!zflag)
+ readwrite(s);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s)
+ close(s);
+
+ exit(ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * unix_bind()
+ * Returns a unix socket bound to the given path
+ */
+int
+unix_bind(char *path)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_un sun_sa;
+ int s;
+
+ /* Create unix domain socket. */
+ if ((s = socket(AF_UNIX, uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM,
+ 0)) < 0)
+ return (-1);
+
+ memset(&sun_sa, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_un));
+ sun_sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+
+ if (strlcpy(sun_sa.sun_path, path, sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) >=
+ sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) {
+ close(s);
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sun_sa, SUN_LEN(&sun_sa)) < 0) {
+ close(s);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ return (s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * unix_connect()
+ * Returns a socket connected to a local unix socket. Returns -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+unix_connect(char *path)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_un sun_sa;
+ int s;
+
+ if (uflag) {
+ if ((s = unix_bind(unix_dg_tmp_socket)) < 0)
+ return (-1);
+ } else {
+ if ((s = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ (void)fcntl(s, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+
+ memset(&sun_sa, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_un));
+ sun_sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+
+ if (strlcpy(sun_sa.sun_path, path, sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) >=
+ sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) {
+ close(s);
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sun_sa, SUN_LEN(&sun_sa)) < 0) {
+ close(s);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ return (s);
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * unix_listen()
+ * Create a unix domain socket, and listen on it.
+ */
+int
+unix_listen(char *path)
+{
+ int s;
+ if ((s = unix_bind(path)) < 0)
+ return (-1);
+
+ if (listen(s, 5) < 0) {
+ close(s);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ return (s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * remote_connect()
+ * Returns a socket connected to a remote host. Properly binds to a local
+ * port or source address if needed. Returns -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+remote_connect(const char *host, const char *port, struct addrinfo hints)
+{
+ struct addrinfo *res, *res0;
+ int s, error;
+#if defined(SO_RTABLE) || defined(SO_BINDANY)
+ int on = 1;
+#endif
+
+ if ((error = getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &res)))
+ errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error));
+
+ res0 = res;
+ do {
+ if ((s = socket(res0->ai_family, res0->ai_socktype,
+ res0->ai_protocol)) < 0)
+ continue;
+
+#ifdef SO_RTABLE
+ if (rtableid >= 0 && (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE,
+ &rtableid, sizeof(rtableid)) == -1))
+ err(1, "setsockopt SO_RTABLE");
+#endif
+ /* Bind to a local port or source address if specified. */
+ if (sflag || pflag) {
+ struct addrinfo ahints, *ares;
+
+#ifdef SO_BINDANY
+ /* try SO_BINDANY, but don't insist */
+ setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDANY, &on, sizeof(on));
+#endif
+ memset(&ahints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
+ ahints.ai_family = res0->ai_family;
+ ahints.ai_socktype = uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM;
+ ahints.ai_protocol = uflag ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP;
+ ahints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+ if ((error = getaddrinfo(sflag, pflag, &ahints, &ares)))
+ errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error));
+
+ if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)ares->ai_addr,
+ ares->ai_addrlen) < 0)
+ err(1, "bind failed");
+ freeaddrinfo(ares);
+ }
+
+ set_common_sockopts(s);
+
+ if (timeout_connect(s, res0->ai_addr, res0->ai_addrlen) == 0)
+ break;
+ else if (vflag)
+ warn("connect to %s port %s (%s) failed", host, port,
+ uflag ? "udp" : "tcp");
+
+ close(s);
+ s = -1;
+ } while ((res0 = res0->ai_next) != NULL);
+
+ freeaddrinfo(res);
+
+ return (s);
+}
+
+int
+timeout_connect(int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen)
+{
+ struct pollfd pfd;
+ socklen_t optlen;
+ int flags = 0, optval;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (timeout != -1) {
+ flags = fcntl(s, F_GETFL, 0);
+ if (fcntl(s, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) == -1)
+ err(1, "set non-blocking mode");
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = connect(s, name, namelen)) != 0 && errno == EINPROGRESS) {
+ pfd.fd = s;
+ pfd.events = POLLOUT;
+ if ((ret = poll(&pfd, 1, timeout)) == 1) {
+ optlen = sizeof(optval);
+ if ((ret = getsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR,
+ &optval, &optlen)) == 0) {
+ errno = optval;
+ ret = optval == 0 ? 0 : -1;
+ }
+ } else if (ret == 0) {
+ errno = ETIMEDOUT;
+ ret = -1;
+ } else
+ err(1, "poll failed");
+ }
+
+ if (timeout != -1 && fcntl(s, F_SETFL, flags) == -1)
+ err(1, "restoring flags");
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * local_listen()
+ * Returns a socket listening on a local port, binds to specified source
+ * address. Returns -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+local_listen(char *host, char *port, struct addrinfo hints)
+{
+ struct addrinfo *res, *res0;
+ int s, ret, x = 1;
+ int error;
+
+ /* Allow nodename to be null. */
+ hints.ai_flags |= AI_PASSIVE;
+
+ /*
+ * In the case of binding to a wildcard address
+ * default to binding to an ipv4 address.
+ */
+ if (host == NULL && hints.ai_family == AF_UNSPEC)
+ hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
+
+ if ((error = getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &res)))
+ errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error));
+
+ res0 = res;
+ do {
+ if ((s = socket(res0->ai_family, res0->ai_socktype,
+ res0->ai_protocol)) < 0)
+ continue;
+
+#ifdef SO_RTABLE
+ if (rtableid >= 0 && (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE,
+ &rtableid, sizeof(rtableid)) == -1))
+ err(1, "setsockopt SO_RTABLE");
+#endif
+#ifdef SO_REUSEPORT
+ ret = setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEPORT, &x, sizeof(x));
+ if (ret == -1)
+ err(1, "setsockopt");
+#endif
+ set_common_sockopts(s);
+
+ if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)res0->ai_addr,
+ res0->ai_addrlen) == 0)
+ break;
+
+ close(s);
+ s = -1;
+ } while ((res0 = res0->ai_next) != NULL);
+
+ if (!uflag && s != -1) {
+ if (listen(s, 1) < 0)
+ err(1, "listen");
+ }
+
+ freeaddrinfo(res);
+
+ return (s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * readwrite()
+ * Loop that polls on the network file descriptor and stdin.
+ */
+void
+readwrite(int net_fd)
+{
+ struct pollfd pfd[4];
+ int stdin_fd = STDIN_FILENO;
+ int stdout_fd = STDOUT_FILENO;
+ unsigned char netinbuf[BUFSIZE];
+ size_t netinbufpos = 0;
+ unsigned char stdinbuf[BUFSIZE];
+ size_t stdinbufpos = 0;
+ int n, num_fds;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ /* don't read from stdin if requested */
+ if (dflag)
+ stdin_fd = -1;
+
+ /* stdin */
+ pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = stdin_fd;
+ pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = POLLIN;
+
+ /* network out */
+ pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = net_fd;
+ pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = 0;
+
+ /* network in */
+ pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = net_fd;
+ pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = POLLIN;
+
+ /* stdout */
+ pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = stdout_fd;
+ pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = 0;
+
+ while (1) {
+ /* both inputs are gone, buffers are empty, we are done */
+ if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd == -1 && pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1
+ && stdinbufpos == 0 && netinbufpos == 0) {
+ close(net_fd);
+ return;
+ }
+ /* both outputs are gone, we can't continue */
+ if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd == -1 && pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd == -1) {
+ close(net_fd);
+ return;
+ }
+ /* listen and net in gone, queues empty, done */
+ if (lflag && pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1
+ && stdinbufpos == 0 && netinbufpos == 0) {
+ close(net_fd);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* help says -i is for "wait between lines sent". We read and
+ * write arbitrary amounts of data, and we don't want to start
+ * scanning for newlines, so this is as good as it gets */
+ if (iflag)
+ sleep(iflag);
+
+ /* poll */
+ num_fds = poll(pfd, 4, timeout);
+
+ /* treat poll errors */
+ if (num_fds == -1) {
+ close(net_fd);
+ err(1, "polling error");
+ }
+
+ /* timeout happened */
+ if (num_fds == 0)
+ return;
+
+ /* treat socket error conditions */
+ for (n = 0; n < 4; n++) {
+ if (pfd[n].revents & (POLLERR|POLLNVAL)) {
+ pfd[n].fd = -1;
+ }
+ }
+ /* reading is possible after HUP */
+ if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].events & POLLIN &&
+ pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLHUP &&
+ ! (pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLIN))
+ pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1;
+
+ if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].events & POLLIN &&
+ pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLHUP &&
+ ! (pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLIN))
+ pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
+
+ if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].revents & POLLHUP) {
+ if (Nflag)
+ shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, SHUT_WR);
+ pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1;
+ }
+ /* if HUP, stop watching stdout */
+ if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].revents & POLLHUP)
+ pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1;
+ /* if no net out, stop watching stdin */
+ if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd == -1)
+ pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1;
+ /* if no stdout, stop watching net in */
+ if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd == -1) {
+ if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd != -1)
+ shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, SHUT_RD);
+ pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
+ }
+
+ /* try to read from stdin */
+ if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLIN && stdinbufpos < BUFSIZE) {
+ ret = fillbuf(pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd, stdinbuf,
+ &stdinbufpos);
+ /* error or eof on stdin - remove from pfd */
+ if (ret == 0 || ret == -1)
+ pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1;
+ /* read something - poll net out */
+ if (stdinbufpos > 0)
+ pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = POLLOUT;
+ /* filled buffer - remove self from polling */
+ if (stdinbufpos == BUFSIZE)
+ pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = 0;
+ }
+ /* try to write to network */
+ if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].revents & POLLOUT && stdinbufpos > 0) {
+ ret = drainbuf(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, stdinbuf,
+ &stdinbufpos);
+ if (ret == -1)
+ pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1;
+ /* buffer empty - remove self from polling */
+ if (stdinbufpos == 0)
+ pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = 0;
+ /* buffer no longer full - poll stdin again */
+ if (stdinbufpos < BUFSIZE)
+ pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = POLLIN;
+ }
+ /* try to read from network */
+ if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLIN && netinbufpos < BUFSIZE) {
+ ret = fillbuf(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, netinbuf,
+ &netinbufpos);
+ if (ret == -1)
+ pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
+ /* eof on net in - remove from pfd */
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, SHUT_RD);
+ pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
+ }
+ /* read something - poll stdout */
+ if (netinbufpos > 0)
+ pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = POLLOUT;
+ /* filled buffer - remove self from polling */
+ if (netinbufpos == BUFSIZE)
+ pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = 0;
+ /* handle telnet */
+ if (tflag)
+ atelnet(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, netinbuf,
+ netinbufpos);
+ }
+ /* try to write to stdout */
+ if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].revents & POLLOUT && netinbufpos > 0) {
+ ret = drainbuf(pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd, netinbuf,
+ &netinbufpos);
+ if (ret == -1)
+ pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1;
+ /* buffer empty - remove self from polling */
+ if (netinbufpos == 0)
+ pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = 0;
+ /* buffer no longer full - poll net in again */
+ if (netinbufpos < BUFSIZE)
+ pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = POLLIN;
+ }
+
+ /* stdin gone and queue empty? */
+ if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd == -1 && stdinbufpos == 0) {
+ if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd != -1 && Nflag)
+ shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, SHUT_WR);
+ pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1;
+ }
+ /* net in gone and queue empty? */
+ if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1 && netinbufpos == 0) {
+ pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+ssize_t
+drainbuf(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t *bufpos)
+{
+ ssize_t n;
+ ssize_t adjust;
+
+ n = write(fd, buf, *bufpos);
+ /* don't treat EAGAIN, EINTR as error */
+ if (n == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
+ n = -2;
+ if (n <= 0)
+ return n;
+ /* adjust buffer */
+ adjust = *bufpos - n;
+ if (adjust > 0)
+ memmove(buf, buf + n, adjust);
+ *bufpos -= n;
+ return n;
+}
+
+
+ssize_t
+fillbuf(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t *bufpos)
+{
+ size_t num = BUFSIZE - *bufpos;
+ ssize_t n;
+
+ n = read(fd, buf + *bufpos, num);
+ /* don't treat EAGAIN, EINTR as error */
+ if (n == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
+ n = -2;
+ if (n <= 0)
+ return n;
+ *bufpos += n;
+ return n;
+}
+
+/*
+ * fdpass()
+ * Pass the connected file descriptor to stdout and exit.
+ */
+void
+fdpass(int nfd)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_SENDMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR))
+ struct msghdr msg;
+#ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+ union {
+ struct cmsghdr hdr;
+ char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
+ } cmsgbuf;
+ struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+#endif
+ struct iovec vec;
+ char ch = '\0';
+ struct pollfd pfd;
+ ssize_t r;
+
+ memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+ msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&nfd;
+ msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(nfd);
+#else
+ memset(&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof(cmsgbuf));
+ msg.msg_control = (caddr_t)&cmsgbuf.buf;
+ msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf);
+ cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+ cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
+ cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
+ cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
+ *(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg) = nfd;
+#endif
+
+ vec.iov_base = &ch;
+ vec.iov_len = 1;
+ msg.msg_iov = &vec;
+ msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+
+ bzero(&pfd, sizeof(pfd));
+ pfd.fd = STDOUT_FILENO;
+ for (;;) {
+ r = sendmsg(STDOUT_FILENO, &msg, 0);
+ if (r == -1) {
+ if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR) {
+ pfd.events = POLLOUT;
+ if (poll(&pfd, 1, -1) == -1)
+ err(1, "poll");
+ continue;
+ }
+ err(1, "sendmsg");
+ } else if (r == -1)
+ errx(1, "sendmsg: unexpected return value %zd", r);
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+ exit(0);
+#else
+ errx(1, "%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__);
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Deal with RFC 854 WILL/WONT DO/DONT negotiation. */
+void
+atelnet(int nfd, unsigned char *buf, unsigned int size)
+{
+ unsigned char *p, *end;
+ unsigned char obuf[4];
+
+ if (size < 3)
+ return;
+ end = buf + size - 2;
+
+ for (p = buf; p < end; p++) {
+ if (*p != IAC)
+ continue;
+
+ obuf[0] = IAC;
+ p++;
+ if ((*p == WILL) || (*p == WONT))
+ obuf[1] = DONT;
+ else if ((*p == DO) || (*p == DONT))
+ obuf[1] = WONT;
+ else
+ continue;
+
+ p++;
+ obuf[2] = *p;
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, nfd, obuf, 3) != 3)
+ warn("Write Error!");
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * build_ports()
+ * Build an array of ports in portlist[], listing each port
+ * that we should try to connect to.
+ */
+void
+build_ports(char *p)
+{
+ const char *errstr;
+ char *n;
+ int hi, lo, cp;
+ int x = 0;
+
+ if ((n = strchr(p, '-')) != NULL) {
+ *n = '\0';
+ n++;
+
+ /* Make sure the ports are in order: lowest->highest. */
+ hi = strtonum(n, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr)
+ errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, n);
+ lo = strtonum(p, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr)
+ errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, p);
+
+ if (lo > hi) {
+ cp = hi;
+ hi = lo;
+ lo = cp;
+ }
+
+ /* Load ports sequentially. */
+ for (cp = lo; cp <= hi; cp++) {
+ portlist[x] = calloc(1, PORT_MAX_LEN);
+ if (portlist[x] == NULL)
+ errx(1, "calloc");
+ snprintf(portlist[x], PORT_MAX_LEN, "%d", cp);
+ x++;
+ }
+
+ /* Randomly swap ports. */
+ if (rflag) {
+ int y;
+ char *c;
+
+ for (x = 0; x <= (hi - lo); x++) {
+ y = (arc4random() & 0xFFFF) % (hi - lo);
+ c = portlist[x];
+ portlist[x] = portlist[y];
+ portlist[y] = c;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ hi = strtonum(p, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr)
+ errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, p);
+ portlist[0] = strdup(p);
+ if (portlist[0] == NULL)
+ errx(1, "strdup");
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * udptest()
+ * Do a few writes to see if the UDP port is there.
+ * Fails once PF state table is full.
+ */
+int
+udptest(int s)
+{
+ int i, ret;
+
+ for (i = 0; i <= 3; i++) {
+ if (write(s, "X", 1) == 1)
+ ret = 1;
+ else
+ ret = -1;
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+void
+set_common_sockopts(int s)
+{
+ int x = 1;
+
+#ifdef TCP_MD5SIG
+ if (Sflag) {
+ if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_MD5SIG,
+ &x, sizeof(x)) == -1)
+ err(1, "setsockopt");
+ }
+#endif
+ if (Dflag) {
+ if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DEBUG,
+ &x, sizeof(x)) == -1)
+ err(1, "setsockopt");
+ }
+ if (Tflag != -1) {
+ if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS,
+ &Tflag, sizeof(Tflag)) == -1)
+ err(1, "set IP ToS");
+ }
+ if (Iflag) {
+ if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
+ &Iflag, sizeof(Iflag)) == -1)
+ err(1, "set TCP receive buffer size");
+ }
+ if (Oflag) {
+ if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF,
+ &Oflag, sizeof(Oflag)) == -1)
+ err(1, "set TCP send buffer size");
+ }
+}
+
+int
+map_tos(char *s, int *val)
+{
+ /* DiffServ Codepoints and other TOS mappings */
+ const struct toskeywords {
+ const char *keyword;
+ int val;
+ } *t, toskeywords[] = {
+ { "af11", IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 },
+ { "af12", IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 },
+ { "af13", IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 },
+ { "af21", IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 },
+ { "af22", IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 },
+ { "af23", IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 },
+ { "af31", IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 },
+ { "af32", IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 },
+ { "af33", IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 },
+ { "af41", IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 },
+ { "af42", IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 },
+ { "af43", IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 },
+ { "critical", IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP },
+ { "cs0", IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 },
+ { "cs1", IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 },
+ { "cs2", IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 },
+ { "cs3", IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 },
+ { "cs4", IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 },
+ { "cs5", IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 },
+ { "cs6", IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 },
+ { "cs7", IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 },
+ { "ef", IPTOS_DSCP_EF },
+ { "inetcontrol", IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL },
+ { "lowdelay", IPTOS_LOWDELAY },
+ { "netcontrol", IPTOS_PREC_NETCONTROL },
+ { "reliability", IPTOS_RELIABILITY },
+ { "throughput", IPTOS_THROUGHPUT },
+ { NULL, -1 },
+ };
+
+ for (t = toskeywords; t->keyword != NULL; t++) {
+ if (strcmp(s, t->keyword) == 0) {
+ *val = t->val;
+ return (1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+void
+report_connect(const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen)
+{
+ char remote_host[NI_MAXHOST];
+ char remote_port[NI_MAXSERV];
+ int herr;
+ int flags = NI_NUMERICSERV;
+
+ if (nflag)
+ flags |= NI_NUMERICHOST;
+
+ if ((herr = getnameinfo(sa, salen,
+ remote_host, sizeof(remote_host),
+ remote_port, sizeof(remote_port),
+ flags)) != 0) {
+ if (herr == EAI_SYSTEM)
+ err(1, "getnameinfo");
+ else
+ errx(1, "getnameinfo: %s", gai_strerror(herr));
+ }
+
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Connection from %s %s "
+ "received!\n", remote_host, remote_port);
+}
+
+void
+help(void)
+{
+ usage(0);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\tCommand Summary:\n\
+ \t-4 Use IPv4\n\
+ \t-6 Use IPv6\n\
+ \t-D Enable the debug socket option\n\
+ \t-d Detach from stdin\n\
+ \t-F Pass socket fd\n\
+ \t-h This help text\n\
+ \t-I length TCP receive buffer length\n\
+ \t-i secs\t Delay interval for lines sent, ports scanned\n\
+ \t-k Keep inbound sockets open for multiple connects\n\
+ \t-l Listen mode, for inbound connects\n\
+ \t-N Shutdown the network socket after EOF on stdin\n\
+ \t-n Suppress name/port resolutions\n\
+ \t-O length TCP send buffer length\n\
+ \t-P proxyuser\tUsername for proxy authentication\n\
+ \t-p port\t Specify local port for remote connects\n\
+ \t-r Randomize remote ports\n\
+ \t-S Enable the TCP MD5 signature option\n\
+ \t-s addr\t Local source address\n\
+ \t-T toskeyword\tSet IP Type of Service\n\
+ \t-t Answer TELNET negotiation\n\
+ \t-U Use UNIX domain socket\n\
+ \t-u UDP mode\n\
+ \t-V rtable Specify alternate routing table\n\
+ \t-v Verbose\n\
+ \t-w secs\t Timeout for connects and final net reads\n\
+ \t-X proto Proxy protocol: \"4\", \"5\" (SOCKS) or \"connect\"\n\
+ \t-x addr[:port]\tSpecify proxy address and port\n\
+ \t-z Zero-I/O mode [used for scanning]\n\
+ Port numbers can be individual or ranges: lo-hi [inclusive]\n");
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+void
+usage(int ret)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "usage: nc [-46DdFhklNnrStUuvz] [-I length] [-i interval] [-O length]\n"
+ "\t [-P proxy_username] [-p source_port] [-s source] [-T ToS]\n"
+ "\t [-V rtable] [-w timeout] [-X proxy_protocol]\n"
+ "\t [-x proxy_address[:port]] [destination] [port]\n");
+ if (ret)
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+/* *** src/usr.bin/nc/socks.c *** */
+
+
+/* $OpenBSD: socks.c,v 1.20 2012/03/08 09:56:28 espie Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+
+#define SOCKS_PORT "1080"
+#define HTTP_PROXY_PORT "3128"
+#define HTTP_MAXHDRS 64
+#define SOCKS_V5 5
+#define SOCKS_V4 4
+#define SOCKS_NOAUTH 0
+#define SOCKS_NOMETHOD 0xff
+#define SOCKS_CONNECT 1
+#define SOCKS_IPV4 1
+#define SOCKS_DOMAIN 3
+#define SOCKS_IPV6 4
+
+int remote_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo);
+int socks_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo,
+ const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, int,
+ const char *);
+
+static int
+decode_addrport(const char *h, const char *p, struct sockaddr *addr,
+ socklen_t addrlen, int v4only, int numeric)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct addrinfo hints, *res;
+
+ bzero(&hints, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = v4only ? PF_INET : PF_UNSPEC;
+ hints.ai_flags = numeric ? AI_NUMERICHOST : 0;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ r = getaddrinfo(h, p, &hints, &res);
+ /* Don't fatal when attempting to convert a numeric address */
+ if (r != 0) {
+ if (!numeric) {
+ errx(1, "getaddrinfo(\"%.64s\", \"%.64s\"): %s", h, p,
+ gai_strerror(r));
+ }
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (addrlen < res->ai_addrlen) {
+ freeaddrinfo(res);
+ errx(1, "internal error: addrlen < res->ai_addrlen");
+ }
+ memcpy(addr, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen);
+ freeaddrinfo(res);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+proxy_read_line(int fd, char *buf, size_t bufsz)
+{
+ size_t off;
+
+ for(off = 0;;) {
+ if (off >= bufsz)
+ errx(1, "proxy read too long");
+ if (atomicio(read, fd, buf + off, 1) != 1)
+ err(1, "proxy read");
+ /* Skip CR */
+ if (buf[off] == '\r')
+ continue;
+ if (buf[off] == '\n') {
+ buf[off] = '\0';
+ break;
+ }
+ off++;
+ }
+ return (off);
+}
+
+static const char *
+getproxypass(const char *proxyuser, const char *proxyhost)
+{
+ char prompt[512];
+ static char pw[256];
+
+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Proxy password for %s@%s: ",
+ proxyuser, proxyhost);
+ if (readpassphrase(prompt, pw, sizeof(pw), RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) == NULL)
+ errx(1, "Unable to read proxy passphrase");
+ return (pw);
+}
+
+int
+socks_connect(const char *host, const char *port,
+ struct addrinfo hints __attribute__ ((__unused__)),
+ const char *proxyhost, const char *proxyport, struct addrinfo proxyhints,
+ int socksv, const char *proxyuser)
+{
+ int proxyfd, r, authretry = 0;
+ size_t hlen, wlen = 0;
+ unsigned char buf[1024];
+ size_t cnt;
+ struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+ struct sockaddr_in *in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&addr;
+ in_port_t serverport;
+ const char *proxypass = NULL;
+
+ if (proxyport == NULL)
+ proxyport = (socksv == -1) ? HTTP_PROXY_PORT : SOCKS_PORT;
+
+ /* Abuse API to lookup port */
+ if (decode_addrport("0.0.0.0", port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
+ sizeof(addr), 1, 1) == -1)
+ errx(1, "unknown port \"%.64s\"", port);
+ serverport = in4->sin_port;
+
+ again:
+ if (authretry++ > 3)
+ errx(1, "Too many authentication failures");
+
+ proxyfd = remote_connect(proxyhost, proxyport, proxyhints);
+
+ if (proxyfd < 0)
+ return (-1);
+
+ if (socksv == 5) {
+ if (decode_addrport(host, port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
+ sizeof(addr), 0, 1) == -1)
+ addr.ss_family = 0; /* used in switch below */
+
+ /* Version 5, one method: no authentication */
+ buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
+ buf[1] = 1;
+ buf[2] = SOCKS_NOAUTH;
+ cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, 3);
+ if (cnt != 3)
+ err(1, "write failed (%zu/3)", cnt);
+
+ cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 2);
+ if (cnt != 2)
+ err(1, "read failed (%zu/3)", cnt);
+
+ if (buf[1] == SOCKS_NOMETHOD)
+ errx(1, "authentication method negotiation failed");
+
+ switch (addr.ss_family) {
+ case 0:
+ /* Version 5, connect: domain name */
+
+ /* Max domain name length is 255 bytes */
+ hlen = strlen(host);
+ if (hlen > 255)
+ errx(1, "host name too long for SOCKS5");
+ buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
+ buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT;
+ buf[2] = 0;
+ buf[3] = SOCKS_DOMAIN;
+ buf[4] = hlen;
+ memcpy(buf + 5, host, hlen);
+ memcpy(buf + 5 + hlen, &serverport, sizeof serverport);
+ wlen = 7 + hlen;
+ break;
+ case AF_INET:
+ /* Version 5, connect: IPv4 address */
+ buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
+ buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT;
+ buf[2] = 0;
+ buf[3] = SOCKS_IPV4;
+ memcpy(buf + 4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof in4->sin_addr);
+ memcpy(buf + 8, &in4->sin_port, sizeof in4->sin_port);
+ wlen = 10;
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ /* Version 5, connect: IPv6 address */
+ buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
+ buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT;
+ buf[2] = 0;
+ buf[3] = SOCKS_IPV6;
+ memcpy(buf + 4, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof in6->sin6_addr);
+ memcpy(buf + 20, &in6->sin6_port,
+ sizeof in6->sin6_port);
+ wlen = 22;
+ break;
+ default:
+ errx(1, "internal error: silly AF");
+ }
+
+ cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, wlen);
+ if (cnt != wlen)
+ err(1, "write failed (%zu/%zu)", cnt, wlen);
+
+ cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 4);
+ if (cnt != 4)
+ err(1, "read failed (%zu/4)", cnt);
+ if (buf[1] != 0)
+ errx(1, "connection failed, SOCKS error %d", buf[1]);
+ switch (buf[3]) {
+ case SOCKS_IPV4:
+ cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf + 4, 6);
+ if (cnt != 6)
+ err(1, "read failed (%zu/6)", cnt);
+ break;
+ case SOCKS_IPV6:
+ cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf + 4, 18);
+ if (cnt != 18)
+ err(1, "read failed (%zu/18)", cnt);
+ break;
+ default:
+ errx(1, "connection failed, unsupported address type");
+ }
+ } else if (socksv == 4) {
+ /* This will exit on lookup failure */
+ decode_addrport(host, port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
+ sizeof(addr), 1, 0);
+
+ /* Version 4 */
+ buf[0] = SOCKS_V4;
+ buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT; /* connect */
+ memcpy(buf + 2, &in4->sin_port, sizeof in4->sin_port);
+ memcpy(buf + 4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof in4->sin_addr);
+ buf[8] = 0; /* empty username */
+ wlen = 9;
+
+ cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, wlen);
+ if (cnt != wlen)
+ err(1, "write failed (%zu/%zu)", cnt, wlen);
+
+ cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 8);
+ if (cnt != 8)
+ err(1, "read failed (%zu/8)", cnt);
+ if (buf[1] != 90)
+ errx(1, "connection failed, SOCKS error %d", buf[1]);
+ } else if (socksv == -1) {
+ /* HTTP proxy CONNECT */
+
+ /* Disallow bad chars in hostname */
+ if (strcspn(host, "\r\n\t []:") != strlen(host))
+ errx(1, "Invalid hostname");
+
+ /* Try to be sane about numeric IPv6 addresses */
+ if (strchr(host, ':') != NULL) {
+ r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+ "CONNECT [%s]:%d HTTP/1.0\r\n",
+ host, ntohs(serverport));
+ } else {
+ r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+ "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0\r\n",
+ host, ntohs(serverport));
+ }
+ if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf))
+ errx(1, "hostname too long");
+ r = strlen(buf);
+
+ cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, r);
+ if (cnt != (size_t)r)
+ err(1, "write failed (%zu/%d)", cnt, r);
+
+ if (authretry > 1) {
+ char resp[1024];
+
+ proxypass = getproxypass(proxyuser, proxyhost);
+ r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s:%s",
+ proxyuser, proxypass);
+ if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf) ||
+ b64_ntop(buf, strlen(buf), resp,
+ sizeof(resp)) == -1)
+ errx(1, "Proxy username/password too long");
+ r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Proxy-Authorization: "
+ "Basic %s\r\n", resp);
+ if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf))
+ errx(1, "Proxy auth response too long");
+ r = strlen(buf);
+ if ((cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, r)) != (size_t)r)
+ err(1, "write failed (%zu/%d)", cnt, r);
+ }
+
+ /* Terminate headers */
+ if ((r = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, "\r\n", 2)) != 2)
+ err(1, "write failed (2/%d)", r);
+
+ /* Read status reply */
+ proxy_read_line(proxyfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (proxyuser != NULL &&
+ strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.0 407 ", 12) == 0) {
+ if (authretry > 1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Proxy authentication "
+ "failed\n");
+ }
+ close(proxyfd);
+ goto again;
+ } else if (strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.0 200 ", 12) != 0 &&
+ strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.1 200 ", 12) != 0)
+ errx(1, "Proxy error: \"%s\"", buf);
+
+ /* Headers continue until we hit an empty line */
+ for (r = 0; r < HTTP_MAXHDRS; r++) {
+ proxy_read_line(proxyfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (*buf == '\0')
+ break;
+ }
+ if (*buf != '\0')
+ errx(1, "Too many proxy headers received");
+ } else
+ errx(1, "Unknown proxy protocol %d", socksv);
+
+ return (proxyfd);
+}
+
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/principals-command.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/principals-command.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/principals-command.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/principals-command.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+# $OpenBSD: principals-command.sh,v 1.1 2015/05/21 06:44:25 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="authorized principals command"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key*
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+if test -z "$SUDO" ; then
+ echo "skipped (SUDO not set)"
+ echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without"
+ exit 0
+fi
+
+# Establish a AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand in /var/run where it will have
+# acceptable directory permissions.
+PRINCIPALS_CMD="/var/run/principals_command_${LOGNAME}"
+cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "cat > '$PRINCIPALS_CMD'"
+#!/bin/sh
+test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1
+test -f "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}" &&
+ exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}"
+_EOF
+test $? -eq 0 || fatal "couldn't prepare principals command"
+$SUDO chmod 0755 "$PRINCIPALS_CMD"
+
+if ! $OBJ/check-perm -m keys-command $PRINCIPALS_CMD ; then
+ echo "skipping: $PRINCIPALS_CMD is unsuitable as " \
+ "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand"
+ $SUDO rm -f $PRINCIPALS_CMD
+ exit 0
+fi
+
+# Create a CA key and a user certificate.
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key || \
+ fatal "ssh-keygen of user_ca_key failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/cert_user_key || \
+ fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_user_key failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+ -z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/cert_user_key || \
+ fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key"
+
+if [ -x $PRINCIPALS_CMD ]; then
+ # Test explicitly-specified principals
+ for privsep in yes no ; do
+ _prefix="privsep $privsep"
+
+ # Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+ rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ (
+ cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+ echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
+ echo "AuthorizedKeysFile none"
+ echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand $PRINCIPALS_CMD %u"
+ echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser ${LOGNAME}"
+ echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
+ ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+ # XXX test missing command
+ # XXX test failing command
+
+ # Empty authorized_principals
+ verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals"
+ echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+ fi
+
+ # Wrong authorized_principals
+ verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals"
+ echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+ fi
+
+ # Correct authorized_principals
+ verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals"
+ echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+ fi
+
+ # authorized_principals with bad key option
+ verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt"
+ echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+ fi
+
+ # authorized_principals with command=false
+ verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false"
+ echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \
+ $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+ fi
+
+ # authorized_principals with command=true
+ verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true"
+ echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \
+ $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+ fi
+
+ # Setup for principals= key option
+ rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+ (
+ cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+ echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
+ ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+ # Wrong principals list
+ verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong principals key option"
+ (
+ printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" '
+ cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+ ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+ fi
+
+ # Correct principals list
+ verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct principals key option"
+ (
+ printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" '
+ cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+ ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+ fi
+ done
+else
+ echo "SKIPPED: $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND not executable " \
+ "(/var/run mounted noexec?)"
+fi
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/proto-mismatch.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/proto-mismatch.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/proto-mismatch.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: proto-mismatch.sh,v 1.3 2002/03/15 13:08:56 markus Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="protocol version mismatch"
-
-mismatch ()
-{
- server=$1
- client=$2
- banner=`echo ${client} | ${SSHD} -o "Protocol=${server}" -i -f ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy`
- r=$?
- trace "sshd prints ${banner}"
- if [ $r -ne 255 ]; then
- fail "sshd prints ${banner} and accepts connect with version ${client}"
- fi
-}
-
-mismatch 2 SSH-1.5-HALLO
-mismatch 1 SSH-2.0-HALLO
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/proto-mismatch.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/proto-mismatch.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/proto-mismatch.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/proto-mismatch.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# $OpenBSD: proto-mismatch.sh,v 1.4 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="protocol version mismatch"
+
+mismatch ()
+{
+ server=$1
+ client=$2
+ banner=`echo ${client} | ${SSHD} -o "Protocol=${server}" -i -f ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy`
+ r=$?
+ trace "sshd prints ${banner}"
+ if [ $r -ne 255 ]; then
+ fail "sshd prints ${banner} and accepts connect with version ${client}"
+ fi
+}
+
+mismatch 2 SSH-1.5-HALLO
+if ssh_version 1; then
+ mismatch 1 SSH-2.0-HALLO
+fi
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/proto-version.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/proto-version.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/proto-version.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: proto-version.sh,v 1.4 2013/05/17 00:37:40 dtucker Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="sshd version with different protocol combinations"
-
-# we just start sshd in inetd mode and check the banner
-check_version ()
-{
- version=$1
- expect=$2
- banner=`printf '' | ${SSHD} -o "Protocol=${version}" -i -f ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy`
- case ${banner} in
- SSH-1.99-*)
- proto=199
- ;;
- SSH-2.0-*)
- proto=20
- ;;
- SSH-1.5-*)
- proto=15
- ;;
- *)
- proto=0
- ;;
- esac
- if [ ${expect} -ne ${proto} ]; then
- fail "wrong protocol version ${banner} for ${version}"
- fi
-}
-
-check_version 2,1 199
-check_version 1,2 199
-check_version 2 20
-check_version 1 15
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/proto-version.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/proto-version.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/proto-version.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/proto-version.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# $OpenBSD: proto-version.sh,v 1.5 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sshd version with different protocol combinations"
+
+# we just start sshd in inetd mode and check the banner
+check_version ()
+{
+ version=$1
+ expect=$2
+ banner=`printf '' | ${SSHD} -o "Protocol=${version}" -i -f ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy`
+ case ${banner} in
+ SSH-1.99-*)
+ proto=199
+ ;;
+ SSH-2.0-*)
+ proto=20
+ ;;
+ SSH-1.5-*)
+ proto=15
+ ;;
+ *)
+ proto=0
+ ;;
+ esac
+ if [ ${expect} -ne ${proto} ]; then
+ fail "wrong protocol version ${banner} for ${version}"
+ fi
+}
+
+check_version 2 20
+if ssh_version 1; then
+ check_version 2,1 199
+ check_version 1,2 199
+ check_version 1 15
+fi
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/proxy-connect.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/proxy-connect.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/proxy-connect.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: proxy-connect.sh,v 1.6 2013/03/07 00:20:34 djm Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="proxy connect"
-
-verbose "plain username"
-for p in 1 2; do
- ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh proxyconnect protocol $p failed"
- fi
- SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh proxyconnect protocol $p failed"
- fi
- if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then
- fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION"
- fi
-done
-
-verbose "username with style"
-for p in 1 2; do
- ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${USER}:style at 999.999.999.999 true || \
- fail "ssh proxyconnect protocol $p failed"
-done
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/proxy-connect.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/proxy-connect.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/proxy-connect.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/proxy-connect.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# $OpenBSD: proxy-connect.sh,v 1.9 2016/02/17 02:24:17 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="proxy connect"
+
+mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+
+for ps in no yes; do
+ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $ps" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ for c in no yes; do
+ verbose "plain username protocol $p privsep=$ps comp=$c"
+ opts="-$p -oCompression=$c -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+ SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts 999.999.999.999 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh proxyconnect protocol $p privsep=$ps comp=$c failed"
+ fi
+ if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then
+ fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION protocol $p privsep=$ps comp=$c: " \
+ "$SSH_CONNECTION"
+ fi
+ done
+ done
+done
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ verbose "username with style protocol $p"
+ ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${USER}:style at 999.999.999.999 true || \
+ fail "ssh proxyconnect protocol $p failed"
+done
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/reconfigure.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/reconfigure.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/reconfigure.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: reconfigure.sh,v 1.2 2003/06/21 09:14:05 markus Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="simple connect after reconfigure"
-
-# we need the full path to sshd for -HUP
-case $SSHD in
-/*)
- # full path is OK
- ;;
-*)
- # otherwise make fully qualified
- SSHD=$OBJ/$SSHD
-esac
-
-start_sshd
-
-PID=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
-rm -f $PIDFILE
-$SUDO kill -HUP $PID
-
-trace "wait for sshd to restart"
-i=0;
-while [ ! -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 10 ]; do
- i=`expr $i + 1`
- sleep $i
-done
-
-test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "sshd did not restart"
-
-for p in 1 2; do
- ${SSH} -o "Protocol=$p" -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh connect with protocol $p failed after reconfigure"
- fi
-done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/reconfigure.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/reconfigure.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/reconfigure.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/reconfigure.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# $OpenBSD: reconfigure.sh,v 1.5 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="simple connect after reconfigure"
+
+# we need the full path to sshd for -HUP
+if test "x$USE_VALGRIND" = "x" ; then
+ case $SSHD in
+ /*)
+ # full path is OK
+ ;;
+ *)
+ # otherwise make fully qualified
+ SSHD=$OBJ/$SSHD
+ esac
+fi
+
+start_sshd
+
+trace "connect before restart"
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS} ; do
+ ${SSH} -o "Protocol=$p" -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh connect with protocol $p failed before reconfigure"
+ fi
+done
+
+PID=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
+rm -f $PIDFILE
+$SUDO kill -HUP $PID
+
+trace "wait for sshd to restart"
+i=0;
+while [ ! -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 10 ]; do
+ i=`expr $i + 1`
+ sleep $i
+done
+
+test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "sshd did not restart"
+
+trace "connect after restart"
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS} ; do
+ ${SSH} -o "Protocol=$p" -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh connect with protocol $p failed after reconfigure"
+ fi
+done
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/reexec.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/reexec.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/reexec.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: reexec.sh,v 1.7 2013/05/17 10:23:52 dtucker Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="reexec tests"
-
-SSHD_ORIG=$SSHD
-SSHD_COPY=$OBJ/sshd
-
-# Start a sshd and then delete it
-start_sshd_copy ()
-{
- cp $SSHD_ORIG $SSHD_COPY
- SSHD=$SSHD_COPY
- start_sshd
- SSHD=$SSHD_ORIG
-}
-
-# Do basic copy tests
-copy_tests ()
-{
- rm -f ${COPY}
- for p in 1 2; do
- verbose "$tid: proto $p"
- ${SSH} -nqo "Protocol=$p" -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost \
- cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
- fi
- cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
- rm -f ${COPY}
- done
-}
-
-verbose "test config passing"
-
-cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_config.orig
-start_sshd
-echo "InvalidXXX=no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
-
-copy_tests
-
-$SUDO kill `$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
-rm -f $PIDFILE
-
-cp $OBJ/sshd_config.orig $OBJ/sshd_config
-
-# cygwin can't fork a deleted binary
-if [ "$os" != "cygwin" ]; then
-
-verbose "test reexec fallback"
-
-start_sshd_copy
-rm -f $SSHD_COPY
-
-copy_tests
-
-$SUDO kill `$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
-rm -f $PIDFILE
-
-verbose "test reexec fallback without privsep"
-
-cp $OBJ/sshd_config.orig $OBJ/sshd_config
-echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation=no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
-
-start_sshd_copy
-rm -f $SSHD_COPY
-
-copy_tests
-
-$SUDO kill `$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
-rm -f $PIDFILE
-
-fi
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/reexec.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/reexec.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/reexec.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/reexec.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+# $OpenBSD: reexec.sh,v 1.8 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="reexec tests"
+
+SSHD_ORIG=$SSHD
+SSHD_COPY=$OBJ/sshd
+
+# Start a sshd and then delete it
+start_sshd_copy ()
+{
+ cp $SSHD_ORIG $SSHD_COPY
+ SSHD=$SSHD_COPY
+ start_sshd
+ SSHD=$SSHD_ORIG
+}
+
+# Do basic copy tests
+copy_tests ()
+{
+ rm -f ${COPY}
+ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS} ; do
+ verbose "$tid: proto $p"
+ ${SSH} -nqo "Protocol=$p" -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost \
+ cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
+ fi
+ cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+ rm -f ${COPY}
+ done
+}
+
+verbose "test config passing"
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_config.orig
+start_sshd
+echo "InvalidXXX=no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+
+copy_tests
+
+$SUDO kill `$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
+rm -f $PIDFILE
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_config.orig $OBJ/sshd_config
+
+# cygwin can't fork a deleted binary
+if [ "$os" != "cygwin" ]; then
+
+verbose "test reexec fallback"
+
+start_sshd_copy
+rm -f $SSHD_COPY
+
+copy_tests
+
+$SUDO kill `$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
+rm -f $PIDFILE
+
+verbose "test reexec fallback without privsep"
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_config.orig $OBJ/sshd_config
+echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation=no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+
+start_sshd_copy
+rm -f $SSHD_COPY
+
+copy_tests
+
+$SUDO kill `$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
+rm -f $PIDFILE
+
+fi
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/rekey.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/rekey.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/rekey.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: rekey.sh,v 1.14 2013/11/21 03:18:51 djm Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="rekey"
-
-LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE}
-
-rm -f ${LOG}
-
-# Test rekeying based on data volume only.
-# Arguments will be passed to ssh.
-ssh_data_rekeying()
-{
- rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
- ${SSH} <${DATA} -oCompression=no $@ -v -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost \
- "cat > ${COPY}"
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh failed ($@)"
- fi
- cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy ($@)"
- n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
- n=`expr $n - 1`
- trace "$n rekeying(s)"
- if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
- fail "no rekeying occured ($@)"
- fi
-}
-
-increase_datafile_size 300
-
-opts=""
-for i in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
- opts="$opts KexAlgorithms=$i"
-done
-for i in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do
- opts="$opts Ciphers=$i"
-done
-for i in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do
- opts="$opts MACs=$i"
-done
-
-for opt in $opts; do
- verbose "client rekey $opt"
- ssh_data_rekeying -oRekeyLimit=256k -o$opt
-done
-
-# AEAD ciphers are magical so test with all KexAlgorithms
-if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep '^.*$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
- for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`; do
- for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
- verbose "client rekey $c $kex"
- ssh_data_rekeying -oRekeyLimit=256k -oCiphers=$c -oKexAlgorithms=$kex
- done
- done
-fi
-
-for s in 16 1k 128k 256k; do
- verbose "client rekeylimit ${s}"
- ssh_data_rekeying -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit=$s
-done
-
-for s in 5 10; do
- verbose "client rekeylimit default ${s}"
- rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
- ${SSH} < ${DATA} -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit="default $s" -F \
- $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat >${COPY};sleep $s;sleep 3"
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh failed"
- fi
- cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
- n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
- n=`expr $n - 1`
- trace "$n rekeying(s)"
- if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
- fail "no rekeying occured"
- fi
-done
-
-for s in 5 10; do
- verbose "client rekeylimit default ${s} no data"
- rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
- ${SSH} -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit="default $s" -F \
- $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep $s;sleep 3"
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh failed"
- fi
- n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
- n=`expr $n - 1`
- trace "$n rekeying(s)"
- if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
- fail "no rekeying occured"
- fi
-done
-
-echo "rekeylimit default 5" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
-for s in 5 10; do
- verbose "server rekeylimit default ${s} no data"
- rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
- ${SSH} -oCompression=no -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep $s;sleep 3"
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh failed"
- fi
- n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
- n=`expr $n - 1`
- trace "$n rekeying(s)"
- if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
- fail "no rekeying occured"
- fi
-done
-
-verbose "rekeylimit parsing"
-for size in 16 1k 1K 1m 1M 1g 1G; do
- for time in 1 1m 1M 1h 1H 1d 1D 1w 1W; do
- case $size in
- 16) bytes=16 ;;
- 1k|1K) bytes=1024 ;;
- 1m|1M) bytes=1048576 ;;
- 1g|1G) bytes=1073741824 ;;
- esac
- case $time in
- 1) seconds=1 ;;
- 1m|1M) seconds=60 ;;
- 1h|1H) seconds=3600 ;;
- 1d|1D) seconds=86400 ;;
- 1w|1W) seconds=604800 ;;
- esac
-
- b=`$SUDO ${SSHD} -T -o "rekeylimit $size $time" -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy | \
- awk '/rekeylimit/{print $2}'`
- s=`$SUDO ${SSHD} -T -o "rekeylimit $size $time" -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy | \
- awk '/rekeylimit/{print $3}'`
-
- if [ "$bytes" != "$b" ]; then
- fatal "rekeylimit size: expected $bytes bytes got $b"
- fi
- if [ "$seconds" != "$s" ]; then
- fatal "rekeylimit time: expected $time seconds got $s"
- fi
- done
-done
-
-rm -f ${COPY} ${DATA}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/rekey.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/rekey.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/rekey.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/rekey.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+# $OpenBSD: rekey.sh,v 1.17 2016/01/29 05:18:15 dtucker Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="rekey"
+
+LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE}
+
+rm -f ${LOG}
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+# Test rekeying based on data volume only.
+# Arguments will be passed to ssh.
+ssh_data_rekeying()
+{
+ _kexopt=$1 ; shift
+ _opts="$@"
+ if ! test -z "$_kexopts" ; then
+ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ echo "$_kexopt" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ _opts="$_opts -o$_kexopt"
+ fi
+ rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
+ _opts="$_opts -oCompression=no"
+ ${SSH} <${DATA} $_opts -v -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat > ${COPY}"
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh failed ($@)"
+ fi
+ cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy ($@)"
+ n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
+ n=`expr $n - 1`
+ trace "$n rekeying(s)"
+ if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
+ fail "no rekeying occured ($@)"
+ fi
+}
+
+increase_datafile_size 300
+
+opts=""
+for i in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
+ opts="$opts KexAlgorithms=$i"
+done
+for i in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do
+ opts="$opts Ciphers=$i"
+done
+for i in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do
+ opts="$opts MACs=$i"
+done
+
+for opt in $opts; do
+ verbose "client rekey $opt"
+ ssh_data_rekeying "$opt" -oRekeyLimit=256k
+done
+
+# AEAD ciphers are magical so test with all KexAlgorithms
+if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep '^.*$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+ for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`; do
+ for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
+ verbose "client rekey $c $kex"
+ ssh_data_rekeying "KexAlgorithms=$kex" -oRekeyLimit=256k -oCiphers=$c
+ done
+ done
+fi
+
+for s in 16 1k 128k 256k; do
+ verbose "client rekeylimit ${s}"
+ ssh_data_rekeying "" -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit=$s
+done
+
+for s in 5 10; do
+ verbose "client rekeylimit default ${s}"
+ rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
+ ${SSH} < ${DATA} -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit="default $s" -F \
+ $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat >${COPY};sleep $s;sleep 3"
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh failed"
+ fi
+ cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+ n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
+ n=`expr $n - 1`
+ trace "$n rekeying(s)"
+ if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
+ fail "no rekeying occured"
+ fi
+done
+
+for s in 5 10; do
+ verbose "client rekeylimit default ${s} no data"
+ rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
+ ${SSH} -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit="default $s" -F \
+ $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep $s;sleep 3"
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh failed"
+ fi
+ n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
+ n=`expr $n - 1`
+ trace "$n rekeying(s)"
+ if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
+ fail "no rekeying occured"
+ fi
+done
+
+for s in 16 1k 128k 256k; do
+ verbose "server rekeylimit ${s}"
+ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ echo "rekeylimit ${s}" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
+ ${SSH} -oCompression=no -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat ${DATA}" \
+ > ${COPY}
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh failed"
+ fi
+ cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+ n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
+ n=`expr $n - 1`
+ trace "$n rekeying(s)"
+ if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
+ fail "no rekeying occured"
+ fi
+done
+
+for s in 5 10; do
+ verbose "server rekeylimit default ${s} no data"
+ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ echo "rekeylimit default ${s}" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
+ ${SSH} -oCompression=no -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep $s;sleep 3"
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh failed"
+ fi
+ n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
+ n=`expr $n - 1`
+ trace "$n rekeying(s)"
+ if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
+ fail "no rekeying occured"
+ fi
+done
+
+verbose "rekeylimit parsing"
+for size in 16 1k 1K 1m 1M 1g 1G 4G 8G; do
+ for time in 1 1m 1M 1h 1H 1d 1D 1w 1W; do
+ case $size in
+ 16) bytes=16 ;;
+ 1k|1K) bytes=1024 ;;
+ 1m|1M) bytes=1048576 ;;
+ 1g|1G) bytes=1073741824 ;;
+ 4g|4G) bytes=4294967296 ;;
+ 8g|8G) bytes=8589934592 ;;
+ esac
+ case $time in
+ 1) seconds=1 ;;
+ 1m|1M) seconds=60 ;;
+ 1h|1H) seconds=3600 ;;
+ 1d|1D) seconds=86400 ;;
+ 1w|1W) seconds=604800 ;;
+ esac
+
+ b=`$SUDO ${SSHD} -T -o "rekeylimit $size $time" -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy | \
+ awk '/rekeylimit/{print $2}'`
+ s=`$SUDO ${SSHD} -T -o "rekeylimit $size $time" -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy | \
+ awk '/rekeylimit/{print $3}'`
+
+ if [ "$bytes" != "$b" ]; then
+ fatal "rekeylimit size: expected $bytes bytes got $b"
+ fi
+ if [ "$seconds" != "$s" ]; then
+ fatal "rekeylimit time: expected $time seconds got $s"
+ fi
+ done
+done
+
+rm -f ${COPY} ${DATA}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/setuid-allowed.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/setuid-allowed.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/setuid-allowed.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-/* $OpenBSD$ */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
-# include <sys/statvfs.h>
-#endif
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-
-void
-usage(void)
-{
- fprintf(stderr, "check-setuid [path]\n");
- exit(1);
-}
-
-int
-main(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- const char *path = ".";
- struct statvfs sb;
-
- if (argc > 2)
- usage();
- else if (argc == 2)
- path = argv[1];
-
- if (statvfs(path, &sb) != 0) {
- /* Don't return an error if the host doesn't support statvfs */
- if (errno == ENOSYS)
- return 0;
- fprintf(stderr, "statvfs for \"%s\" failed: %s\n",
- path, strerror(errno));
- }
- return (sb.f_flag & ST_NOSUID) ? 1 : 0;
-}
-
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/setuid-allowed.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/setuid-allowed.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/setuid-allowed.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/setuid-allowed.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD$ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+# include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "check-setuid [path]\n");
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ const char *path = ".";
+ struct statvfs sb;
+
+ if (argc > 2)
+ usage();
+ else if (argc == 2)
+ path = argv[1];
+
+ if (statvfs(path, &sb) != 0) {
+ /* Don't return an error if the host doesn't support statvfs */
+ if (errno == ENOSYS)
+ return 0;
+ fprintf(stderr, "statvfs for \"%s\" failed: %s\n",
+ path, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ return (sb.f_flag & ST_NOSUID) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/sftp-chroot.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/sftp-chroot.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/sftp-chroot.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: sftp-chroot.sh,v 1.4 2014/01/20 00:00:30 dtucker Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="sftp in chroot"
-
-CHROOT=/var/run
-FILENAME=testdata_${USER}
-PRIVDATA=${CHROOT}/${FILENAME}
-
-if [ -z "$SUDO" ]; then
- echo "skipped: need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without"
- exit 0
-fi
-
-$SUDO sh -c "echo mekmitastdigoat > $PRIVDATA" || \
- fatal "create $PRIVDATA failed"
-
-start_sshd -oChrootDirectory=$CHROOT -oForceCommand="internal-sftp -d /"
-
-verbose "test $tid: get"
-${SFTP} -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config host:/${FILENAME} $COPY \
- >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 || \
- fatal "Fetch ${FILENAME} failed"
-cmp $PRIVDATA $COPY || fail "$PRIVDATA $COPY differ"
-
-$SUDO rm $PRIVDATA
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/sftp-chroot.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/sftp-chroot.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/sftp-chroot.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/sftp-chroot.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# $OpenBSD: sftp-chroot.sh,v 1.4 2014/01/20 00:00:30 dtucker Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sftp in chroot"
+
+CHROOT=/var/run
+FILENAME=testdata_${USER}
+PRIVDATA=${CHROOT}/${FILENAME}
+
+if [ -z "$SUDO" ]; then
+ echo "skipped: need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without"
+ exit 0
+fi
+
+if ! $OBJ/check-perm -m chroot "$CHROOT" ; then
+ echo "skipped: $CHROOT is unsuitable as ChrootDirectory"
+ exit 0
+fi
+
+$SUDO sh -c "echo mekmitastdigoat > $PRIVDATA" || \
+ fatal "create $PRIVDATA failed"
+
+start_sshd -oChrootDirectory=$CHROOT -oForceCommand="internal-sftp -d /"
+
+verbose "test $tid: get"
+${SFTP} -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config host:/${FILENAME} $COPY \
+ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 || \
+ fatal "Fetch ${FILENAME} failed"
+cmp $PRIVDATA $COPY || fail "$PRIVDATA $COPY differ"
+
+$SUDO rm $PRIVDATA
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/ssh-com.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/ssh-com.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/ssh-com.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: ssh-com.sh,v 1.8 2013/05/17 00:37:40 dtucker Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="connect to ssh.com server"
-
-#TEST_COMBASE=/path/to/ssh/com/binaries
-if [ "X${TEST_COMBASE}" = "X" ]; then
- fatal '$TEST_COMBASE is not set'
-fi
-
-VERSIONS="
- 2.0.12
- 2.0.13
- 2.1.0
- 2.2.0
- 2.3.0
- 2.4.0
- 3.0.0
- 3.1.0
- 3.2.0
- 3.2.2
- 3.2.3
- 3.2.5
- 3.2.9
- 3.2.9.1
- 3.3.0"
-# 2.0.10 does not support UserConfigDirectory
-# 2.3.1 requires a config in $HOME/.ssh2
-
-SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}`
-
-# ssh.com
-cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd2_config
-#*:
- # Port and ListenAddress are not used.
- QuietMode yes
- Port 4343
- ListenAddress 127.0.0.1
- UserConfigDirectory ${OBJ}/%U
- Ciphers AnyCipher
- PubKeyAuthentication yes
- #AllowedAuthentications publickey
- AuthorizationFile authorization
- HostKeyFile ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.prv
- PublicHostKeyFile ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.pub
- RandomSeedFile ${OBJ}/random_seed
- MaxConnections 0
- PermitRootLogin yes
- VerboseMode no
- CheckMail no
- Ssh1Compatibility no
-EOF
-
-# create client config
-sed "s/HostKeyAlias.*/HostKeyAlias ssh2-localhost-with-alias/" \
- < $OBJ/ssh_config > $OBJ/ssh_config_com
-
-# we need a DSA key for
-rm -f ${OBJ}/dsa ${OBJ}/dsa.pub
-${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t dsa -f ${OBJ}/dsa
-
-# setup userdir, try rsa first
-mkdir -p ${OBJ}/${USER}
-cp /dev/null ${OBJ}/${USER}/authorization
-for t in rsa dsa; do
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -e -f ${OBJ}/$t.pub > ${OBJ}/${USER}/$t.com
- echo Key $t.com >> ${OBJ}/${USER}/authorization
- echo IdentityFile ${OBJ}/$t >> ${OBJ}/ssh_config_com
-done
-
-# convert and append DSA hostkey
-(
- printf 'ssh2-localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -if ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.pub
-) >> $OBJ/known_hosts
-
-# go for it
-for v in ${VERSIONS}; do
- sshd2=${TEST_COMBASE}/${v}/sshd2
- if [ ! -x ${sshd2} ]; then
- continue
- fi
- trace "sshd2 ${v}"
- PROXY="proxycommand ${sshd2} -qif ${OBJ}/sshd2_config 2> /dev/null"
- ${SSH} -qF ${OBJ}/ssh_config_com -o "${PROXY}" dummy exit 0
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh connect to sshd2 ${v} failed"
- fi
-
- ciphers="3des-cbc blowfish-cbc arcfour"
- macs="hmac-md5"
- case $v in
- 2.4.*)
- ciphers="$ciphers cast128-cbc"
- macs="$macs hmac-sha1 hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96"
- ;;
- 3.*)
- ciphers="$ciphers aes128-cbc cast128-cbc"
- macs="$macs hmac-sha1 hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96"
- ;;
- esac
- #ciphers="3des-cbc"
- for m in $macs; do
- for c in $ciphers; do
- trace "sshd2 ${v} cipher $c mac $m"
- verbose "test ${tid}: sshd2 ${v} cipher $c mac $m"
- ${SSH} -c $c -m $m -qF ${OBJ}/ssh_config_com -o "${PROXY}" dummy exit 0
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh connect to sshd2 ${v} with $c/$m failed"
- fi
- done
- done
-done
-
-rm -rf ${OBJ}/${USER}
-for i in sshd_config_proxy ssh_config_proxy random_seed \
- sshd2_config dsa.pub dsa ssh_config_com; do
- rm -f ${OBJ}/$i
-done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/ssh-com.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/ssh-com.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/ssh-com.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/ssh-com.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+# $OpenBSD: ssh-com.sh,v 1.9 2015/05/08 07:29:00 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="connect to ssh.com server"
+
+#TEST_COMBASE=/path/to/ssh/com/binaries
+if [ "X${TEST_COMBASE}" = "X" ]; then
+ fatal '$TEST_COMBASE is not set'
+fi
+
+VERSIONS="
+ 2.0.12
+ 2.0.13
+ 2.1.0
+ 2.2.0
+ 2.3.0
+ 2.4.0
+ 3.0.0
+ 3.1.0
+ 3.2.0
+ 3.2.2
+ 3.2.3
+ 3.2.5
+ 3.2.9
+ 3.2.9.1
+ 3.3.0"
+# 2.0.10 does not support UserConfigDirectory
+# 2.3.1 requires a config in $HOME/.ssh2
+
+SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}`
+
+# ssh.com
+cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd2_config
+#*:
+ # Port and ListenAddress are not used.
+ QuietMode yes
+ Port 4343
+ ListenAddress 127.0.0.1
+ UserConfigDirectory ${OBJ}/%U
+ Ciphers AnyCipher
+ PubKeyAuthentication yes
+ #AllowedAuthentications publickey
+ AuthorizationFile authorization
+ HostKeyFile ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.prv
+ PublicHostKeyFile ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.pub
+ RandomSeedFile ${OBJ}/random_seed
+ MaxConnections 0
+ PermitRootLogin yes
+ VerboseMode no
+ CheckMail no
+ Ssh1Compatibility no
+EOF
+
+# create client config
+sed "s/HostKeyAlias.*/HostKeyAlias ssh2-localhost-with-alias/" \
+ < $OBJ/ssh_config > $OBJ/ssh_config_com
+
+# we need a DSA key for
+rm -f ${OBJ}/dsa ${OBJ}/dsa.pub
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t dsa -f ${OBJ}/dsa
+
+# setup userdir, try rsa first
+mkdir -p ${OBJ}/${USER}
+cp /dev/null ${OBJ}/${USER}/authorization
+for t in rsa dsa; do
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -e -f ${OBJ}/$t.pub > ${OBJ}/${USER}/$t.com
+ echo Key $t.com >> ${OBJ}/${USER}/authorization
+ echo IdentityFile ${OBJ}/$t >> ${OBJ}/ssh_config_com
+done
+
+# convert and append DSA hostkey
+(
+ printf 'ssh2-localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -if ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.pub
+) >> $OBJ/known_hosts
+
+# go for it
+for v in ${VERSIONS}; do
+ sshd2=${TEST_COMBASE}/${v}/sshd2
+ if [ ! -x ${sshd2} ]; then
+ continue
+ fi
+ trace "sshd2 ${v}"
+ PROXY="proxycommand ${sshd2} -qif ${OBJ}/sshd2_config 2> /dev/null"
+ ${SSH} -qF ${OBJ}/ssh_config_com -o "${PROXY}" dummy exit 0
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh connect to sshd2 ${v} failed"
+ fi
+
+ ciphers="3des-cbc blowfish-cbc arcfour"
+ macs="hmac-md5"
+ case $v in
+ 2.4.*)
+ ciphers="$ciphers cast128-cbc"
+ macs="$macs hmac-sha1 hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96"
+ ;;
+ 3.*)
+ ciphers="$ciphers aes128-cbc cast128-cbc"
+ macs="$macs hmac-sha1 hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96"
+ ;;
+ esac
+ #ciphers="3des-cbc"
+ for m in $macs; do
+ for c in $ciphers; do
+ trace "sshd2 ${v} cipher $c mac $m"
+ verbose "test ${tid}: sshd2 ${v} cipher $c mac $m"
+ ${SSH} -c $c -m $m -qF ${OBJ}/ssh_config_com -o "${PROXY}" dummy exit 0
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh connect to sshd2 ${v} with $c/$m failed"
+ fi
+ done
+ done
+done
+
+rm -rf ${OBJ}/${USER}
+for i in sshd_config_proxy ssh_config_proxy random_seed \
+ sshd2_config dsa.pub dsa ssh_config_com; do
+ rm -f ${OBJ}/$i
+done
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/ssh2putty.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/ssh2putty.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/ssh2putty.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-# $OpenBSD: ssh2putty.sh,v 1.2 2009/10/06 23:51:49 dtucker Exp $
-
-if test "x$1" = "x" -o "x$2" = "x" -o "x$3" = "x" ; then
- echo "Usage: ssh2putty hostname port ssh-private-key"
- exit 1
-fi
-
-HOST=$1
-PORT=$2
-KEYFILE=$3
-
-# XXX - support DSA keys too
-if grep "BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY" $KEYFILE >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
- :
-else
- echo "Unsupported private key format"
- exit 1
-fi
-
-public_exponent=`
- openssl rsa -noout -text -in $KEYFILE | grep ^publicExponent |
- sed 's/.*(//;s/).*//'
-`
-test $? -ne 0 && exit 1
-
-modulus=`
- openssl rsa -noout -modulus -in $KEYFILE | grep ^Modulus= |
- sed 's/^Modulus=/0x/' | tr A-Z a-z
-`
-test $? -ne 0 && exit 1
-
-echo "rsa2@$PORT:$HOST $public_exponent,$modulus"
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/ssh2putty.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/ssh2putty.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/ssh2putty.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/ssh2putty.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# $OpenBSD: ssh2putty.sh,v 1.3 2015/05/08 07:26:13 djm Exp $
+
+if test "x$1" = "x" -o "x$2" = "x" -o "x$3" = "x" ; then
+ echo "Usage: ssh2putty hostname port ssh-private-key"
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+HOST=$1
+PORT=$2
+KEYFILE=$3
+
+# XXX - support DSA keys too
+if grep "BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY" $KEYFILE >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+ :
+else
+ echo "Unsupported private key format"
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+public_exponent=`
+ openssl rsa -noout -text -in $KEYFILE | grep ^publicExponent |
+ sed 's/.*(//;s/).*//'
+`
+test $? -ne 0 && exit 1
+
+modulus=`
+ openssl rsa -noout -modulus -in $KEYFILE | grep ^Modulus= |
+ sed 's/^Modulus=/0x/' | tr A-Z a-z
+`
+test $? -ne 0 && exit 1
+
+echo "rsa2@$PORT:$HOST $public_exponent,$modulus"
+
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/sshcfgparse.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/sshcfgparse.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/sshcfgparse.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/sshcfgparse.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# $OpenBSD: sshcfgparse.sh,v 1.2 2016/07/14 01:24:21 dtucker Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="ssh config parse"
+
+verbose "reparse minimal config"
+(${SSH} -G -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost >$OBJ/ssh_config.1 &&
+ ${SSH} -G -F $OBJ/ssh_config.1 somehost >$OBJ/ssh_config.2 &&
+ diff $OBJ/ssh_config.1 $OBJ/ssh_config.2) || fail "reparse minimal config"
+
+verbose "ssh -W opts"
+f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config host | awk '/exitonforwardfailure/{print $2}'`
+test "$f" = "no" || fail "exitonforwardfailure default"
+f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 h | awk '/exitonforwardfailure/{print $2}'`
+test "$f" = "yes" || fail "exitonforwardfailure enable"
+f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 -o exitonforwardfailure=no h | \
+ awk '/exitonforwardfailure/{print $2}'`
+test "$f" = "no" || fail "exitonforwardfailure override"
+
+f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config host | awk '/clearallforwardings/{print $2}'`
+test "$f" = "no" || fail "clearallforwardings default"
+f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 h | awk '/clearallforwardings/{print $2}'`
+test "$f" = "yes" || fail "clearallforwardings enable"
+f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 -o clearallforwardings=no h | \
+ awk '/clearallforwardings/{print $2}'`
+test "$f" = "no" || fail "clearallforwardings override"
+
+# cleanup
+rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.[012]
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-# $OpenBSD: sshd-log-wrapper.sh,v 1.3 2013/04/07 02:16:03 dtucker Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-#
-# simple wrapper for sshd proxy mode to catch stderr output
-# sh sshd-log-wrapper.sh /path/to/sshd /path/to/logfile
-
-sshd=$1
-log=$2
-shift
-shift
-
-exec $sshd -E$log $@
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# $OpenBSD: sshd-log-wrapper.sh,v 1.3 2013/04/07 02:16:03 dtucker Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+#
+# simple wrapper for sshd proxy mode to catch stderr output
+# sh sshd-log-wrapper.sh /path/to/logfile /path/to/sshd [args...]
+
+log=$1
+shift
+
+exec "$@" -E$log
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/stderr-data.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/stderr-data.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/stderr-data.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: stderr-data.sh,v 1.3 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="stderr data transfer"
-
-for n in '' -n; do
-for p in 1 2; do
- verbose "test $tid: proto $p ($n)"
- ${SSH} $n -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost \
- exec sh -c \'"exec > /dev/null; sleep 3; cat ${DATA} 1>&2 $s"\' \
- 2> ${COPY}
- r=$?
- if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh failed with exit code $r"
- fi
- cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "stderr corrupt"
- rm -f ${COPY}
-
- ${SSH} $n -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost \
- exec sh -c \'"echo a; exec > /dev/null; sleep 3; cat ${DATA} 1>&2 $s"\' \
- > /dev/null 2> ${COPY}
- r=$?
- if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh failed with exit code $r"
- fi
- cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "stderr corrupt"
- rm -f ${COPY}
-done
-done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/stderr-data.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/stderr-data.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/stderr-data.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/stderr-data.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# $OpenBSD: stderr-data.sh,v 1.4 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="stderr data transfer"
+
+for n in '' -n; do
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ verbose "test $tid: proto $p ($n)"
+ ${SSH} $n -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost \
+ exec sh -c \'"exec > /dev/null; sleep 3; cat ${DATA} 1>&2 $s"\' \
+ 2> ${COPY}
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh failed with exit code $r"
+ fi
+ cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "stderr corrupt"
+ rm -f ${COPY}
+
+ ${SSH} $n -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost \
+ exec sh -c \'"echo a; exec > /dev/null; sleep 3; cat ${DATA} 1>&2 $s"\' \
+ > /dev/null 2> ${COPY}
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh failed with exit code $r"
+ fi
+ cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "stderr corrupt"
+ rm -f ${COPY}
+done
+done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/t11.ok (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/t11.ok)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/t11.ok (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/t11.ok 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:4w1rnrek3klTJOTVhwuCIFd5k+pq9Bfo5KTxxb8BqbY
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/t4.ok
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/t4.ok 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/t4.ok 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-3b:dd:44:e9:49:18:84:95:f1:e7:33:6b:9d:93:b1:36
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/t4.ok (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/t4.ok)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/t4.ok (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/t4.ok 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+MD5:3b:dd:44:e9:49:18:84:95:f1:e7:33:6b:9d:93:b1:36
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/test-exec.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/test-exec.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/test-exec.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,487 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.47 2013/11/09 05:41:34 dtucker Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-#SUDO=sudo
-
-# Unbreak GNU head(1)
-_POSIX2_VERSION=199209
-export _POSIX2_VERSION
-
-case `uname -s 2>/dev/null` in
-OSF1*)
- BIN_SH=xpg4
- export BIN_SH
- ;;
-CYGWIN_NT-5.0)
- os=cygwin
- TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
- ;;
-CYGWIN*)
- os=cygwin
- ;;
-esac
-
-if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_PORT" ]; then
- PORT="$TEST_SSH_PORT"
-else
- PORT=4242
-fi
-
-if [ -x /usr/ucb/whoami ]; then
- USER=`/usr/ucb/whoami`
-elif whoami >/dev/null 2>&1; then
- USER=`whoami`
-elif logname >/dev/null 2>&1; then
- USER=`logname`
-else
- USER=`id -un`
-fi
-
-OBJ=$1
-if [ "x$OBJ" = "x" ]; then
- echo '$OBJ not defined'
- exit 2
-fi
-if [ ! -d $OBJ ]; then
- echo "not a directory: $OBJ"
- exit 2
-fi
-SCRIPT=$2
-if [ "x$SCRIPT" = "x" ]; then
- echo '$SCRIPT not defined'
- exit 2
-fi
-if [ ! -f $SCRIPT ]; then
- echo "not a file: $SCRIPT"
- exit 2
-fi
-if $TEST_SHELL -n $SCRIPT; then
- true
-else
- echo "syntax error in $SCRIPT"
- exit 2
-fi
-unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
-
-SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}`
-
-# defaults
-SSH=ssh
-SSHD=sshd
-SSHAGENT=ssh-agent
-SSHADD=ssh-add
-SSHKEYGEN=ssh-keygen
-SSHKEYSCAN=ssh-keyscan
-SFTP=sftp
-SFTPSERVER=/usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server
-SCP=scp
-
-# Interop testing
-PLINK=plink
-PUTTYGEN=puttygen
-CONCH=conch
-
-if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSH" != "x" ]; then
- SSH="${TEST_SSH_SSH}"
-fi
-if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHD" != "x" ]; then
- SSHD="${TEST_SSH_SSHD}"
-fi
-if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT" != "x" ]; then
- SSHAGENT="${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}"
-fi
-if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHADD" != "x" ]; then
- SSHADD="${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}"
-fi
-if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN" != "x" ]; then
- SSHKEYGEN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}"
-fi
-if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN" != "x" ]; then
- SSHKEYSCAN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}"
-fi
-if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTP" != "x" ]; then
- SFTP="${TEST_SSH_SFTP}"
-fi
-if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER" != "x" ]; then
- SFTPSERVER="${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}"
-fi
-if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SCP" != "x" ]; then
- SCP="${TEST_SSH_SCP}"
-fi
-if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PLINK" != "x" ]; then
- # Find real binary, if it exists
- case "${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" in
- /*) PLINK="${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" ;;
- *) PLINK=`which ${TEST_SSH_PLINK} 2>/dev/null` ;;
- esac
-fi
-if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN" != "x" ]; then
- # Find real binary, if it exists
- case "${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" in
- /*) PUTTYGEN="${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" ;;
- *) PUTTYGEN=`which ${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN} 2>/dev/null` ;;
- esac
-fi
-if [ "x$TEST_SSH_CONCH" != "x" ]; then
- # Find real binary, if it exists
- case "${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" in
- /*) CONCH="${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" ;;
- *) CONCH=`which ${TEST_SSH_CONCH} 2>/dev/null` ;;
- esac
-fi
-
-# Path to sshd must be absolute for rexec
-case "$SSHD" in
-/*) ;;
-*) SSHD=`which $SSHD` ;;
-esac
-
-case "$SSHAGENT" in
-/*) ;;
-*) SSHAGENT=`which $SSHAGENT` ;;
-esac
-
-# Logfiles.
-# SSH_LOGFILE should be the debug output of ssh(1) only
-# SSHD_LOGFILE should be the debug output of sshd(8) only
-# REGRESS_LOGFILE is the output of the test itself stdout and stderr
-if [ "x$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then
- TEST_SSH_LOGFILE=$OBJ/ssh.log
-fi
-if [ "x$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then
- TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE=$OBJ/sshd.log
-fi
-if [ "x$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then
- TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE=$OBJ/regress.log
-fi
-
-# truncate logfiles
->$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
->$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
->$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE
-
-# Create wrapper ssh with logging. We can't just specify "SSH=ssh -E..."
-# because sftp and scp don't handle spaces in arguments.
-SSHLOGWRAP=$OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh
-echo "#!/bin/sh" > $SSHLOGWRAP
-echo "exec ${SSH} -E${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} "'"$@"' >>$SSHLOGWRAP
-
-chmod a+rx $OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh
-SSH="$SSHLOGWRAP"
-
-# Some test data. We make a copy because some tests will overwrite it.
-# The tests may assume that $DATA exists and is writable and $COPY does
-# not exist. Tests requiring larger data files can call increase_datafile_size
-# [kbytes] to ensure the file is at least that large.
-DATANAME=data
-DATA=$OBJ/${DATANAME}
-cat ${SSHAGENT} >${DATA}
-chmod u+w ${DATA}
-COPY=$OBJ/copy
-rm -f ${COPY}
-
-increase_datafile_size()
-{
- while [ `du -k ${DATA} | cut -f1` -lt $1 ]; do
- cat ${SSHAGENT} >>${DATA}
- done
-}
-
-# these should be used in tests
-export SSH SSHD SSHAGENT SSHADD SSHKEYGEN SSHKEYSCAN SFTP SFTPSERVER SCP
-#echo $SSH $SSHD $SSHAGENT $SSHADD $SSHKEYGEN $SSHKEYSCAN $SFTP $SFTPSERVER $SCP
-
-# Portable specific functions
-have_prog()
-{
- saved_IFS="$IFS"
- IFS=":"
- for i in $PATH
- do
- if [ -x $i/$1 ]; then
- IFS="$saved_IFS"
- return 0
- fi
- done
- IFS="$saved_IFS"
- return 1
-}
-
-jot() {
- awk "BEGIN { for (i = $2; i < $2 + $1; i++) { printf \"%d\n\", i } exit }"
-}
-
-# Check whether preprocessor symbols are defined in config.h.
-config_defined ()
-{
- str=$1
- while test "x$2" != "x" ; do
- str="$str|$2"
- shift
- done
- egrep "^#define.*($str)" ${BUILDDIR}/config.h >/dev/null 2>&1
-}
-
-md5 () {
- if have_prog md5sum; then
- md5sum
- elif have_prog openssl; then
- openssl md5
- elif have_prog cksum; then
- cksum
- elif have_prog sum; then
- sum
- else
- wc -c
- fi
-}
-# End of portable specific functions
-
-# helper
-cleanup ()
-{
- if [ -f $PIDFILE ]; then
- pid=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
- if [ "X$pid" = "X" ]; then
- echo no sshd running
- else
- if [ $pid -lt 2 ]; then
- echo bad pid for ssh: $pid
- else
- $SUDO kill $pid
- trace "wait for sshd to exit"
- i=0;
- while [ -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 5 ]; do
- i=`expr $i + 1`
- sleep $i
- done
- test -f $PIDFILE && \
- fatal "sshd didn't exit port $PORT pid $pid"
- fi
- fi
- fi
-}
-
-start_debug_log ()
-{
- echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE
- echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
- echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
-}
-
-save_debug_log ()
-{
- echo $@ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE
- echo $@ >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
- echo $@ >>$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
- (cat $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-regress.log
- (cat $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-ssh.log
- (cat $TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-sshd.log
-}
-
-trace ()
-{
- start_debug_log $@
- if [ "X$TEST_SSH_TRACE" = "Xyes" ]; then
- echo "$@"
- fi
-}
-
-verbose ()
-{
- start_debug_log $@
- if [ "X$TEST_SSH_QUIET" != "Xyes" ]; then
- echo "$@"
- fi
-}
-
-warn ()
-{
- echo "WARNING: $@" >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
- echo "WARNING: $@"
-}
-
-fail ()
-{
- save_debug_log "FAIL: $@"
- RESULT=1
- echo "$@"
-
-}
-
-fatal ()
-{
- save_debug_log "FATAL: $@"
- printf "FATAL: "
- fail "$@"
- cleanup
- exit $RESULT
-}
-
-RESULT=0
-PIDFILE=$OBJ/pidfile
-
-trap fatal 3 2
-
-# create server config
-cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd_config
- StrictModes no
- Port $PORT
- Protocol 2,1
- AddressFamily inet
- ListenAddress 127.0.0.1
- #ListenAddress ::1
- PidFile $PIDFILE
- AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/authorized_keys_%u
- LogLevel DEBUG3
- AcceptEnv _XXX_TEST_*
- AcceptEnv _XXX_TEST
- Subsystem sftp $SFTPSERVER
-EOF
-
-if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" ]; then
- trace "adding sshd_config option $TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS"
- echo "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
-fi
-
-# server config for proxy connects
-cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
-# allow group-writable directories in proxy-mode
-echo 'StrictModes no' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
-# create client config
-cat << EOF > $OBJ/ssh_config
-Host *
- Protocol 2,1
- Hostname 127.0.0.1
- HostKeyAlias localhost-with-alias
- Port $PORT
- User $USER
- GlobalKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts
- UserKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts
- RSAAuthentication yes
- PubkeyAuthentication yes
- ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
- HostbasedAuthentication no
- PasswordAuthentication no
- RhostsRSAAuthentication no
- BatchMode yes
- StrictHostKeyChecking yes
- LogLevel DEBUG3
-EOF
-
-if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" ]; then
- trace "adding ssh_config option $TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS"
- echo "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
-fi
-
-rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-
-trace "generate keys"
-for t in rsa rsa1; do
- # generate user key
- if [ ! -f $OBJ/$t ] || [ ${SSHKEYGEN} -nt $OBJ/$t ]; then
- rm -f $OBJ/$t
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f $OBJ/$t ||\
- fail "ssh-keygen for $t failed"
- fi
-
- # known hosts file for client
- (
- printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
- cat $OBJ/$t.pub
- ) >> $OBJ/known_hosts
-
- # setup authorized keys
- cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
- echo IdentityFile $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/ssh_config
-
- # use key as host key, too
- $SUDO cp $OBJ/$t $OBJ/host.$t
- echo HostKey $OBJ/host.$t >> $OBJ/sshd_config
-
- # don't use SUDO for proxy connect
- echo HostKey $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-done
-chmod 644 $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-
-# Activate Twisted Conch tests if the binary is present
-REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=no
-if test -x "$CONCH" ; then
- REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=yes
-fi
-
-# If PuTTY is present and we are running a PuTTY test, prepare keys and
-# configuration
-REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no
-if test -x "$PUTTYGEN" -a -x "$PLINK" ; then
- REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes
-fi
-case "$SCRIPT" in
-*putty*) ;;
-*) REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no ;;
-esac
-
-if test "$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" = "yes" ; then
- mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty
-
- # Add a PuTTY key to authorized_keys
- rm -f ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2
- puttygen -t rsa -o ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 < /dev/null > /dev/null
- puttygen -O public-openssh ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \
- >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-
- # Convert rsa2 host key to PuTTY format
- ${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 $PORT $OBJ/rsa > \
- ${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys
- ${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 22 $OBJ/rsa >> \
- ${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys
-
- # Setup proxied session
- mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions
- rm -f ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
- echo "Hostname=127.0.0.1" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
- echo "PortNumber=$PORT" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
- echo "ProxyMethod=5" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
- echo "ProxyTelnetCommand=sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${SSHD} ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
-
- REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes
-fi
-
-# create a proxy version of the client config
-(
- cat $OBJ/ssh_config
- echo proxycommand ${SUDO} sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${SSHD} ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
-
-# check proxy config
-${SSHD} -t -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy || fatal "sshd_proxy broken"
-
-start_sshd ()
-{
- # start sshd
- $SUDO ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -t || fatal "sshd_config broken"
- $SUDO ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -E$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
-
- trace "wait for sshd"
- i=0;
- while [ ! -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 10 ]; do
- i=`expr $i + 1`
- sleep $i
- done
-
- test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "no sshd running on port $PORT"
-}
-
-# source test body
-. $SCRIPT
-
-# kill sshd
-cleanup
-if [ $RESULT -eq 0 ]; then
- verbose ok $tid
-else
- echo failed $tid
-fi
-exit $RESULT
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/test-exec.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/test-exec.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/test-exec.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/test-exec.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,572 @@
+# $OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.53 2016/04/15 02:57:10 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+#SUDO=sudo
+
+# Unbreak GNU head(1)
+_POSIX2_VERSION=199209
+export _POSIX2_VERSION
+
+case `uname -s 2>/dev/null` in
+OSF1*)
+ BIN_SH=xpg4
+ export BIN_SH
+ ;;
+CYGWIN_NT-5.0)
+ os=cygwin
+ TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
+ ;;
+CYGWIN*)
+ os=cygwin
+ ;;
+esac
+
+if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_PORT" ]; then
+ PORT="$TEST_SSH_PORT"
+else
+ PORT=4242
+fi
+
+if [ -x /usr/ucb/whoami ]; then
+ USER=`/usr/ucb/whoami`
+elif whoami >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ USER=`whoami`
+elif logname >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ USER=`logname`
+else
+ USER=`id -un`
+fi
+
+OBJ=$1
+if [ "x$OBJ" = "x" ]; then
+ echo '$OBJ not defined'
+ exit 2
+fi
+if [ ! -d $OBJ ]; then
+ echo "not a directory: $OBJ"
+ exit 2
+fi
+SCRIPT=$2
+if [ "x$SCRIPT" = "x" ]; then
+ echo '$SCRIPT not defined'
+ exit 2
+fi
+if [ ! -f $SCRIPT ]; then
+ echo "not a file: $SCRIPT"
+ exit 2
+fi
+if $TEST_SHELL -n $SCRIPT; then
+ true
+else
+ echo "syntax error in $SCRIPT"
+ exit 2
+fi
+unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+
+SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}`
+
+# defaults
+SSH=ssh
+SSHD=sshd
+SSHAGENT=ssh-agent
+SSHADD=ssh-add
+SSHKEYGEN=ssh-keygen
+SSHKEYSCAN=ssh-keyscan
+SFTP=sftp
+SFTPSERVER=/usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server
+SCP=scp
+
+# Interop testing
+PLINK=plink
+PUTTYGEN=puttygen
+CONCH=conch
+
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSH" != "x" ]; then
+ SSH="${TEST_SSH_SSH}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHD" != "x" ]; then
+ SSHD="${TEST_SSH_SSHD}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT" != "x" ]; then
+ SSHAGENT="${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHADD" != "x" ]; then
+ SSHADD="${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN" != "x" ]; then
+ SSHKEYGEN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN" != "x" ]; then
+ SSHKEYSCAN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTP" != "x" ]; then
+ SFTP="${TEST_SSH_SFTP}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER" != "x" ]; then
+ SFTPSERVER="${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SCP" != "x" ]; then
+ SCP="${TEST_SSH_SCP}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PLINK" != "x" ]; then
+ # Find real binary, if it exists
+ case "${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" in
+ /*) PLINK="${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" ;;
+ *) PLINK=`which ${TEST_SSH_PLINK} 2>/dev/null` ;;
+ esac
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN" != "x" ]; then
+ # Find real binary, if it exists
+ case "${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" in
+ /*) PUTTYGEN="${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" ;;
+ *) PUTTYGEN=`which ${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN} 2>/dev/null` ;;
+ esac
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_CONCH" != "x" ]; then
+ # Find real binary, if it exists
+ case "${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" in
+ /*) CONCH="${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" ;;
+ *) CONCH=`which ${TEST_SSH_CONCH} 2>/dev/null` ;;
+ esac
+fi
+
+SSH_PROTOCOLS=`$SSH -Q protocol-version`
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PROTOCOLS" != "x" ]; then
+ SSH_PROTOCOLS="${TEST_SSH_PROTOCOLS}"
+fi
+
+# Path to sshd must be absolute for rexec
+case "$SSHD" in
+/*) ;;
+*) SSHD=`which $SSHD` ;;
+esac
+
+case "$SSHAGENT" in
+/*) ;;
+*) SSHAGENT=`which $SSHAGENT` ;;
+esac
+
+# Record the actual binaries used.
+SSH_BIN=${SSH}
+SSHD_BIN=${SSHD}
+SSHAGENT_BIN=${SSHAGENT}
+SSHADD_BIN=${SSHADD}
+SSHKEYGEN_BIN=${SSHKEYGEN}
+SSHKEYSCAN_BIN=${SSHKEYSCAN}
+SFTP_BIN=${SFTP}
+SFTPSERVER_BIN=${SFTPSERVER}
+SCP_BIN=${SCP}
+
+if [ "x$USE_VALGRIND" != "x" ]; then
+ mkdir -p $OBJ/valgrind-out
+ VG_TEST=`basename $SCRIPT .sh`
+
+ # Some tests are difficult to fix.
+ case "$VG_TEST" in
+ connect-privsep|reexec)
+ VG_SKIP=1 ;;
+ esac
+
+ if [ x"$VG_SKIP" = "x" ]; then
+ VG_IGNORE="/bin/*,/sbin/*,/usr/*,/var/*"
+ VG_LOG="$OBJ/valgrind-out/${VG_TEST}."
+ VG_OPTS="--track-origins=yes --leak-check=full"
+ VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children=yes"
+ VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children-skip=${VG_IGNORE}"
+ VG_PATH="valgrind"
+ if [ "x$VALGRIND_PATH" != "x" ]; then
+ VG_PATH="$VALGRIND_PATH"
+ fi
+ VG="$VG_PATH $VG_OPTS"
+ SSH="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh.%p $SSH"
+ SSHD="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sshd.%p $SSHD"
+ SSHAGENT="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-agent.%p $SSHAGENT"
+ SSHADD="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-add.%p $SSHADD"
+ SSHKEYGEN="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-keygen.%p $SSHKEYGEN"
+ SSHKEYSCAN="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-keyscan.%p $SSHKEYSCAN"
+ SFTP="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sftp.%p ${SFTP}"
+ SCP="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}scp.%p $SCP"
+ cat > $OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh << EOF
+#!/bin/sh
+exec $VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sftp-server.%p $SFTPSERVER "\$@"
+EOF
+ chmod a+rx $OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh
+ SFTPSERVER="$OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh"
+ fi
+fi
+
+# Logfiles.
+# SSH_LOGFILE should be the debug output of ssh(1) only
+# SSHD_LOGFILE should be the debug output of sshd(8) only
+# REGRESS_LOGFILE is the output of the test itself stdout and stderr
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then
+ TEST_SSH_LOGFILE=$OBJ/ssh.log
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then
+ TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE=$OBJ/sshd.log
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then
+ TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE=$OBJ/regress.log
+fi
+
+# truncate logfiles
+>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
+>$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
+>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE
+
+# Create wrapper ssh with logging. We can't just specify "SSH=ssh -E..."
+# because sftp and scp don't handle spaces in arguments.
+SSHLOGWRAP=$OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh
+echo "#!/bin/sh" > $SSHLOGWRAP
+echo "exec ${SSH} -E${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} "'"$@"' >>$SSHLOGWRAP
+
+chmod a+rx $OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh
+REAL_SSH="$SSH"
+SSH="$SSHLOGWRAP"
+
+# Some test data. We make a copy because some tests will overwrite it.
+# The tests may assume that $DATA exists and is writable and $COPY does
+# not exist. Tests requiring larger data files can call increase_datafile_size
+# [kbytes] to ensure the file is at least that large.
+DATANAME=data
+DATA=$OBJ/${DATANAME}
+cat ${SSHAGENT_BIN} >${DATA}
+chmod u+w ${DATA}
+COPY=$OBJ/copy
+rm -f ${COPY}
+
+increase_datafile_size()
+{
+ while [ `du -k ${DATA} | cut -f1` -lt $1 ]; do
+ cat ${SSHAGENT_BIN} >>${DATA}
+ done
+}
+
+# these should be used in tests
+export SSH SSHD SSHAGENT SSHADD SSHKEYGEN SSHKEYSCAN SFTP SFTPSERVER SCP
+#echo $SSH $SSHD $SSHAGENT $SSHADD $SSHKEYGEN $SSHKEYSCAN $SFTP $SFTPSERVER $SCP
+
+# Portable specific functions
+have_prog()
+{
+ saved_IFS="$IFS"
+ IFS=":"
+ for i in $PATH
+ do
+ if [ -x $i/$1 ]; then
+ IFS="$saved_IFS"
+ return 0
+ fi
+ done
+ IFS="$saved_IFS"
+ return 1
+}
+
+jot() {
+ awk "BEGIN { for (i = $2; i < $2 + $1; i++) { printf \"%d\n\", i } exit }"
+}
+
+# Check whether preprocessor symbols are defined in config.h.
+config_defined ()
+{
+ str=$1
+ while test "x$2" != "x" ; do
+ str="$str|$2"
+ shift
+ done
+ egrep "^#define.*($str)" ${BUILDDIR}/config.h >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+md5 () {
+ if have_prog md5sum; then
+ md5sum
+ elif have_prog openssl; then
+ openssl md5
+ elif have_prog cksum; then
+ cksum
+ elif have_prog sum; then
+ sum
+ else
+ wc -c
+ fi
+}
+# End of portable specific functions
+
+# helper
+cleanup ()
+{
+ if [ "x$SSH_PID" != "x" ]; then
+ if [ $SSH_PID -lt 2 ]; then
+ echo bad pid for ssh: $SSH_PID
+ else
+ kill $SSH_PID
+ fi
+ fi
+ if [ -f $PIDFILE ]; then
+ pid=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
+ if [ "X$pid" = "X" ]; then
+ echo no sshd running
+ else
+ if [ $pid -lt 2 ]; then
+ echo bad pid for sshd: $pid
+ else
+ $SUDO kill $pid
+ trace "wait for sshd to exit"
+ i=0;
+ while [ -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 5 ]; do
+ i=`expr $i + 1`
+ sleep $i
+ done
+ test -f $PIDFILE && \
+ fatal "sshd didn't exit port $PORT pid $pid"
+ fi
+ fi
+ fi
+}
+
+start_debug_log ()
+{
+ echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE
+ echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
+ echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
+}
+
+save_debug_log ()
+{
+ echo $@ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE
+ echo $@ >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
+ echo $@ >>$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
+ (cat $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-regress.log
+ (cat $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-ssh.log
+ (cat $TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-sshd.log
+}
+
+trace ()
+{
+ start_debug_log $@
+ if [ "X$TEST_SSH_TRACE" = "Xyes" ]; then
+ echo "$@"
+ fi
+}
+
+verbose ()
+{
+ start_debug_log $@
+ if [ "X$TEST_SSH_QUIET" != "Xyes" ]; then
+ echo "$@"
+ fi
+}
+
+warn ()
+{
+ echo "WARNING: $@" >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
+ echo "WARNING: $@"
+}
+
+fail ()
+{
+ save_debug_log "FAIL: $@"
+ RESULT=1
+ echo "$@"
+
+}
+
+fatal ()
+{
+ save_debug_log "FATAL: $@"
+ printf "FATAL: "
+ fail "$@"
+ cleanup
+ exit $RESULT
+}
+
+ssh_version ()
+{
+ echo ${SSH_PROTOCOLS} | grep "$1" >/dev/null
+}
+
+RESULT=0
+PIDFILE=$OBJ/pidfile
+
+trap fatal 3 2
+
+if ssh_version 1; then
+ PROTO="2,1"
+else
+ PROTO="2"
+fi
+
+# create server config
+cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd_config
+ StrictModes no
+ Port $PORT
+ Protocol $PROTO
+ AddressFamily inet
+ ListenAddress 127.0.0.1
+ #ListenAddress ::1
+ PidFile $PIDFILE
+ AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/authorized_keys_%u
+ LogLevel DEBUG3
+ AcceptEnv _XXX_TEST_*
+ AcceptEnv _XXX_TEST
+ Subsystem sftp $SFTPSERVER
+EOF
+
+# This may be necessary if /usr/src and/or /usr/obj are group-writable,
+# but if you aren't careful with permissions then the unit tests could
+# be abused to locally escalate privileges.
+if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS" ]; then
+ echo "StrictModes no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+fi
+
+if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" ]; then
+ trace "adding sshd_config option $TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS"
+ echo "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+fi
+
+# server config for proxy connects
+cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+# allow group-writable directories in proxy-mode
+echo 'StrictModes no' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+# create client config
+cat << EOF > $OBJ/ssh_config
+Host *
+ Protocol $PROTO
+ Hostname 127.0.0.1
+ HostKeyAlias localhost-with-alias
+ Port $PORT
+ User $USER
+ GlobalKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts
+ UserKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts
+ RSAAuthentication yes
+ PubkeyAuthentication yes
+ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
+ HostbasedAuthentication no
+ PasswordAuthentication no
+ RhostsRSAAuthentication no
+ BatchMode yes
+ StrictHostKeyChecking yes
+ LogLevel DEBUG3
+EOF
+
+if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" ]; then
+ trace "adding ssh_config option $TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS"
+ echo "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
+fi
+
+rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+
+if ssh_version 1; then
+ SSH_KEYTYPES="rsa rsa1"
+else
+ SSH_KEYTYPES="rsa ed25519"
+fi
+trace "generate keys"
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+ # generate user key
+ if [ ! -f $OBJ/$t ] || [ ${SSHKEYGEN_BIN} -nt $OBJ/$t ]; then
+ rm -f $OBJ/$t
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f $OBJ/$t ||\
+ fail "ssh-keygen for $t failed"
+ fi
+
+ # known hosts file for client
+ (
+ printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
+ cat $OBJ/$t.pub
+ ) >> $OBJ/known_hosts
+
+ # setup authorized keys
+ cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ echo IdentityFile $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/ssh_config
+
+ # use key as host key, too
+ $SUDO cp $OBJ/$t $OBJ/host.$t
+ echo HostKey $OBJ/host.$t >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+
+ # don't use SUDO for proxy connect
+ echo HostKey $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+done
+chmod 644 $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+
+# Activate Twisted Conch tests if the binary is present
+REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=no
+if test -x "$CONCH" ; then
+ REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=yes
+fi
+
+# If PuTTY is present and we are running a PuTTY test, prepare keys and
+# configuration
+REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no
+if test -x "$PUTTYGEN" -a -x "$PLINK" ; then
+ REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes
+fi
+case "$SCRIPT" in
+*putty*) ;;
+*) REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no ;;
+esac
+
+if test "$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" = "yes" ; then
+ mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty
+
+ # Add a PuTTY key to authorized_keys
+ rm -f ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2
+ puttygen -t rsa -o ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 < /dev/null > /dev/null
+ puttygen -O public-openssh ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \
+ >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+
+ # Convert rsa2 host key to PuTTY format
+ ${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 $PORT $OBJ/rsa > \
+ ${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys
+ ${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 22 $OBJ/rsa >> \
+ ${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys
+
+ # Setup proxied session
+ mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions
+ rm -f ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
+ echo "Hostname=127.0.0.1" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
+ echo "PortNumber=$PORT" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
+ echo "ProxyMethod=5" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
+ echo "ProxyTelnetCommand=sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
+
+ REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes
+fi
+
+# create a proxy version of the client config
+(
+ cat $OBJ/ssh_config
+ echo proxycommand ${SUDO} sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+# check proxy config
+${SSHD} -t -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy || fatal "sshd_proxy broken"
+
+start_sshd ()
+{
+ # start sshd
+ $SUDO ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -t || fatal "sshd_config broken"
+ $SUDO ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -E$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
+
+ trace "wait for sshd"
+ i=0;
+ while [ ! -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 10 ]; do
+ i=`expr $i + 1`
+ sleep $i
+ done
+
+ test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "no sshd running on port $PORT"
+}
+
+# source test body
+. $SCRIPT
+
+# kill sshd
+cleanup
+if [ $RESULT -eq 0 ]; then
+ verbose ok $tid
+else
+ echo failed $tid
+fi
+exit $RESULT
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/transfer.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/transfer.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/transfer.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: transfer.sh,v 1.2 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="transfer data"
-
-for p in 1 2; do
- verbose "$tid: proto $p"
- rm -f ${COPY}
- ${SSH} -n -q -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
- fi
- cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
-
- for s in 10 100 1k 32k 64k 128k 256k; do
- trace "proto $p dd-size ${s}"
- rm -f ${COPY}
- dd if=$DATA obs=${s} 2> /dev/null | \
- ${SSH} -q -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat > ${COPY}"
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
- fi
- cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
- done
-done
-rm -f ${COPY}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/transfer.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/transfer.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/transfer.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/transfer.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# $OpenBSD: transfer.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="transfer data"
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ verbose "$tid: proto $p"
+ rm -f ${COPY}
+ ${SSH} -n -q -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
+ fi
+ cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+ for s in 10 100 1k 32k 64k 128k 256k; do
+ trace "proto $p dd-size ${s}"
+ rm -f ${COPY}
+ dd if=$DATA obs=${s} 2> /dev/null | \
+ ${SSH} -q -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat > ${COPY}"
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
+ fi
+ cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+ done
+done
+rm -f ${COPY}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/try-ciphers.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/try-ciphers.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/try-ciphers.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.22 2013/11/21 03:18:51 djm Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="try ciphers"
-
-for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do
- n=0
- for m in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do
- trace "proto 2 cipher $c mac $m"
- verbose "test $tid: proto 2 cipher $c mac $m"
- ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -2 -m $m -c $c somehost true
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh -2 failed with mac $m cipher $c"
- fi
- # No point trying all MACs for AEAD ciphers since they
- # are ignored.
- if ssh -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
- break
- fi
- n=`expr $n + 1`
- done
-done
-
-ciphers="3des blowfish"
-for c in $ciphers; do
- trace "proto 1 cipher $c"
- verbose "test $tid: proto 1 cipher $c"
- ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -1 -c $c somehost true
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh -1 failed with cipher $c"
- fi
-done
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/try-ciphers.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/try-ciphers.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/try-ciphers.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/try-ciphers.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# $OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.25 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="try ciphers"
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do
+ n=0
+ for m in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do
+ trace "proto 2 cipher $c mac $m"
+ verbose "test $tid: proto 2 cipher $c mac $m"
+ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ echo "Ciphers=$c" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ echo "MACs=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -2 -m $m -c $c somehost true
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh -2 failed with mac $m cipher $c"
+ fi
+ # No point trying all MACs for AEAD ciphers since they
+ # are ignored.
+ if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+ break
+ fi
+ n=`expr $n + 1`
+ done
+done
+
+if ssh_version 1; then
+ ciphers="3des blowfish"
+else
+ ciphers=""
+fi
+for c in $ciphers; do
+ trace "proto 1 cipher $c"
+ verbose "test $tid: proto 1 cipher $c"
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -1 -c $c somehost true
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh -1 failed with cipher $c"
+ fi
+done
+
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/valgrind-unit.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/valgrind-unit.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/valgrind-unit.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/valgrind-unit.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+UNIT_BINARY="$1"
+shift
+UNIT_ARGS="$@"
+
+test "x$OBJ" = "x" && OBJ=$PWD
+
+# This mostly replicates the logic in test-exec.sh for running the
+# regress tests under valgrind.
+VG_TEST=`basename $UNIT_BINARY`
+VG_LOG="$OBJ/valgrind-out/${VG_TEST}.%p"
+VG_OPTS="--track-origins=yes --leak-check=full --log-file=${VG_LOG}"
+VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children=yes"
+VG_PATH="valgrind"
+if [ "x$VALGRIND_PATH" != "x" ]; then
+ VG_PATH="$VALGRIND_PATH"
+fi
+
+exec $VG_PATH $VG_OPTS $UNIT_BINARY $UNIT_ARGS
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/yes-head.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/yes-head.sh 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/yes-head.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: yes-head.sh,v 1.4 2002/03/15 13:08:56 markus Exp $
-# Placed in the Public Domain.
-
-tid="yes pipe head"
-
-for p in 1 2; do
- lines=`${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy thishost 'sh -c "while true;do echo yes;done | _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 head -2000"' | (sleep 3 ; wc -l)`
- if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "yes|head test failed"
- lines = 0;
- fi
- if [ $lines -ne 2000 ]; then
- fail "yes|head returns $lines lines instead of 2000"
- fi
-done
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/yes-head.sh (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/yes-head.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/yes-head.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/regress/yes-head.sh 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# $OpenBSD: yes-head.sh,v 1.5 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="yes pipe head"
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+ lines=`${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy thishost 'sh -c "while true;do echo yes;done | _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 head -2000"' | (sleep 3 ; wc -l)`
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "yes|head test failed"
+ lines = 0;
+ fi
+ if [ $lines -ne 2000 ]; then
+ fail "yes|head returns $lines lines instead of 2000"
+ fi
+done
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rijndael.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/rijndael.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rijndael.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1244 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.c,v 1.16 2004/06/23 00:39:38 mouring Exp $ */
-
-/**
- * rijndael-alg-fst.c
- *
- * @version 3.0 (December 2000)
- *
- * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES)
- *
- * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen at esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
- * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers at esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
- * @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto at terra.com.br>
- *
- * This code is hereby placed in the public domain.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
- * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
- * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
- * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
- * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
- * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
- * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
- * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
- * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
- * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "rijndael.h"
-
-#define FULL_UNROLL
-
-/*
-Te0[x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03];
-Te1[x] = S [x].[03, 02, 01, 01];
-Te2[x] = S [x].[01, 03, 02, 01];
-Te3[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 03, 02];
-Te4[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 01, 01];
-
-Td0[x] = Si[x].[0e, 09, 0d, 0b];
-Td1[x] = Si[x].[0b, 0e, 09, 0d];
-Td2[x] = Si[x].[0d, 0b, 0e, 09];
-Td3[x] = Si[x].[09, 0d, 0b, 0e];
-Td4[x] = Si[x].[01, 01, 01, 01];
-*/
-
-static const u32 Te0[256] = {
- 0xc66363a5U, 0xf87c7c84U, 0xee777799U, 0xf67b7b8dU,
- 0xfff2f20dU, 0xd66b6bbdU, 0xde6f6fb1U, 0x91c5c554U,
- 0x60303050U, 0x02010103U, 0xce6767a9U, 0x562b2b7dU,
- 0xe7fefe19U, 0xb5d7d762U, 0x4dababe6U, 0xec76769aU,
- 0x8fcaca45U, 0x1f82829dU, 0x89c9c940U, 0xfa7d7d87U,
- 0xeffafa15U, 0xb25959ebU, 0x8e4747c9U, 0xfbf0f00bU,
- 0x41adadecU, 0xb3d4d467U, 0x5fa2a2fdU, 0x45afafeaU,
- 0x239c9cbfU, 0x53a4a4f7U, 0xe4727296U, 0x9bc0c05bU,
- 0x75b7b7c2U, 0xe1fdfd1cU, 0x3d9393aeU, 0x4c26266aU,
- 0x6c36365aU, 0x7e3f3f41U, 0xf5f7f702U, 0x83cccc4fU,
- 0x6834345cU, 0x51a5a5f4U, 0xd1e5e534U, 0xf9f1f108U,
- 0xe2717193U, 0xabd8d873U, 0x62313153U, 0x2a15153fU,
- 0x0804040cU, 0x95c7c752U, 0x46232365U, 0x9dc3c35eU,
- 0x30181828U, 0x379696a1U, 0x0a05050fU, 0x2f9a9ab5U,
- 0x0e070709U, 0x24121236U, 0x1b80809bU, 0xdfe2e23dU,
- 0xcdebeb26U, 0x4e272769U, 0x7fb2b2cdU, 0xea75759fU,
- 0x1209091bU, 0x1d83839eU, 0x582c2c74U, 0x341a1a2eU,
- 0x361b1b2dU, 0xdc6e6eb2U, 0xb45a5aeeU, 0x5ba0a0fbU,
- 0xa45252f6U, 0x763b3b4dU, 0xb7d6d661U, 0x7db3b3ceU,
- 0x5229297bU, 0xdde3e33eU, 0x5e2f2f71U, 0x13848497U,
- 0xa65353f5U, 0xb9d1d168U, 0x00000000U, 0xc1eded2cU,
- 0x40202060U, 0xe3fcfc1fU, 0x79b1b1c8U, 0xb65b5bedU,
- 0xd46a6abeU, 0x8dcbcb46U, 0x67bebed9U, 0x7239394bU,
- 0x944a4adeU, 0x984c4cd4U, 0xb05858e8U, 0x85cfcf4aU,
- 0xbbd0d06bU, 0xc5efef2aU, 0x4faaaae5U, 0xedfbfb16U,
- 0x864343c5U, 0x9a4d4dd7U, 0x66333355U, 0x11858594U,
- 0x8a4545cfU, 0xe9f9f910U, 0x04020206U, 0xfe7f7f81U,
- 0xa05050f0U, 0x783c3c44U, 0x259f9fbaU, 0x4ba8a8e3U,
- 0xa25151f3U, 0x5da3a3feU, 0x804040c0U, 0x058f8f8aU,
- 0x3f9292adU, 0x219d9dbcU, 0x70383848U, 0xf1f5f504U,
- 0x63bcbcdfU, 0x77b6b6c1U, 0xafdada75U, 0x42212163U,
- 0x20101030U, 0xe5ffff1aU, 0xfdf3f30eU, 0xbfd2d26dU,
- 0x81cdcd4cU, 0x180c0c14U, 0x26131335U, 0xc3ecec2fU,
- 0xbe5f5fe1U, 0x359797a2U, 0x884444ccU, 0x2e171739U,
- 0x93c4c457U, 0x55a7a7f2U, 0xfc7e7e82U, 0x7a3d3d47U,
- 0xc86464acU, 0xba5d5de7U, 0x3219192bU, 0xe6737395U,
- 0xc06060a0U, 0x19818198U, 0x9e4f4fd1U, 0xa3dcdc7fU,
- 0x44222266U, 0x542a2a7eU, 0x3b9090abU, 0x0b888883U,
- 0x8c4646caU, 0xc7eeee29U, 0x6bb8b8d3U, 0x2814143cU,
- 0xa7dede79U, 0xbc5e5ee2U, 0x160b0b1dU, 0xaddbdb76U,
- 0xdbe0e03bU, 0x64323256U, 0x743a3a4eU, 0x140a0a1eU,
- 0x924949dbU, 0x0c06060aU, 0x4824246cU, 0xb85c5ce4U,
- 0x9fc2c25dU, 0xbdd3d36eU, 0x43acacefU, 0xc46262a6U,
- 0x399191a8U, 0x319595a4U, 0xd3e4e437U, 0xf279798bU,
- 0xd5e7e732U, 0x8bc8c843U, 0x6e373759U, 0xda6d6db7U,
- 0x018d8d8cU, 0xb1d5d564U, 0x9c4e4ed2U, 0x49a9a9e0U,
- 0xd86c6cb4U, 0xac5656faU, 0xf3f4f407U, 0xcfeaea25U,
- 0xca6565afU, 0xf47a7a8eU, 0x47aeaee9U, 0x10080818U,
- 0x6fbabad5U, 0xf0787888U, 0x4a25256fU, 0x5c2e2e72U,
- 0x381c1c24U, 0x57a6a6f1U, 0x73b4b4c7U, 0x97c6c651U,
- 0xcbe8e823U, 0xa1dddd7cU, 0xe874749cU, 0x3e1f1f21U,
- 0x964b4bddU, 0x61bdbddcU, 0x0d8b8b86U, 0x0f8a8a85U,
- 0xe0707090U, 0x7c3e3e42U, 0x71b5b5c4U, 0xcc6666aaU,
- 0x904848d8U, 0x06030305U, 0xf7f6f601U, 0x1c0e0e12U,
- 0xc26161a3U, 0x6a35355fU, 0xae5757f9U, 0x69b9b9d0U,
- 0x17868691U, 0x99c1c158U, 0x3a1d1d27U, 0x279e9eb9U,
- 0xd9e1e138U, 0xebf8f813U, 0x2b9898b3U, 0x22111133U,
- 0xd26969bbU, 0xa9d9d970U, 0x078e8e89U, 0x339494a7U,
- 0x2d9b9bb6U, 0x3c1e1e22U, 0x15878792U, 0xc9e9e920U,
- 0x87cece49U, 0xaa5555ffU, 0x50282878U, 0xa5dfdf7aU,
- 0x038c8c8fU, 0x59a1a1f8U, 0x09898980U, 0x1a0d0d17U,
- 0x65bfbfdaU, 0xd7e6e631U, 0x844242c6U, 0xd06868b8U,
- 0x824141c3U, 0x299999b0U, 0x5a2d2d77U, 0x1e0f0f11U,
- 0x7bb0b0cbU, 0xa85454fcU, 0x6dbbbbd6U, 0x2c16163aU,
-};
-static const u32 Te1[256] = {
- 0xa5c66363U, 0x84f87c7cU, 0x99ee7777U, 0x8df67b7bU,
- 0x0dfff2f2U, 0xbdd66b6bU, 0xb1de6f6fU, 0x5491c5c5U,
- 0x50603030U, 0x03020101U, 0xa9ce6767U, 0x7d562b2bU,
- 0x19e7fefeU, 0x62b5d7d7U, 0xe64dababU, 0x9aec7676U,
- 0x458fcacaU, 0x9d1f8282U, 0x4089c9c9U, 0x87fa7d7dU,
- 0x15effafaU, 0xebb25959U, 0xc98e4747U, 0x0bfbf0f0U,
- 0xec41adadU, 0x67b3d4d4U, 0xfd5fa2a2U, 0xea45afafU,
- 0xbf239c9cU, 0xf753a4a4U, 0x96e47272U, 0x5b9bc0c0U,
- 0xc275b7b7U, 0x1ce1fdfdU, 0xae3d9393U, 0x6a4c2626U,
- 0x5a6c3636U, 0x417e3f3fU, 0x02f5f7f7U, 0x4f83ccccU,
- 0x5c683434U, 0xf451a5a5U, 0x34d1e5e5U, 0x08f9f1f1U,
- 0x93e27171U, 0x73abd8d8U, 0x53623131U, 0x3f2a1515U,
- 0x0c080404U, 0x5295c7c7U, 0x65462323U, 0x5e9dc3c3U,
- 0x28301818U, 0xa1379696U, 0x0f0a0505U, 0xb52f9a9aU,
- 0x090e0707U, 0x36241212U, 0x9b1b8080U, 0x3ddfe2e2U,
- 0x26cdebebU, 0x694e2727U, 0xcd7fb2b2U, 0x9fea7575U,
- 0x1b120909U, 0x9e1d8383U, 0x74582c2cU, 0x2e341a1aU,
- 0x2d361b1bU, 0xb2dc6e6eU, 0xeeb45a5aU, 0xfb5ba0a0U,
- 0xf6a45252U, 0x4d763b3bU, 0x61b7d6d6U, 0xce7db3b3U,
- 0x7b522929U, 0x3edde3e3U, 0x715e2f2fU, 0x97138484U,
- 0xf5a65353U, 0x68b9d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0x2cc1ededU,
- 0x60402020U, 0x1fe3fcfcU, 0xc879b1b1U, 0xedb65b5bU,
- 0xbed46a6aU, 0x468dcbcbU, 0xd967bebeU, 0x4b723939U,
- 0xde944a4aU, 0xd4984c4cU, 0xe8b05858U, 0x4a85cfcfU,
- 0x6bbbd0d0U, 0x2ac5efefU, 0xe54faaaaU, 0x16edfbfbU,
- 0xc5864343U, 0xd79a4d4dU, 0x55663333U, 0x94118585U,
- 0xcf8a4545U, 0x10e9f9f9U, 0x06040202U, 0x81fe7f7fU,
- 0xf0a05050U, 0x44783c3cU, 0xba259f9fU, 0xe34ba8a8U,
- 0xf3a25151U, 0xfe5da3a3U, 0xc0804040U, 0x8a058f8fU,
- 0xad3f9292U, 0xbc219d9dU, 0x48703838U, 0x04f1f5f5U,
- 0xdf63bcbcU, 0xc177b6b6U, 0x75afdadaU, 0x63422121U,
- 0x30201010U, 0x1ae5ffffU, 0x0efdf3f3U, 0x6dbfd2d2U,
- 0x4c81cdcdU, 0x14180c0cU, 0x35261313U, 0x2fc3ececU,
- 0xe1be5f5fU, 0xa2359797U, 0xcc884444U, 0x392e1717U,
- 0x5793c4c4U, 0xf255a7a7U, 0x82fc7e7eU, 0x477a3d3dU,
- 0xacc86464U, 0xe7ba5d5dU, 0x2b321919U, 0x95e67373U,
- 0xa0c06060U, 0x98198181U, 0xd19e4f4fU, 0x7fa3dcdcU,
- 0x66442222U, 0x7e542a2aU, 0xab3b9090U, 0x830b8888U,
- 0xca8c4646U, 0x29c7eeeeU, 0xd36bb8b8U, 0x3c281414U,
- 0x79a7dedeU, 0xe2bc5e5eU, 0x1d160b0bU, 0x76addbdbU,
- 0x3bdbe0e0U, 0x56643232U, 0x4e743a3aU, 0x1e140a0aU,
- 0xdb924949U, 0x0a0c0606U, 0x6c482424U, 0xe4b85c5cU,
- 0x5d9fc2c2U, 0x6ebdd3d3U, 0xef43acacU, 0xa6c46262U,
- 0xa8399191U, 0xa4319595U, 0x37d3e4e4U, 0x8bf27979U,
- 0x32d5e7e7U, 0x438bc8c8U, 0x596e3737U, 0xb7da6d6dU,
- 0x8c018d8dU, 0x64b1d5d5U, 0xd29c4e4eU, 0xe049a9a9U,
- 0xb4d86c6cU, 0xfaac5656U, 0x07f3f4f4U, 0x25cfeaeaU,
- 0xafca6565U, 0x8ef47a7aU, 0xe947aeaeU, 0x18100808U,
- 0xd56fbabaU, 0x88f07878U, 0x6f4a2525U, 0x725c2e2eU,
- 0x24381c1cU, 0xf157a6a6U, 0xc773b4b4U, 0x5197c6c6U,
- 0x23cbe8e8U, 0x7ca1ddddU, 0x9ce87474U, 0x213e1f1fU,
- 0xdd964b4bU, 0xdc61bdbdU, 0x860d8b8bU, 0x850f8a8aU,
- 0x90e07070U, 0x427c3e3eU, 0xc471b5b5U, 0xaacc6666U,
- 0xd8904848U, 0x05060303U, 0x01f7f6f6U, 0x121c0e0eU,
- 0xa3c26161U, 0x5f6a3535U, 0xf9ae5757U, 0xd069b9b9U,
- 0x91178686U, 0x5899c1c1U, 0x273a1d1dU, 0xb9279e9eU,
- 0x38d9e1e1U, 0x13ebf8f8U, 0xb32b9898U, 0x33221111U,
- 0xbbd26969U, 0x70a9d9d9U, 0x89078e8eU, 0xa7339494U,
- 0xb62d9b9bU, 0x223c1e1eU, 0x92158787U, 0x20c9e9e9U,
- 0x4987ceceU, 0xffaa5555U, 0x78502828U, 0x7aa5dfdfU,
- 0x8f038c8cU, 0xf859a1a1U, 0x80098989U, 0x171a0d0dU,
- 0xda65bfbfU, 0x31d7e6e6U, 0xc6844242U, 0xb8d06868U,
- 0xc3824141U, 0xb0299999U, 0x775a2d2dU, 0x111e0f0fU,
- 0xcb7bb0b0U, 0xfca85454U, 0xd66dbbbbU, 0x3a2c1616U,
-};
-static const u32 Te2[256] = {
- 0x63a5c663U, 0x7c84f87cU, 0x7799ee77U, 0x7b8df67bU,
- 0xf20dfff2U, 0x6bbdd66bU, 0x6fb1de6fU, 0xc55491c5U,
- 0x30506030U, 0x01030201U, 0x67a9ce67U, 0x2b7d562bU,
- 0xfe19e7feU, 0xd762b5d7U, 0xabe64dabU, 0x769aec76U,
- 0xca458fcaU, 0x829d1f82U, 0xc94089c9U, 0x7d87fa7dU,
- 0xfa15effaU, 0x59ebb259U, 0x47c98e47U, 0xf00bfbf0U,
- 0xadec41adU, 0xd467b3d4U, 0xa2fd5fa2U, 0xafea45afU,
- 0x9cbf239cU, 0xa4f753a4U, 0x7296e472U, 0xc05b9bc0U,
- 0xb7c275b7U, 0xfd1ce1fdU, 0x93ae3d93U, 0x266a4c26U,
- 0x365a6c36U, 0x3f417e3fU, 0xf702f5f7U, 0xcc4f83ccU,
- 0x345c6834U, 0xa5f451a5U, 0xe534d1e5U, 0xf108f9f1U,
- 0x7193e271U, 0xd873abd8U, 0x31536231U, 0x153f2a15U,
- 0x040c0804U, 0xc75295c7U, 0x23654623U, 0xc35e9dc3U,
- 0x18283018U, 0x96a13796U, 0x050f0a05U, 0x9ab52f9aU,
- 0x07090e07U, 0x12362412U, 0x809b1b80U, 0xe23ddfe2U,
- 0xeb26cdebU, 0x27694e27U, 0xb2cd7fb2U, 0x759fea75U,
- 0x091b1209U, 0x839e1d83U, 0x2c74582cU, 0x1a2e341aU,
- 0x1b2d361bU, 0x6eb2dc6eU, 0x5aeeb45aU, 0xa0fb5ba0U,
- 0x52f6a452U, 0x3b4d763bU, 0xd661b7d6U, 0xb3ce7db3U,
- 0x297b5229U, 0xe33edde3U, 0x2f715e2fU, 0x84971384U,
- 0x53f5a653U, 0xd168b9d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xed2cc1edU,
- 0x20604020U, 0xfc1fe3fcU, 0xb1c879b1U, 0x5bedb65bU,
- 0x6abed46aU, 0xcb468dcbU, 0xbed967beU, 0x394b7239U,
- 0x4ade944aU, 0x4cd4984cU, 0x58e8b058U, 0xcf4a85cfU,
- 0xd06bbbd0U, 0xef2ac5efU, 0xaae54faaU, 0xfb16edfbU,
- 0x43c58643U, 0x4dd79a4dU, 0x33556633U, 0x85941185U,
- 0x45cf8a45U, 0xf910e9f9U, 0x02060402U, 0x7f81fe7fU,
- 0x50f0a050U, 0x3c44783cU, 0x9fba259fU, 0xa8e34ba8U,
- 0x51f3a251U, 0xa3fe5da3U, 0x40c08040U, 0x8f8a058fU,
- 0x92ad3f92U, 0x9dbc219dU, 0x38487038U, 0xf504f1f5U,
- 0xbcdf63bcU, 0xb6c177b6U, 0xda75afdaU, 0x21634221U,
- 0x10302010U, 0xff1ae5ffU, 0xf30efdf3U, 0xd26dbfd2U,
- 0xcd4c81cdU, 0x0c14180cU, 0x13352613U, 0xec2fc3ecU,
- 0x5fe1be5fU, 0x97a23597U, 0x44cc8844U, 0x17392e17U,
- 0xc45793c4U, 0xa7f255a7U, 0x7e82fc7eU, 0x3d477a3dU,
- 0x64acc864U, 0x5de7ba5dU, 0x192b3219U, 0x7395e673U,
- 0x60a0c060U, 0x81981981U, 0x4fd19e4fU, 0xdc7fa3dcU,
- 0x22664422U, 0x2a7e542aU, 0x90ab3b90U, 0x88830b88U,
- 0x46ca8c46U, 0xee29c7eeU, 0xb8d36bb8U, 0x143c2814U,
- 0xde79a7deU, 0x5ee2bc5eU, 0x0b1d160bU, 0xdb76addbU,
- 0xe03bdbe0U, 0x32566432U, 0x3a4e743aU, 0x0a1e140aU,
- 0x49db9249U, 0x060a0c06U, 0x246c4824U, 0x5ce4b85cU,
- 0xc25d9fc2U, 0xd36ebdd3U, 0xacef43acU, 0x62a6c462U,
- 0x91a83991U, 0x95a43195U, 0xe437d3e4U, 0x798bf279U,
- 0xe732d5e7U, 0xc8438bc8U, 0x37596e37U, 0x6db7da6dU,
- 0x8d8c018dU, 0xd564b1d5U, 0x4ed29c4eU, 0xa9e049a9U,
- 0x6cb4d86cU, 0x56faac56U, 0xf407f3f4U, 0xea25cfeaU,
- 0x65afca65U, 0x7a8ef47aU, 0xaee947aeU, 0x08181008U,
- 0xbad56fbaU, 0x7888f078U, 0x256f4a25U, 0x2e725c2eU,
- 0x1c24381cU, 0xa6f157a6U, 0xb4c773b4U, 0xc65197c6U,
- 0xe823cbe8U, 0xdd7ca1ddU, 0x749ce874U, 0x1f213e1fU,
- 0x4bdd964bU, 0xbddc61bdU, 0x8b860d8bU, 0x8a850f8aU,
- 0x7090e070U, 0x3e427c3eU, 0xb5c471b5U, 0x66aacc66U,
- 0x48d89048U, 0x03050603U, 0xf601f7f6U, 0x0e121c0eU,
- 0x61a3c261U, 0x355f6a35U, 0x57f9ae57U, 0xb9d069b9U,
- 0x86911786U, 0xc15899c1U, 0x1d273a1dU, 0x9eb9279eU,
- 0xe138d9e1U, 0xf813ebf8U, 0x98b32b98U, 0x11332211U,
- 0x69bbd269U, 0xd970a9d9U, 0x8e89078eU, 0x94a73394U,
- 0x9bb62d9bU, 0x1e223c1eU, 0x87921587U, 0xe920c9e9U,
- 0xce4987ceU, 0x55ffaa55U, 0x28785028U, 0xdf7aa5dfU,
- 0x8c8f038cU, 0xa1f859a1U, 0x89800989U, 0x0d171a0dU,
- 0xbfda65bfU, 0xe631d7e6U, 0x42c68442U, 0x68b8d068U,
- 0x41c38241U, 0x99b02999U, 0x2d775a2dU, 0x0f111e0fU,
- 0xb0cb7bb0U, 0x54fca854U, 0xbbd66dbbU, 0x163a2c16U,
-};
-static const u32 Te3[256] = {
-
- 0x6363a5c6U, 0x7c7c84f8U, 0x777799eeU, 0x7b7b8df6U,
- 0xf2f20dffU, 0x6b6bbdd6U, 0x6f6fb1deU, 0xc5c55491U,
- 0x30305060U, 0x01010302U, 0x6767a9ceU, 0x2b2b7d56U,
- 0xfefe19e7U, 0xd7d762b5U, 0xababe64dU, 0x76769aecU,
- 0xcaca458fU, 0x82829d1fU, 0xc9c94089U, 0x7d7d87faU,
- 0xfafa15efU, 0x5959ebb2U, 0x4747c98eU, 0xf0f00bfbU,
- 0xadadec41U, 0xd4d467b3U, 0xa2a2fd5fU, 0xafafea45U,
- 0x9c9cbf23U, 0xa4a4f753U, 0x727296e4U, 0xc0c05b9bU,
- 0xb7b7c275U, 0xfdfd1ce1U, 0x9393ae3dU, 0x26266a4cU,
- 0x36365a6cU, 0x3f3f417eU, 0xf7f702f5U, 0xcccc4f83U,
- 0x34345c68U, 0xa5a5f451U, 0xe5e534d1U, 0xf1f108f9U,
- 0x717193e2U, 0xd8d873abU, 0x31315362U, 0x15153f2aU,
- 0x04040c08U, 0xc7c75295U, 0x23236546U, 0xc3c35e9dU,
- 0x18182830U, 0x9696a137U, 0x05050f0aU, 0x9a9ab52fU,
- 0x0707090eU, 0x12123624U, 0x80809b1bU, 0xe2e23ddfU,
- 0xebeb26cdU, 0x2727694eU, 0xb2b2cd7fU, 0x75759feaU,
- 0x09091b12U, 0x83839e1dU, 0x2c2c7458U, 0x1a1a2e34U,
- 0x1b1b2d36U, 0x6e6eb2dcU, 0x5a5aeeb4U, 0xa0a0fb5bU,
- 0x5252f6a4U, 0x3b3b4d76U, 0xd6d661b7U, 0xb3b3ce7dU,
- 0x29297b52U, 0xe3e33eddU, 0x2f2f715eU, 0x84849713U,
- 0x5353f5a6U, 0xd1d168b9U, 0x00000000U, 0xeded2cc1U,
- 0x20206040U, 0xfcfc1fe3U, 0xb1b1c879U, 0x5b5bedb6U,
- 0x6a6abed4U, 0xcbcb468dU, 0xbebed967U, 0x39394b72U,
- 0x4a4ade94U, 0x4c4cd498U, 0x5858e8b0U, 0xcfcf4a85U,
- 0xd0d06bbbU, 0xefef2ac5U, 0xaaaae54fU, 0xfbfb16edU,
- 0x4343c586U, 0x4d4dd79aU, 0x33335566U, 0x85859411U,
- 0x4545cf8aU, 0xf9f910e9U, 0x02020604U, 0x7f7f81feU,
- 0x5050f0a0U, 0x3c3c4478U, 0x9f9fba25U, 0xa8a8e34bU,
- 0x5151f3a2U, 0xa3a3fe5dU, 0x4040c080U, 0x8f8f8a05U,
- 0x9292ad3fU, 0x9d9dbc21U, 0x38384870U, 0xf5f504f1U,
- 0xbcbcdf63U, 0xb6b6c177U, 0xdada75afU, 0x21216342U,
- 0x10103020U, 0xffff1ae5U, 0xf3f30efdU, 0xd2d26dbfU,
- 0xcdcd4c81U, 0x0c0c1418U, 0x13133526U, 0xecec2fc3U,
- 0x5f5fe1beU, 0x9797a235U, 0x4444cc88U, 0x1717392eU,
- 0xc4c45793U, 0xa7a7f255U, 0x7e7e82fcU, 0x3d3d477aU,
- 0x6464acc8U, 0x5d5de7baU, 0x19192b32U, 0x737395e6U,
- 0x6060a0c0U, 0x81819819U, 0x4f4fd19eU, 0xdcdc7fa3U,
- 0x22226644U, 0x2a2a7e54U, 0x9090ab3bU, 0x8888830bU,
- 0x4646ca8cU, 0xeeee29c7U, 0xb8b8d36bU, 0x14143c28U,
- 0xdede79a7U, 0x5e5ee2bcU, 0x0b0b1d16U, 0xdbdb76adU,
- 0xe0e03bdbU, 0x32325664U, 0x3a3a4e74U, 0x0a0a1e14U,
- 0x4949db92U, 0x06060a0cU, 0x24246c48U, 0x5c5ce4b8U,
- 0xc2c25d9fU, 0xd3d36ebdU, 0xacacef43U, 0x6262a6c4U,
- 0x9191a839U, 0x9595a431U, 0xe4e437d3U, 0x79798bf2U,
- 0xe7e732d5U, 0xc8c8438bU, 0x3737596eU, 0x6d6db7daU,
- 0x8d8d8c01U, 0xd5d564b1U, 0x4e4ed29cU, 0xa9a9e049U,
- 0x6c6cb4d8U, 0x5656faacU, 0xf4f407f3U, 0xeaea25cfU,
- 0x6565afcaU, 0x7a7a8ef4U, 0xaeaee947U, 0x08081810U,
- 0xbabad56fU, 0x787888f0U, 0x25256f4aU, 0x2e2e725cU,
- 0x1c1c2438U, 0xa6a6f157U, 0xb4b4c773U, 0xc6c65197U,
- 0xe8e823cbU, 0xdddd7ca1U, 0x74749ce8U, 0x1f1f213eU,
- 0x4b4bdd96U, 0xbdbddc61U, 0x8b8b860dU, 0x8a8a850fU,
- 0x707090e0U, 0x3e3e427cU, 0xb5b5c471U, 0x6666aaccU,
- 0x4848d890U, 0x03030506U, 0xf6f601f7U, 0x0e0e121cU,
- 0x6161a3c2U, 0x35355f6aU, 0x5757f9aeU, 0xb9b9d069U,
- 0x86869117U, 0xc1c15899U, 0x1d1d273aU, 0x9e9eb927U,
- 0xe1e138d9U, 0xf8f813ebU, 0x9898b32bU, 0x11113322U,
- 0x6969bbd2U, 0xd9d970a9U, 0x8e8e8907U, 0x9494a733U,
- 0x9b9bb62dU, 0x1e1e223cU, 0x87879215U, 0xe9e920c9U,
- 0xcece4987U, 0x5555ffaaU, 0x28287850U, 0xdfdf7aa5U,
- 0x8c8c8f03U, 0xa1a1f859U, 0x89898009U, 0x0d0d171aU,
- 0xbfbfda65U, 0xe6e631d7U, 0x4242c684U, 0x6868b8d0U,
- 0x4141c382U, 0x9999b029U, 0x2d2d775aU, 0x0f0f111eU,
- 0xb0b0cb7bU, 0x5454fca8U, 0xbbbbd66dU, 0x16163a2cU,
-};
-static const u32 Te4[256] = {
- 0x63636363U, 0x7c7c7c7cU, 0x77777777U, 0x7b7b7b7bU,
- 0xf2f2f2f2U, 0x6b6b6b6bU, 0x6f6f6f6fU, 0xc5c5c5c5U,
- 0x30303030U, 0x01010101U, 0x67676767U, 0x2b2b2b2bU,
- 0xfefefefeU, 0xd7d7d7d7U, 0xababababU, 0x76767676U,
- 0xcacacacaU, 0x82828282U, 0xc9c9c9c9U, 0x7d7d7d7dU,
- 0xfafafafaU, 0x59595959U, 0x47474747U, 0xf0f0f0f0U,
- 0xadadadadU, 0xd4d4d4d4U, 0xa2a2a2a2U, 0xafafafafU,
- 0x9c9c9c9cU, 0xa4a4a4a4U, 0x72727272U, 0xc0c0c0c0U,
- 0xb7b7b7b7U, 0xfdfdfdfdU, 0x93939393U, 0x26262626U,
- 0x36363636U, 0x3f3f3f3fU, 0xf7f7f7f7U, 0xccccccccU,
- 0x34343434U, 0xa5a5a5a5U, 0xe5e5e5e5U, 0xf1f1f1f1U,
- 0x71717171U, 0xd8d8d8d8U, 0x31313131U, 0x15151515U,
- 0x04040404U, 0xc7c7c7c7U, 0x23232323U, 0xc3c3c3c3U,
- 0x18181818U, 0x96969696U, 0x05050505U, 0x9a9a9a9aU,
- 0x07070707U, 0x12121212U, 0x80808080U, 0xe2e2e2e2U,
- 0xebebebebU, 0x27272727U, 0xb2b2b2b2U, 0x75757575U,
- 0x09090909U, 0x83838383U, 0x2c2c2c2cU, 0x1a1a1a1aU,
- 0x1b1b1b1bU, 0x6e6e6e6eU, 0x5a5a5a5aU, 0xa0a0a0a0U,
- 0x52525252U, 0x3b3b3b3bU, 0xd6d6d6d6U, 0xb3b3b3b3U,
- 0x29292929U, 0xe3e3e3e3U, 0x2f2f2f2fU, 0x84848484U,
- 0x53535353U, 0xd1d1d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xededededU,
- 0x20202020U, 0xfcfcfcfcU, 0xb1b1b1b1U, 0x5b5b5b5bU,
- 0x6a6a6a6aU, 0xcbcbcbcbU, 0xbebebebeU, 0x39393939U,
- 0x4a4a4a4aU, 0x4c4c4c4cU, 0x58585858U, 0xcfcfcfcfU,
- 0xd0d0d0d0U, 0xefefefefU, 0xaaaaaaaaU, 0xfbfbfbfbU,
- 0x43434343U, 0x4d4d4d4dU, 0x33333333U, 0x85858585U,
- 0x45454545U, 0xf9f9f9f9U, 0x02020202U, 0x7f7f7f7fU,
- 0x50505050U, 0x3c3c3c3cU, 0x9f9f9f9fU, 0xa8a8a8a8U,
- 0x51515151U, 0xa3a3a3a3U, 0x40404040U, 0x8f8f8f8fU,
- 0x92929292U, 0x9d9d9d9dU, 0x38383838U, 0xf5f5f5f5U,
- 0xbcbcbcbcU, 0xb6b6b6b6U, 0xdadadadaU, 0x21212121U,
- 0x10101010U, 0xffffffffU, 0xf3f3f3f3U, 0xd2d2d2d2U,
- 0xcdcdcdcdU, 0x0c0c0c0cU, 0x13131313U, 0xececececU,
- 0x5f5f5f5fU, 0x97979797U, 0x44444444U, 0x17171717U,
- 0xc4c4c4c4U, 0xa7a7a7a7U, 0x7e7e7e7eU, 0x3d3d3d3dU,
- 0x64646464U, 0x5d5d5d5dU, 0x19191919U, 0x73737373U,
- 0x60606060U, 0x81818181U, 0x4f4f4f4fU, 0xdcdcdcdcU,
- 0x22222222U, 0x2a2a2a2aU, 0x90909090U, 0x88888888U,
- 0x46464646U, 0xeeeeeeeeU, 0xb8b8b8b8U, 0x14141414U,
- 0xdedededeU, 0x5e5e5e5eU, 0x0b0b0b0bU, 0xdbdbdbdbU,
- 0xe0e0e0e0U, 0x32323232U, 0x3a3a3a3aU, 0x0a0a0a0aU,
- 0x49494949U, 0x06060606U, 0x24242424U, 0x5c5c5c5cU,
- 0xc2c2c2c2U, 0xd3d3d3d3U, 0xacacacacU, 0x62626262U,
- 0x91919191U, 0x95959595U, 0xe4e4e4e4U, 0x79797979U,
- 0xe7e7e7e7U, 0xc8c8c8c8U, 0x37373737U, 0x6d6d6d6dU,
- 0x8d8d8d8dU, 0xd5d5d5d5U, 0x4e4e4e4eU, 0xa9a9a9a9U,
- 0x6c6c6c6cU, 0x56565656U, 0xf4f4f4f4U, 0xeaeaeaeaU,
- 0x65656565U, 0x7a7a7a7aU, 0xaeaeaeaeU, 0x08080808U,
- 0xbabababaU, 0x78787878U, 0x25252525U, 0x2e2e2e2eU,
- 0x1c1c1c1cU, 0xa6a6a6a6U, 0xb4b4b4b4U, 0xc6c6c6c6U,
- 0xe8e8e8e8U, 0xddddddddU, 0x74747474U, 0x1f1f1f1fU,
- 0x4b4b4b4bU, 0xbdbdbdbdU, 0x8b8b8b8bU, 0x8a8a8a8aU,
- 0x70707070U, 0x3e3e3e3eU, 0xb5b5b5b5U, 0x66666666U,
- 0x48484848U, 0x03030303U, 0xf6f6f6f6U, 0x0e0e0e0eU,
- 0x61616161U, 0x35353535U, 0x57575757U, 0xb9b9b9b9U,
- 0x86868686U, 0xc1c1c1c1U, 0x1d1d1d1dU, 0x9e9e9e9eU,
- 0xe1e1e1e1U, 0xf8f8f8f8U, 0x98989898U, 0x11111111U,
- 0x69696969U, 0xd9d9d9d9U, 0x8e8e8e8eU, 0x94949494U,
- 0x9b9b9b9bU, 0x1e1e1e1eU, 0x87878787U, 0xe9e9e9e9U,
- 0xcecececeU, 0x55555555U, 0x28282828U, 0xdfdfdfdfU,
- 0x8c8c8c8cU, 0xa1a1a1a1U, 0x89898989U, 0x0d0d0d0dU,
- 0xbfbfbfbfU, 0xe6e6e6e6U, 0x42424242U, 0x68686868U,
- 0x41414141U, 0x99999999U, 0x2d2d2d2dU, 0x0f0f0f0fU,
- 0xb0b0b0b0U, 0x54545454U, 0xbbbbbbbbU, 0x16161616U,
-};
-static const u32 Td0[256] = {
- 0x51f4a750U, 0x7e416553U, 0x1a17a4c3U, 0x3a275e96U,
- 0x3bab6bcbU, 0x1f9d45f1U, 0xacfa58abU, 0x4be30393U,
- 0x2030fa55U, 0xad766df6U, 0x88cc7691U, 0xf5024c25U,
- 0x4fe5d7fcU, 0xc52acbd7U, 0x26354480U, 0xb562a38fU,
- 0xdeb15a49U, 0x25ba1b67U, 0x45ea0e98U, 0x5dfec0e1U,
- 0xc32f7502U, 0x814cf012U, 0x8d4697a3U, 0x6bd3f9c6U,
- 0x038f5fe7U, 0x15929c95U, 0xbf6d7aebU, 0x955259daU,
- 0xd4be832dU, 0x587421d3U, 0x49e06929U, 0x8ec9c844U,
- 0x75c2896aU, 0xf48e7978U, 0x99583e6bU, 0x27b971ddU,
- 0xbee14fb6U, 0xf088ad17U, 0xc920ac66U, 0x7dce3ab4U,
- 0x63df4a18U, 0xe51a3182U, 0x97513360U, 0x62537f45U,
- 0xb16477e0U, 0xbb6bae84U, 0xfe81a01cU, 0xf9082b94U,
- 0x70486858U, 0x8f45fd19U, 0x94de6c87U, 0x527bf8b7U,
- 0xab73d323U, 0x724b02e2U, 0xe31f8f57U, 0x6655ab2aU,
- 0xb2eb2807U, 0x2fb5c203U, 0x86c57b9aU, 0xd33708a5U,
- 0x302887f2U, 0x23bfa5b2U, 0x02036abaU, 0xed16825cU,
- 0x8acf1c2bU, 0xa779b492U, 0xf307f2f0U, 0x4e69e2a1U,
- 0x65daf4cdU, 0x0605bed5U, 0xd134621fU, 0xc4a6fe8aU,
- 0x342e539dU, 0xa2f355a0U, 0x058ae132U, 0xa4f6eb75U,
- 0x0b83ec39U, 0x4060efaaU, 0x5e719f06U, 0xbd6e1051U,
- 0x3e218af9U, 0x96dd063dU, 0xdd3e05aeU, 0x4de6bd46U,
- 0x91548db5U, 0x71c45d05U, 0x0406d46fU, 0x605015ffU,
- 0x1998fb24U, 0xd6bde997U, 0x894043ccU, 0x67d99e77U,
- 0xb0e842bdU, 0x07898b88U, 0xe7195b38U, 0x79c8eedbU,
- 0xa17c0a47U, 0x7c420fe9U, 0xf8841ec9U, 0x00000000U,
- 0x09808683U, 0x322bed48U, 0x1e1170acU, 0x6c5a724eU,
- 0xfd0efffbU, 0x0f853856U, 0x3daed51eU, 0x362d3927U,
- 0x0a0fd964U, 0x685ca621U, 0x9b5b54d1U, 0x24362e3aU,
- 0x0c0a67b1U, 0x9357e70fU, 0xb4ee96d2U, 0x1b9b919eU,
- 0x80c0c54fU, 0x61dc20a2U, 0x5a774b69U, 0x1c121a16U,
- 0xe293ba0aU, 0xc0a02ae5U, 0x3c22e043U, 0x121b171dU,
- 0x0e090d0bU, 0xf28bc7adU, 0x2db6a8b9U, 0x141ea9c8U,
- 0x57f11985U, 0xaf75074cU, 0xee99ddbbU, 0xa37f60fdU,
- 0xf701269fU, 0x5c72f5bcU, 0x44663bc5U, 0x5bfb7e34U,
- 0x8b432976U, 0xcb23c6dcU, 0xb6edfc68U, 0xb8e4f163U,
- 0xd731dccaU, 0x42638510U, 0x13972240U, 0x84c61120U,
- 0x854a247dU, 0xd2bb3df8U, 0xaef93211U, 0xc729a16dU,
- 0x1d9e2f4bU, 0xdcb230f3U, 0x0d8652ecU, 0x77c1e3d0U,
- 0x2bb3166cU, 0xa970b999U, 0x119448faU, 0x47e96422U,
- 0xa8fc8cc4U, 0xa0f03f1aU, 0x567d2cd8U, 0x223390efU,
- 0x87494ec7U, 0xd938d1c1U, 0x8ccaa2feU, 0x98d40b36U,
- 0xa6f581cfU, 0xa57ade28U, 0xdab78e26U, 0x3fadbfa4U,
- 0x2c3a9de4U, 0x5078920dU, 0x6a5fcc9bU, 0x547e4662U,
- 0xf68d13c2U, 0x90d8b8e8U, 0x2e39f75eU, 0x82c3aff5U,
- 0x9f5d80beU, 0x69d0937cU, 0x6fd52da9U, 0xcf2512b3U,
- 0xc8ac993bU, 0x10187da7U, 0xe89c636eU, 0xdb3bbb7bU,
- 0xcd267809U, 0x6e5918f4U, 0xec9ab701U, 0x834f9aa8U,
- 0xe6956e65U, 0xaaffe67eU, 0x21bccf08U, 0xef15e8e6U,
- 0xbae79bd9U, 0x4a6f36ceU, 0xea9f09d4U, 0x29b07cd6U,
- 0x31a4b2afU, 0x2a3f2331U, 0xc6a59430U, 0x35a266c0U,
- 0x744ebc37U, 0xfc82caa6U, 0xe090d0b0U, 0x33a7d815U,
- 0xf104984aU, 0x41ecdaf7U, 0x7fcd500eU, 0x1791f62fU,
- 0x764dd68dU, 0x43efb04dU, 0xccaa4d54U, 0xe49604dfU,
- 0x9ed1b5e3U, 0x4c6a881bU, 0xc12c1fb8U, 0x4665517fU,
- 0x9d5eea04U, 0x018c355dU, 0xfa877473U, 0xfb0b412eU,
- 0xb3671d5aU, 0x92dbd252U, 0xe9105633U, 0x6dd64713U,
- 0x9ad7618cU, 0x37a10c7aU, 0x59f8148eU, 0xeb133c89U,
- 0xcea927eeU, 0xb761c935U, 0xe11ce5edU, 0x7a47b13cU,
- 0x9cd2df59U, 0x55f2733fU, 0x1814ce79U, 0x73c737bfU,
- 0x53f7cdeaU, 0x5ffdaa5bU, 0xdf3d6f14U, 0x7844db86U,
- 0xcaaff381U, 0xb968c43eU, 0x3824342cU, 0xc2a3405fU,
- 0x161dc372U, 0xbce2250cU, 0x283c498bU, 0xff0d9541U,
- 0x39a80171U, 0x080cb3deU, 0xd8b4e49cU, 0x6456c190U,
- 0x7bcb8461U, 0xd532b670U, 0x486c5c74U, 0xd0b85742U,
-};
-static const u32 Td1[256] = {
- 0x5051f4a7U, 0x537e4165U, 0xc31a17a4U, 0x963a275eU,
- 0xcb3bab6bU, 0xf11f9d45U, 0xabacfa58U, 0x934be303U,
- 0x552030faU, 0xf6ad766dU, 0x9188cc76U, 0x25f5024cU,
- 0xfc4fe5d7U, 0xd7c52acbU, 0x80263544U, 0x8fb562a3U,
- 0x49deb15aU, 0x6725ba1bU, 0x9845ea0eU, 0xe15dfec0U,
- 0x02c32f75U, 0x12814cf0U, 0xa38d4697U, 0xc66bd3f9U,
- 0xe7038f5fU, 0x9515929cU, 0xebbf6d7aU, 0xda955259U,
- 0x2dd4be83U, 0xd3587421U, 0x2949e069U, 0x448ec9c8U,
- 0x6a75c289U, 0x78f48e79U, 0x6b99583eU, 0xdd27b971U,
- 0xb6bee14fU, 0x17f088adU, 0x66c920acU, 0xb47dce3aU,
- 0x1863df4aU, 0x82e51a31U, 0x60975133U, 0x4562537fU,
- 0xe0b16477U, 0x84bb6baeU, 0x1cfe81a0U, 0x94f9082bU,
- 0x58704868U, 0x198f45fdU, 0x8794de6cU, 0xb7527bf8U,
- 0x23ab73d3U, 0xe2724b02U, 0x57e31f8fU, 0x2a6655abU,
- 0x07b2eb28U, 0x032fb5c2U, 0x9a86c57bU, 0xa5d33708U,
- 0xf2302887U, 0xb223bfa5U, 0xba02036aU, 0x5ced1682U,
- 0x2b8acf1cU, 0x92a779b4U, 0xf0f307f2U, 0xa14e69e2U,
- 0xcd65daf4U, 0xd50605beU, 0x1fd13462U, 0x8ac4a6feU,
- 0x9d342e53U, 0xa0a2f355U, 0x32058ae1U, 0x75a4f6ebU,
- 0x390b83ecU, 0xaa4060efU, 0x065e719fU, 0x51bd6e10U,
- 0xf93e218aU, 0x3d96dd06U, 0xaedd3e05U, 0x464de6bdU,
- 0xb591548dU, 0x0571c45dU, 0x6f0406d4U, 0xff605015U,
- 0x241998fbU, 0x97d6bde9U, 0xcc894043U, 0x7767d99eU,
- 0xbdb0e842U, 0x8807898bU, 0x38e7195bU, 0xdb79c8eeU,
- 0x47a17c0aU, 0xe97c420fU, 0xc9f8841eU, 0x00000000U,
- 0x83098086U, 0x48322bedU, 0xac1e1170U, 0x4e6c5a72U,
- 0xfbfd0effU, 0x560f8538U, 0x1e3daed5U, 0x27362d39U,
- 0x640a0fd9U, 0x21685ca6U, 0xd19b5b54U, 0x3a24362eU,
- 0xb10c0a67U, 0x0f9357e7U, 0xd2b4ee96U, 0x9e1b9b91U,
- 0x4f80c0c5U, 0xa261dc20U, 0x695a774bU, 0x161c121aU,
- 0x0ae293baU, 0xe5c0a02aU, 0x433c22e0U, 0x1d121b17U,
- 0x0b0e090dU, 0xadf28bc7U, 0xb92db6a8U, 0xc8141ea9U,
- 0x8557f119U, 0x4caf7507U, 0xbbee99ddU, 0xfda37f60U,
- 0x9ff70126U, 0xbc5c72f5U, 0xc544663bU, 0x345bfb7eU,
- 0x768b4329U, 0xdccb23c6U, 0x68b6edfcU, 0x63b8e4f1U,
- 0xcad731dcU, 0x10426385U, 0x40139722U, 0x2084c611U,
- 0x7d854a24U, 0xf8d2bb3dU, 0x11aef932U, 0x6dc729a1U,
- 0x4b1d9e2fU, 0xf3dcb230U, 0xec0d8652U, 0xd077c1e3U,
- 0x6c2bb316U, 0x99a970b9U, 0xfa119448U, 0x2247e964U,
- 0xc4a8fc8cU, 0x1aa0f03fU, 0xd8567d2cU, 0xef223390U,
- 0xc787494eU, 0xc1d938d1U, 0xfe8ccaa2U, 0x3698d40bU,
- 0xcfa6f581U, 0x28a57adeU, 0x26dab78eU, 0xa43fadbfU,
- 0xe42c3a9dU, 0x0d507892U, 0x9b6a5fccU, 0x62547e46U,
- 0xc2f68d13U, 0xe890d8b8U, 0x5e2e39f7U, 0xf582c3afU,
- 0xbe9f5d80U, 0x7c69d093U, 0xa96fd52dU, 0xb3cf2512U,
- 0x3bc8ac99U, 0xa710187dU, 0x6ee89c63U, 0x7bdb3bbbU,
- 0x09cd2678U, 0xf46e5918U, 0x01ec9ab7U, 0xa8834f9aU,
- 0x65e6956eU, 0x7eaaffe6U, 0x0821bccfU, 0xe6ef15e8U,
- 0xd9bae79bU, 0xce4a6f36U, 0xd4ea9f09U, 0xd629b07cU,
- 0xaf31a4b2U, 0x312a3f23U, 0x30c6a594U, 0xc035a266U,
- 0x37744ebcU, 0xa6fc82caU, 0xb0e090d0U, 0x1533a7d8U,
- 0x4af10498U, 0xf741ecdaU, 0x0e7fcd50U, 0x2f1791f6U,
- 0x8d764dd6U, 0x4d43efb0U, 0x54ccaa4dU, 0xdfe49604U,
- 0xe39ed1b5U, 0x1b4c6a88U, 0xb8c12c1fU, 0x7f466551U,
- 0x049d5eeaU, 0x5d018c35U, 0x73fa8774U, 0x2efb0b41U,
- 0x5ab3671dU, 0x5292dbd2U, 0x33e91056U, 0x136dd647U,
- 0x8c9ad761U, 0x7a37a10cU, 0x8e59f814U, 0x89eb133cU,
- 0xeecea927U, 0x35b761c9U, 0xede11ce5U, 0x3c7a47b1U,
- 0x599cd2dfU, 0x3f55f273U, 0x791814ceU, 0xbf73c737U,
- 0xea53f7cdU, 0x5b5ffdaaU, 0x14df3d6fU, 0x867844dbU,
- 0x81caaff3U, 0x3eb968c4U, 0x2c382434U, 0x5fc2a340U,
- 0x72161dc3U, 0x0cbce225U, 0x8b283c49U, 0x41ff0d95U,
- 0x7139a801U, 0xde080cb3U, 0x9cd8b4e4U, 0x906456c1U,
- 0x617bcb84U, 0x70d532b6U, 0x74486c5cU, 0x42d0b857U,
-};
-static const u32 Td2[256] = {
- 0xa75051f4U, 0x65537e41U, 0xa4c31a17U, 0x5e963a27U,
- 0x6bcb3babU, 0x45f11f9dU, 0x58abacfaU, 0x03934be3U,
- 0xfa552030U, 0x6df6ad76U, 0x769188ccU, 0x4c25f502U,
- 0xd7fc4fe5U, 0xcbd7c52aU, 0x44802635U, 0xa38fb562U,
- 0x5a49deb1U, 0x1b6725baU, 0x0e9845eaU, 0xc0e15dfeU,
- 0x7502c32fU, 0xf012814cU, 0x97a38d46U, 0xf9c66bd3U,
- 0x5fe7038fU, 0x9c951592U, 0x7aebbf6dU, 0x59da9552U,
- 0x832dd4beU, 0x21d35874U, 0x692949e0U, 0xc8448ec9U,
- 0x896a75c2U, 0x7978f48eU, 0x3e6b9958U, 0x71dd27b9U,
- 0x4fb6bee1U, 0xad17f088U, 0xac66c920U, 0x3ab47dceU,
- 0x4a1863dfU, 0x3182e51aU, 0x33609751U, 0x7f456253U,
- 0x77e0b164U, 0xae84bb6bU, 0xa01cfe81U, 0x2b94f908U,
- 0x68587048U, 0xfd198f45U, 0x6c8794deU, 0xf8b7527bU,
- 0xd323ab73U, 0x02e2724bU, 0x8f57e31fU, 0xab2a6655U,
- 0x2807b2ebU, 0xc2032fb5U, 0x7b9a86c5U, 0x08a5d337U,
- 0x87f23028U, 0xa5b223bfU, 0x6aba0203U, 0x825ced16U,
- 0x1c2b8acfU, 0xb492a779U, 0xf2f0f307U, 0xe2a14e69U,
- 0xf4cd65daU, 0xbed50605U, 0x621fd134U, 0xfe8ac4a6U,
- 0x539d342eU, 0x55a0a2f3U, 0xe132058aU, 0xeb75a4f6U,
- 0xec390b83U, 0xefaa4060U, 0x9f065e71U, 0x1051bd6eU,
-
- 0x8af93e21U, 0x063d96ddU, 0x05aedd3eU, 0xbd464de6U,
- 0x8db59154U, 0x5d0571c4U, 0xd46f0406U, 0x15ff6050U,
- 0xfb241998U, 0xe997d6bdU, 0x43cc8940U, 0x9e7767d9U,
- 0x42bdb0e8U, 0x8b880789U, 0x5b38e719U, 0xeedb79c8U,
- 0x0a47a17cU, 0x0fe97c42U, 0x1ec9f884U, 0x00000000U,
- 0x86830980U, 0xed48322bU, 0x70ac1e11U, 0x724e6c5aU,
- 0xfffbfd0eU, 0x38560f85U, 0xd51e3daeU, 0x3927362dU,
- 0xd9640a0fU, 0xa621685cU, 0x54d19b5bU, 0x2e3a2436U,
- 0x67b10c0aU, 0xe70f9357U, 0x96d2b4eeU, 0x919e1b9bU,
- 0xc54f80c0U, 0x20a261dcU, 0x4b695a77U, 0x1a161c12U,
- 0xba0ae293U, 0x2ae5c0a0U, 0xe0433c22U, 0x171d121bU,
- 0x0d0b0e09U, 0xc7adf28bU, 0xa8b92db6U, 0xa9c8141eU,
- 0x198557f1U, 0x074caf75U, 0xddbbee99U, 0x60fda37fU,
- 0x269ff701U, 0xf5bc5c72U, 0x3bc54466U, 0x7e345bfbU,
- 0x29768b43U, 0xc6dccb23U, 0xfc68b6edU, 0xf163b8e4U,
- 0xdccad731U, 0x85104263U, 0x22401397U, 0x112084c6U,
- 0x247d854aU, 0x3df8d2bbU, 0x3211aef9U, 0xa16dc729U,
- 0x2f4b1d9eU, 0x30f3dcb2U, 0x52ec0d86U, 0xe3d077c1U,
- 0x166c2bb3U, 0xb999a970U, 0x48fa1194U, 0x642247e9U,
- 0x8cc4a8fcU, 0x3f1aa0f0U, 0x2cd8567dU, 0x90ef2233U,
- 0x4ec78749U, 0xd1c1d938U, 0xa2fe8ccaU, 0x0b3698d4U,
- 0x81cfa6f5U, 0xde28a57aU, 0x8e26dab7U, 0xbfa43fadU,
- 0x9de42c3aU, 0x920d5078U, 0xcc9b6a5fU, 0x4662547eU,
- 0x13c2f68dU, 0xb8e890d8U, 0xf75e2e39U, 0xaff582c3U,
- 0x80be9f5dU, 0x937c69d0U, 0x2da96fd5U, 0x12b3cf25U,
- 0x993bc8acU, 0x7da71018U, 0x636ee89cU, 0xbb7bdb3bU,
- 0x7809cd26U, 0x18f46e59U, 0xb701ec9aU, 0x9aa8834fU,
- 0x6e65e695U, 0xe67eaaffU, 0xcf0821bcU, 0xe8e6ef15U,
- 0x9bd9bae7U, 0x36ce4a6fU, 0x09d4ea9fU, 0x7cd629b0U,
- 0xb2af31a4U, 0x23312a3fU, 0x9430c6a5U, 0x66c035a2U,
- 0xbc37744eU, 0xcaa6fc82U, 0xd0b0e090U, 0xd81533a7U,
- 0x984af104U, 0xdaf741ecU, 0x500e7fcdU, 0xf62f1791U,
- 0xd68d764dU, 0xb04d43efU, 0x4d54ccaaU, 0x04dfe496U,
- 0xb5e39ed1U, 0x881b4c6aU, 0x1fb8c12cU, 0x517f4665U,
- 0xea049d5eU, 0x355d018cU, 0x7473fa87U, 0x412efb0bU,
- 0x1d5ab367U, 0xd25292dbU, 0x5633e910U, 0x47136dd6U,
- 0x618c9ad7U, 0x0c7a37a1U, 0x148e59f8U, 0x3c89eb13U,
- 0x27eecea9U, 0xc935b761U, 0xe5ede11cU, 0xb13c7a47U,
- 0xdf599cd2U, 0x733f55f2U, 0xce791814U, 0x37bf73c7U,
- 0xcdea53f7U, 0xaa5b5ffdU, 0x6f14df3dU, 0xdb867844U,
- 0xf381caafU, 0xc43eb968U, 0x342c3824U, 0x405fc2a3U,
- 0xc372161dU, 0x250cbce2U, 0x498b283cU, 0x9541ff0dU,
- 0x017139a8U, 0xb3de080cU, 0xe49cd8b4U, 0xc1906456U,
- 0x84617bcbU, 0xb670d532U, 0x5c74486cU, 0x5742d0b8U,
-};
-static const u32 Td3[256] = {
- 0xf4a75051U, 0x4165537eU, 0x17a4c31aU, 0x275e963aU,
- 0xab6bcb3bU, 0x9d45f11fU, 0xfa58abacU, 0xe303934bU,
- 0x30fa5520U, 0x766df6adU, 0xcc769188U, 0x024c25f5U,
- 0xe5d7fc4fU, 0x2acbd7c5U, 0x35448026U, 0x62a38fb5U,
- 0xb15a49deU, 0xba1b6725U, 0xea0e9845U, 0xfec0e15dU,
- 0x2f7502c3U, 0x4cf01281U, 0x4697a38dU, 0xd3f9c66bU,
- 0x8f5fe703U, 0x929c9515U, 0x6d7aebbfU, 0x5259da95U,
- 0xbe832dd4U, 0x7421d358U, 0xe0692949U, 0xc9c8448eU,
- 0xc2896a75U, 0x8e7978f4U, 0x583e6b99U, 0xb971dd27U,
- 0xe14fb6beU, 0x88ad17f0U, 0x20ac66c9U, 0xce3ab47dU,
- 0xdf4a1863U, 0x1a3182e5U, 0x51336097U, 0x537f4562U,
- 0x6477e0b1U, 0x6bae84bbU, 0x81a01cfeU, 0x082b94f9U,
- 0x48685870U, 0x45fd198fU, 0xde6c8794U, 0x7bf8b752U,
- 0x73d323abU, 0x4b02e272U, 0x1f8f57e3U, 0x55ab2a66U,
- 0xeb2807b2U, 0xb5c2032fU, 0xc57b9a86U, 0x3708a5d3U,
- 0x2887f230U, 0xbfa5b223U, 0x036aba02U, 0x16825cedU,
- 0xcf1c2b8aU, 0x79b492a7U, 0x07f2f0f3U, 0x69e2a14eU,
- 0xdaf4cd65U, 0x05bed506U, 0x34621fd1U, 0xa6fe8ac4U,
- 0x2e539d34U, 0xf355a0a2U, 0x8ae13205U, 0xf6eb75a4U,
- 0x83ec390bU, 0x60efaa40U, 0x719f065eU, 0x6e1051bdU,
- 0x218af93eU, 0xdd063d96U, 0x3e05aeddU, 0xe6bd464dU,
- 0x548db591U, 0xc45d0571U, 0x06d46f04U, 0x5015ff60U,
- 0x98fb2419U, 0xbde997d6U, 0x4043cc89U, 0xd99e7767U,
- 0xe842bdb0U, 0x898b8807U, 0x195b38e7U, 0xc8eedb79U,
- 0x7c0a47a1U, 0x420fe97cU, 0x841ec9f8U, 0x00000000U,
- 0x80868309U, 0x2bed4832U, 0x1170ac1eU, 0x5a724e6cU,
- 0x0efffbfdU, 0x8538560fU, 0xaed51e3dU, 0x2d392736U,
- 0x0fd9640aU, 0x5ca62168U, 0x5b54d19bU, 0x362e3a24U,
- 0x0a67b10cU, 0x57e70f93U, 0xee96d2b4U, 0x9b919e1bU,
- 0xc0c54f80U, 0xdc20a261U, 0x774b695aU, 0x121a161cU,
- 0x93ba0ae2U, 0xa02ae5c0U, 0x22e0433cU, 0x1b171d12U,
- 0x090d0b0eU, 0x8bc7adf2U, 0xb6a8b92dU, 0x1ea9c814U,
- 0xf1198557U, 0x75074cafU, 0x99ddbbeeU, 0x7f60fda3U,
- 0x01269ff7U, 0x72f5bc5cU, 0x663bc544U, 0xfb7e345bU,
- 0x4329768bU, 0x23c6dccbU, 0xedfc68b6U, 0xe4f163b8U,
- 0x31dccad7U, 0x63851042U, 0x97224013U, 0xc6112084U,
- 0x4a247d85U, 0xbb3df8d2U, 0xf93211aeU, 0x29a16dc7U,
- 0x9e2f4b1dU, 0xb230f3dcU, 0x8652ec0dU, 0xc1e3d077U,
- 0xb3166c2bU, 0x70b999a9U, 0x9448fa11U, 0xe9642247U,
- 0xfc8cc4a8U, 0xf03f1aa0U, 0x7d2cd856U, 0x3390ef22U,
- 0x494ec787U, 0x38d1c1d9U, 0xcaa2fe8cU, 0xd40b3698U,
- 0xf581cfa6U, 0x7ade28a5U, 0xb78e26daU, 0xadbfa43fU,
- 0x3a9de42cU, 0x78920d50U, 0x5fcc9b6aU, 0x7e466254U,
- 0x8d13c2f6U, 0xd8b8e890U, 0x39f75e2eU, 0xc3aff582U,
- 0x5d80be9fU, 0xd0937c69U, 0xd52da96fU, 0x2512b3cfU,
- 0xac993bc8U, 0x187da710U, 0x9c636ee8U, 0x3bbb7bdbU,
- 0x267809cdU, 0x5918f46eU, 0x9ab701ecU, 0x4f9aa883U,
- 0x956e65e6U, 0xffe67eaaU, 0xbccf0821U, 0x15e8e6efU,
- 0xe79bd9baU, 0x6f36ce4aU, 0x9f09d4eaU, 0xb07cd629U,
- 0xa4b2af31U, 0x3f23312aU, 0xa59430c6U, 0xa266c035U,
- 0x4ebc3774U, 0x82caa6fcU, 0x90d0b0e0U, 0xa7d81533U,
- 0x04984af1U, 0xecdaf741U, 0xcd500e7fU, 0x91f62f17U,
- 0x4dd68d76U, 0xefb04d43U, 0xaa4d54ccU, 0x9604dfe4U,
- 0xd1b5e39eU, 0x6a881b4cU, 0x2c1fb8c1U, 0x65517f46U,
- 0x5eea049dU, 0x8c355d01U, 0x877473faU, 0x0b412efbU,
- 0x671d5ab3U, 0xdbd25292U, 0x105633e9U, 0xd647136dU,
- 0xd7618c9aU, 0xa10c7a37U, 0xf8148e59U, 0x133c89ebU,
- 0xa927eeceU, 0x61c935b7U, 0x1ce5ede1U, 0x47b13c7aU,
- 0xd2df599cU, 0xf2733f55U, 0x14ce7918U, 0xc737bf73U,
- 0xf7cdea53U, 0xfdaa5b5fU, 0x3d6f14dfU, 0x44db8678U,
- 0xaff381caU, 0x68c43eb9U, 0x24342c38U, 0xa3405fc2U,
- 0x1dc37216U, 0xe2250cbcU, 0x3c498b28U, 0x0d9541ffU,
- 0xa8017139U, 0x0cb3de08U, 0xb4e49cd8U, 0x56c19064U,
- 0xcb84617bU, 0x32b670d5U, 0x6c5c7448U, 0xb85742d0U,
-};
-static const u32 Td4[256] = {
- 0x52525252U, 0x09090909U, 0x6a6a6a6aU, 0xd5d5d5d5U,
- 0x30303030U, 0x36363636U, 0xa5a5a5a5U, 0x38383838U,
- 0xbfbfbfbfU, 0x40404040U, 0xa3a3a3a3U, 0x9e9e9e9eU,
- 0x81818181U, 0xf3f3f3f3U, 0xd7d7d7d7U, 0xfbfbfbfbU,
- 0x7c7c7c7cU, 0xe3e3e3e3U, 0x39393939U, 0x82828282U,
- 0x9b9b9b9bU, 0x2f2f2f2fU, 0xffffffffU, 0x87878787U,
- 0x34343434U, 0x8e8e8e8eU, 0x43434343U, 0x44444444U,
- 0xc4c4c4c4U, 0xdedededeU, 0xe9e9e9e9U, 0xcbcbcbcbU,
- 0x54545454U, 0x7b7b7b7bU, 0x94949494U, 0x32323232U,
- 0xa6a6a6a6U, 0xc2c2c2c2U, 0x23232323U, 0x3d3d3d3dU,
- 0xeeeeeeeeU, 0x4c4c4c4cU, 0x95959595U, 0x0b0b0b0bU,
- 0x42424242U, 0xfafafafaU, 0xc3c3c3c3U, 0x4e4e4e4eU,
- 0x08080808U, 0x2e2e2e2eU, 0xa1a1a1a1U, 0x66666666U,
- 0x28282828U, 0xd9d9d9d9U, 0x24242424U, 0xb2b2b2b2U,
- 0x76767676U, 0x5b5b5b5bU, 0xa2a2a2a2U, 0x49494949U,
- 0x6d6d6d6dU, 0x8b8b8b8bU, 0xd1d1d1d1U, 0x25252525U,
- 0x72727272U, 0xf8f8f8f8U, 0xf6f6f6f6U, 0x64646464U,
- 0x86868686U, 0x68686868U, 0x98989898U, 0x16161616U,
- 0xd4d4d4d4U, 0xa4a4a4a4U, 0x5c5c5c5cU, 0xccccccccU,
- 0x5d5d5d5dU, 0x65656565U, 0xb6b6b6b6U, 0x92929292U,
- 0x6c6c6c6cU, 0x70707070U, 0x48484848U, 0x50505050U,
- 0xfdfdfdfdU, 0xededededU, 0xb9b9b9b9U, 0xdadadadaU,
- 0x5e5e5e5eU, 0x15151515U, 0x46464646U, 0x57575757U,
- 0xa7a7a7a7U, 0x8d8d8d8dU, 0x9d9d9d9dU, 0x84848484U,
- 0x90909090U, 0xd8d8d8d8U, 0xababababU, 0x00000000U,
- 0x8c8c8c8cU, 0xbcbcbcbcU, 0xd3d3d3d3U, 0x0a0a0a0aU,
- 0xf7f7f7f7U, 0xe4e4e4e4U, 0x58585858U, 0x05050505U,
- 0xb8b8b8b8U, 0xb3b3b3b3U, 0x45454545U, 0x06060606U,
- 0xd0d0d0d0U, 0x2c2c2c2cU, 0x1e1e1e1eU, 0x8f8f8f8fU,
- 0xcacacacaU, 0x3f3f3f3fU, 0x0f0f0f0fU, 0x02020202U,
- 0xc1c1c1c1U, 0xafafafafU, 0xbdbdbdbdU, 0x03030303U,
- 0x01010101U, 0x13131313U, 0x8a8a8a8aU, 0x6b6b6b6bU,
- 0x3a3a3a3aU, 0x91919191U, 0x11111111U, 0x41414141U,
- 0x4f4f4f4fU, 0x67676767U, 0xdcdcdcdcU, 0xeaeaeaeaU,
- 0x97979797U, 0xf2f2f2f2U, 0xcfcfcfcfU, 0xcecececeU,
- 0xf0f0f0f0U, 0xb4b4b4b4U, 0xe6e6e6e6U, 0x73737373U,
- 0x96969696U, 0xacacacacU, 0x74747474U, 0x22222222U,
- 0xe7e7e7e7U, 0xadadadadU, 0x35353535U, 0x85858585U,
- 0xe2e2e2e2U, 0xf9f9f9f9U, 0x37373737U, 0xe8e8e8e8U,
- 0x1c1c1c1cU, 0x75757575U, 0xdfdfdfdfU, 0x6e6e6e6eU,
- 0x47474747U, 0xf1f1f1f1U, 0x1a1a1a1aU, 0x71717171U,
- 0x1d1d1d1dU, 0x29292929U, 0xc5c5c5c5U, 0x89898989U,
- 0x6f6f6f6fU, 0xb7b7b7b7U, 0x62626262U, 0x0e0e0e0eU,
- 0xaaaaaaaaU, 0x18181818U, 0xbebebebeU, 0x1b1b1b1bU,
- 0xfcfcfcfcU, 0x56565656U, 0x3e3e3e3eU, 0x4b4b4b4bU,
- 0xc6c6c6c6U, 0xd2d2d2d2U, 0x79797979U, 0x20202020U,
- 0x9a9a9a9aU, 0xdbdbdbdbU, 0xc0c0c0c0U, 0xfefefefeU,
- 0x78787878U, 0xcdcdcdcdU, 0x5a5a5a5aU, 0xf4f4f4f4U,
- 0x1f1f1f1fU, 0xddddddddU, 0xa8a8a8a8U, 0x33333333U,
- 0x88888888U, 0x07070707U, 0xc7c7c7c7U, 0x31313131U,
- 0xb1b1b1b1U, 0x12121212U, 0x10101010U, 0x59595959U,
- 0x27272727U, 0x80808080U, 0xececececU, 0x5f5f5f5fU,
- 0x60606060U, 0x51515151U, 0x7f7f7f7fU, 0xa9a9a9a9U,
- 0x19191919U, 0xb5b5b5b5U, 0x4a4a4a4aU, 0x0d0d0d0dU,
- 0x2d2d2d2dU, 0xe5e5e5e5U, 0x7a7a7a7aU, 0x9f9f9f9fU,
- 0x93939393U, 0xc9c9c9c9U, 0x9c9c9c9cU, 0xefefefefU,
- 0xa0a0a0a0U, 0xe0e0e0e0U, 0x3b3b3b3bU, 0x4d4d4d4dU,
- 0xaeaeaeaeU, 0x2a2a2a2aU, 0xf5f5f5f5U, 0xb0b0b0b0U,
- 0xc8c8c8c8U, 0xebebebebU, 0xbbbbbbbbU, 0x3c3c3c3cU,
- 0x83838383U, 0x53535353U, 0x99999999U, 0x61616161U,
- 0x17171717U, 0x2b2b2b2bU, 0x04040404U, 0x7e7e7e7eU,
- 0xbabababaU, 0x77777777U, 0xd6d6d6d6U, 0x26262626U,
- 0xe1e1e1e1U, 0x69696969U, 0x14141414U, 0x63636363U,
- 0x55555555U, 0x21212121U, 0x0c0c0c0cU, 0x7d7d7d7dU,
-};
-static const u32 rcon[] = {
- 0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000,
- 0x10000000, 0x20000000, 0x40000000, 0x80000000,
- 0x1B000000, 0x36000000, /* for 128-bit blocks, Rijndael never uses more than 10 rcon values */
-};
-
-#define GETU32(pt) (((u32)(pt)[0] << 24) ^ ((u32)(pt)[1] << 16) ^ ((u32)(pt)[2] << 8) ^ ((u32)(pt)[3]))
-#define PUTU32(ct, st) { (ct)[0] = (u8)((st) >> 24); (ct)[1] = (u8)((st) >> 16); (ct)[2] = (u8)((st) >> 8); (ct)[3] = (u8)(st); }
-
-/**
- * Expand the cipher key into the encryption key schedule.
- *
- * @return the number of rounds for the given cipher key size.
- */
-static int rijndaelKeySetupEnc(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits) {
- int i = 0;
- u32 temp;
-
- rk[0] = GETU32(cipherKey );
- rk[1] = GETU32(cipherKey + 4);
- rk[2] = GETU32(cipherKey + 8);
- rk[3] = GETU32(cipherKey + 12);
- if (keyBits == 128) {
- for (;;) {
- temp = rk[3];
- rk[4] = rk[0] ^
- (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
- (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
- (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
- (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^
- rcon[i];
- rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4];
- rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5];
- rk[7] = rk[3] ^ rk[6];
- if (++i == 10) {
- return 10;
- }
- rk += 4;
- }
- }
- rk[4] = GETU32(cipherKey + 16);
- rk[5] = GETU32(cipherKey + 20);
- if (keyBits == 192) {
- for (;;) {
- temp = rk[ 5];
- rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^
- (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
- (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
- (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
- (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^
- rcon[i];
- rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6];
- rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7];
- rk[ 9] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[ 8];
- if (++i == 8) {
- return 12;
- }
- rk[10] = rk[ 4] ^ rk[ 9];
- rk[11] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[10];
- rk += 6;
- }
- }
- rk[6] = GETU32(cipherKey + 24);
- rk[7] = GETU32(cipherKey + 28);
- if (keyBits == 256) {
- for (;;) {
- temp = rk[ 7];
- rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^
- (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
- (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
- (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
- (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^
- rcon[i];
- rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8];
- rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9];
- rk[11] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[10];
- if (++i == 7) {
- return 14;
- }
- temp = rk[11];
- rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^
- (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
- (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
- (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
- (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff);
- rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12];
- rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13];
- rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14];
- rk += 8;
- }
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * Expand the cipher key into the decryption key schedule.
- *
- * @return the number of rounds for the given cipher key size.
- */
-static int
-rijndaelKeySetupDec(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits,
- int have_encrypt) {
- int Nr, i, j;
- u32 temp;
-
- if (have_encrypt) {
- Nr = have_encrypt;
- } else {
- /* expand the cipher key: */
- Nr = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(rk, cipherKey, keyBits);
- }
- /* invert the order of the round keys: */
- for (i = 0, j = 4*Nr; i < j; i += 4, j -= 4) {
- temp = rk[i ]; rk[i ] = rk[j ]; rk[j ] = temp;
- temp = rk[i + 1]; rk[i + 1] = rk[j + 1]; rk[j + 1] = temp;
- temp = rk[i + 2]; rk[i + 2] = rk[j + 2]; rk[j + 2] = temp;
- temp = rk[i + 3]; rk[i + 3] = rk[j + 3]; rk[j + 3] = temp;
- }
- /* apply the inverse MixColumn transform to all round keys but the first and the last: */
- for (i = 1; i < Nr; i++) {
- rk += 4;
- rk[0] =
- Td0[Te4[(rk[0] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^
- Td1[Te4[(rk[0] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
- Td2[Te4[(rk[0] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
- Td3[Te4[(rk[0] ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
- rk[1] =
- Td0[Te4[(rk[1] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^
- Td1[Te4[(rk[1] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
- Td2[Te4[(rk[1] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
- Td3[Te4[(rk[1] ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
- rk[2] =
- Td0[Te4[(rk[2] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^
- Td1[Te4[(rk[2] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
- Td2[Te4[(rk[2] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
- Td3[Te4[(rk[2] ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
- rk[3] =
- Td0[Te4[(rk[3] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^
- Td1[Te4[(rk[3] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
- Td2[Te4[(rk[3] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
- Td3[Te4[(rk[3] ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
- }
- return Nr;
-}
-
-static void rijndaelEncrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 pt[16], u8 ct[16]) {
- u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3;
-#ifndef FULL_UNROLL
- int r;
-#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
-
- /*
- * map byte array block to cipher state
- * and add initial round key:
- */
- s0 = GETU32(pt ) ^ rk[0];
- s1 = GETU32(pt + 4) ^ rk[1];
- s2 = GETU32(pt + 8) ^ rk[2];
- s3 = GETU32(pt + 12) ^ rk[3];
-#ifdef FULL_UNROLL
- /* round 1: */
- t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4];
- t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5];
- t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6];
- t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7];
- /* round 2: */
- s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8];
- s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9];
- s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[10];
- s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[11];
- /* round 3: */
- t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[12];
- t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[13];
- t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[14];
- t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[15];
- /* round 4: */
- s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[16];
- s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[17];
- s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[18];
- s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[19];
- /* round 5: */
- t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[20];
- t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[21];
- t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[22];
- t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[23];
- /* round 6: */
- s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[24];
- s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[25];
- s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[26];
- s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[27];
- /* round 7: */
- t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[28];
- t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[29];
- t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[30];
- t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[31];
- /* round 8: */
- s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[32];
- s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[33];
- s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[34];
- s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[35];
- /* round 9: */
- t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[36];
- t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[37];
- t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[38];
- t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[39];
- if (Nr > 10) {
- /* round 10: */
- s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[40];
- s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[41];
- s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[42];
- s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[43];
- /* round 11: */
- t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[44];
- t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[45];
- t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[46];
- t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[47];
- if (Nr > 12) {
- /* round 12: */
- s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[48];
- s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[49];
- s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[50];
- s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[51];
- /* round 13: */
- t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[52];
- t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[53];
- t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[54];
- t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[55];
- }
- }
- rk += Nr << 2;
-#else /* !FULL_UNROLL */
- /*
- * Nr - 1 full rounds:
- */
- r = Nr >> 1;
- for (;;) {
- t0 =
- Te0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^
- Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
- Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
- Te3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^
- rk[4];
- t1 =
- Te0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^
- Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
- Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
- Te3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^
- rk[5];
- t2 =
- Te0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^
- Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
- Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
- Te3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^
- rk[6];
- t3 =
- Te0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^
- Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
- Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
- Te3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^
- rk[7];
-
- rk += 8;
- if (--r == 0) {
- break;
- }
-
- s0 =
- Te0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^
- Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
- Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
- Te3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^
- rk[0];
- s1 =
- Te0[(t1 >> 24) ] ^
- Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
- Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
- Te3[(t0 ) & 0xff] ^
- rk[1];
- s2 =
- Te0[(t2 >> 24) ] ^
- Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
- Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
- Te3[(t1 ) & 0xff] ^
- rk[2];
- s3 =
- Te0[(t3 >> 24) ] ^
- Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
- Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
- Te3[(t2 ) & 0xff] ^
- rk[3];
- }
-#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
- /*
- * apply last round and
- * map cipher state to byte array block:
- */
- s0 =
- (Te4[(t0 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
- (Te4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
- (Te4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
- (Te4[(t3 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
- rk[0];
- PUTU32(ct , s0);
- s1 =
- (Te4[(t1 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
- (Te4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
- (Te4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
- (Te4[(t0 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
- rk[1];
- PUTU32(ct + 4, s1);
- s2 =
- (Te4[(t2 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
- (Te4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
- (Te4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
- (Te4[(t1 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
- rk[2];
- PUTU32(ct + 8, s2);
- s3 =
- (Te4[(t3 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
- (Te4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
- (Te4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
- (Te4[(t2 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
- rk[3];
- PUTU32(ct + 12, s3);
-}
-
-static void rijndaelDecrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 ct[16], u8 pt[16]) {
- u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3;
-#ifndef FULL_UNROLL
- int r;
-#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
-
- /*
- * map byte array block to cipher state
- * and add initial round key:
- */
- s0 = GETU32(ct ) ^ rk[0];
- s1 = GETU32(ct + 4) ^ rk[1];
- s2 = GETU32(ct + 8) ^ rk[2];
- s3 = GETU32(ct + 12) ^ rk[3];
-#ifdef FULL_UNROLL
- /* round 1: */
- t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4];
- t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5];
- t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6];
- t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7];
- /* round 2: */
- s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8];
- s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9];
- s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[10];
- s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[11];
- /* round 3: */
- t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[12];
- t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[13];
- t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[14];
- t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[15];
- /* round 4: */
- s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[16];
- s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[17];
- s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[18];
- s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[19];
- /* round 5: */
- t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[20];
- t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[21];
- t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[22];
- t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[23];
- /* round 6: */
- s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[24];
- s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[25];
- s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[26];
- s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[27];
- /* round 7: */
- t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[28];
- t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[29];
- t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[30];
- t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[31];
- /* round 8: */
- s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[32];
- s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[33];
- s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[34];
- s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[35];
- /* round 9: */
- t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[36];
- t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[37];
- t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[38];
- t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[39];
- if (Nr > 10) {
- /* round 10: */
- s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[40];
- s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[41];
- s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[42];
- s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[43];
- /* round 11: */
- t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[44];
- t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[45];
- t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[46];
- t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[47];
- if (Nr > 12) {
- /* round 12: */
- s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[48];
- s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[49];
- s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[50];
- s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[51];
- /* round 13: */
- t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[52];
- t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[53];
- t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[54];
- t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[55];
- }
- }
- rk += Nr << 2;
-#else /* !FULL_UNROLL */
- /*
- * Nr - 1 full rounds:
- */
- r = Nr >> 1;
- for (;;) {
- t0 =
- Td0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^
- Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
- Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
- Td3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^
- rk[4];
- t1 =
- Td0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^
- Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
- Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
- Td3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^
- rk[5];
- t2 =
- Td0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^
- Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
- Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
- Td3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^
- rk[6];
- t3 =
- Td0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^
- Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
- Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
- Td3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^
- rk[7];
-
- rk += 8;
- if (--r == 0) {
- break;
- }
-
- s0 =
- Td0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^
- Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
- Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
- Td3[(t1 ) & 0xff] ^
- rk[0];
- s1 =
- Td0[(t1 >> 24) ] ^
- Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
- Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
- Td3[(t2 ) & 0xff] ^
- rk[1];
- s2 =
- Td0[(t2 >> 24) ] ^
- Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
- Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
- Td3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^
- rk[2];
- s3 =
- Td0[(t3 >> 24) ] ^
- Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
- Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
- Td3[(t0 ) & 0xff] ^
- rk[3];
- }
-#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
- /*
- * apply last round and
- * map cipher state to byte array block:
- */
- s0 =
- (Td4[(t0 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
- (Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
- (Td4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
- (Td4[(t1 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
- rk[0];
- PUTU32(pt , s0);
- s1 =
- (Td4[(t1 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
- (Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
- (Td4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
- (Td4[(t2 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
- rk[1];
- PUTU32(pt + 4, s1);
- s2 =
- (Td4[(t2 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
- (Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
- (Td4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
- (Td4[(t3 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
- rk[2];
- PUTU32(pt + 8, s2);
- s3 =
- (Td4[(t3 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
- (Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
- (Td4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
- (Td4[(t0 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
- rk[3];
- PUTU32(pt + 12, s3);
-}
-
-void
-rijndael_set_key(rijndael_ctx *ctx, u_char *key, int bits, int do_encrypt)
-{
- ctx->Nr = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(ctx->ek, key, bits);
- if (do_encrypt) {
- ctx->decrypt = 0;
- memset(ctx->dk, 0, sizeof(ctx->dk));
- } else {
- ctx->decrypt = 1;
- memcpy(ctx->dk, ctx->ek, sizeof(ctx->dk));
- rijndaelKeySetupDec(ctx->dk, key, bits, ctx->Nr);
- }
-}
-
-void
-rijndael_decrypt(rijndael_ctx *ctx, u_char *src, u_char *dst)
-{
- rijndaelDecrypt(ctx->dk, ctx->Nr, src, dst);
-}
-
-void
-rijndael_encrypt(rijndael_ctx *ctx, u_char *src, u_char *dst)
-{
- rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->ek, ctx->Nr, src, dst);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rijndael.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/rijndael.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rijndael.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rijndael.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1129 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.c,v 1.20 2015/03/16 11:09:52 djm Exp $ */
+
+/**
+ * rijndael-alg-fst.c
+ *
+ * @version 3.0 (December 2000)
+ *
+ * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES)
+ *
+ * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen at esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers at esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto at terra.com.br>
+ *
+ * This code is hereby placed in the public domain.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
+ * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
+ * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
+ * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "rijndael.h"
+
+#undef FULL_UNROLL
+
+/*
+Te0[x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03];
+Te1[x] = S [x].[03, 02, 01, 01];
+Te2[x] = S [x].[01, 03, 02, 01];
+Te3[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 03, 02];
+
+Td0[x] = Si[x].[0e, 09, 0d, 0b];
+Td1[x] = Si[x].[0b, 0e, 09, 0d];
+Td2[x] = Si[x].[0d, 0b, 0e, 09];
+Td3[x] = Si[x].[09, 0d, 0b, 0e];
+Td4[x] = Si[x].[01];
+*/
+
+static const u32 Te0[256] = {
+ 0xc66363a5U, 0xf87c7c84U, 0xee777799U, 0xf67b7b8dU,
+ 0xfff2f20dU, 0xd66b6bbdU, 0xde6f6fb1U, 0x91c5c554U,
+ 0x60303050U, 0x02010103U, 0xce6767a9U, 0x562b2b7dU,
+ 0xe7fefe19U, 0xb5d7d762U, 0x4dababe6U, 0xec76769aU,
+ 0x8fcaca45U, 0x1f82829dU, 0x89c9c940U, 0xfa7d7d87U,
+ 0xeffafa15U, 0xb25959ebU, 0x8e4747c9U, 0xfbf0f00bU,
+ 0x41adadecU, 0xb3d4d467U, 0x5fa2a2fdU, 0x45afafeaU,
+ 0x239c9cbfU, 0x53a4a4f7U, 0xe4727296U, 0x9bc0c05bU,
+ 0x75b7b7c2U, 0xe1fdfd1cU, 0x3d9393aeU, 0x4c26266aU,
+ 0x6c36365aU, 0x7e3f3f41U, 0xf5f7f702U, 0x83cccc4fU,
+ 0x6834345cU, 0x51a5a5f4U, 0xd1e5e534U, 0xf9f1f108U,
+ 0xe2717193U, 0xabd8d873U, 0x62313153U, 0x2a15153fU,
+ 0x0804040cU, 0x95c7c752U, 0x46232365U, 0x9dc3c35eU,
+ 0x30181828U, 0x379696a1U, 0x0a05050fU, 0x2f9a9ab5U,
+ 0x0e070709U, 0x24121236U, 0x1b80809bU, 0xdfe2e23dU,
+ 0xcdebeb26U, 0x4e272769U, 0x7fb2b2cdU, 0xea75759fU,
+ 0x1209091bU, 0x1d83839eU, 0x582c2c74U, 0x341a1a2eU,
+ 0x361b1b2dU, 0xdc6e6eb2U, 0xb45a5aeeU, 0x5ba0a0fbU,
+ 0xa45252f6U, 0x763b3b4dU, 0xb7d6d661U, 0x7db3b3ceU,
+ 0x5229297bU, 0xdde3e33eU, 0x5e2f2f71U, 0x13848497U,
+ 0xa65353f5U, 0xb9d1d168U, 0x00000000U, 0xc1eded2cU,
+ 0x40202060U, 0xe3fcfc1fU, 0x79b1b1c8U, 0xb65b5bedU,
+ 0xd46a6abeU, 0x8dcbcb46U, 0x67bebed9U, 0x7239394bU,
+ 0x944a4adeU, 0x984c4cd4U, 0xb05858e8U, 0x85cfcf4aU,
+ 0xbbd0d06bU, 0xc5efef2aU, 0x4faaaae5U, 0xedfbfb16U,
+ 0x864343c5U, 0x9a4d4dd7U, 0x66333355U, 0x11858594U,
+ 0x8a4545cfU, 0xe9f9f910U, 0x04020206U, 0xfe7f7f81U,
+ 0xa05050f0U, 0x783c3c44U, 0x259f9fbaU, 0x4ba8a8e3U,
+ 0xa25151f3U, 0x5da3a3feU, 0x804040c0U, 0x058f8f8aU,
+ 0x3f9292adU, 0x219d9dbcU, 0x70383848U, 0xf1f5f504U,
+ 0x63bcbcdfU, 0x77b6b6c1U, 0xafdada75U, 0x42212163U,
+ 0x20101030U, 0xe5ffff1aU, 0xfdf3f30eU, 0xbfd2d26dU,
+ 0x81cdcd4cU, 0x180c0c14U, 0x26131335U, 0xc3ecec2fU,
+ 0xbe5f5fe1U, 0x359797a2U, 0x884444ccU, 0x2e171739U,
+ 0x93c4c457U, 0x55a7a7f2U, 0xfc7e7e82U, 0x7a3d3d47U,
+ 0xc86464acU, 0xba5d5de7U, 0x3219192bU, 0xe6737395U,
+ 0xc06060a0U, 0x19818198U, 0x9e4f4fd1U, 0xa3dcdc7fU,
+ 0x44222266U, 0x542a2a7eU, 0x3b9090abU, 0x0b888883U,
+ 0x8c4646caU, 0xc7eeee29U, 0x6bb8b8d3U, 0x2814143cU,
+ 0xa7dede79U, 0xbc5e5ee2U, 0x160b0b1dU, 0xaddbdb76U,
+ 0xdbe0e03bU, 0x64323256U, 0x743a3a4eU, 0x140a0a1eU,
+ 0x924949dbU, 0x0c06060aU, 0x4824246cU, 0xb85c5ce4U,
+ 0x9fc2c25dU, 0xbdd3d36eU, 0x43acacefU, 0xc46262a6U,
+ 0x399191a8U, 0x319595a4U, 0xd3e4e437U, 0xf279798bU,
+ 0xd5e7e732U, 0x8bc8c843U, 0x6e373759U, 0xda6d6db7U,
+ 0x018d8d8cU, 0xb1d5d564U, 0x9c4e4ed2U, 0x49a9a9e0U,
+ 0xd86c6cb4U, 0xac5656faU, 0xf3f4f407U, 0xcfeaea25U,
+ 0xca6565afU, 0xf47a7a8eU, 0x47aeaee9U, 0x10080818U,
+ 0x6fbabad5U, 0xf0787888U, 0x4a25256fU, 0x5c2e2e72U,
+ 0x381c1c24U, 0x57a6a6f1U, 0x73b4b4c7U, 0x97c6c651U,
+ 0xcbe8e823U, 0xa1dddd7cU, 0xe874749cU, 0x3e1f1f21U,
+ 0x964b4bddU, 0x61bdbddcU, 0x0d8b8b86U, 0x0f8a8a85U,
+ 0xe0707090U, 0x7c3e3e42U, 0x71b5b5c4U, 0xcc6666aaU,
+ 0x904848d8U, 0x06030305U, 0xf7f6f601U, 0x1c0e0e12U,
+ 0xc26161a3U, 0x6a35355fU, 0xae5757f9U, 0x69b9b9d0U,
+ 0x17868691U, 0x99c1c158U, 0x3a1d1d27U, 0x279e9eb9U,
+ 0xd9e1e138U, 0xebf8f813U, 0x2b9898b3U, 0x22111133U,
+ 0xd26969bbU, 0xa9d9d970U, 0x078e8e89U, 0x339494a7U,
+ 0x2d9b9bb6U, 0x3c1e1e22U, 0x15878792U, 0xc9e9e920U,
+ 0x87cece49U, 0xaa5555ffU, 0x50282878U, 0xa5dfdf7aU,
+ 0x038c8c8fU, 0x59a1a1f8U, 0x09898980U, 0x1a0d0d17U,
+ 0x65bfbfdaU, 0xd7e6e631U, 0x844242c6U, 0xd06868b8U,
+ 0x824141c3U, 0x299999b0U, 0x5a2d2d77U, 0x1e0f0f11U,
+ 0x7bb0b0cbU, 0xa85454fcU, 0x6dbbbbd6U, 0x2c16163aU,
+};
+static const u32 Te1[256] = {
+ 0xa5c66363U, 0x84f87c7cU, 0x99ee7777U, 0x8df67b7bU,
+ 0x0dfff2f2U, 0xbdd66b6bU, 0xb1de6f6fU, 0x5491c5c5U,
+ 0x50603030U, 0x03020101U, 0xa9ce6767U, 0x7d562b2bU,
+ 0x19e7fefeU, 0x62b5d7d7U, 0xe64dababU, 0x9aec7676U,
+ 0x458fcacaU, 0x9d1f8282U, 0x4089c9c9U, 0x87fa7d7dU,
+ 0x15effafaU, 0xebb25959U, 0xc98e4747U, 0x0bfbf0f0U,
+ 0xec41adadU, 0x67b3d4d4U, 0xfd5fa2a2U, 0xea45afafU,
+ 0xbf239c9cU, 0xf753a4a4U, 0x96e47272U, 0x5b9bc0c0U,
+ 0xc275b7b7U, 0x1ce1fdfdU, 0xae3d9393U, 0x6a4c2626U,
+ 0x5a6c3636U, 0x417e3f3fU, 0x02f5f7f7U, 0x4f83ccccU,
+ 0x5c683434U, 0xf451a5a5U, 0x34d1e5e5U, 0x08f9f1f1U,
+ 0x93e27171U, 0x73abd8d8U, 0x53623131U, 0x3f2a1515U,
+ 0x0c080404U, 0x5295c7c7U, 0x65462323U, 0x5e9dc3c3U,
+ 0x28301818U, 0xa1379696U, 0x0f0a0505U, 0xb52f9a9aU,
+ 0x090e0707U, 0x36241212U, 0x9b1b8080U, 0x3ddfe2e2U,
+ 0x26cdebebU, 0x694e2727U, 0xcd7fb2b2U, 0x9fea7575U,
+ 0x1b120909U, 0x9e1d8383U, 0x74582c2cU, 0x2e341a1aU,
+ 0x2d361b1bU, 0xb2dc6e6eU, 0xeeb45a5aU, 0xfb5ba0a0U,
+ 0xf6a45252U, 0x4d763b3bU, 0x61b7d6d6U, 0xce7db3b3U,
+ 0x7b522929U, 0x3edde3e3U, 0x715e2f2fU, 0x97138484U,
+ 0xf5a65353U, 0x68b9d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0x2cc1ededU,
+ 0x60402020U, 0x1fe3fcfcU, 0xc879b1b1U, 0xedb65b5bU,
+ 0xbed46a6aU, 0x468dcbcbU, 0xd967bebeU, 0x4b723939U,
+ 0xde944a4aU, 0xd4984c4cU, 0xe8b05858U, 0x4a85cfcfU,
+ 0x6bbbd0d0U, 0x2ac5efefU, 0xe54faaaaU, 0x16edfbfbU,
+ 0xc5864343U, 0xd79a4d4dU, 0x55663333U, 0x94118585U,
+ 0xcf8a4545U, 0x10e9f9f9U, 0x06040202U, 0x81fe7f7fU,
+ 0xf0a05050U, 0x44783c3cU, 0xba259f9fU, 0xe34ba8a8U,
+ 0xf3a25151U, 0xfe5da3a3U, 0xc0804040U, 0x8a058f8fU,
+ 0xad3f9292U, 0xbc219d9dU, 0x48703838U, 0x04f1f5f5U,
+ 0xdf63bcbcU, 0xc177b6b6U, 0x75afdadaU, 0x63422121U,
+ 0x30201010U, 0x1ae5ffffU, 0x0efdf3f3U, 0x6dbfd2d2U,
+ 0x4c81cdcdU, 0x14180c0cU, 0x35261313U, 0x2fc3ececU,
+ 0xe1be5f5fU, 0xa2359797U, 0xcc884444U, 0x392e1717U,
+ 0x5793c4c4U, 0xf255a7a7U, 0x82fc7e7eU, 0x477a3d3dU,
+ 0xacc86464U, 0xe7ba5d5dU, 0x2b321919U, 0x95e67373U,
+ 0xa0c06060U, 0x98198181U, 0xd19e4f4fU, 0x7fa3dcdcU,
+ 0x66442222U, 0x7e542a2aU, 0xab3b9090U, 0x830b8888U,
+ 0xca8c4646U, 0x29c7eeeeU, 0xd36bb8b8U, 0x3c281414U,
+ 0x79a7dedeU, 0xe2bc5e5eU, 0x1d160b0bU, 0x76addbdbU,
+ 0x3bdbe0e0U, 0x56643232U, 0x4e743a3aU, 0x1e140a0aU,
+ 0xdb924949U, 0x0a0c0606U, 0x6c482424U, 0xe4b85c5cU,
+ 0x5d9fc2c2U, 0x6ebdd3d3U, 0xef43acacU, 0xa6c46262U,
+ 0xa8399191U, 0xa4319595U, 0x37d3e4e4U, 0x8bf27979U,
+ 0x32d5e7e7U, 0x438bc8c8U, 0x596e3737U, 0xb7da6d6dU,
+ 0x8c018d8dU, 0x64b1d5d5U, 0xd29c4e4eU, 0xe049a9a9U,
+ 0xb4d86c6cU, 0xfaac5656U, 0x07f3f4f4U, 0x25cfeaeaU,
+ 0xafca6565U, 0x8ef47a7aU, 0xe947aeaeU, 0x18100808U,
+ 0xd56fbabaU, 0x88f07878U, 0x6f4a2525U, 0x725c2e2eU,
+ 0x24381c1cU, 0xf157a6a6U, 0xc773b4b4U, 0x5197c6c6U,
+ 0x23cbe8e8U, 0x7ca1ddddU, 0x9ce87474U, 0x213e1f1fU,
+ 0xdd964b4bU, 0xdc61bdbdU, 0x860d8b8bU, 0x850f8a8aU,
+ 0x90e07070U, 0x427c3e3eU, 0xc471b5b5U, 0xaacc6666U,
+ 0xd8904848U, 0x05060303U, 0x01f7f6f6U, 0x121c0e0eU,
+ 0xa3c26161U, 0x5f6a3535U, 0xf9ae5757U, 0xd069b9b9U,
+ 0x91178686U, 0x5899c1c1U, 0x273a1d1dU, 0xb9279e9eU,
+ 0x38d9e1e1U, 0x13ebf8f8U, 0xb32b9898U, 0x33221111U,
+ 0xbbd26969U, 0x70a9d9d9U, 0x89078e8eU, 0xa7339494U,
+ 0xb62d9b9bU, 0x223c1e1eU, 0x92158787U, 0x20c9e9e9U,
+ 0x4987ceceU, 0xffaa5555U, 0x78502828U, 0x7aa5dfdfU,
+ 0x8f038c8cU, 0xf859a1a1U, 0x80098989U, 0x171a0d0dU,
+ 0xda65bfbfU, 0x31d7e6e6U, 0xc6844242U, 0xb8d06868U,
+ 0xc3824141U, 0xb0299999U, 0x775a2d2dU, 0x111e0f0fU,
+ 0xcb7bb0b0U, 0xfca85454U, 0xd66dbbbbU, 0x3a2c1616U,
+};
+static const u32 Te2[256] = {
+ 0x63a5c663U, 0x7c84f87cU, 0x7799ee77U, 0x7b8df67bU,
+ 0xf20dfff2U, 0x6bbdd66bU, 0x6fb1de6fU, 0xc55491c5U,
+ 0x30506030U, 0x01030201U, 0x67a9ce67U, 0x2b7d562bU,
+ 0xfe19e7feU, 0xd762b5d7U, 0xabe64dabU, 0x769aec76U,
+ 0xca458fcaU, 0x829d1f82U, 0xc94089c9U, 0x7d87fa7dU,
+ 0xfa15effaU, 0x59ebb259U, 0x47c98e47U, 0xf00bfbf0U,
+ 0xadec41adU, 0xd467b3d4U, 0xa2fd5fa2U, 0xafea45afU,
+ 0x9cbf239cU, 0xa4f753a4U, 0x7296e472U, 0xc05b9bc0U,
+ 0xb7c275b7U, 0xfd1ce1fdU, 0x93ae3d93U, 0x266a4c26U,
+ 0x365a6c36U, 0x3f417e3fU, 0xf702f5f7U, 0xcc4f83ccU,
+ 0x345c6834U, 0xa5f451a5U, 0xe534d1e5U, 0xf108f9f1U,
+ 0x7193e271U, 0xd873abd8U, 0x31536231U, 0x153f2a15U,
+ 0x040c0804U, 0xc75295c7U, 0x23654623U, 0xc35e9dc3U,
+ 0x18283018U, 0x96a13796U, 0x050f0a05U, 0x9ab52f9aU,
+ 0x07090e07U, 0x12362412U, 0x809b1b80U, 0xe23ddfe2U,
+ 0xeb26cdebU, 0x27694e27U, 0xb2cd7fb2U, 0x759fea75U,
+ 0x091b1209U, 0x839e1d83U, 0x2c74582cU, 0x1a2e341aU,
+ 0x1b2d361bU, 0x6eb2dc6eU, 0x5aeeb45aU, 0xa0fb5ba0U,
+ 0x52f6a452U, 0x3b4d763bU, 0xd661b7d6U, 0xb3ce7db3U,
+ 0x297b5229U, 0xe33edde3U, 0x2f715e2fU, 0x84971384U,
+ 0x53f5a653U, 0xd168b9d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xed2cc1edU,
+ 0x20604020U, 0xfc1fe3fcU, 0xb1c879b1U, 0x5bedb65bU,
+ 0x6abed46aU, 0xcb468dcbU, 0xbed967beU, 0x394b7239U,
+ 0x4ade944aU, 0x4cd4984cU, 0x58e8b058U, 0xcf4a85cfU,
+ 0xd06bbbd0U, 0xef2ac5efU, 0xaae54faaU, 0xfb16edfbU,
+ 0x43c58643U, 0x4dd79a4dU, 0x33556633U, 0x85941185U,
+ 0x45cf8a45U, 0xf910e9f9U, 0x02060402U, 0x7f81fe7fU,
+ 0x50f0a050U, 0x3c44783cU, 0x9fba259fU, 0xa8e34ba8U,
+ 0x51f3a251U, 0xa3fe5da3U, 0x40c08040U, 0x8f8a058fU,
+ 0x92ad3f92U, 0x9dbc219dU, 0x38487038U, 0xf504f1f5U,
+ 0xbcdf63bcU, 0xb6c177b6U, 0xda75afdaU, 0x21634221U,
+ 0x10302010U, 0xff1ae5ffU, 0xf30efdf3U, 0xd26dbfd2U,
+ 0xcd4c81cdU, 0x0c14180cU, 0x13352613U, 0xec2fc3ecU,
+ 0x5fe1be5fU, 0x97a23597U, 0x44cc8844U, 0x17392e17U,
+ 0xc45793c4U, 0xa7f255a7U, 0x7e82fc7eU, 0x3d477a3dU,
+ 0x64acc864U, 0x5de7ba5dU, 0x192b3219U, 0x7395e673U,
+ 0x60a0c060U, 0x81981981U, 0x4fd19e4fU, 0xdc7fa3dcU,
+ 0x22664422U, 0x2a7e542aU, 0x90ab3b90U, 0x88830b88U,
+ 0x46ca8c46U, 0xee29c7eeU, 0xb8d36bb8U, 0x143c2814U,
+ 0xde79a7deU, 0x5ee2bc5eU, 0x0b1d160bU, 0xdb76addbU,
+ 0xe03bdbe0U, 0x32566432U, 0x3a4e743aU, 0x0a1e140aU,
+ 0x49db9249U, 0x060a0c06U, 0x246c4824U, 0x5ce4b85cU,
+ 0xc25d9fc2U, 0xd36ebdd3U, 0xacef43acU, 0x62a6c462U,
+ 0x91a83991U, 0x95a43195U, 0xe437d3e4U, 0x798bf279U,
+ 0xe732d5e7U, 0xc8438bc8U, 0x37596e37U, 0x6db7da6dU,
+ 0x8d8c018dU, 0xd564b1d5U, 0x4ed29c4eU, 0xa9e049a9U,
+ 0x6cb4d86cU, 0x56faac56U, 0xf407f3f4U, 0xea25cfeaU,
+ 0x65afca65U, 0x7a8ef47aU, 0xaee947aeU, 0x08181008U,
+ 0xbad56fbaU, 0x7888f078U, 0x256f4a25U, 0x2e725c2eU,
+ 0x1c24381cU, 0xa6f157a6U, 0xb4c773b4U, 0xc65197c6U,
+ 0xe823cbe8U, 0xdd7ca1ddU, 0x749ce874U, 0x1f213e1fU,
+ 0x4bdd964bU, 0xbddc61bdU, 0x8b860d8bU, 0x8a850f8aU,
+ 0x7090e070U, 0x3e427c3eU, 0xb5c471b5U, 0x66aacc66U,
+ 0x48d89048U, 0x03050603U, 0xf601f7f6U, 0x0e121c0eU,
+ 0x61a3c261U, 0x355f6a35U, 0x57f9ae57U, 0xb9d069b9U,
+ 0x86911786U, 0xc15899c1U, 0x1d273a1dU, 0x9eb9279eU,
+ 0xe138d9e1U, 0xf813ebf8U, 0x98b32b98U, 0x11332211U,
+ 0x69bbd269U, 0xd970a9d9U, 0x8e89078eU, 0x94a73394U,
+ 0x9bb62d9bU, 0x1e223c1eU, 0x87921587U, 0xe920c9e9U,
+ 0xce4987ceU, 0x55ffaa55U, 0x28785028U, 0xdf7aa5dfU,
+ 0x8c8f038cU, 0xa1f859a1U, 0x89800989U, 0x0d171a0dU,
+ 0xbfda65bfU, 0xe631d7e6U, 0x42c68442U, 0x68b8d068U,
+ 0x41c38241U, 0x99b02999U, 0x2d775a2dU, 0x0f111e0fU,
+ 0xb0cb7bb0U, 0x54fca854U, 0xbbd66dbbU, 0x163a2c16U,
+};
+static const u32 Te3[256] = {
+ 0x6363a5c6U, 0x7c7c84f8U, 0x777799eeU, 0x7b7b8df6U,
+ 0xf2f20dffU, 0x6b6bbdd6U, 0x6f6fb1deU, 0xc5c55491U,
+ 0x30305060U, 0x01010302U, 0x6767a9ceU, 0x2b2b7d56U,
+ 0xfefe19e7U, 0xd7d762b5U, 0xababe64dU, 0x76769aecU,
+ 0xcaca458fU, 0x82829d1fU, 0xc9c94089U, 0x7d7d87faU,
+ 0xfafa15efU, 0x5959ebb2U, 0x4747c98eU, 0xf0f00bfbU,
+ 0xadadec41U, 0xd4d467b3U, 0xa2a2fd5fU, 0xafafea45U,
+ 0x9c9cbf23U, 0xa4a4f753U, 0x727296e4U, 0xc0c05b9bU,
+ 0xb7b7c275U, 0xfdfd1ce1U, 0x9393ae3dU, 0x26266a4cU,
+ 0x36365a6cU, 0x3f3f417eU, 0xf7f702f5U, 0xcccc4f83U,
+ 0x34345c68U, 0xa5a5f451U, 0xe5e534d1U, 0xf1f108f9U,
+ 0x717193e2U, 0xd8d873abU, 0x31315362U, 0x15153f2aU,
+ 0x04040c08U, 0xc7c75295U, 0x23236546U, 0xc3c35e9dU,
+ 0x18182830U, 0x9696a137U, 0x05050f0aU, 0x9a9ab52fU,
+ 0x0707090eU, 0x12123624U, 0x80809b1bU, 0xe2e23ddfU,
+ 0xebeb26cdU, 0x2727694eU, 0xb2b2cd7fU, 0x75759feaU,
+ 0x09091b12U, 0x83839e1dU, 0x2c2c7458U, 0x1a1a2e34U,
+ 0x1b1b2d36U, 0x6e6eb2dcU, 0x5a5aeeb4U, 0xa0a0fb5bU,
+ 0x5252f6a4U, 0x3b3b4d76U, 0xd6d661b7U, 0xb3b3ce7dU,
+ 0x29297b52U, 0xe3e33eddU, 0x2f2f715eU, 0x84849713U,
+ 0x5353f5a6U, 0xd1d168b9U, 0x00000000U, 0xeded2cc1U,
+ 0x20206040U, 0xfcfc1fe3U, 0xb1b1c879U, 0x5b5bedb6U,
+ 0x6a6abed4U, 0xcbcb468dU, 0xbebed967U, 0x39394b72U,
+ 0x4a4ade94U, 0x4c4cd498U, 0x5858e8b0U, 0xcfcf4a85U,
+ 0xd0d06bbbU, 0xefef2ac5U, 0xaaaae54fU, 0xfbfb16edU,
+ 0x4343c586U, 0x4d4dd79aU, 0x33335566U, 0x85859411U,
+ 0x4545cf8aU, 0xf9f910e9U, 0x02020604U, 0x7f7f81feU,
+ 0x5050f0a0U, 0x3c3c4478U, 0x9f9fba25U, 0xa8a8e34bU,
+ 0x5151f3a2U, 0xa3a3fe5dU, 0x4040c080U, 0x8f8f8a05U,
+ 0x9292ad3fU, 0x9d9dbc21U, 0x38384870U, 0xf5f504f1U,
+ 0xbcbcdf63U, 0xb6b6c177U, 0xdada75afU, 0x21216342U,
+ 0x10103020U, 0xffff1ae5U, 0xf3f30efdU, 0xd2d26dbfU,
+ 0xcdcd4c81U, 0x0c0c1418U, 0x13133526U, 0xecec2fc3U,
+ 0x5f5fe1beU, 0x9797a235U, 0x4444cc88U, 0x1717392eU,
+ 0xc4c45793U, 0xa7a7f255U, 0x7e7e82fcU, 0x3d3d477aU,
+ 0x6464acc8U, 0x5d5de7baU, 0x19192b32U, 0x737395e6U,
+ 0x6060a0c0U, 0x81819819U, 0x4f4fd19eU, 0xdcdc7fa3U,
+ 0x22226644U, 0x2a2a7e54U, 0x9090ab3bU, 0x8888830bU,
+ 0x4646ca8cU, 0xeeee29c7U, 0xb8b8d36bU, 0x14143c28U,
+ 0xdede79a7U, 0x5e5ee2bcU, 0x0b0b1d16U, 0xdbdb76adU,
+ 0xe0e03bdbU, 0x32325664U, 0x3a3a4e74U, 0x0a0a1e14U,
+ 0x4949db92U, 0x06060a0cU, 0x24246c48U, 0x5c5ce4b8U,
+ 0xc2c25d9fU, 0xd3d36ebdU, 0xacacef43U, 0x6262a6c4U,
+ 0x9191a839U, 0x9595a431U, 0xe4e437d3U, 0x79798bf2U,
+ 0xe7e732d5U, 0xc8c8438bU, 0x3737596eU, 0x6d6db7daU,
+ 0x8d8d8c01U, 0xd5d564b1U, 0x4e4ed29cU, 0xa9a9e049U,
+ 0x6c6cb4d8U, 0x5656faacU, 0xf4f407f3U, 0xeaea25cfU,
+ 0x6565afcaU, 0x7a7a8ef4U, 0xaeaee947U, 0x08081810U,
+ 0xbabad56fU, 0x787888f0U, 0x25256f4aU, 0x2e2e725cU,
+ 0x1c1c2438U, 0xa6a6f157U, 0xb4b4c773U, 0xc6c65197U,
+ 0xe8e823cbU, 0xdddd7ca1U, 0x74749ce8U, 0x1f1f213eU,
+ 0x4b4bdd96U, 0xbdbddc61U, 0x8b8b860dU, 0x8a8a850fU,
+ 0x707090e0U, 0x3e3e427cU, 0xb5b5c471U, 0x6666aaccU,
+ 0x4848d890U, 0x03030506U, 0xf6f601f7U, 0x0e0e121cU,
+ 0x6161a3c2U, 0x35355f6aU, 0x5757f9aeU, 0xb9b9d069U,
+ 0x86869117U, 0xc1c15899U, 0x1d1d273aU, 0x9e9eb927U,
+ 0xe1e138d9U, 0xf8f813ebU, 0x9898b32bU, 0x11113322U,
+ 0x6969bbd2U, 0xd9d970a9U, 0x8e8e8907U, 0x9494a733U,
+ 0x9b9bb62dU, 0x1e1e223cU, 0x87879215U, 0xe9e920c9U,
+ 0xcece4987U, 0x5555ffaaU, 0x28287850U, 0xdfdf7aa5U,
+ 0x8c8c8f03U, 0xa1a1f859U, 0x89898009U, 0x0d0d171aU,
+ 0xbfbfda65U, 0xe6e631d7U, 0x4242c684U, 0x6868b8d0U,
+ 0x4141c382U, 0x9999b029U, 0x2d2d775aU, 0x0f0f111eU,
+ 0xb0b0cb7bU, 0x5454fca8U, 0xbbbbd66dU, 0x16163a2cU,
+};
+#if 0
+static const u32 Td0[256] = {
+ 0x51f4a750U, 0x7e416553U, 0x1a17a4c3U, 0x3a275e96U,
+ 0x3bab6bcbU, 0x1f9d45f1U, 0xacfa58abU, 0x4be30393U,
+ 0x2030fa55U, 0xad766df6U, 0x88cc7691U, 0xf5024c25U,
+ 0x4fe5d7fcU, 0xc52acbd7U, 0x26354480U, 0xb562a38fU,
+ 0xdeb15a49U, 0x25ba1b67U, 0x45ea0e98U, 0x5dfec0e1U,
+ 0xc32f7502U, 0x814cf012U, 0x8d4697a3U, 0x6bd3f9c6U,
+ 0x038f5fe7U, 0x15929c95U, 0xbf6d7aebU, 0x955259daU,
+ 0xd4be832dU, 0x587421d3U, 0x49e06929U, 0x8ec9c844U,
+ 0x75c2896aU, 0xf48e7978U, 0x99583e6bU, 0x27b971ddU,
+ 0xbee14fb6U, 0xf088ad17U, 0xc920ac66U, 0x7dce3ab4U,
+ 0x63df4a18U, 0xe51a3182U, 0x97513360U, 0x62537f45U,
+ 0xb16477e0U, 0xbb6bae84U, 0xfe81a01cU, 0xf9082b94U,
+ 0x70486858U, 0x8f45fd19U, 0x94de6c87U, 0x527bf8b7U,
+ 0xab73d323U, 0x724b02e2U, 0xe31f8f57U, 0x6655ab2aU,
+ 0xb2eb2807U, 0x2fb5c203U, 0x86c57b9aU, 0xd33708a5U,
+ 0x302887f2U, 0x23bfa5b2U, 0x02036abaU, 0xed16825cU,
+ 0x8acf1c2bU, 0xa779b492U, 0xf307f2f0U, 0x4e69e2a1U,
+ 0x65daf4cdU, 0x0605bed5U, 0xd134621fU, 0xc4a6fe8aU,
+ 0x342e539dU, 0xa2f355a0U, 0x058ae132U, 0xa4f6eb75U,
+ 0x0b83ec39U, 0x4060efaaU, 0x5e719f06U, 0xbd6e1051U,
+ 0x3e218af9U, 0x96dd063dU, 0xdd3e05aeU, 0x4de6bd46U,
+ 0x91548db5U, 0x71c45d05U, 0x0406d46fU, 0x605015ffU,
+ 0x1998fb24U, 0xd6bde997U, 0x894043ccU, 0x67d99e77U,
+ 0xb0e842bdU, 0x07898b88U, 0xe7195b38U, 0x79c8eedbU,
+ 0xa17c0a47U, 0x7c420fe9U, 0xf8841ec9U, 0x00000000U,
+ 0x09808683U, 0x322bed48U, 0x1e1170acU, 0x6c5a724eU,
+ 0xfd0efffbU, 0x0f853856U, 0x3daed51eU, 0x362d3927U,
+ 0x0a0fd964U, 0x685ca621U, 0x9b5b54d1U, 0x24362e3aU,
+ 0x0c0a67b1U, 0x9357e70fU, 0xb4ee96d2U, 0x1b9b919eU,
+ 0x80c0c54fU, 0x61dc20a2U, 0x5a774b69U, 0x1c121a16U,
+ 0xe293ba0aU, 0xc0a02ae5U, 0x3c22e043U, 0x121b171dU,
+ 0x0e090d0bU, 0xf28bc7adU, 0x2db6a8b9U, 0x141ea9c8U,
+ 0x57f11985U, 0xaf75074cU, 0xee99ddbbU, 0xa37f60fdU,
+ 0xf701269fU, 0x5c72f5bcU, 0x44663bc5U, 0x5bfb7e34U,
+ 0x8b432976U, 0xcb23c6dcU, 0xb6edfc68U, 0xb8e4f163U,
+ 0xd731dccaU, 0x42638510U, 0x13972240U, 0x84c61120U,
+ 0x854a247dU, 0xd2bb3df8U, 0xaef93211U, 0xc729a16dU,
+ 0x1d9e2f4bU, 0xdcb230f3U, 0x0d8652ecU, 0x77c1e3d0U,
+ 0x2bb3166cU, 0xa970b999U, 0x119448faU, 0x47e96422U,
+ 0xa8fc8cc4U, 0xa0f03f1aU, 0x567d2cd8U, 0x223390efU,
+ 0x87494ec7U, 0xd938d1c1U, 0x8ccaa2feU, 0x98d40b36U,
+ 0xa6f581cfU, 0xa57ade28U, 0xdab78e26U, 0x3fadbfa4U,
+ 0x2c3a9de4U, 0x5078920dU, 0x6a5fcc9bU, 0x547e4662U,
+ 0xf68d13c2U, 0x90d8b8e8U, 0x2e39f75eU, 0x82c3aff5U,
+ 0x9f5d80beU, 0x69d0937cU, 0x6fd52da9U, 0xcf2512b3U,
+ 0xc8ac993bU, 0x10187da7U, 0xe89c636eU, 0xdb3bbb7bU,
+ 0xcd267809U, 0x6e5918f4U, 0xec9ab701U, 0x834f9aa8U,
+ 0xe6956e65U, 0xaaffe67eU, 0x21bccf08U, 0xef15e8e6U,
+ 0xbae79bd9U, 0x4a6f36ceU, 0xea9f09d4U, 0x29b07cd6U,
+ 0x31a4b2afU, 0x2a3f2331U, 0xc6a59430U, 0x35a266c0U,
+ 0x744ebc37U, 0xfc82caa6U, 0xe090d0b0U, 0x33a7d815U,
+ 0xf104984aU, 0x41ecdaf7U, 0x7fcd500eU, 0x1791f62fU,
+ 0x764dd68dU, 0x43efb04dU, 0xccaa4d54U, 0xe49604dfU,
+ 0x9ed1b5e3U, 0x4c6a881bU, 0xc12c1fb8U, 0x4665517fU,
+ 0x9d5eea04U, 0x018c355dU, 0xfa877473U, 0xfb0b412eU,
+ 0xb3671d5aU, 0x92dbd252U, 0xe9105633U, 0x6dd64713U,
+ 0x9ad7618cU, 0x37a10c7aU, 0x59f8148eU, 0xeb133c89U,
+ 0xcea927eeU, 0xb761c935U, 0xe11ce5edU, 0x7a47b13cU,
+ 0x9cd2df59U, 0x55f2733fU, 0x1814ce79U, 0x73c737bfU,
+ 0x53f7cdeaU, 0x5ffdaa5bU, 0xdf3d6f14U, 0x7844db86U,
+ 0xcaaff381U, 0xb968c43eU, 0x3824342cU, 0xc2a3405fU,
+ 0x161dc372U, 0xbce2250cU, 0x283c498bU, 0xff0d9541U,
+ 0x39a80171U, 0x080cb3deU, 0xd8b4e49cU, 0x6456c190U,
+ 0x7bcb8461U, 0xd532b670U, 0x486c5c74U, 0xd0b85742U,
+};
+static const u32 Td1[256] = {
+ 0x5051f4a7U, 0x537e4165U, 0xc31a17a4U, 0x963a275eU,
+ 0xcb3bab6bU, 0xf11f9d45U, 0xabacfa58U, 0x934be303U,
+ 0x552030faU, 0xf6ad766dU, 0x9188cc76U, 0x25f5024cU,
+ 0xfc4fe5d7U, 0xd7c52acbU, 0x80263544U, 0x8fb562a3U,
+ 0x49deb15aU, 0x6725ba1bU, 0x9845ea0eU, 0xe15dfec0U,
+ 0x02c32f75U, 0x12814cf0U, 0xa38d4697U, 0xc66bd3f9U,
+ 0xe7038f5fU, 0x9515929cU, 0xebbf6d7aU, 0xda955259U,
+ 0x2dd4be83U, 0xd3587421U, 0x2949e069U, 0x448ec9c8U,
+ 0x6a75c289U, 0x78f48e79U, 0x6b99583eU, 0xdd27b971U,
+ 0xb6bee14fU, 0x17f088adU, 0x66c920acU, 0xb47dce3aU,
+ 0x1863df4aU, 0x82e51a31U, 0x60975133U, 0x4562537fU,
+ 0xe0b16477U, 0x84bb6baeU, 0x1cfe81a0U, 0x94f9082bU,
+ 0x58704868U, 0x198f45fdU, 0x8794de6cU, 0xb7527bf8U,
+ 0x23ab73d3U, 0xe2724b02U, 0x57e31f8fU, 0x2a6655abU,
+ 0x07b2eb28U, 0x032fb5c2U, 0x9a86c57bU, 0xa5d33708U,
+ 0xf2302887U, 0xb223bfa5U, 0xba02036aU, 0x5ced1682U,
+ 0x2b8acf1cU, 0x92a779b4U, 0xf0f307f2U, 0xa14e69e2U,
+ 0xcd65daf4U, 0xd50605beU, 0x1fd13462U, 0x8ac4a6feU,
+ 0x9d342e53U, 0xa0a2f355U, 0x32058ae1U, 0x75a4f6ebU,
+ 0x390b83ecU, 0xaa4060efU, 0x065e719fU, 0x51bd6e10U,
+ 0xf93e218aU, 0x3d96dd06U, 0xaedd3e05U, 0x464de6bdU,
+ 0xb591548dU, 0x0571c45dU, 0x6f0406d4U, 0xff605015U,
+ 0x241998fbU, 0x97d6bde9U, 0xcc894043U, 0x7767d99eU,
+ 0xbdb0e842U, 0x8807898bU, 0x38e7195bU, 0xdb79c8eeU,
+ 0x47a17c0aU, 0xe97c420fU, 0xc9f8841eU, 0x00000000U,
+ 0x83098086U, 0x48322bedU, 0xac1e1170U, 0x4e6c5a72U,
+ 0xfbfd0effU, 0x560f8538U, 0x1e3daed5U, 0x27362d39U,
+ 0x640a0fd9U, 0x21685ca6U, 0xd19b5b54U, 0x3a24362eU,
+ 0xb10c0a67U, 0x0f9357e7U, 0xd2b4ee96U, 0x9e1b9b91U,
+ 0x4f80c0c5U, 0xa261dc20U, 0x695a774bU, 0x161c121aU,
+ 0x0ae293baU, 0xe5c0a02aU, 0x433c22e0U, 0x1d121b17U,
+ 0x0b0e090dU, 0xadf28bc7U, 0xb92db6a8U, 0xc8141ea9U,
+ 0x8557f119U, 0x4caf7507U, 0xbbee99ddU, 0xfda37f60U,
+ 0x9ff70126U, 0xbc5c72f5U, 0xc544663bU, 0x345bfb7eU,
+ 0x768b4329U, 0xdccb23c6U, 0x68b6edfcU, 0x63b8e4f1U,
+ 0xcad731dcU, 0x10426385U, 0x40139722U, 0x2084c611U,
+ 0x7d854a24U, 0xf8d2bb3dU, 0x11aef932U, 0x6dc729a1U,
+ 0x4b1d9e2fU, 0xf3dcb230U, 0xec0d8652U, 0xd077c1e3U,
+ 0x6c2bb316U, 0x99a970b9U, 0xfa119448U, 0x2247e964U,
+ 0xc4a8fc8cU, 0x1aa0f03fU, 0xd8567d2cU, 0xef223390U,
+ 0xc787494eU, 0xc1d938d1U, 0xfe8ccaa2U, 0x3698d40bU,
+ 0xcfa6f581U, 0x28a57adeU, 0x26dab78eU, 0xa43fadbfU,
+ 0xe42c3a9dU, 0x0d507892U, 0x9b6a5fccU, 0x62547e46U,
+ 0xc2f68d13U, 0xe890d8b8U, 0x5e2e39f7U, 0xf582c3afU,
+ 0xbe9f5d80U, 0x7c69d093U, 0xa96fd52dU, 0xb3cf2512U,
+ 0x3bc8ac99U, 0xa710187dU, 0x6ee89c63U, 0x7bdb3bbbU,
+ 0x09cd2678U, 0xf46e5918U, 0x01ec9ab7U, 0xa8834f9aU,
+ 0x65e6956eU, 0x7eaaffe6U, 0x0821bccfU, 0xe6ef15e8U,
+ 0xd9bae79bU, 0xce4a6f36U, 0xd4ea9f09U, 0xd629b07cU,
+ 0xaf31a4b2U, 0x312a3f23U, 0x30c6a594U, 0xc035a266U,
+ 0x37744ebcU, 0xa6fc82caU, 0xb0e090d0U, 0x1533a7d8U,
+ 0x4af10498U, 0xf741ecdaU, 0x0e7fcd50U, 0x2f1791f6U,
+ 0x8d764dd6U, 0x4d43efb0U, 0x54ccaa4dU, 0xdfe49604U,
+ 0xe39ed1b5U, 0x1b4c6a88U, 0xb8c12c1fU, 0x7f466551U,
+ 0x049d5eeaU, 0x5d018c35U, 0x73fa8774U, 0x2efb0b41U,
+ 0x5ab3671dU, 0x5292dbd2U, 0x33e91056U, 0x136dd647U,
+ 0x8c9ad761U, 0x7a37a10cU, 0x8e59f814U, 0x89eb133cU,
+ 0xeecea927U, 0x35b761c9U, 0xede11ce5U, 0x3c7a47b1U,
+ 0x599cd2dfU, 0x3f55f273U, 0x791814ceU, 0xbf73c737U,
+ 0xea53f7cdU, 0x5b5ffdaaU, 0x14df3d6fU, 0x867844dbU,
+ 0x81caaff3U, 0x3eb968c4U, 0x2c382434U, 0x5fc2a340U,
+ 0x72161dc3U, 0x0cbce225U, 0x8b283c49U, 0x41ff0d95U,
+ 0x7139a801U, 0xde080cb3U, 0x9cd8b4e4U, 0x906456c1U,
+ 0x617bcb84U, 0x70d532b6U, 0x74486c5cU, 0x42d0b857U,
+};
+static const u32 Td2[256] = {
+ 0xa75051f4U, 0x65537e41U, 0xa4c31a17U, 0x5e963a27U,
+ 0x6bcb3babU, 0x45f11f9dU, 0x58abacfaU, 0x03934be3U,
+ 0xfa552030U, 0x6df6ad76U, 0x769188ccU, 0x4c25f502U,
+ 0xd7fc4fe5U, 0xcbd7c52aU, 0x44802635U, 0xa38fb562U,
+ 0x5a49deb1U, 0x1b6725baU, 0x0e9845eaU, 0xc0e15dfeU,
+ 0x7502c32fU, 0xf012814cU, 0x97a38d46U, 0xf9c66bd3U,
+ 0x5fe7038fU, 0x9c951592U, 0x7aebbf6dU, 0x59da9552U,
+ 0x832dd4beU, 0x21d35874U, 0x692949e0U, 0xc8448ec9U,
+ 0x896a75c2U, 0x7978f48eU, 0x3e6b9958U, 0x71dd27b9U,
+ 0x4fb6bee1U, 0xad17f088U, 0xac66c920U, 0x3ab47dceU,
+ 0x4a1863dfU, 0x3182e51aU, 0x33609751U, 0x7f456253U,
+ 0x77e0b164U, 0xae84bb6bU, 0xa01cfe81U, 0x2b94f908U,
+ 0x68587048U, 0xfd198f45U, 0x6c8794deU, 0xf8b7527bU,
+ 0xd323ab73U, 0x02e2724bU, 0x8f57e31fU, 0xab2a6655U,
+ 0x2807b2ebU, 0xc2032fb5U, 0x7b9a86c5U, 0x08a5d337U,
+ 0x87f23028U, 0xa5b223bfU, 0x6aba0203U, 0x825ced16U,
+ 0x1c2b8acfU, 0xb492a779U, 0xf2f0f307U, 0xe2a14e69U,
+ 0xf4cd65daU, 0xbed50605U, 0x621fd134U, 0xfe8ac4a6U,
+ 0x539d342eU, 0x55a0a2f3U, 0xe132058aU, 0xeb75a4f6U,
+ 0xec390b83U, 0xefaa4060U, 0x9f065e71U, 0x1051bd6eU,
+ 0x8af93e21U, 0x063d96ddU, 0x05aedd3eU, 0xbd464de6U,
+ 0x8db59154U, 0x5d0571c4U, 0xd46f0406U, 0x15ff6050U,
+ 0xfb241998U, 0xe997d6bdU, 0x43cc8940U, 0x9e7767d9U,
+ 0x42bdb0e8U, 0x8b880789U, 0x5b38e719U, 0xeedb79c8U,
+ 0x0a47a17cU, 0x0fe97c42U, 0x1ec9f884U, 0x00000000U,
+ 0x86830980U, 0xed48322bU, 0x70ac1e11U, 0x724e6c5aU,
+ 0xfffbfd0eU, 0x38560f85U, 0xd51e3daeU, 0x3927362dU,
+ 0xd9640a0fU, 0xa621685cU, 0x54d19b5bU, 0x2e3a2436U,
+ 0x67b10c0aU, 0xe70f9357U, 0x96d2b4eeU, 0x919e1b9bU,
+ 0xc54f80c0U, 0x20a261dcU, 0x4b695a77U, 0x1a161c12U,
+ 0xba0ae293U, 0x2ae5c0a0U, 0xe0433c22U, 0x171d121bU,
+ 0x0d0b0e09U, 0xc7adf28bU, 0xa8b92db6U, 0xa9c8141eU,
+ 0x198557f1U, 0x074caf75U, 0xddbbee99U, 0x60fda37fU,
+ 0x269ff701U, 0xf5bc5c72U, 0x3bc54466U, 0x7e345bfbU,
+ 0x29768b43U, 0xc6dccb23U, 0xfc68b6edU, 0xf163b8e4U,
+ 0xdccad731U, 0x85104263U, 0x22401397U, 0x112084c6U,
+ 0x247d854aU, 0x3df8d2bbU, 0x3211aef9U, 0xa16dc729U,
+ 0x2f4b1d9eU, 0x30f3dcb2U, 0x52ec0d86U, 0xe3d077c1U,
+ 0x166c2bb3U, 0xb999a970U, 0x48fa1194U, 0x642247e9U,
+ 0x8cc4a8fcU, 0x3f1aa0f0U, 0x2cd8567dU, 0x90ef2233U,
+ 0x4ec78749U, 0xd1c1d938U, 0xa2fe8ccaU, 0x0b3698d4U,
+ 0x81cfa6f5U, 0xde28a57aU, 0x8e26dab7U, 0xbfa43fadU,
+ 0x9de42c3aU, 0x920d5078U, 0xcc9b6a5fU, 0x4662547eU,
+ 0x13c2f68dU, 0xb8e890d8U, 0xf75e2e39U, 0xaff582c3U,
+ 0x80be9f5dU, 0x937c69d0U, 0x2da96fd5U, 0x12b3cf25U,
+ 0x993bc8acU, 0x7da71018U, 0x636ee89cU, 0xbb7bdb3bU,
+ 0x7809cd26U, 0x18f46e59U, 0xb701ec9aU, 0x9aa8834fU,
+ 0x6e65e695U, 0xe67eaaffU, 0xcf0821bcU, 0xe8e6ef15U,
+ 0x9bd9bae7U, 0x36ce4a6fU, 0x09d4ea9fU, 0x7cd629b0U,
+ 0xb2af31a4U, 0x23312a3fU, 0x9430c6a5U, 0x66c035a2U,
+ 0xbc37744eU, 0xcaa6fc82U, 0xd0b0e090U, 0xd81533a7U,
+ 0x984af104U, 0xdaf741ecU, 0x500e7fcdU, 0xf62f1791U,
+ 0xd68d764dU, 0xb04d43efU, 0x4d54ccaaU, 0x04dfe496U,
+ 0xb5e39ed1U, 0x881b4c6aU, 0x1fb8c12cU, 0x517f4665U,
+ 0xea049d5eU, 0x355d018cU, 0x7473fa87U, 0x412efb0bU,
+ 0x1d5ab367U, 0xd25292dbU, 0x5633e910U, 0x47136dd6U,
+ 0x618c9ad7U, 0x0c7a37a1U, 0x148e59f8U, 0x3c89eb13U,
+ 0x27eecea9U, 0xc935b761U, 0xe5ede11cU, 0xb13c7a47U,
+ 0xdf599cd2U, 0x733f55f2U, 0xce791814U, 0x37bf73c7U,
+ 0xcdea53f7U, 0xaa5b5ffdU, 0x6f14df3dU, 0xdb867844U,
+ 0xf381caafU, 0xc43eb968U, 0x342c3824U, 0x405fc2a3U,
+ 0xc372161dU, 0x250cbce2U, 0x498b283cU, 0x9541ff0dU,
+ 0x017139a8U, 0xb3de080cU, 0xe49cd8b4U, 0xc1906456U,
+ 0x84617bcbU, 0xb670d532U, 0x5c74486cU, 0x5742d0b8U,
+};
+static const u32 Td3[256] = {
+ 0xf4a75051U, 0x4165537eU, 0x17a4c31aU, 0x275e963aU,
+ 0xab6bcb3bU, 0x9d45f11fU, 0xfa58abacU, 0xe303934bU,
+ 0x30fa5520U, 0x766df6adU, 0xcc769188U, 0x024c25f5U,
+ 0xe5d7fc4fU, 0x2acbd7c5U, 0x35448026U, 0x62a38fb5U,
+ 0xb15a49deU, 0xba1b6725U, 0xea0e9845U, 0xfec0e15dU,
+ 0x2f7502c3U, 0x4cf01281U, 0x4697a38dU, 0xd3f9c66bU,
+ 0x8f5fe703U, 0x929c9515U, 0x6d7aebbfU, 0x5259da95U,
+ 0xbe832dd4U, 0x7421d358U, 0xe0692949U, 0xc9c8448eU,
+ 0xc2896a75U, 0x8e7978f4U, 0x583e6b99U, 0xb971dd27U,
+ 0xe14fb6beU, 0x88ad17f0U, 0x20ac66c9U, 0xce3ab47dU,
+ 0xdf4a1863U, 0x1a3182e5U, 0x51336097U, 0x537f4562U,
+ 0x6477e0b1U, 0x6bae84bbU, 0x81a01cfeU, 0x082b94f9U,
+ 0x48685870U, 0x45fd198fU, 0xde6c8794U, 0x7bf8b752U,
+ 0x73d323abU, 0x4b02e272U, 0x1f8f57e3U, 0x55ab2a66U,
+ 0xeb2807b2U, 0xb5c2032fU, 0xc57b9a86U, 0x3708a5d3U,
+ 0x2887f230U, 0xbfa5b223U, 0x036aba02U, 0x16825cedU,
+ 0xcf1c2b8aU, 0x79b492a7U, 0x07f2f0f3U, 0x69e2a14eU,
+ 0xdaf4cd65U, 0x05bed506U, 0x34621fd1U, 0xa6fe8ac4U,
+ 0x2e539d34U, 0xf355a0a2U, 0x8ae13205U, 0xf6eb75a4U,
+ 0x83ec390bU, 0x60efaa40U, 0x719f065eU, 0x6e1051bdU,
+ 0x218af93eU, 0xdd063d96U, 0x3e05aeddU, 0xe6bd464dU,
+ 0x548db591U, 0xc45d0571U, 0x06d46f04U, 0x5015ff60U,
+ 0x98fb2419U, 0xbde997d6U, 0x4043cc89U, 0xd99e7767U,
+ 0xe842bdb0U, 0x898b8807U, 0x195b38e7U, 0xc8eedb79U,
+ 0x7c0a47a1U, 0x420fe97cU, 0x841ec9f8U, 0x00000000U,
+ 0x80868309U, 0x2bed4832U, 0x1170ac1eU, 0x5a724e6cU,
+ 0x0efffbfdU, 0x8538560fU, 0xaed51e3dU, 0x2d392736U,
+ 0x0fd9640aU, 0x5ca62168U, 0x5b54d19bU, 0x362e3a24U,
+ 0x0a67b10cU, 0x57e70f93U, 0xee96d2b4U, 0x9b919e1bU,
+ 0xc0c54f80U, 0xdc20a261U, 0x774b695aU, 0x121a161cU,
+ 0x93ba0ae2U, 0xa02ae5c0U, 0x22e0433cU, 0x1b171d12U,
+ 0x090d0b0eU, 0x8bc7adf2U, 0xb6a8b92dU, 0x1ea9c814U,
+ 0xf1198557U, 0x75074cafU, 0x99ddbbeeU, 0x7f60fda3U,
+ 0x01269ff7U, 0x72f5bc5cU, 0x663bc544U, 0xfb7e345bU,
+ 0x4329768bU, 0x23c6dccbU, 0xedfc68b6U, 0xe4f163b8U,
+ 0x31dccad7U, 0x63851042U, 0x97224013U, 0xc6112084U,
+ 0x4a247d85U, 0xbb3df8d2U, 0xf93211aeU, 0x29a16dc7U,
+ 0x9e2f4b1dU, 0xb230f3dcU, 0x8652ec0dU, 0xc1e3d077U,
+ 0xb3166c2bU, 0x70b999a9U, 0x9448fa11U, 0xe9642247U,
+ 0xfc8cc4a8U, 0xf03f1aa0U, 0x7d2cd856U, 0x3390ef22U,
+ 0x494ec787U, 0x38d1c1d9U, 0xcaa2fe8cU, 0xd40b3698U,
+ 0xf581cfa6U, 0x7ade28a5U, 0xb78e26daU, 0xadbfa43fU,
+ 0x3a9de42cU, 0x78920d50U, 0x5fcc9b6aU, 0x7e466254U,
+ 0x8d13c2f6U, 0xd8b8e890U, 0x39f75e2eU, 0xc3aff582U,
+ 0x5d80be9fU, 0xd0937c69U, 0xd52da96fU, 0x2512b3cfU,
+ 0xac993bc8U, 0x187da710U, 0x9c636ee8U, 0x3bbb7bdbU,
+ 0x267809cdU, 0x5918f46eU, 0x9ab701ecU, 0x4f9aa883U,
+ 0x956e65e6U, 0xffe67eaaU, 0xbccf0821U, 0x15e8e6efU,
+ 0xe79bd9baU, 0x6f36ce4aU, 0x9f09d4eaU, 0xb07cd629U,
+ 0xa4b2af31U, 0x3f23312aU, 0xa59430c6U, 0xa266c035U,
+ 0x4ebc3774U, 0x82caa6fcU, 0x90d0b0e0U, 0xa7d81533U,
+ 0x04984af1U, 0xecdaf741U, 0xcd500e7fU, 0x91f62f17U,
+ 0x4dd68d76U, 0xefb04d43U, 0xaa4d54ccU, 0x9604dfe4U,
+ 0xd1b5e39eU, 0x6a881b4cU, 0x2c1fb8c1U, 0x65517f46U,
+ 0x5eea049dU, 0x8c355d01U, 0x877473faU, 0x0b412efbU,
+ 0x671d5ab3U, 0xdbd25292U, 0x105633e9U, 0xd647136dU,
+ 0xd7618c9aU, 0xa10c7a37U, 0xf8148e59U, 0x133c89ebU,
+ 0xa927eeceU, 0x61c935b7U, 0x1ce5ede1U, 0x47b13c7aU,
+ 0xd2df599cU, 0xf2733f55U, 0x14ce7918U, 0xc737bf73U,
+ 0xf7cdea53U, 0xfdaa5b5fU, 0x3d6f14dfU, 0x44db8678U,
+ 0xaff381caU, 0x68c43eb9U, 0x24342c38U, 0xa3405fc2U,
+ 0x1dc37216U, 0xe2250cbcU, 0x3c498b28U, 0x0d9541ffU,
+ 0xa8017139U, 0x0cb3de08U, 0xb4e49cd8U, 0x56c19064U,
+ 0xcb84617bU, 0x32b670d5U, 0x6c5c7448U, 0xb85742d0U,
+};
+static const u8 Td4[256] = {
+ 0x52U, 0x09U, 0x6aU, 0xd5U, 0x30U, 0x36U, 0xa5U, 0x38U,
+ 0xbfU, 0x40U, 0xa3U, 0x9eU, 0x81U, 0xf3U, 0xd7U, 0xfbU,
+ 0x7cU, 0xe3U, 0x39U, 0x82U, 0x9bU, 0x2fU, 0xffU, 0x87U,
+ 0x34U, 0x8eU, 0x43U, 0x44U, 0xc4U, 0xdeU, 0xe9U, 0xcbU,
+ 0x54U, 0x7bU, 0x94U, 0x32U, 0xa6U, 0xc2U, 0x23U, 0x3dU,
+ 0xeeU, 0x4cU, 0x95U, 0x0bU, 0x42U, 0xfaU, 0xc3U, 0x4eU,
+ 0x08U, 0x2eU, 0xa1U, 0x66U, 0x28U, 0xd9U, 0x24U, 0xb2U,
+ 0x76U, 0x5bU, 0xa2U, 0x49U, 0x6dU, 0x8bU, 0xd1U, 0x25U,
+ 0x72U, 0xf8U, 0xf6U, 0x64U, 0x86U, 0x68U, 0x98U, 0x16U,
+ 0xd4U, 0xa4U, 0x5cU, 0xccU, 0x5dU, 0x65U, 0xb6U, 0x92U,
+ 0x6cU, 0x70U, 0x48U, 0x50U, 0xfdU, 0xedU, 0xb9U, 0xdaU,
+ 0x5eU, 0x15U, 0x46U, 0x57U, 0xa7U, 0x8dU, 0x9dU, 0x84U,
+ 0x90U, 0xd8U, 0xabU, 0x00U, 0x8cU, 0xbcU, 0xd3U, 0x0aU,
+ 0xf7U, 0xe4U, 0x58U, 0x05U, 0xb8U, 0xb3U, 0x45U, 0x06U,
+ 0xd0U, 0x2cU, 0x1eU, 0x8fU, 0xcaU, 0x3fU, 0x0fU, 0x02U,
+ 0xc1U, 0xafU, 0xbdU, 0x03U, 0x01U, 0x13U, 0x8aU, 0x6bU,
+ 0x3aU, 0x91U, 0x11U, 0x41U, 0x4fU, 0x67U, 0xdcU, 0xeaU,
+ 0x97U, 0xf2U, 0xcfU, 0xceU, 0xf0U, 0xb4U, 0xe6U, 0x73U,
+ 0x96U, 0xacU, 0x74U, 0x22U, 0xe7U, 0xadU, 0x35U, 0x85U,
+ 0xe2U, 0xf9U, 0x37U, 0xe8U, 0x1cU, 0x75U, 0xdfU, 0x6eU,
+ 0x47U, 0xf1U, 0x1aU, 0x71U, 0x1dU, 0x29U, 0xc5U, 0x89U,
+ 0x6fU, 0xb7U, 0x62U, 0x0eU, 0xaaU, 0x18U, 0xbeU, 0x1bU,
+ 0xfcU, 0x56U, 0x3eU, 0x4bU, 0xc6U, 0xd2U, 0x79U, 0x20U,
+ 0x9aU, 0xdbU, 0xc0U, 0xfeU, 0x78U, 0xcdU, 0x5aU, 0xf4U,
+ 0x1fU, 0xddU, 0xa8U, 0x33U, 0x88U, 0x07U, 0xc7U, 0x31U,
+ 0xb1U, 0x12U, 0x10U, 0x59U, 0x27U, 0x80U, 0xecU, 0x5fU,
+ 0x60U, 0x51U, 0x7fU, 0xa9U, 0x19U, 0xb5U, 0x4aU, 0x0dU,
+ 0x2dU, 0xe5U, 0x7aU, 0x9fU, 0x93U, 0xc9U, 0x9cU, 0xefU,
+ 0xa0U, 0xe0U, 0x3bU, 0x4dU, 0xaeU, 0x2aU, 0xf5U, 0xb0U,
+ 0xc8U, 0xebU, 0xbbU, 0x3cU, 0x83U, 0x53U, 0x99U, 0x61U,
+ 0x17U, 0x2bU, 0x04U, 0x7eU, 0xbaU, 0x77U, 0xd6U, 0x26U,
+ 0xe1U, 0x69U, 0x14U, 0x63U, 0x55U, 0x21U, 0x0cU, 0x7dU,
+};
+#endif
+static const u32 rcon[] = {
+ 0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000,
+ 0x10000000, 0x20000000, 0x40000000, 0x80000000,
+ 0x1B000000, 0x36000000, /* for 128-bit blocks, Rijndael never uses more than 10 rcon values */
+};
+
+#define GETU32(pt) (((u32)(pt)[0] << 24) ^ ((u32)(pt)[1] << 16) ^ ((u32)(pt)[2] << 8) ^ ((u32)(pt)[3]))
+#define PUTU32(ct, st) { (ct)[0] = (u8)((st) >> 24); (ct)[1] = (u8)((st) >> 16); (ct)[2] = (u8)((st) >> 8); (ct)[3] = (u8)(st); }
+
+/**
+ * Expand the cipher key into the encryption key schedule.
+ *
+ * @return the number of rounds for the given cipher key size.
+ */
+int
+rijndaelKeySetupEnc(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ u32 temp;
+
+ rk[0] = GETU32(cipherKey );
+ rk[1] = GETU32(cipherKey + 4);
+ rk[2] = GETU32(cipherKey + 8);
+ rk[3] = GETU32(cipherKey + 12);
+ if (keyBits == 128) {
+ for (;;) {
+ temp = rk[3];
+ rk[4] = rk[0] ^
+ (Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
+ (Te3[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+ (Te0[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+ (Te1[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^
+ rcon[i];
+ rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4];
+ rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5];
+ rk[7] = rk[3] ^ rk[6];
+ if (++i == 10) {
+ return 10;
+ }
+ rk += 4;
+ }
+ }
+ rk[4] = GETU32(cipherKey + 16);
+ rk[5] = GETU32(cipherKey + 20);
+ if (keyBits == 192) {
+ for (;;) {
+ temp = rk[ 5];
+ rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^
+ (Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
+ (Te3[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+ (Te0[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+ (Te1[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^
+ rcon[i];
+ rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6];
+ rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7];
+ rk[ 9] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[ 8];
+ if (++i == 8) {
+ return 12;
+ }
+ rk[10] = rk[ 4] ^ rk[ 9];
+ rk[11] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[10];
+ rk += 6;
+ }
+ }
+ rk[6] = GETU32(cipherKey + 24);
+ rk[7] = GETU32(cipherKey + 28);
+ if (keyBits == 256) {
+ for (;;) {
+ temp = rk[ 7];
+ rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^
+ (Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
+ (Te3[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+ (Te0[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+ (Te1[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^
+ rcon[i];
+ rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8];
+ rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9];
+ rk[11] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[10];
+ if (++i == 7) {
+ return 14;
+ }
+ temp = rk[11];
+ rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^
+ (Te2[(temp >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
+ (Te3[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+ (Te0[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+ (Te1[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff);
+ rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12];
+ rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13];
+ rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14];
+ rk += 8;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if 0
+/**
+ * Expand the cipher key into the decryption key schedule.
+ *
+ * @return the number of rounds for the given cipher key size.
+ */
+int
+rijndaelKeySetupDec(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits)
+{
+ int Nr, i, j;
+ u32 temp;
+
+ /* expand the cipher key: */
+ Nr = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(rk, cipherKey, keyBits);
+
+ /* invert the order of the round keys: */
+ for (i = 0, j = 4*Nr; i < j; i += 4, j -= 4) {
+ temp = rk[i ]; rk[i ] = rk[j ]; rk[j ] = temp;
+ temp = rk[i + 1]; rk[i + 1] = rk[j + 1]; rk[j + 1] = temp;
+ temp = rk[i + 2]; rk[i + 2] = rk[j + 2]; rk[j + 2] = temp;
+ temp = rk[i + 3]; rk[i + 3] = rk[j + 3]; rk[j + 3] = temp;
+ }
+ /* apply the inverse MixColumn transform to all round keys but the first and the last: */
+ for (i = 1; i < Nr; i++) {
+ rk += 4;
+ rk[0] =
+ Td0[Te1[(rk[0] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^
+ Td1[Te1[(rk[0] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[Te1[(rk[0] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[Te1[(rk[0] ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
+ rk[1] =
+ Td0[Te1[(rk[1] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^
+ Td1[Te1[(rk[1] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[Te1[(rk[1] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[Te1[(rk[1] ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
+ rk[2] =
+ Td0[Te1[(rk[2] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^
+ Td1[Te1[(rk[2] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[Te1[(rk[2] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[Te1[(rk[2] ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
+ rk[3] =
+ Td0[Te1[(rk[3] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^
+ Td1[Te1[(rk[3] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[Te1[(rk[3] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[Te1[(rk[3] ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
+ }
+ return Nr;
+}
+#endif
+
+void
+rijndaelEncrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 pt[16],
+ u8 ct[16])
+{
+ u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3;
+#ifndef FULL_UNROLL
+ int r;
+#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
+
+ /*
+ * map byte array block to cipher state
+ * and add initial round key:
+ */
+ s0 = GETU32(pt ) ^ rk[0];
+ s1 = GETU32(pt + 4) ^ rk[1];
+ s2 = GETU32(pt + 8) ^ rk[2];
+ s3 = GETU32(pt + 12) ^ rk[3];
+#ifdef FULL_UNROLL
+ /* round 1: */
+ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4];
+ t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5];
+ t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6];
+ t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7];
+ /* round 2: */
+ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8];
+ s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9];
+ s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[10];
+ s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[11];
+ /* round 3: */
+ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[12];
+ t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[13];
+ t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[14];
+ t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[15];
+ /* round 4: */
+ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[16];
+ s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[17];
+ s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[18];
+ s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[19];
+ /* round 5: */
+ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[20];
+ t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[21];
+ t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[22];
+ t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[23];
+ /* round 6: */
+ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[24];
+ s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[25];
+ s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[26];
+ s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[27];
+ /* round 7: */
+ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[28];
+ t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[29];
+ t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[30];
+ t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[31];
+ /* round 8: */
+ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[32];
+ s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[33];
+ s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[34];
+ s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[35];
+ /* round 9: */
+ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[36];
+ t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[37];
+ t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[38];
+ t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[39];
+ if (Nr > 10) {
+ /* round 10: */
+ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[40];
+ s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[41];
+ s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[42];
+ s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[43];
+ /* round 11: */
+ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[44];
+ t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[45];
+ t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[46];
+ t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[47];
+ if (Nr > 12) {
+ /* round 12: */
+ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[48];
+ s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[49];
+ s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[50];
+ s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[51];
+ /* round 13: */
+ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[52];
+ t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[53];
+ t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[54];
+ t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[55];
+ }
+ }
+ rk += Nr << 2;
+#else /* !FULL_UNROLL */
+ /*
+ * Nr - 1 full rounds:
+ */
+ r = Nr >> 1;
+ for (;;) {
+ t0 =
+ Te0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^
+ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Te3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[4];
+ t1 =
+ Te0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^
+ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Te3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[5];
+ t2 =
+ Te0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^
+ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Te3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[6];
+ t3 =
+ Te0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^
+ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Te3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[7];
+
+ rk += 8;
+ if (--r == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ s0 =
+ Te0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^
+ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Te3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[0];
+ s1 =
+ Te0[(t1 >> 24) ] ^
+ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Te3[(t0 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[1];
+ s2 =
+ Te0[(t2 >> 24) ] ^
+ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Te3[(t1 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[2];
+ s3 =
+ Te0[(t3 >> 24) ] ^
+ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Te3[(t2 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[3];
+ }
+#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
+ /*
+ * apply last round and
+ * map cipher state to byte array block:
+ */
+ s0 =
+ (Te2[(t0 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
+ (Te3[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+ (Te0[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+ (Te1[(t3 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+ rk[0];
+ PUTU32(ct , s0);
+ s1 =
+ (Te2[(t1 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
+ (Te3[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+ (Te0[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+ (Te1[(t0 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+ rk[1];
+ PUTU32(ct + 4, s1);
+ s2 =
+ (Te2[(t2 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
+ (Te3[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+ (Te0[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+ (Te1[(t1 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+ rk[2];
+ PUTU32(ct + 8, s2);
+ s3 =
+ (Te2[(t3 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
+ (Te3[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+ (Te0[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+ (Te1[(t2 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+ rk[3];
+ PUTU32(ct + 12, s3);
+}
+
+#if 0
+static void
+rijndaelDecrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 ct[16],
+ u8 pt[16])
+{
+ u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3;
+#ifndef FULL_UNROLL
+ int r;
+#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
+
+ /*
+ * map byte array block to cipher state
+ * and add initial round key:
+ */
+ s0 = GETU32(ct ) ^ rk[0];
+ s1 = GETU32(ct + 4) ^ rk[1];
+ s2 = GETU32(ct + 8) ^ rk[2];
+ s3 = GETU32(ct + 12) ^ rk[3];
+#ifdef FULL_UNROLL
+ /* round 1: */
+ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4];
+ t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5];
+ t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6];
+ t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7];
+ /* round 2: */
+ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8];
+ s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9];
+ s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[10];
+ s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[11];
+ /* round 3: */
+ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[12];
+ t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[13];
+ t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[14];
+ t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[15];
+ /* round 4: */
+ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[16];
+ s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[17];
+ s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[18];
+ s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[19];
+ /* round 5: */
+ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[20];
+ t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[21];
+ t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[22];
+ t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[23];
+ /* round 6: */
+ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[24];
+ s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[25];
+ s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[26];
+ s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[27];
+ /* round 7: */
+ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[28];
+ t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[29];
+ t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[30];
+ t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[31];
+ /* round 8: */
+ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[32];
+ s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[33];
+ s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[34];
+ s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[35];
+ /* round 9: */
+ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[36];
+ t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[37];
+ t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[38];
+ t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[39];
+ if (Nr > 10) {
+ /* round 10: */
+ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[40];
+ s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[41];
+ s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[42];
+ s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[43];
+ /* round 11: */
+ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[44];
+ t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[45];
+ t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[46];
+ t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[47];
+ if (Nr > 12) {
+ /* round 12: */
+ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[48];
+ s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[49];
+ s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[50];
+ s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[51];
+ /* round 13: */
+ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[52];
+ t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[53];
+ t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[54];
+ t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[55];
+ }
+ }
+ rk += Nr << 2;
+#else /* !FULL_UNROLL */
+ /*
+ * Nr - 1 full rounds:
+ */
+ r = Nr >> 1;
+ for (;;) {
+ t0 =
+ Td0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^
+ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[4];
+ t1 =
+ Td0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^
+ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[5];
+ t2 =
+ Td0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^
+ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[6];
+ t3 =
+ Td0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^
+ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[7];
+
+ rk += 8;
+ if (--r == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ s0 =
+ Td0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^
+ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[(t1 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[0];
+ s1 =
+ Td0[(t1 >> 24) ] ^
+ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[(t2 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[1];
+ s2 =
+ Td0[(t2 >> 24) ] ^
+ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[2];
+ s3 =
+ Td0[(t3 >> 24) ] ^
+ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[(t0 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[3];
+ }
+#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
+ /*
+ * apply last round and
+ * map cipher state to byte array block:
+ */
+ s0 =
+ (Td4[(t0 >> 24) ] << 24) ^
+ (Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+ (Td4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
+ (Td4[(t1 ) & 0xff]) ^
+ rk[0];
+ PUTU32(pt , s0);
+ s1 =
+ (Td4[(t1 >> 24) ] << 24) ^
+ (Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+ (Td4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
+ (Td4[(t2 ) & 0xff]) ^
+ rk[1];
+ PUTU32(pt + 4, s1);
+ s2 =
+ (Td4[(t2 >> 24) ] << 24) ^
+ (Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+ (Td4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
+ (Td4[(t3 ) & 0xff]) ^
+ rk[2];
+ PUTU32(pt + 8, s2);
+ s3 =
+ (Td4[(t3 >> 24) ] << 24) ^
+ (Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+ (Td4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
+ (Td4[(t0 ) & 0xff]) ^
+ rk[3];
+ PUTU32(pt + 12, s3);
+}
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rijndael.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/rijndael.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rijndael.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.h,v 1.12 2001/12/19 07:18:56 deraadt Exp $ */
-
-/**
- * rijndael-alg-fst.h
- *
- * @version 3.0 (December 2000)
- *
- * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES)
- *
- * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen at esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
- * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers at esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
- * @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto at terra.com.br>
- *
- * This code is hereby placed in the public domain.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
- * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
- * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
- * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
- * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
- * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
- * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
- * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
- * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
- * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-#ifndef __RIJNDAEL_H
-#define __RIJNDAEL_H
-
-#define MAXKC (256/32)
-#define MAXKB (256/8)
-#define MAXNR 14
-
-typedef unsigned char u8;
-typedef unsigned short u16;
-typedef unsigned int u32;
-
-/* The structure for key information */
-typedef struct {
- int decrypt;
- int Nr; /* key-length-dependent number of rounds */
- u32 ek[4*(MAXNR + 1)]; /* encrypt key schedule */
- u32 dk[4*(MAXNR + 1)]; /* decrypt key schedule */
-} rijndael_ctx;
-
-void rijndael_set_key(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, int, int);
-void rijndael_decrypt(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, u_char *);
-void rijndael_encrypt(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, u_char *);
-
-#endif /* __RIJNDAEL_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rijndael.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/rijndael.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rijndael.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rijndael.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.h,v 1.14 2014/04/29 15:42:07 markus Exp $ */
+
+/**
+ * rijndael-alg-fst.h
+ *
+ * @version 3.0 (December 2000)
+ *
+ * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES)
+ *
+ * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen at esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers at esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto at terra.com.br>
+ *
+ * This code is hereby placed in the public domain.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
+ * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
+ * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
+ * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef _PRIVATE_RIJNDAEL_H
+#define _PRIVATE_RIJNDAEL_H
+
+#define AES_MAXKEYBITS (256)
+#define AES_MAXKEYBYTES (AES_MAXKEYBITS/8)
+/* for 256-bit keys, fewer for less */
+#define AES_MAXROUNDS 14
+
+typedef unsigned char u8;
+typedef unsigned short u16;
+typedef unsigned int u32;
+
+int rijndaelKeySetupEnc(unsigned int [], const unsigned char [], int);
+void rijndaelEncrypt(const unsigned int [], int, const unsigned char [],
+ unsigned char []);
+
+/* The structure for key information */
+typedef struct {
+ int decrypt;
+ int Nr; /* key-length-dependent number of rounds */
+ u32 ek[4*(AES_MAXROUNDS + 1)]; /* encrypt key schedule */
+ u32 dk[4*(AES_MAXROUNDS + 1)]; /* decrypt key schedule */
+} rijndael_ctx;
+
+void rijndael_set_key(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, int, int);
+void rijndael_decrypt(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, u_char *);
+void rijndael_encrypt(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, u_char *);
+
+#endif /* _PRIVATE_RIJNDAEL_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/roaming.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/roaming.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/roaming.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: roaming.h,v 1.6 2011/12/07 05:44:38 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2009 AppGate Network Security AB
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#ifndef ROAMING_H
-#define ROAMING_H
-
-#define DEFAULT_ROAMBUF 65536
-#define MAX_ROAMBUF (2*1024*1024) /* XXX arbitrary */
-#define ROAMING_REQUEST "roaming at appgate.com"
-
-extern int roaming_enabled;
-extern int resume_in_progress;
-
-void request_roaming(void);
-int get_snd_buf_size(void);
-int get_recv_buf_size(void);
-void add_recv_bytes(u_int64_t);
-int wait_for_roaming_reconnect(void);
-void roaming_reply(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void set_out_buffer_size(size_t);
-ssize_t roaming_write(int, const void *, size_t, int *);
-ssize_t roaming_read(int, void *, size_t, int *);
-size_t roaming_atomicio(ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t), int, void *, size_t);
-u_int64_t get_recv_bytes(void);
-u_int64_t get_sent_bytes(void);
-void roam_set_bytes(u_int64_t, u_int64_t);
-void resend_bytes(int, u_int64_t *);
-void calculate_new_key(u_int64_t *, u_int64_t, u_int64_t);
-int resume_kex(void);
-
-#endif /* ROAMING */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/roaming_client.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/roaming_client.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/roaming_client.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,277 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: roaming_client.c,v 1.7 2014/01/09 23:20:00 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2009 AppGate Network Security AB
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-#ifdef HAVE_INTTYPES_H
-#include <inttypes.h>
-#endif
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "clientloop.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "readconf.h"
-#include "roaming.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "sshconnect.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern Options options;
-extern char *host;
-extern struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr;
-extern int session_resumed;
-
-static u_int32_t roaming_id;
-static u_int64_t cookie;
-static u_int64_t lastseenchall;
-static u_int64_t key1, key2, oldkey1, oldkey2;
-
-void
-roaming_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) {
- logit("Server denied roaming");
- return;
- }
- verbose("Roaming enabled");
- roaming_id = packet_get_int();
- cookie = packet_get_int64();
- key1 = oldkey1 = packet_get_int64();
- key2 = oldkey2 = packet_get_int64();
- set_out_buffer_size(packet_get_int() + get_snd_buf_size());
- roaming_enabled = 1;
-}
-
-void
-request_roaming(void)
-{
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring(ROAMING_REQUEST);
- packet_put_char(1);
- packet_put_int(get_recv_buf_size());
- packet_send();
- client_register_global_confirm(roaming_reply, NULL);
-}
-
-static void
-roaming_auth_required(void)
-{
- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
- Buffer b;
- u_int64_t chall, oldchall;
-
- chall = packet_get_int64();
- oldchall = packet_get_int64();
- if (oldchall != lastseenchall) {
- key1 = oldkey1;
- key2 = oldkey2;
- }
- lastseenchall = chall;
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_put_int64(&b, cookie);
- buffer_put_int64(&b, chall);
- if (ssh_digest_buffer(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &b, digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: ssh_digest_buffer failed", __func__);
- buffer_free(&b);
-
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_AUTH);
- packet_put_int64(key1 ^ get_recv_bytes());
- packet_put_raw(digest, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1));
- packet_send();
-
- oldkey1 = key1;
- oldkey2 = key2;
- calculate_new_key(&key1, cookie, chall);
- calculate_new_key(&key2, cookie, chall);
-
- debug("Received %llu bytes", (unsigned long long)get_recv_bytes());
- debug("Sent roaming_auth packet");
-}
-
-int
-resume_kex(void)
-{
- /*
- * This should not happen - if the client sends the kex method
- * resume at appgate.com then the kex is done in roaming_resume().
- */
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int
-roaming_resume(void)
-{
- u_int64_t recv_bytes;
- char *str = NULL, *kexlist = NULL, *c;
- int i, type;
- int timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000;
- u_int len;
- u_int32_t rnd = 0;
-
- resume_in_progress = 1;
-
- /* Exchange banners */
- ssh_exchange_identification(timeout_ms);
- packet_set_nonblocking();
-
- /* Send a kexinit message with resume at appgate.com as only kex algo */
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
- for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) {
- if (i % 4 == 0)
- rnd = arc4random();
- packet_put_char(rnd & 0xff);
- rnd >>= 8;
- }
- packet_put_cstring(KEX_RESUME);
- for (i = 1; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
- /* kex algorithm added so start with i=1 and not 0 */
- packet_put_cstring(""); /* Not used when we resume */
- }
- packet_put_char(1); /* first kex_packet follows */
- packet_put_int(0); /* reserved */
- packet_send();
-
- /* Assume that resume at appgate.com will be accepted */
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_RESUME);
- packet_put_int(roaming_id);
- packet_send();
-
- /* Read the server's kexinit and check for resume at appgate.com */
- if ((type = packet_read()) != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) {
- debug("expected kexinit on resume, got %d", type);
- goto fail;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
- (void)packet_get_char();
- kexlist = packet_get_string(&len);
- if (!kexlist
- || (str = match_list(KEX_RESUME, kexlist, NULL)) == NULL) {
- debug("server doesn't allow resume");
- goto fail;
- }
- free(str);
- for (i = 1; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
- /* kex algorithm taken care of so start with i=1 and not 0 */
- free(packet_get_string(&len));
- }
- i = packet_get_char(); /* first_kex_packet_follows */
- if (i && (c = strchr(kexlist, ',')))
- *c = 0;
- if (i && strcmp(kexlist, KEX_RESUME)) {
- debug("server's kex guess (%s) was wrong, skipping", kexlist);
- (void)packet_read(); /* Wrong guess - discard packet */
- }
-
- /*
- * Read the ROAMING_AUTH_REQUIRED challenge from the server and
- * send ROAMING_AUTH
- */
- if ((type = packet_read()) != SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_AUTH_REQUIRED) {
- debug("expected roaming_auth_required, got %d", type);
- goto fail;
- }
- roaming_auth_required();
-
- /* Read ROAMING_AUTH_OK from the server */
- if ((type = packet_read()) != SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_AUTH_OK) {
- debug("expected roaming_auth_ok, got %d", type);
- goto fail;
- }
- recv_bytes = packet_get_int64() ^ oldkey2;
- debug("Peer received %llu bytes", (unsigned long long)recv_bytes);
- resend_bytes(packet_get_connection_out(), &recv_bytes);
-
- resume_in_progress = 0;
-
- session_resumed = 1; /* Tell clientloop */
-
- return 0;
-
-fail:
- free(kexlist);
- if (packet_get_connection_in() == packet_get_connection_out())
- close(packet_get_connection_in());
- else {
- close(packet_get_connection_in());
- close(packet_get_connection_out());
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-int
-wait_for_roaming_reconnect(void)
-{
- static int reenter_guard = 0;
- int timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000;
- int c;
-
- if (reenter_guard != 0)
- fatal("Server refused resume, roaming timeout may be exceeded");
- reenter_guard = 1;
-
- fprintf(stderr, "[connection suspended, press return to resume]");
- fflush(stderr);
- packet_backup_state();
- /* TODO Perhaps we should read from tty here */
- while ((c = fgetc(stdin)) != EOF) {
- if (c == 'Z' - 64) {
- kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP);
- continue;
- }
- if (c != '\n' && c != '\r')
- continue;
-
- if (ssh_connect(host, NULL, &hostaddr, options.port,
- options.address_family, 1, &timeout_ms,
- options.tcp_keep_alive, options.use_privileged_port) == 0 &&
- roaming_resume() == 0) {
- packet_restore_state();
- reenter_guard = 0;
- fprintf(stderr, "[connection resumed]\n");
- fflush(stderr);
- return 0;
- }
-
- fprintf(stderr, "[reconnect failed, press return to retry]");
- fflush(stderr);
- }
- fprintf(stderr, "[exiting]\n");
- fflush(stderr);
- exit(0);
-}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/roaming_common.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/roaming_common.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/roaming_common.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,244 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: roaming_common.c,v 1.12 2014/01/09 23:20:00 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2009 AppGate Network Security AB
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_INTTYPES_H
-#include <inttypes.h>
-#endif
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "roaming.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-
-static size_t out_buf_size = 0;
-static char *out_buf = NULL;
-static size_t out_start;
-static size_t out_last;
-
-static u_int64_t write_bytes = 0;
-static u_int64_t read_bytes = 0;
-
-int roaming_enabled = 0;
-int resume_in_progress = 0;
-
-int
-get_snd_buf_size(void)
-{
- int fd = packet_get_connection_out();
- int optval;
- socklen_t optvallen = sizeof(optval);
-
- if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF, &optval, &optvallen) != 0)
- optval = DEFAULT_ROAMBUF;
- return optval;
-}
-
-int
-get_recv_buf_size(void)
-{
- int fd = packet_get_connection_in();
- int optval;
- socklen_t optvallen = sizeof(optval);
-
- if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &optval, &optvallen) != 0)
- optval = DEFAULT_ROAMBUF;
- return optval;
-}
-
-void
-set_out_buffer_size(size_t size)
-{
- if (size == 0 || size > MAX_ROAMBUF)
- fatal("%s: bad buffer size %lu", __func__, (u_long)size);
- /*
- * The buffer size can only be set once and the buffer will live
- * as long as the session lives.
- */
- if (out_buf == NULL) {
- out_buf_size = size;
- out_buf = xmalloc(size);
- out_start = 0;
- out_last = 0;
- }
-}
-
-u_int64_t
-get_recv_bytes(void)
-{
- return read_bytes;
-}
-
-void
-add_recv_bytes(u_int64_t num)
-{
- read_bytes += num;
-}
-
-u_int64_t
-get_sent_bytes(void)
-{
- return write_bytes;
-}
-
-void
-roam_set_bytes(u_int64_t sent, u_int64_t recvd)
-{
- read_bytes = recvd;
- write_bytes = sent;
-}
-
-static void
-buf_append(const char *buf, size_t count)
-{
- if (count > out_buf_size) {
- buf += count - out_buf_size;
- count = out_buf_size;
- }
- if (count < out_buf_size - out_last) {
- memcpy(out_buf + out_last, buf, count);
- if (out_start > out_last)
- out_start += count;
- out_last += count;
- } else {
- /* data will wrap */
- size_t chunk = out_buf_size - out_last;
- memcpy(out_buf + out_last, buf, chunk);
- memcpy(out_buf, buf + chunk, count - chunk);
- out_last = count - chunk;
- out_start = out_last + 1;
- }
-}
-
-ssize_t
-roaming_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count, int *cont)
-{
- ssize_t ret;
-
- ret = write(fd, buf, count);
- if (ret > 0 && !resume_in_progress) {
- write_bytes += ret;
- if (out_buf_size > 0)
- buf_append(buf, ret);
- }
- if (out_buf_size > 0 &&
- (ret == 0 || (ret == -1 && errno == EPIPE))) {
- if (wait_for_roaming_reconnect() != 0) {
- ret = 0;
- *cont = 1;
- } else {
- ret = -1;
- errno = EAGAIN;
- }
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-ssize_t
-roaming_read(int fd, void *buf, size_t count, int *cont)
-{
- ssize_t ret = read(fd, buf, count);
- if (ret > 0) {
- if (!resume_in_progress) {
- read_bytes += ret;
- }
- } else if (out_buf_size > 0 &&
- (ret == 0 || (ret == -1 && (errno == ECONNRESET
- || errno == ECONNABORTED || errno == ETIMEDOUT
- || errno == EHOSTUNREACH)))) {
- debug("roaming_read failed for %d ret=%ld errno=%d",
- fd, (long)ret, errno);
- ret = 0;
- if (wait_for_roaming_reconnect() == 0)
- *cont = 1;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-size_t
-roaming_atomicio(ssize_t(*f)(int, void*, size_t), int fd, void *buf,
- size_t count)
-{
- size_t ret = atomicio(f, fd, buf, count);
-
- if (f == vwrite && ret > 0 && !resume_in_progress) {
- write_bytes += ret;
- } else if (f == read && ret > 0 && !resume_in_progress) {
- read_bytes += ret;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-void
-resend_bytes(int fd, u_int64_t *offset)
-{
- size_t available, needed;
-
- if (out_start < out_last)
- available = out_last - out_start;
- else
- available = out_buf_size;
- needed = write_bytes - *offset;
- debug3("resend_bytes: resend %lu bytes from %llu",
- (unsigned long)needed, (unsigned long long)*offset);
- if (needed > available)
- fatal("Needed to resend more data than in the cache");
- if (out_last < needed) {
- int chunkend = needed - out_last;
- atomicio(vwrite, fd, out_buf + out_buf_size - chunkend,
- chunkend);
- atomicio(vwrite, fd, out_buf, out_last);
- } else {
- atomicio(vwrite, fd, out_buf + (out_last - needed), needed);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Caclulate a new key after a reconnect
- */
-void
-calculate_new_key(u_int64_t *key, u_int64_t cookie, u_int64_t challenge)
-{
- u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
- Buffer b;
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_put_int64(&b, *key);
- buffer_put_int64(&b, cookie);
- buffer_put_int64(&b, challenge);
-
- if (ssh_digest_buffer(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &b, hash, sizeof(hash)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: digest_buffer failed", __func__);
-
- buffer_clear(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, hash, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1));
- *key = buffer_get_int64(&b);
- buffer_free(&b);
-}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/roaming_dummy.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/roaming_dummy.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/roaming_dummy.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: roaming_dummy.c,v 1.3 2009/06/21 09:04:03 dtucker Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2009 AppGate Network Security AB
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-/*
- * This file is included in the client programs which should not
- * support roaming.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "roaming.h"
-
-int resume_in_progress = 0;
-
-u_int64_t
-get_recv_bytes(void)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-ssize_t
-roaming_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count, int *cont)
-{
- return write(fd, buf, count);
-}
-
-ssize_t
-roaming_read(int fd, void *buf, size_t count, int *cont)
-{
- if (cont)
- *cont = 0;
- return read(fd, buf, count);
-}
-
-void
-add_recv_bytes(u_int64_t num)
-{
-}
-
-int
-resume_kex(void)
-{
- return 1;
-}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/roaming_serv.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/roaming_serv.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/roaming_serv.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: roaming_serv.c,v 1.1 2009/10/24 11:18:23 andreas Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2009 AppGate Network Security AB
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include "roaming.h"
-
-/*
- * Wait for the roaming client to reconnect. Returns 0 if a connect ocurred.
- */
-int
-wait_for_roaming_reconnect(void)
-{
- return 1;
-}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rsa.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/rsa.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rsa.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,151 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: rsa.c,v 1.31 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- *
- * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- *
- * Description of the RSA algorithm can be found e.g. from the following
- * sources:
- *
- * Bruce Schneier: Applied Cryptography. John Wiley & Sons, 1994.
- *
- * Jennifer Seberry and Josed Pieprzyk: Cryptography: An Introduction to
- * Computer Security. Prentice-Hall, 1989.
- *
- * Man Young Rhee: Cryptography and Secure Data Communications. McGraw-Hill,
- * 1994.
- *
- * R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. M. Adleman: Cryptographic Communications
- * System and Method. US Patent 4,405,829, 1983.
- *
- * Hans Riesel: Prime Numbers and Computer Methods for Factorization.
- * Birkhauser, 1994.
- *
- * The RSA Frequently Asked Questions document by RSA Data Security,
- * Inc., 1995.
- *
- * RSA in 3 lines of perl by Adam Back <aba at atlax.ex.ac.uk>, 1995, as
- * included below:
- *
- * [gone - had to be deleted - what a pity]
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-void
-rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
-{
- u_char *inbuf, *outbuf;
- int len, ilen, olen;
-
- if (BN_num_bits(key->e) < 2 || !BN_is_odd(key->e))
- fatal("rsa_public_encrypt() exponent too small or not odd");
-
- olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n);
- outbuf = xmalloc(olen);
-
- ilen = BN_num_bytes(in);
- inbuf = xmalloc(ilen);
- BN_bn2bin(in, inbuf);
-
- if ((len = RSA_public_encrypt(ilen, inbuf, outbuf, key,
- RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0)
- fatal("rsa_public_encrypt() failed");
-
- if (BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out) == NULL)
- fatal("rsa_public_encrypt: BN_bin2bn failed");
-
- explicit_bzero(outbuf, olen);
- explicit_bzero(inbuf, ilen);
- free(outbuf);
- free(inbuf);
-}
-
-int
-rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
-{
- u_char *inbuf, *outbuf;
- int len, ilen, olen;
-
- olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n);
- outbuf = xmalloc(olen);
-
- ilen = BN_num_bytes(in);
- inbuf = xmalloc(ilen);
- BN_bn2bin(in, inbuf);
-
- if ((len = RSA_private_decrypt(ilen, inbuf, outbuf, key,
- RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0) {
- error("rsa_private_decrypt() failed");
- } else {
- if (BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out) == NULL)
- fatal("rsa_private_decrypt: BN_bin2bn failed");
- }
- explicit_bzero(outbuf, olen);
- explicit_bzero(inbuf, ilen);
- free(outbuf);
- free(inbuf);
- return len;
-}
-
-/* calculate p-1 and q-1 */
-void
-rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *rsa)
-{
- BIGNUM *aux;
- BN_CTX *ctx;
-
- if ((aux = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("rsa_generate_additional_parameters: BN_new failed");
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("rsa_generate_additional_parameters: BN_CTX_new failed");
-
- if ((BN_sub(aux, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) == 0) ||
- (BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, aux, ctx) == 0) ||
- (BN_sub(aux, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) == 0) ||
- (BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, aux, ctx) == 0))
- fatal("rsa_generate_additional_parameters: BN_sub/mod failed");
-
- BN_clear_free(aux);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-}
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rsa.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/rsa.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rsa.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rsa.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: rsa.c,v 1.32 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ *
+ * Description of the RSA algorithm can be found e.g. from the following
+ * sources:
+ *
+ * Bruce Schneier: Applied Cryptography. John Wiley & Sons, 1994.
+ *
+ * Jennifer Seberry and Josed Pieprzyk: Cryptography: An Introduction to
+ * Computer Security. Prentice-Hall, 1989.
+ *
+ * Man Young Rhee: Cryptography and Secure Data Communications. McGraw-Hill,
+ * 1994.
+ *
+ * R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. M. Adleman: Cryptographic Communications
+ * System and Method. US Patent 4,405,829, 1983.
+ *
+ * Hans Riesel: Prime Numbers and Computer Methods for Factorization.
+ * Birkhauser, 1994.
+ *
+ * The RSA Frequently Asked Questions document by RSA Data Security,
+ * Inc., 1995.
+ *
+ * RSA in 3 lines of perl by Adam Back <aba at atlax.ex.ac.uk>, 1995, as
+ * included below:
+ *
+ * [gone - had to be deleted - what a pity]
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+int
+rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
+{
+ u_char *inbuf = NULL, *outbuf = NULL;
+ int len, ilen, olen, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (BN_num_bits(key->e) < 2 || !BN_is_odd(key->e))
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n);
+ if ((outbuf = malloc(olen)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ilen = BN_num_bytes(in);
+ if ((inbuf = malloc(ilen)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ BN_bn2bin(in, inbuf);
+
+ if ((len = RSA_public_encrypt(ilen, inbuf, outbuf, key,
+ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+
+ out:
+ if (outbuf != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(outbuf, olen);
+ free(outbuf);
+ }
+ if (inbuf != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(inbuf, ilen);
+ free(inbuf);
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
+{
+ u_char *inbuf = NULL, *outbuf = NULL;
+ int len, ilen, olen, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n);
+ if ((outbuf = malloc(olen)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ilen = BN_num_bytes(in);
+ if ((inbuf = malloc(ilen)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ BN_bn2bin(in, inbuf);
+
+ if ((len = RSA_private_decrypt(ilen, inbuf, outbuf, key,
+ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ } else if (BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ if (outbuf != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(outbuf, olen);
+ free(outbuf);
+ }
+ if (inbuf != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(inbuf, ilen);
+ free(inbuf);
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* calculate p-1 and q-1 */
+int
+rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *rsa)
+{
+ BIGNUM *aux = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((aux = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((BN_sub(aux, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) == 0) ||
+ (BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, aux, ctx) == 0) ||
+ (BN_sub(aux, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) == 0) ||
+ (BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, aux, ctx) == 0)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ BN_clear_free(aux);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return r;
+}
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rsa.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/rsa.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rsa.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: rsa.h,v 1.16 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * RSA key generation, encryption and decryption.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#ifndef RSA_H
-#define RSA_H
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-
-void rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, RSA *);
-int rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, RSA *);
-void rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *);
-
-#endif /* RSA_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rsa.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/rsa.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rsa.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/rsa.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: rsa.h,v 1.17 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * RSA key generation, encryption and decryption.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef RSA_H
+#define RSA_H
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+int rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, RSA *);
+int rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, RSA *);
+int rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *);
+
+#endif /* RSA_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-pledge.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sandbox-pledge.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-pledge.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-pledge.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-pledge.c,v 1.1 2015/10/09 01:37:08 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Theo de Raadt <deraadt at openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_PLEDGE
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+struct ssh_sandbox {
+ pid_t child_pid;
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox *
+ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *m)
+{
+ struct ssh_sandbox *box;
+
+ debug3("%s: preparing pledge sandbox", __func__);
+ box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
+ box->child_pid = 0;
+
+ return box;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+ if (pledge("stdio", NULL) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: pledge()", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+ free(box);
+ debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
+{
+ box->child_pid = child_pid;
+ /* Nothing to do here */
+}
+
+#endif /* SANDBOX_PLEDGE */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,240 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2012 Will Drewry <wad at dataspill.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-/*
- * Uncomment the SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG macro below to help diagnose
- * filter breakage during development. *Do not* use this in production,
- * as it relies on making library calls that are unsafe in signal context.
- *
- * Instead, live systems the auditctl(8) may be used to monitor failures.
- * E.g.
- * auditctl -a task,always -F uid=<privsep uid>
- */
-/* #define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG 1 */
-
-#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
-/* Use the kernel headers in case of an older toolchain. */
-# include <asm/siginfo.h>
-# define __have_siginfo_t 1
-# define __have_sigval_t 1
-# define __have_sigevent_t 1
-#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/resource.h>
-#include <sys/prctl.h>
-
-#include <linux/audit.h>
-#include <linux/filter.h>
-#include <linux/seccomp.h>
-#include <elf.h>
-
-#include <asm/unistd.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stddef.h> /* for offsetof */
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "log.h"
-#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-
-/* Linux seccomp_filter sandbox */
-#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL
-
-/* Use a signal handler to emit violations when debugging */
-#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
-# undef SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL
-# define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
-#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
-
-/* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */
-#define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \
- BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno))
-#define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \
- BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
-
-/* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */
-static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- /* Ensure the syscall arch convention is as expected. */
- BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
- offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)),
- BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH, 1, 0),
- BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
- /* Load the syscall number for checking. */
- BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
- offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
- SC_DENY(open, EACCES),
- SC_ALLOW(getpid),
- SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
- SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime),
-#ifdef __NR_time /* not defined on EABI ARM */
- SC_ALLOW(time),
-#endif
- SC_ALLOW(read),
- SC_ALLOW(write),
- SC_ALLOW(close),
-#ifdef __NR_shutdown /* not defined on archs that go via socketcall(2) */
- SC_ALLOW(shutdown),
-#endif
- SC_ALLOW(brk),
- SC_ALLOW(poll),
-#ifdef __NR__newselect
- SC_ALLOW(_newselect),
-#else
- SC_ALLOW(select),
-#endif
- SC_ALLOW(madvise),
-#ifdef __NR_mmap2 /* EABI ARM only has mmap2() */
- SC_ALLOW(mmap2),
-#endif
-#ifdef __NR_mmap
- SC_ALLOW(mmap),
-#endif
- SC_ALLOW(munmap),
- SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
-#ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask
- SC_ALLOW(rt_sigprocmask),
-#else
- SC_ALLOW(sigprocmask),
-#endif
- BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
-};
-
-static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = {
- .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(preauth_insns)/sizeof(preauth_insns[0])),
- .filter = (struct sock_filter *)preauth_insns,
-};
-
-struct ssh_sandbox {
- pid_t child_pid;
-};
-
-struct ssh_sandbox *
-ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
-{
- struct ssh_sandbox *box;
-
- /*
- * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
- * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
- */
- debug3("%s: preparing seccomp filter sandbox", __func__);
- box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
- box->child_pid = 0;
-
- return box;
-}
-
-#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
-extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
-void mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx);
-
-static void
-ssh_sandbox_violation(int signum, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context)
-{
- char msg[256];
-
- snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
- "%s: unexpected system call (arch:0x%x,syscall:%d @ %p)",
- __func__, info->si_arch, info->si_syscall, info->si_call_addr);
- mm_log_handler(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, msg, pmonitor);
- _exit(1);
-}
-
-static void
-ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(void)
-{
- struct sigaction act;
- sigset_t mask;
-
- debug3("%s: installing SIGSYS handler", __func__);
- memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act));
- sigemptyset(&mask);
- sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS);
-
- act.sa_sigaction = &ssh_sandbox_violation;
- act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
- if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) == -1)
- fatal("%s: sigaction(SIGSYS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL) == -1)
- fatal("%s: sigprocmask(SIGSYS): %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
-}
-#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
-
-void
-ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
-{
- struct rlimit rl_zero;
- int nnp_failed = 0;
-
- /* Set rlimits for completeness if possible. */
- rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
- if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)
- fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
- if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1)
- fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
- if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1)
- fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
-
-#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
- ssh_sandbox_child_debugging();
-#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
-
- debug3("%s: setting PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS", __func__);
- if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1) {
- debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
- nnp_failed = 1;
- }
- debug3("%s: attaching seccomp filter program", __func__);
- if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &preauth_program) == -1)
- debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP): %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
- else if (nnp_failed)
- fatal("%s: SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER activated but "
- "PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS failed", __func__);
-}
-
-void
-ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
-{
- free(box);
- debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
-}
-
-void
-ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
-{
- box->child_pid = child_pid;
-}
-
-#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Will Drewry <wad at dataspill.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Uncomment the SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG macro below to help diagnose
+ * filter breakage during development. *Do not* use this in production,
+ * as it relies on making library calls that are unsafe in signal context.
+ *
+ * Instead, live systems the auditctl(8) may be used to monitor failures.
+ * E.g.
+ * auditctl -a task,always -F uid=<privsep uid>
+ */
+/* #define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG 1 */
+
+/* XXX it should be possible to do logging via the log socket safely */
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
+/* Use the kernel headers in case of an older toolchain. */
+# include <asm/siginfo.h>
+# define __have_siginfo_t 1
+# define __have_sigval_t 1
+# define __have_sigevent_t 1
+#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <elf.h>
+
+#include <asm/unistd.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stddef.h> /* for offsetof */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+/* Linux seccomp_filter sandbox */
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL
+
+/* Use a signal handler to emit violations when debugging */
+#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
+# undef SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL
+# define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
+#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
+
+/* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */
+#define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno))
+#define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
+#define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 4), \
+ /* load first syscall argument */ \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)])), \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_arg_val), 0, 1), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
+ /* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
+
+/* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */
+static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ /* Ensure the syscall arch convention is as expected. */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH, 1, 0),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
+ /* Load the syscall number for checking. */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+
+ /* Syscalls to non-fatally deny */
+#ifdef __NR_lstat
+ SC_DENY(lstat, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_lstat64
+ SC_DENY(lstat64, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_fstat
+ SC_DENY(fstat, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_fstat64
+ SC_DENY(fstat64, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_open
+ SC_DENY(open, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_openat
+ SC_DENY(openat, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_newfstatat
+ SC_DENY(newfstatat, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_stat
+ SC_DENY(stat, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_stat64
+ SC_DENY(stat64, EACCES),
+#endif
+
+ /* Syscalls to permit */
+#ifdef __NR_brk
+ SC_ALLOW(brk),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime
+ SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_close
+ SC_ALLOW(close),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_exit
+ SC_ALLOW(exit),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_exit_group
+ SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getpgid
+ SC_ALLOW(getpgid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getpid
+ SC_ALLOW(getpid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getrandom
+ SC_ALLOW(getrandom),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
+ SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_madvise
+ SC_ALLOW(madvise),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_mmap
+ SC_ALLOW(mmap),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_mmap2
+ SC_ALLOW(mmap2),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_mremap
+ SC_ALLOW(mremap),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_munmap
+ SC_ALLOW(munmap),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR__newselect
+ SC_ALLOW(_newselect),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_poll
+ SC_ALLOW(poll),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_pselect6
+ SC_ALLOW(pselect6),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_read
+ SC_ALLOW(read),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask
+ SC_ALLOW(rt_sigprocmask),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_select
+ SC_ALLOW(select),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_shutdown
+ SC_ALLOW(shutdown),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_sigprocmask
+ SC_ALLOW(sigprocmask),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_time
+ SC_ALLOW(time),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_write
+ SC_ALLOW(write),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_socketcall
+ SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
+#endif
+
+ /* Default deny */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
+};
+
+static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(preauth_insns)/sizeof(preauth_insns[0])),
+ .filter = (struct sock_filter *)preauth_insns,
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox {
+ pid_t child_pid;
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox *
+ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+ struct ssh_sandbox *box;
+
+ /*
+ * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
+ * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
+ */
+ debug3("%s: preparing seccomp filter sandbox", __func__);
+ box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
+ box->child_pid = 0;
+
+ return box;
+}
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
+extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
+void mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx);
+
+static void
+ssh_sandbox_violation(int signum, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context)
+{
+ char msg[256];
+
+ snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
+ "%s: unexpected system call (arch:0x%x,syscall:%d @ %p)",
+ __func__, info->si_arch, info->si_syscall, info->si_call_addr);
+ mm_log_handler(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, msg, pmonitor);
+ _exit(1);
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(void)
+{
+ struct sigaction act;
+ sigset_t mask;
+
+ debug3("%s: installing SIGSYS handler", __func__);
+ memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act));
+ sigemptyset(&mask);
+ sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS);
+
+ act.sa_sigaction = &ssh_sandbox_violation;
+ act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
+ if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: sigaction(SIGSYS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: sigprocmask(SIGSYS): %s",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+}
+#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+ struct rlimit rl_zero;
+ int nnp_failed = 0;
+
+ /* Set rlimits for completeness if possible. */
+ rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+ if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
+ ssh_sandbox_child_debugging();
+#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
+
+ debug3("%s: setting PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS", __func__);
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1) {
+ debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): %s",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+ nnp_failed = 1;
+ }
+ debug3("%s: attaching seccomp filter program", __func__);
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &preauth_program) == -1)
+ debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP): %s",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+ else if (nnp_failed)
+ fatal("%s: SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER activated but "
+ "PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS failed", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+ free(box);
+ debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
+{
+ box->child_pid = child_pid;
+}
+
+#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-solaris.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sandbox-solaris.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-solaris.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-solaris.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Joyent, Inc
+ * Author: Alex Wilson <alex.wilson at joyent.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_SOLARIS
+#ifndef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
+# error "--with-solaris-privs must be used with the Solaris sandbox"
+#endif
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PRIV_H
+# include <priv.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+struct ssh_sandbox {
+ priv_set_t *pset;
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox *
+ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+ struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL;
+
+ box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
+
+ /* Start with "basic" and drop everything we don't need. */
+ box->pset = solaris_basic_privset();
+
+ if (box->pset == NULL) {
+ free(box);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Drop everything except the ability to use already-opened files */
+ if (priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 ||
+#ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS
+ priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 ||
+#endif
+ priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_EXEC) != 0 ||
+ priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_FORK) != 0 ||
+ priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0 ||
+ priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_SESSION) != 0) {
+ free(box);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* These may not be available on older Solaris-es */
+# if defined(PRIV_FILE_READ) && defined(PRIV_FILE_WRITE)
+ if (priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_FILE_READ) != 0 ||
+ priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_FILE_WRITE) != 0) {
+ free(box);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+# endif
+
+ return box;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+ if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, box->pset) != 0 ||
+ setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, box->pset) != 0 ||
+ setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, box->pset) != 0)
+ fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno));
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+ priv_freeset(box->pset);
+ box->pset = NULL;
+ free(box);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
+{
+ /* Nothing to do here */
+}
+
+#endif /* SANDBOX_SOLARIS */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-systrace.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sandbox-systrace.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-systrace.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,200 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-systrace.c,v 1.9 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/ioctl.h>
-#include <sys/syscall.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-
-#include <dev/systrace.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-
-struct sandbox_policy {
- int syscall;
- int action;
-};
-
-/* Permitted syscalls in preauth. Unlisted syscalls get SYSTR_POLICY_KILL */
-static const struct sandbox_policy preauth_policy[] = {
- { SYS_open, SYSTR_POLICY_NEVER },
-
- { SYS___sysctl, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
- { SYS_close, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
- { SYS_exit, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
- { SYS_getpid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
- { SYS_gettimeofday, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
- { SYS_clock_gettime, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
- { SYS_madvise, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
- { SYS_mmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
- { SYS_mprotect, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
- { SYS_mquery, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
- { SYS_poll, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
- { SYS_munmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
- { SYS_read, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
- { SYS_select, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
- { SYS_shutdown, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
- { SYS_sigprocmask, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
- { SYS_write, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
- { -1, -1 }
-};
-
-struct ssh_sandbox {
- int systrace_fd;
- pid_t child_pid;
- void (*osigchld)(int);
-};
-
-struct ssh_sandbox *
-ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
-{
- struct ssh_sandbox *box;
-
- debug3("%s: preparing systrace sandbox", __func__);
- box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
- box->systrace_fd = -1;
- box->child_pid = 0;
- box->osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN);
-
- return box;
-}
-
-void
-ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
-{
- debug3("%s: ready", __func__);
- signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld);
- if (kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP) != 0)
- fatal("%s: kill(%d, SIGSTOP)", __func__, getpid());
- debug3("%s: started", __func__);
-}
-
-static void
-ssh_sandbox_parent(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid,
- const struct sandbox_policy *allowed_syscalls)
-{
- int dev_systrace, i, j, found, status;
- pid_t pid;
- struct systrace_policy policy;
-
- /* Wait for the child to send itself a SIGSTOP */
- debug3("%s: wait for child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid);
- do {
- pid = waitpid(child_pid, &status, WUNTRACED);
- } while (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR);
- signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld);
- if (!WIFSTOPPED(status)) {
- if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
- fatal("%s: child terminated with signal %d",
- __func__, WTERMSIG(status));
- if (WIFEXITED(status))
- fatal("%s: child exited with status %d",
- __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status));
- fatal("%s: child not stopped", __func__);
- }
- debug3("%s: child %ld stopped", __func__, (long)child_pid);
- box->child_pid = child_pid;
-
- /* Set up systracing of child */
- if ((dev_systrace = open("/dev/systrace", O_RDONLY)) == -1)
- fatal("%s: open(\"/dev/systrace\"): %s", __func__,
- strerror(errno));
- if (ioctl(dev_systrace, STRIOCCLONE, &box->systrace_fd) == -1)
- fatal("%s: ioctl(STRIOCCLONE, %d): %s", __func__,
- dev_systrace, strerror(errno));
- close(dev_systrace);
- debug3("%s: systrace attach, fd=%d", __func__, box->systrace_fd);
- if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCATTACH, &child_pid) == -1)
- fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCATTACH, %d): %s", __func__,
- box->systrace_fd, child_pid, strerror(errno));
-
- /* Allocate and assign policy */
- memset(&policy, 0, sizeof(policy));
- policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_NEW;
- policy.strp_maxents = SYS_MAXSYSCALL;
- if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1)
- fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (new)): %s", __func__,
- box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno));
-
- policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_ASSIGN;
- policy.strp_pid = box->child_pid;
- if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1)
- fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (assign)): %s",
- __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno));
-
- /* Set per-syscall policy */
- for (i = 0; i < SYS_MAXSYSCALL; i++) {
- found = 0;
- for (j = 0; allowed_syscalls[j].syscall != -1; j++) {
- if (allowed_syscalls[j].syscall == i) {
- found = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_MODIFY;
- policy.strp_code = i;
- policy.strp_policy = found ?
- allowed_syscalls[j].action : SYSTR_POLICY_KILL;
- if (found)
- debug3("%s: policy: enable syscall %d", __func__, i);
- if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1)
- fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (modify)): %s",
- __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno));
- }
-
- /* Signal the child to start running */
- debug3("%s: start child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid);
- if (kill(box->child_pid, SIGCONT) != 0)
- fatal("%s: kill(%d, SIGCONT)", __func__, box->child_pid);
-}
-
-void
-ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
-{
- /* Closing this before the child exits will terminate it */
- close(box->systrace_fd);
-
- free(box);
- debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
-}
-
-void
-ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
-{
- ssh_sandbox_parent(box, child_pid, preauth_policy);
-}
-
-#endif /* SANDBOX_SYSTRACE */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-systrace.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sandbox-systrace.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-systrace.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sandbox-systrace.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-systrace.c,v 1.18 2015/10/02 01:39:26 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <dev/systrace.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+struct sandbox_policy {
+ int syscall;
+ int action;
+};
+
+/* Permitted syscalls in preauth. Unlisted syscalls get SYSTR_POLICY_KILL */
+static const struct sandbox_policy preauth_policy[] = {
+ { SYS_exit, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+#ifdef SYS_kbind
+ { SYS_kbind, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+#endif
+
+ { SYS_getpid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+ { SYS_getpgid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+ { SYS_clock_gettime, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+ { SYS_gettimeofday, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+ { SYS_sigprocmask, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+
+#ifdef SYS_getentropy
+ /* OpenBSD 5.6 and newer use getentropy(2) to seed arc4random(3). */
+ { SYS_getentropy, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+#else
+ /* Previous releases used sysctl(3)'s kern.arnd variable. */
+ { SYS___sysctl, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+#endif
+#ifdef SYS_sendsyslog
+ { SYS_sendsyslog, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+#endif
+
+ { SYS_madvise, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+ { SYS_mmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+ { SYS_mprotect, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+ { SYS_mquery, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+ { SYS_munmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+
+ { SYS_poll, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+ { SYS_select, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+ { SYS_read, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+ { SYS_write, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+ { SYS_shutdown, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+ { SYS_close, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+
+ { SYS_open, SYSTR_POLICY_NEVER },
+
+ { -1, -1 }
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox {
+ int systrace_fd;
+ pid_t child_pid;
+ void (*osigchld)(int);
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox *
+ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+ struct ssh_sandbox *box;
+
+ debug3("%s: preparing systrace sandbox", __func__);
+ box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
+ box->systrace_fd = -1;
+ box->child_pid = 0;
+ box->osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN);
+
+ return box;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+ debug3("%s: ready", __func__);
+ signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld);
+ if (kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: kill(%d, SIGSTOP)", __func__, getpid());
+ debug3("%s: started", __func__);
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_sandbox_parent(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid,
+ const struct sandbox_policy *allowed_syscalls)
+{
+ int dev_systrace, i, j, found, status;
+ pid_t pid;
+ struct systrace_policy policy;
+
+ /* Wait for the child to send itself a SIGSTOP */
+ debug3("%s: wait for child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid);
+ do {
+ pid = waitpid(child_pid, &status, WUNTRACED);
+ } while (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+ signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld);
+ if (!WIFSTOPPED(status)) {
+ if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
+ fatal("%s: child terminated with signal %d",
+ __func__, WTERMSIG(status));
+ if (WIFEXITED(status))
+ fatal("%s: child exited with status %d",
+ __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ fatal("%s: child not stopped", __func__);
+ }
+ debug3("%s: child %ld stopped", __func__, (long)child_pid);
+ box->child_pid = child_pid;
+
+ /* Set up systracing of child */
+ if ((dev_systrace = open("/dev/systrace", O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: open(\"/dev/systrace\"): %s", __func__,
+ strerror(errno));
+ if (ioctl(dev_systrace, STRIOCCLONE, &box->systrace_fd) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: ioctl(STRIOCCLONE, %d): %s", __func__,
+ dev_systrace, strerror(errno));
+ close(dev_systrace);
+ debug3("%s: systrace attach, fd=%d", __func__, box->systrace_fd);
+ if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCATTACH, &child_pid) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCATTACH, %d): %s", __func__,
+ box->systrace_fd, child_pid, strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Allocate and assign policy */
+ memset(&policy, 0, sizeof(policy));
+ policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_NEW;
+ policy.strp_maxents = SYS_MAXSYSCALL;
+ if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (new)): %s", __func__,
+ box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno));
+
+ policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_ASSIGN;
+ policy.strp_pid = box->child_pid;
+ if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (assign)): %s",
+ __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Set per-syscall policy */
+ for (i = 0; i < SYS_MAXSYSCALL; i++) {
+ found = 0;
+ for (j = 0; allowed_syscalls[j].syscall != -1; j++) {
+ if (allowed_syscalls[j].syscall == i) {
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_MODIFY;
+ policy.strp_code = i;
+ policy.strp_policy = found ?
+ allowed_syscalls[j].action : SYSTR_POLICY_KILL;
+ if (found)
+ debug3("%s: policy: enable syscall %d", __func__, i);
+ if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (modify)): %s",
+ __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno));
+ }
+
+ /* Signal the child to start running */
+ debug3("%s: start child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid);
+ if (kill(box->child_pid, SIGCONT) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: kill(%d, SIGCONT)", __func__, box->child_pid);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+ /* Closing this before the child exits will terminate it */
+ close(box->systrace_fd);
+
+ free(box);
+ debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
+{
+ ssh_sandbox_parent(box, child_pid, preauth_policy);
+}
+
+#endif /* SANDBOX_SYSTRACE */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scp.0
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.0 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scp.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
-SCP(1) OpenBSD Reference Manual SCP(1)
-
-NAME
- scp - secure copy (remote file copy program)
-
-SYNOPSIS
- scp [-12346BCpqrv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]
- [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program]
- [[user@]host1:]file1 ... [[user@]host2:]file2
-
-DESCRIPTION
- scp copies files between hosts on a network. It uses ssh(1) for data
- transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the same security
- as ssh(1). Unlike rcp(1), scp will ask for passwords or passphrases if
- they are needed for authentication.
-
- File names may contain a user and host specification to indicate that the
- file is to be copied to/from that host. Local file names can be made
- explicit using absolute or relative pathnames to avoid scp treating file
- names containing `:' as host specifiers. Copies between two remote hosts
- are also permitted.
-
- The options are as follows:
-
- -1 Forces scp to use protocol 1.
-
- -2 Forces scp to use protocol 2.
-
- -3 Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local
- host. Without this option the data is copied directly between
- the two remote hosts. Note that this option disables the
- progress meter.
-
- -4 Forces scp to use IPv4 addresses only.
-
- -6 Forces scp to use IPv6 addresses only.
-
- -B Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or
- passphrases).
-
- -C Compression enable. Passes the -C flag to ssh(1) to enable
- compression.
-
- -c cipher
- Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer. This
- option is directly passed to ssh(1).
-
- -F ssh_config
- Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for ssh.
- This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
-
- -i identity_file
- Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public
- key authentication is read. This option is directly passed to
- ssh(1).
-
- -l limit
- Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
-
- -o ssh_option
- Can be used to pass options to ssh in the format used in
- ssh_config(5). This is useful for specifying options for which
- there is no separate scp command-line flag. For full details of
- the options listed below, and their possible values, see
- ssh_config(5).
-
- AddressFamily
- BatchMode
- BindAddress
- CanonicalDomains
- CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
- CanonicalizeHostname
- CanonicalizeMaxDots
- CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
- ChallengeResponseAuthentication
- CheckHostIP
- Cipher
- Ciphers
- Compression
- CompressionLevel
- ConnectionAttempts
- ConnectTimeout
- ControlMaster
- ControlPath
- ControlPersist
- GlobalKnownHostsFile
- GSSAPIAuthentication
- GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
- HashKnownHosts
- Host
- HostbasedAuthentication
- HostKeyAlgorithms
- HostKeyAlias
- HostName
- IdentityFile
- IdentitiesOnly
- IPQoS
- KbdInteractiveAuthentication
- KbdInteractiveDevices
- KexAlgorithms
- LogLevel
- MACs
- NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
- NumberOfPasswordPrompts
- PasswordAuthentication
- PKCS11Provider
- Port
- PreferredAuthentications
- Protocol
- ProxyCommand
- PubkeyAuthentication
- RekeyLimit
- RhostsRSAAuthentication
- RSAAuthentication
- SendEnv
- ServerAliveInterval
- ServerAliveCountMax
- StrictHostKeyChecking
- TCPKeepAlive
- UsePrivilegedPort
- User
- UserKnownHostsFile
- VerifyHostKeyDNS
-
- -P port
- Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host. Note that
- this option is written with a capital `P', because -p is already
- reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file in
- rcp(1).
-
- -p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
- original file.
-
- -q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
- diagnostic messages from ssh(1).
-
- -r Recursively copy entire directories. Note that scp follows
- symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
-
- -S program
- Name of program to use for the encrypted connection. The program
- must understand ssh(1) options.
-
- -v Verbose mode. Causes scp and ssh(1) to print debugging messages
- about their progress. This is helpful in debugging connection,
- authentication, and configuration problems.
-
-EXIT STATUS
- The scp utility exits 0 on success, and >0 if an error occurs.
-
-SEE ALSO
- rcp(1), sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1),
- ssh_config(5), sshd(8)
-
-HISTORY
- scp is based on the rcp(1) program in BSD source code from the Regents of
- the University of California.
-
-AUTHORS
- Timo Rinne <tri at iki.fi>
- Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
-
-OpenBSD 5.5 October 20, 2013 OpenBSD 5.5
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scp.0 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.0)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scp.0 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scp.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+SCP(1) General Commands Manual SCP(1)
+
+NAME
+ scp M-bM-^@M-^S secure copy (remote file copy program)
+
+SYNOPSIS
+ scp [-12346BCpqrv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]
+ [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program]
+ [[user@]host1:]file1 ... [[user@]host2:]file2
+
+DESCRIPTION
+ scp copies files between hosts on a network. It uses ssh(1) for data
+ transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the same security
+ as ssh(1). scp will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed
+ for authentication.
+
+ File names may contain a user and host specification to indicate that the
+ file is to be copied to/from that host. Local file names can be made
+ explicit using absolute or relative pathnames to avoid scp treating file
+ names containing M-bM-^@M-^X:M-bM-^@M-^Y as host specifiers. Copies between two remote hosts
+ are also permitted.
+
+ The options are as follows:
+
+ -1 Forces scp to use protocol 1.
+
+ -2 Forces scp to use protocol 2.
+
+ -3 Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local
+ host. Without this option the data is copied directly between
+ the two remote hosts. Note that this option disables the
+ progress meter.
+
+ -4 Forces scp to use IPv4 addresses only.
+
+ -6 Forces scp to use IPv6 addresses only.
+
+ -B Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or
+ passphrases).
+
+ -C Compression enable. Passes the -C flag to ssh(1) to enable
+ compression.
+
+ -c cipher
+ Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer. This
+ option is directly passed to ssh(1).
+
+ -F ssh_config
+ Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for ssh.
+ This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
+
+ -i identity_file
+ Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public
+ key authentication is read. This option is directly passed to
+ ssh(1).
+
+ -l limit
+ Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
+
+ -o ssh_option
+ Can be used to pass options to ssh in the format used in
+ ssh_config(5). This is useful for specifying options for which
+ there is no separate scp command-line flag. For full details of
+ the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+ ssh_config(5).
+
+ AddressFamily
+ BatchMode
+ BindAddress
+ CanonicalDomains
+ CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+ CanonicalizeHostname
+ CanonicalizeMaxDots
+ CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+ CertificateFile
+ ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+ CheckHostIP
+ Cipher
+ Ciphers
+ Compression
+ CompressionLevel
+ ConnectionAttempts
+ ConnectTimeout
+ ControlMaster
+ ControlPath
+ ControlPersist
+ GlobalKnownHostsFile
+ GSSAPIAuthentication
+ GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ HashKnownHosts
+ Host
+ HostbasedAuthentication
+ HostbasedKeyTypes
+ HostKeyAlgorithms
+ HostKeyAlias
+ HostName
+ IdentitiesOnly
+ IdentityAgent
+ IdentityFile
+ IPQoS
+ KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+ KbdInteractiveDevices
+ KexAlgorithms
+ LogLevel
+ MACs
+ NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+ NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+ PasswordAuthentication
+ PKCS11Provider
+ Port
+ PreferredAuthentications
+ Protocol
+ ProxyCommand
+ ProxyJump
+ PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+ PubkeyAuthentication
+ RekeyLimit
+ RhostsRSAAuthentication
+ RSAAuthentication
+ SendEnv
+ ServerAliveInterval
+ ServerAliveCountMax
+ StrictHostKeyChecking
+ TCPKeepAlive
+ UpdateHostKeys
+ UsePrivilegedPort
+ User
+ UserKnownHostsFile
+ VerifyHostKeyDNS
+
+ -P port
+ Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host. Note that
+ this option is written with a capital M-bM-^@M-^XPM-bM-^@M-^Y, because -p is already
+ reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file.
+
+ -p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
+ original file.
+
+ -q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
+ diagnostic messages from ssh(1).
+
+ -r Recursively copy entire directories. Note that scp follows
+ symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
+
+ -S program
+ Name of program to use for the encrypted connection. The program
+ must understand ssh(1) options.
+
+ -v Verbose mode. Causes scp and ssh(1) to print debugging messages
+ about their progress. This is helpful in debugging connection,
+ authentication, and configuration problems.
+
+EXIT STATUS
+ The scp utility exitsM-BM- 0 on success, andM-BM- >0 if an error occurs.
+
+SEE ALSO
+ sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5),
+ sshd(8)
+
+HISTORY
+ scp is based on the rcp program in BSD source code from the Regents of
+ the University of California.
+
+AUTHORS
+ Timo Rinne <tri at iki.fi>
+ Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+
+OpenBSD 6.0 July 16, 2016 OpenBSD 6.0
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scp.1
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.1 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scp.1 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,245 +0,0 @@
-.\"
-.\" scp.1
-.\"
-.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
-.\"
-.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
-.\" All rights reserved
-.\"
-.\" Created: Sun May 7 00:14:37 1995 ylo
-.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.61 2013/10/20 09:51:26 djm Exp $
-.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: October 20 2013 $
-.Dt SCP 1
-.Os
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm scp
-.Nd secure copy (remote file copy program)
-.Sh SYNOPSIS
-.Nm scp
-.Bk -words
-.Op Fl 12346BCpqrv
-.Op Fl c Ar cipher
-.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
-.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
-.Op Fl l Ar limit
-.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
-.Op Fl P Ar port
-.Op Fl S Ar program
-.Sm off
-.Oo
-.Op Ar user No @
-.Ar host1 No :
-.Oc Ar file1
-.Sm on
-.Ar ...
-.Sm off
-.Oo
-.Op Ar user No @
-.Ar host2 No :
-.Oc Ar file2
-.Sm on
-.Ek
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-.Nm
-copies files between hosts on a network.
-It uses
-.Xr ssh 1
-for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the
-same security as
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-Unlike
-.Xr rcp 1 ,
-.Nm
-will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for
-authentication.
-.Pp
-File names may contain a user and host specification to indicate
-that the file is to be copied to/from that host.
-Local file names can be made explicit using absolute or relative pathnames
-to avoid
-.Nm
-treating file names containing
-.Sq :\&
-as host specifiers.
-Copies between two remote hosts are also permitted.
-.Pp
-The options are as follows:
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Fl 1
-Forces
-.Nm
-to use protocol 1.
-.It Fl 2
-Forces
-.Nm
-to use protocol 2.
-.It Fl 3
-Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host.
-Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote
-hosts.
-Note that this option disables the progress meter.
-.It Fl 4
-Forces
-.Nm
-to use IPv4 addresses only.
-.It Fl 6
-Forces
-.Nm
-to use IPv6 addresses only.
-.It Fl B
-Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or passphrases).
-.It Fl C
-Compression enable.
-Passes the
-.Fl C
-flag to
-.Xr ssh 1
-to enable compression.
-.It Fl c Ar cipher
-Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer.
-This option is directly passed to
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-.It Fl F Ar ssh_config
-Specifies an alternative
-per-user configuration file for
-.Nm ssh .
-This option is directly passed to
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-.It Fl i Ar identity_file
-Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key
-authentication is read.
-This option is directly passed to
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-.It Fl l Ar limit
-Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
-.It Fl o Ar ssh_option
-Can be used to pass options to
-.Nm ssh
-in the format used in
-.Xr ssh_config 5 .
-This is useful for specifying options
-for which there is no separate
-.Nm scp
-command-line flag.
-For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
-.Xr ssh_config 5 .
-.Pp
-.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact
-.It AddressFamily
-.It BatchMode
-.It BindAddress
-.It CanonicalDomains
-.It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
-.It CanonicalizeHostname
-.It CanonicalizeMaxDots
-.It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
-.It ChallengeResponseAuthentication
-.It CheckHostIP
-.It Cipher
-.It Ciphers
-.It Compression
-.It CompressionLevel
-.It ConnectionAttempts
-.It ConnectTimeout
-.It ControlMaster
-.It ControlPath
-.It ControlPersist
-.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
-.It GSSAPIAuthentication
-.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
-.It HashKnownHosts
-.It Host
-.It HostbasedAuthentication
-.It HostKeyAlgorithms
-.It HostKeyAlias
-.It HostName
-.It IdentityFile
-.It IdentitiesOnly
-.It IPQoS
-.It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
-.It KbdInteractiveDevices
-.It KexAlgorithms
-.It LogLevel
-.It MACs
-.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
-.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
-.It PasswordAuthentication
-.It PKCS11Provider
-.It Port
-.It PreferredAuthentications
-.It Protocol
-.It ProxyCommand
-.It PubkeyAuthentication
-.It RekeyLimit
-.It RhostsRSAAuthentication
-.It RSAAuthentication
-.It SendEnv
-.It ServerAliveInterval
-.It ServerAliveCountMax
-.It StrictHostKeyChecking
-.It TCPKeepAlive
-.It UsePrivilegedPort
-.It User
-.It UserKnownHostsFile
-.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
-.El
-.It Fl P Ar port
-Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
-Note that this option is written with a capital
-.Sq P ,
-because
-.Fl p
-is already reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file in
-.Xr rcp 1 .
-.It Fl p
-Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
-original file.
-.It Fl q
-Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and diagnostic
-messages from
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-.It Fl r
-Recursively copy entire directories.
-Note that
-.Nm
-follows symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
-.It Fl S Ar program
-Name of
-.Ar program
-to use for the encrypted connection.
-The program must understand
-.Xr ssh 1
-options.
-.It Fl v
-Verbose mode.
-Causes
-.Nm
-and
-.Xr ssh 1
-to print debugging messages about their progress.
-This is helpful in
-debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
-.El
-.Sh EXIT STATUS
-.Ex -std scp
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr rcp 1 ,
-.Xr sftp 1 ,
-.Xr ssh 1 ,
-.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
-.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
-.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
-.Xr sshd 8
-.Sh HISTORY
-.Nm
-is based on the
-.Xr rcp 1
-program in
-.Bx
-source code from the Regents of the University of California.
-.Sh AUTHORS
-.An Timo Rinne Aq Mt tri at iki.fi
-.An Tatu Ylonen Aq Mt ylo at cs.hut.fi
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scp.1 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.1)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scp.1 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scp.1 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+.\"
+.\" scp.1
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\" All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" Created: Sun May 7 00:14:37 1995 ylo
+.\"
+.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.71 2016/07/16 06:57:55 jmc Exp $
+.\"
+.Dd $Mdocdate: July 16 2016 $
+.Dt SCP 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm scp
+.Nd secure copy (remote file copy program)
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm scp
+.Bk -words
+.Op Fl 12346BCpqrv
+.Op Fl c Ar cipher
+.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
+.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
+.Op Fl l Ar limit
+.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
+.Op Fl P Ar port
+.Op Fl S Ar program
+.Sm off
+.Oo
+.Op Ar user No @
+.Ar host1 :
+.Oc Ar file1
+.Sm on
+.Ar ...
+.Sm off
+.Oo
+.Op Ar user No @
+.Ar host2 :
+.Oc Ar file2
+.Sm on
+.Ek
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+copies files between hosts on a network.
+It uses
+.Xr ssh 1
+for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the
+same security as
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.Nm
+will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for
+authentication.
+.Pp
+File names may contain a user and host specification to indicate
+that the file is to be copied to/from that host.
+Local file names can be made explicit using absolute or relative pathnames
+to avoid
+.Nm
+treating file names containing
+.Sq :\&
+as host specifiers.
+Copies between two remote hosts are also permitted.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl 1
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use protocol 1.
+.It Fl 2
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use protocol 2.
+.It Fl 3
+Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host.
+Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote
+hosts.
+Note that this option disables the progress meter.
+.It Fl 4
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv4 addresses only.
+.It Fl 6
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.It Fl B
+Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or passphrases).
+.It Fl C
+Compression enable.
+Passes the
+.Fl C
+flag to
+.Xr ssh 1
+to enable compression.
+.It Fl c Ar cipher
+Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer.
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl F Ar ssh_config
+Specifies an alternative
+per-user configuration file for
+.Nm ssh .
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl i Ar identity_file
+Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key
+authentication is read.
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl l Ar limit
+Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
+.It Fl o Ar ssh_option
+Can be used to pass options to
+.Nm ssh
+in the format used in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+This is useful for specifying options
+for which there is no separate
+.Nm scp
+command-line flag.
+For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact
+.It AddressFamily
+.It BatchMode
+.It BindAddress
+.It CanonicalDomains
+.It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+.It CanonicalizeHostname
+.It CanonicalizeMaxDots
+.It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+.It CertificateFile
+.It ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+.It CheckHostIP
+.It Cipher
+.It Ciphers
+.It Compression
+.It CompressionLevel
+.It ConnectionAttempts
+.It ConnectTimeout
+.It ControlMaster
+.It ControlPath
+.It ControlPersist
+.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
+.It GSSAPIAuthentication
+.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+.It HashKnownHosts
+.It Host
+.It HostbasedAuthentication
+.It HostbasedKeyTypes
+.It HostKeyAlgorithms
+.It HostKeyAlias
+.It HostName
+.It IdentitiesOnly
+.It IdentityAgent
+.It IdentityFile
+.It IPQoS
+.It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+.It KbdInteractiveDevices
+.It KexAlgorithms
+.It LogLevel
+.It MACs
+.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+.It PasswordAuthentication
+.It PKCS11Provider
+.It Port
+.It PreferredAuthentications
+.It Protocol
+.It ProxyCommand
+.It ProxyJump
+.It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+.It PubkeyAuthentication
+.It RekeyLimit
+.It RhostsRSAAuthentication
+.It RSAAuthentication
+.It SendEnv
+.It ServerAliveInterval
+.It ServerAliveCountMax
+.It StrictHostKeyChecking
+.It TCPKeepAlive
+.It UpdateHostKeys
+.It UsePrivilegedPort
+.It User
+.It UserKnownHostsFile
+.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
+.El
+.It Fl P Ar port
+Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
+Note that this option is written with a capital
+.Sq P ,
+because
+.Fl p
+is already reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file.
+.It Fl p
+Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
+original file.
+.It Fl q
+Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and diagnostic
+messages from
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl r
+Recursively copy entire directories.
+Note that
+.Nm
+follows symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
+.It Fl S Ar program
+Name of
+.Ar program
+to use for the encrypted connection.
+The program must understand
+.Xr ssh 1
+options.
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode.
+Causes
+.Nm
+and
+.Xr ssh 1
+to print debugging messages about their progress.
+This is helpful in
+debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
+.El
+.Sh EXIT STATUS
+.Ex -std scp
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr sftp 1 ,
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh HISTORY
+.Nm
+is based on the rcp program in
+.Bx
+source code from the Regents of the University of California.
+.Sh AUTHORS
+.An Timo Rinne Aq Mt tri at iki.fi
+.An Tatu Ylonen Aq Mt ylo at cs.hut.fi
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scp.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scp.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1346 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.179 2013/11/20 20:53:10 deraadt Exp $ */
-/*
- * scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which
- * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
- *
- * NOTE: This version should NOT be suid root. (This uses ssh to
- * do the transfer and ssh has the necessary privileges.)
- *
- * 1995 Timo Rinne <tri at iki.fi>, Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-/*
- * Parts from:
- *
- * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995
- * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
- * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
- * without specific prior written permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
-# include <sys/stat.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
-#include <poll.h>
-#else
-# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
-# include <sys/poll.h>
-# endif
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
-
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <dirent.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
-#include <vis.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "progressmeter.h"
-
-extern char *__progname;
-
-#define COPY_BUFLEN 16384
-
-int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout);
-int do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout);
-
-/* Struct for addargs */
-arglist args;
-arglist remote_remote_args;
-
-/* Bandwidth limit */
-long long limit_kbps = 0;
-struct bwlimit bwlimit;
-
-/* Name of current file being transferred. */
-char *curfile;
-
-/* This is set to non-zero to enable verbose mode. */
-int verbose_mode = 0;
-
-/* This is set to zero if the progressmeter is not desired. */
-int showprogress = 1;
-
-/*
- * This is set to non-zero if remote-remote copy should be piped
- * through this process.
- */
-int throughlocal = 0;
-
-/* This is the program to execute for the secured connection. ("ssh" or -S) */
-char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM;
-
-/* This is used to store the pid of ssh_program */
-pid_t do_cmd_pid = -1;
-
-static void
-killchild(int signo)
-{
- if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
- kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
- waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
- }
-
- if (signo)
- _exit(1);
- exit(1);
-}
-
-static void
-suspchild(int signo)
-{
- int status;
-
- if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
- kill(do_cmd_pid, signo);
- while (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, WUNTRACED) == -1 &&
- errno == EINTR)
- ;
- kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
- }
-}
-
-static int
-do_local_cmd(arglist *a)
-{
- u_int i;
- int status;
- pid_t pid;
-
- if (a->num == 0)
- fatal("do_local_cmd: no arguments");
-
- if (verbose_mode) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Executing:");
- for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
- if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
- fatal("do_local_cmd: fork: %s", strerror(errno));
-
- if (pid == 0) {
- execvp(a->list[0], a->list);
- perror(a->list[0]);
- exit(1);
- }
-
- do_cmd_pid = pid;
- signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
- signal(SIGINT, killchild);
- signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
-
- while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
- if (errno != EINTR)
- fatal("do_local_cmd: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
-
- do_cmd_pid = -1;
-
- if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
- return (-1);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-/*
- * This function executes the given command as the specified user on the
- * given host. This returns < 0 if execution fails, and >= 0 otherwise. This
- * assigns the input and output file descriptors on success.
- */
-
-int
-do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout)
-{
- int pin[2], pout[2], reserved[2];
-
- if (verbose_mode)
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Executing: program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n",
- ssh_program, host,
- remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd);
-
- /*
- * Reserve two descriptors so that the real pipes won't get
- * descriptors 0 and 1 because that will screw up dup2 below.
- */
- if (pipe(reserved) < 0)
- fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
-
- /* Create a socket pair for communicating with ssh. */
- if (pipe(pin) < 0)
- fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (pipe(pout) < 0)
- fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
-
- /* Free the reserved descriptors. */
- close(reserved[0]);
- close(reserved[1]);
-
- signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild);
- signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild);
- signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild);
-
- /* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */
- do_cmd_pid = fork();
- if (do_cmd_pid == 0) {
- /* Child. */
- close(pin[1]);
- close(pout[0]);
- dup2(pin[0], 0);
- dup2(pout[1], 1);
- close(pin[0]);
- close(pout[1]);
-
- replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
- if (remuser != NULL) {
- addargs(&args, "-l");
- addargs(&args, "%s", remuser);
- }
- addargs(&args, "--");
- addargs(&args, "%s", host);
- addargs(&args, "%s", cmd);
-
- execvp(ssh_program, args.list);
- perror(ssh_program);
- exit(1);
- } else if (do_cmd_pid == -1) {
- fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
- }
- /* Parent. Close the other side, and return the local side. */
- close(pin[0]);
- *fdout = pin[1];
- close(pout[1]);
- *fdin = pout[0];
- signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
- signal(SIGINT, killchild);
- signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * This functions executes a command simlar to do_cmd(), but expects the
- * input and output descriptors to be setup by a previous call to do_cmd().
- * This way the input and output of two commands can be connected.
- */
-int
-do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout)
-{
- pid_t pid;
- int status;
-
- if (verbose_mode)
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Executing: 2nd program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n",
- ssh_program, host,
- remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd);
-
- /* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */
- pid = fork();
- if (pid == 0) {
- dup2(fdin, 0);
- dup2(fdout, 1);
-
- replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
- if (remuser != NULL) {
- addargs(&args, "-l");
- addargs(&args, "%s", remuser);
- }
- addargs(&args, "--");
- addargs(&args, "%s", host);
- addargs(&args, "%s", cmd);
-
- execvp(ssh_program, args.list);
- perror(ssh_program);
- exit(1);
- } else if (pid == -1) {
- fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
- }
- while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
- if (errno != EINTR)
- fatal("do_cmd2: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
- return 0;
-}
-
-typedef struct {
- size_t cnt;
- char *buf;
-} BUF;
-
-BUF *allocbuf(BUF *, int, int);
-void lostconn(int);
-int okname(char *);
-void run_err(const char *,...);
-void verifydir(char *);
-
-struct passwd *pwd;
-uid_t userid;
-int errs, remin, remout;
-int pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
-
-#define CMDNEEDS 64
-char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */
-
-int response(void);
-void rsource(char *, struct stat *);
-void sink(int, char *[]);
-void source(int, char *[]);
-void tolocal(int, char *[]);
-void toremote(char *, int, char *[]);
-void usage(void);
-
-int
-main(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- int ch, fflag, tflag, status, n;
- char *targ, **newargv;
- const char *errstr;
- extern char *optarg;
- extern int optind;
-
- /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
- sanitise_stdfd();
-
- /* Copy argv, because we modify it */
- newargv = xcalloc(MAX(argc + 1, 1), sizeof(*newargv));
- for (n = 0; n < argc; n++)
- newargv[n] = xstrdup(argv[n]);
- argv = newargv;
-
- __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
-
- memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args));
- memset(&remote_remote_args, '\0', sizeof(remote_remote_args));
- args.list = remote_remote_args.list = NULL;
- addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program);
- addargs(&args, "-x");
- addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent=no");
- addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand=no");
- addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
-
- fflag = tflag = 0;
- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:")) != -1)
- switch (ch) {
- /* User-visible flags. */
- case '1':
- case '2':
- case '4':
- case '6':
- case 'C':
- addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
- addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch);
- break;
- case '3':
- throughlocal = 1;
- break;
- case 'o':
- case 'c':
- case 'i':
- case 'F':
- addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch);
- addargs(&remote_remote_args, "%s", optarg);
- addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
- addargs(&args, "%s", optarg);
- break;
- case 'P':
- addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-p");
- addargs(&remote_remote_args, "%s", optarg);
- addargs(&args, "-p");
- addargs(&args, "%s", optarg);
- break;
- case 'B':
- addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-oBatchmode=yes");
- addargs(&args, "-oBatchmode=yes");
- break;
- case 'l':
- limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024,
- &errstr);
- if (errstr != NULL)
- usage();
- limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */
- bandwidth_limit_init(&bwlimit, limit_kbps, COPY_BUFLEN);
- break;
- case 'p':
- pflag = 1;
- break;
- case 'r':
- iamrecursive = 1;
- break;
- case 'S':
- ssh_program = xstrdup(optarg);
- break;
- case 'v':
- addargs(&args, "-v");
- addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-v");
- verbose_mode = 1;
- break;
- case 'q':
- addargs(&args, "-q");
- addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-q");
- showprogress = 0;
- break;
-
- /* Server options. */
- case 'd':
- targetshouldbedirectory = 1;
- break;
- case 'f': /* "from" */
- iamremote = 1;
- fflag = 1;
- break;
- case 't': /* "to" */
- iamremote = 1;
- tflag = 1;
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- setmode(0, O_BINARY);
-#endif
- break;
- default:
- usage();
- }
- argc -= optind;
- argv += optind;
-
- if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL)
- fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid);
-
- if (!isatty(STDOUT_FILENO))
- showprogress = 0;
-
- remin = STDIN_FILENO;
- remout = STDOUT_FILENO;
-
- if (fflag) {
- /* Follow "protocol", send data. */
- (void) response();
- source(argc, argv);
- exit(errs != 0);
- }
- if (tflag) {
- /* Receive data. */
- sink(argc, argv);
- exit(errs != 0);
- }
- if (argc < 2)
- usage();
- if (argc > 2)
- targetshouldbedirectory = 1;
-
- remin = remout = -1;
- do_cmd_pid = -1;
- /* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */
- (void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "scp%s%s%s%s",
- verbose_mode ? " -v" : "",
- iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "",
- targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : "");
-
- (void) signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn);
-
- if ((targ = colon(argv[argc - 1]))) /* Dest is remote host. */
- toremote(targ, argc, argv);
- else {
- if (targetshouldbedirectory)
- verifydir(argv[argc - 1]);
- tolocal(argc, argv); /* Dest is local host. */
- }
- /*
- * Finally check the exit status of the ssh process, if one was forked
- * and no error has occurred yet
- */
- if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && errs == 0) {
- if (remin != -1)
- (void) close(remin);
- if (remout != -1)
- (void) close(remout);
- if (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
- errs = 1;
- else {
- if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
- errs = 1;
- }
- }
- exit(errs != 0);
-}
-
-/* Callback from atomicio6 to update progress meter and limit bandwidth */
-static int
-scpio(void *_cnt, size_t s)
-{
- off_t *cnt = (off_t *)_cnt;
-
- *cnt += s;
- if (limit_kbps > 0)
- bandwidth_limit(&bwlimit, s);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-do_times(int fd, int verb, const struct stat *sb)
-{
- /* strlen(2^64) == 20; strlen(10^6) == 7 */
- char buf[(20 + 7 + 2) * 2 + 2];
-
- (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "T%llu 0 %llu 0\n",
- (unsigned long long) (sb->st_mtime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_mtime),
- (unsigned long long) (sb->st_atime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_atime));
- if (verb) {
- fprintf(stderr, "File mtime %lld atime %lld\n",
- (long long)sb->st_mtime, (long long)sb->st_atime);
- fprintf(stderr, "Sending file timestamps: %s", buf);
- }
- (void) atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, strlen(buf));
- return (response());
-}
-
-void
-toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv)
-{
- char *bp, *host, *src, *suser, *thost, *tuser, *arg;
- arglist alist;
- int i;
- u_int j;
-
- memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist));
- alist.list = NULL;
-
- *targ++ = 0;
- if (*targ == 0)
- targ = ".";
-
- arg = xstrdup(argv[argc - 1]);
- if ((thost = strrchr(arg, '@'))) {
- /* user at host */
- *thost++ = 0;
- tuser = arg;
- if (*tuser == '\0')
- tuser = NULL;
- } else {
- thost = arg;
- tuser = NULL;
- }
-
- if (tuser != NULL && !okname(tuser)) {
- free(arg);
- return;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) {
- src = colon(argv[i]);
- if (src && throughlocal) { /* extended remote to remote */
- *src++ = 0;
- if (*src == 0)
- src = ".";
- host = strrchr(argv[i], '@');
- if (host) {
- *host++ = 0;
- host = cleanhostname(host);
- suser = argv[i];
- if (*suser == '\0')
- suser = pwd->pw_name;
- else if (!okname(suser))
- continue;
- } else {
- host = cleanhostname(argv[i]);
- suser = NULL;
- }
- xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s", cmd,
- *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src);
- if (do_cmd(host, suser, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0)
- exit(1);
- free(bp);
- host = cleanhostname(thost);
- xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd,
- *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ);
- if (do_cmd2(host, tuser, bp, remin, remout) < 0)
- exit(1);
- free(bp);
- (void) close(remin);
- (void) close(remout);
- remin = remout = -1;
- } else if (src) { /* standard remote to remote */
- freeargs(&alist);
- addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
- addargs(&alist, "-x");
- addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
- addargs(&alist, "-n");
- for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
- addargs(&alist, "%s",
- remote_remote_args.list[j]);
- }
- *src++ = 0;
- if (*src == 0)
- src = ".";
- host = strrchr(argv[i], '@');
-
- if (host) {
- *host++ = 0;
- host = cleanhostname(host);
- suser = argv[i];
- if (*suser == '\0')
- suser = pwd->pw_name;
- else if (!okname(suser))
- continue;
- addargs(&alist, "-l");
- addargs(&alist, "%s", suser);
- } else {
- host = cleanhostname(argv[i]);
- }
- addargs(&alist, "--");
- addargs(&alist, "%s", host);
- addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd);
- addargs(&alist, "%s", src);
- addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s",
- tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "",
- thost, targ);
- if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0)
- errs = 1;
- } else { /* local to remote */
- if (remin == -1) {
- xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd,
- *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ);
- host = cleanhostname(thost);
- if (do_cmd(host, tuser, bp, &remin,
- &remout) < 0)
- exit(1);
- if (response() < 0)
- exit(1);
- free(bp);
- }
- source(1, argv + i);
- }
- }
- free(arg);
-}
-
-void
-tolocal(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- char *bp, *host, *src, *suser;
- arglist alist;
- int i;
-
- memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist));
- alist.list = NULL;
-
- for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) {
- if (!(src = colon(argv[i]))) { /* Local to local. */
- freeargs(&alist);
- addargs(&alist, "%s", _PATH_CP);
- if (iamrecursive)
- addargs(&alist, "-r");
- if (pflag)
- addargs(&alist, "-p");
- addargs(&alist, "--");
- addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[i]);
- addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[argc-1]);
- if (do_local_cmd(&alist))
- ++errs;
- continue;
- }
- *src++ = 0;
- if (*src == 0)
- src = ".";
- if ((host = strrchr(argv[i], '@')) == NULL) {
- host = argv[i];
- suser = NULL;
- } else {
- *host++ = 0;
- suser = argv[i];
- if (*suser == '\0')
- suser = pwd->pw_name;
- }
- host = cleanhostname(host);
- xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s",
- cmd, *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src);
- if (do_cmd(host, suser, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) {
- free(bp);
- ++errs;
- continue;
- }
- free(bp);
- sink(1, argv + argc - 1);
- (void) close(remin);
- remin = remout = -1;
- }
-}
-
-void
-source(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- struct stat stb;
- static BUF buffer;
- BUF *bp;
- off_t i, statbytes;
- size_t amt;
- int fd = -1, haderr, indx;
- char *last, *name, buf[2048], encname[MAXPATHLEN];
- int len;
-
- for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) {
- name = argv[indx];
- statbytes = 0;
- len = strlen(name);
- while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/')
- name[--len] = '\0';
- if ((fd = open(name, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK, 0)) < 0)
- goto syserr;
- if (strchr(name, '\n') != NULL) {
- strnvis(encname, name, sizeof(encname), VIS_NL);
- name = encname;
- }
- if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) {
-syserr: run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
- goto next;
- }
- if (stb.st_size < 0) {
- run_err("%s: %s", name, "Negative file size");
- goto next;
- }
- unset_nonblock(fd);
- switch (stb.st_mode & S_IFMT) {
- case S_IFREG:
- break;
- case S_IFDIR:
- if (iamrecursive) {
- rsource(name, &stb);
- goto next;
- }
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- default:
- run_err("%s: not a regular file", name);
- goto next;
- }
- if ((last = strrchr(name, '/')) == NULL)
- last = name;
- else
- ++last;
- curfile = last;
- if (pflag) {
- if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, &stb) < 0)
- goto next;
- }
-#define FILEMODEMASK (S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s\n",
- (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK),
- (long long)stb.st_size, last);
- if (verbose_mode) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Sending file modes: %s", buf);
- }
- (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, buf, strlen(buf));
- if (response() < 0)
- goto next;
- if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, fd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) {
-next: if (fd != -1) {
- (void) close(fd);
- fd = -1;
- }
- continue;
- }
- if (showprogress)
- start_progress_meter(curfile, stb.st_size, &statbytes);
- set_nonblock(remout);
- for (haderr = i = 0; i < stb.st_size; i += bp->cnt) {
- amt = bp->cnt;
- if (i + (off_t)amt > stb.st_size)
- amt = stb.st_size - i;
- if (!haderr) {
- if (atomicio(read, fd, bp->buf, amt) != amt)
- haderr = errno;
- }
- /* Keep writing after error to retain sync */
- if (haderr) {
- (void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt);
- continue;
- }
- if (atomicio6(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt, scpio,
- &statbytes) != amt)
- haderr = errno;
- }
- unset_nonblock(remout);
- if (showprogress)
- stop_progress_meter();
-
- if (fd != -1) {
- if (close(fd) < 0 && !haderr)
- haderr = errno;
- fd = -1;
- }
- if (!haderr)
- (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
- else
- run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr));
- (void) response();
- }
-}
-
-void
-rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp)
-{
- DIR *dirp;
- struct dirent *dp;
- char *last, *vect[1], path[MAXPATHLEN];
-
- if (!(dirp = opendir(name))) {
- run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
- return;
- }
- last = strrchr(name, '/');
- if (last == 0)
- last = name;
- else
- last++;
- if (pflag) {
- if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, statp) < 0) {
- closedir(dirp);
- return;
- }
- }
- (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "D%04o %d %.1024s\n",
- (u_int) (statp->st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), 0, last);
- if (verbose_mode)
- fprintf(stderr, "Entering directory: %s", path);
- (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, path, strlen(path));
- if (response() < 0) {
- closedir(dirp);
- return;
- }
- while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
- if (dp->d_ino == 0)
- continue;
- if (!strcmp(dp->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dp->d_name, ".."))
- continue;
- if (strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(dp->d_name) >= sizeof(path) - 1) {
- run_err("%s/%s: name too long", name, dp->d_name);
- continue;
- }
- (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/%s", name, dp->d_name);
- vect[0] = path;
- source(1, vect);
- }
- (void) closedir(dirp);
- (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "E\n", 2);
- (void) response();
-}
-
-void
-sink(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- static BUF buffer;
- struct stat stb;
- enum {
- YES, NO, DISPLAYED
- } wrerr;
- BUF *bp;
- off_t i;
- size_t j, count;
- int amt, exists, first, ofd;
- mode_t mode, omode, mask;
- off_t size, statbytes;
- unsigned long long ull;
- int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0;
- char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048];
- struct timeval tv[2];
-
-#define atime tv[0]
-#define mtime tv[1]
-#define SCREWUP(str) { why = str; goto screwup; }
-
- setimes = targisdir = 0;
- mask = umask(0);
- if (!pflag)
- (void) umask(mask);
- if (argc != 1) {
- run_err("ambiguous target");
- exit(1);
- }
- targ = *argv;
- if (targetshouldbedirectory)
- verifydir(targ);
-
- (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
- if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
- targisdir = 1;
- for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
- cp = buf;
- if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1)
- return;
- if (*cp++ == '\n')
- SCREWUP("unexpected <newline>");
- do {
- if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch))
- SCREWUP("lost connection");
- *cp++ = ch;
- } while (cp < &buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] && ch != '\n');
- *cp = 0;
- if (verbose_mode)
- fprintf(stderr, "Sink: %s", buf);
-
- if (buf[0] == '\01' || buf[0] == '\02') {
- if (iamremote == 0)
- (void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO,
- buf + 1, strlen(buf + 1));
- if (buf[0] == '\02')
- exit(1);
- ++errs;
- continue;
- }
- if (buf[0] == 'E') {
- (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
- return;
- }
- if (ch == '\n')
- *--cp = 0;
-
- cp = buf;
- if (*cp == 'T') {
- setimes++;
- cp++;
- if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp))
- SCREWUP("mtime.sec not present");
- ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10);
- if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
- SCREWUP("mtime.sec not delimited");
- if ((time_t)ull < 0 ||
- (unsigned long long)(time_t)ull != ull)
- setimes = 0; /* out of range */
- mtime.tv_sec = ull;
- mtime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
- if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ' || mtime.tv_usec < 0 ||
- mtime.tv_usec > 999999)
- SCREWUP("mtime.usec not delimited");
- if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp))
- SCREWUP("atime.sec not present");
- ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10);
- if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
- SCREWUP("atime.sec not delimited");
- if ((time_t)ull < 0 ||
- (unsigned long long)(time_t)ull != ull)
- setimes = 0; /* out of range */
- atime.tv_sec = ull;
- atime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
- if (!cp || *cp++ != '\0' || atime.tv_usec < 0 ||
- atime.tv_usec > 999999)
- SCREWUP("atime.usec not delimited");
- (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
- continue;
- }
- if (*cp != 'C' && *cp != 'D') {
- /*
- * Check for the case "rcp remote:foo\* local:bar".
- * In this case, the line "No match." can be returned
- * by the shell before the rcp command on the remote is
- * executed so the ^Aerror_message convention isn't
- * followed.
- */
- if (first) {
- run_err("%s", cp);
- exit(1);
- }
- SCREWUP("expected control record");
- }
- mode = 0;
- for (++cp; cp < buf + 5; cp++) {
- if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '7')
- SCREWUP("bad mode");
- mode = (mode << 3) | (*cp - '0');
- }
- if (*cp++ != ' ')
- SCREWUP("mode not delimited");
-
- for (size = 0; isdigit((unsigned char)*cp);)
- size = size * 10 + (*cp++ - '0');
- if (*cp++ != ' ')
- SCREWUP("size not delimited");
- if ((strchr(cp, '/') != NULL) || (strcmp(cp, "..") == 0)) {
- run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
- exit(1);
- }
- if (targisdir) {
- static char *namebuf;
- static size_t cursize;
- size_t need;
-
- need = strlen(targ) + strlen(cp) + 250;
- if (need > cursize) {
- free(namebuf);
- namebuf = xmalloc(need);
- cursize = need;
- }
- (void) snprintf(namebuf, need, "%s%s%s", targ,
- strcmp(targ, "/") ? "/" : "", cp);
- np = namebuf;
- } else
- np = targ;
- curfile = cp;
- exists = stat(np, &stb) == 0;
- if (buf[0] == 'D') {
- int mod_flag = pflag;
- if (!iamrecursive)
- SCREWUP("received directory without -r");
- if (exists) {
- if (!S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) {
- errno = ENOTDIR;
- goto bad;
- }
- if (pflag)
- (void) chmod(np, mode);
- } else {
- /* Handle copying from a read-only
- directory */
- mod_flag = 1;
- if (mkdir(np, mode | S_IRWXU) < 0)
- goto bad;
- }
- vect[0] = xstrdup(np);
- sink(1, vect);
- if (setimes) {
- setimes = 0;
- if (utimes(vect[0], tv) < 0)
- run_err("%s: set times: %s",
- vect[0], strerror(errno));
- }
- if (mod_flag)
- (void) chmod(vect[0], mode);
- free(vect[0]);
- continue;
- }
- omode = mode;
- mode |= S_IWUSR;
- if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) < 0) {
-bad: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno));
- continue;
- }
- (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
- if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) {
- (void) close(ofd);
- continue;
- }
- cp = bp->buf;
- wrerr = NO;
-
- statbytes = 0;
- if (showprogress)
- start_progress_meter(curfile, size, &statbytes);
- set_nonblock(remin);
- for (count = i = 0; i < size; i += bp->cnt) {
- amt = bp->cnt;
- if (i + amt > size)
- amt = size - i;
- count += amt;
- do {
- j = atomicio6(read, remin, cp, amt,
- scpio, &statbytes);
- if (j == 0) {
- run_err("%s", j != EPIPE ?
- strerror(errno) :
- "dropped connection");
- exit(1);
- }
- amt -= j;
- cp += j;
- } while (amt > 0);
-
- if (count == bp->cnt) {
- /* Keep reading so we stay sync'd up. */
- if (wrerr == NO) {
- if (atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf,
- count) != count) {
- wrerr = YES;
- wrerrno = errno;
- }
- }
- count = 0;
- cp = bp->buf;
- }
- }
- unset_nonblock(remin);
- if (showprogress)
- stop_progress_meter();
- if (count != 0 && wrerr == NO &&
- atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) {
- wrerr = YES;
- wrerrno = errno;
- }
- if (wrerr == NO && (!exists || S_ISREG(stb.st_mode)) &&
- ftruncate(ofd, size) != 0) {
- run_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno));
- wrerr = DISPLAYED;
- }
- if (pflag) {
- if (exists || omode != mode)
-#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
- if (fchmod(ofd, omode)) {
-#else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
- if (chmod(np, omode)) {
-#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
- run_err("%s: set mode: %s",
- np, strerror(errno));
- wrerr = DISPLAYED;
- }
- } else {
- if (!exists && omode != mode)
-#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
- if (fchmod(ofd, omode & ~mask)) {
-#else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
- if (chmod(np, omode & ~mask)) {
-#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
- run_err("%s: set mode: %s",
- np, strerror(errno));
- wrerr = DISPLAYED;
- }
- }
- if (close(ofd) == -1) {
- wrerr = YES;
- wrerrno = errno;
- }
- (void) response();
- if (setimes && wrerr == NO) {
- setimes = 0;
- if (utimes(np, tv) < 0) {
- run_err("%s: set times: %s",
- np, strerror(errno));
- wrerr = DISPLAYED;
- }
- }
- switch (wrerr) {
- case YES:
- run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(wrerrno));
- break;
- case NO:
- (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
- break;
- case DISPLAYED:
- break;
- }
- }
-screwup:
- run_err("protocol error: %s", why);
- exit(1);
-}
-
-int
-response(void)
-{
- char ch, *cp, resp, rbuf[2048];
-
- if (atomicio(read, remin, &resp, sizeof(resp)) != sizeof(resp))
- lostconn(0);
-
- cp = rbuf;
- switch (resp) {
- case 0: /* ok */
- return (0);
- default:
- *cp++ = resp;
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case 1: /* error, followed by error msg */
- case 2: /* fatal error, "" */
- do {
- if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch))
- lostconn(0);
- *cp++ = ch;
- } while (cp < &rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] && ch != '\n');
-
- if (!iamremote)
- (void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, rbuf, cp - rbuf);
- ++errs;
- if (resp == 1)
- return (-1);
- exit(1);
- }
- /* NOTREACHED */
-}
-
-void
-usage(void)
-{
- (void) fprintf(stderr,
- "usage: scp [-12346BCpqrv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n"
- " [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program]\n"
- " [[user@]host1:]file1 ... [[user@]host2:]file2\n");
- exit(1);
-}
-
-void
-run_err(const char *fmt,...)
-{
- static FILE *fp;
- va_list ap;
-
- ++errs;
- if (fp != NULL || (remout != -1 && (fp = fdopen(remout, "w")))) {
- (void) fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01);
- (void) fprintf(fp, "scp: ");
- va_start(ap, fmt);
- (void) vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap);
- va_end(ap);
- (void) fprintf(fp, "\n");
- (void) fflush(fp);
- }
-
- if (!iamremote) {
- va_start(ap, fmt);
- vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
- va_end(ap);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
-}
-
-void
-verifydir(char *cp)
-{
- struct stat stb;
-
- if (!stat(cp, &stb)) {
- if (S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
- return;
- errno = ENOTDIR;
- }
- run_err("%s: %s", cp, strerror(errno));
- killchild(0);
-}
-
-int
-okname(char *cp0)
-{
- int c;
- char *cp;
-
- cp = cp0;
- do {
- c = (int)*cp;
- if (c & 0200)
- goto bad;
- if (!isalpha(c) && !isdigit((unsigned char)c)) {
- switch (c) {
- case '\'':
- case '"':
- case '`':
- case ' ':
- case '#':
- goto bad;
- default:
- break;
- }
- }
- } while (*++cp);
- return (1);
-
-bad: fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid user name\n", cp0);
- return (0);
-}
-
-BUF *
-allocbuf(BUF *bp, int fd, int blksize)
-{
- size_t size;
-#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE
- struct stat stb;
-
- if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) {
- run_err("fstat: %s", strerror(errno));
- return (0);
- }
- size = roundup(stb.st_blksize, blksize);
- if (size == 0)
- size = blksize;
-#else /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */
- size = blksize;
-#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */
- if (bp->cnt >= size)
- return (bp);
- if (bp->buf == NULL)
- bp->buf = xmalloc(size);
- else
- bp->buf = xrealloc(bp->buf, 1, size);
- memset(bp->buf, 0, size);
- bp->cnt = size;
- return (bp);
-}
-
-void
-lostconn(int signo)
-{
- if (!iamremote)
- (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "lost connection\n", 16);
- if (signo)
- _exit(1);
- else
- exit(1);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scp.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scp.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/scp.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1372 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.186 2016/05/25 23:48:45 schwarze Exp $ */
+/*
+ * scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which
+ * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
+ *
+ * NOTE: This version should NOT be suid root. (This uses ssh to
+ * do the transfer and ssh has the necessary privileges.)
+ *
+ * 1995 Timo Rinne <tri at iki.fi>, Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Parts from:
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+# include <sys/poll.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <locale.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+#include <vis.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "progressmeter.h"
+#include "utf8.h"
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+#define COPY_BUFLEN 16384
+
+int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout);
+int do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout);
+
+/* Struct for addargs */
+arglist args;
+arglist remote_remote_args;
+
+/* Bandwidth limit */
+long long limit_kbps = 0;
+struct bwlimit bwlimit;
+
+/* Name of current file being transferred. */
+char *curfile;
+
+/* This is set to non-zero to enable verbose mode. */
+int verbose_mode = 0;
+
+/* This is set to zero if the progressmeter is not desired. */
+int showprogress = 1;
+
+/*
+ * This is set to non-zero if remote-remote copy should be piped
+ * through this process.
+ */
+int throughlocal = 0;
+
+/* This is the program to execute for the secured connection. ("ssh" or -S) */
+char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM;
+
+/* This is used to store the pid of ssh_program */
+pid_t do_cmd_pid = -1;
+
+static void
+killchild(int signo)
+{
+ if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
+ kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
+ waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ if (signo)
+ _exit(1);
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+static void
+suspchild(int signo)
+{
+ int status;
+
+ if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
+ kill(do_cmd_pid, signo);
+ while (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, WUNTRACED) == -1 &&
+ errno == EINTR)
+ ;
+ kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+do_local_cmd(arglist *a)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ int status;
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ if (a->num == 0)
+ fatal("do_local_cmd: no arguments");
+
+ if (verbose_mode) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Executing:");
+ for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++)
+ fmprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+ if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
+ fatal("do_local_cmd: fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ execvp(a->list[0], a->list);
+ perror(a->list[0]);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ do_cmd_pid = pid;
+ signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
+ signal(SIGINT, killchild);
+ signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
+
+ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+ if (errno != EINTR)
+ fatal("do_local_cmd: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ do_cmd_pid = -1;
+
+ if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
+ return (-1);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function executes the given command as the specified user on the
+ * given host. This returns < 0 if execution fails, and >= 0 otherwise. This
+ * assigns the input and output file descriptors on success.
+ */
+
+int
+do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout)
+{
+ int pin[2], pout[2], reserved[2];
+
+ if (verbose_mode)
+ fmprintf(stderr,
+ "Executing: program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n",
+ ssh_program, host,
+ remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd);
+
+ /*
+ * Reserve two descriptors so that the real pipes won't get
+ * descriptors 0 and 1 because that will screw up dup2 below.
+ */
+ if (pipe(reserved) < 0)
+ fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Create a socket pair for communicating with ssh. */
+ if (pipe(pin) < 0)
+ fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (pipe(pout) < 0)
+ fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Free the reserved descriptors. */
+ close(reserved[0]);
+ close(reserved[1]);
+
+ signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild);
+ signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild);
+ signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild);
+
+ /* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */
+ do_cmd_pid = fork();
+ if (do_cmd_pid == 0) {
+ /* Child. */
+ close(pin[1]);
+ close(pout[0]);
+ dup2(pin[0], 0);
+ dup2(pout[1], 1);
+ close(pin[0]);
+ close(pout[1]);
+
+ replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
+ if (remuser != NULL) {
+ addargs(&args, "-l");
+ addargs(&args, "%s", remuser);
+ }
+ addargs(&args, "--");
+ addargs(&args, "%s", host);
+ addargs(&args, "%s", cmd);
+
+ execvp(ssh_program, args.list);
+ perror(ssh_program);
+ exit(1);
+ } else if (do_cmd_pid == -1) {
+ fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+ /* Parent. Close the other side, and return the local side. */
+ close(pin[0]);
+ *fdout = pin[1];
+ close(pout[1]);
+ *fdin = pout[0];
+ signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
+ signal(SIGINT, killchild);
+ signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This functions executes a command simlar to do_cmd(), but expects the
+ * input and output descriptors to be setup by a previous call to do_cmd().
+ * This way the input and output of two commands can be connected.
+ */
+int
+do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ int status;
+
+ if (verbose_mode)
+ fmprintf(stderr,
+ "Executing: 2nd program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n",
+ ssh_program, host,
+ remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd);
+
+ /* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */
+ pid = fork();
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ dup2(fdin, 0);
+ dup2(fdout, 1);
+
+ replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
+ if (remuser != NULL) {
+ addargs(&args, "-l");
+ addargs(&args, "%s", remuser);
+ }
+ addargs(&args, "--");
+ addargs(&args, "%s", host);
+ addargs(&args, "%s", cmd);
+
+ execvp(ssh_program, args.list);
+ perror(ssh_program);
+ exit(1);
+ } else if (pid == -1) {
+ fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+ if (errno != EINTR)
+ fatal("do_cmd2: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+ size_t cnt;
+ char *buf;
+} BUF;
+
+BUF *allocbuf(BUF *, int, int);
+void lostconn(int);
+int okname(char *);
+void run_err(const char *,...);
+void verifydir(char *);
+
+struct passwd *pwd;
+uid_t userid;
+int errs, remin, remout;
+int pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
+
+#define CMDNEEDS 64
+char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */
+
+int response(void);
+void rsource(char *, struct stat *);
+void sink(int, char *[]);
+void source(int, char *[]);
+void tolocal(int, char *[]);
+void toremote(char *, int, char *[]);
+void usage(void);
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ int ch, fflag, tflag, status, n;
+ char *targ, **newargv;
+ const char *errstr;
+ extern char *optarg;
+ extern int optind;
+
+ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+ sanitise_stdfd();
+
+ setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "");
+
+ /* Copy argv, because we modify it */
+ newargv = xcalloc(MAX(argc + 1, 1), sizeof(*newargv));
+ for (n = 0; n < argc; n++)
+ newargv[n] = xstrdup(argv[n]);
+ argv = newargv;
+
+ __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+
+ memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args));
+ memset(&remote_remote_args, '\0', sizeof(remote_remote_args));
+ args.list = remote_remote_args.list = NULL;
+ addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program);
+ addargs(&args, "-x");
+ addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent=no");
+ addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand=no");
+ addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
+
+ fflag = tflag = 0;
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:")) != -1)
+ switch (ch) {
+ /* User-visible flags. */
+ case '1':
+ case '2':
+ case '4':
+ case '6':
+ case 'C':
+ addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
+ addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch);
+ break;
+ case '3':
+ throughlocal = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'o':
+ case 'c':
+ case 'i':
+ case 'F':
+ addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch);
+ addargs(&remote_remote_args, "%s", optarg);
+ addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
+ addargs(&args, "%s", optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'P':
+ addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-p");
+ addargs(&remote_remote_args, "%s", optarg);
+ addargs(&args, "-p");
+ addargs(&args, "%s", optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'B':
+ addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-oBatchmode=yes");
+ addargs(&args, "-oBatchmode=yes");
+ break;
+ case 'l':
+ limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024,
+ &errstr);
+ if (errstr != NULL)
+ usage();
+ limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */
+ bandwidth_limit_init(&bwlimit, limit_kbps, COPY_BUFLEN);
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ pflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'r':
+ iamrecursive = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'S':
+ ssh_program = xstrdup(optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'v':
+ addargs(&args, "-v");
+ addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-v");
+ verbose_mode = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'q':
+ addargs(&args, "-q");
+ addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-q");
+ showprogress = 0;
+ break;
+
+ /* Server options. */
+ case 'd':
+ targetshouldbedirectory = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'f': /* "from" */
+ iamremote = 1;
+ fflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 't': /* "to" */
+ iamremote = 1;
+ tflag = 1;
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ setmode(0, O_BINARY);
+#endif
+ break;
+ default:
+ usage();
+ }
+ argc -= optind;
+ argv += optind;
+
+ if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL)
+ fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid);
+
+ if (!isatty(STDOUT_FILENO))
+ showprogress = 0;
+
+ if (pflag) {
+ /* Cannot pledge: -p allows setuid/setgid files... */
+ } else {
+ if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath fattr tty proc exec",
+ NULL) == -1) {
+ perror("pledge");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ remin = STDIN_FILENO;
+ remout = STDOUT_FILENO;
+
+ if (fflag) {
+ /* Follow "protocol", send data. */
+ (void) response();
+ source(argc, argv);
+ exit(errs != 0);
+ }
+ if (tflag) {
+ /* Receive data. */
+ sink(argc, argv);
+ exit(errs != 0);
+ }
+ if (argc < 2)
+ usage();
+ if (argc > 2)
+ targetshouldbedirectory = 1;
+
+ remin = remout = -1;
+ do_cmd_pid = -1;
+ /* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */
+ (void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "scp%s%s%s%s",
+ verbose_mode ? " -v" : "",
+ iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "",
+ targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : "");
+
+ (void) signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn);
+
+ if ((targ = colon(argv[argc - 1]))) /* Dest is remote host. */
+ toremote(targ, argc, argv);
+ else {
+ if (targetshouldbedirectory)
+ verifydir(argv[argc - 1]);
+ tolocal(argc, argv); /* Dest is local host. */
+ }
+ /*
+ * Finally check the exit status of the ssh process, if one was forked
+ * and no error has occurred yet
+ */
+ if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && errs == 0) {
+ if (remin != -1)
+ (void) close(remin);
+ if (remout != -1)
+ (void) close(remout);
+ if (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+ errs = 1;
+ else {
+ if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
+ errs = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ exit(errs != 0);
+}
+
+/* Callback from atomicio6 to update progress meter and limit bandwidth */
+static int
+scpio(void *_cnt, size_t s)
+{
+ off_t *cnt = (off_t *)_cnt;
+
+ *cnt += s;
+ if (limit_kbps > 0)
+ bandwidth_limit(&bwlimit, s);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+do_times(int fd, int verb, const struct stat *sb)
+{
+ /* strlen(2^64) == 20; strlen(10^6) == 7 */
+ char buf[(20 + 7 + 2) * 2 + 2];
+
+ (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "T%llu 0 %llu 0\n",
+ (unsigned long long) (sb->st_mtime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_mtime),
+ (unsigned long long) (sb->st_atime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_atime));
+ if (verb) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "File mtime %lld atime %lld\n",
+ (long long)sb->st_mtime, (long long)sb->st_atime);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Sending file timestamps: %s", buf);
+ }
+ (void) atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, strlen(buf));
+ return (response());
+}
+
+void
+toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ char *bp, *host, *src, *suser, *thost, *tuser, *arg;
+ arglist alist;
+ int i;
+ u_int j;
+
+ memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist));
+ alist.list = NULL;
+
+ *targ++ = 0;
+ if (*targ == 0)
+ targ = ".";
+
+ arg = xstrdup(argv[argc - 1]);
+ if ((thost = strrchr(arg, '@'))) {
+ /* user at host */
+ *thost++ = 0;
+ tuser = arg;
+ if (*tuser == '\0')
+ tuser = NULL;
+ } else {
+ thost = arg;
+ tuser = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (tuser != NULL && !okname(tuser)) {
+ free(arg);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) {
+ src = colon(argv[i]);
+ if (src && throughlocal) { /* extended remote to remote */
+ *src++ = 0;
+ if (*src == 0)
+ src = ".";
+ host = strrchr(argv[i], '@');
+ if (host) {
+ *host++ = 0;
+ host = cleanhostname(host);
+ suser = argv[i];
+ if (*suser == '\0')
+ suser = pwd->pw_name;
+ else if (!okname(suser))
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ host = cleanhostname(argv[i]);
+ suser = NULL;
+ }
+ xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s", cmd,
+ *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src);
+ if (do_cmd(host, suser, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0)
+ exit(1);
+ free(bp);
+ host = cleanhostname(thost);
+ xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd,
+ *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ);
+ if (do_cmd2(host, tuser, bp, remin, remout) < 0)
+ exit(1);
+ free(bp);
+ (void) close(remin);
+ (void) close(remout);
+ remin = remout = -1;
+ } else if (src) { /* standard remote to remote */
+ freeargs(&alist);
+ addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
+ addargs(&alist, "-x");
+ addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
+ addargs(&alist, "-n");
+ for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
+ addargs(&alist, "%s",
+ remote_remote_args.list[j]);
+ }
+ *src++ = 0;
+ if (*src == 0)
+ src = ".";
+ host = strrchr(argv[i], '@');
+
+ if (host) {
+ *host++ = 0;
+ host = cleanhostname(host);
+ suser = argv[i];
+ if (*suser == '\0')
+ suser = pwd->pw_name;
+ else if (!okname(suser))
+ continue;
+ addargs(&alist, "-l");
+ addargs(&alist, "%s", suser);
+ } else {
+ host = cleanhostname(argv[i]);
+ }
+ addargs(&alist, "--");
+ addargs(&alist, "%s", host);
+ addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd);
+ addargs(&alist, "%s", src);
+ addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s",
+ tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "",
+ thost, targ);
+ if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0)
+ errs = 1;
+ } else { /* local to remote */
+ if (remin == -1) {
+ xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd,
+ *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ);
+ host = cleanhostname(thost);
+ if (do_cmd(host, tuser, bp, &remin,
+ &remout) < 0)
+ exit(1);
+ if (response() < 0)
+ exit(1);
+ free(bp);
+ }
+ source(1, argv + i);
+ }
+ }
+ free(arg);
+}
+
+void
+tolocal(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ char *bp, *host, *src, *suser;
+ arglist alist;
+ int i;
+
+ memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist));
+ alist.list = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) {
+ if (!(src = colon(argv[i]))) { /* Local to local. */
+ freeargs(&alist);
+ addargs(&alist, "%s", _PATH_CP);
+ if (iamrecursive)
+ addargs(&alist, "-r");
+ if (pflag)
+ addargs(&alist, "-p");
+ addargs(&alist, "--");
+ addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[i]);
+ addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[argc-1]);
+ if (do_local_cmd(&alist))
+ ++errs;
+ continue;
+ }
+ *src++ = 0;
+ if (*src == 0)
+ src = ".";
+ if ((host = strrchr(argv[i], '@')) == NULL) {
+ host = argv[i];
+ suser = NULL;
+ } else {
+ *host++ = 0;
+ suser = argv[i];
+ if (*suser == '\0')
+ suser = pwd->pw_name;
+ }
+ host = cleanhostname(host);
+ xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s",
+ cmd, *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src);
+ if (do_cmd(host, suser, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) {
+ free(bp);
+ ++errs;
+ continue;
+ }
+ free(bp);
+ sink(1, argv + argc - 1);
+ (void) close(remin);
+ remin = remout = -1;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+source(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ struct stat stb;
+ static BUF buffer;
+ BUF *bp;
+ off_t i, statbytes;
+ size_t amt, nr;
+ int fd = -1, haderr, indx;
+ char *last, *name, buf[2048], encname[PATH_MAX];
+ int len;
+
+ for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) {
+ name = argv[indx];
+ statbytes = 0;
+ len = strlen(name);
+ while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/')
+ name[--len] = '\0';
+ if ((fd = open(name, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK, 0)) < 0)
+ goto syserr;
+ if (strchr(name, '\n') != NULL) {
+ strnvis(encname, name, sizeof(encname), VIS_NL);
+ name = encname;
+ }
+ if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) {
+syserr: run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
+ goto next;
+ }
+ if (stb.st_size < 0) {
+ run_err("%s: %s", name, "Negative file size");
+ goto next;
+ }
+ unset_nonblock(fd);
+ switch (stb.st_mode & S_IFMT) {
+ case S_IFREG:
+ break;
+ case S_IFDIR:
+ if (iamrecursive) {
+ rsource(name, &stb);
+ goto next;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ run_err("%s: not a regular file", name);
+ goto next;
+ }
+ if ((last = strrchr(name, '/')) == NULL)
+ last = name;
+ else
+ ++last;
+ curfile = last;
+ if (pflag) {
+ if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, &stb) < 0)
+ goto next;
+ }
+#define FILEMODEMASK (S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s\n",
+ (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK),
+ (long long)stb.st_size, last);
+ if (verbose_mode)
+ fmprintf(stderr, "Sending file modes: %s", buf);
+ (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, buf, strlen(buf));
+ if (response() < 0)
+ goto next;
+ if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, fd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) {
+next: if (fd != -1) {
+ (void) close(fd);
+ fd = -1;
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (showprogress)
+ start_progress_meter(curfile, stb.st_size, &statbytes);
+ set_nonblock(remout);
+ for (haderr = i = 0; i < stb.st_size; i += bp->cnt) {
+ amt = bp->cnt;
+ if (i + (off_t)amt > stb.st_size)
+ amt = stb.st_size - i;
+ if (!haderr) {
+ if ((nr = atomicio(read, fd,
+ bp->buf, amt)) != amt) {
+ haderr = errno;
+ memset(bp->buf + nr, 0, amt - nr);
+ }
+ }
+ /* Keep writing after error to retain sync */
+ if (haderr) {
+ (void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt);
+ memset(bp->buf, 0, amt);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (atomicio6(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt, scpio,
+ &statbytes) != amt)
+ haderr = errno;
+ }
+ unset_nonblock(remout);
+
+ if (fd != -1) {
+ if (close(fd) < 0 && !haderr)
+ haderr = errno;
+ fd = -1;
+ }
+ if (!haderr)
+ (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+ else
+ run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr));
+ (void) response();
+ if (showprogress)
+ stop_progress_meter();
+ }
+}
+
+void
+rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp)
+{
+ DIR *dirp;
+ struct dirent *dp;
+ char *last, *vect[1], path[PATH_MAX];
+
+ if (!(dirp = opendir(name))) {
+ run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
+ return;
+ }
+ last = strrchr(name, '/');
+ if (last == NULL)
+ last = name;
+ else
+ last++;
+ if (pflag) {
+ if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, statp) < 0) {
+ closedir(dirp);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "D%04o %d %.1024s\n",
+ (u_int) (statp->st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), 0, last);
+ if (verbose_mode)
+ fmprintf(stderr, "Entering directory: %s", path);
+ (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, path, strlen(path));
+ if (response() < 0) {
+ closedir(dirp);
+ return;
+ }
+ while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
+ if (dp->d_ino == 0)
+ continue;
+ if (!strcmp(dp->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dp->d_name, ".."))
+ continue;
+ if (strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(dp->d_name) >= sizeof(path) - 1) {
+ run_err("%s/%s: name too long", name, dp->d_name);
+ continue;
+ }
+ (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/%s", name, dp->d_name);
+ vect[0] = path;
+ source(1, vect);
+ }
+ (void) closedir(dirp);
+ (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "E\n", 2);
+ (void) response();
+}
+
+void
+sink(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ static BUF buffer;
+ struct stat stb;
+ enum {
+ YES, NO, DISPLAYED
+ } wrerr;
+ BUF *bp;
+ off_t i;
+ size_t j, count;
+ int amt, exists, first, ofd;
+ mode_t mode, omode, mask;
+ off_t size, statbytes;
+ unsigned long long ull;
+ int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0;
+ char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048];
+ struct timeval tv[2];
+
+#define atime tv[0]
+#define mtime tv[1]
+#define SCREWUP(str) { why = str; goto screwup; }
+
+ setimes = targisdir = 0;
+ mask = umask(0);
+ if (!pflag)
+ (void) umask(mask);
+ if (argc != 1) {
+ run_err("ambiguous target");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ targ = *argv;
+ if (targetshouldbedirectory)
+ verifydir(targ);
+
+ (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+ if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
+ targisdir = 1;
+ for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
+ cp = buf;
+ if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1)
+ return;
+ if (*cp++ == '\n')
+ SCREWUP("unexpected <newline>");
+ do {
+ if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch))
+ SCREWUP("lost connection");
+ *cp++ = ch;
+ } while (cp < &buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] && ch != '\n');
+ *cp = 0;
+ if (verbose_mode)
+ fmprintf(stderr, "Sink: %s", buf);
+
+ if (buf[0] == '\01' || buf[0] == '\02') {
+ if (iamremote == 0) {
+ (void) snmprintf(visbuf, sizeof(visbuf),
+ NULL, "%s", buf + 1);
+ (void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO,
+ visbuf, strlen(visbuf));
+ }
+ if (buf[0] == '\02')
+ exit(1);
+ ++errs;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (buf[0] == 'E') {
+ (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (ch == '\n')
+ *--cp = 0;
+
+ cp = buf;
+ if (*cp == 'T') {
+ setimes++;
+ cp++;
+ if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp))
+ SCREWUP("mtime.sec not present");
+ ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10);
+ if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
+ SCREWUP("mtime.sec not delimited");
+ if ((time_t)ull < 0 ||
+ (unsigned long long)(time_t)ull != ull)
+ setimes = 0; /* out of range */
+ mtime.tv_sec = ull;
+ mtime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
+ if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ' || mtime.tv_usec < 0 ||
+ mtime.tv_usec > 999999)
+ SCREWUP("mtime.usec not delimited");
+ if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp))
+ SCREWUP("atime.sec not present");
+ ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10);
+ if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
+ SCREWUP("atime.sec not delimited");
+ if ((time_t)ull < 0 ||
+ (unsigned long long)(time_t)ull != ull)
+ setimes = 0; /* out of range */
+ atime.tv_sec = ull;
+ atime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
+ if (!cp || *cp++ != '\0' || atime.tv_usec < 0 ||
+ atime.tv_usec > 999999)
+ SCREWUP("atime.usec not delimited");
+ (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (*cp != 'C' && *cp != 'D') {
+ /*
+ * Check for the case "rcp remote:foo\* local:bar".
+ * In this case, the line "No match." can be returned
+ * by the shell before the rcp command on the remote is
+ * executed so the ^Aerror_message convention isn't
+ * followed.
+ */
+ if (first) {
+ run_err("%s", cp);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ SCREWUP("expected control record");
+ }
+ mode = 0;
+ for (++cp; cp < buf + 5; cp++) {
+ if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '7')
+ SCREWUP("bad mode");
+ mode = (mode << 3) | (*cp - '0');
+ }
+ if (*cp++ != ' ')
+ SCREWUP("mode not delimited");
+
+ for (size = 0; isdigit((unsigned char)*cp);)
+ size = size * 10 + (*cp++ - '0');
+ if (*cp++ != ' ')
+ SCREWUP("size not delimited");
+ if ((strchr(cp, '/') != NULL) || (strcmp(cp, "..") == 0)) {
+ run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (targisdir) {
+ static char *namebuf;
+ static size_t cursize;
+ size_t need;
+
+ need = strlen(targ) + strlen(cp) + 250;
+ if (need > cursize) {
+ free(namebuf);
+ namebuf = xmalloc(need);
+ cursize = need;
+ }
+ (void) snprintf(namebuf, need, "%s%s%s", targ,
+ strcmp(targ, "/") ? "/" : "", cp);
+ np = namebuf;
+ } else
+ np = targ;
+ curfile = cp;
+ exists = stat(np, &stb) == 0;
+ if (buf[0] == 'D') {
+ int mod_flag = pflag;
+ if (!iamrecursive)
+ SCREWUP("received directory without -r");
+ if (exists) {
+ if (!S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) {
+ errno = ENOTDIR;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ if (pflag)
+ (void) chmod(np, mode);
+ } else {
+ /* Handle copying from a read-only
+ directory */
+ mod_flag = 1;
+ if (mkdir(np, mode | S_IRWXU) < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ vect[0] = xstrdup(np);
+ sink(1, vect);
+ if (setimes) {
+ setimes = 0;
+ if (utimes(vect[0], tv) < 0)
+ run_err("%s: set times: %s",
+ vect[0], strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (mod_flag)
+ (void) chmod(vect[0], mode);
+ free(vect[0]);
+ continue;
+ }
+ omode = mode;
+ mode |= S_IWUSR;
+ if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) < 0) {
+bad: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno));
+ continue;
+ }
+ (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+ if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) {
+ (void) close(ofd);
+ continue;
+ }
+ cp = bp->buf;
+ wrerr = NO;
+
+ statbytes = 0;
+ if (showprogress)
+ start_progress_meter(curfile, size, &statbytes);
+ set_nonblock(remin);
+ for (count = i = 0; i < size; i += bp->cnt) {
+ amt = bp->cnt;
+ if (i + amt > size)
+ amt = size - i;
+ count += amt;
+ do {
+ j = atomicio6(read, remin, cp, amt,
+ scpio, &statbytes);
+ if (j == 0) {
+ run_err("%s", j != EPIPE ?
+ strerror(errno) :
+ "dropped connection");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ amt -= j;
+ cp += j;
+ } while (amt > 0);
+
+ if (count == bp->cnt) {
+ /* Keep reading so we stay sync'd up. */
+ if (wrerr == NO) {
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf,
+ count) != count) {
+ wrerr = YES;
+ wrerrno = errno;
+ }
+ }
+ count = 0;
+ cp = bp->buf;
+ }
+ }
+ unset_nonblock(remin);
+ if (count != 0 && wrerr == NO &&
+ atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) {
+ wrerr = YES;
+ wrerrno = errno;
+ }
+ if (wrerr == NO && (!exists || S_ISREG(stb.st_mode)) &&
+ ftruncate(ofd, size) != 0) {
+ run_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno));
+ wrerr = DISPLAYED;
+ }
+ if (pflag) {
+ if (exists || omode != mode)
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
+ if (fchmod(ofd, omode)) {
+#else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
+ if (chmod(np, omode)) {
+#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
+ run_err("%s: set mode: %s",
+ np, strerror(errno));
+ wrerr = DISPLAYED;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!exists && omode != mode)
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
+ if (fchmod(ofd, omode & ~mask)) {
+#else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
+ if (chmod(np, omode & ~mask)) {
+#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
+ run_err("%s: set mode: %s",
+ np, strerror(errno));
+ wrerr = DISPLAYED;
+ }
+ }
+ if (close(ofd) == -1) {
+ wrerr = YES;
+ wrerrno = errno;
+ }
+ (void) response();
+ if (showprogress)
+ stop_progress_meter();
+ if (setimes && wrerr == NO) {
+ setimes = 0;
+ if (utimes(np, tv) < 0) {
+ run_err("%s: set times: %s",
+ np, strerror(errno));
+ wrerr = DISPLAYED;
+ }
+ }
+ switch (wrerr) {
+ case YES:
+ run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(wrerrno));
+ break;
+ case NO:
+ (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+ break;
+ case DISPLAYED:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+screwup:
+ run_err("protocol error: %s", why);
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+response(void)
+{
+ char ch, *cp, resp, rbuf[2048], visbuf[2048];
+
+ if (atomicio(read, remin, &resp, sizeof(resp)) != sizeof(resp))
+ lostconn(0);
+
+ cp = rbuf;
+ switch (resp) {
+ case 0: /* ok */
+ return (0);
+ default:
+ *cp++ = resp;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case 1: /* error, followed by error msg */
+ case 2: /* fatal error, "" */
+ do {
+ if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch))
+ lostconn(0);
+ *cp++ = ch;
+ } while (cp < &rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] && ch != '\n');
+
+ if (!iamremote) {
+ cp[-1] = '\0';
+ (void) snmprintf(visbuf, sizeof(visbuf),
+ NULL, "%s\n", rbuf);
+ (void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO,
+ visbuf, strlen(visbuf));
+ }
+ ++errs;
+ if (resp == 1)
+ return (-1);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+void
+usage(void)
+{
+ (void) fprintf(stderr,
+ "usage: scp [-12346BCpqrv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n"
+ " [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program]\n"
+ " [[user@]host1:]file1 ... [[user@]host2:]file2\n");
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+void
+run_err(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ static FILE *fp;
+ va_list ap;
+
+ ++errs;
+ if (fp != NULL || (remout != -1 && (fp = fdopen(remout, "w")))) {
+ (void) fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01);
+ (void) fprintf(fp, "scp: ");
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ (void) vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ (void) fprintf(fp, "\n");
+ (void) fflush(fp);
+ }
+
+ if (!iamremote) {
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ vfmprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+}
+
+void
+verifydir(char *cp)
+{
+ struct stat stb;
+
+ if (!stat(cp, &stb)) {
+ if (S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
+ return;
+ errno = ENOTDIR;
+ }
+ run_err("%s: %s", cp, strerror(errno));
+ killchild(0);
+}
+
+int
+okname(char *cp0)
+{
+ int c;
+ char *cp;
+
+ cp = cp0;
+ do {
+ c = (int)*cp;
+ if (c & 0200)
+ goto bad;
+ if (!isalpha(c) && !isdigit((unsigned char)c)) {
+ switch (c) {
+ case '\'':
+ case '"':
+ case '`':
+ case ' ':
+ case '#':
+ goto bad;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ } while (*++cp);
+ return (1);
+
+bad: fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid user name\n", cp0);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+BUF *
+allocbuf(BUF *bp, int fd, int blksize)
+{
+ size_t size;
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE
+ struct stat stb;
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) {
+ run_err("fstat: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return (0);
+ }
+ size = roundup(stb.st_blksize, blksize);
+ if (size == 0)
+ size = blksize;
+#else /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */
+ size = blksize;
+#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */
+ if (bp->cnt >= size)
+ return (bp);
+ if (bp->buf == NULL)
+ bp->buf = xmalloc(size);
+ else
+ bp->buf = xreallocarray(bp->buf, 1, size);
+ memset(bp->buf, 0, size);
+ bp->cnt = size;
+ return (bp);
+}
+
+void
+lostconn(int signo)
+{
+ if (!iamremote)
+ (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "lost connection\n", 16);
+ if (signo)
+ _exit(1);
+ else
+ exit(1);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/servconf.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/servconf.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/servconf.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,2082 +0,0 @@
-
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.249 2014/01/29 06:18:35 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
-#include <netinet/ip.h>
-
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
-#include <util.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "mac.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "groupaccess.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-
-static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
-static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
-
-/* Use of privilege separation or not */
-extern int use_privsep;
-extern Buffer cfg;
-
-/* Initializes the server options to their default values. */
-
-void
-initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
-{
- memset(options, 0, sizeof(*options));
-
- /* Portable-specific options */
- options->use_pam = -1;
-
- /* Standard Options */
- options->num_ports = 0;
- options->ports_from_cmdline = 0;
- options->listen_addrs = NULL;
- options->address_family = -1;
- options->num_host_key_files = 0;
- options->num_host_cert_files = 0;
- options->host_key_agent = NULL;
- options->pid_file = NULL;
- options->server_key_bits = -1;
- options->login_grace_time = -1;
- options->key_regeneration_time = -1;
- options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NOT_SET;
- options->ignore_rhosts = -1;
- options->ignore_user_known_hosts = -1;
- options->print_motd = -1;
- options->print_lastlog = -1;
- options->x11_forwarding = -1;
- options->x11_display_offset = -1;
- options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
- options->permit_tty = -1;
- options->xauth_location = NULL;
- options->strict_modes = -1;
- options->tcp_keep_alive = -1;
- options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET;
- options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
- options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1;
- options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
- options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = -1;
- options->rsa_authentication = -1;
- options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
- options->kerberos_authentication = -1;
- options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
- options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
- options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
- options->gss_authentication=-1;
- options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
- options->password_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
- options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
- options->permit_user_env = -1;
- options->use_login = -1;
- options->compression = -1;
- options->rekey_limit = -1;
- options->rekey_interval = -1;
- options->allow_tcp_forwarding = -1;
- options->allow_agent_forwarding = -1;
- options->num_allow_users = 0;
- options->num_deny_users = 0;
- options->num_allow_groups = 0;
- options->num_deny_groups = 0;
- options->ciphers = NULL;
- options->macs = NULL;
- options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
- options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
- options->gateway_ports = -1;
- options->num_subsystems = 0;
- options->max_startups_begin = -1;
- options->max_startups_rate = -1;
- options->max_startups = -1;
- options->max_authtries = -1;
- options->max_sessions = -1;
- options->banner = NULL;
- options->use_dns = -1;
- options->client_alive_interval = -1;
- options->client_alive_count_max = -1;
- options->num_authkeys_files = 0;
- options->num_accept_env = 0;
- options->permit_tun = -1;
- options->num_permitted_opens = -1;
- options->adm_forced_command = NULL;
- options->chroot_directory = NULL;
- options->authorized_keys_command = NULL;
- options->authorized_keys_command_user = NULL;
- options->revoked_keys_file = NULL;
- options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
- options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
- options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
- options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
- options->version_addendum = NULL;
-}
-
-void
-fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
-{
- /* Portable-specific options */
- if (options->use_pam == -1)
- options->use_pam = 0;
-
- /* Standard Options */
- if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
- options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
- if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
- /* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
- if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
- options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
- _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE;
- if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
- options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
- _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE;
- options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
- _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
- _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE;
-#endif
- options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
- _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE;
- }
- }
- /* No certificates by default */
- if (options->num_ports == 0)
- options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
- if (options->listen_addrs == NULL)
- add_listen_addr(options, NULL, 0);
- if (options->pid_file == NULL)
- options->pid_file = _PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE;
- if (options->server_key_bits == -1)
- options->server_key_bits = 1024;
- if (options->login_grace_time == -1)
- options->login_grace_time = 120;
- if (options->key_regeneration_time == -1)
- options->key_regeneration_time = 3600;
- if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET)
- options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_YES;
- if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1)
- options->ignore_rhosts = 1;
- if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1)
- options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0;
- if (options->print_motd == -1)
- options->print_motd = 1;
- if (options->print_lastlog == -1)
- options->print_lastlog = 1;
- if (options->x11_forwarding == -1)
- options->x11_forwarding = 0;
- if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
- options->x11_display_offset = 10;
- if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
- options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
- if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
- options->xauth_location = _PATH_XAUTH;
- if (options->permit_tty == -1)
- options->permit_tty = 1;
- if (options->strict_modes == -1)
- options->strict_modes = 1;
- if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1)
- options->tcp_keep_alive = 1;
- if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
- options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
- if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
- options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
- if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1)
- options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0;
- if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
- options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
- if (options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only == -1)
- options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = 0;
- if (options->rsa_authentication == -1)
- options->rsa_authentication = 1;
- if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
- options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
- if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1)
- options->kerberos_authentication = 0;
- if (options->kerberos_or_local_passwd == -1)
- options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = 1;
- if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1)
- options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
- if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
- options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
- if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- options->gss_authentication = 0;
- if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
- options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
- if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- options->password_authentication = 1;
- if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
- options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
- if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
- options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
- if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1)
- options->permit_empty_passwd = 0;
- if (options->permit_user_env == -1)
- options->permit_user_env = 0;
- if (options->use_login == -1)
- options->use_login = 0;
- if (options->compression == -1)
- options->compression = COMP_DELAYED;
- if (options->rekey_limit == -1)
- options->rekey_limit = 0;
- if (options->rekey_interval == -1)
- options->rekey_interval = 0;
- if (options->allow_tcp_forwarding == -1)
- options->allow_tcp_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW;
- if (options->allow_agent_forwarding == -1)
- options->allow_agent_forwarding = 1;
- if (options->gateway_ports == -1)
- options->gateway_ports = 0;
- if (options->max_startups == -1)
- options->max_startups = 100;
- if (options->max_startups_rate == -1)
- options->max_startups_rate = 30; /* 30% */
- if (options->max_startups_begin == -1)
- options->max_startups_begin = 10;
- if (options->max_authtries == -1)
- options->max_authtries = DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX;
- if (options->max_sessions == -1)
- options->max_sessions = DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX;
- if (options->use_dns == -1)
- options->use_dns = 1;
- if (options->client_alive_interval == -1)
- options->client_alive_interval = 0;
- if (options->client_alive_count_max == -1)
- options->client_alive_count_max = 3;
- if (options->num_authkeys_files == 0) {
- options->authorized_keys_files[options->num_authkeys_files++] =
- xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS);
- options->authorized_keys_files[options->num_authkeys_files++] =
- xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2);
- }
- if (options->permit_tun == -1)
- options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
- if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
- options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_LOWDELAY;
- if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
- options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT;
- if (options->version_addendum == NULL)
- options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
- /* Turn privilege separation on by default */
- if (use_privsep == -1)
- use_privsep = PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX;
-
-#ifndef HAVE_MMAP
- if (use_privsep && options->compression == 1) {
- error("This platform does not support both privilege "
- "separation and compression");
- error("Compression disabled");
- options->compression = 0;
- }
-#endif
-
-}
-
-/* Keyword tokens. */
-typedef enum {
- sBadOption, /* == unknown option */
- /* Portable-specific options */
- sUsePAM,
- /* Standard Options */
- sPort, sHostKeyFile, sServerKeyBits, sLoginGraceTime, sKeyRegenerationTime,
- sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
- sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
- sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
- sKerberosGetAFSToken,
- sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
- sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
- sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
- sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
- sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
- sPermitUserEnvironment, sUseLogin, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
- sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
- sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile,
- sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem,
- sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions,
- sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
- sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
- sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
- sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
- sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
- sHostCertificate,
- sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
- sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
- sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
- sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent,
- sDeprecated, sUnsupported
-} ServerOpCodes;
-
-#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL 0x01 /* allowed in main section of sshd_config */
-#define SSHCFG_MATCH 0x02 /* allowed inside a Match section */
-#define SSHCFG_ALL (SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
-
-/* Textual representation of the tokens. */
-static struct {
- const char *name;
- ServerOpCodes opcode;
- u_int flags;
-} keywords[] = {
- /* Portable-specific options */
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- { "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-#else
- { "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-#endif
- { "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- /* Standard Options */
- { "port", sPort, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "hostkey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
- { "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "serverkeybits", sServerKeyBits, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "logingracetime", sLoginGraceTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "keyregenerationinterval", sKeyRegenerationTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "syslogfacility", sLogFacility, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "loglevel", sLogLevel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "rhostsauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "rhostsrsaauthentication", sRhostsRSAAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "rsaauthentication", sRSAAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
-#ifdef KRB5
- { "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-#ifdef USE_AFS
- { "kerberosgetafstoken", sKerberosGetAFSToken, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-#else
- { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-#endif
-#else
- { "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-#endif
- { "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-#ifdef GSSAPI
- { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-#else
- { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-#endif
- { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "skeyauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
- { "checkmail", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "listenaddress", sListenAddress, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "addressfamily", sAddressFamily, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "printmotd", sPrintMotd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "uselogin", sUseLogin, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "compression", sCompression, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "rekeylimit", sRekeyLimit, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "tcpkeepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "keepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* obsolete alias */
- { "allowtcpforwarding", sAllowTcpForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "allowagentforwarding", sAllowAgentForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "allowusers", sAllowUsers, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "denyusers", sDenyUsers, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "allowgroups", sAllowGroups, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "denygroups", sDenyGroups, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "ciphers", sCiphers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "macs", sMacs, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "protocol", sProtocol, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "gatewayports", sGatewayPorts, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "subsystem", sSubsystem, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "maxstartups", sMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "authorizedkeysfile2", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "useprivilegeseparation", sUsePrivilegeSeparation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL},
- { "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "permittty", sPermitTTY, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
-};
-
-static struct {
- int val;
- char *text;
-} tunmode_desc[] = {
- { SSH_TUNMODE_NO, "no" },
- { SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT, "point-to-point" },
- { SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET, "ethernet" },
- { SSH_TUNMODE_YES, "yes" },
- { -1, NULL }
-};
-
-/*
- * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or sBadOption.
- */
-
-static ServerOpCodes
-parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename,
- int linenum, u_int *flags)
-{
- u_int i;
-
- for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
- if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) {
- *flags = keywords[i].flags;
- return keywords[i].opcode;
- }
-
- error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s",
- filename, linenum, cp);
- return sBadOption;
-}
-
-char *
-derelativise_path(const char *path)
-{
- char *expanded, *ret, cwd[MAXPATHLEN];
-
- expanded = tilde_expand_filename(path, getuid());
- if (*expanded == '/')
- return expanded;
- if (getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: getcwd: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- xasprintf(&ret, "%s/%s", cwd, expanded);
- free(expanded);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static void
-add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port)
-{
- u_int i;
-
- if (options->num_ports == 0)
- options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
- if (options->address_family == -1)
- options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
- if (port == 0)
- for (i = 0; i < options->num_ports; i++)
- add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, options->ports[i]);
- else
- add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, port);
-}
-
-static void
-add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port)
-{
- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
- char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
- int gaierr;
-
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = options->address_family;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- hints.ai_flags = (addr == NULL) ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
- snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
- if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
- fatal("bad addr or host: %s (%s)",
- addr ? addr : "<NULL>",
- ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
- for (ai = aitop; ai->ai_next; ai = ai->ai_next)
- ;
- ai->ai_next = options->listen_addrs;
- options->listen_addrs = aitop;
-}
-
-struct connection_info *
-get_connection_info(int populate, int use_dns)
-{
- static struct connection_info ci;
-
- if (!populate)
- return &ci;
- ci.host = get_canonical_hostname(use_dns);
- ci.address = get_remote_ipaddr();
- ci.laddress = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in());
- ci.lport = get_local_port();
- return &ci;
-}
-
-/*
- * The strategy for the Match blocks is that the config file is parsed twice.
- *
- * The first time is at startup. activep is initialized to 1 and the
- * directives in the global context are processed and acted on. Hitting a
- * Match directive unsets activep and the directives inside the block are
- * checked for syntax only.
- *
- * The second time is after a connection has been established but before
- * authentication. activep is initialized to 2 and global config directives
- * are ignored since they have already been processed. If the criteria in a
- * Match block is met, activep is set and the subsequent directives
- * processed and actioned until EOF or another Match block unsets it. Any
- * options set are copied into the main server config.
- *
- * Potential additions/improvements:
- * - Add Match support for pre-kex directives, eg Protocol, Ciphers.
- *
- * - Add a Tag directive (idea from David Leonard) ala pf, eg:
- * Match Address 192.168.0.*
- * Tag trusted
- * Match Group wheel
- * Tag trusted
- * Match Tag trusted
- * AllowTcpForwarding yes
- * GatewayPorts clientspecified
- * [...]
- *
- * - Add a PermittedChannelRequests directive
- * Match Group shell
- * PermittedChannelRequests session,forwarded-tcpip
- */
-
-static int
-match_cfg_line_group(const char *grps, int line, const char *user)
-{
- int result = 0;
- struct passwd *pw;
-
- if (user == NULL)
- goto out;
-
- if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
- debug("Can't match group at line %d because user %.100s does "
- "not exist", line, user);
- } else if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
- debug("Can't Match group because user %.100s not in any group "
- "at line %d", user, line);
- } else if (ga_match_pattern_list(grps) != 1) {
- debug("user %.100s does not match group list %.100s at line %d",
- user, grps, line);
- } else {
- debug("user %.100s matched group list %.100s at line %d", user,
- grps, line);
- result = 1;
- }
-out:
- ga_free();
- return result;
-}
-
-/*
- * All of the attributes on a single Match line are ANDed together, so we need
- * to check every attribute and set the result to zero if any attribute does
- * not match.
- */
-static int
-match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
-{
- int result = 1, attributes = 0, port;
- char *arg, *attrib, *cp = *condition;
- size_t len;
-
- if (ci == NULL)
- debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", cp);
- else
- debug3("checking match for '%s' user %s host %s addr %s "
- "laddr %s lport %d", cp, ci->user ? ci->user : "(null)",
- ci->host ? ci->host : "(null)",
- ci->address ? ci->address : "(null)",
- ci->laddress ? ci->laddress : "(null)", ci->lport);
-
- while ((attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') {
- attributes++;
- if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) {
- if (attributes != 1 ||
- ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')) {
- error("'all' cannot be combined with other "
- "Match attributes");
- return -1;
- }
- *condition = cp;
- return 1;
- }
- if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') {
- error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
- return -1;
- }
- len = strlen(arg);
- if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
- if (ci == NULL || ci->user == NULL) {
- result = 0;
- continue;
- }
- if (match_pattern_list(ci->user, arg, len, 0) != 1)
- result = 0;
- else
- debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at "
- "line %d", ci->user, arg, line);
- } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "group") == 0) {
- if (ci == NULL || ci->user == NULL) {
- result = 0;
- continue;
- }
- switch (match_cfg_line_group(arg, line, ci->user)) {
- case -1:
- return -1;
- case 0:
- result = 0;
- }
- } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
- if (ci == NULL || ci->host == NULL) {
- result = 0;
- continue;
- }
- if (match_hostname(ci->host, arg, len) != 1)
- result = 0;
- else
- debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host "
- "%.100s' at line %d", ci->host, arg, line);
- } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "address") == 0) {
- if (ci == NULL || ci->address == NULL) {
- result = 0;
- continue;
- }
- switch (addr_match_list(ci->address, arg)) {
- case 1:
- debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Address "
- "%.100s' at line %d", ci->address, arg, line);
- break;
- case 0:
- case -1:
- result = 0;
- break;
- case -2:
- return -1;
- }
- } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localaddress") == 0){
- if (ci == NULL || ci->laddress == NULL) {
- result = 0;
- continue;
- }
- switch (addr_match_list(ci->laddress, arg)) {
- case 1:
- debug("connection from %.100s matched "
- "'LocalAddress %.100s' at line %d",
- ci->laddress, arg, line);
- break;
- case 0:
- case -1:
- result = 0;
- break;
- case -2:
- return -1;
- }
- } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localport") == 0) {
- if ((port = a2port(arg)) == -1) {
- error("Invalid LocalPort '%s' on Match line",
- arg);
- return -1;
- }
- if (ci == NULL || ci->lport == 0) {
- result = 0;
- continue;
- }
- /* TODO support port lists */
- if (port == ci->lport)
- debug("connection from %.100s matched "
- "'LocalPort %d' at line %d",
- ci->laddress, port, line);
- else
- result = 0;
- } else {
- error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- if (attributes == 0) {
- error("One or more attributes required for Match");
- return -1;
- }
- if (ci != NULL)
- debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
- *condition = cp;
- return result;
-}
-
-#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
-
-/* Multistate option parsing */
-struct multistate {
- char *key;
- int value;
-};
-static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = {
- { "inet", AF_INET },
- { "inet6", AF_INET6 },
- { "any", AF_UNSPEC },
- { NULL, -1 }
-};
-static const struct multistate multistate_permitrootlogin[] = {
- { "without-password", PERMIT_NO_PASSWD },
- { "forced-commands-only", PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY },
- { "yes", PERMIT_YES },
- { "no", PERMIT_NO },
- { NULL, -1 }
-};
-static const struct multistate multistate_compression[] = {
- { "delayed", COMP_DELAYED },
- { "yes", COMP_ZLIB },
- { "no", COMP_NONE },
- { NULL, -1 }
-};
-static const struct multistate multistate_gatewayports[] = {
- { "clientspecified", 2 },
- { "yes", 1 },
- { "no", 0 },
- { NULL, -1 }
-};
-static const struct multistate multistate_privsep[] = {
- { "yes", PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX },
- { "sandbox", PRIVSEP_ON },
- { "nosandbox", PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX },
- { "no", PRIVSEP_OFF },
- { NULL, -1 }
-};
-static const struct multistate multistate_tcpfwd[] = {
- { "yes", FORWARD_ALLOW },
- { "all", FORWARD_ALLOW },
- { "no", FORWARD_DENY },
- { "remote", FORWARD_REMOTE },
- { "local", FORWARD_LOCAL },
- { NULL, -1 }
-};
-
-int
-process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep,
- struct connection_info *connectinfo)
-{
- char *cp, **charptr, *arg, *p;
- int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port;
- SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr;
- LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
- ServerOpCodes opcode;
- u_int i, flags = 0;
- size_t len;
- long long val64;
- const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;
-
- cp = line;
- if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
- return 0;
- /* Ignore leading whitespace */
- if (*arg == '\0')
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#')
- return 0;
- intptr = NULL;
- charptr = NULL;
- opcode = parse_token(arg, filename, linenum, &flags);
-
- if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */
- cmdline = 1;
- activep = &cmdline;
- }
- if (*activep && opcode != sMatch)
- debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, arg, cp);
- if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) {
- if (connectinfo == NULL) {
- fatal("%s line %d: Directive '%s' is not allowed "
- "within a Match block", filename, linenum, arg);
- } else { /* this is a directive we have already processed */
- while (arg)
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- switch (opcode) {
- /* Portable-specific options */
- case sUsePAM:
- intptr = &options->use_pam;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- /* Standard Options */
- case sBadOption:
- return -1;
- case sPort:
- /* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */
- if (options->ports_from_cmdline)
- return 0;
- if (options->listen_addrs != NULL)
- fatal("%s line %d: ports must be specified before "
- "ListenAddress.", filename, linenum);
- if (options->num_ports >= MAX_PORTS)
- fatal("%s line %d: too many ports.",
- filename, linenum);
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing port number.",
- filename, linenum);
- options->ports[options->num_ports++] = a2port(arg);
- if (options->ports[options->num_ports-1] <= 0)
- fatal("%s line %d: Badly formatted port number.",
- filename, linenum);
- break;
-
- case sServerKeyBits:
- intptr = &options->server_key_bits;
- parse_int:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing integer value.",
- filename, linenum);
- value = atoi(arg);
- if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
- *intptr = value;
- break;
-
- case sLoginGraceTime:
- intptr = &options->login_grace_time;
- parse_time:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.",
- filename, linenum);
- if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1)
- fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
- filename, linenum);
- if (*intptr == -1)
- *intptr = value;
- break;
-
- case sKeyRegenerationTime:
- intptr = &options->key_regeneration_time;
- goto parse_time;
-
- case sListenAddress:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing address",
- filename, linenum);
- /* check for bare IPv6 address: no "[]" and 2 or more ":" */
- if (strchr(arg, '[') == NULL && (p = strchr(arg, ':')) != NULL
- && strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL) {
- add_listen_addr(options, arg, 0);
- break;
- }
- p = hpdelim(&arg);
- if (p == NULL)
- fatal("%s line %d: bad address:port usage",
- filename, linenum);
- p = cleanhostname(p);
- if (arg == NULL)
- port = 0;
- else if ((port = a2port(arg)) <= 0)
- fatal("%s line %d: bad port number", filename, linenum);
-
- add_listen_addr(options, p, port);
-
- break;
-
- case sAddressFamily:
- intptr = &options->address_family;
- multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily;
- if (options->listen_addrs != NULL)
- fatal("%s line %d: address family must be specified "
- "before ListenAddress.", filename, linenum);
- parse_multistate:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.",
- filename, linenum);
- value = -1;
- for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) {
- if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) {
- value = multistate_ptr[i].value;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (value == -1)
- fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".",
- filename, linenum, arg);
- if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
- *intptr = value;
- break;
-
- case sHostKeyFile:
- intptr = &options->num_host_key_files;
- if (*intptr >= MAX_HOSTKEYS)
- fatal("%s line %d: too many host keys specified (max %d).",
- filename, linenum, MAX_HOSTKEYS);
- charptr = &options->host_key_files[*intptr];
- parse_filename:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
- filename, linenum);
- if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
- *charptr = derelativise_path(arg);
- /* increase optional counter */
- if (intptr != NULL)
- *intptr = *intptr + 1;
- }
- break;
-
- case sHostKeyAgent:
- charptr = &options->host_key_agent;
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing socket name.",
- filename, linenum);
- if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
- *charptr = !strcmp(arg, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) ?
- xstrdup(arg) : derelativise_path(arg);
- break;
-
- case sHostCertificate:
- intptr = &options->num_host_cert_files;
- if (*intptr >= MAX_HOSTKEYS)
- fatal("%s line %d: too many host certificates "
- "specified (max %d).", filename, linenum,
- MAX_HOSTCERTS);
- charptr = &options->host_cert_files[*intptr];
- goto parse_filename;
- break;
-
- case sPidFile:
- charptr = &options->pid_file;
- goto parse_filename;
-
- case sPermitRootLogin:
- intptr = &options->permit_root_login;
- multistate_ptr = multistate_permitrootlogin;
- goto parse_multistate;
-
- case sIgnoreRhosts:
- intptr = &options->ignore_rhosts;
- parse_flag:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing yes/no argument.",
- filename, linenum);
- value = 0; /* silence compiler */
- if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0)
- value = 1;
- else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0)
- value = 0;
- else
- fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/no argument: %s",
- filename, linenum, arg);
- if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
- *intptr = value;
- break;
-
- case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts:
- intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sRhostsRSAAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->rhosts_rsa_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sHostbasedAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly:
- intptr = &options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sRSAAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->rsa_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sPubkeyAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sKerberosAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sKerberosOrLocalPasswd:
- intptr = &options->kerberos_or_local_passwd;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sKerberosTicketCleanup:
- intptr = &options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sKerberosGetAFSToken:
- intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sGssAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sGssCleanupCreds:
- intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sPasswordAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->password_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sChallengeResponseAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sPrintMotd:
- intptr = &options->print_motd;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sPrintLastLog:
- intptr = &options->print_lastlog;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sX11Forwarding:
- intptr = &options->x11_forwarding;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sX11DisplayOffset:
- intptr = &options->x11_display_offset;
- goto parse_int;
-
- case sX11UseLocalhost:
- intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sXAuthLocation:
- charptr = &options->xauth_location;
- goto parse_filename;
-
- case sPermitTTY:
- intptr = &options->permit_tty;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sStrictModes:
- intptr = &options->strict_modes;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sTCPKeepAlive:
- intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sEmptyPasswd:
- intptr = &options->permit_empty_passwd;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sPermitUserEnvironment:
- intptr = &options->permit_user_env;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sUseLogin:
- intptr = &options->use_login;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sCompression:
- intptr = &options->compression;
- multistate_ptr = multistate_compression;
- goto parse_multistate;
-
- case sRekeyLimit:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
- linenum);
- if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) {
- val64 = 0;
- } else {
- if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s",
- filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno));
- /* check for too-large or too-small limits */
- if (val64 > UINT_MAX)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too large",
- filename, linenum);
- if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small",
- filename, linenum);
- }
- if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1)
- options->rekey_limit = (u_int32_t)val64;
- if (cp != NULL) { /* optional rekey interval present */
- if (strcmp(cp, "none") == 0) {
- (void)strdelim(&cp); /* discard */
- break;
- }
- intptr = &options->rekey_interval;
- goto parse_time;
- }
- break;
-
- case sGatewayPorts:
- intptr = &options->gateway_ports;
- multistate_ptr = multistate_gatewayports;
- goto parse_multistate;
-
- case sUseDNS:
- intptr = &options->use_dns;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sLogFacility:
- log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility;
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- value = log_facility_number(arg);
- if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'",
- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
- if (*log_facility_ptr == -1)
- *log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value;
- break;
-
- case sLogLevel:
- log_level_ptr = &options->log_level;
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- value = log_level_number(arg);
- if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'",
- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
- if (*log_level_ptr == -1)
- *log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value;
- break;
-
- case sAllowTcpForwarding:
- intptr = &options->allow_tcp_forwarding;
- multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd;
- goto parse_multistate;
-
- case sAllowAgentForwarding:
- intptr = &options->allow_agent_forwarding;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sUsePrivilegeSeparation:
- intptr = &use_privsep;
- multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep;
- goto parse_multistate;
-
- case sAllowUsers:
- while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
- fatal("%s line %d: too many allow users.",
- filename, linenum);
- if (!*activep)
- continue;
- options->allow_users[options->num_allow_users++] =
- xstrdup(arg);
- }
- break;
-
- case sDenyUsers:
- while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- if (options->num_deny_users >= MAX_DENY_USERS)
- fatal("%s line %d: too many deny users.",
- filename, linenum);
- if (!*activep)
- continue;
- options->deny_users[options->num_deny_users++] =
- xstrdup(arg);
- }
- break;
-
- case sAllowGroups:
- while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- if (options->num_allow_groups >= MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS)
- fatal("%s line %d: too many allow groups.",
- filename, linenum);
- if (!*activep)
- continue;
- options->allow_groups[options->num_allow_groups++] =
- xstrdup(arg);
- }
- break;
-
- case sDenyGroups:
- while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- if (options->num_deny_groups >= MAX_DENY_GROUPS)
- fatal("%s line %d: too many deny groups.",
- filename, linenum);
- if (!*activep)
- continue;
- options->deny_groups[options->num_deny_groups++] =
- xstrdup(arg);
- }
- break;
-
- case sCiphers:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
- if (!ciphers_valid(arg))
- fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
- if (options->ciphers == NULL)
- options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
- break;
-
- case sMacs:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
- if (!mac_valid(arg))
- fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.",
- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
- if (options->macs == NULL)
- options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
- break;
-
- case sKexAlgorithms:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
- filename, linenum);
- if (!kex_names_valid(arg))
- fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
- if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
- options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
- break;
-
- case sProtocol:
- intptr = &options->protocol;
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
- value = proto_spec(arg);
- if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
- fatal("%s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.",
- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
- if (*intptr == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
- *intptr = value;
- break;
-
- case sSubsystem:
- if (options->num_subsystems >= MAX_SUBSYSTEMS) {
- fatal("%s line %d: too many subsystems defined.",
- filename, linenum);
- }
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
- filename, linenum);
- if (!*activep) {
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- break;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
- if (strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0)
- fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' already defined.",
- filename, linenum, arg);
- options->subsystem_name[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem command.",
- filename, linenum);
- options->subsystem_command[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
-
- /* Collect arguments (separate to executable) */
- p = xstrdup(arg);
- len = strlen(p) + 1;
- while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
- len += 1 + strlen(arg);
- p = xrealloc(p, 1, len);
- strlcat(p, " ", len);
- strlcat(p, arg, len);
- }
- options->subsystem_args[options->num_subsystems] = p;
- options->num_subsystems++;
- break;
-
- case sMaxStartups:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: Missing MaxStartups spec.",
- filename, linenum);
- if ((n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d:%d",
- &options->max_startups_begin,
- &options->max_startups_rate,
- &options->max_startups)) == 3) {
- if (options->max_startups_begin >
- options->max_startups ||
- options->max_startups_rate > 100 ||
- options->max_startups_rate < 1)
- fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.",
- filename, linenum);
- } else if (n != 1)
- fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.",
- filename, linenum);
- else
- options->max_startups = options->max_startups_begin;
- break;
-
- case sMaxAuthTries:
- intptr = &options->max_authtries;
- goto parse_int;
-
- case sMaxSessions:
- intptr = &options->max_sessions;
- goto parse_int;
-
- case sBanner:
- charptr = &options->banner;
- goto parse_filename;
-
- /*
- * These options can contain %X options expanded at
- * connect time, so that you can specify paths like:
- *
- * AuthorizedKeysFile /etc/ssh_keys/%u
- */
- case sAuthorizedKeysFile:
- if (*activep && options->num_authkeys_files == 0) {
- while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- if (options->num_authkeys_files >=
- MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES)
- fatal("%s line %d: "
- "too many authorized keys files.",
- filename, linenum);
- options->authorized_keys_files[
- options->num_authkeys_files++] =
- tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
- }
- }
- return 0;
-
- case sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile:
- charptr = &options->authorized_principals_file;
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
- filename, linenum);
- if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
- *charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
- /* increase optional counter */
- if (intptr != NULL)
- *intptr = *intptr + 1;
- }
- break;
-
- case sClientAliveInterval:
- intptr = &options->client_alive_interval;
- goto parse_time;
-
- case sClientAliveCountMax:
- intptr = &options->client_alive_count_max;
- goto parse_int;
-
- case sAcceptEnv:
- while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL)
- fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.",
- filename, linenum);
- if (options->num_accept_env >= MAX_ACCEPT_ENV)
- fatal("%s line %d: too many allow env.",
- filename, linenum);
- if (!*activep)
- continue;
- options->accept_env[options->num_accept_env++] =
- xstrdup(arg);
- }
- break;
-
- case sPermitTunnel:
- intptr = &options->permit_tun;
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: Missing yes/point-to-point/"
- "ethernet/no argument.", filename, linenum);
- value = -1;
- for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++)
- if (strcmp(tunmode_desc[i].text, arg) == 0) {
- value = tunmode_desc[i].val;
- break;
- }
- if (value == -1)
- fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/point-to-point/ethernet/"
- "no argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg);
- if (*intptr == -1)
- *intptr = value;
- break;
-
- case sMatch:
- if (cmdline)
- fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
- "option");
- value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum, connectinfo);
- if (value < 0)
- fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
- linenum);
- *activep = value;
- break;
-
- case sPermitOpen:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing PermitOpen specification",
- filename, linenum);
- n = options->num_permitted_opens; /* modified later */
- if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) {
- if (*activep && n == -1) {
- channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens();
- options->num_permitted_opens = 0;
- }
- break;
- }
- if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) {
- if (*activep && n == -1) {
- options->num_permitted_opens = 1;
- channel_disable_adm_local_opens();
- }
- break;
- }
- if (*activep && n == -1)
- channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens();
- for (; arg != NULL && *arg != '\0'; arg = strdelim(&cp)) {
- p = hpdelim(&arg);
- if (p == NULL)
- fatal("%s line %d: missing host in PermitOpen",
- filename, linenum);
- p = cleanhostname(p);
- if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0))
- fatal("%s line %d: bad port number in "
- "PermitOpen", filename, linenum);
- if (*activep && n == -1)
- options->num_permitted_opens =
- channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(p, port);
- }
- break;
-
- case sForceCommand:
- if (cp == NULL)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
- linenum);
- len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
- if (*activep && options->adm_forced_command == NULL)
- options->adm_forced_command = xstrdup(cp + len);
- return 0;
-
- case sChrootDirectory:
- charptr = &options->chroot_directory;
-
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
- filename, linenum);
- if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
- *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
- break;
-
- case sTrustedUserCAKeys:
- charptr = &options->trusted_user_ca_keys;
- goto parse_filename;
-
- case sRevokedKeys:
- charptr = &options->revoked_keys_file;
- goto parse_filename;
-
- case sIPQoS:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
- fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
- filename, linenum, arg);
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (arg == NULL)
- value2 = value;
- else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
- fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
- filename, linenum, arg);
- if (*activep) {
- options->ip_qos_interactive = value;
- options->ip_qos_bulk = value2;
- }
- break;
-
- case sVersionAddendum:
- if (cp == NULL)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
- linenum);
- len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
- if (*activep && options->version_addendum == NULL) {
- if (strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") == 0)
- options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
- else if (strchr(cp + len, '\r') != NULL)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid argument",
- filename, linenum);
- else
- options->version_addendum = xstrdup(cp + len);
- }
- return 0;
-
- case sAuthorizedKeysCommand:
- len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
- if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL) {
- if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: AuthorizedKeysCommand "
- "must be an absolute path",
- filename, linenum);
- options->authorized_keys_command = xstrdup(cp + len);
- }
- return 0;
-
- case sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser:
- charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command_user;
-
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
- *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
- break;
-
- case sAuthenticationMethods:
- if (*activep && options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
- while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- if (options->num_auth_methods >=
- MAX_AUTH_METHODS)
- fatal("%s line %d: "
- "too many authentication methods.",
- filename, linenum);
- if (auth2_methods_valid(arg, 0) != 0)
- fatal("%s line %d: invalid "
- "authentication method list.",
- filename, linenum);
- options->auth_methods[
- options->num_auth_methods++] = xstrdup(arg);
- }
- }
- return 0;
-
- case sDeprecated:
- logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
- filename, linenum, arg);
- while (arg)
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- break;
-
- case sUnsupported:
- logit("%s line %d: Unsupported option %s",
- filename, linenum, arg);
- while (arg)
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- break;
-
- default:
- fatal("%s line %d: Missing handler for opcode %s (%d)",
- filename, linenum, arg, opcode);
- }
- if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".",
- filename, linenum, arg);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Reads the server configuration file. */
-
-void
-load_server_config(const char *filename, Buffer *conf)
-{
- char line[4096], *cp;
- FILE *f;
- int lineno = 0;
-
- debug2("%s: filename %s", __func__, filename);
- if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) {
- perror(filename);
- exit(1);
- }
- buffer_clear(conf);
- while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
- lineno++;
- if (strlen(line) == sizeof(line) - 1)
- fatal("%s line %d too long", filename, lineno);
- /*
- * Trim out comments and strip whitespace
- * NB - preserve newlines, they are needed to reproduce
- * line numbers later for error messages
- */
- if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) != NULL)
- memcpy(cp, "\n", 2);
- cp = line + strspn(line, " \t\r");
-
- buffer_append(conf, cp, strlen(cp));
- }
- buffer_append(conf, "\0", 1);
- fclose(f);
- debug2("%s: done config len = %d", __func__, buffer_len(conf));
-}
-
-void
-parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options,
- struct connection_info *connectinfo)
-{
- ServerOptions mo;
-
- initialize_server_options(&mo);
- parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", &cfg, connectinfo);
- copy_set_server_options(options, &mo, 0);
-}
-
-int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *ci, char *spec)
-{
- char *p;
-
- while ((p = strsep(&spec, ",")) && *p != '\0') {
- if (strncmp(p, "addr=", 5) == 0) {
- ci->address = xstrdup(p + 5);
- } else if (strncmp(p, "host=", 5) == 0) {
- ci->host = xstrdup(p + 5);
- } else if (strncmp(p, "user=", 5) == 0) {
- ci->user = xstrdup(p + 5);
- } else if (strncmp(p, "laddr=", 6) == 0) {
- ci->laddress = xstrdup(p + 6);
- } else if (strncmp(p, "lport=", 6) == 0) {
- ci->lport = a2port(p + 6);
- if (ci->lport == -1) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Invalid port '%s' in test mode"
- " specification %s\n", p+6, p);
- return -1;
- }
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr, "Invalid test mode specification %s\n",
- p);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * returns 1 for a complete spec, 0 for partial spec and -1 for an
- * empty spec.
- */
-int server_match_spec_complete(struct connection_info *ci)
-{
- if (ci->user && ci->host && ci->address)
- return 1; /* complete */
- if (!ci->user && !ci->host && !ci->address)
- return -1; /* empty */
- return 0; /* partial */
-}
-
-/*
- * Copy any supported values that are set.
- *
- * If the preauth flag is set, we do not bother copying the string or
- * array values that are not used pre-authentication, because any that we
- * do use must be explictly sent in mm_getpwnamallow().
- */
-void
-copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
-{
-#define M_CP_INTOPT(n) do {\
- if (src->n != -1) \
- dst->n = src->n; \
-} while (0)
-
- M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication);
- M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication);
- M_CP_INTOPT(rsa_authentication);
- M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication);
- M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication);
- M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_authentication);
- M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
- M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication);
- M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login);
- M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd);
-
- M_CP_INTOPT(allow_tcp_forwarding);
- M_CP_INTOPT(allow_agent_forwarding);
- M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tun);
- M_CP_INTOPT(gateway_ports);
- M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
- M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
- M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
- M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty);
- M_CP_INTOPT(max_sessions);
- M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries);
- M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
- M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
- M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
- M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
-
- /* M_CP_STROPT and M_CP_STRARRAYOPT should not appear before here */
-#define M_CP_STROPT(n) do {\
- if (src->n != NULL && dst->n != src->n) { \
- free(dst->n); \
- dst->n = src->n; \
- } \
-} while(0)
-#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(n, num_n) do {\
- if (src->num_n != 0) { \
- for (dst->num_n = 0; dst->num_n < src->num_n; dst->num_n++) \
- dst->n[dst->num_n] = xstrdup(src->n[dst->num_n]); \
- } \
-} while(0)
-
- /* See comment in servconf.h */
- COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
-
- /*
- * The only things that should be below this point are string options
- * which are only used after authentication.
- */
- if (preauth)
- return;
-
- M_CP_STROPT(adm_forced_command);
- M_CP_STROPT(chroot_directory);
-}
-
-#undef M_CP_INTOPT
-#undef M_CP_STROPT
-#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
-
-void
-parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, Buffer *conf,
- struct connection_info *connectinfo)
-{
- int active, linenum, bad_options = 0;
- char *cp, *obuf, *cbuf;
-
- debug2("%s: config %s len %d", __func__, filename, buffer_len(conf));
-
- obuf = cbuf = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(conf));
- active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1;
- linenum = 1;
- while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) {
- if (process_server_config_line(options, cp, filename,
- linenum++, &active, connectinfo) != 0)
- bad_options++;
- }
- free(obuf);
- if (bad_options > 0)
- fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
- filename, bad_options);
-}
-
-static const char *
-fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m)
-{
- u_int i;
-
- for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) {
- if (m[i].value == val)
- return m[i].key;
- }
- return "UNKNOWN";
-}
-
-static const char *
-fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
-{
- if (val == -1)
- return "unset";
- switch (code) {
- case sAddressFamily:
- return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily);
- case sPermitRootLogin:
- return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_permitrootlogin);
- case sGatewayPorts:
- return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_gatewayports);
- case sCompression:
- return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_compression);
- case sUsePrivilegeSeparation:
- return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_privsep);
- case sAllowTcpForwarding:
- return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd);
- case sProtocol:
- switch (val) {
- case SSH_PROTO_1:
- return "1";
- case SSH_PROTO_2:
- return "2";
- case (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2):
- return "2,1";
- default:
- return "UNKNOWN";
- }
- default:
- switch (val) {
- case 0:
- return "no";
- case 1:
- return "yes";
- default:
- return "UNKNOWN";
- }
- }
-}
-
-static const char *
-lookup_opcode_name(ServerOpCodes code)
-{
- u_int i;
-
- for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++)
- if (keywords[i].opcode == code)
- return(keywords[i].name);
- return "UNKNOWN";
-}
-
-static void
-dump_cfg_int(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
-{
- printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
-}
-
-static void
-dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
-{
- printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val));
-}
-
-static void
-dump_cfg_string(ServerOpCodes code, const char *val)
-{
- if (val == NULL)
- return;
- printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
-}
-
-static void
-dump_cfg_strarray(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
-{
- u_int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
- printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]);
-}
-
-static void
-dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
-{
- u_int i;
-
- printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
- for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
- printf(" %s", vals[i]);
- printf("\n");
-}
-
-void
-dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
-{
- u_int i;
- int ret;
- struct addrinfo *ai;
- char addr[NI_MAXHOST], port[NI_MAXSERV], *s = NULL;
-
- /* these are usually at the top of the config */
- for (i = 0; i < o->num_ports; i++)
- printf("port %d\n", o->ports[i]);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sProtocol, o->protocol);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sAddressFamily, o->address_family);
-
- /* ListenAddress must be after Port */
- for (ai = o->listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, addr,
- sizeof(addr), port, sizeof(port),
- NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
- error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
- (ret != EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(ret) :
- strerror(errno));
- } else {
- if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
- printf("listenaddress [%s]:%s\n", addr, port);
- else
- printf("listenaddress %s:%s\n", addr, port);
- }
- }
-
- /* integer arguments */
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- dump_cfg_int(sUsePAM, o->use_pam);
-#endif
- dump_cfg_int(sServerKeyBits, o->server_key_bits);
- dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
- dump_cfg_int(sKeyRegenerationTime, o->key_regeneration_time);
- dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
- dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
- dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
- dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
- dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max);
-
- /* formatted integer arguments */
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreRhosts, o->ignore_rhosts);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, o->ignore_user_known_hosts);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sRhostsRSAAuthentication, o->rhosts_rsa_authentication);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly,
- o->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sRSAAuthentication, o->rsa_authentication);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication);
-#ifdef KRB5
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosAuthentication, o->kerberos_authentication);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, o->kerberos_or_local_passwd);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosTicketCleanup, o->kerberos_ticket_cleanup);
-# ifdef USE_AFS
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
-# endif
-#endif
-#ifdef GSSAPI
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
-#endif
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- o->kbd_interactive_authentication);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
- o->challenge_response_authentication);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintMotd, o->print_motd);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintLastLog, o->print_lastlog);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11Forwarding, o->x11_forwarding);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11UseLocalhost, o->x11_use_localhost);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitTTY, o->permit_tty);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sStrictModes, o->strict_modes);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sEmptyPasswd, o->permit_empty_passwd);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserEnvironment, o->permit_user_env);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseLogin, o->use_login);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->gateway_ports);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
-
- /* string arguments */
- dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file);
- dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
- dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers :
- cipher_alg_list(',', 0));
- dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : mac_alg_list(','));
- dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
- dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
- dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
- dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);
- dump_cfg_string(sRevokedKeys, o->revoked_keys_file);
- dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
- o->authorized_principals_file);
- dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, o->version_addendum);
- dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command);
- dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user);
- dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAgent, o->host_key_agent);
- dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms :
- kex_alg_list(','));
-
- /* string arguments requiring a lookup */
- dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
- dump_cfg_string(sLogFacility, log_facility_name(o->log_facility));
-
- /* string array arguments */
- dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthorizedKeysFile, o->num_authkeys_files,
- o->authorized_keys_files);
- dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_key_files,
- o->host_key_files);
- dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_cert_files,
- o->host_cert_files);
- dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowUsers, o->num_allow_users, o->allow_users);
- dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyUsers, o->num_deny_users, o->deny_users);
- dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowGroups, o->num_allow_groups, o->allow_groups);
- dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyGroups, o->num_deny_groups, o->deny_groups);
- dump_cfg_strarray(sAcceptEnv, o->num_accept_env, o->accept_env);
- dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthenticationMethods,
- o->num_auth_methods, o->auth_methods);
-
- /* other arguments */
- for (i = 0; i < o->num_subsystems; i++)
- printf("subsystem %s %s\n", o->subsystem_name[i],
- o->subsystem_args[i]);
-
- printf("maxstartups %d:%d:%d\n", o->max_startups_begin,
- o->max_startups_rate, o->max_startups);
-
- for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++)
- if (tunmode_desc[i].val == o->permit_tun) {
- s = tunmode_desc[i].text;
- break;
- }
- dump_cfg_string(sPermitTunnel, s);
-
- printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive));
- printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk));
-
- printf("rekeylimit %lld %d\n", (long long)o->rekey_limit,
- o->rekey_interval);
-
- channel_print_adm_permitted_opens();
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/servconf.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/servconf.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/servconf.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/servconf.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,2410 @@
+
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.292 2016/06/23 05:17:51 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+#include <util.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "groupaccess.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
+static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
+
+/* Use of privilege separation or not */
+extern int use_privsep;
+extern Buffer cfg;
+
+/* Initializes the server options to their default values. */
+
+void
+initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+{
+ memset(options, 0, sizeof(*options));
+
+ /* Portable-specific options */
+ options->use_pam = -1;
+
+ /* Standard Options */
+ options->num_ports = 0;
+ options->ports_from_cmdline = 0;
+ options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL;
+ options->num_queued_listens = 0;
+ options->listen_addrs = NULL;
+ options->address_family = -1;
+ options->num_host_key_files = 0;
+ options->num_host_cert_files = 0;
+ options->host_key_agent = NULL;
+ options->pid_file = NULL;
+ options->server_key_bits = -1;
+ options->login_grace_time = -1;
+ options->key_regeneration_time = -1;
+ options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NOT_SET;
+ options->ignore_rhosts = -1;
+ options->ignore_user_known_hosts = -1;
+ options->print_motd = -1;
+ options->print_lastlog = -1;
+ options->x11_forwarding = -1;
+ options->x11_display_offset = -1;
+ options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
+ options->permit_tty = -1;
+ options->permit_user_rc = -1;
+ options->xauth_location = NULL;
+ options->strict_modes = -1;
+ options->tcp_keep_alive = -1;
+ options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET;
+ options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
+ options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1;
+ options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
+ options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = -1;
+ options->hostbased_key_types = NULL;
+ options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL;
+ options->rsa_authentication = -1;
+ options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+ options->pubkey_key_types = NULL;
+ options->kerberos_authentication = -1;
+ options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
+ options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
+ options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
+ options->gss_authentication=-1;
+ options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+ options->password_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+ options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
+ options->permit_user_env = -1;
+ options->use_login = -1;
+ options->compression = -1;
+ options->rekey_limit = -1;
+ options->rekey_interval = -1;
+ options->allow_tcp_forwarding = -1;
+ options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = -1;
+ options->allow_agent_forwarding = -1;
+ options->num_allow_users = 0;
+ options->num_deny_users = 0;
+ options->num_allow_groups = 0;
+ options->num_deny_groups = 0;
+ options->ciphers = NULL;
+ options->macs = NULL;
+ options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
+ options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
+ options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1;
+ options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1;
+ options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1;
+ options->num_subsystems = 0;
+ options->max_startups_begin = -1;
+ options->max_startups_rate = -1;
+ options->max_startups = -1;
+ options->max_authtries = -1;
+ options->max_sessions = -1;
+ options->banner = NULL;
+ options->use_dns = -1;
+ options->client_alive_interval = -1;
+ options->client_alive_count_max = -1;
+ options->num_authkeys_files = 0;
+ options->num_accept_env = 0;
+ options->permit_tun = -1;
+ options->num_permitted_opens = -1;
+ options->adm_forced_command = NULL;
+ options->chroot_directory = NULL;
+ options->authorized_keys_command = NULL;
+ options->authorized_keys_command_user = NULL;
+ options->revoked_keys_file = NULL;
+ options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
+ options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
+ options->authorized_principals_command = NULL;
+ options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL;
+ options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
+ options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+ options->version_addendum = NULL;
+ options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
+}
+
+/* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
+static int
+option_clear_or_none(const char *o)
+{
+ return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0;
+}
+
+static void
+assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
+{
+ if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, &o->ciphers) != 0 ||
+ kex_assemble_names(KEX_SERVER_MAC, &o->macs) != 0 ||
+ kex_assemble_names(KEX_SERVER_KEX, &o->kex_algorithms) != 0 ||
+ kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG,
+ &o->hostkeyalgorithms) != 0 ||
+ kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG,
+ &o->hostbased_key_types) != 0 ||
+ kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, &o->pubkey_key_types) != 0)
+ fatal("kex_assemble_names failed");
+}
+
+void
+fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /* Portable-specific options */
+ if (options->use_pam == -1)
+ options->use_pam = 0;
+
+ /* Standard Options */
+ if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
+ if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
+ /* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
+ if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
+ options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
+ _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE;
+ if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
+ options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
+ _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE;
+ options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
+ _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
+ _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE;
+#endif
+ options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
+ _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE;
+ }
+ }
+ /* No certificates by default */
+ if (options->num_ports == 0)
+ options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+ if (options->address_family == -1)
+ options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+ if (options->listen_addrs == NULL)
+ add_listen_addr(options, NULL, 0);
+ if (options->pid_file == NULL)
+ options->pid_file = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE);
+ if (options->server_key_bits == -1)
+ options->server_key_bits = 1024;
+ if (options->login_grace_time == -1)
+ options->login_grace_time = 120;
+ if (options->key_regeneration_time == -1)
+ options->key_regeneration_time = 3600;
+ if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET)
+ options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD;
+ if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1)
+ options->ignore_rhosts = 1;
+ if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1)
+ options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0;
+ if (options->print_motd == -1)
+ options->print_motd = 1;
+ if (options->print_lastlog == -1)
+ options->print_lastlog = 1;
+ if (options->x11_forwarding == -1)
+ options->x11_forwarding = 0;
+ if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
+ options->x11_display_offset = 10;
+ if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
+ options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
+ if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
+ options->xauth_location = xstrdup(_PATH_XAUTH);
+ if (options->permit_tty == -1)
+ options->permit_tty = 1;
+ if (options->permit_user_rc == -1)
+ options->permit_user_rc = 1;
+ if (options->strict_modes == -1)
+ options->strict_modes = 1;
+ if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1)
+ options->tcp_keep_alive = 1;
+ if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
+ options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
+ if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
+ options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+ if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1)
+ options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0;
+ if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
+ options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
+ if (options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only == -1)
+ options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = 0;
+ if (options->rsa_authentication == -1)
+ options->rsa_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
+ options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1)
+ options->kerberos_authentication = 0;
+ if (options->kerberos_or_local_passwd == -1)
+ options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = 1;
+ if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1)
+ options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
+ if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
+ options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
+ if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+ options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
+ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 0;
+ if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ options->password_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
+ if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1)
+ options->permit_empty_passwd = 0;
+ if (options->permit_user_env == -1)
+ options->permit_user_env = 0;
+ if (options->use_login == -1)
+ options->use_login = 0;
+ if (options->compression == -1)
+ options->compression = COMP_DELAYED;
+ if (options->rekey_limit == -1)
+ options->rekey_limit = 0;
+ if (options->rekey_interval == -1)
+ options->rekey_interval = 0;
+ if (options->allow_tcp_forwarding == -1)
+ options->allow_tcp_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW;
+ if (options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding == -1)
+ options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW;
+ if (options->allow_agent_forwarding == -1)
+ options->allow_agent_forwarding = 1;
+ if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1)
+ options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0;
+ if (options->max_startups == -1)
+ options->max_startups = 100;
+ if (options->max_startups_rate == -1)
+ options->max_startups_rate = 30; /* 30% */
+ if (options->max_startups_begin == -1)
+ options->max_startups_begin = 10;
+ if (options->max_authtries == -1)
+ options->max_authtries = DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX;
+ if (options->max_sessions == -1)
+ options->max_sessions = DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX;
+ if (options->use_dns == -1)
+ options->use_dns = 0;
+ if (options->client_alive_interval == -1)
+ options->client_alive_interval = 0;
+ if (options->client_alive_count_max == -1)
+ options->client_alive_count_max = 3;
+ if (options->num_authkeys_files == 0) {
+ options->authorized_keys_files[options->num_authkeys_files++] =
+ xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS);
+ options->authorized_keys_files[options->num_authkeys_files++] =
+ xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2);
+ }
+ if (options->permit_tun == -1)
+ options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
+ if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
+ options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_LOWDELAY;
+ if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
+ options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT;
+ if (options->version_addendum == NULL)
+ options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
+ if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
+ options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
+ if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
+ options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0;
+ if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1)
+ options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
+
+ assemble_algorithms(options);
+
+ /* Turn privilege separation and sandboxing on by default */
+ if (use_privsep == -1)
+ use_privsep = PRIVSEP_ON;
+
+#define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \
+ do { \
+ if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \
+ free(v); \
+ v = NULL; \
+ } \
+ } while(0)
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->pid_file);
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->xauth_location);
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->banner);
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->trusted_user_ca_keys);
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_keys_file);
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->authorized_principals_file);
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->adm_forced_command);
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->chroot_directory);
+ for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_key_files; i++)
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_files[i]);
+ for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_cert_files; i++)
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_cert_files[i]);
+#undef CLEAR_ON_NONE
+
+ /* Similar handling for AuthenticationMethods=any */
+ if (options->num_auth_methods == 1 &&
+ strcmp(options->auth_methods[0], "any") == 0) {
+ free(options->auth_methods[0]);
+ options->auth_methods[0] = NULL;
+ options->num_auth_methods = 0;
+ }
+
+#ifndef HAVE_MMAP
+ if (use_privsep && options->compression == 1) {
+ error("This platform does not support both privilege "
+ "separation and compression");
+ error("Compression disabled");
+ options->compression = 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+}
+
+/* Keyword tokens. */
+typedef enum {
+ sBadOption, /* == unknown option */
+ /* Portable-specific options */
+ sUsePAM,
+ /* Standard Options */
+ sPort, sHostKeyFile, sServerKeyBits, sLoginGraceTime,
+ sKeyRegenerationTime, sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+ sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
+ sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+ sKerberosGetAFSToken,
+ sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+ sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+ sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+ sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+ sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
+ sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
+ sPermitUserEnvironment, sUseLogin, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
+ sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
+ sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile,
+ sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes,
+ sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions,
+ sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
+ sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
+ sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+ sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+ sHostCertificate,
+ sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
+ sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser,
+ sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
+ sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
+ sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
+ sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
+ sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash,
+ sDeprecated, sUnsupported
+} ServerOpCodes;
+
+#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL 0x01 /* allowed in main section of sshd_config */
+#define SSHCFG_MATCH 0x02 /* allowed inside a Match section */
+#define SSHCFG_ALL (SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
+
+/* Textual representation of the tokens. */
+static struct {
+ const char *name;
+ ServerOpCodes opcode;
+ u_int flags;
+} keywords[] = {
+ /* Portable-specific options */
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ { "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#else
+ { "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#endif
+ { "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ /* Standard Options */
+ { "port", sPort, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "hostkey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
+ { "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "serverkeybits", sServerKeyBits, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "logingracetime", sLoginGraceTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "keyregenerationinterval", sKeyRegenerationTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "syslogfacility", sLogFacility, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "loglevel", sLogLevel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "rhostsauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "rhostsrsaauthentication", sRhostsRSAAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "hostbasedacceptedkeytypes", sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "hostkeyalgorithms", sHostKeyAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "rsaauthentication", sRSAAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
+#ifdef KRB5
+ { "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#ifdef USE_AFS
+ { "kerberosgetafstoken", sKerberosGetAFSToken, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#else
+ { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#endif
+#else
+ { "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#endif
+ { "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#else
+ { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#endif
+ { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "skeyauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
+ { "checkmail", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "listenaddress", sListenAddress, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "addressfamily", sAddressFamily, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "printmotd", sPrintMotd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#ifdef DISABLE_LASTLOG
+ { "printlastlog", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#else
+ { "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#endif
+ { "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "uselogin", sUseLogin, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "compression", sCompression, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "rekeylimit", sRekeyLimit, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "tcpkeepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "keepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* obsolete alias */
+ { "allowtcpforwarding", sAllowTcpForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "allowagentforwarding", sAllowAgentForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "allowusers", sAllowUsers, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "denyusers", sDenyUsers, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "allowgroups", sAllowGroups, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "denygroups", sDenyGroups, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "ciphers", sCiphers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "macs", sMacs, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "protocol", sProtocol, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gatewayports", sGatewayPorts, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "subsystem", sSubsystem, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "maxstartups", sMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "authorizedkeysfile2", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "useprivilegeseparation", sUsePrivilegeSeparation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL},
+ { "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "permittty", sPermitTTY, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "permituserrc", sPermitUserRC, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "authorizedprincipalscommand", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "authorizedprincipalscommanduser", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "streamlocalbindunlink", sStreamLocalBindUnlink, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
+};
+
+static struct {
+ int val;
+ char *text;
+} tunmode_desc[] = {
+ { SSH_TUNMODE_NO, "no" },
+ { SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT, "point-to-point" },
+ { SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET, "ethernet" },
+ { SSH_TUNMODE_YES, "yes" },
+ { -1, NULL }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or sBadOption.
+ */
+
+static ServerOpCodes
+parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename,
+ int linenum, u_int *flags)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
+ if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) {
+ *flags = keywords[i].flags;
+ return keywords[i].opcode;
+ }
+
+ error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s",
+ filename, linenum, cp);
+ return sBadOption;
+}
+
+char *
+derelativise_path(const char *path)
+{
+ char *expanded, *ret, cwd[PATH_MAX];
+
+ if (strcasecmp(path, "none") == 0)
+ return xstrdup("none");
+ expanded = tilde_expand_filename(path, getuid());
+ if (*expanded == '/')
+ return expanded;
+ if (getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: getcwd: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ xasprintf(&ret, "%s/%s", cwd, expanded);
+ free(expanded);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ if (port == 0)
+ for (i = 0; i < options->num_ports; i++)
+ add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, options->ports[i]);
+ else
+ add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, port);
+}
+
+static void
+add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port)
+{
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+ char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+ int gaierr;
+
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = options->address_family;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ hints.ai_flags = (addr == NULL) ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
+ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+ if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
+ fatal("bad addr or host: %s (%s)",
+ addr ? addr : "<NULL>",
+ ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+ for (ai = aitop; ai->ai_next; ai = ai->ai_next)
+ ;
+ ai->ai_next = options->listen_addrs;
+ options->listen_addrs = aitop;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Queue a ListenAddress to be processed once we have all of the Ports
+ * and AddressFamily options.
+ */
+static void
+queue_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port)
+{
+ options->queued_listen_addrs = xreallocarray(
+ options->queued_listen_addrs, options->num_queued_listens + 1,
+ sizeof(addr));
+ options->queued_listen_ports = xreallocarray(
+ options->queued_listen_ports, options->num_queued_listens + 1,
+ sizeof(port));
+ options->queued_listen_addrs[options->num_queued_listens] =
+ xstrdup(addr);
+ options->queued_listen_ports[options->num_queued_listens] = port;
+ options->num_queued_listens++;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process queued (text) ListenAddress entries.
+ */
+static void
+process_queued_listen_addrs(ServerOptions *options)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ if (options->num_ports == 0)
+ options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+ if (options->address_family == -1)
+ options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options->num_queued_listens; i++) {
+ add_listen_addr(options, options->queued_listen_addrs[i],
+ options->queued_listen_ports[i]);
+ free(options->queued_listen_addrs[i]);
+ options->queued_listen_addrs[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ free(options->queued_listen_addrs);
+ options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL;
+ free(options->queued_listen_ports);
+ options->queued_listen_ports = NULL;
+ options->num_queued_listens = 0;
+}
+
+struct connection_info *
+get_connection_info(int populate, int use_dns)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ static struct connection_info ci;
+
+ if (!populate)
+ return &ci;
+ ci.host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns);
+ ci.address = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ ci.laddress = ssh_local_ipaddr(ssh);
+ ci.lport = ssh_local_port(ssh);
+ return &ci;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The strategy for the Match blocks is that the config file is parsed twice.
+ *
+ * The first time is at startup. activep is initialized to 1 and the
+ * directives in the global context are processed and acted on. Hitting a
+ * Match directive unsets activep and the directives inside the block are
+ * checked for syntax only.
+ *
+ * The second time is after a connection has been established but before
+ * authentication. activep is initialized to 2 and global config directives
+ * are ignored since they have already been processed. If the criteria in a
+ * Match block is met, activep is set and the subsequent directives
+ * processed and actioned until EOF or another Match block unsets it. Any
+ * options set are copied into the main server config.
+ *
+ * Potential additions/improvements:
+ * - Add Match support for pre-kex directives, eg Protocol, Ciphers.
+ *
+ * - Add a Tag directive (idea from David Leonard) ala pf, eg:
+ * Match Address 192.168.0.*
+ * Tag trusted
+ * Match Group wheel
+ * Tag trusted
+ * Match Tag trusted
+ * AllowTcpForwarding yes
+ * GatewayPorts clientspecified
+ * [...]
+ *
+ * - Add a PermittedChannelRequests directive
+ * Match Group shell
+ * PermittedChannelRequests session,forwarded-tcpip
+ */
+
+static int
+match_cfg_line_group(const char *grps, int line, const char *user)
+{
+ int result = 0;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+ if (user == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
+ debug("Can't match group at line %d because user %.100s does "
+ "not exist", line, user);
+ } else if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
+ debug("Can't Match group because user %.100s not in any group "
+ "at line %d", user, line);
+ } else if (ga_match_pattern_list(grps) != 1) {
+ debug("user %.100s does not match group list %.100s at line %d",
+ user, grps, line);
+ } else {
+ debug("user %.100s matched group list %.100s at line %d", user,
+ grps, line);
+ result = 1;
+ }
+out:
+ ga_free();
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * All of the attributes on a single Match line are ANDed together, so we need
+ * to check every attribute and set the result to zero if any attribute does
+ * not match.
+ */
+static int
+match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
+{
+ int result = 1, attributes = 0, port;
+ char *arg, *attrib, *cp = *condition;
+
+ if (ci == NULL)
+ debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", cp);
+ else
+ debug3("checking match for '%s' user %s host %s addr %s "
+ "laddr %s lport %d", cp, ci->user ? ci->user : "(null)",
+ ci->host ? ci->host : "(null)",
+ ci->address ? ci->address : "(null)",
+ ci->laddress ? ci->laddress : "(null)", ci->lport);
+
+ while ((attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') {
+ attributes++;
+ if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) {
+ if (attributes != 1 ||
+ ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')) {
+ error("'all' cannot be combined with other "
+ "Match attributes");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *condition = cp;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
+ if (ci == NULL || ci->user == NULL) {
+ result = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (match_pattern_list(ci->user, arg, 0) != 1)
+ result = 0;
+ else
+ debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at "
+ "line %d", ci->user, arg, line);
+ } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "group") == 0) {
+ if (ci == NULL || ci->user == NULL) {
+ result = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ switch (match_cfg_line_group(arg, line, ci->user)) {
+ case -1:
+ return -1;
+ case 0:
+ result = 0;
+ }
+ } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
+ if (ci == NULL || ci->host == NULL) {
+ result = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (match_hostname(ci->host, arg) != 1)
+ result = 0;
+ else
+ debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host "
+ "%.100s' at line %d", ci->host, arg, line);
+ } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "address") == 0) {
+ if (ci == NULL || ci->address == NULL) {
+ result = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ switch (addr_match_list(ci->address, arg)) {
+ case 1:
+ debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Address "
+ "%.100s' at line %d", ci->address, arg, line);
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ case -1:
+ result = 0;
+ break;
+ case -2:
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localaddress") == 0){
+ if (ci == NULL || ci->laddress == NULL) {
+ result = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ switch (addr_match_list(ci->laddress, arg)) {
+ case 1:
+ debug("connection from %.100s matched "
+ "'LocalAddress %.100s' at line %d",
+ ci->laddress, arg, line);
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ case -1:
+ result = 0;
+ break;
+ case -2:
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localport") == 0) {
+ if ((port = a2port(arg)) == -1) {
+ error("Invalid LocalPort '%s' on Match line",
+ arg);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ci == NULL || ci->lport == 0) {
+ result = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* TODO support port lists */
+ if (port == ci->lport)
+ debug("connection from %.100s matched "
+ "'LocalPort %d' at line %d",
+ ci->laddress, port, line);
+ else
+ result = 0;
+ } else {
+ error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (attributes == 0) {
+ error("One or more attributes required for Match");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ci != NULL)
+ debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
+ *condition = cp;
+ return result;
+}
+
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+
+/* Multistate option parsing */
+struct multistate {
+ char *key;
+ int value;
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = {
+ { "inet", AF_INET },
+ { "inet6", AF_INET6 },
+ { "any", AF_UNSPEC },
+ { NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_permitrootlogin[] = {
+ { "without-password", PERMIT_NO_PASSWD },
+ { "prohibit-password", PERMIT_NO_PASSWD },
+ { "forced-commands-only", PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY },
+ { "yes", PERMIT_YES },
+ { "no", PERMIT_NO },
+ { NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_compression[] = {
+ { "delayed", COMP_DELAYED },
+ { "yes", COMP_ZLIB },
+ { "no", COMP_NONE },
+ { NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_gatewayports[] = {
+ { "clientspecified", 2 },
+ { "yes", 1 },
+ { "no", 0 },
+ { NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_privsep[] = {
+ { "yes", PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX },
+ { "sandbox", PRIVSEP_ON },
+ { "nosandbox", PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX },
+ { "no", PRIVSEP_OFF },
+ { NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_tcpfwd[] = {
+ { "yes", FORWARD_ALLOW },
+ { "all", FORWARD_ALLOW },
+ { "no", FORWARD_DENY },
+ { "remote", FORWARD_REMOTE },
+ { "local", FORWARD_LOCAL },
+ { NULL, -1 }
+};
+
+int
+process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep,
+ struct connection_info *connectinfo)
+{
+ char *cp, **charptr, *arg, *p;
+ int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port;
+ SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr;
+ LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
+ ServerOpCodes opcode;
+ u_int i, flags = 0;
+ size_t len;
+ long long val64;
+ const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;
+
+ cp = line;
+ if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ /* Ignore leading whitespace */
+ if (*arg == '\0')
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#')
+ return 0;
+ intptr = NULL;
+ charptr = NULL;
+ opcode = parse_token(arg, filename, linenum, &flags);
+
+ if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */
+ cmdline = 1;
+ activep = &cmdline;
+ }
+ if (*activep && opcode != sMatch)
+ debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, arg, cp);
+ if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) {
+ if (connectinfo == NULL) {
+ fatal("%s line %d: Directive '%s' is not allowed "
+ "within a Match block", filename, linenum, arg);
+ } else { /* this is a directive we have already processed */
+ while (arg)
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (opcode) {
+ /* Portable-specific options */
+ case sUsePAM:
+ intptr = &options->use_pam;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ /* Standard Options */
+ case sBadOption:
+ return -1;
+ case sPort:
+ /* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */
+ if (options->ports_from_cmdline)
+ return 0;
+ if (options->num_ports >= MAX_PORTS)
+ fatal("%s line %d: too many ports.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing port number.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ options->ports[options->num_ports++] = a2port(arg);
+ if (options->ports[options->num_ports-1] <= 0)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Badly formatted port number.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ break;
+
+ case sServerKeyBits:
+ intptr = &options->server_key_bits;
+ parse_int:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing integer value.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ value = atoi(arg);
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case sLoginGraceTime:
+ intptr = &options->login_grace_time;
+ parse_time:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1)
+ fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case sKeyRegenerationTime:
+ intptr = &options->key_regeneration_time;
+ goto parse_time;
+
+ case sListenAddress:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing address",
+ filename, linenum);
+ /* check for bare IPv6 address: no "[]" and 2 or more ":" */
+ if (strchr(arg, '[') == NULL && (p = strchr(arg, ':')) != NULL
+ && strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL) {
+ queue_listen_addr(options, arg, 0);
+ break;
+ }
+ p = hpdelim(&arg);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ fatal("%s line %d: bad address:port usage",
+ filename, linenum);
+ p = cleanhostname(p);
+ if (arg == NULL)
+ port = 0;
+ else if ((port = a2port(arg)) <= 0)
+ fatal("%s line %d: bad port number", filename, linenum);
+
+ queue_listen_addr(options, p, port);
+
+ break;
+
+ case sAddressFamily:
+ intptr = &options->address_family;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily;
+ parse_multistate:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ value = -1;
+ for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) {
+ if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) {
+ value = multistate_ptr[i].value;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (value == -1)
+ fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case sHostKeyFile:
+ intptr = &options->num_host_key_files;
+ if (*intptr >= MAX_HOSTKEYS)
+ fatal("%s line %d: too many host keys specified (max %d).",
+ filename, linenum, MAX_HOSTKEYS);
+ charptr = &options->host_key_files[*intptr];
+ parse_filename:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+ *charptr = derelativise_path(arg);
+ /* increase optional counter */
+ if (intptr != NULL)
+ *intptr = *intptr + 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case sHostKeyAgent:
+ charptr = &options->host_key_agent;
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing socket name.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+ *charptr = !strcmp(arg, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) ?
+ xstrdup(arg) : derelativise_path(arg);
+ break;
+
+ case sHostCertificate:
+ intptr = &options->num_host_cert_files;
+ if (*intptr >= MAX_HOSTKEYS)
+ fatal("%s line %d: too many host certificates "
+ "specified (max %d).", filename, linenum,
+ MAX_HOSTCERTS);
+ charptr = &options->host_cert_files[*intptr];
+ goto parse_filename;
+ break;
+
+ case sPidFile:
+ charptr = &options->pid_file;
+ goto parse_filename;
+
+ case sPermitRootLogin:
+ intptr = &options->permit_root_login;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_permitrootlogin;
+ goto parse_multistate;
+
+ case sIgnoreRhosts:
+ intptr = &options->ignore_rhosts;
+ parse_flag:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing yes/no argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ value = 0; /* silence compiler */
+ if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0)
+ value = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0)
+ value = 0;
+ else
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/no argument: %s",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts:
+ intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sRhostsRSAAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->rhosts_rsa_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sHostbasedAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly:
+ intptr = &options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes:
+ charptr = &options->hostbased_key_types;
+ parse_keytypes:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+ *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
+ case sHostKeyAlgorithms:
+ charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms;
+ goto parse_keytypes;
+
+ case sRSAAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->rsa_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sPubkeyAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes:
+ charptr = &options->pubkey_key_types;
+ goto parse_keytypes;
+
+ case sKerberosAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sKerberosOrLocalPasswd:
+ intptr = &options->kerberos_or_local_passwd;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sKerberosTicketCleanup:
+ intptr = &options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sKerberosGetAFSToken:
+ intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sGssAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sGssCleanupCreds:
+ intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sGssStrictAcceptor:
+ intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sPasswordAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sChallengeResponseAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sPrintMotd:
+ intptr = &options->print_motd;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sPrintLastLog:
+ intptr = &options->print_lastlog;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sX11Forwarding:
+ intptr = &options->x11_forwarding;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sX11DisplayOffset:
+ intptr = &options->x11_display_offset;
+ goto parse_int;
+
+ case sX11UseLocalhost:
+ intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sXAuthLocation:
+ charptr = &options->xauth_location;
+ goto parse_filename;
+
+ case sPermitTTY:
+ intptr = &options->permit_tty;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sPermitUserRC:
+ intptr = &options->permit_user_rc;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sStrictModes:
+ intptr = &options->strict_modes;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sTCPKeepAlive:
+ intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sEmptyPasswd:
+ intptr = &options->permit_empty_passwd;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sPermitUserEnvironment:
+ intptr = &options->permit_user_env;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sUseLogin:
+ intptr = &options->use_login;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sCompression:
+ intptr = &options->compression;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_compression;
+ goto parse_multistate;
+
+ case sRekeyLimit:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
+ linenum);
+ if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) {
+ val64 = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s",
+ filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno));
+ if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small",
+ filename, linenum);
+ }
+ if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1)
+ options->rekey_limit = val64;
+ if (cp != NULL) { /* optional rekey interval present */
+ if (strcmp(cp, "none") == 0) {
+ (void)strdelim(&cp); /* discard */
+ break;
+ }
+ intptr = &options->rekey_interval;
+ goto parse_time;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case sGatewayPorts:
+ intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_gatewayports;
+ goto parse_multistate;
+
+ case sUseDNS:
+ intptr = &options->use_dns;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sLogFacility:
+ log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility;
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ value = log_facility_number(arg);
+ if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*log_facility_ptr == -1)
+ *log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value;
+ break;
+
+ case sLogLevel:
+ log_level_ptr = &options->log_level;
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ value = log_level_number(arg);
+ if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*log_level_ptr == -1)
+ *log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value;
+ break;
+
+ case sAllowTcpForwarding:
+ intptr = &options->allow_tcp_forwarding;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd;
+ goto parse_multistate;
+
+ case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding:
+ intptr = &options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd;
+ goto parse_multistate;
+
+ case sAllowAgentForwarding:
+ intptr = &options->allow_agent_forwarding;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sUsePrivilegeSeparation:
+ intptr = &use_privsep;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep;
+ goto parse_multistate;
+
+ case sAllowUsers:
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
+ fatal("%s line %d: too many allow users.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (!*activep)
+ continue;
+ options->allow_users[options->num_allow_users++] =
+ xstrdup(arg);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case sDenyUsers:
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ if (options->num_deny_users >= MAX_DENY_USERS)
+ fatal("%s line %d: too many deny users.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (!*activep)
+ continue;
+ options->deny_users[options->num_deny_users++] =
+ xstrdup(arg);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case sAllowGroups:
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ if (options->num_allow_groups >= MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS)
+ fatal("%s line %d: too many allow groups.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (!*activep)
+ continue;
+ options->allow_groups[options->num_allow_groups++] =
+ xstrdup(arg);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case sDenyGroups:
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ if (options->num_deny_groups >= MAX_DENY_GROUPS)
+ fatal("%s line %d: too many deny groups.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (!*activep)
+ continue;
+ options->deny_groups[options->num_deny_groups++] =
+ xstrdup(arg);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case sCiphers:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (options->ciphers == NULL)
+ options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
+ case sMacs:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (!mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (options->macs == NULL)
+ options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
+ case sKexAlgorithms:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
+ options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
+ case sProtocol:
+ intptr = &options->protocol;
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ value = proto_spec(arg);
+ if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*intptr == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case sSubsystem:
+ if (options->num_subsystems >= MAX_SUBSYSTEMS) {
+ fatal("%s line %d: too many subsystems defined.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ }
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (!*activep) {
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ break;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
+ if (strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' already defined.",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ options->subsystem_name[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem command.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ options->subsystem_command[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
+
+ /* Collect arguments (separate to executable) */
+ p = xstrdup(arg);
+ len = strlen(p) + 1;
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
+ len += 1 + strlen(arg);
+ p = xreallocarray(p, 1, len);
+ strlcat(p, " ", len);
+ strlcat(p, arg, len);
+ }
+ options->subsystem_args[options->num_subsystems] = p;
+ options->num_subsystems++;
+ break;
+
+ case sMaxStartups:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: Missing MaxStartups spec.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if ((n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d:%d",
+ &options->max_startups_begin,
+ &options->max_startups_rate,
+ &options->max_startups)) == 3) {
+ if (options->max_startups_begin >
+ options->max_startups ||
+ options->max_startups_rate > 100 ||
+ options->max_startups_rate < 1)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ } else if (n != 1)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ else
+ options->max_startups = options->max_startups_begin;
+ break;
+
+ case sMaxAuthTries:
+ intptr = &options->max_authtries;
+ goto parse_int;
+
+ case sMaxSessions:
+ intptr = &options->max_sessions;
+ goto parse_int;
+
+ case sBanner:
+ charptr = &options->banner;
+ goto parse_filename;
+
+ /*
+ * These options can contain %X options expanded at
+ * connect time, so that you can specify paths like:
+ *
+ * AuthorizedKeysFile /etc/ssh_keys/%u
+ */
+ case sAuthorizedKeysFile:
+ if (*activep && options->num_authkeys_files == 0) {
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ if (options->num_authkeys_files >=
+ MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES)
+ fatal("%s line %d: "
+ "too many authorized keys files.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ options->authorized_keys_files[
+ options->num_authkeys_files++] =
+ tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ case sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile:
+ charptr = &options->authorized_principals_file;
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+ *charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
+ /* increase optional counter */
+ if (intptr != NULL)
+ *intptr = *intptr + 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case sClientAliveInterval:
+ intptr = &options->client_alive_interval;
+ goto parse_time;
+
+ case sClientAliveCountMax:
+ intptr = &options->client_alive_count_max;
+ goto parse_int;
+
+ case sAcceptEnv:
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (options->num_accept_env >= MAX_ACCEPT_ENV)
+ fatal("%s line %d: too many allow env.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (!*activep)
+ continue;
+ options->accept_env[options->num_accept_env++] =
+ xstrdup(arg);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case sPermitTunnel:
+ intptr = &options->permit_tun;
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: Missing yes/point-to-point/"
+ "ethernet/no argument.", filename, linenum);
+ value = -1;
+ for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++)
+ if (strcmp(tunmode_desc[i].text, arg) == 0) {
+ value = tunmode_desc[i].val;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (value == -1)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/point-to-point/ethernet/"
+ "no argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case sMatch:
+ if (cmdline)
+ fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
+ "option");
+ value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum, connectinfo);
+ if (value < 0)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
+ linenum);
+ *activep = value;
+ break;
+
+ case sPermitOpen:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing PermitOpen specification",
+ filename, linenum);
+ n = options->num_permitted_opens; /* modified later */
+ if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) {
+ if (*activep && n == -1) {
+ channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens();
+ options->num_permitted_opens = 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) {
+ if (*activep && n == -1) {
+ options->num_permitted_opens = 1;
+ channel_disable_adm_local_opens();
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ if (*activep && n == -1)
+ channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens();
+ for (; arg != NULL && *arg != '\0'; arg = strdelim(&cp)) {
+ p = hpdelim(&arg);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing host in PermitOpen",
+ filename, linenum);
+ p = cleanhostname(p);
+ if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0))
+ fatal("%s line %d: bad port number in "
+ "PermitOpen", filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep && n == -1)
+ options->num_permitted_opens =
+ channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(p, port);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case sForceCommand:
+ if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
+ linenum);
+ len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+ if (*activep && options->adm_forced_command == NULL)
+ options->adm_forced_command = xstrdup(cp + len);
+ return 0;
+
+ case sChrootDirectory:
+ charptr = &options->chroot_directory;
+
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+ *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
+ case sTrustedUserCAKeys:
+ charptr = &options->trusted_user_ca_keys;
+ goto parse_filename;
+
+ case sRevokedKeys:
+ charptr = &options->revoked_keys_file;
+ goto parse_filename;
+
+ case sIPQoS:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (arg == NULL)
+ value2 = value;
+ else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (*activep) {
+ options->ip_qos_interactive = value;
+ options->ip_qos_bulk = value2;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case sVersionAddendum:
+ if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
+ linenum);
+ len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+ if (*activep && options->version_addendum == NULL) {
+ if (strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") == 0)
+ options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
+ else if (strchr(cp + len, '\r') != NULL)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid argument",
+ filename, linenum);
+ else
+ options->version_addendum = xstrdup(cp + len);
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ case sAuthorizedKeysCommand:
+ if (cp == NULL)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
+ linenum);
+ len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+ if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL) {
+ if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: AuthorizedKeysCommand "
+ "must be an absolute path",
+ filename, linenum);
+ options->authorized_keys_command = xstrdup(cp + len);
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ case sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser:
+ charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command_user;
+
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing AuthorizedKeysCommandUser "
+ "argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+ *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
+ case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand:
+ if (cp == NULL)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
+ linenum);
+ len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+ if (*activep &&
+ options->authorized_principals_command == NULL) {
+ if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: "
+ "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand must be "
+ "an absolute path", filename, linenum);
+ options->authorized_principals_command =
+ xstrdup(cp + len);
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser:
+ charptr = &options->authorized_principals_command_user;
+
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing "
+ "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+ *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
+ case sAuthenticationMethods:
+ if (options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
+ value = 0; /* seen "any" pseudo-method */
+ value2 = 0; /* sucessfully parsed any method */
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ if (options->num_auth_methods >=
+ MAX_AUTH_METHODS)
+ fatal("%s line %d: "
+ "too many authentication methods.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) {
+ if (options->num_auth_methods > 0) {
+ fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" "
+ "must appear alone in "
+ "AuthenticationMethods",
+ filename, linenum);
+ }
+ value = 1;
+ } else if (value) {
+ fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" must appear "
+ "alone in AuthenticationMethods",
+ filename, linenum);
+ } else if (auth2_methods_valid(arg, 0) != 0) {
+ fatal("%s line %d: invalid "
+ "authentication method list.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ }
+ value2 = 1;
+ if (!*activep)
+ continue;
+ options->auth_methods[
+ options->num_auth_methods++] = xstrdup(arg);
+ }
+ if (value2 == 0) {
+ fatal("%s line %d: no AuthenticationMethods "
+ "specified", filename, linenum);
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ case sStreamLocalBindMask:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing StreamLocalBindMask "
+ "argument.", filename, linenum);
+ /* Parse mode in octal format */
+ value = strtol(arg, &p, 8);
+ if (arg == p || value < 0 || value > 0777)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep)
+ options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value;
+ break;
+
+ case sStreamLocalBindUnlink:
+ intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sFingerprintHash:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (*activep)
+ options->fingerprint_hash = value;
+ break;
+
+ case sDeprecated:
+ logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ while (arg)
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ break;
+
+ case sUnsupported:
+ logit("%s line %d: Unsupported option %s",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ while (arg)
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ fatal("%s line %d: Missing handler for opcode %s (%d)",
+ filename, linenum, arg, opcode);
+ }
+ if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Reads the server configuration file. */
+
+void
+load_server_config(const char *filename, Buffer *conf)
+{
+ char line[4096], *cp;
+ FILE *f;
+ int lineno = 0;
+
+ debug2("%s: filename %s", __func__, filename);
+ if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) {
+ perror(filename);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ buffer_clear(conf);
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+ lineno++;
+ if (strlen(line) == sizeof(line) - 1)
+ fatal("%s line %d too long", filename, lineno);
+ /*
+ * Trim out comments and strip whitespace
+ * NB - preserve newlines, they are needed to reproduce
+ * line numbers later for error messages
+ */
+ if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) != NULL)
+ memcpy(cp, "\n", 2);
+ cp = line + strspn(line, " \t\r");
+
+ buffer_append(conf, cp, strlen(cp));
+ }
+ buffer_append(conf, "\0", 1);
+ fclose(f);
+ debug2("%s: done config len = %d", __func__, buffer_len(conf));
+}
+
+void
+parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options,
+ struct connection_info *connectinfo)
+{
+ ServerOptions mo;
+
+ initialize_server_options(&mo);
+ parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", &cfg, connectinfo);
+ copy_set_server_options(options, &mo, 0);
+}
+
+int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *ci, char *spec)
+{
+ char *p;
+
+ while ((p = strsep(&spec, ",")) && *p != '\0') {
+ if (strncmp(p, "addr=", 5) == 0) {
+ ci->address = xstrdup(p + 5);
+ } else if (strncmp(p, "host=", 5) == 0) {
+ ci->host = xstrdup(p + 5);
+ } else if (strncmp(p, "user=", 5) == 0) {
+ ci->user = xstrdup(p + 5);
+ } else if (strncmp(p, "laddr=", 6) == 0) {
+ ci->laddress = xstrdup(p + 6);
+ } else if (strncmp(p, "lport=", 6) == 0) {
+ ci->lport = a2port(p + 6);
+ if (ci->lport == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid port '%s' in test mode"
+ " specification %s\n", p+6, p);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid test mode specification %s\n",
+ p);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * returns 1 for a complete spec, 0 for partial spec and -1 for an
+ * empty spec.
+ */
+int server_match_spec_complete(struct connection_info *ci)
+{
+ if (ci->user && ci->host && ci->address)
+ return 1; /* complete */
+ if (!ci->user && !ci->host && !ci->address)
+ return -1; /* empty */
+ return 0; /* partial */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy any supported values that are set.
+ *
+ * If the preauth flag is set, we do not bother copying the string or
+ * array values that are not used pre-authentication, because any that we
+ * do use must be explictly sent in mm_getpwnamallow().
+ */
+void
+copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
+{
+#define M_CP_INTOPT(n) do {\
+ if (src->n != -1) \
+ dst->n = src->n; \
+} while (0)
+
+ M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(rsa_authentication);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_authentication);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd);
+
+ M_CP_INTOPT(allow_tcp_forwarding);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(allow_streamlocal_forwarding);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(allow_agent_forwarding);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tun);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(max_sessions);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
+
+ /*
+ * The bind_mask is a mode_t that may be unsigned, so we can't use
+ * M_CP_INTOPT - it does a signed comparison that causes compiler
+ * warnings.
+ */
+ if (src->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask != (mode_t)-1) {
+ dst->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask =
+ src->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask;
+ }
+
+ /* M_CP_STROPT and M_CP_STRARRAYOPT should not appear before here */
+#define M_CP_STROPT(n) do {\
+ if (src->n != NULL && dst->n != src->n) { \
+ free(dst->n); \
+ dst->n = src->n; \
+ } \
+} while(0)
+#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(n, num_n) do {\
+ if (src->num_n != 0) { \
+ for (dst->num_n = 0; dst->num_n < src->num_n; dst->num_n++) \
+ dst->n[dst->num_n] = xstrdup(src->n[dst->num_n]); \
+ } \
+} while(0)
+
+ /* See comment in servconf.h */
+ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
+
+ /* Arguments that accept '+...' need to be expanded */
+ assemble_algorithms(dst);
+
+ /*
+ * The only things that should be below this point are string options
+ * which are only used after authentication.
+ */
+ if (preauth)
+ return;
+
+ /* These options may be "none" to clear a global setting */
+ M_CP_STROPT(adm_forced_command);
+ if (option_clear_or_none(dst->adm_forced_command)) {
+ free(dst->adm_forced_command);
+ dst->adm_forced_command = NULL;
+ }
+ M_CP_STROPT(chroot_directory);
+ if (option_clear_or_none(dst->chroot_directory)) {
+ free(dst->chroot_directory);
+ dst->chroot_directory = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+#undef M_CP_INTOPT
+#undef M_CP_STROPT
+#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
+
+void
+parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, Buffer *conf,
+ struct connection_info *connectinfo)
+{
+ int active, linenum, bad_options = 0;
+ char *cp, *obuf, *cbuf;
+
+ debug2("%s: config %s len %d", __func__, filename, buffer_len(conf));
+
+ if ((obuf = cbuf = sshbuf_dup_string(conf)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
+ active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1;
+ linenum = 1;
+ while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) {
+ if (process_server_config_line(options, cp, filename,
+ linenum++, &active, connectinfo) != 0)
+ bad_options++;
+ }
+ free(obuf);
+ if (bad_options > 0)
+ fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
+ filename, bad_options);
+ process_queued_listen_addrs(options);
+}
+
+static const char *
+fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) {
+ if (m[i].value == val)
+ return m[i].key;
+ }
+ return "UNKNOWN";
+}
+
+static const char *
+fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
+{
+ if (val == -1)
+ return "unset";
+ switch (code) {
+ case sAddressFamily:
+ return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily);
+ case sPermitRootLogin:
+ return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_permitrootlogin);
+ case sGatewayPorts:
+ return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_gatewayports);
+ case sCompression:
+ return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_compression);
+ case sUsePrivilegeSeparation:
+ return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_privsep);
+ case sAllowTcpForwarding:
+ return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd);
+ case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding:
+ return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd);
+ case sFingerprintHash:
+ return ssh_digest_alg_name(val);
+ case sProtocol:
+ switch (val) {
+ case SSH_PROTO_1:
+ return "1";
+ case SSH_PROTO_2:
+ return "2";
+ case (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2):
+ return "2,1";
+ default:
+ return "UNKNOWN";
+ }
+ default:
+ switch (val) {
+ case 0:
+ return "no";
+ case 1:
+ return "yes";
+ default:
+ return "UNKNOWN";
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static const char *
+lookup_opcode_name(ServerOpCodes code)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++)
+ if (keywords[i].opcode == code)
+ return(keywords[i].name);
+ return "UNKNOWN";
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_int(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
+{
+ printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_oct(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
+{
+ printf("%s 0%o\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
+{
+ printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val));
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_string(ServerOpCodes code, const char *val)
+{
+ if (val == NULL)
+ return;
+ printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code),
+ val == NULL ? "none" : val);
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_strarray(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+ printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]);
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ if (count <= 0 && code != sAuthenticationMethods)
+ return;
+ printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+ printf(" %s", vals[i]);
+ if (code == sAuthenticationMethods && count == 0)
+ printf(" any");
+ printf("\n");
+}
+
+void
+dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ int ret;
+ struct addrinfo *ai;
+ char addr[NI_MAXHOST], port[NI_MAXSERV], *s = NULL;
+ char *laddr1 = xstrdup(""), *laddr2 = NULL;
+
+ /* these are usually at the top of the config */
+ for (i = 0; i < o->num_ports; i++)
+ printf("port %d\n", o->ports[i]);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sProtocol, o->protocol);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sAddressFamily, o->address_family);
+
+ /*
+ * ListenAddress must be after Port. add_one_listen_addr pushes
+ * addresses onto a stack, so to maintain ordering we need to
+ * print these in reverse order.
+ */
+ for (ai = o->listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, addr,
+ sizeof(addr), port, sizeof(port),
+ NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
+ error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
+ (ret != EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(ret) :
+ strerror(errno));
+ } else {
+ laddr2 = laddr1;
+ if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
+ xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress [%s]:%s\n%s",
+ addr, port, laddr2);
+ else
+ xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress %s:%s\n%s",
+ addr, port, laddr2);
+ free(laddr2);
+ }
+ }
+ printf("%s", laddr1);
+ free(laddr1);
+
+ /* integer arguments */
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePAM, o->use_pam);
+#endif
+ dump_cfg_int(sServerKeyBits, o->server_key_bits);
+ dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
+ dump_cfg_int(sKeyRegenerationTime, o->key_regeneration_time);
+ dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
+ dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
+ dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
+ dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
+ dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max);
+ dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask);
+
+ /* formatted integer arguments */
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreRhosts, o->ignore_rhosts);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, o->ignore_user_known_hosts);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sRhostsRSAAuthentication, o->rhosts_rsa_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly,
+ o->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sRSAAuthentication, o->rsa_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication);
+#ifdef KRB5
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosAuthentication, o->kerberos_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, o->kerberos_or_local_passwd);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosTicketCleanup, o->kerberos_ticket_cleanup);
+# ifdef USE_AFS
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
+#endif
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+ o->kbd_interactive_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+ o->challenge_response_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintMotd, o->print_motd);
+#ifndef DISABLE_LASTLOG
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintLastLog, o->print_lastlog);
+#endif
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11Forwarding, o->x11_forwarding);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11UseLocalhost, o->x11_use_localhost);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitTTY, o->permit_tty);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserRC, o->permit_user_rc);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sStrictModes, o->strict_modes);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sEmptyPasswd, o->permit_empty_passwd);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserEnvironment, o->permit_user_env);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseLogin, o->use_login);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowAgentForwarding, o->allow_agent_forwarding);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
+
+ /* string arguments */
+ dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file);
+ dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
+ dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT);
+ dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_SERVER_MAC);
+ dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
+ dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
+ dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
+ dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);
+ dump_cfg_string(sRevokedKeys, o->revoked_keys_file);
+ dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
+ o->authorized_principals_file);
+ dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, *o->version_addendum == '\0'
+ ? "none" : o->version_addendum);
+ dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command);
+ dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user);
+ dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, o->authorized_principals_command);
+ dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, o->authorized_principals_command_user);
+ dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAgent, o->host_key_agent);
+ dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms,
+ o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms : KEX_SERVER_KEX);
+ dump_cfg_string(sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, o->hostbased_key_types ?
+ o->hostbased_key_types : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
+ dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms ?
+ o->hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
+ dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types ?
+ o->pubkey_key_types : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
+
+ /* string arguments requiring a lookup */
+ dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
+ dump_cfg_string(sLogFacility, log_facility_name(o->log_facility));
+
+ /* string array arguments */
+ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthorizedKeysFile, o->num_authkeys_files,
+ o->authorized_keys_files);
+ dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_key_files,
+ o->host_key_files);
+ dump_cfg_strarray(sHostCertificate, o->num_host_cert_files,
+ o->host_cert_files);
+ dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowUsers, o->num_allow_users, o->allow_users);
+ dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyUsers, o->num_deny_users, o->deny_users);
+ dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowGroups, o->num_allow_groups, o->allow_groups);
+ dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyGroups, o->num_deny_groups, o->deny_groups);
+ dump_cfg_strarray(sAcceptEnv, o->num_accept_env, o->accept_env);
+ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthenticationMethods,
+ o->num_auth_methods, o->auth_methods);
+
+ /* other arguments */
+ for (i = 0; i < o->num_subsystems; i++)
+ printf("subsystem %s %s\n", o->subsystem_name[i],
+ o->subsystem_args[i]);
+
+ printf("maxstartups %d:%d:%d\n", o->max_startups_begin,
+ o->max_startups_rate, o->max_startups);
+
+ for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++)
+ if (tunmode_desc[i].val == o->permit_tun) {
+ s = tunmode_desc[i].text;
+ break;
+ }
+ dump_cfg_string(sPermitTunnel, s);
+
+ printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive));
+ printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk));
+
+ printf("rekeylimit %llu %d\n", (unsigned long long)o->rekey_limit,
+ o->rekey_interval);
+
+ channel_print_adm_permitted_opens();
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/servconf.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/servconf.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/servconf.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,238 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.112 2014/01/29 06:18:35 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Definitions for server configuration data and for the functions reading it.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#ifndef SERVCONF_H
-#define SERVCONF_H
-
-#define MAX_PORTS 256 /* Max # ports. */
-
-#define MAX_ALLOW_USERS 256 /* Max # users on allow list. */
-#define MAX_DENY_USERS 256 /* Max # users on deny list. */
-#define MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS 256 /* Max # groups on allow list. */
-#define MAX_DENY_GROUPS 256 /* Max # groups on deny list. */
-#define MAX_SUBSYSTEMS 256 /* Max # subsystems. */
-#define MAX_HOSTKEYS 256 /* Max # hostkeys. */
-#define MAX_HOSTCERTS 256 /* Max # host certificates. */
-#define MAX_ACCEPT_ENV 256 /* Max # of env vars. */
-#define MAX_MATCH_GROUPS 256 /* Max # of groups for Match. */
-#define MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES 256 /* Max # of authorized_keys files. */
-#define MAX_AUTH_METHODS 256 /* Max # of AuthenticationMethods. */
-
-/* permit_root_login */
-#define PERMIT_NOT_SET -1
-#define PERMIT_NO 0
-#define PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY 1
-#define PERMIT_NO_PASSWD 2
-#define PERMIT_YES 3
-
-/* use_privsep */
-#define PRIVSEP_OFF 0
-#define PRIVSEP_ON 1
-#define PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX 2
-
-/* AllowTCPForwarding */
-#define FORWARD_DENY 0
-#define FORWARD_REMOTE (1)
-#define FORWARD_LOCAL (1<<1)
-#define FORWARD_ALLOW (FORWARD_REMOTE|FORWARD_LOCAL)
-
-#define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6 /* Default for MaxAuthTries */
-#define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX 10 /* Default for MaxSessions */
-
-/* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
-#define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME "internal-sftp"
-
-typedef struct {
- u_int num_ports;
- u_int ports_from_cmdline;
- int ports[MAX_PORTS]; /* Port number to listen on. */
- char *listen_addr; /* Address on which the server listens. */
- struct addrinfo *listen_addrs; /* Addresses on which the server listens. */
- int address_family; /* Address family used by the server. */
- char *host_key_files[MAX_HOSTKEYS]; /* Files containing host keys. */
- int num_host_key_files; /* Number of files for host keys. */
- char *host_cert_files[MAX_HOSTCERTS]; /* Files containing host certs. */
- int num_host_cert_files; /* Number of files for host certs. */
- char *host_key_agent; /* ssh-agent socket for host keys. */
- char *pid_file; /* Where to put our pid */
- int server_key_bits;/* Size of the server key. */
- int login_grace_time; /* Disconnect if no auth in this time
- * (sec). */
- int key_regeneration_time; /* Server key lifetime (seconds). */
- int permit_root_login; /* PERMIT_*, see above */
- int ignore_rhosts; /* Ignore .rhosts and .shosts. */
- int ignore_user_known_hosts; /* Ignore ~/.ssh/known_hosts
- * for RhostsRsaAuth */
- int print_motd; /* If true, print /etc/motd. */
- int print_lastlog; /* If true, print lastlog */
- int x11_forwarding; /* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
- int x11_display_offset; /* What DISPLAY number to start
- * searching at */
- int x11_use_localhost; /* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
- char *xauth_location; /* Location of xauth program */
- int permit_tty; /* If false, deny pty allocation */
- int strict_modes; /* If true, require string home dir modes. */
- int tcp_keep_alive; /* If true, set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
- int ip_qos_interactive; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */
- int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */
- char *ciphers; /* Supported SSH2 ciphers. */
- char *macs; /* Supported SSH2 macs. */
- char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
- int protocol; /* Supported protocol versions. */
- int gateway_ports; /* If true, allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */
- SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */
- LogLevel log_level; /* Level for system logging. */
- int rhosts_rsa_authentication; /* If true, permit rhosts RSA
- * authentication. */
- int hostbased_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 hostbased auth */
- int hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; /* experimental */
- int rsa_authentication; /* If true, permit RSA authentication. */
- int pubkey_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
- int kerberos_authentication; /* If true, permit Kerberos
- * authentication. */
- int kerberos_or_local_passwd; /* If true, permit kerberos
- * and any other password
- * authentication mechanism,
- * such as SecurID or
- * /etc/passwd */
- int kerberos_ticket_cleanup; /* If true, destroy ticket
- * file on logout. */
- int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
- * authenticated with Kerberos. */
- int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
- int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
- int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
- * authentication. */
- int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
- int challenge_response_authentication;
- int permit_empty_passwd; /* If false, do not permit empty
- * passwords. */
- int permit_user_env; /* If true, read ~/.ssh/environment */
- int use_login; /* If true, login(1) is used */
- int compression; /* If true, compression is allowed */
- int allow_tcp_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */
- int allow_agent_forwarding;
- u_int num_allow_users;
- char *allow_users[MAX_ALLOW_USERS];
- u_int num_deny_users;
- char *deny_users[MAX_DENY_USERS];
- u_int num_allow_groups;
- char *allow_groups[MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS];
- u_int num_deny_groups;
- char *deny_groups[MAX_DENY_GROUPS];
-
- u_int num_subsystems;
- char *subsystem_name[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
- char *subsystem_command[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
- char *subsystem_args[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
-
- u_int num_accept_env;
- char *accept_env[MAX_ACCEPT_ENV];
-
- int max_startups_begin;
- int max_startups_rate;
- int max_startups;
- int max_authtries;
- int max_sessions;
- char *banner; /* SSH-2 banner message */
- int use_dns;
- int client_alive_interval; /*
- * poke the client this often to
- * see if it's still there
- */
- int client_alive_count_max; /*
- * If the client is unresponsive
- * for this many intervals above,
- * disconnect the session
- */
-
- u_int num_authkeys_files; /* Files containing public keys */
- char *authorized_keys_files[MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES];
-
- char *adm_forced_command;
-
- int use_pam; /* Enable auth via PAM */
-
- int permit_tun;
-
- int num_permitted_opens;
-
- char *chroot_directory;
- char *revoked_keys_file;
- char *trusted_user_ca_keys;
- char *authorized_principals_file;
- char *authorized_keys_command;
- char *authorized_keys_command_user;
-
- int64_t rekey_limit;
- int rekey_interval;
-
- char *version_addendum; /* Appended to SSH banner */
-
- u_int num_auth_methods;
- char *auth_methods[MAX_AUTH_METHODS];
-} ServerOptions;
-
-/* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
-struct connection_info {
- const char *user;
- const char *host; /* possibly resolved hostname */
- const char *address; /* remote address */
- const char *laddress; /* local address */
- int lport; /* local port */
-};
-
-
-/*
- * These are string config options that must be copied between the
- * Match sub-config and the main config, and must be sent from the
- * privsep slave to the privsep master. We use a macro to ensure all
- * the options are copied and the copies are done in the correct order.
- *
- * NB. an option must appear in servconf.c:copy_set_server_options() or
- * COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS here but never both.
- */
-#define COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS() do { \
- M_CP_STROPT(banner); \
- M_CP_STROPT(trusted_user_ca_keys); \
- M_CP_STROPT(revoked_keys_file); \
- M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file); \
- M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command); \
- M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_user); \
- M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \
- M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \
- M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \
- M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_groups, num_allow_groups); \
- M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_groups, num_deny_groups); \
- M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(accept_env, num_accept_env); \
- M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(auth_methods, num_auth_methods); \
- } while (0)
-
-struct connection_info *get_connection_info(int, int);
-void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *);
-void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *);
-int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int,
- int *, struct connection_info *);
-void load_server_config(const char *, Buffer *);
-void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, Buffer *,
- struct connection_info *);
-void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *, struct connection_info *);
-int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *, char *);
-int server_match_spec_complete(struct connection_info *);
-void copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *, ServerOptions *, int);
-void dump_config(ServerOptions *);
-char *derelativise_path(const char *);
-
-#endif /* SERVCONF_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/servconf.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/servconf.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/servconf.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/servconf.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.120 2015/07/10 06:21:53 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Definitions for server configuration data and for the functions reading it.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef SERVCONF_H
+#define SERVCONF_H
+
+#define MAX_PORTS 256 /* Max # ports. */
+
+#define MAX_ALLOW_USERS 256 /* Max # users on allow list. */
+#define MAX_DENY_USERS 256 /* Max # users on deny list. */
+#define MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS 256 /* Max # groups on allow list. */
+#define MAX_DENY_GROUPS 256 /* Max # groups on deny list. */
+#define MAX_SUBSYSTEMS 256 /* Max # subsystems. */
+#define MAX_HOSTKEYS 256 /* Max # hostkeys. */
+#define MAX_HOSTCERTS 256 /* Max # host certificates. */
+#define MAX_ACCEPT_ENV 256 /* Max # of env vars. */
+#define MAX_MATCH_GROUPS 256 /* Max # of groups for Match. */
+#define MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES 256 /* Max # of authorized_keys files. */
+#define MAX_AUTH_METHODS 256 /* Max # of AuthenticationMethods. */
+
+/* permit_root_login */
+#define PERMIT_NOT_SET -1
+#define PERMIT_NO 0
+#define PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY 1
+#define PERMIT_NO_PASSWD 2
+#define PERMIT_YES 3
+
+/* use_privsep */
+#define PRIVSEP_OFF 0
+#define PRIVSEP_ON 1
+#define PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX 2
+
+/* AllowTCPForwarding */
+#define FORWARD_DENY 0
+#define FORWARD_REMOTE (1)
+#define FORWARD_LOCAL (1<<1)
+#define FORWARD_ALLOW (FORWARD_REMOTE|FORWARD_LOCAL)
+
+#define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6 /* Default for MaxAuthTries */
+#define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX 10 /* Default for MaxSessions */
+
+/* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
+#define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME "internal-sftp"
+
+typedef struct {
+ u_int num_ports;
+ u_int ports_from_cmdline;
+ int ports[MAX_PORTS]; /* Port number to listen on. */
+ u_int num_queued_listens;
+ char **queued_listen_addrs;
+ int *queued_listen_ports;
+ struct addrinfo *listen_addrs; /* Addresses on which the server listens. */
+ int address_family; /* Address family used by the server. */
+ char *host_key_files[MAX_HOSTKEYS]; /* Files containing host keys. */
+ int num_host_key_files; /* Number of files for host keys. */
+ char *host_cert_files[MAX_HOSTCERTS]; /* Files containing host certs. */
+ int num_host_cert_files; /* Number of files for host certs. */
+ char *host_key_agent; /* ssh-agent socket for host keys. */
+ char *pid_file; /* Where to put our pid */
+ int server_key_bits;/* Size of the server key. */
+ int login_grace_time; /* Disconnect if no auth in this time
+ * (sec). */
+ int key_regeneration_time; /* Server key lifetime (seconds). */
+ int permit_root_login; /* PERMIT_*, see above */
+ int ignore_rhosts; /* Ignore .rhosts and .shosts. */
+ int ignore_user_known_hosts; /* Ignore ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+ * for RhostsRsaAuth */
+ int print_motd; /* If true, print /etc/motd. */
+ int print_lastlog; /* If true, print lastlog */
+ int x11_forwarding; /* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
+ int x11_display_offset; /* What DISPLAY number to start
+ * searching at */
+ int x11_use_localhost; /* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
+ char *xauth_location; /* Location of xauth program */
+ int permit_tty; /* If false, deny pty allocation */
+ int permit_user_rc; /* If false, deny ~/.ssh/rc execution */
+ int strict_modes; /* If true, require string home dir modes. */
+ int tcp_keep_alive; /* If true, set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
+ int ip_qos_interactive; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */
+ int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */
+ char *ciphers; /* Supported SSH2 ciphers. */
+ char *macs; /* Supported SSH2 macs. */
+ char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
+ int protocol; /* Supported protocol versions. */
+ struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */
+ SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */
+ LogLevel log_level; /* Level for system logging. */
+ int rhosts_rsa_authentication; /* If true, permit rhosts RSA
+ * authentication. */
+ int hostbased_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 hostbased auth */
+ int hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; /* experimental */
+ char *hostbased_key_types; /* Key types allowed for hostbased */
+ char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types */
+ int rsa_authentication; /* If true, permit RSA authentication. */
+ int pubkey_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
+ char *pubkey_key_types; /* Key types allowed for public key */
+ int kerberos_authentication; /* If true, permit Kerberos
+ * authentication. */
+ int kerberos_or_local_passwd; /* If true, permit kerberos
+ * and any other password
+ * authentication mechanism,
+ * such as SecurID or
+ * /etc/passwd */
+ int kerberos_ticket_cleanup; /* If true, destroy ticket
+ * file on logout. */
+ int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
+ * authenticated with Kerberos. */
+ int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+ int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
+ int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
+ * authentication. */
+ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
+ int challenge_response_authentication;
+ int permit_empty_passwd; /* If false, do not permit empty
+ * passwords. */
+ int permit_user_env; /* If true, read ~/.ssh/environment */
+ int use_login; /* If true, login(1) is used */
+ int compression; /* If true, compression is allowed */
+ int allow_tcp_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */
+ int allow_streamlocal_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */
+ int allow_agent_forwarding;
+ u_int num_allow_users;
+ char *allow_users[MAX_ALLOW_USERS];
+ u_int num_deny_users;
+ char *deny_users[MAX_DENY_USERS];
+ u_int num_allow_groups;
+ char *allow_groups[MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS];
+ u_int num_deny_groups;
+ char *deny_groups[MAX_DENY_GROUPS];
+
+ u_int num_subsystems;
+ char *subsystem_name[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
+ char *subsystem_command[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
+ char *subsystem_args[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
+
+ u_int num_accept_env;
+ char *accept_env[MAX_ACCEPT_ENV];
+
+ int max_startups_begin;
+ int max_startups_rate;
+ int max_startups;
+ int max_authtries;
+ int max_sessions;
+ char *banner; /* SSH-2 banner message */
+ int use_dns;
+ int client_alive_interval; /*
+ * poke the client this often to
+ * see if it's still there
+ */
+ int client_alive_count_max; /*
+ * If the client is unresponsive
+ * for this many intervals above,
+ * disconnect the session
+ */
+
+ u_int num_authkeys_files; /* Files containing public keys */
+ char *authorized_keys_files[MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES];
+
+ char *adm_forced_command;
+
+ int use_pam; /* Enable auth via PAM */
+
+ int permit_tun;
+
+ int num_permitted_opens;
+
+ char *chroot_directory;
+ char *revoked_keys_file;
+ char *trusted_user_ca_keys;
+ char *authorized_keys_command;
+ char *authorized_keys_command_user;
+ char *authorized_principals_file;
+ char *authorized_principals_command;
+ char *authorized_principals_command_user;
+
+ int64_t rekey_limit;
+ int rekey_interval;
+
+ char *version_addendum; /* Appended to SSH banner */
+
+ u_int num_auth_methods;
+ char *auth_methods[MAX_AUTH_METHODS];
+
+ int fingerprint_hash;
+} ServerOptions;
+
+/* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
+struct connection_info {
+ const char *user;
+ const char *host; /* possibly resolved hostname */
+ const char *address; /* remote address */
+ const char *laddress; /* local address */
+ int lport; /* local port */
+};
+
+
+/*
+ * These are string config options that must be copied between the
+ * Match sub-config and the main config, and must be sent from the
+ * privsep slave to the privsep master. We use a macro to ensure all
+ * the options are copied and the copies are done in the correct order.
+ *
+ * NB. an option must appear in servconf.c:copy_set_server_options() or
+ * COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS here but never both.
+ */
+#define COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS() do { \
+ M_CP_STROPT(banner); \
+ M_CP_STROPT(trusted_user_ca_keys); \
+ M_CP_STROPT(revoked_keys_file); \
+ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command); \
+ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_user); \
+ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file); \
+ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command); \
+ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command_user); \
+ M_CP_STROPT(hostbased_key_types); \
+ M_CP_STROPT(pubkey_key_types); \
+ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \
+ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \
+ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \
+ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_groups, num_allow_groups); \
+ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_groups, num_deny_groups); \
+ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(accept_env, num_accept_env); \
+ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(auth_methods, num_auth_methods); \
+ } while (0)
+
+struct connection_info *get_connection_info(int, int);
+void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *);
+void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *);
+int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int,
+ int *, struct connection_info *);
+void load_server_config(const char *, Buffer *);
+void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, Buffer *,
+ struct connection_info *);
+void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *, struct connection_info *);
+int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *, char *);
+int server_match_spec_complete(struct connection_info *);
+void copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *, ServerOptions *, int);
+void dump_config(ServerOptions *);
+char *derelativise_path(const char *);
+
+#endif /* SERVCONF_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/serverloop.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/serverloop.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/serverloop.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1271 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.170 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Server main loop for handling the interactive session.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl.
- * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <termios.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "sshpty.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "session.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "serverloop.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "roaming.h"
-
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-/* XXX */
-extern Kex *xxx_kex;
-extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
-extern int use_privsep;
-
-static Buffer stdin_buffer; /* Buffer for stdin data. */
-static Buffer stdout_buffer; /* Buffer for stdout data. */
-static Buffer stderr_buffer; /* Buffer for stderr data. */
-static int fdin; /* Descriptor for stdin (for writing) */
-static int fdout; /* Descriptor for stdout (for reading);
- May be same number as fdin. */
-static int fderr; /* Descriptor for stderr. May be -1. */
-static long stdin_bytes = 0; /* Number of bytes written to stdin. */
-static long stdout_bytes = 0; /* Number of stdout bytes sent to client. */
-static long stderr_bytes = 0; /* Number of stderr bytes sent to client. */
-static long fdout_bytes = 0; /* Number of stdout bytes read from program. */
-static int stdin_eof = 0; /* EOF message received from client. */
-static int fdout_eof = 0; /* EOF encountered reading from fdout. */
-static int fderr_eof = 0; /* EOF encountered readung from fderr. */
-static int fdin_is_tty = 0; /* fdin points to a tty. */
-static int connection_in; /* Connection to client (input). */
-static int connection_out; /* Connection to client (output). */
-static int connection_closed = 0; /* Connection to client closed. */
-static u_int buffer_high; /* "Soft" max buffer size. */
-static int no_more_sessions = 0; /* Disallow further sessions. */
-
-/*
- * This SIGCHLD kludge is used to detect when the child exits. The server
- * will exit after that, as soon as forwarded connections have terminated.
- */
-
-static volatile sig_atomic_t child_terminated = 0; /* The child has terminated. */
-
-/* Cleanup on signals (!use_privsep case only) */
-static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
-
-/* prototypes */
-static void server_init_dispatch(void);
-
-/*
- * we write to this pipe if a SIGCHLD is caught in order to avoid
- * the race between select() and child_terminated
- */
-static int notify_pipe[2];
-static void
-notify_setup(void)
-{
- if (pipe(notify_pipe) < 0) {
- error("pipe(notify_pipe) failed %s", strerror(errno));
- } else if ((fcntl(notify_pipe[0], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) ||
- (fcntl(notify_pipe[1], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1)) {
- error("fcntl(notify_pipe, F_SETFD) failed %s", strerror(errno));
- close(notify_pipe[0]);
- close(notify_pipe[1]);
- } else {
- set_nonblock(notify_pipe[0]);
- set_nonblock(notify_pipe[1]);
- return;
- }
- notify_pipe[0] = -1; /* read end */
- notify_pipe[1] = -1; /* write end */
-}
-static void
-notify_parent(void)
-{
- if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
- (void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
-}
-static void
-notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
-{
- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
- FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
-}
-static void
-notify_done(fd_set *readset)
-{
- char c;
-
- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
- while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
- debug2("notify_done: reading");
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static void
-sigchld_handler(int sig)
-{
- int save_errno = errno;
- child_terminated = 1;
-#ifndef _UNICOS
- mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
-#endif
- notify_parent();
- errno = save_errno;
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static void
-sigterm_handler(int sig)
-{
- received_sigterm = sig;
-}
-
-/*
- * Make packets from buffered stderr data, and buffer it for sending
- * to the client.
- */
-static void
-make_packets_from_stderr_data(void)
-{
- u_int len;
-
- /* Send buffered stderr data to the client. */
- while (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0 &&
- packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
- len = buffer_len(&stderr_buffer);
- if (packet_is_interactive()) {
- if (len > 512)
- len = 512;
- } else {
- /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */
- if (len > packet_get_maxsize())
- len = packet_get_maxsize();
- }
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
- packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), len);
- packet_send();
- buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len);
- stderr_bytes += len;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Make packets from buffered stdout data, and buffer it for sending to the
- * client.
- */
-static void
-make_packets_from_stdout_data(void)
-{
- u_int len;
-
- /* Send buffered stdout data to the client. */
- while (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0 &&
- packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
- len = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
- if (packet_is_interactive()) {
- if (len > 512)
- len = 512;
- } else {
- /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */
- if (len > packet_get_maxsize())
- len = packet_get_maxsize();
- }
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
- packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), len);
- packet_send();
- buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len);
- stdout_bytes += len;
- }
-}
-
-static void
-client_alive_check(void)
-{
- int channel_id;
-
- /* timeout, check to see how many we have had */
- if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.client_alive_count_max) {
- logit("Timeout, client not responding.");
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
-
- /*
- * send a bogus global/channel request with "wantreply",
- * we should get back a failure
- */
- if ((channel_id = channel_find_open()) == -1) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring("keepalive at openssh.com");
- packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */
- } else {
- channel_request_start(channel_id, "keepalive at openssh.com", 1);
- }
- packet_send();
-}
-
-/*
- * Sleep in select() until we can do something. This will initialize the
- * select masks. Upon return, the masks will indicate which descriptors
- * have data or can accept data. Optionally, a maximum time can be specified
- * for the duration of the wait (0 = infinite).
- */
-static void
-wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
- u_int *nallocp, u_int64_t max_time_milliseconds)
-{
- struct timeval tv, *tvp;
- int ret;
- time_t minwait_secs = 0;
- int client_alive_scheduled = 0;
- int program_alive_scheduled = 0;
-
- /* Allocate and update select() masks for channel descriptors. */
- channel_prepare_select(readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp,
- &minwait_secs, 0);
-
- if (minwait_secs != 0)
- max_time_milliseconds = MIN(max_time_milliseconds,
- (u_int)minwait_secs * 1000);
-
- /*
- * if using client_alive, set the max timeout accordingly,
- * and indicate that this particular timeout was for client
- * alive by setting the client_alive_scheduled flag.
- *
- * this could be randomized somewhat to make traffic
- * analysis more difficult, but we're not doing it yet.
- */
- if (compat20 &&
- max_time_milliseconds == 0 && options.client_alive_interval) {
- client_alive_scheduled = 1;
- max_time_milliseconds =
- (u_int64_t)options.client_alive_interval * 1000;
- }
-
- if (compat20) {
-#if 0
- /* wrong: bad condition XXX */
- if (channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
-#endif
- FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
- } else {
- /*
- * Read packets from the client unless we have too much
- * buffered stdin or channel data.
- */
- if (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) < buffer_high &&
- channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
- FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
- /*
- * If there is not too much data already buffered going to
- * the client, try to get some more data from the program.
- */
- if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
- program_alive_scheduled = child_terminated;
- if (!fdout_eof)
- FD_SET(fdout, *readsetp);
- if (!fderr_eof)
- FD_SET(fderr, *readsetp);
- }
- /*
- * If we have buffered data, try to write some of that data
- * to the program.
- */
- if (fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0)
- FD_SET(fdin, *writesetp);
- }
- notify_prepare(*readsetp);
-
- /*
- * If we have buffered packet data going to the client, mark that
- * descriptor.
- */
- if (packet_have_data_to_write())
- FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp);
-
- /*
- * If child has terminated and there is enough buffer space to read
- * from it, then read as much as is available and exit.
- */
- if (child_terminated && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
- if (max_time_milliseconds == 0 || client_alive_scheduled)
- max_time_milliseconds = 100;
-
- if (max_time_milliseconds == 0)
- tvp = NULL;
- else {
- tv.tv_sec = max_time_milliseconds / 1000;
- tv.tv_usec = 1000 * (max_time_milliseconds % 1000);
- tvp = &tv;
- }
-
- /* Wait for something to happen, or the timeout to expire. */
- ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp);
-
- if (ret == -1) {
- memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
- memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
- if (errno != EINTR)
- error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- } else {
- if (ret == 0 && client_alive_scheduled)
- client_alive_check();
- if (!compat20 && program_alive_scheduled && fdin_is_tty) {
- if (!fdout_eof)
- FD_SET(fdout, *readsetp);
- if (!fderr_eof)
- FD_SET(fderr, *readsetp);
- }
- }
-
- notify_done(*readsetp);
-}
-
-/*
- * Processes input from the client and the program. Input data is stored
- * in buffers and processed later.
- */
-static void
-process_input(fd_set *readset)
-{
- int len;
- char buf[16384];
-
- /* Read and buffer any input data from the client. */
- if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
- int cont = 0;
- len = roaming_read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf), &cont);
- if (len == 0) {
- if (cont)
- return;
- verbose("Connection closed by %.100s",
- get_remote_ipaddr());
- connection_closed = 1;
- if (compat20)
- return;
- cleanup_exit(255);
- } else if (len < 0) {
- if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN &&
- errno != EWOULDBLOCK) {
- verbose("Read error from remote host "
- "%.100s: %.100s",
- get_remote_ipaddr(), strerror(errno));
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- } else {
- /* Buffer any received data. */
- packet_process_incoming(buf, len);
- }
- }
- if (compat20)
- return;
-
- /* Read and buffer any available stdout data from the program. */
- if (!fdout_eof && FD_ISSET(fdout, readset)) {
- errno = 0;
- len = read(fdout, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN ||
- errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !child_terminated))) {
- /* do nothing */
-#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD
- } else if (len <= 0) {
-#else
- } else if ((!isatty(fdout) && len <= 0) ||
- (isatty(fdout) && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) {
-#endif
- fdout_eof = 1;
- } else {
- buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, buf, len);
- fdout_bytes += len;
- }
- }
- /* Read and buffer any available stderr data from the program. */
- if (!fderr_eof && FD_ISSET(fderr, readset)) {
- errno = 0;
- len = read(fderr, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN ||
- errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !child_terminated))) {
- /* do nothing */
-#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD
- } else if (len <= 0) {
-#else
- } else if ((!isatty(fderr) && len <= 0) ||
- (isatty(fderr) && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) {
-#endif
- fderr_eof = 1;
- } else {
- buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, len);
- }
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Sends data from internal buffers to client program stdin.
- */
-static void
-process_output(fd_set *writeset)
-{
- struct termios tio;
- u_char *data;
- u_int dlen;
- int len;
-
- /* Write buffered data to program stdin. */
- if (!compat20 && fdin != -1 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) {
- data = buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer);
- dlen = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer);
- len = write(fdin, data, dlen);
- if (len < 0 &&
- (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) {
- /* do nothing */
- } else if (len <= 0) {
- if (fdin != fdout)
- close(fdin);
- else
- shutdown(fdin, SHUT_WR); /* We will no longer send. */
- fdin = -1;
- } else {
- /* Successful write. */
- if (fdin_is_tty && dlen >= 1 && data[0] != '\r' &&
- tcgetattr(fdin, &tio) == 0 &&
- !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) {
- /*
- * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of
- * traffic analysis
- */
- packet_send_ignore(len);
- packet_send();
- }
- /* Consume the data from the buffer. */
- buffer_consume(&stdin_buffer, len);
- /* Update the count of bytes written to the program. */
- stdin_bytes += len;
- }
- }
- /* Send any buffered packet data to the client. */
- if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset))
- packet_write_poll();
-}
-
-/*
- * Wait until all buffered output has been sent to the client.
- * This is used when the program terminates.
- */
-static void
-drain_output(void)
-{
- /* Send any buffered stdout data to the client. */
- if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) {
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
- packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer),
- buffer_len(&stdout_buffer));
- packet_send();
- /* Update the count of sent bytes. */
- stdout_bytes += buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
- }
- /* Send any buffered stderr data to the client. */
- if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) {
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
- packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer),
- buffer_len(&stderr_buffer));
- packet_send();
- /* Update the count of sent bytes. */
- stderr_bytes += buffer_len(&stderr_buffer);
- }
- /* Wait until all buffered data has been written to the client. */
- packet_write_wait();
-}
-
-static void
-process_buffered_input_packets(void)
-{
- dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, NULL, compat20 ? xxx_kex : NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * Performs the interactive session. This handles data transmission between
- * the client and the program. Note that the notion of stdin, stdout, and
- * stderr in this function is sort of reversed: this function writes to
- * stdin (of the child program), and reads from stdout and stderr (of the
- * child program).
- */
-void
-server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg)
-{
- fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
- int max_fd = 0;
- u_int nalloc = 0;
- int wait_status; /* Status returned by wait(). */
- pid_t wait_pid; /* pid returned by wait(). */
- int waiting_termination = 0; /* Have displayed waiting close message. */
- u_int64_t max_time_milliseconds;
- u_int previous_stdout_buffer_bytes;
- u_int stdout_buffer_bytes;
- int type;
-
- debug("Entering interactive session.");
-
- /* Initialize the SIGCHLD kludge. */
- child_terminated = 0;
- mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
-
- if (!use_privsep) {
- signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
- signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler);
- signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
- }
-
- /* Initialize our global variables. */
- fdin = fdin_arg;
- fdout = fdout_arg;
- fderr = fderr_arg;
-
- /* nonblocking IO */
- set_nonblock(fdin);
- set_nonblock(fdout);
- /* we don't have stderr for interactive terminal sessions, see below */
- if (fderr != -1)
- set_nonblock(fderr);
-
- if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG) && isatty(fdin))
- fdin_is_tty = 1;
-
- connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
- connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
-
- notify_setup();
-
- previous_stdout_buffer_bytes = 0;
-
- /* Set approximate I/O buffer size. */
- if (packet_is_interactive())
- buffer_high = 4096;
- else
- buffer_high = 64 * 1024;
-
-#if 0
- /* Initialize max_fd to the maximum of the known file descriptors. */
- max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin);
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout);
- if (fderr != -1)
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr);
-#endif
-
- /* Initialize Initialize buffers. */
- buffer_init(&stdin_buffer);
- buffer_init(&stdout_buffer);
- buffer_init(&stderr_buffer);
-
- /*
- * If we have no separate fderr (which is the case when we have a pty
- * - there we cannot make difference between data sent to stdout and
- * stderr), indicate that we have seen an EOF from stderr. This way
- * we don't need to check the descriptor everywhere.
- */
- if (fderr == -1)
- fderr_eof = 1;
-
- server_init_dispatch();
-
- /* Main loop of the server for the interactive session mode. */
- for (;;) {
-
- /* Process buffered packets from the client. */
- process_buffered_input_packets();
-
- /*
- * If we have received eof, and there is no more pending
- * input data, cause a real eof by closing fdin.
- */
- if (stdin_eof && fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
- if (fdin != fdout)
- close(fdin);
- else
- shutdown(fdin, SHUT_WR); /* We will no longer send. */
- fdin = -1;
- }
- /* Make packets from buffered stderr data to send to the client. */
- make_packets_from_stderr_data();
-
- /*
- * Make packets from buffered stdout data to send to the
- * client. If there is very little to send, this arranges to
- * not send them now, but to wait a short while to see if we
- * are getting more data. This is necessary, as some systems
- * wake up readers from a pty after each separate character.
- */
- max_time_milliseconds = 0;
- stdout_buffer_bytes = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
- if (stdout_buffer_bytes != 0 && stdout_buffer_bytes < 256 &&
- stdout_buffer_bytes != previous_stdout_buffer_bytes) {
- /* try again after a while */
- max_time_milliseconds = 10;
- } else {
- /* Send it now. */
- make_packets_from_stdout_data();
- }
- previous_stdout_buffer_bytes = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
-
- /* Send channel data to the client. */
- if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
- channel_output_poll();
-
- /*
- * Bail out of the loop if the program has closed its output
- * descriptors, and we have no more data to send to the
- * client, and there is no pending buffered data.
- */
- if (fdout_eof && fderr_eof && !packet_have_data_to_write() &&
- buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) == 0 && buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) == 0) {
- if (!channel_still_open())
- break;
- if (!waiting_termination) {
- const char *s = "Waiting for forwarded connections to terminate...\r\n";
- char *cp;
- waiting_termination = 1;
- buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, s, strlen(s));
-
- /* Display list of open channels. */
- cp = channel_open_message();
- buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, cp, strlen(cp));
- free(cp);
- }
- }
- max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin);
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout);
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr);
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, notify_pipe[0]);
-
- /* Sleep in select() until we can do something. */
- wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, &max_fd,
- &nalloc, max_time_milliseconds);
-
- if (received_sigterm) {
- logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm);
- /* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
-
- /* Process any channel events. */
- channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
-
- /* Process input from the client and from program stdout/stderr. */
- process_input(readset);
-
- /* Process output to the client and to program stdin. */
- process_output(writeset);
- }
- free(readset);
- free(writeset);
-
- /* Cleanup and termination code. */
-
- /* Wait until all output has been sent to the client. */
- drain_output();
-
- debug("End of interactive session; stdin %ld, stdout (read %ld, sent %ld), stderr %ld bytes.",
- stdin_bytes, fdout_bytes, stdout_bytes, stderr_bytes);
-
- /* Free and clear the buffers. */
- buffer_free(&stdin_buffer);
- buffer_free(&stdout_buffer);
- buffer_free(&stderr_buffer);
-
- /* Close the file descriptors. */
- if (fdout != -1)
- close(fdout);
- fdout = -1;
- fdout_eof = 1;
- if (fderr != -1)
- close(fderr);
- fderr = -1;
- fderr_eof = 1;
- if (fdin != -1)
- close(fdin);
- fdin = -1;
-
- channel_free_all();
-
- /* We no longer want our SIGCHLD handler to be called. */
- mysignal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
-
- while ((wait_pid = waitpid(-1, &wait_status, 0)) < 0)
- if (errno != EINTR)
- packet_disconnect("wait: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- if (wait_pid != pid)
- error("Strange, wait returned pid %ld, expected %ld",
- (long)wait_pid, (long)pid);
-
- /* Check if it exited normally. */
- if (WIFEXITED(wait_status)) {
- /* Yes, normal exit. Get exit status and send it to the client. */
- debug("Command exited with status %d.", WEXITSTATUS(wait_status));
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS);
- packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(wait_status));
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /*
- * Wait for exit confirmation. Note that there might be
- * other packets coming before it; however, the program has
- * already died so we just ignore them. The client is
- * supposed to respond with the confirmation when it receives
- * the exit status.
- */
- do {
- type = packet_read();
- }
- while (type != SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
-
- debug("Received exit confirmation.");
- return;
- }
- /* Check if the program terminated due to a signal. */
- if (WIFSIGNALED(wait_status))
- packet_disconnect("Command terminated on signal %d.",
- WTERMSIG(wait_status));
-
- /* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */
- packet_disconnect("wait returned status %04x.", wait_status);
- /* NOTREACHED */
-}
-
-static void
-collect_children(void)
-{
- pid_t pid;
- sigset_t oset, nset;
- int status;
-
- /* block SIGCHLD while we check for dead children */
- sigemptyset(&nset);
- sigaddset(&nset, SIGCHLD);
- sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset);
- if (child_terminated) {
- debug("Received SIGCHLD.");
- while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
- (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
- if (pid > 0)
- session_close_by_pid(pid, status);
- child_terminated = 0;
- }
- sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
-}
-
-void
-server_loop2(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
- int rekeying = 0, max_fd;
- u_int nalloc = 0;
- u_int64_t rekey_timeout_ms = 0;
-
- debug("Entering interactive session for SSH2.");
-
- mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
- child_terminated = 0;
- connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
- connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
-
- if (!use_privsep) {
- signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
- signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler);
- signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
- }
-
- notify_setup();
-
- max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, notify_pipe[0]);
-
- server_init_dispatch();
-
- for (;;) {
- process_buffered_input_packets();
-
- rekeying = (xxx_kex != NULL && !xxx_kex->done);
-
- if (!rekeying && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
- channel_output_poll();
- if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && compat20 && !rekeying)
- rekey_timeout_ms = packet_get_rekey_timeout() * 1000;
- else
- rekey_timeout_ms = 0;
-
- wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, &max_fd,
- &nalloc, rekey_timeout_ms);
-
- if (received_sigterm) {
- logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm);
- /* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
-
- collect_children();
- if (!rekeying) {
- channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
- if (packet_need_rekeying()) {
- debug("need rekeying");
- xxx_kex->done = 0;
- kex_send_kexinit(xxx_kex);
- }
- }
- process_input(readset);
- if (connection_closed)
- break;
- process_output(writeset);
- }
- collect_children();
-
- free(readset);
- free(writeset);
-
- /* free all channels, no more reads and writes */
- channel_free_all();
-
- /* free remaining sessions, e.g. remove wtmp entries */
- session_destroy_all(NULL);
-}
-
-static void
-server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- debug("Got %d/%u for keepalive", type, seq);
- /*
- * reset timeout, since we got a sane answer from the client.
- * even if this was generated by something other than
- * the bogus CHANNEL_REQUEST we send for keepalives.
- */
- packet_set_alive_timeouts(0);
-}
-
-static void
-server_input_stdin_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- char *data;
- u_int data_len;
-
- /* Stdin data from the client. Append it to the buffer. */
- /* Ignore any data if the client has closed stdin. */
- if (fdin == -1)
- return;
- data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
- packet_check_eom();
- buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, data, data_len);
- explicit_bzero(data, data_len);
- free(data);
-}
-
-static void
-server_input_eof(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- /*
- * Eof from the client. The stdin descriptor to the
- * program will be closed when all buffered data has
- * drained.
- */
- debug("EOF received for stdin.");
- packet_check_eom();
- stdin_eof = 1;
-}
-
-static void
-server_input_window_size(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- u_int row = packet_get_int();
- u_int col = packet_get_int();
- u_int xpixel = packet_get_int();
- u_int ypixel = packet_get_int();
-
- debug("Window change received.");
- packet_check_eom();
- if (fdin != -1)
- pty_change_window_size(fdin, row, col, xpixel, ypixel);
-}
-
-static Channel *
-server_request_direct_tcpip(void)
-{
- Channel *c = NULL;
- char *target, *originator;
- u_short target_port, originator_port;
-
- target = packet_get_string(NULL);
- target_port = packet_get_int();
- originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
- originator_port = packet_get_int();
- packet_check_eom();
-
- debug("server_request_direct_tcpip: originator %s port %d, target %s "
- "port %d", originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
-
- /* XXX fine grained permissions */
- if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
- !no_port_forwarding_flag) {
- c = channel_connect_to(target, target_port,
- "direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip");
- } else {
- logit("refused local port forward: "
- "originator %s port %d, target %s port %d",
- originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
- }
-
- free(originator);
- free(target);
-
- return c;
-}
-
-static Channel *
-server_request_tun(void)
-{
- Channel *c = NULL;
- int mode, tun;
- int sock;
-
- mode = packet_get_int();
- switch (mode) {
- case SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT:
- case SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET:
- break;
- default:
- packet_send_debug("Unsupported tunnel device mode.");
- return NULL;
- }
- if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0) {
- packet_send_debug("Server has rejected tunnel device "
- "forwarding");
- return NULL;
- }
-
- tun = packet_get_int();
- if (forced_tun_device != -1) {
- if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun)
- goto done;
- tun = forced_tun_device;
- }
- sock = tun_open(tun, mode);
- if (sock < 0)
- goto done;
- c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
- CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
- c->datagram = 1;
-#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
- if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT)
- channel_register_filter(c->self, sys_tun_infilter,
- sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL);
-#endif
-
- done:
- if (c == NULL)
- packet_send_debug("Failed to open the tunnel device.");
- return c;
-}
-
-static Channel *
-server_request_session(void)
-{
- Channel *c;
-
- debug("input_session_request");
- packet_check_eom();
-
- if (no_more_sessions) {
- packet_disconnect("Possible attack: attempt to open a session "
- "after additional sessions disabled");
- }
-
- /*
- * A server session has no fd to read or write until a
- * CHANNEL_REQUEST for a shell is made, so we set the type to
- * SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL. Additionally, a callback for handling all
- * CHANNEL_REQUEST messages is registered.
- */
- c = channel_new("session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL,
- -1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT,
- 0, "server-session", 1);
- if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) {
- debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self);
- channel_free(c);
- return NULL;
- }
- channel_register_cleanup(c->self, session_close_by_channel, 0);
- return c;
-}
-
-static void
-server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- Channel *c = NULL;
- char *ctype;
- int rchan;
- u_int rmaxpack, rwindow, len;
-
- ctype = packet_get_string(&len);
- rchan = packet_get_int();
- rwindow = packet_get_int();
- rmaxpack = packet_get_int();
-
- debug("server_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d",
- ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack);
-
- if (strcmp(ctype, "session") == 0) {
- c = server_request_session();
- } else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) {
- c = server_request_direct_tcpip();
- } else if (strcmp(ctype, "tun at openssh.com") == 0) {
- c = server_request_tun();
- }
- if (c != NULL) {
- debug("server_input_channel_open: confirm %s", ctype);
- c->remote_id = rchan;
- c->remote_window = rwindow;
- c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack;
- if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
- packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
- packet_put_int(c->self);
- packet_put_int(c->local_window);
- packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
- packet_send();
- }
- } else {
- debug("server_input_channel_open: failure %s", ctype);
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
- packet_put_int(rchan);
- packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED);
- if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) {
- packet_put_cstring("open failed");
- packet_put_cstring("");
- }
- packet_send();
- }
- free(ctype);
-}
-
-static void
-server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- char *rtype;
- int want_reply;
- int success = 0, allocated_listen_port = 0;
-
- rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
- want_reply = packet_get_char();
- debug("server_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d", rtype, want_reply);
-
- /* -R style forwarding */
- if (strcmp(rtype, "tcpip-forward") == 0) {
- struct passwd *pw;
- char *listen_address;
- u_short listen_port;
-
- pw = the_authctxt->pw;
- if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
- fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user");
- listen_address = packet_get_string(NULL);
- listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int();
- debug("server_input_global_request: tcpip-forward listen %s port %d",
- listen_address, listen_port);
-
- /* check permissions */
- if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 ||
- no_port_forwarding_flag ||
- (!want_reply && listen_port == 0)
-#ifndef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT
- || (listen_port != 0 && listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED &&
- pw->pw_uid != 0)
-#endif
- ) {
- success = 0;
- packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding.");
- } else {
- /* Start listening on the port */
- success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(
- listen_address, listen_port,
- &allocated_listen_port, options.gateway_ports);
- }
- free(listen_address);
- } else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-tcpip-forward") == 0) {
- char *cancel_address;
- u_short cancel_port;
-
- cancel_address = packet_get_string(NULL);
- cancel_port = (u_short)packet_get_int();
- debug("%s: cancel-tcpip-forward addr %s port %d", __func__,
- cancel_address, cancel_port);
-
- success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(cancel_address,
- cancel_port);
- free(cancel_address);
- } else if (strcmp(rtype, "no-more-sessions at openssh.com") == 0) {
- no_more_sessions = 1;
- success = 1;
- }
- if (want_reply) {
- packet_start(success ?
- SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
- if (success && allocated_listen_port > 0)
- packet_put_int(allocated_listen_port);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- }
- free(rtype);
-}
-
-static void
-server_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- Channel *c;
- int id, reply, success = 0;
- char *rtype;
-
- id = packet_get_int();
- rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
- reply = packet_get_char();
-
- debug("server_input_channel_req: channel %d request %s reply %d",
- id, rtype, reply);
-
- if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL)
- packet_disconnect("server_input_channel_req: "
- "unknown channel %d", id);
- if (!strcmp(rtype, "eow at openssh.com")) {
- packet_check_eom();
- chan_rcvd_eow(c);
- } else if ((c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL ||
- c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) && strcmp(c->ctype, "session") == 0)
- success = session_input_channel_req(c, rtype);
- if (reply) {
- packet_start(success ?
- SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
- packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
- packet_send();
- }
- free(rtype);
-}
-
-static void
-server_init_dispatch_20(void)
-{
- debug("server_init_dispatch_20");
- dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &server_input_channel_open);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &server_input_channel_req);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &server_input_global_request);
- /* client_alive */
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive);
- /* rekeying */
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
-}
-static void
-server_init_dispatch_13(void)
-{
- debug("server_init_dispatch_13");
- dispatch_init(NULL);
- dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_EOF, &server_input_eof);
- dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA, &server_input_stdin_data);
- dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE, &server_input_window_size);
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_close);
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_close_confirmation);
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN, &channel_input_port_open);
-}
-static void
-server_init_dispatch_15(void)
-{
- server_init_dispatch_13();
- debug("server_init_dispatch_15");
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_ieof);
- dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_oclose);
-}
-static void
-server_init_dispatch(void)
-{
- if (compat20)
- server_init_dispatch_20();
- else if (compat13)
- server_init_dispatch_13();
- else
- server_init_dispatch_15();
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/serverloop.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/serverloop.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/serverloop.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/serverloop.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1410 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.184 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Server main loop for handling the interactive session.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h> /* MIN MAX */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "serverloop.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+/* XXX */
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+extern int use_privsep;
+
+static Buffer stdin_buffer; /* Buffer for stdin data. */
+static Buffer stdout_buffer; /* Buffer for stdout data. */
+static Buffer stderr_buffer; /* Buffer for stderr data. */
+static int fdin; /* Descriptor for stdin (for writing) */
+static int fdout; /* Descriptor for stdout (for reading);
+ May be same number as fdin. */
+static int fderr; /* Descriptor for stderr. May be -1. */
+static long stdin_bytes = 0; /* Number of bytes written to stdin. */
+static long stdout_bytes = 0; /* Number of stdout bytes sent to client. */
+static long stderr_bytes = 0; /* Number of stderr bytes sent to client. */
+static long fdout_bytes = 0; /* Number of stdout bytes read from program. */
+static int stdin_eof = 0; /* EOF message received from client. */
+static int fdout_eof = 0; /* EOF encountered reading from fdout. */
+static int fderr_eof = 0; /* EOF encountered readung from fderr. */
+static int fdin_is_tty = 0; /* fdin points to a tty. */
+static int connection_in; /* Connection to client (input). */
+static int connection_out; /* Connection to client (output). */
+static int connection_closed = 0; /* Connection to client closed. */
+static u_int buffer_high; /* "Soft" max buffer size. */
+static int no_more_sessions = 0; /* Disallow further sessions. */
+
+/*
+ * This SIGCHLD kludge is used to detect when the child exits. The server
+ * will exit after that, as soon as forwarded connections have terminated.
+ */
+
+static volatile sig_atomic_t child_terminated = 0; /* The child has terminated. */
+
+/* Cleanup on signals (!use_privsep case only) */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
+
+/* prototypes */
+static void server_init_dispatch(void);
+
+/*
+ * we write to this pipe if a SIGCHLD is caught in order to avoid
+ * the race between select() and child_terminated
+ */
+static int notify_pipe[2];
+static void
+notify_setup(void)
+{
+ if (pipe(notify_pipe) < 0) {
+ error("pipe(notify_pipe) failed %s", strerror(errno));
+ } else if ((fcntl(notify_pipe[0], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) ||
+ (fcntl(notify_pipe[1], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1)) {
+ error("fcntl(notify_pipe, F_SETFD) failed %s", strerror(errno));
+ close(notify_pipe[0]);
+ close(notify_pipe[1]);
+ } else {
+ set_nonblock(notify_pipe[0]);
+ set_nonblock(notify_pipe[1]);
+ return;
+ }
+ notify_pipe[0] = -1; /* read end */
+ notify_pipe[1] = -1; /* write end */
+}
+static void
+notify_parent(void)
+{
+ if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
+ (void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
+}
+static void
+notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
+{
+ if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
+ FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+}
+static void
+notify_done(fd_set *readset)
+{
+ char c;
+
+ if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
+ while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
+ debug2("notify_done: reading");
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+sigchld_handler(int sig)
+{
+ int save_errno = errno;
+ child_terminated = 1;
+#ifndef _UNICOS
+ mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
+#endif
+ notify_parent();
+ errno = save_errno;
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+sigterm_handler(int sig)
+{
+ received_sigterm = sig;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Make packets from buffered stderr data, and buffer it for sending
+ * to the client.
+ */
+static void
+make_packets_from_stderr_data(void)
+{
+ u_int len;
+
+ /* Send buffered stderr data to the client. */
+ while (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0 &&
+ packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
+ len = buffer_len(&stderr_buffer);
+ if (packet_is_interactive()) {
+ if (len > 512)
+ len = 512;
+ } else {
+ /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */
+ if (len > packet_get_maxsize())
+ len = packet_get_maxsize();
+ }
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), len);
+ packet_send();
+ buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len);
+ stderr_bytes += len;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Make packets from buffered stdout data, and buffer it for sending to the
+ * client.
+ */
+static void
+make_packets_from_stdout_data(void)
+{
+ u_int len;
+
+ /* Send buffered stdout data to the client. */
+ while (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0 &&
+ packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
+ len = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
+ if (packet_is_interactive()) {
+ if (len > 512)
+ len = 512;
+ } else {
+ /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */
+ if (len > packet_get_maxsize())
+ len = packet_get_maxsize();
+ }
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), len);
+ packet_send();
+ buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len);
+ stdout_bytes += len;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+client_alive_check(void)
+{
+ int channel_id;
+
+ /* timeout, check to see how many we have had */
+ if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.client_alive_count_max) {
+ logit("Timeout, client not responding.");
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * send a bogus global/channel request with "wantreply",
+ * we should get back a failure
+ */
+ if ((channel_id = channel_find_open()) == -1) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring("keepalive at openssh.com");
+ packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */
+ } else {
+ channel_request_start(channel_id, "keepalive at openssh.com", 1);
+ }
+ packet_send();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sleep in select() until we can do something. This will initialize the
+ * select masks. Upon return, the masks will indicate which descriptors
+ * have data or can accept data. Optionally, a maximum time can be specified
+ * for the duration of the wait (0 = infinite).
+ */
+static void
+wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
+ u_int *nallocp, u_int64_t max_time_ms)
+{
+ struct timeval tv, *tvp;
+ int ret;
+ time_t minwait_secs = 0;
+ int client_alive_scheduled = 0;
+ int program_alive_scheduled = 0;
+
+ /* Allocate and update select() masks for channel descriptors. */
+ channel_prepare_select(readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp,
+ &minwait_secs, 0);
+
+ /* XXX need proper deadline system for rekey/client alive */
+ if (minwait_secs != 0)
+ max_time_ms = MIN(max_time_ms, (u_int)minwait_secs * 1000);
+
+ /*
+ * if using client_alive, set the max timeout accordingly,
+ * and indicate that this particular timeout was for client
+ * alive by setting the client_alive_scheduled flag.
+ *
+ * this could be randomized somewhat to make traffic
+ * analysis more difficult, but we're not doing it yet.
+ */
+ if (compat20 && options.client_alive_interval) {
+ uint64_t keepalive_ms =
+ (uint64_t)options.client_alive_interval * 1000;
+
+ client_alive_scheduled = 1;
+ if (max_time_ms == 0 || max_time_ms > keepalive_ms)
+ max_time_ms = keepalive_ms;
+ }
+
+ if (compat20) {
+#if 0
+ /* wrong: bad condition XXX */
+ if (channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
+#endif
+ FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Read packets from the client unless we have too much
+ * buffered stdin or channel data.
+ */
+ if (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) < buffer_high &&
+ channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
+ FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
+ /*
+ * If there is not too much data already buffered going to
+ * the client, try to get some more data from the program.
+ */
+ if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
+ program_alive_scheduled = child_terminated;
+ if (!fdout_eof)
+ FD_SET(fdout, *readsetp);
+ if (!fderr_eof)
+ FD_SET(fderr, *readsetp);
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we have buffered data, try to write some of that data
+ * to the program.
+ */
+ if (fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0)
+ FD_SET(fdin, *writesetp);
+ }
+ notify_prepare(*readsetp);
+
+ /*
+ * If we have buffered packet data going to the client, mark that
+ * descriptor.
+ */
+ if (packet_have_data_to_write())
+ FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp);
+
+ /*
+ * If child has terminated and there is enough buffer space to read
+ * from it, then read as much as is available and exit.
+ */
+ if (child_terminated && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
+ if (max_time_ms == 0 || client_alive_scheduled)
+ max_time_ms = 100;
+
+ if (max_time_ms == 0)
+ tvp = NULL;
+ else {
+ tv.tv_sec = max_time_ms / 1000;
+ tv.tv_usec = 1000 * (max_time_ms % 1000);
+ tvp = &tv;
+ }
+
+ /* Wait for something to happen, or the timeout to expire. */
+ ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp);
+
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
+ memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
+ if (errno != EINTR)
+ error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ } else {
+ if (ret == 0 && client_alive_scheduled)
+ client_alive_check();
+ if (!compat20 && program_alive_scheduled && fdin_is_tty) {
+ if (!fdout_eof)
+ FD_SET(fdout, *readsetp);
+ if (!fderr_eof)
+ FD_SET(fderr, *readsetp);
+ }
+ }
+
+ notify_done(*readsetp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Processes input from the client and the program. Input data is stored
+ * in buffers and processed later.
+ */
+static void
+process_input(fd_set *readset)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ int len;
+ char buf[16384];
+
+ /* Read and buffer any input data from the client. */
+ if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
+ len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (len == 0) {
+ verbose("Connection closed by %.100s port %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ connection_closed = 1;
+ if (compat20)
+ return;
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ } else if (len < 0) {
+ if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN &&
+ errno != EWOULDBLOCK) {
+ verbose("Read error from remote host "
+ "%.100s port %d: %.100s",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh), strerror(errno));
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Buffer any received data. */
+ packet_process_incoming(buf, len);
+ }
+ }
+ if (compat20)
+ return;
+
+ /* Read and buffer any available stdout data from the program. */
+ if (!fdout_eof && FD_ISSET(fdout, readset)) {
+ errno = 0;
+ len = read(fdout, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN ||
+ errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !child_terminated))) {
+ /* do nothing */
+#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD
+ } else if (len <= 0) {
+#else
+ } else if ((!isatty(fdout) && len <= 0) ||
+ (isatty(fdout) && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) {
+#endif
+ fdout_eof = 1;
+ } else {
+ buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, buf, len);
+ fdout_bytes += len;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Read and buffer any available stderr data from the program. */
+ if (!fderr_eof && FD_ISSET(fderr, readset)) {
+ errno = 0;
+ len = read(fderr, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN ||
+ errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !child_terminated))) {
+ /* do nothing */
+#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD
+ } else if (len <= 0) {
+#else
+ } else if ((!isatty(fderr) && len <= 0) ||
+ (isatty(fderr) && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) {
+#endif
+ fderr_eof = 1;
+ } else {
+ buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, len);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sends data from internal buffers to client program stdin.
+ */
+static void
+process_output(fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ struct termios tio;
+ u_char *data;
+ u_int dlen;
+ int len;
+
+ /* Write buffered data to program stdin. */
+ if (!compat20 && fdin != -1 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) {
+ data = buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer);
+ dlen = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer);
+ len = write(fdin, data, dlen);
+ if (len < 0 &&
+ (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) {
+ /* do nothing */
+ } else if (len <= 0) {
+ if (fdin != fdout)
+ close(fdin);
+ else
+ shutdown(fdin, SHUT_WR); /* We will no longer send. */
+ fdin = -1;
+ } else {
+ /* Successful write. */
+ if (fdin_is_tty && dlen >= 1 && data[0] != '\r' &&
+ tcgetattr(fdin, &tio) == 0 &&
+ !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) {
+ /*
+ * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of
+ * traffic analysis
+ */
+ packet_send_ignore(len);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ /* Consume the data from the buffer. */
+ buffer_consume(&stdin_buffer, len);
+ /* Update the count of bytes written to the program. */
+ stdin_bytes += len;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Send any buffered packet data to the client. */
+ if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset))
+ packet_write_poll();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wait until all buffered output has been sent to the client.
+ * This is used when the program terminates.
+ */
+static void
+drain_output(void)
+{
+ /* Send any buffered stdout data to the client. */
+ if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) {
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer),
+ buffer_len(&stdout_buffer));
+ packet_send();
+ /* Update the count of sent bytes. */
+ stdout_bytes += buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
+ }
+ /* Send any buffered stderr data to the client. */
+ if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) {
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer),
+ buffer_len(&stderr_buffer));
+ packet_send();
+ /* Update the count of sent bytes. */
+ stderr_bytes += buffer_len(&stderr_buffer);
+ }
+ /* Wait until all buffered data has been written to the client. */
+ packet_write_wait();
+}
+
+static void
+process_buffered_input_packets(void)
+{
+ dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, NULL, active_state);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Performs the interactive session. This handles data transmission between
+ * the client and the program. Note that the notion of stdin, stdout, and
+ * stderr in this function is sort of reversed: this function writes to
+ * stdin (of the child program), and reads from stdout and stderr (of the
+ * child program).
+ */
+void
+server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg)
+{
+ fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
+ int max_fd = 0;
+ u_int nalloc = 0;
+ int wait_status; /* Status returned by wait(). */
+ pid_t wait_pid; /* pid returned by wait(). */
+ int waiting_termination = 0; /* Have displayed waiting close message. */
+ u_int64_t max_time_milliseconds;
+ u_int previous_stdout_buffer_bytes;
+ u_int stdout_buffer_bytes;
+ int type;
+
+ debug("Entering interactive session.");
+
+ /* Initialize the SIGCHLD kludge. */
+ child_terminated = 0;
+ mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
+
+ if (!use_privsep) {
+ signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
+ signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler);
+ signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize our global variables. */
+ fdin = fdin_arg;
+ fdout = fdout_arg;
+ fderr = fderr_arg;
+
+ /* nonblocking IO */
+ set_nonblock(fdin);
+ set_nonblock(fdout);
+ /* we don't have stderr for interactive terminal sessions, see below */
+ if (fderr != -1)
+ set_nonblock(fderr);
+
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG) && isatty(fdin))
+ fdin_is_tty = 1;
+
+ connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
+ connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
+
+ notify_setup();
+
+ previous_stdout_buffer_bytes = 0;
+
+ /* Set approximate I/O buffer size. */
+ if (packet_is_interactive())
+ buffer_high = 4096;
+ else
+ buffer_high = 64 * 1024;
+
+#if 0
+ /* Initialize max_fd to the maximum of the known file descriptors. */
+ max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
+ max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin);
+ max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout);
+ if (fderr != -1)
+ max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr);
+#endif
+
+ /* Initialize Initialize buffers. */
+ buffer_init(&stdin_buffer);
+ buffer_init(&stdout_buffer);
+ buffer_init(&stderr_buffer);
+
+ /*
+ * If we have no separate fderr (which is the case when we have a pty
+ * - there we cannot make difference between data sent to stdout and
+ * stderr), indicate that we have seen an EOF from stderr. This way
+ * we don't need to check the descriptor everywhere.
+ */
+ if (fderr == -1)
+ fderr_eof = 1;
+
+ server_init_dispatch();
+
+ /* Main loop of the server for the interactive session mode. */
+ for (;;) {
+
+ /* Process buffered packets from the client. */
+ process_buffered_input_packets();
+
+ /*
+ * If we have received eof, and there is no more pending
+ * input data, cause a real eof by closing fdin.
+ */
+ if (stdin_eof && fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
+ if (fdin != fdout)
+ close(fdin);
+ else
+ shutdown(fdin, SHUT_WR); /* We will no longer send. */
+ fdin = -1;
+ }
+ /* Make packets from buffered stderr data to send to the client. */
+ make_packets_from_stderr_data();
+
+ /*
+ * Make packets from buffered stdout data to send to the
+ * client. If there is very little to send, this arranges to
+ * not send them now, but to wait a short while to see if we
+ * are getting more data. This is necessary, as some systems
+ * wake up readers from a pty after each separate character.
+ */
+ max_time_milliseconds = 0;
+ stdout_buffer_bytes = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
+ if (stdout_buffer_bytes != 0 && stdout_buffer_bytes < 256 &&
+ stdout_buffer_bytes != previous_stdout_buffer_bytes) {
+ /* try again after a while */
+ max_time_milliseconds = 10;
+ } else {
+ /* Send it now. */
+ make_packets_from_stdout_data();
+ }
+ previous_stdout_buffer_bytes = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
+
+ /* Send channel data to the client. */
+ if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
+ channel_output_poll();
+
+ /*
+ * Bail out of the loop if the program has closed its output
+ * descriptors, and we have no more data to send to the
+ * client, and there is no pending buffered data.
+ */
+ if (fdout_eof && fderr_eof && !packet_have_data_to_write() &&
+ buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) == 0 && buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) == 0) {
+ if (!channel_still_open())
+ break;
+ if (!waiting_termination) {
+ const char *s = "Waiting for forwarded connections to terminate...\r\n";
+ char *cp;
+ waiting_termination = 1;
+ buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, s, strlen(s));
+
+ /* Display list of open channels. */
+ cp = channel_open_message();
+ buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, cp, strlen(cp));
+ free(cp);
+ }
+ }
+ max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
+ max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin);
+ max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout);
+ max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr);
+ max_fd = MAX(max_fd, notify_pipe[0]);
+
+ /* Sleep in select() until we can do something. */
+ wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, &max_fd,
+ &nalloc, max_time_milliseconds);
+
+ if (received_sigterm) {
+ logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm);
+ /* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+
+ /* Process any channel events. */
+ channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
+
+ /* Process input from the client and from program stdout/stderr. */
+ process_input(readset);
+
+ /* Process output to the client and to program stdin. */
+ process_output(writeset);
+ }
+ free(readset);
+ free(writeset);
+
+ /* Cleanup and termination code. */
+
+ /* Wait until all output has been sent to the client. */
+ drain_output();
+
+ debug("End of interactive session; stdin %ld, stdout (read %ld, sent %ld), stderr %ld bytes.",
+ stdin_bytes, fdout_bytes, stdout_bytes, stderr_bytes);
+
+ /* Free and clear the buffers. */
+ buffer_free(&stdin_buffer);
+ buffer_free(&stdout_buffer);
+ buffer_free(&stderr_buffer);
+
+ /* Close the file descriptors. */
+ if (fdout != -1)
+ close(fdout);
+ fdout = -1;
+ fdout_eof = 1;
+ if (fderr != -1)
+ close(fderr);
+ fderr = -1;
+ fderr_eof = 1;
+ if (fdin != -1)
+ close(fdin);
+ fdin = -1;
+
+ channel_free_all();
+
+ /* We no longer want our SIGCHLD handler to be called. */
+ mysignal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+
+ while ((wait_pid = waitpid(-1, &wait_status, 0)) < 0)
+ if (errno != EINTR)
+ packet_disconnect("wait: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ if (wait_pid != pid)
+ error("Strange, wait returned pid %ld, expected %ld",
+ (long)wait_pid, (long)pid);
+
+ /* Check if it exited normally. */
+ if (WIFEXITED(wait_status)) {
+ /* Yes, normal exit. Get exit status and send it to the client. */
+ debug("Command exited with status %d.", WEXITSTATUS(wait_status));
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS);
+ packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(wait_status));
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /*
+ * Wait for exit confirmation. Note that there might be
+ * other packets coming before it; however, the program has
+ * already died so we just ignore them. The client is
+ * supposed to respond with the confirmation when it receives
+ * the exit status.
+ */
+ do {
+ type = packet_read();
+ }
+ while (type != SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
+
+ debug("Received exit confirmation.");
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Check if the program terminated due to a signal. */
+ if (WIFSIGNALED(wait_status))
+ packet_disconnect("Command terminated on signal %d.",
+ WTERMSIG(wait_status));
+
+ /* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */
+ packet_disconnect("wait returned status %04x.", wait_status);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+static void
+collect_children(void)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ sigset_t oset, nset;
+ int status;
+
+ /* block SIGCHLD while we check for dead children */
+ sigemptyset(&nset);
+ sigaddset(&nset, SIGCHLD);
+ sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset);
+ if (child_terminated) {
+ debug("Received SIGCHLD.");
+ while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
+ (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
+ if (pid > 0)
+ session_close_by_pid(pid, status);
+ child_terminated = 0;
+ }
+ sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
+}
+
+void
+server_loop2(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
+ int max_fd;
+ u_int nalloc = 0;
+ u_int64_t rekey_timeout_ms = 0;
+
+ debug("Entering interactive session for SSH2.");
+
+ mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
+ child_terminated = 0;
+ connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
+ connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
+
+ if (!use_privsep) {
+ signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
+ signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler);
+ signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
+ }
+
+ notify_setup();
+
+ max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
+ max_fd = MAX(max_fd, notify_pipe[0]);
+
+ server_init_dispatch();
+
+ for (;;) {
+ process_buffered_input_packets();
+
+ if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state) &&
+ packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
+ channel_output_poll();
+ if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && compat20 &&
+ !ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state))
+ rekey_timeout_ms = packet_get_rekey_timeout() * 1000;
+ else
+ rekey_timeout_ms = 0;
+
+ wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, &max_fd,
+ &nalloc, rekey_timeout_ms);
+
+ if (received_sigterm) {
+ logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm);
+ /* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+
+ collect_children();
+ if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state))
+ channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
+ process_input(readset);
+ if (connection_closed)
+ break;
+ process_output(writeset);
+ }
+ collect_children();
+
+ free(readset);
+ free(writeset);
+
+ /* free all channels, no more reads and writes */
+ channel_free_all();
+
+ /* free remaining sessions, e.g. remove wtmp entries */
+ session_destroy_all(NULL);
+}
+
+static int
+server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ debug("Got %d/%u for keepalive", type, seq);
+ /*
+ * reset timeout, since we got a sane answer from the client.
+ * even if this was generated by something other than
+ * the bogus CHANNEL_REQUEST we send for keepalives.
+ */
+ packet_set_alive_timeouts(0);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+server_input_stdin_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ char *data;
+ u_int data_len;
+
+ /* Stdin data from the client. Append it to the buffer. */
+ /* Ignore any data if the client has closed stdin. */
+ if (fdin == -1)
+ return 0;
+ data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
+ packet_check_eom();
+ buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, data, data_len);
+ explicit_bzero(data, data_len);
+ free(data);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+server_input_eof(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ /*
+ * Eof from the client. The stdin descriptor to the
+ * program will be closed when all buffered data has
+ * drained.
+ */
+ debug("EOF received for stdin.");
+ packet_check_eom();
+ stdin_eof = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+server_input_window_size(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ u_int row = packet_get_int();
+ u_int col = packet_get_int();
+ u_int xpixel = packet_get_int();
+ u_int ypixel = packet_get_int();
+
+ debug("Window change received.");
+ packet_check_eom();
+ if (fdin != -1)
+ pty_change_window_size(fdin, row, col, xpixel, ypixel);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static Channel *
+server_request_direct_tcpip(void)
+{
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+ char *target, *originator;
+ u_short target_port, originator_port;
+
+ target = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ target_port = packet_get_int();
+ originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ originator_port = packet_get_int();
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ debug("server_request_direct_tcpip: originator %s port %d, target %s "
+ "port %d", originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
+
+ /* XXX fine grained permissions */
+ if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
+ !no_port_forwarding_flag) {
+ c = channel_connect_to_port(target, target_port,
+ "direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip");
+ } else {
+ logit("refused local port forward: "
+ "originator %s port %d, target %s port %d",
+ originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
+ }
+
+ free(originator);
+ free(target);
+
+ return c;
+}
+
+static Channel *
+server_request_direct_streamlocal(void)
+{
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+ char *target, *originator;
+ u_short originator_port;
+
+ target = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ originator_port = packet_get_int();
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ debug("server_request_direct_streamlocal: originator %s port %d, target %s",
+ originator, originator_port, target);
+
+ /* XXX fine grained permissions */
+ if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
+ !no_port_forwarding_flag) {
+ c = channel_connect_to_path(target,
+ "direct-streamlocal at openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal");
+ } else {
+ logit("refused streamlocal port forward: "
+ "originator %s port %d, target %s",
+ originator, originator_port, target);
+ }
+
+ free(originator);
+ free(target);
+
+ return c;
+}
+
+static Channel *
+server_request_tun(void)
+{
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+ int mode, tun;
+ int sock;
+
+ mode = packet_get_int();
+ switch (mode) {
+ case SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT:
+ case SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET:
+ break;
+ default:
+ packet_send_debug("Unsupported tunnel device mode.");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0) {
+ packet_send_debug("Server has rejected tunnel device "
+ "forwarding");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ tun = packet_get_int();
+ if (forced_tun_device != -1) {
+ if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun)
+ goto done;
+ tun = forced_tun_device;
+ }
+ sock = tun_open(tun, mode);
+ if (sock < 0)
+ goto done;
+ c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
+ c->datagram = 1;
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
+ if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT)
+ channel_register_filter(c->self, sys_tun_infilter,
+ sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL);
+#endif
+
+ done:
+ if (c == NULL)
+ packet_send_debug("Failed to open the tunnel device.");
+ return c;
+}
+
+static Channel *
+server_request_session(void)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+
+ debug("input_session_request");
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ if (no_more_sessions) {
+ packet_disconnect("Possible attack: attempt to open a session "
+ "after additional sessions disabled");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * A server session has no fd to read or write until a
+ * CHANNEL_REQUEST for a shell is made, so we set the type to
+ * SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL. Additionally, a callback for handling all
+ * CHANNEL_REQUEST messages is registered.
+ */
+ c = channel_new("session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL,
+ -1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+ 0, "server-session", 1);
+ if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) {
+ debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self);
+ channel_free(c);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ channel_register_cleanup(c->self, session_close_by_channel, 0);
+ return c;
+}
+
+static int
+server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+ char *ctype;
+ int rchan;
+ u_int rmaxpack, rwindow, len;
+
+ ctype = packet_get_string(&len);
+ rchan = packet_get_int();
+ rwindow = packet_get_int();
+ rmaxpack = packet_get_int();
+
+ debug("server_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d",
+ ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack);
+
+ if (strcmp(ctype, "session") == 0) {
+ c = server_request_session();
+ } else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) {
+ c = server_request_direct_tcpip();
+ } else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-streamlocal at openssh.com") == 0) {
+ c = server_request_direct_streamlocal();
+ } else if (strcmp(ctype, "tun at openssh.com") == 0) {
+ c = server_request_tun();
+ }
+ if (c != NULL) {
+ debug("server_input_channel_open: confirm %s", ctype);
+ c->remote_id = rchan;
+ c->remote_window = rwindow;
+ c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack;
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(c->self);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_window);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ } else {
+ debug("server_input_channel_open: failure %s", ctype);
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_int(rchan);
+ packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED);
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) {
+ packet_put_cstring("open failed");
+ packet_put_cstring("");
+ }
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ free(ctype);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct sshbuf **respp)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL, *key_pub = NULL, *key_prv = NULL;
+ int r, ndx, success = 0;
+ const u_char *blob;
+ u_char *sig = 0;
+ size_t blen, slen;
+
+ if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+
+ while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ key = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: couldn't parse key: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Better check that this is actually one of our hostkeys
+ * before attempting to sign anything with it.
+ */
+ if ((ndx = ssh->kex->host_key_index(key, 1, ssh)) == -1) {
+ error("%s: unknown host %s key",
+ __func__, sshkey_type(key));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /*
+ * XXX refactor: make kex->sign just use an index rather
+ * than passing in public and private keys
+ */
+ if ((key_prv = get_hostkey_by_index(ndx)) == NULL &&
+ (key_pub = get_hostkey_public_by_index(ndx, ssh)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: can't retrieve hostkey %d", __func__, ndx);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sshbuf_reset(sigbuf);
+ free(sig);
+ sig = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
+ "hostkeys-prove-00 at openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf,
+ ssh->kex->session_id, ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh->kex->sign(key_prv, key_pub, &sig, &slen,
+ sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf), NULL, 0)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, slen)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: couldn't prepare signature: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Success */
+ *respp = resp;
+ resp = NULL; /* don't free it */
+ success = 1;
+ out:
+ free(sig);
+ sshbuf_free(resp);
+ sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ return success;
+}
+
+static int
+server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ char *rtype;
+ int want_reply;
+ int r, success = 0, allocated_listen_port = 0;
+ struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
+
+ rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ want_reply = packet_get_char();
+ debug("server_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d", rtype, want_reply);
+
+ /* -R style forwarding */
+ if (strcmp(rtype, "tcpip-forward") == 0) {
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ struct Forward fwd;
+
+ pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+ if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
+ fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user");
+ memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
+ fwd.listen_host = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ fwd.listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int();
+ debug("server_input_global_request: tcpip-forward listen %s port %d",
+ fwd.listen_host, fwd.listen_port);
+
+ /* check permissions */
+ if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 ||
+ no_port_forwarding_flag ||
+ (!want_reply && fwd.listen_port == 0) ||
+ (fwd.listen_port != 0 && fwd.listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED &&
+ pw->pw_uid != 0)) {
+ success = 0;
+ packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding.");
+ } else {
+ /* Start listening on the port */
+ success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(&fwd,
+ &allocated_listen_port, &options.fwd_opts);
+ }
+ free(fwd.listen_host);
+ if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ if (allocated_listen_port != 0 &&
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, allocated_listen_port)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u32: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-tcpip-forward") == 0) {
+ struct Forward fwd;
+
+ memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
+ fwd.listen_host = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ fwd.listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int();
+ debug("%s: cancel-tcpip-forward addr %s port %d", __func__,
+ fwd.listen_host, fwd.listen_port);
+
+ success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(&fwd);
+ free(fwd.listen_host);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "streamlocal-forward at openssh.com") == 0) {
+ struct Forward fwd;
+
+ memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
+ fwd.listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ debug("server_input_global_request: streamlocal-forward listen path %s",
+ fwd.listen_path);
+
+ /* check permissions */
+ if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0
+ || no_port_forwarding_flag) {
+ success = 0;
+ packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding.");
+ } else {
+ /* Start listening on the socket */
+ success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(
+ &fwd, NULL, &options.fwd_opts);
+ }
+ free(fwd.listen_path);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-streamlocal-forward at openssh.com") == 0) {
+ struct Forward fwd;
+
+ memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
+ fwd.listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ debug("%s: cancel-streamlocal-forward path %s", __func__,
+ fwd.listen_path);
+
+ success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(&fwd);
+ free(fwd.listen_path);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "no-more-sessions at openssh.com") == 0) {
+ no_more_sessions = 1;
+ success = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-prove-00 at openssh.com") == 0) {
+ success = server_input_hostkeys_prove(&resp);
+ }
+ if (want_reply) {
+ packet_start(success ?
+ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
+ if (success && resp != NULL)
+ ssh_packet_put_raw(active_state, sshbuf_ptr(resp),
+ sshbuf_len(resp));
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ }
+ free(rtype);
+ sshbuf_free(resp);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+server_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+ int id, reply, success = 0;
+ char *rtype;
+
+ id = packet_get_int();
+ rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ reply = packet_get_char();
+
+ debug("server_input_channel_req: channel %d request %s reply %d",
+ id, rtype, reply);
+
+ if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL)
+ packet_disconnect("server_input_channel_req: "
+ "unknown channel %d", id);
+ if (!strcmp(rtype, "eow at openssh.com")) {
+ packet_check_eom();
+ chan_rcvd_eow(c);
+ } else if ((c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL ||
+ c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) && strcmp(c->ctype, "session") == 0)
+ success = session_input_channel_req(c, rtype);
+ if (reply && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) {
+ packet_start(success ?
+ SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ free(rtype);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+server_init_dispatch_20(void)
+{
+ debug("server_init_dispatch_20");
+ dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &server_input_channel_open);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &server_input_channel_req);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &server_input_global_request);
+ /* client_alive */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive);
+ /* rekeying */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
+}
+static void
+server_init_dispatch_13(void)
+{
+ debug("server_init_dispatch_13");
+ dispatch_init(NULL);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_EOF, &server_input_eof);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA, &server_input_stdin_data);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE, &server_input_window_size);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_close);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_close_confirmation);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN, &channel_input_port_open);
+}
+static void
+server_init_dispatch_15(void)
+{
+ server_init_dispatch_13();
+ debug("server_init_dispatch_15");
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_ieof);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_oclose);
+}
+static void
+server_init_dispatch(void)
+{
+ if (compat20)
+ server_init_dispatch_20();
+ else if (compat13)
+ server_init_dispatch_13();
+ else
+ server_init_dispatch_15();
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/session.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/session.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/session.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,2774 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.270 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl.
- * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
-# include <sys/stat.h>
-#endif
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/un.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <grp.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-#include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "sshpty.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "authfd.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "sshlogin.h"
-#include "serverloop.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "session.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "sftp.h"
-
-#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
-#include <kafs.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-#include <selinux/selinux.h>
-#endif
-
-#define IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(c) \
- (!strncmp(c, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1) && \
- (c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\0' || \
- c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == ' ' || \
- c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\t'))
-
-/* func */
-
-Session *session_new(void);
-void session_set_fds(Session *, int, int, int, int, int);
-void session_pty_cleanup(Session *);
-void session_proctitle(Session *);
-int session_setup_x11fwd(Session *);
-int do_exec_pty(Session *, const char *);
-int do_exec_no_pty(Session *, const char *);
-int do_exec(Session *, const char *);
-void do_login(Session *, const char *);
-#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
-static void do_pre_login(Session *s);
-#endif
-void do_child(Session *, const char *);
-void do_motd(void);
-int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
-
-static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *);
-static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *);
-
-static int session_pty_req(Session *);
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern char *__progname;
-extern int log_stderr;
-extern int debug_flag;
-extern u_int utmp_len;
-extern int startup_pipe;
-extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
-extern Buffer loginmsg;
-
-/* original command from peer. */
-const char *original_command = NULL;
-
-/* data */
-static int sessions_first_unused = -1;
-static int sessions_nalloc = 0;
-static Session *sessions = NULL;
-
-#define SUBSYSTEM_NONE 0
-#define SUBSYSTEM_EXT 1
-#define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP 2
-#define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR 3
-
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
-login_cap_t *lc;
-#endif
-
-static int is_child = 0;
-
-/* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */
-static char *auth_sock_name = NULL;
-static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL;
-
-/* removes the agent forwarding socket */
-
-static void
-auth_sock_cleanup_proc(struct passwd *pw)
-{
- if (auth_sock_name != NULL) {
- temporarily_use_uid(pw);
- unlink(auth_sock_name);
- rmdir(auth_sock_dir);
- auth_sock_name = NULL;
- restore_uid();
- }
-}
-
-static int
-auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd * pw)
-{
- Channel *nc;
- int sock = -1;
- struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
-
- if (auth_sock_name != NULL) {
- error("authentication forwarding requested twice.");
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Temporarily drop privileged uid for mkdir/bind. */
- temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-
- /* Allocate a buffer for the socket name, and format the name. */
- auth_sock_dir = xstrdup("/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX");
-
- /* Create private directory for socket */
- if (mkdtemp(auth_sock_dir) == NULL) {
- packet_send_debug("Agent forwarding disabled: "
- "mkdtemp() failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- restore_uid();
- free(auth_sock_dir);
- auth_sock_dir = NULL;
- goto authsock_err;
- }
-
- xasprintf(&auth_sock_name, "%s/agent.%ld",
- auth_sock_dir, (long) getpid());
-
- /* Create the socket. */
- sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- if (sock < 0) {
- error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- restore_uid();
- goto authsock_err;
- }
-
- /* Bind it to the name. */
- memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
- sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
- strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, auth_sock_name, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
-
- if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) {
- error("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- restore_uid();
- goto authsock_err;
- }
-
- /* Restore the privileged uid. */
- restore_uid();
-
- /* Start listening on the socket. */
- if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) {
- error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- goto authsock_err;
- }
-
- /* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */
- nc = channel_new("auth socket",
- SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1,
- CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
- 0, "auth socket", 1);
- nc->path = xstrdup(auth_sock_name);
- return 1;
-
- authsock_err:
- free(auth_sock_name);
- if (auth_sock_dir != NULL) {
- rmdir(auth_sock_dir);
- free(auth_sock_dir);
- }
- if (sock != -1)
- close(sock);
- auth_sock_name = NULL;
- auth_sock_dir = NULL;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void
-display_loginmsg(void)
-{
- if (buffer_len(&loginmsg) > 0) {
- buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
- printf("%s", (char *)buffer_ptr(&loginmsg));
- buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
- }
-}
-
-void
-do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-
- /* setup the channel layer */
- if (no_port_forwarding_flag ||
- (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0)
- channel_disable_adm_local_opens();
- else
- channel_permit_all_opens();
-
- auth_debug_send();
-
- if (compat20)
- do_authenticated2(authctxt);
- else
- do_authenticated1(authctxt);
-
- do_cleanup(authctxt);
-}
-
-/*
- * Prepares for an interactive session. This is called after the user has
- * been successfully authenticated. During this message exchange, pseudo
- * terminals are allocated, X11, TCP/IP, and authentication agent forwardings
- * are requested, etc.
- */
-static void
-do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- Session *s;
- char *command;
- int success, type, screen_flag;
- int enable_compression_after_reply = 0;
- u_int proto_len, data_len, dlen, compression_level = 0;
-
- s = session_new();
- if (s == NULL) {
- error("no more sessions");
- return;
- }
- s->authctxt = authctxt;
- s->pw = authctxt->pw;
-
- /*
- * We stay in this loop until the client requests to execute a shell
- * or a command.
- */
- for (;;) {
- success = 0;
-
- /* Get a packet from the client. */
- type = packet_read();
-
- /* Process the packet. */
- switch (type) {
- case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION:
- compression_level = packet_get_int();
- packet_check_eom();
- if (compression_level < 1 || compression_level > 9) {
- packet_send_debug("Received invalid compression level %d.",
- compression_level);
- break;
- }
- if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
- debug2("compression disabled");
- break;
- }
- /* Enable compression after we have responded with SUCCESS. */
- enable_compression_after_reply = 1;
- success = 1;
- break;
-
- case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY:
- success = session_pty_req(s);
- break;
-
- case SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING:
- s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(&proto_len);
- s->auth_data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
-
- screen_flag = packet_get_protocol_flags() &
- SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER;
- debug2("SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER: %d", screen_flag);
-
- if (packet_remaining() == 4) {
- if (!screen_flag)
- debug2("Buggy client: "
- "X11 screen flag missing");
- s->screen = packet_get_int();
- } else {
- s->screen = 0;
- }
- packet_check_eom();
- success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
- if (!success) {
- free(s->auth_proto);
- free(s->auth_data);
- s->auth_proto = NULL;
- s->auth_data = NULL;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING:
- if (!options.allow_agent_forwarding ||
- no_agent_forwarding_flag || compat13) {
- debug("Authentication agent forwarding not permitted for this authentication.");
- break;
- }
- debug("Received authentication agent forwarding request.");
- success = auth_input_request_forwarding(s->pw);
- break;
-
- case SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST:
- if (no_port_forwarding_flag) {
- debug("Port forwarding not permitted for this authentication.");
- break;
- }
- if (!(options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE)) {
- debug("Port forwarding not permitted.");
- break;
- }
- debug("Received TCP/IP port forwarding request.");
- if (channel_input_port_forward_request(s->pw->pw_uid == 0,
- options.gateway_ports) < 0) {
- debug("Port forwarding failed.");
- break;
- }
- success = 1;
- break;
-
- case SSH_CMSG_MAX_PACKET_SIZE:
- if (packet_set_maxsize(packet_get_int()) > 0)
- success = 1;
- break;
-
- case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL:
- case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD:
- if (type == SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD) {
- command = packet_get_string(&dlen);
- debug("Exec command '%.500s'", command);
- if (do_exec(s, command) != 0)
- packet_disconnect(
- "command execution failed");
- free(command);
- } else {
- if (do_exec(s, NULL) != 0)
- packet_disconnect(
- "shell execution failed");
- }
- packet_check_eom();
- session_close(s);
- return;
-
- default:
- /*
- * Any unknown messages in this phase are ignored,
- * and a failure message is returned.
- */
- logit("Unknown packet type received after authentication: %d", type);
- }
- packet_start(success ? SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS : SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Enable compression now that we have replied if appropriate. */
- if (enable_compression_after_reply) {
- enable_compression_after_reply = 0;
- packet_start_compression(compression_level);
- }
- }
-}
-
-#define USE_PIPES 1
-/*
- * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty. This
- * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after
- * setting up file descriptors and such.
- */
-int
-do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
-{
- pid_t pid;
-
-#ifdef USE_PIPES
- int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2];
-
- if (s == NULL)
- fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
-
- /* Allocate pipes for communicating with the program. */
- if (pipe(pin) < 0) {
- error("%s: pipe in: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- if (pipe(pout) < 0) {
- error("%s: pipe out: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- close(pin[0]);
- close(pin[1]);
- return -1;
- }
- if (pipe(perr) < 0) {
- error("%s: pipe err: %.100s", __func__,
- strerror(errno));
- close(pin[0]);
- close(pin[1]);
- close(pout[0]);
- close(pout[1]);
- return -1;
- }
-#else
- int inout[2], err[2];
-
- if (s == NULL)
- fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
-
- /* Uses socket pairs to communicate with the program. */
- if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) < 0) {
- error("%s: socketpair #1: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) < 0) {
- error("%s: socketpair #2: %.100s", __func__,
- strerror(errno));
- close(inout[0]);
- close(inout[1]);
- return -1;
- }
-#endif
-
- session_proctitle(s);
-
- /* Fork the child. */
- switch ((pid = fork())) {
- case -1:
- error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-#ifdef USE_PIPES
- close(pin[0]);
- close(pin[1]);
- close(pout[0]);
- close(pout[1]);
- close(perr[0]);
- close(perr[1]);
-#else
- close(inout[0]);
- close(inout[1]);
- close(err[0]);
- close(err[1]);
-#endif
- return -1;
- case 0:
- is_child = 1;
-
- /* Child. Reinitialize the log since the pid has changed. */
- log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
- options.log_facility, log_stderr);
-
- /*
- * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
- * setlogin() affects the entire process group.
- */
- if (setsid() < 0)
- error("setsid failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-
-#ifdef USE_PIPES
- /*
- * Redirect stdin. We close the parent side of the socket
- * pair, and make the child side the standard input.
- */
- close(pin[1]);
- if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0)
- perror("dup2 stdin");
- close(pin[0]);
-
- /* Redirect stdout. */
- close(pout[0]);
- if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0)
- perror("dup2 stdout");
- close(pout[1]);
-
- /* Redirect stderr. */
- close(perr[0]);
- if (dup2(perr[1], 2) < 0)
- perror("dup2 stderr");
- close(perr[1]);
-#else
- /*
- * Redirect stdin, stdout, and stderr. Stdin and stdout will
- * use the same socket, as some programs (particularly rdist)
- * seem to depend on it.
- */
- close(inout[1]);
- close(err[1]);
- if (dup2(inout[0], 0) < 0) /* stdin */
- perror("dup2 stdin");
- if (dup2(inout[0], 1) < 0) /* stdout (same as stdin) */
- perror("dup2 stdout");
- close(inout[0]);
- if (dup2(err[0], 2) < 0) /* stderr */
- perror("dup2 stderr");
- close(err[0]);
-#endif
-
-
-#ifdef _UNICOS
- cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */
-#endif
-
- /* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
- do_child(s, command);
- /* NOTREACHED */
- default:
- break;
- }
-
-#ifdef _UNICOS
- signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler);
-#endif /* _UNICOS */
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
-#endif
-
- s->pid = pid;
- /* Set interactive/non-interactive mode. */
- packet_set_interactive(s->display != NULL,
- options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
-
- /*
- * Clear loginmsg, since it's the child's responsibility to display
- * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate
- * multiple copies of the login messages.
- */
- buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
-
-#ifdef USE_PIPES
- /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the pipes. */
- close(pin[0]);
- close(pout[1]);
- close(perr[1]);
-
- if (compat20) {
- session_set_fds(s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0],
- s->is_subsystem, 0);
- } else {
- /* Enter the interactive session. */
- server_loop(pid, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0]);
- /* server_loop has closed pin[1], pout[0], and perr[0]. */
- }
-#else
- /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the socket pairs. */
- close(inout[0]);
- close(err[0]);
-
- /*
- * Enter the interactive session. Note: server_loop must be able to
- * handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same.
- */
- if (compat20) {
- session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1],
- s->is_subsystem, 0);
- } else {
- server_loop(pid, inout[1], inout[1], err[1]);
- /* server_loop has closed inout[1] and err[1]. */
- }
-#endif
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have a tty. This
- * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after
- * setting up file descriptors, controlling tty, updating wtmp, utmp,
- * lastlog, and other such operations.
- */
-int
-do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
-{
- int fdout, ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
- pid_t pid;
-
- if (s == NULL)
- fatal("do_exec_pty: no session");
- ptyfd = s->ptyfd;
- ttyfd = s->ttyfd;
-
- /*
- * Create another descriptor of the pty master side for use as the
- * standard input. We could use the original descriptor, but this
- * simplifies code in server_loop. The descriptor is bidirectional.
- * Do this before forking (and cleanup in the child) so as to
- * detect and gracefully fail out-of-fd conditions.
- */
- if ((fdout = dup(ptyfd)) < 0) {
- error("%s: dup #1: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- close(ttyfd);
- close(ptyfd);
- return -1;
- }
- /* we keep a reference to the pty master */
- if ((ptymaster = dup(ptyfd)) < 0) {
- error("%s: dup #2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- close(ttyfd);
- close(ptyfd);
- close(fdout);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Fork the child. */
- switch ((pid = fork())) {
- case -1:
- error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- close(fdout);
- close(ptymaster);
- close(ttyfd);
- close(ptyfd);
- return -1;
- case 0:
- is_child = 1;
-
- close(fdout);
- close(ptymaster);
-
- /* Child. Reinitialize the log because the pid has changed. */
- log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
- options.log_facility, log_stderr);
- /* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */
- close(ptyfd);
-
- /* Make the pseudo tty our controlling tty. */
- pty_make_controlling_tty(&ttyfd, s->tty);
-
- /* Redirect stdin/stdout/stderr from the pseudo tty. */
- if (dup2(ttyfd, 0) < 0)
- error("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (dup2(ttyfd, 1) < 0)
- error("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (dup2(ttyfd, 2) < 0)
- error("dup2 stderr: %s", strerror(errno));
-
- /* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
- close(ttyfd);
-
- /* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
-#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
- if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL)) {
-#ifdef _UNICOS
- cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */
-#endif /* _UNICOS */
- do_login(s, command);
- }
-# ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
- else
- do_pre_login(s);
-# endif
-#endif
- /*
- * Do common processing for the child, such as execing
- * the command.
- */
- do_child(s, command);
- /* NOTREACHED */
- default:
- break;
- }
-
-#ifdef _UNICOS
- signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler);
-#endif /* _UNICOS */
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
-#endif
-
- s->pid = pid;
-
- /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
- close(ttyfd);
-
- /* Enter interactive session. */
- s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
- packet_set_interactive(1,
- options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
- if (compat20) {
- session_set_fds(s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1);
- } else {
- server_loop(pid, ptyfd, fdout, -1);
- /* server_loop _has_ closed ptyfd and fdout. */
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
-static void
-do_pre_login(Session *s)
-{
- socklen_t fromlen;
- struct sockaddr_storage from;
- pid_t pid = getpid();
-
- /*
- * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
- * the address be 0.0.0.0.
- */
- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- fromlen = sizeof(from);
- if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
- if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
- debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- }
-
- record_utmp_only(pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name,
- get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
- (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
-}
-#endif
-
-/*
- * This is called to fork and execute a command. If another command is
- * to be forced, execute that instead.
- */
-int
-do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
-{
- int ret;
- const char *forced = NULL;
- char session_type[1024], *tty = NULL;
-
- if (options.adm_forced_command) {
- original_command = command;
- command = options.adm_forced_command;
- forced = "(config)";
- } else if (forced_command) {
- original_command = command;
- command = forced_command;
- forced = "(key-option)";
- }
- if (forced != NULL) {
- if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command)) {
- s->is_subsystem = s->is_subsystem ?
- SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP : SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR;
- } else if (s->is_subsystem)
- s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT;
- snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type),
- "forced-command %s '%.900s'", forced, command);
- } else if (s->is_subsystem) {
- snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type),
- "subsystem '%.900s'", s->subsys);
- } else if (command == NULL) {
- snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "shell");
- } else {
- /* NB. we don't log unforced commands to preserve privacy */
- snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "command");
- }
-
- if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
- tty = s->tty;
- if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
- tty += 5;
- }
-
- verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d",
- session_type,
- tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
- tty == NULL ? "" : tty,
- s->pw->pw_name,
- get_remote_ipaddr(),
- get_remote_port());
-
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- if (command != NULL)
- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
- else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
- char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
-
- if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */
- shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
- }
-#endif
- if (s->ttyfd != -1)
- ret = do_exec_pty(s, command);
- else
- ret = do_exec_no_pty(s, command);
-
- original_command = NULL;
-
- /*
- * Clear loginmsg: it's the child's responsibility to display
- * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate
- * multiple copies of the login messages.
- */
- buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/* administrative, login(1)-like work */
-void
-do_login(Session *s, const char *command)
-{
- socklen_t fromlen;
- struct sockaddr_storage from;
- struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
- pid_t pid = getpid();
-
- /*
- * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
- * the address be 0.0.0.0.
- */
- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- fromlen = sizeof(from);
- if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
- if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
- debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- }
-
- /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
- if (!use_privsep)
- record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
- get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len,
- options.use_dns),
- (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- /*
- * If password change is needed, do it now.
- * This needs to occur before the ~/.hushlogin check.
- */
- if (options.use_pam && !use_privsep && s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
- display_loginmsg();
- do_pam_chauthtok();
- s->authctxt->force_pwchange = 0;
- /* XXX - signal [net] parent to enable forwardings */
- }
-#endif
-
- if (check_quietlogin(s, command))
- return;
-
- display_loginmsg();
-
- do_motd();
-}
-
-/*
- * Display the message of the day.
- */
-void
-do_motd(void)
-{
- FILE *f;
- char buf[256];
-
- if (options.print_motd) {
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd",
- "/etc/motd"), "r");
-#else
- f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r");
-#endif
- if (f) {
- while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
- fputs(buf, stdout);
- fclose(f);
- }
- }
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Check for quiet login, either .hushlogin or command given.
- */
-int
-check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command)
-{
- char buf[256];
- struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
- struct stat st;
-
- /* Return 1 if .hushlogin exists or a command given. */
- if (command != NULL)
- return 1;
- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir);
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
- return 1;
-#else
- if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
- return 1;
-#endif
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Sets the value of the given variable in the environment. If the variable
- * already exists, its value is overridden.
- */
-void
-child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
- const char *value)
-{
- char **env;
- u_int envsize;
- u_int i, namelen;
-
- if (strchr(name, '=') != NULL) {
- error("Invalid environment variable \"%.100s\"", name);
- return;
- }
-
- /*
- * If we're passed an uninitialized list, allocate a single null
- * entry before continuing.
- */
- if (*envp == NULL && *envsizep == 0) {
- *envp = xmalloc(sizeof(char *));
- *envp[0] = NULL;
- *envsizep = 1;
- }
-
- /*
- * Find the slot where the value should be stored. If the variable
- * already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append a new slot
- * at the end of the array, expanding if necessary.
- */
- env = *envp;
- namelen = strlen(name);
- for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
- if (strncmp(env[i], name, namelen) == 0 && env[i][namelen] == '=')
- break;
- if (env[i]) {
- /* Reuse the slot. */
- free(env[i]);
- } else {
- /* New variable. Expand if necessary. */
- envsize = *envsizep;
- if (i >= envsize - 1) {
- if (envsize >= 1000)
- fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars");
- envsize += 50;
- env = (*envp) = xrealloc(env, envsize, sizeof(char *));
- *envsizep = envsize;
- }
- /* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */
- env[i + 1] = NULL;
- }
-
- /* Allocate space and format the variable in the appropriate slot. */
- env[i] = xmalloc(strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1);
- snprintf(env[i], strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1, "%s=%s", name, value);
-}
-
-/*
- * Reads environment variables from the given file and adds/overrides them
- * into the environment. If the file does not exist, this does nothing.
- * Otherwise, it must consist of empty lines, comments (line starts with '#')
- * and assignments of the form name=value. No other forms are allowed.
- */
-static void
-read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize,
- const char *filename)
-{
- FILE *f;
- char buf[4096];
- char *cp, *value;
- u_int lineno = 0;
-
- f = fopen(filename, "r");
- if (!f)
- return;
-
- while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
- if (++lineno > 1000)
- fatal("Too many lines in environment file %s", filename);
- for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
- ;
- if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n')
- continue;
-
- cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
-
- value = strchr(cp, '=');
- if (value == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Bad line %u in %.100s\n", lineno,
- filename);
- continue;
- }
- /*
- * Replace the equals sign by nul, and advance value to
- * the value string.
- */
- *value = '\0';
- value++;
- child_set_env(env, envsize, cp, value);
- }
- fclose(f);
-}
-
-#ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
-/*
- * Return named variable from specified environment, or NULL if not present.
- */
-static char *
-child_get_env(char **env, const char *name)
-{
- int i;
- size_t len;
-
- len = strlen(name);
- for (i=0; env[i] != NULL; i++)
- if (strncmp(name, env[i], len) == 0 && env[i][len] == '=')
- return(env[i] + len + 1);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/*
- * Read /etc/default/login.
- * We pick up the PATH (or SUPATH for root) and UMASK.
- */
-static void
-read_etc_default_login(char ***env, u_int *envsize, uid_t uid)
-{
- char **tmpenv = NULL, *var;
- u_int i, tmpenvsize = 0;
- u_long mask;
-
- /*
- * We don't want to copy the whole file to the child's environment,
- * so we use a temporary environment and copy the variables we're
- * interested in.
- */
- read_environment_file(&tmpenv, &tmpenvsize, "/etc/default/login");
-
- if (tmpenv == NULL)
- return;
-
- if (uid == 0)
- var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "SUPATH");
- else
- var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "PATH");
- if (var != NULL)
- child_set_env(env, envsize, "PATH", var);
-
- if ((var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "UMASK")) != NULL)
- if (sscanf(var, "%5lo", &mask) == 1)
- umask((mode_t)mask);
-
- for (i = 0; tmpenv[i] != NULL; i++)
- free(tmpenv[i]);
- free(tmpenv);
-}
-#endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
-
-void
-copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize)
-{
- char *var_name, *var_val;
- int i;
-
- if (source == NULL)
- return;
-
- for(i = 0; source[i] != NULL; i++) {
- var_name = xstrdup(source[i]);
- if ((var_val = strstr(var_name, "=")) == NULL) {
- free(var_name);
- continue;
- }
- *var_val++ = '\0';
-
- debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val);
- child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val);
-
- free(var_name);
- }
-}
-
-static char **
-do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
-{
- char buf[256];
- u_int i, envsize;
- char **env, *laddr;
- struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
-#if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
- char *path = NULL;
-#endif
-
- /* Initialize the environment. */
- envsize = 100;
- env = xcalloc(envsize, sizeof(char *));
- env[0] = NULL;
-
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- /*
- * The Windows environment contains some setting which are
- * important for a running system. They must not be dropped.
- */
- {
- char **p;
-
- p = fetch_windows_environment();
- copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
- free_windows_environment(p);
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
- /* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
- * the childs environment as they see fit
- */
- ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
-#endif
-
- if (!options.use_login) {
- /* Set basic environment. */
- for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++)
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s->env[i].name,
- s->env[i].val);
-
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
-#ifdef _AIX
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name);
-#endif
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH) < 0)
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
- else
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH"));
-#else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
-# ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
- /*
- * There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains
- * important components pointing to the system directories,
- * needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better
- * remains intact here.
- */
-# ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
- read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid);
- path = child_get_env(env, "PATH");
-# endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
- if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH",
- s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ?
- SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH);
- }
-# endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
-#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
-
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s",
- _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name);
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf);
-
- /* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell);
- }
- if (getenv("TZ"))
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ"));
-
- /* Set custom environment options from RSA authentication. */
- if (!options.use_login) {
- while (custom_environment) {
- struct envstring *ce = custom_environment;
- char *str = ce->s;
-
- for (i = 0; str[i] != '=' && str[i]; i++)
- ;
- if (str[i] == '=') {
- str[i] = 0;
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, str, str + i + 1);
- }
- custom_environment = ce->next;
- free(ce->s);
- free(ce);
- }
- }
-
- /* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d",
- get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), get_local_port());
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf);
-
- laddr = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in());
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d",
- get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), laddr, get_local_port());
- free(laddr);
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf);
-
- if (s->ttyfd != -1)
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty);
- if (s->term)
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term);
- if (s->display)
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display);
- if (original_command)
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND",
- original_command);
-
-#ifdef _UNICOS
- if (cray_tmpdir[0] != '\0')
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TMPDIR", cray_tmpdir);
-#endif /* _UNICOS */
-
- /*
- * Since we clear KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set now then it
- * must have been set by a native authentication method (eg AIX or
- * SIA), so copy it to the child.
- */
- {
- char *cp;
-
- if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL)
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp);
- }
-
-#ifdef _AIX
- {
- char *cp;
-
- if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL)
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp);
- read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment");
- }
-#endif
-#ifdef KRB5
- if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname)
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
- s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- /*
- * Pull in any environment variables that may have
- * been set by PAM.
- */
- if (options.use_pam) {
- char **p;
-
- p = fetch_pam_child_environment();
- copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
- free_pam_environment(p);
-
- p = fetch_pam_environment();
- copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
- free_pam_environment(p);
- }
-#endif /* USE_PAM */
-
- if (auth_sock_name != NULL)
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
- auth_sock_name);
-
- /* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */
- if (options.permit_user_env && !options.use_login) {
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/.ssh/environment",
- strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? pw->pw_dir : "");
- read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf);
- }
- if (debug_flag) {
- /* dump the environment */
- fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n");
- for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]);
- }
- return env;
-}
-
-/*
- * Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/ssh/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found
- * first in this order).
- */
-static void
-do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell)
-{
- FILE *f = NULL;
- char cmd[1024];
- int do_xauth;
- struct stat st;
-
- do_xauth =
- s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL;
-
- /* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems and admin forced commands */
- if (!s->is_subsystem && options.adm_forced_command == NULL &&
- !no_user_rc && stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0) {
- snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'",
- shell, _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
- if (debug_flag)
- fprintf(stderr, "Running %s\n", cmd);
- f = popen(cmd, "w");
- if (f) {
- if (do_xauth)
- fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
- s->auth_data);
- pclose(f);
- } else
- fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
- _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
- } else if (stat(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, &st) >= 0) {
- if (debug_flag)
- fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL,
- _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
- f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, "w");
- if (f) {
- if (do_xauth)
- fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
- s->auth_data);
- pclose(f);
- } else
- fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
- _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
- } else if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) {
- /* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */
- if (debug_flag) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Running %.500s remove %.100s\n",
- options.xauth_location, s->auth_display);
- fprintf(stderr,
- "%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
- options.xauth_location, s->auth_display,
- s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
- }
- snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -",
- options.xauth_location);
- f = popen(cmd, "w");
- if (f) {
- fprintf(f, "remove %s\n",
- s->auth_display);
- fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n",
- s->auth_display, s->auth_proto,
- s->auth_data);
- pclose(f);
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
- cmd);
- }
- }
-}
-
-static void
-do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
-{
- FILE *f = NULL;
- char buf[1024], *nl, *def_nl = _PATH_NOLOGIN;
- struct stat sb;
-
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- if (login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) || pw->pw_uid == 0)
- return;
- nl = login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", def_nl, def_nl);
-#else
- if (pw->pw_uid == 0)
- return;
- nl = def_nl;
-#endif
- if (stat(nl, &sb) == -1) {
- if (nl != def_nl)
- free(nl);
- return;
- }
-
- /* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents if we can and exit. */
- logit("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists", pw->pw_name, nl);
- if ((f = fopen(nl, "r")) != NULL) {
- while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
- fputs(buf, stderr);
- fclose(f);
- }
- exit(254);
-}
-
-/*
- * Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components
- * must be root-owned directories with strict permissions.
- */
-static void
-safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
-{
- const char *cp;
- char component[MAXPATHLEN];
- struct stat st;
-
- if (*path != '/')
- fatal("chroot path does not begin at root");
- if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component))
- fatal("chroot path too long");
-
- /*
- * Descend the path, checking that each component is a
- * root-owned directory with strict permissions.
- */
- for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) {
- if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL)
- strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component));
- else {
- cp++;
- memcpy(component, path, cp - path);
- component[cp - path] = '\0';
- }
-
- debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component);
-
- if (stat(component, &st) != 0)
- fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
- component, strerror(errno));
- if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)
- fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot "
- "directory %s\"%s\"",
- cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
- if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
- fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory",
- cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
-
- }
-
- if (chdir(path) == -1)
- fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": "
- "%s", path, strerror(errno));
- if (chroot(path) == -1)
- fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno));
- if (chdir("/") == -1)
- fatal("%s: chdir(/) after chroot: %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
- verbose("Changed root directory to \"%s\"", path);
-}
-
-/* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
-void
-do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
-{
- char *chroot_path, *tmp;
-
- platform_setusercontext(pw);
-
- if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
- (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
- perror("unable to set user context");
- exit(1);
- }
-#else
- if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0)
- error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) {
- perror("setgid");
- exit(1);
- }
- /* Initialize the group list. */
- if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) {
- perror("initgroups");
- exit(1);
- }
- endgrent();
-#endif
-
- platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw);
-
- if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
- strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
- tmp = tilde_expand_filename(options.chroot_directory,
- pw->pw_uid);
- chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
- "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
- safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
- free(tmp);
- free(chroot_path);
- /* Make sure we don't attempt to chroot again */
- free(options.chroot_directory);
- options.chroot_directory = NULL;
- }
-
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUSER) < 0) {
- perror("unable to set user context (setuser)");
- exit(1);
- }
- /*
- * FreeBSD's setusercontext() will not apply the user's
- * own umask setting unless running with the user's UID.
- */
- (void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUMASK);
-#else
-# ifdef USE_LIBIAF
- if (set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0) {
- fatal("set_id(%s) Failed", pw->pw_name);
- }
-# endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
- /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
- permanently_set_uid(pw);
-#endif
- } else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
- strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
- fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
- }
-
- if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
- fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
-}
-
-static void
-do_pwchange(Session *s)
-{
- fflush(NULL);
- fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Your password has expired.\n");
- if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "You must change your password now and login again!\n");
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- setexeccon(NULL);
-#endif
-#ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
- execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
- (char *)NULL);
-#else
- execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", (char *)NULL);
-#endif
- perror("passwd");
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Password change required but no TTY available.\n");
- }
- exit(1);
-}
-
-static void
-launch_login(struct passwd *pw, const char *hostname)
-{
- /* Launch login(1). */
-
- execl(LOGIN_PROGRAM, "login", "-h", hostname,
-#ifdef xxxLOGIN_NEEDS_TERM
- (s->term ? s->term : "unknown"),
-#endif /* LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM */
-#ifdef LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT
- "-p", "-f", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
-#else
- "-p", "-f", "--", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
-#endif
-
- /* Login couldn't be executed, die. */
-
- perror("login");
- exit(1);
-}
-
-static void
-child_close_fds(void)
-{
- extern AuthenticationConnection *auth_conn;
-
- if (auth_conn) {
- ssh_close_authentication_connection(auth_conn);
- auth_conn = NULL;
- }
-
- if (packet_get_connection_in() == packet_get_connection_out())
- close(packet_get_connection_in());
- else {
- close(packet_get_connection_in());
- close(packet_get_connection_out());
- }
- /*
- * Close all descriptors related to channels. They will still remain
- * open in the parent.
- */
- /* XXX better use close-on-exec? -markus */
- channel_close_all();
-
- /*
- * Close any extra file descriptors. Note that there may still be
- * descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed later.
- */
- endpwent();
-
- /*
- * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
- * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after
- * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
- * descriptors open.
- */
- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
-}
-
-/*
- * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
- * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
- * ids, and executing the command or shell.
- */
-#define ARGV_MAX 10
-void
-do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
-{
- extern char **environ;
- char **env;
- char *argv[ARGV_MAX];
- const char *shell, *shell0, *hostname = NULL;
- struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
- int r = 0;
-
- /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
- destroy_sensitive_data();
-
- /* Force a password change */
- if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
- do_setusercontext(pw);
- child_close_fds();
- do_pwchange(s);
- exit(1);
- }
-
- /* login(1) is only called if we execute the login shell */
- if (options.use_login && command != NULL)
- options.use_login = 0;
-
-#ifdef _UNICOS
- cray_setup(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name, command);
-#endif /* _UNICOS */
-
- /*
- * Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h"
- * switch, so we let login(1) to this for us.
- */
- if (!options.use_login) {
-#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
- session_setup_sia(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty);
- if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
- do_motd();
-#else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
- /* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
- if (!options.use_pam)
- do_nologin(pw);
- do_setusercontext(pw);
- /*
- * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
- * generated messages, so if this in an interactive
- * login then display them too.
- */
- if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
- display_loginmsg();
-#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
- }
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam && !options.use_login && !is_pam_session_open()) {
- debug3("PAM session not opened, exiting");
- display_loginmsg();
- exit(254);
- }
-#endif
-
- /*
- * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is
- * legal, and means /bin/sh.
- */
- shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
-
- /*
- * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file,
- * even if shell is overridden from login.conf
- */
- env = do_setup_env(s, shell);
-
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell);
-#endif
-
- /* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */
- if (options.use_login)
- hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len,
- options.use_dns);
- /*
- * Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and
- * the server will still have the socket open, and it is important
- * that we do not shutdown it. Note that the descriptors cannot be
- * closed before building the environment, as we call
- * get_remote_ipaddr there.
- */
- child_close_fds();
-
- /*
- * Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc,
- * /etc/ssh/sshrc and xauth are run in the proper environment.
- */
- environ = env;
-
-#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
- /*
- * At this point, we check to see if AFS is active and if we have
- * a valid Kerberos 5 TGT. If so, it seems like a good idea to see
- * if we can (and need to) extend the ticket into an AFS token. If
- * we don't do this, we run into potential problems if the user's
- * home directory is in AFS and it's not world-readable.
- */
-
- if (options.kerberos_get_afs_token && k_hasafs() &&
- (s->authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL)) {
- char cell[64];
-
- debug("Getting AFS token");
-
- k_setpag();
-
- if (k_afs_cell_of_file(pw->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0)
- krb5_afslog(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx,
- s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, cell, NULL);
-
- krb5_afslog_home(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx,
- s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, NULL, NULL, pw->pw_dir);
- }
-#endif
-
- /* Change current directory to the user's home directory. */
- if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) < 0) {
- /* Suppress missing homedir warning for chroot case */
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- r = login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0);
-#endif
- if (r || options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
- strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0)
- fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home "
- "directory %s: %s\n", pw->pw_dir,
- strerror(errno));
- if (r)
- exit(1);
- }
-
- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
-
- if (!options.use_login)
- do_rc_files(s, shell);
-
- /* restore SIGPIPE for child */
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
-
- if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR) {
- printf("This service allows sftp connections only.\n");
- fflush(NULL);
- exit(1);
- } else if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) {
- extern int optind, optreset;
- int i;
- char *p, *args;
-
- setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME);
- args = xstrdup(command ? command : "sftp-server");
- for (i = 0, (p = strtok(args, " ")); p; (p = strtok(NULL, " ")))
- if (i < ARGV_MAX - 1)
- argv[i++] = p;
- argv[i] = NULL;
- optind = optreset = 1;
- __progname = argv[0];
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
-#endif
- exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
- }
-
- fflush(NULL);
-
- if (options.use_login) {
- launch_login(pw, hostname);
- /* NEVERREACHED */
- }
-
- /* Get the last component of the shell name. */
- if ((shell0 = strrchr(shell, '/')) != NULL)
- shell0++;
- else
- shell0 = shell;
-
- /*
- * If we have no command, execute the shell. In this case, the shell
- * name to be passed in argv[0] is preceded by '-' to indicate that
- * this is a login shell.
- */
- if (!command) {
- char argv0[256];
-
- /* Start the shell. Set initial character to '-'. */
- argv0[0] = '-';
-
- if (strlcpy(argv0 + 1, shell0, sizeof(argv0) - 1)
- >= sizeof(argv0) - 1) {
- errno = EINVAL;
- perror(shell);
- exit(1);
- }
-
- /* Execute the shell. */
- argv[0] = argv0;
- argv[1] = NULL;
- execve(shell, argv, env);
-
- /* Executing the shell failed. */
- perror(shell);
- exit(1);
- }
- /*
- * Execute the command using the user's shell. This uses the -c
- * option to execute the command.
- */
- argv[0] = (char *) shell0;
- argv[1] = "-c";
- argv[2] = (char *) command;
- argv[3] = NULL;
- execve(shell, argv, env);
- perror(shell);
- exit(1);
-}
-
-void
-session_unused(int id)
-{
- debug3("%s: session id %d unused", __func__, id);
- if (id >= options.max_sessions ||
- id >= sessions_nalloc) {
- fatal("%s: insane session id %d (max %d nalloc %d)",
- __func__, id, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc);
- }
- memset(&sessions[id], 0, sizeof(*sessions));
- sessions[id].self = id;
- sessions[id].used = 0;
- sessions[id].chanid = -1;
- sessions[id].ptyfd = -1;
- sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
- sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
- sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
- sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
- sessions_first_unused = id;
-}
-
-Session *
-session_new(void)
-{
- Session *s, *tmp;
-
- if (sessions_first_unused == -1) {
- if (sessions_nalloc >= options.max_sessions)
- return NULL;
- debug2("%s: allocate (allocated %d max %d)",
- __func__, sessions_nalloc, options.max_sessions);
- tmp = xrealloc(sessions, sessions_nalloc + 1,
- sizeof(*sessions));
- if (tmp == NULL) {
- error("%s: cannot allocate %d sessions",
- __func__, sessions_nalloc + 1);
- return NULL;
- }
- sessions = tmp;
- session_unused(sessions_nalloc++);
- }
-
- if (sessions_first_unused >= sessions_nalloc ||
- sessions_first_unused < 0) {
- fatal("%s: insane first_unused %d max %d nalloc %d",
- __func__, sessions_first_unused, options.max_sessions,
- sessions_nalloc);
- }
-
- s = &sessions[sessions_first_unused];
- if (s->used) {
- fatal("%s: session %d already used",
- __func__, sessions_first_unused);
- }
- sessions_first_unused = s->next_unused;
- s->used = 1;
- s->next_unused = -1;
- debug("session_new: session %d", s->self);
-
- return s;
-}
-
-static void
-session_dump(void)
-{
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
- Session *s = &sessions[i];
-
- debug("dump: used %d next_unused %d session %d %p "
- "channel %d pid %ld",
- s->used,
- s->next_unused,
- s->self,
- s,
- s->chanid,
- (long)s->pid);
- }
-}
-
-int
-session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid)
-{
- Session *s = session_new();
- debug("session_open: channel %d", chanid);
- if (s == NULL) {
- error("no more sessions");
- return 0;
- }
- s->authctxt = authctxt;
- s->pw = authctxt->pw;
- if (s->pw == NULL || !authctxt->valid)
- fatal("no user for session %d", s->self);
- debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid);
- s->chanid = chanid;
- return 1;
-}
-
-Session *
-session_by_tty(char *tty)
-{
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
- Session *s = &sessions[i];
- if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) {
- debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty);
- return s;
- }
- }
- debug("session_by_tty: unknown tty %.100s", tty);
- session_dump();
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static Session *
-session_by_channel(int id)
-{
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
- Session *s = &sessions[i];
- if (s->used && s->chanid == id) {
- debug("session_by_channel: session %d channel %d",
- i, id);
- return s;
- }
- }
- debug("session_by_channel: unknown channel %d", id);
- session_dump();
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static Session *
-session_by_x11_channel(int id)
-{
- int i, j;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
- Session *s = &sessions[i];
-
- if (s->x11_chanids == NULL || !s->used)
- continue;
- for (j = 0; s->x11_chanids[j] != -1; j++) {
- if (s->x11_chanids[j] == id) {
- debug("session_by_x11_channel: session %d "
- "channel %d", s->self, id);
- return s;
- }
- }
- }
- debug("session_by_x11_channel: unknown channel %d", id);
- session_dump();
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static Session *
-session_by_pid(pid_t pid)
-{
- int i;
- debug("session_by_pid: pid %ld", (long)pid);
- for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
- Session *s = &sessions[i];
- if (s->used && s->pid == pid)
- return s;
- }
- error("session_by_pid: unknown pid %ld", (long)pid);
- session_dump();
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static int
-session_window_change_req(Session *s)
-{
- s->col = packet_get_int();
- s->row = packet_get_int();
- s->xpixel = packet_get_int();
- s->ypixel = packet_get_int();
- packet_check_eom();
- pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int
-session_pty_req(Session *s)
-{
- u_int len;
- int n_bytes;
-
- if (no_pty_flag || !options.permit_tty) {
- debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this authentication.");
- return 0;
- }
- if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error: you already have a pty.");
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->term = packet_get_string(&len);
-
- if (compat20) {
- s->col = packet_get_int();
- s->row = packet_get_int();
- } else {
- s->row = packet_get_int();
- s->col = packet_get_int();
- }
- s->xpixel = packet_get_int();
- s->ypixel = packet_get_int();
-
- if (strcmp(s->term, "") == 0) {
- free(s->term);
- s->term = NULL;
- }
-
- /* Allocate a pty and open it. */
- debug("Allocating pty.");
- if (!PRIVSEP(pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty,
- sizeof(s->tty)))) {
- free(s->term);
- s->term = NULL;
- s->ptyfd = -1;
- s->ttyfd = -1;
- error("session_pty_req: session %d alloc failed", s->self);
- return 0;
- }
- debug("session_pty_req: session %d alloc %s", s->self, s->tty);
-
- /* for SSH1 the tty modes length is not given */
- if (!compat20)
- n_bytes = packet_remaining();
- tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
-
- if (!use_privsep)
- pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
-
- /* Set window size from the packet. */
- pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
-
- packet_check_eom();
- session_proctitle(s);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int
-session_subsystem_req(Session *s)
-{
- struct stat st;
- u_int len;
- int success = 0;
- char *prog, *cmd;
- u_int i;
-
- s->subsys = packet_get_string(&len);
- packet_check_eom();
- debug2("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s", s->subsys,
- s->pw->pw_name);
-
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) {
- if (strcmp(s->subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) {
- prog = options.subsystem_command[i];
- cmd = options.subsystem_args[i];
- if (strcmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, prog) == 0) {
- s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP;
- debug("subsystem: %s", prog);
- } else {
- if (stat(prog, &st) < 0)
- debug("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s",
- prog, strerror(errno));
- s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT;
- debug("subsystem: exec() %s", cmd);
- }
- success = do_exec(s, cmd) == 0;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (!success)
- logit("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s failed, "
- "subsystem not found", s->subsys, s->pw->pw_name);
-
- return success;
-}
-
-static int
-session_x11_req(Session *s)
-{
- int success;
-
- if (s->auth_proto != NULL || s->auth_data != NULL) {
- error("session_x11_req: session %d: "
- "x11 forwarding already active", s->self);
- return 0;
- }
- s->single_connection = packet_get_char();
- s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(NULL);
- s->auth_data = packet_get_string(NULL);
- s->screen = packet_get_int();
- packet_check_eom();
-
- success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
- if (!success) {
- free(s->auth_proto);
- free(s->auth_data);
- s->auth_proto = NULL;
- s->auth_data = NULL;
- }
- return success;
-}
-
-static int
-session_shell_req(Session *s)
-{
- packet_check_eom();
- return do_exec(s, NULL) == 0;
-}
-
-static int
-session_exec_req(Session *s)
-{
- u_int len, success;
-
- char *command = packet_get_string(&len);
- packet_check_eom();
- success = do_exec(s, command) == 0;
- free(command);
- return success;
-}
-
-static int
-session_break_req(Session *s)
-{
-
- packet_get_int(); /* ignored */
- packet_check_eom();
-
- if (s->ptymaster == -1 || tcsendbreak(s->ptymaster, 0) < 0)
- return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int
-session_env_req(Session *s)
-{
- char *name, *val;
- u_int name_len, val_len, i;
-
- name = packet_get_cstring(&name_len);
- val = packet_get_cstring(&val_len);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- /* Don't set too many environment variables */
- if (s->num_env > 128) {
- debug2("Ignoring env request %s: too many env vars", name);
- goto fail;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_accept_env; i++) {
- if (match_pattern(name, options.accept_env[i])) {
- debug2("Setting env %d: %s=%s", s->num_env, name, val);
- s->env = xrealloc(s->env, s->num_env + 1,
- sizeof(*s->env));
- s->env[s->num_env].name = name;
- s->env[s->num_env].val = val;
- s->num_env++;
- return (1);
- }
- }
- debug2("Ignoring env request %s: disallowed name", name);
-
- fail:
- free(name);
- free(val);
- return (0);
-}
-
-static int
-session_auth_agent_req(Session *s)
-{
- static int called = 0;
- packet_check_eom();
- if (no_agent_forwarding_flag || !options.allow_agent_forwarding) {
- debug("session_auth_agent_req: no_agent_forwarding_flag");
- return 0;
- }
- if (called) {
- return 0;
- } else {
- called = 1;
- return auth_input_request_forwarding(s->pw);
- }
-}
-
-int
-session_input_channel_req(Channel *c, const char *rtype)
-{
- int success = 0;
- Session *s;
-
- if ((s = session_by_channel(c->self)) == NULL) {
- logit("session_input_channel_req: no session %d req %.100s",
- c->self, rtype);
- return 0;
- }
- debug("session_input_channel_req: session %d req %s", s->self, rtype);
-
- /*
- * a session is in LARVAL state until a shell, a command
- * or a subsystem is executed
- */
- if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) {
- if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) {
- success = session_shell_req(s);
- } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exec") == 0) {
- success = session_exec_req(s);
- } else if (strcmp(rtype, "pty-req") == 0) {
- success = session_pty_req(s);
- } else if (strcmp(rtype, "x11-req") == 0) {
- success = session_x11_req(s);
- } else if (strcmp(rtype, "auth-agent-req at openssh.com") == 0) {
- success = session_auth_agent_req(s);
- } else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) {
- success = session_subsystem_req(s);
- } else if (strcmp(rtype, "env") == 0) {
- success = session_env_req(s);
- }
- }
- if (strcmp(rtype, "window-change") == 0) {
- success = session_window_change_req(s);
- } else if (strcmp(rtype, "break") == 0) {
- success = session_break_req(s);
- }
-
- return success;
-}
-
-void
-session_set_fds(Session *s, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int ignore_fderr,
- int is_tty)
-{
- if (!compat20)
- fatal("session_set_fds: called for proto != 2.0");
- /*
- * now that have a child and a pipe to the child,
- * we can activate our channel and register the fd's
- */
- if (s->chanid == -1)
- fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self);
- channel_set_fds(s->chanid,
- fdout, fdin, fderr,
- ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ,
- 1, is_tty, CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT);
-}
-
-/*
- * Function to perform pty cleanup. Also called if we get aborted abnormally
- * (e.g., due to a dropped connection).
- */
-void
-session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
-{
- if (s == NULL) {
- error("session_pty_cleanup: no session");
- return;
- }
- if (s->ttyfd == -1)
- return;
-
- debug("session_pty_cleanup: session %d release %s", s->self, s->tty);
-
- /* Record that the user has logged out. */
- if (s->pid != 0)
- record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name);
-
- /* Release the pseudo-tty. */
- if (getuid() == 0)
- pty_release(s->tty);
-
- /*
- * Close the server side of the socket pairs. We must do this after
- * the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty
- * while we're still cleaning up.
- */
- if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) < 0)
- error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s",
- s->ptymaster, strerror(errno));
-
- /* unlink pty from session */
- s->ttyfd = -1;
-}
-
-void
-session_pty_cleanup(Session *s)
-{
- PRIVSEP(session_pty_cleanup2(s));
-}
-
-static char *
-sig2name(int sig)
-{
-#define SSH_SIG(x) if (sig == SIG ## x) return #x
- SSH_SIG(ABRT);
- SSH_SIG(ALRM);
- SSH_SIG(FPE);
- SSH_SIG(HUP);
- SSH_SIG(ILL);
- SSH_SIG(INT);
- SSH_SIG(KILL);
- SSH_SIG(PIPE);
- SSH_SIG(QUIT);
- SSH_SIG(SEGV);
- SSH_SIG(TERM);
- SSH_SIG(USR1);
- SSH_SIG(USR2);
-#undef SSH_SIG
- return "SIG at openssh.com";
-}
-
-static void
-session_close_x11(int id)
-{
- Channel *c;
-
- if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL) {
- debug("session_close_x11: x11 channel %d missing", id);
- } else {
- /* Detach X11 listener */
- debug("session_close_x11: detach x11 channel %d", id);
- channel_cancel_cleanup(id);
- if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
- chan_mark_dead(c);
- }
-}
-
-static void
-session_close_single_x11(int id, void *arg)
-{
- Session *s;
- u_int i;
-
- debug3("session_close_single_x11: channel %d", id);
- channel_cancel_cleanup(id);
- if ((s = session_by_x11_channel(id)) == NULL)
- fatal("session_close_single_x11: no x11 channel %d", id);
- for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
- debug("session_close_single_x11: session %d: "
- "closing channel %d", s->self, s->x11_chanids[i]);
- /*
- * The channel "id" is already closing, but make sure we
- * close all of its siblings.
- */
- if (s->x11_chanids[i] != id)
- session_close_x11(s->x11_chanids[i]);
- }
- free(s->x11_chanids);
- s->x11_chanids = NULL;
- free(s->display);
- s->display = NULL;
- free(s->auth_proto);
- s->auth_proto = NULL;
- free(s->auth_data);
- s->auth_data = NULL;
- free(s->auth_display);
- s->auth_display = NULL;
-}
-
-static void
-session_exit_message(Session *s, int status)
-{
- Channel *c;
-
- if ((c = channel_lookup(s->chanid)) == NULL)
- fatal("session_exit_message: session %d: no channel %d",
- s->self, s->chanid);
- debug("session_exit_message: session %d channel %d pid %ld",
- s->self, s->chanid, (long)s->pid);
-
- if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
- channel_request_start(s->chanid, "exit-status", 0);
- packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(status));
- packet_send();
- } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
- channel_request_start(s->chanid, "exit-signal", 0);
- packet_put_cstring(sig2name(WTERMSIG(status)));
-#ifdef WCOREDUMP
- packet_put_char(WCOREDUMP(status)? 1 : 0);
-#else /* WCOREDUMP */
- packet_put_char(0);
-#endif /* WCOREDUMP */
- packet_put_cstring("");
- packet_put_cstring("");
- packet_send();
- } else {
- /* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */
- packet_disconnect("wait returned status %04x.", status);
- }
-
- /* disconnect channel */
- debug("session_exit_message: release channel %d", s->chanid);
-
- /*
- * Adjust cleanup callback attachment to send close messages when
- * the channel gets EOF. The session will be then be closed
- * by session_close_by_channel when the childs close their fds.
- */
- channel_register_cleanup(c->self, session_close_by_channel, 1);
-
- /*
- * emulate a write failure with 'chan_write_failed', nobody will be
- * interested in data we write.
- * Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there could
- * be some more data waiting in the pipe.
- */
- if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
- chan_write_failed(c);
-}
-
-void
-session_close(Session *s)
-{
- u_int i;
-
- debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
- if (s->ttyfd != -1)
- session_pty_cleanup(s);
- free(s->term);
- free(s->display);
- free(s->x11_chanids);
- free(s->auth_display);
- free(s->auth_data);
- free(s->auth_proto);
- free(s->subsys);
- if (s->env != NULL) {
- for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) {
- free(s->env[i].name);
- free(s->env[i].val);
- }
- free(s->env);
- }
- session_proctitle(s);
- session_unused(s->self);
-}
-
-void
-session_close_by_pid(pid_t pid, int status)
-{
- Session *s = session_by_pid(pid);
- if (s == NULL) {
- debug("session_close_by_pid: no session for pid %ld",
- (long)pid);
- return;
- }
- if (s->chanid != -1)
- session_exit_message(s, status);
- if (s->ttyfd != -1)
- session_pty_cleanup(s);
- s->pid = 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * this is called when a channel dies before
- * the session 'child' itself dies
- */
-void
-session_close_by_channel(int id, void *arg)
-{
- Session *s = session_by_channel(id);
- u_int i;
-
- if (s == NULL) {
- debug("session_close_by_channel: no session for id %d", id);
- return;
- }
- debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d child %ld",
- id, (long)s->pid);
- if (s->pid != 0) {
- debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d: has child", id);
- /*
- * delay detach of session, but release pty, since
- * the fd's to the child are already closed
- */
- if (s->ttyfd != -1)
- session_pty_cleanup(s);
- return;
- }
- /* detach by removing callback */
- channel_cancel_cleanup(s->chanid);
-
- /* Close any X11 listeners associated with this session */
- if (s->x11_chanids != NULL) {
- for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
- session_close_x11(s->x11_chanids[i]);
- s->x11_chanids[i] = -1;
- }
- }
-
- s->chanid = -1;
- session_close(s);
-}
-
-void
-session_destroy_all(void (*closefunc)(Session *))
-{
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
- Session *s = &sessions[i];
- if (s->used) {
- if (closefunc != NULL)
- closefunc(s);
- else
- session_close(s);
- }
- }
-}
-
-static char *
-session_tty_list(void)
-{
- static char buf[1024];
- int i;
- char *cp;
-
- buf[0] = '\0';
- for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
- Session *s = &sessions[i];
- if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1) {
-
- if (strncmp(s->tty, "/dev/", 5) != 0) {
- cp = strrchr(s->tty, '/');
- cp = (cp == NULL) ? s->tty : cp + 1;
- } else
- cp = s->tty + 5;
-
- if (buf[0] != '\0')
- strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf);
- strlcat(buf, cp, sizeof buf);
- }
- }
- if (buf[0] == '\0')
- strlcpy(buf, "notty", sizeof buf);
- return buf;
-}
-
-void
-session_proctitle(Session *s)
-{
- if (s->pw == NULL)
- error("no user for session %d", s->self);
- else
- setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, session_tty_list());
-}
-
-int
-session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
-{
- struct stat st;
- char display[512], auth_display[512];
- char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
- u_int i;
-
- if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) {
- packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled in user configuration file.");
- return 0;
- }
- if (!options.x11_forwarding) {
- debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
- return 0;
- }
- if (!options.xauth_location ||
- (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) {
- packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward with spoofing.");
- return 0;
- }
- if (options.use_login) {
- packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled; "
- "not compatible with UseLogin=yes.");
- return 0;
- }
- if (s->display != NULL) {
- debug("X11 display already set.");
- return 0;
- }
- if (x11_create_display_inet(options.x11_display_offset,
- options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
- &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
- debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
- return 0;
- }
- for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
- channel_register_cleanup(s->x11_chanids[i],
- session_close_single_x11, 0);
- }
-
- /* Set up a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable. */
- if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0)
- fatal("gethostname: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- /*
- * auth_display must be used as the displayname when the
- * authorization entry is added with xauth(1). This will be
- * different than the DISPLAY string for localhost displays.
- */
- if (options.x11_use_localhost) {
- snprintf(display, sizeof display, "localhost:%u.%u",
- s->display_number, s->screen);
- snprintf(auth_display, sizeof auth_display, "unix:%u.%u",
- s->display_number, s->screen);
- s->display = xstrdup(display);
- s->auth_display = xstrdup(auth_display);
- } else {
-#ifdef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY
- struct hostent *he;
- struct in_addr my_addr;
-
- he = gethostbyname(hostname);
- if (he == NULL) {
- error("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY.");
- packet_send_debug("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY.");
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(&my_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
- snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.50s:%u.%u", inet_ntoa(my_addr),
- s->display_number, s->screen);
-#else
- snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.400s:%u.%u", hostname,
- s->display_number, s->screen);
-#endif
- s->display = xstrdup(display);
- s->auth_display = xstrdup(display);
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void
-do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- server_loop2(authctxt);
-}
-
-void
-do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- static int called = 0;
-
- debug("do_cleanup");
-
- /* no cleanup if we're in the child for login shell */
- if (is_child)
- return;
-
- /* avoid double cleanup */
- if (called)
- return;
- called = 1;
-
- if (authctxt == NULL)
- return;
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam) {
- sshpam_cleanup();
- sshpam_thread_cleanup();
- }
-#endif
-
- if (!authctxt->authenticated)
- return;
-
-#ifdef KRB5
- if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup &&
- authctxt->krb5_ctx)
- krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
- if (compat20 && options.gss_cleanup_creds)
- ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds();
-#endif
-
- /* remove agent socket */
- auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
-
- /*
- * Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled,
- * or if running in monitor.
- */
- if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
- session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/session.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/session.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/session.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/session.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,2825 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.282 2016/03/10 11:47:57 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "sshlogin.h"
+#include "serverloop.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "sftp.h"
+
+#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
+#include <kafs.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#endif
+
+#define IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(c) \
+ (!strncmp(c, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1) && \
+ (c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\0' || \
+ c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == ' ' || \
+ c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\t'))
+
+/* func */
+
+Session *session_new(void);
+void session_set_fds(Session *, int, int, int, int, int);
+void session_pty_cleanup(Session *);
+void session_proctitle(Session *);
+int session_setup_x11fwd(Session *);
+int do_exec_pty(Session *, const char *);
+int do_exec_no_pty(Session *, const char *);
+int do_exec(Session *, const char *);
+void do_login(Session *, const char *);
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+static void do_pre_login(Session *s);
+#endif
+void do_child(Session *, const char *);
+void do_motd(void);
+int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
+
+static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *);
+static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *);
+
+static int session_pty_req(Session *);
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern char *__progname;
+extern int log_stderr;
+extern int debug_flag;
+extern u_int utmp_len;
+extern int startup_pipe;
+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+
+/* original command from peer. */
+const char *original_command = NULL;
+
+/* data */
+static int sessions_first_unused = -1;
+static int sessions_nalloc = 0;
+static Session *sessions = NULL;
+
+#define SUBSYSTEM_NONE 0
+#define SUBSYSTEM_EXT 1
+#define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP 2
+#define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR 3
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+login_cap_t *lc;
+#endif
+
+static int is_child = 0;
+static int in_chroot = 0;
+
+/* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */
+static char *auth_sock_name = NULL;
+static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL;
+
+/* removes the agent forwarding socket */
+
+static void
+auth_sock_cleanup_proc(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ if (auth_sock_name != NULL) {
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ unlink(auth_sock_name);
+ rmdir(auth_sock_dir);
+ auth_sock_name = NULL;
+ restore_uid();
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd * pw)
+{
+ Channel *nc;
+ int sock = -1;
+
+ if (auth_sock_name != NULL) {
+ error("authentication forwarding requested twice.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Temporarily drop privileged uid for mkdir/bind. */
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+ /* Allocate a buffer for the socket name, and format the name. */
+ auth_sock_dir = xstrdup("/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX");
+
+ /* Create private directory for socket */
+ if (mkdtemp(auth_sock_dir) == NULL) {
+ packet_send_debug("Agent forwarding disabled: "
+ "mkdtemp() failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ restore_uid();
+ free(auth_sock_dir);
+ auth_sock_dir = NULL;
+ goto authsock_err;
+ }
+
+ xasprintf(&auth_sock_name, "%s/agent.%ld",
+ auth_sock_dir, (long) getpid());
+
+ /* Start a Unix listener on auth_sock_name. */
+ sock = unix_listener(auth_sock_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0);
+
+ /* Restore the privileged uid. */
+ restore_uid();
+
+ /* Check for socket/bind/listen failure. */
+ if (sock < 0)
+ goto authsock_err;
+
+ /* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */
+ nc = channel_new("auth socket",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+ 0, "auth socket", 1);
+ nc->path = xstrdup(auth_sock_name);
+ return 1;
+
+ authsock_err:
+ free(auth_sock_name);
+ if (auth_sock_dir != NULL) {
+ rmdir(auth_sock_dir);
+ free(auth_sock_dir);
+ }
+ if (sock != -1)
+ close(sock);
+ auth_sock_name = NULL;
+ auth_sock_dir = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+display_loginmsg(void)
+{
+ if (buffer_len(&loginmsg) > 0) {
+ buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
+ printf("%s", (char *)buffer_ptr(&loginmsg));
+ buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name);
+
+ /* setup the channel layer */
+ /* XXX - streamlocal? */
+ if (no_port_forwarding_flag ||
+ (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0)
+ channel_disable_adm_local_opens();
+ else
+ channel_permit_all_opens();
+
+ auth_debug_send();
+
+ if (compat20)
+ do_authenticated2(authctxt);
+ else
+ do_authenticated1(authctxt);
+
+ do_cleanup(authctxt);
+}
+
+/* Check untrusted xauth strings for metacharacters */
+static int
+xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+ if (!isalnum((u_char)s[i]) &&
+ s[i] != '.' && s[i] != ':' && s[i] != '/' &&
+ s[i] != '-' && s[i] != '_')
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prepares for an interactive session. This is called after the user has
+ * been successfully authenticated. During this message exchange, pseudo
+ * terminals are allocated, X11, TCP/IP, and authentication agent forwardings
+ * are requested, etc.
+ */
+static void
+do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ Session *s;
+ char *command;
+ int success, type, screen_flag;
+ int enable_compression_after_reply = 0;
+ u_int proto_len, data_len, dlen, compression_level = 0;
+
+ s = session_new();
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ error("no more sessions");
+ return;
+ }
+ s->authctxt = authctxt;
+ s->pw = authctxt->pw;
+
+ /*
+ * We stay in this loop until the client requests to execute a shell
+ * or a command.
+ */
+ for (;;) {
+ success = 0;
+
+ /* Get a packet from the client. */
+ type = packet_read();
+
+ /* Process the packet. */
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION:
+ compression_level = packet_get_int();
+ packet_check_eom();
+ if (compression_level < 1 || compression_level > 9) {
+ packet_send_debug("Received invalid compression level %d.",
+ compression_level);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
+ debug2("compression disabled");
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Enable compression after we have responded with SUCCESS. */
+ enable_compression_after_reply = 1;
+ success = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY:
+ success = session_pty_req(s);
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING:
+ s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(&proto_len);
+ s->auth_data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
+
+ screen_flag = packet_get_protocol_flags() &
+ SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER;
+ debug2("SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER: %d", screen_flag);
+
+ if (packet_remaining() == 4) {
+ if (!screen_flag)
+ debug2("Buggy client: "
+ "X11 screen flag missing");
+ s->screen = packet_get_int();
+ } else {
+ s->screen = 0;
+ }
+ packet_check_eom();
+ if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) &&
+ xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data))
+ success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
+ else {
+ success = 0;
+ error("Invalid X11 forwarding data");
+ }
+ if (!success) {
+ free(s->auth_proto);
+ free(s->auth_data);
+ s->auth_proto = NULL;
+ s->auth_data = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING:
+ if (!options.allow_agent_forwarding ||
+ no_agent_forwarding_flag || compat13) {
+ debug("Authentication agent forwarding not permitted for this authentication.");
+ break;
+ }
+ debug("Received authentication agent forwarding request.");
+ success = auth_input_request_forwarding(s->pw);
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST:
+ if (no_port_forwarding_flag) {
+ debug("Port forwarding not permitted for this authentication.");
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!(options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE)) {
+ debug("Port forwarding not permitted.");
+ break;
+ }
+ debug("Received TCP/IP port forwarding request.");
+ if (channel_input_port_forward_request(s->pw->pw_uid == 0,
+ &options.fwd_opts) < 0) {
+ debug("Port forwarding failed.");
+ break;
+ }
+ success = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_CMSG_MAX_PACKET_SIZE:
+ if (packet_set_maxsize(packet_get_int()) > 0)
+ success = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL:
+ case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD:
+ if (type == SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD) {
+ command = packet_get_string(&dlen);
+ debug("Exec command '%.500s'", command);
+ if (do_exec(s, command) != 0)
+ packet_disconnect(
+ "command execution failed");
+ free(command);
+ } else {
+ if (do_exec(s, NULL) != 0)
+ packet_disconnect(
+ "shell execution failed");
+ }
+ packet_check_eom();
+ session_close(s);
+ return;
+
+ default:
+ /*
+ * Any unknown messages in this phase are ignored,
+ * and a failure message is returned.
+ */
+ logit("Unknown packet type received after authentication: %d", type);
+ }
+ packet_start(success ? SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS : SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Enable compression now that we have replied if appropriate. */
+ if (enable_compression_after_reply) {
+ enable_compression_after_reply = 0;
+ packet_start_compression(compression_level);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#define USE_PIPES 1
+/*
+ * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty. This
+ * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after
+ * setting up file descriptors and such.
+ */
+int
+do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+ int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2];
+
+ if (s == NULL)
+ fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
+
+ /* Allocate pipes for communicating with the program. */
+ if (pipe(pin) < 0) {
+ error("%s: pipe in: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (pipe(pout) < 0) {
+ error("%s: pipe out: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ close(pin[0]);
+ close(pin[1]);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (pipe(perr) < 0) {
+ error("%s: pipe err: %.100s", __func__,
+ strerror(errno));
+ close(pin[0]);
+ close(pin[1]);
+ close(pout[0]);
+ close(pout[1]);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#else
+ int inout[2], err[2];
+
+ if (s == NULL)
+ fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
+
+ /* Uses socket pairs to communicate with the program. */
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) < 0) {
+ error("%s: socketpair #1: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) < 0) {
+ error("%s: socketpair #2: %.100s", __func__,
+ strerror(errno));
+ close(inout[0]);
+ close(inout[1]);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ session_proctitle(s);
+
+ /* Fork the child. */
+ switch ((pid = fork())) {
+ case -1:
+ error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+ close(pin[0]);
+ close(pin[1]);
+ close(pout[0]);
+ close(pout[1]);
+ close(perr[0]);
+ close(perr[1]);
+#else
+ close(inout[0]);
+ close(inout[1]);
+ close(err[0]);
+ close(err[1]);
+#endif
+ return -1;
+ case 0:
+ is_child = 1;
+
+ /* Child. Reinitialize the log since the pid has changed. */
+ log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
+ options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+ /*
+ * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
+ * setlogin() affects the entire process group.
+ */
+ if (setsid() < 0)
+ error("setsid failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+ /*
+ * Redirect stdin. We close the parent side of the socket
+ * pair, and make the child side the standard input.
+ */
+ close(pin[1]);
+ if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0)
+ perror("dup2 stdin");
+ close(pin[0]);
+
+ /* Redirect stdout. */
+ close(pout[0]);
+ if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0)
+ perror("dup2 stdout");
+ close(pout[1]);
+
+ /* Redirect stderr. */
+ close(perr[0]);
+ if (dup2(perr[1], 2) < 0)
+ perror("dup2 stderr");
+ close(perr[1]);
+#else
+ /*
+ * Redirect stdin, stdout, and stderr. Stdin and stdout will
+ * use the same socket, as some programs (particularly rdist)
+ * seem to depend on it.
+ */
+ close(inout[1]);
+ close(err[1]);
+ if (dup2(inout[0], 0) < 0) /* stdin */
+ perror("dup2 stdin");
+ if (dup2(inout[0], 1) < 0) /* stdout (same as stdin) */
+ perror("dup2 stdout");
+ close(inout[0]);
+ if (dup2(err[0], 2) < 0) /* stderr */
+ perror("dup2 stderr");
+ close(err[0]);
+#endif
+
+
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+ cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */
+#endif
+
+ /* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
+ do_child(s, command);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+ signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler);
+#endif /* _UNICOS */
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
+#endif
+
+ s->pid = pid;
+ /* Set interactive/non-interactive mode. */
+ packet_set_interactive(s->display != NULL,
+ options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
+
+ /*
+ * Clear loginmsg, since it's the child's responsibility to display
+ * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate
+ * multiple copies of the login messages.
+ */
+ buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+ /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the pipes. */
+ close(pin[0]);
+ close(pout[1]);
+ close(perr[1]);
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ session_set_fds(s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0],
+ s->is_subsystem, 0);
+ } else {
+ /* Enter the interactive session. */
+ server_loop(pid, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0]);
+ /* server_loop has closed pin[1], pout[0], and perr[0]. */
+ }
+#else
+ /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the socket pairs. */
+ close(inout[0]);
+ close(err[0]);
+
+ /*
+ * Enter the interactive session. Note: server_loop must be able to
+ * handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same.
+ */
+ if (compat20) {
+ session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1],
+ s->is_subsystem, 0);
+ } else {
+ server_loop(pid, inout[1], inout[1], err[1]);
+ /* server_loop has closed inout[1] and err[1]. */
+ }
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have a tty. This
+ * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after
+ * setting up file descriptors, controlling tty, updating wtmp, utmp,
+ * lastlog, and other such operations.
+ */
+int
+do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+ int fdout, ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ if (s == NULL)
+ fatal("do_exec_pty: no session");
+ ptyfd = s->ptyfd;
+ ttyfd = s->ttyfd;
+
+ /*
+ * Create another descriptor of the pty master side for use as the
+ * standard input. We could use the original descriptor, but this
+ * simplifies code in server_loop. The descriptor is bidirectional.
+ * Do this before forking (and cleanup in the child) so as to
+ * detect and gracefully fail out-of-fd conditions.
+ */
+ if ((fdout = dup(ptyfd)) < 0) {
+ error("%s: dup #1: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ close(ttyfd);
+ close(ptyfd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* we keep a reference to the pty master */
+ if ((ptymaster = dup(ptyfd)) < 0) {
+ error("%s: dup #2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ close(ttyfd);
+ close(ptyfd);
+ close(fdout);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Fork the child. */
+ switch ((pid = fork())) {
+ case -1:
+ error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ close(fdout);
+ close(ptymaster);
+ close(ttyfd);
+ close(ptyfd);
+ return -1;
+ case 0:
+ is_child = 1;
+
+ close(fdout);
+ close(ptymaster);
+
+ /* Child. Reinitialize the log because the pid has changed. */
+ log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
+ options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+ /* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */
+ close(ptyfd);
+
+ /* Make the pseudo tty our controlling tty. */
+ pty_make_controlling_tty(&ttyfd, s->tty);
+
+ /* Redirect stdin/stdout/stderr from the pseudo tty. */
+ if (dup2(ttyfd, 0) < 0)
+ error("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (dup2(ttyfd, 1) < 0)
+ error("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (dup2(ttyfd, 2) < 0)
+ error("dup2 stderr: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
+ close(ttyfd);
+
+ /* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
+#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+ if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL)) {
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+ cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */
+#endif /* _UNICOS */
+ do_login(s, command);
+ }
+# ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+ else
+ do_pre_login(s);
+# endif
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Do common processing for the child, such as execing
+ * the command.
+ */
+ do_child(s, command);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+ signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler);
+#endif /* _UNICOS */
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
+#endif
+
+ s->pid = pid;
+
+ /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
+ close(ttyfd);
+
+ /* Enter interactive session. */
+ s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
+ packet_set_interactive(1,
+ options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
+ if (compat20) {
+ session_set_fds(s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1);
+ } else {
+ server_loop(pid, ptyfd, fdout, -1);
+ /* server_loop _has_ closed ptyfd and fdout. */
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+static void
+do_pre_login(Session *s)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ socklen_t fromlen;
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ pid_t pid = getpid();
+
+ /*
+ * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
+ * the address be 0.0.0.0.
+ */
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+ if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+ }
+
+ record_utmp_only(pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name,
+ session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * This is called to fork and execute a command. If another command is
+ * to be forced, execute that instead.
+ */
+int
+do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ int ret;
+ const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
+ char session_type[1024];
+
+ if (options.adm_forced_command) {
+ original_command = command;
+ command = options.adm_forced_command;
+ forced = "(config)";
+ } else if (forced_command) {
+ original_command = command;
+ command = forced_command;
+ forced = "(key-option)";
+ }
+ if (forced != NULL) {
+ if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command)) {
+ s->is_subsystem = s->is_subsystem ?
+ SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP : SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR;
+ } else if (s->is_subsystem)
+ s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT;
+ snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type),
+ "forced-command %s '%.900s'", forced, command);
+ } else if (s->is_subsystem) {
+ snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type),
+ "subsystem '%.900s'", s->subsys);
+ } else if (command == NULL) {
+ snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "shell");
+ } else {
+ /* NB. we don't log unforced commands to preserve privacy */
+ snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "command");
+ }
+
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ tty = s->tty;
+ if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
+ tty += 5;
+ }
+
+ verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
+ session_type,
+ tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
+ tty == NULL ? "" : tty,
+ s->pw->pw_name,
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ s->self);
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (command != NULL)
+ PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
+ else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
+ char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
+
+ if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */
+ shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
+ PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
+ }
+#endif
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ ret = do_exec_pty(s, command);
+ else
+ ret = do_exec_no_pty(s, command);
+
+ original_command = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Clear loginmsg: it's the child's responsibility to display
+ * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate
+ * multiple copies of the login messages.
+ */
+ buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* administrative, login(1)-like work */
+void
+do_login(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ socklen_t fromlen;
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
+ pid_t pid = getpid();
+
+ /*
+ * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
+ * the address be 0.0.0.0.
+ */
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+ if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
+ if (!use_privsep)
+ record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
+ session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len,
+ options.use_dns),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ /*
+ * If password change is needed, do it now.
+ * This needs to occur before the ~/.hushlogin check.
+ */
+ if (options.use_pam && !use_privsep && s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+ display_loginmsg();
+ do_pam_chauthtok();
+ s->authctxt->force_pwchange = 0;
+ /* XXX - signal [net] parent to enable forwardings */
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (check_quietlogin(s, command))
+ return;
+
+ display_loginmsg();
+
+ do_motd();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Display the message of the day.
+ */
+void
+do_motd(void)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char buf[256];
+
+ if (options.print_motd) {
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd",
+ "/etc/motd"), "r");
+#else
+ f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r");
+#endif
+ if (f) {
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
+ fputs(buf, stdout);
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Check for quiet login, either .hushlogin or command given.
+ */
+int
+check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+ char buf[256];
+ struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ /* Return 1 if .hushlogin exists or a command given. */
+ if (command != NULL)
+ return 1;
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
+ return 1;
+#else
+ if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
+ return 1;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets the value of the given variable in the environment. If the variable
+ * already exists, its value is overridden.
+ */
+void
+child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
+ const char *value)
+{
+ char **env;
+ u_int envsize;
+ u_int i, namelen;
+
+ if (strchr(name, '=') != NULL) {
+ error("Invalid environment variable \"%.100s\"", name);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we're passed an uninitialized list, allocate a single null
+ * entry before continuing.
+ */
+ if (*envp == NULL && *envsizep == 0) {
+ *envp = xmalloc(sizeof(char *));
+ *envp[0] = NULL;
+ *envsizep = 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Find the slot where the value should be stored. If the variable
+ * already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append a new slot
+ * at the end of the array, expanding if necessary.
+ */
+ env = *envp;
+ namelen = strlen(name);
+ for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
+ if (strncmp(env[i], name, namelen) == 0 && env[i][namelen] == '=')
+ break;
+ if (env[i]) {
+ /* Reuse the slot. */
+ free(env[i]);
+ } else {
+ /* New variable. Expand if necessary. */
+ envsize = *envsizep;
+ if (i >= envsize - 1) {
+ if (envsize >= 1000)
+ fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars");
+ envsize += 50;
+ env = (*envp) = xreallocarray(env, envsize, sizeof(char *));
+ *envsizep = envsize;
+ }
+ /* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */
+ env[i + 1] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate space and format the variable in the appropriate slot. */
+ env[i] = xmalloc(strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1);
+ snprintf(env[i], strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1, "%s=%s", name, value);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads environment variables from the given file and adds/overrides them
+ * into the environment. If the file does not exist, this does nothing.
+ * Otherwise, it must consist of empty lines, comments (line starts with '#')
+ * and assignments of the form name=value. No other forms are allowed.
+ */
+static void
+read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize,
+ const char *filename)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char buf[4096];
+ char *cp, *value;
+ u_int lineno = 0;
+
+ f = fopen(filename, "r");
+ if (!f)
+ return;
+
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
+ if (++lineno > 1000)
+ fatal("Too many lines in environment file %s", filename);
+ for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n')
+ continue;
+
+ cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
+
+ value = strchr(cp, '=');
+ if (value == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad line %u in %.100s\n", lineno,
+ filename);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Replace the equals sign by nul, and advance value to
+ * the value string.
+ */
+ *value = '\0';
+ value++;
+ child_set_env(env, envsize, cp, value);
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
+/*
+ * Return named variable from specified environment, or NULL if not present.
+ */
+static char *
+child_get_env(char **env, const char *name)
+{
+ int i;
+ size_t len;
+
+ len = strlen(name);
+ for (i=0; env[i] != NULL; i++)
+ if (strncmp(name, env[i], len) == 0 && env[i][len] == '=')
+ return(env[i] + len + 1);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read /etc/default/login.
+ * We pick up the PATH (or SUPATH for root) and UMASK.
+ */
+static void
+read_etc_default_login(char ***env, u_int *envsize, uid_t uid)
+{
+ char **tmpenv = NULL, *var;
+ u_int i, tmpenvsize = 0;
+ u_long mask;
+
+ /*
+ * We don't want to copy the whole file to the child's environment,
+ * so we use a temporary environment and copy the variables we're
+ * interested in.
+ */
+ read_environment_file(&tmpenv, &tmpenvsize, "/etc/default/login");
+
+ if (tmpenv == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (uid == 0)
+ var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "SUPATH");
+ else
+ var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "PATH");
+ if (var != NULL)
+ child_set_env(env, envsize, "PATH", var);
+
+ if ((var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "UMASK")) != NULL)
+ if (sscanf(var, "%5lo", &mask) == 1)
+ umask((mode_t)mask);
+
+ for (i = 0; tmpenv[i] != NULL; i++)
+ free(tmpenv[i]);
+ free(tmpenv);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
+
+void
+copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize)
+{
+ char *var_name, *var_val;
+ int i;
+
+ if (source == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ for(i = 0; source[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ var_name = xstrdup(source[i]);
+ if ((var_val = strstr(var_name, "=")) == NULL) {
+ free(var_name);
+ continue;
+ }
+ *var_val++ = '\0';
+
+ debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val);
+ child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val);
+
+ free(var_name);
+ }
+}
+
+static char **
+do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ char buf[256];
+ u_int i, envsize;
+ char **env, *laddr;
+ struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+#if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
+ char *path = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ /* Initialize the environment. */
+ envsize = 100;
+ env = xcalloc(envsize, sizeof(char *));
+ env[0] = NULL;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ /*
+ * The Windows environment contains some setting which are
+ * important for a running system. They must not be dropped.
+ */
+ {
+ char **p;
+
+ p = fetch_windows_environment();
+ copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
+ free_windows_environment(p);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ /* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
+ * the childs environment as they see fit
+ */
+ ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
+#endif
+
+ if (!options.use_login) {
+ /* Set basic environment. */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s->env[i].name,
+ s->env[i].val);
+
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
+#ifdef _AIX
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name);
+#endif
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH) < 0)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
+ else
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH"));
+#else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
+# ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ /*
+ * There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains
+ * important components pointing to the system directories,
+ * needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better
+ * remains intact here.
+ */
+# ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
+ read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid);
+ path = child_get_env(env, "PATH");
+# endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
+ if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH",
+ s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ?
+ SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH);
+ }
+# endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
+#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s",
+ _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name);
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf);
+
+ /* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell);
+ }
+ if (getenv("TZ"))
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ"));
+
+ /* Set custom environment options from RSA authentication. */
+ if (!options.use_login) {
+ while (custom_environment) {
+ struct envstring *ce = custom_environment;
+ char *str = ce->s;
+
+ for (i = 0; str[i] != '=' && str[i]; i++)
+ ;
+ if (str[i] == '=') {
+ str[i] = 0;
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, str, str + i + 1);
+ }
+ custom_environment = ce->next;
+ free(ce->s);
+ free(ce);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ ssh_local_port(ssh));
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf);
+
+ laddr = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in());
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
+ free(laddr);
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf);
+
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty);
+ if (s->term)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term);
+ if (s->display)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display);
+ if (original_command)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND",
+ original_command);
+
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+ if (cray_tmpdir[0] != '\0')
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TMPDIR", cray_tmpdir);
+#endif /* _UNICOS */
+
+ /*
+ * Since we clear KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set now then it
+ * must have been set by a native authentication method (eg AIX or
+ * SIA), so copy it to the child.
+ */
+ {
+ char *cp;
+
+ if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp);
+ }
+
+#ifdef _AIX
+ {
+ char *cp;
+
+ if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp);
+ read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment");
+ }
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB5
+ if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
+ s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ /*
+ * Pull in any environment variables that may have
+ * been set by PAM.
+ */
+ if (options.use_pam && !options.use_login) {
+ char **p;
+
+ p = fetch_pam_child_environment();
+ copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
+ free_pam_environment(p);
+
+ p = fetch_pam_environment();
+ copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
+ free_pam_environment(p);
+ }
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+ if (auth_sock_name != NULL)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
+ auth_sock_name);
+
+ /* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */
+ if (options.permit_user_env && !options.use_login) {
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/.ssh/environment",
+ strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? pw->pw_dir : "");
+ read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf);
+ }
+ if (debug_flag) {
+ /* dump the environment */
+ fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n");
+ for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]);
+ }
+ return env;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/ssh/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found
+ * first in this order).
+ */
+static void
+do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell)
+{
+ FILE *f = NULL;
+ char cmd[1024];
+ int do_xauth;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ do_xauth =
+ s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL;
+
+ /* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems and admin forced commands */
+ if (!s->is_subsystem && options.adm_forced_command == NULL &&
+ !no_user_rc && options.permit_user_rc &&
+ stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0) {
+ snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'",
+ shell, _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
+ if (debug_flag)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Running %s\n", cmd);
+ f = popen(cmd, "w");
+ if (f) {
+ if (do_xauth)
+ fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
+ s->auth_data);
+ pclose(f);
+ } else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
+ _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
+ } else if (stat(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, &st) >= 0) {
+ if (debug_flag)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL,
+ _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
+ f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, "w");
+ if (f) {
+ if (do_xauth)
+ fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
+ s->auth_data);
+ pclose(f);
+ } else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
+ _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
+ } else if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) {
+ /* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */
+ if (debug_flag) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Running %.500s remove %.100s\n",
+ options.xauth_location, s->auth_display);
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
+ options.xauth_location, s->auth_display,
+ s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
+ }
+ snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -",
+ options.xauth_location);
+ f = popen(cmd, "w");
+ if (f) {
+ fprintf(f, "remove %s\n",
+ s->auth_display);
+ fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n",
+ s->auth_display, s->auth_proto,
+ s->auth_data);
+ pclose(f);
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
+ cmd);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ FILE *f = NULL;
+ char buf[1024], *nl, *def_nl = _PATH_NOLOGIN;
+ struct stat sb;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if (login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) || pw->pw_uid == 0)
+ return;
+ nl = login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", def_nl, def_nl);
+#else
+ if (pw->pw_uid == 0)
+ return;
+ nl = def_nl;
+#endif
+ if (stat(nl, &sb) == -1) {
+ if (nl != def_nl)
+ free(nl);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents if we can and exit. */
+ logit("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists", pw->pw_name, nl);
+ if ((f = fopen(nl, "r")) != NULL) {
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
+ fputs(buf, stderr);
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+ exit(254);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components
+ * must be root-owned directories with strict permissions.
+ */
+static void
+safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
+{
+ const char *cp;
+ char component[PATH_MAX];
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (*path != '/')
+ fatal("chroot path does not begin at root");
+ if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component))
+ fatal("chroot path too long");
+
+ /*
+ * Descend the path, checking that each component is a
+ * root-owned directory with strict permissions.
+ */
+ for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) {
+ if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL)
+ strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component));
+ else {
+ cp++;
+ memcpy(component, path, cp - path);
+ component[cp - path] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component);
+
+ if (stat(component, &st) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
+ component, strerror(errno));
+ if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)
+ fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot "
+ "directory %s\"%s\"",
+ cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
+ if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
+ fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory",
+ cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
+
+ }
+
+ if (chdir(path) == -1)
+ fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": "
+ "%s", path, strerror(errno));
+ if (chroot(path) == -1)
+ fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno));
+ if (chdir("/") == -1)
+ fatal("%s: chdir(/) after chroot: %s",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+ verbose("Changed root directory to \"%s\"", path);
+}
+
+/* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
+void
+do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ char *chroot_path, *tmp;
+
+ platform_setusercontext(pw);
+
+ if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
+ (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
+ perror("unable to set user context");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+#else
+ if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0)
+ error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) {
+ perror("setgid");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Initialize the group list. */
+ if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) {
+ perror("initgroups");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ endgrent();
+#endif
+
+ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw);
+
+ if (!in_chroot && options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+ strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
+ tmp = tilde_expand_filename(options.chroot_directory,
+ pw->pw_uid);
+ chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+ "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+ safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
+ free(tmp);
+ free(chroot_path);
+ /* Make sure we don't attempt to chroot again */
+ free(options.chroot_directory);
+ options.chroot_directory = NULL;
+ in_chroot = 1;
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUSER) < 0) {
+ perror("unable to set user context (setuser)");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /*
+ * FreeBSD's setusercontext() will not apply the user's
+ * own umask setting unless running with the user's UID.
+ */
+ (void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUMASK);
+#else
+# ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+ /*
+ * In a chroot environment, the set_id() will always fail;
+ * typically because of the lack of necessary authentication
+ * services and runtime such as ./usr/lib/libiaf.so,
+ * ./usr/lib/libpam.so.1, and ./etc/passwd We skip it in the
+ * internal sftp chroot case. We'll lose auditing and ACLs but
+ * permanently_set_uid will take care of the rest.
+ */
+ if (!in_chroot && set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0)
+ fatal("set_id(%s) Failed", pw->pw_name);
+# endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
+ /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
+ permanently_set_uid(pw);
+#endif
+ } else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+ strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
+ fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
+ }
+
+ if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
+ fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
+}
+
+static void
+do_pwchange(Session *s)
+{
+ fflush(NULL);
+ fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Your password has expired.\n");
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "You must change your password now and login again!\n");
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ setexeccon(NULL);
+#endif
+#ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
+ execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
+ (char *)NULL);
+#else
+ execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", (char *)NULL);
+#endif
+ perror("passwd");
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Password change required but no TTY available.\n");
+ }
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+static void
+launch_login(struct passwd *pw, const char *hostname)
+{
+ /* Launch login(1). */
+
+ execl(LOGIN_PROGRAM, "login", "-h", hostname,
+#ifdef xxxLOGIN_NEEDS_TERM
+ (s->term ? s->term : "unknown"),
+#endif /* LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM */
+#ifdef LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT
+ "-p", "-f", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+#else
+ "-p", "-f", "--", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+#endif
+
+ /* Login couldn't be executed, die. */
+
+ perror("login");
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+static void
+child_close_fds(void)
+{
+ extern int auth_sock;
+
+ if (auth_sock != -1) {
+ close(auth_sock);
+ auth_sock = -1;
+ }
+
+ if (packet_get_connection_in() == packet_get_connection_out())
+ close(packet_get_connection_in());
+ else {
+ close(packet_get_connection_in());
+ close(packet_get_connection_out());
+ }
+ /*
+ * Close all descriptors related to channels. They will still remain
+ * open in the parent.
+ */
+ /* XXX better use close-on-exec? -markus */
+ channel_close_all();
+
+ /*
+ * Close any extra file descriptors. Note that there may still be
+ * descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed later.
+ */
+ endpwent();
+
+ /*
+ * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
+ * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after
+ * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
+ * descriptors open.
+ */
+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
+ * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
+ * ids, and executing the command or shell.
+ */
+#define ARGV_MAX 10
+void
+do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ extern char **environ;
+ char **env;
+ char *argv[ARGV_MAX];
+ const char *shell, *shell0, *hostname = NULL;
+ struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+ int r = 0;
+
+ /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+ destroy_sensitive_data();
+
+ /* Force a password change */
+ if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+ do_setusercontext(pw);
+ child_close_fds();
+ do_pwchange(s);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /* login(1) is only called if we execute the login shell */
+ if (options.use_login && command != NULL)
+ options.use_login = 0;
+
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+ cray_setup(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name, command);
+#endif /* _UNICOS */
+
+ /*
+ * Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h"
+ * switch, so we let login(1) to this for us.
+ */
+ if (!options.use_login) {
+#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+ session_setup_sia(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty);
+ if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
+ do_motd();
+#else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
+ /* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
+ if (!options.use_pam)
+ do_nologin(pw);
+ do_setusercontext(pw);
+ /*
+ * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
+ * generated messages, so if this in an interactive
+ * login then display them too.
+ */
+ if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
+ display_loginmsg();
+#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
+ }
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam && !options.use_login && !is_pam_session_open()) {
+ debug3("PAM session not opened, exiting");
+ display_loginmsg();
+ exit(254);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is
+ * legal, and means /bin/sh.
+ */
+ shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file,
+ * even if shell is overridden from login.conf
+ */
+ env = do_setup_env(s, shell);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell);
+#endif
+
+ /* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */
+ if (options.use_login)
+ hostname = session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len,
+ options.use_dns);
+ /*
+ * Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and
+ * the server will still have the socket open, and it is important
+ * that we do not shutdown it. Note that the descriptors cannot be
+ * closed before building the environment, as we call
+ * ssh_remote_ipaddr there.
+ */
+ child_close_fds();
+
+ /*
+ * Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc,
+ * /etc/ssh/sshrc and xauth are run in the proper environment.
+ */
+ environ = env;
+
+#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
+ /*
+ * At this point, we check to see if AFS is active and if we have
+ * a valid Kerberos 5 TGT. If so, it seems like a good idea to see
+ * if we can (and need to) extend the ticket into an AFS token. If
+ * we don't do this, we run into potential problems if the user's
+ * home directory is in AFS and it's not world-readable.
+ */
+
+ if (options.kerberos_get_afs_token && k_hasafs() &&
+ (s->authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL)) {
+ char cell[64];
+
+ debug("Getting AFS token");
+
+ k_setpag();
+
+ if (k_afs_cell_of_file(pw->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0)
+ krb5_afslog(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+ s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, cell, NULL);
+
+ krb5_afslog_home(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+ s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, NULL, NULL, pw->pw_dir);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* Change current directory to the user's home directory. */
+ if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) < 0) {
+ /* Suppress missing homedir warning for chroot case */
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ r = login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0);
+#endif
+ if (r || !in_chroot) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home "
+ "directory %s: %s\n", pw->pw_dir,
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (r)
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
+ if (!options.use_login)
+ do_rc_files(s, shell);
+
+ /* restore SIGPIPE for child */
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+
+ if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR) {
+ printf("This service allows sftp connections only.\n");
+ fflush(NULL);
+ exit(1);
+ } else if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) {
+ extern int optind, optreset;
+ int i;
+ char *p, *args;
+
+ setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME);
+ args = xstrdup(command ? command : "sftp-server");
+ for (i = 0, (p = strtok(args, " ")); p; (p = strtok(NULL, " ")))
+ if (i < ARGV_MAX - 1)
+ argv[i++] = p;
+ argv[i] = NULL;
+ optind = optreset = 1;
+ __progname = argv[0];
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
+#endif
+ exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
+ }
+
+ fflush(NULL);
+
+ if (options.use_login) {
+ launch_login(pw, hostname);
+ /* NEVERREACHED */
+ }
+
+ /* Get the last component of the shell name. */
+ if ((shell0 = strrchr(shell, '/')) != NULL)
+ shell0++;
+ else
+ shell0 = shell;
+
+ /*
+ * If we have no command, execute the shell. In this case, the shell
+ * name to be passed in argv[0] is preceded by '-' to indicate that
+ * this is a login shell.
+ */
+ if (!command) {
+ char argv0[256];
+
+ /* Start the shell. Set initial character to '-'. */
+ argv0[0] = '-';
+
+ if (strlcpy(argv0 + 1, shell0, sizeof(argv0) - 1)
+ >= sizeof(argv0) - 1) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ perror(shell);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /* Execute the shell. */
+ argv[0] = argv0;
+ argv[1] = NULL;
+ execve(shell, argv, env);
+
+ /* Executing the shell failed. */
+ perror(shell);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Execute the command using the user's shell. This uses the -c
+ * option to execute the command.
+ */
+ argv[0] = (char *) shell0;
+ argv[1] = "-c";
+ argv[2] = (char *) command;
+ argv[3] = NULL;
+ execve(shell, argv, env);
+ perror(shell);
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+void
+session_unused(int id)
+{
+ debug3("%s: session id %d unused", __func__, id);
+ if (id >= options.max_sessions ||
+ id >= sessions_nalloc) {
+ fatal("%s: insane session id %d (max %d nalloc %d)",
+ __func__, id, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc);
+ }
+ memset(&sessions[id], 0, sizeof(*sessions));
+ sessions[id].self = id;
+ sessions[id].used = 0;
+ sessions[id].chanid = -1;
+ sessions[id].ptyfd = -1;
+ sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
+ sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
+ sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
+ sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
+ sessions_first_unused = id;
+}
+
+Session *
+session_new(void)
+{
+ Session *s, *tmp;
+
+ if (sessions_first_unused == -1) {
+ if (sessions_nalloc >= options.max_sessions)
+ return NULL;
+ debug2("%s: allocate (allocated %d max %d)",
+ __func__, sessions_nalloc, options.max_sessions);
+ tmp = xreallocarray(sessions, sessions_nalloc + 1,
+ sizeof(*sessions));
+ if (tmp == NULL) {
+ error("%s: cannot allocate %d sessions",
+ __func__, sessions_nalloc + 1);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ sessions = tmp;
+ session_unused(sessions_nalloc++);
+ }
+
+ if (sessions_first_unused >= sessions_nalloc ||
+ sessions_first_unused < 0) {
+ fatal("%s: insane first_unused %d max %d nalloc %d",
+ __func__, sessions_first_unused, options.max_sessions,
+ sessions_nalloc);
+ }
+
+ s = &sessions[sessions_first_unused];
+ if (s->used) {
+ fatal("%s: session %d already used",
+ __func__, sessions_first_unused);
+ }
+ sessions_first_unused = s->next_unused;
+ s->used = 1;
+ s->next_unused = -1;
+ debug("session_new: session %d", s->self);
+
+ return s;
+}
+
+static void
+session_dump(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+
+ debug("dump: used %d next_unused %d session %d %p "
+ "channel %d pid %ld",
+ s->used,
+ s->next_unused,
+ s->self,
+ s,
+ s->chanid,
+ (long)s->pid);
+ }
+}
+
+int
+session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid)
+{
+ Session *s = session_new();
+ debug("session_open: channel %d", chanid);
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ error("no more sessions");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->authctxt = authctxt;
+ s->pw = authctxt->pw;
+ if (s->pw == NULL || !authctxt->valid)
+ fatal("no user for session %d", s->self);
+ debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid);
+ s->chanid = chanid;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+Session *
+session_by_tty(char *tty)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+ if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) {
+ debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty);
+ return s;
+ }
+ }
+ debug("session_by_tty: unknown tty %.100s", tty);
+ session_dump();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static Session *
+session_by_channel(int id)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+ if (s->used && s->chanid == id) {
+ debug("session_by_channel: session %d channel %d",
+ i, id);
+ return s;
+ }
+ }
+ debug("session_by_channel: unknown channel %d", id);
+ session_dump();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static Session *
+session_by_x11_channel(int id)
+{
+ int i, j;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+
+ if (s->x11_chanids == NULL || !s->used)
+ continue;
+ for (j = 0; s->x11_chanids[j] != -1; j++) {
+ if (s->x11_chanids[j] == id) {
+ debug("session_by_x11_channel: session %d "
+ "channel %d", s->self, id);
+ return s;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ debug("session_by_x11_channel: unknown channel %d", id);
+ session_dump();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static Session *
+session_by_pid(pid_t pid)
+{
+ int i;
+ debug("session_by_pid: pid %ld", (long)pid);
+ for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+ if (s->used && s->pid == pid)
+ return s;
+ }
+ error("session_by_pid: unknown pid %ld", (long)pid);
+ session_dump();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+session_window_change_req(Session *s)
+{
+ s->col = packet_get_int();
+ s->row = packet_get_int();
+ s->xpixel = packet_get_int();
+ s->ypixel = packet_get_int();
+ packet_check_eom();
+ pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+session_pty_req(Session *s)
+{
+ u_int len;
+ int n_bytes;
+
+ if (no_pty_flag || !options.permit_tty) {
+ debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this authentication.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: you already have a pty.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->term = packet_get_string(&len);
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ s->col = packet_get_int();
+ s->row = packet_get_int();
+ } else {
+ s->row = packet_get_int();
+ s->col = packet_get_int();
+ }
+ s->xpixel = packet_get_int();
+ s->ypixel = packet_get_int();
+
+ if (strcmp(s->term, "") == 0) {
+ free(s->term);
+ s->term = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate a pty and open it. */
+ debug("Allocating pty.");
+ if (!PRIVSEP(pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty,
+ sizeof(s->tty)))) {
+ free(s->term);
+ s->term = NULL;
+ s->ptyfd = -1;
+ s->ttyfd = -1;
+ error("session_pty_req: session %d alloc failed", s->self);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ debug("session_pty_req: session %d alloc %s", s->self, s->tty);
+
+ /* for SSH1 the tty modes length is not given */
+ if (!compat20)
+ n_bytes = packet_remaining();
+ tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
+
+ if (!use_privsep)
+ pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
+
+ /* Set window size from the packet. */
+ pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
+
+ packet_check_eom();
+ session_proctitle(s);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+session_subsystem_req(Session *s)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+ u_int len;
+ int success = 0;
+ char *prog, *cmd;
+ u_int i;
+
+ s->subsys = packet_get_string(&len);
+ packet_check_eom();
+ debug2("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s", s->subsys,
+ s->pw->pw_name);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(s->subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) {
+ prog = options.subsystem_command[i];
+ cmd = options.subsystem_args[i];
+ if (strcmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, prog) == 0) {
+ s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP;
+ debug("subsystem: %s", prog);
+ } else {
+ if (stat(prog, &st) < 0)
+ debug("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s",
+ prog, strerror(errno));
+ s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT;
+ debug("subsystem: exec() %s", cmd);
+ }
+ success = do_exec(s, cmd) == 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!success)
+ logit("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s failed, "
+ "subsystem not found", s->subsys, s->pw->pw_name);
+
+ return success;
+}
+
+static int
+session_x11_req(Session *s)
+{
+ int success;
+
+ if (s->auth_proto != NULL || s->auth_data != NULL) {
+ error("session_x11_req: session %d: "
+ "x11 forwarding already active", s->self);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->single_connection = packet_get_char();
+ s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ s->auth_data = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ s->screen = packet_get_int();
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) &&
+ xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data))
+ success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
+ else {
+ success = 0;
+ error("Invalid X11 forwarding data");
+ }
+ if (!success) {
+ free(s->auth_proto);
+ free(s->auth_data);
+ s->auth_proto = NULL;
+ s->auth_data = NULL;
+ }
+ return success;
+}
+
+static int
+session_shell_req(Session *s)
+{
+ packet_check_eom();
+ return do_exec(s, NULL) == 0;
+}
+
+static int
+session_exec_req(Session *s)
+{
+ u_int len, success;
+
+ char *command = packet_get_string(&len);
+ packet_check_eom();
+ success = do_exec(s, command) == 0;
+ free(command);
+ return success;
+}
+
+static int
+session_break_req(Session *s)
+{
+
+ packet_get_int(); /* ignored */
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ if (s->ptymaster == -1 || tcsendbreak(s->ptymaster, 0) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+session_env_req(Session *s)
+{
+ char *name, *val;
+ u_int name_len, val_len, i;
+
+ name = packet_get_cstring(&name_len);
+ val = packet_get_cstring(&val_len);
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ /* Don't set too many environment variables */
+ if (s->num_env > 128) {
+ debug2("Ignoring env request %s: too many env vars", name);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_accept_env; i++) {
+ if (match_pattern(name, options.accept_env[i])) {
+ debug2("Setting env %d: %s=%s", s->num_env, name, val);
+ s->env = xreallocarray(s->env, s->num_env + 1,
+ sizeof(*s->env));
+ s->env[s->num_env].name = name;
+ s->env[s->num_env].val = val;
+ s->num_env++;
+ return (1);
+ }
+ }
+ debug2("Ignoring env request %s: disallowed name", name);
+
+ fail:
+ free(name);
+ free(val);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+session_auth_agent_req(Session *s)
+{
+ static int called = 0;
+ packet_check_eom();
+ if (no_agent_forwarding_flag || !options.allow_agent_forwarding) {
+ debug("session_auth_agent_req: no_agent_forwarding_flag");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (called) {
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ called = 1;
+ return auth_input_request_forwarding(s->pw);
+ }
+}
+
+int
+session_input_channel_req(Channel *c, const char *rtype)
+{
+ int success = 0;
+ Session *s;
+
+ if ((s = session_by_channel(c->self)) == NULL) {
+ logit("session_input_channel_req: no session %d req %.100s",
+ c->self, rtype);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ debug("session_input_channel_req: session %d req %s", s->self, rtype);
+
+ /*
+ * a session is in LARVAL state until a shell, a command
+ * or a subsystem is executed
+ */
+ if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) {
+ if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) {
+ success = session_shell_req(s);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exec") == 0) {
+ success = session_exec_req(s);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "pty-req") == 0) {
+ success = session_pty_req(s);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "x11-req") == 0) {
+ success = session_x11_req(s);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "auth-agent-req at openssh.com") == 0) {
+ success = session_auth_agent_req(s);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) {
+ success = session_subsystem_req(s);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "env") == 0) {
+ success = session_env_req(s);
+ }
+ }
+ if (strcmp(rtype, "window-change") == 0) {
+ success = session_window_change_req(s);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "break") == 0) {
+ success = session_break_req(s);
+ }
+
+ return success;
+}
+
+void
+session_set_fds(Session *s, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int ignore_fderr,
+ int is_tty)
+{
+ if (!compat20)
+ fatal("session_set_fds: called for proto != 2.0");
+ /*
+ * now that have a child and a pipe to the child,
+ * we can activate our channel and register the fd's
+ */
+ if (s->chanid == -1)
+ fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self);
+ channel_set_fds(s->chanid,
+ fdout, fdin, fderr,
+ ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ,
+ 1, is_tty, CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Function to perform pty cleanup. Also called if we get aborted abnormally
+ * (e.g., due to a dropped connection).
+ */
+void
+session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
+{
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ error("session_pty_cleanup: no session");
+ return;
+ }
+ if (s->ttyfd == -1)
+ return;
+
+ debug("session_pty_cleanup: session %d release %s", s->self, s->tty);
+
+ /* Record that the user has logged out. */
+ if (s->pid != 0)
+ record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name);
+
+ /* Release the pseudo-tty. */
+ if (getuid() == 0)
+ pty_release(s->tty);
+
+ /*
+ * Close the server side of the socket pairs. We must do this after
+ * the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty
+ * while we're still cleaning up.
+ */
+ if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) < 0)
+ error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s",
+ s->ptymaster, strerror(errno));
+
+ /* unlink pty from session */
+ s->ttyfd = -1;
+}
+
+void
+session_pty_cleanup(Session *s)
+{
+ PRIVSEP(session_pty_cleanup2(s));
+}
+
+static char *
+sig2name(int sig)
+{
+#define SSH_SIG(x) if (sig == SIG ## x) return #x
+ SSH_SIG(ABRT);
+ SSH_SIG(ALRM);
+ SSH_SIG(FPE);
+ SSH_SIG(HUP);
+ SSH_SIG(ILL);
+ SSH_SIG(INT);
+ SSH_SIG(KILL);
+ SSH_SIG(PIPE);
+ SSH_SIG(QUIT);
+ SSH_SIG(SEGV);
+ SSH_SIG(TERM);
+ SSH_SIG(USR1);
+ SSH_SIG(USR2);
+#undef SSH_SIG
+ return "SIG at openssh.com";
+}
+
+static void
+session_close_x11(int id)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+
+ if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL) {
+ debug("session_close_x11: x11 channel %d missing", id);
+ } else {
+ /* Detach X11 listener */
+ debug("session_close_x11: detach x11 channel %d", id);
+ channel_cancel_cleanup(id);
+ if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
+ chan_mark_dead(c);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+session_close_single_x11(int id, void *arg)
+{
+ Session *s;
+ u_int i;
+
+ debug3("session_close_single_x11: channel %d", id);
+ channel_cancel_cleanup(id);
+ if ((s = session_by_x11_channel(id)) == NULL)
+ fatal("session_close_single_x11: no x11 channel %d", id);
+ for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
+ debug("session_close_single_x11: session %d: "
+ "closing channel %d", s->self, s->x11_chanids[i]);
+ /*
+ * The channel "id" is already closing, but make sure we
+ * close all of its siblings.
+ */
+ if (s->x11_chanids[i] != id)
+ session_close_x11(s->x11_chanids[i]);
+ }
+ free(s->x11_chanids);
+ s->x11_chanids = NULL;
+ free(s->display);
+ s->display = NULL;
+ free(s->auth_proto);
+ s->auth_proto = NULL;
+ free(s->auth_data);
+ s->auth_data = NULL;
+ free(s->auth_display);
+ s->auth_display = NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+session_exit_message(Session *s, int status)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+
+ if ((c = channel_lookup(s->chanid)) == NULL)
+ fatal("session_exit_message: session %d: no channel %d",
+ s->self, s->chanid);
+ debug("session_exit_message: session %d channel %d pid %ld",
+ s->self, s->chanid, (long)s->pid);
+
+ if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
+ channel_request_start(s->chanid, "exit-status", 0);
+ packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ packet_send();
+ } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+ channel_request_start(s->chanid, "exit-signal", 0);
+ packet_put_cstring(sig2name(WTERMSIG(status)));
+#ifdef WCOREDUMP
+ packet_put_char(WCOREDUMP(status)? 1 : 0);
+#else /* WCOREDUMP */
+ packet_put_char(0);
+#endif /* WCOREDUMP */
+ packet_put_cstring("");
+ packet_put_cstring("");
+ packet_send();
+ } else {
+ /* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */
+ packet_disconnect("wait returned status %04x.", status);
+ }
+
+ /* disconnect channel */
+ debug("session_exit_message: release channel %d", s->chanid);
+
+ /*
+ * Adjust cleanup callback attachment to send close messages when
+ * the channel gets EOF. The session will be then be closed
+ * by session_close_by_channel when the childs close their fds.
+ */
+ channel_register_cleanup(c->self, session_close_by_channel, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * emulate a write failure with 'chan_write_failed', nobody will be
+ * interested in data we write.
+ * Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there could
+ * be some more data waiting in the pipe.
+ */
+ if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
+ chan_write_failed(c);
+}
+
+void
+session_close(Session *s)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ u_int i;
+
+ verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
+ s->pw->pw_name,
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ s->self);
+
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ session_pty_cleanup(s);
+ free(s->term);
+ free(s->display);
+ free(s->x11_chanids);
+ free(s->auth_display);
+ free(s->auth_data);
+ free(s->auth_proto);
+ free(s->subsys);
+ if (s->env != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) {
+ free(s->env[i].name);
+ free(s->env[i].val);
+ }
+ free(s->env);
+ }
+ session_proctitle(s);
+ session_unused(s->self);
+}
+
+void
+session_close_by_pid(pid_t pid, int status)
+{
+ Session *s = session_by_pid(pid);
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ debug("session_close_by_pid: no session for pid %ld",
+ (long)pid);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (s->chanid != -1)
+ session_exit_message(s, status);
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ session_pty_cleanup(s);
+ s->pid = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * this is called when a channel dies before
+ * the session 'child' itself dies
+ */
+void
+session_close_by_channel(int id, void *arg)
+{
+ Session *s = session_by_channel(id);
+ u_int i;
+
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ debug("session_close_by_channel: no session for id %d", id);
+ return;
+ }
+ debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d child %ld",
+ id, (long)s->pid);
+ if (s->pid != 0) {
+ debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d: has child", id);
+ /*
+ * delay detach of session, but release pty, since
+ * the fd's to the child are already closed
+ */
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ session_pty_cleanup(s);
+ return;
+ }
+ /* detach by removing callback */
+ channel_cancel_cleanup(s->chanid);
+
+ /* Close any X11 listeners associated with this session */
+ if (s->x11_chanids != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
+ session_close_x11(s->x11_chanids[i]);
+ s->x11_chanids[i] = -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->chanid = -1;
+ session_close(s);
+}
+
+void
+session_destroy_all(void (*closefunc)(Session *))
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+ if (s->used) {
+ if (closefunc != NULL)
+ closefunc(s);
+ else
+ session_close(s);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static char *
+session_tty_list(void)
+{
+ static char buf[1024];
+ int i;
+ char *cp;
+
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+ if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1) {
+
+ if (strncmp(s->tty, "/dev/", 5) != 0) {
+ cp = strrchr(s->tty, '/');
+ cp = (cp == NULL) ? s->tty : cp + 1;
+ } else
+ cp = s->tty + 5;
+
+ if (buf[0] != '\0')
+ strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf);
+ strlcat(buf, cp, sizeof buf);
+ }
+ }
+ if (buf[0] == '\0')
+ strlcpy(buf, "notty", sizeof buf);
+ return buf;
+}
+
+void
+session_proctitle(Session *s)
+{
+ if (s->pw == NULL)
+ error("no user for session %d", s->self);
+ else
+ setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, session_tty_list());
+}
+
+int
+session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+ char display[512], auth_display[512];
+ char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
+ u_int i;
+
+ if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) {
+ packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled in user configuration file.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!options.x11_forwarding) {
+ debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (options.xauth_location == NULL ||
+ (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) {
+ packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward with spoofing.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (options.use_login) {
+ packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled; "
+ "not compatible with UseLogin=yes.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->display != NULL) {
+ debug("X11 display already set.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (x11_create_display_inet(options.x11_display_offset,
+ options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
+ &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
+ debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
+ channel_register_cleanup(s->x11_chanids[i],
+ session_close_single_x11, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* Set up a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable. */
+ if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0)
+ fatal("gethostname: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ /*
+ * auth_display must be used as the displayname when the
+ * authorization entry is added with xauth(1). This will be
+ * different than the DISPLAY string for localhost displays.
+ */
+ if (options.x11_use_localhost) {
+ snprintf(display, sizeof display, "localhost:%u.%u",
+ s->display_number, s->screen);
+ snprintf(auth_display, sizeof auth_display, "unix:%u.%u",
+ s->display_number, s->screen);
+ s->display = xstrdup(display);
+ s->auth_display = xstrdup(auth_display);
+ } else {
+#ifdef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY
+ struct hostent *he;
+ struct in_addr my_addr;
+
+ he = gethostbyname(hostname);
+ if (he == NULL) {
+ error("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY.");
+ packet_send_debug("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(&my_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
+ snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.50s:%u.%u", inet_ntoa(my_addr),
+ s->display_number, s->screen);
+#else
+ snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.400s:%u.%u", hostname,
+ s->display_number, s->screen);
+#endif
+ s->display = xstrdup(display);
+ s->auth_display = xstrdup(display);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ server_loop2(authctxt);
+}
+
+void
+do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ static int called = 0;
+
+ debug("do_cleanup");
+
+ /* no cleanup if we're in the child for login shell */
+ if (is_child)
+ return;
+
+ /* avoid double cleanup */
+ if (called)
+ return;
+ called = 1;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ return;
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam) {
+ sshpam_cleanup();
+ sshpam_thread_cleanup();
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (!authctxt->authenticated)
+ return;
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+ if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup &&
+ authctxt->krb5_ctx)
+ krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ if (compat20 && options.gss_cleanup_creds)
+ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds();
+#endif
+
+ /* remove agent socket */
+ auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
+
+ /*
+ * Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled,
+ * or if running in monitor.
+ */
+ if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+ session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2);
+}
+
+/* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */
+
+const char *
+session_get_remote_name_or_ip(struct ssh *ssh, u_int utmp_size, int use_dns)
+{
+ const char *remote = "";
+
+ if (utmp_size > 0)
+ remote = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns);
+ if (utmp_size == 0 || strlen(remote) > utmp_size)
+ remote = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ return remote;
+}
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/session.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/session.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/session.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.31 2013/10/14 21:20:52 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-#ifndef SESSION_H
-#define SESSION_H
-
-#define TTYSZ 64
-typedef struct Session Session;
-struct Session {
- int used;
- int self;
- int next_unused;
- struct passwd *pw;
- Authctxt *authctxt;
- pid_t pid;
-
- /* tty */
- char *term;
- int ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
- u_int row, col, xpixel, ypixel;
- char tty[TTYSZ];
-
- /* X11 */
- u_int display_number;
- char *display;
- u_int screen;
- char *auth_display;
- char *auth_proto;
- char *auth_data;
- int single_connection;
-
- /* proto 2 */
- int chanid;
- int *x11_chanids;
- int is_subsystem;
- char *subsys;
- u_int num_env;
- struct {
- char *name;
- char *val;
- } *env;
-};
-
-void do_authenticated(Authctxt *);
-void do_cleanup(Authctxt *);
-
-int session_open(Authctxt *, int);
-void session_unused(int);
-int session_input_channel_req(Channel *, const char *);
-void session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int);
-void session_close_by_channel(int, void *);
-void session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *));
-void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
-
-Session *session_new(void);
-Session *session_by_tty(char *);
-void session_close(Session *);
-void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
-void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
- const char *value);
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/session.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/session.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/session.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/session.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.32 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef SESSION_H
+#define SESSION_H
+
+#define TTYSZ 64
+typedef struct Session Session;
+struct Session {
+ int used;
+ int self;
+ int next_unused;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ Authctxt *authctxt;
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ /* tty */
+ char *term;
+ int ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
+ u_int row, col, xpixel, ypixel;
+ char tty[TTYSZ];
+
+ /* X11 */
+ u_int display_number;
+ char *display;
+ u_int screen;
+ char *auth_display;
+ char *auth_proto;
+ char *auth_data;
+ int single_connection;
+
+ /* proto 2 */
+ int chanid;
+ int *x11_chanids;
+ int is_subsystem;
+ char *subsys;
+ u_int num_env;
+ struct {
+ char *name;
+ char *val;
+ } *env;
+};
+
+void do_authenticated(Authctxt *);
+void do_cleanup(Authctxt *);
+
+int session_open(Authctxt *, int);
+void session_unused(int);
+int session_input_channel_req(Channel *, const char *);
+void session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int);
+void session_close_by_channel(int, void *);
+void session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *));
+void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
+
+Session *session_new(void);
+Session *session_by_tty(char *);
+void session_close(Session *);
+void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
+void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
+ const char *value);
+
+const char *session_get_remote_name_or_ip(struct ssh *, u_int, int);
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-client.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-client.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-client.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1735 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.114 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm at openbsd.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-/* XXX: memleaks */
-/* XXX: signed vs unsigned */
-/* XXX: remove all logging, only return status codes */
-/* XXX: copy between two remote sites */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
-#include <sys/statvfs.h>
-#endif
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
-# include <sys/stat.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-#include <sys/uio.h>
-
-#include <dirent.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "progressmeter.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-
-#include "sftp.h"
-#include "sftp-common.h"
-#include "sftp-client.h"
-
-extern volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted;
-extern int showprogress;
-
-/* Minimum amount of data to read at a time */
-#define MIN_READ_SIZE 512
-
-/* Maximum depth to descend in directory trees */
-#define MAX_DIR_DEPTH 64
-
-struct sftp_conn {
- int fd_in;
- int fd_out;
- u_int transfer_buflen;
- u_int num_requests;
- u_int version;
- u_int msg_id;
-#define SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME 0x00000001
-#define SFTP_EXT_STATVFS 0x00000002
-#define SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS 0x00000004
-#define SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK 0x00000008
-#define SFTP_EXT_FSYNC 0x00000010
- u_int exts;
- u_int64_t limit_kbps;
- struct bwlimit bwlimit_in, bwlimit_out;
-};
-
-static char *
-get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, u_int *len,
- const char *errfmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5)));
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int
-sftpio(void *_bwlimit, size_t amount)
-{
- struct bwlimit *bwlimit = (struct bwlimit *)_bwlimit;
-
- bandwidth_limit(bwlimit, amount);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void
-send_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, Buffer *m)
-{
- u_char mlen[4];
- struct iovec iov[2];
-
- if (buffer_len(m) > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)
- fatal("Outbound message too long %u", buffer_len(m));
-
- /* Send length first */
- put_u32(mlen, buffer_len(m));
- iov[0].iov_base = mlen;
- iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(mlen);
- iov[1].iov_base = buffer_ptr(m);
- iov[1].iov_len = buffer_len(m);
-
- if (atomiciov6(writev, conn->fd_out, iov, 2,
- conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_out) !=
- buffer_len(m) + sizeof(mlen))
- fatal("Couldn't send packet: %s", strerror(errno));
-
- buffer_clear(m);
-}
-
-static void
-get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, Buffer *m)
-{
- u_int msg_len;
-
- buffer_append_space(m, 4);
- if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, buffer_ptr(m), 4,
- conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_in) != 4) {
- if (errno == EPIPE)
- fatal("Connection closed");
- else
- fatal("Couldn't read packet: %s", strerror(errno));
- }
-
- msg_len = buffer_get_int(m);
- if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)
- fatal("Received message too long %u", msg_len);
-
- buffer_append_space(m, msg_len);
- if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len,
- conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_in)
- != msg_len) {
- if (errno == EPIPE)
- fatal("Connection closed");
- else
- fatal("Read packet: %s", strerror(errno));
- }
-}
-
-static void
-send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, char *s,
- u_int len)
-{
- Buffer msg;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, code);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
- buffer_put_string(&msg, s, len);
- send_msg(conn, &msg);
- debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", conn->fd_out, code, id);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-}
-
-static void
-send_string_attrs_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code,
- char *s, u_int len, Attrib *a)
-{
- Buffer msg;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, code);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
- buffer_put_string(&msg, s, len);
- encode_attrib(&msg, a);
- send_msg(conn, &msg);
- debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", conn->fd_out, code, id);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-}
-
-static u_int
-get_status(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id)
-{
- Buffer msg;
- u_int type, id, status;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- get_msg(conn, &msg);
- type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
- id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
-
- if (id != expected_id)
- fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
- if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS)
- fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%u) packet, got %u",
- SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type);
-
- status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-
- debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status);
-
- return status;
-}
-
-static char *
-get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, u_int *len,
- const char *errfmt, ...)
-{
- Buffer msg;
- u_int type, id;
- char *handle, errmsg[256];
- va_list args;
- int status;
-
- va_start(args, errfmt);
- if (errfmt != NULL)
- vsnprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), errfmt, args);
- va_end(args);
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- get_msg(conn, &msg);
- type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
- id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
-
- if (id != expected_id)
- fatal("%s: ID mismatch (%u != %u)",
- errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, id, expected_id);
- if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
- status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
- if (errfmt != NULL)
- error("%s: %s", errmsg, fx2txt(status));
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return(NULL);
- } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_HANDLE)
- fatal("%s: Expected SSH2_FXP_HANDLE(%u) packet, got %u",
- errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, type);
-
- handle = buffer_get_string(&msg, len);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-
- return(handle);
-}
-
-static Attrib *
-get_decode_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, int quiet)
-{
- Buffer msg;
- u_int type, id;
- Attrib *a;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- get_msg(conn, &msg);
-
- type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
- id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
-
- debug3("Received stat reply T:%u I:%u", type, id);
- if (id != expected_id)
- fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
- if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
- int status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
-
- if (quiet)
- debug("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status));
- else
- error("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status));
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return(NULL);
- } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_ATTRS) {
- fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_ATTRS(%u) packet, got %u",
- SSH2_FXP_ATTRS, type);
- }
- a = decode_attrib(&msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-
- return(a);
-}
-
-static int
-get_decode_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sftp_statvfs *st,
- u_int expected_id, int quiet)
-{
- Buffer msg;
- u_int type, id, flag;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- get_msg(conn, &msg);
-
- type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
- id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
-
- debug3("Received statvfs reply T:%u I:%u", type, id);
- if (id != expected_id)
- fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
- if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
- int status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
-
- if (quiet)
- debug("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status));
- else
- error("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status));
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return -1;
- } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY) {
- fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY(%u) packet, got %u",
- SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY, type);
- }
-
- memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
- st->f_bsize = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
- st->f_frsize = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
- st->f_blocks = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
- st->f_bfree = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
- st->f_bavail = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
- st->f_files = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
- st->f_ffree = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
- st->f_favail = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
- st->f_fsid = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
- flag = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
- st->f_namemax = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
-
- st->f_flag = (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY) ? ST_RDONLY : 0;
- st->f_flag |= (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID) ? ST_NOSUID : 0;
-
- buffer_free(&msg);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-struct sftp_conn *
-do_init(int fd_in, int fd_out, u_int transfer_buflen, u_int num_requests,
- u_int64_t limit_kbps)
-{
- u_int type;
- Buffer msg;
- struct sftp_conn *ret;
-
- ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
- ret->msg_id = 1;
- ret->fd_in = fd_in;
- ret->fd_out = fd_out;
- ret->transfer_buflen = transfer_buflen;
- ret->num_requests = num_requests;
- ret->exts = 0;
- ret->limit_kbps = 0;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_INIT);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION);
- send_msg(ret, &msg);
-
- buffer_clear(&msg);
-
- get_msg(ret, &msg);
-
- /* Expecting a VERSION reply */
- if ((type = buffer_get_char(&msg)) != SSH2_FXP_VERSION) {
- error("Invalid packet back from SSH2_FXP_INIT (type %u)",
- type);
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return(NULL);
- }
- ret->version = buffer_get_int(&msg);
-
- debug2("Remote version: %u", ret->version);
-
- /* Check for extensions */
- while (buffer_len(&msg) > 0) {
- char *name = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
- char *value = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
- int known = 0;
-
- if (strcmp(name, "posix-rename at openssh.com") == 0 &&
- strcmp(value, "1") == 0) {
- ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME;
- known = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(name, "statvfs at openssh.com") == 0 &&
- strcmp(value, "2") == 0) {
- ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_STATVFS;
- known = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(name, "fstatvfs at openssh.com") == 0 &&
- strcmp(value, "2") == 0) {
- ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS;
- known = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(name, "hardlink at openssh.com") == 0 &&
- strcmp(value, "1") == 0) {
- ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK;
- known = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(name, "fsync at openssh.com") == 0 &&
- strcmp(value, "1") == 0) {
- ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSYNC;
- known = 1;
- }
- if (known) {
- debug2("Server supports extension \"%s\" revision %s",
- name, value);
- } else {
- debug2("Unrecognised server extension \"%s\"", name);
- }
- free(name);
- free(value);
- }
-
- buffer_free(&msg);
-
- /* Some filexfer v.0 servers don't support large packets */
- if (ret->version == 0)
- ret->transfer_buflen = MIN(ret->transfer_buflen, 20480);
-
- ret->limit_kbps = limit_kbps;
- if (ret->limit_kbps > 0) {
- bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_in, ret->limit_kbps,
- ret->transfer_buflen);
- bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_out, ret->limit_kbps,
- ret->transfer_buflen);
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-u_int
-sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *conn)
-{
- return conn->version;
-}
-
-int
-do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len)
-{
- u_int id, status;
- Buffer msg;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
-
- id = conn->msg_id++;
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
- buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len);
- send_msg(conn, &msg);
- debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_CLOSE I:%u", id);
-
- status = get_status(conn, id);
- if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
- error("Couldn't close file: %s", fx2txt(status));
-
- buffer_free(&msg);
-
- return status;
-}
-
-
-static int
-do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int print_flag,
- SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
-{
- Buffer msg;
- u_int count, type, id, handle_len, i, expected_id, ents = 0;
- char *handle;
- int status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
-
- if (dir)
- *dir = NULL;
-
- id = conn->msg_id++;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, path);
- send_msg(conn, &msg);
-
- handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len,
- "remote readdir(\"%s\")", path);
- if (handle == NULL) {
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (dir) {
- ents = 0;
- *dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir));
- (*dir)[0] = NULL;
- }
-
- for (; !interrupted;) {
- id = expected_id = conn->msg_id++;
-
- debug3("Sending SSH2_FXP_READDIR I:%u", id);
-
- buffer_clear(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_READDIR);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
- buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len);
- send_msg(conn, &msg);
-
- buffer_clear(&msg);
-
- get_msg(conn, &msg);
-
- type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
- id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
-
- debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u", type, id);
-
- if (id != expected_id)
- fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
-
- if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
- status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
- debug3("Received SSH2_FXP_STATUS %d", status);
- if (status == SSH2_FX_EOF)
- break;
- error("Couldn't read directory: %s", fx2txt(status));
- goto out;
- } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
- fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
- SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
-
- count = buffer_get_int(&msg);
- if (count == 0)
- break;
- debug3("Received %d SSH2_FXP_NAME responses", count);
- for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- char *filename, *longname;
- Attrib *a;
-
- filename = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
- longname = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
- a = decode_attrib(&msg);
-
- if (print_flag)
- printf("%s\n", longname);
-
- /*
- * Directory entries should never contain '/'
- * These can be used to attack recursive ops
- * (e.g. send '../../../../etc/passwd')
- */
- if (strchr(filename, '/') != NULL) {
- error("Server sent suspect path \"%s\" "
- "during readdir of \"%s\"", filename, path);
- } else if (dir) {
- *dir = xrealloc(*dir, ents + 2, sizeof(**dir));
- (*dir)[ents] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(***dir));
- (*dir)[ents]->filename = xstrdup(filename);
- (*dir)[ents]->longname = xstrdup(longname);
- memcpy(&(*dir)[ents]->a, a, sizeof(*a));
- (*dir)[++ents] = NULL;
- }
- free(filename);
- free(longname);
- }
- }
- status = 0;
-
- out:
- buffer_free(&msg);
- do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
- free(handle);
-
- if (status != 0 && dir != NULL) {
- /* Don't return results on error */
- free_sftp_dirents(*dir);
- *dir = NULL;
- } else if (interrupted && dir != NULL && *dir != NULL) {
- /* Don't return partial matches on interrupt */
- free_sftp_dirents(*dir);
- *dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir));
- **dir = NULL;
- }
-
- return status;
-}
-
-int
-do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
-{
- return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir));
-}
-
-void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (s == NULL)
- return;
- for (i = 0; s[i]; i++) {
- free(s[i]->filename);
- free(s[i]->longname);
- free(s[i]);
- }
- free(s);
-}
-
-int
-do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-{
- u_int status, id;
-
- debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REMOVE \"%s\"", path);
-
- id = conn->msg_id++;
- send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, path, strlen(path));
- status = get_status(conn, id);
- if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
- error("Couldn't delete file: %s", fx2txt(status));
- return(status);
-}
-
-int
-do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a, int print_flag)
-{
- u_int status, id;
-
- id = conn->msg_id++;
- send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, path,
- strlen(path), a);
-
- status = get_status(conn, id);
- if (status != SSH2_FX_OK && print_flag)
- error("Couldn't create directory: %s", fx2txt(status));
-
- return(status);
-}
-
-int
-do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-{
- u_int status, id;
-
- id = conn->msg_id++;
- send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, path,
- strlen(path));
-
- status = get_status(conn, id);
- if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
- error("Couldn't remove directory: %s", fx2txt(status));
-
- return(status);
-}
-
-Attrib *
-do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet)
-{
- u_int id;
-
- id = conn->msg_id++;
-
- send_string_request(conn, id,
- conn->version == 0 ? SSH2_FXP_STAT_VERSION_0 : SSH2_FXP_STAT,
- path, strlen(path));
-
- return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet));
-}
-
-Attrib *
-do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet)
-{
- u_int id;
-
- if (conn->version == 0) {
- if (quiet)
- debug("Server version does not support lstat operation");
- else
- logit("Server version does not support lstat operation");
- return(do_stat(conn, path, quiet));
- }
-
- id = conn->msg_id++;
- send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, path,
- strlen(path));
-
- return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet));
-}
-
-#ifdef notyet
-Attrib *
-do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len, int quiet)
-{
- u_int id;
-
- id = conn->msg_id++;
- send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, handle,
- handle_len);
-
- return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet));
-}
-#endif
-
-int
-do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a)
-{
- u_int status, id;
-
- id = conn->msg_id++;
- send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, path,
- strlen(path), a);
-
- status = get_status(conn, id);
- if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
- error("Couldn't setstat on \"%s\": %s", path,
- fx2txt(status));
-
- return(status);
-}
-
-int
-do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len,
- Attrib *a)
-{
- u_int status, id;
-
- id = conn->msg_id++;
- send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, handle,
- handle_len, a);
-
- status = get_status(conn, id);
- if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
- error("Couldn't fsetstat: %s", fx2txt(status));
-
- return(status);
-}
-
-char *
-do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-{
- Buffer msg;
- u_int type, expected_id, count, id;
- char *filename, *longname;
- Attrib *a;
-
- expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++;
- send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, path,
- strlen(path));
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
-
- get_msg(conn, &msg);
- type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
- id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
-
- if (id != expected_id)
- fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
-
- if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
- u_int status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
-
- error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status));
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return NULL;
- } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
- fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
- SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
-
- count = buffer_get_int(&msg);
- if (count != 1)
- fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_REALPATH", count);
-
- filename = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
- longname = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
- a = decode_attrib(&msg);
-
- debug3("SSH_FXP_REALPATH %s -> %s size %lu", path, filename,
- (unsigned long)a->size);
-
- free(longname);
-
- buffer_free(&msg);
-
- return(filename);
-}
-
-int
-do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath,
- int force_legacy)
-{
- Buffer msg;
- u_int status, id;
- int use_ext = (conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME) && !force_legacy;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
-
- /* Send rename request */
- id = conn->msg_id++;
- if (use_ext) {
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "posix-rename at openssh.com");
- } else {
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_RENAME);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
- }
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, oldpath);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, newpath);
- send_msg(conn, &msg);
- debug3("Sent message %s \"%s\" -> \"%s\"",
- use_ext ? "posix-rename at openssh.com" : "SSH2_FXP_RENAME",
- oldpath, newpath);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-
- status = get_status(conn, id);
- if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
- error("Couldn't rename file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath,
- newpath, fx2txt(status));
-
- return(status);
-}
-
-int
-do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
-{
- Buffer msg;
- u_int status, id;
-
- if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK) == 0) {
- error("Server does not support hardlink at openssh.com extension");
- return -1;
- }
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
-
- /* Send link request */
- id = conn->msg_id++;
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "hardlink at openssh.com");
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, oldpath);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, newpath);
- send_msg(conn, &msg);
- debug3("Sent message hardlink at openssh.com \"%s\" -> \"%s\"",
- oldpath, newpath);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-
- status = get_status(conn, id);
- if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
- error("Couldn't link file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath,
- newpath, fx2txt(status));
-
- return(status);
-}
-
-int
-do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
-{
- Buffer msg;
- u_int status, id;
-
- if (conn->version < 3) {
- error("This server does not support the symlink operation");
- return(SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED);
- }
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
-
- /* Send symlink request */
- id = conn->msg_id++;
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, oldpath);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, newpath);
- send_msg(conn, &msg);
- debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath,
- newpath);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-
- status = get_status(conn, id);
- if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
- error("Couldn't symlink file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath,
- newpath, fx2txt(status));
-
- return(status);
-}
-
-int
-do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len)
-{
- Buffer msg;
- u_int status, id;
-
- /* Silently return if the extension is not supported */
- if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSYNC) == 0)
- return -1;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
-
- /* Send fsync request */
- id = conn->msg_id++;
-
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "fsync at openssh.com");
- buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len);
- send_msg(conn, &msg);
- debug3("Sent message fsync at openssh.com I:%u", id);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-
- status = get_status(conn, id);
- if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
- error("Couldn't sync file: %s", fx2txt(status));
-
- return status;
-}
-
-#ifdef notyet
-char *
-do_readlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-{
- Buffer msg;
- u_int type, expected_id, count, id;
- char *filename, *longname;
- Attrib *a;
-
- expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++;
- send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, path, strlen(path));
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
-
- get_msg(conn, &msg);
- type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
- id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
-
- if (id != expected_id)
- fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
-
- if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
- u_int status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
-
- error("Couldn't readlink: %s", fx2txt(status));
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return(NULL);
- } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
- fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
- SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
-
- count = buffer_get_int(&msg);
- if (count != 1)
- fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_READLINK", count);
-
- filename = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
- longname = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
- a = decode_attrib(&msg);
-
- debug3("SSH_FXP_READLINK %s -> %s", path, filename);
-
- free(longname);
-
- buffer_free(&msg);
-
- return(filename);
-}
-#endif
-
-int
-do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, struct sftp_statvfs *st,
- int quiet)
-{
- Buffer msg;
- u_int id;
-
- if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_STATVFS) == 0) {
- error("Server does not support statvfs at openssh.com extension");
- return -1;
- }
-
- id = conn->msg_id++;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_clear(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "statvfs at openssh.com");
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, path);
- send_msg(conn, &msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-
- return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet);
-}
-
-#ifdef notyet
-int
-do_fstatvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len,
- struct sftp_statvfs *st, int quiet)
-{
- Buffer msg;
- u_int id;
-
- if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS) == 0) {
- error("Server does not support fstatvfs at openssh.com extension");
- return -1;
- }
-
- id = conn->msg_id++;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_clear(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "fstatvfs at openssh.com");
- buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len);
- send_msg(conn, &msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-
- return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet);
-}
-#endif
-
-static void
-send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int64_t offset,
- u_int len, char *handle, u_int handle_len)
-{
- Buffer msg;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_clear(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_READ);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
- buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len);
- buffer_put_int64(&msg, offset);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, len);
- send_msg(conn, &msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-}
-
-int
-do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *local_path,
- Attrib *a, int preserve_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag)
-{
- Attrib junk;
- Buffer msg;
- char *handle;
- int local_fd = -1, status = 0, write_error;
- int read_error, write_errno, reordered = 0;
- u_int64_t offset = 0, size, highwater;
- u_int handle_len, mode, type, id, buflen, num_req, max_req;
- off_t progress_counter;
- struct stat st;
- struct request {
- u_int id;
- u_int len;
- u_int64_t offset;
- TAILQ_ENTRY(request) tq;
- };
- TAILQ_HEAD(reqhead, request) requests;
- struct request *req;
-
- TAILQ_INIT(&requests);
-
- if (a == NULL && (a = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL)
- return -1;
-
- /* Do not preserve set[ug]id here, as we do not preserve ownership */
- if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
- mode = a->perm & 0777;
- else
- mode = 0666;
-
- if ((a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) &&
- (!S_ISREG(a->perm))) {
- error("Cannot download non-regular file: %s", remote_path);
- return(-1);
- }
-
- if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE)
- size = a->size;
- else
- size = 0;
-
- buflen = conn->transfer_buflen;
- buffer_init(&msg);
-
- /* Send open request */
- id = conn->msg_id++;
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, remote_path);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FXF_READ);
- attrib_clear(&junk); /* Send empty attributes */
- encode_attrib(&msg, &junk);
- send_msg(conn, &msg);
- debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path);
-
- handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len,
- "remote open(\"%s\")", remote_path);
- if (handle == NULL) {
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return(-1);
- }
-
- local_fd = open(local_path,
- O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | (resume_flag ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR);
- if (local_fd == -1) {
- error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for writing: %s",
- local_path, strerror(errno));
- goto fail;
- }
- offset = highwater = 0;
- if (resume_flag) {
- if (fstat(local_fd, &st) == -1) {
- error("Unable to stat local file \"%s\": %s",
- local_path, strerror(errno));
- goto fail;
- }
- if (st.st_size < 0) {
- error("\"%s\" has negative size", local_path);
- goto fail;
- }
- if ((u_int64_t)st.st_size > size) {
- error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": "
- "local file is larger than remote", local_path);
- fail:
- do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
- buffer_free(&msg);
- free(handle);
- if (local_fd != -1)
- close(local_fd);
- return -1;
- }
- offset = highwater = st.st_size;
- }
-
- /* Read from remote and write to local */
- write_error = read_error = write_errno = num_req = 0;
- max_req = 1;
- progress_counter = offset;
-
- if (showprogress && size != 0)
- start_progress_meter(remote_path, size, &progress_counter);
-
- while (num_req > 0 || max_req > 0) {
- char *data;
- u_int len;
-
- /*
- * Simulate EOF on interrupt: stop sending new requests and
- * allow outstanding requests to drain gracefully
- */
- if (interrupted) {
- if (num_req == 0) /* If we haven't started yet... */
- break;
- max_req = 0;
- }
-
- /* Send some more requests */
- while (num_req < max_req) {
- debug3("Request range %llu -> %llu (%d/%d)",
- (unsigned long long)offset,
- (unsigned long long)offset + buflen - 1,
- num_req, max_req);
- req = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*req));
- req->id = conn->msg_id++;
- req->len = buflen;
- req->offset = offset;
- offset += buflen;
- num_req++;
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&requests, req, tq);
- send_read_request(conn, req->id, req->offset,
- req->len, handle, handle_len);
- }
-
- buffer_clear(&msg);
- get_msg(conn, &msg);
- type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
- id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
- debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u R:%d", type, id, max_req);
-
- /* Find the request in our queue */
- for (req = TAILQ_FIRST(&requests);
- req != NULL && req->id != id;
- req = TAILQ_NEXT(req, tq))
- ;
- if (req == NULL)
- fatal("Unexpected reply %u", id);
-
- switch (type) {
- case SSH2_FXP_STATUS:
- status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
- if (status != SSH2_FX_EOF)
- read_error = 1;
- max_req = 0;
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq);
- free(req);
- num_req--;
- break;
- case SSH2_FXP_DATA:
- data = buffer_get_string(&msg, &len);
- debug3("Received data %llu -> %llu",
- (unsigned long long)req->offset,
- (unsigned long long)req->offset + len - 1);
- if (len > req->len)
- fatal("Received more data than asked for "
- "%u > %u", len, req->len);
- if ((lseek(local_fd, req->offset, SEEK_SET) == -1 ||
- atomicio(vwrite, local_fd, data, len) != len) &&
- !write_error) {
- write_errno = errno;
- write_error = 1;
- max_req = 0;
- }
- else if (!reordered && req->offset <= highwater)
- highwater = req->offset + len;
- else if (!reordered && req->offset > highwater)
- reordered = 1;
- progress_counter += len;
- free(data);
-
- if (len == req->len) {
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq);
- free(req);
- num_req--;
- } else {
- /* Resend the request for the missing data */
- debug3("Short data block, re-requesting "
- "%llu -> %llu (%2d)",
- (unsigned long long)req->offset + len,
- (unsigned long long)req->offset +
- req->len - 1, num_req);
- req->id = conn->msg_id++;
- req->len -= len;
- req->offset += len;
- send_read_request(conn, req->id,
- req->offset, req->len, handle, handle_len);
- /* Reduce the request size */
- if (len < buflen)
- buflen = MAX(MIN_READ_SIZE, len);
- }
- if (max_req > 0) { /* max_req = 0 iff EOF received */
- if (size > 0 && offset > size) {
- /* Only one request at a time
- * after the expected EOF */
- debug3("Finish at %llu (%2d)",
- (unsigned long long)offset,
- num_req);
- max_req = 1;
- } else if (max_req <= conn->num_requests) {
- ++max_req;
- }
- }
- break;
- default:
- fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_DATA(%u) packet, got %u",
- SSH2_FXP_DATA, type);
- }
- }
-
- if (showprogress && size)
- stop_progress_meter();
-
- /* Sanity check */
- if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL)
- fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue");
- /* Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt */
- if (read_error || write_error || interrupted) {
- if (reordered && resume_flag) {
- error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": "
- "server reordered requests", local_path);
- }
- debug("truncating at %llu", (unsigned long long)highwater);
- ftruncate(local_fd, highwater);
- }
- if (read_error) {
- error("Couldn't read from remote file \"%s\" : %s",
- remote_path, fx2txt(status));
- status = -1;
- do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
- } else if (write_error) {
- error("Couldn't write to \"%s\": %s", local_path,
- strerror(write_errno));
- status = -1;
- do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
- } else {
- status = do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
- if (interrupted || status != SSH2_FX_OK)
- status = -1;
- /* Override umask and utimes if asked */
-#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
- if (preserve_flag && fchmod(local_fd, mode) == -1)
-#else
- if (preserve_flag && chmod(local_path, mode) == -1)
-#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
- error("Couldn't set mode on \"%s\": %s", local_path,
- strerror(errno));
- if (preserve_flag &&
- (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME)) {
- struct timeval tv[2];
- tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime;
- tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime;
- tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
- if (utimes(local_path, tv) == -1)
- error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s",
- local_path, strerror(errno));
- }
- if (fsync_flag) {
- debug("syncing \"%s\"", local_path);
- if (fsync(local_fd) == -1)
- error("Couldn't sync file \"%s\": %s",
- local_path, strerror(errno));
- }
- }
- close(local_fd);
- buffer_free(&msg);
- free(handle);
-
- return(status);
-}
-
-static int
-download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int depth,
- Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag,
- int fsync_flag)
-{
- int i, ret = 0;
- SFTP_DIRENT **dir_entries;
- char *filename, *new_src, *new_dst;
- mode_t mode = 0777;
-
- if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) {
- error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (dirattrib == NULL &&
- (dirattrib = do_stat(conn, src, 1)) == NULL) {
- error("Unable to stat remote directory \"%s\"", src);
- return -1;
- }
- if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) {
- error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src);
- return -1;
- }
- if (print_flag)
- printf("Retrieving %s\n", src);
-
- if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
- mode = dirattrib->perm & 01777;
- else {
- debug("Server did not send permissions for "
- "directory \"%s\"", dst);
- }
-
- if (mkdir(dst, mode) == -1 && errno != EEXIST) {
- error("mkdir %s: %s", dst, strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (do_readdir(conn, src, &dir_entries) == -1) {
- error("%s: Failed to get directory contents", src);
- return -1;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; dir_entries[i] != NULL && !interrupted; i++) {
- filename = dir_entries[i]->filename;
-
- new_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
- new_src = path_append(src, filename);
-
- if (S_ISDIR(dir_entries[i]->a.perm)) {
- if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 ||
- strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
- continue;
- if (download_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst,
- depth + 1, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag,
- print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1)
- ret = -1;
- } else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ) {
- if (do_download(conn, new_src, new_dst,
- &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag,
- resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) {
- error("Download of file %s to %s failed",
- new_src, new_dst);
- ret = -1;
- }
- } else
- logit("%s: not a regular file\n", new_src);
-
- free(new_dst);
- free(new_src);
- }
-
- if (preserve_flag) {
- if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
- struct timeval tv[2];
- tv[0].tv_sec = dirattrib->atime;
- tv[1].tv_sec = dirattrib->mtime;
- tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
- if (utimes(dst, tv) == -1)
- error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s",
- dst, strerror(errno));
- } else
- debug("Server did not send times for directory "
- "\"%s\"", dst);
- }
-
- free_sftp_dirents(dir_entries);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-int
-download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst,
- Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag,
- int resume_flag, int fsync_flag)
-{
- char *src_canon;
- int ret;
-
- if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) {
- error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", src);
- return -1;
- }
-
- ret = download_dir_internal(conn, src_canon, dst, 0,
- dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag);
- free(src_canon);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int
-do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path,
- int preserve_flag, int fsync_flag)
-{
- int local_fd;
- int status = SSH2_FX_OK;
- u_int handle_len, id, type;
- off_t offset, progress_counter;
- char *handle, *data;
- Buffer msg;
- struct stat sb;
- Attrib a;
- u_int32_t startid;
- u_int32_t ackid;
- struct outstanding_ack {
- u_int id;
- u_int len;
- off_t offset;
- TAILQ_ENTRY(outstanding_ack) tq;
- };
- TAILQ_HEAD(ackhead, outstanding_ack) acks;
- struct outstanding_ack *ack = NULL;
-
- TAILQ_INIT(&acks);
-
- if ((local_fd = open(local_path, O_RDONLY, 0)) == -1) {
- error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for reading: %s",
- local_path, strerror(errno));
- return(-1);
- }
- if (fstat(local_fd, &sb) == -1) {
- error("Couldn't fstat local file \"%s\": %s",
- local_path, strerror(errno));
- close(local_fd);
- return(-1);
- }
- if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
- error("%s is not a regular file", local_path);
- close(local_fd);
- return(-1);
- }
- stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a);
-
- a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
- a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
- a.perm &= 0777;
- if (!preserve_flag)
- a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
-
- /* Send open request */
- id = conn->msg_id++;
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, remote_path);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|SSH2_FXF_TRUNC);
- encode_attrib(&msg, &a);
- send_msg(conn, &msg);
- debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path);
-
- buffer_clear(&msg);
-
- handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len,
- "remote open(\"%s\")", remote_path);
- if (handle == NULL) {
- close(local_fd);
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return -1;
- }
-
- startid = ackid = id + 1;
- data = xmalloc(conn->transfer_buflen);
-
- /* Read from local and write to remote */
- offset = progress_counter = 0;
- if (showprogress)
- start_progress_meter(local_path, sb.st_size,
- &progress_counter);
-
- for (;;) {
- int len;
-
- /*
- * Can't use atomicio here because it returns 0 on EOF,
- * thus losing the last block of the file.
- * Simulate an EOF on interrupt, allowing ACKs from the
- * server to drain.
- */
- if (interrupted || status != SSH2_FX_OK)
- len = 0;
- else do
- len = read(local_fd, data, conn->transfer_buflen);
- while ((len == -1) &&
- (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK));
-
- if (len == -1)
- fatal("Couldn't read from \"%s\": %s", local_path,
- strerror(errno));
-
- if (len != 0) {
- ack = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ack));
- ack->id = ++id;
- ack->offset = offset;
- ack->len = len;
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&acks, ack, tq);
-
- buffer_clear(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_WRITE);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, ack->id);
- buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len);
- buffer_put_int64(&msg, offset);
- buffer_put_string(&msg, data, len);
- send_msg(conn, &msg);
- debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_WRITE I:%u O:%llu S:%u",
- id, (unsigned long long)offset, len);
- } else if (TAILQ_FIRST(&acks) == NULL)
- break;
-
- if (ack == NULL)
- fatal("Unexpected ACK %u", id);
-
- if (id == startid || len == 0 ||
- id - ackid >= conn->num_requests) {
- u_int r_id;
-
- buffer_clear(&msg);
- get_msg(conn, &msg);
- type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
- r_id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
-
- if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS)
- fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%d) packet, "
- "got %d", SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type);
-
- status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
- debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %d", status);
-
- /* Find the request in our queue */
- for (ack = TAILQ_FIRST(&acks);
- ack != NULL && ack->id != r_id;
- ack = TAILQ_NEXT(ack, tq))
- ;
- if (ack == NULL)
- fatal("Can't find request for ID %u", r_id);
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&acks, ack, tq);
- debug3("In write loop, ack for %u %u bytes at %lld",
- ack->id, ack->len, (long long)ack->offset);
- ++ackid;
- progress_counter += ack->len;
- free(ack);
- }
- offset += len;
- if (offset < 0)
- fatal("%s: offset < 0", __func__);
- }
- buffer_free(&msg);
-
- if (showprogress)
- stop_progress_meter();
- free(data);
-
- if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) {
- error("Couldn't write to remote file \"%s\": %s",
- remote_path, fx2txt(status));
- status = -1;
- }
-
- if (close(local_fd) == -1) {
- error("Couldn't close local file \"%s\": %s", local_path,
- strerror(errno));
- status = -1;
- }
-
- /* Override umask and utimes if asked */
- if (preserve_flag)
- do_fsetstat(conn, handle, handle_len, &a);
-
- if (fsync_flag)
- (void)do_fsync(conn, handle, handle_len);
-
- if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != SSH2_FX_OK)
- status = -1;
- free(handle);
-
- return status;
-}
-
-static int
-upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int depth,
- int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int fsync_flag)
-{
- int ret = 0, status;
- DIR *dirp;
- struct dirent *dp;
- char *filename, *new_src, *new_dst;
- struct stat sb;
- Attrib a;
-
- if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) {
- error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (stat(src, &sb) == -1) {
- error("Couldn't stat directory \"%s\": %s",
- src, strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- if (!S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
- error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src);
- return -1;
- }
- if (print_flag)
- printf("Entering %s\n", src);
-
- attrib_clear(&a);
- stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a);
- a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
- a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
- a.perm &= 01777;
- if (!preserve_flag)
- a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME;
-
- status = do_mkdir(conn, dst, &a, 0);
- /*
- * we lack a portable status for errno EEXIST,
- * so if we get a SSH2_FX_FAILURE back we must check
- * if it was created successfully.
- */
- if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) {
- if (status != SSH2_FX_FAILURE)
- return -1;
- if (do_stat(conn, dst, 0) == NULL)
- return -1;
- }
-
- if ((dirp = opendir(src)) == NULL) {
- error("Failed to open dir \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
-
- while (((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) && !interrupted) {
- if (dp->d_ino == 0)
- continue;
- filename = dp->d_name;
- new_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
- new_src = path_append(src, filename);
-
- if (lstat(new_src, &sb) == -1) {
- logit("%s: lstat failed: %s", filename,
- strerror(errno));
- ret = -1;
- } else if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
- if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 ||
- strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
- continue;
-
- if (upload_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst,
- depth + 1, preserve_flag, print_flag,
- fsync_flag) == -1)
- ret = -1;
- } else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
- if (do_upload(conn, new_src, new_dst,
- preserve_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) {
- error("Uploading of file %s to %s failed!",
- new_src, new_dst);
- ret = -1;
- }
- } else
- logit("%s: not a regular file\n", filename);
- free(new_dst);
- free(new_src);
- }
-
- do_setstat(conn, dst, &a);
-
- (void) closedir(dirp);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int
-upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int preserve_flag,
- int print_flag, int fsync_flag)
-{
- char *dst_canon;
- int ret;
-
- if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) {
- error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", dst);
- return -1;
- }
-
- ret = upload_dir_internal(conn, src, dst_canon, 0, preserve_flag,
- print_flag, fsync_flag);
-
- free(dst_canon);
- return ret;
-}
-
-char *
-path_append(char *p1, char *p2)
-{
- char *ret;
- size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2;
-
- ret = xmalloc(len);
- strlcpy(ret, p1, len);
- if (p1[0] != '\0' && p1[strlen(p1) - 1] != '/')
- strlcat(ret, "/", len);
- strlcat(ret, p2, len);
-
- return(ret);
-}
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-client.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-client.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-client.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-client.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1898 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.124 2016/05/25 23:48:45 schwarze Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm at openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* XXX: memleaks */
+/* XXX: signed vs unsigned */
+/* XXX: remove all logging, only return status codes */
+/* XXX: copy between two remote sites */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h> /* MIN MAX */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "progressmeter.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "utf8.h"
+
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+#include "sftp-client.h"
+
+extern volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted;
+extern int showprogress;
+
+/* Minimum amount of data to read at a time */
+#define MIN_READ_SIZE 512
+
+/* Maximum depth to descend in directory trees */
+#define MAX_DIR_DEPTH 64
+
+struct sftp_conn {
+ int fd_in;
+ int fd_out;
+ u_int transfer_buflen;
+ u_int num_requests;
+ u_int version;
+ u_int msg_id;
+#define SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME 0x00000001
+#define SFTP_EXT_STATVFS 0x00000002
+#define SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS 0x00000004
+#define SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK 0x00000008
+#define SFTP_EXT_FSYNC 0x00000010
+ u_int exts;
+ u_int64_t limit_kbps;
+ struct bwlimit bwlimit_in, bwlimit_out;
+};
+
+static u_char *
+get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, size_t *len,
+ const char *errfmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5)));
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+sftpio(void *_bwlimit, size_t amount)
+{
+ struct bwlimit *bwlimit = (struct bwlimit *)_bwlimit;
+
+ bandwidth_limit(bwlimit, amount);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+send_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+ u_char mlen[4];
+ struct iovec iov[2];
+
+ if (sshbuf_len(m) > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)
+ fatal("Outbound message too long %zu", sshbuf_len(m));
+
+ /* Send length first */
+ put_u32(mlen, sshbuf_len(m));
+ iov[0].iov_base = mlen;
+ iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(mlen);
+ iov[1].iov_base = (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(m);
+ iov[1].iov_len = sshbuf_len(m);
+
+ if (atomiciov6(writev, conn->fd_out, iov, 2,
+ conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_out) !=
+ sshbuf_len(m) + sizeof(mlen))
+ fatal("Couldn't send packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+}
+
+static void
+get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+ u_int msg_len;
+ u_char *p;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, 4, &p)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, 4,
+ conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_in) != 4) {
+ if (errno == EPIPE)
+ fatal("Connection closed");
+ else
+ fatal("Couldn't read packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &msg_len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)
+ fatal("Received message too long %u", msg_len);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, msg_len,
+ conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_in)
+ != msg_len) {
+ if (errno == EPIPE)
+ fatal("Connection closed");
+ else
+ fatal("Read packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const char *s,
+ u_int len)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, s, len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ send_msg(conn, msg);
+ debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", conn->fd_out, code, id);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+static void
+send_string_attrs_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code,
+ const void *s, u_int len, Attrib *a)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, s, len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ send_msg(conn, msg);
+ debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", conn->fd_out, code, id);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+static u_int
+get_status(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_char type;
+ u_int id, status;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ get_msg(conn, msg);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ if (id != expected_id)
+ fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+ if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS)
+ fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%u) packet, got %u",
+ SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+ debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status);
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+static u_char *
+get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, size_t *len,
+ const char *errfmt, ...)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_int id, status;
+ u_char type;
+ u_char *handle;
+ char errmsg[256];
+ va_list args;
+ int r;
+
+ va_start(args, errfmt);
+ if (errfmt != NULL)
+ vsnprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), errfmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ get_msg(conn, msg);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ if (id != expected_id)
+ fatal("%s: ID mismatch (%u != %u)",
+ errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, id, expected_id);
+ if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (errfmt != NULL)
+ error("%s: %s", errmsg, fx2txt(status));
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return(NULL);
+ } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_HANDLE)
+ fatal("%s: Expected SSH2_FXP_HANDLE(%u) packet, got %u",
+ errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, type);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &handle, len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+ return handle;
+}
+
+static Attrib *
+get_decode_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, int quiet)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_int id;
+ u_char type;
+ int r;
+ static Attrib a;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ get_msg(conn, msg);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug3("Received stat reply T:%u I:%u", type, id);
+ if (id != expected_id)
+ fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+ if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+ u_int status;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (quiet)
+ debug("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status));
+ else
+ error("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status));
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return(NULL);
+ } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_ATTRS) {
+ fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_ATTRS(%u) packet, got %u",
+ SSH2_FXP_ATTRS, type);
+ }
+ if ((r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: couldn't decode attrib: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+ return &a;
+}
+
+static int
+get_decode_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sftp_statvfs *st,
+ u_int expected_id, int quiet)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_char type;
+ u_int id;
+ u_int64_t flag;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ get_msg(conn, msg);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug3("Received statvfs reply T:%u I:%u", type, id);
+ if (id != expected_id)
+ fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+ if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+ u_int status;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (quiet)
+ debug("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status));
+ else
+ error("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status));
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return -1;
+ } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY) {
+ fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY(%u) packet, got %u",
+ SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY, type);
+ }
+
+ memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bsize)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_frsize)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_blocks)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bfree)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bavail)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_files)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_ffree)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_favail)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_fsid)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &flag)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_namemax)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ st->f_flag = (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY) ? ST_RDONLY : 0;
+ st->f_flag |= (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID) ? ST_NOSUID : 0;
+
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct sftp_conn *
+do_init(int fd_in, int fd_out, u_int transfer_buflen, u_int num_requests,
+ u_int64_t limit_kbps)
+{
+ u_char type;
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ struct sftp_conn *ret;
+ int r;
+
+ ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
+ ret->msg_id = 1;
+ ret->fd_in = fd_in;
+ ret->fd_out = fd_out;
+ ret->transfer_buflen = transfer_buflen;
+ ret->num_requests = num_requests;
+ ret->exts = 0;
+ ret->limit_kbps = 0;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_INIT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ send_msg(ret, msg);
+
+ sshbuf_reset(msg);
+
+ get_msg(ret, msg);
+
+ /* Expecting a VERSION reply */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (type != SSH2_FXP_VERSION) {
+ error("Invalid packet back from SSH2_FXP_INIT (type %u)",
+ type);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ free(ret);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &ret->version)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug2("Remote version: %u", ret->version);
+
+ /* Check for extensions */
+ while (sshbuf_len(msg) > 0) {
+ char *name;
+ u_char *value;
+ size_t vlen;
+ int known = 0;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &value, &vlen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (strcmp(name, "posix-rename at openssh.com") == 0 &&
+ strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) {
+ ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME;
+ known = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "statvfs at openssh.com") == 0 &&
+ strcmp((char *)value, "2") == 0) {
+ ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_STATVFS;
+ known = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "fstatvfs at openssh.com") == 0 &&
+ strcmp((char *)value, "2") == 0) {
+ ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS;
+ known = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "hardlink at openssh.com") == 0 &&
+ strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) {
+ ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK;
+ known = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "fsync at openssh.com") == 0 &&
+ strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) {
+ ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSYNC;
+ known = 1;
+ }
+ if (known) {
+ debug2("Server supports extension \"%s\" revision %s",
+ name, value);
+ } else {
+ debug2("Unrecognised server extension \"%s\"", name);
+ }
+ free(name);
+ free(value);
+ }
+
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+ /* Some filexfer v.0 servers don't support large packets */
+ if (ret->version == 0)
+ ret->transfer_buflen = MIN(ret->transfer_buflen, 20480);
+
+ ret->limit_kbps = limit_kbps;
+ if (ret->limit_kbps > 0) {
+ bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_in, ret->limit_kbps,
+ ret->transfer_buflen);
+ bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_out, ret->limit_kbps,
+ ret->transfer_buflen);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+u_int
+sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *conn)
+{
+ return conn->version;
+}
+
+int
+do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len)
+{
+ u_int id, status;
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+
+ id = conn->msg_id++;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ send_msg(conn, msg);
+ debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_CLOSE I:%u", id);
+
+ status = get_status(conn, id);
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ error("Couldn't close file: %s", fx2txt(status));
+
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+ return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag,
+ SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_int count, id, i, expected_id, ents = 0;
+ size_t handle_len;
+ u_char type, *handle;
+ int status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ int r;
+
+ if (dir)
+ *dir = NULL;
+
+ id = conn->msg_id++;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ send_msg(conn, msg);
+
+ handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len,
+ "remote readdir(\"%s\")", path);
+ if (handle == NULL) {
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (dir) {
+ ents = 0;
+ *dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir));
+ (*dir)[0] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ for (; !interrupted;) {
+ id = expected_id = conn->msg_id++;
+
+ debug3("Sending SSH2_FXP_READDIR I:%u", id);
+
+ sshbuf_reset(msg);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_READDIR)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ send_msg(conn, msg);
+
+ sshbuf_reset(msg);
+
+ get_msg(conn, msg);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u", type, id);
+
+ if (id != expected_id)
+ fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+
+ if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+ u_int rstatus;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &rstatus)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ debug3("Received SSH2_FXP_STATUS %d", rstatus);
+ if (rstatus == SSH2_FX_EOF)
+ break;
+ error("Couldn't read directory: %s", fx2txt(rstatus));
+ goto out;
+ } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
+ fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
+ SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (count == 0)
+ break;
+ debug3("Received %d SSH2_FXP_NAME responses", count);
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ char *filename, *longname;
+ Attrib a;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename,
+ NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname,
+ NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: couldn't decode attrib: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ free(filename);
+ free(longname);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (print_flag)
+ mprintf("%s\n", longname);
+
+ /*
+ * Directory entries should never contain '/'
+ * These can be used to attack recursive ops
+ * (e.g. send '../../../../etc/passwd')
+ */
+ if (strchr(filename, '/') != NULL) {
+ error("Server sent suspect path \"%s\" "
+ "during readdir of \"%s\"", filename, path);
+ } else if (dir) {
+ *dir = xreallocarray(*dir, ents + 2, sizeof(**dir));
+ (*dir)[ents] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(***dir));
+ (*dir)[ents]->filename = xstrdup(filename);
+ (*dir)[ents]->longname = xstrdup(longname);
+ memcpy(&(*dir)[ents]->a, &a, sizeof(a));
+ (*dir)[++ents] = NULL;
+ }
+ free(filename);
+ free(longname);
+ }
+ }
+ status = 0;
+
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
+ free(handle);
+
+ if (status != 0 && dir != NULL) {
+ /* Don't return results on error */
+ free_sftp_dirents(*dir);
+ *dir = NULL;
+ } else if (interrupted && dir != NULL && *dir != NULL) {
+ /* Don't return partial matches on interrupt */
+ free_sftp_dirents(*dir);
+ *dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir));
+ **dir = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+int
+do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
+{
+ return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir));
+}
+
+void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; s[i]; i++) {
+ free(s[i]->filename);
+ free(s[i]->longname);
+ free(s[i]);
+ }
+ free(s);
+}
+
+int
+do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+{
+ u_int status, id;
+
+ debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REMOVE \"%s\"", path);
+
+ id = conn->msg_id++;
+ send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, path, strlen(path));
+ status = get_status(conn, id);
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ error("Couldn't delete file: %s", fx2txt(status));
+ return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+int
+do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a, int print_flag)
+{
+ u_int status, id;
+
+ id = conn->msg_id++;
+ send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, path,
+ strlen(path), a);
+
+ status = get_status(conn, id);
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK && print_flag)
+ error("Couldn't create directory: %s", fx2txt(status));
+
+ return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+int
+do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+{
+ u_int status, id;
+
+ id = conn->msg_id++;
+ send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, path,
+ strlen(path));
+
+ status = get_status(conn, id);
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ error("Couldn't remove directory: %s", fx2txt(status));
+
+ return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+Attrib *
+do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet)
+{
+ u_int id;
+
+ id = conn->msg_id++;
+
+ send_string_request(conn, id,
+ conn->version == 0 ? SSH2_FXP_STAT_VERSION_0 : SSH2_FXP_STAT,
+ path, strlen(path));
+
+ return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet));
+}
+
+Attrib *
+do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet)
+{
+ u_int id;
+
+ if (conn->version == 0) {
+ if (quiet)
+ debug("Server version does not support lstat operation");
+ else
+ logit("Server version does not support lstat operation");
+ return(do_stat(conn, path, quiet));
+ }
+
+ id = conn->msg_id++;
+ send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, path,
+ strlen(path));
+
+ return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet));
+}
+
+#ifdef notyet
+Attrib *
+do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len,
+ int quiet)
+{
+ u_int id;
+
+ id = conn->msg_id++;
+ send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, handle,
+ handle_len);
+
+ return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet));
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a)
+{
+ u_int status, id;
+
+ id = conn->msg_id++;
+ send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, path,
+ strlen(path), a);
+
+ status = get_status(conn, id);
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ error("Couldn't setstat on \"%s\": %s", path,
+ fx2txt(status));
+
+ return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+int
+do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len,
+ Attrib *a)
+{
+ u_int status, id;
+
+ id = conn->msg_id++;
+ send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, handle,
+ handle_len, a);
+
+ status = get_status(conn, id);
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ error("Couldn't fsetstat: %s", fx2txt(status));
+
+ return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+char *
+do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_int expected_id, count, id;
+ char *filename, *longname;
+ Attrib a;
+ u_char type;
+ int r;
+
+ expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++;
+ send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, path,
+ strlen(path));
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+
+ get_msg(conn, msg);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ if (id != expected_id)
+ fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+
+ if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+ u_int status;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status));
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return NULL;
+ } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
+ fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
+ SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (count != 1)
+ fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_REALPATH", count);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug3("SSH_FXP_REALPATH %s -> %s size %lu", path, filename,
+ (unsigned long)a.size);
+
+ free(longname);
+
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+ return(filename);
+}
+
+int
+do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath,
+ int force_legacy)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_int status, id;
+ int r, use_ext = (conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME) && !force_legacy;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+
+ /* Send rename request */
+ id = conn->msg_id++;
+ if (use_ext) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg,
+ "posix-rename at openssh.com")) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ } else {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_RENAME)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ send_msg(conn, msg);
+ debug3("Sent message %s \"%s\" -> \"%s\"",
+ use_ext ? "posix-rename at openssh.com" :
+ "SSH2_FXP_RENAME", oldpath, newpath);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+ status = get_status(conn, id);
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ error("Couldn't rename file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath,
+ newpath, fx2txt(status));
+
+ return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+int
+do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_int status, id;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK) == 0) {
+ error("Server does not support hardlink at openssh.com extension");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+
+ /* Send link request */
+ id = conn->msg_id++;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "hardlink at openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ send_msg(conn, msg);
+ debug3("Sent message hardlink at openssh.com \"%s\" -> \"%s\"",
+ oldpath, newpath);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+ status = get_status(conn, id);
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ error("Couldn't link file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath,
+ newpath, fx2txt(status));
+
+ return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+int
+do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_int status, id;
+ int r;
+
+ if (conn->version < 3) {
+ error("This server does not support the symlink operation");
+ return(SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED);
+ }
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+
+ /* Send symlink request */
+ id = conn->msg_id++;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ send_msg(conn, msg);
+ debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath,
+ newpath);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+ status = get_status(conn, id);
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ error("Couldn't symlink file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath,
+ newpath, fx2txt(status));
+
+ return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+int
+do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *handle, u_int handle_len)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_int status, id;
+ int r;
+
+ /* Silently return if the extension is not supported */
+ if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSYNC) == 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Send fsync request */
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ id = conn->msg_id++;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fsync at openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ send_msg(conn, msg);
+ debug3("Sent message fsync at openssh.com I:%u", id);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+ status = get_status(conn, id);
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ error("Couldn't sync file: %s", fx2txt(status));
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+#ifdef notyet
+char *
+do_readlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_int expected_id, count, id;
+ char *filename, *longname;
+ Attrib a;
+ u_char type;
+ int r;
+
+ expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++;
+ send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, path, strlen(path));
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+
+ get_msg(conn, msg);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ if (id != expected_id)
+ fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+
+ if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+ u_int status;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error("Couldn't readlink: %s", fx2txt(status));
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return(NULL);
+ } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
+ fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
+ SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (count != 1)
+ fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_READLINK", count);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug3("SSH_FXP_READLINK %s -> %s", path, filename);
+
+ free(longname);
+
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+ return filename;
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, struct sftp_statvfs *st,
+ int quiet)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_int id;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_STATVFS) == 0) {
+ error("Server does not support statvfs at openssh.com extension");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ id = conn->msg_id++;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ sshbuf_reset(msg);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "statvfs at openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ send_msg(conn, msg);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+ return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet);
+}
+
+#ifdef notyet
+int
+do_fstatvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len,
+ struct sftp_statvfs *st, int quiet)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_int id;
+
+ if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS) == 0) {
+ error("Server does not support fstatvfs at openssh.com extension");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ id = conn->msg_id++;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ sshbuf_reset(msg);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fstatvfs at openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ send_msg(conn, msg);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+ return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet);
+}
+#endif
+
+static void
+send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int64_t offset,
+ u_int len, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ sshbuf_reset(msg);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_READ)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, offset)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ send_msg(conn, msg);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+int
+do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path,
+ const char *local_path, Attrib *a, int preserve_flag, int resume_flag,
+ int fsync_flag)
+{
+ Attrib junk;
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_char *handle;
+ int local_fd = -1, write_error;
+ int read_error, write_errno, reordered = 0, r;
+ u_int64_t offset = 0, size, highwater;
+ u_int mode, id, buflen, num_req, max_req, status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ off_t progress_counter;
+ size_t handle_len;
+ struct stat st;
+ struct request {
+ u_int id;
+ size_t len;
+ u_int64_t offset;
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(request) tq;
+ };
+ TAILQ_HEAD(reqhead, request) requests;
+ struct request *req;
+ u_char type;
+
+ TAILQ_INIT(&requests);
+
+ if (a == NULL && (a = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Do not preserve set[ug]id here, as we do not preserve ownership */
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
+ mode = a->perm & 0777;
+ else
+ mode = 0666;
+
+ if ((a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) &&
+ (!S_ISREG(a->perm))) {
+ error("Cannot download non-regular file: %s", remote_path);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE)
+ size = a->size;
+ else
+ size = 0;
+
+ buflen = conn->transfer_buflen;
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+
+ attrib_clear(&junk); /* Send empty attributes */
+
+ /* Send open request */
+ id = conn->msg_id++;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, remote_path)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FXF_READ)) != 0 ||
+ (r = encode_attrib(msg, &junk)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ send_msg(conn, msg);
+ debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path);
+
+ handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len,
+ "remote open(\"%s\")", remote_path);
+ if (handle == NULL) {
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ local_fd = open(local_path,
+ O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | (resume_flag ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR);
+ if (local_fd == -1) {
+ error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for writing: %s",
+ local_path, strerror(errno));
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ offset = highwater = 0;
+ if (resume_flag) {
+ if (fstat(local_fd, &st) == -1) {
+ error("Unable to stat local file \"%s\": %s",
+ local_path, strerror(errno));
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (st.st_size < 0) {
+ error("\"%s\" has negative size", local_path);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((u_int64_t)st.st_size > size) {
+ error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": "
+ "local file is larger than remote", local_path);
+ fail:
+ do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ free(handle);
+ if (local_fd != -1)
+ close(local_fd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ offset = highwater = st.st_size;
+ }
+
+ /* Read from remote and write to local */
+ write_error = read_error = write_errno = num_req = 0;
+ max_req = 1;
+ progress_counter = offset;
+
+ if (showprogress && size != 0)
+ start_progress_meter(remote_path, size, &progress_counter);
+
+ while (num_req > 0 || max_req > 0) {
+ u_char *data;
+ size_t len;
+
+ /*
+ * Simulate EOF on interrupt: stop sending new requests and
+ * allow outstanding requests to drain gracefully
+ */
+ if (interrupted) {
+ if (num_req == 0) /* If we haven't started yet... */
+ break;
+ max_req = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Send some more requests */
+ while (num_req < max_req) {
+ debug3("Request range %llu -> %llu (%d/%d)",
+ (unsigned long long)offset,
+ (unsigned long long)offset + buflen - 1,
+ num_req, max_req);
+ req = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*req));
+ req->id = conn->msg_id++;
+ req->len = buflen;
+ req->offset = offset;
+ offset += buflen;
+ num_req++;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&requests, req, tq);
+ send_read_request(conn, req->id, req->offset,
+ req->len, handle, handle_len);
+ }
+
+ sshbuf_reset(msg);
+ get_msg(conn, msg);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u R:%d", type, id, max_req);
+
+ /* Find the request in our queue */
+ for (req = TAILQ_FIRST(&requests);
+ req != NULL && req->id != id;
+ req = TAILQ_NEXT(req, tq))
+ ;
+ if (req == NULL)
+ fatal("Unexpected reply %u", id);
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH2_FXP_STATUS:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_EOF)
+ read_error = 1;
+ max_req = 0;
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq);
+ free(req);
+ num_req--;
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_DATA:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &data, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ debug3("Received data %llu -> %llu",
+ (unsigned long long)req->offset,
+ (unsigned long long)req->offset + len - 1);
+ if (len > req->len)
+ fatal("Received more data than asked for "
+ "%zu > %zu", len, req->len);
+ if ((lseek(local_fd, req->offset, SEEK_SET) == -1 ||
+ atomicio(vwrite, local_fd, data, len) != len) &&
+ !write_error) {
+ write_errno = errno;
+ write_error = 1;
+ max_req = 0;
+ }
+ else if (!reordered && req->offset <= highwater)
+ highwater = req->offset + len;
+ else if (!reordered && req->offset > highwater)
+ reordered = 1;
+ progress_counter += len;
+ free(data);
+
+ if (len == req->len) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq);
+ free(req);
+ num_req--;
+ } else {
+ /* Resend the request for the missing data */
+ debug3("Short data block, re-requesting "
+ "%llu -> %llu (%2d)",
+ (unsigned long long)req->offset + len,
+ (unsigned long long)req->offset +
+ req->len - 1, num_req);
+ req->id = conn->msg_id++;
+ req->len -= len;
+ req->offset += len;
+ send_read_request(conn, req->id,
+ req->offset, req->len, handle, handle_len);
+ /* Reduce the request size */
+ if (len < buflen)
+ buflen = MAX(MIN_READ_SIZE, len);
+ }
+ if (max_req > 0) { /* max_req = 0 iff EOF received */
+ if (size > 0 && offset > size) {
+ /* Only one request at a time
+ * after the expected EOF */
+ debug3("Finish at %llu (%2d)",
+ (unsigned long long)offset,
+ num_req);
+ max_req = 1;
+ } else if (max_req <= conn->num_requests) {
+ ++max_req;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_DATA(%u) packet, got %u",
+ SSH2_FXP_DATA, type);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (showprogress && size)
+ stop_progress_meter();
+
+ /* Sanity check */
+ if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL)
+ fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue");
+ /* Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt */
+ if (read_error || write_error || interrupted) {
+ if (reordered && resume_flag) {
+ error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": "
+ "server reordered requests", local_path);
+ }
+ debug("truncating at %llu", (unsigned long long)highwater);
+ if (ftruncate(local_fd, highwater) == -1)
+ error("ftruncate \"%s\": %s", local_path,
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (read_error) {
+ error("Couldn't read from remote file \"%s\" : %s",
+ remote_path, fx2txt(status));
+ status = -1;
+ do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
+ } else if (write_error) {
+ error("Couldn't write to \"%s\": %s", local_path,
+ strerror(write_errno));
+ status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
+ } else {
+ if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != 0 || interrupted)
+ status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ else
+ status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ /* Override umask and utimes if asked */
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
+ if (preserve_flag && fchmod(local_fd, mode) == -1)
+#else
+ if (preserve_flag && chmod(local_path, mode) == -1)
+#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
+ error("Couldn't set mode on \"%s\": %s", local_path,
+ strerror(errno));
+ if (preserve_flag &&
+ (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME)) {
+ struct timeval tv[2];
+ tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime;
+ tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime;
+ tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
+ if (utimes(local_path, tv) == -1)
+ error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s",
+ local_path, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (fsync_flag) {
+ debug("syncing \"%s\"", local_path);
+ if (fsync(local_fd) == -1)
+ error("Couldn't sync file \"%s\": %s",
+ local_path, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+ close(local_fd);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ free(handle);
+
+ return(status);
+}
+
+static int
+download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+ int depth, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag,
+ int resume_flag, int fsync_flag)
+{
+ int i, ret = 0;
+ SFTP_DIRENT **dir_entries;
+ char *filename, *new_src, *new_dst;
+ mode_t mode = 0777;
+
+ if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) {
+ error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (dirattrib == NULL &&
+ (dirattrib = do_stat(conn, src, 1)) == NULL) {
+ error("Unable to stat remote directory \"%s\"", src);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) {
+ error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (print_flag)
+ mprintf("Retrieving %s\n", src);
+
+ if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
+ mode = dirattrib->perm & 01777;
+ else {
+ debug("Server did not send permissions for "
+ "directory \"%s\"", dst);
+ }
+
+ if (mkdir(dst, mode) == -1 && errno != EEXIST) {
+ error("mkdir %s: %s", dst, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (do_readdir(conn, src, &dir_entries) == -1) {
+ error("%s: Failed to get directory contents", src);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; dir_entries[i] != NULL && !interrupted; i++) {
+ filename = dir_entries[i]->filename;
+
+ new_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
+ new_src = path_append(src, filename);
+
+ if (S_ISDIR(dir_entries[i]->a.perm)) {
+ if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
+ continue;
+ if (download_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst,
+ depth + 1, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag,
+ print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1)
+ ret = -1;
+ } else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ) {
+ if (do_download(conn, new_src, new_dst,
+ &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag,
+ resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) {
+ error("Download of file %s to %s failed",
+ new_src, new_dst);
+ ret = -1;
+ }
+ } else
+ logit("%s: not a regular file\n", new_src);
+
+ free(new_dst);
+ free(new_src);
+ }
+
+ if (preserve_flag) {
+ if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+ struct timeval tv[2];
+ tv[0].tv_sec = dirattrib->atime;
+ tv[1].tv_sec = dirattrib->mtime;
+ tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
+ if (utimes(dst, tv) == -1)
+ error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s",
+ dst, strerror(errno));
+ } else
+ debug("Server did not send times for directory "
+ "\"%s\"", dst);
+ }
+
+ free_sftp_dirents(dir_entries);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+ Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag,
+ int fsync_flag)
+{
+ char *src_canon;
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) {
+ error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", src);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ret = download_dir_internal(conn, src_canon, dst, 0,
+ dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag);
+ free(src_canon);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path,
+ const char *remote_path, int preserve_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag)
+{
+ int r, local_fd;
+ u_int status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ u_int id;
+ u_char type;
+ off_t offset, progress_counter;
+ u_char *handle, *data;
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ struct stat sb;
+ Attrib a, *c = NULL;
+ u_int32_t startid;
+ u_int32_t ackid;
+ struct outstanding_ack {
+ u_int id;
+ u_int len;
+ off_t offset;
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(outstanding_ack) tq;
+ };
+ TAILQ_HEAD(ackhead, outstanding_ack) acks;
+ struct outstanding_ack *ack = NULL;
+ size_t handle_len;
+
+ TAILQ_INIT(&acks);
+
+ if ((local_fd = open(local_path, O_RDONLY, 0)) == -1) {
+ error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for reading: %s",
+ local_path, strerror(errno));
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ if (fstat(local_fd, &sb) == -1) {
+ error("Couldn't fstat local file \"%s\": %s",
+ local_path, strerror(errno));
+ close(local_fd);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
+ error("%s is not a regular file", local_path);
+ close(local_fd);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a);
+
+ a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
+ a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
+ a.perm &= 0777;
+ if (!preserve_flag)
+ a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME;
+
+ if (resume) {
+ /* Get remote file size if it exists */
+ if ((c = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL) {
+ close(local_fd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((off_t)c->size >= sb.st_size) {
+ error("destination file bigger or same size as "
+ "source file");
+ close(local_fd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (lseek(local_fd, (off_t)c->size, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
+ close(local_fd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+
+ /* Send open request */
+ id = conn->msg_id++;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, remote_path)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|
+ (resume ? SSH2_FXF_APPEND : SSH2_FXF_TRUNC))) != 0 ||
+ (r = encode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ send_msg(conn, msg);
+ debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path);
+
+ sshbuf_reset(msg);
+
+ handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len,
+ "remote open(\"%s\")", remote_path);
+ if (handle == NULL) {
+ close(local_fd);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ startid = ackid = id + 1;
+ data = xmalloc(conn->transfer_buflen);
+
+ /* Read from local and write to remote */
+ offset = progress_counter = (resume ? c->size : 0);
+ if (showprogress)
+ start_progress_meter(local_path, sb.st_size,
+ &progress_counter);
+
+ for (;;) {
+ int len;
+
+ /*
+ * Can't use atomicio here because it returns 0 on EOF,
+ * thus losing the last block of the file.
+ * Simulate an EOF on interrupt, allowing ACKs from the
+ * server to drain.
+ */
+ if (interrupted || status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ len = 0;
+ else do
+ len = read(local_fd, data, conn->transfer_buflen);
+ while ((len == -1) &&
+ (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK));
+
+ if (len == -1)
+ fatal("Couldn't read from \"%s\": %s", local_path,
+ strerror(errno));
+
+ if (len != 0) {
+ ack = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ack));
+ ack->id = ++id;
+ ack->offset = offset;
+ ack->len = len;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&acks, ack, tq);
+
+ sshbuf_reset(msg);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_WRITE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, ack->id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle,
+ handle_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, offset)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ send_msg(conn, msg);
+ debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_WRITE I:%u O:%llu S:%u",
+ id, (unsigned long long)offset, len);
+ } else if (TAILQ_FIRST(&acks) == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ if (ack == NULL)
+ fatal("Unexpected ACK %u", id);
+
+ if (id == startid || len == 0 ||
+ id - ackid >= conn->num_requests) {
+ u_int rid;
+
+ sshbuf_reset(msg);
+ get_msg(conn, msg);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &rid)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS)
+ fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%d) packet, "
+ "got %d", SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status);
+
+ /* Find the request in our queue */
+ for (ack = TAILQ_FIRST(&acks);
+ ack != NULL && ack->id != rid;
+ ack = TAILQ_NEXT(ack, tq))
+ ;
+ if (ack == NULL)
+ fatal("Can't find request for ID %u", rid);
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&acks, ack, tq);
+ debug3("In write loop, ack for %u %u bytes at %lld",
+ ack->id, ack->len, (long long)ack->offset);
+ ++ackid;
+ progress_counter += ack->len;
+ free(ack);
+ }
+ offset += len;
+ if (offset < 0)
+ fatal("%s: offset < 0", __func__);
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+ if (showprogress)
+ stop_progress_meter();
+ free(data);
+
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) {
+ error("Couldn't write to remote file \"%s\": %s",
+ remote_path, fx2txt(status));
+ status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ if (close(local_fd) == -1) {
+ error("Couldn't close local file \"%s\": %s", local_path,
+ strerror(errno));
+ status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ /* Override umask and utimes if asked */
+ if (preserve_flag)
+ do_fsetstat(conn, handle, handle_len, &a);
+
+ if (fsync_flag)
+ (void)do_fsync(conn, handle, handle_len);
+
+ if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != 0)
+ status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+ free(handle);
+
+ return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+static int
+upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+ int depth, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ DIR *dirp;
+ struct dirent *dp;
+ char *filename, *new_src, *new_dst;
+ struct stat sb;
+ Attrib a, *dirattrib;
+
+ if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) {
+ error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (stat(src, &sb) == -1) {
+ error("Couldn't stat directory \"%s\": %s",
+ src, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (!S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
+ error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (print_flag)
+ mprintf("Entering %s\n", src);
+
+ attrib_clear(&a);
+ stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a);
+ a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
+ a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
+ a.perm &= 01777;
+ if (!preserve_flag)
+ a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME;
+
+ /*
+ * sftp lacks a portable status value to match errno EEXIST,
+ * so if we get a failure back then we must check whether
+ * the path already existed and is a directory.
+ */
+ if (do_mkdir(conn, dst, &a, 0) != 0) {
+ if ((dirattrib = do_stat(conn, dst, 0)) == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) {
+ error("\"%s\" exists but is not a directory", dst);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((dirp = opendir(src)) == NULL) {
+ error("Failed to open dir \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ while (((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) && !interrupted) {
+ if (dp->d_ino == 0)
+ continue;
+ filename = dp->d_name;
+ new_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
+ new_src = path_append(src, filename);
+
+ if (lstat(new_src, &sb) == -1) {
+ logit("%s: lstat failed: %s", filename,
+ strerror(errno));
+ ret = -1;
+ } else if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
+ if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ if (upload_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst,
+ depth + 1, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume,
+ fsync_flag) == -1)
+ ret = -1;
+ } else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
+ if (do_upload(conn, new_src, new_dst,
+ preserve_flag, resume, fsync_flag) == -1) {
+ error("Uploading of file %s to %s failed!",
+ new_src, new_dst);
+ ret = -1;
+ }
+ } else
+ logit("%s: not a regular file\n", filename);
+ free(new_dst);
+ free(new_src);
+ }
+
+ do_setstat(conn, dst, &a);
+
+ (void) closedir(dirp);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+ int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag)
+{
+ char *dst_canon;
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) {
+ error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", dst);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ret = upload_dir_internal(conn, src, dst_canon, 0, preserve_flag,
+ print_flag, resume, fsync_flag);
+
+ free(dst_canon);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+char *
+path_append(const char *p1, const char *p2)
+{
+ char *ret;
+ size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2;
+
+ ret = xmalloc(len);
+ strlcpy(ret, p1, len);
+ if (p1[0] != '\0' && p1[strlen(p1) - 1] != '/')
+ strlcat(ret, "/", len);
+ strlcat(ret, p2, len);
+
+ return(ret);
+}
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-client.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-client.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-client.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.24 2013/10/17 00:30:13 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm at openbsd.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-/* Client side of SSH2 filexfer protocol */
-
-#ifndef _SFTP_CLIENT_H
-#define _SFTP_CLIENT_H
-
-typedef struct SFTP_DIRENT SFTP_DIRENT;
-
-struct SFTP_DIRENT {
- char *filename;
- char *longname;
- Attrib a;
-};
-
-/*
- * Used for statvfs responses on the wire from the server, because the
- * server's native format may be larger than the client's.
- */
-struct sftp_statvfs {
- u_int64_t f_bsize;
- u_int64_t f_frsize;
- u_int64_t f_blocks;
- u_int64_t f_bfree;
- u_int64_t f_bavail;
- u_int64_t f_files;
- u_int64_t f_ffree;
- u_int64_t f_favail;
- u_int64_t f_fsid;
- u_int64_t f_flag;
- u_int64_t f_namemax;
-};
-
-/*
- * Initialise a SSH filexfer connection. Returns NULL on error or
- * a pointer to a initialized sftp_conn struct on success.
- */
-struct sftp_conn *do_init(int, int, u_int, u_int, u_int64_t);
-
-u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *);
-
-/* Close file referred to by 'handle' */
-int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int);
-
-/* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */
-int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***);
-
-/* Frees a NULL-terminated array of SFTP_DIRENTs (eg. from do_readdir) */
-void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **);
-
-/* Delete file 'path' */
-int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
-
-/* Create directory 'path' */
-int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *, int);
-
-/* Remove directory 'path' */
-int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
-
-/* Get file attributes of 'path' (follows symlinks) */
-Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int);
-
-/* Get file attributes of 'path' (does not follow symlinks) */
-Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int);
-
-/* Set file attributes of 'path' */
-int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *);
-
-/* Set file attributes of open file 'handle' */
-int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int, Attrib *);
-
-/* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
-char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
-
-/* Get statistics for filesystem hosting file at "path" */
-int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, struct sftp_statvfs *, int);
-
-/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
-int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *m, int force_legacy);
-
-/* Link 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
-int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *);
-
-/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
-int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *);
-
-/* Call fsync() on open file 'handle' */
-int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *, u_int);
-
-/*
- * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times
- * if 'pflag' is set
- */
-int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int, int, int);
-
-/*
- * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve
- * times if 'pflag' is set
- */
-int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int,
- int, int, int);
-
-/*
- * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times
- * if 'pflag' is set
- */
-int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int, int);
-
-/*
- * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve
- * times if 'pflag' is set
- */
-int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int, int, int);
-
-/* Concatenate paths, taking care of slashes. Caller must free result. */
-char *path_append(char *, char *);
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-client.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-client.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-client.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-client.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.27 2015/05/08 06:45:13 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm at openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Client side of SSH2 filexfer protocol */
+
+#ifndef _SFTP_CLIENT_H
+#define _SFTP_CLIENT_H
+
+#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
+# include <glob.h>
+#else
+# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h"
+#endif
+
+typedef struct SFTP_DIRENT SFTP_DIRENT;
+
+struct SFTP_DIRENT {
+ char *filename;
+ char *longname;
+ Attrib a;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Used for statvfs responses on the wire from the server, because the
+ * server's native format may be larger than the client's.
+ */
+struct sftp_statvfs {
+ u_int64_t f_bsize;
+ u_int64_t f_frsize;
+ u_int64_t f_blocks;
+ u_int64_t f_bfree;
+ u_int64_t f_bavail;
+ u_int64_t f_files;
+ u_int64_t f_ffree;
+ u_int64_t f_favail;
+ u_int64_t f_fsid;
+ u_int64_t f_flag;
+ u_int64_t f_namemax;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Initialise a SSH filexfer connection. Returns NULL on error or
+ * a pointer to a initialized sftp_conn struct on success.
+ */
+struct sftp_conn *do_init(int, int, u_int, u_int, u_int64_t);
+
+u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *);
+
+/* Close file referred to by 'handle' */
+int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, const u_char *, u_int);
+
+/* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */
+int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***);
+
+/* Frees a NULL-terminated array of SFTP_DIRENTs (eg. from do_readdir) */
+void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **);
+
+/* Delete file 'path' */
+int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+
+/* Create directory 'path' */
+int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *, int);
+
+/* Remove directory 'path' */
+int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+
+/* Get file attributes of 'path' (follows symlinks) */
+Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
+
+/* Get file attributes of 'path' (does not follow symlinks) */
+Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
+
+/* Set file attributes of 'path' */
+int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *);
+
+/* Set file attributes of open file 'handle' */
+int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const u_char *, u_int, Attrib *);
+
+/* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
+char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+
+/* Get statistics for filesystem hosting file at "path" */
+int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, struct sftp_statvfs *, int);
+
+/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
+int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int force_legacy);
+
+/* Link 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
+int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
+
+/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
+int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
+
+/* Call fsync() on open file 'handle' */
+int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *, u_int);
+
+/*
+ * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times
+ * if 'pflag' is set
+ */
+int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
+ Attrib *, int, int, int);
+
+/*
+ * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve
+ * times if 'pflag' is set
+ */
+int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
+ Attrib *, int, int, int, int);
+
+/*
+ * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times
+ * if 'pflag' is set
+ */
+int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int);
+
+/*
+ * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve
+ * times if 'pflag' is set
+ */
+int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int,
+ int);
+
+/* Concatenate paths, taking care of slashes. Caller must free result. */
+char *path_append(const char *, const char *);
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-common.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-common.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-common.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,236 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.c,v 1.26 2014/01/09 03:26:00 guenther Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-
-#include <grp.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
-#include <util.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-#include "sftp.h"
-#include "sftp-common.h"
-
-/* Clear contents of attributes structure */
-void
-attrib_clear(Attrib *a)
-{
- a->flags = 0;
- a->size = 0;
- a->uid = 0;
- a->gid = 0;
- a->perm = 0;
- a->atime = 0;
- a->mtime = 0;
-}
-
-/* Convert from struct stat to filexfer attribs */
-void
-stat_to_attrib(const struct stat *st, Attrib *a)
-{
- attrib_clear(a);
- a->flags = 0;
- a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
- a->size = st->st_size;
- a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
- a->uid = st->st_uid;
- a->gid = st->st_gid;
- a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
- a->perm = st->st_mode;
- a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME;
- a->atime = st->st_atime;
- a->mtime = st->st_mtime;
-}
-
-/* Convert from filexfer attribs to struct stat */
-void
-attrib_to_stat(const Attrib *a, struct stat *st)
-{
- memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
-
- if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE)
- st->st_size = a->size;
- if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
- st->st_uid = a->uid;
- st->st_gid = a->gid;
- }
- if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
- st->st_mode = a->perm;
- if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
- st->st_atime = a->atime;
- st->st_mtime = a->mtime;
- }
-}
-
-/* Decode attributes in buffer */
-Attrib *
-decode_attrib(Buffer *b)
-{
- static Attrib a;
-
- attrib_clear(&a);
- a.flags = buffer_get_int(b);
- if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE)
- a.size = buffer_get_int64(b);
- if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
- a.uid = buffer_get_int(b);
- a.gid = buffer_get_int(b);
- }
- if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
- a.perm = buffer_get_int(b);
- if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
- a.atime = buffer_get_int(b);
- a.mtime = buffer_get_int(b);
- }
- /* vendor-specific extensions */
- if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED) {
- char *type, *data;
- int i, count;
-
- count = buffer_get_int(b);
- for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- type = buffer_get_string(b, NULL);
- data = buffer_get_string(b, NULL);
- debug3("Got file attribute \"%s\"", type);
- free(type);
- free(data);
- }
- }
- return &a;
-}
-
-/* Encode attributes to buffer */
-void
-encode_attrib(Buffer *b, const Attrib *a)
-{
- buffer_put_int(b, a->flags);
- if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE)
- buffer_put_int64(b, a->size);
- if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
- buffer_put_int(b, a->uid);
- buffer_put_int(b, a->gid);
- }
- if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
- buffer_put_int(b, a->perm);
- if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
- buffer_put_int(b, a->atime);
- buffer_put_int(b, a->mtime);
- }
-}
-
-/* Convert from SSH2_FX_ status to text error message */
-const char *
-fx2txt(int status)
-{
- switch (status) {
- case SSH2_FX_OK:
- return("No error");
- case SSH2_FX_EOF:
- return("End of file");
- case SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE:
- return("No such file or directory");
- case SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED:
- return("Permission denied");
- case SSH2_FX_FAILURE:
- return("Failure");
- case SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE:
- return("Bad message");
- case SSH2_FX_NO_CONNECTION:
- return("No connection");
- case SSH2_FX_CONNECTION_LOST:
- return("Connection lost");
- case SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED:
- return("Operation unsupported");
- default:
- return("Unknown status");
- }
- /* NOTREACHED */
-}
-
-/*
- * drwxr-xr-x 5 markus markus 1024 Jan 13 18:39 .ssh
- */
-char *
-ls_file(const char *name, const struct stat *st, int remote, int si_units)
-{
- int ulen, glen, sz = 0;
- struct tm *ltime = localtime(&st->st_mtime);
- char *user, *group;
- char buf[1024], mode[11+1], tbuf[12+1], ubuf[11+1], gbuf[11+1];
- char sbuf[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
- time_t now;
-
- strmode(st->st_mode, mode);
- if (!remote) {
- user = user_from_uid(st->st_uid, 0);
- } else {
- snprintf(ubuf, sizeof ubuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_uid);
- user = ubuf;
- }
- if (!remote) {
- group = group_from_gid(st->st_gid, 0);
- } else {
- snprintf(gbuf, sizeof gbuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_gid);
- group = gbuf;
- }
- if (ltime != NULL) {
- now = time(NULL);
- if (now - (365*24*60*60)/2 < st->st_mtime &&
- now >= st->st_mtime)
- sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e %H:%M", ltime);
- else
- sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e %Y", ltime);
- }
- if (sz == 0)
- tbuf[0] = '\0';
- ulen = MAX(strlen(user), 8);
- glen = MAX(strlen(group), 8);
- if (si_units) {
- fmt_scaled((long long)st->st_size, sbuf);
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s %3u %-*s %-*s %8s %s %s", mode,
- (u_int)st->st_nlink, ulen, user, glen, group,
- sbuf, tbuf, name);
- } else {
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s %3u %-*s %-*s %8llu %s %s", mode,
- (u_int)st->st_nlink, ulen, user, glen, group,
- (unsigned long long)st->st_size, tbuf, name);
- }
- return xstrdup(buf);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-common.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-common.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-common.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-common.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.c,v 1.28 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h> /* MAX */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+#include <util.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+
+/* Clear contents of attributes structure */
+void
+attrib_clear(Attrib *a)
+{
+ a->flags = 0;
+ a->size = 0;
+ a->uid = 0;
+ a->gid = 0;
+ a->perm = 0;
+ a->atime = 0;
+ a->mtime = 0;
+}
+
+/* Convert from struct stat to filexfer attribs */
+void
+stat_to_attrib(const struct stat *st, Attrib *a)
+{
+ attrib_clear(a);
+ a->flags = 0;
+ a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
+ a->size = st->st_size;
+ a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
+ a->uid = st->st_uid;
+ a->gid = st->st_gid;
+ a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
+ a->perm = st->st_mode;
+ a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME;
+ a->atime = st->st_atime;
+ a->mtime = st->st_mtime;
+}
+
+/* Convert from filexfer attribs to struct stat */
+void
+attrib_to_stat(const Attrib *a, struct stat *st)
+{
+ memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
+
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE)
+ st->st_size = a->size;
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+ st->st_uid = a->uid;
+ st->st_gid = a->gid;
+ }
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
+ st->st_mode = a->perm;
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+ st->st_atime = a->atime;
+ st->st_mtime = a->mtime;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Decode attributes in buffer */
+int
+decode_attrib(struct sshbuf *b, Attrib *a)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ attrib_clear(a);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->flags)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &a->size)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->uid)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->gid)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->perm)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->atime)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->mtime)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ /* vendor-specific extensions */
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED) {
+ char *type;
+ u_char *data;
+ size_t dlen;
+ u_int i, count;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &count)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &type, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &data, &dlen)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ debug3("Got file attribute \"%.100s\" len %zu",
+ type, dlen);
+ free(type);
+ free(data);
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Encode attributes to buffer */
+int
+encode_attrib(struct sshbuf *b, const Attrib *a)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->flags)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(b, a->size)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->uid)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->gid)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->perm)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->atime)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->mtime)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Convert from SSH2_FX_ status to text error message */
+const char *
+fx2txt(int status)
+{
+ switch (status) {
+ case SSH2_FX_OK:
+ return("No error");
+ case SSH2_FX_EOF:
+ return("End of file");
+ case SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE:
+ return("No such file or directory");
+ case SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED:
+ return("Permission denied");
+ case SSH2_FX_FAILURE:
+ return("Failure");
+ case SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE:
+ return("Bad message");
+ case SSH2_FX_NO_CONNECTION:
+ return("No connection");
+ case SSH2_FX_CONNECTION_LOST:
+ return("Connection lost");
+ case SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED:
+ return("Operation unsupported");
+ default:
+ return("Unknown status");
+ }
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+/*
+ * drwxr-xr-x 5 markus markus 1024 Jan 13 18:39 .ssh
+ */
+char *
+ls_file(const char *name, const struct stat *st, int remote, int si_units)
+{
+ int ulen, glen, sz = 0;
+ struct tm *ltime = localtime(&st->st_mtime);
+ char *user, *group;
+ char buf[1024], mode[11+1], tbuf[12+1], ubuf[11+1], gbuf[11+1];
+ char sbuf[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+ time_t now;
+
+ strmode(st->st_mode, mode);
+ if (!remote) {
+ user = user_from_uid(st->st_uid, 0);
+ } else {
+ snprintf(ubuf, sizeof ubuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_uid);
+ user = ubuf;
+ }
+ if (!remote) {
+ group = group_from_gid(st->st_gid, 0);
+ } else {
+ snprintf(gbuf, sizeof gbuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_gid);
+ group = gbuf;
+ }
+ if (ltime != NULL) {
+ now = time(NULL);
+ if (now - (365*24*60*60)/2 < st->st_mtime &&
+ now >= st->st_mtime)
+ sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e %H:%M", ltime);
+ else
+ sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e %Y", ltime);
+ }
+ if (sz == 0)
+ tbuf[0] = '\0';
+ ulen = MAX(strlen(user), 8);
+ glen = MAX(strlen(group), 8);
+ if (si_units) {
+ fmt_scaled((long long)st->st_size, sbuf);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s %3u %-*s %-*s %8s %s %s", mode,
+ (u_int)st->st_nlink, ulen, user, glen, group,
+ sbuf, tbuf, name);
+ } else {
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s %3u %-*s %-*s %8llu %s %s", mode,
+ (u_int)st->st_nlink, ulen, user, glen, group,
+ (unsigned long long)st->st_size, tbuf, name);
+ }
+ return xstrdup(buf);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-common.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-common.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-common.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.h,v 1.11 2010/01/13 01:40:16 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-/* Maximum packet that we are willing to send/accept */
-#define SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH (256 * 1024)
-
-typedef struct Attrib Attrib;
-
-/* File attributes */
-struct Attrib {
- u_int32_t flags;
- u_int64_t size;
- u_int32_t uid;
- u_int32_t gid;
- u_int32_t perm;
- u_int32_t atime;
- u_int32_t mtime;
-};
-
-void attrib_clear(Attrib *);
-void stat_to_attrib(const struct stat *, Attrib *);
-void attrib_to_stat(const Attrib *, struct stat *);
-Attrib *decode_attrib(Buffer *);
-void encode_attrib(Buffer *, const Attrib *);
-char *ls_file(const char *, const struct stat *, int, int);
-
-const char *fx2txt(int);
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-common.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-common.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-common.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-common.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.h,v 1.12 2015/01/14 13:54:13 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* Maximum packet that we are willing to send/accept */
+#define SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH (256 * 1024)
+
+struct sshbuf;
+typedef struct Attrib Attrib;
+
+/* File attributes */
+struct Attrib {
+ u_int32_t flags;
+ u_int64_t size;
+ u_int32_t uid;
+ u_int32_t gid;
+ u_int32_t perm;
+ u_int32_t atime;
+ u_int32_t mtime;
+};
+
+void attrib_clear(Attrib *);
+void stat_to_attrib(const struct stat *, Attrib *);
+void attrib_to_stat(const Attrib *, struct stat *);
+int decode_attrib(struct sshbuf *, Attrib *);
+int encode_attrib(struct sshbuf *, const Attrib *);
+char *ls_file(const char *, const struct stat *, int, int);
+
+const char *fx2txt(int);
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-glob.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-glob.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-glob.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-glob.c,v 1.26 2013/11/08 11:15:19 dtucker Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm at openbsd.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
-# include <sys/stat.h>
-#endif
-
-#include <dirent.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "sftp.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "sftp-common.h"
-#include "sftp-client.h"
-
-int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
- int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *);
-
-struct SFTP_OPENDIR {
- SFTP_DIRENT **dir;
- int offset;
-};
-
-static struct {
- struct sftp_conn *conn;
-} cur;
-
-static void *
-fudge_opendir(const char *path)
-{
- struct SFTP_OPENDIR *r;
-
- r = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*r));
-
- if (do_readdir(cur.conn, (char *)path, &r->dir)) {
- free(r);
- return(NULL);
- }
-
- r->offset = 0;
-
- return((void *)r);
-}
-
-static struct dirent *
-fudge_readdir(struct SFTP_OPENDIR *od)
-{
- /* Solaris needs sizeof(dirent) + path length (see below) */
- static char buf[sizeof(struct dirent) + MAXPATHLEN];
- struct dirent *ret = (struct dirent *)buf;
-#ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__
- static int inum = 1;
-#endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */
-
- if (od->dir[od->offset] == NULL)
- return(NULL);
-
- memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
-
- /*
- * Solaris defines dirent->d_name as a one byte array and expects
- * you to hack around it.
- */
-#ifdef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME
- strlcpy(ret->d_name, od->dir[od->offset++]->filename, MAXPATHLEN);
-#else
- strlcpy(ret->d_name, od->dir[od->offset++]->filename,
- sizeof(ret->d_name));
-#endif
-#ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__
- /*
- * Idiot glibc uses extensions to struct dirent for readdir with
- * ALTDIRFUNCs. Not that this is documented anywhere but the
- * source... Fake an inode number to appease it.
- */
- ret->d_ino = inum++;
- if (!inum)
- inum = 1;
-#endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */
-
- return(ret);
-}
-
-static void
-fudge_closedir(struct SFTP_OPENDIR *od)
-{
- free_sftp_dirents(od->dir);
- free(od);
-}
-
-static int
-fudge_lstat(const char *path, struct stat *st)
-{
- Attrib *a;
-
- if (!(a = do_lstat(cur.conn, (char *)path, 1)))
- return(-1);
-
- attrib_to_stat(a, st);
-
- return(0);
-}
-
-static int
-fudge_stat(const char *path, struct stat *st)
-{
- Attrib *a;
-
- if (!(a = do_stat(cur.conn, (char *)path, 1)))
- return(-1);
-
- attrib_to_stat(a, st);
-
- return(0);
-}
-
-int
-remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *pattern, int flags,
- int (*errfunc)(const char *, int), glob_t *pglob)
-{
- pglob->gl_opendir = fudge_opendir;
- pglob->gl_readdir = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))fudge_readdir;
- pglob->gl_closedir = (void (*)(void *))fudge_closedir;
- pglob->gl_lstat = fudge_lstat;
- pglob->gl_stat = fudge_stat;
-
- memset(&cur, 0, sizeof(cur));
- cur.conn = conn;
-
- return(glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc, pglob));
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-glob.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-glob.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-glob.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-glob.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-glob.c,v 1.27 2015/01/14 13:54:13 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm at openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+#include "sftp-client.h"
+
+int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
+ int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *);
+
+struct SFTP_OPENDIR {
+ SFTP_DIRENT **dir;
+ int offset;
+};
+
+static struct {
+ struct sftp_conn *conn;
+} cur;
+
+static void *
+fudge_opendir(const char *path)
+{
+ struct SFTP_OPENDIR *r;
+
+ r = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*r));
+
+ if (do_readdir(cur.conn, (char *)path, &r->dir)) {
+ free(r);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+ r->offset = 0;
+
+ return((void *)r);
+}
+
+static struct dirent *
+fudge_readdir(struct SFTP_OPENDIR *od)
+{
+ /* Solaris needs sizeof(dirent) + path length (see below) */
+ static char buf[sizeof(struct dirent) + MAXPATHLEN];
+ struct dirent *ret = (struct dirent *)buf;
+#ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__
+ static int inum = 1;
+#endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */
+
+ if (od->dir[od->offset] == NULL)
+ return(NULL);
+
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+
+ /*
+ * Solaris defines dirent->d_name as a one byte array and expects
+ * you to hack around it.
+ */
+#ifdef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME
+ strlcpy(ret->d_name, od->dir[od->offset++]->filename, MAXPATHLEN);
+#else
+ strlcpy(ret->d_name, od->dir[od->offset++]->filename,
+ sizeof(ret->d_name));
+#endif
+#ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__
+ /*
+ * Idiot glibc uses extensions to struct dirent for readdir with
+ * ALTDIRFUNCs. Not that this is documented anywhere but the
+ * source... Fake an inode number to appease it.
+ */
+ ret->d_ino = inum++;
+ if (!inum)
+ inum = 1;
+#endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */
+
+ return(ret);
+}
+
+static void
+fudge_closedir(struct SFTP_OPENDIR *od)
+{
+ free_sftp_dirents(od->dir);
+ free(od);
+}
+
+static int
+fudge_lstat(const char *path, struct stat *st)
+{
+ Attrib *a;
+
+ if (!(a = do_lstat(cur.conn, (char *)path, 1)))
+ return(-1);
+
+ attrib_to_stat(a, st);
+
+ return(0);
+}
+
+static int
+fudge_stat(const char *path, struct stat *st)
+{
+ Attrib *a;
+
+ if (!(a = do_stat(cur.conn, (char *)path, 1)))
+ return(-1);
+
+ attrib_to_stat(a, st);
+
+ return(0);
+}
+
+int
+remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *pattern, int flags,
+ int (*errfunc)(const char *, int), glob_t *pglob)
+{
+ pglob->gl_opendir = fudge_opendir;
+ pglob->gl_readdir = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))fudge_readdir;
+ pglob->gl_closedir = (void (*)(void *))fudge_closedir;
+ pglob->gl_lstat = fudge_lstat;
+ pglob->gl_stat = fudge_stat;
+
+ memset(&cur, 0, sizeof(cur));
+ cur.conn = conn;
+
+ return(glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc, pglob));
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server-main.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-server-main.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server-main.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server-main.c,v 1.4 2009/02/21 19:32:04 tobias Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2008 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "log.h"
-#include "sftp.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-
-void
-cleanup_exit(int i)
-{
- sftp_server_cleanup_exit(i);
-}
-
-int
-main(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- struct passwd *user_pw;
-
- /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
- sanitise_stdfd();
-
- if ((user_pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "No user found for uid %lu\n",
- (u_long)getuid());
- return 1;
- }
-
- return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server-main.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-server-main.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server-main.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server-main.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server-main.c,v 1.5 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+ sftp_server_cleanup_exit(i);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ struct passwd *user_pw;
+
+ ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
+ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+ sanitise_stdfd();
+
+ if ((user_pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "No user found for uid %lu\n",
+ (u_long)getuid());
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server.0
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-server.0 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-SFTP-SERVER(8) OpenBSD System Manager's Manual SFTP-SERVER(8)
-
-NAME
- sftp-server - SFTP server subsystem
-
-SYNOPSIS
- sftp-server [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] [-l log_level]
- [-P blacklisted_requests] [-p whitelisted_requests]
- [-u umask]
- sftp-server -Q protocol_feature
-
-DESCRIPTION
- sftp-server is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol to
- stdout and expects client requests from stdin. sftp-server is not
- intended to be called directly, but from sshd(8) using the Subsystem
- option.
-
- Command-line flags to sftp-server should be specified in the Subsystem
- declaration. See sshd_config(5) for more information.
-
- Valid options are:
-
- -d start_directory
- specifies an alternate starting directory for users. The
- pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at
- runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the
- home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is
- replaced by the username of that user. The default is to use the
- user's home directory. This option is useful in conjunction with
- the sshd_config(5) ChrootDirectory option.
-
- -e Causes sftp-server to print logging information to stderr instead
- of syslog for debugging.
-
- -f log_facility
- Specifies the facility code that is used when logging messages
- from sftp-server. The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH,
- LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
- The default is AUTH.
-
- -h Displays sftp-server usage information.
-
- -l log_level
- Specifies which messages will be logged by sftp-server. The
- possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG,
- DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. INFO and VERBOSE log transactions
- that sftp-server performs on behalf of the client. DEBUG and
- DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher
- levels of debugging output. The default is ERROR.
-
- -P blacklisted_requests
- Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are
- banned by the server. sftp-server will reply to any blacklisted
- request with a failure. The -Q flag can be used to determine the
- supported request types. If both a blacklist and a whitelist are
- specified, then the blacklist is applied before the whitelist.
-
- -p whitelisted_requests
- Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are
- permitted by the server. All request types that are not on the
- whitelist will be logged and replied to with a failure message.
-
- Care must be taken when using this feature to ensure that
- requests made implicitly by SFTP clients are permitted.
-
- -Q protocol_feature
- Query protocol features supported by sftp-server. At present the
- only feature that may be queried is ``requests'', which may be
- used for black or whitelisting (flags -P and -p respectively).
-
- -R Places this instance of sftp-server into a read-only mode.
- Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations
- that change the state of the filesystem, will be denied.
-
- -u umask
- Sets an explicit umask(2) to be applied to newly-created files
- and directories, instead of the user's default mask.
-
- For logging to work, sftp-server must be able to access /dev/log. Use of
- sftp-server in a chroot configuration therefore requires that syslogd(8)
- establish a logging socket inside the chroot directory.
-
-SEE ALSO
- sftp(1), ssh(1), sshd_config(5), sshd(8)
-
- T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh-
- filexfer-02.txt, October 2001, work in progress material.
-
-HISTORY
- sftp-server first appeared in OpenBSD 2.8.
-
-AUTHORS
- Markus Friedl <markus at openbsd.org>
-
-OpenBSD 5.5 October 14, 2013 OpenBSD 5.5
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server.0 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-server.0)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server.0 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+SFTP-SERVER(8) System Manager's Manual SFTP-SERVER(8)
+
+NAME
+ sftp-server M-bM-^@M-^S SFTP server subsystem
+
+SYNOPSIS
+ sftp-server [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] [-l log_level]
+ [-P blacklisted_requests] [-p whitelisted_requests]
+ [-u umask]
+ sftp-server -Q protocol_feature
+
+DESCRIPTION
+ sftp-server is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol to
+ stdout and expects client requests from stdin. sftp-server is not
+ intended to be called directly, but from sshd(8) using the Subsystem
+ option.
+
+ Command-line flags to sftp-server should be specified in the Subsystem
+ declaration. See sshd_config(5) for more information.
+
+ Valid options are:
+
+ -d start_directory
+ specifies an alternate starting directory for users. The
+ pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at
+ runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %d is replaced by the
+ home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is
+ replaced by the username of that user. The default is to use the
+ user's home directory. This option is useful in conjunction with
+ the sshd_config(5) ChrootDirectory option.
+
+ -e Causes sftp-server to print logging information to stderr instead
+ of syslog for debugging.
+
+ -f log_facility
+ Specifies the facility code that is used when logging messages
+ from sftp-server. The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH,
+ LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+ The default is AUTH.
+
+ -h Displays sftp-server usage information.
+
+ -l log_level
+ Specifies which messages will be logged by sftp-server. The
+ possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG,
+ DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. INFO and VERBOSE log transactions
+ that sftp-server performs on behalf of the client. DEBUG and
+ DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher
+ levels of debugging output. The default is ERROR.
+
+ -P blacklisted_requests
+ Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are
+ banned by the server. sftp-server will reply to any blacklisted
+ request with a failure. The -Q flag can be used to determine the
+ supported request types. If both a blacklist and a whitelist are
+ specified, then the blacklist is applied before the whitelist.
+
+ -p whitelisted_requests
+ Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are
+ permitted by the server. All request types that are not on the
+ whitelist will be logged and replied to with a failure message.
+
+ Care must be taken when using this feature to ensure that
+ requests made implicitly by SFTP clients are permitted.
+
+ -Q protocol_feature
+ Query protocol features supported by sftp-server. At present the
+ only feature that may be queried is M-bM-^@M-^\requestsM-bM-^@M-^], which may be used
+ for black or whitelisting (flags -P and -p respectively).
+
+ -R Places this instance of sftp-server into a read-only mode.
+ Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations
+ that change the state of the filesystem, will be denied.
+
+ -u umask
+ Sets an explicit umask(2) to be applied to newly-created files
+ and directories, instead of the user's default mask.
+
+ On some systems, sftp-server must be able to access /dev/log for logging
+ to work, and use of sftp-server in a chroot configuration therefore
+ requires that syslogd(8) establish a logging socket inside the chroot
+ directory.
+
+SEE ALSO
+ sftp(1), ssh(1), sshd_config(5), sshd(8)
+
+ T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh-
+ filexfer-02.txt, October 2001, work in progress material.
+
+HISTORY
+ sftp-server first appeared in OpenBSD 2.8.
+
+AUTHORS
+ Markus Friedl <markus at openbsd.org>
+
+OpenBSD 6.0 December 11, 2014 OpenBSD 6.0
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server.8
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-server.8 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server.8 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.25 2013/10/14 14:18:56 jmc Exp $
-.\"
-.\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
-.\"
-.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-.\" are met:
-.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-.\"
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: October 14 2013 $
-.Dt SFTP-SERVER 8
-.Os
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm sftp-server
-.Nd SFTP server subsystem
-.Sh SYNOPSIS
-.Nm sftp-server
-.Bk -words
-.Op Fl ehR
-.Op Fl d Ar start_directory
-.Op Fl f Ar log_facility
-.Op Fl l Ar log_level
-.Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
-.Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
-.Op Fl u Ar umask
-.Ek
-.Nm
-.Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-.Nm
-is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol
-to stdout and expects client requests from stdin.
-.Nm
-is not intended to be called directly, but from
-.Xr sshd 8
-using the
-.Cm Subsystem
-option.
-.Pp
-Command-line flags to
-.Nm
-should be specified in the
-.Cm Subsystem
-declaration.
-See
-.Xr sshd_config 5
-for more information.
-.Pp
-Valid options are:
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Fl d Ar start_directory
-specifies an alternate starting directory for users.
-The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime:
-%% is replaced by a literal '%',
-%h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated,
-and %u is replaced by the username of that user.
-The default is to use the user's home directory.
-This option is useful in conjunction with the
-.Xr sshd_config 5
-.Cm ChrootDirectory
-option.
-.It Fl e
-Causes
-.Nm
-to print logging information to stderr instead of syslog for debugging.
-.It Fl f Ar log_facility
-Specifies the facility code that is used when logging messages from
-.Nm .
-The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
-LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
-The default is AUTH.
-.It Fl h
-Displays
-.Nm
-usage information.
-.It Fl l Ar log_level
-Specifies which messages will be logged by
-.Nm .
-The possible values are:
-QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
-INFO and VERBOSE log transactions that
-.Nm
-performs on behalf of the client.
-DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
-DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
-The default is ERROR.
-.It Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
-Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are banned by
-the server.
-.Nm
-will reply to any blacklisted request with a failure.
-The
-.Fl Q
-flag can be used to determine the supported request types.
-If both a blacklist and a whitelist are specified, then the blacklist is
-applied before the whitelist.
-.It Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
-Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are permitted
-by the server.
-All request types that are not on the whitelist will be logged and replied
-to with a failure message.
-.Pp
-Care must be taken when using this feature to ensure that requests made
-implicitly by SFTP clients are permitted.
-.It Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
-Query protocol features supported by
-.Nm .
-At present the only feature that may be queried is
-.Dq requests ,
-which may be used for black or whitelisting (flags
-.Fl P
-and
-.Fl p
-respectively).
-.It Fl R
-Places this instance of
-.Nm
-into a read-only mode.
-Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations that change
-the state of the filesystem, will be denied.
-.It Fl u Ar umask
-Sets an explicit
-.Xr umask 2
-to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
-user's default mask.
-.El
-.Pp
-For logging to work,
-.Nm
-must be able to access
-.Pa /dev/log .
-Use of
-.Nm
-in a chroot configuration therefore requires that
-.Xr syslogd 8
-establish a logging socket inside the chroot directory.
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr sftp 1 ,
-.Xr ssh 1 ,
-.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
-.Xr sshd 8
-.Rs
-.%A T. Ylonen
-.%A S. Lehtinen
-.%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol"
-.%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt
-.%D October 2001
-.%O work in progress material
-.Re
-.Sh HISTORY
-.Nm
-first appeared in
-.Ox 2.8 .
-.Sh AUTHORS
-.An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus at openbsd.org
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server.8 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-server.8)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server.8 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server.8 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.27 2014/12/11 04:16:14 djm Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd $Mdocdate: December 11 2014 $
+.Dt SFTP-SERVER 8
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm sftp-server
+.Nd SFTP server subsystem
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm sftp-server
+.Bk -words
+.Op Fl ehR
+.Op Fl d Ar start_directory
+.Op Fl f Ar log_facility
+.Op Fl l Ar log_level
+.Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
+.Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
+.Op Fl u Ar umask
+.Ek
+.Nm
+.Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol
+to stdout and expects client requests from stdin.
+.Nm
+is not intended to be called directly, but from
+.Xr sshd 8
+using the
+.Cm Subsystem
+option.
+.Pp
+Command-line flags to
+.Nm
+should be specified in the
+.Cm Subsystem
+declaration.
+See
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+for more information.
+.Pp
+Valid options are:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl d Ar start_directory
+specifies an alternate starting directory for users.
+The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime:
+%% is replaced by a literal '%',
+%d is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated,
+and %u is replaced by the username of that user.
+The default is to use the user's home directory.
+This option is useful in conjunction with the
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+.Cm ChrootDirectory
+option.
+.It Fl e
+Causes
+.Nm
+to print logging information to stderr instead of syslog for debugging.
+.It Fl f Ar log_facility
+Specifies the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+.Nm .
+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+The default is AUTH.
+.It Fl h
+Displays
+.Nm
+usage information.
+.It Fl l Ar log_level
+Specifies which messages will be logged by
+.Nm .
+The possible values are:
+QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
+INFO and VERBOSE log transactions that
+.Nm
+performs on behalf of the client.
+DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
+The default is ERROR.
+.It Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
+Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are banned by
+the server.
+.Nm
+will reply to any blacklisted request with a failure.
+The
+.Fl Q
+flag can be used to determine the supported request types.
+If both a blacklist and a whitelist are specified, then the blacklist is
+applied before the whitelist.
+.It Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
+Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are permitted
+by the server.
+All request types that are not on the whitelist will be logged and replied
+to with a failure message.
+.Pp
+Care must be taken when using this feature to ensure that requests made
+implicitly by SFTP clients are permitted.
+.It Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
+Query protocol features supported by
+.Nm .
+At present the only feature that may be queried is
+.Dq requests ,
+which may be used for black or whitelisting (flags
+.Fl P
+and
+.Fl p
+respectively).
+.It Fl R
+Places this instance of
+.Nm
+into a read-only mode.
+Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations that change
+the state of the filesystem, will be denied.
+.It Fl u Ar umask
+Sets an explicit
+.Xr umask 2
+to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
+user's default mask.
+.El
+.Pp
+On some systems,
+.Nm
+must be able to access
+.Pa /dev/log
+for logging to work, and use of
+.Nm
+in a chroot configuration therefore requires that
+.Xr syslogd 8
+establish a logging socket inside the chroot directory.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr sftp 1 ,
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A S. Lehtinen
+.%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol"
+.%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt
+.%D October 2001
+.%O work in progress material
+.Re
+.Sh HISTORY
+.Nm
+first appeared in
+.Ox 2.8 .
+.Sh AUTHORS
+.An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus at openbsd.org
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-server.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1624 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.103 2014/01/17 06:23:24 dtucker Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
-#include <sys/mount.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
-#include <sys/statvfs.h>
-#endif
-
-#include <dirent.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-
-#include "sftp.h"
-#include "sftp-common.h"
-
-/* helper */
-#define get_int64() buffer_get_int64(&iqueue);
-#define get_int() buffer_get_int(&iqueue);
-#define get_string(lenp) buffer_get_string(&iqueue, lenp);
-
-/* Our verbosity */
-static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
-
-/* Our client */
-static struct passwd *pw = NULL;
-static char *client_addr = NULL;
-
-/* input and output queue */
-static Buffer iqueue;
-static Buffer oqueue;
-
-/* Version of client */
-static u_int version;
-
-/* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
-static int init_done;
-
-/* Disable writes */
-static int readonly;
-
-/* Requests that are allowed/denied */
-static char *request_whitelist, *request_blacklist;
-
-/* portable attributes, etc. */
-typedef struct Stat Stat;
-
-struct Stat {
- char *name;
- char *long_name;
- Attrib attrib;
-};
-
-/* Packet handlers */
-static void process_open(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_close(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_read(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_write(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_stat(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_lstat(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_fstat(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_setstat(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_opendir(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_readdir(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_remove(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_mkdir(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_rmdir(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_realpath(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_rename(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_readlink(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_symlink(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id);
-static void process_extended(u_int32_t id);
-
-struct sftp_handler {
- const char *name; /* user-visible name for fine-grained perms */
- const char *ext_name; /* extended request name */
- u_int type; /* packet type, for non extended packets */
- void (*handler)(u_int32_t);
- int does_write; /* if nonzero, banned for readonly mode */
-};
-
-struct sftp_handler handlers[] = {
- /* NB. SSH2_FXP_OPEN does the readonly check in the handler itself */
- { "open", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPEN, process_open, 0 },
- { "close", NULL, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE, process_close, 0 },
- { "read", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READ, process_read, 0 },
- { "write", NULL, SSH2_FXP_WRITE, process_write, 1 },
- { "lstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, process_lstat, 0 },
- { "fstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, process_fstat, 0 },
- { "setstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, process_setstat, 1 },
- { "fsetstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, process_fsetstat, 1 },
- { "opendir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR, process_opendir, 0 },
- { "readdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READDIR, process_readdir, 0 },
- { "remove", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, process_remove, 1 },
- { "mkdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, process_mkdir, 1 },
- { "rmdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, process_rmdir, 1 },
- { "realpath", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, process_realpath, 0 },
- { "stat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_STAT, process_stat, 0 },
- { "rename", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RENAME, process_rename, 1 },
- { "readlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, process_readlink, 0 },
- { "symlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK, process_symlink, 1 },
- { NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
-};
-
-/* SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED submessages */
-struct sftp_handler extended_handlers[] = {
- { "posix-rename", "posix-rename at openssh.com", 0,
- process_extended_posix_rename, 1 },
- { "statvfs", "statvfs at openssh.com", 0, process_extended_statvfs, 0 },
- { "fstatvfs", "fstatvfs at openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fstatvfs, 0 },
- { "hardlink", "hardlink at openssh.com", 0, process_extended_hardlink, 1 },
- { "fsync", "fsync at openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fsync, 1 },
- { NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
-};
-
-static int
-request_permitted(struct sftp_handler *h)
-{
- char *result;
-
- if (readonly && h->does_write) {
- verbose("Refusing %s request in read-only mode", h->name);
- return 0;
- }
- if (request_blacklist != NULL &&
- ((result = match_list(h->name, request_blacklist, NULL))) != NULL) {
- free(result);
- verbose("Refusing blacklisted %s request", h->name);
- return 0;
- }
- if (request_whitelist != NULL &&
- ((result = match_list(h->name, request_whitelist, NULL))) != NULL) {
- free(result);
- debug2("Permitting whitelisted %s request", h->name);
- return 1;
- }
- if (request_whitelist != NULL) {
- verbose("Refusing non-whitelisted %s request", h->name);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int
-errno_to_portable(int unixerrno)
-{
- int ret = 0;
-
- switch (unixerrno) {
- case 0:
- ret = SSH2_FX_OK;
- break;
- case ENOENT:
- case ENOTDIR:
- case EBADF:
- case ELOOP:
- ret = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE;
- break;
- case EPERM:
- case EACCES:
- case EFAULT:
- ret = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
- break;
- case ENAMETOOLONG:
- case EINVAL:
- ret = SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE;
- break;
- case ENOSYS:
- ret = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED;
- break;
- default:
- ret = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
- break;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int
-flags_from_portable(int pflags)
-{
- int flags = 0;
-
- if ((pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) &&
- (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)) {
- flags = O_RDWR;
- } else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) {
- flags = O_RDONLY;
- } else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE) {
- flags = O_WRONLY;
- }
- if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND)
- flags |= O_APPEND;
- if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT)
- flags |= O_CREAT;
- if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC)
- flags |= O_TRUNC;
- if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL)
- flags |= O_EXCL;
- return flags;
-}
-
-static const char *
-string_from_portable(int pflags)
-{
- static char ret[128];
-
- *ret = '\0';
-
-#define PAPPEND(str) { \
- if (*ret != '\0') \
- strlcat(ret, ",", sizeof(ret)); \
- strlcat(ret, str, sizeof(ret)); \
- }
-
- if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ)
- PAPPEND("READ")
- if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)
- PAPPEND("WRITE")
- if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND)
- PAPPEND("APPEND")
- if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT)
- PAPPEND("CREATE")
- if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC)
- PAPPEND("TRUNCATE")
- if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL)
- PAPPEND("EXCL")
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static Attrib *
-get_attrib(void)
-{
- return decode_attrib(&iqueue);
-}
-
-/* handle handles */
-
-typedef struct Handle Handle;
-struct Handle {
- int use;
- DIR *dirp;
- int fd;
- int flags;
- char *name;
- u_int64_t bytes_read, bytes_write;
- int next_unused;
-};
-
-enum {
- HANDLE_UNUSED,
- HANDLE_DIR,
- HANDLE_FILE
-};
-
-Handle *handles = NULL;
-u_int num_handles = 0;
-int first_unused_handle = -1;
-
-static void handle_unused(int i)
-{
- handles[i].use = HANDLE_UNUSED;
- handles[i].next_unused = first_unused_handle;
- first_unused_handle = i;
-}
-
-static int
-handle_new(int use, const char *name, int fd, int flags, DIR *dirp)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (first_unused_handle == -1) {
- if (num_handles + 1 <= num_handles)
- return -1;
- num_handles++;
- handles = xrealloc(handles, num_handles, sizeof(Handle));
- handle_unused(num_handles - 1);
- }
-
- i = first_unused_handle;
- first_unused_handle = handles[i].next_unused;
-
- handles[i].use = use;
- handles[i].dirp = dirp;
- handles[i].fd = fd;
- handles[i].flags = flags;
- handles[i].name = xstrdup(name);
- handles[i].bytes_read = handles[i].bytes_write = 0;
-
- return i;
-}
-
-static int
-handle_is_ok(int i, int type)
-{
- return i >= 0 && (u_int)i < num_handles && handles[i].use == type;
-}
-
-static int
-handle_to_string(int handle, char **stringp, int *hlenp)
-{
- if (stringp == NULL || hlenp == NULL)
- return -1;
- *stringp = xmalloc(sizeof(int32_t));
- put_u32(*stringp, handle);
- *hlenp = sizeof(int32_t);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-handle_from_string(const char *handle, u_int hlen)
-{
- int val;
-
- if (hlen != sizeof(int32_t))
- return -1;
- val = get_u32(handle);
- if (handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_FILE) ||
- handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_DIR))
- return val;
- return -1;
-}
-
-static char *
-handle_to_name(int handle)
-{
- if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)||
- handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
- return handles[handle].name;
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static DIR *
-handle_to_dir(int handle)
-{
- if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR))
- return handles[handle].dirp;
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static int
-handle_to_fd(int handle)
-{
- if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
- return handles[handle].fd;
- return -1;
-}
-
-static int
-handle_to_flags(int handle)
-{
- if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
- return handles[handle].flags;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void
-handle_update_read(int handle, ssize_t bytes)
-{
- if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0)
- handles[handle].bytes_read += bytes;
-}
-
-static void
-handle_update_write(int handle, ssize_t bytes)
-{
- if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0)
- handles[handle].bytes_write += bytes;
-}
-
-static u_int64_t
-handle_bytes_read(int handle)
-{
- if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
- return (handles[handle].bytes_read);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static u_int64_t
-handle_bytes_write(int handle)
-{
- if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
- return (handles[handle].bytes_write);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-handle_close(int handle)
-{
- int ret = -1;
-
- if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) {
- ret = close(handles[handle].fd);
- free(handles[handle].name);
- handle_unused(handle);
- } else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)) {
- ret = closedir(handles[handle].dirp);
- free(handles[handle].name);
- handle_unused(handle);
- } else {
- errno = ENOENT;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-static void
-handle_log_close(int handle, char *emsg)
-{
- if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) {
- logit("%s%sclose \"%s\" bytes read %llu written %llu",
- emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ",
- handle_to_name(handle),
- (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_read(handle),
- (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_write(handle));
- } else {
- logit("%s%sclosedir \"%s\"",
- emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ",
- handle_to_name(handle));
- }
-}
-
-static void
-handle_log_exit(void)
-{
- u_int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < num_handles; i++)
- if (handles[i].use != HANDLE_UNUSED)
- handle_log_close(i, "forced");
-}
-
-static int
-get_handle(void)
-{
- char *handle;
- int val = -1;
- u_int hlen;
-
- handle = get_string(&hlen);
- if (hlen < 256)
- val = handle_from_string(handle, hlen);
- free(handle);
- return val;
-}
-
-/* send replies */
-
-static void
-send_msg(Buffer *m)
-{
- int mlen = buffer_len(m);
-
- buffer_put_int(&oqueue, mlen);
- buffer_append(&oqueue, buffer_ptr(m), mlen);
- buffer_consume(m, mlen);
-}
-
-static const char *
-status_to_message(u_int32_t status)
-{
- const char *status_messages[] = {
- "Success", /* SSH_FX_OK */
- "End of file", /* SSH_FX_EOF */
- "No such file", /* SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE */
- "Permission denied", /* SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED */
- "Failure", /* SSH_FX_FAILURE */
- "Bad message", /* SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE */
- "No connection", /* SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION */
- "Connection lost", /* SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST */
- "Operation unsupported", /* SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED */
- "Unknown error" /* Others */
- };
- return (status_messages[MIN(status,SSH2_FX_MAX)]);
-}
-
-static void
-send_status(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t status)
-{
- Buffer msg;
-
- debug3("request %u: sent status %u", id, status);
- if (log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE ||
- (status != SSH2_FX_OK && status != SSH2_FX_EOF))
- logit("sent status %s", status_to_message(status));
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_STATUS);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, status);
- if (version >= 3) {
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, status_to_message(status));
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "");
- }
- send_msg(&msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-}
-static void
-send_data_or_handle(char type, u_int32_t id, const char *data, int dlen)
-{
- Buffer msg;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
- buffer_put_string(&msg, data, dlen);
- send_msg(&msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-}
-
-static void
-send_data(u_int32_t id, const char *data, int dlen)
-{
- debug("request %u: sent data len %d", id, dlen);
- send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_DATA, id, data, dlen);
-}
-
-static void
-send_handle(u_int32_t id, int handle)
-{
- char *string;
- int hlen;
-
- handle_to_string(handle, &string, &hlen);
- debug("request %u: sent handle handle %d", id, handle);
- send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, id, string, hlen);
- free(string);
-}
-
-static void
-send_names(u_int32_t id, int count, const Stat *stats)
-{
- Buffer msg;
- int i;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_NAME);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, count);
- debug("request %u: sent names count %d", id, count);
- for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, stats[i].name);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, stats[i].long_name);
- encode_attrib(&msg, &stats[i].attrib);
- }
- send_msg(&msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-}
-
-static void
-send_attrib(u_int32_t id, const Attrib *a)
-{
- Buffer msg;
-
- debug("request %u: sent attrib have 0x%x", id, a->flags);
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_ATTRS);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
- encode_attrib(&msg, a);
- send_msg(&msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-}
-
-static void
-send_statvfs(u_int32_t id, struct statvfs *st)
-{
- Buffer msg;
- u_int64_t flag;
-
- flag = (st->f_flag & ST_RDONLY) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY : 0;
- flag |= (st->f_flag & ST_NOSUID) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID : 0;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
- buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_bsize);
- buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_frsize);
- buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_blocks);
- buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_bfree);
- buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_bavail);
- buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_files);
- buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_ffree);
- buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_favail);
- buffer_put_int64(&msg, FSID_TO_ULONG(st->f_fsid));
- buffer_put_int64(&msg, flag);
- buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_namemax);
- send_msg(&msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-}
-
-/* parse incoming */
-
-static void
-process_init(void)
-{
- Buffer msg;
-
- version = get_int();
- verbose("received client version %u", version);
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_VERSION);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION);
- /* POSIX rename extension */
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "posix-rename at openssh.com");
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "1"); /* version */
- /* statvfs extension */
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "statvfs at openssh.com");
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "2"); /* version */
- /* fstatvfs extension */
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "fstatvfs at openssh.com");
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "2"); /* version */
- /* hardlink extension */
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "hardlink at openssh.com");
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "1"); /* version */
- /* fsync extension */
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "fsync at openssh.com");
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "1"); /* version */
- send_msg(&msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-}
-
-static void
-process_open(u_int32_t id)
-{
- u_int32_t pflags;
- Attrib *a;
- char *name;
- int handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
-
- name = get_string(NULL);
- pflags = get_int(); /* portable flags */
- debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
- a = get_attrib();
- flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
- mode = (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a->perm : 0666;
- logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
- name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
- if (readonly &&
- ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY ||
- (flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDWR)) {
- verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode");
- status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
- } else {
- fd = open(name, flags, mode);
- if (fd < 0) {
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- } else {
- handle = handle_new(HANDLE_FILE, name, fd, flags, NULL);
- if (handle < 0) {
- close(fd);
- } else {
- send_handle(id, handle);
- status = SSH2_FX_OK;
- }
- }
- }
- if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
- send_status(id, status);
- free(name);
-}
-
-static void
-process_close(u_int32_t id)
-{
- int handle, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
-
- handle = get_handle();
- debug3("request %u: close handle %u", id, handle);
- handle_log_close(handle, NULL);
- ret = handle_close(handle);
- status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
- send_status(id, status);
-}
-
-static void
-process_read(u_int32_t id)
-{
- char buf[64*1024];
- u_int32_t len;
- int handle, fd, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
- u_int64_t off;
-
- handle = get_handle();
- off = get_int64();
- len = get_int();
-
- debug("request %u: read \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %d",
- id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len);
- if (len > sizeof buf) {
- len = sizeof buf;
- debug2("read change len %d", len);
- }
- fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
- if (fd >= 0) {
- if (lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
- error("process_read: seek failed");
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- } else {
- ret = read(fd, buf, len);
- if (ret < 0) {
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- } else if (ret == 0) {
- status = SSH2_FX_EOF;
- } else {
- send_data(id, buf, ret);
- status = SSH2_FX_OK;
- handle_update_read(handle, ret);
- }
- }
- }
- if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
- send_status(id, status);
-}
-
-static void
-process_write(u_int32_t id)
-{
- u_int64_t off;
- u_int len;
- int handle, fd, ret, status;
- char *data;
-
- handle = get_handle();
- off = get_int64();
- data = get_string(&len);
-
- debug("request %u: write \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %d",
- id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len);
- fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
-
- if (fd < 0)
- status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
- else {
- if (!(handle_to_flags(handle) & O_APPEND) &&
- lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- error("process_write: seek failed");
- } else {
-/* XXX ATOMICIO ? */
- ret = write(fd, data, len);
- if (ret < 0) {
- error("process_write: write failed");
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- } else if ((size_t)ret == len) {
- status = SSH2_FX_OK;
- handle_update_write(handle, ret);
- } else {
- debug2("nothing at all written");
- status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
- }
- }
- }
- send_status(id, status);
- free(data);
-}
-
-static void
-process_do_stat(u_int32_t id, int do_lstat)
-{
- Attrib a;
- struct stat st;
- char *name;
- int ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
-
- name = get_string(NULL);
- debug3("request %u: %sstat", id, do_lstat ? "l" : "");
- verbose("%sstat name \"%s\"", do_lstat ? "l" : "", name);
- ret = do_lstat ? lstat(name, &st) : stat(name, &st);
- if (ret < 0) {
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- } else {
- stat_to_attrib(&st, &a);
- send_attrib(id, &a);
- status = SSH2_FX_OK;
- }
- if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
- send_status(id, status);
- free(name);
-}
-
-static void
-process_stat(u_int32_t id)
-{
- process_do_stat(id, 0);
-}
-
-static void
-process_lstat(u_int32_t id)
-{
- process_do_stat(id, 1);
-}
-
-static void
-process_fstat(u_int32_t id)
-{
- Attrib a;
- struct stat st;
- int fd, ret, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
-
- handle = get_handle();
- debug("request %u: fstat \"%s\" (handle %u)",
- id, handle_to_name(handle), handle);
- fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
- if (fd >= 0) {
- ret = fstat(fd, &st);
- if (ret < 0) {
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- } else {
- stat_to_attrib(&st, &a);
- send_attrib(id, &a);
- status = SSH2_FX_OK;
- }
- }
- if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
- send_status(id, status);
-}
-
-static struct timeval *
-attrib_to_tv(const Attrib *a)
-{
- static struct timeval tv[2];
-
- tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime;
- tv[0].tv_usec = 0;
- tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime;
- tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
- return tv;
-}
-
-static void
-process_setstat(u_int32_t id)
-{
- Attrib *a;
- char *name;
- int status = SSH2_FX_OK, ret;
-
- name = get_string(NULL);
- a = get_attrib();
- debug("request %u: setstat name \"%s\"", id, name);
- if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
- logit("set \"%s\" size %llu",
- name, (unsigned long long)a->size);
- ret = truncate(name, a->size);
- if (ret == -1)
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- }
- if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
- logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a->perm);
- ret = chmod(name, a->perm & 07777);
- if (ret == -1)
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- }
- if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
- char buf[64];
- time_t t = a->mtime;
-
- strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S",
- localtime(&t));
- logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf);
- ret = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(a));
- if (ret == -1)
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- }
- if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
- logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name,
- (u_long)a->uid, (u_long)a->gid);
- ret = chown(name, a->uid, a->gid);
- if (ret == -1)
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- }
- send_status(id, status);
- free(name);
-}
-
-static void
-process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id)
-{
- Attrib *a;
- int handle, fd, ret;
- int status = SSH2_FX_OK;
-
- handle = get_handle();
- a = get_attrib();
- debug("request %u: fsetstat handle %d", id, handle);
- fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
- if (fd < 0)
- status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
- else {
- char *name = handle_to_name(handle);
-
- if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
- logit("set \"%s\" size %llu",
- name, (unsigned long long)a->size);
- ret = ftruncate(fd, a->size);
- if (ret == -1)
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- }
- if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
- logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a->perm);
-#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
- ret = fchmod(fd, a->perm & 07777);
-#else
- ret = chmod(name, a->perm & 07777);
-#endif
- if (ret == -1)
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- }
- if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
- char buf[64];
- time_t t = a->mtime;
-
- strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S",
- localtime(&t));
- logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf);
-#ifdef HAVE_FUTIMES
- ret = futimes(fd, attrib_to_tv(a));
-#else
- ret = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(a));
-#endif
- if (ret == -1)
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- }
- if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
- logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name,
- (u_long)a->uid, (u_long)a->gid);
-#ifdef HAVE_FCHOWN
- ret = fchown(fd, a->uid, a->gid);
-#else
- ret = chown(name, a->uid, a->gid);
-#endif
- if (ret == -1)
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- }
- }
- send_status(id, status);
-}
-
-static void
-process_opendir(u_int32_t id)
-{
- DIR *dirp = NULL;
- char *path;
- int handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
-
- path = get_string(NULL);
- debug3("request %u: opendir", id);
- logit("opendir \"%s\"", path);
- dirp = opendir(path);
- if (dirp == NULL) {
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- } else {
- handle = handle_new(HANDLE_DIR, path, 0, 0, dirp);
- if (handle < 0) {
- closedir(dirp);
- } else {
- send_handle(id, handle);
- status = SSH2_FX_OK;
- }
-
- }
- if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
- send_status(id, status);
- free(path);
-}
-
-static void
-process_readdir(u_int32_t id)
-{
- DIR *dirp;
- struct dirent *dp;
- char *path;
- int handle;
-
- handle = get_handle();
- debug("request %u: readdir \"%s\" (handle %d)", id,
- handle_to_name(handle), handle);
- dirp = handle_to_dir(handle);
- path = handle_to_name(handle);
- if (dirp == NULL || path == NULL) {
- send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE);
- } else {
- struct stat st;
- char pathname[MAXPATHLEN];
- Stat *stats;
- int nstats = 10, count = 0, i;
-
- stats = xcalloc(nstats, sizeof(Stat));
- while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
- if (count >= nstats) {
- nstats *= 2;
- stats = xrealloc(stats, nstats, sizeof(Stat));
- }
-/* XXX OVERFLOW ? */
- snprintf(pathname, sizeof pathname, "%s%s%s", path,
- strcmp(path, "/") ? "/" : "", dp->d_name);
- if (lstat(pathname, &st) < 0)
- continue;
- stat_to_attrib(&st, &(stats[count].attrib));
- stats[count].name = xstrdup(dp->d_name);
- stats[count].long_name = ls_file(dp->d_name, &st, 0, 0);
- count++;
- /* send up to 100 entries in one message */
- /* XXX check packet size instead */
- if (count == 100)
- break;
- }
- if (count > 0) {
- send_names(id, count, stats);
- for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- free(stats[i].name);
- free(stats[i].long_name);
- }
- } else {
- send_status(id, SSH2_FX_EOF);
- }
- free(stats);
- }
-}
-
-static void
-process_remove(u_int32_t id)
-{
- char *name;
- int status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
- int ret;
-
- name = get_string(NULL);
- debug3("request %u: remove", id);
- logit("remove name \"%s\"", name);
- ret = unlink(name);
- status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
- send_status(id, status);
- free(name);
-}
-
-static void
-process_mkdir(u_int32_t id)
-{
- Attrib *a;
- char *name;
- int ret, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
-
- name = get_string(NULL);
- a = get_attrib();
- mode = (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ?
- a->perm & 07777 : 0777;
- debug3("request %u: mkdir", id);
- logit("mkdir name \"%s\" mode 0%o", name, mode);
- ret = mkdir(name, mode);
- status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
- send_status(id, status);
- free(name);
-}
-
-static void
-process_rmdir(u_int32_t id)
-{
- char *name;
- int ret, status;
-
- name = get_string(NULL);
- debug3("request %u: rmdir", id);
- logit("rmdir name \"%s\"", name);
- ret = rmdir(name);
- status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
- send_status(id, status);
- free(name);
-}
-
-static void
-process_realpath(u_int32_t id)
-{
- char resolvedname[MAXPATHLEN];
- char *path;
-
- path = get_string(NULL);
- if (path[0] == '\0') {
- free(path);
- path = xstrdup(".");
- }
- debug3("request %u: realpath", id);
- verbose("realpath \"%s\"", path);
- if (realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
- send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
- } else {
- Stat s;
- attrib_clear(&s.attrib);
- s.name = s.long_name = resolvedname;
- send_names(id, 1, &s);
- }
- free(path);
-}
-
-static void
-process_rename(u_int32_t id)
-{
- char *oldpath, *newpath;
- int status;
- struct stat sb;
-
- oldpath = get_string(NULL);
- newpath = get_string(NULL);
- debug3("request %u: rename", id);
- logit("rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
- status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
- if (lstat(oldpath, &sb) == -1)
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
- /* Race-free rename of regular files */
- if (link(oldpath, newpath) == -1) {
- if (errno == EOPNOTSUPP || errno == ENOSYS
-#ifdef EXDEV
- || errno == EXDEV
-#endif
-#ifdef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO
- || errno == LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO
-#endif
- ) {
- struct stat st;
-
- /*
- * fs doesn't support links, so fall back to
- * stat+rename. This is racy.
- */
- if (stat(newpath, &st) == -1) {
- if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1)
- status =
- errno_to_portable(errno);
- else
- status = SSH2_FX_OK;
- }
- } else {
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- }
- } else if (unlink(oldpath) == -1) {
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- /* clean spare link */
- unlink(newpath);
- } else
- status = SSH2_FX_OK;
- } else if (stat(newpath, &sb) == -1) {
- if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1)
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- else
- status = SSH2_FX_OK;
- }
- send_status(id, status);
- free(oldpath);
- free(newpath);
-}
-
-static void
-process_readlink(u_int32_t id)
-{
- int len;
- char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
- char *path;
-
- path = get_string(NULL);
- debug3("request %u: readlink", id);
- verbose("readlink \"%s\"", path);
- if ((len = readlink(path, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) == -1)
- send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
- else {
- Stat s;
-
- buf[len] = '\0';
- attrib_clear(&s.attrib);
- s.name = s.long_name = buf;
- send_names(id, 1, &s);
- }
- free(path);
-}
-
-static void
-process_symlink(u_int32_t id)
-{
- char *oldpath, *newpath;
- int ret, status;
-
- oldpath = get_string(NULL);
- newpath = get_string(NULL);
- debug3("request %u: symlink", id);
- logit("symlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
- /* this will fail if 'newpath' exists */
- ret = symlink(oldpath, newpath);
- status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
- send_status(id, status);
- free(oldpath);
- free(newpath);
-}
-
-static void
-process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id)
-{
- char *oldpath, *newpath;
- int ret, status;
-
- oldpath = get_string(NULL);
- newpath = get_string(NULL);
- debug3("request %u: posix-rename", id);
- logit("posix-rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
- ret = rename(oldpath, newpath);
- status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
- send_status(id, status);
- free(oldpath);
- free(newpath);
-}
-
-static void
-process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id)
-{
- char *path;
- struct statvfs st;
-
- path = get_string(NULL);
- debug3("request %u: statvfs", id);
- logit("statvfs \"%s\"", path);
-
- if (statvfs(path, &st) != 0)
- send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
- else
- send_statvfs(id, &st);
- free(path);
-}
-
-static void
-process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id)
-{
- int handle, fd;
- struct statvfs st;
-
- handle = get_handle();
- debug("request %u: fstatvfs \"%s\" (handle %u)",
- id, handle_to_name(handle), handle);
- if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0) {
- send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE);
- return;
- }
- if (fstatvfs(fd, &st) != 0)
- send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
- else
- send_statvfs(id, &st);
-}
-
-static void
-process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id)
-{
- char *oldpath, *newpath;
- int ret, status;
-
- oldpath = get_string(NULL);
- newpath = get_string(NULL);
- debug3("request %u: hardlink", id);
- logit("hardlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
- ret = link(oldpath, newpath);
- status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
- send_status(id, status);
- free(oldpath);
- free(newpath);
-}
-
-static void
-process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id)
-{
- int handle, fd, ret, status = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED;
-
- handle = get_handle();
- debug3("request %u: fsync (handle %u)", id, handle);
- verbose("fsync \"%s\"", handle_to_name(handle));
- if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0)
- status = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE;
- else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) {
- ret = fsync(fd);
- status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
- }
- send_status(id, status);
-}
-
-static void
-process_extended(u_int32_t id)
-{
- char *request;
- u_int i;
-
- request = get_string(NULL);
- for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) {
- if (strcmp(request, extended_handlers[i].ext_name) == 0) {
- if (!request_permitted(&extended_handlers[i]))
- send_status(id, SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED);
- else
- extended_handlers[i].handler(id);
- break;
- }
- }
- if (extended_handlers[i].handler == NULL) {
- error("Unknown extended request \"%.100s\"", request);
- send_status(id, SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED); /* MUST */
- }
- free(request);
-}
-
-/* stolen from ssh-agent */
-
-static void
-process(void)
-{
- u_int msg_len, buf_len, consumed, type, i;
- u_char *cp;
- u_int32_t id;
-
- buf_len = buffer_len(&iqueue);
- if (buf_len < 5)
- return; /* Incomplete message. */
- cp = buffer_ptr(&iqueue);
- msg_len = get_u32(cp);
- if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) {
- error("bad message from %s local user %s",
- client_addr, pw->pw_name);
- sftp_server_cleanup_exit(11);
- }
- if (buf_len < msg_len + 4)
- return;
- buffer_consume(&iqueue, 4);
- buf_len -= 4;
- type = buffer_get_char(&iqueue);
-
- switch (type) {
- case SSH2_FXP_INIT:
- process_init();
- init_done = 1;
- break;
- case SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED:
- if (!init_done)
- fatal("Received extended request before init");
- id = get_int();
- process_extended(id);
- break;
- default:
- if (!init_done)
- fatal("Received %u request before init", type);
- id = get_int();
- for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) {
- if (type == handlers[i].type) {
- if (!request_permitted(&handlers[i])) {
- send_status(id,
- SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED);
- } else {
- handlers[i].handler(id);
- }
- break;
- }
- }
- if (handlers[i].handler == NULL)
- error("Unknown message %u", type);
- }
- /* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */
- if (buf_len < buffer_len(&iqueue)) {
- error("iqueue grew unexpectedly");
- sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- consumed = buf_len - buffer_len(&iqueue);
- if (msg_len < consumed) {
- error("msg_len %u < consumed %u", msg_len, consumed);
- sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- if (msg_len > consumed)
- buffer_consume(&iqueue, msg_len - consumed);
-}
-
-/* Cleanup handler that logs active handles upon normal exit */
-void
-sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int i)
-{
- if (pw != NULL && client_addr != NULL) {
- handle_log_exit();
- logit("session closed for local user %s from [%s]",
- pw->pw_name, client_addr);
- }
- _exit(i);
-}
-
-static void
-sftp_server_usage(void)
-{
- extern char *__progname;
-
- fprintf(stderr,
- "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
- "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] "
- "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n"
- " %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
- __progname, __progname);
- exit(1);
-}
-
-int
-sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
-{
- fd_set *rset, *wset;
- int i, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
- ssize_t len, olen, set_size;
- SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
- char *cp, *homedir = NULL, buf[4*4096];
- long mask;
-
- extern char *optarg;
- extern char *__progname;
-
- __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
- log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
-
- pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
-
- while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
- "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
- switch (ch) {
- case 'Q':
- if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Invalid query type\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++)
- printf("%s\n", handlers[i].name);
- for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++)
- printf("%s\n", extended_handlers[i].name);
- exit(0);
- break;
- case 'R':
- readonly = 1;
- break;
- case 'c':
- /*
- * Ignore all arguments if we are invoked as a
- * shell using "sftp-server -c command"
- */
- skipargs = 1;
- break;
- case 'e':
- log_stderr = 1;
- break;
- case 'l':
- log_level = log_level_number(optarg);
- if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
- error("Invalid log level \"%s\"", optarg);
- break;
- case 'f':
- log_facility = log_facility_number(optarg);
- if (log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
- error("Invalid log facility \"%s\"", optarg);
- break;
- case 'd':
- cp = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, user_pw->pw_uid);
- homedir = percent_expand(cp, "d", user_pw->pw_dir,
- "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
- free(cp);
- break;
- case 'p':
- if (request_whitelist != NULL)
- fatal("Permitted requests already set");
- request_whitelist = xstrdup(optarg);
- break;
- case 'P':
- if (request_blacklist != NULL)
- fatal("Refused requests already set");
- request_blacklist = xstrdup(optarg);
- break;
- case 'u':
- errno = 0;
- mask = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
- if (mask < 0 || mask > 0777 || *cp != '\0' ||
- cp == optarg || (mask == 0 && errno != 0))
- fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
- (void)umask((mode_t)mask);
- break;
- case 'h':
- default:
- sftp_server_usage();
- }
- }
-
- log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
-
- if ((cp = getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")) != NULL) {
- client_addr = xstrdup(cp);
- if ((cp = strchr(client_addr, ' ')) == NULL) {
- error("Malformed SSH_CONNECTION variable: \"%s\"",
- getenv("SSH_CONNECTION"));
- sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- *cp = '\0';
- } else
- client_addr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
-
- logit("session opened for local user %s from [%s]",
- pw->pw_name, client_addr);
-
- in = STDIN_FILENO;
- out = STDOUT_FILENO;
-
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- setmode(in, O_BINARY);
- setmode(out, O_BINARY);
-#endif
-
- max = 0;
- if (in > max)
- max = in;
- if (out > max)
- max = out;
-
- buffer_init(&iqueue);
- buffer_init(&oqueue);
-
- set_size = howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
- rset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(set_size);
- wset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(set_size);
-
- if (homedir != NULL) {
- if (chdir(homedir) != 0) {
- error("chdir to \"%s\" failed: %s", homedir,
- strerror(errno));
- }
- }
-
- for (;;) {
- memset(rset, 0, set_size);
- memset(wset, 0, set_size);
-
- /*
- * Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle
- * the worst-case length packet it can generate,
- * otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads.
- */
- if (buffer_check_alloc(&iqueue, sizeof(buf)) &&
- buffer_check_alloc(&oqueue, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH))
- FD_SET(in, rset);
-
- olen = buffer_len(&oqueue);
- if (olen > 0)
- FD_SET(out, wset);
-
- if (select(max+1, rset, wset, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
- if (errno == EINTR)
- continue;
- error("select: %s", strerror(errno));
- sftp_server_cleanup_exit(2);
- }
-
- /* copy stdin to iqueue */
- if (FD_ISSET(in, rset)) {
- len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf);
- if (len == 0) {
- debug("read eof");
- sftp_server_cleanup_exit(0);
- } else if (len < 0) {
- error("read: %s", strerror(errno));
- sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1);
- } else {
- buffer_append(&iqueue, buf, len);
- }
- }
- /* send oqueue to stdout */
- if (FD_ISSET(out, wset)) {
- len = write(out, buffer_ptr(&oqueue), olen);
- if (len < 0) {
- error("write: %s", strerror(errno));
- sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1);
- } else {
- buffer_consume(&oqueue, len);
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Process requests from client if we can fit the results
- * into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input
- * and let the output queue drain.
- */
- if (buffer_check_alloc(&oqueue, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH))
- process();
- }
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-server.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp-server.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1709 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.109 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h> /* MIN */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+
+/* Our verbosity */
+static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
+
+/* Our client */
+static struct passwd *pw = NULL;
+static char *client_addr = NULL;
+
+/* input and output queue */
+struct sshbuf *iqueue;
+struct sshbuf *oqueue;
+
+/* Version of client */
+static u_int version;
+
+/* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
+static int init_done;
+
+/* Disable writes */
+static int readonly;
+
+/* Requests that are allowed/denied */
+static char *request_whitelist, *request_blacklist;
+
+/* portable attributes, etc. */
+typedef struct Stat Stat;
+
+struct Stat {
+ char *name;
+ char *long_name;
+ Attrib attrib;
+};
+
+/* Packet handlers */
+static void process_open(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_close(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_read(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_write(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_stat(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_lstat(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_fstat(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_setstat(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_opendir(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_readdir(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_remove(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_mkdir(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_rmdir(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_realpath(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_rename(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_readlink(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_symlink(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_extended(u_int32_t id);
+
+struct sftp_handler {
+ const char *name; /* user-visible name for fine-grained perms */
+ const char *ext_name; /* extended request name */
+ u_int type; /* packet type, for non extended packets */
+ void (*handler)(u_int32_t);
+ int does_write; /* if nonzero, banned for readonly mode */
+};
+
+struct sftp_handler handlers[] = {
+ /* NB. SSH2_FXP_OPEN does the readonly check in the handler itself */
+ { "open", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPEN, process_open, 0 },
+ { "close", NULL, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE, process_close, 0 },
+ { "read", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READ, process_read, 0 },
+ { "write", NULL, SSH2_FXP_WRITE, process_write, 1 },
+ { "lstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, process_lstat, 0 },
+ { "fstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, process_fstat, 0 },
+ { "setstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, process_setstat, 1 },
+ { "fsetstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, process_fsetstat, 1 },
+ { "opendir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR, process_opendir, 0 },
+ { "readdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READDIR, process_readdir, 0 },
+ { "remove", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, process_remove, 1 },
+ { "mkdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, process_mkdir, 1 },
+ { "rmdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, process_rmdir, 1 },
+ { "realpath", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, process_realpath, 0 },
+ { "stat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_STAT, process_stat, 0 },
+ { "rename", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RENAME, process_rename, 1 },
+ { "readlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, process_readlink, 0 },
+ { "symlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK, process_symlink, 1 },
+ { NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
+};
+
+/* SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED submessages */
+struct sftp_handler extended_handlers[] = {
+ { "posix-rename", "posix-rename at openssh.com", 0,
+ process_extended_posix_rename, 1 },
+ { "statvfs", "statvfs at openssh.com", 0, process_extended_statvfs, 0 },
+ { "fstatvfs", "fstatvfs at openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fstatvfs, 0 },
+ { "hardlink", "hardlink at openssh.com", 0, process_extended_hardlink, 1 },
+ { "fsync", "fsync at openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fsync, 1 },
+ { NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
+};
+
+static int
+request_permitted(struct sftp_handler *h)
+{
+ char *result;
+
+ if (readonly && h->does_write) {
+ verbose("Refusing %s request in read-only mode", h->name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (request_blacklist != NULL &&
+ ((result = match_list(h->name, request_blacklist, NULL))) != NULL) {
+ free(result);
+ verbose("Refusing blacklisted %s request", h->name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (request_whitelist != NULL &&
+ ((result = match_list(h->name, request_whitelist, NULL))) != NULL) {
+ free(result);
+ debug2("Permitting whitelisted %s request", h->name);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (request_whitelist != NULL) {
+ verbose("Refusing non-whitelisted %s request", h->name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+errno_to_portable(int unixerrno)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ switch (unixerrno) {
+ case 0:
+ ret = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ break;
+ case ENOENT:
+ case ENOTDIR:
+ case EBADF:
+ case ELOOP:
+ ret = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE;
+ break;
+ case EPERM:
+ case EACCES:
+ case EFAULT:
+ ret = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
+ break;
+ case ENAMETOOLONG:
+ case EINVAL:
+ ret = SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE;
+ break;
+ case ENOSYS:
+ ret = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ break;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+flags_from_portable(int pflags)
+{
+ int flags = 0;
+
+ if ((pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) &&
+ (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)) {
+ flags = O_RDWR;
+ } else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) {
+ flags = O_RDONLY;
+ } else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE) {
+ flags = O_WRONLY;
+ }
+ if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND)
+ flags |= O_APPEND;
+ if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT)
+ flags |= O_CREAT;
+ if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC)
+ flags |= O_TRUNC;
+ if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL)
+ flags |= O_EXCL;
+ return flags;
+}
+
+static const char *
+string_from_portable(int pflags)
+{
+ static char ret[128];
+
+ *ret = '\0';
+
+#define PAPPEND(str) { \
+ if (*ret != '\0') \
+ strlcat(ret, ",", sizeof(ret)); \
+ strlcat(ret, str, sizeof(ret)); \
+ }
+
+ if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ)
+ PAPPEND("READ")
+ if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)
+ PAPPEND("WRITE")
+ if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND)
+ PAPPEND("APPEND")
+ if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT)
+ PAPPEND("CREATE")
+ if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC)
+ PAPPEND("TRUNCATE")
+ if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL)
+ PAPPEND("EXCL")
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* handle handles */
+
+typedef struct Handle Handle;
+struct Handle {
+ int use;
+ DIR *dirp;
+ int fd;
+ int flags;
+ char *name;
+ u_int64_t bytes_read, bytes_write;
+ int next_unused;
+};
+
+enum {
+ HANDLE_UNUSED,
+ HANDLE_DIR,
+ HANDLE_FILE
+};
+
+Handle *handles = NULL;
+u_int num_handles = 0;
+int first_unused_handle = -1;
+
+static void handle_unused(int i)
+{
+ handles[i].use = HANDLE_UNUSED;
+ handles[i].next_unused = first_unused_handle;
+ first_unused_handle = i;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_new(int use, const char *name, int fd, int flags, DIR *dirp)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (first_unused_handle == -1) {
+ if (num_handles + 1 <= num_handles)
+ return -1;
+ num_handles++;
+ handles = xreallocarray(handles, num_handles, sizeof(Handle));
+ handle_unused(num_handles - 1);
+ }
+
+ i = first_unused_handle;
+ first_unused_handle = handles[i].next_unused;
+
+ handles[i].use = use;
+ handles[i].dirp = dirp;
+ handles[i].fd = fd;
+ handles[i].flags = flags;
+ handles[i].name = xstrdup(name);
+ handles[i].bytes_read = handles[i].bytes_write = 0;
+
+ return i;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_is_ok(int i, int type)
+{
+ return i >= 0 && (u_int)i < num_handles && handles[i].use == type;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_to_string(int handle, u_char **stringp, int *hlenp)
+{
+ if (stringp == NULL || hlenp == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ *stringp = xmalloc(sizeof(int32_t));
+ put_u32(*stringp, handle);
+ *hlenp = sizeof(int32_t);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_from_string(const u_char *handle, u_int hlen)
+{
+ int val;
+
+ if (hlen != sizeof(int32_t))
+ return -1;
+ val = get_u32(handle);
+ if (handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_FILE) ||
+ handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_DIR))
+ return val;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static char *
+handle_to_name(int handle)
+{
+ if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)||
+ handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
+ return handles[handle].name;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static DIR *
+handle_to_dir(int handle)
+{
+ if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR))
+ return handles[handle].dirp;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_to_fd(int handle)
+{
+ if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
+ return handles[handle].fd;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_to_flags(int handle)
+{
+ if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
+ return handles[handle].flags;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+handle_update_read(int handle, ssize_t bytes)
+{
+ if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0)
+ handles[handle].bytes_read += bytes;
+}
+
+static void
+handle_update_write(int handle, ssize_t bytes)
+{
+ if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0)
+ handles[handle].bytes_write += bytes;
+}
+
+static u_int64_t
+handle_bytes_read(int handle)
+{
+ if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
+ return (handles[handle].bytes_read);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u_int64_t
+handle_bytes_write(int handle)
+{
+ if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
+ return (handles[handle].bytes_write);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_close(int handle)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) {
+ ret = close(handles[handle].fd);
+ free(handles[handle].name);
+ handle_unused(handle);
+ } else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)) {
+ ret = closedir(handles[handle].dirp);
+ free(handles[handle].name);
+ handle_unused(handle);
+ } else {
+ errno = ENOENT;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+handle_log_close(int handle, char *emsg)
+{
+ if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) {
+ logit("%s%sclose \"%s\" bytes read %llu written %llu",
+ emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ",
+ handle_to_name(handle),
+ (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_read(handle),
+ (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_write(handle));
+ } else {
+ logit("%s%sclosedir \"%s\"",
+ emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ",
+ handle_to_name(handle));
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+handle_log_exit(void)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_handles; i++)
+ if (handles[i].use != HANDLE_UNUSED)
+ handle_log_close(i, "forced");
+}
+
+static int
+get_handle(struct sshbuf *queue, int *hp)
+{
+ u_char *handle;
+ int r;
+ size_t hlen;
+
+ *hp = -1;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(queue, &handle, &hlen)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (hlen < 256)
+ *hp = handle_from_string(handle, hlen);
+ free(handle);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* send replies */
+
+static void
+send_msg(struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(oqueue, m)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+}
+
+static const char *
+status_to_message(u_int32_t status)
+{
+ const char *status_messages[] = {
+ "Success", /* SSH_FX_OK */
+ "End of file", /* SSH_FX_EOF */
+ "No such file", /* SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE */
+ "Permission denied", /* SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED */
+ "Failure", /* SSH_FX_FAILURE */
+ "Bad message", /* SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE */
+ "No connection", /* SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION */
+ "Connection lost", /* SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST */
+ "Operation unsupported", /* SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED */
+ "Unknown error" /* Others */
+ };
+ return (status_messages[MIN(status,SSH2_FX_MAX)]);
+}
+
+static void
+send_status(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t status)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r;
+
+ debug3("request %u: sent status %u", id, status);
+ if (log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE ||
+ (status != SSH2_FX_OK && status != SSH2_FX_EOF))
+ logit("sent status %s", status_to_message(status));
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_STATUS)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, status)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (version >= 3) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg,
+ status_to_message(status))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "")) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ send_msg(msg);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+static void
+send_data_or_handle(char type, u_int32_t id, const u_char *data, int dlen)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, dlen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ send_msg(msg);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+static void
+send_data(u_int32_t id, const u_char *data, int dlen)
+{
+ debug("request %u: sent data len %d", id, dlen);
+ send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_DATA, id, data, dlen);
+}
+
+static void
+send_handle(u_int32_t id, int handle)
+{
+ u_char *string;
+ int hlen;
+
+ handle_to_string(handle, &string, &hlen);
+ debug("request %u: sent handle handle %d", id, handle);
+ send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, id, string, hlen);
+ free(string);
+}
+
+static void
+send_names(u_int32_t id, int count, const Stat *stats)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int i, r;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_NAME)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, count)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ debug("request %u: sent names count %d", id, count);
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, stats[i].name)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, stats[i].long_name)) != 0 ||
+ (r = encode_attrib(msg, &stats[i].attrib)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ send_msg(msg);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+static void
+send_attrib(u_int32_t id, const Attrib *a)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r;
+
+ debug("request %u: sent attrib have 0x%x", id, a->flags);
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_ATTRS)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ send_msg(msg);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+static void
+send_statvfs(u_int32_t id, struct statvfs *st)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_int64_t flag;
+ int r;
+
+ flag = (st->f_flag & ST_RDONLY) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY : 0;
+ flag |= (st->f_flag & ST_NOSUID) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID : 0;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bsize)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_frsize)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_blocks)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bfree)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bavail)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_files)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_ffree)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_favail)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, FSID_TO_ULONG(st->f_fsid))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, flag)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_namemax)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ send_msg(msg);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+/* parse incoming */
+
+static void
+process_init(void)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &version)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ verbose("received client version %u", version);
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_VERSION)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION)) != 0 ||
+ /* POSIX rename extension */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "posix-rename at openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0 || /* version */
+ /* statvfs extension */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "statvfs at openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "2")) != 0 || /* version */
+ /* fstatvfs extension */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fstatvfs at openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "2")) != 0 || /* version */
+ /* hardlink extension */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "hardlink at openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0 || /* version */
+ /* fsync extension */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fsync at openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0) /* version */
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ send_msg(msg);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+static void
+process_open(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ u_int32_t pflags;
+ Attrib a;
+ char *name;
+ int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
+ (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
+ flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
+ mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
+ logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
+ name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
+ if (readonly &&
+ ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY ||
+ (flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDWR)) {
+ verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode");
+ status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
+ } else {
+ fd = open(name, flags, mode);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ } else {
+ handle = handle_new(HANDLE_FILE, name, fd, flags, NULL);
+ if (handle < 0) {
+ close(fd);
+ } else {
+ send_handle(id, handle);
+ status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ send_status(id, status);
+ free(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_close(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ int r, handle, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+ if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug3("request %u: close handle %u", id, handle);
+ handle_log_close(handle, NULL);
+ ret = handle_close(handle);
+ status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+ send_status(id, status);
+}
+
+static void
+process_read(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ u_char buf[64*1024];
+ u_int32_t len;
+ int r, handle, fd, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ u_int64_t off;
+
+ if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &off)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug("request %u: read \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %d",
+ id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len);
+ if (len > sizeof buf) {
+ len = sizeof buf;
+ debug2("read change len %d", len);
+ }
+ fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ if (lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+ error("process_read: seek failed");
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ } else {
+ ret = read(fd, buf, len);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ } else if (ret == 0) {
+ status = SSH2_FX_EOF;
+ } else {
+ send_data(id, buf, ret);
+ status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ handle_update_read(handle, ret);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ send_status(id, status);
+}
+
+static void
+process_write(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ u_int64_t off;
+ size_t len;
+ int r, handle, fd, ret, status;
+ u_char *data;
+
+ if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &off)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(iqueue, &data, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug("request %u: write \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %zu",
+ id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len);
+ fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
+
+ if (fd < 0)
+ status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ else {
+ if (!(handle_to_flags(handle) & O_APPEND) &&
+ lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ error("process_write: seek failed");
+ } else {
+/* XXX ATOMICIO ? */
+ ret = write(fd, data, len);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ error("process_write: write failed");
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ } else if ((size_t)ret == len) {
+ status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ handle_update_write(handle, ret);
+ } else {
+ debug2("nothing at all written");
+ status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ send_status(id, status);
+ free(data);
+}
+
+static void
+process_do_stat(u_int32_t id, int do_lstat)
+{
+ Attrib a;
+ struct stat st;
+ char *name;
+ int r, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug3("request %u: %sstat", id, do_lstat ? "l" : "");
+ verbose("%sstat name \"%s\"", do_lstat ? "l" : "", name);
+ r = do_lstat ? lstat(name, &st) : stat(name, &st);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ } else {
+ stat_to_attrib(&st, &a);
+ send_attrib(id, &a);
+ status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ }
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ send_status(id, status);
+ free(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_stat(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ process_do_stat(id, 0);
+}
+
+static void
+process_lstat(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ process_do_stat(id, 1);
+}
+
+static void
+process_fstat(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ Attrib a;
+ struct stat st;
+ int fd, r, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+ if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ debug("request %u: fstat \"%s\" (handle %u)",
+ id, handle_to_name(handle), handle);
+ fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ r = fstat(fd, &st);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ } else {
+ stat_to_attrib(&st, &a);
+ send_attrib(id, &a);
+ status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ }
+ }
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ send_status(id, status);
+}
+
+static struct timeval *
+attrib_to_tv(const Attrib *a)
+{
+ static struct timeval tv[2];
+
+ tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime;
+ tv[0].tv_usec = 0;
+ tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime;
+ tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
+ return tv;
+}
+
+static void
+process_setstat(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ Attrib a;
+ char *name;
+ int r, status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug("request %u: setstat name \"%s\"", id, name);
+ if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
+ logit("set \"%s\" size %llu",
+ name, (unsigned long long)a.size);
+ r = truncate(name, a.size);
+ if (r == -1)
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ }
+ if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
+ logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm);
+ r = chmod(name, a.perm & 07777);
+ if (r == -1)
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ }
+ if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+ char buf[64];
+ time_t t = a.mtime;
+
+ strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S",
+ localtime(&t));
+ logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf);
+ r = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(&a));
+ if (r == -1)
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ }
+ if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+ logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name,
+ (u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid);
+ r = chown(name, a.uid, a.gid);
+ if (r == -1)
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ }
+ send_status(id, status);
+ free(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ Attrib a;
+ int handle, fd, r;
+ int status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+
+ if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 ||
+ (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug("request %u: fsetstat handle %d", id, handle);
+ fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ else {
+ char *name = handle_to_name(handle);
+
+ if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
+ logit("set \"%s\" size %llu",
+ name, (unsigned long long)a.size);
+ r = ftruncate(fd, a.size);
+ if (r == -1)
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ }
+ if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
+ logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm);
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
+ r = fchmod(fd, a.perm & 07777);
+#else
+ r = chmod(name, a.perm & 07777);
+#endif
+ if (r == -1)
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ }
+ if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+ char buf[64];
+ time_t t = a.mtime;
+
+ strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S",
+ localtime(&t));
+ logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf);
+#ifdef HAVE_FUTIMES
+ r = futimes(fd, attrib_to_tv(&a));
+#else
+ r = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(&a));
+#endif
+ if (r == -1)
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ }
+ if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+ logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name,
+ (u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid);
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHOWN
+ r = fchown(fd, a.uid, a.gid);
+#else
+ r = chown(name, a.uid, a.gid);
+#endif
+ if (r == -1)
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ }
+ }
+ send_status(id, status);
+}
+
+static void
+process_opendir(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ DIR *dirp = NULL;
+ char *path;
+ int r, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug3("request %u: opendir", id);
+ logit("opendir \"%s\"", path);
+ dirp = opendir(path);
+ if (dirp == NULL) {
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ } else {
+ handle = handle_new(HANDLE_DIR, path, 0, 0, dirp);
+ if (handle < 0) {
+ closedir(dirp);
+ } else {
+ send_handle(id, handle);
+ status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ }
+
+ }
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ send_status(id, status);
+ free(path);
+}
+
+static void
+process_readdir(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ DIR *dirp;
+ struct dirent *dp;
+ char *path;
+ int r, handle;
+
+ if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug("request %u: readdir \"%s\" (handle %d)", id,
+ handle_to_name(handle), handle);
+ dirp = handle_to_dir(handle);
+ path = handle_to_name(handle);
+ if (dirp == NULL || path == NULL) {
+ send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE);
+ } else {
+ struct stat st;
+ char pathname[PATH_MAX];
+ Stat *stats;
+ int nstats = 10, count = 0, i;
+
+ stats = xcalloc(nstats, sizeof(Stat));
+ while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
+ if (count >= nstats) {
+ nstats *= 2;
+ stats = xreallocarray(stats, nstats, sizeof(Stat));
+ }
+/* XXX OVERFLOW ? */
+ snprintf(pathname, sizeof pathname, "%s%s%s", path,
+ strcmp(path, "/") ? "/" : "", dp->d_name);
+ if (lstat(pathname, &st) < 0)
+ continue;
+ stat_to_attrib(&st, &(stats[count].attrib));
+ stats[count].name = xstrdup(dp->d_name);
+ stats[count].long_name = ls_file(dp->d_name, &st, 0, 0);
+ count++;
+ /* send up to 100 entries in one message */
+ /* XXX check packet size instead */
+ if (count == 100)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (count > 0) {
+ send_names(id, count, stats);
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ free(stats[i].name);
+ free(stats[i].long_name);
+ }
+ } else {
+ send_status(id, SSH2_FX_EOF);
+ }
+ free(stats);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+process_remove(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ char *name;
+ int r, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug3("request %u: remove", id);
+ logit("remove name \"%s\"", name);
+ r = unlink(name);
+ status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+ send_status(id, status);
+ free(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_mkdir(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ Attrib a;
+ char *name;
+ int r, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ?
+ a.perm & 07777 : 0777;
+ debug3("request %u: mkdir", id);
+ logit("mkdir name \"%s\" mode 0%o", name, mode);
+ r = mkdir(name, mode);
+ status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+ send_status(id, status);
+ free(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_rmdir(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ char *name;
+ int r, status;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug3("request %u: rmdir", id);
+ logit("rmdir name \"%s\"", name);
+ r = rmdir(name);
+ status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+ send_status(id, status);
+ free(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_realpath(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ char resolvedname[PATH_MAX];
+ char *path;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ if (path[0] == '\0') {
+ free(path);
+ path = xstrdup(".");
+ }
+ debug3("request %u: realpath", id);
+ verbose("realpath \"%s\"", path);
+ if (realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
+ send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
+ } else {
+ Stat s;
+ attrib_clear(&s.attrib);
+ s.name = s.long_name = resolvedname;
+ send_names(id, 1, &s);
+ }
+ free(path);
+}
+
+static void
+process_rename(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ char *oldpath, *newpath;
+ int r, status;
+ struct stat sb;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug3("request %u: rename", id);
+ logit("rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
+ status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ if (lstat(oldpath, &sb) == -1)
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
+ /* Race-free rename of regular files */
+ if (link(oldpath, newpath) == -1) {
+ if (errno == EOPNOTSUPP || errno == ENOSYS
+#ifdef EXDEV
+ || errno == EXDEV
+#endif
+#ifdef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO
+ || errno == LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO
+#endif
+ ) {
+ struct stat st;
+
+ /*
+ * fs doesn't support links, so fall back to
+ * stat+rename. This is racy.
+ */
+ if (stat(newpath, &st) == -1) {
+ if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1)
+ status =
+ errno_to_portable(errno);
+ else
+ status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ }
+ } else {
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ }
+ } else if (unlink(oldpath) == -1) {
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ /* clean spare link */
+ unlink(newpath);
+ } else
+ status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ } else if (stat(newpath, &sb) == -1) {
+ if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1)
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ else
+ status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ }
+ send_status(id, status);
+ free(oldpath);
+ free(newpath);
+}
+
+static void
+process_readlink(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ int r, len;
+ char buf[PATH_MAX];
+ char *path;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug3("request %u: readlink", id);
+ verbose("readlink \"%s\"", path);
+ if ((len = readlink(path, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) == -1)
+ send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
+ else {
+ Stat s;
+
+ buf[len] = '\0';
+ attrib_clear(&s.attrib);
+ s.name = s.long_name = buf;
+ send_names(id, 1, &s);
+ }
+ free(path);
+}
+
+static void
+process_symlink(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ char *oldpath, *newpath;
+ int r, status;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug3("request %u: symlink", id);
+ logit("symlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
+ /* this will fail if 'newpath' exists */
+ r = symlink(oldpath, newpath);
+ status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+ send_status(id, status);
+ free(oldpath);
+ free(newpath);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ char *oldpath, *newpath;
+ int r, status;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug3("request %u: posix-rename", id);
+ logit("posix-rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
+ r = rename(oldpath, newpath);
+ status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+ send_status(id, status);
+ free(oldpath);
+ free(newpath);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ char *path;
+ struct statvfs st;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ debug3("request %u: statvfs", id);
+ logit("statvfs \"%s\"", path);
+
+ if (statvfs(path, &st) != 0)
+ send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
+ else
+ send_statvfs(id, &st);
+ free(path);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ int r, handle, fd;
+ struct statvfs st;
+
+ if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ debug("request %u: fstatvfs \"%s\" (handle %u)",
+ id, handle_to_name(handle), handle);
+ if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0) {
+ send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (fstatvfs(fd, &st) != 0)
+ send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
+ else
+ send_statvfs(id, &st);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ char *oldpath, *newpath;
+ int r, status;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ debug3("request %u: hardlink", id);
+ logit("hardlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
+ r = link(oldpath, newpath);
+ status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+ send_status(id, status);
+ free(oldpath);
+ free(newpath);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ int handle, fd, r, status = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED;
+
+ if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ debug3("request %u: fsync (handle %u)", id, handle);
+ verbose("fsync \"%s\"", handle_to_name(handle));
+ if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0)
+ status = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE;
+ else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) {
+ r = fsync(fd);
+ status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+ }
+ send_status(id, status);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ char *request;
+ int i, r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &request, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(request, extended_handlers[i].ext_name) == 0) {
+ if (!request_permitted(&extended_handlers[i]))
+ send_status(id, SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED);
+ else
+ extended_handlers[i].handler(id);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (extended_handlers[i].handler == NULL) {
+ error("Unknown extended request \"%.100s\"", request);
+ send_status(id, SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED); /* MUST */
+ }
+ free(request);
+}
+
+/* stolen from ssh-agent */
+
+static void
+process(void)
+{
+ u_int msg_len;
+ u_int buf_len;
+ u_int consumed;
+ u_char type;
+ const u_char *cp;
+ int i, r;
+ u_int32_t id;
+
+ buf_len = sshbuf_len(iqueue);
+ if (buf_len < 5)
+ return; /* Incomplete message. */
+ cp = sshbuf_ptr(iqueue);
+ msg_len = get_u32(cp);
+ if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) {
+ error("bad message from %s local user %s",
+ client_addr, pw->pw_name);
+ sftp_server_cleanup_exit(11);
+ }
+ if (buf_len < msg_len + 4)
+ return;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, 4)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ buf_len -= 4;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(iqueue, &type)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH2_FXP_INIT:
+ process_init();
+ init_done = 1;
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED:
+ if (!init_done)
+ fatal("Received extended request before init");
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &id)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ process_extended(id);
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (!init_done)
+ fatal("Received %u request before init", type);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &id)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) {
+ if (type == handlers[i].type) {
+ if (!request_permitted(&handlers[i])) {
+ send_status(id,
+ SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED);
+ } else {
+ handlers[i].handler(id);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (handlers[i].handler == NULL)
+ error("Unknown message %u", type);
+ }
+ /* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */
+ if (buf_len < sshbuf_len(iqueue)) {
+ error("iqueue grew unexpectedly");
+ sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+ consumed = buf_len - sshbuf_len(iqueue);
+ if (msg_len < consumed) {
+ error("msg_len %u < consumed %u", msg_len, consumed);
+ sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+ if (msg_len > consumed &&
+ (r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, msg_len - consumed)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+/* Cleanup handler that logs active handles upon normal exit */
+void
+sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+ if (pw != NULL && client_addr != NULL) {
+ handle_log_exit();
+ logit("session closed for local user %s from [%s]",
+ pw->pw_name, client_addr);
+ }
+ _exit(i);
+}
+
+static void
+sftp_server_usage(void)
+{
+ extern char *__progname;
+
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
+ "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] "
+ "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n"
+ " %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
+ __progname, __progname);
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
+{
+ fd_set *rset, *wset;
+ int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
+ ssize_t len, olen, set_size;
+ SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
+ char *cp, *homedir = NULL, buf[4*4096];
+ long mask;
+
+ extern char *optarg;
+ extern char *__progname;
+
+ ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
+ __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+ log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+ pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
+
+ while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
+ "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'Q':
+ if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid query type\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++)
+ printf("%s\n", handlers[i].name);
+ for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++)
+ printf("%s\n", extended_handlers[i].name);
+ exit(0);
+ break;
+ case 'R':
+ readonly = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'c':
+ /*
+ * Ignore all arguments if we are invoked as a
+ * shell using "sftp-server -c command"
+ */
+ skipargs = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'e':
+ log_stderr = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'l':
+ log_level = log_level_number(optarg);
+ if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
+ error("Invalid log level \"%s\"", optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'f':
+ log_facility = log_facility_number(optarg);
+ if (log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
+ error("Invalid log facility \"%s\"", optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'd':
+ cp = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, user_pw->pw_uid);
+ homedir = percent_expand(cp, "d", user_pw->pw_dir,
+ "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+ free(cp);
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ if (request_whitelist != NULL)
+ fatal("Permitted requests already set");
+ request_whitelist = xstrdup(optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'P':
+ if (request_blacklist != NULL)
+ fatal("Refused requests already set");
+ request_blacklist = xstrdup(optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'u':
+ errno = 0;
+ mask = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
+ if (mask < 0 || mask > 0777 || *cp != '\0' ||
+ cp == optarg || (mask == 0 && errno != 0))
+ fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
+ (void)umask((mode_t)mask);
+ break;
+ case 'h':
+ default:
+ sftp_server_usage();
+ }
+ }
+
+ log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+ /*
+ * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
+ * available to the user so that sftp access doesn't automatically
+ * imply arbitrary code execution access that will break
+ * restricted configurations.
+ */
+ platform_disable_tracing(1); /* strict */
+
+ /* Drop any fine-grained privileges we don't need */
+ platform_pledge_sftp_server();
+
+ if ((cp = getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")) != NULL) {
+ client_addr = xstrdup(cp);
+ if ((cp = strchr(client_addr, ' ')) == NULL) {
+ error("Malformed SSH_CONNECTION variable: \"%s\"",
+ getenv("SSH_CONNECTION"));
+ sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+ *cp = '\0';
+ } else
+ client_addr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
+
+ logit("session opened for local user %s from [%s]",
+ pw->pw_name, client_addr);
+
+ in = STDIN_FILENO;
+ out = STDOUT_FILENO;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ setmode(in, O_BINARY);
+ setmode(out, O_BINARY);
+#endif
+
+ max = 0;
+ if (in > max)
+ max = in;
+ if (out > max)
+ max = out;
+
+ if ((iqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((oqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+
+ rset = xcalloc(howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
+ wset = xcalloc(howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
+
+ if (homedir != NULL) {
+ if (chdir(homedir) != 0) {
+ error("chdir to \"%s\" failed: %s", homedir,
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+
+ set_size = howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
+ for (;;) {
+ memset(rset, 0, set_size);
+ memset(wset, 0, set_size);
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle
+ * the worst-case length packet it can generate,
+ * otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads.
+ */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(iqueue, sizeof(buf))) == 0 &&
+ (r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue,
+ SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) == 0)
+ FD_SET(in, rset);
+ else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_check_reserve failed: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ olen = sshbuf_len(oqueue);
+ if (olen > 0)
+ FD_SET(out, wset);
+
+ if (select(max+1, rset, wset, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ error("select: %s", strerror(errno));
+ sftp_server_cleanup_exit(2);
+ }
+
+ /* copy stdin to iqueue */
+ if (FD_ISSET(in, rset)) {
+ len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf);
+ if (len == 0) {
+ debug("read eof");
+ sftp_server_cleanup_exit(0);
+ } else if (len < 0) {
+ error("read: %s", strerror(errno));
+ sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1);
+ } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(iqueue, buf, len)) != 0) {
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ }
+ /* send oqueue to stdout */
+ if (FD_ISSET(out, wset)) {
+ len = write(out, sshbuf_ptr(oqueue), olen);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ error("write: %s", strerror(errno));
+ sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1);
+ } else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(oqueue, len)) != 0) {
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Process requests from client if we can fit the results
+ * into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input
+ * and let the output queue drain.
+ */
+ r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH);
+ if (r == 0)
+ process();
+ else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_check_reserve: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp.0
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp.0 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,370 +0,0 @@
-SFTP(1) OpenBSD Reference Manual SFTP(1)
-
-NAME
- sftp - secure file transfer program
-
-SYNOPSIS
- sftp [-1246aCfpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]
- [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file] [-l limit]
- [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-R num_requests] [-S program]
- [-s subsystem | sftp_server] host
- sftp [user@]host[:file ...]
- sftp [user@]host[:dir[/]]
- sftp -b batchfile [user@]host
-
-DESCRIPTION
- sftp is an interactive file transfer program, similar to ftp(1), which
- performs all operations over an encrypted ssh(1) transport. It may also
- use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and
- compression. sftp connects and logs into the specified host, then enters
- an interactive command mode.
-
- The second usage format will retrieve files automatically if a non-
- interactive authentication method is used; otherwise it will do so after
- successful interactive authentication.
-
- The third usage format allows sftp to start in a remote directory.
-
- The final usage format allows for automated sessions using the -b option.
- In such cases, it is necessary to configure non-interactive
- authentication to obviate the need to enter a password at connection time
- (see sshd(8) and ssh-keygen(1) for details).
-
- Since some usage formats use colon characters to delimit host names from
- path names, IPv6 addresses must be enclosed in square brackets to avoid
- ambiguity.
-
- The options are as follows:
-
- -1 Specify the use of protocol version 1.
-
- -2 Specify the use of protocol version 2.
-
- -4 Forces sftp to use IPv4 addresses only.
-
- -6 Forces sftp to use IPv6 addresses only.
-
- -a Attempt to continue interrupted downloads rather than overwriting
- existing partial or complete copies of files. If the remote file
- contents differ from the partial local copy then the resultant
- file is likely to be corrupt.
-
- -B buffer_size
- Specify the size of the buffer that sftp uses when transferring
- files. Larger buffers require fewer round trips at the cost of
- higher memory consumption. The default is 32768 bytes.
-
- -b batchfile
- Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input batchfile
- instead of stdin. Since it lacks user interaction it should be
- used in conjunction with non-interactive authentication. A
- batchfile of `-' may be used to indicate standard input. sftp
- will abort if any of the following commands fail: get, put,
- reget, rename, ln, rm, mkdir, chdir, ls, lchdir, chmod, chown,
- chgrp, lpwd, df, symlink, and lmkdir. Termination on error can
- be suppressed on a command by command basis by prefixing the
- command with a `-' character (for example, -rm /tmp/blah*).
-
- -C Enables compression (via ssh's -C flag).
-
- -c cipher
- Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfers.
- This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
-
- -D sftp_server_path
- Connect directly to a local sftp server (rather than via ssh(1)).
- This option may be useful in debugging the client and server.
-
- -F ssh_config
- Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for ssh(1).
- This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
-
- -f Requests that files be flushed to disk immediately after
- transfer. When uploading files, this feature is only enabled if
- the server implements the "fsync at openssh.com" extension.
-
- -i identity_file
- Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public
- key authentication is read. This option is directly passed to
- ssh(1).
-
- -l limit
- Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
-
- -o ssh_option
- Can be used to pass options to ssh in the format used in
- ssh_config(5). This is useful for specifying options for which
- there is no separate sftp command-line flag. For example, to
- specify an alternate port use: sftp -oPort=24. For full details
- of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
- ssh_config(5).
-
- AddressFamily
- BatchMode
- BindAddress
- CanonicalDomains
- CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
- CanonicalizeHostname
- CanonicalizeMaxDots
- CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
- ChallengeResponseAuthentication
- CheckHostIP
- Cipher
- Ciphers
- Compression
- CompressionLevel
- ConnectionAttempts
- ConnectTimeout
- ControlMaster
- ControlPath
- ControlPersist
- GlobalKnownHostsFile
- GSSAPIAuthentication
- GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
- HashKnownHosts
- Host
- HostbasedAuthentication
- HostKeyAlgorithms
- HostKeyAlias
- HostName
- IdentityFile
- IdentitiesOnly
- IPQoS
- KbdInteractiveAuthentication
- KbdInteractiveDevices
- KexAlgorithms
- LogLevel
- MACs
- NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
- NumberOfPasswordPrompts
- PasswordAuthentication
- PKCS11Provider
- Port
- PreferredAuthentications
- Protocol
- ProxyCommand
- PubkeyAuthentication
- RekeyLimit
- RhostsRSAAuthentication
- RSAAuthentication
- SendEnv
- ServerAliveInterval
- ServerAliveCountMax
- StrictHostKeyChecking
- TCPKeepAlive
- UsePrivilegedPort
- User
- UserKnownHostsFile
- VerifyHostKeyDNS
-
- -P port
- Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
-
- -p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
- original files transferred.
-
- -q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
- diagnostic messages from ssh(1).
-
- -R num_requests
- Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
- Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed but will
- increase memory usage. The default is 64 outstanding requests.
-
- -r Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and
- downloading. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links
- encountered in the tree traversal.
-
- -S program
- Name of the program to use for the encrypted connection. The
- program must understand ssh(1) options.
-
- -s subsystem | sftp_server
- Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server on
- the remote host. A path is useful for using sftp over protocol
- version 1, or when the remote sshd(8) does not have an sftp
- subsystem configured.
-
- -v Raise logging level. This option is also passed to ssh.
-
-INTERACTIVE COMMANDS
- Once in interactive mode, sftp understands a set of commands similar to
- those of ftp(1). Commands are case insensitive. Pathnames that contain
- spaces must be enclosed in quotes. Any special characters contained
- within pathnames that are recognized by glob(3) must be escaped with
- backslashes (`\').
-
- bye Quit sftp.
-
- cd path
- Change remote directory to path.
-
- chgrp grp path
- Change group of file path to grp. path may contain glob(3)
- characters and may match multiple files. grp must be a numeric
- GID.
-
- chmod mode path
- Change permissions of file path to mode. path may contain
- glob(3) characters and may match multiple files.
-
- chown own path
- Change owner of file path to own. path may contain glob(3)
- characters and may match multiple files. own must be a numeric
- UID.
-
- df [-hi] [path]
- Display usage information for the filesystem holding the current
- directory (or path if specified). If the -h flag is specified,
- the capacity information will be displayed using "human-readable"
- suffixes. The -i flag requests display of inode information in
- addition to capacity information. This command is only supported
- on servers that implement the ``statvfs at openssh.com'' extension.
-
- exit Quit sftp.
-
- get [-afPpr] remote-path [local-path]
- Retrieve the remote-path and store it on the local machine. If
- the local path name is not specified, it is given the same name
- it has on the remote machine. remote-path may contain glob(3)
- characters and may match multiple files. If it does and
- local-path is specified, then local-path must specify a
- directory.
-
- If the -a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial
- transfers of existing files. Note that resumption assumes that
- any partial copy of the local file matches the remote copy. If
- the remote file contents differ from the partial local copy then
- the resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
-
- If the -f flag is specified, then fsync(2) will be called after
- the file transfer has completed to flush the file to disk.
-
- If either the -P or -p flag is specified, then full file
- permissions and access times are copied too.
-
- If the -r flag is specified then directories will be copied
- recursively. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when
- performing recursive transfers.
-
- help Display help text.
-
- lcd path
- Change local directory to path.
-
- lls [ls-options [path]]
- Display local directory listing of either path or current
- directory if path is not specified. ls-options may contain any
- flags supported by the local system's ls(1) command. path may
- contain glob(3) characters and may match multiple files.
-
- lmkdir path
- Create local directory specified by path.
-
- ln [-s] oldpath newpath
- Create a link from oldpath to newpath. If the -s flag is
- specified the created link is a symbolic link, otherwise it is a
- hard link.
-
- lpwd Print local working directory.
-
- ls [-1afhlnrSt] [path]
- Display a remote directory listing of either path or the current
- directory if path is not specified. path may contain glob(3)
- characters and may match multiple files.
-
- The following flags are recognized and alter the behaviour of ls
- accordingly:
-
- -1 Produce single columnar output.
-
- -a List files beginning with a dot (`.').
-
- -f Do not sort the listing. The default sort order is
- lexicographical.
-
- -h When used with a long format option, use unit suffixes:
- Byte, Kilobyte, Megabyte, Gigabyte, Terabyte, Petabyte,
- and Exabyte in order to reduce the number of digits to
- four or fewer using powers of 2 for sizes (K=1024,
- M=1048576, etc.).
-
- -l Display additional details including permissions and
- ownership information.
-
- -n Produce a long listing with user and group information
- presented numerically.
-
- -r Reverse the sort order of the listing.
-
- -S Sort the listing by file size.
-
- -t Sort the listing by last modification time.
-
- lumask umask
- Set local umask to umask.
-
- mkdir path
- Create remote directory specified by path.
-
- progress
- Toggle display of progress meter.
-
- put [-fPpr] local-path [remote-path]
- Upload local-path and store it on the remote machine. If the
- remote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it
- has on the local machine. local-path may contain glob(3)
- characters and may match multiple files. If it does and
- remote-path is specified, then remote-path must specify a
- directory.
-
- If the -f flag is specified, then a request will be sent to the
- server to call fsync(2) after the file has been transferred.
- Note that this is only supported by servers that implement the
- "fsync at openssh.com" extension.
-
- If either the -P or -p flag is specified, then full file
- permissions and access times are copied too.
-
- If the -r flag is specified then directories will be copied
- recursively. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when
- performing recursive transfers.
-
- pwd Display remote working directory.
-
- quit Quit sftp.
-
- reget [-Ppr] remote-path [local-path]
- Resume download of remote-path. Equivalent to get with the -a
- flag set.
-
- rename oldpath newpath
- Rename remote file from oldpath to newpath.
-
- rm path
- Delete remote file specified by path.
-
- rmdir path
- Remove remote directory specified by path.
-
- symlink oldpath newpath
- Create a symbolic link from oldpath to newpath.
-
- version
- Display the sftp protocol version.
-
- !command
- Execute command in local shell.
-
- ! Escape to local shell.
-
- ? Synonym for help.
-
-SEE ALSO
- ftp(1), ls(1), scp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), glob(3),
- ssh_config(5), sftp-server(8), sshd(8)
-
- T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh-
- filexfer-00.txt, January 2001, work in progress material.
-
-OpenBSD 5.5 October 20, 2013 OpenBSD 5.5
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp.0 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp.0)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp.0 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@
+SFTP(1) General Commands Manual SFTP(1)
+
+NAME
+ sftp M-bM-^@M-^S secure file transfer program
+
+SYNOPSIS
+ sftp [-1246aCfpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]
+ [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file] [-l limit]
+ [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-R num_requests] [-S program]
+ [-s subsystem | sftp_server] host
+ sftp [user@]host[:file ...]
+ sftp [user@]host[:dir[/]]
+ sftp -b batchfile [user@]host
+
+DESCRIPTION
+ sftp is an interactive file transfer program, similar to ftp(1), which
+ performs all operations over an encrypted ssh(1) transport. It may also
+ use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and
+ compression. sftp connects and logs into the specified host, then enters
+ an interactive command mode.
+
+ The second usage format will retrieve files automatically if a non-
+ interactive authentication method is used; otherwise it will do so after
+ successful interactive authentication.
+
+ The third usage format allows sftp to start in a remote directory.
+
+ The final usage format allows for automated sessions using the -b option.
+ In such cases, it is necessary to configure non-interactive
+ authentication to obviate the need to enter a password at connection time
+ (see sshd(8) and ssh-keygen(1) for details).
+
+ Since some usage formats use colon characters to delimit host names from
+ path names, IPv6 addresses must be enclosed in square brackets to avoid
+ ambiguity.
+
+ The options are as follows:
+
+ -1 Specify the use of protocol version 1.
+
+ -2 Specify the use of protocol version 2.
+
+ -4 Forces sftp to use IPv4 addresses only.
+
+ -6 Forces sftp to use IPv6 addresses only.
+
+ -a Attempt to continue interrupted transfers rather than overwriting
+ existing partial or complete copies of files. If the partial
+ contents differ from those being transferred, then the resultant
+ file is likely to be corrupt.
+
+ -B buffer_size
+ Specify the size of the buffer that sftp uses when transferring
+ files. Larger buffers require fewer round trips at the cost of
+ higher memory consumption. The default is 32768 bytes.
+
+ -b batchfile
+ Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input batchfile
+ instead of stdin. Since it lacks user interaction it should be
+ used in conjunction with non-interactive authentication. A
+ batchfile of M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y may be used to indicate standard input. sftp
+ will abort if any of the following commands fail: get, put,
+ reget, reput, rename, ln, rm, mkdir, chdir, ls, lchdir, chmod,
+ chown, chgrp, lpwd, df, symlink, and lmkdir. Termination on
+ error can be suppressed on a command by command basis by
+ prefixing the command with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character (for example, -rm
+ /tmp/blah*).
+
+ -C Enables compression (via ssh's -C flag).
+
+ -c cipher
+ Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfers.
+ This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
+
+ -D sftp_server_path
+ Connect directly to a local sftp server (rather than via ssh(1)).
+ This option may be useful in debugging the client and server.
+
+ -F ssh_config
+ Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for ssh(1).
+ This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
+
+ -f Requests that files be flushed to disk immediately after
+ transfer. When uploading files, this feature is only enabled if
+ the server implements the "fsync at openssh.com" extension.
+
+ -i identity_file
+ Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public
+ key authentication is read. This option is directly passed to
+ ssh(1).
+
+ -l limit
+ Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
+
+ -o ssh_option
+ Can be used to pass options to ssh in the format used in
+ ssh_config(5). This is useful for specifying options for which
+ there is no separate sftp command-line flag. For example, to
+ specify an alternate port use: sftp -oPort=24. For full details
+ of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+ ssh_config(5).
+
+ AddressFamily
+ BatchMode
+ BindAddress
+ CanonicalDomains
+ CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+ CanonicalizeHostname
+ CanonicalizeMaxDots
+ CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+ CertificateFile
+ ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+ CheckHostIP
+ Cipher
+ Ciphers
+ Compression
+ CompressionLevel
+ ConnectionAttempts
+ ConnectTimeout
+ ControlMaster
+ ControlPath
+ ControlPersist
+ GlobalKnownHostsFile
+ GSSAPIAuthentication
+ GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ HashKnownHosts
+ Host
+ HostbasedAuthentication
+ HostbasedKeyTypes
+ HostKeyAlgorithms
+ HostKeyAlias
+ HostName
+ IdentitiesOnly
+ IdentityAgent
+ IdentityFile
+ IPQoS
+ KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+ KbdInteractiveDevices
+ KexAlgorithms
+ LogLevel
+ MACs
+ NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+ NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+ PasswordAuthentication
+ PKCS11Provider
+ Port
+ PreferredAuthentications
+ Protocol
+ ProxyCommand
+ ProxyJump
+ PubkeyAuthentication
+ RekeyLimit
+ RhostsRSAAuthentication
+ RSAAuthentication
+ SendEnv
+ ServerAliveInterval
+ ServerAliveCountMax
+ StrictHostKeyChecking
+ TCPKeepAlive
+ UpdateHostKeys
+ UsePrivilegedPort
+ User
+ UserKnownHostsFile
+ VerifyHostKeyDNS
+
+ -P port
+ Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
+
+ -p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
+ original files transferred.
+
+ -q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
+ diagnostic messages from ssh(1).
+
+ -R num_requests
+ Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
+ Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed but will
+ increase memory usage. The default is 64 outstanding requests.
+
+ -r Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and
+ downloading. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links
+ encountered in the tree traversal.
+
+ -S program
+ Name of the program to use for the encrypted connection. The
+ program must understand ssh(1) options.
+
+ -s subsystem | sftp_server
+ Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server on
+ the remote host. A path is useful for using sftp over protocol
+ version 1, or when the remote sshd(8) does not have an sftp
+ subsystem configured.
+
+ -v Raise logging level. This option is also passed to ssh.
+
+INTERACTIVE COMMANDS
+ Once in interactive mode, sftp understands a set of commands similar to
+ those of ftp(1). Commands are case insensitive. Pathnames that contain
+ spaces must be enclosed in quotes. Any special characters contained
+ within pathnames that are recognized by glob(3) must be escaped with
+ backslashes (M-bM-^@M-^X\M-bM-^@M-^Y).
+
+ bye Quit sftp.
+
+ cd path
+ Change remote directory to path.
+
+ chgrp grp path
+ Change group of file path to grp. path may contain glob(3)
+ characters and may match multiple files. grp must be a numeric
+ GID.
+
+ chmod mode path
+ Change permissions of file path to mode. path may contain
+ glob(3) characters and may match multiple files.
+
+ chown own path
+ Change owner of file path to own. path may contain glob(3)
+ characters and may match multiple files. own must be a numeric
+ UID.
+
+ df [-hi] [path]
+ Display usage information for the filesystem holding the current
+ directory (or path if specified). If the -h flag is specified,
+ the capacity information will be displayed using "human-readable"
+ suffixes. The -i flag requests display of inode information in
+ addition to capacity information. This command is only supported
+ on servers that implement the M-bM-^@M-^\statvfs at openssh.comM-bM-^@M-^] extension.
+
+ exit Quit sftp.
+
+ get [-afPpr] remote-path [local-path]
+ Retrieve the remote-path and store it on the local machine. If
+ the local path name is not specified, it is given the same name
+ it has on the remote machine. remote-path may contain glob(3)
+ characters and may match multiple files. If it does and
+ local-path is specified, then local-path must specify a
+ directory.
+
+ If the -a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial
+ transfers of existing files. Note that resumption assumes that
+ any partial copy of the local file matches the remote copy. If
+ the remote file contents differ from the partial local copy then
+ the resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
+
+ If the -f flag is specified, then fsync(2) will be called after
+ the file transfer has completed to flush the file to disk.
+
+ If either the -P or -p flag is specified, then full file
+ permissions and access times are copied too.
+
+ If the -r flag is specified then directories will be copied
+ recursively. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when
+ performing recursive transfers.
+
+ help Display help text.
+
+ lcd path
+ Change local directory to path.
+
+ lls [ls-options [path]]
+ Display local directory listing of either path or current
+ directory if path is not specified. ls-options may contain any
+ flags supported by the local system's ls(1) command. path may
+ contain glob(3) characters and may match multiple files.
+
+ lmkdir path
+ Create local directory specified by path.
+
+ ln [-s] oldpath newpath
+ Create a link from oldpath to newpath. If the -s flag is
+ specified the created link is a symbolic link, otherwise it is a
+ hard link.
+
+ lpwd Print local working directory.
+
+ ls [-1afhlnrSt] [path]
+ Display a remote directory listing of either path or the current
+ directory if path is not specified. path may contain glob(3)
+ characters and may match multiple files.
+
+ The following flags are recognized and alter the behaviour of ls
+ accordingly:
+
+ -1 Produce single columnar output.
+
+ -a List files beginning with a dot (M-bM-^@M-^X.M-bM-^@M-^Y).
+
+ -f Do not sort the listing. The default sort order is
+ lexicographical.
+
+ -h When used with a long format option, use unit suffixes:
+ Byte, Kilobyte, Megabyte, Gigabyte, Terabyte, Petabyte,
+ and Exabyte in order to reduce the number of digits to
+ four or fewer using powers of 2 for sizes (K=1024,
+ M=1048576, etc.).
+
+ -l Display additional details including permissions and
+ ownership information.
+
+ -n Produce a long listing with user and group information
+ presented numerically.
+
+ -r Reverse the sort order of the listing.
+
+ -S Sort the listing by file size.
+
+ -t Sort the listing by last modification time.
+
+ lumask umask
+ Set local umask to umask.
+
+ mkdir path
+ Create remote directory specified by path.
+
+ progress
+ Toggle display of progress meter.
+
+ put [-afPpr] local-path [remote-path]
+ Upload local-path and store it on the remote machine. If the
+ remote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it
+ has on the local machine. local-path may contain glob(3)
+ characters and may match multiple files. If it does and
+ remote-path is specified, then remote-path must specify a
+ directory.
+
+ If the -a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial
+ transfers of existing files. Note that resumption assumes that
+ any partial copy of the remote file matches the local copy. If
+ the local file contents differ from the remote local copy then
+ the resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
+
+ If the -f flag is specified, then a request will be sent to the
+ server to call fsync(2) after the file has been transferred.
+ Note that this is only supported by servers that implement the
+ "fsync at openssh.com" extension.
+
+ If either the -P or -p flag is specified, then full file
+ permissions and access times are copied too.
+
+ If the -r flag is specified then directories will be copied
+ recursively. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when
+ performing recursive transfers.
+
+ pwd Display remote working directory.
+
+ quit Quit sftp.
+
+ reget [-Ppr] remote-path [local-path]
+ Resume download of remote-path. Equivalent to get with the -a
+ flag set.
+
+ reput [-Ppr] [local-path] remote-path
+ Resume upload of [local-path]. Equivalent to put with the -a
+ flag set.
+
+ rename oldpath newpath
+ Rename remote file from oldpath to newpath.
+
+ rm path
+ Delete remote file specified by path.
+
+ rmdir path
+ Remove remote directory specified by path.
+
+ symlink oldpath newpath
+ Create a symbolic link from oldpath to newpath.
+
+ version
+ Display the sftp protocol version.
+
+ !command
+ Execute command in local shell.
+
+ ! Escape to local shell.
+
+ ? Synonym for help.
+
+SEE ALSO
+ ftp(1), ls(1), scp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), glob(3),
+ ssh_config(5), sftp-server(8), sshd(8)
+
+ T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh-
+ filexfer-00.txt, January 2001, work in progress material.
+
+OpenBSD 6.0 July 16, 2016 OpenBSD 6.0
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp.1
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp.1 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp.1 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,602 +0,0 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.97 2013/10/20 09:51:26 djm Exp $
-.\"
-.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
-.\"
-.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-.\" are met:
-.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-.\"
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: October 20 2013 $
-.Dt SFTP 1
-.Os
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm sftp
-.Nd secure file transfer program
-.Sh SYNOPSIS
-.Nm sftp
-.Bk -words
-.Op Fl 1246aCfpqrv
-.Op Fl B Ar buffer_size
-.Op Fl b Ar batchfile
-.Op Fl c Ar cipher
-.Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
-.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
-.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
-.Op Fl l Ar limit
-.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
-.Op Fl P Ar port
-.Op Fl R Ar num_requests
-.Op Fl S Ar program
-.Op Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server
-.Ar host
-.Ek
-.Nm sftp
-.Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns
-.Ar host Ns Op : Ns Ar
-.Nm sftp
-.Oo
-.Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns
-.Ar host Ns Oo : Ns Ar dir Ns
-.Op Ar /
-.Oc
-.Nm sftp
-.Fl b Ar batchfile
-.Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns Ar host
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-.Nm
-is an interactive file transfer program, similar to
-.Xr ftp 1 ,
-which performs all operations over an encrypted
-.Xr ssh 1
-transport.
-It may also use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and
-compression.
-.Nm
-connects and logs into the specified
-.Ar host ,
-then enters an interactive command mode.
-.Pp
-The second usage format will retrieve files automatically if a non-interactive
-authentication method is used; otherwise it will do so after
-successful interactive authentication.
-.Pp
-The third usage format allows
-.Nm
-to start in a remote directory.
-.Pp
-The final usage format allows for automated sessions using the
-.Fl b
-option.
-In such cases, it is necessary to configure non-interactive authentication
-to obviate the need to enter a password at connection time (see
-.Xr sshd 8
-and
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1
-for details).
-.Pp
-Since some usage formats use colon characters to delimit host names from path
-names, IPv6 addresses must be enclosed in square brackets to avoid ambiguity.
-.Pp
-The options are as follows:
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Fl 1
-Specify the use of protocol version 1.
-.It Fl 2
-Specify the use of protocol version 2.
-.It Fl 4
-Forces
-.Nm
-to use IPv4 addresses only.
-.It Fl 6
-Forces
-.Nm
-to use IPv6 addresses only.
-.It Fl a
-Attempt to continue interrupted downloads rather than overwriting existing
-partial or complete copies of files.
-If the remote file contents differ from the partial local copy then the
-resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
-.It Fl B Ar buffer_size
-Specify the size of the buffer that
-.Nm
-uses when transferring files.
-Larger buffers require fewer round trips at the cost of higher
-memory consumption.
-The default is 32768 bytes.
-.It Fl b Ar batchfile
-Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input
-.Ar batchfile
-instead of
-.Em stdin .
-Since it lacks user interaction it should be used in conjunction with
-non-interactive authentication.
-A
-.Ar batchfile
-of
-.Sq \-
-may be used to indicate standard input.
-.Nm
-will abort if any of the following
-commands fail:
-.Ic get , put , reget , rename , ln ,
-.Ic rm , mkdir , chdir , ls ,
-.Ic lchdir , chmod , chown ,
-.Ic chgrp , lpwd , df , symlink ,
-and
-.Ic lmkdir .
-Termination on error can be suppressed on a command by command basis by
-prefixing the command with a
-.Sq \-
-character (for example,
-.Ic -rm /tmp/blah* ) .
-.It Fl C
-Enables compression (via ssh's
-.Fl C
-flag).
-.It Fl c Ar cipher
-Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfers.
-This option is directly passed to
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-.It Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
-Connect directly to a local sftp server
-(rather than via
-.Xr ssh 1 ) .
-This option may be useful in debugging the client and server.
-.It Fl F Ar ssh_config
-Specifies an alternative
-per-user configuration file for
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-This option is directly passed to
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-.It Fl f
-Requests that files be flushed to disk immediately after transfer.
-When uploading files, this feature is only enabled if the server
-implements the "fsync at openssh.com" extension.
-.It Fl i Ar identity_file
-Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key
-authentication is read.
-This option is directly passed to
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-.It Fl l Ar limit
-Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
-.It Fl o Ar ssh_option
-Can be used to pass options to
-.Nm ssh
-in the format used in
-.Xr ssh_config 5 .
-This is useful for specifying options
-for which there is no separate
-.Nm sftp
-command-line flag.
-For example, to specify an alternate port use:
-.Ic sftp -oPort=24 .
-For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
-.Xr ssh_config 5 .
-.Pp
-.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact
-.It AddressFamily
-.It BatchMode
-.It BindAddress
-.It CanonicalDomains
-.It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
-.It CanonicalizeHostname
-.It CanonicalizeMaxDots
-.It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
-.It ChallengeResponseAuthentication
-.It CheckHostIP
-.It Cipher
-.It Ciphers
-.It Compression
-.It CompressionLevel
-.It ConnectionAttempts
-.It ConnectTimeout
-.It ControlMaster
-.It ControlPath
-.It ControlPersist
-.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
-.It GSSAPIAuthentication
-.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
-.It HashKnownHosts
-.It Host
-.It HostbasedAuthentication
-.It HostKeyAlgorithms
-.It HostKeyAlias
-.It HostName
-.It IdentityFile
-.It IdentitiesOnly
-.It IPQoS
-.It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
-.It KbdInteractiveDevices
-.It KexAlgorithms
-.It LogLevel
-.It MACs
-.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
-.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
-.It PasswordAuthentication
-.It PKCS11Provider
-.It Port
-.It PreferredAuthentications
-.It Protocol
-.It ProxyCommand
-.It PubkeyAuthentication
-.It RekeyLimit
-.It RhostsRSAAuthentication
-.It RSAAuthentication
-.It SendEnv
-.It ServerAliveInterval
-.It ServerAliveCountMax
-.It StrictHostKeyChecking
-.It TCPKeepAlive
-.It UsePrivilegedPort
-.It User
-.It UserKnownHostsFile
-.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
-.El
-.It Fl P Ar port
-Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
-.It Fl p
-Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
-original files transferred.
-.It Fl q
-Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
-diagnostic messages from
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-.It Fl R Ar num_requests
-Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
-Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed
-but will increase memory usage.
-The default is 64 outstanding requests.
-.It Fl r
-Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and downloading.
-Note that
-.Nm
-does not follow symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
-.It Fl S Ar program
-Name of the
-.Ar program
-to use for the encrypted connection.
-The program must understand
-.Xr ssh 1
-options.
-.It Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server
-Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server
-on the remote host.
-A path is useful for using
-.Nm
-over protocol version 1, or when the remote
-.Xr sshd 8
-does not have an sftp subsystem configured.
-.It Fl v
-Raise logging level.
-This option is also passed to ssh.
-.El
-.Sh INTERACTIVE COMMANDS
-Once in interactive mode,
-.Nm
-understands a set of commands similar to those of
-.Xr ftp 1 .
-Commands are case insensitive.
-Pathnames that contain spaces must be enclosed in quotes.
-Any special characters contained within pathnames that are recognized by
-.Xr glob 3
-must be escaped with backslashes
-.Pq Sq \e .
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Ic bye
-Quit
-.Nm sftp .
-.It Ic cd Ar path
-Change remote directory to
-.Ar path .
-.It Ic chgrp Ar grp Ar path
-Change group of file
-.Ar path
-to
-.Ar grp .
-.Ar path
-may contain
-.Xr glob 3
-characters and may match multiple files.
-.Ar grp
-must be a numeric GID.
-.It Ic chmod Ar mode Ar path
-Change permissions of file
-.Ar path
-to
-.Ar mode .
-.Ar path
-may contain
-.Xr glob 3
-characters and may match multiple files.
-.It Ic chown Ar own Ar path
-Change owner of file
-.Ar path
-to
-.Ar own .
-.Ar path
-may contain
-.Xr glob 3
-characters and may match multiple files.
-.Ar own
-must be a numeric UID.
-.It Xo Ic df
-.Op Fl hi
-.Op Ar path
-.Xc
-Display usage information for the filesystem holding the current directory
-(or
-.Ar path
-if specified).
-If the
-.Fl h
-flag is specified, the capacity information will be displayed using
-"human-readable" suffixes.
-The
-.Fl i
-flag requests display of inode information in addition to capacity information.
-This command is only supported on servers that implement the
-.Dq statvfs at openssh.com
-extension.
-.It Ic exit
-Quit
-.Nm sftp .
-.It Xo Ic get
-.Op Fl afPpr
-.Ar remote-path
-.Op Ar local-path
-.Xc
-Retrieve the
-.Ar remote-path
-and store it on the local machine.
-If the local
-path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has on the
-remote machine.
-.Ar remote-path
-may contain
-.Xr glob 3
-characters and may match multiple files.
-If it does and
-.Ar local-path
-is specified, then
-.Ar local-path
-must specify a directory.
-.Pp
-If the
-.Fl a
-flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial transfers of existing files.
-Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the local file matches
-the remote copy.
-If the remote file contents differ from the partial local copy then the
-resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
-.Pp
-If the
-.Fl f
-flag is specified, then
-.Xr fsync 2
-will be called after the file transfer has completed to flush the file
-to disk.
-.Pp
-If either the
-.Fl P
-or
-.Fl p
-flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are
-copied too.
-.Pp
-If the
-.Fl r
-flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively.
-Note that
-.Nm
-does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers.
-.It Ic help
-Display help text.
-.It Ic lcd Ar path
-Change local directory to
-.Ar path .
-.It Ic lls Op Ar ls-options Op Ar path
-Display local directory listing of either
-.Ar path
-or current directory if
-.Ar path
-is not specified.
-.Ar ls-options
-may contain any flags supported by the local system's
-.Xr ls 1
-command.
-.Ar path
-may contain
-.Xr glob 3
-characters and may match multiple files.
-.It Ic lmkdir Ar path
-Create local directory specified by
-.Ar path .
-.It Xo Ic ln
-.Op Fl s
-.Ar oldpath
-.Ar newpath
-.Xc
-Create a link from
-.Ar oldpath
-to
-.Ar newpath .
-If the
-.Fl s
-flag is specified the created link is a symbolic link, otherwise it is
-a hard link.
-.It Ic lpwd
-Print local working directory.
-.It Xo Ic ls
-.Op Fl 1afhlnrSt
-.Op Ar path
-.Xc
-Display a remote directory listing of either
-.Ar path
-or the current directory if
-.Ar path
-is not specified.
-.Ar path
-may contain
-.Xr glob 3
-characters and may match multiple files.
-.Pp
-The following flags are recognized and alter the behaviour of
-.Ic ls
-accordingly:
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Fl 1
-Produce single columnar output.
-.It Fl a
-List files beginning with a dot
-.Pq Sq \&. .
-.It Fl f
-Do not sort the listing.
-The default sort order is lexicographical.
-.It Fl h
-When used with a long format option, use unit suffixes: Byte, Kilobyte,
-Megabyte, Gigabyte, Terabyte, Petabyte, and Exabyte in order to reduce
-the number of digits to four or fewer using powers of 2 for sizes (K=1024,
-M=1048576, etc.).
-.It Fl l
-Display additional details including permissions
-and ownership information.
-.It Fl n
-Produce a long listing with user and group information presented
-numerically.
-.It Fl r
-Reverse the sort order of the listing.
-.It Fl S
-Sort the listing by file size.
-.It Fl t
-Sort the listing by last modification time.
-.El
-.It Ic lumask Ar umask
-Set local umask to
-.Ar umask .
-.It Ic mkdir Ar path
-Create remote directory specified by
-.Ar path .
-.It Ic progress
-Toggle display of progress meter.
-.It Xo Ic put
-.Op Fl fPpr
-.Ar local-path
-.Op Ar remote-path
-.Xc
-Upload
-.Ar local-path
-and store it on the remote machine.
-If the remote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has
-on the local machine.
-.Ar local-path
-may contain
-.Xr glob 3
-characters and may match multiple files.
-If it does and
-.Ar remote-path
-is specified, then
-.Ar remote-path
-must specify a directory.
-.Pp
-If the
-.Fl f
-flag is specified, then a request will be sent to the server to call
-.Xr fsync 2
-after the file has been transferred.
-Note that this is only supported by servers that implement
-the "fsync at openssh.com" extension.
-.Pp
-If either the
-.Fl P
-or
-.Fl p
-flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are
-copied too.
-.Pp
-If the
-.Fl r
-flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively.
-Note that
-.Nm
-does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers.
-.It Ic pwd
-Display remote working directory.
-.It Ic quit
-Quit
-.Nm sftp .
-.It Xo Ic reget
-.Op Fl Ppr
-.Ar remote-path
-.Op Ar local-path
-.Xc
-Resume download of
-.Ar remote-path .
-Equivalent to
-.Ic get
-with the
-.Fl a
-flag set.
-.It Ic rename Ar oldpath Ar newpath
-Rename remote file from
-.Ar oldpath
-to
-.Ar newpath .
-.It Ic rm Ar path
-Delete remote file specified by
-.Ar path .
-.It Ic rmdir Ar path
-Remove remote directory specified by
-.Ar path .
-.It Ic symlink Ar oldpath Ar newpath
-Create a symbolic link from
-.Ar oldpath
-to
-.Ar newpath .
-.It Ic version
-Display the
-.Nm
-protocol version.
-.It Ic \&! Ns Ar command
-Execute
-.Ar command
-in local shell.
-.It Ic \&!
-Escape to local shell.
-.It Ic \&?
-Synonym for help.
-.El
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr ftp 1 ,
-.Xr ls 1 ,
-.Xr scp 1 ,
-.Xr ssh 1 ,
-.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
-.Xr glob 3 ,
-.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
-.Xr sftp-server 8 ,
-.Xr sshd 8
-.Rs
-.%A T. Ylonen
-.%A S. Lehtinen
-.%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol"
-.%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt
-.%D January 2001
-.%O work in progress material
-.Re
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp.1 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp.1)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp.1 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp.1 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,628 @@
+.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.105 2016/07/16 06:57:55 jmc Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd $Mdocdate: July 16 2016 $
+.Dt SFTP 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm sftp
+.Nd secure file transfer program
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm sftp
+.Bk -words
+.Op Fl 1246aCfpqrv
+.Op Fl B Ar buffer_size
+.Op Fl b Ar batchfile
+.Op Fl c Ar cipher
+.Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
+.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
+.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
+.Op Fl l Ar limit
+.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
+.Op Fl P Ar port
+.Op Fl R Ar num_requests
+.Op Fl S Ar program
+.Op Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server
+.Ar host
+.Ek
+.Nm sftp
+.Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns
+.Ar host Ns Op : Ns Ar
+.Nm sftp
+.Oo
+.Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns
+.Ar host Ns Oo : Ns Ar dir Ns
+.Op Ar /
+.Oc
+.Nm sftp
+.Fl b Ar batchfile
+.Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns Ar host
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is an interactive file transfer program, similar to
+.Xr ftp 1 ,
+which performs all operations over an encrypted
+.Xr ssh 1
+transport.
+It may also use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and
+compression.
+.Nm
+connects and logs into the specified
+.Ar host ,
+then enters an interactive command mode.
+.Pp
+The second usage format will retrieve files automatically if a non-interactive
+authentication method is used; otherwise it will do so after
+successful interactive authentication.
+.Pp
+The third usage format allows
+.Nm
+to start in a remote directory.
+.Pp
+The final usage format allows for automated sessions using the
+.Fl b
+option.
+In such cases, it is necessary to configure non-interactive authentication
+to obviate the need to enter a password at connection time (see
+.Xr sshd 8
+and
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+for details).
+.Pp
+Since some usage formats use colon characters to delimit host names from path
+names, IPv6 addresses must be enclosed in square brackets to avoid ambiguity.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl 1
+Specify the use of protocol version 1.
+.It Fl 2
+Specify the use of protocol version 2.
+.It Fl 4
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv4 addresses only.
+.It Fl 6
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.It Fl a
+Attempt to continue interrupted transfers rather than overwriting
+existing partial or complete copies of files.
+If the partial contents differ from those being transferred,
+then the resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
+.It Fl B Ar buffer_size
+Specify the size of the buffer that
+.Nm
+uses when transferring files.
+Larger buffers require fewer round trips at the cost of higher
+memory consumption.
+The default is 32768 bytes.
+.It Fl b Ar batchfile
+Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input
+.Ar batchfile
+instead of
+.Em stdin .
+Since it lacks user interaction it should be used in conjunction with
+non-interactive authentication.
+A
+.Ar batchfile
+of
+.Sq \-
+may be used to indicate standard input.
+.Nm
+will abort if any of the following
+commands fail:
+.Ic get , put , reget , reput, rename , ln ,
+.Ic rm , mkdir , chdir , ls ,
+.Ic lchdir , chmod , chown ,
+.Ic chgrp , lpwd , df , symlink ,
+and
+.Ic lmkdir .
+Termination on error can be suppressed on a command by command basis by
+prefixing the command with a
+.Sq \-
+character (for example,
+.Ic -rm /tmp/blah* ) .
+.It Fl C
+Enables compression (via ssh's
+.Fl C
+flag).
+.It Fl c Ar cipher
+Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfers.
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
+Connect directly to a local sftp server
+(rather than via
+.Xr ssh 1 ) .
+This option may be useful in debugging the client and server.
+.It Fl F Ar ssh_config
+Specifies an alternative
+per-user configuration file for
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl f
+Requests that files be flushed to disk immediately after transfer.
+When uploading files, this feature is only enabled if the server
+implements the "fsync at openssh.com" extension.
+.It Fl i Ar identity_file
+Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key
+authentication is read.
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl l Ar limit
+Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
+.It Fl o Ar ssh_option
+Can be used to pass options to
+.Nm ssh
+in the format used in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+This is useful for specifying options
+for which there is no separate
+.Nm sftp
+command-line flag.
+For example, to specify an alternate port use:
+.Ic sftp -oPort=24 .
+For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact
+.It AddressFamily
+.It BatchMode
+.It BindAddress
+.It CanonicalDomains
+.It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+.It CanonicalizeHostname
+.It CanonicalizeMaxDots
+.It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+.It CertificateFile
+.It ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+.It CheckHostIP
+.It Cipher
+.It Ciphers
+.It Compression
+.It CompressionLevel
+.It ConnectionAttempts
+.It ConnectTimeout
+.It ControlMaster
+.It ControlPath
+.It ControlPersist
+.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
+.It GSSAPIAuthentication
+.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+.It HashKnownHosts
+.It Host
+.It HostbasedAuthentication
+.It HostbasedKeyTypes
+.It HostKeyAlgorithms
+.It HostKeyAlias
+.It HostName
+.It IdentitiesOnly
+.It IdentityAgent
+.It IdentityFile
+.It IPQoS
+.It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+.It KbdInteractiveDevices
+.It KexAlgorithms
+.It LogLevel
+.It MACs
+.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+.It PasswordAuthentication
+.It PKCS11Provider
+.It Port
+.It PreferredAuthentications
+.It Protocol
+.It ProxyCommand
+.It ProxyJump
+.It PubkeyAuthentication
+.It RekeyLimit
+.It RhostsRSAAuthentication
+.It RSAAuthentication
+.It SendEnv
+.It ServerAliveInterval
+.It ServerAliveCountMax
+.It StrictHostKeyChecking
+.It TCPKeepAlive
+.It UpdateHostKeys
+.It UsePrivilegedPort
+.It User
+.It UserKnownHostsFile
+.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
+.El
+.It Fl P Ar port
+Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
+.It Fl p
+Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
+original files transferred.
+.It Fl q
+Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
+diagnostic messages from
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl R Ar num_requests
+Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
+Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed
+but will increase memory usage.
+The default is 64 outstanding requests.
+.It Fl r
+Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and downloading.
+Note that
+.Nm
+does not follow symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
+.It Fl S Ar program
+Name of the
+.Ar program
+to use for the encrypted connection.
+The program must understand
+.Xr ssh 1
+options.
+.It Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server
+Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server
+on the remote host.
+A path is useful for using
+.Nm
+over protocol version 1, or when the remote
+.Xr sshd 8
+does not have an sftp subsystem configured.
+.It Fl v
+Raise logging level.
+This option is also passed to ssh.
+.El
+.Sh INTERACTIVE COMMANDS
+Once in interactive mode,
+.Nm
+understands a set of commands similar to those of
+.Xr ftp 1 .
+Commands are case insensitive.
+Pathnames that contain spaces must be enclosed in quotes.
+Any special characters contained within pathnames that are recognized by
+.Xr glob 3
+must be escaped with backslashes
+.Pq Sq \e .
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Ic bye
+Quit
+.Nm sftp .
+.It Ic cd Ar path
+Change remote directory to
+.Ar path .
+.It Ic chgrp Ar grp Ar path
+Change group of file
+.Ar path
+to
+.Ar grp .
+.Ar path
+may contain
+.Xr glob 3
+characters and may match multiple files.
+.Ar grp
+must be a numeric GID.
+.It Ic chmod Ar mode Ar path
+Change permissions of file
+.Ar path
+to
+.Ar mode .
+.Ar path
+may contain
+.Xr glob 3
+characters and may match multiple files.
+.It Ic chown Ar own Ar path
+Change owner of file
+.Ar path
+to
+.Ar own .
+.Ar path
+may contain
+.Xr glob 3
+characters and may match multiple files.
+.Ar own
+must be a numeric UID.
+.It Xo Ic df
+.Op Fl hi
+.Op Ar path
+.Xc
+Display usage information for the filesystem holding the current directory
+(or
+.Ar path
+if specified).
+If the
+.Fl h
+flag is specified, the capacity information will be displayed using
+"human-readable" suffixes.
+The
+.Fl i
+flag requests display of inode information in addition to capacity information.
+This command is only supported on servers that implement the
+.Dq statvfs at openssh.com
+extension.
+.It Ic exit
+Quit
+.Nm sftp .
+.It Xo Ic get
+.Op Fl afPpr
+.Ar remote-path
+.Op Ar local-path
+.Xc
+Retrieve the
+.Ar remote-path
+and store it on the local machine.
+If the local
+path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has on the
+remote machine.
+.Ar remote-path
+may contain
+.Xr glob 3
+characters and may match multiple files.
+If it does and
+.Ar local-path
+is specified, then
+.Ar local-path
+must specify a directory.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Fl a
+flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial transfers of existing files.
+Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the local file matches
+the remote copy.
+If the remote file contents differ from the partial local copy then the
+resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Fl f
+flag is specified, then
+.Xr fsync 2
+will be called after the file transfer has completed to flush the file
+to disk.
+.Pp
+If either the
+.Fl P
+or
+.Fl p
+flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are
+copied too.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Fl r
+flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively.
+Note that
+.Nm
+does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers.
+.It Ic help
+Display help text.
+.It Ic lcd Ar path
+Change local directory to
+.Ar path .
+.It Ic lls Op Ar ls-options Op Ar path
+Display local directory listing of either
+.Ar path
+or current directory if
+.Ar path
+is not specified.
+.Ar ls-options
+may contain any flags supported by the local system's
+.Xr ls 1
+command.
+.Ar path
+may contain
+.Xr glob 3
+characters and may match multiple files.
+.It Ic lmkdir Ar path
+Create local directory specified by
+.Ar path .
+.It Xo Ic ln
+.Op Fl s
+.Ar oldpath
+.Ar newpath
+.Xc
+Create a link from
+.Ar oldpath
+to
+.Ar newpath .
+If the
+.Fl s
+flag is specified the created link is a symbolic link, otherwise it is
+a hard link.
+.It Ic lpwd
+Print local working directory.
+.It Xo Ic ls
+.Op Fl 1afhlnrSt
+.Op Ar path
+.Xc
+Display a remote directory listing of either
+.Ar path
+or the current directory if
+.Ar path
+is not specified.
+.Ar path
+may contain
+.Xr glob 3
+characters and may match multiple files.
+.Pp
+The following flags are recognized and alter the behaviour of
+.Ic ls
+accordingly:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl 1
+Produce single columnar output.
+.It Fl a
+List files beginning with a dot
+.Pq Sq \&. .
+.It Fl f
+Do not sort the listing.
+The default sort order is lexicographical.
+.It Fl h
+When used with a long format option, use unit suffixes: Byte, Kilobyte,
+Megabyte, Gigabyte, Terabyte, Petabyte, and Exabyte in order to reduce
+the number of digits to four or fewer using powers of 2 for sizes (K=1024,
+M=1048576, etc.).
+.It Fl l
+Display additional details including permissions
+and ownership information.
+.It Fl n
+Produce a long listing with user and group information presented
+numerically.
+.It Fl r
+Reverse the sort order of the listing.
+.It Fl S
+Sort the listing by file size.
+.It Fl t
+Sort the listing by last modification time.
+.El
+.It Ic lumask Ar umask
+Set local umask to
+.Ar umask .
+.It Ic mkdir Ar path
+Create remote directory specified by
+.Ar path .
+.It Ic progress
+Toggle display of progress meter.
+.It Xo Ic put
+.Op Fl afPpr
+.Ar local-path
+.Op Ar remote-path
+.Xc
+Upload
+.Ar local-path
+and store it on the remote machine.
+If the remote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has
+on the local machine.
+.Ar local-path
+may contain
+.Xr glob 3
+characters and may match multiple files.
+If it does and
+.Ar remote-path
+is specified, then
+.Ar remote-path
+must specify a directory.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Fl a
+flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial
+transfers of existing files.
+Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the remote file
+matches the local copy.
+If the local file contents differ from the remote local copy then
+the resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Fl f
+flag is specified, then a request will be sent to the server to call
+.Xr fsync 2
+after the file has been transferred.
+Note that this is only supported by servers that implement
+the "fsync at openssh.com" extension.
+.Pp
+If either the
+.Fl P
+or
+.Fl p
+flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are
+copied too.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Fl r
+flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively.
+Note that
+.Nm
+does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers.
+.It Ic pwd
+Display remote working directory.
+.It Ic quit
+Quit
+.Nm sftp .
+.It Xo Ic reget
+.Op Fl Ppr
+.Ar remote-path
+.Op Ar local-path
+.Xc
+Resume download of
+.Ar remote-path .
+Equivalent to
+.Ic get
+with the
+.Fl a
+flag set.
+.It Xo Ic reput
+.Op Fl Ppr
+.Op Ar local-path
+.Ar remote-path
+.Xc
+Resume upload of
+.Op Ar local-path .
+Equivalent to
+.Ic put
+with the
+.Fl a
+flag set.
+.It Ic rename Ar oldpath Ar newpath
+Rename remote file from
+.Ar oldpath
+to
+.Ar newpath .
+.It Ic rm Ar path
+Delete remote file specified by
+.Ar path .
+.It Ic rmdir Ar path
+Remove remote directory specified by
+.Ar path .
+.It Ic symlink Ar oldpath Ar newpath
+Create a symbolic link from
+.Ar oldpath
+to
+.Ar newpath .
+.It Ic version
+Display the
+.Nm
+protocol version.
+.It Ic \&! Ns Ar command
+Execute
+.Ar command
+in local shell.
+.It Ic \&!
+Escape to local shell.
+.It Ic \&?
+Synonym for help.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ftp 1 ,
+.Xr ls 1 ,
+.Xr scp 1 ,
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr glob 3 ,
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
+.Xr sftp-server 8 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A S. Lehtinen
+.%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol"
+.%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt
+.%D January 2001
+.%O work in progress material
+.Re
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,2428 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.158 2013/11/20 20:54:10 deraadt Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm at openbsd.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/ioctl.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
-# include <sys/stat.h>
-#endif
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
-#include <sys/statvfs.h>
-#endif
-
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
-#include <libgen.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H
-# include <locale.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
-#include <histedit.h>
-#else
-typedef void EditLine;
-#endif
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
-# include <util.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-
-#include "sftp.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "sftp-common.h"
-#include "sftp-client.h"
-
-#define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN 32768 /* Size of buffer for up/download */
-#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS 64 /* # concurrent outstanding requests */
-
-/* File to read commands from */
-FILE* infile;
-
-/* Are we in batchfile mode? */
-int batchmode = 0;
-
-/* PID of ssh transport process */
-static pid_t sshpid = -1;
-
-/* Suppress diagnositic messages */
-int quiet = 0;
-
-/* This is set to 0 if the progressmeter is not desired. */
-int showprogress = 1;
-
-/* When this option is set, we always recursively download/upload directories */
-int global_rflag = 0;
-
-/* When this option is set, we resume download if possible */
-int global_aflag = 0;
-
-/* When this option is set, the file transfers will always preserve times */
-int global_pflag = 0;
-
-/* When this option is set, transfers will have fsync() called on each file */
-int global_fflag = 0;
-
-/* SIGINT received during command processing */
-volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted = 0;
-
-/* I wish qsort() took a separate ctx for the comparison function...*/
-int sort_flag;
-
-/* Context used for commandline completion */
-struct complete_ctx {
- struct sftp_conn *conn;
- char **remote_pathp;
-};
-
-int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
- int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */
-
-extern char *__progname;
-
-/* Separators for interactive commands */
-#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
-
-/* ls flags */
-#define LS_LONG_VIEW 0x0001 /* Full view ala ls -l */
-#define LS_SHORT_VIEW 0x0002 /* Single row view ala ls -1 */
-#define LS_NUMERIC_VIEW 0x0004 /* Long view with numeric uid/gid */
-#define LS_NAME_SORT 0x0008 /* Sort by name (default) */
-#define LS_TIME_SORT 0x0010 /* Sort by mtime */
-#define LS_SIZE_SORT 0x0020 /* Sort by file size */
-#define LS_REVERSE_SORT 0x0040 /* Reverse sort order */
-#define LS_SHOW_ALL 0x0080 /* Don't skip filenames starting with '.' */
-#define LS_SI_UNITS 0x0100 /* Display sizes as K, M, G, etc. */
-
-#define VIEW_FLAGS (LS_LONG_VIEW|LS_SHORT_VIEW|LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS)
-#define SORT_FLAGS (LS_NAME_SORT|LS_TIME_SORT|LS_SIZE_SORT)
-
-/* Commands for interactive mode */
-enum sftp_command {
- I_CHDIR = 1,
- I_CHGRP,
- I_CHMOD,
- I_CHOWN,
- I_DF,
- I_GET,
- I_HELP,
- I_LCHDIR,
- I_LINK,
- I_LLS,
- I_LMKDIR,
- I_LPWD,
- I_LS,
- I_LUMASK,
- I_MKDIR,
- I_PUT,
- I_PWD,
- I_QUIT,
- I_RENAME,
- I_RM,
- I_RMDIR,
- I_SHELL,
- I_SYMLINK,
- I_VERSION,
- I_PROGRESS,
- I_REGET,
-};
-
-struct CMD {
- const char *c;
- const int n;
- const int t;
-};
-
-/* Type of completion */
-#define NOARGS 0
-#define REMOTE 1
-#define LOCAL 2
-
-static const struct CMD cmds[] = {
- { "bye", I_QUIT, NOARGS },
- { "cd", I_CHDIR, REMOTE },
- { "chdir", I_CHDIR, REMOTE },
- { "chgrp", I_CHGRP, REMOTE },
- { "chmod", I_CHMOD, REMOTE },
- { "chown", I_CHOWN, REMOTE },
- { "df", I_DF, REMOTE },
- { "dir", I_LS, REMOTE },
- { "exit", I_QUIT, NOARGS },
- { "get", I_GET, REMOTE },
- { "help", I_HELP, NOARGS },
- { "lcd", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL },
- { "lchdir", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL },
- { "lls", I_LLS, LOCAL },
- { "lmkdir", I_LMKDIR, LOCAL },
- { "ln", I_LINK, REMOTE },
- { "lpwd", I_LPWD, LOCAL },
- { "ls", I_LS, REMOTE },
- { "lumask", I_LUMASK, NOARGS },
- { "mkdir", I_MKDIR, REMOTE },
- { "mget", I_GET, REMOTE },
- { "mput", I_PUT, LOCAL },
- { "progress", I_PROGRESS, NOARGS },
- { "put", I_PUT, LOCAL },
- { "pwd", I_PWD, REMOTE },
- { "quit", I_QUIT, NOARGS },
- { "reget", I_REGET, REMOTE },
- { "rename", I_RENAME, REMOTE },
- { "rm", I_RM, REMOTE },
- { "rmdir", I_RMDIR, REMOTE },
- { "symlink", I_SYMLINK, REMOTE },
- { "version", I_VERSION, NOARGS },
- { "!", I_SHELL, NOARGS },
- { "?", I_HELP, NOARGS },
- { NULL, -1, -1 }
-};
-
-int interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *, char *file1, char *file2);
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void
-killchild(int signo)
-{
- if (sshpid > 1) {
- kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
- waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
- }
-
- _exit(1);
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void
-cmd_interrupt(int signo)
-{
- const char msg[] = "\rInterrupt \n";
- int olderrno = errno;
-
- (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1);
- interrupted = 1;
- errno = olderrno;
-}
-
-static void
-help(void)
-{
- printf("Available commands:\n"
- "bye Quit sftp\n"
- "cd path Change remote directory to 'path'\n"
- "chgrp grp path Change group of file 'path' to 'grp'\n"
- "chmod mode path Change permissions of file 'path' to 'mode'\n"
- "chown own path Change owner of file 'path' to 'own'\n"
- "df [-hi] [path] Display statistics for current directory or\n"
- " filesystem containing 'path'\n"
- "exit Quit sftp\n"
- "get [-Ppr] remote [local] Download file\n"
- "reget remote [local] Resume download file\n"
- "help Display this help text\n"
- "lcd path Change local directory to 'path'\n"
- "lls [ls-options [path]] Display local directory listing\n"
- "lmkdir path Create local directory\n"
- "ln [-s] oldpath newpath Link remote file (-s for symlink)\n"
- "lpwd Print local working directory\n"
- "ls [-1afhlnrSt] [path] Display remote directory listing\n"
- "lumask umask Set local umask to 'umask'\n"
- "mkdir path Create remote directory\n"
- "progress Toggle display of progress meter\n"
- "put [-Ppr] local [remote] Upload file\n"
- "pwd Display remote working directory\n"
- "quit Quit sftp\n"
- "rename oldpath newpath Rename remote file\n"
- "rm path Delete remote file\n"
- "rmdir path Remove remote directory\n"
- "symlink oldpath newpath Symlink remote file\n"
- "version Show SFTP version\n"
- "!command Execute 'command' in local shell\n"
- "! Escape to local shell\n"
- "? Synonym for help\n");
-}
-
-static void
-local_do_shell(const char *args)
-{
- int status;
- char *shell;
- pid_t pid;
-
- if (!*args)
- args = NULL;
-
- if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0')
- shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
-
- if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
- fatal("Couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno));
-
- if (pid == 0) {
- /* XXX: child has pipe fds to ssh subproc open - issue? */
- if (args) {
- debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
- execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
- } else {
- debug3("Executing %s", shell);
- execl(shell, shell, (char *)NULL);
- }
- fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't execute \"%s\": %s\n", shell,
- strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
- while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
- if (errno != EINTR)
- fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (!WIFEXITED(status))
- error("Shell exited abnormally");
- else if (WEXITSTATUS(status))
- error("Shell exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
-}
-
-static void
-local_do_ls(const char *args)
-{
- if (!args || !*args)
- local_do_shell(_PATH_LS);
- else {
- int len = strlen(_PATH_LS " ") + strlen(args) + 1;
- char *buf = xmalloc(len);
-
- /* XXX: quoting - rip quoting code from ftp? */
- snprintf(buf, len, _PATH_LS " %s", args);
- local_do_shell(buf);
- free(buf);
- }
-}
-
-/* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */
-static char *
-path_strip(char *path, char *strip)
-{
- size_t len;
-
- if (strip == NULL)
- return (xstrdup(path));
-
- len = strlen(strip);
- if (strncmp(path, strip, len) == 0) {
- if (strip[len - 1] != '/' && path[len] == '/')
- len++;
- return (xstrdup(path + len));
- }
-
- return (xstrdup(path));
-}
-
-static char *
-make_absolute(char *p, char *pwd)
-{
- char *abs_str;
-
- /* Derelativise */
- if (p && p[0] != '/') {
- abs_str = path_append(pwd, p);
- free(p);
- return(abs_str);
- } else
- return(p);
-}
-
-static int
-parse_getput_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc,
- int *aflag, int *fflag, int *pflag, int *rflag)
-{
- extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
- int ch;
-
- optind = optreset = 1;
- opterr = 0;
-
- *aflag = *fflag = *rflag = *pflag = 0;
- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "afPpRr")) != -1) {
- switch (ch) {
- case 'a':
- *aflag = 1;
- break;
- case 'f':
- *fflag = 1;
- break;
- case 'p':
- case 'P':
- *pflag = 1;
- break;
- case 'r':
- case 'R':
- *rflag = 1;
- break;
- default:
- error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- return optind;
-}
-
-static int
-parse_link_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *sflag)
-{
- extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
- int ch;
-
- optind = optreset = 1;
- opterr = 0;
-
- *sflag = 0;
- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "s")) != -1) {
- switch (ch) {
- case 's':
- *sflag = 1;
- break;
- default:
- error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- return optind;
-}
-
-static int
-parse_rename_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *lflag)
-{
- extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
- int ch;
-
- optind = optreset = 1;
- opterr = 0;
-
- *lflag = 0;
- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "l")) != -1) {
- switch (ch) {
- case 'l':
- *lflag = 1;
- break;
- default:
- error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- return optind;
-}
-
-static int
-parse_ls_flags(char **argv, int argc, int *lflag)
-{
- extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
- int ch;
-
- optind = optreset = 1;
- opterr = 0;
-
- *lflag = LS_NAME_SORT;
- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "1Safhlnrt")) != -1) {
- switch (ch) {
- case '1':
- *lflag &= ~VIEW_FLAGS;
- *lflag |= LS_SHORT_VIEW;
- break;
- case 'S':
- *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS;
- *lflag |= LS_SIZE_SORT;
- break;
- case 'a':
- *lflag |= LS_SHOW_ALL;
- break;
- case 'f':
- *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS;
- break;
- case 'h':
- *lflag |= LS_SI_UNITS;
- break;
- case 'l':
- *lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW;
- *lflag |= LS_LONG_VIEW;
- break;
- case 'n':
- *lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW;
- *lflag |= LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_LONG_VIEW;
- break;
- case 'r':
- *lflag |= LS_REVERSE_SORT;
- break;
- case 't':
- *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS;
- *lflag |= LS_TIME_SORT;
- break;
- default:
- error("ls: Invalid flag -%c", optopt);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- return optind;
-}
-
-static int
-parse_df_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *hflag, int *iflag)
-{
- extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
- int ch;
-
- optind = optreset = 1;
- opterr = 0;
-
- *hflag = *iflag = 0;
- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hi")) != -1) {
- switch (ch) {
- case 'h':
- *hflag = 1;
- break;
- case 'i':
- *iflag = 1;
- break;
- default:
- error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- return optind;
-}
-
-static int
-parse_no_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc)
-{
- extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
- int ch;
-
- optind = optreset = 1;
- opterr = 0;
-
- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "")) != -1) {
- switch (ch) {
- default:
- error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- return optind;
-}
-
-static int
-is_dir(char *path)
-{
- struct stat sb;
-
- /* XXX: report errors? */
- if (stat(path, &sb) == -1)
- return(0);
-
- return(S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode));
-}
-
-static int
-remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-{
- Attrib *a;
-
- /* XXX: report errors? */
- if ((a = do_stat(conn, path, 1)) == NULL)
- return(0);
- if (!(a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS))
- return(0);
- return(S_ISDIR(a->perm));
-}
-
-/* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */
-static int
-pathname_is_dir(char *pathname)
-{
- size_t l = strlen(pathname);
-
- return l > 0 && pathname[l - 1] == '/';
-}
-
-static int
-process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd,
- int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag)
-{
- char *abs_src = NULL;
- char *abs_dst = NULL;
- glob_t g;
- char *filename, *tmp=NULL;
- int i, err = 0;
-
- abs_src = xstrdup(src);
- abs_src = make_absolute(abs_src, pwd);
- memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
-
- debug3("Looking up %s", abs_src);
- if (remote_glob(conn, abs_src, GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) {
- error("File \"%s\" not found.", abs_src);
- err = -1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- /*
- * If multiple matches then dst must be a directory or
- * unspecified.
- */
- if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && dst != NULL && !is_dir(dst)) {
- error("Multiple source paths, but destination "
- "\"%s\" is not a directory", dst);
- err = -1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
- tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]);
- if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) {
- error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno));
- free(tmp);
- err = -1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && dst) {
- if (is_dir(dst)) {
- abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
- } else {
- abs_dst = xstrdup(dst);
- }
- } else if (dst) {
- abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
- } else {
- abs_dst = xstrdup(filename);
- }
- free(tmp);
-
- resume |= global_aflag;
- if (!quiet && resume)
- printf("Resuming %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
- else if (!quiet && !resume)
- printf("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
- if (pathname_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
- if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
- pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
- fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
- err = -1;
- } else {
- if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
- pflag || global_pflag, resume,
- fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
- err = -1;
- }
- free(abs_dst);
- abs_dst = NULL;
- }
-
-out:
- free(abs_src);
- globfree(&g);
- return(err);
-}
-
-static int
-process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd,
- int pflag, int rflag, int fflag)
-{
- char *tmp_dst = NULL;
- char *abs_dst = NULL;
- char *tmp = NULL, *filename = NULL;
- glob_t g;
- int err = 0;
- int i, dst_is_dir = 1;
- struct stat sb;
-
- if (dst) {
- tmp_dst = xstrdup(dst);
- tmp_dst = make_absolute(tmp_dst, pwd);
- }
-
- memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
- debug3("Looking up %s", src);
- if (glob(src, GLOB_NOCHECK | GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) {
- error("File \"%s\" not found.", src);
- err = -1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* If we aren't fetching to pwd then stash this status for later */
- if (tmp_dst != NULL)
- dst_is_dir = remote_is_dir(conn, tmp_dst);
-
- /* If multiple matches, dst may be directory or unspecified */
- if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && tmp_dst && !dst_is_dir) {
- error("Multiple paths match, but destination "
- "\"%s\" is not a directory", tmp_dst);
- err = -1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
- if (stat(g.gl_pathv[i], &sb) == -1) {
- err = -1;
- error("stat %s: %s", g.gl_pathv[i], strerror(errno));
- continue;
- }
-
- tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]);
- if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) {
- error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno));
- free(tmp);
- err = -1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && tmp_dst) {
- /* If directory specified, append filename */
- if (dst_is_dir)
- abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename);
- else
- abs_dst = xstrdup(tmp_dst);
- } else if (tmp_dst) {
- abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename);
- } else {
- abs_dst = make_absolute(xstrdup(filename), pwd);
- }
- free(tmp);
-
- if (!quiet)
- printf("Uploading %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
- if (pathname_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
- if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
- pflag || global_pflag, 1,
- fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
- err = -1;
- } else {
- if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
- pflag || global_pflag,
- fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
- err = -1;
- }
- }
-
-out:
- free(abs_dst);
- free(tmp_dst);
- globfree(&g);
- return(err);
-}
-
-static int
-sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb)
-{
- SFTP_DIRENT *a = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)aa;
- SFTP_DIRENT *b = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)bb;
- int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1;
-
-#define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1))
- if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT)
- return (rmul * strcmp(a->filename, b->filename));
- else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT)
- return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.mtime, b->a.mtime));
- else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT)
- return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.size, b->a.size));
-
- fatal("Unknown ls sort type");
-}
-
-/* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */
-static int
-do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, int lflag)
-{
- int n;
- u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1;
- SFTP_DIRENT **d;
-
- if ((n = do_readdir(conn, path, &d)) != 0)
- return (n);
-
- if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) {
- u_int m = 0, width = 80;
- struct winsize ws;
- char *tmp;
-
- /* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */
- for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++) {
- if (d[n]->filename[0] != '.' || (lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL))
- m = MAX(m, strlen(d[n]->filename));
- }
-
- /* Add any subpath that also needs to be counted */
- tmp = path_strip(path, strip_path);
- m += strlen(tmp);
- free(tmp);
-
- if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1)
- width = ws.ws_col;
-
- columns = width / (m + 2);
- columns = MAX(columns, 1);
- colspace = width / columns;
- colspace = MIN(colspace, width);
- }
-
- if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) {
- for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++)
- ; /* count entries */
- sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT);
- qsort(d, n, sizeof(*d), sdirent_comp);
- }
-
- for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL && !interrupted; n++) {
- char *tmp, *fname;
-
- if (d[n]->filename[0] == '.' && !(lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL))
- continue;
-
- tmp = path_append(path, d[n]->filename);
- fname = path_strip(tmp, strip_path);
- free(tmp);
-
- if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
- if (lflag & (LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS)) {
- char *lname;
- struct stat sb;
-
- memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb));
- attrib_to_stat(&d[n]->a, &sb);
- lname = ls_file(fname, &sb, 1,
- (lflag & LS_SI_UNITS));
- printf("%s\n", lname);
- free(lname);
- } else
- printf("%s\n", d[n]->longname);
- } else {
- printf("%-*s", colspace, fname);
- if (c >= columns) {
- printf("\n");
- c = 1;
- } else
- c++;
- }
-
- free(fname);
- }
-
- if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1))
- printf("\n");
-
- free_sftp_dirents(d);
- return (0);
-}
-
-/* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */
-static int
-do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path,
- int lflag)
-{
- char *fname, *lname;
- glob_t g;
- int err;
- struct winsize ws;
- u_int i, c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1, m = 0, width = 80;
-
- memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
-
- if (remote_glob(conn, path,
- GLOB_MARK|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_KEEPSTAT|GLOB_NOSORT,
- NULL, &g) ||
- (g.gl_pathc && !g.gl_matchc)) {
- if (g.gl_pathc)
- globfree(&g);
- error("Can't ls: \"%s\" not found", path);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (interrupted)
- goto out;
-
- /*
- * If the glob returns a single match and it is a directory,
- * then just list its contents.
- */
- if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && g.gl_statv[0] != NULL &&
- S_ISDIR(g.gl_statv[0]->st_mode)) {
- err = do_ls_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[0], strip_path, lflag);
- globfree(&g);
- return err;
- }
-
- if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1)
- width = ws.ws_col;
-
- if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) {
- /* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */
- for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++)
- m = MAX(m, strlen(g.gl_pathv[i]));
-
- columns = width / (m + 2);
- columns = MAX(columns, 1);
- colspace = width / columns;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
- fname = path_strip(g.gl_pathv[i], strip_path);
- if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
- if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) {
- error("no stat information for %s", fname);
- continue;
- }
- lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1,
- (lflag & LS_SI_UNITS));
- printf("%s\n", lname);
- free(lname);
- } else {
- printf("%-*s", colspace, fname);
- if (c >= columns) {
- printf("\n");
- c = 1;
- } else
- c++;
- }
- free(fname);
- }
-
- if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1))
- printf("\n");
-
- out:
- if (g.gl_pathc)
- globfree(&g);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
-{
- struct sftp_statvfs st;
- char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
- char s_avail[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
- char s_root[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
- char s_total[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
- unsigned long long ffree;
-
- if (do_statvfs(conn, path, &st, 1) == -1)
- return -1;
- if (iflag) {
- ffree = st.f_files ? (100 * (st.f_files - st.f_ffree) / st.f_files) : 0;
- printf(" Inodes Used Avail "
- "(root) %%Capacity\n");
- printf("%11llu %11llu %11llu %11llu %3llu%%\n",
- (unsigned long long)st.f_files,
- (unsigned long long)(st.f_files - st.f_ffree),
- (unsigned long long)st.f_favail,
- (unsigned long long)st.f_ffree, ffree);
- } else if (hflag) {
- strlcpy(s_used, "error", sizeof(s_used));
- strlcpy(s_avail, "error", sizeof(s_avail));
- strlcpy(s_root, "error", sizeof(s_root));
- strlcpy(s_total, "error", sizeof(s_total));
- fmt_scaled((st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) * st.f_frsize, s_used);
- fmt_scaled(st.f_bavail * st.f_frsize, s_avail);
- fmt_scaled(st.f_bfree * st.f_frsize, s_root);
- fmt_scaled(st.f_blocks * st.f_frsize, s_total);
- printf(" Size Used Avail (root) %%Capacity\n");
- printf("%7sB %7sB %7sB %7sB %3llu%%\n",
- s_total, s_used, s_avail, s_root,
- (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) /
- st.f_blocks));
- } else {
- printf(" Size Used Avail "
- "(root) %%Capacity\n");
- printf("%12llu %12llu %12llu %12llu %3llu%%\n",
- (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_blocks / 1024),
- (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize *
- (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / 1024),
- (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bavail / 1024),
- (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bfree / 1024),
- (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) /
- st.f_blocks));
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Undo escaping of glob sequences in place. Used to undo extra escaping
- * applied in makeargv() when the string is destined for a function that
- * does not glob it.
- */
-static void
-undo_glob_escape(char *s)
-{
- size_t i, j;
-
- for (i = j = 0;;) {
- if (s[i] == '\0') {
- s[j] = '\0';
- return;
- }
- if (s[i] != '\\') {
- s[j++] = s[i++];
- continue;
- }
- /* s[i] == '\\' */
- ++i;
- switch (s[i]) {
- case '?':
- case '[':
- case '*':
- case '\\':
- s[j++] = s[i++];
- break;
- case '\0':
- s[j++] = '\\';
- s[j] = '\0';
- return;
- default:
- s[j++] = '\\';
- s[j++] = s[i++];
- break;
- }
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Split a string into an argument vector using sh(1)-style quoting,
- * comment and escaping rules, but with some tweaks to handle glob(3)
- * wildcards.
- * The "sloppy" flag allows for recovery from missing terminating quote, for
- * use in parsing incomplete commandlines during tab autocompletion.
- *
- * Returns NULL on error or a NULL-terminated array of arguments.
- *
- * If "lastquote" is not NULL, the quoting character used for the last
- * argument is placed in *lastquote ("\0", "'" or "\"").
- *
- * If "terminated" is not NULL, *terminated will be set to 1 when the
- * last argument's quote has been properly terminated or 0 otherwise.
- * This parameter is only of use if "sloppy" is set.
- */
-#define MAXARGS 128
-#define MAXARGLEN 8192
-static char **
-makeargv(const char *arg, int *argcp, int sloppy, char *lastquote,
- u_int *terminated)
-{
- int argc, quot;
- size_t i, j;
- static char argvs[MAXARGLEN];
- static char *argv[MAXARGS + 1];
- enum { MA_START, MA_SQUOTE, MA_DQUOTE, MA_UNQUOTED } state, q;
-
- *argcp = argc = 0;
- if (strlen(arg) > sizeof(argvs) - 1) {
- args_too_longs:
- error("string too long");
- return NULL;
- }
- if (terminated != NULL)
- *terminated = 1;
- if (lastquote != NULL)
- *lastquote = '\0';
- state = MA_START;
- i = j = 0;
- for (;;) {
- if ((size_t)argc >= sizeof(argv) / sizeof(*argv)){
- error("Too many arguments.");
- return NULL;
- }
- if (isspace((unsigned char)arg[i])) {
- if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) {
- /* Terminate current argument */
- argvs[j++] = '\0';
- argc++;
- state = MA_START;
- } else if (state != MA_START)
- argvs[j++] = arg[i];
- } else if (arg[i] == '"' || arg[i] == '\'') {
- q = arg[i] == '"' ? MA_DQUOTE : MA_SQUOTE;
- if (state == MA_START) {
- argv[argc] = argvs + j;
- state = q;
- if (lastquote != NULL)
- *lastquote = arg[i];
- } else if (state == MA_UNQUOTED)
- state = q;
- else if (state == q)
- state = MA_UNQUOTED;
- else
- argvs[j++] = arg[i];
- } else if (arg[i] == '\\') {
- if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) {
- quot = state == MA_SQUOTE ? '\'' : '"';
- /* Unescape quote we are in */
- /* XXX support \n and friends? */
- if (arg[i + 1] == quot) {
- i++;
- argvs[j++] = arg[i];
- } else if (arg[i + 1] == '?' ||
- arg[i + 1] == '[' || arg[i + 1] == '*') {
- /*
- * Special case for sftp: append
- * double-escaped glob sequence -
- * glob will undo one level of
- * escaping. NB. string can grow here.
- */
- if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 5)
- goto args_too_longs;
- argvs[j++] = '\\';
- argvs[j++] = arg[i++];
- argvs[j++] = '\\';
- argvs[j++] = arg[i];
- } else {
- argvs[j++] = arg[i++];
- argvs[j++] = arg[i];
- }
- } else {
- if (state == MA_START) {
- argv[argc] = argvs + j;
- state = MA_UNQUOTED;
- if (lastquote != NULL)
- *lastquote = '\0';
- }
- if (arg[i + 1] == '?' || arg[i + 1] == '[' ||
- arg[i + 1] == '*' || arg[i + 1] == '\\') {
- /*
- * Special case for sftp: append
- * escaped glob sequence -
- * glob will undo one level of
- * escaping.
- */
- argvs[j++] = arg[i++];
- argvs[j++] = arg[i];
- } else {
- /* Unescape everything */
- /* XXX support \n and friends? */
- i++;
- argvs[j++] = arg[i];
- }
- }
- } else if (arg[i] == '#') {
- if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE)
- argvs[j++] = arg[i];
- else
- goto string_done;
- } else if (arg[i] == '\0') {
- if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) {
- if (sloppy) {
- state = MA_UNQUOTED;
- if (terminated != NULL)
- *terminated = 0;
- goto string_done;
- }
- error("Unterminated quoted argument");
- return NULL;
- }
- string_done:
- if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) {
- argvs[j++] = '\0';
- argc++;
- }
- break;
- } else {
- if (state == MA_START) {
- argv[argc] = argvs + j;
- state = MA_UNQUOTED;
- if (lastquote != NULL)
- *lastquote = '\0';
- }
- if ((state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) &&
- (arg[i] == '?' || arg[i] == '[' || arg[i] == '*')) {
- /*
- * Special case for sftp: escape quoted
- * glob(3) wildcards. NB. string can grow
- * here.
- */
- if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 3)
- goto args_too_longs;
- argvs[j++] = '\\';
- argvs[j++] = arg[i];
- } else
- argvs[j++] = arg[i];
- }
- i++;
- }
- *argcp = argc;
- return argv;
-}
-
-static int
-parse_args(const char **cpp, int *ignore_errors, int *aflag, int *fflag,
- int *hflag, int *iflag, int *lflag, int *pflag, int *rflag, int *sflag,
- unsigned long *n_arg, char **path1, char **path2)
-{
- const char *cmd, *cp = *cpp;
- char *cp2, **argv;
- int base = 0;
- long l;
- int i, cmdnum, optidx, argc;
-
- /* Skip leading whitespace */
- cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
-
- /* Check for leading '-' (disable error processing) */
- *ignore_errors = 0;
- if (*cp == '-') {
- *ignore_errors = 1;
- cp++;
- cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
- }
-
- /* Ignore blank lines and lines which begin with comment '#' char */
- if (*cp == '\0' || *cp == '#')
- return (0);
-
- if ((argv = makeargv(cp, &argc, 0, NULL, NULL)) == NULL)
- return -1;
-
- /* Figure out which command we have */
- for (i = 0; cmds[i].c != NULL; i++) {
- if (argv[0] != NULL && strcasecmp(cmds[i].c, argv[0]) == 0)
- break;
- }
- cmdnum = cmds[i].n;
- cmd = cmds[i].c;
-
- /* Special case */
- if (*cp == '!') {
- cp++;
- cmdnum = I_SHELL;
- } else if (cmdnum == -1) {
- error("Invalid command.");
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Get arguments and parse flags */
- *aflag = *fflag = *hflag = *iflag = *lflag = *pflag = 0;
- *rflag = *sflag = 0;
- *path1 = *path2 = NULL;
- optidx = 1;
- switch (cmdnum) {
- case I_GET:
- case I_REGET:
- case I_PUT:
- if ((optidx = parse_getput_flags(cmd, argv, argc,
- aflag, fflag, pflag, rflag)) == -1)
- return -1;
- /* Get first pathname (mandatory) */
- if (argc - optidx < 1) {
- error("You must specify at least one path after a "
- "%s command.", cmd);
- return -1;
- }
- *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
- /* Get second pathname (optional) */
- if (argc - optidx > 1) {
- *path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]);
- /* Destination is not globbed */
- undo_glob_escape(*path2);
- }
- if (*aflag && cmdnum == I_PUT) {
- /* XXX implement resume for uploads */
- error("Resume is not supported for uploads");
- return -1;
- }
- break;
- case I_LINK:
- if ((optidx = parse_link_flags(cmd, argv, argc, sflag)) == -1)
- return -1;
- goto parse_two_paths;
- case I_RENAME:
- if ((optidx = parse_rename_flags(cmd, argv, argc, lflag)) == -1)
- return -1;
- goto parse_two_paths;
- case I_SYMLINK:
- if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
- return -1;
- parse_two_paths:
- if (argc - optidx < 2) {
- error("You must specify two paths after a %s "
- "command.", cmd);
- return -1;
- }
- *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
- *path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]);
- /* Paths are not globbed */
- undo_glob_escape(*path1);
- undo_glob_escape(*path2);
- break;
- case I_RM:
- case I_MKDIR:
- case I_RMDIR:
- case I_CHDIR:
- case I_LCHDIR:
- case I_LMKDIR:
- if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
- return -1;
- /* Get pathname (mandatory) */
- if (argc - optidx < 1) {
- error("You must specify a path after a %s command.",
- cmd);
- return -1;
- }
- *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
- /* Only "rm" globs */
- if (cmdnum != I_RM)
- undo_glob_escape(*path1);
- break;
- case I_DF:
- if ((optidx = parse_df_flags(cmd, argv, argc, hflag,
- iflag)) == -1)
- return -1;
- /* Default to current directory if no path specified */
- if (argc - optidx < 1)
- *path1 = NULL;
- else {
- *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
- undo_glob_escape(*path1);
- }
- break;
- case I_LS:
- if ((optidx = parse_ls_flags(argv, argc, lflag)) == -1)
- return(-1);
- /* Path is optional */
- if (argc - optidx > 0)
- *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
- break;
- case I_LLS:
- /* Skip ls command and following whitespace */
- cp = cp + strlen(cmd) + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
- case I_SHELL:
- /* Uses the rest of the line */
- break;
- case I_LUMASK:
- case I_CHMOD:
- base = 8;
- case I_CHOWN:
- case I_CHGRP:
- if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
- return -1;
- /* Get numeric arg (mandatory) */
- if (argc - optidx < 1)
- goto need_num_arg;
- errno = 0;
- l = strtol(argv[optidx], &cp2, base);
- if (cp2 == argv[optidx] || *cp2 != '\0' ||
- ((l == LONG_MIN || l == LONG_MAX) && errno == ERANGE) ||
- l < 0) {
- need_num_arg:
- error("You must supply a numeric argument "
- "to the %s command.", cmd);
- return -1;
- }
- *n_arg = l;
- if (cmdnum == I_LUMASK)
- break;
- /* Get pathname (mandatory) */
- if (argc - optidx < 2) {
- error("You must specify a path after a %s command.",
- cmd);
- return -1;
- }
- *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]);
- break;
- case I_QUIT:
- case I_PWD:
- case I_LPWD:
- case I_HELP:
- case I_VERSION:
- case I_PROGRESS:
- if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
- return -1;
- break;
- default:
- fatal("Command not implemented");
- }
-
- *cpp = cp;
- return(cmdnum);
-}
-
-static int
-parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd,
- int err_abort)
-{
- char *path1, *path2, *tmp;
- int ignore_errors = 0, aflag = 0, fflag = 0, hflag = 0, iflag = 0;
- int lflag = 0, pflag = 0, rflag = 0, sflag = 0;
- int cmdnum, i;
- unsigned long n_arg = 0;
- Attrib a, *aa;
- char path_buf[MAXPATHLEN];
- int err = 0;
- glob_t g;
-
- path1 = path2 = NULL;
- cmdnum = parse_args(&cmd, &ignore_errors, &aflag, &fflag, &hflag,
- &iflag, &lflag, &pflag, &rflag, &sflag, &n_arg, &path1, &path2);
- if (ignore_errors != 0)
- err_abort = 0;
-
- memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
-
- /* Perform command */
- switch (cmdnum) {
- case 0:
- /* Blank line */
- break;
- case -1:
- /* Unrecognized command */
- err = -1;
- break;
- case I_REGET:
- aflag = 1;
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case I_GET:
- err = process_get(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag,
- rflag, aflag, fflag);
- break;
- case I_PUT:
- err = process_put(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag,
- rflag, fflag);
- break;
- case I_RENAME:
- path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
- path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd);
- err = do_rename(conn, path1, path2, lflag);
- break;
- case I_SYMLINK:
- sflag = 1;
- case I_LINK:
- if (!sflag)
- path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
- path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd);
- err = (sflag ? do_symlink : do_hardlink)(conn, path1, path2);
- break;
- case I_RM:
- path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
- remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
- for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
- if (!quiet)
- printf("Removing %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]);
- err = do_rm(conn, g.gl_pathv[i]);
- if (err != 0 && err_abort)
- break;
- }
- break;
- case I_MKDIR:
- path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
- attrib_clear(&a);
- a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
- a.perm = 0777;
- err = do_mkdir(conn, path1, &a, 1);
- break;
- case I_RMDIR:
- path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
- err = do_rmdir(conn, path1);
- break;
- case I_CHDIR:
- path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
- if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) {
- err = 1;
- break;
- }
- if ((aa = do_stat(conn, tmp, 0)) == NULL) {
- free(tmp);
- err = 1;
- break;
- }
- if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) {
- error("Can't change directory: Can't check target");
- free(tmp);
- err = 1;
- break;
- }
- if (!S_ISDIR(aa->perm)) {
- error("Can't change directory: \"%s\" is not "
- "a directory", tmp);
- free(tmp);
- err = 1;
- break;
- }
- free(*pwd);
- *pwd = tmp;
- break;
- case I_LS:
- if (!path1) {
- do_ls_dir(conn, *pwd, *pwd, lflag);
- break;
- }
-
- /* Strip pwd off beginning of non-absolute paths */
- tmp = NULL;
- if (*path1 != '/')
- tmp = *pwd;
-
- path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
- err = do_globbed_ls(conn, path1, tmp, lflag);
- break;
- case I_DF:
- /* Default to current directory if no path specified */
- if (path1 == NULL)
- path1 = xstrdup(*pwd);
- path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
- err = do_df(conn, path1, hflag, iflag);
- break;
- case I_LCHDIR:
- if (chdir(path1) == -1) {
- error("Couldn't change local directory to "
- "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno));
- err = 1;
- }
- break;
- case I_LMKDIR:
- if (mkdir(path1, 0777) == -1) {
- error("Couldn't create local directory "
- "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno));
- err = 1;
- }
- break;
- case I_LLS:
- local_do_ls(cmd);
- break;
- case I_SHELL:
- local_do_shell(cmd);
- break;
- case I_LUMASK:
- umask(n_arg);
- printf("Local umask: %03lo\n", n_arg);
- break;
- case I_CHMOD:
- path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
- attrib_clear(&a);
- a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
- a.perm = n_arg;
- remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
- for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
- if (!quiet)
- printf("Changing mode on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]);
- err = do_setstat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], &a);
- if (err != 0 && err_abort)
- break;
- }
- break;
- case I_CHOWN:
- case I_CHGRP:
- path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
- remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
- for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
- if (!(aa = do_stat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], 0))) {
- if (err_abort) {
- err = -1;
- break;
- } else
- continue;
- }
- if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID)) {
- error("Can't get current ownership of "
- "remote file \"%s\"", g.gl_pathv[i]);
- if (err_abort) {
- err = -1;
- break;
- } else
- continue;
- }
- aa->flags &= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
- if (cmdnum == I_CHOWN) {
- if (!quiet)
- printf("Changing owner on %s\n",
- g.gl_pathv[i]);
- aa->uid = n_arg;
- } else {
- if (!quiet)
- printf("Changing group on %s\n",
- g.gl_pathv[i]);
- aa->gid = n_arg;
- }
- err = do_setstat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], aa);
- if (err != 0 && err_abort)
- break;
- }
- break;
- case I_PWD:
- printf("Remote working directory: %s\n", *pwd);
- break;
- case I_LPWD:
- if (!getcwd(path_buf, sizeof(path_buf))) {
- error("Couldn't get local cwd: %s", strerror(errno));
- err = -1;
- break;
- }
- printf("Local working directory: %s\n", path_buf);
- break;
- case I_QUIT:
- /* Processed below */
- break;
- case I_HELP:
- help();
- break;
- case I_VERSION:
- printf("SFTP protocol version %u\n", sftp_proto_version(conn));
- break;
- case I_PROGRESS:
- showprogress = !showprogress;
- if (showprogress)
- printf("Progress meter enabled\n");
- else
- printf("Progress meter disabled\n");
- break;
- default:
- fatal("%d is not implemented", cmdnum);
- }
-
- if (g.gl_pathc)
- globfree(&g);
- free(path1);
- free(path2);
-
- /* If an unignored error occurs in batch mode we should abort. */
- if (err_abort && err != 0)
- return (-1);
- else if (cmdnum == I_QUIT)
- return (1);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
-static char *
-prompt(EditLine *el)
-{
- return ("sftp> ");
-}
-
-/* Display entries in 'list' after skipping the first 'len' chars */
-static void
-complete_display(char **list, u_int len)
-{
- u_int y, m = 0, width = 80, columns = 1, colspace = 0, llen;
- struct winsize ws;
- char *tmp;
-
- /* Count entries for sort and find longest */
- for (y = 0; list[y]; y++)
- m = MAX(m, strlen(list[y]));
-
- if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1)
- width = ws.ws_col;
-
- m = m > len ? m - len : 0;
- columns = width / (m + 2);
- columns = MAX(columns, 1);
- colspace = width / columns;
- colspace = MIN(colspace, width);
-
- printf("\n");
- m = 1;
- for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) {
- llen = strlen(list[y]);
- tmp = llen > len ? list[y] + len : "";
- printf("%-*s", colspace, tmp);
- if (m >= columns) {
- printf("\n");
- m = 1;
- } else
- m++;
- }
- printf("\n");
-}
-
-/*
- * Given a "list" of words that begin with a common prefix of "word",
- * attempt to find an autocompletion to extends "word" by the next
- * characters common to all entries in "list".
- */
-static char *
-complete_ambiguous(const char *word, char **list, size_t count)
-{
- if (word == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- if (count > 0) {
- u_int y, matchlen = strlen(list[0]);
-
- /* Find length of common stem */
- for (y = 1; list[y]; y++) {
- u_int x;
-
- for (x = 0; x < matchlen; x++)
- if (list[0][x] != list[y][x])
- break;
-
- matchlen = x;
- }
-
- if (matchlen > strlen(word)) {
- char *tmp = xstrdup(list[0]);
-
- tmp[matchlen] = '\0';
- return tmp;
- }
- }
-
- return xstrdup(word);
-}
-
-/* Autocomplete a sftp command */
-static int
-complete_cmd_parse(EditLine *el, char *cmd, int lastarg, char quote,
- int terminated)
-{
- u_int y, count = 0, cmdlen, tmplen;
- char *tmp, **list, argterm[3];
- const LineInfo *lf;
-
- list = xcalloc((sizeof(cmds) / sizeof(*cmds)) + 1, sizeof(char *));
-
- /* No command specified: display all available commands */
- if (cmd == NULL) {
- for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++)
- list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c);
-
- list[count] = NULL;
- complete_display(list, 0);
-
- for (y = 0; list[y] != NULL; y++)
- free(list[y]);
- free(list);
- return count;
- }
-
- /* Prepare subset of commands that start with "cmd" */
- cmdlen = strlen(cmd);
- for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++) {
- if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[y].c, cmdlen))
- list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c);
- }
- list[count] = NULL;
-
- if (count == 0) {
- free(list);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Complete ambigious command */
- tmp = complete_ambiguous(cmd, list, count);
- if (count > 1)
- complete_display(list, 0);
-
- for (y = 0; list[y]; y++)
- free(list[y]);
- free(list);
-
- if (tmp != NULL) {
- tmplen = strlen(tmp);
- cmdlen = strlen(cmd);
- /* If cmd may be extended then do so */
- if (tmplen > cmdlen)
- if (el_insertstr(el, tmp + cmdlen) == -1)
- fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
- lf = el_line(el);
- /* Terminate argument cleanly */
- if (count == 1) {
- y = 0;
- if (!terminated)
- argterm[y++] = quote;
- if (lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' ')
- argterm[y++] = ' ';
- argterm[y] = '\0';
- if (y > 0 && el_insertstr(el, argterm) == -1)
- fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
- }
- free(tmp);
- }
-
- return count;
-}
-
-/*
- * Determine whether a particular sftp command's arguments (if any)
- * represent local or remote files.
- */
-static int
-complete_is_remote(char *cmd) {
- int i;
-
- if (cmd == NULL)
- return -1;
-
- for (i = 0; cmds[i].c; i++) {
- if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[i].c, strlen(cmds[i].c)))
- return cmds[i].t;
- }
-
- return -1;
-}
-
-/* Autocomplete a filename "file" */
-static int
-complete_match(EditLine *el, struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path,
- char *file, int remote, int lastarg, char quote, int terminated)
-{
- glob_t g;
- char *tmp, *tmp2, ins[8];
- u_int i, hadglob, pwdlen, len, tmplen, filelen, cesc, isesc, isabs;
- int clen;
- const LineInfo *lf;
-
- /* Glob from "file" location */
- if (file == NULL)
- tmp = xstrdup("*");
- else
- xasprintf(&tmp, "%s*", file);
-
- /* Check if the path is absolute. */
- isabs = tmp[0] == '/';
-
- memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
- if (remote != LOCAL) {
- tmp = make_absolute(tmp, remote_path);
- remote_glob(conn, tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g);
- } else
- glob(tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g);
-
- /* Determine length of pwd so we can trim completion display */
- for (hadglob = tmplen = pwdlen = 0; tmp[tmplen] != 0; tmplen++) {
- /* Terminate counting on first unescaped glob metacharacter */
- if (tmp[tmplen] == '*' || tmp[tmplen] == '?') {
- if (tmp[tmplen] != '*' || tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0')
- hadglob = 1;
- break;
- }
- if (tmp[tmplen] == '\\' && tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0')
- tmplen++;
- if (tmp[tmplen] == '/')
- pwdlen = tmplen + 1; /* track last seen '/' */
- }
- free(tmp);
-
- if (g.gl_matchc == 0)
- goto out;
-
- if (g.gl_matchc > 1)
- complete_display(g.gl_pathv, pwdlen);
-
- tmp = NULL;
- /* Don't try to extend globs */
- if (file == NULL || hadglob)
- goto out;
-
- tmp2 = complete_ambiguous(file, g.gl_pathv, g.gl_matchc);
- tmp = path_strip(tmp2, isabs ? NULL : remote_path);
- free(tmp2);
-
- if (tmp == NULL)
- goto out;
-
- tmplen = strlen(tmp);
- filelen = strlen(file);
-
- /* Count the number of escaped characters in the input string. */
- cesc = isesc = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < filelen; i++) {
- if (!isesc && file[i] == '\\' && i + 1 < filelen){
- isesc = 1;
- cesc++;
- } else
- isesc = 0;
- }
-
- if (tmplen > (filelen - cesc)) {
- tmp2 = tmp + filelen - cesc;
- len = strlen(tmp2);
- /* quote argument on way out */
- for (i = 0; i < len; i += clen) {
- if ((clen = mblen(tmp2 + i, len - i)) < 0 ||
- (size_t)clen > sizeof(ins) - 2)
- fatal("invalid multibyte character");
- ins[0] = '\\';
- memcpy(ins + 1, tmp2 + i, clen);
- ins[clen + 1] = '\0';
- switch (tmp2[i]) {
- case '\'':
- case '"':
- case '\\':
- case '\t':
- case '[':
- case ' ':
- case '#':
- case '*':
- if (quote == '\0' || tmp2[i] == quote) {
- if (el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1)
- fatal("el_insertstr "
- "failed.");
- break;
- }
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- default:
- if (el_insertstr(el, ins + 1) == -1)
- fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
- break;
- }
- }
- }
-
- lf = el_line(el);
- if (g.gl_matchc == 1) {
- i = 0;
- if (!terminated)
- ins[i++] = quote;
- if (*(lf->cursor - 1) != '/' &&
- (lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' '))
- ins[i++] = ' ';
- ins[i] = '\0';
- if (i > 0 && el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1)
- fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
- }
- free(tmp);
-
- out:
- globfree(&g);
- return g.gl_matchc;
-}
-
-/* tab-completion hook function, called via libedit */
-static unsigned char
-complete(EditLine *el, int ch)
-{
- char **argv, *line, quote;
- int argc, carg;
- u_int cursor, len, terminated, ret = CC_ERROR;
- const LineInfo *lf;
- struct complete_ctx *complete_ctx;
-
- lf = el_line(el);
- if (el_get(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void**)&complete_ctx) != 0)
- fatal("%s: el_get failed", __func__);
-
- /* Figure out which argument the cursor points to */
- cursor = lf->cursor - lf->buffer;
- line = (char *)xmalloc(cursor + 1);
- memcpy(line, lf->buffer, cursor);
- line[cursor] = '\0';
- argv = makeargv(line, &carg, 1, "e, &terminated);
- free(line);
-
- /* Get all the arguments on the line */
- len = lf->lastchar - lf->buffer;
- line = (char *)xmalloc(len + 1);
- memcpy(line, lf->buffer, len);
- line[len] = '\0';
- argv = makeargv(line, &argc, 1, NULL, NULL);
-
- /* Ensure cursor is at EOL or a argument boundary */
- if (line[cursor] != ' ' && line[cursor] != '\0' &&
- line[cursor] != '\n') {
- free(line);
- return ret;
- }
-
- if (carg == 0) {
- /* Show all available commands */
- complete_cmd_parse(el, NULL, argc == carg, '\0', 1);
- ret = CC_REDISPLAY;
- } else if (carg == 1 && cursor > 0 && line[cursor - 1] != ' ') {
- /* Handle the command parsing */
- if (complete_cmd_parse(el, argv[0], argc == carg,
- quote, terminated) != 0)
- ret = CC_REDISPLAY;
- } else if (carg >= 1) {
- /* Handle file parsing */
- int remote = complete_is_remote(argv[0]);
- char *filematch = NULL;
-
- if (carg > 1 && line[cursor-1] != ' ')
- filematch = argv[carg - 1];
-
- if (remote != 0 &&
- complete_match(el, complete_ctx->conn,
- *complete_ctx->remote_pathp, filematch,
- remote, carg == argc, quote, terminated) != 0)
- ret = CC_REDISPLAY;
- }
-
- free(line);
- return ret;
-}
-#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
-
-int
-interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2)
-{
- char *remote_path;
- char *dir = NULL;
- char cmd[2048];
- int err, interactive;
- EditLine *el = NULL;
-#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
- History *hl = NULL;
- HistEvent hev;
- extern char *__progname;
- struct complete_ctx complete_ctx;
-
- if (!batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
- if ((el = el_init(__progname, stdin, stdout, stderr)) == NULL)
- fatal("Couldn't initialise editline");
- if ((hl = history_init()) == NULL)
- fatal("Couldn't initialise editline history");
- history(hl, &hev, H_SETSIZE, 100);
- el_set(el, EL_HIST, history, hl);
-
- el_set(el, EL_PROMPT, prompt);
- el_set(el, EL_EDITOR, "emacs");
- el_set(el, EL_TERMINAL, NULL);
- el_set(el, EL_SIGNAL, 1);
- el_source(el, NULL);
-
- /* Tab Completion */
- el_set(el, EL_ADDFN, "ftp-complete",
- "Context sensitive argument completion", complete);
- complete_ctx.conn = conn;
- complete_ctx.remote_pathp = &remote_path;
- el_set(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void*)&complete_ctx);
- el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^I", "ftp-complete", NULL);
- /* enable ctrl-left-arrow and ctrl-right-arrow */
- el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5C", "em-next-word", NULL);
- el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[5C", "em-next-word", NULL);
- el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5D", "ed-prev-word", NULL);
- el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e\\e[D", "ed-prev-word", NULL);
- /* make ^w match ksh behaviour */
- el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^w", "ed-delete-prev-word", NULL);
- }
-#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
-
- remote_path = do_realpath(conn, ".");
- if (remote_path == NULL)
- fatal("Need cwd");
-
- if (file1 != NULL) {
- dir = xstrdup(file1);
- dir = make_absolute(dir, remote_path);
-
- if (remote_is_dir(conn, dir) && file2 == NULL) {
- if (!quiet)
- printf("Changing to: %s\n", dir);
- snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "cd \"%s\"", dir);
- if (parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd,
- &remote_path, 1) != 0) {
- free(dir);
- free(remote_path);
- free(conn);
- return (-1);
- }
- } else {
- /* XXX this is wrong wrt quoting */
- snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get%s %s%s%s",
- global_aflag ? " -a" : "", dir,
- file2 == NULL ? "" : " ",
- file2 == NULL ? "" : file2);
- err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd,
- &remote_path, 1);
- free(dir);
- free(remote_path);
- free(conn);
- return (err);
- }
- free(dir);
- }
-
- setlinebuf(stdout);
- setlinebuf(infile);
-
- interactive = !batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO);
- err = 0;
- for (;;) {
- char *cp;
-
- signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
-
- if (el == NULL) {
- if (interactive)
- printf("sftp> ");
- if (fgets(cmd, sizeof(cmd), infile) == NULL) {
- if (interactive)
- printf("\n");
- break;
- }
- if (!interactive) { /* Echo command */
- printf("sftp> %s", cmd);
- if (strlen(cmd) > 0 &&
- cmd[strlen(cmd) - 1] != '\n')
- printf("\n");
- }
- } else {
-#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
- const char *line;
- int count = 0;
-
- if ((line = el_gets(el, &count)) == NULL ||
- count <= 0) {
- printf("\n");
- break;
- }
- history(hl, &hev, H_ENTER, line);
- if (strlcpy(cmd, line, sizeof(cmd)) >= sizeof(cmd)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Error: input line too long\n");
- continue;
- }
-#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
- }
-
- cp = strrchr(cmd, '\n');
- if (cp)
- *cp = '\0';
-
- /* Handle user interrupts gracefully during commands */
- interrupted = 0;
- signal(SIGINT, cmd_interrupt);
-
- err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path,
- batchmode);
- if (err != 0)
- break;
- }
- free(remote_path);
- free(conn);
-
-#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
- if (el != NULL)
- el_end(el);
-#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
-
- /* err == 1 signifies normal "quit" exit */
- return (err >= 0 ? 0 : -1);
-}
-
-static void
-connect_to_server(char *path, char **args, int *in, int *out)
-{
- int c_in, c_out;
-
-#ifdef USE_PIPES
- int pin[2], pout[2];
-
- if ((pipe(pin) == -1) || (pipe(pout) == -1))
- fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
- *in = pin[0];
- *out = pout[1];
- c_in = pout[0];
- c_out = pin[1];
-#else /* USE_PIPES */
- int inout[2];
-
- if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1)
- fatal("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
- *in = *out = inout[0];
- c_in = c_out = inout[1];
-#endif /* USE_PIPES */
-
- if ((sshpid = fork()) == -1)
- fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
- else if (sshpid == 0) {
- if ((dup2(c_in, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) ||
- (dup2(c_out, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
- close(*in);
- close(*out);
- close(c_in);
- close(c_out);
-
- /*
- * The underlying ssh is in the same process group, so we must
- * ignore SIGINT if we want to gracefully abort commands,
- * otherwise the signal will make it to the ssh process and
- * kill it too. Contrawise, since sftp sends SIGTERMs to the
- * underlying ssh, it must *not* ignore that signal.
- */
- signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
- signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
- execvp(path, args);
- fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
-
- signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
- signal(SIGINT, killchild);
- signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
- close(c_in);
- close(c_out);
-}
-
-static void
-usage(void)
-{
- extern char *__progname;
-
- fprintf(stderr,
- "usage: %s [-1246aCfpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]\n"
- " [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config] "
- "[-i identity_file] [-l limit]\n"
- " [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-R num_requests] "
- "[-S program]\n"
- " [-s subsystem | sftp_server] host\n"
- " %s [user@]host[:file ...]\n"
- " %s [user@]host[:dir[/]]\n"
- " %s -b batchfile [user@]host\n",
- __progname, __progname, __progname, __progname);
- exit(1);
-}
-
-int
-main(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- int in, out, ch, err;
- char *host = NULL, *userhost, *cp, *file2 = NULL;
- int debug_level = 0, sshver = 2;
- char *file1 = NULL, *sftp_server = NULL;
- char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM, *sftp_direct = NULL;
- const char *errstr;
- LogLevel ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
- arglist args;
- extern int optind;
- extern char *optarg;
- struct sftp_conn *conn;
- size_t copy_buffer_len = DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN;
- size_t num_requests = DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS;
- long long limit_kbps = 0;
-
- /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
- sanitise_stdfd();
- setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "");
-
- __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
- memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args));
- args.list = NULL;
- addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program);
- addargs(&args, "-oForwardX11 no");
- addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no");
- addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand no");
- addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes");
-
- ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
- infile = stdin;
-
- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
- "1246afhpqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:P:R:")) != -1) {
- switch (ch) {
- /* Passed through to ssh(1) */
- case '4':
- case '6':
- case 'C':
- addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
- break;
- /* Passed through to ssh(1) with argument */
- case 'F':
- case 'c':
- case 'i':
- case 'o':
- addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
- addargs(&args, "%s", optarg);
- break;
- case 'q':
- ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
- quiet = 1;
- showprogress = 0;
- addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
- break;
- case 'P':
- addargs(&args, "-oPort %s", optarg);
- break;
- case 'v':
- if (debug_level < 3) {
- addargs(&args, "-v");
- ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 + debug_level;
- }
- debug_level++;
- break;
- case '1':
- sshver = 1;
- if (sftp_server == NULL)
- sftp_server = _PATH_SFTP_SERVER;
- break;
- case '2':
- sshver = 2;
- break;
- case 'a':
- global_aflag = 1;
- break;
- case 'B':
- copy_buffer_len = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10);
- if (copy_buffer_len == 0 || *cp != '\0')
- fatal("Invalid buffer size \"%s\"", optarg);
- break;
- case 'b':
- if (batchmode)
- fatal("Batch file already specified.");
-
- /* Allow "-" as stdin */
- if (strcmp(optarg, "-") != 0 &&
- (infile = fopen(optarg, "r")) == NULL)
- fatal("%s (%s).", strerror(errno), optarg);
- showprogress = 0;
- quiet = batchmode = 1;
- addargs(&args, "-obatchmode yes");
- break;
- case 'f':
- global_fflag = 1;
- break;
- case 'p':
- global_pflag = 1;
- break;
- case 'D':
- sftp_direct = optarg;
- break;
- case 'l':
- limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024,
- &errstr);
- if (errstr != NULL)
- usage();
- limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */
- break;
- case 'r':
- global_rflag = 1;
- break;
- case 'R':
- num_requests = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10);
- if (num_requests == 0 || *cp != '\0')
- fatal("Invalid number of requests \"%s\"",
- optarg);
- break;
- case 's':
- sftp_server = optarg;
- break;
- case 'S':
- ssh_program = optarg;
- replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
- break;
- case 'h':
- default:
- usage();
- }
- }
-
- if (!isatty(STDERR_FILENO))
- showprogress = 0;
-
- log_init(argv[0], ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
-
- if (sftp_direct == NULL) {
- if (optind == argc || argc > (optind + 2))
- usage();
-
- userhost = xstrdup(argv[optind]);
- file2 = argv[optind+1];
-
- if ((host = strrchr(userhost, '@')) == NULL)
- host = userhost;
- else {
- *host++ = '\0';
- if (!userhost[0]) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Missing username\n");
- usage();
- }
- addargs(&args, "-l");
- addargs(&args, "%s", userhost);
- }
-
- if ((cp = colon(host)) != NULL) {
- *cp++ = '\0';
- file1 = cp;
- }
-
- host = cleanhostname(host);
- if (!*host) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Missing hostname\n");
- usage();
- }
-
- addargs(&args, "-oProtocol %d", sshver);
-
- /* no subsystem if the server-spec contains a '/' */
- if (sftp_server == NULL || strchr(sftp_server, '/') == NULL)
- addargs(&args, "-s");
-
- addargs(&args, "--");
- addargs(&args, "%s", host);
- addargs(&args, "%s", (sftp_server != NULL ?
- sftp_server : "sftp"));
-
- connect_to_server(ssh_program, args.list, &in, &out);
- } else {
- args.list = NULL;
- addargs(&args, "sftp-server");
-
- connect_to_server(sftp_direct, args.list, &in, &out);
- }
- freeargs(&args);
-
- conn = do_init(in, out, copy_buffer_len, num_requests, limit_kbps);
- if (conn == NULL)
- fatal("Couldn't initialise connection to server");
-
- if (!quiet) {
- if (sftp_direct == NULL)
- fprintf(stderr, "Connected to %s.\n", host);
- else
- fprintf(stderr, "Attached to %s.\n", sftp_direct);
- }
-
- err = interactive_loop(conn, file1, file2);
-
-#if !defined(USE_PIPES)
- shutdown(in, SHUT_RDWR);
- shutdown(out, SHUT_RDWR);
-#endif
-
- close(in);
- close(out);
- if (batchmode)
- fclose(infile);
-
- while (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0) == -1)
- if (errno != EINTR)
- fatal("Couldn't wait for ssh process: %s",
- strerror(errno));
-
- exit(err == 0 ? 0 : 1);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sftp.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,2458 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.175 2016/07/22 03:47:36 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm at openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h> /* MIN MAX */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
+#include <libgen.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H
+# include <locale.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
+#include <histedit.h>
+#else
+typedef void EditLine;
+#endif
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "utf8.h"
+
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+#include "sftp-client.h"
+
+#define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN 32768 /* Size of buffer for up/download */
+#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS 64 /* # concurrent outstanding requests */
+
+/* File to read commands from */
+FILE* infile;
+
+/* Are we in batchfile mode? */
+int batchmode = 0;
+
+/* PID of ssh transport process */
+static pid_t sshpid = -1;
+
+/* Suppress diagnositic messages */
+int quiet = 0;
+
+/* This is set to 0 if the progressmeter is not desired. */
+int showprogress = 1;
+
+/* When this option is set, we always recursively download/upload directories */
+int global_rflag = 0;
+
+/* When this option is set, we resume download or upload if possible */
+int global_aflag = 0;
+
+/* When this option is set, the file transfers will always preserve times */
+int global_pflag = 0;
+
+/* When this option is set, transfers will have fsync() called on each file */
+int global_fflag = 0;
+
+/* SIGINT received during command processing */
+volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted = 0;
+
+/* I wish qsort() took a separate ctx for the comparison function...*/
+int sort_flag;
+
+/* Context used for commandline completion */
+struct complete_ctx {
+ struct sftp_conn *conn;
+ char **remote_pathp;
+};
+
+int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
+ int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* Separators for interactive commands */
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+
+/* ls flags */
+#define LS_LONG_VIEW 0x0001 /* Full view ala ls -l */
+#define LS_SHORT_VIEW 0x0002 /* Single row view ala ls -1 */
+#define LS_NUMERIC_VIEW 0x0004 /* Long view with numeric uid/gid */
+#define LS_NAME_SORT 0x0008 /* Sort by name (default) */
+#define LS_TIME_SORT 0x0010 /* Sort by mtime */
+#define LS_SIZE_SORT 0x0020 /* Sort by file size */
+#define LS_REVERSE_SORT 0x0040 /* Reverse sort order */
+#define LS_SHOW_ALL 0x0080 /* Don't skip filenames starting with '.' */
+#define LS_SI_UNITS 0x0100 /* Display sizes as K, M, G, etc. */
+
+#define VIEW_FLAGS (LS_LONG_VIEW|LS_SHORT_VIEW|LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS)
+#define SORT_FLAGS (LS_NAME_SORT|LS_TIME_SORT|LS_SIZE_SORT)
+
+/* Commands for interactive mode */
+enum sftp_command {
+ I_CHDIR = 1,
+ I_CHGRP,
+ I_CHMOD,
+ I_CHOWN,
+ I_DF,
+ I_GET,
+ I_HELP,
+ I_LCHDIR,
+ I_LINK,
+ I_LLS,
+ I_LMKDIR,
+ I_LPWD,
+ I_LS,
+ I_LUMASK,
+ I_MKDIR,
+ I_PUT,
+ I_PWD,
+ I_QUIT,
+ I_REGET,
+ I_RENAME,
+ I_REPUT,
+ I_RM,
+ I_RMDIR,
+ I_SHELL,
+ I_SYMLINK,
+ I_VERSION,
+ I_PROGRESS,
+};
+
+struct CMD {
+ const char *c;
+ const int n;
+ const int t;
+};
+
+/* Type of completion */
+#define NOARGS 0
+#define REMOTE 1
+#define LOCAL 2
+
+static const struct CMD cmds[] = {
+ { "bye", I_QUIT, NOARGS },
+ { "cd", I_CHDIR, REMOTE },
+ { "chdir", I_CHDIR, REMOTE },
+ { "chgrp", I_CHGRP, REMOTE },
+ { "chmod", I_CHMOD, REMOTE },
+ { "chown", I_CHOWN, REMOTE },
+ { "df", I_DF, REMOTE },
+ { "dir", I_LS, REMOTE },
+ { "exit", I_QUIT, NOARGS },
+ { "get", I_GET, REMOTE },
+ { "help", I_HELP, NOARGS },
+ { "lcd", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL },
+ { "lchdir", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL },
+ { "lls", I_LLS, LOCAL },
+ { "lmkdir", I_LMKDIR, LOCAL },
+ { "ln", I_LINK, REMOTE },
+ { "lpwd", I_LPWD, LOCAL },
+ { "ls", I_LS, REMOTE },
+ { "lumask", I_LUMASK, NOARGS },
+ { "mkdir", I_MKDIR, REMOTE },
+ { "mget", I_GET, REMOTE },
+ { "mput", I_PUT, LOCAL },
+ { "progress", I_PROGRESS, NOARGS },
+ { "put", I_PUT, LOCAL },
+ { "pwd", I_PWD, REMOTE },
+ { "quit", I_QUIT, NOARGS },
+ { "reget", I_REGET, REMOTE },
+ { "rename", I_RENAME, REMOTE },
+ { "reput", I_REPUT, LOCAL },
+ { "rm", I_RM, REMOTE },
+ { "rmdir", I_RMDIR, REMOTE },
+ { "symlink", I_SYMLINK, REMOTE },
+ { "version", I_VERSION, NOARGS },
+ { "!", I_SHELL, NOARGS },
+ { "?", I_HELP, NOARGS },
+ { NULL, -1, -1 }
+};
+
+int interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *, char *file1, char *file2);
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+killchild(int signo)
+{
+ if (sshpid > 1) {
+ kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
+ waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ _exit(1);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+cmd_interrupt(int signo)
+{
+ const char msg[] = "\rInterrupt \n";
+ int olderrno = errno;
+
+ (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1);
+ interrupted = 1;
+ errno = olderrno;
+}
+
+static void
+help(void)
+{
+ printf("Available commands:\n"
+ "bye Quit sftp\n"
+ "cd path Change remote directory to 'path'\n"
+ "chgrp grp path Change group of file 'path' to 'grp'\n"
+ "chmod mode path Change permissions of file 'path' to 'mode'\n"
+ "chown own path Change owner of file 'path' to 'own'\n"
+ "df [-hi] [path] Display statistics for current directory or\n"
+ " filesystem containing 'path'\n"
+ "exit Quit sftp\n"
+ "get [-afPpRr] remote [local] Download file\n"
+ "reget [-fPpRr] remote [local] Resume download file\n"
+ "reput [-fPpRr] [local] remote Resume upload file\n"
+ "help Display this help text\n"
+ "lcd path Change local directory to 'path'\n"
+ "lls [ls-options [path]] Display local directory listing\n"
+ "lmkdir path Create local directory\n"
+ "ln [-s] oldpath newpath Link remote file (-s for symlink)\n"
+ "lpwd Print local working directory\n"
+ "ls [-1afhlnrSt] [path] Display remote directory listing\n"
+ "lumask umask Set local umask to 'umask'\n"
+ "mkdir path Create remote directory\n"
+ "progress Toggle display of progress meter\n"
+ "put [-afPpRr] local [remote] Upload file\n"
+ "pwd Display remote working directory\n"
+ "quit Quit sftp\n"
+ "rename oldpath newpath Rename remote file\n"
+ "rm path Delete remote file\n"
+ "rmdir path Remove remote directory\n"
+ "symlink oldpath newpath Symlink remote file\n"
+ "version Show SFTP version\n"
+ "!command Execute 'command' in local shell\n"
+ "! Escape to local shell\n"
+ "? Synonym for help\n");
+}
+
+static void
+local_do_shell(const char *args)
+{
+ int status;
+ char *shell;
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ if (!*args)
+ args = NULL;
+
+ if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0')
+ shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
+
+ if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
+ fatal("Couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ /* XXX: child has pipe fds to ssh subproc open - issue? */
+ if (args) {
+ debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
+ execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
+ } else {
+ debug3("Executing %s", shell);
+ execl(shell, shell, (char *)NULL);
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't execute \"%s\": %s\n", shell,
+ strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+ if (errno != EINTR)
+ fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (!WIFEXITED(status))
+ error("Shell exited abnormally");
+ else if (WEXITSTATUS(status))
+ error("Shell exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+static void
+local_do_ls(const char *args)
+{
+ if (!args || !*args)
+ local_do_shell(_PATH_LS);
+ else {
+ int len = strlen(_PATH_LS " ") + strlen(args) + 1;
+ char *buf = xmalloc(len);
+
+ /* XXX: quoting - rip quoting code from ftp? */
+ snprintf(buf, len, _PATH_LS " %s", args);
+ local_do_shell(buf);
+ free(buf);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */
+static char *
+path_strip(const char *path, const char *strip)
+{
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (strip == NULL)
+ return (xstrdup(path));
+
+ len = strlen(strip);
+ if (strncmp(path, strip, len) == 0) {
+ if (strip[len - 1] != '/' && path[len] == '/')
+ len++;
+ return (xstrdup(path + len));
+ }
+
+ return (xstrdup(path));
+}
+
+static char *
+make_absolute(char *p, const char *pwd)
+{
+ char *abs_str;
+
+ /* Derelativise */
+ if (p && p[0] != '/') {
+ abs_str = path_append(pwd, p);
+ free(p);
+ return(abs_str);
+ } else
+ return(p);
+}
+
+static int
+parse_getput_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc,
+ int *aflag, int *fflag, int *pflag, int *rflag)
+{
+ extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
+ int ch;
+
+ optind = optreset = 1;
+ opterr = 0;
+
+ *aflag = *fflag = *rflag = *pflag = 0;
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "afPpRr")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'a':
+ *aflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'f':
+ *fflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ case 'P':
+ *pflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'r':
+ case 'R':
+ *rflag = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return optind;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_link_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *sflag)
+{
+ extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
+ int ch;
+
+ optind = optreset = 1;
+ opterr = 0;
+
+ *sflag = 0;
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "s")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 's':
+ *sflag = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return optind;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_rename_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *lflag)
+{
+ extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
+ int ch;
+
+ optind = optreset = 1;
+ opterr = 0;
+
+ *lflag = 0;
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "l")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'l':
+ *lflag = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return optind;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_ls_flags(char **argv, int argc, int *lflag)
+{
+ extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
+ int ch;
+
+ optind = optreset = 1;
+ opterr = 0;
+
+ *lflag = LS_NAME_SORT;
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "1Safhlnrt")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ case '1':
+ *lflag &= ~VIEW_FLAGS;
+ *lflag |= LS_SHORT_VIEW;
+ break;
+ case 'S':
+ *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS;
+ *lflag |= LS_SIZE_SORT;
+ break;
+ case 'a':
+ *lflag |= LS_SHOW_ALL;
+ break;
+ case 'f':
+ *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS;
+ break;
+ case 'h':
+ *lflag |= LS_SI_UNITS;
+ break;
+ case 'l':
+ *lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW;
+ *lflag |= LS_LONG_VIEW;
+ break;
+ case 'n':
+ *lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW;
+ *lflag |= LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_LONG_VIEW;
+ break;
+ case 'r':
+ *lflag |= LS_REVERSE_SORT;
+ break;
+ case 't':
+ *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS;
+ *lflag |= LS_TIME_SORT;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("ls: Invalid flag -%c", optopt);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return optind;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_df_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *hflag, int *iflag)
+{
+ extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
+ int ch;
+
+ optind = optreset = 1;
+ opterr = 0;
+
+ *hflag = *iflag = 0;
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hi")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'h':
+ *hflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'i':
+ *iflag = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return optind;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_no_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc)
+{
+ extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
+ int ch;
+
+ optind = optreset = 1;
+ opterr = 0;
+
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ default:
+ error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return optind;
+}
+
+static int
+is_dir(const char *path)
+{
+ struct stat sb;
+
+ /* XXX: report errors? */
+ if (stat(path, &sb) == -1)
+ return(0);
+
+ return(S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode));
+}
+
+static int
+remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+{
+ Attrib *a;
+
+ /* XXX: report errors? */
+ if ((a = do_stat(conn, path, 1)) == NULL)
+ return(0);
+ if (!(a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS))
+ return(0);
+ return(S_ISDIR(a->perm));
+}
+
+/* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */
+static int
+pathname_is_dir(const char *pathname)
+{
+ size_t l = strlen(pathname);
+
+ return l > 0 && pathname[l - 1] == '/';
+}
+
+static int
+process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+ const char *pwd, int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag)
+{
+ char *abs_src = NULL;
+ char *abs_dst = NULL;
+ glob_t g;
+ char *filename, *tmp=NULL;
+ int i, r, err = 0;
+
+ abs_src = xstrdup(src);
+ abs_src = make_absolute(abs_src, pwd);
+ memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+
+ debug3("Looking up %s", abs_src);
+ if ((r = remote_glob(conn, abs_src, GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) != 0) {
+ if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) {
+ error("Too many matches for \"%s\".", abs_src);
+ } else {
+ error("File \"%s\" not found.", abs_src);
+ }
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If multiple matches then dst must be a directory or
+ * unspecified.
+ */
+ if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && dst != NULL && !is_dir(dst)) {
+ error("Multiple source paths, but destination "
+ "\"%s\" is not a directory", dst);
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+ tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]);
+ if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) {
+ error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno));
+ free(tmp);
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && dst) {
+ if (is_dir(dst)) {
+ abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
+ } else {
+ abs_dst = xstrdup(dst);
+ }
+ } else if (dst) {
+ abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
+ } else {
+ abs_dst = xstrdup(filename);
+ }
+ free(tmp);
+
+ resume |= global_aflag;
+ if (!quiet && resume)
+ mprintf("Resuming %s to %s\n",
+ g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
+ else if (!quiet && !resume)
+ mprintf("Fetching %s to %s\n",
+ g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
+ if (pathname_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
+ if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
+ pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
+ fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
+ err = -1;
+ } else {
+ if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
+ pflag || global_pflag, resume,
+ fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
+ err = -1;
+ }
+ free(abs_dst);
+ abs_dst = NULL;
+ }
+
+out:
+ free(abs_src);
+ globfree(&g);
+ return(err);
+}
+
+static int
+process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+ const char *pwd, int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag)
+{
+ char *tmp_dst = NULL;
+ char *abs_dst = NULL;
+ char *tmp = NULL, *filename = NULL;
+ glob_t g;
+ int err = 0;
+ int i, dst_is_dir = 1;
+ struct stat sb;
+
+ if (dst) {
+ tmp_dst = xstrdup(dst);
+ tmp_dst = make_absolute(tmp_dst, pwd);
+ }
+
+ memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+ debug3("Looking up %s", src);
+ if (glob(src, GLOB_NOCHECK | GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) {
+ error("File \"%s\" not found.", src);
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* If we aren't fetching to pwd then stash this status for later */
+ if (tmp_dst != NULL)
+ dst_is_dir = remote_is_dir(conn, tmp_dst);
+
+ /* If multiple matches, dst may be directory or unspecified */
+ if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && tmp_dst && !dst_is_dir) {
+ error("Multiple paths match, but destination "
+ "\"%s\" is not a directory", tmp_dst);
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+ if (stat(g.gl_pathv[i], &sb) == -1) {
+ err = -1;
+ error("stat %s: %s", g.gl_pathv[i], strerror(errno));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]);
+ if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) {
+ error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno));
+ free(tmp);
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && tmp_dst) {
+ /* If directory specified, append filename */
+ if (dst_is_dir)
+ abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename);
+ else
+ abs_dst = xstrdup(tmp_dst);
+ } else if (tmp_dst) {
+ abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename);
+ } else {
+ abs_dst = make_absolute(xstrdup(filename), pwd);
+ }
+ free(tmp);
+
+ resume |= global_aflag;
+ if (!quiet && resume)
+ mprintf("Resuming upload of %s to %s\n",
+ g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
+ else if (!quiet && !resume)
+ mprintf("Uploading %s to %s\n",
+ g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
+ if (pathname_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
+ if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+ pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
+ fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
+ err = -1;
+ } else {
+ if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+ pflag || global_pflag, resume,
+ fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
+ err = -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ free(abs_dst);
+ free(tmp_dst);
+ globfree(&g);
+ return(err);
+}
+
+static int
+sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb)
+{
+ SFTP_DIRENT *a = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)aa;
+ SFTP_DIRENT *b = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)bb;
+ int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1;
+
+#define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1))
+ if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT)
+ return (rmul * strcmp(a->filename, b->filename));
+ else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT)
+ return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.mtime, b->a.mtime));
+ else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT)
+ return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.size, b->a.size));
+
+ fatal("Unknown ls sort type");
+}
+
+/* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */
+static int
+do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path,
+ const char *strip_path, int lflag)
+{
+ int n;
+ u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1;
+ SFTP_DIRENT **d;
+
+ if ((n = do_readdir(conn, path, &d)) != 0)
+ return (n);
+
+ if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) {
+ u_int m = 0, width = 80;
+ struct winsize ws;
+ char *tmp;
+
+ /* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */
+ for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++) {
+ if (d[n]->filename[0] != '.' || (lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL))
+ m = MAX(m, strlen(d[n]->filename));
+ }
+
+ /* Add any subpath that also needs to be counted */
+ tmp = path_strip(path, strip_path);
+ m += strlen(tmp);
+ free(tmp);
+
+ if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1)
+ width = ws.ws_col;
+
+ columns = width / (m + 2);
+ columns = MAX(columns, 1);
+ colspace = width / columns;
+ colspace = MIN(colspace, width);
+ }
+
+ if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) {
+ for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++)
+ ; /* count entries */
+ sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT);
+ qsort(d, n, sizeof(*d), sdirent_comp);
+ }
+
+ for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL && !interrupted; n++) {
+ char *tmp, *fname;
+
+ if (d[n]->filename[0] == '.' && !(lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL))
+ continue;
+
+ tmp = path_append(path, d[n]->filename);
+ fname = path_strip(tmp, strip_path);
+ free(tmp);
+
+ if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
+ if (lflag & (LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS)) {
+ char *lname;
+ struct stat sb;
+
+ memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb));
+ attrib_to_stat(&d[n]->a, &sb);
+ lname = ls_file(fname, &sb, 1,
+ (lflag & LS_SI_UNITS));
+ mprintf("%s\n", lname);
+ free(lname);
+ } else
+ mprintf("%s\n", d[n]->longname);
+ } else {
+ mprintf("%-*s", colspace, fname);
+ if (c >= columns) {
+ printf("\n");
+ c = 1;
+ } else
+ c++;
+ }
+
+ free(fname);
+ }
+
+ if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1))
+ printf("\n");
+
+ free_sftp_dirents(d);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */
+static int
+do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path,
+ const char *strip_path, int lflag)
+{
+ char *fname, *lname;
+ glob_t g;
+ int err, r;
+ struct winsize ws;
+ u_int i, c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1, m = 0, width = 80;
+
+ memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+
+ if ((r = remote_glob(conn, path,
+ GLOB_MARK|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_KEEPSTAT|GLOB_NOSORT,
+ NULL, &g)) != 0 ||
+ (g.gl_pathc && !g.gl_matchc)) {
+ if (g.gl_pathc)
+ globfree(&g);
+ if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) {
+ error("Can't ls: Too many matches for \"%s\"", path);
+ } else {
+ error("Can't ls: \"%s\" not found", path);
+ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (interrupted)
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * If the glob returns a single match and it is a directory,
+ * then just list its contents.
+ */
+ if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && g.gl_statv[0] != NULL &&
+ S_ISDIR(g.gl_statv[0]->st_mode)) {
+ err = do_ls_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[0], strip_path, lflag);
+ globfree(&g);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1)
+ width = ws.ws_col;
+
+ if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) {
+ /* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */
+ for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++)
+ m = MAX(m, strlen(g.gl_pathv[i]));
+
+ columns = width / (m + 2);
+ columns = MAX(columns, 1);
+ colspace = width / columns;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+ fname = path_strip(g.gl_pathv[i], strip_path);
+ if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
+ if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) {
+ error("no stat information for %s", fname);
+ continue;
+ }
+ lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1,
+ (lflag & LS_SI_UNITS));
+ mprintf("%s\n", lname);
+ free(lname);
+ } else {
+ mprintf("%-*s", colspace, fname);
+ if (c >= columns) {
+ printf("\n");
+ c = 1;
+ } else
+ c++;
+ }
+ free(fname);
+ }
+
+ if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1))
+ printf("\n");
+
+ out:
+ if (g.gl_pathc)
+ globfree(&g);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
+{
+ struct sftp_statvfs st;
+ char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+ char s_avail[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+ char s_root[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+ char s_total[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+ unsigned long long ffree;
+
+ if (do_statvfs(conn, path, &st, 1) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ if (iflag) {
+ ffree = st.f_files ? (100 * (st.f_files - st.f_ffree) / st.f_files) : 0;
+ printf(" Inodes Used Avail "
+ "(root) %%Capacity\n");
+ printf("%11llu %11llu %11llu %11llu %3llu%%\n",
+ (unsigned long long)st.f_files,
+ (unsigned long long)(st.f_files - st.f_ffree),
+ (unsigned long long)st.f_favail,
+ (unsigned long long)st.f_ffree, ffree);
+ } else if (hflag) {
+ strlcpy(s_used, "error", sizeof(s_used));
+ strlcpy(s_avail, "error", sizeof(s_avail));
+ strlcpy(s_root, "error", sizeof(s_root));
+ strlcpy(s_total, "error", sizeof(s_total));
+ fmt_scaled((st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) * st.f_frsize, s_used);
+ fmt_scaled(st.f_bavail * st.f_frsize, s_avail);
+ fmt_scaled(st.f_bfree * st.f_frsize, s_root);
+ fmt_scaled(st.f_blocks * st.f_frsize, s_total);
+ printf(" Size Used Avail (root) %%Capacity\n");
+ printf("%7sB %7sB %7sB %7sB %3llu%%\n",
+ s_total, s_used, s_avail, s_root,
+ (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) /
+ st.f_blocks));
+ } else {
+ printf(" Size Used Avail "
+ "(root) %%Capacity\n");
+ printf("%12llu %12llu %12llu %12llu %3llu%%\n",
+ (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_blocks / 1024),
+ (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize *
+ (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / 1024),
+ (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bavail / 1024),
+ (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bfree / 1024),
+ (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) /
+ st.f_blocks));
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Undo escaping of glob sequences in place. Used to undo extra escaping
+ * applied in makeargv() when the string is destined for a function that
+ * does not glob it.
+ */
+static void
+undo_glob_escape(char *s)
+{
+ size_t i, j;
+
+ for (i = j = 0;;) {
+ if (s[i] == '\0') {
+ s[j] = '\0';
+ return;
+ }
+ if (s[i] != '\\') {
+ s[j++] = s[i++];
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* s[i] == '\\' */
+ ++i;
+ switch (s[i]) {
+ case '?':
+ case '[':
+ case '*':
+ case '\\':
+ s[j++] = s[i++];
+ break;
+ case '\0':
+ s[j++] = '\\';
+ s[j] = '\0';
+ return;
+ default:
+ s[j++] = '\\';
+ s[j++] = s[i++];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Split a string into an argument vector using sh(1)-style quoting,
+ * comment and escaping rules, but with some tweaks to handle glob(3)
+ * wildcards.
+ * The "sloppy" flag allows for recovery from missing terminating quote, for
+ * use in parsing incomplete commandlines during tab autocompletion.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL on error or a NULL-terminated array of arguments.
+ *
+ * If "lastquote" is not NULL, the quoting character used for the last
+ * argument is placed in *lastquote ("\0", "'" or "\"").
+ *
+ * If "terminated" is not NULL, *terminated will be set to 1 when the
+ * last argument's quote has been properly terminated or 0 otherwise.
+ * This parameter is only of use if "sloppy" is set.
+ */
+#define MAXARGS 128
+#define MAXARGLEN 8192
+static char **
+makeargv(const char *arg, int *argcp, int sloppy, char *lastquote,
+ u_int *terminated)
+{
+ int argc, quot;
+ size_t i, j;
+ static char argvs[MAXARGLEN];
+ static char *argv[MAXARGS + 1];
+ enum { MA_START, MA_SQUOTE, MA_DQUOTE, MA_UNQUOTED } state, q;
+
+ *argcp = argc = 0;
+ if (strlen(arg) > sizeof(argvs) - 1) {
+ args_too_longs:
+ error("string too long");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (terminated != NULL)
+ *terminated = 1;
+ if (lastquote != NULL)
+ *lastquote = '\0';
+ state = MA_START;
+ i = j = 0;
+ for (;;) {
+ if ((size_t)argc >= sizeof(argv) / sizeof(*argv)){
+ error("Too many arguments.");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (isspace((unsigned char)arg[i])) {
+ if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) {
+ /* Terminate current argument */
+ argvs[j++] = '\0';
+ argc++;
+ state = MA_START;
+ } else if (state != MA_START)
+ argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+ } else if (arg[i] == '"' || arg[i] == '\'') {
+ q = arg[i] == '"' ? MA_DQUOTE : MA_SQUOTE;
+ if (state == MA_START) {
+ argv[argc] = argvs + j;
+ state = q;
+ if (lastquote != NULL)
+ *lastquote = arg[i];
+ } else if (state == MA_UNQUOTED)
+ state = q;
+ else if (state == q)
+ state = MA_UNQUOTED;
+ else
+ argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+ } else if (arg[i] == '\\') {
+ if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) {
+ quot = state == MA_SQUOTE ? '\'' : '"';
+ /* Unescape quote we are in */
+ /* XXX support \n and friends? */
+ if (arg[i + 1] == quot) {
+ i++;
+ argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+ } else if (arg[i + 1] == '?' ||
+ arg[i + 1] == '[' || arg[i + 1] == '*') {
+ /*
+ * Special case for sftp: append
+ * double-escaped glob sequence -
+ * glob will undo one level of
+ * escaping. NB. string can grow here.
+ */
+ if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 5)
+ goto args_too_longs;
+ argvs[j++] = '\\';
+ argvs[j++] = arg[i++];
+ argvs[j++] = '\\';
+ argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+ } else {
+ argvs[j++] = arg[i++];
+ argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (state == MA_START) {
+ argv[argc] = argvs + j;
+ state = MA_UNQUOTED;
+ if (lastquote != NULL)
+ *lastquote = '\0';
+ }
+ if (arg[i + 1] == '?' || arg[i + 1] == '[' ||
+ arg[i + 1] == '*' || arg[i + 1] == '\\') {
+ /*
+ * Special case for sftp: append
+ * escaped glob sequence -
+ * glob will undo one level of
+ * escaping.
+ */
+ argvs[j++] = arg[i++];
+ argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+ } else {
+ /* Unescape everything */
+ /* XXX support \n and friends? */
+ i++;
+ argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (arg[i] == '#') {
+ if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE)
+ argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+ else
+ goto string_done;
+ } else if (arg[i] == '\0') {
+ if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) {
+ if (sloppy) {
+ state = MA_UNQUOTED;
+ if (terminated != NULL)
+ *terminated = 0;
+ goto string_done;
+ }
+ error("Unterminated quoted argument");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ string_done:
+ if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) {
+ argvs[j++] = '\0';
+ argc++;
+ }
+ break;
+ } else {
+ if (state == MA_START) {
+ argv[argc] = argvs + j;
+ state = MA_UNQUOTED;
+ if (lastquote != NULL)
+ *lastquote = '\0';
+ }
+ if ((state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) &&
+ (arg[i] == '?' || arg[i] == '[' || arg[i] == '*')) {
+ /*
+ * Special case for sftp: escape quoted
+ * glob(3) wildcards. NB. string can grow
+ * here.
+ */
+ if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 3)
+ goto args_too_longs;
+ argvs[j++] = '\\';
+ argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+ } else
+ argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+ }
+ i++;
+ }
+ *argcp = argc;
+ return argv;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_args(const char **cpp, int *ignore_errors, int *aflag,
+ int *fflag, int *hflag, int *iflag, int *lflag, int *pflag,
+ int *rflag, int *sflag,
+ unsigned long *n_arg, char **path1, char **path2)
+{
+ const char *cmd, *cp = *cpp;
+ char *cp2, **argv;
+ int base = 0;
+ long l;
+ int i, cmdnum, optidx, argc;
+
+ /* Skip leading whitespace */
+ cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+
+ /* Check for leading '-' (disable error processing) */
+ *ignore_errors = 0;
+ if (*cp == '-') {
+ *ignore_errors = 1;
+ cp++;
+ cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+ }
+
+ /* Ignore blank lines and lines which begin with comment '#' char */
+ if (*cp == '\0' || *cp == '#')
+ return (0);
+
+ if ((argv = makeargv(cp, &argc, 0, NULL, NULL)) == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Figure out which command we have */
+ for (i = 0; cmds[i].c != NULL; i++) {
+ if (argv[0] != NULL && strcasecmp(cmds[i].c, argv[0]) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ cmdnum = cmds[i].n;
+ cmd = cmds[i].c;
+
+ /* Special case */
+ if (*cp == '!') {
+ cp++;
+ cmdnum = I_SHELL;
+ } else if (cmdnum == -1) {
+ error("Invalid command.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Get arguments and parse flags */
+ *aflag = *fflag = *hflag = *iflag = *lflag = *pflag = 0;
+ *rflag = *sflag = 0;
+ *path1 = *path2 = NULL;
+ optidx = 1;
+ switch (cmdnum) {
+ case I_GET:
+ case I_REGET:
+ case I_REPUT:
+ case I_PUT:
+ if ((optidx = parse_getput_flags(cmd, argv, argc,
+ aflag, fflag, pflag, rflag)) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ /* Get first pathname (mandatory) */
+ if (argc - optidx < 1) {
+ error("You must specify at least one path after a "
+ "%s command.", cmd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
+ /* Get second pathname (optional) */
+ if (argc - optidx > 1) {
+ *path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]);
+ /* Destination is not globbed */
+ undo_glob_escape(*path2);
+ }
+ break;
+ case I_LINK:
+ if ((optidx = parse_link_flags(cmd, argv, argc, sflag)) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ goto parse_two_paths;
+ case I_RENAME:
+ if ((optidx = parse_rename_flags(cmd, argv, argc, lflag)) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ goto parse_two_paths;
+ case I_SYMLINK:
+ if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ parse_two_paths:
+ if (argc - optidx < 2) {
+ error("You must specify two paths after a %s "
+ "command.", cmd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
+ *path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]);
+ /* Paths are not globbed */
+ undo_glob_escape(*path1);
+ undo_glob_escape(*path2);
+ break;
+ case I_RM:
+ case I_MKDIR:
+ case I_RMDIR:
+ case I_CHDIR:
+ case I_LCHDIR:
+ case I_LMKDIR:
+ if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ /* Get pathname (mandatory) */
+ if (argc - optidx < 1) {
+ error("You must specify a path after a %s command.",
+ cmd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
+ /* Only "rm" globs */
+ if (cmdnum != I_RM)
+ undo_glob_escape(*path1);
+ break;
+ case I_DF:
+ if ((optidx = parse_df_flags(cmd, argv, argc, hflag,
+ iflag)) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ /* Default to current directory if no path specified */
+ if (argc - optidx < 1)
+ *path1 = NULL;
+ else {
+ *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
+ undo_glob_escape(*path1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case I_LS:
+ if ((optidx = parse_ls_flags(argv, argc, lflag)) == -1)
+ return(-1);
+ /* Path is optional */
+ if (argc - optidx > 0)
+ *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
+ break;
+ case I_LLS:
+ /* Skip ls command and following whitespace */
+ cp = cp + strlen(cmd) + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+ case I_SHELL:
+ /* Uses the rest of the line */
+ break;
+ case I_LUMASK:
+ case I_CHMOD:
+ base = 8;
+ case I_CHOWN:
+ case I_CHGRP:
+ if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ /* Get numeric arg (mandatory) */
+ if (argc - optidx < 1)
+ goto need_num_arg;
+ errno = 0;
+ l = strtol(argv[optidx], &cp2, base);
+ if (cp2 == argv[optidx] || *cp2 != '\0' ||
+ ((l == LONG_MIN || l == LONG_MAX) && errno == ERANGE) ||
+ l < 0) {
+ need_num_arg:
+ error("You must supply a numeric argument "
+ "to the %s command.", cmd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *n_arg = l;
+ if (cmdnum == I_LUMASK)
+ break;
+ /* Get pathname (mandatory) */
+ if (argc - optidx < 2) {
+ error("You must specify a path after a %s command.",
+ cmd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]);
+ break;
+ case I_QUIT:
+ case I_PWD:
+ case I_LPWD:
+ case I_HELP:
+ case I_VERSION:
+ case I_PROGRESS:
+ if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("Command not implemented");
+ }
+
+ *cpp = cp;
+ return(cmdnum);
+}
+
+static int
+parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd,
+ int err_abort)
+{
+ char *path1, *path2, *tmp;
+ int ignore_errors = 0, aflag = 0, fflag = 0, hflag = 0,
+ iflag = 0;
+ int lflag = 0, pflag = 0, rflag = 0, sflag = 0;
+ int cmdnum, i;
+ unsigned long n_arg = 0;
+ Attrib a, *aa;
+ char path_buf[PATH_MAX];
+ int err = 0;
+ glob_t g;
+
+ path1 = path2 = NULL;
+ cmdnum = parse_args(&cmd, &ignore_errors, &aflag, &fflag, &hflag,
+ &iflag, &lflag, &pflag, &rflag, &sflag, &n_arg, &path1, &path2);
+ if (ignore_errors != 0)
+ err_abort = 0;
+
+ memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+
+ /* Perform command */
+ switch (cmdnum) {
+ case 0:
+ /* Blank line */
+ break;
+ case -1:
+ /* Unrecognized command */
+ err = -1;
+ break;
+ case I_REGET:
+ aflag = 1;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case I_GET:
+ err = process_get(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag,
+ rflag, aflag, fflag);
+ break;
+ case I_REPUT:
+ aflag = 1;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case I_PUT:
+ err = process_put(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag,
+ rflag, aflag, fflag);
+ break;
+ case I_RENAME:
+ path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+ path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd);
+ err = do_rename(conn, path1, path2, lflag);
+ break;
+ case I_SYMLINK:
+ sflag = 1;
+ case I_LINK:
+ if (!sflag)
+ path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+ path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd);
+ err = (sflag ? do_symlink : do_hardlink)(conn, path1, path2);
+ break;
+ case I_RM:
+ path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+ remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
+ for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+ if (!quiet)
+ mprintf("Removing %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]);
+ err = do_rm(conn, g.gl_pathv[i]);
+ if (err != 0 && err_abort)
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case I_MKDIR:
+ path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+ attrib_clear(&a);
+ a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
+ a.perm = 0777;
+ err = do_mkdir(conn, path1, &a, 1);
+ break;
+ case I_RMDIR:
+ path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+ err = do_rmdir(conn, path1);
+ break;
+ case I_CHDIR:
+ path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+ if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) {
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((aa = do_stat(conn, tmp, 0)) == NULL) {
+ free(tmp);
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) {
+ error("Can't change directory: Can't check target");
+ free(tmp);
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!S_ISDIR(aa->perm)) {
+ error("Can't change directory: \"%s\" is not "
+ "a directory", tmp);
+ free(tmp);
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ free(*pwd);
+ *pwd = tmp;
+ break;
+ case I_LS:
+ if (!path1) {
+ do_ls_dir(conn, *pwd, *pwd, lflag);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Strip pwd off beginning of non-absolute paths */
+ tmp = NULL;
+ if (*path1 != '/')
+ tmp = *pwd;
+
+ path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+ err = do_globbed_ls(conn, path1, tmp, lflag);
+ break;
+ case I_DF:
+ /* Default to current directory if no path specified */
+ if (path1 == NULL)
+ path1 = xstrdup(*pwd);
+ path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+ err = do_df(conn, path1, hflag, iflag);
+ break;
+ case I_LCHDIR:
+ tmp = tilde_expand_filename(path1, getuid());
+ free(path1);
+ path1 = tmp;
+ if (chdir(path1) == -1) {
+ error("Couldn't change local directory to "
+ "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno));
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case I_LMKDIR:
+ if (mkdir(path1, 0777) == -1) {
+ error("Couldn't create local directory "
+ "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno));
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case I_LLS:
+ local_do_ls(cmd);
+ break;
+ case I_SHELL:
+ local_do_shell(cmd);
+ break;
+ case I_LUMASK:
+ umask(n_arg);
+ printf("Local umask: %03lo\n", n_arg);
+ break;
+ case I_CHMOD:
+ path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+ attrib_clear(&a);
+ a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
+ a.perm = n_arg;
+ remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
+ for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+ if (!quiet)
+ mprintf("Changing mode on %s\n",
+ g.gl_pathv[i]);
+ err = do_setstat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], &a);
+ if (err != 0 && err_abort)
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case I_CHOWN:
+ case I_CHGRP:
+ path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+ remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
+ for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+ if (!(aa = do_stat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], 0))) {
+ if (err_abort) {
+ err = -1;
+ break;
+ } else
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID)) {
+ error("Can't get current ownership of "
+ "remote file \"%s\"", g.gl_pathv[i]);
+ if (err_abort) {
+ err = -1;
+ break;
+ } else
+ continue;
+ }
+ aa->flags &= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
+ if (cmdnum == I_CHOWN) {
+ if (!quiet)
+ mprintf("Changing owner on %s\n",
+ g.gl_pathv[i]);
+ aa->uid = n_arg;
+ } else {
+ if (!quiet)
+ mprintf("Changing group on %s\n",
+ g.gl_pathv[i]);
+ aa->gid = n_arg;
+ }
+ err = do_setstat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], aa);
+ if (err != 0 && err_abort)
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case I_PWD:
+ mprintf("Remote working directory: %s\n", *pwd);
+ break;
+ case I_LPWD:
+ if (!getcwd(path_buf, sizeof(path_buf))) {
+ error("Couldn't get local cwd: %s", strerror(errno));
+ err = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ mprintf("Local working directory: %s\n", path_buf);
+ break;
+ case I_QUIT:
+ /* Processed below */
+ break;
+ case I_HELP:
+ help();
+ break;
+ case I_VERSION:
+ printf("SFTP protocol version %u\n", sftp_proto_version(conn));
+ break;
+ case I_PROGRESS:
+ showprogress = !showprogress;
+ if (showprogress)
+ printf("Progress meter enabled\n");
+ else
+ printf("Progress meter disabled\n");
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("%d is not implemented", cmdnum);
+ }
+
+ if (g.gl_pathc)
+ globfree(&g);
+ free(path1);
+ free(path2);
+
+ /* If an unignored error occurs in batch mode we should abort. */
+ if (err_abort && err != 0)
+ return (-1);
+ else if (cmdnum == I_QUIT)
+ return (1);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
+static char *
+prompt(EditLine *el)
+{
+ return ("sftp> ");
+}
+
+/* Display entries in 'list' after skipping the first 'len' chars */
+static void
+complete_display(char **list, u_int len)
+{
+ u_int y, m = 0, width = 80, columns = 1, colspace = 0, llen;
+ struct winsize ws;
+ char *tmp;
+
+ /* Count entries for sort and find longest */
+ for (y = 0; list[y]; y++)
+ m = MAX(m, strlen(list[y]));
+
+ if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1)
+ width = ws.ws_col;
+
+ m = m > len ? m - len : 0;
+ columns = width / (m + 2);
+ columns = MAX(columns, 1);
+ colspace = width / columns;
+ colspace = MIN(colspace, width);
+
+ printf("\n");
+ m = 1;
+ for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) {
+ llen = strlen(list[y]);
+ tmp = llen > len ? list[y] + len : "";
+ mprintf("%-*s", colspace, tmp);
+ if (m >= columns) {
+ printf("\n");
+ m = 1;
+ } else
+ m++;
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a "list" of words that begin with a common prefix of "word",
+ * attempt to find an autocompletion to extends "word" by the next
+ * characters common to all entries in "list".
+ */
+static char *
+complete_ambiguous(const char *word, char **list, size_t count)
+{
+ if (word == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (count > 0) {
+ u_int y, matchlen = strlen(list[0]);
+
+ /* Find length of common stem */
+ for (y = 1; list[y]; y++) {
+ u_int x;
+
+ for (x = 0; x < matchlen; x++)
+ if (list[0][x] != list[y][x])
+ break;
+
+ matchlen = x;
+ }
+
+ if (matchlen > strlen(word)) {
+ char *tmp = xstrdup(list[0]);
+
+ tmp[matchlen] = '\0';
+ return tmp;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return xstrdup(word);
+}
+
+/* Autocomplete a sftp command */
+static int
+complete_cmd_parse(EditLine *el, char *cmd, int lastarg, char quote,
+ int terminated)
+{
+ u_int y, count = 0, cmdlen, tmplen;
+ char *tmp, **list, argterm[3];
+ const LineInfo *lf;
+
+ list = xcalloc((sizeof(cmds) / sizeof(*cmds)) + 1, sizeof(char *));
+
+ /* No command specified: display all available commands */
+ if (cmd == NULL) {
+ for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++)
+ list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c);
+
+ list[count] = NULL;
+ complete_display(list, 0);
+
+ for (y = 0; list[y] != NULL; y++)
+ free(list[y]);
+ free(list);
+ return count;
+ }
+
+ /* Prepare subset of commands that start with "cmd" */
+ cmdlen = strlen(cmd);
+ for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++) {
+ if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[y].c, cmdlen))
+ list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c);
+ }
+ list[count] = NULL;
+
+ if (count == 0) {
+ free(list);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Complete ambigious command */
+ tmp = complete_ambiguous(cmd, list, count);
+ if (count > 1)
+ complete_display(list, 0);
+
+ for (y = 0; list[y]; y++)
+ free(list[y]);
+ free(list);
+
+ if (tmp != NULL) {
+ tmplen = strlen(tmp);
+ cmdlen = strlen(cmd);
+ /* If cmd may be extended then do so */
+ if (tmplen > cmdlen)
+ if (el_insertstr(el, tmp + cmdlen) == -1)
+ fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
+ lf = el_line(el);
+ /* Terminate argument cleanly */
+ if (count == 1) {
+ y = 0;
+ if (!terminated)
+ argterm[y++] = quote;
+ if (lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' ')
+ argterm[y++] = ' ';
+ argterm[y] = '\0';
+ if (y > 0 && el_insertstr(el, argterm) == -1)
+ fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
+ }
+ free(tmp);
+ }
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether a particular sftp command's arguments (if any)
+ * represent local or remote files.
+ */
+static int
+complete_is_remote(char *cmd) {
+ int i;
+
+ if (cmd == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ for (i = 0; cmds[i].c; i++) {
+ if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[i].c, strlen(cmds[i].c)))
+ return cmds[i].t;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Autocomplete a filename "file" */
+static int
+complete_match(EditLine *el, struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path,
+ char *file, int remote, int lastarg, char quote, int terminated)
+{
+ glob_t g;
+ char *tmp, *tmp2, ins[8];
+ u_int i, hadglob, pwdlen, len, tmplen, filelen, cesc, isesc, isabs;
+ int clen;
+ const LineInfo *lf;
+
+ /* Glob from "file" location */
+ if (file == NULL)
+ tmp = xstrdup("*");
+ else
+ xasprintf(&tmp, "%s*", file);
+
+ /* Check if the path is absolute. */
+ isabs = tmp[0] == '/';
+
+ memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+ if (remote != LOCAL) {
+ tmp = make_absolute(tmp, remote_path);
+ remote_glob(conn, tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g);
+ } else
+ glob(tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g);
+
+ /* Determine length of pwd so we can trim completion display */
+ for (hadglob = tmplen = pwdlen = 0; tmp[tmplen] != 0; tmplen++) {
+ /* Terminate counting on first unescaped glob metacharacter */
+ if (tmp[tmplen] == '*' || tmp[tmplen] == '?') {
+ if (tmp[tmplen] != '*' || tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0')
+ hadglob = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (tmp[tmplen] == '\\' && tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0')
+ tmplen++;
+ if (tmp[tmplen] == '/')
+ pwdlen = tmplen + 1; /* track last seen '/' */
+ }
+ free(tmp);
+ tmp = NULL;
+
+ if (g.gl_matchc == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (g.gl_matchc > 1)
+ complete_display(g.gl_pathv, pwdlen);
+
+ /* Don't try to extend globs */
+ if (file == NULL || hadglob)
+ goto out;
+
+ tmp2 = complete_ambiguous(file, g.gl_pathv, g.gl_matchc);
+ tmp = path_strip(tmp2, isabs ? NULL : remote_path);
+ free(tmp2);
+
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ tmplen = strlen(tmp);
+ filelen = strlen(file);
+
+ /* Count the number of escaped characters in the input string. */
+ cesc = isesc = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < filelen; i++) {
+ if (!isesc && file[i] == '\\' && i + 1 < filelen){
+ isesc = 1;
+ cesc++;
+ } else
+ isesc = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (tmplen > (filelen - cesc)) {
+ tmp2 = tmp + filelen - cesc;
+ len = strlen(tmp2);
+ /* quote argument on way out */
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i += clen) {
+ if ((clen = mblen(tmp2 + i, len - i)) < 0 ||
+ (size_t)clen > sizeof(ins) - 2)
+ fatal("invalid multibyte character");
+ ins[0] = '\\';
+ memcpy(ins + 1, tmp2 + i, clen);
+ ins[clen + 1] = '\0';
+ switch (tmp2[i]) {
+ case '\'':
+ case '"':
+ case '\\':
+ case '\t':
+ case '[':
+ case ' ':
+ case '#':
+ case '*':
+ if (quote == '\0' || tmp2[i] == quote) {
+ if (el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1)
+ fatal("el_insertstr "
+ "failed.");
+ break;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ if (el_insertstr(el, ins + 1) == -1)
+ fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ lf = el_line(el);
+ if (g.gl_matchc == 1) {
+ i = 0;
+ if (!terminated && quote != '\0')
+ ins[i++] = quote;
+ if (*(lf->cursor - 1) != '/' &&
+ (lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' '))
+ ins[i++] = ' ';
+ ins[i] = '\0';
+ if (i > 0 && el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1)
+ fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
+ }
+ free(tmp);
+
+ out:
+ globfree(&g);
+ return g.gl_matchc;
+}
+
+/* tab-completion hook function, called via libedit */
+static unsigned char
+complete(EditLine *el, int ch)
+{
+ char **argv, *line, quote;
+ int argc, carg;
+ u_int cursor, len, terminated, ret = CC_ERROR;
+ const LineInfo *lf;
+ struct complete_ctx *complete_ctx;
+
+ lf = el_line(el);
+ if (el_get(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void**)&complete_ctx) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: el_get failed", __func__);
+
+ /* Figure out which argument the cursor points to */
+ cursor = lf->cursor - lf->buffer;
+ line = xmalloc(cursor + 1);
+ memcpy(line, lf->buffer, cursor);
+ line[cursor] = '\0';
+ argv = makeargv(line, &carg, 1, "e, &terminated);
+ free(line);
+
+ /* Get all the arguments on the line */
+ len = lf->lastchar - lf->buffer;
+ line = xmalloc(len + 1);
+ memcpy(line, lf->buffer, len);
+ line[len] = '\0';
+ argv = makeargv(line, &argc, 1, NULL, NULL);
+
+ /* Ensure cursor is at EOL or a argument boundary */
+ if (line[cursor] != ' ' && line[cursor] != '\0' &&
+ line[cursor] != '\n') {
+ free(line);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (carg == 0) {
+ /* Show all available commands */
+ complete_cmd_parse(el, NULL, argc == carg, '\0', 1);
+ ret = CC_REDISPLAY;
+ } else if (carg == 1 && cursor > 0 && line[cursor - 1] != ' ') {
+ /* Handle the command parsing */
+ if (complete_cmd_parse(el, argv[0], argc == carg,
+ quote, terminated) != 0)
+ ret = CC_REDISPLAY;
+ } else if (carg >= 1) {
+ /* Handle file parsing */
+ int remote = complete_is_remote(argv[0]);
+ char *filematch = NULL;
+
+ if (carg > 1 && line[cursor-1] != ' ')
+ filematch = argv[carg - 1];
+
+ if (remote != 0 &&
+ complete_match(el, complete_ctx->conn,
+ *complete_ctx->remote_pathp, filematch,
+ remote, carg == argc, quote, terminated) != 0)
+ ret = CC_REDISPLAY;
+ }
+
+ free(line);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
+
+int
+interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2)
+{
+ char *remote_path;
+ char *dir = NULL;
+ char cmd[2048];
+ int err, interactive;
+ EditLine *el = NULL;
+#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
+ History *hl = NULL;
+ HistEvent hev;
+ extern char *__progname;
+ struct complete_ctx complete_ctx;
+
+ if (!batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
+ if ((el = el_init(__progname, stdin, stdout, stderr)) == NULL)
+ fatal("Couldn't initialise editline");
+ if ((hl = history_init()) == NULL)
+ fatal("Couldn't initialise editline history");
+ history(hl, &hev, H_SETSIZE, 100);
+ el_set(el, EL_HIST, history, hl);
+
+ el_set(el, EL_PROMPT, prompt);
+ el_set(el, EL_EDITOR, "emacs");
+ el_set(el, EL_TERMINAL, NULL);
+ el_set(el, EL_SIGNAL, 1);
+ el_source(el, NULL);
+
+ /* Tab Completion */
+ el_set(el, EL_ADDFN, "ftp-complete",
+ "Context sensitive argument completion", complete);
+ complete_ctx.conn = conn;
+ complete_ctx.remote_pathp = &remote_path;
+ el_set(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void*)&complete_ctx);
+ el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^I", "ftp-complete", NULL);
+ /* enable ctrl-left-arrow and ctrl-right-arrow */
+ el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5C", "em-next-word", NULL);
+ el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[5C", "em-next-word", NULL);
+ el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5D", "ed-prev-word", NULL);
+ el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e\\e[D", "ed-prev-word", NULL);
+ /* make ^w match ksh behaviour */
+ el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^w", "ed-delete-prev-word", NULL);
+ }
+#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
+
+ remote_path = do_realpath(conn, ".");
+ if (remote_path == NULL)
+ fatal("Need cwd");
+
+ if (file1 != NULL) {
+ dir = xstrdup(file1);
+ dir = make_absolute(dir, remote_path);
+
+ if (remote_is_dir(conn, dir) && file2 == NULL) {
+ if (!quiet)
+ mprintf("Changing to: %s\n", dir);
+ snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "cd \"%s\"", dir);
+ if (parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd,
+ &remote_path, 1) != 0) {
+ free(dir);
+ free(remote_path);
+ free(conn);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* XXX this is wrong wrt quoting */
+ snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get%s %s%s%s",
+ global_aflag ? " -a" : "", dir,
+ file2 == NULL ? "" : " ",
+ file2 == NULL ? "" : file2);
+ err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd,
+ &remote_path, 1);
+ free(dir);
+ free(remote_path);
+ free(conn);
+ return (err);
+ }
+ free(dir);
+ }
+
+ setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
+ setvbuf(infile, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
+
+ interactive = !batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO);
+ err = 0;
+ for (;;) {
+ char *cp;
+
+ signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
+
+ if (el == NULL) {
+ if (interactive)
+ printf("sftp> ");
+ if (fgets(cmd, sizeof(cmd), infile) == NULL) {
+ if (interactive)
+ printf("\n");
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!interactive) { /* Echo command */
+ mprintf("sftp> %s", cmd);
+ if (strlen(cmd) > 0 &&
+ cmd[strlen(cmd) - 1] != '\n')
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+ } else {
+#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
+ const char *line;
+ int count = 0;
+
+ if ((line = el_gets(el, &count)) == NULL ||
+ count <= 0) {
+ printf("\n");
+ break;
+ }
+ history(hl, &hev, H_ENTER, line);
+ if (strlcpy(cmd, line, sizeof(cmd)) >= sizeof(cmd)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: input line too long\n");
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
+ }
+
+ cp = strrchr(cmd, '\n');
+ if (cp)
+ *cp = '\0';
+
+ /* Handle user interrupts gracefully during commands */
+ interrupted = 0;
+ signal(SIGINT, cmd_interrupt);
+
+ err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path,
+ batchmode);
+ if (err != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ free(remote_path);
+ free(conn);
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
+ if (el != NULL)
+ el_end(el);
+#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
+
+ /* err == 1 signifies normal "quit" exit */
+ return (err >= 0 ? 0 : -1);
+}
+
+static void
+connect_to_server(char *path, char **args, int *in, int *out)
+{
+ int c_in, c_out;
+
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+ int pin[2], pout[2];
+
+ if ((pipe(pin) == -1) || (pipe(pout) == -1))
+ fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+ *in = pin[0];
+ *out = pout[1];
+ c_in = pout[0];
+ c_out = pin[1];
+#else /* USE_PIPES */
+ int inout[2];
+
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1)
+ fatal("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
+ *in = *out = inout[0];
+ c_in = c_out = inout[1];
+#endif /* USE_PIPES */
+
+ if ((sshpid = fork()) == -1)
+ fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+ else if (sshpid == 0) {
+ if ((dup2(c_in, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) ||
+ (dup2(c_out, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ close(*in);
+ close(*out);
+ close(c_in);
+ close(c_out);
+
+ /*
+ * The underlying ssh is in the same process group, so we must
+ * ignore SIGINT if we want to gracefully abort commands,
+ * otherwise the signal will make it to the ssh process and
+ * kill it too. Contrawise, since sftp sends SIGTERMs to the
+ * underlying ssh, it must *not* ignore that signal.
+ */
+ signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
+ signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
+ execvp(path, args);
+ fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+
+ signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
+ signal(SIGINT, killchild);
+ signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
+ close(c_in);
+ close(c_out);
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ extern char *__progname;
+
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "usage: %s [-1246aCfpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]\n"
+ " [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config] "
+ "[-i identity_file] [-l limit]\n"
+ " [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-R num_requests] "
+ "[-S program]\n"
+ " [-s subsystem | sftp_server] host\n"
+ " %s [user@]host[:file ...]\n"
+ " %s [user@]host[:dir[/]]\n"
+ " %s -b batchfile [user@]host\n",
+ __progname, __progname, __progname, __progname);
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ int in, out, ch, err;
+ char *host = NULL, *userhost, *cp, *file2 = NULL;
+ int debug_level = 0, sshver = 2;
+ char *file1 = NULL, *sftp_server = NULL;
+ char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM, *sftp_direct = NULL;
+ const char *errstr;
+ LogLevel ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+ arglist args;
+ extern int optind;
+ extern char *optarg;
+ struct sftp_conn *conn;
+ size_t copy_buffer_len = DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN;
+ size_t num_requests = DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS;
+ long long limit_kbps = 0;
+
+ ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
+ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+ sanitise_stdfd();
+ setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "");
+
+ __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+ memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args));
+ args.list = NULL;
+ addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program);
+ addargs(&args, "-oForwardX11 no");
+ addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no");
+ addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand no");
+ addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes");
+
+ ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+ infile = stdin;
+
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
+ "1246afhpqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:P:R:")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ /* Passed through to ssh(1) */
+ case '4':
+ case '6':
+ case 'C':
+ addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
+ break;
+ /* Passed through to ssh(1) with argument */
+ case 'F':
+ case 'c':
+ case 'i':
+ case 'o':
+ addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
+ addargs(&args, "%s", optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'q':
+ ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
+ quiet = 1;
+ showprogress = 0;
+ addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
+ break;
+ case 'P':
+ addargs(&args, "-oPort %s", optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'v':
+ if (debug_level < 3) {
+ addargs(&args, "-v");
+ ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 + debug_level;
+ }
+ debug_level++;
+ break;
+ case '1':
+ sshver = 1;
+ if (sftp_server == NULL)
+ sftp_server = _PATH_SFTP_SERVER;
+ break;
+ case '2':
+ sshver = 2;
+ break;
+ case 'a':
+ global_aflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'B':
+ copy_buffer_len = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10);
+ if (copy_buffer_len == 0 || *cp != '\0')
+ fatal("Invalid buffer size \"%s\"", optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'b':
+ if (batchmode)
+ fatal("Batch file already specified.");
+
+ /* Allow "-" as stdin */
+ if (strcmp(optarg, "-") != 0 &&
+ (infile = fopen(optarg, "r")) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s (%s).", strerror(errno), optarg);
+ showprogress = 0;
+ quiet = batchmode = 1;
+ addargs(&args, "-obatchmode yes");
+ break;
+ case 'f':
+ global_fflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ global_pflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'D':
+ sftp_direct = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'l':
+ limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024,
+ &errstr);
+ if (errstr != NULL)
+ usage();
+ limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */
+ break;
+ case 'r':
+ global_rflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'R':
+ num_requests = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10);
+ if (num_requests == 0 || *cp != '\0')
+ fatal("Invalid number of requests \"%s\"",
+ optarg);
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ sftp_server = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'S':
+ ssh_program = optarg;
+ replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
+ break;
+ case 'h':
+ default:
+ usage();
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!isatty(STDERR_FILENO))
+ showprogress = 0;
+
+ log_init(argv[0], ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+ if (sftp_direct == NULL) {
+ if (optind == argc || argc > (optind + 2))
+ usage();
+
+ userhost = xstrdup(argv[optind]);
+ file2 = argv[optind+1];
+
+ if ((host = strrchr(userhost, '@')) == NULL)
+ host = userhost;
+ else {
+ *host++ = '\0';
+ if (!userhost[0]) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Missing username\n");
+ usage();
+ }
+ addargs(&args, "-l");
+ addargs(&args, "%s", userhost);
+ }
+
+ if ((cp = colon(host)) != NULL) {
+ *cp++ = '\0';
+ file1 = cp;
+ }
+
+ host = cleanhostname(host);
+ if (!*host) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Missing hostname\n");
+ usage();
+ }
+
+ addargs(&args, "-oProtocol %d", sshver);
+
+ /* no subsystem if the server-spec contains a '/' */
+ if (sftp_server == NULL || strchr(sftp_server, '/') == NULL)
+ addargs(&args, "-s");
+
+ addargs(&args, "--");
+ addargs(&args, "%s", host);
+ addargs(&args, "%s", (sftp_server != NULL ?
+ sftp_server : "sftp"));
+
+ connect_to_server(ssh_program, args.list, &in, &out);
+ } else {
+ args.list = NULL;
+ addargs(&args, "sftp-server");
+
+ connect_to_server(sftp_direct, args.list, &in, &out);
+ }
+ freeargs(&args);
+
+ conn = do_init(in, out, copy_buffer_len, num_requests, limit_kbps);
+ if (conn == NULL)
+ fatal("Couldn't initialise connection to server");
+
+ if (!quiet) {
+ if (sftp_direct == NULL)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Connected to %s.\n", host);
+ else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Attached to %s.\n", sftp_direct);
+ }
+
+ err = interactive_loop(conn, file1, file2);
+
+#if !defined(USE_PIPES)
+ shutdown(in, SHUT_RDWR);
+ shutdown(out, SHUT_RDWR);
+#endif
+
+ close(in);
+ close(out);
+ if (batchmode)
+ fclose(infile);
+
+ while (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0) == -1)
+ if (errno != EINTR)
+ fatal("Couldn't wait for ssh process: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+
+ exit(err == 0 ? 0 : 1);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-add.0
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-add.0 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-add.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
-SSH-ADD(1) OpenBSD Reference Manual SSH-ADD(1)
-
-NAME
- ssh-add - adds private key identities to the authentication agent
-
-SYNOPSIS
- ssh-add [-cDdkLlXx] [-t life] [file ...]
- ssh-add -s pkcs11
- ssh-add -e pkcs11
-
-DESCRIPTION
- ssh-add adds private key identities to the authentication agent,
- ssh-agent(1). When run without arguments, it adds the files
- ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and
- ~/.ssh/identity. After loading a private key, ssh-add will try to load
- corresponding certificate information from the filename obtained by
- appending -cert.pub to the name of the private key file. Alternative
- file names can be given on the command line.
-
- If any file requires a passphrase, ssh-add asks for the passphrase from
- the user. The passphrase is read from the user's tty. ssh-add retries
- the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given.
-
- The authentication agent must be running and the SSH_AUTH_SOCK
- environment variable must contain the name of its socket for ssh-add to
- work.
-
- The options are as follows:
-
- -c Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation
- before being used for authentication. Confirmation is performed
- by the SSH_ASKPASS program mentioned below. Successful
- confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from the
- SSH_ASKPASS program, rather than text entered into the requester.
-
- -D Deletes all identities from the agent.
-
- -d Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent.
- If ssh-add has been run without arguments, the keys for the
- default identities and their corresponding certificates will be
- removed. Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a
- list of paths to public key files to specify keys and
- certificates to be removed from the agent. If no public key is
- found at a given path, ssh-add will append .pub and retry.
-
- -e pkcs11
- Remove keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11.
-
- -k When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process
- plain private keys only and skip certificates.
-
- -L Lists public key parameters of all identities currently
- represented by the agent.
-
- -l Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the
- agent.
-
- -s pkcs11
- Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11.
-
- -t life
- Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent. The
- lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format
- specified in sshd_config(5).
-
- -X Unlock the agent.
-
- -x Lock the agent with a password.
-
-ENVIRONMENT
- DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS
- If ssh-add needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from
- the current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If ssh-add
- does not have a terminal associated with it but DISPLAY and
- SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by
- SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. This
- is particularly useful when calling ssh-add from a .xsession or
- related script. (Note that on some machines it may be necessary
- to redirect the input from /dev/null to make this work.)
-
- SSH_AUTH_SOCK
- Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate
- with the agent.
-
-FILES
- ~/.ssh/identity
- Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of
- the user.
-
- ~/.ssh/id_dsa
- Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of
- the user.
-
- ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
- Contains the protocol version 2 ECDSA authentication identity of
- the user.
-
- ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
- Contains the protocol version 2 ED25519 authentication identity
- of the user.
-
- ~/.ssh/id_rsa
- Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of
- the user.
-
- Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user. Note that
- ssh-add ignores identity files if they are accessible by others.
-
-EXIT STATUS
- Exit status is 0 on success, 1 if the specified command fails, and 2 if
- ssh-add is unable to contact the authentication agent.
-
-SEE ALSO
- ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8)
-
-AUTHORS
- OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
- Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
- de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
- created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
- versions 1.5 and 2.0.
-
-OpenBSD 5.5 December 7, 2013 OpenBSD 5.5
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-add.0 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-add.0)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-add.0 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-add.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+SSH-ADD(1) General Commands Manual SSH-ADD(1)
+
+NAME
+ ssh-add M-bM-^@M-^S adds private key identities to the authentication agent
+
+SYNOPSIS
+ ssh-add [-cDdkLlXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-t life] [file ...]
+ ssh-add -s pkcs11
+ ssh-add -e pkcs11
+
+DESCRIPTION
+ ssh-add adds private key identities to the authentication agent,
+ ssh-agent(1). When run without arguments, it adds the files
+ ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and
+ ~/.ssh/identity. After loading a private key, ssh-add will try to load
+ corresponding certificate information from the filename obtained by
+ appending -cert.pub to the name of the private key file. Alternative
+ file names can be given on the command line.
+
+ If any file requires a passphrase, ssh-add asks for the passphrase from
+ the user. The passphrase is read from the user's tty. ssh-add retries
+ the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given.
+
+ The authentication agent must be running and the SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ environment variable must contain the name of its socket for ssh-add to
+ work.
+
+ The options are as follows:
+
+ -c Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation
+ before being used for authentication. Confirmation is performed
+ by ssh-askpass(1). Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero
+ exit status from ssh-askpass(1), rather than text entered into
+ the requester.
+
+ -D Deletes all identities from the agent.
+
+ -d Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent.
+ If ssh-add has been run without arguments, the keys for the
+ default identities and their corresponding certificates will be
+ removed. Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a
+ list of paths to public key files to specify keys and
+ certificates to be removed from the agent. If no public key is
+ found at a given path, ssh-add will append .pub and retry.
+
+ -E fingerprint_hash
+ Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key
+ fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The
+ default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ -e pkcs11
+ Remove keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11.
+
+ -k When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process
+ plain private keys only and skip certificates.
+
+ -L Lists public key parameters of all identities currently
+ represented by the agent.
+
+ -l Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the
+ agent.
+
+ -s pkcs11
+ Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11.
+
+ -t life
+ Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent. The
+ lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format
+ specified in sshd_config(5).
+
+ -X Unlock the agent.
+
+ -x Lock the agent with a password.
+
+ENVIRONMENT
+ DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS
+ If ssh-add needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from
+ the current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If ssh-add
+ does not have a terminal associated with it but DISPLAY and
+ SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by
+ SSH_ASKPASS (by default M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-askpassM-bM-^@M-^]) and open an X11 window to
+ read the passphrase. This is particularly useful when calling
+ ssh-add from a .xsession or related script. (Note that on some
+ machines it may be necessary to redirect the input from /dev/null
+ to make this work.)
+
+ SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate
+ with the agent.
+
+FILES
+ ~/.ssh/identity
+ Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of
+ the user.
+
+ ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+ Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of
+ the user.
+
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+ Contains the protocol version 2 ECDSA authentication identity of
+ the user.
+
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+ Contains the protocol version 2 Ed25519 authentication identity
+ of the user.
+
+ ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+ Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of
+ the user.
+
+ Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user. Note that
+ ssh-add ignores identity files if they are accessible by others.
+
+EXIT STATUS
+ Exit status is 0 on success, 1 if the specified command fails, and 2 if
+ ssh-add is unable to contact the authentication agent.
+
+SEE ALSO
+ ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-askpass(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8)
+
+AUTHORS
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+ Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+ de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+ created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+ versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+
+OpenBSD 6.0 March 30, 2015 OpenBSD 6.0
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-add.1
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-add.1 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-add.1 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,201 +0,0 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.59 2013/12/07 11:58:46 naddy Exp $
-.\"
-.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
-.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
-.\" All rights reserved
-.\"
-.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
-.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
-.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
-.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
-.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
-.\"
-.\"
-.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
-.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
-.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
-.\"
-.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-.\" are met:
-.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-.\"
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: December 7 2013 $
-.Dt SSH-ADD 1
-.Os
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm ssh-add
-.Nd adds private key identities to the authentication agent
-.Sh SYNOPSIS
-.Nm ssh-add
-.Op Fl cDdkLlXx
-.Op Fl t Ar life
-.Op Ar
-.Nm ssh-add
-.Fl s Ar pkcs11
-.Nm ssh-add
-.Fl e Ar pkcs11
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-.Nm
-adds private key identities to the authentication agent,
-.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
-When run without arguments, it adds the files
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
-and
-.Pa ~/.ssh/identity .
-After loading a private key,
-.Nm
-will try to load corresponding certificate information from the
-filename obtained by appending
-.Pa -cert.pub
-to the name of the private key file.
-Alternative file names can be given on the command line.
-.Pp
-If any file requires a passphrase,
-.Nm
-asks for the passphrase from the user.
-The passphrase is read from the user's tty.
-.Nm
-retries the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given.
-.Pp
-The authentication agent must be running and the
-.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
-environment variable must contain the name of its socket for
-.Nm
-to work.
-.Pp
-The options are as follows:
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Fl c
-Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation before
-being used for authentication.
-Confirmation is performed by the
-.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
-program mentioned below.
-Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from the
-.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
-program, rather than text entered into the requester.
-.It Fl D
-Deletes all identities from the agent.
-.It Fl d
-Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent.
-If
-.Nm
-has been run without arguments, the keys for the default identities and
-their corresponding certificates will be removed.
-Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a list of paths to
-public key files to specify keys and certificates to be removed from the agent.
-If no public key is found at a given path,
-.Nm
-will append
-.Pa .pub
-and retry.
-.It Fl e Ar pkcs11
-Remove keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
-.Ar pkcs11 .
-.It Fl k
-When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process plain private
-keys only and skip certificates.
-.It Fl L
-Lists public key parameters of all identities currently represented
-by the agent.
-.It Fl l
-Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the agent.
-.It Fl s Ar pkcs11
-Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
-.Ar pkcs11 .
-.It Fl t Ar life
-Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent.
-The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format
-specified in
-.Xr sshd_config 5 .
-.It Fl X
-Unlock the agent.
-.It Fl x
-Lock the agent with a password.
-.El
-.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Ev "DISPLAY" and "SSH_ASKPASS"
-If
-.Nm
-needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current
-terminal if it was run from a terminal.
-If
-.Nm
-does not have a terminal associated with it but
-.Ev DISPLAY
-and
-.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
-are set, it will execute the program specified by
-.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
-and open an X11 window to read the passphrase.
-This is particularly useful when calling
-.Nm
-from a
-.Pa .xsession
-or related script.
-(Note that on some machines it
-may be necessary to redirect the input from
-.Pa /dev/null
-to make this work.)
-.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
-Identifies the path of a
-.Ux Ns -domain
-socket used to communicate with the agent.
-.El
-.Sh FILES
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
-Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
-Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
-Contains the protocol version 2 ECDSA authentication identity of the user.
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
-Contains the protocol version 2 ED25519 authentication identity of the user.
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
-Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user.
-.El
-.Pp
-Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user.
-Note that
-.Nm
-ignores identity files if they are accessible by others.
-.Sh EXIT STATUS
-Exit status is 0 on success, 1 if the specified command fails,
-and 2 if
-.Nm
-is unable to contact the authentication agent.
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr ssh 1 ,
-.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
-.Xr sshd 8
-.Sh AUTHORS
-OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
-ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
-Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
-Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
-removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
-created OpenSSH.
-Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
-protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-add.1 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-add.1)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-add.1 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-add.1 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.62 2015/03/30 18:28:37 jmc Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\" All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd $Mdocdate: March 30 2015 $
+.Dt SSH-ADD 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-add
+.Nd adds private key identities to the authentication agent
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ssh-add
+.Op Fl cDdkLlXx
+.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
+.Op Fl t Ar life
+.Op Ar
+.Nm ssh-add
+.Fl s Ar pkcs11
+.Nm ssh-add
+.Fl e Ar pkcs11
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+adds private key identities to the authentication agent,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+When run without arguments, it adds the files
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity .
+After loading a private key,
+.Nm
+will try to load corresponding certificate information from the
+filename obtained by appending
+.Pa -cert.pub
+to the name of the private key file.
+Alternative file names can be given on the command line.
+.Pp
+If any file requires a passphrase,
+.Nm
+asks for the passphrase from the user.
+The passphrase is read from the user's tty.
+.Nm
+retries the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given.
+.Pp
+The authentication agent must be running and the
+.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+environment variable must contain the name of its socket for
+.Nm
+to work.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl c
+Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation before
+being used for authentication.
+Confirmation is performed by
+.Xr ssh-askpass 1 .
+Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from
+.Xr ssh-askpass 1 ,
+rather than text entered into the requester.
+.It Fl D
+Deletes all identities from the agent.
+.It Fl d
+Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent.
+If
+.Nm
+has been run without arguments, the keys for the default identities and
+their corresponding certificates will be removed.
+Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a list of paths to
+public key files to specify keys and certificates to be removed from the agent.
+If no public key is found at a given path,
+.Nm
+will append
+.Pa .pub
+and retry.
+.It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
+Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
+Valid options are:
+.Dq md5
+and
+.Dq sha256 .
+The default is
+.Dq sha256 .
+.It Fl e Ar pkcs11
+Remove keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
+.Ar pkcs11 .
+.It Fl k
+When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process plain private
+keys only and skip certificates.
+.It Fl L
+Lists public key parameters of all identities currently represented
+by the agent.
+.It Fl l
+Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the agent.
+.It Fl s Ar pkcs11
+Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
+.Ar pkcs11 .
+.It Fl t Ar life
+Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent.
+The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format
+specified in
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.It Fl X
+Unlock the agent.
+.It Fl x
+Lock the agent with a password.
+.El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Ev "DISPLAY" and "SSH_ASKPASS"
+If
+.Nm
+needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current
+terminal if it was run from a terminal.
+If
+.Nm
+does not have a terminal associated with it but
+.Ev DISPLAY
+and
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+are set, it will execute the program specified by
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+(by default
+.Dq ssh-askpass )
+and open an X11 window to read the passphrase.
+This is particularly useful when calling
+.Nm
+from a
+.Pa .xsession
+or related script.
+(Note that on some machines it
+may be necessary to redirect the input from
+.Pa /dev/null
+to make this work.)
+.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+Identifies the path of a
+.Ux Ns -domain
+socket used to communicate with the agent.
+.El
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
+Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+Contains the protocol version 2 ECDSA authentication identity of the user.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+Contains the protocol version 2 Ed25519 authentication identity of the user.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user.
+.El
+.Pp
+Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user.
+Note that
+.Nm
+ignores identity files if they are accessible by others.
+.Sh EXIT STATUS
+Exit status is 0 on success, 1 if the specified command fails,
+and 2 if
+.Nm
+is unable to contact the authentication agent.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-askpass 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-add.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-add.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-add.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,525 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.109 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Adds an identity to the authentication server, or removes an identity.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- * SSH2 implementation,
- * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "authfd.h"
-#include "authfile.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-
-/* argv0 */
-extern char *__progname;
-
-/* Default files to add */
-static char *default_files[] = {
- _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA,
- _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA,
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA,
-#endif
- _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519,
- _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY,
- NULL
-};
-
-/* Default lifetime (0 == forever) */
-static int lifetime = 0;
-
-/* User has to confirm key use */
-static int confirm = 0;
-
-/* we keep a cache of one passphrases */
-static char *pass = NULL;
-static void
-clear_pass(void)
-{
- if (pass) {
- explicit_bzero(pass, strlen(pass));
- free(pass);
- pass = NULL;
- }
-}
-
-static int
-delete_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename, int key_only)
-{
- Key *public = NULL, *cert = NULL;
- char *certpath = NULL, *comment = NULL;
- int ret = -1;
-
- public = key_load_public(filename, &comment);
- if (public == NULL) {
- printf("Bad key file %s\n", filename);
- return -1;
- }
- if (ssh_remove_identity(ac, public)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment);
- ret = 0;
- } else
- fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity: %s\n", filename);
-
- if (key_only)
- goto out;
-
- /* Now try to delete the corresponding certificate too */
- free(comment);
- comment = NULL;
- xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename);
- if ((cert = key_load_public(certpath, &comment)) == NULL)
- goto out;
- if (!key_equal_public(cert, public))
- fatal("Certificate %s does not match private key %s",
- certpath, filename);
-
- if (ssh_remove_identity(ac, cert)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", certpath,
- comment);
- ret = 0;
- } else
- fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity: %s\n", certpath);
-
- out:
- if (cert != NULL)
- key_free(cert);
- if (public != NULL)
- key_free(public);
- free(certpath);
- free(comment);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/* Send a request to remove all identities. */
-static int
-delete_all(AuthenticationConnection *ac)
-{
- int ret = -1;
-
- if (ssh_remove_all_identities(ac, 1))
- ret = 0;
- /* ignore error-code for ssh2 */
- ssh_remove_all_identities(ac, 2);
-
- if (ret == 0)
- fprintf(stderr, "All identities removed.\n");
- else
- fprintf(stderr, "Failed to remove all identities.\n");
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int
-add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename, int key_only)
-{
- Key *private, *cert;
- char *comment = NULL;
- char msg[1024], *certpath = NULL;
- int fd, perms_ok, ret = -1;
- Buffer keyblob;
-
- if (strcmp(filename, "-") == 0) {
- fd = STDIN_FILENO;
- filename = "(stdin)";
- } else if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
- perror(filename);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /*
- * Since we'll try to load a keyfile multiple times, permission errors
- * will occur multiple times, so check perms first and bail if wrong.
- */
- if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) {
- perms_ok = key_perm_ok(fd, filename);
- if (!perms_ok) {
- close(fd);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- buffer_init(&keyblob);
- if (!key_load_file(fd, filename, &keyblob)) {
- buffer_free(&keyblob);
- close(fd);
- return -1;
- }
- close(fd);
-
- /* At first, try empty passphrase */
- private = key_parse_private(&keyblob, filename, "", &comment);
- if (comment == NULL)
- comment = xstrdup(filename);
- /* try last */
- if (private == NULL && pass != NULL)
- private = key_parse_private(&keyblob, filename, pass, NULL);
- if (private == NULL) {
- /* clear passphrase since it did not work */
- clear_pass();
- snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Enter passphrase for %.200s: ",
- comment);
- for (;;) {
- pass = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
- if (strcmp(pass, "") == 0) {
- clear_pass();
- free(comment);
- buffer_free(&keyblob);
- return -1;
- }
- private = key_parse_private(&keyblob, filename, pass,
- &comment);
- if (private != NULL)
- break;
- clear_pass();
- snprintf(msg, sizeof msg,
- "Bad passphrase, try again for %.200s: ", comment);
- }
- }
- buffer_free(&keyblob);
-
- if (ssh_add_identity_constrained(ac, private, comment, lifetime,
- confirm)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment);
- ret = 0;
- if (lifetime != 0)
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime);
- if (confirm != 0)
- fprintf(stderr,
- "The user must confirm each use of the key\n");
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity: %s\n", filename);
- }
-
- /* Skip trying to load the cert if requested */
- if (key_only)
- goto out;
-
- /* Now try to add the certificate flavour too */
- xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename);
- if ((cert = key_load_public(certpath, NULL)) == NULL)
- goto out;
-
- if (!key_equal_public(cert, private)) {
- error("Certificate %s does not match private key %s",
- certpath, filename);
- key_free(cert);
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* Graft with private bits */
- if (key_to_certified(private, key_cert_is_legacy(cert)) != 0) {
- error("%s: key_to_certified failed", __func__);
- key_free(cert);
- goto out;
- }
- key_cert_copy(cert, private);
- key_free(cert);
-
- if (!ssh_add_identity_constrained(ac, private, comment,
- lifetime, confirm)) {
- error("Certificate %s (%s) add failed", certpath,
- private->cert->key_id);
- }
- fprintf(stderr, "Certificate added: %s (%s)\n", certpath,
- private->cert->key_id);
- if (lifetime != 0)
- fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime);
- if (confirm != 0)
- fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm each use of the key\n");
- out:
- if (certpath != NULL)
- free(certpath);
- free(comment);
- key_free(private);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int
-update_card(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int add, const char *id)
-{
- char *pin = NULL;
- int ret = -1;
-
- if (add) {
- if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for PKCS#11: ",
- RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL)
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (ssh_update_card(ac, add, id, pin == NULL ? "" : pin,
- lifetime, confirm)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Card %s: %s\n",
- add ? "added" : "removed", id);
- ret = 0;
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr, "Could not %s card: %s\n",
- add ? "add" : "remove", id);
- ret = -1;
- }
- free(pin);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int
-list_identities(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int do_fp)
-{
- Key *key;
- char *comment, *fp;
- int had_identities = 0;
- int version;
-
- for (version = 1; version <= 2; version++) {
- for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, version);
- key != NULL;
- key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) {
- had_identities = 1;
- if (do_fp) {
- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5,
- SSH_FP_HEX);
- printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n",
- key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key));
- free(fp);
- } else {
- if (!key_write(key, stdout))
- fprintf(stderr, "key_write failed");
- fprintf(stdout, " %s\n", comment);
- }
- key_free(key);
- free(comment);
- }
- }
- if (!had_identities) {
- printf("The agent has no identities.\n");
- return -1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int lock)
-{
- char prompt[100], *p1, *p2;
- int passok = 1, ret = -1;
-
- strlcpy(prompt, "Enter lock password: ", sizeof(prompt));
- p1 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
- if (lock) {
- strlcpy(prompt, "Again: ", sizeof prompt);
- p2 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
- if (strcmp(p1, p2) != 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Passwords do not match.\n");
- passok = 0;
- }
- explicit_bzero(p2, strlen(p2));
- free(p2);
- }
- if (passok && ssh_lock_agent(ac, lock, p1)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Agent %slocked.\n", lock ? "" : "un");
- ret = 0;
- } else
- fprintf(stderr, "Failed to %slock agent.\n", lock ? "" : "un");
- explicit_bzero(p1, strlen(p1));
- free(p1);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int
-do_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int deleting, int key_only, char *file)
-{
- if (deleting) {
- if (delete_file(ac, file, key_only) == -1)
- return -1;
- } else {
- if (add_file(ac, file, key_only) == -1)
- return -1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void
-usage(void)
-{
- fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options] [file ...]\n", __progname);
- fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -l List fingerprints of all identities.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -L List public key parameters of all identities.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -k Load only keys and not certificates.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -c Require confirmation to sign using identities\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -t life Set lifetime (in seconds) when adding identities.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -d Delete identity.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -D Delete all identities.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -x Lock agent.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -X Unlock agent.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -s pkcs11 Add keys from PKCS#11 provider.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -e pkcs11 Remove keys provided by PKCS#11 provider.\n");
-}
-
-int
-main(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- extern char *optarg;
- extern int optind;
- AuthenticationConnection *ac = NULL;
- char *pkcs11provider = NULL;
- int i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0, key_only = 0;
-
- /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
- sanitise_stdfd();
-
- __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
- seed_rng();
-
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
-
- /* At first, get a connection to the authentication agent. */
- ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
- if (ac == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Could not open a connection to your authentication agent.\n");
- exit(2);
- }
- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "klLcdDxXe:s:t:")) != -1) {
- switch (ch) {
- case 'k':
- key_only = 1;
- break;
- case 'l':
- case 'L':
- if (list_identities(ac, ch == 'l' ? 1 : 0) == -1)
- ret = 1;
- goto done;
- case 'x':
- case 'X':
- if (lock_agent(ac, ch == 'x' ? 1 : 0) == -1)
- ret = 1;
- goto done;
- case 'c':
- confirm = 1;
- break;
- case 'd':
- deleting = 1;
- break;
- case 'D':
- if (delete_all(ac) == -1)
- ret = 1;
- goto done;
- case 's':
- pkcs11provider = optarg;
- break;
- case 'e':
- deleting = 1;
- pkcs11provider = optarg;
- break;
- case 't':
- if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n");
- ret = 1;
- goto done;
- }
- break;
- default:
- usage();
- ret = 1;
- goto done;
- }
- }
- argc -= optind;
- argv += optind;
- if (pkcs11provider != NULL) {
- if (update_card(ac, !deleting, pkcs11provider) == -1)
- ret = 1;
- goto done;
- }
- if (argc == 0) {
- char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
- struct passwd *pw;
- struct stat st;
- int count = 0;
-
- if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "No user found with uid %u\n",
- (u_int)getuid());
- ret = 1;
- goto done;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; default_files[i]; i++) {
- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
- default_files[i]);
- if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
- continue;
- if (do_file(ac, deleting, key_only, buf) == -1)
- ret = 1;
- else
- count++;
- }
- if (count == 0)
- ret = 1;
- } else {
- for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
- if (do_file(ac, deleting, key_only, argv[i]) == -1)
- ret = 1;
- }
- }
- clear_pass();
-
-done:
- ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
- return ret;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-add.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-add.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-add.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-add.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,622 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.128 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Adds an identity to the authentication server, or removes an identity.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 implementation,
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+/* argv0 */
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* Default files to add */
+static char *default_files[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA,
+ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA,
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA,
+#endif
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519,
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY,
+#endif
+ NULL
+};
+
+static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
+
+/* Default lifetime (0 == forever) */
+static int lifetime = 0;
+
+/* User has to confirm key use */
+static int confirm = 0;
+
+/* we keep a cache of one passphrase */
+static char *pass = NULL;
+static void
+clear_pass(void)
+{
+ if (pass) {
+ explicit_bzero(pass, strlen(pass));
+ free(pass);
+ pass = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+delete_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only)
+{
+ struct sshkey *public, *cert = NULL;
+ char *certpath = NULL, *comment = NULL;
+ int r, ret = -1;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, &comment)) != 0) {
+ printf("Bad key file %s: %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, public)) == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment);
+ ret = 0;
+ } else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n",
+ filename, ssh_err(r));
+
+ if (key_only)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Now try to delete the corresponding certificate too */
+ free(comment);
+ comment = NULL;
+ xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename);
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, &comment)) != 0) {
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || errno != ENOENT)
+ error("Failed to load certificate \"%s\": %s",
+ certpath, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, public))
+ fatal("Certificate %s does not match private key %s",
+ certpath, filename);
+
+ if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, cert)) == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", certpath,
+ comment);
+ ret = 0;
+ } else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n",
+ certpath, ssh_err(r));
+
+ out:
+ sshkey_free(cert);
+ sshkey_free(public);
+ free(certpath);
+ free(comment);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Send a request to remove all identities. */
+static int
+delete_all(int agent_fd)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 2) == 0)
+ ret = 0;
+ /* ignore error-code for ssh1 */
+ ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 1);
+
+ if (ret == 0)
+ fprintf(stderr, "All identities removed.\n");
+ else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to remove all identities.\n");
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only)
+{
+ struct sshkey *private, *cert;
+ char *comment = NULL;
+ char msg[1024], *certpath = NULL;
+ int r, fd, ret = -1;
+ struct sshbuf *keyblob;
+
+ if (strcmp(filename, "-") == 0) {
+ fd = STDIN_FILENO;
+ filename = "(stdin)";
+ } else if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+ perror(filename);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Since we'll try to load a keyfile multiple times, permission errors
+ * will occur multiple times, so check perms first and bail if wrong.
+ */
+ if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) {
+ if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) {
+ close(fd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, keyblob)) != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
+ filename, ssh_err(r));
+ sshbuf_free(keyblob);
+ close(fd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ close(fd);
+
+ /* At first, try empty passphrase */
+ if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, "", &private,
+ &comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
+ filename, ssh_err(r));
+ goto fail_load;
+ }
+ /* try last */
+ if (private == NULL && pass != NULL) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass, &private,
+ &comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
+ filename, ssh_err(r));
+ goto fail_load;
+ }
+ }
+ if (private == NULL) {
+ /* clear passphrase since it did not work */
+ clear_pass();
+ snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Enter passphrase for %s%s: ",
+ filename, confirm ? " (will confirm each use)" : "");
+ for (;;) {
+ pass = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ if (strcmp(pass, "") == 0)
+ goto fail_load;
+ if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass,
+ &private, &comment)) == 0)
+ break;
+ else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
+ filename, ssh_err(r));
+ fail_load:
+ clear_pass();
+ sshbuf_free(keyblob);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ clear_pass();
+ snprintf(msg, sizeof msg,
+ "Bad passphrase, try again for %s%s: ", filename,
+ confirm ? " (will confirm each use)" : "");
+ }
+ }
+ if (comment == NULL || *comment == '\0')
+ comment = xstrdup(filename);
+ sshbuf_free(keyblob);
+
+ if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment,
+ lifetime, confirm)) == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment);
+ ret = 0;
+ if (lifetime != 0)
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime);
+ if (confirm != 0)
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "The user must confirm each use of the key\n");
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity \"%s\": %s\n",
+ filename, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+
+ /* Skip trying to load the cert if requested */
+ if (key_only)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Now try to add the certificate flavour too */
+ xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename);
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, NULL)) != 0) {
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || errno != ENOENT)
+ error("Failed to load certificate \"%s\": %s",
+ certpath, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, private)) {
+ error("Certificate %s does not match private key %s",
+ certpath, filename);
+ sshkey_free(cert);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Graft with private bits */
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(private)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: sshkey_to_certified: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ sshkey_free(cert);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, private)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: key_cert_copy: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ sshkey_free(cert);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sshkey_free(cert);
+
+ if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment,
+ lifetime, confirm)) != 0) {
+ error("Certificate %s (%s) add failed: %s", certpath,
+ private->cert->key_id, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "Certificate added: %s (%s)\n", certpath,
+ private->cert->key_id);
+ if (lifetime != 0)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime);
+ if (confirm != 0)
+ fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm each use of the key\n");
+ out:
+ free(certpath);
+ free(comment);
+ sshkey_free(private);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id)
+{
+ char *pin = NULL;
+ int r, ret = -1;
+
+ if (add) {
+ if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for PKCS#11: ",
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = ssh_update_card(agent_fd, add, id, pin == NULL ? "" : pin,
+ lifetime, confirm)) == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Card %s: %s\n",
+ add ? "added" : "removed", id);
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not %s card \"%s\": %s\n",
+ add ? "add" : "remove", id, ssh_err(r));
+ ret = -1;
+ }
+ free(pin);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+list_identities(int agent_fd, int do_fp)
+{
+ char *fp;
+ int r, had_identities = 0;
+ struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
+ size_t i;
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ int version = 1;
+#else
+ int version = 2;
+#endif
+
+ for (; version <= 2; version++) {
+ if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, version,
+ &idlist)) != 0) {
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
+ fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities for "
+ "protocol %d: %s\n", version, ssh_err(r));
+ continue;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) {
+ had_identities = 1;
+ if (do_fp) {
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(idlist->keys[i],
+ fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n",
+ sshkey_size(idlist->keys[i]),
+ fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
+ idlist->comments[i],
+ sshkey_type(idlist->keys[i]));
+ free(fp);
+ } else {
+ if ((r = sshkey_write(idlist->keys[i],
+ stdout)) != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "sshkey_write: %s\n",
+ ssh_err(r));
+ continue;
+ }
+ fprintf(stdout, " %s\n", idlist->comments[i]);
+ }
+ }
+ ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
+ }
+ if (!had_identities) {
+ printf("The agent has no identities.\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+lock_agent(int agent_fd, int lock)
+{
+ char prompt[100], *p1, *p2;
+ int r, passok = 1, ret = -1;
+
+ strlcpy(prompt, "Enter lock password: ", sizeof(prompt));
+ p1 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ if (lock) {
+ strlcpy(prompt, "Again: ", sizeof prompt);
+ p2 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ if (strcmp(p1, p2) != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Passwords do not match.\n");
+ passok = 0;
+ }
+ explicit_bzero(p2, strlen(p2));
+ free(p2);
+ }
+ if (passok) {
+ if ((r = ssh_lock_agent(agent_fd, lock, p1)) == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Agent %slocked.\n", lock ? "" : "un");
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to %slock agent: %s\n",
+ lock ? "" : "un", ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ }
+ explicit_bzero(p1, strlen(p1));
+ free(p1);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int
+do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, char *file)
+{
+ if (deleting) {
+ if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ if (add_file(agent_fd, file, key_only) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options] [file ...]\n", __progname);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -l List fingerprints of all identities.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -E hash Specify hash algorithm used for fingerprints.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -L List public key parameters of all identities.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -k Load only keys and not certificates.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -c Require confirmation to sign using identities\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -t life Set lifetime (in seconds) when adding identities.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -d Delete identity.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -D Delete all identities.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -x Lock agent.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -X Unlock agent.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -s pkcs11 Add keys from PKCS#11 provider.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -e pkcs11 Remove keys provided by PKCS#11 provider.\n");
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ extern char *optarg;
+ extern int optind;
+ int agent_fd;
+ char *pkcs11provider = NULL;
+ int r, i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0, key_only = 0;
+ int xflag = 0, lflag = 0, Dflag = 0;
+
+ ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
+ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+ sanitise_stdfd();
+
+ __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+ seed_rng();
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+#endif
+
+ setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
+
+ /* First, get a connection to the authentication agent. */
+ switch (r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) {
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT:
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not open a connection to your "
+ "authentication agent.\n");
+ exit(2);
+ default:
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to agent: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
+ exit(2);
+ }
+
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "klLcdDxXE:e:s:t:")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'E':
+ fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
+ if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
+ fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'k':
+ key_only = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'l':
+ case 'L':
+ if (lflag != 0)
+ fatal("-%c flag already specified", lflag);
+ lflag = ch;
+ break;
+ case 'x':
+ case 'X':
+ if (xflag != 0)
+ fatal("-%c flag already specified", xflag);
+ xflag = ch;
+ break;
+ case 'c':
+ confirm = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'd':
+ deleting = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'D':
+ Dflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ pkcs11provider = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'e':
+ deleting = 1;
+ pkcs11provider = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 't':
+ if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n");
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ usage();
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((xflag != 0) + (lflag != 0) + (Dflag != 0) > 1)
+ fatal("Invalid combination of actions");
+ else if (xflag) {
+ if (lock_agent(agent_fd, xflag == 'x' ? 1 : 0) == -1)
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
+ } else if (lflag) {
+ if (list_identities(agent_fd, lflag == 'l' ? 1 : 0) == -1)
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
+ } else if (Dflag) {
+ if (delete_all(agent_fd) == -1)
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ argc -= optind;
+ argv += optind;
+ if (pkcs11provider != NULL) {
+ if (update_card(agent_fd, !deleting, pkcs11provider) == -1)
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (argc == 0) {
+ char buf[PATH_MAX];
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ struct stat st;
+ int count = 0;
+
+ if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "No user found with uid %u\n",
+ (u_int)getuid());
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; default_files[i]; i++) {
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
+ default_files[i]);
+ if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
+ continue;
+ if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only, buf) == -1)
+ ret = 1;
+ else
+ count++;
+ }
+ if (count == 0)
+ ret = 1;
+ } else {
+ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+ if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only,
+ argv[i]) == -1)
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ clear_pass();
+
+done:
+ ssh_close_authentication_socket(agent_fd);
+ return ret;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-agent.0
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-agent.0 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-agent.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
-SSH-AGENT(1) OpenBSD Reference Manual SSH-AGENT(1)
-
-NAME
- ssh-agent - authentication agent
-
-SYNOPSIS
- ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-d] [-a bind_address] [-t life] [command [arg ...]]
- ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k
-
-DESCRIPTION
- ssh-agent is a program to hold private keys used for public key
- authentication (RSA, DSA, ECDSA, ED25519). The idea is that ssh-agent is
- started in the beginning of an X-session or a login session, and all
- other windows or programs are started as clients to the ssh-agent
- program. Through use of environment variables the agent can be located
- and automatically used for authentication when logging in to other
- machines using ssh(1).
-
- The options are as follows:
-
- -a bind_address
- Bind the agent to the UNIX-domain socket bind_address. The
- default is $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>.
-
- -c Generate C-shell commands on stdout. This is the default if
- SHELL looks like it's a csh style of shell.
-
- -d Debug mode. When this option is specified ssh-agent will not
- fork.
-
- -k Kill the current agent (given by the SSH_AGENT_PID environment
- variable).
-
- -s Generate Bourne shell commands on stdout. This is the default if
- SHELL does not look like it's a csh style of shell.
-
- -t life
- Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added
- to the agent. The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a
- time format specified in sshd_config(5). A lifetime specified
- for an identity with ssh-add(1) overrides this value. Without
- this option the default maximum lifetime is forever.
-
- If a commandline is given, this is executed as a subprocess of the agent.
- When the command dies, so does the agent.
-
- The agent initially does not have any private keys. Keys are added using
- ssh-add(1). When executed without arguments, ssh-add(1) adds the files
- ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and
- ~/.ssh/identity. If the identity has a passphrase, ssh-add(1) asks for
- the passphrase on the terminal if it has one or from a small X11 program
- if running under X11. If neither of these is the case then the
- authentication will fail. It then sends the identity to the agent.
- Several identities can be stored in the agent; the agent can
- automatically use any of these identities. ssh-add -l displays the
- identities currently held by the agent.
-
- The idea is that the agent is run in the user's local PC, laptop, or
- terminal. Authentication data need not be stored on any other machine,
- and authentication passphrases never go over the network. However, the
- connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH remote logins, and the user
- can thus use the privileges given by the identities anywhere in the
- network in a secure way.
-
- There are two main ways to get an agent set up: The first is that the
- agent starts a new subcommand into which some environment variables are
- exported, eg ssh-agent xterm &. The second is that the agent prints the
- needed shell commands (either sh(1) or csh(1) syntax can be generated)
- which can be evaluated in the calling shell, eg eval `ssh-agent -s` for
- Bourne-type shells such as sh(1) or ksh(1) and eval `ssh-agent -c` for
- csh(1) and derivatives.
-
- Later ssh(1) looks at these variables and uses them to establish a
- connection to the agent.
-
- The agent will never send a private key over its request channel.
- Instead, operations that require a private key will be performed by the
- agent, and the result will be returned to the requester. This way,
- private keys are not exposed to clients using the agent.
-
- A UNIX-domain socket is created and the name of this socket is stored in
- the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. The socket is made accessible
- only to the current user. This method is easily abused by root or
- another instance of the same user.
-
- The SSH_AGENT_PID environment variable holds the agent's process ID.
-
- The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command line
- terminates.
-
-FILES
- ~/.ssh/identity
- Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of
- the user.
-
- ~/.ssh/id_dsa
- Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of
- the user.
-
- ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
- Contains the protocol version 2 ECDSA authentication identity of
- the user.
-
- ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
- Contains the protocol version 2 ED25519 authentication identity
- of the user.
-
- ~/.ssh/id_rsa
- Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of
- the user.
-
- $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>
- UNIX-domain sockets used to contain the connection to the
- authentication agent. These sockets should only be readable by
- the owner. The sockets should get automatically removed when the
- agent exits.
-
-SEE ALSO
- ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8)
-
-AUTHORS
- OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
- Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
- de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
- created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
- versions 1.5 and 2.0.
-
-OpenBSD 5.5 December 7, 2013 OpenBSD 5.5
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-agent.0 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-agent.0)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-agent.0 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-agent.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+SSH-AGENT(1) General Commands Manual SSH-AGENT(1)
+
+NAME
+ ssh-agent M-bM-^@M-^S authentication agent
+
+SYNOPSIS
+ ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]
+ [-t life] [command [arg ...]]
+ ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k
+
+DESCRIPTION
+ ssh-agent is a program to hold private keys used for public key
+ authentication (RSA, DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519). ssh-agent is usually started
+ in the beginning of an X-session or a login session, and all other
+ windows or programs are started as clients to the ssh-agent program.
+ Through use of environment variables the agent can be located and
+ automatically used for authentication when logging in to other machines
+ using ssh(1).
+
+ The agent initially does not have any private keys. Keys are added using
+ ssh(1) (see AddKeysToAgent in ssh_config(5) for details) or ssh-add(1).
+ Multiple identities may be stored in ssh-agent concurrently and ssh(1)
+ will automatically use them if present. ssh-add(1) is also used to
+ remove keys from ssh-agent and to query the keys that are held in one.
+
+ The options are as follows:
+
+ -a bind_address
+ Bind the agent to the UNIX-domain socket bind_address. The
+ default is $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>.
+
+ -c Generate C-shell commands on stdout. This is the default if
+ SHELL looks like it's a csh style of shell.
+
+ -D Foreground mode. When this option is specified ssh-agent will
+ not fork.
+
+ -d Debug mode. When this option is specified ssh-agent will not
+ fork and will write debug information to standard error.
+
+ -E fingerprint_hash
+ Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key
+ fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The
+ default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ -k Kill the current agent (given by the SSH_AGENT_PID environment
+ variable).
+
+ -s Generate Bourne shell commands on stdout. This is the default if
+ SHELL does not look like it's a csh style of shell.
+
+ -t life
+ Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added
+ to the agent. The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a
+ time format specified in sshd_config(5). A lifetime specified
+ for an identity with ssh-add(1) overrides this value. Without
+ this option the default maximum lifetime is forever.
+
+ If a command line is given, this is executed as a subprocess of the
+ agent. When the command dies, so does the agent.
+
+ The idea is that the agent is run in the user's local PC, laptop, or
+ terminal. Authentication data need not be stored on any other machine,
+ and authentication passphrases never go over the network. However, the
+ connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH remote logins, and the user
+ can thus use the privileges given by the identities anywhere in the
+ network in a secure way.
+
+ There are two main ways to get an agent set up: The first is that the
+ agent starts a new subcommand into which some environment variables are
+ exported, eg ssh-agent xterm &. The second is that the agent prints the
+ needed shell commands (either sh(1) or csh(1) syntax can be generated)
+ which can be evaluated in the calling shell, eg eval `ssh-agent -s` for
+ Bourne-type shells such as sh(1) or ksh(1) and eval `ssh-agent -c` for
+ csh(1) and derivatives.
+
+ Later ssh(1) looks at these variables and uses them to establish a
+ connection to the agent.
+
+ The agent will never send a private key over its request channel.
+ Instead, operations that require a private key will be performed by the
+ agent, and the result will be returned to the requester. This way,
+ private keys are not exposed to clients using the agent.
+
+ A UNIX-domain socket is created and the name of this socket is stored in
+ the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. The socket is made accessible
+ only to the current user. This method is easily abused by root or
+ another instance of the same user.
+
+ The SSH_AGENT_PID environment variable holds the agent's process ID.
+
+ The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command line
+ terminates.
+
+FILES
+ $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>
+ UNIX-domain sockets used to contain the connection to the
+ authentication agent. These sockets should only be readable by
+ the owner. The sockets should get automatically removed when the
+ agent exits.
+
+SEE ALSO
+ ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8)
+
+AUTHORS
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+ Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+ de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+ created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+ versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+
+OpenBSD 6.0 November 15, 2015 OpenBSD 6.0
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-agent.1
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-agent.1 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-agent.1 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,217 +0,0 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.54 2013/12/07 11:58:46 naddy Exp $
-.\"
-.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
-.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
-.\" All rights reserved
-.\"
-.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
-.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
-.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
-.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
-.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
-.\"
-.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
-.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
-.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
-.\"
-.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-.\" are met:
-.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-.\"
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: December 7 2013 $
-.Dt SSH-AGENT 1
-.Os
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm ssh-agent
-.Nd authentication agent
-.Sh SYNOPSIS
-.Nm ssh-agent
-.Op Fl c | s
-.Op Fl d
-.Op Fl a Ar bind_address
-.Op Fl t Ar life
-.Op Ar command Op Ar arg ...
-.Nm ssh-agent
-.Op Fl c | s
-.Fl k
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-.Nm
-is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication
-(RSA, DSA, ECDSA, ED25519).
-The idea is that
-.Nm
-is started in the beginning of an X-session or a login session, and
-all other windows or programs are started as clients to the ssh-agent
-program.
-Through use of environment variables the agent can be located
-and automatically used for authentication when logging in to other
-machines using
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-.Pp
-The options are as follows:
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Fl a Ar bind_address
-Bind the agent to the
-.Ux Ns -domain
-socket
-.Ar bind_address .
-The default is
-.Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt .
-.It Fl c
-Generate C-shell commands on
-.Dv stdout .
-This is the default if
-.Ev SHELL
-looks like it's a csh style of shell.
-.It Fl d
-Debug mode.
-When this option is specified
-.Nm
-will not fork.
-.It Fl k
-Kill the current agent (given by the
-.Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
-environment variable).
-.It Fl s
-Generate Bourne shell commands on
-.Dv stdout .
-This is the default if
-.Ev SHELL
-does not look like it's a csh style of shell.
-.It Fl t Ar life
-Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added to the agent.
-The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format specified in
-.Xr sshd_config 5 .
-A lifetime specified for an identity with
-.Xr ssh-add 1
-overrides this value.
-Without this option the default maximum lifetime is forever.
-.El
-.Pp
-If a commandline is given, this is executed as a subprocess of the agent.
-When the command dies, so does the agent.
-.Pp
-The agent initially does not have any private keys.
-Keys are added using
-.Xr ssh-add 1 .
-When executed without arguments,
-.Xr ssh-add 1
-adds the files
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
-and
-.Pa ~/.ssh/identity .
-If the identity has a passphrase,
-.Xr ssh-add 1
-asks for the passphrase on the terminal if it has one or from a small X11
-program if running under X11.
-If neither of these is the case then the authentication will fail.
-It then sends the identity to the agent.
-Several identities can be stored in the
-agent; the agent can automatically use any of these identities.
-.Ic ssh-add -l
-displays the identities currently held by the agent.
-.Pp
-The idea is that the agent is run in the user's local PC, laptop, or
-terminal.
-Authentication data need not be stored on any other
-machine, and authentication passphrases never go over the network.
-However, the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH
-remote logins, and the user can thus use the privileges given by the
-identities anywhere in the network in a secure way.
-.Pp
-There are two main ways to get an agent set up:
-The first is that the agent starts a new subcommand into which some environment
-variables are exported, eg
-.Cm ssh-agent xterm & .
-The second is that the agent prints the needed shell commands (either
-.Xr sh 1
-or
-.Xr csh 1
-syntax can be generated) which can be evaluated in the calling shell, eg
-.Cm eval `ssh-agent -s`
-for Bourne-type shells such as
-.Xr sh 1
-or
-.Xr ksh 1
-and
-.Cm eval `ssh-agent -c`
-for
-.Xr csh 1
-and derivatives.
-.Pp
-Later
-.Xr ssh 1
-looks at these variables and uses them to establish a connection to the agent.
-.Pp
-The agent will never send a private key over its request channel.
-Instead, operations that require a private key will be performed
-by the agent, and the result will be returned to the requester.
-This way, private keys are not exposed to clients using the agent.
-.Pp
-A
-.Ux Ns -domain
-socket is created and the name of this socket is stored in the
-.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
-environment
-variable.
-The socket is made accessible only to the current user.
-This method is easily abused by root or another instance of the same
-user.
-.Pp
-The
-.Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
-environment variable holds the agent's process ID.
-.Pp
-The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command
-line terminates.
-.Sh FILES
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
-Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
-Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
-Contains the protocol version 2 ECDSA authentication identity of the user.
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
-Contains the protocol version 2 ED25519 authentication identity of the user.
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
-Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user.
-.It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt
-.Ux Ns -domain
-sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent.
-These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
-The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
-.El
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr ssh 1 ,
-.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
-.Xr sshd 8
-.Sh AUTHORS
-OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
-ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
-Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
-Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
-removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
-created OpenSSH.
-Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
-protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-agent.1 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-agent.1)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-agent.1 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-agent.1 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.62 2015/11/15 23:54:15 jmc Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\" All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd $Mdocdate: November 15 2015 $
+.Dt SSH-AGENT 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-agent
+.Nd authentication agent
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ssh-agent
+.Op Fl c | s
+.Op Fl \&Dd
+.Op Fl a Ar bind_address
+.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
+.Op Fl t Ar life
+.Op Ar command Op Ar arg ...
+.Nm ssh-agent
+.Op Fl c | s
+.Fl k
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication
+(RSA, DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519).
+.Nm
+is usually started in the beginning of an X-session or a login session, and
+all other windows or programs are started as clients to the ssh-agent
+program.
+Through use of environment variables the agent can be located
+and automatically used for authentication when logging in to other
+machines using
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.Pp
+The agent initially does not have any private keys.
+Keys are added using
+.Xr ssh 1
+(see
+.Cm AddKeysToAgent
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for details)
+or
+.Xr ssh-add 1 .
+Multiple identities may be stored in
+.Nm
+concurrently and
+.Xr ssh 1
+will automatically use them if present.
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+is also used to remove keys from
+.Nm
+and to query the keys that are held in one.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl a Ar bind_address
+Bind the agent to the
+.Ux Ns -domain
+socket
+.Ar bind_address .
+The default is
+.Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt .
+.It Fl c
+Generate C-shell commands on
+.Dv stdout .
+This is the default if
+.Ev SHELL
+looks like it's a csh style of shell.
+.It Fl D
+Foreground mode.
+When this option is specified
+.Nm
+will not fork.
+.It Fl d
+Debug mode.
+When this option is specified
+.Nm
+will not fork and will write debug information to standard error.
+.It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
+Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
+Valid options are:
+.Dq md5
+and
+.Dq sha256 .
+The default is
+.Dq sha256 .
+.It Fl k
+Kill the current agent (given by the
+.Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
+environment variable).
+.It Fl s
+Generate Bourne shell commands on
+.Dv stdout .
+This is the default if
+.Ev SHELL
+does not look like it's a csh style of shell.
+.It Fl t Ar life
+Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added to the agent.
+The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format specified in
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+A lifetime specified for an identity with
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+overrides this value.
+Without this option the default maximum lifetime is forever.
+.El
+.Pp
+If a command line is given, this is executed as a subprocess of the agent.
+When the command dies, so does the agent.
+.Pp
+The idea is that the agent is run in the user's local PC, laptop, or
+terminal.
+Authentication data need not be stored on any other
+machine, and authentication passphrases never go over the network.
+However, the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH
+remote logins, and the user can thus use the privileges given by the
+identities anywhere in the network in a secure way.
+.Pp
+There are two main ways to get an agent set up:
+The first is that the agent starts a new subcommand into which some environment
+variables are exported, eg
+.Cm ssh-agent xterm & .
+The second is that the agent prints the needed shell commands (either
+.Xr sh 1
+or
+.Xr csh 1
+syntax can be generated) which can be evaluated in the calling shell, eg
+.Cm eval `ssh-agent -s`
+for Bourne-type shells such as
+.Xr sh 1
+or
+.Xr ksh 1
+and
+.Cm eval `ssh-agent -c`
+for
+.Xr csh 1
+and derivatives.
+.Pp
+Later
+.Xr ssh 1
+looks at these variables and uses them to establish a connection to the agent.
+.Pp
+The agent will never send a private key over its request channel.
+Instead, operations that require a private key will be performed
+by the agent, and the result will be returned to the requester.
+This way, private keys are not exposed to clients using the agent.
+.Pp
+A
+.Ux Ns -domain
+socket is created and the name of this socket is stored in the
+.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+environment
+variable.
+The socket is made accessible only to the current user.
+This method is easily abused by root or another instance of the same
+user.
+.Pp
+The
+.Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
+environment variable holds the agent's process ID.
+.Pp
+The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command
+line terminates.
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt
+.Ux Ns -domain
+sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent.
+These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
+The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-agent.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-agent.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-agent.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1262 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.183 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * The authentication agent program.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/resource.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
-# include <sys/un.h>
-#endif
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "authfd.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-
-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H)
-#include <sys/prctl.h> /* For prctl() and PR_SET_DUMPABLE */
-#endif
-
-typedef enum {
- AUTH_UNUSED,
- AUTH_SOCKET,
- AUTH_CONNECTION
-} sock_type;
-
-typedef struct {
- int fd;
- sock_type type;
- Buffer input;
- Buffer output;
- Buffer request;
-} SocketEntry;
-
-u_int sockets_alloc = 0;
-SocketEntry *sockets = NULL;
-
-typedef struct identity {
- TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
- Key *key;
- char *comment;
- char *provider;
- time_t death;
- u_int confirm;
-} Identity;
-
-typedef struct {
- int nentries;
- TAILQ_HEAD(idqueue, identity) idlist;
-} Idtab;
-
-/* private key table, one per protocol version */
-Idtab idtable[3];
-
-int max_fd = 0;
-
-/* pid of shell == parent of agent */
-pid_t parent_pid = -1;
-time_t parent_alive_interval = 0;
-
-/* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */
-char socket_name[MAXPATHLEN];
-char socket_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
-
-/* locking */
-int locked = 0;
-char *lock_passwd = NULL;
-
-extern char *__progname;
-
-/* Default lifetime in seconds (0 == forever) */
-static long lifetime = 0;
-
-static void
-close_socket(SocketEntry *e)
-{
- close(e->fd);
- e->fd = -1;
- e->type = AUTH_UNUSED;
- buffer_free(&e->input);
- buffer_free(&e->output);
- buffer_free(&e->request);
-}
-
-static void
-idtab_init(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i <=2; i++) {
- TAILQ_INIT(&idtable[i].idlist);
- idtable[i].nentries = 0;
- }
-}
-
-/* return private key table for requested protocol version */
-static Idtab *
-idtab_lookup(int version)
-{
- if (version < 1 || version > 2)
- fatal("internal error, bad protocol version %d", version);
- return &idtable[version];
-}
-
-static void
-free_identity(Identity *id)
-{
- key_free(id->key);
- free(id->provider);
- free(id->comment);
- free(id);
-}
-
-/* return matching private key for given public key */
-static Identity *
-lookup_identity(Key *key, int version)
-{
- Identity *id;
-
- Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
- TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &tab->idlist, next) {
- if (key_equal(key, id->key))
- return (id);
- }
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-/* Check confirmation of keysign request */
-static int
-confirm_key(Identity *id)
-{
- char *p;
- int ret = -1;
-
- p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.",
- id->comment, p))
- ret = 0;
- free(p);
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-/* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */
-static void
-process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
-{
- Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
- Identity *id;
- Buffer msg;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, (version == 1) ?
- SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER : SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, tab->nentries);
- TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &tab->idlist, next) {
- if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
- buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(id->key->rsa->n));
- buffer_put_bignum(&msg, id->key->rsa->e);
- buffer_put_bignum(&msg, id->key->rsa->n);
- } else {
- u_char *blob;
- u_int blen;
- key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &blen);
- buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
- free(blob);
- }
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, id->comment);
- }
- buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg));
- buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg), buffer_len(&msg));
- buffer_free(&msg);
-}
-
-/* ssh1 only */
-static void
-process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e)
-{
- u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16], session_id[16];
- u_int response_type;
- BIGNUM *challenge;
- Identity *id;
- int i, len;
- Buffer msg;
- struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
- Key *key;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
- if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("process_authentication_challenge1: BN_new failed");
-
- (void) buffer_get_int(&e->request); /* ignored */
- buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, key->rsa->e);
- buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, key->rsa->n);
- buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, challenge);
-
- /* Only protocol 1.1 is supported */
- if (buffer_len(&e->request) == 0)
- goto failure;
- buffer_get(&e->request, session_id, 16);
- response_type = buffer_get_int(&e->request);
- if (response_type != 1)
- goto failure;
-
- id = lookup_identity(key, 1);
- if (id != NULL && (!id->confirm || confirm_key(id) == 0)) {
- Key *private = id->key;
- /* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */
- if (rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, private->rsa) <= 0)
- goto failure;
-
- /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
- len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
- if (len <= 0 || len > 32) {
- logit("process_authentication_challenge: bad challenge length %d", len);
- goto failure;
- }
- memset(buf, 0, 32);
- BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
- if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
- ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 ||
- ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 ||
- ssh_digest_final(md, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf)) < 0)
- fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
- ssh_digest_free(md);
-
- /* Send the response. */
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- buffer_put_char(&msg, mdbuf[i]);
- goto send;
- }
-
-failure:
- /* Unknown identity or protocol error. Send failure. */
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
-send:
- buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg));
- buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg), buffer_len(&msg));
- key_free(key);
- BN_clear_free(challenge);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-}
-
-/* ssh2 only */
-static void
-process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
-{
- u_char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL;
- u_int blen, dlen, slen = 0;
- extern int datafellows;
- int odatafellows;
- int ok = -1, flags;
- Buffer msg;
- Key *key;
-
- datafellows = 0;
-
- blob = buffer_get_string(&e->request, &blen);
- data = buffer_get_string(&e->request, &dlen);
-
- flags = buffer_get_int(&e->request);
- odatafellows = datafellows;
- if (flags & SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE)
- datafellows = SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB;
-
- key = key_from_blob(blob, blen);
- if (key != NULL) {
- Identity *id = lookup_identity(key, 2);
- if (id != NULL && (!id->confirm || confirm_key(id) == 0))
- ok = key_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen, data, dlen);
- key_free(key);
- }
- buffer_init(&msg);
- if (ok == 0) {
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE);
- buffer_put_string(&msg, signature, slen);
- } else {
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
- }
- buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg));
- buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg),
- buffer_len(&msg));
- buffer_free(&msg);
- free(data);
- free(blob);
- free(signature);
- datafellows = odatafellows;
-}
-
-/* shared */
-static void
-process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
-{
- u_int blen, bits;
- int success = 0;
- Key *key = NULL;
- u_char *blob;
-
- switch (version) {
- case 1:
- key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
- bits = buffer_get_int(&e->request);
- buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, key->rsa->e);
- buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, key->rsa->n);
-
- if (bits != key_size(key))
- logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %u, announced %u",
- key_size(key), bits);
- break;
- case 2:
- blob = buffer_get_string(&e->request, &blen);
- key = key_from_blob(blob, blen);
- free(blob);
- break;
- }
- if (key != NULL) {
- Identity *id = lookup_identity(key, version);
- if (id != NULL) {
- /*
- * We have this key. Free the old key. Since we
- * don't want to leave empty slots in the middle of
- * the array, we actually free the key there and move
- * all the entries between the empty slot and the end
- * of the array.
- */
- Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
- if (tab->nentries < 1)
- fatal("process_remove_identity: "
- "internal error: tab->nentries %d",
- tab->nentries);
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
- free_identity(id);
- tab->nentries--;
- success = 1;
- }
- key_free(key);
- }
- buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
- buffer_put_char(&e->output,
- success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
-}
-
-static void
-process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
-{
- Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
- Identity *id;
-
- /* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */
- for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id;
- id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist)) {
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
- free_identity(id);
- }
-
- /* Mark that there are no identities. */
- tab->nentries = 0;
-
- /* Send success. */
- buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
- buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS);
-}
-
-/* removes expired keys and returns number of seconds until the next expiry */
-static time_t
-reaper(void)
-{
- time_t deadline = 0, now = monotime();
- Identity *id, *nxt;
- int version;
- Idtab *tab;
-
- for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) {
- tab = idtab_lookup(version);
- for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
- nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
- if (id->death == 0)
- continue;
- if (now >= id->death) {
- debug("expiring key '%s'", id->comment);
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
- free_identity(id);
- tab->nentries--;
- } else
- deadline = (deadline == 0) ? id->death :
- MIN(deadline, id->death);
- }
- }
- if (deadline == 0 || deadline <= now)
- return 0;
- else
- return (deadline - now);
-}
-
-static void
-process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
-{
- Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
- Identity *id;
- int type, success = 0, confirm = 0;
- char *comment;
- time_t death = 0;
- Key *k = NULL;
-
- switch (version) {
- case 1:
- k = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
- (void) buffer_get_int(&e->request); /* ignored */
- buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->n);
- buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->e);
- buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->d);
- buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->iqmp);
-
- /* SSH and SSL have p and q swapped */
- buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->q); /* p */
- buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->p); /* q */
-
- /* Generate additional parameters */
- rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa);
-
- /* enable blinding */
- if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
- error("process_add_identity: RSA_blinding_on failed");
- key_free(k);
- goto send;
- }
- break;
- case 2:
- k = key_private_deserialize(&e->request);
- if (k == NULL) {
- buffer_clear(&e->request);
- goto send;
- }
- break;
- }
- comment = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
- if (k == NULL) {
- free(comment);
- goto send;
- }
- while (buffer_len(&e->request)) {
- switch ((type = buffer_get_char(&e->request))) {
- case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
- death = monotime() + buffer_get_int(&e->request);
- break;
- case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
- confirm = 1;
- break;
- default:
- error("process_add_identity: "
- "Unknown constraint type %d", type);
- free(comment);
- key_free(k);
- goto send;
- }
- }
- success = 1;
- if (lifetime && !death)
- death = monotime() + lifetime;
- if ((id = lookup_identity(k, version)) == NULL) {
- id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
- id->key = k;
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
- /* Increment the number of identities. */
- tab->nentries++;
- } else {
- key_free(k);
- free(id->comment);
- }
- id->comment = comment;
- id->death = death;
- id->confirm = confirm;
-send:
- buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
- buffer_put_char(&e->output,
- success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
-}
-
-/* XXX todo: encrypt sensitive data with passphrase */
-static void
-process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock)
-{
- int success = 0;
- char *passwd;
-
- passwd = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
- if (locked && !lock && strcmp(passwd, lock_passwd) == 0) {
- locked = 0;
- explicit_bzero(lock_passwd, strlen(lock_passwd));
- free(lock_passwd);
- lock_passwd = NULL;
- success = 1;
- } else if (!locked && lock) {
- locked = 1;
- lock_passwd = xstrdup(passwd);
- success = 1;
- }
- explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
- free(passwd);
-
- buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
- buffer_put_char(&e->output,
- success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
-}
-
-static void
-no_identities(SocketEntry *e, u_int type)
-{
- Buffer msg;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg,
- (type == SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES) ?
- SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER : SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, 0);
- buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg));
- buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg), buffer_len(&msg));
- buffer_free(&msg);
-}
-
-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-static void
-process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
-{
- char *provider = NULL, *pin;
- int i, type, version, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
- time_t death = 0;
- Key **keys = NULL, *k;
- Identity *id;
- Idtab *tab;
-
- provider = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
- pin = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
-
- while (buffer_len(&e->request)) {
- switch ((type = buffer_get_char(&e->request))) {
- case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
- death = monotime() + buffer_get_int(&e->request);
- break;
- case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
- confirm = 1;
- break;
- default:
- error("process_add_smartcard_key: "
- "Unknown constraint type %d", type);
- goto send;
- }
- }
- if (lifetime && !death)
- death = monotime() + lifetime;
-
- count = pkcs11_add_provider(provider, pin, &keys);
- for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- k = keys[i];
- version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2;
- tab = idtab_lookup(version);
- if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) {
- id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
- id->key = k;
- id->provider = xstrdup(provider);
- id->comment = xstrdup(provider); /* XXX */
- id->death = death;
- id->confirm = confirm;
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
- tab->nentries++;
- success = 1;
- } else {
- key_free(k);
- }
- keys[i] = NULL;
- }
-send:
- free(pin);
- free(provider);
- free(keys);
- buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
- buffer_put_char(&e->output,
- success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
-}
-
-static void
-process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
-{
- char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL;
- int version, success = 0;
- Identity *id, *nxt;
- Idtab *tab;
-
- provider = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
- pin = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
- free(pin);
-
- for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) {
- tab = idtab_lookup(version);
- for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
- nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
- /* Skip file--based keys */
- if (id->provider == NULL)
- continue;
- if (!strcmp(provider, id->provider)) {
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
- free_identity(id);
- tab->nentries--;
- }
- }
- }
- if (pkcs11_del_provider(provider) == 0)
- success = 1;
- else
- error("process_remove_smartcard_key:"
- " pkcs11_del_provider failed");
- free(provider);
- buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
- buffer_put_char(&e->output,
- success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
-}
-#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
-
-/* dispatch incoming messages */
-
-static void
-process_message(SocketEntry *e)
-{
- u_int msg_len, type;
- u_char *cp;
-
- if (buffer_len(&e->input) < 5)
- return; /* Incomplete message. */
- cp = buffer_ptr(&e->input);
- msg_len = get_u32(cp);
- if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
- close_socket(e);
- return;
- }
- if (buffer_len(&e->input) < msg_len + 4)
- return;
-
- /* move the current input to e->request */
- buffer_consume(&e->input, 4);
- buffer_clear(&e->request);
- buffer_append(&e->request, buffer_ptr(&e->input), msg_len);
- buffer_consume(&e->input, msg_len);
- type = buffer_get_char(&e->request);
-
- /* check wheter agent is locked */
- if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) {
- buffer_clear(&e->request);
- switch (type) {
- case SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES:
- case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
- /* send empty lists */
- no_identities(e, type);
- break;
- default:
- /* send a fail message for all other request types */
- buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
- buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
- }
- return;
- }
-
- debug("type %d", type);
- switch (type) {
- case SSH_AGENTC_LOCK:
- case SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK:
- process_lock_agent(e, type == SSH_AGENTC_LOCK);
- break;
- /* ssh1 */
- case SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE:
- process_authentication_challenge1(e);
- break;
- case SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES:
- process_request_identities(e, 1);
- break;
- case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY:
- case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED:
- process_add_identity(e, 1);
- break;
- case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY:
- process_remove_identity(e, 1);
- break;
- case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES:
- process_remove_all_identities(e, 1);
- break;
- /* ssh2 */
- case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST:
- process_sign_request2(e);
- break;
- case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
- process_request_identities(e, 2);
- break;
- case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY:
- case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED:
- process_add_identity(e, 2);
- break;
- case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY:
- process_remove_identity(e, 2);
- break;
- case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES:
- process_remove_all_identities(e, 2);
- break;
-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY:
- case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED:
- process_add_smartcard_key(e);
- break;
- case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY:
- process_remove_smartcard_key(e);
- break;
-#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
- default:
- /* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */
- error("Unknown message %d", type);
- buffer_clear(&e->request);
- buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
- buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
- break;
- }
-}
-
-static void
-new_socket(sock_type type, int fd)
-{
- u_int i, old_alloc, new_alloc;
-
- set_nonblock(fd);
-
- if (fd > max_fd)
- max_fd = fd;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++)
- if (sockets[i].type == AUTH_UNUSED) {
- sockets[i].fd = fd;
- buffer_init(&sockets[i].input);
- buffer_init(&sockets[i].output);
- buffer_init(&sockets[i].request);
- sockets[i].type = type;
- return;
- }
- old_alloc = sockets_alloc;
- new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10;
- sockets = xrealloc(sockets, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0]));
- for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++)
- sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
- sockets_alloc = new_alloc;
- sockets[old_alloc].fd = fd;
- buffer_init(&sockets[old_alloc].input);
- buffer_init(&sockets[old_alloc].output);
- buffer_init(&sockets[old_alloc].request);
- sockets[old_alloc].type = type;
-}
-
-static int
-prepare_select(fd_set **fdrp, fd_set **fdwp, int *fdl, u_int *nallocp,
- struct timeval **tvpp)
-{
- u_int i, sz;
- int n = 0;
- static struct timeval tv;
- time_t deadline;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
- switch (sockets[i].type) {
- case AUTH_SOCKET:
- case AUTH_CONNECTION:
- n = MAX(n, sockets[i].fd);
- break;
- case AUTH_UNUSED:
- break;
- default:
- fatal("Unknown socket type %d", sockets[i].type);
- break;
- }
- }
-
- sz = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
- if (*fdrp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) {
- free(*fdrp);
- free(*fdwp);
- *fdrp = xmalloc(sz);
- *fdwp = xmalloc(sz);
- *nallocp = sz;
- }
- if (n < *fdl)
- debug("XXX shrink: %d < %d", n, *fdl);
- *fdl = n;
- memset(*fdrp, 0, sz);
- memset(*fdwp, 0, sz);
-
- for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
- switch (sockets[i].type) {
- case AUTH_SOCKET:
- case AUTH_CONNECTION:
- FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, *fdrp);
- if (buffer_len(&sockets[i].output) > 0)
- FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, *fdwp);
- break;
- default:
- break;
- }
- }
- deadline = reaper();
- if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
- deadline = (deadline == 0) ? parent_alive_interval :
- MIN(deadline, parent_alive_interval);
- if (deadline == 0) {
- *tvpp = NULL;
- } else {
- tv.tv_sec = deadline;
- tv.tv_usec = 0;
- *tvpp = &tv;
- }
- return (1);
-}
-
-static void
-after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-{
- struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
- socklen_t slen;
- char buf[1024];
- int len, sock;
- u_int i, orig_alloc;
- uid_t euid;
- gid_t egid;
-
- for (i = 0, orig_alloc = sockets_alloc; i < orig_alloc; i++)
- switch (sockets[i].type) {
- case AUTH_UNUSED:
- break;
- case AUTH_SOCKET:
- if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) {
- slen = sizeof(sunaddr);
- sock = accept(sockets[i].fd,
- (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, &slen);
- if (sock < 0) {
- error("accept from AUTH_SOCKET: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- break;
- }
- if (getpeereid(sock, &euid, &egid) < 0) {
- error("getpeereid %d failed: %s",
- sock, strerror(errno));
- close(sock);
- break;
- }
- if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) {
- error("uid mismatch: "
- "peer euid %u != uid %u",
- (u_int) euid, (u_int) getuid());
- close(sock);
- break;
- }
- new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, sock);
- }
- break;
- case AUTH_CONNECTION:
- if (buffer_len(&sockets[i].output) > 0 &&
- FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, writeset)) {
- len = write(sockets[i].fd,
- buffer_ptr(&sockets[i].output),
- buffer_len(&sockets[i].output));
- if (len == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN ||
- errno == EWOULDBLOCK ||
- errno == EINTR))
- continue;
- if (len <= 0) {
- close_socket(&sockets[i]);
- break;
- }
- buffer_consume(&sockets[i].output, len);
- }
- if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) {
- len = read(sockets[i].fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (len == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN ||
- errno == EWOULDBLOCK ||
- errno == EINTR))
- continue;
- if (len <= 0) {
- close_socket(&sockets[i]);
- break;
- }
- buffer_append(&sockets[i].input, buf, len);
- process_message(&sockets[i]);
- }
- break;
- default:
- fatal("Unknown type %d", sockets[i].type);
- }
-}
-
-static void
-cleanup_socket(void)
-{
- if (socket_name[0])
- unlink(socket_name);
- if (socket_dir[0])
- rmdir(socket_dir);
-}
-
-void
-cleanup_exit(int i)
-{
- cleanup_socket();
- _exit(i);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static void
-cleanup_handler(int sig)
-{
- cleanup_socket();
-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- pkcs11_terminate();
-#endif
- _exit(2);
-}
-
-static void
-check_parent_exists(void)
-{
- /*
- * If our parent has exited then getppid() will return (pid_t)1,
- * so testing for that should be safe.
- */
- if (parent_pid != -1 && getppid() != parent_pid) {
- /* printf("Parent has died - Authentication agent exiting.\n"); */
- cleanup_socket();
- _exit(2);
- }
-}
-
-static void
-usage(void)
-{
- fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options] [command [arg ...]]\n",
- __progname);
- fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -c Generate C-shell commands on stdout.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -s Generate Bourne shell commands on stdout.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -k Kill the current agent.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -d Debug mode.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -a socket Bind agent socket to given name.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -t life Default identity lifetime (seconds).\n");
- exit(1);
-}
-
-int
-main(int ac, char **av)
-{
- int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0;
- int sock, fd, ch, result, saved_errno;
- u_int nalloc;
- char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL;
- fd_set *readsetp = NULL, *writesetp = NULL;
- struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
-#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
- struct rlimit rlim;
-#endif
- int prev_mask;
- extern int optind;
- extern char *optarg;
- pid_t pid;
- char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid];
- struct timeval *tvp = NULL;
- size_t len;
-
- /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
- sanitise_stdfd();
-
- /* drop */
- setegid(getgid());
- setgid(getgid());
-
-#if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE)
- /* Disable ptrace on Linux without sgid bit */
- prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0);
-#endif
-
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
-
- __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
- seed_rng();
-
- while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cdksa:t:")) != -1) {
- switch (ch) {
- case 'c':
- if (s_flag)
- usage();
- c_flag++;
- break;
- case 'k':
- k_flag++;
- break;
- case 's':
- if (c_flag)
- usage();
- s_flag++;
- break;
- case 'd':
- if (d_flag)
- usage();
- d_flag++;
- break;
- case 'a':
- agentsocket = optarg;
- break;
- case 't':
- if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n");
- usage();
- }
- break;
- default:
- usage();
- }
- }
- ac -= optind;
- av += optind;
-
- if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag))
- usage();
-
- if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
- shell = getenv("SHELL");
- if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 &&
- strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
- c_flag = 1;
- }
- if (k_flag) {
- const char *errstr = NULL;
-
- pidstr = getenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
- if (pidstr == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s not set, cannot kill agent\n",
- SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
- exit(1);
- }
- pid = (int)strtonum(pidstr, 2, INT_MAX, &errstr);
- if (errstr) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID: %s\n",
- SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr, errstr);
- exit(1);
- }
- if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1) {
- perror("kill");
- exit(1);
- }
- format = c_flag ? "unsetenv %s;\n" : "unset %s;\n";
- printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
- printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
- printf("echo Agent pid %ld killed;\n", (long)pid);
- exit(0);
- }
- parent_pid = getpid();
-
- if (agentsocket == NULL) {
- /* Create private directory for agent socket */
- mktemp_proto(socket_dir, sizeof(socket_dir));
- if (mkdtemp(socket_dir) == NULL) {
- perror("mkdtemp: private socket dir");
- exit(1);
- }
- snprintf(socket_name, sizeof socket_name, "%s/agent.%ld", socket_dir,
- (long)parent_pid);
- } else {
- /* Try to use specified agent socket */
- socket_dir[0] = '\0';
- strlcpy(socket_name, agentsocket, sizeof socket_name);
- }
-
- /*
- * Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from
- * the parent.
- */
- sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- if (sock < 0) {
- perror("socket");
- *socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */
- cleanup_exit(1);
- }
- memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
- sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
- strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, socket_name, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
- prev_mask = umask(0177);
- if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) {
- perror("bind");
- *socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */
- umask(prev_mask);
- cleanup_exit(1);
- }
- umask(prev_mask);
- if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) {
- perror("listen");
- cleanup_exit(1);
- }
-
- /*
- * Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present
- * the socket data. The child continues as the authentication agent.
- */
- if (d_flag) {
- log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
- format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
- printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
- SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
- printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)parent_pid);
- goto skip;
- }
- pid = fork();
- if (pid == -1) {
- perror("fork");
- cleanup_exit(1);
- }
- if (pid != 0) { /* Parent - execute the given command. */
- close(sock);
- snprintf(pidstrbuf, sizeof pidstrbuf, "%ld", (long)pid);
- if (ac == 0) {
- format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
- printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
- SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
- printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf,
- SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
- printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)pid);
- exit(0);
- }
- if (setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, 1) == -1 ||
- setenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, 1) == -1) {
- perror("setenv");
- exit(1);
- }
- execvp(av[0], av);
- perror(av[0]);
- exit(1);
- }
- /* child */
- log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
-
- if (setsid() == -1) {
- error("setsid: %s", strerror(errno));
- cleanup_exit(1);
- }
-
- (void)chdir("/");
- if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
- /* XXX might close listen socket */
- (void)dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
- (void)dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
- (void)dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
- if (fd > 2)
- close(fd);
- }
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
- /* deny core dumps, since memory contains unencrypted private keys */
- rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
- if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0) {
- error("setrlimit RLIMIT_CORE: %s", strerror(errno));
- cleanup_exit(1);
- }
-#endif
-
-skip:
-
-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- pkcs11_init(0);
-#endif
- new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock);
- if (ac > 0)
- parent_alive_interval = 10;
- idtab_init();
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
- signal(SIGINT, d_flag ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN);
- signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler);
- signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
- nalloc = 0;
-
- while (1) {
- prepare_select(&readsetp, &writesetp, &max_fd, &nalloc, &tvp);
- result = select(max_fd + 1, readsetp, writesetp, NULL, tvp);
- saved_errno = errno;
- if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
- check_parent_exists();
- (void) reaper(); /* remove expired keys */
- if (result < 0) {
- if (saved_errno == EINTR)
- continue;
- fatal("select: %s", strerror(saved_errno));
- } else if (result > 0)
- after_select(readsetp, writesetp);
- }
- /* NOTREACHED */
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-agent.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-agent.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-agent.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-agent.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1432 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.213 2016/05/02 08:49:03 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * The authentication agent program.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h> /* MIN MAX */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+# include <sys/un.h>
+#endif
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+#endif
+
+typedef enum {
+ AUTH_UNUSED,
+ AUTH_SOCKET,
+ AUTH_CONNECTION
+} sock_type;
+
+typedef struct {
+ int fd;
+ sock_type type;
+ struct sshbuf *input;
+ struct sshbuf *output;
+ struct sshbuf *request;
+} SocketEntry;
+
+u_int sockets_alloc = 0;
+SocketEntry *sockets = NULL;
+
+typedef struct identity {
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
+ struct sshkey *key;
+ char *comment;
+ char *provider;
+ time_t death;
+ u_int confirm;
+} Identity;
+
+typedef struct {
+ int nentries;
+ TAILQ_HEAD(idqueue, identity) idlist;
+} Idtab;
+
+/* private key table, one per protocol version */
+Idtab idtable[3];
+
+int max_fd = 0;
+
+/* pid of shell == parent of agent */
+pid_t parent_pid = -1;
+time_t parent_alive_interval = 0;
+
+/* pid of process for which cleanup_socket is applicable */
+pid_t cleanup_pid = 0;
+
+/* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */
+char socket_name[PATH_MAX];
+char socket_dir[PATH_MAX];
+
+/* locking */
+#define LOCK_SIZE 32
+#define LOCK_SALT_SIZE 16
+#define LOCK_ROUNDS 1
+int locked = 0;
+u_char lock_pwhash[LOCK_SIZE];
+u_char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE];
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* Default lifetime in seconds (0 == forever) */
+static long lifetime = 0;
+
+static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
+
+static void
+close_socket(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+ close(e->fd);
+ e->fd = -1;
+ e->type = AUTH_UNUSED;
+ sshbuf_free(e->input);
+ sshbuf_free(e->output);
+ sshbuf_free(e->request);
+}
+
+static void
+idtab_init(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i <=2; i++) {
+ TAILQ_INIT(&idtable[i].idlist);
+ idtable[i].nentries = 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/* return private key table for requested protocol version */
+static Idtab *
+idtab_lookup(int version)
+{
+ if (version < 1 || version > 2)
+ fatal("internal error, bad protocol version %d", version);
+ return &idtable[version];
+}
+
+static void
+free_identity(Identity *id)
+{
+ sshkey_free(id->key);
+ free(id->provider);
+ free(id->comment);
+ free(id);
+}
+
+/* return matching private key for given public key */
+static Identity *
+lookup_identity(struct sshkey *key, int version)
+{
+ Identity *id;
+
+ Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &tab->idlist, next) {
+ if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key))
+ return (id);
+ }
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+/* Check confirmation of keysign request */
+static int
+confirm_key(Identity *id)
+{
+ char *p;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ p = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ if (p != NULL &&
+ ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.",
+ id->comment, p))
+ ret = 0;
+ free(p);
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static void
+send_status(SocketEntry *e, int success)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(e->output, 1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(e->output, success ?
+ SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+/* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */
+static void
+process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
+{
+ Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+ Identity *id;
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, (version == 1) ?
+ SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER :
+ SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, tab->nentries)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &tab->idlist, next) {
+ if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg,
+ BN_num_bits(id->key->rsa->n))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg,
+ id->key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg,
+ id->key->rsa->n)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+#endif
+ } else {
+ u_char *blob;
+ size_t blen;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__,
+ ssh_err(r));
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ free(blob);
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, id->comment)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+/* ssh1 only */
+static void
+process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+ u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16], session_id[16];
+ u_int response_type;
+ BIGNUM *challenge;
+ Identity *id;
+ int r, len;
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
+ struct sshkey *key;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignored */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, challenge)))
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ /* Only protocol 1.1 is supported */
+ if (sshbuf_len(e->request) == 0)
+ goto failure;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get(e->request, session_id, sizeof(session_id))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &response_type)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (response_type != 1)
+ goto failure;
+
+ id = lookup_identity(key, 1);
+ if (id != NULL && (!id->confirm || confirm_key(id) == 0)) {
+ struct sshkey *private = id->key;
+ /* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */
+ if ((r = rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge,
+ private->rsa) != 0)) {
+ fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt: %s", __func__,
+ ssh_err(r));
+ goto failure; /* XXX ? */
+ }
+
+ /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id */
+ len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
+ if (len <= 0 || len > 32) {
+ logit("%s: bad challenge length %d", __func__, len);
+ goto failure;
+ }
+ memset(buf, 0, 32);
+ BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
+ if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
+ ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_final(md, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf)) < 0)
+ fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
+ ssh_digest_free(md);
+
+ /* Send the response. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(msg, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf))) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto send;
+ }
+
+ failure:
+ /* Unknown identity or protocol error. Send failure. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ send:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ BN_clear_free(challenge);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+#endif
+
+static char *
+agent_decode_alg(struct sshkey *key, u_int flags)
+{
+ if (key->type == KEY_RSA) {
+ if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256)
+ return "rsa-sha2-256";
+ else if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512)
+ return "rsa-sha2-512";
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* ssh2 only */
+static void
+process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+ u_char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL;
+ size_t blen, dlen, slen = 0;
+ u_int compat = 0, flags;
+ int r, ok = -1;
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ struct sshkey *key;
+ struct identity *id;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(e->request, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(e->request, &data, &dlen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &flags)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (flags & SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE)
+ compat = SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB;
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: cannot parse key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto send;
+ }
+ if ((id = lookup_identity(key, 2)) == NULL) {
+ verbose("%s: %s key not found", __func__, sshkey_type(key));
+ goto send;
+ }
+ if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id) != 0) {
+ verbose("%s: user refused key", __func__);
+ goto send;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen,
+ data, dlen, agent_decode_alg(key, flags), compat)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: sshkey_sign: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto send;
+ }
+ /* Success */
+ ok = 0;
+ send:
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ if (ok == 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, signature, slen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ } else if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ free(data);
+ free(blob);
+ free(signature);
+}
+
+/* shared */
+static void
+process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
+{
+ size_t blen;
+ int r, success = 0;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ u_char *blob;
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ u_int bits;
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+
+ switch (version) {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ case 1:
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &bits)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->n)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ if (bits != sshkey_size(key))
+ logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: "
+ "actual %u, announced %u",
+ sshkey_size(key), bits);
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+ case 2:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(e->request, &blob, &blen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0)
+ error("%s: sshkey_from_blob failed: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ free(blob);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (key != NULL) {
+ Identity *id = lookup_identity(key, version);
+ if (id != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * We have this key. Free the old key. Since we
+ * don't want to leave empty slots in the middle of
+ * the array, we actually free the key there and move
+ * all the entries between the empty slot and the end
+ * of the array.
+ */
+ Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+ if (tab->nentries < 1)
+ fatal("process_remove_identity: "
+ "internal error: tab->nentries %d",
+ tab->nentries);
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
+ free_identity(id);
+ tab->nentries--;
+ success = 1;
+ }
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ }
+ send_status(e, success);
+}
+
+static void
+process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
+{
+ Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+ Identity *id;
+
+ /* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */
+ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id;
+ id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist)) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
+ free_identity(id);
+ }
+
+ /* Mark that there are no identities. */
+ tab->nentries = 0;
+
+ /* Send success. */
+ send_status(e, 1);
+}
+
+/* removes expired keys and returns number of seconds until the next expiry */
+static time_t
+reaper(void)
+{
+ time_t deadline = 0, now = monotime();
+ Identity *id, *nxt;
+ int version;
+ Idtab *tab;
+
+ for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) {
+ tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
+ nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
+ if (id->death == 0)
+ continue;
+ if (now >= id->death) {
+ debug("expiring key '%s'", id->comment);
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
+ free_identity(id);
+ tab->nentries--;
+ } else
+ deadline = (deadline == 0) ? id->death :
+ MIN(deadline, id->death);
+ }
+ }
+ if (deadline == 0 || deadline <= now)
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return (deadline - now);
+}
+
+/*
+ * XXX this and the corresponding serialisation function probably belongs
+ * in key.c
+ */
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+static int
+agent_decode_rsa1(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshkey **kp)
+{
+ struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ *kp = NULL;
+ if ((k = sshkey_new_private(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignored */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
+ /* SSH1 and SSL have p and q swapped */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->q)) != 0 || /* p */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->p)) != 0) /* q */
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Generate additional parameters */
+ if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* enable blinding */
+ if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = 0; /* success */
+ out:
+ if (r == 0)
+ *kp = k;
+ else
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+
+static void
+process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
+{
+ Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+ Identity *id;
+ int success = 0, confirm = 0;
+ u_int seconds;
+ char *comment = NULL;
+ time_t death = 0;
+ struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+ u_char ctype;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ switch (version) {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ case 1:
+ r = agent_decode_rsa1(e->request, &k);
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+ case 2:
+ r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (r != 0 || k == NULL ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: decode private key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &ctype)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ switch (ctype) {
+ case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: bad lifetime constraint: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ death = monotime() + seconds;
+ break;
+ case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
+ confirm = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("%s: Unknown constraint %d", __func__, ctype);
+ err:
+ sshbuf_reset(e->request);
+ free(comment);
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ goto send;
+ }
+ }
+
+ success = 1;
+ if (lifetime && !death)
+ death = monotime() + lifetime;
+ if ((id = lookup_identity(k, version)) == NULL) {
+ id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
+ id->key = k;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
+ /* Increment the number of identities. */
+ tab->nentries++;
+ } else {
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ free(id->comment);
+ }
+ id->comment = comment;
+ id->death = death;
+ id->confirm = confirm;
+send:
+ send_status(e, success);
+}
+
+/* XXX todo: encrypt sensitive data with passphrase */
+static void
+process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock)
+{
+ int r, success = 0, delay;
+ char *passwd;
+ u_char passwdhash[LOCK_SIZE];
+ static u_int fail_count = 0;
+ size_t pwlen;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &passwd, &pwlen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (pwlen == 0) {
+ debug("empty password not supported");
+ } else if (locked && !lock) {
+ if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
+ passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
+ fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
+ if (timingsafe_bcmp(passwdhash, lock_pwhash, LOCK_SIZE) == 0) {
+ debug("agent unlocked");
+ locked = 0;
+ fail_count = 0;
+ explicit_bzero(lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash));
+ success = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* delay in 0.1s increments up to 10s */
+ if (fail_count < 100)
+ fail_count++;
+ delay = 100000 * fail_count;
+ debug("unlock failed, delaying %0.1lf seconds",
+ (double)delay/1000000);
+ usleep(delay);
+ }
+ explicit_bzero(passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash));
+ } else if (!locked && lock) {
+ debug("agent locked");
+ locked = 1;
+ arc4random_buf(lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt));
+ if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
+ lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
+ fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
+ success = 1;
+ }
+ explicit_bzero(passwd, pwlen);
+ free(passwd);
+ send_status(e, success);
+}
+
+static void
+no_identities(SocketEntry *e, u_int type)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg,
+ (type == SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES) ?
+ SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER :
+ SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+static void
+process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+ char *provider = NULL, *pin;
+ int r, i, version, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
+ u_int seconds;
+ time_t death = 0;
+ u_char type;
+ struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k;
+ Identity *id;
+ Idtab *tab;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ death = monotime() + seconds;
+ break;
+ case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
+ confirm = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("process_add_smartcard_key: "
+ "Unknown constraint type %d", type);
+ goto send;
+ }
+ }
+ if (lifetime && !death)
+ death = monotime() + lifetime;
+
+ count = pkcs11_add_provider(provider, pin, &keys);
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ k = keys[i];
+ version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2;
+ tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+ if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) {
+ id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
+ id->key = k;
+ id->provider = xstrdup(provider);
+ id->comment = xstrdup(provider); /* XXX */
+ id->death = death;
+ id->confirm = confirm;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
+ tab->nentries++;
+ success = 1;
+ } else {
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ }
+ keys[i] = NULL;
+ }
+send:
+ free(pin);
+ free(provider);
+ free(keys);
+ send_status(e, success);
+}
+
+static void
+process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+ char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL;
+ int r, version, success = 0;
+ Identity *id, *nxt;
+ Idtab *tab;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ free(pin);
+
+ for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) {
+ tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
+ nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
+ /* Skip file--based keys */
+ if (id->provider == NULL)
+ continue;
+ if (!strcmp(provider, id->provider)) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
+ free_identity(id);
+ tab->nentries--;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (pkcs11_del_provider(provider) == 0)
+ success = 1;
+ else
+ error("process_remove_smartcard_key:"
+ " pkcs11_del_provider failed");
+ free(provider);
+ send_status(e, success);
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+
+/* dispatch incoming messages */
+
+static void
+process_message(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+ u_int msg_len;
+ u_char type;
+ const u_char *cp;
+ int r;
+
+ if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < 5)
+ return; /* Incomplete message. */
+ cp = sshbuf_ptr(e->input);
+ msg_len = PEEK_U32(cp);
+ if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
+ close_socket(e);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < msg_len + 4)
+ return;
+
+ /* move the current input to e->request */
+ sshbuf_reset(e->request);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->input, e->request)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ /* check wheter agent is locked */
+ if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) {
+ sshbuf_reset(e->request);
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES:
+ case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
+ /* send empty lists */
+ no_identities(e, type);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* send a fail message for all other request types */
+ send_status(e, 0);
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
+ debug("type %d", type);
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH_AGENTC_LOCK:
+ case SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK:
+ process_lock_agent(e, type == SSH_AGENTC_LOCK);
+ break;
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ /* ssh1 */
+ case SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE:
+ process_authentication_challenge1(e);
+ break;
+ case SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES:
+ process_request_identities(e, 1);
+ break;
+ case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY:
+ case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED:
+ process_add_identity(e, 1);
+ break;
+ case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY:
+ process_remove_identity(e, 1);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES:
+ process_remove_all_identities(e, 1); /* safe for !WITH_SSH1 */
+ break;
+ /* ssh2 */
+ case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST:
+ process_sign_request2(e);
+ break;
+ case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
+ process_request_identities(e, 2);
+ break;
+ case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY:
+ case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED:
+ process_add_identity(e, 2);
+ break;
+ case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY:
+ process_remove_identity(e, 2);
+ break;
+ case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES:
+ process_remove_all_identities(e, 2);
+ break;
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY:
+ case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED:
+ process_add_smartcard_key(e);
+ break;
+ case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY:
+ process_remove_smartcard_key(e);
+ break;
+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+ default:
+ /* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */
+ error("Unknown message %d", type);
+ sshbuf_reset(e->request);
+ send_status(e, 0);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+new_socket(sock_type type, int fd)
+{
+ u_int i, old_alloc, new_alloc;
+
+ set_nonblock(fd);
+
+ if (fd > max_fd)
+ max_fd = fd;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++)
+ if (sockets[i].type == AUTH_UNUSED) {
+ sockets[i].fd = fd;
+ if ((sockets[i].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((sockets[i].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((sockets[i].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ sockets[i].type = type;
+ return;
+ }
+ old_alloc = sockets_alloc;
+ new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10;
+ sockets = xreallocarray(sockets, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0]));
+ for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++)
+ sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
+ sockets_alloc = new_alloc;
+ sockets[old_alloc].fd = fd;
+ if ((sockets[old_alloc].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((sockets[old_alloc].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((sockets[old_alloc].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ sockets[old_alloc].type = type;
+}
+
+static int
+prepare_select(fd_set **fdrp, fd_set **fdwp, int *fdl, u_int *nallocp,
+ struct timeval **tvpp)
+{
+ u_int i, sz;
+ int n = 0;
+ static struct timeval tv;
+ time_t deadline;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
+ switch (sockets[i].type) {
+ case AUTH_SOCKET:
+ case AUTH_CONNECTION:
+ n = MAX(n, sockets[i].fd);
+ break;
+ case AUTH_UNUSED:
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("Unknown socket type %d", sockets[i].type);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ sz = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
+ if (*fdrp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) {
+ free(*fdrp);
+ free(*fdwp);
+ *fdrp = xmalloc(sz);
+ *fdwp = xmalloc(sz);
+ *nallocp = sz;
+ }
+ if (n < *fdl)
+ debug("XXX shrink: %d < %d", n, *fdl);
+ *fdl = n;
+ memset(*fdrp, 0, sz);
+ memset(*fdwp, 0, sz);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
+ switch (sockets[i].type) {
+ case AUTH_SOCKET:
+ case AUTH_CONNECTION:
+ FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, *fdrp);
+ if (sshbuf_len(sockets[i].output) > 0)
+ FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, *fdwp);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ deadline = reaper();
+ if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
+ deadline = (deadline == 0) ? parent_alive_interval :
+ MIN(deadline, parent_alive_interval);
+ if (deadline == 0) {
+ *tvpp = NULL;
+ } else {
+ tv.tv_sec = deadline;
+ tv.tv_usec = 0;
+ *tvpp = &tv;
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static void
+after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+ socklen_t slen;
+ char buf[1024];
+ int len, sock, r;
+ u_int i, orig_alloc;
+ uid_t euid;
+ gid_t egid;
+
+ for (i = 0, orig_alloc = sockets_alloc; i < orig_alloc; i++)
+ switch (sockets[i].type) {
+ case AUTH_UNUSED:
+ break;
+ case AUTH_SOCKET:
+ if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) {
+ slen = sizeof(sunaddr);
+ sock = accept(sockets[i].fd,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, &slen);
+ if (sock < 0) {
+ error("accept from AUTH_SOCKET: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ break;
+ }
+ if (getpeereid(sock, &euid, &egid) < 0) {
+ error("getpeereid %d failed: %s",
+ sock, strerror(errno));
+ close(sock);
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) {
+ error("uid mismatch: "
+ "peer euid %u != uid %u",
+ (u_int) euid, (u_int) getuid());
+ close(sock);
+ break;
+ }
+ new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, sock);
+ }
+ break;
+ case AUTH_CONNECTION:
+ if (sshbuf_len(sockets[i].output) > 0 &&
+ FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, writeset)) {
+ len = write(sockets[i].fd,
+ sshbuf_ptr(sockets[i].output),
+ sshbuf_len(sockets[i].output));
+ if (len == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN ||
+ errno == EWOULDBLOCK ||
+ errno == EINTR))
+ continue;
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ close_socket(&sockets[i]);
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(sockets[i].output,
+ len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) {
+ len = read(sockets[i].fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (len == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN ||
+ errno == EWOULDBLOCK ||
+ errno == EINTR))
+ continue;
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ close_socket(&sockets[i]);
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(sockets[i].input,
+ buf, len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ process_message(&sockets[i]);
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("Unknown type %d", sockets[i].type);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+cleanup_socket(void)
+{
+ if (cleanup_pid != 0 && getpid() != cleanup_pid)
+ return;
+ debug("%s: cleanup", __func__);
+ if (socket_name[0])
+ unlink(socket_name);
+ if (socket_dir[0])
+ rmdir(socket_dir);
+}
+
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+ cleanup_socket();
+ _exit(i);
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+cleanup_handler(int sig)
+{
+ cleanup_socket();
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ pkcs11_terminate();
+#endif
+ _exit(2);
+}
+
+static void
+check_parent_exists(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * If our parent has exited then getppid() will return (pid_t)1,
+ * so testing for that should be safe.
+ */
+ if (parent_pid != -1 && getppid() != parent_pid) {
+ /* printf("Parent has died - Authentication agent exiting.\n"); */
+ cleanup_socket();
+ _exit(2);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
+ " [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n"
+ " ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n");
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int ac, char **av)
+{
+ int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, D_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0;
+ int sock, fd, ch, result, saved_errno;
+ u_int nalloc;
+ char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL;
+ fd_set *readsetp = NULL, *writesetp = NULL;
+#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
+ struct rlimit rlim;
+#endif
+ extern int optind;
+ extern char *optarg;
+ pid_t pid;
+ char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid];
+ struct timeval *tvp = NULL;
+ size_t len;
+ mode_t prev_mask;
+
+ ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
+ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+ sanitise_stdfd();
+
+ /* drop */
+ setegid(getgid());
+ setgid(getgid());
+
+ platform_disable_tracing(0); /* strict=no */
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+#endif
+
+ __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+ seed_rng();
+
+ while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:t:")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'E':
+ fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
+ if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
+ fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'c':
+ if (s_flag)
+ usage();
+ c_flag++;
+ break;
+ case 'k':
+ k_flag++;
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ if (c_flag)
+ usage();
+ s_flag++;
+ break;
+ case 'd':
+ if (d_flag || D_flag)
+ usage();
+ d_flag++;
+ break;
+ case 'D':
+ if (d_flag || D_flag)
+ usage();
+ D_flag++;
+ break;
+ case 'a':
+ agentsocket = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 't':
+ if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n");
+ usage();
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ usage();
+ }
+ }
+ ac -= optind;
+ av += optind;
+
+ if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag || D_flag))
+ usage();
+
+ if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
+ shell = getenv("SHELL");
+ if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 &&
+ strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
+ c_flag = 1;
+ }
+ if (k_flag) {
+ const char *errstr = NULL;
+
+ pidstr = getenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
+ if (pidstr == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s not set, cannot kill agent\n",
+ SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ pid = (int)strtonum(pidstr, 2, INT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID: %s\n",
+ SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr, errstr);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1) {
+ perror("kill");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ format = c_flag ? "unsetenv %s;\n" : "unset %s;\n";
+ printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+ printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
+ printf("echo Agent pid %ld killed;\n", (long)pid);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+ parent_pid = getpid();
+
+ if (agentsocket == NULL) {
+ /* Create private directory for agent socket */
+ mktemp_proto(socket_dir, sizeof(socket_dir));
+ if (mkdtemp(socket_dir) == NULL) {
+ perror("mkdtemp: private socket dir");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ snprintf(socket_name, sizeof socket_name, "%s/agent.%ld", socket_dir,
+ (long)parent_pid);
+ } else {
+ /* Try to use specified agent socket */
+ socket_dir[0] = '\0';
+ strlcpy(socket_name, agentsocket, sizeof socket_name);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from
+ * the parent.
+ */
+ prev_mask = umask(0177);
+ sock = unix_listener(socket_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0);
+ if (sock < 0) {
+ /* XXX - unix_listener() calls error() not perror() */
+ *socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */
+ cleanup_exit(1);
+ }
+ umask(prev_mask);
+
+ /*
+ * Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present
+ * the socket data. The child continues as the authentication agent.
+ */
+ if (D_flag || d_flag) {
+ log_init(__progname,
+ d_flag ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
+ format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
+ printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
+ SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+ printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)parent_pid);
+ fflush(stdout);
+ goto skip;
+ }
+ pid = fork();
+ if (pid == -1) {
+ perror("fork");
+ cleanup_exit(1);
+ }
+ if (pid != 0) { /* Parent - execute the given command. */
+ close(sock);
+ snprintf(pidstrbuf, sizeof pidstrbuf, "%ld", (long)pid);
+ if (ac == 0) {
+ format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
+ printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
+ SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+ printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf,
+ SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
+ printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)pid);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+ if (setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, 1) == -1 ||
+ setenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, 1) == -1) {
+ perror("setenv");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ execvp(av[0], av);
+ perror(av[0]);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* child */
+ log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
+
+ if (setsid() == -1) {
+ error("setsid: %s", strerror(errno));
+ cleanup_exit(1);
+ }
+
+ (void)chdir("/");
+ if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
+ /* XXX might close listen socket */
+ (void)dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
+ (void)dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
+ (void)dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
+ if (fd > 2)
+ close(fd);
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
+ /* deny core dumps, since memory contains unencrypted private keys */
+ rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
+ if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0) {
+ error("setrlimit RLIMIT_CORE: %s", strerror(errno));
+ cleanup_exit(1);
+ }
+#endif
+
+skip:
+
+ cleanup_pid = getpid();
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ pkcs11_init(0);
+#endif
+ new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock);
+ if (ac > 0)
+ parent_alive_interval = 10;
+ idtab_init();
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+ signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN);
+ signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler);
+ signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
+ nalloc = 0;
+
+ if (pledge("stdio cpath unix id proc exec", NULL) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
+ platform_pledge_agent();
+
+ while (1) {
+ prepare_select(&readsetp, &writesetp, &max_fd, &nalloc, &tvp);
+ result = select(max_fd + 1, readsetp, writesetp, NULL, tvp);
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
+ check_parent_exists();
+ (void) reaper(); /* remove expired keys */
+ if (result < 0) {
+ if (saved_errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ fatal("select: %s", strerror(saved_errno));
+ } else if (result > 0)
+ after_select(readsetp, writesetp);
+ }
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-dss.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-dss.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-dss.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.31 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-
-#define INTBLOB_LEN 20
-#define SIGBLOB_LEN (2*INTBLOB_LEN)
-
-int
-ssh_dss_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
- const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
- DSA_SIG *sig;
- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
- u_int rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
- Buffer b;
-
- if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
- key->dsa == NULL) {
- error("%s: no DSA key", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
- digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0) {
- error("%s: ssh_digest_memory failed", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa);
- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-
- if (sig == NULL) {
- error("ssh_dss_sign: sign failed");
- return -1;
- }
-
- rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig->r);
- slen = BN_num_bytes(sig->s);
- if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) {
- error("bad sig size %u %u", rlen, slen);
- DSA_SIG_free(sig);
- return -1;
- }
- explicit_bzero(sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN);
- BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen);
- BN_bn2bin(sig->s, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - slen);
- DSA_SIG_free(sig);
-
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) {
- if (lenp != NULL)
- *lenp = SIGBLOB_LEN;
- if (sigp != NULL) {
- *sigp = xmalloc(SIGBLOB_LEN);
- memcpy(*sigp, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN);
- }
- } else {
- /* ietf-drafts */
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-dss");
- buffer_put_string(&b, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN);
- len = buffer_len(&b);
- if (lenp != NULL)
- *lenp = len;
- if (sigp != NULL) {
- *sigp = xmalloc(len);
- memcpy(*sigp, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
- }
- buffer_free(&b);
- }
- return 0;
-}
-int
-ssh_dss_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
- const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
- DSA_SIG *sig;
- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob;
- u_int len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
- int rlen, ret;
- Buffer b;
-
- if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
- key->dsa == NULL) {
- error("%s: no DSA key", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* fetch signature */
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) {
- sigblob = xmalloc(signaturelen);
- memcpy(sigblob, signature, signaturelen);
- len = signaturelen;
- } else {
- /* ietf-drafts */
- char *ktype;
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen);
- ktype = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
- if (strcmp("ssh-dss", ktype) != 0) {
- error("%s: cannot handle type %s", __func__, ktype);
- buffer_free(&b);
- free(ktype);
- return -1;
- }
- free(ktype);
- sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
- rlen = buffer_len(&b);
- buffer_free(&b);
- if (rlen != 0) {
- error("%s: remaining bytes in signature %d",
- __func__, rlen);
- free(sigblob);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- if (len != SIGBLOB_LEN) {
- fatal("bad sigbloblen %u != SIGBLOB_LEN", len);
- }
-
- /* parse signature */
- if ((sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: DSA_SIG_new failed", __func__);
- if ((sig->r = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
- if ((sig->s = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("ssh_dss_verify: BN_new failed");
- if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->r) == NULL) ||
- (BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->s) == NULL))
- fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__);
-
- /* clean up */
- explicit_bzero(sigblob, len);
- free(sigblob);
-
- /* sha1 the data */
- if (ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
- digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0) {
- error("%s: digest_memory failed", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- ret = DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa);
- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-
- DSA_SIG_free(sig);
-
- debug("%s: signature %s", __func__,
- ret == 1 ? "correct" : ret == 0 ? "incorrect" : "error");
- return ret;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-dss.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-dss.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-dss.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-dss.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.35 2016/04/21 06:08:02 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+#include "sshkey.h"
+
+#define INTBLOB_LEN 20
+#define SIGBLOB_LEN (2*INTBLOB_LEN)
+
+int
+ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+{
+ DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
+ size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = 0;
+ if (sigp != NULL)
+ *sigp = NULL;
+
+ if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
+ sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
+ digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig->r);
+ slen = BN_num_bytes(sig->s);
+ if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ explicit_bzero(sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN);
+ BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen);
+ BN_bn2bin(sig->s, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - slen);
+
+ if (compat & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) {
+ if (sigp != NULL) {
+ if ((*sigp = malloc(SIGBLOB_LEN)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(*sigp, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN);
+ }
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = SIGBLOB_LEN;
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* ietf-drafts */
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-dss")) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ len = sshbuf_len(b);
+ if (sigp != NULL) {
+ if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
+ }
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = len;
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+ if (sig != NULL)
+ DSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+{
+ DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL;
+ size_t len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ char *ktype = NULL;
+
+ if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
+ sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
+ signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ /* fetch signature */
+ if (compat & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) {
+ if ((sigblob = malloc(signaturelen)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ memcpy(sigblob, signature, signaturelen);
+ len = signaturelen;
+ } else {
+ /* ietf-drafts */
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_string(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strcmp("ssh-dss", ktype) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (len != SIGBLOB_LEN) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* parse signature */
+ if ((sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL ||
+ (sig->r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (sig->s = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->r) == NULL) ||
+ (BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->s) == NULL)) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* sha1 the data */
+ if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
+ digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa)) {
+ case 1:
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ default:
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+ if (sig != NULL)
+ DSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ free(ktype);
+ if (sigblob != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(sigblob, len);
+ free(sigblob);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-ecdsa.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-ecdsa.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-ecdsa.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,178 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa.c,v 1.10 2014/02/03 23:28:00 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-
-int
-ssh_ecdsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
- const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
- ECDSA_SIG *sig;
- int hash_alg;
- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
- u_int len, dlen;
- Buffer b, bb;
-
- if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
- key->ecdsa == NULL) {
- error("%s: no ECDSA key", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- hash_alg = key_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid);
- if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
- error("%s: bad hash algorithm %d", __func__, hash_alg);
- return -1;
- }
- if (ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
- digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0) {
- error("%s: digest_memory failed", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa);
- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-
- if (sig == NULL) {
- error("%s: sign failed", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- buffer_init(&bb);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&bb, sig->r);
- buffer_put_bignum2(&bb, sig->s);
- ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name_plain(key));
- buffer_put_string(&b, buffer_ptr(&bb), buffer_len(&bb));
- buffer_free(&bb);
- len = buffer_len(&b);
- if (lenp != NULL)
- *lenp = len;
- if (sigp != NULL) {
- *sigp = xmalloc(len);
- memcpy(*sigp, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
- }
- buffer_free(&b);
-
- return 0;
-}
-int
-ssh_ecdsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
- const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
- ECDSA_SIG *sig;
- int hash_alg;
- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob;
- u_int len, dlen;
- int rlen, ret;
- Buffer b, bb;
- char *ktype;
-
- if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
- key->ecdsa == NULL) {
- error("%s: no ECDSA key", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* fetch signature */
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen);
- ktype = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
- if (strcmp(key_ssh_name_plain(key), ktype) != 0) {
- error("%s: cannot handle type %s", __func__, ktype);
- buffer_free(&b);
- free(ktype);
- return -1;
- }
- free(ktype);
- sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
- rlen = buffer_len(&b);
- buffer_free(&b);
- if (rlen != 0) {
- error("%s: remaining bytes in signature %d", __func__, rlen);
- free(sigblob);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* parse signature */
- if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: ECDSA_SIG_new failed", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&bb);
- buffer_append(&bb, sigblob, len);
- buffer_get_bignum2(&bb, sig->r);
- buffer_get_bignum2(&bb, sig->s);
- if (buffer_len(&bb) != 0)
- fatal("%s: remaining bytes in inner sigblob", __func__);
- buffer_free(&bb);
-
- /* clean up */
- explicit_bzero(sigblob, len);
- free(sigblob);
-
- /* hash the data */
- hash_alg = key_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid);
- if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
- error("%s: bad hash algorithm %d", __func__, hash_alg);
- return -1;
- }
- if (ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
- digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0) {
- error("%s: digest_memory failed", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- ret = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa);
- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-
- ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
-
- debug("%s: signature %s", __func__,
- ret == 1 ? "correct" : ret == 0 ? "incorrect" : "error");
- return ret;
-}
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-ecdsa.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-ecdsa.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-ecdsa.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-ecdsa.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa.c,v 1.13 2016/04/21 06:08:02 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+#include "sshkey.h"
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+{
+ ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ int hash_alg;
+ u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t len, dlen;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = 0;
+ if (sigp != NULL)
+ *sigp = NULL;
+
+ if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
+ sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
+ (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
+ digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig->r)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig->s)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key))) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, bb)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ len = sshbuf_len(b);
+ if (sigp != NULL) {
+ if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
+ }
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = len;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ sshbuf_free(bb);
+ if (sig != NULL)
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+{
+ ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ int hash_alg;
+ u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t dlen;
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL;
+ char *ktype = NULL;
+
+ if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
+ sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
+ signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
+ (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ /* fetch signature */
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_froms(b, &sigbuf) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key), ktype) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* parse signature */
+ if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, sig->r) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, sig->s) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
+ digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa)) {
+ case 1:
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ default:
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+ sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ if (sig != NULL)
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ free(ktype);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-ed25519.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-ed25519.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-ed25519.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ed25519.c,v 1.3 2014/02/23 20:03:42 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2013 Markus Friedl <markus at openbsd.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include "crypto_api.h"
-
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-
-int
-ssh_ed25519_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
- const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
- u_char *sig;
- u_int slen, len;
- unsigned long long smlen;
- int ret;
- Buffer b;
-
- if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 ||
- key->ed25519_sk == NULL) {
- error("%s: no ED25519 key", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (datalen >= UINT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) {
- error("%s: datalen %u too long", __func__, datalen);
- return -1;
- }
- smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES;
- sig = xmalloc(slen);
-
- if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519(sig, &smlen, data, datalen,
- key->ed25519_sk)) != 0 || smlen <= datalen) {
- error("%s: crypto_sign_ed25519 failed: %d", __func__, ret);
- free(sig);
- return -1;
- }
- /* encode signature */
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-ed25519");
- buffer_put_string(&b, sig, smlen - datalen);
- len = buffer_len(&b);
- if (lenp != NULL)
- *lenp = len;
- if (sigp != NULL) {
- *sigp = xmalloc(len);
- memcpy(*sigp, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
- }
- buffer_free(&b);
- explicit_bzero(sig, slen);
- free(sig);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-ssh_ed25519_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
- const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
- Buffer b;
- char *ktype;
- u_char *sigblob, *sm, *m;
- u_int len;
- unsigned long long smlen, mlen;
- int rlen, ret;
-
- if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 ||
- key->ed25519_pk == NULL) {
- error("%s: no ED25519 key", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen);
- ktype = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
- if (strcmp("ssh-ed25519", ktype) != 0) {
- error("%s: cannot handle type %s", __func__, ktype);
- buffer_free(&b);
- free(ktype);
- return -1;
- }
- free(ktype);
- sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
- rlen = buffer_len(&b);
- buffer_free(&b);
- if (rlen != 0) {
- error("%s: remaining bytes in signature %d", __func__, rlen);
- free(sigblob);
- return -1;
- }
- if (len > crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) {
- error("%s: len %u > crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES %u", __func__,
- len, crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES);
- free(sigblob);
- return -1;
- }
- smlen = len + datalen;
- sm = xmalloc(smlen);
- memcpy(sm, sigblob, len);
- memcpy(sm+len, data, datalen);
- mlen = smlen;
- m = xmalloc(mlen);
- if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519_open(m, &mlen, sm, smlen,
- key->ed25519_pk)) != 0) {
- debug2("%s: crypto_sign_ed25519_open failed: %d",
- __func__, ret);
- }
- if (ret == 0 && mlen != datalen) {
- debug2("%s: crypto_sign_ed25519_open "
- "mlen != datalen (%llu != %u)", __func__, mlen, datalen);
- ret = -1;
- }
- /* XXX compare 'm' and 'data' ? */
-
- explicit_bzero(sigblob, len);
- explicit_bzero(sm, smlen);
- explicit_bzero(m, smlen); /* NB. mlen may be invalid if ret != 0 */
- free(sigblob);
- free(sm);
- free(m);
- debug("%s: signature %scorrect", __func__, (ret != 0) ? "in" : "");
-
- /* translate return code carefully */
- return (ret == 0) ? 1 : -1;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-ed25519.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-ed25519.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-ed25519.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-ed25519.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ed25519.c,v 1.7 2016/04/21 06:08:02 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Markus Friedl <markus at openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+int
+ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+{
+ u_char *sig = NULL;
+ size_t slen = 0, len;
+ unsigned long long smlen;
+ int r, ret;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = 0;
+ if (sigp != NULL)
+ *sigp = NULL;
+
+ if (key == NULL ||
+ sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 ||
+ key->ed25519_sk == NULL ||
+ datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES;
+ if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+ if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519(sig, &smlen, data, datalen,
+ key->ed25519_sk)) != 0 || smlen <= datalen) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* XXX better error? */
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* encode signature */
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-ed25519")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sig, smlen - datalen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ len = sshbuf_len(b);
+ if (sigp != NULL) {
+ if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
+ }
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = len;
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ if (sig != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(sig, slen);
+ free(sig);
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ char *ktype = NULL;
+ const u_char *sigblob;
+ u_char *sm = NULL, *m = NULL;
+ size_t len;
+ unsigned long long smlen = 0, mlen = 0;
+ int r, ret;
+
+ if (key == NULL ||
+ sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 ||
+ key->ed25519_pk == NULL ||
+ datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
+ signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &sigblob, &len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (strcmp("ssh-ed25519", ktype) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (len > crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (datalen >= SIZE_MAX - len) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ smlen = len + datalen;
+ mlen = smlen;
+ if ((sm = malloc(smlen)) == NULL || (m = malloc(mlen)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(sm, sigblob, len);
+ memcpy(sm+len, data, datalen);
+ if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519_open(m, &mlen, sm, smlen,
+ key->ed25519_pk)) != 0) {
+ debug2("%s: crypto_sign_ed25519_open failed: %d",
+ __func__, ret);
+ }
+ if (ret != 0 || mlen != datalen) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* XXX compare 'm' and 'data' ? */
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ if (sm != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(sm, smlen);
+ free(sm);
+ }
+ if (m != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(m, smlen); /* NB mlen may be invalid if r != 0 */
+ free(m);
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ free(ktype);
+ return r;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keygen.0
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keygen.0 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keygen.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,562 +0,0 @@
-SSH-KEYGEN(1) OpenBSD Reference Manual SSH-KEYGEN(1)
-
-NAME
- ssh-keygen - authentication key generation, management and conversion
-
-SYNOPSIS
- ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t type] [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment]
- [-f output_keyfile]
- ssh-keygen -p [-P old_passphrase] [-N new_passphrase] [-f keyfile]
- ssh-keygen -i [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]
- ssh-keygen -e [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]
- ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]
- ssh-keygen -c [-P passphrase] [-C comment] [-f keyfile]
- ssh-keygen -l [-f input_keyfile]
- ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]
- ssh-keygen -D pkcs11
- ssh-keygen -F hostname [-f known_hosts_file] [-l]
- ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]
- ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]
- ssh-keygen -r hostname [-f input_keyfile] [-g]
- ssh-keygen -G output_file [-v] [-b bits] [-M memory] [-S start_point]
- ssh-keygen -T output_file -f input_file [-v] [-a rounds] [-J num_lines]
- [-j start_line] [-K checkpt] [-W generator]
- ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I certificate_identity [-h] [-n principals]
- [-O option] [-V validity_interval] [-z serial_number] file ...
- ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]
- ssh-keygen -A
- ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]
- file ...
- ssh-keygen -Q -f krl_file file ...
-
-DESCRIPTION
- ssh-keygen generates, manages and converts authentication keys for
- ssh(1). ssh-keygen can create RSA keys for use by SSH protocol version 1
- and DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 or RSA keys for use by SSH protocol version 2.
- The type of key to be generated is specified with the -t option. If
- invoked without any arguments, ssh-keygen will generate an RSA key for
- use in SSH protocol 2 connections.
-
- ssh-keygen is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman
- group exchange (DH-GEX). See the MODULI GENERATION section for details.
-
- Finally, ssh-keygen can be used to generate and update Key Revocation
- Lists, and to test whether given keys have been revoked by one. See the
- KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details.
-
- Normally each user wishing to use SSH with public key authentication runs
- this once to create the authentication key in ~/.ssh/identity,
- ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 or ~/.ssh/id_rsa.
- Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host
- keys, as seen in /etc/rc.
-
- Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which to
- store the private key. The public key is stored in a file with the same
- name but ``.pub'' appended. The program also asks for a passphrase. The
- passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase (host keys must have an
- empty passphrase), or it may be a string of arbitrary length. A
- passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a
- series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of
- characters you want. Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are not
- simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English prose has only
- 1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad passphrases),
- and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters, numbers, and non-
- alphanumeric characters. The passphrase can be changed later by using
- the -p option.
-
- There is no way to recover a lost passphrase. If the passphrase is lost
- or forgotten, a new key must be generated and the corresponding public
- key copied to other machines.
-
- For RSA1 keys, there is also a comment field in the key file that is only
- for convenience to the user to help identify the key. The comment can
- tell what the key is for, or whatever is useful. The comment is
- initialized to ``user at host'' when the key is created, but can be changed
- using the -c option.
-
- After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys should
- be placed to be activated.
-
- The options are as follows:
-
- -A For each of the key types (rsa1, rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519) for
- which host keys do not exist, generate the host keys with the
- default key file path, an empty passphrase, default bits for the
- key type, and default comment. This is used by /etc/rc to
- generate new host keys.
-
- -a rounds
- When saving a new-format private key (i.e. an ed25519 key or any
- SSH protocol 2 key when the -o flag is set), this option
- specifies the number of KDF (key derivation function) rounds
- used. Higher numbers result in slower passphrase verification
- and increased resistance to brute-force password cracking (should
- the keys be stolen).
-
- When screening DH-GEX candidates ( using the -T command). This
- option specifies the number of primality tests to perform.
-
- -B Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key
- file.
-
- -b bits
- Specifies the number of bits in the key to create. For RSA keys,
- the minimum size is 768 bits and the default is 2048 bits.
- Generally, 2048 bits is considered sufficient. DSA keys must be
- exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2. For ECDSA keys,
- the -b flag determines the key length by selecting from one of
- three elliptic curve sizes: 256, 384 or 521 bits. Attempting to
- use bit lengths other than these three values for ECDSA keys will
- fail. ED25519 keys have a fixed length and the -b flag will be
- ignored.
-
- -C comment
- Provides a new comment.
-
- -c Requests changing the comment in the private and public key
- files. This operation is only supported for RSA1 keys. The
- program will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for
- the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment.
-
- -D pkcs11
- Download the RSA public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared
- library pkcs11. When used in combination with -s, this option
- indicates that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the
- CERTIFICATES section for details).
-
- -e This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and
- print to stdout the key in one of the formats specified by the -m
- option. The default export format is ``RFC4716''. This option
- allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs,
- including several commercial SSH implementations.
-
- -F hostname
- Search for the specified hostname in a known_hosts file, listing
- any occurrences found. This option is useful to find hashed host
- names or addresses and may also be used in conjunction with the
- -H option to print found keys in a hashed format.
-
- -f filename
- Specifies the filename of the key file.
-
- -G output_file
- Generate candidate primes for DH-GEX. These primes must be
- screened for safety (using the -T option) before use.
-
- -g Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records
- using the -r command.
-
- -H Hash a known_hosts file. This replaces all hostnames and
- addresses with hashed representations within the specified file;
- the original content is moved to a file with a .old suffix.
- These hashes may be used normally by ssh and sshd, but they do
- not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be
- disclosed. This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames
- and is therefore safe to use on files that mix hashed and non-
- hashed names.
-
- -h When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user
- certificate. Please see the CERTIFICATES section for details.
-
- -I certificate_identity
- Specify the key identity when signing a public key. Please see
- the CERTIFICATES section for details.
-
- -i This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file
- in the format specified by the -m option and print an OpenSSH
- compatible private (or public) key to stdout.
-
- -J num_lines
- Exit after screening the specified number of lines while
- performing DH candidate screening using the -T option.
-
- -j start_line
- Start screening at the specified line number while performing DH
- candidate screening using the -T option.
-
- -K checkpt
- Write the last line processed to the file checkpt while
- performing DH candidate screening using the -T option. This will
- be used to skip lines in the input file that have already been
- processed if the job is restarted. This option allows importing
- keys from other software, including several commercial SSH
- implementations. The default import format is ``RFC4716''.
-
- -k Generate a KRL file. In this mode, ssh-keygen will generate a
- KRL file at the location specified via the -f flag that revokes
- every key or certificate presented on the command line.
- Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key
- file or using the format described in the KEY REVOCATION LISTS
- section.
-
- -L Prints the contents of a certificate.
-
- -l Show fingerprint of specified public key file. Private RSA1 keys
- are also supported. For RSA and DSA keys ssh-keygen tries to
- find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint. If
- combined with -v, an ASCII art representation of the key is
- supplied with the fingerprint.
-
- -M memory
- Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when
- generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
-
- -m key_format
- Specify a key format for the -i (import) or -e (export)
- conversion options. The supported key formats are: ``RFC4716''
- (RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key), ``PKCS8'' (PEM PKCS8
- public key) or ``PEM'' (PEM public key). The default conversion
- format is ``RFC4716''.
-
- -N new_passphrase
- Provides the new passphrase.
-
- -n principals
- Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be
- included in a certificate when signing a key. Multiple
- principals may be specified, separated by commas. Please see the
- CERTIFICATES section for details.
-
- -O option
- Specify a certificate option when signing a key. This option may
- be specified multiple times. Please see the CERTIFICATES section
- for details. The options that are valid for user certificates
- are:
-
- clear Clear all enabled permissions. This is useful for
- clearing the default set of permissions so permissions
- may be added individually.
-
- force-command=command
- Forces the execution of command instead of any shell or
- command specified by the user when the certificate is
- used for authentication.
-
- no-agent-forwarding
- Disable ssh-agent(1) forwarding (permitted by default).
-
- no-port-forwarding
- Disable port forwarding (permitted by default).
-
- no-pty Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default).
-
- no-user-rc
- Disable execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8) (permitted by
- default).
-
- no-x11-forwarding
- Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default).
-
- permit-agent-forwarding
- Allows ssh-agent(1) forwarding.
-
- permit-port-forwarding
- Allows port forwarding.
-
- permit-pty
- Allows PTY allocation.
-
- permit-user-rc
- Allows execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8).
-
- permit-x11-forwarding
- Allows X11 forwarding.
-
- source-address=address_list
- Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate
- is considered valid. The address_list is a comma-
- separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in
- CIDR format.
-
- At present, no options are valid for host keys.
-
- -o Causes ssh-keygen to save SSH protocol 2 private keys using the
- new OpenSSH format rather than the more compatible PEM format.
- The new format has increased resistance to brute-force password
- cracking but is not supported by versions of OpenSSH prior to
- 6.5. Ed25519 keys always use the new private key format.
-
- -P passphrase
- Provides the (old) passphrase.
-
- -p Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of
- creating a new private key. The program will prompt for the file
- containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for
- the new passphrase.
-
- -Q Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL.
-
- -q Silence ssh-keygen.
-
- -R hostname
- Removes all keys belonging to hostname from a known_hosts file.
- This option is useful to delete hashed hosts (see the -H option
- above).
-
- -r hostname
- Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named hostname for
- the specified public key file.
-
- -S start
- Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for
- DH-GEX.
-
- -s ca_key
- Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key. Please
- see the CERTIFICATES section for details.
-
- When generating a KRL, -s specifies a path to a CA public key
- file used to revoke certificates directly by key ID or serial
- number. See the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details.
-
- -T output_file
- Test DH group exchange candidate primes (generated using the -G
- option) for safety.
-
- -t type
- Specifies the type of key to create. The possible values are
- ``rsa1'' for protocol version 1 and ``dsa'', ``ecdsa'',
- ``ed25519'', or ``rsa'' for protocol version 2.
-
- -u Update a KRL. When specified with -k, keys listed via the
- command line are added to the existing KRL rather than a new KRL
- being created.
-
- -V validity_interval
- Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate. A
- validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that
- the certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time,
- or may consist of two times separated by a colon to indicate an
- explicit time interval. The start time may be specified as a
- date in YYYYMMDD format, a time in YYYYMMDDHHMMSS format or a
- relative time (to the current time) consisting of a minus sign
- followed by a relative time in the format described in the TIME
- FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). The end time may be specified
- as a YYYYMMDD date, a YYYYMMDDHHMMSS time or a relative time
- starting with a plus character.
-
- For example: ``+52w1d'' (valid from now to 52 weeks and one day
- from now), ``-4w:+4w'' (valid from four weeks ago to four weeks
- from now), ``20100101123000:20110101123000'' (valid from 12:30
- PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011),
- ``-1d:20110101'' (valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st,
- 2011).
-
- -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh-keygen to print debugging messages
- about its progress. This is helpful for debugging moduli
- generation. Multiple -v options increase the verbosity. The
- maximum is 3.
-
- -W generator
- Specify desired generator when testing candidate moduli for DH-
- GEX.
-
- -y This option will read a private OpenSSH format file and print an
- OpenSSH public key to stdout.
-
- -z serial_number
- Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to
- distinguish this certificate from others from the same CA. The
- default serial number is zero.
-
- When generating a KRL, the -z flag is used to specify a KRL
- version number.
-
-MODULI GENERATION
- ssh-keygen may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group
- Exchange (DH-GEX) protocol. Generating these groups is a two-step
- process: first, candidate primes are generated using a fast, but memory
- intensive process. These candidate primes are then tested for
- suitability (a CPU-intensive process).
-
- Generation of primes is performed using the -G option. The desired
- length of the primes may be specified by the -b option. For example:
-
- # ssh-keygen -G moduli-2048.candidates -b 2048
-
- By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the desired
- length range. This may be overridden using the -S option, which
- specifies a different start point (in hex).
-
- Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be screened for
- suitability. This may be performed using the -T option. In this mode
- ssh-keygen will read candidates from standard input (or a file specified
- using the -f option). For example:
-
- # ssh-keygen -T moduli-2048 -f moduli-2048.candidates
-
- By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests.
- This may be overridden using the -a option. The DH generator value will
- be chosen automatically for the prime under consideration. If a specific
- generator is desired, it may be requested using the -W option. Valid
- generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
-
- Screened DH groups may be installed in /etc/moduli. It is important that
- this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and that both ends of
- a connection share common moduli.
-
-CERTIFICATES
- ssh-keygen supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be
- used for user or host authentication. Certificates consist of a public
- key, some identity information, zero or more principal (user or host)
- names and a set of options that are signed by a Certification Authority
- (CA) key. Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify
- its signature on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys.
- Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format
- to the X.509 certificates used in ssl(8).
-
- ssh-keygen supports two types of certificates: user and host. User
- certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates
- authenticate server hosts to users. To generate a user certificate:
-
- $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub
-
- The resultant certificate will be placed in /path/to/user_key-cert.pub.
- A host certificate requires the -h option:
-
- $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub
-
- The host certificate will be output to /path/to/host_key-cert.pub.
-
- It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by
- providing the token library using -D and identifying the CA key by
- providing its public half as an argument to -s:
-
- $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id host_key.pub
-
- In all cases, key_id is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server
- when the certificate is used for authentication.
-
- Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal
- (user/host) names. By default, generated certificates are valid for all
- users or hosts. To generate a certificate for a specified set of
- principals:
-
- $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub
- $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain user_key.pub
-
- Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may
- be specified through certificate options. A certificate option may
- disable features of the SSH session, may be valid only when presented
- from particular source addresses or may force the use of a specific
- command. For a list of valid certificate options, see the documentation
- for the -O option above.
-
- Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime. The -V
- option allows specification of certificate start and end times. A
- certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be
- considered valid. By default, certificates are valid from UNIX Epoch to
- the distant future.
-
- For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA
- public key must be trusted by sshd(8) or ssh(1). Please refer to those
- manual pages for details.
-
-KEY REVOCATION LISTS
- ssh-keygen is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs).
- These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a
- compact format, taking as little as one bit per certificate if they are
- being revoked by serial number.
-
- KRLs may be generated using the -k flag. This option reads one or more
- files from the command line and generates a new KRL. The files may
- either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys, listed one
- per line. Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or
- contents in the KRL and certificates revoked by serial number or key ID
- (if the serial is zero or not available).
-
- Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the
- types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke
- certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete
- original certificate on hand. A KRL specification consists of lines
- containing one of the following directives followed by a colon and some
- directive-specific information.
-
- serial: serial_number[-serial_number]
- Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number. Serial
- numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be
- expressed in decimal, hex or octal. If two serial numbers are
- specified separated by a hyphen, then the range of serial numbers
- including and between each is revoked. The CA key must have been
- specified on the ssh-keygen command line using the -s option.
-
- id: key_id
- Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string. The CA
- key must have been specified on the ssh-keygen command line using
- the -s option.
-
- key: public_key
- Revokes the specified key. If a certificate is listed, then it
- is revoked as a plain public key.
-
- sha1: public_key
- Revokes the specified key by its SHA1 hash.
-
- KRLs may be updated using the -u flag in addition to -k. When this
- option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into the
- KRL, adding to those already there.
-
- It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular
- key (or keys). The -Q flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key
- specified on the commandline. If any key listed on the command line has
- been revoked (or an error encountered) then ssh-keygen will exit with a
- non-zero exit status. A zero exit status will only be returned if no key
- was revoked.
-
-FILES
- ~/.ssh/identity
- Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of
- the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the
- user. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the
- key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of
- this file using 3DES. This file is not automatically accessed by
- ssh-keygen but it is offered as the default file for the private
- key. ssh(1) will read this file when a login attempt is made.
-
- ~/.ssh/identity.pub
- Contains the protocol version 1 RSA public key for
- authentication. The contents of this file should be added to
- ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to
- log in using RSA authentication. There is no need to keep the
- contents of this file secret.
-
- ~/.ssh/id_dsa
- ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
- ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
- ~/.ssh/id_rsa
- Contains the protocol version 2 DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 or RSA
- authentication identity of the user. This file should not be
- readable by anyone but the user. It is possible to specify a
- passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be used
- to encrypt the private part of this file using 128-bit AES. This
- file is not automatically accessed by ssh-keygen but it is
- offered as the default file for the private key. ssh(1) will
- read this file when a login attempt is made.
-
- ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
- ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
- ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
- ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
- Contains the protocol version 2 DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 or RSA public
- key for authentication. The contents of this file should be
- added to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user
- wishes to log in using public key authentication. There is no
- need to keep the contents of this file secret.
-
- /etc/moduli
- Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX. The file format
- is described in moduli(5).
-
-SEE ALSO
- ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), moduli(5), sshd(8)
-
- The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format, RFC 4716, 2006.
-
-AUTHORS
- OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
- Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
- de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
- created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
- versions 1.5 and 2.0.
-
-OpenBSD 5.5 February 5, 2014 OpenBSD 5.5
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keygen.0 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keygen.0)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keygen.0 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keygen.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,570 @@
+SSH-KEYGEN(1) General Commands Manual SSH-KEYGEN(1)
+
+NAME
+ ssh-keygen M-bM-^@M-^S authentication key generation, management and conversion
+
+SYNOPSIS
+ ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1]
+ [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]
+ ssh-keygen -p [-P old_passphrase] [-N new_passphrase] [-f keyfile]
+ ssh-keygen -i [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]
+ ssh-keygen -e [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]
+ ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]
+ ssh-keygen -c [-P passphrase] [-C comment] [-f keyfile]
+ ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]
+ ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]
+ ssh-keygen -D pkcs11
+ ssh-keygen -F hostname [-f known_hosts_file] [-l]
+ ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]
+ ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]
+ ssh-keygen -r hostname [-f input_keyfile] [-g]
+ ssh-keygen -G output_file [-v] [-b bits] [-M memory] [-S start_point]
+ ssh-keygen -T output_file -f input_file [-v] [-a rounds] [-J num_lines]
+ [-j start_line] [-K checkpt] [-W generator]
+ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I certificate_identity [-h] [-n principals]
+ [-O option] [-V validity_interval] [-z serial_number] file ...
+ ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]
+ ssh-keygen -A
+ ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]
+ file ...
+ ssh-keygen -Q -f krl_file file ...
+
+DESCRIPTION
+ ssh-keygen generates, manages and converts authentication keys for
+ ssh(1). ssh-keygen can create keys for use by SSH protocol versions 1
+ and 2. Protocol 1 should not be used and is only offered to support
+ legacy devices. It suffers from a number of cryptographic weaknesses and
+ doesn't support many of the advanced features available for protocol 2.
+
+ The type of key to be generated is specified with the -t option. If
+ invoked without any arguments, ssh-keygen will generate an RSA key for
+ use in SSH protocol 2 connections.
+
+ ssh-keygen is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman
+ group exchange (DH-GEX). See the MODULI GENERATION section for details.
+
+ Finally, ssh-keygen can be used to generate and update Key Revocation
+ Lists, and to test whether given keys have been revoked by one. See the
+ KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details.
+
+ Normally each user wishing to use SSH with public key authentication runs
+ this once to create the authentication key in ~/.ssh/identity,
+ ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 or ~/.ssh/id_rsa.
+ Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host
+ keys, as seen in /etc/rc.
+
+ Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which to
+ store the private key. The public key is stored in a file with the same
+ name but M-bM-^@M-^\.pubM-bM-^@M-^] appended. The program also asks for a passphrase. The
+ passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase (host keys must have an
+ empty passphrase), or it may be a string of arbitrary length. A
+ passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a
+ series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of
+ characters you want. Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are not
+ simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English prose has only
+ 1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad passphrases),
+ and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters, numbers, and non-
+ alphanumeric characters. The passphrase can be changed later by using
+ the -p option.
+
+ There is no way to recover a lost passphrase. If the passphrase is lost
+ or forgotten, a new key must be generated and the corresponding public
+ key copied to other machines.
+
+ For RSA1 keys and keys stored in the newer OpenSSH format, there is also
+ a comment field in the key file that is only for convenience to the user
+ to help identify the key. The comment can tell what the key is for, or
+ whatever is useful. The comment is initialized to M-bM-^@M-^\user at hostM-bM-^@M-^] when the
+ key is created, but can be changed using the -c option.
+
+ After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys should
+ be placed to be activated.
+
+ The options are as follows:
+
+ -A For each of the key types (rsa1, rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519) for
+ which host keys do not exist, generate the host keys with the
+ default key file path, an empty passphrase, default bits for the
+ key type, and default comment. This is used by /etc/rc to
+ generate new host keys.
+
+ -a rounds
+ When saving a new-format private key (i.e. an ed25519 key or any
+ SSH protocol 2 key when the -o flag is set), this option
+ specifies the number of KDF (key derivation function) rounds
+ used. Higher numbers result in slower passphrase verification
+ and increased resistance to brute-force password cracking (should
+ the keys be stolen).
+
+ When screening DH-GEX candidates ( using the -T command). This
+ option specifies the number of primality tests to perform.
+
+ -B Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key
+ file.
+
+ -b bits
+ Specifies the number of bits in the key to create. For RSA keys,
+ the minimum size is 1024 bits and the default is 2048 bits.
+ Generally, 2048 bits is considered sufficient. DSA keys must be
+ exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2. For ECDSA keys,
+ the -b flag determines the key length by selecting from one of
+ three elliptic curve sizes: 256, 384 or 521 bits. Attempting to
+ use bit lengths other than these three values for ECDSA keys will
+ fail. Ed25519 keys have a fixed length and the -b flag will be
+ ignored.
+
+ -C comment
+ Provides a new comment.
+
+ -c Requests changing the comment in the private and public key
+ files. This operation is only supported for RSA1 keys and keys
+ stored in the newer OpenSSH format. The program will prompt for
+ the file containing the private keys, for the passphrase if the
+ key has one, and for the new comment.
+
+ -D pkcs11
+ Download the RSA public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared
+ library pkcs11. When used in combination with -s, this option
+ indicates that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the
+ CERTIFICATES section for details).
+
+ -E fingerprint_hash
+ Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key
+ fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The
+ default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ -e This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and
+ print to stdout the key in one of the formats specified by the -m
+ option. The default export format is M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^]. This option
+ allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs,
+ including several commercial SSH implementations.
+
+ -F hostname
+ Search for the specified hostname in a known_hosts file, listing
+ any occurrences found. This option is useful to find hashed host
+ names or addresses and may also be used in conjunction with the
+ -H option to print found keys in a hashed format.
+
+ -f filename
+ Specifies the filename of the key file.
+
+ -G output_file
+ Generate candidate primes for DH-GEX. These primes must be
+ screened for safety (using the -T option) before use.
+
+ -g Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records
+ using the -r command.
+
+ -H Hash a known_hosts file. This replaces all hostnames and
+ addresses with hashed representations within the specified file;
+ the original content is moved to a file with a .old suffix.
+ These hashes may be used normally by ssh and sshd, but they do
+ not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be
+ disclosed. This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames
+ and is therefore safe to use on files that mix hashed and non-
+ hashed names.
+
+ -h When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user
+ certificate. Please see the CERTIFICATES section for details.
+
+ -I certificate_identity
+ Specify the key identity when signing a public key. Please see
+ the CERTIFICATES section for details.
+
+ -i This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file
+ in the format specified by the -m option and print an OpenSSH
+ compatible private (or public) key to stdout. This option allows
+ importing keys from other software, including several commercial
+ SSH implementations. The default import format is M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ -J num_lines
+ Exit after screening the specified number of lines while
+ performing DH candidate screening using the -T option.
+
+ -j start_line
+ Start screening at the specified line number while performing DH
+ candidate screening using the -T option.
+
+ -K checkpt
+ Write the last line processed to the file checkpt while
+ performing DH candidate screening using the -T option. This will
+ be used to skip lines in the input file that have already been
+ processed if the job is restarted.
+
+ -k Generate a KRL file. In this mode, ssh-keygen will generate a
+ KRL file at the location specified via the -f flag that revokes
+ every key or certificate presented on the command line.
+ Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key
+ file or using the format described in the KEY REVOCATION LISTS
+ section.
+
+ -L Prints the contents of one or more certificates.
+
+ -l Show fingerprint of specified public key file. Private RSA1 keys
+ are also supported. For RSA and DSA keys ssh-keygen tries to
+ find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint. If
+ combined with -v, a visual ASCII art representation of the key is
+ supplied with the fingerprint.
+
+ -M memory
+ Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when
+ generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+
+ -m key_format
+ Specify a key format for the -i (import) or -e (export)
+ conversion options. The supported key formats are: M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^]
+ (RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key), M-bM-^@M-^\PKCS8M-bM-^@M-^] (PEM PKCS8 public
+ key) or M-bM-^@M-^\PEMM-bM-^@M-^] (PEM public key). The default conversion format is
+ M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ -N new_passphrase
+ Provides the new passphrase.
+
+ -n principals
+ Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be
+ included in a certificate when signing a key. Multiple
+ principals may be specified, separated by commas. Please see the
+ CERTIFICATES section for details.
+
+ -O option
+ Specify a certificate option when signing a key. This option may
+ be specified multiple times. Please see the CERTIFICATES section
+ for details. The options that are valid for user certificates
+ are:
+
+ clear Clear all enabled permissions. This is useful for
+ clearing the default set of permissions so permissions
+ may be added individually.
+
+ force-command=command
+ Forces the execution of command instead of any shell or
+ command specified by the user when the certificate is
+ used for authentication.
+
+ no-agent-forwarding
+ Disable ssh-agent(1) forwarding (permitted by default).
+
+ no-port-forwarding
+ Disable port forwarding (permitted by default).
+
+ no-pty Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default).
+
+ no-user-rc
+ Disable execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8) (permitted by
+ default).
+
+ no-x11-forwarding
+ Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default).
+
+ permit-agent-forwarding
+ Allows ssh-agent(1) forwarding.
+
+ permit-port-forwarding
+ Allows port forwarding.
+
+ permit-pty
+ Allows PTY allocation.
+
+ permit-user-rc
+ Allows execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8).
+
+ permit-x11-forwarding
+ Allows X11 forwarding.
+
+ source-address=address_list
+ Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate
+ is considered valid. The address_list is a comma-
+ separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in
+ CIDR format.
+
+ At present, no options are valid for host keys.
+
+ -o Causes ssh-keygen to save private keys using the new OpenSSH
+ format rather than the more compatible PEM format. The new
+ format has increased resistance to brute-force password cracking
+ but is not supported by versions of OpenSSH prior to 6.5.
+ Ed25519 keys always use the new private key format.
+
+ -P passphrase
+ Provides the (old) passphrase.
+
+ -p Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of
+ creating a new private key. The program will prompt for the file
+ containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for
+ the new passphrase.
+
+ -Q Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL.
+
+ -q Silence ssh-keygen.
+
+ -R hostname
+ Removes all keys belonging to hostname from a known_hosts file.
+ This option is useful to delete hashed hosts (see the -H option
+ above).
+
+ -r hostname
+ Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named hostname for
+ the specified public key file.
+
+ -S start
+ Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for
+ DH-GEX.
+
+ -s ca_key
+ Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key. Please
+ see the CERTIFICATES section for details.
+
+ When generating a KRL, -s specifies a path to a CA public key
+ file used to revoke certificates directly by key ID or serial
+ number. See the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details.
+
+ -T output_file
+ Test DH group exchange candidate primes (generated using the -G
+ option) for safety.
+
+ -t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1
+ Specifies the type of key to create. The possible values are
+ M-bM-^@M-^\rsa1M-bM-^@M-^] for protocol version 1 and M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], or
+ M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^] for protocol version 2.
+
+ -u Update a KRL. When specified with -k, keys listed via the
+ command line are added to the existing KRL rather than a new KRL
+ being created.
+
+ -V validity_interval
+ Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate. A
+ validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that
+ the certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time,
+ or may consist of two times separated by a colon to indicate an
+ explicit time interval. The start time may be specified as a
+ date in YYYYMMDD format, a time in YYYYMMDDHHMMSS format or a
+ relative time (to the current time) consisting of a minus sign
+ followed by a relative time in the format described in the TIME
+ FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). The end time may be specified
+ as a YYYYMMDD date, a YYYYMMDDHHMMSS time or a relative time
+ starting with a plus character.
+
+ For example: M-bM-^@M-^\+52w1dM-bM-^@M-^] (valid from now to 52 weeks and one day
+ from now), M-bM-^@M-^\-4w:+4wM-bM-^@M-^] (valid from four weeks ago to four weeks
+ from now), M-bM-^@M-^\20100101123000:20110101123000M-bM-^@M-^] (valid from 12:30 PM,
+ January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011), M-bM-^@M-^\-1d:20110101M-bM-^@M-^]
+ (valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011).
+
+ -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh-keygen to print debugging messages
+ about its progress. This is helpful for debugging moduli
+ generation. Multiple -v options increase the verbosity. The
+ maximum is 3.
+
+ -W generator
+ Specify desired generator when testing candidate moduli for DH-
+ GEX.
+
+ -y This option will read a private OpenSSH format file and print an
+ OpenSSH public key to stdout.
+
+ -z serial_number
+ Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to
+ distinguish this certificate from others from the same CA. The
+ default serial number is zero.
+
+ When generating a KRL, the -z flag is used to specify a KRL
+ version number.
+
+MODULI GENERATION
+ ssh-keygen may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group
+ Exchange (DH-GEX) protocol. Generating these groups is a two-step
+ process: first, candidate primes are generated using a fast, but memory
+ intensive process. These candidate primes are then tested for
+ suitability (a CPU-intensive process).
+
+ Generation of primes is performed using the -G option. The desired
+ length of the primes may be specified by the -b option. For example:
+
+ # ssh-keygen -G moduli-2048.candidates -b 2048
+
+ By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the desired
+ length range. This may be overridden using the -S option, which
+ specifies a different start point (in hex).
+
+ Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be screened for
+ suitability. This may be performed using the -T option. In this mode
+ ssh-keygen will read candidates from standard input (or a file specified
+ using the -f option). For example:
+
+ # ssh-keygen -T moduli-2048 -f moduli-2048.candidates
+
+ By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests.
+ This may be overridden using the -a option. The DH generator value will
+ be chosen automatically for the prime under consideration. If a specific
+ generator is desired, it may be requested using the -W option. Valid
+ generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
+
+ Screened DH groups may be installed in /etc/moduli. It is important that
+ this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and that both ends of
+ a connection share common moduli.
+
+CERTIFICATES
+ ssh-keygen supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be
+ used for user or host authentication. Certificates consist of a public
+ key, some identity information, zero or more principal (user or host)
+ names and a set of options that are signed by a Certification Authority
+ (CA) key. Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify
+ its signature on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys.
+ Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format
+ to the X.509 certificates used in ssl(8).
+
+ ssh-keygen supports two types of certificates: user and host. User
+ certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates
+ authenticate server hosts to users. To generate a user certificate:
+
+ $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub
+
+ The resultant certificate will be placed in /path/to/user_key-cert.pub.
+ A host certificate requires the -h option:
+
+ $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub
+
+ The host certificate will be output to /path/to/host_key-cert.pub.
+
+ It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by
+ providing the token library using -D and identifying the CA key by
+ providing its public half as an argument to -s:
+
+ $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id user_key.pub
+
+ In all cases, key_id is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server
+ when the certificate is used for authentication.
+
+ Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal
+ (user/host) names. By default, generated certificates are valid for all
+ users or hosts. To generate a certificate for a specified set of
+ principals:
+
+ $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub
+ $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain host_key.pub
+
+ Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may
+ be specified through certificate options. A certificate option may
+ disable features of the SSH session, may be valid only when presented
+ from particular source addresses or may force the use of a specific
+ command. For a list of valid certificate options, see the documentation
+ for the -O option above.
+
+ Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime. The -V
+ option allows specification of certificate start and end times. A
+ certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be
+ considered valid. By default, certificates are valid from UNIX Epoch to
+ the distant future.
+
+ For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA
+ public key must be trusted by sshd(8) or ssh(1). Please refer to those
+ manual pages for details.
+
+KEY REVOCATION LISTS
+ ssh-keygen is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs).
+ These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a
+ compact format, taking as little as one bit per certificate if they are
+ being revoked by serial number.
+
+ KRLs may be generated using the -k flag. This option reads one or more
+ files from the command line and generates a new KRL. The files may
+ either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys, listed one
+ per line. Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or
+ contents in the KRL and certificates revoked by serial number or key ID
+ (if the serial is zero or not available).
+
+ Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the
+ types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke
+ certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete
+ original certificate on hand. A KRL specification consists of lines
+ containing one of the following directives followed by a colon and some
+ directive-specific information.
+
+ serial: serial_number[-serial_number]
+ Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number. Serial
+ numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be
+ expressed in decimal, hex or octal. If two serial numbers are
+ specified separated by a hyphen, then the range of serial numbers
+ including and between each is revoked. The CA key must have been
+ specified on the ssh-keygen command line using the -s option.
+
+ id: key_id
+ Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string. The CA
+ key must have been specified on the ssh-keygen command line using
+ the -s option.
+
+ key: public_key
+ Revokes the specified key. If a certificate is listed, then it
+ is revoked as a plain public key.
+
+ sha1: public_key
+ Revokes the specified key by its SHA1 hash.
+
+ KRLs may be updated using the -u flag in addition to -k. When this
+ option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into the
+ KRL, adding to those already there.
+
+ It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular
+ key (or keys). The -Q flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key
+ specified on the command line. If any key listed on the command line has
+ been revoked (or an error encountered) then ssh-keygen will exit with a
+ non-zero exit status. A zero exit status will only be returned if no key
+ was revoked.
+
+FILES
+ ~/.ssh/identity
+ Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of
+ the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the
+ user. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the
+ key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of
+ this file using 3DES. This file is not automatically accessed by
+ ssh-keygen but it is offered as the default file for the private
+ key. ssh(1) will read this file when a login attempt is made.
+
+ ~/.ssh/identity.pub
+ Contains the protocol version 1 RSA public key for
+ authentication. The contents of this file should be added to
+ ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to
+ log in using RSA authentication. There is no need to keep the
+ contents of this file secret.
+
+ ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+ ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+ Contains the protocol version 2 DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA
+ authentication identity of the user. This file should not be
+ readable by anyone but the user. It is possible to specify a
+ passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be used
+ to encrypt the private part of this file using 128-bit AES. This
+ file is not automatically accessed by ssh-keygen but it is
+ offered as the default file for the private key. ssh(1) will
+ read this file when a login attempt is made.
+
+ ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+ ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+ Contains the protocol version 2 DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA public
+ key for authentication. The contents of this file should be
+ added to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user
+ wishes to log in using public key authentication. There is no
+ need to keep the contents of this file secret.
+
+ /etc/moduli
+ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX. The file format
+ is described in moduli(5).
+
+SEE ALSO
+ ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), moduli(5), sshd(8)
+
+ The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format, RFC 4716, 2006.
+
+AUTHORS
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+ Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+ de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+ created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+ versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+
+OpenBSD 6.0 June 16, 2016 OpenBSD 6.0
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keygen.1
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keygen.1 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keygen.1 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,854 +0,0 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.120 2014/02/05 20:13:25 naddy Exp $
-.\"
-.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
-.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
-.\" All rights reserved
-.\"
-.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
-.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
-.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
-.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
-.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
-.\"
-.\"
-.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
-.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
-.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
-.\"
-.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-.\" are met:
-.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-.\"
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: February 5 2014 $
-.Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
-.Os
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Nd authentication key generation, management and conversion
-.Sh SYNOPSIS
-.Bk -words
-.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Op Fl q
-.Op Fl b Ar bits
-.Op Fl t Ar type
-.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
-.Op Fl C Ar comment
-.Op Fl f Ar output_keyfile
-.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl p
-.Op Fl P Ar old_passphrase
-.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
-.Op Fl f Ar keyfile
-.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl i
-.Op Fl m Ar key_format
-.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
-.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl e
-.Op Fl m Ar key_format
-.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
-.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl y
-.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
-.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl c
-.Op Fl P Ar passphrase
-.Op Fl C Ar comment
-.Op Fl f Ar keyfile
-.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl l
-.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
-.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl B
-.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
-.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl D Ar pkcs11
-.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl F Ar hostname
-.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
-.Op Fl l
-.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl H
-.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
-.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl R Ar hostname
-.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
-.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl r Ar hostname
-.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
-.Op Fl g
-.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl G Ar output_file
-.Op Fl v
-.Op Fl b Ar bits
-.Op Fl M Ar memory
-.Op Fl S Ar start_point
-.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl T Ar output_file
-.Fl f Ar input_file
-.Op Fl v
-.Op Fl a Ar rounds
-.Op Fl J Ar num_lines
-.Op Fl j Ar start_line
-.Op Fl K Ar checkpt
-.Op Fl W Ar generator
-.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl s Ar ca_key
-.Fl I Ar certificate_identity
-.Op Fl h
-.Op Fl n Ar principals
-.Op Fl O Ar option
-.Op Fl V Ar validity_interval
-.Op Fl z Ar serial_number
-.Ar
-.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl L
-.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
-.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl A
-.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl k
-.Fl f Ar krl_file
-.Op Fl u
-.Op Fl s Ar ca_public
-.Op Fl z Ar version_number
-.Ar
-.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl Q
-.Fl f Ar krl_file
-.Ar
-.Ek
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-.Nm
-generates, manages and converts authentication keys for
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-.Nm
-can create RSA keys for use by SSH protocol version 1 and
-DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 or RSA keys for use by SSH protocol version 2.
-The type of key to be generated is specified with the
-.Fl t
-option.
-If invoked without any arguments,
-.Nm
-will generate an RSA key for use in SSH protocol 2 connections.
-.Pp
-.Nm
-is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman group
-exchange (DH-GEX).
-See the
-.Sx MODULI GENERATION
-section for details.
-.Pp
-Finally,
-.Nm
-can be used to generate and update Key Revocation Lists, and to test whether
-given keys have been revoked by one.
-See the
-.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
-section for details.
-.Pp
-Normally each user wishing to use SSH
-with public key authentication runs this once to create the authentication
-key in
-.Pa ~/.ssh/identity ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
-or
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
-Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys,
-as seen in
-.Pa /etc/rc .
-.Pp
-Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which
-to store the private key.
-The public key is stored in a file with the same name but
-.Dq .pub
-appended.
-The program also asks for a passphrase.
-The passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase
-(host keys must have an empty passphrase), or it may be a string of
-arbitrary length.
-A passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a
-series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of
-characters you want.
-Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are
-not simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English
-prose has only 1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad
-passphrases), and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters,
-numbers, and non-alphanumeric characters.
-The passphrase can be changed later by using the
-.Fl p
-option.
-.Pp
-There is no way to recover a lost passphrase.
-If the passphrase is lost or forgotten, a new key must be generated
-and the corresponding public key copied to other machines.
-.Pp
-For RSA1 keys,
-there is also a comment field in the key file that is only for
-convenience to the user to help identify the key.
-The comment can tell what the key is for, or whatever is useful.
-The comment is initialized to
-.Dq user at host
-when the key is created, but can be changed using the
-.Fl c
-option.
-.Pp
-After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys
-should be placed to be activated.
-.Pp
-The options are as follows:
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Fl A
-For each of the key types (rsa1, rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519)
-for which host keys
-do not exist, generate the host keys with the default key file path,
-an empty passphrase, default bits for the key type, and default comment.
-This is used by
-.Pa /etc/rc
-to generate new host keys.
-.It Fl a Ar rounds
-When saving a new-format private key (i.e. an ed25519 key or any SSH protocol
-2 key when the
-.Fl o
-flag is set), this option specifies the number of KDF (key derivation function)
-rounds used.
-Higher numbers result in slower passphrase verification and increased
-resistance to brute-force password cracking (should the keys be stolen).
-.Pp
-When screening DH-GEX candidates (
-using the
-.Fl T
-command).
-This option specifies the number of primality tests to perform.
-.It Fl B
-Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key file.
-.It Fl b Ar bits
-Specifies the number of bits in the key to create.
-For RSA keys, the minimum size is 768 bits and the default is 2048 bits.
-Generally, 2048 bits is considered sufficient.
-DSA keys must be exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2.
-For ECDSA keys, the
-.Fl b
-flag determines the key length by selecting from one of three elliptic
-curve sizes: 256, 384 or 521 bits.
-Attempting to use bit lengths other than these three values for ECDSA keys
-will fail.
-ED25519 keys have a fixed length and the
-.Fl b
-flag will be ignored.
-.It Fl C Ar comment
-Provides a new comment.
-.It Fl c
-Requests changing the comment in the private and public key files.
-This operation is only supported for RSA1 keys.
-The program will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for
-the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment.
-.It Fl D Ar pkcs11
-Download the RSA public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
-.Ar pkcs11 .
-When used in combination with
-.Fl s ,
-this option indicates that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the
-.Sx CERTIFICATES
-section for details).
-.It Fl e
-This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and
-print to stdout the key in one of the formats specified by the
-.Fl m
-option.
-The default export format is
-.Dq RFC4716 .
-This option allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs, including
-several commercial SSH implementations.
-.It Fl F Ar hostname
-Search for the specified
-.Ar hostname
-in a
-.Pa known_hosts
-file, listing any occurrences found.
-This option is useful to find hashed host names or addresses and may also be
-used in conjunction with the
-.Fl H
-option to print found keys in a hashed format.
-.It Fl f Ar filename
-Specifies the filename of the key file.
-.It Fl G Ar output_file
-Generate candidate primes for DH-GEX.
-These primes must be screened for
-safety (using the
-.Fl T
-option) before use.
-.It Fl g
-Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records using the
-.Fl r
-command.
-.It Fl H
-Hash a
-.Pa known_hosts
-file.
-This replaces all hostnames and addresses with hashed representations
-within the specified file; the original content is moved to a file with
-a .old suffix.
-These hashes may be used normally by
-.Nm ssh
-and
-.Nm sshd ,
-but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents
-be disclosed.
-This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames and is therefore safe
-to use on files that mix hashed and non-hashed names.
-.It Fl h
-When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user
-certificate.
-Please see the
-.Sx CERTIFICATES
-section for details.
-.It Fl I Ar certificate_identity
-Specify the key identity when signing a public key.
-Please see the
-.Sx CERTIFICATES
-section for details.
-.It Fl i
-This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file
-in the format specified by the
-.Fl m
-option and print an OpenSSH compatible private
-(or public) key to stdout.
-.It Fl J Ar num_lines
-Exit after screening the specified number of lines
-while performing DH candidate screening using the
-.Fl T
-option.
-.It Fl j Ar start_line
-Start screening at the specified line number
-while performing DH candidate screening using the
-.Fl T
-option.
-.It Fl K Ar checkpt
-Write the last line processed to the file
-.Ar checkpt
-while performing DH candidate screening using the
-.Fl T
-option.
-This will be used to skip lines in the input file that have already been
-processed if the job is restarted.
-This option allows importing keys from other software, including several
-commercial SSH implementations.
-The default import format is
-.Dq RFC4716 .
-.It Fl k
-Generate a KRL file.
-In this mode,
-.Nm
-will generate a KRL file at the location specified via the
-.Fl f
-flag that revokes every key or certificate presented on the command line.
-Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key file or
-using the format described in the
-.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
-section.
-.It Fl L
-Prints the contents of a certificate.
-.It Fl l
-Show fingerprint of specified public key file.
-Private RSA1 keys are also supported.
-For RSA and DSA keys
-.Nm
-tries to find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint.
-If combined with
-.Fl v ,
-an ASCII art representation of the key is supplied with the fingerprint.
-.It Fl M Ar memory
-Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when generating
-candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
-.It Fl m Ar key_format
-Specify a key format for the
-.Fl i
-(import) or
-.Fl e
-(export) conversion options.
-The supported key formats are:
-.Dq RFC4716
-(RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key),
-.Dq PKCS8
-(PEM PKCS8 public key)
-or
-.Dq PEM
-(PEM public key).
-The default conversion format is
-.Dq RFC4716 .
-.It Fl N Ar new_passphrase
-Provides the new passphrase.
-.It Fl n Ar principals
-Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be included in
-a certificate when signing a key.
-Multiple principals may be specified, separated by commas.
-Please see the
-.Sx CERTIFICATES
-section for details.
-.It Fl O Ar option
-Specify a certificate option when signing a key.
-This option may be specified multiple times.
-Please see the
-.Sx CERTIFICATES
-section for details.
-The options that are valid for user certificates are:
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Ic clear
-Clear all enabled permissions.
-This is useful for clearing the default set of permissions so permissions may
-be added individually.
-.It Ic force-command Ns = Ns Ar command
-Forces the execution of
-.Ar command
-instead of any shell or command specified by the user when
-the certificate is used for authentication.
-.It Ic no-agent-forwarding
-Disable
-.Xr ssh-agent 1
-forwarding (permitted by default).
-.It Ic no-port-forwarding
-Disable port forwarding (permitted by default).
-.It Ic no-pty
-Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default).
-.It Ic no-user-rc
-Disable execution of
-.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
-by
-.Xr sshd 8
-(permitted by default).
-.It Ic no-x11-forwarding
-Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default).
-.It Ic permit-agent-forwarding
-Allows
-.Xr ssh-agent 1
-forwarding.
-.It Ic permit-port-forwarding
-Allows port forwarding.
-.It Ic permit-pty
-Allows PTY allocation.
-.It Ic permit-user-rc
-Allows execution of
-.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
-by
-.Xr sshd 8 .
-.It Ic permit-x11-forwarding
-Allows X11 forwarding.
-.It Ic source-address Ns = Ns Ar address_list
-Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is considered valid.
-The
-.Ar address_list
-is a comma-separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR
-format.
-.El
-.Pp
-At present, no options are valid for host keys.
-.It Fl o
-Causes
-.Nm
-to save SSH protocol 2 private keys using the new OpenSSH format rather than
-the more compatible PEM format.
-The new format has increased resistance to brute-force password cracking
-but is not supported by versions of OpenSSH prior to 6.5.
-Ed25519 keys always use the new private key format.
-.It Fl P Ar passphrase
-Provides the (old) passphrase.
-.It Fl p
-Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of
-creating a new private key.
-The program will prompt for the file
-containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for the
-new passphrase.
-.It Fl Q
-Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL.
-.It Fl q
-Silence
-.Nm ssh-keygen .
-.It Fl R Ar hostname
-Removes all keys belonging to
-.Ar hostname
-from a
-.Pa known_hosts
-file.
-This option is useful to delete hashed hosts (see the
-.Fl H
-option above).
-.It Fl r Ar hostname
-Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named
-.Ar hostname
-for the specified public key file.
-.It Fl S Ar start
-Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
-.It Fl s Ar ca_key
-Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key.
-Please see the
-.Sx CERTIFICATES
-section for details.
-.Pp
-When generating a KRL,
-.Fl s
-specifies a path to a CA public key file used to revoke certificates directly
-by key ID or serial number.
-See the
-.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
-section for details.
-.It Fl T Ar output_file
-Test DH group exchange candidate primes (generated using the
-.Fl G
-option) for safety.
-.It Fl t Ar type
-Specifies the type of key to create.
-The possible values are
-.Dq rsa1
-for protocol version 1 and
-.Dq dsa ,
-.Dq ecdsa ,
-.Dq ed25519 ,
-or
-.Dq rsa
-for protocol version 2.
-.It Fl u
-Update a KRL.
-When specified with
-.Fl k ,
-keys listed via the command line are added to the existing KRL rather than
-a new KRL being created.
-.It Fl V Ar validity_interval
-Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate.
-A validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that the
-certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time, or may consist
-of two times separated by a colon to indicate an explicit time interval.
-The start time may be specified as a date in YYYYMMDD format, a time
-in YYYYMMDDHHMMSS format or a relative time (to the current time) consisting
-of a minus sign followed by a relative time in the format described in the
-TIME FORMATS section of
-.Xr sshd_config 5 .
-The end time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date, a YYYYMMDDHHMMSS time or
-a relative time starting with a plus character.
-.Pp
-For example:
-.Dq +52w1d
-(valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now),
-.Dq -4w:+4w
-(valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now),
-.Dq 20100101123000:20110101123000
-(valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011),
-.Dq -1d:20110101
-(valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011).
-.It Fl v
-Verbose mode.
-Causes
-.Nm
-to print debugging messages about its progress.
-This is helpful for debugging moduli generation.
-Multiple
-.Fl v
-options increase the verbosity.
-The maximum is 3.
-.It Fl W Ar generator
-Specify desired generator when testing candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
-.It Fl y
-This option will read a private
-OpenSSH format file and print an OpenSSH public key to stdout.
-.It Fl z Ar serial_number
-Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to distinguish
-this certificate from others from the same CA.
-The default serial number is zero.
-.Pp
-When generating a KRL, the
-.Fl z
-flag is used to specify a KRL version number.
-.El
-.Sh MODULI GENERATION
-.Nm
-may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange
-(DH-GEX) protocol.
-Generating these groups is a two-step process: first, candidate
-primes are generated using a fast, but memory intensive process.
-These candidate primes are then tested for suitability (a CPU-intensive
-process).
-.Pp
-Generation of primes is performed using the
-.Fl G
-option.
-The desired length of the primes may be specified by the
-.Fl b
-option.
-For example:
-.Pp
-.Dl # ssh-keygen -G moduli-2048.candidates -b 2048
-.Pp
-By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the
-desired length range.
-This may be overridden using the
-.Fl S
-option, which specifies a different start point (in hex).
-.Pp
-Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be screened for
-suitability.
-This may be performed using the
-.Fl T
-option.
-In this mode
-.Nm
-will read candidates from standard input (or a file specified using the
-.Fl f
-option).
-For example:
-.Pp
-.Dl # ssh-keygen -T moduli-2048 -f moduli-2048.candidates
-.Pp
-By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests.
-This may be overridden using the
-.Fl a
-option.
-The DH generator value will be chosen automatically for the
-prime under consideration.
-If a specific generator is desired, it may be requested using the
-.Fl W
-option.
-Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
-.Pp
-Screened DH groups may be installed in
-.Pa /etc/moduli .
-It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and
-that both ends of a connection share common moduli.
-.Sh CERTIFICATES
-.Nm
-supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be used for
-user or host authentication.
-Certificates consist of a public key, some identity information, zero or
-more principal (user or host) names and a set of options that
-are signed by a Certification Authority (CA) key.
-Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify its signature
-on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys.
-Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format to
-the X.509 certificates used in
-.Xr ssl 8 .
-.Pp
-.Nm
-supports two types of certificates: user and host.
-User certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates
-authenticate server hosts to users.
-To generate a user certificate:
-.Pp
-.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub
-.Pp
-The resultant certificate will be placed in
-.Pa /path/to/user_key-cert.pub .
-A host certificate requires the
-.Fl h
-option:
-.Pp
-.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub
-.Pp
-The host certificate will be output to
-.Pa /path/to/host_key-cert.pub .
-.Pp
-It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by
-providing the token library using
-.Fl D
-and identifying the CA key by providing its public half as an argument
-to
-.Fl s :
-.Pp
-.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id host_key.pub
-.Pp
-In all cases,
-.Ar key_id
-is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server when the certificate
-is used for authentication.
-.Pp
-Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal (user/host)
-names.
-By default, generated certificates are valid for all users or hosts.
-To generate a certificate for a specified set of principals:
-.Pp
-.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub
-.Dl "$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain user_key.pub"
-.Pp
-Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may
-be specified through certificate options.
-A certificate option may disable features of the SSH session, may be
-valid only when presented from particular source addresses or may
-force the use of a specific command.
-For a list of valid certificate options, see the documentation for the
-.Fl O
-option above.
-.Pp
-Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime.
-The
-.Fl V
-option allows specification of certificate start and end times.
-A certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be
-considered valid.
-By default, certificates are valid from
-.Ux
-Epoch to the distant future.
-.Pp
-For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA
-public key must be trusted by
-.Xr sshd 8
-or
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-Please refer to those manual pages for details.
-.Sh KEY REVOCATION LISTS
-.Nm
-is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs).
-These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a
-compact format, taking as little as one bit per certificate if they are being
-revoked by serial number.
-.Pp
-KRLs may be generated using the
-.Fl k
-flag.
-This option reads one or more files from the command line and generates a new
-KRL.
-The files may either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys,
-listed one per line.
-Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or contents in the KRL and
-certificates revoked by serial number or key ID (if the serial is zero or
-not available).
-.Pp
-Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the
-types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke
-certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete original
-certificate on hand.
-A KRL specification consists of lines containing one of the following directives
-followed by a colon and some directive-specific information.
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Cm serial : Ar serial_number Ns Op - Ns Ar serial_number
-Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number.
-Serial numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be expressed
-in decimal, hex or octal.
-If two serial numbers are specified separated by a hyphen, then the range
-of serial numbers including and between each is revoked.
-The CA key must have been specified on the
-.Nm
-command line using the
-.Fl s
-option.
-.It Cm id : Ar key_id
-Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string.
-The CA key must have been specified on the
-.Nm
-command line using the
-.Fl s
-option.
-.It Cm key : Ar public_key
-Revokes the specified key.
-If a certificate is listed, then it is revoked as a plain public key.
-.It Cm sha1 : Ar public_key
-Revokes the specified key by its SHA1 hash.
-.El
-.Pp
-KRLs may be updated using the
-.Fl u
-flag in addition to
-.Fl k .
-When this option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into
-the KRL, adding to those already there.
-.Pp
-It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular key
-(or keys).
-The
-.Fl Q
-flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key specified on the commandline.
-If any key listed on the command line has been revoked (or an error encountered)
-then
-.Nm
-will exit with a non-zero exit status.
-A zero exit status will only be returned if no key was revoked.
-.Sh FILES
-.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
-Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
-This file should not be readable by anyone but the user.
-It is possible to
-specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be
-used to encrypt the private part of this file using 3DES.
-This file is not automatically accessed by
-.Nm
-but it is offered as the default file for the private key.
-.Xr ssh 1
-will read this file when a login attempt is made.
-.Pp
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub
-Contains the protocol version 1 RSA public key for authentication.
-The contents of this file should be added to
-.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-on all machines
-where the user wishes to log in using RSA authentication.
-There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
-.Pp
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
-Contains the protocol version 2 DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 or RSA
-authentication identity of the user.
-This file should not be readable by anyone but the user.
-It is possible to
-specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be
-used to encrypt the private part of this file using 128-bit AES.
-This file is not automatically accessed by
-.Nm
-but it is offered as the default file for the private key.
-.Xr ssh 1
-will read this file when a login attempt is made.
-.Pp
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
-Contains the protocol version 2 DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 or RSA
-public key for authentication.
-The contents of this file should be added to
-.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-on all machines
-where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
-There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
-.Pp
-.It Pa /etc/moduli
-Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
-The file format is described in
-.Xr moduli 5 .
-.El
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr ssh 1 ,
-.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
-.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
-.Xr moduli 5 ,
-.Xr sshd 8
-.Rs
-.%R RFC 4716
-.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format"
-.%D 2006
-.Re
-.Sh AUTHORS
-OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
-ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
-Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
-Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
-removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
-created OpenSSH.
-Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
-protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keygen.1 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keygen.1)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keygen.1 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keygen.1 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,870 @@
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.133 2016/06/16 06:10:45 jmc Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\" All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd $Mdocdate: June 16 2016 $
+.Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Nd authentication key generation, management and conversion
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Bk -words
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Op Fl q
+.Op Fl b Ar bits
+.Op Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1
+.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
+.Op Fl C Ar comment
+.Op Fl f Ar output_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl p
+.Op Fl P Ar old_passphrase
+.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
+.Op Fl f Ar keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl i
+.Op Fl m Ar key_format
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl e
+.Op Fl m Ar key_format
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl y
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl c
+.Op Fl P Ar passphrase
+.Op Fl C Ar comment
+.Op Fl f Ar keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl l
+.Op Fl v
+.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl B
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl D Ar pkcs11
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl F Ar hostname
+.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
+.Op Fl l
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl H
+.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl R Ar hostname
+.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl r Ar hostname
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Op Fl g
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl G Ar output_file
+.Op Fl v
+.Op Fl b Ar bits
+.Op Fl M Ar memory
+.Op Fl S Ar start_point
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl T Ar output_file
+.Fl f Ar input_file
+.Op Fl v
+.Op Fl a Ar rounds
+.Op Fl J Ar num_lines
+.Op Fl j Ar start_line
+.Op Fl K Ar checkpt
+.Op Fl W Ar generator
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl s Ar ca_key
+.Fl I Ar certificate_identity
+.Op Fl h
+.Op Fl n Ar principals
+.Op Fl O Ar option
+.Op Fl V Ar validity_interval
+.Op Fl z Ar serial_number
+.Ar
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl L
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl A
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl k
+.Fl f Ar krl_file
+.Op Fl u
+.Op Fl s Ar ca_public
+.Op Fl z Ar version_number
+.Ar
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl Q
+.Fl f Ar krl_file
+.Ar
+.Ek
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+generates, manages and converts authentication keys for
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.Nm
+can create keys for use by SSH protocol versions 1 and 2.
+Protocol 1 should not be used
+and is only offered to support legacy devices.
+It suffers from a number of cryptographic weaknesses
+and doesn't support many of the advanced features available for protocol 2.
+.Pp
+The type of key to be generated is specified with the
+.Fl t
+option.
+If invoked without any arguments,
+.Nm
+will generate an RSA key for use in SSH protocol 2 connections.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman group
+exchange (DH-GEX).
+See the
+.Sx MODULI GENERATION
+section for details.
+.Pp
+Finally,
+.Nm
+can be used to generate and update Key Revocation Lists, and to test whether
+given keys have been revoked by one.
+See the
+.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
+section for details.
+.Pp
+Normally each user wishing to use SSH
+with public key authentication runs this once to create the authentication
+key in
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+or
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
+Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys,
+as seen in
+.Pa /etc/rc .
+.Pp
+Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which
+to store the private key.
+The public key is stored in a file with the same name but
+.Dq .pub
+appended.
+The program also asks for a passphrase.
+The passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase
+(host keys must have an empty passphrase), or it may be a string of
+arbitrary length.
+A passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a
+series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of
+characters you want.
+Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are
+not simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English
+prose has only 1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad
+passphrases), and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters,
+numbers, and non-alphanumeric characters.
+The passphrase can be changed later by using the
+.Fl p
+option.
+.Pp
+There is no way to recover a lost passphrase.
+If the passphrase is lost or forgotten, a new key must be generated
+and the corresponding public key copied to other machines.
+.Pp
+For RSA1 keys and keys stored in the newer OpenSSH format,
+there is also a comment field in the key file that is only for
+convenience to the user to help identify the key.
+The comment can tell what the key is for, or whatever is useful.
+The comment is initialized to
+.Dq user at host
+when the key is created, but can be changed using the
+.Fl c
+option.
+.Pp
+After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys
+should be placed to be activated.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl A
+For each of the key types (rsa1, rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519)
+for which host keys
+do not exist, generate the host keys with the default key file path,
+an empty passphrase, default bits for the key type, and default comment.
+This is used by
+.Pa /etc/rc
+to generate new host keys.
+.It Fl a Ar rounds
+When saving a new-format private key (i.e. an ed25519 key or any SSH protocol
+2 key when the
+.Fl o
+flag is set), this option specifies the number of KDF (key derivation function)
+rounds used.
+Higher numbers result in slower passphrase verification and increased
+resistance to brute-force password cracking (should the keys be stolen).
+.Pp
+When screening DH-GEX candidates (
+using the
+.Fl T
+command).
+This option specifies the number of primality tests to perform.
+.It Fl B
+Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key file.
+.It Fl b Ar bits
+Specifies the number of bits in the key to create.
+For RSA keys, the minimum size is 1024 bits and the default is 2048 bits.
+Generally, 2048 bits is considered sufficient.
+DSA keys must be exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2.
+For ECDSA keys, the
+.Fl b
+flag determines the key length by selecting from one of three elliptic
+curve sizes: 256, 384 or 521 bits.
+Attempting to use bit lengths other than these three values for ECDSA keys
+will fail.
+Ed25519 keys have a fixed length and the
+.Fl b
+flag will be ignored.
+.It Fl C Ar comment
+Provides a new comment.
+.It Fl c
+Requests changing the comment in the private and public key files.
+This operation is only supported for RSA1 keys and keys stored in the
+newer OpenSSH format.
+The program will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for
+the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment.
+.It Fl D Ar pkcs11
+Download the RSA public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
+.Ar pkcs11 .
+When used in combination with
+.Fl s ,
+this option indicates that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the
+.Sx CERTIFICATES
+section for details).
+.It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
+Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
+Valid options are:
+.Dq md5
+and
+.Dq sha256 .
+The default is
+.Dq sha256 .
+.It Fl e
+This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and
+print to stdout the key in one of the formats specified by the
+.Fl m
+option.
+The default export format is
+.Dq RFC4716 .
+This option allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs, including
+several commercial SSH implementations.
+.It Fl F Ar hostname
+Search for the specified
+.Ar hostname
+in a
+.Pa known_hosts
+file, listing any occurrences found.
+This option is useful to find hashed host names or addresses and may also be
+used in conjunction with the
+.Fl H
+option to print found keys in a hashed format.
+.It Fl f Ar filename
+Specifies the filename of the key file.
+.It Fl G Ar output_file
+Generate candidate primes for DH-GEX.
+These primes must be screened for
+safety (using the
+.Fl T
+option) before use.
+.It Fl g
+Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records using the
+.Fl r
+command.
+.It Fl H
+Hash a
+.Pa known_hosts
+file.
+This replaces all hostnames and addresses with hashed representations
+within the specified file; the original content is moved to a file with
+a .old suffix.
+These hashes may be used normally by
+.Nm ssh
+and
+.Nm sshd ,
+but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents
+be disclosed.
+This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames and is therefore safe
+to use on files that mix hashed and non-hashed names.
+.It Fl h
+When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user
+certificate.
+Please see the
+.Sx CERTIFICATES
+section for details.
+.It Fl I Ar certificate_identity
+Specify the key identity when signing a public key.
+Please see the
+.Sx CERTIFICATES
+section for details.
+.It Fl i
+This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file
+in the format specified by the
+.Fl m
+option and print an OpenSSH compatible private
+(or public) key to stdout.
+This option allows importing keys from other software, including several
+commercial SSH implementations.
+The default import format is
+.Dq RFC4716 .
+.It Fl J Ar num_lines
+Exit after screening the specified number of lines
+while performing DH candidate screening using the
+.Fl T
+option.
+.It Fl j Ar start_line
+Start screening at the specified line number
+while performing DH candidate screening using the
+.Fl T
+option.
+.It Fl K Ar checkpt
+Write the last line processed to the file
+.Ar checkpt
+while performing DH candidate screening using the
+.Fl T
+option.
+This will be used to skip lines in the input file that have already been
+processed if the job is restarted.
+.It Fl k
+Generate a KRL file.
+In this mode,
+.Nm
+will generate a KRL file at the location specified via the
+.Fl f
+flag that revokes every key or certificate presented on the command line.
+Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key file or
+using the format described in the
+.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
+section.
+.It Fl L
+Prints the contents of one or more certificates.
+.It Fl l
+Show fingerprint of specified public key file.
+Private RSA1 keys are also supported.
+For RSA and DSA keys
+.Nm
+tries to find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint.
+If combined with
+.Fl v ,
+a visual ASCII art representation of the key is supplied with the
+fingerprint.
+.It Fl M Ar memory
+Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when generating
+candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+.It Fl m Ar key_format
+Specify a key format for the
+.Fl i
+(import) or
+.Fl e
+(export) conversion options.
+The supported key formats are:
+.Dq RFC4716
+(RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key),
+.Dq PKCS8
+(PEM PKCS8 public key)
+or
+.Dq PEM
+(PEM public key).
+The default conversion format is
+.Dq RFC4716 .
+.It Fl N Ar new_passphrase
+Provides the new passphrase.
+.It Fl n Ar principals
+Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be included in
+a certificate when signing a key.
+Multiple principals may be specified, separated by commas.
+Please see the
+.Sx CERTIFICATES
+section for details.
+.It Fl O Ar option
+Specify a certificate option when signing a key.
+This option may be specified multiple times.
+Please see the
+.Sx CERTIFICATES
+section for details.
+The options that are valid for user certificates are:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Ic clear
+Clear all enabled permissions.
+This is useful for clearing the default set of permissions so permissions may
+be added individually.
+.It Ic force-command Ns = Ns Ar command
+Forces the execution of
+.Ar command
+instead of any shell or command specified by the user when
+the certificate is used for authentication.
+.It Ic no-agent-forwarding
+Disable
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+forwarding (permitted by default).
+.It Ic no-port-forwarding
+Disable port forwarding (permitted by default).
+.It Ic no-pty
+Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default).
+.It Ic no-user-rc
+Disable execution of
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+by
+.Xr sshd 8
+(permitted by default).
+.It Ic no-x11-forwarding
+Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default).
+.It Ic permit-agent-forwarding
+Allows
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+forwarding.
+.It Ic permit-port-forwarding
+Allows port forwarding.
+.It Ic permit-pty
+Allows PTY allocation.
+.It Ic permit-user-rc
+Allows execution of
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+by
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+.It Ic permit-x11-forwarding
+Allows X11 forwarding.
+.It Ic source-address Ns = Ns Ar address_list
+Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is considered valid.
+The
+.Ar address_list
+is a comma-separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR
+format.
+.El
+.Pp
+At present, no options are valid for host keys.
+.It Fl o
+Causes
+.Nm
+to save private keys using the new OpenSSH format rather than
+the more compatible PEM format.
+The new format has increased resistance to brute-force password cracking
+but is not supported by versions of OpenSSH prior to 6.5.
+Ed25519 keys always use the new private key format.
+.It Fl P Ar passphrase
+Provides the (old) passphrase.
+.It Fl p
+Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of
+creating a new private key.
+The program will prompt for the file
+containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for the
+new passphrase.
+.It Fl Q
+Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL.
+.It Fl q
+Silence
+.Nm ssh-keygen .
+.It Fl R Ar hostname
+Removes all keys belonging to
+.Ar hostname
+from a
+.Pa known_hosts
+file.
+This option is useful to delete hashed hosts (see the
+.Fl H
+option above).
+.It Fl r Ar hostname
+Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named
+.Ar hostname
+for the specified public key file.
+.It Fl S Ar start
+Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+.It Fl s Ar ca_key
+Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key.
+Please see the
+.Sx CERTIFICATES
+section for details.
+.Pp
+When generating a KRL,
+.Fl s
+specifies a path to a CA public key file used to revoke certificates directly
+by key ID or serial number.
+See the
+.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
+section for details.
+.It Fl T Ar output_file
+Test DH group exchange candidate primes (generated using the
+.Fl G
+option) for safety.
+.It Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1
+Specifies the type of key to create.
+The possible values are
+.Dq rsa1
+for protocol version 1 and
+.Dq dsa ,
+.Dq ecdsa ,
+.Dq ed25519 ,
+or
+.Dq rsa
+for protocol version 2.
+.It Fl u
+Update a KRL.
+When specified with
+.Fl k ,
+keys listed via the command line are added to the existing KRL rather than
+a new KRL being created.
+.It Fl V Ar validity_interval
+Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate.
+A validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that the
+certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time, or may consist
+of two times separated by a colon to indicate an explicit time interval.
+The start time may be specified as a date in YYYYMMDD format, a time
+in YYYYMMDDHHMMSS format or a relative time (to the current time) consisting
+of a minus sign followed by a relative time in the format described in the
+TIME FORMATS section of
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+The end time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date, a YYYYMMDDHHMMSS time or
+a relative time starting with a plus character.
+.Pp
+For example:
+.Dq +52w1d
+(valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now),
+.Dq -4w:+4w
+(valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now),
+.Dq 20100101123000:20110101123000
+(valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011),
+.Dq -1d:20110101
+(valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011).
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode.
+Causes
+.Nm
+to print debugging messages about its progress.
+This is helpful for debugging moduli generation.
+Multiple
+.Fl v
+options increase the verbosity.
+The maximum is 3.
+.It Fl W Ar generator
+Specify desired generator when testing candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+.It Fl y
+This option will read a private
+OpenSSH format file and print an OpenSSH public key to stdout.
+.It Fl z Ar serial_number
+Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to distinguish
+this certificate from others from the same CA.
+The default serial number is zero.
+.Pp
+When generating a KRL, the
+.Fl z
+flag is used to specify a KRL version number.
+.El
+.Sh MODULI GENERATION
+.Nm
+may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange
+(DH-GEX) protocol.
+Generating these groups is a two-step process: first, candidate
+primes are generated using a fast, but memory intensive process.
+These candidate primes are then tested for suitability (a CPU-intensive
+process).
+.Pp
+Generation of primes is performed using the
+.Fl G
+option.
+The desired length of the primes may be specified by the
+.Fl b
+option.
+For example:
+.Pp
+.Dl # ssh-keygen -G moduli-2048.candidates -b 2048
+.Pp
+By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the
+desired length range.
+This may be overridden using the
+.Fl S
+option, which specifies a different start point (in hex).
+.Pp
+Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be screened for
+suitability.
+This may be performed using the
+.Fl T
+option.
+In this mode
+.Nm
+will read candidates from standard input (or a file specified using the
+.Fl f
+option).
+For example:
+.Pp
+.Dl # ssh-keygen -T moduli-2048 -f moduli-2048.candidates
+.Pp
+By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests.
+This may be overridden using the
+.Fl a
+option.
+The DH generator value will be chosen automatically for the
+prime under consideration.
+If a specific generator is desired, it may be requested using the
+.Fl W
+option.
+Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
+.Pp
+Screened DH groups may be installed in
+.Pa /etc/moduli .
+It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and
+that both ends of a connection share common moduli.
+.Sh CERTIFICATES
+.Nm
+supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be used for
+user or host authentication.
+Certificates consist of a public key, some identity information, zero or
+more principal (user or host) names and a set of options that
+are signed by a Certification Authority (CA) key.
+Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify its signature
+on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys.
+Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format to
+the X.509 certificates used in
+.Xr ssl 8 .
+.Pp
+.Nm
+supports two types of certificates: user and host.
+User certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates
+authenticate server hosts to users.
+To generate a user certificate:
+.Pp
+.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub
+.Pp
+The resultant certificate will be placed in
+.Pa /path/to/user_key-cert.pub .
+A host certificate requires the
+.Fl h
+option:
+.Pp
+.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub
+.Pp
+The host certificate will be output to
+.Pa /path/to/host_key-cert.pub .
+.Pp
+It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by
+providing the token library using
+.Fl D
+and identifying the CA key by providing its public half as an argument
+to
+.Fl s :
+.Pp
+.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id user_key.pub
+.Pp
+In all cases,
+.Ar key_id
+is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server when the certificate
+is used for authentication.
+.Pp
+Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal (user/host)
+names.
+By default, generated certificates are valid for all users or hosts.
+To generate a certificate for a specified set of principals:
+.Pp
+.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub
+.Dl "$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain host_key.pub"
+.Pp
+Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may
+be specified through certificate options.
+A certificate option may disable features of the SSH session, may be
+valid only when presented from particular source addresses or may
+force the use of a specific command.
+For a list of valid certificate options, see the documentation for the
+.Fl O
+option above.
+.Pp
+Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime.
+The
+.Fl V
+option allows specification of certificate start and end times.
+A certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be
+considered valid.
+By default, certificates are valid from
+.Ux
+Epoch to the distant future.
+.Pp
+For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA
+public key must be trusted by
+.Xr sshd 8
+or
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+Please refer to those manual pages for details.
+.Sh KEY REVOCATION LISTS
+.Nm
+is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs).
+These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a
+compact format, taking as little as one bit per certificate if they are being
+revoked by serial number.
+.Pp
+KRLs may be generated using the
+.Fl k
+flag.
+This option reads one or more files from the command line and generates a new
+KRL.
+The files may either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys,
+listed one per line.
+Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or contents in the KRL and
+certificates revoked by serial number or key ID (if the serial is zero or
+not available).
+.Pp
+Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the
+types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke
+certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete original
+certificate on hand.
+A KRL specification consists of lines containing one of the following directives
+followed by a colon and some directive-specific information.
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm serial : Ar serial_number Ns Op - Ns Ar serial_number
+Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number.
+Serial numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be expressed
+in decimal, hex or octal.
+If two serial numbers are specified separated by a hyphen, then the range
+of serial numbers including and between each is revoked.
+The CA key must have been specified on the
+.Nm
+command line using the
+.Fl s
+option.
+.It Cm id : Ar key_id
+Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string.
+The CA key must have been specified on the
+.Nm
+command line using the
+.Fl s
+option.
+.It Cm key : Ar public_key
+Revokes the specified key.
+If a certificate is listed, then it is revoked as a plain public key.
+.It Cm sha1 : Ar public_key
+Revokes the specified key by its SHA1 hash.
+.El
+.Pp
+KRLs may be updated using the
+.Fl u
+flag in addition to
+.Fl k .
+When this option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into
+the KRL, adding to those already there.
+.Pp
+It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular key
+(or keys).
+The
+.Fl Q
+flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key specified on the command line.
+If any key listed on the command line has been revoked (or an error encountered)
+then
+.Nm
+will exit with a non-zero exit status.
+A zero exit status will only be returned if no key was revoked.
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
+Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
+This file should not be readable by anyone but the user.
+It is possible to
+specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be
+used to encrypt the private part of this file using 3DES.
+This file is not automatically accessed by
+.Nm
+but it is offered as the default file for the private key.
+.Xr ssh 1
+will read this file when a login attempt is made.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub
+Contains the protocol version 1 RSA public key for authentication.
+The contents of this file should be added to
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+on all machines
+where the user wishes to log in using RSA authentication.
+There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+Contains the protocol version 2 DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA
+authentication identity of the user.
+This file should not be readable by anyone but the user.
+It is possible to
+specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be
+used to encrypt the private part of this file using 128-bit AES.
+This file is not automatically accessed by
+.Nm
+but it is offered as the default file for the private key.
+.Xr ssh 1
+will read this file when a login attempt is made.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+Contains the protocol version 2 DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA
+public key for authentication.
+The contents of this file should be added to
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+on all machines
+where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
+There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/moduli
+Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
+The file format is described in
+.Xr moduli 5 .
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr moduli 5 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4716
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keygen.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keygen.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keygen.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,2704 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.241 2014/02/05 20:13:25 naddy Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Identity and host key generation and maintenance.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "authfile.h"
-#include "uuencode.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "dns.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "krl.h"
-
-/* Number of bits in the RSA/DSA key. This value can be set on the command line. */
-#define DEFAULT_BITS 2048
-#define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA 1024
-#define DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA 256
-u_int32_t bits = 0;
-
-/*
- * Flag indicating that we just want to change the passphrase. This can be
- * set on the command line.
- */
-int change_passphrase = 0;
-
-/*
- * Flag indicating that we just want to change the comment. This can be set
- * on the command line.
- */
-int change_comment = 0;
-
-int quiet = 0;
-
-int log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
-
-/* Flag indicating that we want to hash a known_hosts file */
-int hash_hosts = 0;
-/* Flag indicating that we want lookup a host in known_hosts file */
-int find_host = 0;
-/* Flag indicating that we want to delete a host from a known_hosts file */
-int delete_host = 0;
-
-/* Flag indicating that we want to show the contents of a certificate */
-int show_cert = 0;
-
-/* Flag indicating that we just want to see the key fingerprint */
-int print_fingerprint = 0;
-int print_bubblebabble = 0;
-
-/* The identity file name, given on the command line or entered by the user. */
-char identity_file[1024];
-int have_identity = 0;
-
-/* This is set to the passphrase if given on the command line. */
-char *identity_passphrase = NULL;
-
-/* This is set to the new passphrase if given on the command line. */
-char *identity_new_passphrase = NULL;
-
-/* This is set to the new comment if given on the command line. */
-char *identity_comment = NULL;
-
-/* Path to CA key when certifying keys. */
-char *ca_key_path = NULL;
-
-/* Certificate serial number */
-unsigned long long cert_serial = 0;
-
-/* Key type when certifying */
-u_int cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER;
-
-/* "key ID" of signed key */
-char *cert_key_id = NULL;
-
-/* Comma-separated list of principal names for certifying keys */
-char *cert_principals = NULL;
-
-/* Validity period for certificates */
-u_int64_t cert_valid_from = 0;
-u_int64_t cert_valid_to = ~0ULL;
-
-/* Certificate options */
-#define CERTOPT_X_FWD (1)
-#define CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD (1<<1)
-#define CERTOPT_PORT_FWD (1<<2)
-#define CERTOPT_PTY (1<<3)
-#define CERTOPT_USER_RC (1<<4)
-#define CERTOPT_DEFAULT (CERTOPT_X_FWD|CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD| \
- CERTOPT_PORT_FWD|CERTOPT_PTY|CERTOPT_USER_RC)
-u_int32_t certflags_flags = CERTOPT_DEFAULT;
-char *certflags_command = NULL;
-char *certflags_src_addr = NULL;
-
-/* Conversion to/from various formats */
-int convert_to = 0;
-int convert_from = 0;
-enum {
- FMT_RFC4716,
- FMT_PKCS8,
- FMT_PEM
-} convert_format = FMT_RFC4716;
-int print_public = 0;
-int print_generic = 0;
-
-char *key_type_name = NULL;
-
-/* Load key from this PKCS#11 provider */
-char *pkcs11provider = NULL;
-
-/* Use new OpenSSH private key format when writing SSH2 keys instead of PEM */
-int use_new_format = 0;
-
-/* Cipher for new-format private keys */
-char *new_format_cipher = NULL;
-
-/*
- * Number of KDF rounds to derive new format keys /
- * number of primality trials when screening moduli.
- */
-int rounds = 0;
-
-/* argv0 */
-extern char *__progname;
-
-char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
-
-/* moduli.c */
-int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *);
-int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long,
- unsigned long);
-
-static void
-type_bits_valid(int type, u_int32_t *bitsp)
-{
- u_int maxbits;
-
- if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
- fprintf(stderr, "unknown key type %s\n", key_type_name);
- exit(1);
- }
- if (*bitsp == 0) {
- if (type == KEY_DSA)
- *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_DSA;
- else if (type == KEY_ECDSA)
- *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA;
- else
- *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS;
- }
- maxbits = (type == KEY_DSA) ?
- OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS : OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS;
- if (*bitsp > maxbits) {
- fprintf(stderr, "key bits exceeds maximum %d\n", maxbits);
- exit(1);
- }
- if (type == KEY_DSA && *bitsp != 1024)
- fatal("DSA keys must be 1024 bits");
- else if (type != KEY_ECDSA && type != KEY_ED25519 && *bitsp < 768)
- fatal("Key must at least be 768 bits");
- else if (type == KEY_ECDSA && key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(*bitsp) == -1)
- fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length - valid lengths are "
- "256, 384 or 521 bits");
-}
-
-static void
-ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
-{
- char buf[1024];
- char *name = NULL;
-
- if (key_type_name == NULL)
- name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA;
- else {
- switch (key_type_from_name(key_type_name)) {
- case KEY_RSA1:
- name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY;
- break;
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA:
- name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA;
- break;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA;
- break;
-#endif
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA:
- name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA;
- break;
- case KEY_ED25519:
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
- break;
- default:
- fprintf(stderr, "bad key type\n");
- exit(1);
- break;
- }
- }
- snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name);
- fprintf(stderr, "%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file);
- if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL)
- exit(1);
- buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0';
- if (strcmp(buf, "") != 0)
- strlcpy(identity_file, buf, sizeof(identity_file));
- have_identity = 1;
-}
-
-static Key *
-load_identity(char *filename)
-{
- char *pass;
- Key *prv;
-
- prv = key_load_private(filename, "", NULL);
- if (prv == NULL) {
- if (identity_passphrase)
- pass = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
- else
- pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ",
- RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
- prv = key_load_private(filename, pass, NULL);
- explicit_bzero(pass, strlen(pass));
- free(pass);
- }
- return prv;
-}
-
-#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
-#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END "---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
-#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----"
-#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC 0x3f6ff9eb
-
-static void
-do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, Key *k)
-{
- u_int len;
- u_char *blob;
- char comment[61];
-
- if (k->type == KEY_RSA1) {
- fprintf(stderr, "version 1 keys are not supported\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- if (key_to_blob(k, &blob, &len) <= 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "key_to_blob failed\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- /* Comment + surrounds must fit into 72 chars (RFC 4716 sec 3.3) */
- snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment),
- "%u-bit %s, converted by %s@%s from OpenSSH",
- key_size(k), key_type(k),
- pw->pw_name, hostname);
-
- fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN);
- fprintf(stdout, "Comment: \"%s\"\n", comment);
- dump_base64(stdout, blob, len);
- fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END);
- key_free(k);
- free(blob);
- exit(0);
-}
-
-static void
-do_convert_to_pkcs8(Key *k)
-{
- switch (key_type_plain(k->type)) {
- case KEY_RSA1:
- case KEY_RSA:
- if (!PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->rsa))
- fatal("PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY failed");
- break;
- case KEY_DSA:
- if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa))
- fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed");
- break;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa))
- fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed");
- break;
-#endif
- default:
- fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, key_type(k));
- }
- exit(0);
-}
-
-static void
-do_convert_to_pem(Key *k)
-{
- switch (key_type_plain(k->type)) {
- case KEY_RSA1:
- case KEY_RSA:
- if (!PEM_write_RSAPublicKey(stdout, k->rsa))
- fatal("PEM_write_RSAPublicKey failed");
- break;
-#if notyet /* OpenSSH 0.9.8 lacks this function */
- case KEY_DSA:
- if (!PEM_write_DSAPublicKey(stdout, k->dsa))
- fatal("PEM_write_DSAPublicKey failed");
- break;
-#endif
- /* XXX ECDSA? */
- default:
- fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, key_type(k));
- }
- exit(0);
-}
-
-static void
-do_convert_to(struct passwd *pw)
-{
- Key *k;
- struct stat st;
-
- if (!have_identity)
- ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
- if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
- fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
- if ((k = key_load_public(identity_file, NULL)) == NULL) {
- if ((k = load_identity(identity_file)) == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "load failed\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- }
-
- switch (convert_format) {
- case FMT_RFC4716:
- do_convert_to_ssh2(pw, k);
- break;
- case FMT_PKCS8:
- do_convert_to_pkcs8(k);
- break;
- case FMT_PEM:
- do_convert_to_pem(k);
- break;
- default:
- fatal("%s: unknown key format %d", __func__, convert_format);
- }
- exit(0);
-}
-
-static void
-buffer_get_bignum_bits(Buffer *b, BIGNUM *value)
-{
- u_int bignum_bits = buffer_get_int(b);
- u_int bytes = (bignum_bits + 7) / 8;
-
- if (buffer_len(b) < bytes)
- fatal("buffer_get_bignum_bits: input buffer too small: "
- "need %d have %d", bytes, buffer_len(b));
- if (BN_bin2bn(buffer_ptr(b), bytes, value) == NULL)
- fatal("buffer_get_bignum_bits: BN_bin2bn failed");
- buffer_consume(b, bytes);
-}
-
-static Key *
-do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(u_char *blob, u_int blen)
-{
- Buffer b;
- Key *key = NULL;
- char *type, *cipher;
- u_char *sig, data[] = "abcde12345";
- int magic, rlen, ktype, i1, i2, i3, i4;
- u_int slen;
- u_long e;
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, blob, blen);
-
- magic = buffer_get_int(&b);
- if (magic != SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC) {
- error("bad magic 0x%x != 0x%x", magic, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC);
- buffer_free(&b);
- return NULL;
- }
- i1 = buffer_get_int(&b);
- type = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
- cipher = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
- i2 = buffer_get_int(&b);
- i3 = buffer_get_int(&b);
- i4 = buffer_get_int(&b);
- debug("ignore (%d %d %d %d)", i1, i2, i3, i4);
- if (strcmp(cipher, "none") != 0) {
- error("unsupported cipher %s", cipher);
- free(cipher);
- buffer_free(&b);
- free(type);
- return NULL;
- }
- free(cipher);
-
- if (strstr(type, "dsa")) {
- ktype = KEY_DSA;
- } else if (strstr(type, "rsa")) {
- ktype = KEY_RSA;
- } else {
- buffer_free(&b);
- free(type);
- return NULL;
- }
- key = key_new_private(ktype);
- free(type);
-
- switch (key->type) {
- case KEY_DSA:
- buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->p);
- buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->g);
- buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->q);
- buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->pub_key);
- buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->priv_key);
- break;
- case KEY_RSA:
- e = buffer_get_char(&b);
- debug("e %lx", e);
- if (e < 30) {
- e <<= 8;
- e += buffer_get_char(&b);
- debug("e %lx", e);
- e <<= 8;
- e += buffer_get_char(&b);
- debug("e %lx", e);
- }
- if (!BN_set_word(key->rsa->e, e)) {
- buffer_free(&b);
- key_free(key);
- return NULL;
- }
- buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->d);
- buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->n);
- buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->iqmp);
- buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->q);
- buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->p);
- rsa_generate_additional_parameters(key->rsa);
- break;
- }
- rlen = buffer_len(&b);
- if (rlen != 0)
- error("do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob: "
- "remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen);
- buffer_free(&b);
-
- /* try the key */
- key_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data));
- key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data));
- free(sig);
- return key;
-}
-
-static int
-get_line(FILE *fp, char *line, size_t len)
-{
- int c;
- size_t pos = 0;
-
- line[0] = '\0';
- while ((c = fgetc(fp)) != EOF) {
- if (pos >= len - 1) {
- fprintf(stderr, "input line too long.\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- switch (c) {
- case '\r':
- c = fgetc(fp);
- if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF) {
- fprintf(stderr, "unget: %s\n", strerror(errno));
- exit(1);
- }
- return pos;
- case '\n':
- return pos;
- }
- line[pos++] = c;
- line[pos] = '\0';
- }
- /* We reached EOF */
- return -1;
-}
-
-static void
-do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, Key **k, int *private)
-{
- int blen;
- u_int len;
- char line[1024];
- u_char blob[8096];
- char encoded[8096];
- int escaped = 0;
- FILE *fp;
-
- if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
- encoded[0] = '\0';
- while ((blen = get_line(fp, line, sizeof(line))) != -1) {
- if (blen > 0 && line[blen - 1] == '\\')
- escaped++;
- if (strncmp(line, "----", 4) == 0 ||
- strstr(line, ": ") != NULL) {
- if (strstr(line, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN) != NULL)
- *private = 1;
- if (strstr(line, " END ") != NULL) {
- break;
- }
- /* fprintf(stderr, "ignore: %s", line); */
- continue;
- }
- if (escaped) {
- escaped--;
- /* fprintf(stderr, "escaped: %s", line); */
- continue;
- }
- strlcat(encoded, line, sizeof(encoded));
- }
- len = strlen(encoded);
- if (((len % 4) == 3) &&
- (encoded[len-1] == '=') &&
- (encoded[len-2] == '=') &&
- (encoded[len-3] == '='))
- encoded[len-3] = '\0';
- blen = uudecode(encoded, blob, sizeof(blob));
- if (blen < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "uudecode failed.\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- *k = *private ?
- do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(blob, blen) :
- key_from_blob(blob, blen);
- if (*k == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "decode blob failed.\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- fclose(fp);
-}
-
-static void
-do_convert_from_pkcs8(Key **k, int *private)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *pubkey;
- FILE *fp;
-
- if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
- if ((pubkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) {
- fatal("%s: %s is not a recognised public key format", __func__,
- identity_file);
- }
- fclose(fp);
- switch (EVP_PKEY_type(pubkey->type)) {
- case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
- *k = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
- (*k)->type = KEY_RSA;
- (*k)->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pubkey);
- break;
- case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
- *k = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
- (*k)->type = KEY_DSA;
- (*k)->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pubkey);
- break;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case EVP_PKEY_EC:
- *k = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
- (*k)->type = KEY_ECDSA;
- (*k)->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pubkey);
- (*k)->ecdsa_nid = key_ecdsa_key_to_nid((*k)->ecdsa);
- break;
-#endif
- default:
- fatal("%s: unsupported pubkey type %d", __func__,
- EVP_PKEY_type(pubkey->type));
- }
- EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
- return;
-}
-
-static void
-do_convert_from_pem(Key **k, int *private)
-{
- FILE *fp;
- RSA *rsa;
-#ifdef notyet
- DSA *dsa;
-#endif
-
- if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
- if ((rsa = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) {
- *k = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
- (*k)->type = KEY_RSA;
- (*k)->rsa = rsa;
- fclose(fp);
- return;
- }
-#if notyet /* OpenSSH 0.9.8 lacks this function */
- rewind(fp);
- if ((dsa = PEM_read_DSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) {
- *k = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
- (*k)->type = KEY_DSA;
- (*k)->dsa = dsa;
- fclose(fp);
- return;
- }
- /* XXX ECDSA */
-#endif
- fatal("%s: unrecognised raw private key format", __func__);
-}
-
-static void
-do_convert_from(struct passwd *pw)
-{
- Key *k = NULL;
- int private = 0, ok = 0;
- struct stat st;
-
- if (!have_identity)
- ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
- if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
- fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
-
- switch (convert_format) {
- case FMT_RFC4716:
- do_convert_from_ssh2(pw, &k, &private);
- break;
- case FMT_PKCS8:
- do_convert_from_pkcs8(&k, &private);
- break;
- case FMT_PEM:
- do_convert_from_pem(&k, &private);
- break;
- default:
- fatal("%s: unknown key format %d", __func__, convert_format);
- }
-
- if (!private)
- ok = key_write(k, stdout);
- if (ok)
- fprintf(stdout, "\n");
- else {
- switch (k->type) {
- case KEY_DSA:
- ok = PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->dsa, NULL,
- NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
- break;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- ok = PEM_write_ECPrivateKey(stdout, k->ecdsa, NULL,
- NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
- break;
-#endif
- case KEY_RSA:
- ok = PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->rsa, NULL,
- NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
- break;
- default:
- fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__,
- key_type(k));
- }
- }
-
- if (!ok) {
- fprintf(stderr, "key write failed\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- key_free(k);
- exit(0);
-}
-
-static void
-do_print_public(struct passwd *pw)
-{
- Key *prv;
- struct stat st;
-
- if (!have_identity)
- ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
- if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
- perror(identity_file);
- exit(1);
- }
- prv = load_identity(identity_file);
- if (prv == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "load failed\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- if (!key_write(prv, stdout))
- fprintf(stderr, "key_write failed");
- key_free(prv);
- fprintf(stdout, "\n");
- exit(0);
-}
-
-static void
-do_download(struct passwd *pw)
-{
-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- Key **keys = NULL;
- int i, nkeys;
- enum fp_rep rep;
- enum fp_type fptype;
- char *fp, *ra;
-
- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
- rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
-
- pkcs11_init(0);
- nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys);
- if (nkeys <= 0)
- fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11");
- for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
- if (print_fingerprint) {
- fp = key_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep);
- ra = key_fingerprint(keys[i], SSH_FP_MD5,
- SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", key_size(keys[i]),
- fp, key_type(keys[i]));
- if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
- printf("%s\n", ra);
- free(ra);
- free(fp);
- } else {
- key_write(keys[i], stdout);
- fprintf(stdout, "\n");
- }
- key_free(keys[i]);
- }
- free(keys);
- pkcs11_terminate();
- exit(0);
-#else
- fatal("no pkcs11 support");
-#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
-}
-
-static void
-do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
-{
- FILE *f;
- Key *public;
- char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra;
- int i, skip = 0, num = 0, invalid = 1;
- enum fp_rep rep;
- enum fp_type fptype;
- struct stat st;
-
- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
- rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
-
- if (!have_identity)
- ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
- if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
- perror(identity_file);
- exit(1);
- }
- public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment);
- if (public != NULL) {
- fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
- ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, comment,
- key_type(public));
- if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
- printf("%s\n", ra);
- key_free(public);
- free(comment);
- free(ra);
- free(fp);
- exit(0);
- }
- if (comment) {
- free(comment);
- comment = NULL;
- }
-
- if ((f = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
-
- while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
- if ((cp = strchr(line, '\n')) == NULL) {
- error("line %d too long: %.40s...",
- num + 1, line);
- skip = 1;
- continue;
- }
- num++;
- if (skip) {
- skip = 0;
- continue;
- }
- *cp = '\0';
-
- /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
- for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
- ;
- if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
- continue;
- i = strtol(cp, &ep, 10);
- if (i == 0 || ep == NULL || (*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) {
- int quoted = 0;
- comment = cp;
- for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' &&
- *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
- if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
- cp++; /* Skip both */
- else if (*cp == '"')
- quoted = !quoted;
- }
- if (!*cp)
- continue;
- *cp++ = '\0';
- }
- ep = cp;
- public = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
- if (key_read(public, &cp) != 1) {
- cp = ep;
- key_free(public);
- public = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
- if (key_read(public, &cp) != 1) {
- key_free(public);
- continue;
- }
- }
- comment = *cp ? cp : comment;
- fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
- ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp,
- comment ? comment : "no comment", key_type(public));
- if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
- printf("%s\n", ra);
- free(ra);
- free(fp);
- key_free(public);
- invalid = 0;
- }
- fclose(f);
-
- if (invalid) {
- printf("%s is not a public key file.\n", identity_file);
- exit(1);
- }
- exit(0);
-}
-
-static void
-do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
-{
- struct {
- char *key_type;
- char *key_type_display;
- char *path;
- } key_types[] = {
- { "rsa1", "RSA1", _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE },
- { "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE },
- { "dsa", "DSA", _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE },
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- { "ecdsa", "ECDSA",_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE },
-#endif
- { "ed25519", "ED25519",_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE },
- { NULL, NULL, NULL }
- };
-
- int first = 0;
- struct stat st;
- Key *private, *public;
- char comment[1024];
- int i, type, fd;
- FILE *f;
-
- for (i = 0; key_types[i].key_type; i++) {
- if (stat(key_types[i].path, &st) == 0)
- continue;
- if (errno != ENOENT) {
- printf("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path,
- strerror(errno));
- first = 0;
- continue;
- }
-
- if (first == 0) {
- first = 1;
- printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
- }
- printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
- fflush(stdout);
- type = key_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
- strlcpy(identity_file, key_types[i].path, sizeof(identity_file));
- bits = 0;
- type_bits_valid(type, &bits);
- private = key_generate(type, bits);
- if (private == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "key_generate failed\n");
- first = 0;
- continue;
- }
- public = key_from_private(private);
- snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name,
- hostname);
- if (!key_save_private(private, identity_file, "", comment,
- use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) {
- printf("Saving the key failed: %s.\n", identity_file);
- key_free(private);
- key_free(public);
- first = 0;
- continue;
- }
- key_free(private);
- strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
- fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
- if (fd == -1) {
- printf("Could not save your public key in %s\n",
- identity_file);
- key_free(public);
- first = 0;
- continue;
- }
- f = fdopen(fd, "w");
- if (f == NULL) {
- printf("fdopen %s failed\n", identity_file);
- key_free(public);
- first = 0;
- continue;
- }
- if (!key_write(public, f)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "write key failed\n");
- key_free(public);
- first = 0;
- continue;
- }
- fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
- fclose(f);
- key_free(public);
-
- }
- if (first != 0)
- printf("\n");
-}
-
-static void
-printhost(FILE *f, const char *name, Key *public, int ca, int hash)
-{
- if (print_fingerprint) {
- enum fp_rep rep;
- enum fp_type fptype;
- char *fp, *ra;
-
- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
- rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
- fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
- ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, name,
- key_type(public));
- if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
- printf("%s\n", ra);
- free(ra);
- free(fp);
- } else {
- if (hash && (name = host_hash(name, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
- fatal("hash_host failed");
- fprintf(f, "%s%s%s ", ca ? CA_MARKER : "", ca ? " " : "", name);
- if (!key_write(public, f))
- fatal("key_write failed");
- fprintf(f, "\n");
- }
-}
-
-static void
-do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name)
-{
- FILE *in, *out = stdout;
- Key *pub;
- char *cp, *cp2, *kp, *kp2;
- char line[16*1024], tmp[MAXPATHLEN], old[MAXPATHLEN];
- int c, skip = 0, inplace = 0, num = 0, invalid = 0, has_unhashed = 0;
- int ca;
- int found_key = 0;
-
- if (!have_identity) {
- cp = tilde_expand_filename(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid);
- if (strlcpy(identity_file, cp, sizeof(identity_file)) >=
- sizeof(identity_file))
- fatal("Specified known hosts path too long");
- free(cp);
- have_identity = 1;
- }
- if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
-
- /*
- * Find hosts goes to stdout, hash and deletions happen in-place
- * A corner case is ssh-keygen -HF foo, which should go to stdout
- */
- if (!find_host && (hash_hosts || delete_host)) {
- if (strlcpy(tmp, identity_file, sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) ||
- strlcat(tmp, ".XXXXXXXXXX", sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) ||
- strlcpy(old, identity_file, sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old) ||
- strlcat(old, ".old", sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old))
- fatal("known_hosts path too long");
- umask(077);
- if ((c = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1)
- fatal("mkstemp: %s", strerror(errno));
- if ((out = fdopen(c, "w")) == NULL) {
- c = errno;
- unlink(tmp);
- fatal("fdopen: %s", strerror(c));
- }
- inplace = 1;
- }
-
- while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), in)) {
- if ((cp = strchr(line, '\n')) == NULL) {
- error("line %d too long: %.40s...", num + 1, line);
- skip = 1;
- invalid = 1;
- continue;
- }
- num++;
- if (skip) {
- skip = 0;
- continue;
- }
- *cp = '\0';
-
- /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
- for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
- ;
- if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') {
- if (inplace)
- fprintf(out, "%s\n", cp);
- continue;
- }
- /* Check whether this is a CA key */
- if (strncasecmp(cp, CA_MARKER, sizeof(CA_MARKER) - 1) == 0 &&
- (cp[sizeof(CA_MARKER) - 1] == ' ' ||
- cp[sizeof(CA_MARKER) - 1] == '\t')) {
- ca = 1;
- cp += sizeof(CA_MARKER);
- } else
- ca = 0;
-
- /* Find the end of the host name portion. */
- for (kp = cp; *kp && *kp != ' ' && *kp != '\t'; kp++)
- ;
-
- if (*kp == '\0' || *(kp + 1) == '\0') {
- error("line %d missing key: %.40s...",
- num, line);
- invalid = 1;
- continue;
- }
- *kp++ = '\0';
- kp2 = kp;
-
- pub = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
- if (key_read(pub, &kp) != 1) {
- kp = kp2;
- key_free(pub);
- pub = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
- if (key_read(pub, &kp) != 1) {
- error("line %d invalid key: %.40s...",
- num, line);
- key_free(pub);
- invalid = 1;
- continue;
- }
- }
-
- if (*cp == HASH_DELIM) {
- if (find_host || delete_host) {
- cp2 = host_hash(name, cp, strlen(cp));
- if (cp2 == NULL) {
- error("line %d: invalid hashed "
- "name: %.64s...", num, line);
- invalid = 1;
- continue;
- }
- c = (strcmp(cp2, cp) == 0);
- if (find_host && c) {
- if (!quiet)
- printf("# Host %s found: "
- "line %d type %s%s\n", name,
- num, key_type(pub),
- ca ? " (CA key)" : "");
- printhost(out, cp, pub, ca, 0);
- found_key = 1;
- }
- if (delete_host) {
- if (!c && !ca)
- printhost(out, cp, pub, ca, 0);
- else
- printf("# Host %s found: "
- "line %d type %s\n", name,
- num, key_type(pub));
- }
- } else if (hash_hosts)
- printhost(out, cp, pub, ca, 0);
- } else {
- if (find_host || delete_host) {
- c = (match_hostname(name, cp,
- strlen(cp)) == 1);
- if (find_host && c) {
- if (!quiet)
- printf("# Host %s found: "
- "line %d type %s%s\n", name,
- num, key_type(pub),
- ca ? " (CA key)" : "");
- printhost(out, name, pub,
- ca, hash_hosts && !ca);
- found_key = 1;
- }
- if (delete_host) {
- if (!c && !ca)
- printhost(out, cp, pub, ca, 0);
- else
- printf("# Host %s found: "
- "line %d type %s\n", name,
- num, key_type(pub));
- }
- } else if (hash_hosts) {
- for (cp2 = strsep(&cp, ",");
- cp2 != NULL && *cp2 != '\0';
- cp2 = strsep(&cp, ",")) {
- if (ca) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Warning: "
- "ignoring CA key for host: "
- "%.64s\n", cp2);
- printhost(out, cp2, pub, ca, 0);
- } else if (strcspn(cp2, "*?!") !=
- strlen(cp2)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Warning: "
- "ignoring host name with "
- "metacharacters: %.64s\n",
- cp2);
- printhost(out, cp2, pub, ca, 0);
- } else
- printhost(out, cp2, pub, ca, 1);
- }
- has_unhashed = 1;
- }
- }
- key_free(pub);
- }
- fclose(in);
-
- if (invalid) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s is not a valid known_hosts file.\n",
- identity_file);
- if (inplace) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Not replacing existing known_hosts "
- "file because of errors\n");
- fclose(out);
- unlink(tmp);
- }
- exit(1);
- }
-
- if (inplace) {
- fclose(out);
-
- /* Backup existing file */
- if (unlink(old) == -1 && errno != ENOENT)
- fatal("unlink %.100s: %s", old, strerror(errno));
- if (link(identity_file, old) == -1)
- fatal("link %.100s to %.100s: %s", identity_file, old,
- strerror(errno));
- /* Move new one into place */
- if (rename(tmp, identity_file) == -1) {
- error("rename\"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", tmp, identity_file,
- strerror(errno));
- unlink(tmp);
- unlink(old);
- exit(1);
- }
-
- fprintf(stderr, "%s updated.\n", identity_file);
- fprintf(stderr, "Original contents retained as %s\n", old);
- if (has_unhashed) {
- fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: %s contains unhashed "
- "entries\n", old);
- fprintf(stderr, "Delete this file to ensure privacy "
- "of hostnames\n");
- }
- }
-
- exit (find_host && !found_key);
-}
-
-/*
- * Perform changing a passphrase. The argument is the passwd structure
- * for the current user.
- */
-static void
-do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
-{
- char *comment;
- char *old_passphrase, *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
- struct stat st;
- Key *private;
-
- if (!have_identity)
- ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
- if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
- perror(identity_file);
- exit(1);
- }
- /* Try to load the file with empty passphrase. */
- private = key_load_private(identity_file, "", &comment);
- if (private == NULL) {
- if (identity_passphrase)
- old_passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
- else
- old_passphrase =
- read_passphrase("Enter old passphrase: ",
- RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
- private = key_load_private(identity_file, old_passphrase,
- &comment);
- explicit_bzero(old_passphrase, strlen(old_passphrase));
- free(old_passphrase);
- if (private == NULL) {
- printf("Bad passphrase.\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- }
- printf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment);
-
- /* Ask the new passphrase (twice). */
- if (identity_new_passphrase) {
- passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
- passphrase2 = NULL;
- } else {
- passphrase1 =
- read_passphrase("Enter new passphrase (empty for no "
- "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
- passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ",
- RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
-
- /* Verify that they are the same. */
- if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) {
- explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
- explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
- free(passphrase1);
- free(passphrase2);
- printf("Pass phrases do not match. Try again.\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- /* Destroy the other copy. */
- explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
- free(passphrase2);
- }
-
- /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
- if (!key_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, comment,
- use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) {
- printf("Saving the key failed: %s.\n", identity_file);
- explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
- free(passphrase1);
- key_free(private);
- free(comment);
- exit(1);
- }
- /* Destroy the passphrase and the copy of the key in memory. */
- explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
- free(passphrase1);
- key_free(private); /* Destroys contents */
- free(comment);
-
- printf("Your identification has been saved with the new passphrase.\n");
- exit(0);
-}
-
-/*
- * Print the SSHFP RR.
- */
-static int
-do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *fname, char *hname)
-{
- Key *public;
- char *comment = NULL;
- struct stat st;
-
- if (fname == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no filename", __func__);
- if (stat(fname, &st) < 0) {
- if (errno == ENOENT)
- return 0;
- perror(fname);
- exit(1);
- }
- public = key_load_public(fname, &comment);
- if (public != NULL) {
- export_dns_rr(hname, public, stdout, print_generic);
- key_free(public);
- free(comment);
- return 1;
- }
- if (comment)
- free(comment);
-
- printf("failed to read v2 public key from %s.\n", fname);
- exit(1);
-}
-
-/*
- * Change the comment of a private key file.
- */
-static void
-do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw)
-{
- char new_comment[1024], *comment, *passphrase;
- Key *private;
- Key *public;
- struct stat st;
- FILE *f;
- int fd;
-
- if (!have_identity)
- ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
- if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
- perror(identity_file);
- exit(1);
- }
- private = key_load_private(identity_file, "", &comment);
- if (private == NULL) {
- if (identity_passphrase)
- passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
- else if (identity_new_passphrase)
- passphrase = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
- else
- passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ",
- RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
- /* Try to load using the passphrase. */
- private = key_load_private(identity_file, passphrase, &comment);
- if (private == NULL) {
- explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
- free(passphrase);
- printf("Bad passphrase.\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- } else {
- passphrase = xstrdup("");
- }
- if (private->type != KEY_RSA1) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Comments are only supported for RSA1 keys.\n");
- key_free(private);
- exit(1);
- }
- printf("Key now has comment '%s'\n", comment);
-
- if (identity_comment) {
- strlcpy(new_comment, identity_comment, sizeof(new_comment));
- } else {
- printf("Enter new comment: ");
- fflush(stdout);
- if (!fgets(new_comment, sizeof(new_comment), stdin)) {
- explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
- key_free(private);
- exit(1);
- }
- new_comment[strcspn(new_comment, "\n")] = '\0';
- }
-
- /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
- if (!key_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase, new_comment,
- use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) {
- printf("Saving the key failed: %s.\n", identity_file);
- explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
- free(passphrase);
- key_free(private);
- free(comment);
- exit(1);
- }
- explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
- free(passphrase);
- public = key_from_private(private);
- key_free(private);
-
- strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
- fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
- if (fd == -1) {
- printf("Could not save your public key in %s\n", identity_file);
- exit(1);
- }
- f = fdopen(fd, "w");
- if (f == NULL) {
- printf("fdopen %s failed\n", identity_file);
- exit(1);
- }
- if (!key_write(public, f))
- fprintf(stderr, "write key failed\n");
- key_free(public);
- fprintf(f, " %s\n", new_comment);
- fclose(f);
-
- free(comment);
-
- printf("The comment in your key file has been changed.\n");
- exit(0);
-}
-
-static const char *
-fmt_validity(u_int64_t valid_from, u_int64_t valid_to)
-{
- char from[32], to[32];
- static char ret[64];
- time_t tt;
- struct tm *tm;
-
- *from = *to = '\0';
- if (valid_from == 0 && valid_to == 0xffffffffffffffffULL)
- return "forever";
-
- if (valid_from != 0) {
- /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */
- tt = valid_from > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : valid_from;
- tm = localtime(&tt);
- strftime(from, sizeof(from), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm);
- }
- if (valid_to != 0xffffffffffffffffULL) {
- /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */
- tt = valid_to > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : valid_to;
- tm = localtime(&tt);
- strftime(to, sizeof(to), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm);
- }
-
- if (valid_from == 0) {
- snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "before %s", to);
- return ret;
- }
- if (valid_to == 0xffffffffffffffffULL) {
- snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "after %s", from);
- return ret;
- }
-
- snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "from %s to %s", from, to);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static void
-add_flag_option(Buffer *c, const char *name)
-{
- debug3("%s: %s", __func__, name);
- buffer_put_cstring(c, name);
- buffer_put_string(c, NULL, 0);
-}
-
-static void
-add_string_option(Buffer *c, const char *name, const char *value)
-{
- Buffer b;
-
- debug3("%s: %s=%s", __func__, name, value);
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, value);
-
- buffer_put_cstring(c, name);
- buffer_put_string(c, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
-
- buffer_free(&b);
-}
-
-#define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1
-#define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2
-static void
-prepare_options_buf(Buffer *c, int which)
-{
- buffer_clear(c);
- if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 &&
- certflags_command != NULL)
- add_string_option(c, "force-command", certflags_command);
- if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
- (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_X_FWD) != 0)
- add_flag_option(c, "permit-X11-forwarding");
- if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
- (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD) != 0)
- add_flag_option(c, "permit-agent-forwarding");
- if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
- (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PORT_FWD) != 0)
- add_flag_option(c, "permit-port-forwarding");
- if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
- (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PTY) != 0)
- add_flag_option(c, "permit-pty");
- if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
- (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_USER_RC) != 0)
- add_flag_option(c, "permit-user-rc");
- if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 &&
- certflags_src_addr != NULL)
- add_string_option(c, "source-address", certflags_src_addr);
-}
-
-static Key *
-load_pkcs11_key(char *path)
-{
-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- Key **keys = NULL, *public, *private = NULL;
- int i, nkeys;
-
- if ((public = key_load_public(path, NULL)) == NULL)
- fatal("Couldn't load CA public key \"%s\"", path);
-
- nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, identity_passphrase, &keys);
- debug3("%s: %d keys", __func__, nkeys);
- if (nkeys <= 0)
- fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11");
- for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
- if (key_equal_public(public, keys[i])) {
- private = keys[i];
- continue;
- }
- key_free(keys[i]);
- }
- free(keys);
- key_free(public);
- return private;
-#else
- fatal("no pkcs11 support");
-#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
-}
-
-static void
-do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv)
-{
- int i, fd;
- u_int n;
- Key *ca, *public;
- char *otmp, *tmp, *cp, *out, *comment, **plist = NULL;
- FILE *f;
- int v00 = 0; /* legacy keys */
-
- if (key_type_name != NULL) {
- switch (key_type_from_name(key_type_name)) {
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- v00 = 1;
- break;
- case KEY_UNSPEC:
- if (strcasecmp(key_type_name, "v00") == 0) {
- v00 = 1;
- break;
- } else if (strcasecmp(key_type_name, "v01") == 0)
- break;
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- default:
- fprintf(stderr, "unknown key type %s\n", key_type_name);
- exit(1);
- }
- }
-
- pkcs11_init(1);
- tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid);
- if (pkcs11provider != NULL) {
- if ((ca = load_pkcs11_key(tmp)) == NULL)
- fatal("No PKCS#11 key matching %s found", ca_key_path);
- } else if ((ca = load_identity(tmp)) == NULL)
- fatal("Couldn't load CA key \"%s\"", tmp);
- free(tmp);
-
- for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
- /* Split list of principals */
- n = 0;
- if (cert_principals != NULL) {
- otmp = tmp = xstrdup(cert_principals);
- plist = NULL;
- for (; (cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL; n++) {
- plist = xrealloc(plist, n + 1, sizeof(*plist));
- if (*(plist[n] = xstrdup(cp)) == '\0')
- fatal("Empty principal name");
- }
- free(otmp);
- }
-
- tmp = tilde_expand_filename(argv[i], pw->pw_uid);
- if ((public = key_load_public(tmp, &comment)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: unable to open \"%s\"", __func__, tmp);
- if (public->type != KEY_RSA && public->type != KEY_DSA &&
- public->type != KEY_ECDSA && public->type != KEY_ED25519)
- fatal("%s: key \"%s\" type %s cannot be certified",
- __func__, tmp, key_type(public));
-
- /* Prepare certificate to sign */
- if (key_to_certified(public, v00) != 0)
- fatal("Could not upgrade key %s to certificate", tmp);
- public->cert->type = cert_key_type;
- public->cert->serial = (u_int64_t)cert_serial;
- public->cert->key_id = xstrdup(cert_key_id);
- public->cert->nprincipals = n;
- public->cert->principals = plist;
- public->cert->valid_after = cert_valid_from;
- public->cert->valid_before = cert_valid_to;
- if (v00) {
- prepare_options_buf(&public->cert->critical,
- OPTIONS_CRITICAL|OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS);
- } else {
- prepare_options_buf(&public->cert->critical,
- OPTIONS_CRITICAL);
- prepare_options_buf(&public->cert->extensions,
- OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS);
- }
- public->cert->signature_key = key_from_private(ca);
-
- if (key_certify(public, ca) != 0)
- fatal("Couldn't not certify key %s", tmp);
-
- if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '.')) != NULL && strcmp(cp, ".pub") == 0)
- *cp = '\0';
- xasprintf(&out, "%s-cert.pub", tmp);
- free(tmp);
-
- if ((fd = open(out, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1)
- fatal("Could not open \"%s\" for writing: %s", out,
- strerror(errno));
- if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- if (!key_write(public, f))
- fatal("Could not write certified key to %s", out);
- fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
- fclose(f);
-
- if (!quiet) {
- logit("Signed %s key %s: id \"%s\" serial %llu%s%s "
- "valid %s", key_cert_type(public),
- out, public->cert->key_id,
- (unsigned long long)public->cert->serial,
- cert_principals != NULL ? " for " : "",
- cert_principals != NULL ? cert_principals : "",
- fmt_validity(cert_valid_from, cert_valid_to));
- }
-
- key_free(public);
- free(out);
- }
- pkcs11_terminate();
- exit(0);
-}
-
-static u_int64_t
-parse_relative_time(const char *s, time_t now)
-{
- int64_t mul, secs;
-
- mul = *s == '-' ? -1 : 1;
-
- if ((secs = convtime(s + 1)) == -1)
- fatal("Invalid relative certificate time %s", s);
- if (mul == -1 && secs > now)
- fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s);
- return now + (u_int64_t)(secs * mul);
-}
-
-static u_int64_t
-parse_absolute_time(const char *s)
-{
- struct tm tm;
- time_t tt;
- char buf[32], *fmt;
-
- /*
- * POSIX strptime says "The application shall ensure that there
- * is white-space or other non-alphanumeric characters between
- * any two conversion specifications" so arrange things this way.
- */
- switch (strlen(s)) {
- case 8:
- fmt = "%Y-%m-%d";
- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6);
- break;
- case 14:
- fmt = "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S";
- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2sT%.2s:%.2s:%.2s",
- s, s + 4, s + 6, s + 8, s + 10, s + 12);
- break;
- default:
- fatal("Invalid certificate time format %s", s);
- }
-
- memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm));
- if (strptime(buf, fmt, &tm) == NULL)
- fatal("Invalid certificate time %s", s);
- if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0)
- fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s);
- return (u_int64_t)tt;
-}
-
-static void
-parse_cert_times(char *timespec)
-{
- char *from, *to;
- time_t now = time(NULL);
- int64_t secs;
-
- /* +timespec relative to now */
- if (*timespec == '+' && strchr(timespec, ':') == NULL) {
- if ((secs = convtime(timespec + 1)) == -1)
- fatal("Invalid relative certificate life %s", timespec);
- cert_valid_to = now + secs;
- /*
- * Backdate certificate one minute to avoid problems on hosts
- * with poorly-synchronised clocks.
- */
- cert_valid_from = ((now - 59)/ 60) * 60;
- return;
- }
-
- /*
- * from:to, where
- * from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS
- * to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS
- */
- from = xstrdup(timespec);
- to = strchr(from, ':');
- if (to == NULL || from == to || *(to + 1) == '\0')
- fatal("Invalid certificate life specification %s", timespec);
- *to++ = '\0';
-
- if (*from == '-' || *from == '+')
- cert_valid_from = parse_relative_time(from, now);
- else
- cert_valid_from = parse_absolute_time(from);
-
- if (*to == '-' || *to == '+')
- cert_valid_to = parse_relative_time(to, now);
- else
- cert_valid_to = parse_absolute_time(to);
-
- if (cert_valid_to <= cert_valid_from)
- fatal("Empty certificate validity interval");
- free(from);
-}
-
-static void
-add_cert_option(char *opt)
-{
- char *val;
-
- if (strcasecmp(opt, "clear") == 0)
- certflags_flags = 0;
- else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-x11-forwarding") == 0)
- certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_X_FWD;
- else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-x11-forwarding") == 0)
- certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_X_FWD;
- else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-agent-forwarding") == 0)
- certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD;
- else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0)
- certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD;
- else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-port-forwarding") == 0)
- certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PORT_FWD;
- else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0)
- certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PORT_FWD;
- else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-pty") == 0)
- certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PTY;
- else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-pty") == 0)
- certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PTY;
- else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-user-rc") == 0)
- certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_USER_RC;
- else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-user-rc") == 0)
- certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_USER_RC;
- else if (strncasecmp(opt, "force-command=", 14) == 0) {
- val = opt + 14;
- if (*val == '\0')
- fatal("Empty force-command option");
- if (certflags_command != NULL)
- fatal("force-command already specified");
- certflags_command = xstrdup(val);
- } else if (strncasecmp(opt, "source-address=", 15) == 0) {
- val = opt + 15;
- if (*val == '\0')
- fatal("Empty source-address option");
- if (certflags_src_addr != NULL)
- fatal("source-address already specified");
- if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, val) != 0)
- fatal("Invalid source-address list");
- certflags_src_addr = xstrdup(val);
- } else
- fatal("Unsupported certificate option \"%s\"", opt);
-}
-
-static void
-show_options(const Buffer *optbuf, int v00, int in_critical)
-{
- char *name;
- u_char *data;
- u_int dlen;
- Buffer options, option;
-
- buffer_init(&options);
- buffer_append(&options, buffer_ptr(optbuf), buffer_len(optbuf));
-
- buffer_init(&option);
- while (buffer_len(&options) != 0) {
- name = buffer_get_string(&options, NULL);
- data = buffer_get_string_ptr(&options, &dlen);
- buffer_append(&option, data, dlen);
- printf(" %s", name);
- if ((v00 || !in_critical) &&
- (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0 ||
- strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0 ||
- strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0 ||
- strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0 ||
- strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0))
- printf("\n");
- else if ((v00 || in_critical) &&
- (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0 ||
- strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0)) {
- data = buffer_get_string(&option, NULL);
- printf(" %s\n", data);
- free(data);
- } else {
- printf(" UNKNOWN OPTION (len %u)\n",
- buffer_len(&option));
- buffer_clear(&option);
- }
- free(name);
- if (buffer_len(&option) != 0)
- fatal("Option corrupt: extra data at end");
- }
- buffer_free(&option);
- buffer_free(&options);
-}
-
-static void
-do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
-{
- Key *key;
- struct stat st;
- char *key_fp, *ca_fp;
- u_int i, v00;
-
- if (!have_identity)
- ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
- if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
- fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
- if ((key = key_load_public(identity_file, NULL)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s is not a public key", identity_file);
- if (!key_is_cert(key))
- fatal("%s is not a certificate", identity_file);
- v00 = key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 || key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00;
-
- key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-
- printf("%s:\n", identity_file);
- printf(" Type: %s %s certificate\n", key_ssh_name(key),
- key_cert_type(key));
- printf(" Public key: %s %s\n", key_type(key), key_fp);
- printf(" Signing CA: %s %s\n",
- key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp);
- printf(" Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id);
- if (!v00) {
- printf(" Serial: %llu\n",
- (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial);
- }
- printf(" Valid: %s\n",
- fmt_validity(key->cert->valid_after, key->cert->valid_before));
- printf(" Principals: ");
- if (key->cert->nprincipals == 0)
- printf("(none)\n");
- else {
- for (i = 0; i < key->cert->nprincipals; i++)
- printf("\n %s",
- key->cert->principals[i]);
- printf("\n");
- }
- printf(" Critical Options: ");
- if (buffer_len(&key->cert->critical) == 0)
- printf("(none)\n");
- else {
- printf("\n");
- show_options(&key->cert->critical, v00, 1);
- }
- if (!v00) {
- printf(" Extensions: ");
- if (buffer_len(&key->cert->extensions) == 0)
- printf("(none)\n");
- else {
- printf("\n");
- show_options(&key->cert->extensions, v00, 0);
- }
- }
- exit(0);
-}
-
-static void
-load_krl(const char *path, struct ssh_krl **krlp)
-{
- Buffer krlbuf;
- int fd;
-
- buffer_init(&krlbuf);
- if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
- fatal("open %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
- if (!key_load_file(fd, path, &krlbuf))
- fatal("Unable to load KRL");
- close(fd);
- /* XXX check sigs */
- if (ssh_krl_from_blob(&krlbuf, krlp, NULL, 0) != 0 ||
- *krlp == NULL)
- fatal("Invalid KRL file");
- buffer_free(&krlbuf);
-}
-
-static void
-update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, const Key *ca,
- struct ssh_krl *krl)
-{
- Key *key = NULL;
- u_long lnum = 0;
- char *path, *cp, *ep, line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
- unsigned long long serial, serial2;
- int i, was_explicit_key, was_sha1, r;
- FILE *krl_spec;
-
- path = tilde_expand_filename(file, pw->pw_uid);
- if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) {
- krl_spec = stdin;
- free(path);
- path = xstrdup("(standard input)");
- } else if ((krl_spec = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
- fatal("fopen %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
-
- if (!quiet)
- printf("Revoking from %s\n", path);
- while (read_keyfile_line(krl_spec, path, line, sizeof(line),
- &lnum) == 0) {
- was_explicit_key = was_sha1 = 0;
- cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
- /* Trim trailing space, comments and strip \n */
- for (i = 0, r = -1; cp[i] != '\0'; i++) {
- if (cp[i] == '#' || cp[i] == '\n') {
- cp[i] = '\0';
- break;
- }
- if (cp[i] == ' ' || cp[i] == '\t') {
- /* Remember the start of a span of whitespace */
- if (r == -1)
- r = i;
- } else
- r = -1;
- }
- if (r != -1)
- cp[r] = '\0';
- if (*cp == '\0')
- continue;
- if (strncasecmp(cp, "serial:", 7) == 0) {
- if (ca == NULL) {
- fatal("revoking certificates by serial number "
- "requires specification of a CA key");
- }
- cp += 7;
- cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
- errno = 0;
- serial = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0);
- if (*cp == '\0' || (*ep != '\0' && *ep != '-'))
- fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"",
- path, lnum, cp);
- if (errno == ERANGE && serial == ULLONG_MAX)
- fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range",
- path, lnum);
- serial2 = serial;
- if (*ep == '-') {
- cp = ep + 1;
- errno = 0;
- serial2 = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0);
- if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0')
- fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"",
- path, lnum, cp);
- if (errno == ERANGE && serial2 == ULLONG_MAX)
- fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range",
- path, lnum);
- if (serial2 <= serial)
- fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial range "
- "%llu:%llu", path, lnum,
- (unsigned long long)serial,
- (unsigned long long)serial2);
- }
- if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl,
- ca, serial, serial2) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: revoke serial failed",
- __func__);
- }
- } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "id:", 3) == 0) {
- if (ca == NULL) {
- fatal("revoking certificates by key ID "
- "requires specification of a CA key");
- }
- cp += 3;
- cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
- if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca, cp) != 0)
- fatal("%s: revoke key ID failed", __func__);
- } else {
- if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
- cp += 4;
- cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
- was_explicit_key = 1;
- } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha1:", 5) == 0) {
- cp += 5;
- cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
- was_sha1 = 1;
- } else {
- /*
- * Just try to process the line as a key.
- * Parsing will fail if it isn't.
- */
- }
- if ((key = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
- fatal("key_new");
- if (key_read(key, &cp) != 1)
- fatal("%s:%lu: invalid key", path, lnum);
- if (was_explicit_key)
- r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key);
- else if (was_sha1)
- r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, key);
- else
- r = ssh_krl_revoke_key(krl, key);
- if (r != 0)
- fatal("%s: revoke key failed", __func__);
- key_free(key);
- }
- }
- if (strcmp(path, "-") != 0)
- fclose(krl_spec);
- free(path);
-}
-
-static void
-do_gen_krl(struct passwd *pw, int updating, int argc, char **argv)
-{
- struct ssh_krl *krl;
- struct stat sb;
- Key *ca = NULL;
- int fd, i;
- char *tmp;
- Buffer kbuf;
-
- if (*identity_file == '\0')
- fatal("KRL generation requires an output file");
- if (stat(identity_file, &sb) == -1) {
- if (errno != ENOENT)
- fatal("Cannot access KRL \"%s\": %s",
- identity_file, strerror(errno));
- if (updating)
- fatal("KRL \"%s\" does not exist", identity_file);
- }
- if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
- tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid);
- if ((ca = key_load_public(tmp, NULL)) == NULL)
- fatal("Cannot load CA public key %s", tmp);
- free(tmp);
- }
-
- if (updating)
- load_krl(identity_file, &krl);
- else if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL)
- fatal("couldn't create KRL");
-
- if (cert_serial != 0)
- ssh_krl_set_version(krl, cert_serial);
- if (identity_comment != NULL)
- ssh_krl_set_comment(krl, identity_comment);
-
- for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
- update_krl_from_file(pw, argv[i], ca, krl);
-
- buffer_init(&kbuf);
- if (ssh_krl_to_blob(krl, &kbuf, NULL, 0) != 0)
- fatal("Couldn't generate KRL");
- if ((fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1)
- fatal("open %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
- if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buffer_ptr(&kbuf), buffer_len(&kbuf)) !=
- buffer_len(&kbuf))
- fatal("write %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
- close(fd);
- buffer_free(&kbuf);
- ssh_krl_free(krl);
- if (ca != NULL)
- key_free(ca);
-}
-
-static void
-do_check_krl(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv)
-{
- int i, r, ret = 0;
- char *comment;
- struct ssh_krl *krl;
- Key *k;
-
- if (*identity_file == '\0')
- fatal("KRL checking requires an input file");
- load_krl(identity_file, &krl);
- for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
- if ((k = key_load_public(argv[i], &comment)) == NULL)
- fatal("Cannot load public key %s", argv[i]);
- r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, k);
- printf("%s%s%s%s: %s\n", argv[i],
- *comment ? " (" : "", comment, *comment ? ")" : "",
- r == 0 ? "ok" : "REVOKED");
- if (r != 0)
- ret = 1;
- key_free(k);
- free(comment);
- }
- ssh_krl_free(krl);
- exit(ret);
-}
-
-static void
-usage(void)
-{
- fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options]\n", __progname);
- fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -A Generate non-existent host keys for all key types.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -a number Number of KDF rounds for new key format or moduli primality tests.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -B Show bubblebabble digest of key file.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -b bits Number of bits in the key to create.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -C comment Provide new comment.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -c Change comment in private and public key files.\n");
-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- fprintf(stderr, " -D pkcs11 Download public key from pkcs11 token.\n");
-#endif
- fprintf(stderr, " -e Export OpenSSH to foreign format key file.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -F hostname Find hostname in known hosts file.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -f filename Filename of the key file.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -G file Generate candidates for DH-GEX moduli.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -g Use generic DNS resource record format.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -H Hash names in known_hosts file.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -h Generate host certificate instead of a user certificate.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -I key_id Key identifier to include in certificate.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -i Import foreign format to OpenSSH key file.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -J number Screen this number of moduli lines.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -j number Start screening moduli at specified line.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -K checkpt Write checkpoints to this file.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -k Generate a KRL file.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -L Print the contents of a certificate.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -l Show fingerprint of key file.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -M memory Amount of memory (MB) to use for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -m key_fmt Conversion format for -e/-i (PEM|PKCS8|RFC4716).\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -N phrase Provide new passphrase.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -n name,... User/host principal names to include in certificate\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -O option Specify a certificate option.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -o Enforce new private key format.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -P phrase Provide old passphrase.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -p Change passphrase of private key file.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -Q Test whether key(s) are revoked in KRL.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -R hostname Remove host from known_hosts file.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -r hostname Print DNS resource record.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -S start Start point (hex) for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -s ca_key Certify keys with CA key.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -T file Screen candidates for DH-GEX moduli.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -t type Specify type of key to create.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -u Update KRL rather than creating a new one.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -V from:to Specify certificate validity interval.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -v Verbose.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -W gen Generator to use for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -y Read private key file and print public key.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -Z cipher Specify a cipher for new private key format.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -z serial Specify a serial number.\n");
-
- exit(1);
-}
-
-/*
- * Main program for key management.
- */
-int
-main(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- char dotsshdir[MAXPATHLEN], comment[1024], *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
- char *checkpoint = NULL;
- char out_file[MAXPATHLEN], *ep, *rr_hostname = NULL;
- Key *private, *public;
- struct passwd *pw;
- struct stat st;
- int opt, type, fd;
- u_int32_t memory = 0, generator_wanted = 0;
- int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0;
- int gen_all_hostkeys = 0, gen_krl = 0, update_krl = 0, check_krl = 0;
- unsigned long start_lineno = 0, lines_to_process = 0;
- BIGNUM *start = NULL;
- FILE *f;
- const char *errstr;
-
- extern int optind;
- extern char *optarg;
-
- /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
- sanitise_stdfd();
-
- __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
-
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
-
- seed_rng();
-
- /* we need this for the home * directory. */
- pw = getpwuid(getuid());
- if (!pw) {
- printf("No user exists for uid %lu\n", (u_long)getuid());
- exit(1);
- }
- if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) {
- perror("gethostname");
- exit(1);
- }
-
- /* Remaining characters: EUYdw */
- while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHLQXceghiklopquvxy"
- "C:D:F:G:I:J:K:M:N:O:P:R:S:T:V:W:Z:a:b:f:g:j:m:n:r:s:t:z:")) != -1) {
- switch (opt) {
- case 'A':
- gen_all_hostkeys = 1;
- break;
- case 'b':
- bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 256, 32768, &errstr);
- if (errstr)
- fatal("Bits has bad value %s (%s)",
- optarg, errstr);
- break;
- case 'F':
- find_host = 1;
- rr_hostname = optarg;
- break;
- case 'H':
- hash_hosts = 1;
- break;
- case 'I':
- cert_key_id = optarg;
- break;
- case 'J':
- lines_to_process = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
- break;
- case 'j':
- start_lineno = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
- break;
- case 'R':
- delete_host = 1;
- rr_hostname = optarg;
- break;
- case 'L':
- show_cert = 1;
- break;
- case 'l':
- print_fingerprint = 1;
- break;
- case 'B':
- print_bubblebabble = 1;
- break;
- case 'm':
- if (strcasecmp(optarg, "RFC4716") == 0 ||
- strcasecmp(optarg, "ssh2") == 0) {
- convert_format = FMT_RFC4716;
- break;
- }
- if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PKCS8") == 0) {
- convert_format = FMT_PKCS8;
- break;
- }
- if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PEM") == 0) {
- convert_format = FMT_PEM;
- break;
- }
- fatal("Unsupported conversion format \"%s\"", optarg);
- case 'n':
- cert_principals = optarg;
- break;
- case 'o':
- use_new_format = 1;
- break;
- case 'p':
- change_passphrase = 1;
- break;
- case 'c':
- change_comment = 1;
- break;
- case 'f':
- if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg, sizeof(identity_file)) >=
- sizeof(identity_file))
- fatal("Identity filename too long");
- have_identity = 1;
- break;
- case 'g':
- print_generic = 1;
- break;
- case 'P':
- identity_passphrase = optarg;
- break;
- case 'N':
- identity_new_passphrase = optarg;
- break;
- case 'Q':
- check_krl = 1;
- break;
- case 'O':
- add_cert_option(optarg);
- break;
- case 'Z':
- new_format_cipher = optarg;
- break;
- case 'C':
- identity_comment = optarg;
- break;
- case 'q':
- quiet = 1;
- break;
- case 'e':
- case 'x':
- /* export key */
- convert_to = 1;
- break;
- case 'h':
- cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST;
- certflags_flags = 0;
- break;
- case 'k':
- gen_krl = 1;
- break;
- case 'i':
- case 'X':
- /* import key */
- convert_from = 1;
- break;
- case 'y':
- print_public = 1;
- break;
- case 's':
- ca_key_path = optarg;
- break;
- case 't':
- key_type_name = optarg;
- break;
- case 'D':
- pkcs11provider = optarg;
- break;
- case 'u':
- update_krl = 1;
- break;
- case 'v':
- if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
- log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
- else {
- if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 &&
- log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
- log_level++;
- }
- break;
- case 'r':
- rr_hostname = optarg;
- break;
- case 'W':
- generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1,
- UINT_MAX, &errstr);
- if (errstr)
- fatal("Desired generator has bad value: %s (%s)",
- optarg, errstr);
- break;
- case 'a':
- rounds = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr);
- if (errstr)
- fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)",
- optarg, errstr);
- break;
- case 'M':
- memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
- if (errstr)
- fatal("Memory limit is %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
- break;
- case 'G':
- do_gen_candidates = 1;
- if (strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file)) >=
- sizeof(out_file))
- fatal("Output filename too long");
- break;
- case 'T':
- do_screen_candidates = 1;
- if (strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file)) >=
- sizeof(out_file))
- fatal("Output filename too long");
- break;
- case 'K':
- if (strlen(optarg) >= MAXPATHLEN)
- fatal("Checkpoint filename too long");
- checkpoint = xstrdup(optarg);
- break;
- case 'S':
- /* XXX - also compare length against bits */
- if (BN_hex2bn(&start, optarg) == 0)
- fatal("Invalid start point.");
- break;
- case 'V':
- parse_cert_times(optarg);
- break;
- case 'z':
- errno = 0;
- cert_serial = strtoull(optarg, &ep, 10);
- if (*optarg < '0' || *optarg > '9' || *ep != '\0' ||
- (errno == ERANGE && cert_serial == ULLONG_MAX))
- fatal("Invalid serial number \"%s\"", optarg);
- break;
- case '?':
- default:
- usage();
- }
- }
-
- /* reinit */
- log_init(argv[0], log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
-
- argv += optind;
- argc -= optind;
-
- if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
- if (argc < 1 && !gen_krl) {
- printf("Too few arguments.\n");
- usage();
- }
- } else if (argc > 0 && !gen_krl && !check_krl) {
- printf("Too many arguments.\n");
- usage();
- }
- if (change_passphrase && change_comment) {
- printf("Can only have one of -p and -c.\n");
- usage();
- }
- if (print_fingerprint && (delete_host || hash_hosts)) {
- printf("Cannot use -l with -H or -R.\n");
- usage();
- }
- if (gen_krl) {
- do_gen_krl(pw, update_krl, argc, argv);
- return (0);
- }
- if (check_krl) {
- do_check_krl(pw, argc, argv);
- return (0);
- }
- if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
- if (cert_key_id == NULL)
- fatal("Must specify key id (-I) when certifying");
- do_ca_sign(pw, argc, argv);
- }
- if (show_cert)
- do_show_cert(pw);
- if (delete_host || hash_hosts || find_host)
- do_known_hosts(pw, rr_hostname);
- if (pkcs11provider != NULL)
- do_download(pw);
- if (print_fingerprint || print_bubblebabble)
- do_fingerprint(pw);
- if (change_passphrase)
- do_change_passphrase(pw);
- if (change_comment)
- do_change_comment(pw);
- if (convert_to)
- do_convert_to(pw);
- if (convert_from)
- do_convert_from(pw);
- if (print_public)
- do_print_public(pw);
- if (rr_hostname != NULL) {
- unsigned int n = 0;
-
- if (have_identity) {
- n = do_print_resource_record(pw,
- identity_file, rr_hostname);
- if (n == 0) {
- perror(identity_file);
- exit(1);
- }
- exit(0);
- } else {
-
- n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
- _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname);
- n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
- _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname);
- n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
- _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname);
-
- if (n == 0)
- fatal("no keys found.");
- exit(0);
- }
- }
-
- if (do_gen_candidates) {
- FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "w");
-
- if (out == NULL) {
- error("Couldn't open modulus candidate file \"%s\": %s",
- out_file, strerror(errno));
- return (1);
- }
- if (bits == 0)
- bits = DEFAULT_BITS;
- if (gen_candidates(out, memory, bits, start) != 0)
- fatal("modulus candidate generation failed");
-
- return (0);
- }
-
- if (do_screen_candidates) {
- FILE *in;
- FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "a");
-
- if (have_identity && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0) {
- if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) {
- fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate "
- "file \"%s\": %s", identity_file,
- strerror(errno));
- }
- } else
- in = stdin;
-
- if (out == NULL) {
- fatal("Couldn't open moduli file \"%s\": %s",
- out_file, strerror(errno));
- }
- if (prime_test(in, out, rounds == 0 ? 100 : rounds,
- generator_wanted, checkpoint,
- start_lineno, lines_to_process) != 0)
- fatal("modulus screening failed");
- return (0);
- }
-
- if (gen_all_hostkeys) {
- do_gen_all_hostkeys(pw);
- return (0);
- }
-
- if (key_type_name == NULL)
- key_type_name = "rsa";
-
- type = key_type_from_name(key_type_name);
- type_bits_valid(type, &bits);
-
- if (!quiet)
- printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n", key_type_name);
- private = key_generate(type, bits);
- if (private == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "key_generate failed\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- public = key_from_private(private);
-
- if (!have_identity)
- ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which to save the key");
-
- /* Create ~/.ssh directory if it doesn't already exist. */
- snprintf(dotsshdir, sizeof dotsshdir, "%s/%s",
- pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
- if (strstr(identity_file, dotsshdir) != NULL) {
- if (stat(dotsshdir, &st) < 0) {
- if (errno != ENOENT) {
- error("Could not stat %s: %s", dotsshdir,
- strerror(errno));
- } else if (mkdir(dotsshdir, 0700) < 0) {
- error("Could not create directory '%s': %s",
- dotsshdir, strerror(errno));
- } else if (!quiet)
- printf("Created directory '%s'.\n", dotsshdir);
- }
- }
- /* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */
- if (stat(identity_file, &st) >= 0) {
- char yesno[3];
- printf("%s already exists.\n", identity_file);
- printf("Overwrite (y/n)? ");
- fflush(stdout);
- if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL)
- exit(1);
- if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y')
- exit(1);
- }
- /* Ask for a passphrase (twice). */
- if (identity_passphrase)
- passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
- else if (identity_new_passphrase)
- passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
- else {
-passphrase_again:
- passphrase1 =
- read_passphrase("Enter passphrase (empty for no "
- "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
- passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ",
- RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
- if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) {
- /*
- * The passphrases do not match. Clear them and
- * retry.
- */
- explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
- explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
- free(passphrase1);
- free(passphrase2);
- printf("Passphrases do not match. Try again.\n");
- goto passphrase_again;
- }
- /* Clear the other copy of the passphrase. */
- explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
- free(passphrase2);
- }
-
- if (identity_comment) {
- strlcpy(comment, identity_comment, sizeof(comment));
- } else {
- /* Create default comment field for the passphrase. */
- snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname);
- }
-
- /* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */
- if (!key_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, comment,
- use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) {
- printf("Saving the key failed: %s.\n", identity_file);
- explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
- free(passphrase1);
- exit(1);
- }
- /* Clear the passphrase. */
- explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
- free(passphrase1);
-
- /* Clear the private key and the random number generator. */
- key_free(private);
-
- if (!quiet)
- printf("Your identification has been saved in %s.\n", identity_file);
-
- strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
- fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
- if (fd == -1) {
- printf("Could not save your public key in %s\n", identity_file);
- exit(1);
- }
- f = fdopen(fd, "w");
- if (f == NULL) {
- printf("fdopen %s failed\n", identity_file);
- exit(1);
- }
- if (!key_write(public, f))
- fprintf(stderr, "write key failed\n");
- fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
- fclose(f);
-
- if (!quiet) {
- char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5,
- SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n",
- identity_file);
- printf("The key fingerprint is:\n");
- printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment);
- printf("The key's randomart image is:\n");
- printf("%s\n", ra);
- free(ra);
- free(fp);
- }
-
- key_free(public);
- exit(0);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keygen.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keygen.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keygen.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keygen.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,2748 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.290 2016/05/02 09:36:42 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Identity and host key generation and maintenance.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "uuencode.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "dns.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "krl.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa"
+#else
+# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519"
+#endif
+
+/* Number of bits in the RSA/DSA key. This value can be set on the command line. */
+#define DEFAULT_BITS 2048
+#define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA 1024
+#define DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA 256
+u_int32_t bits = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Flag indicating that we just want to change the passphrase. This can be
+ * set on the command line.
+ */
+int change_passphrase = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Flag indicating that we just want to change the comment. This can be set
+ * on the command line.
+ */
+int change_comment = 0;
+
+int quiet = 0;
+
+int log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+
+/* Flag indicating that we want to hash a known_hosts file */
+int hash_hosts = 0;
+/* Flag indicating that we want lookup a host in known_hosts file */
+int find_host = 0;
+/* Flag indicating that we want to delete a host from a known_hosts file */
+int delete_host = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating that we want to show the contents of a certificate */
+int show_cert = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating that we just want to see the key fingerprint */
+int print_fingerprint = 0;
+int print_bubblebabble = 0;
+
+/* Hash algorithm to use for fingerprints. */
+int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
+
+/* The identity file name, given on the command line or entered by the user. */
+char identity_file[1024];
+int have_identity = 0;
+
+/* This is set to the passphrase if given on the command line. */
+char *identity_passphrase = NULL;
+
+/* This is set to the new passphrase if given on the command line. */
+char *identity_new_passphrase = NULL;
+
+/* This is set to the new comment if given on the command line. */
+char *identity_comment = NULL;
+
+/* Path to CA key when certifying keys. */
+char *ca_key_path = NULL;
+
+/* Certificate serial number */
+unsigned long long cert_serial = 0;
+
+/* Key type when certifying */
+u_int cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER;
+
+/* "key ID" of signed key */
+char *cert_key_id = NULL;
+
+/* Comma-separated list of principal names for certifying keys */
+char *cert_principals = NULL;
+
+/* Validity period for certificates */
+u_int64_t cert_valid_from = 0;
+u_int64_t cert_valid_to = ~0ULL;
+
+/* Certificate options */
+#define CERTOPT_X_FWD (1)
+#define CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD (1<<1)
+#define CERTOPT_PORT_FWD (1<<2)
+#define CERTOPT_PTY (1<<3)
+#define CERTOPT_USER_RC (1<<4)
+#define CERTOPT_DEFAULT (CERTOPT_X_FWD|CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD| \
+ CERTOPT_PORT_FWD|CERTOPT_PTY|CERTOPT_USER_RC)
+u_int32_t certflags_flags = CERTOPT_DEFAULT;
+char *certflags_command = NULL;
+char *certflags_src_addr = NULL;
+
+/* Conversion to/from various formats */
+int convert_to = 0;
+int convert_from = 0;
+enum {
+ FMT_RFC4716,
+ FMT_PKCS8,
+ FMT_PEM
+} convert_format = FMT_RFC4716;
+int print_public = 0;
+int print_generic = 0;
+
+char *key_type_name = NULL;
+
+/* Load key from this PKCS#11 provider */
+char *pkcs11provider = NULL;
+
+/* Use new OpenSSH private key format when writing SSH2 keys instead of PEM */
+int use_new_format = 0;
+
+/* Cipher for new-format private keys */
+char *new_format_cipher = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Number of KDF rounds to derive new format keys /
+ * number of primality trials when screening moduli.
+ */
+int rounds = 0;
+
+/* argv0 */
+extern char *__progname;
+
+char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+/* moduli.c */
+int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *);
+int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long,
+ unsigned long);
+#endif
+
+static void
+type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ u_int maxbits, nid;
+#endif
+
+ if (type == KEY_UNSPEC)
+ fatal("unknown key type %s", key_type_name);
+ if (*bitsp == 0) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ if (type == KEY_DSA)
+ *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_DSA;
+ else if (type == KEY_ECDSA) {
+ if (name != NULL &&
+ (nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(name)) > 0)
+ *bitsp = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid);
+ if (*bitsp == 0)
+ *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA;
+ } else
+#endif
+ *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS;
+ }
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ maxbits = (type == KEY_DSA) ?
+ OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS : OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS;
+ if (*bitsp > maxbits)
+ fatal("key bits exceeds maximum %d", maxbits);
+ if (type == KEY_DSA && *bitsp != 1024)
+ fatal("DSA keys must be 1024 bits");
+ else if (type != KEY_ECDSA && type != KEY_ED25519 && *bitsp < 1024)
+ fatal("Key must at least be 1024 bits");
+ else if (type == KEY_ECDSA && sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(*bitsp) == -1)
+ fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length - valid lengths are "
+ "256, 384 or 521 bits");
+#endif
+}
+
+static void
+ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
+{
+ char buf[1024];
+ char *name = NULL;
+
+ if (key_type_name == NULL)
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA;
+ else {
+ switch (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name)) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY;
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA;
+ break;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA;
+ break;
+#endif
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("bad key type");
+ }
+ }
+ snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file),
+ "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name);
+ printf("%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file);
+ fflush(stdout);
+ if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL)
+ exit(1);
+ buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0';
+ if (strcmp(buf, "") != 0)
+ strlcpy(identity_file, buf, sizeof(identity_file));
+ have_identity = 1;
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+load_identity(char *filename)
+{
+ char *pass;
+ struct sshkey *prv;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_private(filename, "", &prv, NULL)) == 0)
+ return prv;
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
+ fatal("Load key \"%s\": %s", filename, ssh_err(r));
+ if (identity_passphrase)
+ pass = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+ else
+ pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ r = sshkey_load_private(filename, pass, &prv, NULL);
+ explicit_bzero(pass, strlen(pass));
+ free(pass);
+ if (r != 0)
+ fatal("Load key \"%s\": %s", filename, ssh_err(r));
+ return prv;
+}
+
+#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
+#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END "---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
+#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----"
+#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC 0x3f6ff9eb
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+static void
+do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ u_char *blob;
+ char comment[61];
+ int r;
+
+ if (k->type == KEY_RSA1)
+ fatal("version 1 keys are not supported");
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(k, &blob, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal("key_to_blob failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ /* Comment + surrounds must fit into 72 chars (RFC 4716 sec 3.3) */
+ snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment),
+ "%u-bit %s, converted by %s@%s from OpenSSH",
+ sshkey_size(k), sshkey_type(k),
+ pw->pw_name, hostname);
+
+ fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN);
+ fprintf(stdout, "Comment: \"%s\"\n", comment);
+ dump_base64(stdout, blob, len);
+ fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END);
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ free(blob);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_to_pkcs8(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ if (!PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->rsa))
+ fatal("PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY failed");
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa))
+ fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed");
+ break;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa))
+ fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed");
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k));
+ }
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_to_pem(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ if (!PEM_write_RSAPublicKey(stdout, k->rsa))
+ fatal("PEM_write_RSAPublicKey failed");
+ break;
+#if notyet /* OpenSSH 0.9.8 lacks this function */
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ if (!PEM_write_DSAPublicKey(stdout, k->dsa))
+ fatal("PEM_write_DSAPublicKey failed");
+ break;
+#endif
+ /* XXX ECDSA? */
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k));
+ }
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_to(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ struct sshkey *k;
+ struct stat st;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(identity_file, &k, NULL)) != 0)
+ k = load_identity(identity_file);
+ switch (convert_format) {
+ case FMT_RFC4716:
+ do_convert_to_ssh2(pw, k);
+ break;
+ case FMT_PKCS8:
+ do_convert_to_pkcs8(k);
+ break;
+ case FMT_PEM:
+ do_convert_to_pem(k);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: unknown key format %d", __func__, convert_format);
+ }
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is almost exactly the bignum1 encoding, but with 32 bit for length
+ * instead of 16.
+ */
+static void
+buffer_get_bignum_bits(struct sshbuf *b, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+ u_int bytes, bignum_bits;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &bignum_bits)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ bytes = (bignum_bits + 7) / 8;
+ if (sshbuf_len(b) < bytes)
+ fatal("%s: input buffer too small: need %d have %zu",
+ __func__, bytes, sshbuf_len(b));
+ if (BN_bin2bn(sshbuf_ptr(b), bytes, value) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, bytes)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(u_char *blob, u_int blen)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ char *type, *cipher;
+ u_char e1, e2, e3, *sig = NULL, data[] = "abcde12345";
+ int r, rlen, ktype;
+ u_int magic, i1, i2, i3, i4;
+ size_t slen;
+ u_long e;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(blob, blen)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_from failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &magic)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ if (magic != SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC) {
+ error("bad magic 0x%x != 0x%x", magic,
+ SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &type, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cipher, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i2)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i3)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i4)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ debug("ignore (%d %d %d %d)", i1, i2, i3, i4);
+ if (strcmp(cipher, "none") != 0) {
+ error("unsupported cipher %s", cipher);
+ free(cipher);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ free(type);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ free(cipher);
+
+ if (strstr(type, "dsa")) {
+ ktype = KEY_DSA;
+ } else if (strstr(type, "rsa")) {
+ ktype = KEY_RSA;
+ } else {
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ free(type);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((key = sshkey_new_private(ktype)) == NULL)
+ fatal("key_new_private failed");
+ free(type);
+
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->p);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->g);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->q);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->pub_key);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->priv_key);
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e1)) != 0 ||
+ (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e2)) != 0) ||
+ (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e3)) != 0))
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ e = e1;
+ debug("e %lx", e);
+ if (e < 30) {
+ e <<= 8;
+ e += e2;
+ debug("e %lx", e);
+ e <<= 8;
+ e += e3;
+ debug("e %lx", e);
+ }
+ if (!BN_set_word(key->rsa->e, e)) {
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->d);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->n);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->iqmp);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->q);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->p);
+ if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(key->rsa)) != 0)
+ fatal("generate RSA parameters failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ break;
+ }
+ rlen = sshbuf_len(b);
+ if (rlen != 0)
+ error("do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob: "
+ "remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+
+ /* try the key */
+ if (sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data), NULL, 0) != 0 ||
+ sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data), 0) != 0) {
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ free(sig);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ free(sig);
+ return key;
+}
+
+static int
+get_line(FILE *fp, char *line, size_t len)
+{
+ int c;
+ size_t pos = 0;
+
+ line[0] = '\0';
+ while ((c = fgetc(fp)) != EOF) {
+ if (pos >= len - 1)
+ fatal("input line too long.");
+ switch (c) {
+ case '\r':
+ c = fgetc(fp);
+ if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF)
+ fatal("unget: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return pos;
+ case '\n':
+ return pos;
+ }
+ line[pos++] = c;
+ line[pos] = '\0';
+ }
+ /* We reached EOF */
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey **k, int *private)
+{
+ int r, blen, escaped = 0;
+ u_int len;
+ char line[1024];
+ u_char blob[8096];
+ char encoded[8096];
+ FILE *fp;
+
+ if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ encoded[0] = '\0';
+ while ((blen = get_line(fp, line, sizeof(line))) != -1) {
+ if (blen > 0 && line[blen - 1] == '\\')
+ escaped++;
+ if (strncmp(line, "----", 4) == 0 ||
+ strstr(line, ": ") != NULL) {
+ if (strstr(line, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN) != NULL)
+ *private = 1;
+ if (strstr(line, " END ") != NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+ /* fprintf(stderr, "ignore: %s", line); */
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (escaped) {
+ escaped--;
+ /* fprintf(stderr, "escaped: %s", line); */
+ continue;
+ }
+ strlcat(encoded, line, sizeof(encoded));
+ }
+ len = strlen(encoded);
+ if (((len % 4) == 3) &&
+ (encoded[len-1] == '=') &&
+ (encoded[len-2] == '=') &&
+ (encoded[len-3] == '='))
+ encoded[len-3] = '\0';
+ blen = uudecode(encoded, blob, sizeof(blob));
+ if (blen < 0)
+ fatal("uudecode failed.");
+ if (*private)
+ *k = do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(blob, blen);
+ else if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, k)) != 0)
+ fatal("decode blob failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ fclose(fp);
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_from_pkcs8(struct sshkey **k, int *private)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pubkey;
+ FILE *fp;
+
+ if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ if ((pubkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) {
+ fatal("%s: %s is not a recognised public key format", __func__,
+ identity_file);
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+ switch (EVP_PKEY_type(pubkey->type)) {
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+ if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshkey_new failed");
+ (*k)->type = KEY_RSA;
+ (*k)->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pubkey);
+ break;
+ case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+ if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshkey_new failed");
+ (*k)->type = KEY_DSA;
+ (*k)->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pubkey);
+ break;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+ if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshkey_new failed");
+ (*k)->type = KEY_ECDSA;
+ (*k)->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pubkey);
+ (*k)->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid((*k)->ecdsa);
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: unsupported pubkey type %d", __func__,
+ EVP_PKEY_type(pubkey->type));
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
+ return;
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_from_pem(struct sshkey **k, int *private)
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+ RSA *rsa;
+#ifdef notyet
+ DSA *dsa;
+#endif
+
+ if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ if ((rsa = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) {
+ if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshkey_new failed");
+ (*k)->type = KEY_RSA;
+ (*k)->rsa = rsa;
+ fclose(fp);
+ return;
+ }
+#if notyet /* OpenSSH 0.9.8 lacks this function */
+ rewind(fp);
+ if ((dsa = PEM_read_DSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) {
+ if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshkey_new failed");
+ (*k)->type = KEY_DSA;
+ (*k)->dsa = dsa;
+ fclose(fp);
+ return;
+ }
+ /* XXX ECDSA */
+#endif
+ fatal("%s: unrecognised raw private key format", __func__);
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_from(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+ int r, private = 0, ok = 0;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
+
+ switch (convert_format) {
+ case FMT_RFC4716:
+ do_convert_from_ssh2(pw, &k, &private);
+ break;
+ case FMT_PKCS8:
+ do_convert_from_pkcs8(&k, &private);
+ break;
+ case FMT_PEM:
+ do_convert_from_pem(&k, &private);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: unknown key format %d", __func__, convert_format);
+ }
+
+ if (!private) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_write(k, stdout)) == 0)
+ ok = 1;
+ if (ok)
+ fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+ } else {
+ switch (k->type) {
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ ok = PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->dsa, NULL,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ break;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ ok = PEM_write_ECPrivateKey(stdout, k->ecdsa, NULL,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ ok = PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->rsa, NULL,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__,
+ sshkey_type(k));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ok)
+ fatal("key write failed");
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ exit(0);
+}
+#endif
+
+static void
+do_print_public(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ struct sshkey *prv;
+ struct stat st;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ prv = load_identity(identity_file);
+ if ((r = sshkey_write(prv, stdout)) != 0)
+ error("key_write failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ sshkey_free(prv);
+ fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+do_download(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ struct sshkey **keys = NULL;
+ int i, nkeys;
+ enum sshkey_fp_rep rep;
+ int fptype;
+ char *fp, *ra;
+
+ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash;
+ rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT;
+
+ pkcs11_init(0);
+ nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys);
+ if (nkeys <= 0)
+ fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11");
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+ if (print_fingerprint) {
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep);
+ ra = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", sshkey_size(keys[i]),
+ fp, sshkey_type(keys[i]));
+ if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+ printf("%s\n", ra);
+ free(ra);
+ free(fp);
+ } else {
+ (void) sshkey_write(keys[i], stdout); /* XXX check */
+ fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+ }
+ sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+ }
+ free(keys);
+ pkcs11_terminate();
+ exit(0);
+#else
+ fatal("no pkcs11 support");
+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+try_read_key(char **cpp)
+{
+ struct sshkey *ret;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((ret = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshkey_new failed");
+ /* Try RSA1 */
+ if ((r = sshkey_read(ret, cpp)) == 0)
+ return ret;
+ /* Try modern */
+ sshkey_free(ret);
+ if ((ret = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshkey_new failed");
+ if ((r = sshkey_read(ret, cpp)) == 0)
+ return ret;
+ /* Not a key */
+ sshkey_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+fingerprint_one_key(const struct sshkey *public, const char *comment)
+{
+ char *fp = NULL, *ra = NULL;
+ enum sshkey_fp_rep rep;
+ int fptype;
+
+ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash;
+ rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT;
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
+ ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp,
+ comment ? comment : "no comment", sshkey_type(public));
+ if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+ printf("%s\n", ra);
+ free(ra);
+ free(fp);
+}
+
+static void
+fingerprint_private(const char *path)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+ char *comment = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *public = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &public, &comment)) != 0) {
+ debug("load public \"%s\": %s", path, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_private(path, NULL,
+ &public, &comment)) != 0) {
+ debug("load private \"%s\": %s", path, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal("%s is not a key file.", path);
+ }
+ }
+
+ fingerprint_one_key(public, comment);
+ sshkey_free(public);
+ free(comment);
+}
+
+static void
+do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ struct sshkey *public = NULL;
+ char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
+ int i, invalid = 1;
+ const char *path;
+ u_long lnum = 0;
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ path = identity_file;
+
+ if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") == 0) {
+ f = stdin;
+ path = "(stdin)";
+ } else if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, path, strerror(errno));
+
+ while (read_keyfile_line(f, path, line, sizeof(line), &lnum) == 0) {
+ cp = line;
+ cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
+ /* Trim leading space and comments */
+ cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
+ if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Input may be plain keys, private keys, authorized_keys
+ * or known_hosts.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Try private keys first. Assume a key is private if
+ * "SSH PRIVATE KEY" appears on the first line and we're
+ * not reading from stdin (XXX support private keys on stdin).
+ */
+ if (lnum == 1 && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 &&
+ strstr(cp, "PRIVATE KEY") != NULL) {
+ fclose(f);
+ fingerprint_private(path);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If it's not a private key, then this must be prepared to
+ * accept a public key prefixed with a hostname or options.
+ * Try a bare key first, otherwise skip the leading stuff.
+ */
+ if ((public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) {
+ i = strtol(cp, &ep, 10);
+ if (i == 0 || ep == NULL ||
+ (*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) {
+ int quoted = 0;
+
+ comment = cp;
+ for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' &&
+ *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+ if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+ cp++; /* Skip both */
+ else if (*cp == '"')
+ quoted = !quoted;
+ }
+ if (!*cp)
+ continue;
+ *cp++ = '\0';
+ }
+ }
+ /* Retry after parsing leading hostname/key options */
+ if (public == NULL && (public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) {
+ debug("%s:%lu: not a public key", path, lnum);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Find trailing comment, if any */
+ for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ if (*cp != '\0' && *cp != '#')
+ comment = cp;
+
+ fingerprint_one_key(public, comment);
+ sshkey_free(public);
+ invalid = 0; /* One good key in the file is sufficient */
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+
+ if (invalid)
+ fatal("%s is not a public key file.", path);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ struct {
+ char *key_type;
+ char *key_type_display;
+ char *path;
+ } key_types[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ { "rsa1", "RSA1", _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE },
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+ { "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE },
+ { "dsa", "DSA", _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE },
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ { "ecdsa", "ECDSA",_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE },
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ { "ed25519", "ED25519",_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE },
+ { NULL, NULL, NULL }
+ };
+
+ int first = 0;
+ struct stat st;
+ struct sshkey *private, *public;
+ char comment[1024];
+ int i, type, fd, r;
+ FILE *f;
+
+ for (i = 0; key_types[i].key_type; i++) {
+ if (stat(key_types[i].path, &st) == 0)
+ continue;
+ if (errno != ENOENT) {
+ error("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path,
+ strerror(errno));
+ first = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (first == 0) {
+ first = 1;
+ printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
+ }
+ printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
+ fflush(stdout);
+ type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
+ strlcpy(identity_file, key_types[i].path, sizeof(identity_file));
+ bits = 0;
+ type_bits_valid(type, NULL, &bits);
+ if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) {
+ error("key_generate failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ first = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshkey_from_private failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name,
+ hostname);
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, "",
+ comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
+ error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
+ identity_file, ssh_err(r));
+ sshkey_free(private);
+ sshkey_free(public);
+ first = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ sshkey_free(private);
+ strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
+ fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ error("Could not save your public key in %s",
+ identity_file);
+ sshkey_free(public);
+ first = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ f = fdopen(fd, "w");
+ if (f == NULL) {
+ error("fdopen %s failed", identity_file);
+ close(fd);
+ sshkey_free(public);
+ first = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) {
+ error("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ fclose(f);
+ sshkey_free(public);
+ first = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
+ fclose(f);
+ sshkey_free(public);
+
+ }
+ if (first != 0)
+ printf("\n");
+}
+
+struct known_hosts_ctx {
+ const char *host; /* Hostname searched for in find/delete case */
+ FILE *out; /* Output file, stdout for find_hosts case */
+ int has_unhashed; /* When hashing, original had unhashed hosts */
+ int found_key; /* For find/delete, host was found */
+ int invalid; /* File contained invalid items; don't delete */
+};
+
+static int
+known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+{
+ struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx;
+ char *hashed, *cp, *hosts, *ohosts;
+ int has_wild = l->hosts && strcspn(l->hosts, "*?!") != strlen(l->hosts);
+
+ switch (l->status) {
+ case HKF_STATUS_OK:
+ case HKF_STATUS_MATCHED:
+ /*
+ * Don't hash hosts already already hashed, with wildcard
+ * characters or a CA/revocation marker.
+ */
+ if ((l->match & HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED) != 0 ||
+ has_wild || l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
+ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+ if (has_wild && !find_host) {
+ logit("%s:%ld: ignoring host name "
+ "with wildcard: %.64s", l->path,
+ l->linenum, l->hosts);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Split any comma-separated hostnames from the host list,
+ * hash and store separately.
+ */
+ ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(l->hosts);
+ while ((cp = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') {
+ if ((hashed = host_hash(cp, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
+ fatal("hash_host failed");
+ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s %s\n", hashed, l->rawkey);
+ ctx->has_unhashed = 1;
+ }
+ free(ohosts);
+ return 0;
+ case HKF_STATUS_INVALID:
+ /* Retain invalid lines, but mark file as invalid. */
+ ctx->invalid = 1;
+ logit("%s:%ld: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int
+known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+{
+ struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx;
+ enum sshkey_fp_rep rep;
+ int fptype;
+ char *fp;
+
+ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash;
+ rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT;
+
+ if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) {
+ if (delete_host) {
+ if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
+ /* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */
+ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke
+ * marker, delete it by *not* writing the
+ * line to ctx->out.
+ */
+ ctx->found_key = 1;
+ if (!quiet)
+ printf("# Host %s found: line %ld\n",
+ ctx->host, l->linenum);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ } else if (find_host) {
+ ctx->found_key = 1;
+ if (!quiet) {
+ printf("# Host %s found: line %ld %s\n",
+ ctx->host,
+ l->linenum, l->marker == MRK_CA ? "CA" :
+ (l->marker == MRK_REVOKE ? "REVOKED" : ""));
+ }
+ if (hash_hosts)
+ known_hosts_hash(l, ctx);
+ else if (print_fingerprint) {
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, fptype, rep);
+ printf("%s %s %s %s\n", ctx->host,
+ sshkey_type(l->key), fp, l->comment);
+ free(fp);
+ } else
+ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (delete_host) {
+ /* Retain non-matching hosts when deleting */
+ if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
+ ctx->invalid = 1;
+ logit("%s:%ld: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
+ }
+ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name)
+{
+ char *cp, tmp[PATH_MAX], old[PATH_MAX];
+ int r, fd, oerrno, inplace = 0;
+ struct known_hosts_ctx ctx;
+ u_int foreach_options;
+
+ if (!have_identity) {
+ cp = tilde_expand_filename(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid);
+ if (strlcpy(identity_file, cp, sizeof(identity_file)) >=
+ sizeof(identity_file))
+ fatal("Specified known hosts path too long");
+ free(cp);
+ have_identity = 1;
+ }
+
+ memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+ ctx.out = stdout;
+ ctx.host = name;
+
+ /*
+ * Find hosts goes to stdout, hash and deletions happen in-place
+ * A corner case is ssh-keygen -HF foo, which should go to stdout
+ */
+ if (!find_host && (hash_hosts || delete_host)) {
+ if (strlcpy(tmp, identity_file, sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) ||
+ strlcat(tmp, ".XXXXXXXXXX", sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) ||
+ strlcpy(old, identity_file, sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old) ||
+ strlcat(old, ".old", sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old))
+ fatal("known_hosts path too long");
+ umask(077);
+ if ((fd = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1)
+ fatal("mkstemp: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ unlink(tmp);
+ fatal("fdopen: %s", strerror(oerrno));
+ }
+ inplace = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX support identity_file == "-" for stdin */
+ foreach_options = find_host ? HKF_WANT_MATCH : 0;
+ foreach_options |= print_fingerprint ? HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY : 0;
+ if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(identity_file,
+ hash_hosts ? known_hosts_hash : known_hosts_find_delete, &ctx,
+ name, NULL, foreach_options)) != 0) {
+ if (inplace)
+ unlink(tmp);
+ fatal("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+
+ if (inplace)
+ fclose(ctx.out);
+
+ if (ctx.invalid) {
+ error("%s is not a valid known_hosts file.", identity_file);
+ if (inplace) {
+ error("Not replacing existing known_hosts "
+ "file because of errors");
+ unlink(tmp);
+ }
+ exit(1);
+ } else if (delete_host && !ctx.found_key) {
+ logit("Host %s not found in %s", name, identity_file);
+ if (inplace)
+ unlink(tmp);
+ } else if (inplace) {
+ /* Backup existing file */
+ if (unlink(old) == -1 && errno != ENOENT)
+ fatal("unlink %.100s: %s", old, strerror(errno));
+ if (link(identity_file, old) == -1)
+ fatal("link %.100s to %.100s: %s", identity_file, old,
+ strerror(errno));
+ /* Move new one into place */
+ if (rename(tmp, identity_file) == -1) {
+ error("rename\"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", tmp, identity_file,
+ strerror(errno));
+ unlink(tmp);
+ unlink(old);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ printf("%s updated.\n", identity_file);
+ printf("Original contents retained as %s\n", old);
+ if (ctx.has_unhashed) {
+ logit("WARNING: %s contains unhashed entries", old);
+ logit("Delete this file to ensure privacy "
+ "of hostnames");
+ }
+ }
+
+ exit (find_host && !ctx.found_key);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform changing a passphrase. The argument is the passwd structure
+ * for the current user.
+ */
+static void
+do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ char *comment;
+ char *old_passphrase, *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
+ struct stat st;
+ struct sshkey *private;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ /* Try to load the file with empty passphrase. */
+ r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", &private, &comment);
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
+ if (identity_passphrase)
+ old_passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+ else
+ old_passphrase =
+ read_passphrase("Enter old passphrase: ",
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, old_passphrase,
+ &private, &comment);
+ explicit_bzero(old_passphrase, strlen(old_passphrase));
+ free(old_passphrase);
+ if (r != 0)
+ goto badkey;
+ } else if (r != 0) {
+ badkey:
+ fatal("Failed to load key %s: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ if (comment)
+ printf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment);
+
+ /* Ask the new passphrase (twice). */
+ if (identity_new_passphrase) {
+ passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
+ passphrase2 = NULL;
+ } else {
+ passphrase1 =
+ read_passphrase("Enter new passphrase (empty for no "
+ "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ",
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+
+ /* Verify that they are the same. */
+ if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) {
+ explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
+ explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
+ free(passphrase1);
+ free(passphrase2);
+ printf("Pass phrases do not match. Try again.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Destroy the other copy. */
+ explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
+ free(passphrase2);
+ }
+
+ /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1,
+ comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
+ error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s.",
+ identity_file, ssh_err(r));
+ explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
+ free(passphrase1);
+ sshkey_free(private);
+ free(comment);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Destroy the passphrase and the copy of the key in memory. */
+ explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
+ free(passphrase1);
+ sshkey_free(private); /* Destroys contents */
+ free(comment);
+
+ printf("Your identification has been saved with the new passphrase.\n");
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Print the SSHFP RR.
+ */
+static int
+do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *fname, char *hname)
+{
+ struct sshkey *public;
+ char *comment = NULL;
+ struct stat st;
+ int r;
+
+ if (fname == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: no filename", __func__);
+ if (stat(fname, &st) < 0) {
+ if (errno == ENOENT)
+ return 0;
+ fatal("%s: %s", fname, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(fname, &public, &comment)) != 0)
+ fatal("Failed to read v2 public key from \"%s\": %s.",
+ fname, ssh_err(r));
+ export_dns_rr(hname, public, stdout, print_generic);
+ sshkey_free(public);
+ free(comment);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Change the comment of a private key file.
+ */
+static void
+do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ char new_comment[1024], *comment, *passphrase;
+ struct sshkey *private;
+ struct sshkey *public;
+ struct stat st;
+ FILE *f;
+ int r, fd;
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "",
+ &private, &comment)) == 0)
+ passphrase = xstrdup("");
+ else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
+ fatal("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.",
+ identity_file, ssh_err(r));
+ else {
+ if (identity_passphrase)
+ passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+ else if (identity_new_passphrase)
+ passphrase = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
+ else
+ passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ",
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ /* Try to load using the passphrase. */
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, passphrase,
+ &private, &comment)) != 0) {
+ explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ free(passphrase);
+ fatal("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.",
+ identity_file, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (private->type != KEY_RSA1 && private->type != KEY_ED25519 &&
+ !use_new_format) {
+ error("Comments are only supported for RSA1 or keys stored in "
+ "the new format (-o).");
+ explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ sshkey_free(private);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ printf("Key now has comment '%s'\n", comment);
+
+ if (identity_comment) {
+ strlcpy(new_comment, identity_comment, sizeof(new_comment));
+ } else {
+ printf("Enter new comment: ");
+ fflush(stdout);
+ if (!fgets(new_comment, sizeof(new_comment), stdin)) {
+ explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ sshkey_free(private);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ new_comment[strcspn(new_comment, "\n")] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase,
+ new_comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
+ error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
+ identity_file, ssh_err(r));
+ explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ free(passphrase);
+ sshkey_free(private);
+ free(comment);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ free(passphrase);
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0)
+ fatal("key_from_private failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ sshkey_free(private);
+
+ strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
+ fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
+ if (fd == -1)
+ fatal("Could not save your public key in %s", identity_file);
+ f = fdopen(fd, "w");
+ if (f == NULL)
+ fatal("fdopen %s failed: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0)
+ fatal("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ sshkey_free(public);
+ fprintf(f, " %s\n", new_comment);
+ fclose(f);
+
+ free(comment);
+
+ printf("The comment in your key file has been changed.\n");
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+add_flag_option(struct sshbuf *c, const char *name)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ debug3("%s: %s", __func__, name);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, name)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(c, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+static void
+add_string_option(struct sshbuf *c, const char *name, const char *value)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ int r;
+
+ debug3("%s: %s=%s", __func__, name, value);
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, value)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, name)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c, b)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+}
+
+#define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1
+#define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2
+static void
+prepare_options_buf(struct sshbuf *c, int which)
+{
+ sshbuf_reset(c);
+ if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 &&
+ certflags_command != NULL)
+ add_string_option(c, "force-command", certflags_command);
+ if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
+ (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_X_FWD) != 0)
+ add_flag_option(c, "permit-X11-forwarding");
+ if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
+ (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD) != 0)
+ add_flag_option(c, "permit-agent-forwarding");
+ if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
+ (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PORT_FWD) != 0)
+ add_flag_option(c, "permit-port-forwarding");
+ if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
+ (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PTY) != 0)
+ add_flag_option(c, "permit-pty");
+ if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
+ (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_USER_RC) != 0)
+ add_flag_option(c, "permit-user-rc");
+ if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 &&
+ certflags_src_addr != NULL)
+ add_string_option(c, "source-address", certflags_src_addr);
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+load_pkcs11_key(char *path)
+{
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *public, *private = NULL;
+ int r, i, nkeys;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &public, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("Couldn't load CA public key \"%s\": %s",
+ path, ssh_err(r));
+
+ nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, identity_passphrase, &keys);
+ debug3("%s: %d keys", __func__, nkeys);
+ if (nkeys <= 0)
+ fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11");
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+ if (sshkey_equal_public(public, keys[i])) {
+ private = keys[i];
+ continue;
+ }
+ sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+ }
+ free(keys);
+ sshkey_free(public);
+ return private;
+#else
+ fatal("no pkcs11 support");
+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+}
+
+static void
+do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ int r, i, fd;
+ u_int n;
+ struct sshkey *ca, *public;
+ char valid[64], *otmp, *tmp, *cp, *out, *comment, **plist = NULL;
+ FILE *f;
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ pkcs11_init(1);
+#endif
+ tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid);
+ if (pkcs11provider != NULL) {
+ if ((ca = load_pkcs11_key(tmp)) == NULL)
+ fatal("No PKCS#11 key matching %s found", ca_key_path);
+ } else
+ ca = load_identity(tmp);
+ free(tmp);
+
+ if (key_type_name != NULL &&
+ sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name) != ca->type) {
+ fatal("CA key type %s doesn't match specified %s",
+ sshkey_ssh_name(ca), key_type_name);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+ /* Split list of principals */
+ n = 0;
+ if (cert_principals != NULL) {
+ otmp = tmp = xstrdup(cert_principals);
+ plist = NULL;
+ for (; (cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL; n++) {
+ plist = xreallocarray(plist, n + 1, sizeof(*plist));
+ if (*(plist[n] = xstrdup(cp)) == '\0')
+ fatal("Empty principal name");
+ }
+ free(otmp);
+ }
+
+ tmp = tilde_expand_filename(argv[i], pw->pw_uid);
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &public, &comment)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: unable to open \"%s\": %s",
+ __func__, tmp, ssh_err(r));
+ if (public->type != KEY_RSA && public->type != KEY_DSA &&
+ public->type != KEY_ECDSA && public->type != KEY_ED25519)
+ fatal("%s: key \"%s\" type %s cannot be certified",
+ __func__, tmp, sshkey_type(public));
+
+ /* Prepare certificate to sign */
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(public)) != 0)
+ fatal("Could not upgrade key %s to certificate: %s",
+ tmp, ssh_err(r));
+ public->cert->type = cert_key_type;
+ public->cert->serial = (u_int64_t)cert_serial;
+ public->cert->key_id = xstrdup(cert_key_id);
+ public->cert->nprincipals = n;
+ public->cert->principals = plist;
+ public->cert->valid_after = cert_valid_from;
+ public->cert->valid_before = cert_valid_to;
+ prepare_options_buf(public->cert->critical, OPTIONS_CRITICAL);
+ prepare_options_buf(public->cert->extensions,
+ OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS);
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca,
+ &public->cert->signature_key)) != 0)
+ fatal("key_from_private (ca key): %s", ssh_err(r));
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_certify(public, ca, key_type_name)) != 0)
+ fatal("Couldn't certify key %s: %s", tmp, ssh_err(r));
+
+ if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '.')) != NULL && strcmp(cp, ".pub") == 0)
+ *cp = '\0';
+ xasprintf(&out, "%s-cert.pub", tmp);
+ free(tmp);
+
+ if ((fd = open(out, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1)
+ fatal("Could not open \"%s\" for writing: %s", out,
+ strerror(errno));
+ if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0)
+ fatal("Could not write certified key to %s: %s",
+ out, ssh_err(r));
+ fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
+ fclose(f);
+
+ if (!quiet) {
+ sshkey_format_cert_validity(public->cert,
+ valid, sizeof(valid));
+ logit("Signed %s key %s: id \"%s\" serial %llu%s%s "
+ "valid %s", sshkey_cert_type(public),
+ out, public->cert->key_id,
+ (unsigned long long)public->cert->serial,
+ cert_principals != NULL ? " for " : "",
+ cert_principals != NULL ? cert_principals : "",
+ valid);
+ }
+
+ sshkey_free(public);
+ free(out);
+ }
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ pkcs11_terminate();
+#endif
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+static u_int64_t
+parse_relative_time(const char *s, time_t now)
+{
+ int64_t mul, secs;
+
+ mul = *s == '-' ? -1 : 1;
+
+ if ((secs = convtime(s + 1)) == -1)
+ fatal("Invalid relative certificate time %s", s);
+ if (mul == -1 && secs > now)
+ fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s);
+ return now + (u_int64_t)(secs * mul);
+}
+
+static u_int64_t
+parse_absolute_time(const char *s)
+{
+ struct tm tm;
+ time_t tt;
+ char buf[32], *fmt;
+
+ /*
+ * POSIX strptime says "The application shall ensure that there
+ * is white-space or other non-alphanumeric characters between
+ * any two conversion specifications" so arrange things this way.
+ */
+ switch (strlen(s)) {
+ case 8:
+ fmt = "%Y-%m-%d";
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6);
+ break;
+ case 14:
+ fmt = "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S";
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2sT%.2s:%.2s:%.2s",
+ s, s + 4, s + 6, s + 8, s + 10, s + 12);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("Invalid certificate time format %s", s);
+ }
+
+ memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm));
+ if (strptime(buf, fmt, &tm) == NULL)
+ fatal("Invalid certificate time %s", s);
+ if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0)
+ fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s);
+ return (u_int64_t)tt;
+}
+
+static void
+parse_cert_times(char *timespec)
+{
+ char *from, *to;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ int64_t secs;
+
+ /* +timespec relative to now */
+ if (*timespec == '+' && strchr(timespec, ':') == NULL) {
+ if ((secs = convtime(timespec + 1)) == -1)
+ fatal("Invalid relative certificate life %s", timespec);
+ cert_valid_to = now + secs;
+ /*
+ * Backdate certificate one minute to avoid problems on hosts
+ * with poorly-synchronised clocks.
+ */
+ cert_valid_from = ((now - 59)/ 60) * 60;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * from:to, where
+ * from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS
+ * to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS
+ */
+ from = xstrdup(timespec);
+ to = strchr(from, ':');
+ if (to == NULL || from == to || *(to + 1) == '\0')
+ fatal("Invalid certificate life specification %s", timespec);
+ *to++ = '\0';
+
+ if (*from == '-' || *from == '+')
+ cert_valid_from = parse_relative_time(from, now);
+ else
+ cert_valid_from = parse_absolute_time(from);
+
+ if (*to == '-' || *to == '+')
+ cert_valid_to = parse_relative_time(to, now);
+ else
+ cert_valid_to = parse_absolute_time(to);
+
+ if (cert_valid_to <= cert_valid_from)
+ fatal("Empty certificate validity interval");
+ free(from);
+}
+
+static void
+add_cert_option(char *opt)
+{
+ char *val;
+
+ if (strcasecmp(opt, "clear") == 0)
+ certflags_flags = 0;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-x11-forwarding") == 0)
+ certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_X_FWD;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-x11-forwarding") == 0)
+ certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_X_FWD;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-agent-forwarding") == 0)
+ certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0)
+ certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-port-forwarding") == 0)
+ certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PORT_FWD;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0)
+ certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PORT_FWD;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-pty") == 0)
+ certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PTY;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-pty") == 0)
+ certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PTY;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-user-rc") == 0)
+ certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_USER_RC;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-user-rc") == 0)
+ certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_USER_RC;
+ else if (strncasecmp(opt, "force-command=", 14) == 0) {
+ val = opt + 14;
+ if (*val == '\0')
+ fatal("Empty force-command option");
+ if (certflags_command != NULL)
+ fatal("force-command already specified");
+ certflags_command = xstrdup(val);
+ } else if (strncasecmp(opt, "source-address=", 15) == 0) {
+ val = opt + 15;
+ if (*val == '\0')
+ fatal("Empty source-address option");
+ if (certflags_src_addr != NULL)
+ fatal("source-address already specified");
+ if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, val) != 0)
+ fatal("Invalid source-address list");
+ certflags_src_addr = xstrdup(val);
+ } else
+ fatal("Unsupported certificate option \"%s\"", opt);
+}
+
+static void
+show_options(struct sshbuf *optbuf, int in_critical)
+{
+ char *name, *arg;
+ struct sshbuf *options, *option = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((options = sshbuf_fromb(optbuf)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__);
+ while (sshbuf_len(options) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(option);
+ option = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(options, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_froms(options, &option)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ printf(" %s", name);
+ if (!in_critical &&
+ (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0))
+ printf("\n");
+ else if (in_critical &&
+ (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0)) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(option, &arg, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ printf(" %s\n", arg);
+ free(arg);
+ } else {
+ printf(" UNKNOWN OPTION (len %zu)\n",
+ sshbuf_len(option));
+ sshbuf_reset(option);
+ }
+ free(name);
+ if (sshbuf_len(option) != 0)
+ fatal("Option corrupt: extra data at end");
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(option);
+ sshbuf_free(options);
+}
+
+static void
+print_cert(struct sshkey *key)
+{
+ char valid[64], *key_fp, *ca_fp;
+ u_int i;
+
+ key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+ fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ if (key_fp == NULL || ca_fp == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ sshkey_format_cert_validity(key->cert, valid, sizeof(valid));
+
+ printf(" Type: %s %s certificate\n", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+ sshkey_cert_type(key));
+ printf(" Public key: %s %s\n", sshkey_type(key), key_fp);
+ printf(" Signing CA: %s %s\n",
+ sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp);
+ printf(" Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id);
+ printf(" Serial: %llu\n", (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial);
+ printf(" Valid: %s\n", valid);
+ printf(" Principals: ");
+ if (key->cert->nprincipals == 0)
+ printf("(none)\n");
+ else {
+ for (i = 0; i < key->cert->nprincipals; i++)
+ printf("\n %s",
+ key->cert->principals[i]);
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+ printf(" Critical Options: ");
+ if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) == 0)
+ printf("(none)\n");
+ else {
+ printf("\n");
+ show_options(key->cert->critical, 1);
+ }
+ printf(" Extensions: ");
+ if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->extensions) == 0)
+ printf("(none)\n");
+ else {
+ printf("\n");
+ show_options(key->cert->extensions, 0);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ struct stat st;
+ int r, is_stdin = 0, ok = 0;
+ FILE *f;
+ char *cp, line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
+ const char *path;
+ u_long lnum = 0;
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 && stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
+
+ path = identity_file;
+ if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) {
+ f = stdin;
+ path = "(stdin)";
+ is_stdin = 1;
+ } else if ((f = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
+ fatal("fopen %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+
+ while (read_keyfile_line(f, path, line, sizeof(line), &lnum) == 0) {
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ key = NULL;
+ /* Trim leading space and comments */
+ cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
+ if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
+ continue;
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ fatal("key_new");
+ if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) {
+ error("%s:%lu: invalid key: %s", path,
+ lnum, ssh_err(r));
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+ error("%s:%lu is not a certificate", path, lnum);
+ continue;
+ }
+ ok = 1;
+ if (!is_stdin && lnum == 1)
+ printf("%s:\n", path);
+ else
+ printf("%s:%lu:\n", path, lnum);
+ print_cert(key);
+ }
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ fclose(f);
+ exit(ok ? 0 : 1);
+}
+
+static void
+load_krl(const char *path, struct ssh_krl **krlp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *krlbuf;
+ int r, fd;
+
+ if ((krlbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+ fatal("open %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, krlbuf)) != 0)
+ fatal("Unable to load KRL: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ close(fd);
+ /* XXX check sigs */
+ if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, krlp, NULL, 0)) != 0 ||
+ *krlp == NULL)
+ fatal("Invalid KRL file: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ sshbuf_free(krlbuf);
+}
+
+static void
+update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, int wild_ca,
+ const struct sshkey *ca, struct ssh_krl *krl)
+{
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ u_long lnum = 0;
+ char *path, *cp, *ep, line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
+ unsigned long long serial, serial2;
+ int i, was_explicit_key, was_sha1, r;
+ FILE *krl_spec;
+
+ path = tilde_expand_filename(file, pw->pw_uid);
+ if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) {
+ krl_spec = stdin;
+ free(path);
+ path = xstrdup("(standard input)");
+ } else if ((krl_spec = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
+ fatal("fopen %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+
+ if (!quiet)
+ printf("Revoking from %s\n", path);
+ while (read_keyfile_line(krl_spec, path, line, sizeof(line),
+ &lnum) == 0) {
+ was_explicit_key = was_sha1 = 0;
+ cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
+ /* Trim trailing space, comments and strip \n */
+ for (i = 0, r = -1; cp[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+ if (cp[i] == '#' || cp[i] == '\n') {
+ cp[i] = '\0';
+ break;
+ }
+ if (cp[i] == ' ' || cp[i] == '\t') {
+ /* Remember the start of a span of whitespace */
+ if (r == -1)
+ r = i;
+ } else
+ r = -1;
+ }
+ if (r != -1)
+ cp[r] = '\0';
+ if (*cp == '\0')
+ continue;
+ if (strncasecmp(cp, "serial:", 7) == 0) {
+ if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) {
+ fatal("revoking certificates by serial number "
+ "requires specification of a CA key");
+ }
+ cp += 7;
+ cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
+ errno = 0;
+ serial = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0);
+ if (*cp == '\0' || (*ep != '\0' && *ep != '-'))
+ fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"",
+ path, lnum, cp);
+ if (errno == ERANGE && serial == ULLONG_MAX)
+ fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range",
+ path, lnum);
+ serial2 = serial;
+ if (*ep == '-') {
+ cp = ep + 1;
+ errno = 0;
+ serial2 = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0);
+ if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0')
+ fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"",
+ path, lnum, cp);
+ if (errno == ERANGE && serial2 == ULLONG_MAX)
+ fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range",
+ path, lnum);
+ if (serial2 <= serial)
+ fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial range "
+ "%llu:%llu", path, lnum,
+ (unsigned long long)serial,
+ (unsigned long long)serial2);
+ }
+ if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl,
+ ca, serial, serial2) != 0) {
+ fatal("%s: revoke serial failed",
+ __func__);
+ }
+ } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "id:", 3) == 0) {
+ if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) {
+ fatal("revoking certificates by key ID "
+ "requires specification of a CA key");
+ }
+ cp += 3;
+ cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
+ if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca, cp) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: revoke key ID failed", __func__);
+ } else {
+ if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
+ cp += 4;
+ cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
+ was_explicit_key = 1;
+ } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha1:", 5) == 0) {
+ cp += 5;
+ cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
+ was_sha1 = 1;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Just try to process the line as a key.
+ * Parsing will fail if it isn't.
+ */
+ }
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ fatal("key_new");
+ if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s:%lu: invalid key: %s",
+ path, lnum, ssh_err(r));
+ if (was_explicit_key)
+ r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key);
+ else if (was_sha1)
+ r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, key);
+ else
+ r = ssh_krl_revoke_key(krl, key);
+ if (r != 0)
+ fatal("%s: revoke key failed: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ }
+ }
+ if (strcmp(path, "-") != 0)
+ fclose(krl_spec);
+ free(path);
+}
+
+static void
+do_gen_krl(struct passwd *pw, int updating, int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ struct ssh_krl *krl;
+ struct stat sb;
+ struct sshkey *ca = NULL;
+ int fd, i, r, wild_ca = 0;
+ char *tmp;
+ struct sshbuf *kbuf;
+
+ if (*identity_file == '\0')
+ fatal("KRL generation requires an output file");
+ if (stat(identity_file, &sb) == -1) {
+ if (errno != ENOENT)
+ fatal("Cannot access KRL \"%s\": %s",
+ identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ if (updating)
+ fatal("KRL \"%s\" does not exist", identity_file);
+ }
+ if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
+ if (strcasecmp(ca_key_path, "none") == 0)
+ wild_ca = 1;
+ else {
+ tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid);
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("Cannot load CA public key %s: %s",
+ tmp, ssh_err(r));
+ free(tmp);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (updating)
+ load_krl(identity_file, &krl);
+ else if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL)
+ fatal("couldn't create KRL");
+
+ if (cert_serial != 0)
+ ssh_krl_set_version(krl, cert_serial);
+ if (identity_comment != NULL)
+ ssh_krl_set_comment(krl, identity_comment);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
+ update_krl_from_file(pw, argv[i], wild_ca, ca, krl);
+
+ if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if (ssh_krl_to_blob(krl, kbuf, NULL, 0) != 0)
+ fatal("Couldn't generate KRL");
+ if ((fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1)
+ fatal("open %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, (void *)sshbuf_ptr(kbuf), sshbuf_len(kbuf)) !=
+ sshbuf_len(kbuf))
+ fatal("write %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ close(fd);
+ sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+ ssh_krl_free(krl);
+ sshkey_free(ca);
+}
+
+static void
+do_check_krl(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ int i, r, ret = 0;
+ char *comment;
+ struct ssh_krl *krl;
+ struct sshkey *k;
+
+ if (*identity_file == '\0')
+ fatal("KRL checking requires an input file");
+ load_krl(identity_file, &krl);
+ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(argv[i], &k, &comment)) != 0)
+ fatal("Cannot load public key %s: %s",
+ argv[i], ssh_err(r));
+ r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, k);
+ printf("%s%s%s%s: %s\n", argv[i],
+ *comment ? " (" : "", comment, *comment ? ")" : "",
+ r == 0 ? "ok" : "REVOKED");
+ if (r != 0)
+ ret = 1;
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ free(comment);
+ }
+ ssh_krl_free(krl);
+ exit(ret);
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1]\n"
+ " [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -p [-P old_passphrase] [-N new_passphrase] [-f keyfile]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -i [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -e [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -c [-P passphrase] [-C comment] [-f keyfile]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n");
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ " ssh-keygen -D pkcs11\n");
+#endif
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ " ssh-keygen -F hostname [-f known_hosts_file] [-l]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -r hostname [-f input_keyfile] [-g]\n"
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ " ssh-keygen -G output_file [-v] [-b bits] [-M memory] [-S start_point]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -T output_file -f input_file [-v] [-a rounds] [-J num_lines]\n"
+ " [-j start_line] [-K checkpt] [-W generator]\n"
+#endif
+ " ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I certificate_identity [-h] [-n principals]\n"
+ " [-O option] [-V validity_interval] [-z serial_number] file ...\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -A\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]\n"
+ " file ...\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -Q -f krl_file file ...\n");
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Main program for key management.
+ */
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ char dotsshdir[PATH_MAX], comment[1024], *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
+ char *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep, *fp, *ra;
+ struct sshkey *private, *public;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ struct stat st;
+ int r, opt, type, fd;
+ int gen_all_hostkeys = 0, gen_krl = 0, update_krl = 0, check_krl = 0;
+ FILE *f;
+ const char *errstr;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ /* Moduli generation/screening */
+ char out_file[PATH_MAX], *checkpoint = NULL;
+ u_int32_t memory = 0, generator_wanted = 0;
+ int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0;
+ unsigned long start_lineno = 0, lines_to_process = 0;
+ BIGNUM *start = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ extern int optind;
+ extern char *optarg;
+
+ ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
+ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+ sanitise_stdfd();
+
+ __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+#endif
+ log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+ seed_rng();
+
+ /* we need this for the home * directory. */
+ pw = getpwuid(getuid());
+ if (!pw)
+ fatal("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid());
+ if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0)
+ fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Remaining characters: UYdw */
+ while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHLQXceghiklopquvxy"
+ "C:D:E:F:G:I:J:K:M:N:O:P:R:S:T:V:W:Z:"
+ "a:b:f:g:j:m:n:r:s:t:z:")) != -1) {
+ switch (opt) {
+ case 'A':
+ gen_all_hostkeys = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'b':
+ bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 256, 32768, &errstr);
+ if (errstr)
+ fatal("Bits has bad value %s (%s)",
+ optarg, errstr);
+ break;
+ case 'E':
+ fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
+ if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
+ fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'F':
+ find_host = 1;
+ rr_hostname = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'H':
+ hash_hosts = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'I':
+ cert_key_id = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'R':
+ delete_host = 1;
+ rr_hostname = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'L':
+ show_cert = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'l':
+ print_fingerprint = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'B':
+ print_bubblebabble = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'm':
+ if (strcasecmp(optarg, "RFC4716") == 0 ||
+ strcasecmp(optarg, "ssh2") == 0) {
+ convert_format = FMT_RFC4716;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PKCS8") == 0) {
+ convert_format = FMT_PKCS8;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PEM") == 0) {
+ convert_format = FMT_PEM;
+ break;
+ }
+ fatal("Unsupported conversion format \"%s\"", optarg);
+ case 'n':
+ cert_principals = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'o':
+ use_new_format = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ change_passphrase = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'c':
+ change_comment = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'f':
+ if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg,
+ sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file))
+ fatal("Identity filename too long");
+ have_identity = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'g':
+ print_generic = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'P':
+ identity_passphrase = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'N':
+ identity_new_passphrase = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'Q':
+ check_krl = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'O':
+ add_cert_option(optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'Z':
+ new_format_cipher = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'C':
+ identity_comment = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'q':
+ quiet = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'e':
+ case 'x':
+ /* export key */
+ convert_to = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'h':
+ cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST;
+ certflags_flags = 0;
+ break;
+ case 'k':
+ gen_krl = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'i':
+ case 'X':
+ /* import key */
+ convert_from = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'y':
+ print_public = 1;
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ ca_key_path = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 't':
+ key_type_name = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'D':
+ pkcs11provider = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'u':
+ update_krl = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'v':
+ if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
+ log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+ else {
+ if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 &&
+ log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+ log_level++;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'r':
+ rr_hostname = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'a':
+ rounds = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr)
+ fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)",
+ optarg, errstr);
+ break;
+ case 'V':
+ parse_cert_times(optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'z':
+ errno = 0;
+ cert_serial = strtoull(optarg, &ep, 10);
+ if (*optarg < '0' || *optarg > '9' || *ep != '\0' ||
+ (errno == ERANGE && cert_serial == ULLONG_MAX))
+ fatal("Invalid serial number \"%s\"", optarg);
+ break;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ /* Moduli generation/screening */
+ case 'W':
+ generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1,
+ UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr)
+ fatal("Desired generator has bad value: %s (%s)",
+ optarg, errstr);
+ break;
+ case 'M':
+ memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr)
+ fatal("Memory limit is %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'G':
+ do_gen_candidates = 1;
+ if (strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file)) >=
+ sizeof(out_file))
+ fatal("Output filename too long");
+ break;
+ case 'T':
+ do_screen_candidates = 1;
+ if (strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file)) >=
+ sizeof(out_file))
+ fatal("Output filename too long");
+ break;
+ case 'K':
+ if (strlen(optarg) >= PATH_MAX)
+ fatal("Checkpoint filename too long");
+ checkpoint = xstrdup(optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'S':
+ /* XXX - also compare length against bits */
+ if (BN_hex2bn(&start, optarg) == 0)
+ fatal("Invalid start point.");
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case '?':
+ default:
+ usage();
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* reinit */
+ log_init(argv[0], log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+ argv += optind;
+ argc -= optind;
+
+ if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
+ if (argc < 1 && !gen_krl) {
+ error("Too few arguments.");
+ usage();
+ }
+ } else if (argc > 0 && !gen_krl && !check_krl) {
+ error("Too many arguments.");
+ usage();
+ }
+ if (change_passphrase && change_comment) {
+ error("Can only have one of -p and -c.");
+ usage();
+ }
+ if (print_fingerprint && (delete_host || hash_hosts)) {
+ error("Cannot use -l with -H or -R.");
+ usage();
+ }
+ if (gen_krl) {
+ do_gen_krl(pw, update_krl, argc, argv);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (check_krl) {
+ do_check_krl(pw, argc, argv);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
+ if (cert_key_id == NULL)
+ fatal("Must specify key id (-I) when certifying");
+ do_ca_sign(pw, argc, argv);
+ }
+ if (show_cert)
+ do_show_cert(pw);
+ if (delete_host || hash_hosts || find_host)
+ do_known_hosts(pw, rr_hostname);
+ if (pkcs11provider != NULL)
+ do_download(pw);
+ if (print_fingerprint || print_bubblebabble)
+ do_fingerprint(pw);
+ if (change_passphrase)
+ do_change_passphrase(pw);
+ if (change_comment)
+ do_change_comment(pw);
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ if (convert_to)
+ do_convert_to(pw);
+ if (convert_from)
+ do_convert_from(pw);
+#endif
+ if (print_public)
+ do_print_public(pw);
+ if (rr_hostname != NULL) {
+ unsigned int n = 0;
+
+ if (have_identity) {
+ n = do_print_resource_record(pw,
+ identity_file, rr_hostname);
+ if (n == 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ exit(0);
+ } else {
+
+ n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
+ _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname);
+ n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
+ _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname);
+ n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
+ _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname);
+ n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
+ _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname);
+ if (n == 0)
+ fatal("no keys found.");
+ exit(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ if (do_gen_candidates) {
+ FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "w");
+
+ if (out == NULL) {
+ error("Couldn't open modulus candidate file \"%s\": %s",
+ out_file, strerror(errno));
+ return (1);
+ }
+ if (bits == 0)
+ bits = DEFAULT_BITS;
+ if (gen_candidates(out, memory, bits, start) != 0)
+ fatal("modulus candidate generation failed");
+
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (do_screen_candidates) {
+ FILE *in;
+ FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "a");
+
+ if (have_identity && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0) {
+ if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) {
+ fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate "
+ "file \"%s\": %s", identity_file,
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ } else
+ in = stdin;
+
+ if (out == NULL) {
+ fatal("Couldn't open moduli file \"%s\": %s",
+ out_file, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (prime_test(in, out, rounds == 0 ? 100 : rounds,
+ generator_wanted, checkpoint,
+ start_lineno, lines_to_process) != 0)
+ fatal("modulus screening failed");
+ return (0);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (gen_all_hostkeys) {
+ do_gen_all_hostkeys(pw);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (key_type_name == NULL)
+ key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
+
+ type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name);
+ type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits);
+
+ if (!quiet)
+ printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n",
+ key_type_name);
+ if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0)
+ fatal("key_generate failed");
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0)
+ fatal("key_from_private failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which to save the key");
+
+ /* Create ~/.ssh directory if it doesn't already exist. */
+ snprintf(dotsshdir, sizeof dotsshdir, "%s/%s",
+ pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
+ if (strstr(identity_file, dotsshdir) != NULL) {
+ if (stat(dotsshdir, &st) < 0) {
+ if (errno != ENOENT) {
+ error("Could not stat %s: %s", dotsshdir,
+ strerror(errno));
+ } else if (mkdir(dotsshdir, 0700) < 0) {
+ error("Could not create directory '%s': %s",
+ dotsshdir, strerror(errno));
+ } else if (!quiet)
+ printf("Created directory '%s'.\n", dotsshdir);
+ }
+ }
+ /* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) >= 0) {
+ char yesno[3];
+ printf("%s already exists.\n", identity_file);
+ printf("Overwrite (y/n)? ");
+ fflush(stdout);
+ if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL)
+ exit(1);
+ if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y')
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Ask for a passphrase (twice). */
+ if (identity_passphrase)
+ passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+ else if (identity_new_passphrase)
+ passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
+ else {
+passphrase_again:
+ passphrase1 =
+ read_passphrase("Enter passphrase (empty for no "
+ "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ",
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * The passphrases do not match. Clear them and
+ * retry.
+ */
+ explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
+ explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
+ free(passphrase1);
+ free(passphrase2);
+ printf("Passphrases do not match. Try again.\n");
+ goto passphrase_again;
+ }
+ /* Clear the other copy of the passphrase. */
+ explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
+ free(passphrase2);
+ }
+
+ if (identity_comment) {
+ strlcpy(comment, identity_comment, sizeof(comment));
+ } else {
+ /* Create default comment field for the passphrase. */
+ snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname);
+ }
+
+ /* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1,
+ comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
+ error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
+ identity_file, ssh_err(r));
+ explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
+ free(passphrase1);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Clear the passphrase. */
+ explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
+ free(passphrase1);
+
+ /* Clear the private key and the random number generator. */
+ sshkey_free(private);
+
+ if (!quiet)
+ printf("Your identification has been saved in %s.\n", identity_file);
+
+ strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
+ if ((fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1)
+ fatal("Unable to save public key to %s: %s",
+ identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL)
+ fatal("fdopen %s failed: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0)
+ error("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
+ fclose(f);
+
+ if (!quiet) {
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+ fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n",
+ identity_file);
+ printf("The key fingerprint is:\n");
+ printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment);
+ printf("The key's randomart image is:\n");
+ printf("%s\n", ra);
+ free(ra);
+ free(fp);
+ }
+
+ sshkey_free(public);
+ exit(0);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keyscan.0
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keyscan.0 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keyscan.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-SSH-KEYSCAN(1) OpenBSD Reference Manual SSH-KEYSCAN(1)
-
-NAME
- ssh-keyscan - gather ssh public keys
-
-SYNOPSIS
- ssh-keyscan [-46Hv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]
- [host | addrlist namelist] ...
-
-DESCRIPTION
- ssh-keyscan is a utility for gathering the public ssh host keys of a
- number of hosts. It was designed to aid in building and verifying
- ssh_known_hosts files. ssh-keyscan provides a minimal interface suitable
- for use by shell and perl scripts.
-
- ssh-keyscan uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as
- possible in parallel, so it is very efficient. The keys from a domain of
- 1,000 hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those
- hosts are down or do not run ssh. For scanning, one does not need login
- access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the scanning
- process involve any encryption.
-
- The options are as follows:
-
- -4 Forces ssh-keyscan to use IPv4 addresses only.
-
- -6 Forces ssh-keyscan to use IPv6 addresses only.
-
- -f file
- Read hosts or ``addrlist namelist'' pairs from file, one per
- line. If - is supplied instead of a filename, ssh-keyscan will
- read hosts or ``addrlist namelist'' pairs from the standard
- input.
-
- -H Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output. Hashed names may
- be used normally by ssh and sshd, but they do not reveal
- identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed.
-
- -p port
- Port to connect to on the remote host.
-
- -T timeout
- Set the timeout for connection attempts. If timeout seconds have
- elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the
- last time anything was read from that host, then the connection
- is closed and the host in question considered unavailable.
- Default is 5 seconds.
-
- -t type
- Specifies the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts.
- The possible values are ``rsa1'' for protocol version 1 and
- ``dsa'', ``ecdsa'', ``ed25519'', or ``rsa'' for protocol version
- 2. Multiple values may be specified by separating them with
- commas. The default is to fetch ``rsa'' and ``ecdsa'' keys.
-
- -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh-keyscan to print debugging messages
- about its progress.
-
-SECURITY
- If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using ssh-keyscan without
- verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to man in the middle
- attacks. On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk,
- ssh-keyscan can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the
- middle attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was
- created.
-
-FILES
- Input format:
-
- 1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4
-
- Output format for rsa1 keys:
-
- host-or-namelist bits exponent modulus
-
- Output format for rsa, dsa and ecdsa keys:
-
- host-or-namelist keytype base64-encoded-key
-
- Where keytype is either ``ecdsa-sha2-nistp256'', ``ecdsa-sha2-nistp384'',
- ``ecdsa-sha2-nistp521'', ``ssh-ed25519'', ``ssh-dss'' or ``ssh-rsa''.
-
- /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
-
-EXAMPLES
- Print the rsa host key for machine hostname:
-
- $ ssh-keyscan hostname
-
- Find all hosts from the file ssh_hosts which have new or different keys
- from those in the sorted file ssh_known_hosts:
-
- $ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa -f ssh_hosts | \
- sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts -
-
-SEE ALSO
- ssh(1), sshd(8)
-
-AUTHORS
- David Mazieres <dm at lcs.mit.edu> wrote the initial version, and Wayne
- Davison <wayned at users.sourceforge.net> added support for protocol version
- 2.
-
-BUGS
- It generates "Connection closed by remote host" messages on the consoles
- of all the machines it scans if the server is older than version 2.9.
- This is because it opens a connection to the ssh port, reads the public
- key, and drops the connection as soon as it gets the key.
-
-OpenBSD 5.5 January 28, 2014 OpenBSD 5.5
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keyscan.0 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keyscan.0)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keyscan.0 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keyscan.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+SSH-KEYSCAN(1) General Commands Manual SSH-KEYSCAN(1)
+
+NAME
+ ssh-keyscan M-bM-^@M-^S gather ssh public keys
+
+SYNOPSIS
+ ssh-keyscan [-46cHv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]
+ [host | addrlist namelist] ...
+
+DESCRIPTION
+ ssh-keyscan is a utility for gathering the public ssh host keys of a
+ number of hosts. It was designed to aid in building and verifying
+ ssh_known_hosts files. ssh-keyscan provides a minimal interface suitable
+ for use by shell and perl scripts.
+
+ ssh-keyscan uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as
+ possible in parallel, so it is very efficient. The keys from a domain of
+ 1,000 hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those
+ hosts are down or do not run ssh. For scanning, one does not need login
+ access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the scanning
+ process involve any encryption.
+
+ The options are as follows:
+
+ -4 Forces ssh-keyscan to use IPv4 addresses only.
+
+ -6 Forces ssh-keyscan to use IPv6 addresses only.
+
+ -c Request certificates from target hosts instead of plain keys.
+
+ -f file
+ Read hosts or M-bM-^@M-^\addrlist namelistM-bM-^@M-^] pairs from file, one per line.
+ If - is supplied instead of a filename, ssh-keyscan will read
+ hosts or M-bM-^@M-^\addrlist namelistM-bM-^@M-^] pairs from the standard input.
+
+ -H Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output. Hashed names may
+ be used normally by ssh and sshd, but they do not reveal
+ identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed.
+
+ -p port
+ Port to connect to on the remote host.
+
+ -T timeout
+ Set the timeout for connection attempts. If timeout seconds have
+ elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the
+ last time anything was read from that host, then the connection
+ is closed and the host in question considered unavailable.
+ Default is 5 seconds.
+
+ -t type
+ Specifies the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts.
+ The possible values are M-bM-^@M-^\rsa1M-bM-^@M-^] for protocol version 1 and M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^],
+ M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^] for protocol version 2. Multiple
+ values may be specified by separating them with commas. The
+ default is to fetch M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^] keys.
+
+ -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh-keyscan to print debugging messages
+ about its progress.
+
+SECURITY
+ If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using ssh-keyscan without
+ verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to man in the middle
+ attacks. On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk,
+ ssh-keyscan can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the
+ middle attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was
+ created.
+
+FILES
+ Input format:
+
+ 1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4
+
+ Output format for RSA1 keys:
+
+ host-or-namelist bits exponent modulus
+
+ Output format for RSA, DSA, ECDSA, and Ed25519 keys:
+
+ host-or-namelist keytype base64-encoded-key
+
+ Where keytype is either M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-sha2-nistp256M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-sha2-nistp384M-bM-^@M-^],
+ M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-sha2-nistp521M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-dssM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-rsaM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+
+EXAMPLES
+ Print the rsa host key for machine hostname:
+
+ $ ssh-keyscan hostname
+
+ Find all hosts from the file ssh_hosts which have new or different keys
+ from those in the sorted file ssh_known_hosts:
+
+ $ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa,ed25519 -f ssh_hosts | \
+ sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts -
+
+SEE ALSO
+ ssh(1), sshd(8)
+
+AUTHORS
+ David Mazieres <dm at lcs.mit.edu> wrote the initial version, and Wayne
+ Davison <wayned at users.sourceforge.net> added support for protocol version
+ 2.
+
+BUGS
+ It generates "Connection closed by remote host" messages on the consoles
+ of all the machines it scans if the server is older than version 2.9.
+ This is because it opens a connection to the ssh port, reads the public
+ key, and drops the connection as soon as it gets the key.
+
+OpenBSD 6.0 November 8, 2015 OpenBSD 6.0
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keyscan.1
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keyscan.1 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keyscan.1 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,177 +0,0 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.34 2014/01/28 14:13:39 jmc Exp $
-.\"
-.\" Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm at lcs.mit.edu>.
-.\"
-.\" Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is
-.\" permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
-.\" OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
-.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: January 28 2014 $
-.Dt SSH-KEYSCAN 1
-.Os
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm ssh-keyscan
-.Nd gather ssh public keys
-.Sh SYNOPSIS
-.Nm ssh-keyscan
-.Bk -words
-.Op Fl 46Hv
-.Op Fl f Ar file
-.Op Fl p Ar port
-.Op Fl T Ar timeout
-.Op Fl t Ar type
-.Op Ar host | addrlist namelist
-.Ar ...
-.Ek
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-.Nm
-is a utility for gathering the public ssh host keys of a number of
-hosts.
-It was designed to aid in building and verifying
-.Pa ssh_known_hosts
-files.
-.Nm
-provides a minimal interface suitable for use by shell and perl
-scripts.
-.Pp
-.Nm
-uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as possible in
-parallel, so it is very efficient.
-The keys from a domain of 1,000
-hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those
-hosts are down or do not run ssh.
-For scanning, one does not need
-login access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the
-scanning process involve any encryption.
-.Pp
-The options are as follows:
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Fl 4
-Forces
-.Nm
-to use IPv4 addresses only.
-.It Fl 6
-Forces
-.Nm
-to use IPv6 addresses only.
-.It Fl f Ar file
-Read hosts or
-.Dq addrlist namelist
-pairs from
-.Ar file ,
-one per line.
-If
-.Pa -
-is supplied instead of a filename,
-.Nm
-will read hosts or
-.Dq addrlist namelist
-pairs from the standard input.
-.It Fl H
-Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output.
-Hashed names may be used normally by
-.Nm ssh
-and
-.Nm sshd ,
-but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents
-be disclosed.
-.It Fl p Ar port
-Port to connect to on the remote host.
-.It Fl T Ar timeout
-Set the timeout for connection attempts.
-If
-.Ar timeout
-seconds have elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the
-last time anything was read from that host, then the connection is
-closed and the host in question considered unavailable.
-Default is 5 seconds.
-.It Fl t Ar type
-Specifies the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts.
-The possible values are
-.Dq rsa1
-for protocol version 1 and
-.Dq dsa ,
-.Dq ecdsa ,
-.Dq ed25519 ,
-or
-.Dq rsa
-for protocol version 2.
-Multiple values may be specified by separating them with commas.
-The default is to fetch
-.Dq rsa
-and
-.Dq ecdsa
-keys.
-.It Fl v
-Verbose mode.
-Causes
-.Nm
-to print debugging messages about its progress.
-.El
-.Sh SECURITY
-If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using
-.Nm
-without verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to
-.Em man in the middle
-attacks.
-On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk,
-.Nm
-can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the middle
-attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was created.
-.Sh FILES
-Input format:
-.Bd -literal
-1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4
-.Ed
-.Pp
-Output format for rsa1 keys:
-.Bd -literal
-host-or-namelist bits exponent modulus
-.Ed
-.Pp
-Output format for rsa, dsa and ecdsa keys:
-.Bd -literal
-host-or-namelist keytype base64-encoded-key
-.Ed
-.Pp
-Where
-.Ar keytype
-is either
-.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 ,
-.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 ,
-.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 ,
-.Dq ssh-ed25519 ,
-.Dq ssh-dss
-or
-.Dq ssh-rsa .
-.Pp
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
-.Sh EXAMPLES
-Print the rsa host key for machine
-.Ar hostname :
-.Bd -literal
-$ ssh-keyscan hostname
-.Ed
-.Pp
-Find all hosts from the file
-.Pa ssh_hosts
-which have new or different keys from those in the sorted file
-.Pa ssh_known_hosts :
-.Bd -literal
-$ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa -f ssh_hosts | \e
- sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts -
-.Ed
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr ssh 1 ,
-.Xr sshd 8
-.Sh AUTHORS
-.An -nosplit
-.An David Mazieres Aq Mt dm at lcs.mit.edu
-wrote the initial version, and
-.An Wayne Davison Aq Mt wayned at users.sourceforge.net
-added support for protocol version 2.
-.Sh BUGS
-It generates "Connection closed by remote host" messages on the consoles
-of all the machines it scans if the server is older than version 2.9.
-This is because it opens a connection to the ssh port, reads the public
-key, and drops the connection as soon as it gets the key.
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keyscan.1 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keyscan.1)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keyscan.1 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keyscan.1 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.38 2015/11/08 23:24:03 jmc Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm at lcs.mit.edu>.
+.\"
+.\" Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is
+.\" permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
+.\" OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
+.\"
+.Dd $Mdocdate: November 8 2015 $
+.Dt SSH-KEYSCAN 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-keyscan
+.Nd gather ssh public keys
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ssh-keyscan
+.Bk -words
+.Op Fl 46cHv
+.Op Fl f Ar file
+.Op Fl p Ar port
+.Op Fl T Ar timeout
+.Op Fl t Ar type
+.Op Ar host | addrlist namelist
+.Ar ...
+.Ek
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is a utility for gathering the public ssh host keys of a number of
+hosts.
+It was designed to aid in building and verifying
+.Pa ssh_known_hosts
+files.
+.Nm
+provides a minimal interface suitable for use by shell and perl
+scripts.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as possible in
+parallel, so it is very efficient.
+The keys from a domain of 1,000
+hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those
+hosts are down or do not run ssh.
+For scanning, one does not need
+login access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the
+scanning process involve any encryption.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl 4
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv4 addresses only.
+.It Fl 6
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.It Fl c
+Request certificates from target hosts instead of plain keys.
+.It Fl f Ar file
+Read hosts or
+.Dq addrlist namelist
+pairs from
+.Ar file ,
+one per line.
+If
+.Pa -
+is supplied instead of a filename,
+.Nm
+will read hosts or
+.Dq addrlist namelist
+pairs from the standard input.
+.It Fl H
+Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output.
+Hashed names may be used normally by
+.Nm ssh
+and
+.Nm sshd ,
+but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents
+be disclosed.
+.It Fl p Ar port
+Port to connect to on the remote host.
+.It Fl T Ar timeout
+Set the timeout for connection attempts.
+If
+.Ar timeout
+seconds have elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the
+last time anything was read from that host, then the connection is
+closed and the host in question considered unavailable.
+Default is 5 seconds.
+.It Fl t Ar type
+Specifies the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts.
+The possible values are
+.Dq rsa1
+for protocol version 1 and
+.Dq dsa ,
+.Dq ecdsa ,
+.Dq ed25519 ,
+or
+.Dq rsa
+for protocol version 2.
+Multiple values may be specified by separating them with commas.
+The default is to fetch
+.Dq rsa ,
+.Dq ecdsa ,
+and
+.Dq ed25519
+keys.
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode.
+Causes
+.Nm
+to print debugging messages about its progress.
+.El
+.Sh SECURITY
+If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using
+.Nm
+without verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to
+.Em man in the middle
+attacks.
+On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk,
+.Nm
+can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the middle
+attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was created.
+.Sh FILES
+Input format:
+.Bd -literal
+1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4
+.Ed
+.Pp
+Output format for RSA1 keys:
+.Bd -literal
+host-or-namelist bits exponent modulus
+.Ed
+.Pp
+Output format for RSA, DSA, ECDSA, and Ed25519 keys:
+.Bd -literal
+host-or-namelist keytype base64-encoded-key
+.Ed
+.Pp
+Where
+.Ar keytype
+is either
+.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 ,
+.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 ,
+.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 ,
+.Dq ssh-ed25519 ,
+.Dq ssh-dss
+or
+.Dq ssh-rsa .
+.Pp
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+.Sh EXAMPLES
+Print the rsa host key for machine
+.Ar hostname :
+.Bd -literal
+$ ssh-keyscan hostname
+.Ed
+.Pp
+Find all hosts from the file
+.Pa ssh_hosts
+which have new or different keys from those in the sorted file
+.Pa ssh_known_hosts :
+.Bd -literal
+$ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa,ed25519 -f ssh_hosts | \e
+ sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts -
+.Ed
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh AUTHORS
+.An -nosplit
+.An David Mazieres Aq Mt dm at lcs.mit.edu
+wrote the initial version, and
+.An Wayne Davison Aq Mt wayned at users.sourceforge.net
+added support for protocol version 2.
+.Sh BUGS
+It generates "Connection closed by remote host" messages on the consoles
+of all the machines it scans if the server is older than version 2.9.
+This is because it opens a connection to the ssh port, reads the public
+key, and drops the connection as soon as it gets the key.
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keyscan.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keyscan.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keyscan.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,770 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.89 2013/12/06 13:39:49 markus Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm at lcs.mit.edu>.
- *
- * Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is
- * permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
- * OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-#include <sys/resource.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-
-#include <netdb.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <setjmp.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "myproposal.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-
-/* Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line.
- Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */
-int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
-
-int ssh_port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
-
-#define KT_RSA1 1
-#define KT_DSA 2
-#define KT_RSA 4
-#define KT_ECDSA 8
-#define KT_ED25519 16
-
-int get_keytypes = KT_RSA|KT_ECDSA;/* Get RSA and ECDSA keys by default */
-
-int hash_hosts = 0; /* Hash hostname on output */
-
-#define MAXMAXFD 256
-
-/* The number of seconds after which to give up on a TCP connection */
-int timeout = 5;
-
-int maxfd;
-#define MAXCON (maxfd - 10)
-
-extern char *__progname;
-fd_set *read_wait;
-size_t read_wait_nfdset;
-int ncon;
-int nonfatal_fatal = 0;
-jmp_buf kexjmp;
-Key *kexjmp_key;
-
-/*
- * Keep a connection structure for each file descriptor. The state
- * associated with file descriptor n is held in fdcon[n].
- */
-typedef struct Connection {
- u_char c_status; /* State of connection on this file desc. */
-#define CS_UNUSED 0 /* File descriptor unused */
-#define CS_CON 1 /* Waiting to connect/read greeting */
-#define CS_SIZE 2 /* Waiting to read initial packet size */
-#define CS_KEYS 3 /* Waiting to read public key packet */
- int c_fd; /* Quick lookup: c->c_fd == c - fdcon */
- int c_plen; /* Packet length field for ssh packet */
- int c_len; /* Total bytes which must be read. */
- int c_off; /* Length of data read so far. */
- int c_keytype; /* Only one of KT_RSA1, KT_DSA, or KT_RSA */
- char *c_namebase; /* Address to free for c_name and c_namelist */
- char *c_name; /* Hostname of connection for errors */
- char *c_namelist; /* Pointer to other possible addresses */
- char *c_output_name; /* Hostname of connection for output */
- char *c_data; /* Data read from this fd */
- Kex *c_kex; /* The key-exchange struct for ssh2 */
- struct timeval c_tv; /* Time at which connection gets aborted */
- TAILQ_ENTRY(Connection) c_link; /* List of connections in timeout order. */
-} con;
-
-TAILQ_HEAD(conlist, Connection) tq; /* Timeout Queue */
-con *fdcon;
-
-static int
-fdlim_get(int hard)
-{
-#if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
- struct rlimit rlfd;
-
- if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0)
- return (-1);
- if ((hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur) == RLIM_INFINITY)
- return SSH_SYSFDMAX;
- else
- return hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur;
-#else
- return SSH_SYSFDMAX;
-#endif
-}
-
-static int
-fdlim_set(int lim)
-{
-#if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
- struct rlimit rlfd;
-#endif
-
- if (lim <= 0)
- return (-1);
-#if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
- if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0)
- return (-1);
- rlfd.rlim_cur = lim;
- if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0)
- return (-1);
-#elif defined (HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE)
- setdtablesize(lim);
-#endif
- return (0);
-}
-
-/*
- * This is an strsep function that returns a null field for adjacent
- * separators. This is the same as the 4.4BSD strsep, but different from the
- * one in the GNU libc.
- */
-static char *
-xstrsep(char **str, const char *delim)
-{
- char *s, *e;
-
- if (!**str)
- return (NULL);
-
- s = *str;
- e = s + strcspn(s, delim);
-
- if (*e != '\0')
- *e++ = '\0';
- *str = e;
-
- return (s);
-}
-
-/*
- * Get the next non-null token (like GNU strsep). Strsep() will return a
- * null token for two adjacent separators, so we may have to loop.
- */
-static char *
-strnnsep(char **stringp, char *delim)
-{
- char *tok;
-
- do {
- tok = xstrsep(stringp, delim);
- } while (tok && *tok == '\0');
- return (tok);
-}
-
-static Key *
-keygrab_ssh1(con *c)
-{
- static Key *rsa;
- static Buffer msg;
-
- if (rsa == NULL) {
- buffer_init(&msg);
- rsa = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
- }
- buffer_append(&msg, c->c_data, c->c_plen);
- buffer_consume(&msg, 8 - (c->c_plen & 7)); /* padding */
- if (buffer_get_char(&msg) != (int) SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) {
- error("%s: invalid packet type", c->c_name);
- buffer_clear(&msg);
- return NULL;
- }
- buffer_consume(&msg, 8); /* cookie */
-
- /* server key */
- (void) buffer_get_int(&msg);
- buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->e);
- buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->n);
-
- /* host key */
- (void) buffer_get_int(&msg);
- buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->e);
- buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->n);
-
- buffer_clear(&msg);
-
- return (rsa);
-}
-
-static int
-hostjump(Key *hostkey)
-{
- kexjmp_key = hostkey;
- longjmp(kexjmp, 1);
-}
-
-static int
-ssh2_capable(int remote_major, int remote_minor)
-{
- switch (remote_major) {
- case 1:
- if (remote_minor == 99)
- return 1;
- break;
- case 2:
- return 1;
- default:
- break;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static Key *
-keygrab_ssh2(con *c)
-{
- int j;
-
- packet_set_connection(c->c_fd, c->c_fd);
- enable_compat20();
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
- c->c_keytype == KT_DSA ? "ssh-dss" :
- (c->c_keytype == KT_RSA ? "ssh-rsa" :
- (c->c_keytype == KT_ED25519 ? "ssh-ed25519" :
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521"));
- c->c_kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
- c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
- c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
- c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
- c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
- c->c_kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
- c->c_kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
- c->c_kex->verify_host_key = hostjump;
-
- if (!(j = setjmp(kexjmp))) {
- nonfatal_fatal = 1;
- dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &c->c_kex->done, c->c_kex);
- fprintf(stderr, "Impossible! dispatch_run() returned!\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- nonfatal_fatal = 0;
- free(c->c_kex);
- c->c_kex = NULL;
- packet_close();
-
- return j < 0? NULL : kexjmp_key;
-}
-
-static void
-keyprint(con *c, Key *key)
-{
- char *host = c->c_output_name ? c->c_output_name : c->c_name;
-
- if (!key)
- return;
- if (hash_hosts && (host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
- fatal("host_hash failed");
-
- fprintf(stdout, "%s ", host);
- key_write(key, stdout);
- fputs("\n", stdout);
-}
-
-static int
-tcpconnect(char *host)
-{
- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
- char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
- int gaierr, s = -1;
-
- snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", ssh_port);
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
- fatal("getaddrinfo %s: %s", host, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
- for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- s = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
- if (s < 0) {
- error("socket: %s", strerror(errno));
- continue;
- }
- if (set_nonblock(s) == -1)
- fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, s);
- if (connect(s, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0 &&
- errno != EINPROGRESS)
- error("connect (`%s'): %s", host, strerror(errno));
- else
- break;
- close(s);
- s = -1;
- }
- freeaddrinfo(aitop);
- return s;
-}
-
-static int
-conalloc(char *iname, char *oname, int keytype)
-{
- char *namebase, *name, *namelist;
- int s;
-
- namebase = namelist = xstrdup(iname);
-
- do {
- name = xstrsep(&namelist, ",");
- if (!name) {
- free(namebase);
- return (-1);
- }
- } while ((s = tcpconnect(name)) < 0);
-
- if (s >= maxfd)
- fatal("conalloc: fdno %d too high", s);
- if (fdcon[s].c_status)
- fatal("conalloc: attempt to reuse fdno %d", s);
-
- fdcon[s].c_fd = s;
- fdcon[s].c_status = CS_CON;
- fdcon[s].c_namebase = namebase;
- fdcon[s].c_name = name;
- fdcon[s].c_namelist = namelist;
- fdcon[s].c_output_name = xstrdup(oname);
- fdcon[s].c_data = (char *) &fdcon[s].c_plen;
- fdcon[s].c_len = 4;
- fdcon[s].c_off = 0;
- fdcon[s].c_keytype = keytype;
- gettimeofday(&fdcon[s].c_tv, NULL);
- fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout;
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
- FD_SET(s, read_wait);
- ncon++;
- return (s);
-}
-
-static void
-confree(int s)
-{
- if (s >= maxfd || fdcon[s].c_status == CS_UNUSED)
- fatal("confree: attempt to free bad fdno %d", s);
- close(s);
- free(fdcon[s].c_namebase);
- free(fdcon[s].c_output_name);
- if (fdcon[s].c_status == CS_KEYS)
- free(fdcon[s].c_data);
- fdcon[s].c_status = CS_UNUSED;
- fdcon[s].c_keytype = 0;
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
- FD_CLR(s, read_wait);
- ncon--;
-}
-
-static void
-contouch(int s)
-{
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
- gettimeofday(&fdcon[s].c_tv, NULL);
- fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout;
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
-}
-
-static int
-conrecycle(int s)
-{
- con *c = &fdcon[s];
- int ret;
-
- ret = conalloc(c->c_namelist, c->c_output_name, c->c_keytype);
- confree(s);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static void
-congreet(int s)
-{
- int n = 0, remote_major = 0, remote_minor = 0;
- char buf[256], *cp;
- char remote_version[sizeof buf];
- size_t bufsiz;
- con *c = &fdcon[s];
-
- for (;;) {
- memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
- bufsiz = sizeof(buf);
- cp = buf;
- while (bufsiz-- &&
- (n = atomicio(read, s, cp, 1)) == 1 && *cp != '\n') {
- if (*cp == '\r')
- *cp = '\n';
- cp++;
- }
- if (n != 1 || strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0)
- break;
- }
- if (n == 0) {
- switch (errno) {
- case EPIPE:
- error("%s: Connection closed by remote host", c->c_name);
- break;
- case ECONNREFUSED:
- break;
- default:
- error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
- break;
- }
- conrecycle(s);
- return;
- }
- if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
- error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name);
- confree(s);
- return;
- }
- *cp = '\0';
- if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
- &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) == 3)
- compat_datafellows(remote_version);
- else
- datafellows = 0;
- if (c->c_keytype != KT_RSA1) {
- if (!ssh2_capable(remote_major, remote_minor)) {
- debug("%s doesn't support ssh2", c->c_name);
- confree(s);
- return;
- }
- } else if (remote_major != 1) {
- debug("%s doesn't support ssh1", c->c_name);
- confree(s);
- return;
- }
- fprintf(stderr, "# %s %s\n", c->c_name, chop(buf));
- n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n",
- c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2,
- c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MINOR_2);
- if (n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sizeof(buf)) {
- error("snprintf: buffer too small");
- confree(s);
- return;
- }
- if (atomicio(vwrite, s, buf, n) != (size_t)n) {
- error("write (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
- confree(s);
- return;
- }
- if (c->c_keytype != KT_RSA1) {
- keyprint(c, keygrab_ssh2(c));
- confree(s);
- return;
- }
- c->c_status = CS_SIZE;
- contouch(s);
-}
-
-static void
-conread(int s)
-{
- con *c = &fdcon[s];
- size_t n;
-
- if (c->c_status == CS_CON) {
- congreet(s);
- return;
- }
- n = atomicio(read, s, c->c_data + c->c_off, c->c_len - c->c_off);
- if (n == 0) {
- error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
- confree(s);
- return;
- }
- c->c_off += n;
-
- if (c->c_off == c->c_len)
- switch (c->c_status) {
- case CS_SIZE:
- c->c_plen = htonl(c->c_plen);
- c->c_len = c->c_plen + 8 - (c->c_plen & 7);
- c->c_off = 0;
- c->c_data = xmalloc(c->c_len);
- c->c_status = CS_KEYS;
- break;
- case CS_KEYS:
- keyprint(c, keygrab_ssh1(c));
- confree(s);
- return;
- default:
- fatal("conread: invalid status %d", c->c_status);
- break;
- }
-
- contouch(s);
-}
-
-static void
-conloop(void)
-{
- struct timeval seltime, now;
- fd_set *r, *e;
- con *c;
- int i;
-
- gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
- c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq);
-
- if (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec > now.tv_sec ||
- (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec > now.tv_usec))) {
- seltime = c->c_tv;
- seltime.tv_sec -= now.tv_sec;
- seltime.tv_usec -= now.tv_usec;
- if (seltime.tv_usec < 0) {
- seltime.tv_usec += 1000000;
- seltime.tv_sec--;
- }
- } else
- timerclear(&seltime);
-
- r = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
- e = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
- memcpy(r, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask));
- memcpy(e, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask));
-
- while (select(maxfd, r, NULL, e, &seltime) == -1 &&
- (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
- ;
-
- for (i = 0; i < maxfd; i++) {
- if (FD_ISSET(i, e)) {
- error("%s: exception!", fdcon[i].c_name);
- confree(i);
- } else if (FD_ISSET(i, r))
- conread(i);
- }
- free(r);
- free(e);
-
- c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq);
- while (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec < now.tv_sec ||
- (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec < now.tv_usec))) {
- int s = c->c_fd;
-
- c = TAILQ_NEXT(c, c_link);
- conrecycle(s);
- }
-}
-
-static void
-do_host(char *host)
-{
- char *name = strnnsep(&host, " \t\n");
- int j;
-
- if (name == NULL)
- return;
- for (j = KT_RSA1; j <= KT_ED25519; j *= 2) {
- if (get_keytypes & j) {
- while (ncon >= MAXCON)
- conloop();
- conalloc(name, *host ? host : name, j);
- }
- }
-}
-
-void
-fatal(const char *fmt,...)
-{
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
- if (nonfatal_fatal)
- longjmp(kexjmp, -1);
- else
- exit(255);
-}
-
-static void
-usage(void)
-{
- fprintf(stderr,
- "usage: %s [-46Hv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]\n"
- "\t\t [host | addrlist namelist] ...\n",
- __progname);
- exit(1);
-}
-
-int
-main(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- int debug_flag = 0, log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
- int opt, fopt_count = 0, j;
- char *tname, *cp, line[NI_MAXHOST];
- FILE *fp;
- u_long linenum;
-
- extern int optind;
- extern char *optarg;
-
- __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
- seed_rng();
- TAILQ_INIT(&tq);
-
- /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
- sanitise_stdfd();
-
- if (argc <= 1)
- usage();
-
- while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "Hv46p:T:t:f:")) != -1) {
- switch (opt) {
- case 'H':
- hash_hosts = 1;
- break;
- case 'p':
- ssh_port = a2port(optarg);
- if (ssh_port <= 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg);
- exit(1);
- }
- break;
- case 'T':
- timeout = convtime(optarg);
- if (timeout == -1 || timeout == 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Bad timeout '%s'\n", optarg);
- usage();
- }
- break;
- case 'v':
- if (!debug_flag) {
- debug_flag = 1;
- log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
- }
- else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
- log_level++;
- else
- fatal("Too high debugging level.");
- break;
- case 'f':
- if (strcmp(optarg, "-") == 0)
- optarg = NULL;
- argv[fopt_count++] = optarg;
- break;
- case 't':
- get_keytypes = 0;
- tname = strtok(optarg, ",");
- while (tname) {
- int type = key_type_from_name(tname);
- switch (type) {
- case KEY_RSA1:
- get_keytypes |= KT_RSA1;
- break;
- case KEY_DSA:
- get_keytypes |= KT_DSA;
- break;
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- get_keytypes |= KT_ECDSA;
- break;
- case KEY_RSA:
- get_keytypes |= KT_RSA;
- break;
- case KEY_ED25519:
- get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519;
- break;
- case KEY_UNSPEC:
- fatal("unknown key type %s", tname);
- }
- tname = strtok(NULL, ",");
- }
- break;
- case '4':
- IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
- break;
- case '6':
- IPv4or6 = AF_INET6;
- break;
- case '?':
- default:
- usage();
- }
- }
- if (optind == argc && !fopt_count)
- usage();
-
- log_init("ssh-keyscan", log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
-
- maxfd = fdlim_get(1);
- if (maxfd < 0)
- fatal("%s: fdlim_get: bad value", __progname);
- if (maxfd > MAXMAXFD)
- maxfd = MAXMAXFD;
- if (MAXCON <= 0)
- fatal("%s: not enough file descriptors", __progname);
- if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
- fdlim_set(maxfd);
- fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
-
- read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS);
- read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
-
- for (j = 0; j < fopt_count; j++) {
- if (argv[j] == NULL)
- fp = stdin;
- else if ((fp = fopen(argv[j], "r")) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j],
- strerror(errno));
- linenum = 0;
-
- while (read_keyfile_line(fp,
- argv[j] == NULL ? "(stdin)" : argv[j], line, sizeof(line),
- &linenum) != -1) {
- /* Chomp off trailing whitespace and comments */
- if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) == NULL)
- cp = line + strlen(line) - 1;
- while (cp >= line) {
- if (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t' ||
- *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
- *cp-- = '\0';
- else
- break;
- }
-
- /* Skip empty lines */
- if (*line == '\0')
- continue;
-
- do_host(line);
- }
-
- if (ferror(fp))
- fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j],
- strerror(errno));
-
- fclose(fp);
- }
-
- while (optind < argc)
- do_host(argv[optind++]);
-
- while (ncon > 0)
- conloop();
-
- return (0);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keyscan.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keyscan.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keyscan.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keyscan.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,850 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.106 2016/05/02 10:26:04 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm at lcs.mit.edu>.
+ *
+ * Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is
+ * permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
+ * OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh_api.h"
+
+/* Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line.
+ Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */
+int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
+
+int ssh_port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+
+#define KT_RSA1 1
+#define KT_DSA 2
+#define KT_RSA 4
+#define KT_ECDSA 8
+#define KT_ED25519 16
+
+int get_cert = 0;
+int get_keytypes = KT_RSA|KT_ECDSA|KT_ED25519;
+
+int hash_hosts = 0; /* Hash hostname on output */
+
+#define MAXMAXFD 256
+
+/* The number of seconds after which to give up on a TCP connection */
+int timeout = 5;
+
+int maxfd;
+#define MAXCON (maxfd - 10)
+
+extern char *__progname;
+fd_set *read_wait;
+size_t read_wait_nfdset;
+int ncon;
+
+struct ssh *active_state = NULL; /* XXX needed for linking */
+
+/*
+ * Keep a connection structure for each file descriptor. The state
+ * associated with file descriptor n is held in fdcon[n].
+ */
+typedef struct Connection {
+ u_char c_status; /* State of connection on this file desc. */
+#define CS_UNUSED 0 /* File descriptor unused */
+#define CS_CON 1 /* Waiting to connect/read greeting */
+#define CS_SIZE 2 /* Waiting to read initial packet size */
+#define CS_KEYS 3 /* Waiting to read public key packet */
+ int c_fd; /* Quick lookup: c->c_fd == c - fdcon */
+ int c_plen; /* Packet length field for ssh packet */
+ int c_len; /* Total bytes which must be read. */
+ int c_off; /* Length of data read so far. */
+ int c_keytype; /* Only one of KT_RSA1, KT_DSA, or KT_RSA */
+ sig_atomic_t c_done; /* SSH2 done */
+ char *c_namebase; /* Address to free for c_name and c_namelist */
+ char *c_name; /* Hostname of connection for errors */
+ char *c_namelist; /* Pointer to other possible addresses */
+ char *c_output_name; /* Hostname of connection for output */
+ char *c_data; /* Data read from this fd */
+ struct ssh *c_ssh; /* SSH-connection */
+ struct timeval c_tv; /* Time at which connection gets aborted */
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(Connection) c_link; /* List of connections in timeout order. */
+} con;
+
+TAILQ_HEAD(conlist, Connection) tq; /* Timeout Queue */
+con *fdcon;
+
+static void keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key);
+
+static int
+fdlim_get(int hard)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
+ struct rlimit rlfd;
+
+ if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0)
+ return (-1);
+ if ((hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur) == RLIM_INFINITY)
+ return SSH_SYSFDMAX;
+ else
+ return hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur;
+#else
+ return SSH_SYSFDMAX;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int
+fdlim_set(int lim)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
+ struct rlimit rlfd;
+#endif
+
+ if (lim <= 0)
+ return (-1);
+#if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
+ if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0)
+ return (-1);
+ rlfd.rlim_cur = lim;
+ if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0)
+ return (-1);
+#elif defined (HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE)
+ setdtablesize(lim);
+#endif
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is an strsep function that returns a null field for adjacent
+ * separators. This is the same as the 4.4BSD strsep, but different from the
+ * one in the GNU libc.
+ */
+static char *
+xstrsep(char **str, const char *delim)
+{
+ char *s, *e;
+
+ if (!**str)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ s = *str;
+ e = s + strcspn(s, delim);
+
+ if (*e != '\0')
+ *e++ = '\0';
+ *str = e;
+
+ return (s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the next non-null token (like GNU strsep). Strsep() will return a
+ * null token for two adjacent separators, so we may have to loop.
+ */
+static char *
+strnnsep(char **stringp, char *delim)
+{
+ char *tok;
+
+ do {
+ tok = xstrsep(stringp, delim);
+ } while (tok && *tok == '\0');
+ return (tok);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+static struct sshkey *
+keygrab_ssh1(con *c)
+{
+ static struct sshkey *rsa;
+ static struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r;
+ u_char type;
+
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ if ((rsa = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(msg, c->c_data, c->c_plen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_consume(msg, 8 - (c->c_plen & 7))) != 0 || /* padding */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+ goto buf_err;
+ if (type != (int) SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) {
+ error("%s: invalid packet type", c->c_name);
+ sshbuf_reset(msg);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(msg, 8)) != 0 || /* cookie */
+ /* server key */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ /* host key */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, rsa->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, rsa->rsa->n)) != 0) {
+ buf_err:
+ error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ sshbuf_reset(msg);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ sshbuf_reset(msg);
+
+ return (rsa);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int
+key_print_wrapper(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ con *c;
+
+ if ((c = ssh_get_app_data(ssh)) != NULL)
+ keyprint(c, hostkey);
+ /* always abort key exchange */
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh2_capable(int remote_major, int remote_minor)
+{
+ switch (remote_major) {
+ case 1:
+ if (remote_minor == 99)
+ return 1;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+keygrab_ssh2(con *c)
+{
+ char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+ int r;
+
+ enable_compat20();
+ switch (c->c_keytype) {
+ case KT_DSA:
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
+ "ssh-dss-cert-v01 at openssh.com" : "ssh-dss";
+ break;
+ case KT_RSA:
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
+ "ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com" : "ssh-rsa";
+ break;
+ case KT_ED25519:
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
+ "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com" : "ssh-ed25519";
+ break;
+ case KT_ECDSA:
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com,"
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com,"
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com" :
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,"
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,"
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521";
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("unknown key type %d", c->c_keytype);
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((r = kex_setup(c->c_ssh, myproposal)) != 0) {
+ free(c->c_ssh);
+ fprintf(stderr, "kex_setup: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
+ c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
+ c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_client;
+ c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_client;
+ c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_client;
+ c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
+ c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
+# endif
+#endif
+ c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
+ ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(c->c_ssh, key_print_wrapper);
+ /*
+ * do the key-exchange until an error occurs or until
+ * the key_print_wrapper() callback sets c_done.
+ */
+ ssh_dispatch_run(c->c_ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &c->c_done, c->c_ssh);
+}
+
+static void
+keyprint_one(char *host, struct sshkey *key)
+{
+ char *hostport;
+
+ if (hash_hosts && (host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
+ fatal("host_hash failed");
+
+ hostport = put_host_port(host, ssh_port);
+ if (!get_cert)
+ fprintf(stdout, "%s ", hostport);
+ sshkey_write(key, stdout);
+ fputs("\n", stdout);
+ free(hostport);
+}
+
+static void
+keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key)
+{
+ char *hosts = c->c_output_name ? c->c_output_name : c->c_name;
+ char *host, *ohosts;
+
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return;
+ if (get_cert || (!hash_hosts && ssh_port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT)) {
+ keyprint_one(hosts, key);
+ return;
+ }
+ ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(hosts);
+ while ((host = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL)
+ keyprint_one(host, key);
+ free(ohosts);
+}
+
+static int
+tcpconnect(char *host)
+{
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+ char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+ int gaierr, s = -1;
+
+ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", ssh_port);
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+ error("getaddrinfo %s: %s", host, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ s = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+ if (s < 0) {
+ error("socket: %s", strerror(errno));
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (set_nonblock(s) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, s);
+ if (connect(s, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0 &&
+ errno != EINPROGRESS)
+ error("connect (`%s'): %s", host, strerror(errno));
+ else
+ break;
+ close(s);
+ s = -1;
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ return s;
+}
+
+static int
+conalloc(char *iname, char *oname, int keytype)
+{
+ char *namebase, *name, *namelist;
+ int s;
+
+ namebase = namelist = xstrdup(iname);
+
+ do {
+ name = xstrsep(&namelist, ",");
+ if (!name) {
+ free(namebase);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ } while ((s = tcpconnect(name)) < 0);
+
+ if (s >= maxfd)
+ fatal("conalloc: fdno %d too high", s);
+ if (fdcon[s].c_status)
+ fatal("conalloc: attempt to reuse fdno %d", s);
+
+ debug3("%s: oname %s kt %d", __func__, oname, keytype);
+ fdcon[s].c_fd = s;
+ fdcon[s].c_status = CS_CON;
+ fdcon[s].c_namebase = namebase;
+ fdcon[s].c_name = name;
+ fdcon[s].c_namelist = namelist;
+ fdcon[s].c_output_name = xstrdup(oname);
+ fdcon[s].c_data = (char *) &fdcon[s].c_plen;
+ fdcon[s].c_len = 4;
+ fdcon[s].c_off = 0;
+ fdcon[s].c_keytype = keytype;
+ gettimeofday(&fdcon[s].c_tv, NULL);
+ fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
+ FD_SET(s, read_wait);
+ ncon++;
+ return (s);
+}
+
+static void
+confree(int s)
+{
+ if (s >= maxfd || fdcon[s].c_status == CS_UNUSED)
+ fatal("confree: attempt to free bad fdno %d", s);
+ close(s);
+ free(fdcon[s].c_namebase);
+ free(fdcon[s].c_output_name);
+ if (fdcon[s].c_status == CS_KEYS)
+ free(fdcon[s].c_data);
+ fdcon[s].c_status = CS_UNUSED;
+ fdcon[s].c_keytype = 0;
+ if (fdcon[s].c_ssh) {
+ ssh_packet_close(fdcon[s].c_ssh);
+ free(fdcon[s].c_ssh);
+ fdcon[s].c_ssh = NULL;
+ }
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
+ FD_CLR(s, read_wait);
+ ncon--;
+}
+
+static void
+contouch(int s)
+{
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
+ gettimeofday(&fdcon[s].c_tv, NULL);
+ fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
+}
+
+static int
+conrecycle(int s)
+{
+ con *c = &fdcon[s];
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = conalloc(c->c_namelist, c->c_output_name, c->c_keytype);
+ confree(s);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static void
+congreet(int s)
+{
+ int n = 0, remote_major = 0, remote_minor = 0;
+ char buf[256], *cp;
+ char remote_version[sizeof buf];
+ size_t bufsiz;
+ con *c = &fdcon[s];
+
+ for (;;) {
+ memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+ bufsiz = sizeof(buf);
+ cp = buf;
+ while (bufsiz-- &&
+ (n = atomicio(read, s, cp, 1)) == 1 && *cp != '\n') {
+ if (*cp == '\r')
+ *cp = '\n';
+ cp++;
+ }
+ if (n != 1 || strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (n == 0) {
+ switch (errno) {
+ case EPIPE:
+ error("%s: Connection closed by remote host", c->c_name);
+ break;
+ case ECONNREFUSED:
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
+ break;
+ }
+ conrecycle(s);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
+ error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name);
+ confree(s);
+ return;
+ }
+ *cp = '\0';
+ if ((c->c_ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, s, s)) == NULL)
+ fatal("ssh_packet_set_connection failed");
+ ssh_packet_set_timeout(c->c_ssh, timeout, 1);
+ ssh_set_app_data(c->c_ssh, c); /* back link */
+ if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
+ &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) == 3)
+ c->c_ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version);
+ else
+ c->c_ssh->compat = 0;
+ if (c->c_keytype != KT_RSA1) {
+ if (!ssh2_capable(remote_major, remote_minor)) {
+ debug("%s doesn't support ssh2", c->c_name);
+ confree(s);
+ return;
+ }
+ } else if (remote_major != 1) {
+ debug("%s doesn't support ssh1", c->c_name);
+ confree(s);
+ return;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "# %s:%d %s\n", c->c_name, ssh_port, chop(buf));
+ n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n",
+ c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2,
+ c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MINOR_2);
+ if (n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sizeof(buf)) {
+ error("snprintf: buffer too small");
+ confree(s);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, s, buf, n) != (size_t)n) {
+ error("write (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
+ confree(s);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (c->c_keytype != KT_RSA1) {
+ keygrab_ssh2(c);
+ confree(s);
+ return;
+ }
+ c->c_status = CS_SIZE;
+ contouch(s);
+}
+
+static void
+conread(int s)
+{
+ con *c = &fdcon[s];
+ size_t n;
+
+ if (c->c_status == CS_CON) {
+ congreet(s);
+ return;
+ }
+ n = atomicio(read, s, c->c_data + c->c_off, c->c_len - c->c_off);
+ if (n == 0) {
+ error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
+ confree(s);
+ return;
+ }
+ c->c_off += n;
+
+ if (c->c_off == c->c_len)
+ switch (c->c_status) {
+ case CS_SIZE:
+ c->c_plen = htonl(c->c_plen);
+ c->c_len = c->c_plen + 8 - (c->c_plen & 7);
+ c->c_off = 0;
+ c->c_data = xmalloc(c->c_len);
+ c->c_status = CS_KEYS;
+ break;
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ case CS_KEYS:
+ keyprint(c, keygrab_ssh1(c));
+ confree(s);
+ return;
+#endif
+ default:
+ fatal("conread: invalid status %d", c->c_status);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ contouch(s);
+}
+
+static void
+conloop(void)
+{
+ struct timeval seltime, now;
+ fd_set *r, *e;
+ con *c;
+ int i;
+
+ gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
+ c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq);
+
+ if (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec > now.tv_sec ||
+ (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec > now.tv_usec))) {
+ seltime = c->c_tv;
+ seltime.tv_sec -= now.tv_sec;
+ seltime.tv_usec -= now.tv_usec;
+ if (seltime.tv_usec < 0) {
+ seltime.tv_usec += 1000000;
+ seltime.tv_sec--;
+ }
+ } else
+ timerclear(&seltime);
+
+ r = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+ e = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+ memcpy(r, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask));
+ memcpy(e, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask));
+
+ while (select(maxfd, r, NULL, e, &seltime) == -1 &&
+ (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
+ ;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < maxfd; i++) {
+ if (FD_ISSET(i, e)) {
+ error("%s: exception!", fdcon[i].c_name);
+ confree(i);
+ } else if (FD_ISSET(i, r))
+ conread(i);
+ }
+ free(r);
+ free(e);
+
+ c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq);
+ while (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec < now.tv_sec ||
+ (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec < now.tv_usec))) {
+ int s = c->c_fd;
+
+ c = TAILQ_NEXT(c, c_link);
+ conrecycle(s);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+do_host(char *host)
+{
+ char *name = strnnsep(&host, " \t\n");
+ int j;
+
+ if (name == NULL)
+ return;
+ for (j = KT_RSA1; j <= KT_ED25519; j *= 2) {
+ if (get_keytypes & j) {
+ while (ncon >= MAXCON)
+ conloop();
+ conalloc(name, *host ? host : name, j);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void
+fatal(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ exit(255);
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "usage: %s [-46cHv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]\n"
+ "\t\t [host | addrlist namelist] ...\n",
+ __progname);
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ int debug_flag = 0, log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+ int opt, fopt_count = 0, j;
+ char *tname, *cp, line[NI_MAXHOST];
+ FILE *fp;
+ u_long linenum;
+
+ extern int optind;
+ extern char *optarg;
+
+ ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
+ __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+ seed_rng();
+ TAILQ_INIT(&tq);
+
+ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+ sanitise_stdfd();
+
+ if (argc <= 1)
+ usage();
+
+ while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "cHv46p:T:t:f:")) != -1) {
+ switch (opt) {
+ case 'H':
+ hash_hosts = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'c':
+ get_cert = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ ssh_port = a2port(optarg);
+ if (ssh_port <= 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'T':
+ timeout = convtime(optarg);
+ if (timeout == -1 || timeout == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad timeout '%s'\n", optarg);
+ usage();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'v':
+ if (!debug_flag) {
+ debug_flag = 1;
+ log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+ }
+ else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+ log_level++;
+ else
+ fatal("Too high debugging level.");
+ break;
+ case 'f':
+ if (strcmp(optarg, "-") == 0)
+ optarg = NULL;
+ argv[fopt_count++] = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 't':
+ get_keytypes = 0;
+ tname = strtok(optarg, ",");
+ while (tname) {
+ int type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname);
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ get_keytypes |= KT_RSA1;
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ get_keytypes |= KT_DSA;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ get_keytypes |= KT_ECDSA;
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ get_keytypes |= KT_RSA;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519;
+ break;
+ case KEY_UNSPEC:
+ fatal("unknown key type %s", tname);
+ }
+ tname = strtok(NULL, ",");
+ }
+ break;
+ case '4':
+ IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
+ break;
+ case '6':
+ IPv4or6 = AF_INET6;
+ break;
+ case '?':
+ default:
+ usage();
+ }
+ }
+ if (optind == argc && !fopt_count)
+ usage();
+
+ log_init("ssh-keyscan", log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+ maxfd = fdlim_get(1);
+ if (maxfd < 0)
+ fatal("%s: fdlim_get: bad value", __progname);
+ if (maxfd > MAXMAXFD)
+ maxfd = MAXMAXFD;
+ if (MAXCON <= 0)
+ fatal("%s: not enough file descriptors", __progname);
+ if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
+ fdlim_set(maxfd);
+ fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
+
+ read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS);
+ read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+
+ for (j = 0; j < fopt_count; j++) {
+ if (argv[j] == NULL)
+ fp = stdin;
+ else if ((fp = fopen(argv[j], "r")) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j],
+ strerror(errno));
+ linenum = 0;
+
+ while (read_keyfile_line(fp,
+ argv[j] == NULL ? "(stdin)" : argv[j], line, sizeof(line),
+ &linenum) != -1) {
+ /* Chomp off trailing whitespace and comments */
+ if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) == NULL)
+ cp = line + strlen(line) - 1;
+ while (cp >= line) {
+ if (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t' ||
+ *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+ *cp-- = '\0';
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Skip empty lines */
+ if (*line == '\0')
+ continue;
+
+ do_host(line);
+ }
+
+ if (ferror(fp))
+ fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j],
+ strerror(errno));
+
+ fclose(fp);
+ }
+
+ while (optind < argc)
+ do_host(argv[optind++]);
+
+ while (ncon > 0)
+ conloop();
+
+ return (0);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keysign.0
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keysign.0 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keysign.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-SSH-KEYSIGN(8) OpenBSD System Manager's Manual SSH-KEYSIGN(8)
-
-NAME
- ssh-keysign - ssh helper program for host-based authentication
-
-SYNOPSIS
- ssh-keysign
-
-DESCRIPTION
- ssh-keysign is used by ssh(1) to access the local host keys and generate
- the digital signature required during host-based authentication with SSH
- protocol version 2.
-
- ssh-keysign is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the global
- client configuration file /etc/ssh/ssh_config by setting EnableSSHKeysign
- to ``yes''.
-
- ssh-keysign is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from ssh(1).
- See ssh(1) and sshd(8) for more information about host-based
- authentication.
-
-FILES
- /etc/ssh/ssh_config
- Controls whether ssh-keysign is enabled.
-
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
- These files contain the private parts of the host keys used to
- generate the digital signature. They should be owned by root,
- readable only by root, and not accessible to others. Since they
- are readable only by root, ssh-keysign must be set-uid root if
- host-based authentication is used.
-
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub
- If these files exist they are assumed to contain public
- certificate information corresponding with the private keys
- above.
-
-SEE ALSO
- ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5), sshd(8)
-
-HISTORY
- ssh-keysign first appeared in OpenBSD 3.2.
-
-AUTHORS
- Markus Friedl <markus at openbsd.org>
-
-OpenBSD 5.5 December 7, 2013 OpenBSD 5.5
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keysign.0 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keysign.0)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keysign.0 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keysign.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+SSH-KEYSIGN(8) System Manager's Manual SSH-KEYSIGN(8)
+
+NAME
+ ssh-keysign M-bM-^@M-^S ssh helper program for host-based authentication
+
+SYNOPSIS
+ ssh-keysign
+
+DESCRIPTION
+ ssh-keysign is used by ssh(1) to access the local host keys and generate
+ the digital signature required during host-based authentication.
+
+ ssh-keysign is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the global
+ client configuration file /etc/ssh/ssh_config by setting EnableSSHKeysign
+ to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ ssh-keysign is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from ssh(1).
+ See ssh(1) and sshd(8) for more information about host-based
+ authentication.
+
+FILES
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+ Controls whether ssh-keysign is enabled.
+
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+ These files contain the private parts of the host keys used to
+ generate the digital signature. They should be owned by root,
+ readable only by root, and not accessible to others. Since they
+ are readable only by root, ssh-keysign must be set-uid root if
+ host-based authentication is used.
+
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub
+ If these files exist they are assumed to contain public
+ certificate information corresponding with the private keys
+ above.
+
+SEE ALSO
+ ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5), sshd(8)
+
+HISTORY
+ ssh-keysign first appeared in OpenBSD 3.2.
+
+AUTHORS
+ Markus Friedl <markus at openbsd.org>
+
+OpenBSD 6.0 February 17, 2016 OpenBSD 6.0
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keysign.8
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keysign.8 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keysign.8 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.14 2013/12/07 11:58:46 naddy Exp $
-.\"
-.\" Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
-.\"
-.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-.\" are met:
-.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-.\"
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: December 7 2013 $
-.Dt SSH-KEYSIGN 8
-.Os
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm ssh-keysign
-.Nd ssh helper program for host-based authentication
-.Sh SYNOPSIS
-.Nm
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-.Nm
-is used by
-.Xr ssh 1
-to access the local host keys and generate the digital signature
-required during host-based authentication with SSH protocol version 2.
-.Pp
-.Nm
-is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the
-global client configuration file
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
-by setting
-.Cm EnableSSHKeysign
-to
-.Dq yes .
-.Pp
-.Nm
-is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-See
-.Xr ssh 1
-and
-.Xr sshd 8
-for more information about host-based authentication.
-.Sh FILES
-.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
-Controls whether
-.Nm
-is enabled.
-.Pp
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
-These files contain the private parts of the host keys used to
-generate the digital signature.
-They should be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
-accessible to others.
-Since they are readable only by root,
-.Nm
-must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used.
-.Pp
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub
-If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
-information corresponding with the private keys above.
-.El
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr ssh 1 ,
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
-.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
-.Xr sshd 8
-.Sh HISTORY
-.Nm
-first appeared in
-.Ox 3.2 .
-.Sh AUTHORS
-.An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus at openbsd.org
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keysign.8 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keysign.8)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keysign.8 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keysign.8 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.15 2016/02/17 07:38:19 jmc Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd $Mdocdate: February 17 2016 $
+.Dt SSH-KEYSIGN 8
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-keysign
+.Nd ssh helper program for host-based authentication
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is used by
+.Xr ssh 1
+to access the local host keys and generate the digital signature
+required during host-based authentication.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the
+global client configuration file
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+by setting
+.Cm EnableSSHKeysign
+to
+.Dq yes .
+.Pp
+.Nm
+is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+See
+.Xr ssh 1
+and
+.Xr sshd 8
+for more information about host-based authentication.
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+Controls whether
+.Nm
+is enabled.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+These files contain the private parts of the host keys used to
+generate the digital signature.
+They should be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
+accessible to others.
+Since they are readable only by root,
+.Nm
+must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub
+If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
+information corresponding with the private keys above.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh HISTORY
+.Nm
+first appeared in
+.Ox 3.2 .
+.Sh AUTHORS
+.An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus at openbsd.org
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keysign.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keysign.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keysign.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,260 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.39 2013/12/06 13:39:49 markus Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-#include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "authfile.h"
-#include "msg.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "readconf.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-
-/* XXX readconf.c needs these */
-uid_t original_real_uid;
-
-extern char *__progname;
-
-static int
-valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, Key **ret, u_char *data,
- u_int datalen)
-{
- Buffer b;
- Key *key = NULL;
- u_char *pkblob;
- u_int blen, len;
- char *pkalg, *p;
- int pktype, fail;
-
- fail = 0;
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
-
- /* session id, currently limited to SHA1 (20 bytes) or SHA256 (32) */
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
- if (len != 20 && len != 32)
- fail++;
- free(p);
-
- if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
- fail++;
-
- /* server user */
- buffer_skip_string(&b);
-
- /* service */
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
- if (strcmp("ssh-connection", p) != 0)
- fail++;
- free(p);
-
- /* method */
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
- if (strcmp("hostbased", p) != 0)
- fail++;
- free(p);
-
- /* pubkey */
- pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
- pkblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &blen);
-
- pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
- if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC)
- fail++;
- else if ((key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen)) == NULL)
- fail++;
- else if (key->type != pktype)
- fail++;
- free(pkalg);
- free(pkblob);
-
- /* client host name, handle trailing dot */
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
- debug2("valid_request: check expect chost %s got %s", host, p);
- if (strlen(host) != len - 1)
- fail++;
- else if (p[len - 1] != '.')
- fail++;
- else if (strncasecmp(host, p, len - 1) != 0)
- fail++;
- free(p);
-
- /* local user */
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
-
- if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, p) != 0)
- fail++;
- free(p);
-
- /* end of message */
- if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
- fail++;
- buffer_free(&b);
-
- debug3("valid_request: fail %d", fail);
-
- if (fail && key != NULL)
- key_free(key);
- else
- *ret = key;
-
- return (fail ? -1 : 0);
-}
-
-int
-main(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- Buffer b;
- Options options;
-#define NUM_KEYTYPES 4
- Key *keys[NUM_KEYTYPES], *key = NULL;
- struct passwd *pw;
- int key_fd[NUM_KEYTYPES], i, found, version = 2, fd;
- u_char *signature, *data;
- char *host;
- u_int slen, dlen;
- u_int32_t rnd[256];
-
- /* Ensure that stdin and stdout are connected */
- if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) < 2)
- exit(1);
- /* Leave /dev/null fd iff it is attached to stderr */
- if (fd > 2)
- close(fd);
-
- i = 0;
- key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
- key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
- key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
- key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
-
- original_real_uid = getuid(); /* XXX readconf.c needs this */
- if ((pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid)) == NULL)
- fatal("getpwuid failed");
- pw = pwcopy(pw);
-
- permanently_set_uid(pw);
-
- seed_rng();
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_SSH_KEYSIGN
- log_init("ssh-keysign", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
-#endif
-
- /* verify that ssh-keysign is enabled by the admin */
- initialize_options(&options);
- (void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, "", &options, 0);
- fill_default_options(&options);
- if (options.enable_ssh_keysign != 1)
- fatal("ssh-keysign not enabled in %s",
- _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE);
-
- for (i = found = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) {
- if (key_fd[i] != -1)
- found = 1;
- }
- if (found == 0)
- fatal("could not open any host key");
-
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
- rnd[i] = arc4random();
- RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
-
- found = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) {
- keys[i] = NULL;
- if (key_fd[i] == -1)
- continue;
- keys[i] = key_load_private_pem(key_fd[i], KEY_UNSPEC,
- NULL, NULL);
- close(key_fd[i]);
- if (keys[i] != NULL)
- found = 1;
- }
- if (!found)
- fatal("no hostkey found");
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- if (ssh_msg_recv(STDIN_FILENO, &b) < 0)
- fatal("ssh_msg_recv failed");
- if (buffer_get_char(&b) != version)
- fatal("bad version");
- fd = buffer_get_int(&b);
- if ((fd == STDIN_FILENO) || (fd == STDOUT_FILENO))
- fatal("bad fd");
- if ((host = get_local_name(fd)) == NULL)
- fatal("cannot get local name for fd");
-
- data = buffer_get_string(&b, &dlen);
- if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, data, dlen) < 0)
- fatal("not a valid request");
- free(host);
-
- found = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) {
- if (keys[i] != NULL &&
- key_equal_public(key, keys[i])) {
- found = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!found)
- fatal("no matching hostkey found");
-
- if (key_sign(keys[i], &signature, &slen, data, dlen) != 0)
- fatal("key_sign failed");
- free(data);
-
- /* send reply */
- buffer_clear(&b);
- buffer_put_string(&b, signature, slen);
- if (ssh_msg_send(STDOUT_FILENO, version, &b) == -1)
- fatal("ssh_msg_send failed");
-
- return (0);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keysign.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keysign.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keysign.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-keysign.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.52 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+struct ssh *active_state = NULL; /* XXX needed for linking */
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* XXX readconf.c needs these */
+uid_t original_real_uid;
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+static int
+valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, struct sshkey **ret,
+ u_char *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ u_char type, *pkblob;
+ char *p;
+ size_t blen, len;
+ char *pkalg, *luser;
+ int r, pktype, fail;
+
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ *ret = NULL;
+ fail = 0;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_from failed", __func__);
+
+ /* session id, currently limited to SHA1 (20 bytes) or SHA256 (32) */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, NULL, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (len != 20 && len != 32)
+ fail++;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+ fail++;
+
+ /* server user */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ /* service */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (strcmp("ssh-connection", p) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ free(p);
+
+ /* method */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (strcmp("hostbased", p) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ free(p);
+
+ /* pubkey */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
+ if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC)
+ fail++;
+ else if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: bad key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fail++;
+ } else if (key->type != pktype)
+ fail++;
+ free(pkalg);
+ free(pkblob);
+
+ /* client host name, handle trailing dot */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ debug2("%s: check expect chost %s got %s", __func__, host, p);
+ if (strlen(host) != len - 1)
+ fail++;
+ else if (p[len - 1] != '.')
+ fail++;
+ else if (strncasecmp(host, p, len - 1) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ free(p);
+
+ /* local user */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &luser, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, luser) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ free(luser);
+
+ /* end of message */
+ if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+
+ debug3("%s: fail %d", __func__, fail);
+
+ if (fail && key != NULL)
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ else if (ret != NULL)
+ *ret = key;
+
+ return (fail ? -1 : 0);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ Options options;
+#define NUM_KEYTYPES 4
+ struct sshkey *keys[NUM_KEYTYPES], *key = NULL;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ int r, key_fd[NUM_KEYTYPES], i, found, version = 2, fd;
+ u_char *signature, *data, rver;
+ char *host, *fp;
+ size_t slen, dlen;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ u_int32_t rnd[256];
+#endif
+
+ ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
+ if (pledge("stdio rpath getpw dns id", NULL) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Ensure that stdin and stdout are connected */
+ if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) < 2)
+ exit(1);
+ /* Leave /dev/null fd iff it is attached to stderr */
+ if (fd > 2)
+ close(fd);
+
+ i = 0;
+ /* XXX This really needs to read sshd_config for the paths */
+ key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
+ key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
+ key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
+ key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
+
+ original_real_uid = getuid(); /* XXX readconf.c needs this */
+ if ((pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid)) == NULL)
+ fatal("getpwuid failed");
+ pw = pwcopy(pw);
+
+ permanently_set_uid(pw);
+
+ seed_rng();
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SSH_KEYSIGN
+ log_init("ssh-keysign", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
+#endif
+
+ /* verify that ssh-keysign is enabled by the admin */
+ initialize_options(&options);
+ (void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, "", "", &options, 0);
+ fill_default_options(&options);
+ if (options.enable_ssh_keysign != 1)
+ fatal("ssh-keysign not enabled in %s",
+ _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE);
+
+ for (i = found = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) {
+ if (key_fd[i] != -1)
+ found = 1;
+ }
+ if (found == 0)
+ fatal("could not open any host key");
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+ arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+ RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+#endif
+
+ found = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) {
+ keys[i] = NULL;
+ if (key_fd[i] == -1)
+ continue;
+ r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(key_fd[i], KEY_UNSPEC,
+ NULL, &key, NULL);
+ close(key_fd[i]);
+ if (r != 0)
+ debug("parse key %d: %s", i, ssh_err(r));
+ else if (key != NULL) {
+ keys[i] = key;
+ found = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found)
+ fatal("no hostkey found");
+
+ if (pledge("stdio dns", NULL) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+ if (ssh_msg_recv(STDIN_FILENO, b) < 0)
+ fatal("ssh_msg_recv failed");
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &rver)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
+ if (rver != version)
+ fatal("bad version: received %d, expected %d", rver, version);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&fd)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
+ if (fd < 0 || fd == STDIN_FILENO || fd == STDOUT_FILENO)
+ fatal("bad fd");
+ if ((host = get_local_name(fd)) == NULL)
+ fatal("cannot get local name for fd");
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &data, &dlen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
+ if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, data, dlen) < 0)
+ fatal("not a valid request");
+ free(host);
+
+ found = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) {
+ if (keys[i] != NULL &&
+ sshkey_equal_public(key, keys[i])) {
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found) {
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __progname);
+ fatal("no matching hostkey found for key %s %s",
+ sshkey_type(key), fp ? fp : "");
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_sign(keys[i], &signature, &slen, data, dlen, NULL, 0))
+ != 0)
+ fatal("sshkey_sign failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ free(data);
+
+ /* send reply */
+ sshbuf_reset(b);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, signature, slen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
+ if (ssh_msg_send(STDOUT_FILENO, version, b) == -1)
+ fatal("ssh_msg_send failed");
+
+ return (0);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11-client.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,240 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-client.c,v 1.4 2013/05/17 00:13:14 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "authfd.h"
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
-
-/* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */
-
-int fd = -1;
-pid_t pid = -1;
-
-static void
-send_msg(Buffer *m)
-{
- u_char buf[4];
- int mlen = buffer_len(m);
-
- put_u32(buf, mlen);
- if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
- atomicio(vwrite, fd, buffer_ptr(m),
- buffer_len(m)) != buffer_len(m))
- error("write to helper failed");
- buffer_consume(m, mlen);
-}
-
-static int
-recv_msg(Buffer *m)
-{
- u_int l, len;
- u_char buf[1024];
-
- if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, 4)) != 4) {
- error("read from helper failed: %u", len);
- return (0); /* XXX */
- }
- len = get_u32(buf);
- if (len > 256 * 1024)
- fatal("response too long: %u", len);
- /* read len bytes into m */
- buffer_clear(m);
- while (len > 0) {
- l = len;
- if (l > sizeof(buf))
- l = sizeof(buf);
- if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, l) != l) {
- error("response from helper failed.");
- return (0); /* XXX */
- }
- buffer_append(m, buf, l);
- len -= l;
- }
- return (buffer_get_char(m));
-}
-
-int
-pkcs11_init(int interactive)
-{
- return (0);
-}
-
-void
-pkcs11_terminate(void)
-{
- close(fd);
-}
-
-static int
-pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
- int padding)
-{
- Key key;
- u_char *blob, *signature = NULL;
- u_int blen, slen = 0;
- int ret = -1;
- Buffer msg;
-
- if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
- return (-1);
- key.type = KEY_RSA;
- key.rsa = rsa;
- if (key_to_blob(&key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
- return -1;
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST);
- buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
- buffer_put_string(&msg, from, flen);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, 0);
- free(blob);
- send_msg(&msg);
- buffer_clear(&msg);
-
- if (recv_msg(&msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
- signature = buffer_get_string(&msg, &slen);
- if (slen <= (u_int)RSA_size(rsa)) {
- memcpy(to, signature, slen);
- ret = slen;
- }
- free(signature);
- }
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-/* redirect the private key encrypt operation to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */
-static int
-wrap_key(RSA *rsa)
-{
- static RSA_METHOD helper_rsa;
-
- memcpy(&helper_rsa, RSA_get_default_method(), sizeof(helper_rsa));
- helper_rsa.name = "ssh-pkcs11-helper";
- helper_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt;
- RSA_set_method(rsa, &helper_rsa);
- return (0);
-}
-
-static int
-pkcs11_start_helper(void)
-{
- int pair[2];
-
- if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) {
- error("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
- return (-1);
- }
- if ((pid = fork()) == -1) {
- error("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
- return (-1);
- } else if (pid == 0) {
- if ((dup2(pair[1], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) ||
- (dup2(pair[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
- close(pair[0]);
- close(pair[1]);
- execlp(_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER, _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER,
- (char *) 0);
- fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER,
- strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
- close(pair[1]);
- fd = pair[0];
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, Key ***keysp)
-{
- Key *k;
- int i, nkeys;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int blen;
- Buffer msg;
-
- if (fd < 0 && pkcs11_start_helper() < 0)
- return (-1);
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, name);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, pin);
- send_msg(&msg);
- buffer_clear(&msg);
-
- if (recv_msg(&msg) == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
- nkeys = buffer_get_int(&msg);
- *keysp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(Key *));
- for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
- blob = buffer_get_string(&msg, &blen);
- free(buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL));
- k = key_from_blob(blob, blen);
- wrap_key(k->rsa);
- (*keysp)[i] = k;
- free(blob);
- }
- } else {
- nkeys = -1;
- }
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return (nkeys);
-}
-
-int
-pkcs11_del_provider(char *name)
-{
- int ret = -1;
- Buffer msg;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, name);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "");
- send_msg(&msg);
- buffer_clear(&msg);
-
- if (recv_msg(&msg) == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS)
- ret = 0;
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11-client.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-client.c,v 1.6 2015/12/11 00:20:04 mmcc Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+
+/* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */
+
+int fd = -1;
+pid_t pid = -1;
+
+static void
+send_msg(Buffer *m)
+{
+ u_char buf[4];
+ int mlen = buffer_len(m);
+
+ put_u32(buf, mlen);
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
+ atomicio(vwrite, fd, buffer_ptr(m),
+ buffer_len(m)) != buffer_len(m))
+ error("write to helper failed");
+ buffer_consume(m, mlen);
+}
+
+static int
+recv_msg(Buffer *m)
+{
+ u_int l, len;
+ u_char buf[1024];
+
+ if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, 4)) != 4) {
+ error("read from helper failed: %u", len);
+ return (0); /* XXX */
+ }
+ len = get_u32(buf);
+ if (len > 256 * 1024)
+ fatal("response too long: %u", len);
+ /* read len bytes into m */
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ while (len > 0) {
+ l = len;
+ if (l > sizeof(buf))
+ l = sizeof(buf);
+ if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, l) != l) {
+ error("response from helper failed.");
+ return (0); /* XXX */
+ }
+ buffer_append(m, buf, l);
+ len -= l;
+ }
+ return (buffer_get_char(m));
+}
+
+int
+pkcs11_init(int interactive)
+{
+ return (0);
+}
+
+void
+pkcs11_terminate(void)
+{
+ close(fd);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
+ int padding)
+{
+ Key key;
+ u_char *blob, *signature = NULL;
+ u_int blen, slen = 0;
+ int ret = -1;
+ Buffer msg;
+
+ if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+ return (-1);
+ key.type = KEY_RSA;
+ key.rsa = rsa;
+ if (key_to_blob(&key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
+ return -1;
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, from, flen);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, 0);
+ free(blob);
+ send_msg(&msg);
+ buffer_clear(&msg);
+
+ if (recv_msg(&msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
+ signature = buffer_get_string(&msg, &slen);
+ if (slen <= (u_int)RSA_size(rsa)) {
+ memcpy(to, signature, slen);
+ ret = slen;
+ }
+ free(signature);
+ }
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/* redirect the private key encrypt operation to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */
+static int
+wrap_key(RSA *rsa)
+{
+ static RSA_METHOD helper_rsa;
+
+ memcpy(&helper_rsa, RSA_get_default_method(), sizeof(helper_rsa));
+ helper_rsa.name = "ssh-pkcs11-helper";
+ helper_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt;
+ RSA_set_method(rsa, &helper_rsa);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_start_helper(void)
+{
+ int pair[2];
+
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) {
+ error("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if ((pid = fork()) == -1) {
+ error("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return (-1);
+ } else if (pid == 0) {
+ if ((dup2(pair[1], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) ||
+ (dup2(pair[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ close(pair[0]);
+ close(pair[1]);
+ execlp(_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER, _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER,
+ (char *)NULL);
+ fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER,
+ strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ close(pair[1]);
+ fd = pair[0];
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, Key ***keysp)
+{
+ Key *k;
+ int i, nkeys;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int blen;
+ Buffer msg;
+
+ if (fd < 0 && pkcs11_start_helper() < 0)
+ return (-1);
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, name);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, pin);
+ send_msg(&msg);
+ buffer_clear(&msg);
+
+ if (recv_msg(&msg) == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
+ nkeys = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+ *keysp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(Key *));
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+ blob = buffer_get_string(&msg, &blen);
+ free(buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL));
+ k = key_from_blob(blob, blen);
+ wrap_key(k->rsa);
+ (*keysp)[i] = k;
+ free(blob);
+ }
+ } else {
+ nkeys = -1;
+ }
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return (nkeys);
+}
+
+int
+pkcs11_del_provider(char *name)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ Buffer msg;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, name);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "");
+ send_msg(&msg);
+ buffer_clear(&msg);
+
+ if (recv_msg(&msg) == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS)
+ ret = 0;
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-SSH-PKCS11-HELPER(8) OpenBSD System Manager's Manual SSH-PKCS11-HELPER(8)
-
-NAME
- ssh-pkcs11-helper - ssh-agent helper program for PKCS#11 support
-
-SYNOPSIS
- ssh-pkcs11-helper
-
-DESCRIPTION
- ssh-pkcs11-helper is used by ssh-agent(1) to access keys provided by a
- PKCS#11 token.
-
- ssh-pkcs11-helper is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from
- ssh-agent(1).
-
-SEE ALSO
- ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1)
-
-HISTORY
- ssh-pkcs11-helper first appeared in OpenBSD 4.7.
-
-AUTHORS
- Markus Friedl <markus at openbsd.org>
-
-OpenBSD 5.5 July 16, 2013 OpenBSD 5.5
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+SSH-PKCS11-HELPER(8) System Manager's Manual SSH-PKCS11-HELPER(8)
+
+NAME
+ ssh-pkcs11-helper M-bM-^@M-^S ssh-agent helper program for PKCS#11 support
+
+SYNOPSIS
+ ssh-pkcs11-helper
+
+DESCRIPTION
+ ssh-pkcs11-helper is used by ssh-agent(1) to access keys provided by a
+ PKCS#11 token.
+
+ ssh-pkcs11-helper is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from
+ ssh-agent(1).
+
+SEE ALSO
+ ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1)
+
+HISTORY
+ ssh-pkcs11-helper first appeared in OpenBSD 4.7.
+
+AUTHORS
+ Markus Friedl <markus at openbsd.org>
+
+OpenBSD 6.0 July 16, 2013 OpenBSD 6.0
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,370 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.c,v 1.7 2013/12/02 02:56:17 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "authfd.h"
-#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
-
-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-
-/* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */
-
-struct pkcs11_keyinfo {
- Key *key;
- char *providername;
- TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_keyinfo) next;
-};
-
-TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_keyinfo) pkcs11_keylist;
-
-#define MAX_MSG_LENGTH 10240 /*XXX*/
-
-/* helper */
-#define get_int() buffer_get_int(&iqueue);
-#define get_string(lenp) buffer_get_string(&iqueue, lenp);
-
-/* input and output queue */
-Buffer iqueue;
-Buffer oqueue;
-
-static void
-add_key(Key *k, char *name)
-{
- struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki;
-
- ki = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ki));
- ki->providername = xstrdup(name);
- ki->key = k;
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_keylist, ki, next);
-}
-
-static void
-del_keys_by_name(char *name)
-{
- struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki, *nxt;
-
- for (ki = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_keylist); ki; ki = nxt) {
- nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(ki, next);
- if (!strcmp(ki->providername, name)) {
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_keylist, ki, next);
- free(ki->providername);
- key_free(ki->key);
- free(ki);
- }
- }
-}
-
-/* lookup matching 'private' key */
-static Key *
-lookup_key(Key *k)
-{
- struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki;
-
- TAILQ_FOREACH(ki, &pkcs11_keylist, next) {
- debug("check %p %s", ki, ki->providername);
- if (key_equal(k, ki->key))
- return (ki->key);
- }
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-static void
-send_msg(Buffer *m)
-{
- int mlen = buffer_len(m);
-
- buffer_put_int(&oqueue, mlen);
- buffer_append(&oqueue, buffer_ptr(m), mlen);
- buffer_consume(m, mlen);
-}
-
-static void
-process_add(void)
-{
- char *name, *pin;
- Key **keys;
- int i, nkeys;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int blen;
- Buffer msg;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- name = get_string(NULL);
- pin = get_string(NULL);
- if ((nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(name, pin, &keys)) > 0) {
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, nkeys);
- for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
- if (key_to_blob(keys[i], &blob, &blen) == 0)
- continue;
- buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
- buffer_put_cstring(&msg, name);
- free(blob);
- add_key(keys[i], name);
- }
- free(keys);
- } else {
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
- }
- free(pin);
- free(name);
- send_msg(&msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-}
-
-static void
-process_del(void)
-{
- char *name, *pin;
- Buffer msg;
-
- buffer_init(&msg);
- name = get_string(NULL);
- pin = get_string(NULL);
- del_keys_by_name(name);
- if (pkcs11_del_provider(name) == 0)
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS);
- else
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
- free(pin);
- free(name);
- send_msg(&msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-}
-
-static void
-process_sign(void)
-{
- u_char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL;
- u_int blen, dlen, slen = 0;
- int ok = -1, ret;
- Key *key, *found;
- Buffer msg;
-
- blob = get_string(&blen);
- data = get_string(&dlen);
- (void)get_int(); /* XXX ignore flags */
-
- if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) != NULL) {
- if ((found = lookup_key(key)) != NULL) {
- slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
- signature = xmalloc(slen);
- if ((ret = RSA_private_encrypt(dlen, data, signature,
- found->rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) != -1) {
- slen = ret;
- ok = 0;
- }
- }
- key_free(key);
- }
- buffer_init(&msg);
- if (ok == 0) {
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE);
- buffer_put_string(&msg, signature, slen);
- } else {
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
- }
- free(data);
- free(blob);
- free(signature);
- send_msg(&msg);
- buffer_free(&msg);
-}
-
-static void
-process(void)
-{
- u_int msg_len;
- u_int buf_len;
- u_int consumed;
- u_int type;
- u_char *cp;
-
- buf_len = buffer_len(&iqueue);
- if (buf_len < 5)
- return; /* Incomplete message. */
- cp = buffer_ptr(&iqueue);
- msg_len = get_u32(cp);
- if (msg_len > MAX_MSG_LENGTH) {
- error("bad message len %d", msg_len);
- cleanup_exit(11);
- }
- if (buf_len < msg_len + 4)
- return;
- buffer_consume(&iqueue, 4);
- buf_len -= 4;
- type = buffer_get_char(&iqueue);
- switch (type) {
- case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY:
- debug("process_add");
- process_add();
- break;
- case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY:
- debug("process_del");
- process_del();
- break;
- case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST:
- debug("process_sign");
- process_sign();
- break;
- default:
- error("Unknown message %d", type);
- break;
- }
- /* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */
- if (buf_len < buffer_len(&iqueue)) {
- error("iqueue grew unexpectedly");
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- consumed = buf_len - buffer_len(&iqueue);
- if (msg_len < consumed) {
- error("msg_len %d < consumed %d", msg_len, consumed);
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- if (msg_len > consumed)
- buffer_consume(&iqueue, msg_len - consumed);
-}
-
-void
-cleanup_exit(int i)
-{
- /* XXX */
- _exit(i);
-}
-
-int
-main(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- fd_set *rset, *wset;
- int in, out, max, log_stderr = 0;
- ssize_t len, olen, set_size;
- SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
- LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
- char buf[4*4096];
-
- extern char *__progname;
-
- TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_keylist);
- pkcs11_init(0);
-
- seed_rng();
- __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
-
- log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
-
- in = STDIN_FILENO;
- out = STDOUT_FILENO;
-
- max = 0;
- if (in > max)
- max = in;
- if (out > max)
- max = out;
-
- buffer_init(&iqueue);
- buffer_init(&oqueue);
-
- set_size = howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
- rset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(set_size);
- wset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(set_size);
-
- for (;;) {
- memset(rset, 0, set_size);
- memset(wset, 0, set_size);
-
- /*
- * Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle
- * the worst-case length packet it can generate,
- * otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads.
- */
- if (buffer_check_alloc(&iqueue, sizeof(buf)) &&
- buffer_check_alloc(&oqueue, MAX_MSG_LENGTH))
- FD_SET(in, rset);
-
- olen = buffer_len(&oqueue);
- if (olen > 0)
- FD_SET(out, wset);
-
- if (select(max+1, rset, wset, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
- if (errno == EINTR)
- continue;
- error("select: %s", strerror(errno));
- cleanup_exit(2);
- }
-
- /* copy stdin to iqueue */
- if (FD_ISSET(in, rset)) {
- len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf);
- if (len == 0) {
- debug("read eof");
- cleanup_exit(0);
- } else if (len < 0) {
- error("read: %s", strerror(errno));
- cleanup_exit(1);
- } else {
- buffer_append(&iqueue, buf, len);
- }
- }
- /* send oqueue to stdout */
- if (FD_ISSET(out, wset)) {
- len = write(out, buffer_ptr(&oqueue), olen);
- if (len < 0) {
- error("write: %s", strerror(errno));
- cleanup_exit(1);
- } else {
- buffer_consume(&oqueue, len);
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Process requests from client if we can fit the results
- * into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input
- * and let the output queue drain.
- */
- if (buffer_check_alloc(&oqueue, MAX_MSG_LENGTH))
- process();
- }
-}
-#else /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
-int
-main(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- extern char *__progname;
-
- __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
- log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
- fatal("PKCS#11 support disabled at compile time");
-}
-#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,375 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.c,v 1.12 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+
+/* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */
+
+struct pkcs11_keyinfo {
+ Key *key;
+ char *providername;
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_keyinfo) next;
+};
+
+TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_keyinfo) pkcs11_keylist;
+
+#define MAX_MSG_LENGTH 10240 /*XXX*/
+
+/* helper */
+#define get_int() buffer_get_int(&iqueue);
+#define get_string(lenp) buffer_get_string(&iqueue, lenp);
+
+/* input and output queue */
+Buffer iqueue;
+Buffer oqueue;
+
+static void
+add_key(Key *k, char *name)
+{
+ struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki;
+
+ ki = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ki));
+ ki->providername = xstrdup(name);
+ ki->key = k;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_keylist, ki, next);
+}
+
+static void
+del_keys_by_name(char *name)
+{
+ struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki, *nxt;
+
+ for (ki = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_keylist); ki; ki = nxt) {
+ nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(ki, next);
+ if (!strcmp(ki->providername, name)) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_keylist, ki, next);
+ free(ki->providername);
+ key_free(ki->key);
+ free(ki);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* lookup matching 'private' key */
+static Key *
+lookup_key(Key *k)
+{
+ struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki;
+
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(ki, &pkcs11_keylist, next) {
+ debug("check %p %s", ki, ki->providername);
+ if (key_equal(k, ki->key))
+ return (ki->key);
+ }
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+static void
+send_msg(Buffer *m)
+{
+ int mlen = buffer_len(m);
+
+ buffer_put_int(&oqueue, mlen);
+ buffer_append(&oqueue, buffer_ptr(m), mlen);
+ buffer_consume(m, mlen);
+}
+
+static void
+process_add(void)
+{
+ char *name, *pin;
+ Key **keys;
+ int i, nkeys;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int blen;
+ Buffer msg;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ name = get_string(NULL);
+ pin = get_string(NULL);
+ if ((nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(name, pin, &keys)) > 0) {
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, nkeys);
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+ if (key_to_blob(keys[i], &blob, &blen) == 0)
+ continue;
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, name);
+ free(blob);
+ add_key(keys[i], name);
+ }
+ free(keys);
+ } else {
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ free(pin);
+ free(name);
+ send_msg(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+static void
+process_del(void)
+{
+ char *name, *pin;
+ Buffer msg;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ name = get_string(NULL);
+ pin = get_string(NULL);
+ del_keys_by_name(name);
+ if (pkcs11_del_provider(name) == 0)
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS);
+ else
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
+ free(pin);
+ free(name);
+ send_msg(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+static void
+process_sign(void)
+{
+ u_char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL;
+ u_int blen, dlen, slen = 0;
+ int ok = -1;
+ Key *key, *found;
+ Buffer msg;
+
+ blob = get_string(&blen);
+ data = get_string(&dlen);
+ (void)get_int(); /* XXX ignore flags */
+
+ if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) != NULL) {
+ if ((found = lookup_key(key)) != NULL) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ int ret;
+
+ slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
+ signature = xmalloc(slen);
+ if ((ret = RSA_private_encrypt(dlen, data, signature,
+ found->rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) != -1) {
+ slen = ret;
+ ok = 0;
+ }
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ }
+ key_free(key);
+ }
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ if (ok == 0) {
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, signature, slen);
+ } else {
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ free(data);
+ free(blob);
+ free(signature);
+ send_msg(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+static void
+process(void)
+{
+ u_int msg_len;
+ u_int buf_len;
+ u_int consumed;
+ u_int type;
+ u_char *cp;
+
+ buf_len = buffer_len(&iqueue);
+ if (buf_len < 5)
+ return; /* Incomplete message. */
+ cp = buffer_ptr(&iqueue);
+ msg_len = get_u32(cp);
+ if (msg_len > MAX_MSG_LENGTH) {
+ error("bad message len %d", msg_len);
+ cleanup_exit(11);
+ }
+ if (buf_len < msg_len + 4)
+ return;
+ buffer_consume(&iqueue, 4);
+ buf_len -= 4;
+ type = buffer_get_char(&iqueue);
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY:
+ debug("process_add");
+ process_add();
+ break;
+ case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY:
+ debug("process_del");
+ process_del();
+ break;
+ case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST:
+ debug("process_sign");
+ process_sign();
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("Unknown message %d", type);
+ break;
+ }
+ /* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */
+ if (buf_len < buffer_len(&iqueue)) {
+ error("iqueue grew unexpectedly");
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+ consumed = buf_len - buffer_len(&iqueue);
+ if (msg_len < consumed) {
+ error("msg_len %d < consumed %d", msg_len, consumed);
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+ if (msg_len > consumed)
+ buffer_consume(&iqueue, msg_len - consumed);
+}
+
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+ /* XXX */
+ _exit(i);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ fd_set *rset, *wset;
+ int in, out, max, log_stderr = 0;
+ ssize_t len, olen, set_size;
+ SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
+ LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
+ char buf[4*4096];
+
+ extern char *__progname;
+
+ ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
+ TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_keylist);
+ pkcs11_init(0);
+
+ seed_rng();
+ __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+
+ log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+ in = STDIN_FILENO;
+ out = STDOUT_FILENO;
+
+ max = 0;
+ if (in > max)
+ max = in;
+ if (out > max)
+ max = out;
+
+ buffer_init(&iqueue);
+ buffer_init(&oqueue);
+
+ set_size = howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
+ rset = xmalloc(set_size);
+ wset = xmalloc(set_size);
+
+ for (;;) {
+ memset(rset, 0, set_size);
+ memset(wset, 0, set_size);
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle
+ * the worst-case length packet it can generate,
+ * otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads.
+ */
+ if (buffer_check_alloc(&iqueue, sizeof(buf)) &&
+ buffer_check_alloc(&oqueue, MAX_MSG_LENGTH))
+ FD_SET(in, rset);
+
+ olen = buffer_len(&oqueue);
+ if (olen > 0)
+ FD_SET(out, wset);
+
+ if (select(max+1, rset, wset, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ error("select: %s", strerror(errno));
+ cleanup_exit(2);
+ }
+
+ /* copy stdin to iqueue */
+ if (FD_ISSET(in, rset)) {
+ len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf);
+ if (len == 0) {
+ debug("read eof");
+ cleanup_exit(0);
+ } else if (len < 0) {
+ error("read: %s", strerror(errno));
+ cleanup_exit(1);
+ } else {
+ buffer_append(&iqueue, buf, len);
+ }
+ }
+ /* send oqueue to stdout */
+ if (FD_ISSET(out, wset)) {
+ len = write(out, buffer_ptr(&oqueue), olen);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ error("write: %s", strerror(errno));
+ cleanup_exit(1);
+ } else {
+ buffer_consume(&oqueue, len);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Process requests from client if we can fit the results
+ * into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input
+ * and let the output queue drain.
+ */
+ if (buffer_check_alloc(&oqueue, MAX_MSG_LENGTH))
+ process();
+ }
+}
+#else /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ extern char *__progname;
+
+ __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+ log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
+ fatal("PKCS#11 support disabled at compile time");
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,670 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.11 2013/11/13 13:48:20 markus Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include <dlfcn.h>
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-
-#define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT
-#include "pkcs11.h"
-
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-
-struct pkcs11_slotinfo {
- CK_TOKEN_INFO token;
- CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
- int logged_in;
-};
-
-struct pkcs11_provider {
- char *name;
- void *handle;
- CK_FUNCTION_LIST *function_list;
- CK_INFO info;
- CK_ULONG nslots;
- CK_SLOT_ID *slotlist;
- struct pkcs11_slotinfo *slotinfo;
- int valid;
- int refcount;
- TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_provider) next;
-};
-
-TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_provider) pkcs11_providers;
-
-struct pkcs11_key {
- struct pkcs11_provider *provider;
- CK_ULONG slotidx;
- int (*orig_finish)(RSA *rsa);
- RSA_METHOD rsa_method;
- char *keyid;
- int keyid_len;
-};
-
-int pkcs11_interactive = 0;
-
-int
-pkcs11_init(int interactive)
-{
- pkcs11_interactive = interactive;
- TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_providers);
- return (0);
-}
-
-/*
- * finalize a provider shared libarary, it's no longer usable.
- * however, there might still be keys referencing this provider,
- * so the actuall freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref().
- * this is called when a provider gets unregistered.
- */
-static void
-pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
-{
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_ULONG i;
-
- debug("pkcs11_provider_finalize: %p refcount %d valid %d",
- p, p->refcount, p->valid);
- if (!p->valid)
- return;
- for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
- if (p->slotinfo[i].session &&
- (rv = p->function_list->C_CloseSession(
- p->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK)
- error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv);
- }
- if ((rv = p->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
- error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv);
- p->valid = 0;
- p->function_list = NULL;
- dlclose(p->handle);
-}
-
-/*
- * remove a reference to the provider.
- * called when a key gets destroyed or when the provider is unregistered.
- */
-static void
-pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
-{
- debug("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p refcount %d", p, p->refcount);
- if (--p->refcount <= 0) {
- if (p->valid)
- error("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p still valid", p);
- free(p->slotlist);
- free(p->slotinfo);
- free(p);
- }
-}
-
-/* unregister all providers, keys might still point to the providers */
-void
-pkcs11_terminate(void)
-{
- struct pkcs11_provider *p;
-
- while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_providers)) != NULL) {
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
- pkcs11_provider_finalize(p);
- pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
- }
-}
-
-/* lookup provider by name */
-static struct pkcs11_provider *
-pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id)
-{
- struct pkcs11_provider *p;
-
- TAILQ_FOREACH(p, &pkcs11_providers, next) {
- debug("check %p %s", p, p->name);
- if (!strcmp(provider_id, p->name))
- return (p);
- }
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-/* unregister provider by name */
-int
-pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id)
-{
- struct pkcs11_provider *p;
-
- if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) {
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
- pkcs11_provider_finalize(p);
- pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
- return (0);
- }
- return (-1);
-}
-
-/* openssl callback for freeing an RSA key */
-static int
-pkcs11_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa)
-{
- struct pkcs11_key *k11;
- int rv = -1;
-
- if ((k11 = RSA_get_app_data(rsa)) != NULL) {
- if (k11->orig_finish)
- rv = k11->orig_finish(rsa);
- if (k11->provider)
- pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider);
- free(k11->keyid);
- free(k11);
- }
- return (rv);
-}
-
-/* find a single 'obj' for given attributes */
-static int
-pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr,
- CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
-{
- CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
- CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
- CK_ULONG nfound = 0;
- CK_RV rv;
- int ret = -1;
-
- f = p->function_list;
- session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
- if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) {
- error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv);
- return (-1);
- }
- if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK ||
- nfound != 1) {
- debug("C_FindObjects failed (nfound %lu nattr %lu): %lu",
- nfound, nattr, rv);
- } else
- ret = 0;
- if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK)
- error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-/* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */
-static int
-pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
- int padding)
-{
- struct pkcs11_key *k11;
- struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
- CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
- CK_ULONG tlen = 0;
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS private_key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
- CK_BBOOL true_val = CK_TRUE;
- CK_MECHANISM mech = {
- CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL_PTR, 0
- };
- CK_ATTRIBUTE key_filter[] = {
- {CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(private_key_class) },
- {CKA_ID, NULL, 0},
- {CKA_SIGN, NULL, sizeof(true_val) }
- };
- char *pin, prompt[1024];
- int rval = -1;
-
- key_filter[0].pValue = &private_key_class;
- key_filter[2].pValue = &true_val;
-
- if ((k11 = RSA_get_app_data(rsa)) == NULL) {
- error("RSA_get_app_data failed for rsa %p", rsa);
- return (-1);
- }
- if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) {
- error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider for rsa %p", rsa);
- return (-1);
- }
- f = k11->provider->function_list;
- si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
- if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) {
- if (!pkcs11_interactive) {
- error("need pin");
- return (-1);
- }
- snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ",
- si->token.label);
- pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF);
- if (pin == NULL)
- return (-1); /* bail out */
- if ((rv = f->C_Login(si->session, CKU_USER,
- (u_char *)pin, strlen(pin))) != CKR_OK) {
- free(pin);
- error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv);
- return (-1);
- }
- free(pin);
- si->logged_in = 1;
- }
- key_filter[1].pValue = k11->keyid;
- key_filter[1].ulValueLen = k11->keyid_len;
- /* try to find object w/CKA_SIGN first, retry w/o */
- if (pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 3, &obj) < 0 &&
- pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 2, &obj) < 0) {
- error("cannot find private key");
- } else if ((rv = f->C_SignInit(si->session, &mech, obj)) != CKR_OK) {
- error("C_SignInit failed: %lu", rv);
- } else {
- /* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
- tlen = RSA_size(rsa);
- rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)from, flen, to, &tlen);
- if (rv == CKR_OK)
- rval = tlen;
- else
- error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv);
- }
- return (rval);
-}
-
-static int
-pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
- int padding)
-{
- return (-1);
-}
-
-/* redirect private key operations for rsa key to pkcs11 token */
-static int
-pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
- CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, RSA *rsa)
-{
- struct pkcs11_key *k11;
- const RSA_METHOD *def = RSA_get_default_method();
-
- k11 = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k11));
- k11->provider = provider;
- provider->refcount++; /* provider referenced by RSA key */
- k11->slotidx = slotidx;
- /* identify key object on smartcard */
- k11->keyid_len = keyid_attrib->ulValueLen;
- k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len);
- memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
- k11->orig_finish = def->finish;
- memcpy(&k11->rsa_method, def, sizeof(k11->rsa_method));
- k11->rsa_method.name = "pkcs11";
- k11->rsa_method.rsa_priv_enc = pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt;
- k11->rsa_method.rsa_priv_dec = pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt;
- k11->rsa_method.finish = pkcs11_rsa_finish;
- RSA_set_method(rsa, &k11->rsa_method);
- RSA_set_app_data(rsa, k11);
- return (0);
-}
-
-/* remove trailing spaces */
-static void
-rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len)
-{
- size_t i;
-
- if (!len)
- return;
- for (i = len - 1; i > 0; i--)
- if (i == len - 1 || buf[i] == ' ')
- buf[i] = '\0';
- else
- break;
-}
-
-/*
- * open a pkcs11 session and login if required.
- * if pin == NULL we delay login until key use
- */
-static int
-pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin)
-{
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
- CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
- int login_required;
-
- f = p->function_list;
- login_required = p->slotinfo[slotidx].token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED;
- if (pin && login_required && !strlen(pin)) {
- error("pin required");
- return (-1);
- }
- if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION|
- CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session))
- != CKR_OK) {
- error("C_OpenSession failed: %lu", rv);
- return (-1);
- }
- if (login_required && pin) {
- if ((rv = f->C_Login(session, CKU_USER,
- (u_char *)pin, strlen(pin))) != CKR_OK) {
- error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv);
- if ((rv = f->C_CloseSession(session)) != CKR_OK)
- error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv);
- return (-1);
- }
- p->slotinfo[slotidx].logged_in = 1;
- }
- p->slotinfo[slotidx].session = session;
- return (0);
-}
-
-/*
- * lookup public keys for token in slot identified by slotidx,
- * add 'wrapped' public keys to the 'keysp' array and increment nkeys.
- * keysp points to an (possibly empty) array with *nkeys keys.
- */
-static int pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *, CK_ULONG,
- CK_ATTRIBUTE [], CK_ATTRIBUTE [3], Key ***, int *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,4, 3 * sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE))));
-
-static int
-pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
- Key ***keysp, int *nkeys)
-{
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubkey_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS cert_class = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE pubkey_filter[] = {
- { CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(pubkey_class) }
- };
- CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_filter[] = {
- { CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(cert_class) }
- };
- CK_ATTRIBUTE pubkey_attribs[] = {
- { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 },
- { CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0 },
- { CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0 }
- };
- CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_attribs[] = {
- { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 },
- { CKA_SUBJECT, NULL, 0 },
- { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 }
- };
- pubkey_filter[0].pValue = &pubkey_class;
- cert_filter[0].pValue = &cert_class;
-
- if (pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, pubkey_filter, pubkey_attribs,
- keysp, nkeys) < 0 ||
- pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, cert_filter, cert_attribs,
- keysp, nkeys) < 0)
- return (-1);
- return (0);
-}
-
-static int
-pkcs11_key_included(Key ***keysp, int *nkeys, Key *key)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < *nkeys; i++)
- if (key_equal(key, (*keysp)[i]))
- return (1);
- return (0);
-}
-
-static int
-pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
- CK_ATTRIBUTE filter[], CK_ATTRIBUTE attribs[3],
- Key ***keysp, int *nkeys)
-{
- Key *key;
- RSA *rsa;
- X509 *x509;
- EVP_PKEY *evp;
- int i;
- const u_char *cp;
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
- CK_ULONG nfound;
- CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
- CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
-
- f = p->function_list;
- session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
- /* setup a filter the looks for public keys */
- if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, filter, 1)) != CKR_OK) {
- error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
- return (-1);
- }
- while (1) {
- /* XXX 3 attributes in attribs[] */
- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
- attribs[i].pValue = NULL;
- attribs[i].ulValueLen = 0;
- }
- if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK
- || nfound == 0)
- break;
- /* found a key, so figure out size of the attributes */
- if ((rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attribs, 3))
- != CKR_OK) {
- error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
- continue;
- }
- /* check that none of the attributes are zero length */
- if (attribs[0].ulValueLen == 0 ||
- attribs[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
- attribs[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
- continue;
- }
- /* allocate buffers for attributes */
- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
- attribs[i].pValue = xmalloc(attribs[i].ulValueLen);
- /*
- * retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key,
- * or ID, subject and value for certificates.
- */
- rsa = NULL;
- if ((rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attribs, 3))
- != CKR_OK) {
- error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
- } else if (attribs[1].type == CKA_MODULUS ) {
- if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
- error("RSA_new failed");
- } else {
- rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(attribs[1].pValue,
- attribs[1].ulValueLen, NULL);
- rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(attribs[2].pValue,
- attribs[2].ulValueLen, NULL);
- }
- } else {
- cp = attribs[2].pValue;
- if ((x509 = X509_new()) == NULL) {
- error("X509_new failed");
- } else if (d2i_X509(&x509, &cp, attribs[2].ulValueLen)
- == NULL) {
- error("d2i_X509 failed");
- } else if ((evp = X509_get_pubkey(x509)) == NULL ||
- evp->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA ||
- evp->pkey.rsa == NULL) {
- debug("X509_get_pubkey failed or no rsa");
- } else if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup(evp->pkey.rsa))
- == NULL) {
- error("RSAPublicKey_dup");
- }
- if (x509)
- X509_free(x509);
- }
- if (rsa && rsa->n && rsa->e &&
- pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], rsa) == 0) {
- key = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
- key->rsa = rsa;
- key->type = KEY_RSA;
- key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_EXT;
- if (pkcs11_key_included(keysp, nkeys, key)) {
- key_free(key);
- } else {
- /* expand key array and add key */
- *keysp = xrealloc(*keysp, *nkeys + 1,
- sizeof(Key *));
- (*keysp)[*nkeys] = key;
- *nkeys = *nkeys + 1;
- debug("have %d keys", *nkeys);
- }
- } else if (rsa) {
- RSA_free(rsa);
- }
- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
- free(attribs[i].pValue);
- }
- if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK)
- error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv);
- return (0);
-}
-
-/* register a new provider, fails if provider already exists */
-int
-pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, Key ***keyp)
-{
- int nkeys, need_finalize = 0;
- struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
- void *handle = NULL;
- CK_RV (*getfunctionlist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST **);
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
- CK_TOKEN_INFO *token;
- CK_ULONG i;
-
- *keyp = NULL;
- if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) {
- error("provider already registered: %s", provider_id);
- goto fail;
- }
- /* open shared pkcs11-libarary */
- if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) {
- error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror());
- goto fail;
- }
- if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
- error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
- goto fail;
- }
- p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p));
- p->name = xstrdup(provider_id);
- p->handle = handle;
- /* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */
- if ((rv = (*getfunctionlist)(&f)) != CKR_OK) {
- error("C_GetFunctionList failed: %lu", rv);
- goto fail;
- }
- p->function_list = f;
- if ((rv = f->C_Initialize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) {
- error("C_Initialize failed: %lu", rv);
- goto fail;
- }
- need_finalize = 1;
- if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&p->info)) != CKR_OK) {
- error("C_GetInfo failed: %lu", rv);
- goto fail;
- }
- rmspace(p->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(p->info.manufacturerID));
- rmspace(p->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(p->info.libraryDescription));
- debug("manufacturerID <%s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d"
- " libraryDescription <%s> libraryVersion %d.%d",
- p->info.manufacturerID,
- p->info.cryptokiVersion.major,
- p->info.cryptokiVersion.minor,
- p->info.libraryDescription,
- p->info.libraryVersion.major,
- p->info.libraryVersion.minor);
- if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) {
- error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv);
- goto fail;
- }
- if (p->nslots == 0) {
- error("no slots");
- goto fail;
- }
- p->slotlist = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
- if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, p->slotlist, &p->nslots))
- != CKR_OK) {
- error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv);
- goto fail;
- }
- p->slotinfo = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo));
- p->valid = 1;
- nkeys = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
- token = &p->slotinfo[i].token;
- if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(p->slotlist[i], token))
- != CKR_OK) {
- error("C_GetTokenInfo failed: %lu", rv);
- continue;
- }
- rmspace(token->label, sizeof(token->label));
- rmspace(token->manufacturerID, sizeof(token->manufacturerID));
- rmspace(token->model, sizeof(token->model));
- rmspace(token->serialNumber, sizeof(token->serialNumber));
- debug("label <%s> manufacturerID <%s> model <%s> serial <%s>"
- " flags 0x%lx",
- token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model,
- token->serialNumber, token->flags);
- /* open session, login with pin and retrieve public keys */
- if (pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin) == 0)
- pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, &nkeys);
- }
- if (nkeys > 0) {
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
- p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */
- return (nkeys);
- }
- error("no keys");
- /* don't add the provider, since it does not have any keys */
-fail:
- if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
- error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv);
- if (p) {
- free(p->slotlist);
- free(p->slotinfo);
- free(p);
- }
- if (handle)
- dlclose(handle);
- return (-1);
-}
-
-#else
-
-int
-pkcs11_init(int interactive)
-{
- return (0);
-}
-
-void
-pkcs11_terminate(void)
-{
- return;
-}
-
-#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,695 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.22 2016/02/12 00:20:30 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+struct pkcs11_slotinfo {
+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token;
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ int logged_in;
+};
+
+struct pkcs11_provider {
+ char *name;
+ void *handle;
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *function_list;
+ CK_INFO info;
+ CK_ULONG nslots;
+ CK_SLOT_ID *slotlist;
+ struct pkcs11_slotinfo *slotinfo;
+ int valid;
+ int refcount;
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_provider) next;
+};
+
+TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_provider) pkcs11_providers;
+
+struct pkcs11_key {
+ struct pkcs11_provider *provider;
+ CK_ULONG slotidx;
+ int (*orig_finish)(RSA *rsa);
+ RSA_METHOD rsa_method;
+ char *keyid;
+ int keyid_len;
+};
+
+int pkcs11_interactive = 0;
+
+int
+pkcs11_init(int interactive)
+{
+ pkcs11_interactive = interactive;
+ TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_providers);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * finalize a provider shared libarary, it's no longer usable.
+ * however, there might still be keys referencing this provider,
+ * so the actuall freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref().
+ * this is called when a provider gets unregistered.
+ */
+static void
+pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
+{
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_ULONG i;
+
+ debug("pkcs11_provider_finalize: %p refcount %d valid %d",
+ p, p->refcount, p->valid);
+ if (!p->valid)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
+ if (p->slotinfo[i].session &&
+ (rv = p->function_list->C_CloseSession(
+ p->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK)
+ error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv);
+ }
+ if ((rv = p->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
+ error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv);
+ p->valid = 0;
+ p->function_list = NULL;
+ dlclose(p->handle);
+}
+
+/*
+ * remove a reference to the provider.
+ * called when a key gets destroyed or when the provider is unregistered.
+ */
+static void
+pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
+{
+ debug("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p refcount %d", p, p->refcount);
+ if (--p->refcount <= 0) {
+ if (p->valid)
+ error("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p still valid", p);
+ free(p->slotlist);
+ free(p->slotinfo);
+ free(p);
+ }
+}
+
+/* unregister all providers, keys might still point to the providers */
+void
+pkcs11_terminate(void)
+{
+ struct pkcs11_provider *p;
+
+ while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_providers)) != NULL) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
+ pkcs11_provider_finalize(p);
+ pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
+ }
+}
+
+/* lookup provider by name */
+static struct pkcs11_provider *
+pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id)
+{
+ struct pkcs11_provider *p;
+
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(p, &pkcs11_providers, next) {
+ debug("check %p %s", p, p->name);
+ if (!strcmp(provider_id, p->name))
+ return (p);
+ }
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+/* unregister provider by name */
+int
+pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id)
+{
+ struct pkcs11_provider *p;
+
+ if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
+ pkcs11_provider_finalize(p);
+ pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+/* openssl callback for freeing an RSA key */
+static int
+pkcs11_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa)
+{
+ struct pkcs11_key *k11;
+ int rv = -1;
+
+ if ((k11 = RSA_get_app_data(rsa)) != NULL) {
+ if (k11->orig_finish)
+ rv = k11->orig_finish(rsa);
+ if (k11->provider)
+ pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider);
+ free(k11->keyid);
+ free(k11);
+ }
+ return (rv);
+}
+
+/* find a single 'obj' for given attributes */
+static int
+pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr,
+ CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
+{
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ CK_ULONG nfound = 0;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ f = p->function_list;
+ session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+ if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK ||
+ nfound != 1) {
+ debug("C_FindObjects failed (nfound %lu nattr %lu): %lu",
+ nfound, nattr, rv);
+ } else
+ ret = 0;
+ if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK)
+ error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */
+static int
+pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
+ int padding)
+{
+ struct pkcs11_key *k11;
+ struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
+ CK_ULONG tlen = 0;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS private_key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+ CK_BBOOL true_val = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_MECHANISM mech = {
+ CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL_PTR, 0
+ };
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_filter[] = {
+ {CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(private_key_class) },
+ {CKA_ID, NULL, 0},
+ {CKA_SIGN, NULL, sizeof(true_val) }
+ };
+ char *pin = NULL, prompt[1024];
+ int rval = -1;
+
+ key_filter[0].pValue = &private_key_class;
+ key_filter[2].pValue = &true_val;
+
+ if ((k11 = RSA_get_app_data(rsa)) == NULL) {
+ error("RSA_get_app_data failed for rsa %p", rsa);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) {
+ error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider for rsa %p", rsa);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ f = k11->provider->function_list;
+ si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
+ if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) {
+ if (!pkcs11_interactive) {
+ error("need pin entry%s", (si->token.flags &
+ CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) ?
+ " on reader keypad" : "");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH)
+ verbose("Deferring PIN entry to reader keypad.");
+ else {
+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
+ "Enter PIN for '%s': ", si->token.label);
+ pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF);
+ if (pin == NULL)
+ return (-1); /* bail out */
+ }
+ rv = f->C_Login(si->session, CKU_USER, (u_char *)pin,
+ (pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0);
+ if (pin != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(pin, strlen(pin));
+ free(pin);
+ }
+ if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) {
+ error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ si->logged_in = 1;
+ }
+ key_filter[1].pValue = k11->keyid;
+ key_filter[1].ulValueLen = k11->keyid_len;
+ /* try to find object w/CKA_SIGN first, retry w/o */
+ if (pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 3, &obj) < 0 &&
+ pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 2, &obj) < 0) {
+ error("cannot find private key");
+ } else if ((rv = f->C_SignInit(si->session, &mech, obj)) != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_SignInit failed: %lu", rv);
+ } else {
+ /* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
+ tlen = RSA_size(rsa);
+ rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)from, flen, to, &tlen);
+ if (rv == CKR_OK)
+ rval = tlen;
+ else
+ error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv);
+ }
+ return (rval);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
+ int padding)
+{
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+/* redirect private key operations for rsa key to pkcs11 token */
+static int
+pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, RSA *rsa)
+{
+ struct pkcs11_key *k11;
+ const RSA_METHOD *def = RSA_get_default_method();
+
+ k11 = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k11));
+ k11->provider = provider;
+ provider->refcount++; /* provider referenced by RSA key */
+ k11->slotidx = slotidx;
+ /* identify key object on smartcard */
+ k11->keyid_len = keyid_attrib->ulValueLen;
+ if (k11->keyid_len > 0) {
+ k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len);
+ memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
+ }
+ k11->orig_finish = def->finish;
+ memcpy(&k11->rsa_method, def, sizeof(k11->rsa_method));
+ k11->rsa_method.name = "pkcs11";
+ k11->rsa_method.rsa_priv_enc = pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt;
+ k11->rsa_method.rsa_priv_dec = pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt;
+ k11->rsa_method.finish = pkcs11_rsa_finish;
+ RSA_set_method(rsa, &k11->rsa_method);
+ RSA_set_app_data(rsa, k11);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/* remove trailing spaces */
+static void
+rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (!len)
+ return;
+ for (i = len - 1; i > 0; i--)
+ if (i == len - 1 || buf[i] == ' ')
+ buf[i] = '\0';
+ else
+ break;
+}
+
+/*
+ * open a pkcs11 session and login if required.
+ * if pin == NULL we delay login until key use
+ */
+static int
+pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin)
+{
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ int login_required;
+
+ f = p->function_list;
+ login_required = p->slotinfo[slotidx].token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED;
+ if (pin && login_required && !strlen(pin)) {
+ error("pin required");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION|
+ CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session))
+ != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_OpenSession failed: %lu", rv);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (login_required && pin) {
+ rv = f->C_Login(session, CKU_USER,
+ (u_char *)pin, strlen(pin));
+ if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) {
+ error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv);
+ if ((rv = f->C_CloseSession(session)) != CKR_OK)
+ error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ p->slotinfo[slotidx].logged_in = 1;
+ }
+ p->slotinfo[slotidx].session = session;
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * lookup public keys for token in slot identified by slotidx,
+ * add 'wrapped' public keys to the 'keysp' array and increment nkeys.
+ * keysp points to an (possibly empty) array with *nkeys keys.
+ */
+static int pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *, CK_ULONG,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE [], CK_ATTRIBUTE [3], struct sshkey ***, int *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,4, 3 * sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE))));
+
+static int
+pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys)
+{
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubkey_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS cert_class = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pubkey_filter[] = {
+ { CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(pubkey_class) }
+ };
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_filter[] = {
+ { CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(cert_class) }
+ };
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pubkey_attribs[] = {
+ { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0 }
+ };
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_attribs[] = {
+ { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_SUBJECT, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 }
+ };
+ pubkey_filter[0].pValue = &pubkey_class;
+ cert_filter[0].pValue = &cert_class;
+
+ if (pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, pubkey_filter, pubkey_attribs,
+ keysp, nkeys) < 0 ||
+ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, cert_filter, cert_attribs,
+ keysp, nkeys) < 0)
+ return (-1);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_key_included(struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys, struct sshkey *key)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < *nkeys; i++)
+ if (sshkey_equal(key, (*keysp)[i]))
+ return (1);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE filter[], CK_ATTRIBUTE attribs[3],
+ struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys)
+{
+ struct sshkey *key;
+ RSA *rsa;
+ X509 *x509;
+ EVP_PKEY *evp;
+ int i;
+ const u_char *cp;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
+ CK_ULONG nfound;
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
+
+ f = p->function_list;
+ session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+ /* setup a filter the looks for public keys */
+ if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, filter, 1)) != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ while (1) {
+ /* XXX 3 attributes in attribs[] */
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ attribs[i].pValue = NULL;
+ attribs[i].ulValueLen = 0;
+ }
+ if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK
+ || nfound == 0)
+ break;
+ /* found a key, so figure out size of the attributes */
+ if ((rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attribs, 3))
+ != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but
+ * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
+ * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
+ */
+ if (attribs[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
+ attribs[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* allocate buffers for attributes */
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ if (attribs[i].ulValueLen > 0) {
+ attribs[i].pValue = xmalloc(
+ attribs[i].ulValueLen);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key,
+ * or ID, subject and value for certificates.
+ */
+ rsa = NULL;
+ if ((rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attribs, 3))
+ != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ } else if (attribs[1].type == CKA_MODULUS ) {
+ if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
+ error("RSA_new failed");
+ } else {
+ rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(attribs[1].pValue,
+ attribs[1].ulValueLen, NULL);
+ rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(attribs[2].pValue,
+ attribs[2].ulValueLen, NULL);
+ }
+ } else {
+ cp = attribs[2].pValue;
+ if ((x509 = X509_new()) == NULL) {
+ error("X509_new failed");
+ } else if (d2i_X509(&x509, &cp, attribs[2].ulValueLen)
+ == NULL) {
+ error("d2i_X509 failed");
+ } else if ((evp = X509_get_pubkey(x509)) == NULL ||
+ evp->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA ||
+ evp->pkey.rsa == NULL) {
+ debug("X509_get_pubkey failed or no rsa");
+ } else if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup(evp->pkey.rsa))
+ == NULL) {
+ error("RSAPublicKey_dup");
+ }
+ if (x509)
+ X509_free(x509);
+ }
+ if (rsa && rsa->n && rsa->e &&
+ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], rsa) == 0) {
+ key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+ key->rsa = rsa;
+ key->type = KEY_RSA;
+ key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
+ if (pkcs11_key_included(keysp, nkeys, key)) {
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ } else {
+ /* expand key array and add key */
+ *keysp = xreallocarray(*keysp, *nkeys + 1,
+ sizeof(struct sshkey *));
+ (*keysp)[*nkeys] = key;
+ *nkeys = *nkeys + 1;
+ debug("have %d keys", *nkeys);
+ }
+ } else if (rsa) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+ free(attribs[i].pValue);
+ }
+ if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK)
+ error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/* register a new provider, fails if provider already exists */
+int
+pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp)
+{
+ int nkeys, need_finalize = 0;
+ struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
+ void *handle = NULL;
+ CK_RV (*getfunctionlist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST **);
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
+ CK_TOKEN_INFO *token;
+ CK_ULONG i;
+
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) {
+ error("provider already registered: %s", provider_id);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /* open shared pkcs11-libarary */
+ if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) {
+ error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror());
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
+ error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p));
+ p->name = xstrdup(provider_id);
+ p->handle = handle;
+ /* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */
+ if ((rv = (*getfunctionlist)(&f)) != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_GetFunctionList failed: %lu", rv);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ p->function_list = f;
+ if ((rv = f->C_Initialize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_Initialize failed: %lu", rv);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ need_finalize = 1;
+ if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&p->info)) != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_GetInfo failed: %lu", rv);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ rmspace(p->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(p->info.manufacturerID));
+ rmspace(p->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(p->info.libraryDescription));
+ debug("manufacturerID <%s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d"
+ " libraryDescription <%s> libraryVersion %d.%d",
+ p->info.manufacturerID,
+ p->info.cryptokiVersion.major,
+ p->info.cryptokiVersion.minor,
+ p->info.libraryDescription,
+ p->info.libraryVersion.major,
+ p->info.libraryVersion.minor);
+ if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (p->nslots == 0) {
+ error("no slots");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ p->slotlist = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
+ if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, p->slotlist, &p->nslots))
+ != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ p->slotinfo = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo));
+ p->valid = 1;
+ nkeys = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
+ token = &p->slotinfo[i].token;
+ if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(p->slotlist[i], token))
+ != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_GetTokenInfo failed: %lu", rv);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
+ debug2("%s: ignoring uninitialised token in slot %lu",
+ __func__, (unsigned long)i);
+ continue;
+ }
+ rmspace(token->label, sizeof(token->label));
+ rmspace(token->manufacturerID, sizeof(token->manufacturerID));
+ rmspace(token->model, sizeof(token->model));
+ rmspace(token->serialNumber, sizeof(token->serialNumber));
+ debug("label <%s> manufacturerID <%s> model <%s> serial <%s>"
+ " flags 0x%lx",
+ token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model,
+ token->serialNumber, token->flags);
+ /* open session, login with pin and retrieve public keys */
+ if (pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin) == 0)
+ pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, &nkeys);
+ }
+ if (nkeys > 0) {
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
+ p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */
+ return (nkeys);
+ }
+ error("no keys");
+ /* don't add the provider, since it does not have any keys */
+fail:
+ if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
+ error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv);
+ if (p) {
+ free(p->slotlist);
+ free(p->slotinfo);
+ free(p);
+ }
+ if (handle)
+ dlclose(handle);
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+#else
+
+int
+pkcs11_init(int interactive)
+{
+ return (0);
+}
+
+void
+pkcs11_terminate(void)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.h,v 1.2 2010/02/24 06:12:53 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-int pkcs11_init(int);
-void pkcs11_terminate(void);
-int pkcs11_add_provider(char *, char *, Key ***);
-int pkcs11_del_provider(char *);
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.h,v 1.4 2015/01/15 09:40:00 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+int pkcs11_init(int);
+void pkcs11_terminate(void);
+int pkcs11_add_provider(char *, char *, struct sshkey ***);
+int pkcs11_del_provider(char *);
+
+#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(ENABLE_PKCS11)
+#undef ENABLE_PKCS11
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-rsa.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-rsa.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-rsa.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,259 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.51 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl <markus at openbsd.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-
-static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int, RSA *);
-
-/* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v2.0 signature) with SHA1 */
-int
-ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
- const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
- int hash_alg;
- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig;
- u_int slen, dlen, len;
- int ok, nid;
- Buffer b;
-
- if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
- key->rsa == NULL) {
- error("%s: no RSA key", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* hash the data */
- hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
- nid = NID_sha1;
- if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
- error("%s: bad hash algorithm %d", __func__, hash_alg);
- return -1;
- }
- if (ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
- digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0) {
- error("%s: ssh_digest_memory failed", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
- sig = xmalloc(slen);
-
- ok = RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa);
- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-
- if (ok != 1) {
- int ecode = ERR_get_error();
-
- error("%s: RSA_sign failed: %s", __func__,
- ERR_error_string(ecode, NULL));
- free(sig);
- return -1;
- }
- if (len < slen) {
- u_int diff = slen - len;
- debug("slen %u > len %u", slen, len);
- memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
- explicit_bzero(sig, diff);
- } else if (len > slen) {
- error("%s: slen %u slen2 %u", __func__, slen, len);
- free(sig);
- return -1;
- }
- /* encode signature */
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-rsa");
- buffer_put_string(&b, sig, slen);
- len = buffer_len(&b);
- if (lenp != NULL)
- *lenp = len;
- if (sigp != NULL) {
- *sigp = xmalloc(len);
- memcpy(*sigp, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
- }
- buffer_free(&b);
- explicit_bzero(sig, slen);
- free(sig);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
- const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
- Buffer b;
- int hash_alg;
- char *ktype;
- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob;
- u_int len, dlen, modlen;
- int rlen, ret;
-
- if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
- key->rsa == NULL) {
- error("%s: no RSA key", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
- error("%s: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
- __func__, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n),
- SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
- return -1;
- }
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen);
- ktype = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
- if (strcmp("ssh-rsa", ktype) != 0) {
- error("%s: cannot handle type %s", __func__, ktype);
- buffer_free(&b);
- free(ktype);
- return -1;
- }
- free(ktype);
- sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
- rlen = buffer_len(&b);
- buffer_free(&b);
- if (rlen != 0) {
- error("%s: remaining bytes in signature %d", __func__, rlen);
- free(sigblob);
- return -1;
- }
- /* RSA_verify expects a signature of RSA_size */
- modlen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
- if (len > modlen) {
- error("%s: len %u > modlen %u", __func__, len, modlen);
- free(sigblob);
- return -1;
- } else if (len < modlen) {
- u_int diff = modlen - len;
- debug("%s: add padding: modlen %u > len %u", __func__,
- modlen, len);
- sigblob = xrealloc(sigblob, 1, modlen);
- memmove(sigblob + diff, sigblob, len);
- explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff);
- len = modlen;
- }
- /* hash the data */
- hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
- if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
- error("%s: bad hash algorithm %d", __func__, hash_alg);
- return -1;
- }
- if (ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
- digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0) {
- error("%s: ssh_digest_memory failed", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len,
- key->rsa);
- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
- explicit_bzero(sigblob, len);
- free(sigblob);
- debug("%s: signature %scorrect", __func__, (ret == 0) ? "in" : "");
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * See:
- * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/
- * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn
- */
-/*
- * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
- * oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
- */
-static const u_char id_sha1[] = {
- 0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */
- 0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */
- 0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */
- 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */
- 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
- 0x04, 0x14 /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */
-};
-
-static int
-openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
- u_char *sigbuf, u_int siglen, RSA *rsa)
-{
- u_int ret, rsasize, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
- int len, oidmatch, hashmatch;
- const u_char *oid = NULL;
- u_char *decrypted = NULL;
-
- ret = 0;
- switch (hash_alg) {
- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
- oid = id_sha1;
- oidlen = sizeof(id_sha1);
- hlen = 20;
- break;
- default:
- goto done;
- }
- if (hashlen != hlen) {
- error("bad hashlen");
- goto done;
- }
- rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
- if (siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
- error("bad siglen");
- goto done;
- }
- decrypted = xmalloc(rsasize);
- if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa,
- RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) {
- error("RSA_public_decrypt failed: %s",
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
- goto done;
- }
- if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != hlen + oidlen) {
- error("bad decrypted len: %d != %d + %d", len, hlen, oidlen);
- goto done;
- }
- oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0;
- hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0;
- if (!oidmatch) {
- error("oid mismatch");
- goto done;
- }
- if (!hashmatch) {
- error("hash mismatch");
- goto done;
- }
- ret = 1;
-done:
- free(decrypted);
- return ret;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-rsa.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-rsa.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-rsa.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh-rsa.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.59 2016/04/21 06:08:02 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl <markus at openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *);
+
+static const char *
+rsa_hash_alg_ident(int hash_alg)
+{
+ switch (hash_alg) {
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
+ return "ssh-rsa";
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
+ return "rsa-sha2-256";
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
+ return "rsa-sha2-512";
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+rsa_hash_alg_from_ident(const char *ident)
+{
+ if (strcmp(ident, "ssh-rsa") == 0)
+ return SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
+ if (strcmp(ident, "rsa-sha2-256") == 0)
+ return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
+ if (strcmp(ident, "rsa-sha2-512") == 0)
+ return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int
+rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
+ return NID_sha1;
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
+ return NID_sha256;
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
+ return NID_sha512;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+/* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v2.0 signature) with SHA1 */
+int
+ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg_ident)
+{
+ u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL;
+ size_t slen;
+ u_int dlen, len;
+ int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = 0;
+ if (sigp != NULL)
+ *sigp = NULL;
+
+ if (alg_ident == NULL || strlen(alg_ident) == 0 ||
+ strncmp(alg_ident, "ssh-rsa-cert", strlen("ssh-rsa-cert")) == 0)
+ hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
+ else
+ hash_alg = rsa_hash_alg_from_ident(alg_ident);
+ if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 ||
+ sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
+ BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
+ if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ /* hash the data */
+ nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg);
+ if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
+ digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (len < slen) {
+ size_t diff = slen - len;
+ memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
+ explicit_bzero(sig, diff);
+ } else if (len > slen) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* encode signature */
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, rsa_hash_alg_ident(hash_alg))) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, sig, slen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ len = sshbuf_len(b);
+ if (sigp != NULL) {
+ if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
+ }
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = len;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+ if (sig != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(sig, slen);
+ free(sig);
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+ char *ktype = NULL;
+ int hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ size_t len, diff, modlen, dlen;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL;
+
+ if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL ||
+ sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
+ BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
+ sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((hash_alg = rsa_hash_alg_from_ident(ktype)) == -1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_get_string(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* RSA_verify expects a signature of RSA_size */
+ modlen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
+ if (len > modlen) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ } else if (len < modlen) {
+ diff = modlen - len;
+ osigblob = sigblob;
+ if ((sigblob = realloc(sigblob, modlen)) == NULL) {
+ sigblob = osigblob; /* put it back for clear/free */
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memmove(sigblob + diff, sigblob, len);
+ explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff);
+ len = modlen;
+ }
+ if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
+ digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len,
+ key->rsa);
+ out:
+ if (sigblob != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(sigblob, len);
+ free(sigblob);
+ }
+ free(ktype);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * See:
+ * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/
+ * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn
+ */
+
+/*
+ * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
+ * oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
+ */
+static const u_char id_sha1[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */
+ 0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */
+ 0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */
+ 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */
+ 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
+ 0x04, 0x14 /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */
+};
+
+/*
+ * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
+ * id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
+ * organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
+ * id-sha256(1) }
+ */
+static const u_char id_sha256[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x31, /* type Sequence, length 0x31 (49) */
+ 0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
+ 0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, /* id-sha256 */
+ 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
+ 0x04, 0x20 /* Octet string, length 0x20 (32), followed by sha256 hash */
+};
+
+/*
+ * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
+ * id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
+ * organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
+ * id-sha256(3) }
+ */
+static const u_char id_sha512[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x51, /* type Sequence, length 0x51 (81) */
+ 0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
+ 0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, /* id-sha512 */
+ 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
+ 0x04, 0x40 /* Octet string, length 0x40 (64), followed by sha512 hash */
+};
+
+static int
+rsa_hash_alg_oid(int hash_alg, const u_char **oidp, size_t *oidlenp)
+{
+ switch (hash_alg) {
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
+ *oidp = id_sha1;
+ *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha1);
+ break;
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
+ *oidp = id_sha256;
+ *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha256);
+ break;
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
+ *oidp = id_sha512;
+ *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha512);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen,
+ u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+ size_t rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
+ int ret, len, oidmatch, hashmatch;
+ const u_char *oid = NULL;
+ u_char *decrypted = NULL;
+
+ if ((ret = rsa_hash_alg_oid(hash_alg, &oid, &oidlen)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
+ if (hashlen != hlen) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
+ if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM ||
+ siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa,
+ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0;
+ hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0;
+ if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+done:
+ if (decrypted) {
+ explicit_bzero(decrypted, rsasize);
+ free(decrypted);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.0
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh.0 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,946 +0,0 @@
-SSH(1) OpenBSD Reference Manual SSH(1)
-
-NAME
- ssh - OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program)
-
-SYNOPSIS
- ssh [-1246AaCfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]
- [-D [bind_address:]port] [-E log_file] [-e escape_char]
- [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11] [-i identity_file]
- [-L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec]
- [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]
- [-Q cipher | cipher-auth | mac | kex | key]
- [-R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport] [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port]
- [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] [user@]hostname [command]
-
-DESCRIPTION
- ssh (SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
- executing commands on a remote machine. It is intended to replace rlogin
- and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two
- untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary
- TCP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
-
- ssh connects and logs into the specified hostname (with optional user
- name). The user must prove his/her identity to the remote machine using
- one of several methods depending on the protocol version used (see
- below).
-
- If command is specified, it is executed on the remote host instead of a
- login shell.
-
- The options are as follows:
-
- -1 Forces ssh to try protocol version 1 only.
-
- -2 Forces ssh to try protocol version 2 only.
-
- -4 Forces ssh to use IPv4 addresses only.
-
- -6 Forces ssh to use IPv6 addresses only.
-
- -A Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. This
- can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration
- file.
-
- Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
- ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
- agent's UNIX-domain socket) can access the local agent through
- the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material
- from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys
- that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into
- the agent.
-
- -a Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
-
- -b bind_address
- Use bind_address on the local machine as the source address of
- the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one
- address.
-
- -C Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout,
- stderr, and data for forwarded X11 and TCP connections). The
- compression algorithm is the same used by gzip(1), and the
- ``level'' can be controlled by the CompressionLevel option for
- protocol version 1. Compression is desirable on modem lines and
- other slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast
- networks. The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis
- in the configuration files; see the Compression option.
-
- -c cipher_spec
- Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session.
-
- Protocol version 1 allows specification of a single cipher. The
- supported values are ``3des'', ``blowfish'', and ``des''. 3des
- (triple-des) is an encrypt-decrypt-encrypt triple with three
- different keys. It is believed to be secure. blowfish is a fast
- block cipher; it appears very secure and is much faster than
- 3des. des is only supported in the ssh client for
- interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations that do
- not support the 3des cipher. Its use is strongly discouraged due
- to cryptographic weaknesses. The default is ``3des''.
-
- For protocol version 2, cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of
- ciphers listed in order of preference. See the Ciphers keyword
- in ssh_config(5) for more information.
-
- -D [bind_address:]port
- Specifies a local ``dynamic'' application-level port forwarding.
- This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local
- side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address. Whenever a
- connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over
- the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to
- determine where to connect to from the remote machine. Currently
- the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and ssh will act
- as a SOCKS server. Only root can forward privileged ports.
- Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the
- configuration file.
-
- IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in
- square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged
- ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with
- the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may
- be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The
- bind_address of ``localhost'' indicates that the listening port
- be bound for local use only, while an empty address or `*'
- indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
-
- -E log_file
- Append debug logs to log_file instead of standard error.
-
- -e escape_char
- Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: `~').
- The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a
- line. The escape character followed by a dot (`.') closes the
- connection; followed by control-Z suspends the connection; and
- followed by itself sends the escape character once. Setting the
- character to ``none'' disables any escapes and makes the session
- fully transparent.
-
- -F configfile
- Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. If a
- configuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide
- configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config) will be ignored. The
- default for the per-user configuration file is ~/.ssh/config.
-
- -f Requests ssh to go to background just before command execution.
- This is useful if ssh is going to ask for passwords or
- passphrases, but the user wants it in the background. This
- implies -n. The recommended way to start X11 programs at a
- remote site is with something like ssh -f host xterm.
-
- If the ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to
- ``yes'', then a client started with -f will wait for all remote
- port forwards to be successfully established before placing
- itself in the background.
-
- -g Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports.
-
- -I pkcs11
- Specify the PKCS#11 shared library ssh should use to communicate
- with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's private RSA key.
-
- -i identity_file
- Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for public
- key authentication is read. The default is ~/.ssh/identity for
- protocol version 1, and ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa,
- ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and ~/.ssh/id_rsa for protocol version 2.
- Identity files may also be specified on a per-host basis in the
- configuration file. It is possible to have multiple -i options
- (and multiple identities specified in configuration files). ssh
- will also try to load certificate information from the filename
- obtained by appending -cert.pub to identity filenames.
-
- -K Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation)
- of GSSAPI credentials to the server.
-
- -k Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the
- server.
-
- -L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport
- Specifies that the given port on the local (client) host is to be
- forwarded to the given host and port on the remote side. This
- works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local side,
- optionally bound to the specified bind_address. Whenever a
- connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over
- the secure channel, and a connection is made to host port
- hostport from the remote machine. Port forwardings can also be
- specified in the configuration file. IPv6 addresses can be
- specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Only the
- superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local
- port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting.
- However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind the
- connection to a specific address. The bind_address of
- ``localhost'' indicates that the listening port be bound for
- local use only, while an empty address or `*' indicates that the
- port should be available from all interfaces.
-
- -l login_name
- Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine. This also
- may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
-
- -M Places the ssh client into ``master'' mode for connection
- sharing. Multiple -M options places ssh into ``master'' mode
- with confirmation required before slave connections are accepted.
- Refer to the description of ControlMaster in ssh_config(5) for
- details.
-
- -m mac_spec
- Additionally, for protocol version 2 a comma-separated list of
- MAC (message authentication code) algorithms can be specified in
- order of preference. See the MACs keyword for more information.
-
- -N Do not execute a remote command. This is useful for just
- forwarding ports (protocol version 2 only).
-
- -n Redirects stdin from /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from
- stdin). This must be used when ssh is run in the background. A
- common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote
- machine. For example, ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will
- start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will
- be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. The ssh
- program will be put in the background. (This does not work if
- ssh needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the -f
- option.)
-
- -O ctl_cmd
- Control an active connection multiplexing master process. When
- the -O option is specified, the ctl_cmd argument is interpreted
- and passed to the master process. Valid commands are: ``check''
- (check that the master process is running), ``forward'' (request
- forwardings without command execution), ``cancel'' (cancel
- forwardings), ``exit'' (request the master to exit), and ``stop''
- (request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing
- requests).
-
- -o option
- Can be used to give options in the format used in the
- configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for
- which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details
- of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
- ssh_config(5).
-
- AddressFamily
- BatchMode
- BindAddress
- CanonicalDomains
- CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
- CanonicalizeHostname
- CanonicalizeMaxDots
- CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
- ChallengeResponseAuthentication
- CheckHostIP
- Cipher
- Ciphers
- ClearAllForwardings
- Compression
- CompressionLevel
- ConnectionAttempts
- ConnectTimeout
- ControlMaster
- ControlPath
- ControlPersist
- DynamicForward
- EscapeChar
- ExitOnForwardFailure
- ForwardAgent
- ForwardX11
- ForwardX11Timeout
- ForwardX11Trusted
- GatewayPorts
- GlobalKnownHostsFile
- GSSAPIAuthentication
- GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
- HashKnownHosts
- Host
- HostbasedAuthentication
- HostKeyAlgorithms
- HostKeyAlias
- HostName
- IdentityFile
- IdentitiesOnly
- IPQoS
- KbdInteractiveAuthentication
- KbdInteractiveDevices
- KexAlgorithms
- LocalCommand
- LocalForward
- LogLevel
- MACs
- Match
- NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
- NumberOfPasswordPrompts
- PasswordAuthentication
- PermitLocalCommand
- PKCS11Provider
- Port
- PreferredAuthentications
- Protocol
- ProxyCommand
- ProxyUseFdpass
- PubkeyAuthentication
- RekeyLimit
- RemoteForward
- RequestTTY
- RhostsRSAAuthentication
- RSAAuthentication
- SendEnv
- ServerAliveInterval
- ServerAliveCountMax
- StrictHostKeyChecking
- TCPKeepAlive
- Tunnel
- TunnelDevice
- UsePrivilegedPort
- User
- UserKnownHostsFile
- VerifyHostKeyDNS
- VisualHostKey
- XAuthLocation
-
- -p port
- Port to connect to on the remote host. This can be specified on
- a per-host basis in the configuration file.
-
- -Q cipher | cipher-auth | mac | kex | key
- Queries ssh for the algorithms supported for the specified
- version 2. The available features are: cipher (supported
- symmetric ciphers), cipher-auth (supported symmetric ciphers that
- support authenticated encryption), mac (supported message
- integrity codes), kex (key exchange algorithms), key (key types).
-
- -q Quiet mode. Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be
- suppressed.
-
- -R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport
- Specifies that the given port on the remote (server) host is to
- be forwarded to the given host and port on the local side. This
- works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the remote
- side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the
- connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection
- is made to host port hostport from the local machine.
-
- Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
- Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on
- the remote machine. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing
- the address in square brackets.
-
- By default, the listening socket on the server will be bound to
- the loopback interface only. This may be overridden by
- specifying a bind_address. An empty bind_address, or the address
- `*', indicates that the remote socket should listen on all
- interfaces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed
- if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see
- sshd_config(5)).
-
- If the port argument is `0', the listen port will be dynamically
- allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time.
- When used together with -O forward the allocated port will be
- printed to the standard output.
-
- -S ctl_path
- Specifies the location of a control socket for connection
- sharing, or the string ``none'' to disable connection sharing.
- Refer to the description of ControlPath and ControlMaster in
- ssh_config(5) for details.
-
- -s May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote
- system. Subsystems are a feature of the SSH2 protocol which
- facilitate the use of SSH as a secure transport for other
- applications (eg. sftp(1)). The subsystem is specified as the
- remote command.
-
- -T Disable pseudo-tty allocation.
-
- -t Force pseudo-tty allocation. This can be used to execute
- arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be
- very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services. Multiple -t
- options force tty allocation, even if ssh has no local tty.
-
- -V Display the version number and exit.
-
- -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh to print debugging messages about its
- progress. This is helpful in debugging connection,
- authentication, and configuration problems. Multiple -v options
- increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3.
-
- -W host:port
- Requests that standard input and output on the client be
- forwarded to host on port over the secure channel. Implies -N,
- -T, ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings. Works with
- Protocol version 2 only.
-
- -w local_tun[:remote_tun]
- Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified tun(4)
- devices between the client (local_tun) and the server
- (remote_tun).
-
- The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
- ``any'', which uses the next available tunnel device. If
- remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to ``any''. See also
- the Tunnel and TunnelDevice directives in ssh_config(5). If the
- Tunnel directive is unset, it is set to the default tunnel mode,
- which is ``point-to-point''.
-
- -X Enables X11 forwarding. This can also be specified on a per-host
- basis in a configuration file.
-
- X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
- ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
- user's X authorization database) can access the local X11 display
- through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able
- to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring.
-
- For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY
- extension restrictions by default. Please refer to the ssh -Y
- option and the ForwardX11Trusted directive in ssh_config(5) for
- more information.
-
- -x Disables X11 forwarding.
-
- -Y Enables trusted X11 forwarding. Trusted X11 forwardings are not
- subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls.
-
- -y Send log information using the syslog(3) system module. By
- default this information is sent to stderr.
-
- ssh may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user
- configuration file and a system-wide configuration file. The file format
- and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5).
-
-AUTHENTICATION
- The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocols 1 and 2. The default is to
- use protocol 2 only, though this can be changed via the Protocol option
- in ssh_config(5) or the -1 and -2 options (see above). Both protocols
- support similar authentication methods, but protocol 2 is the default
- since it provides additional mechanisms for confidentiality (the traffic
- is encrypted using AES, 3DES, Blowfish, CAST128, or Arcfour) and
- integrity (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512, umac-64,
- umac-128, hmac-ripemd160). Protocol 1 lacks a strong mechanism for
- ensuring the integrity of the connection.
-
- The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based
- authentication, host-based authentication, public key authentication,
- challenge-response authentication, and password authentication.
- Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above, though
- protocol 2 has a configuration option to change the default order:
- PreferredAuthentications.
-
- Host-based authentication works as follows: If the machine the user logs
- in from is listed in /etc/hosts.equiv or /etc/shosts.equiv on the remote
- machine, and the user names are the same on both sides, or if the files
- ~/.rhosts or ~/.shosts exist in the user's home directory on the remote
- machine and contain a line containing the name of the client machine and
- the name of the user on that machine, the user is considered for login.
- Additionally, the server must be able to verify the client's host key
- (see the description of /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts,
- below) for login to be permitted. This authentication method closes
- security holes due to IP spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing.
- [Note to the administrator: /etc/hosts.equiv, ~/.rhosts, and the
- rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be
- disabled if security is desired.]
-
- Public key authentication works as follows: The scheme is based on
- public-key cryptography, using cryptosystems where encryption and
- decryption are done using separate keys, and it is unfeasible to derive
- the decryption key from the encryption key. The idea is that each user
- creates a public/private key pair for authentication purposes. The
- server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key.
- ssh implements public key authentication protocol automatically, using
- one of the DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 or RSA algorithms. Protocol 1 is
- restricted to using only RSA keys, but protocol 2 may use any. The
- HISTORY section of ssl(8) contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA
- algorithms.
-
- The file ~/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public keys that are permitted
- for logging in. When the user logs in, the ssh program tells the server
- which key pair it would like to use for authentication. The client
- proves that it has access to the private key and the server checks that
- the corresponding public key is authorized to accept the account.
-
- The user creates his/her key pair by running ssh-keygen(1). This stores
- the private key in ~/.ssh/identity (protocol 1), ~/.ssh/id_dsa (protocol
- 2 DSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa (protocol 2 ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 (protocol 2
- ED25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa (protocol 2 RSA) and stores the public key in
- ~/.ssh/identity.pub (protocol 1), ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (protocol 2 DSA),
- ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub (protocol 2 ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub (protocol 2
- ED25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (protocol 2 RSA) in the user's home
- directory. The user should then copy the public key to
- ~/.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her home directory on the remote machine.
- The authorized_keys file corresponds to the conventional ~/.rhosts file,
- and has one key per line, though the lines can be very long. After this,
- the user can log in without giving the password.
-
- A variation on public key authentication is available in the form of
- certificate authentication: instead of a set of public/private keys,
- signed certificates are used. This has the advantage that a single
- trusted certification authority can be used in place of many
- public/private keys. See the CERTIFICATES section of ssh-keygen(1) for
- more information.
-
- The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication
- may be with an authentication agent. See ssh-agent(1) for more
- information.
-
- Challenge-response authentication works as follows: The server sends an
- arbitrary "challenge" text, and prompts for a response. Protocol 2
- allows multiple challenges and responses; protocol 1 is restricted to
- just one challenge/response. Examples of challenge-response
- authentication include BSD Authentication (see login.conf(5)) and PAM
- (some non-OpenBSD systems).
-
- Finally, if other authentication methods fail, ssh prompts the user for a
- password. The password is sent to the remote host for checking; however,
- since all communications are encrypted, the password cannot be seen by
- someone listening on the network.
-
- ssh automatically maintains and checks a database containing
- identification for all hosts it has ever been used with. Host keys are
- stored in ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory. Additionally,
- the file /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known
- hosts. Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. If a
- host's identification ever changes, ssh warns about this and disables
- password authentication to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle
- attacks, which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. The
- StrictHostKeyChecking option can be used to control logins to machines
- whose host key is not known or has changed.
-
- When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server
- either executes the given command, or logs into the machine and gives the
- user a normal shell on the remote machine. All communication with the
- remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
-
- If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated (normal login session), the user
- may use the escape characters noted below.
-
- If no pseudo-tty has been allocated, the session is transparent and can
- be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting the
- escape character to ``none'' will also make the session transparent even
- if a tty is used.
-
- The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine
- exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed.
-
-ESCAPE CHARACTERS
- When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, ssh supports a number of
- functions through the use of an escape character.
-
- A single tilde character can be sent as ~~ or by following the tilde by a
- character other than those described below. The escape character must
- always follow a newline to be interpreted as special. The escape
- character can be changed in configuration files using the EscapeChar
- configuration directive or on the command line by the -e option.
-
- The supported escapes (assuming the default `~') are:
-
- ~. Disconnect.
-
- ~^Z Background ssh.
-
- ~# List forwarded connections.
-
- ~& Background ssh at logout when waiting for forwarded connection /
- X11 sessions to terminate.
-
- ~? Display a list of escape characters.
-
- ~B Send a BREAK to the remote system (only useful for SSH protocol
- version 2 and if the peer supports it).
-
- ~C Open command line. Currently this allows the addition of port
- forwardings using the -L, -R and -D options (see above). It also
- allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings with
- -KL[bind_address:]port for local, -KR[bind_address:]port for
- remote and -KD[bind_address:]port for dynamic port-forwardings.
- !command allows the user to execute a local command if the
- PermitLocalCommand option is enabled in ssh_config(5). Basic
- help is available, using the -h option.
-
- ~R Request rekeying of the connection (only useful for SSH protocol
- version 2 and if the peer supports it).
-
- ~V Decrease the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written
- to stderr.
-
- ~v Increase the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written
- to stderr.
-
-TCP FORWARDING
- Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over the secure channel can be
- specified either on the command line or in a configuration file. One
- possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a mail
- server; another is going through firewalls.
-
- In the example below, we look at encrypting communication between an IRC
- client and server, even though the IRC server does not directly support
- encrypted communications. This works as follows: the user connects to
- the remote host using ssh, specifying a port to be used to forward
- connections to the remote server. After that it is possible to start the
- service which is to be encrypted on the client machine, connecting to the
- same local port, and ssh will encrypt and forward the connection.
-
- The following example tunnels an IRC session from client machine
- ``127.0.0.1'' (localhost) to remote server ``server.example.com'':
-
- $ ssh -f -L 1234:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10
- $ irc -c '#users' -p 1234 pinky 127.0.0.1
-
- This tunnels a connection to IRC server ``server.example.com'', joining
- channel ``#users'', nickname ``pinky'', using port 1234. It doesn't
- matter which port is used, as long as it's greater than 1023 (remember,
- only root can open sockets on privileged ports) and doesn't conflict with
- any ports already in use. The connection is forwarded to port 6667 on
- the remote server, since that's the standard port for IRC services.
-
- The -f option backgrounds ssh and the remote command ``sleep 10'' is
- specified to allow an amount of time (10 seconds, in the example) to
- start the service which is to be tunnelled. If no connections are made
- within the time specified, ssh will exit.
-
-X11 FORWARDING
- If the ForwardX11 variable is set to ``yes'' (or see the description of
- the -X, -x, and -Y options above) and the user is using X11 (the DISPLAY
- environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is
- automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11
- programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the
- encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made
- from the local machine. The user should not manually set DISPLAY.
- Forwarding of X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in
- configuration files.
-
- The DISPLAY value set by ssh will point to the server machine, but with a
- display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens because
- ssh creates a ``proxy'' X server on the server machine for forwarding the
- connections over the encrypted channel.
-
- ssh will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine.
- For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, store
- it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded connections
- carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when the connection
- is opened. The real authentication cookie is never sent to the server
- machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain).
-
- If the ForwardAgent variable is set to ``yes'' (or see the description of
- the -A and -a options above) and the user is using an authentication
- agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the
- remote side.
-
-VERIFYING HOST KEYS
- When connecting to a server for the first time, a fingerprint of the
- server's public key is presented to the user (unless the option
- StrictHostKeyChecking has been disabled). Fingerprints can be determined
- using ssh-keygen(1):
-
- $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
-
- If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched and the key can be
- accepted or rejected. Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys
- just by looking at hex strings, there is also support to compare host
- keys visually, using random art. By setting the VisualHostKey option to
- ``yes'', a small ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server,
- no matter if the session itself is interactive or not. By learning the
- pattern a known server produces, a user can easily find out that the host
- key has changed when a completely different pattern is displayed.
- Because these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks
- similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good probability that the
- host key is the same, not guaranteed proof.
-
- To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for all
- known hosts, the following command line can be used:
-
- $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts
-
- If the fingerprint is unknown, an alternative method of verification is
- available: SSH fingerprints verified by DNS. An additional resource
- record (RR), SSHFP, is added to a zonefile and the connecting client is
- able to match the fingerprint with that of the key presented.
-
- In this example, we are connecting a client to a server,
- ``host.example.com''. The SSHFP resource records should first be added
- to the zonefile for host.example.com:
-
- $ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com.
-
- The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile. To check that
- the zone is answering fingerprint queries:
-
- $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com
-
- Finally the client connects:
-
- $ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com
- [...]
- Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS.
- Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
-
- See the VerifyHostKeyDNS option in ssh_config(5) for more information.
-
-SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS
- ssh contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling using
- the tun(4) network pseudo-device, allowing two networks to be joined
- securely. The sshd_config(5) configuration option PermitTunnel controls
- whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer 2 or 3
- traffic).
-
- The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 with
- remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection from
- 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2, provided that the SSH server running on the gateway
- to the remote network, at 192.168.1.15, allows it.
-
- On the client:
-
- # ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true
- # ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252
- # route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2
-
- On the server:
-
- # ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252
- # route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1
-
- Client access may be more finely tuned via the /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
- file (see below) and the PermitRootLogin server option. The following
- entry would permit connections on tun(4) device 1 from user ``jane'' and
- on tun device 2 from user ``john'', if PermitRootLogin is set to
- ``forced-commands-only'':
-
- tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane
- tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john
-
- Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead, it may be
- more suited to temporary setups, such as for wireless VPNs. More
- permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as ipsecctl(8) and
- isakmpd(8).
-
-ENVIRONMENT
- ssh will normally set the following environment variables:
-
- DISPLAY The DISPLAY variable indicates the location of the
- X11 server. It is automatically set by ssh to
- point to a value of the form ``hostname:n'', where
- ``hostname'' indicates the host where the shell
- runs, and `n' is an integer >= 1. ssh uses this
- special value to forward X11 connections over the
- secure channel. The user should normally not set
- DISPLAY explicitly, as that will render the X11
- connection insecure (and will require the user to
- manually copy any required authorization cookies).
-
- HOME Set to the path of the user's home directory.
-
- LOGNAME Synonym for USER; set for compatibility with
- systems that use this variable.
-
- MAIL Set to the path of the user's mailbox.
-
- PATH Set to the default PATH, as specified when
- compiling ssh.
-
- SSH_ASKPASS If ssh needs a passphrase, it will read the
- passphrase from the current terminal if it was run
- from a terminal. If ssh does not have a terminal
- associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS are
- set, it will execute the program specified by
- SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the
- passphrase. This is particularly useful when
- calling ssh from a .xsession or related script.
- (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to
- redirect the input from /dev/null to make this
- work.)
-
- SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to
- communicate with the agent.
-
- SSH_CONNECTION Identifies the client and server ends of the
- connection. The variable contains four space-
- separated values: client IP address, client port
- number, server IP address, and server port number.
-
- SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND This variable contains the original command line if
- a forced command is executed. It can be used to
- extract the original arguments.
-
- SSH_TTY This is set to the name of the tty (path to the
- device) associated with the current shell or
- command. If the current session has no tty, this
- variable is not set.
-
- TZ This variable is set to indicate the present time
- zone if it was set when the daemon was started
- (i.e. the daemon passes the value on to new
- connections).
-
- USER Set to the name of the user logging in.
-
- Additionally, ssh reads ~/.ssh/environment, and adds lines of the format
- ``VARNAME=value'' to the environment if the file exists and users are
- allowed to change their environment. For more information, see the
- PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5).
-
-FILES
- ~/.rhosts
- This file is used for host-based authentication (see above). On
- some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the
- user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because sshd(8)
- reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the
- user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The
- recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the
- user, and not accessible by others.
-
- ~/.shosts
- This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows
- host-based authentication without permitting login with
- rlogin/rsh.
-
- ~/.ssh/
- This directory is the default location for all user-specific
- configuration and authentication information. There is no
- general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
- secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute
- for the user, and not accessible by others.
-
- ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
- Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, ED25519, RSA) that can be used
- for logging in as this user. The format of this file is
- described in the sshd(8) manual page. This file is not highly
- sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the
- user, and not accessible by others.
-
- ~/.ssh/config
- This is the per-user configuration file. The file format and
- configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). Because of
- the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
- read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
-
- ~/.ssh/environment
- Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
- ENVIRONMENT, above.
-
- ~/.ssh/identity
- ~/.ssh/id_dsa
- ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
- ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
- ~/.ssh/id_rsa
- Contains the private key for authentication. These files contain
- sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not
- accessible by others (read/write/execute). ssh will simply
- ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others. It is
- possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key which
- will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using
- 3DES.
-
- ~/.ssh/identity.pub
- ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
- ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
- ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
- ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
- Contains the public key for authentication. These files are not
- sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone.
-
- ~/.ssh/known_hosts
- Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged
- into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host
- keys. See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this
- file.
-
- ~/.ssh/rc
- Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in,
- just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the
- sshd(8) manual page for more information.
-
- /etc/hosts.equiv
- This file is for host-based authentication (see above). It
- should only be writable by root.
-
- /etc/shosts.equiv
- This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but
- allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
- rlogin/rsh.
-
- /etc/ssh/ssh_config
- Systemwide configuration file. The file format and configuration
- options are described in ssh_config(5).
-
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
- These files contain the private parts of the host keys and are
- used for host-based authentication. If protocol version 1 is
- used, ssh must be setuid root, since the host key is readable
- only by root. For protocol version 2, ssh uses ssh-keysign(8) to
- access the host keys, eliminating the requirement that ssh be
- setuid root when host-based authentication is used. By default
- ssh is not setuid root.
-
- /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
- Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared
- by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of
- all machines in the organization. It should be world-readable.
- See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this file.
-
- /etc/ssh/sshrc
- Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in,
- just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the
- sshd(8) manual page for more information.
-
-EXIT STATUS
- ssh exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an
- error occurred.
-
-SEE ALSO
- scp(1), sftp(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh-keyscan(1),
- tun(4), hosts.equiv(5), ssh_config(5), ssh-keysign(8), sshd(8)
-
-STANDARDS
- S. Lehtinen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned
- Numbers, RFC 4250, January 2006.
-
- T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture,
- RFC 4251, January 2006.
-
- T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol,
- RFC 4252, January 2006.
-
- T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
- Protocol, RFC 4253, January 2006.
-
- T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol, RFC
- 4254, January 2006.
-
- J. Schlyter and W. Griffin, Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell
- (SSH) Key Fingerprints, RFC 4255, January 2006.
-
- F. Cusack and M. Forssen, Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the
- Secure Shell Protocol (SSH), RFC 4256, January 2006.
-
- J. Galbraith and P. Remaker, The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break
- Extension, RFC 4335, January 2006.
-
- M. Bellare, T. Kohno, and C. Namprempre, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport
- Layer Encryption Modes, RFC 4344, January 2006.
-
- B. Harris, Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport
- Layer Protocol, RFC 4345, January 2006.
-
- M. Friedl, N. Provos, and W. Simpson, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for
- the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006.
-
- J. Galbraith and R. Thayer, The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File
- Format, RFC 4716, November 2006.
-
- D. Stebila and J. Green, Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
- Secure Shell Transport Layer, RFC 5656, December 2009.
-
- A. Perrig and D. Song, Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve
- Real-World Security, 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
- Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99).
-
-AUTHORS
- OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
- Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
- de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
- created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
- versions 1.5 and 2.0.
-
-OpenBSD 5.5 December 7, 2013 OpenBSD 5.5
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.0 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh.0)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.0 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,971 @@
+SSH(1) General Commands Manual SSH(1)
+
+NAME
+ ssh M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program)
+
+SYNOPSIS
+ ssh [-1246AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]
+ [-D [bind_address:]port] [-E log_file] [-e escape_char]
+ [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11] [-i identity_file]
+ [-J [user@]host[:port]] [-L address] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec]
+ [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port] [-Q query_option] [-R address]
+ [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port] [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]]
+ [user@]hostname [command]
+
+DESCRIPTION
+ ssh (SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
+ executing commands on a remote machine. It is intended to provide secure
+ encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure
+ network. X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and UNIX-domain sockets
+ can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+
+ ssh connects and logs into the specified hostname (with optional user
+ name). The user must prove his/her identity to the remote machine using
+ one of several methods (see below).
+
+ If command is specified, it is executed on the remote host instead of a
+ login shell.
+
+ The options are as follows:
+
+ -1 Forces ssh to try protocol version 1 only.
+
+ -2 Forces ssh to try protocol version 2 only.
+
+ -4 Forces ssh to use IPv4 addresses only.
+
+ -6 Forces ssh to use IPv6 addresses only.
+
+ -A Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. This
+ can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration
+ file.
+
+ Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
+ ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
+ agent's UNIX-domain socket) can access the local agent through
+ the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material
+ from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys
+ that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into
+ the agent.
+
+ -a Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
+
+ -b bind_address
+ Use bind_address on the local machine as the source address of
+ the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one
+ address.
+
+ -C Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout,
+ stderr, and data for forwarded X11, TCP and UNIX-domain
+ connections). The compression algorithm is the same used by
+ gzip(1), and the M-bM-^@M-^\levelM-bM-^@M-^] can be controlled by the
+ CompressionLevel option for protocol version 1. Compression is
+ desirable on modem lines and other slow connections, but will
+ only slow down things on fast networks. The default value can be
+ set on a host-by-host basis in the configuration files; see the
+ Compression option.
+
+ -c cipher_spec
+ Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session.
+
+ Protocol version 1 allows specification of a single cipher. The
+ supported values are M-bM-^@M-^\3desM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\blowfishM-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\desM-bM-^@M-^]. For protocol
+ version 2, cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of ciphers
+ listed in order of preference. See the Ciphers keyword in
+ ssh_config(5) for more information.
+
+ -D [bind_address:]port
+ Specifies a local M-bM-^@M-^\dynamicM-bM-^@M-^] application-level port forwarding.
+ This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local
+ side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address. Whenever a
+ connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over
+ the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to
+ determine where to connect to from the remote machine. Currently
+ the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and ssh will act
+ as a SOCKS server. Only root can forward privileged ports.
+ Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the
+ configuration file.
+
+ IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in
+ square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged
+ ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with
+ the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may
+ be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The
+ bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be
+ bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates
+ that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+
+ -E log_file
+ Append debug logs to log_file instead of standard error.
+
+ -e escape_char
+ Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y).
+ The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a
+ line. The escape character followed by a dot (M-bM-^@M-^X.M-bM-^@M-^Y) closes the
+ connection; followed by control-Z suspends the connection; and
+ followed by itself sends the escape character once. Setting the
+ character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] disables any escapes and makes the session
+ fully transparent.
+
+ -F configfile
+ Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. If a
+ configuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide
+ configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config) will be ignored. The
+ default for the per-user configuration file is ~/.ssh/config.
+
+ -f Requests ssh to go to background just before command execution.
+ This is useful if ssh is going to ask for passwords or
+ passphrases, but the user wants it in the background. This
+ implies -n. The recommended way to start X11 programs at a
+ remote site is with something like ssh -f host xterm.
+
+ If the ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^],
+ then a client started with -f will wait for all remote port
+ forwards to be successfully established before placing itself in
+ the background.
+
+ -G Causes ssh to print its configuration after evaluating Host and
+ Match blocks and exit.
+
+ -g Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports. If used
+ on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified
+ on the master process.
+
+ -I pkcs11
+ Specify the PKCS#11 shared library ssh should use to communicate
+ with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's private RSA key.
+
+ -i identity_file
+ Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for public
+ key authentication is read. The default is ~/.ssh/identity for
+ protocol version 1, and ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa,
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and ~/.ssh/id_rsa for protocol version 2.
+ Identity files may also be specified on a per-host basis in the
+ configuration file. It is possible to have multiple -i options
+ (and multiple identities specified in configuration files). If
+ no certificates have been explicitly specified by the
+ CertificateFile directive, ssh will also try to load certificate
+ information from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to
+ identity filenames.
+
+ -J [user@]host[:port]
+ Connect to the target host by first making a ssh connection to
+ the jump host and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the
+ ultimate destination from there. Multiple jump hops may be
+ specified separated by comma characters. This is a shortcut to
+ specify a ProxyJump configuration directive.
+
+ -K Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation)
+ of GSSAPI credentials to the server.
+
+ -k Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the
+ server.
+
+ -L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport
+ -L [bind_address:]port:remote_socket
+ -L local_socket:host:hostport
+ -L local_socket:remote_socket
+ Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket
+ on the local (client) host are to be forwarded to the given host
+ and port, or Unix socket, on the remote side. This works by
+ allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP port on the local
+ side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address, or to a
+ Unix socket. Whenever a connection is made to the local port or
+ socket, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and
+ a connection is made to either host port hostport, or the Unix
+ socket remote_socket, from the remote machine.
+
+ Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+ Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. IPv6 addresses
+ can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
+
+ By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
+ GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be
+ used to bind the connection to a specific address. The
+ bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be
+ bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates
+ that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+
+ -l login_name
+ Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine. This also
+ may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+
+ -M Places the ssh client into M-bM-^@M-^\masterM-bM-^@M-^] mode for connection sharing.
+ Multiple -M options places ssh into M-bM-^@M-^\masterM-bM-^@M-^] mode with
+ confirmation required before slave connections are accepted.
+ Refer to the description of ControlMaster in ssh_config(5) for
+ details.
+
+ -m mac_spec
+ A comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code)
+ algorithms, specified in order of preference. See the MACs
+ keyword for more information.
+
+ -N Do not execute a remote command. This is useful for just
+ forwarding ports.
+
+ -n Redirects stdin from /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from
+ stdin). This must be used when ssh is run in the background. A
+ common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote
+ machine. For example, ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will
+ start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will
+ be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. The ssh
+ program will be put in the background. (This does not work if
+ ssh needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the -f
+ option.)
+
+ -O ctl_cmd
+ Control an active connection multiplexing master process. When
+ the -O option is specified, the ctl_cmd argument is interpreted
+ and passed to the master process. Valid commands are: M-bM-^@M-^\checkM-bM-^@M-^]
+ (check that the master process is running), M-bM-^@M-^\forwardM-bM-^@M-^] (request
+ forwardings without command execution), M-bM-^@M-^\cancelM-bM-^@M-^] (cancel
+ forwardings), M-bM-^@M-^\exitM-bM-^@M-^] (request the master to exit), and M-bM-^@M-^\stopM-bM-^@M-^]
+ (request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing
+ requests).
+
+ -o option
+ Can be used to give options in the format used in the
+ configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for
+ which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details
+ of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+ ssh_config(5).
+
+ AddKeysToAgent
+ AddressFamily
+ BatchMode
+ BindAddress
+ CanonicalDomains
+ CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+ CanonicalizeHostname
+ CanonicalizeMaxDots
+ CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+ CertificateFile
+ ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+ CheckHostIP
+ Cipher
+ Ciphers
+ ClearAllForwardings
+ Compression
+ CompressionLevel
+ ConnectionAttempts
+ ConnectTimeout
+ ControlMaster
+ ControlPath
+ ControlPersist
+ DynamicForward
+ EscapeChar
+ ExitOnForwardFailure
+ FingerprintHash
+ ForwardAgent
+ ForwardX11
+ ForwardX11Timeout
+ ForwardX11Trusted
+ GatewayPorts
+ GlobalKnownHostsFile
+ GSSAPIAuthentication
+ GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ HashKnownHosts
+ Host
+ HostbasedAuthentication
+ HostbasedKeyTypes
+ HostKeyAlgorithms
+ HostKeyAlias
+ HostName
+ IdentitiesOnly
+ IdentityAgent
+ IdentityFile
+ Include
+ IPQoS
+ KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+ KbdInteractiveDevices
+ KexAlgorithms
+ LocalCommand
+ LocalForward
+ LogLevel
+ MACs
+ Match
+ NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+ NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+ PasswordAuthentication
+ PermitLocalCommand
+ PKCS11Provider
+ Port
+ PreferredAuthentications
+ Protocol
+ ProxyCommand
+ ProxyJump
+ ProxyUseFdpass
+ PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+ PubkeyAuthentication
+ RekeyLimit
+ RemoteForward
+ RequestTTY
+ RhostsRSAAuthentication
+ RSAAuthentication
+ SendEnv
+ ServerAliveInterval
+ ServerAliveCountMax
+ StreamLocalBindMask
+ StreamLocalBindUnlink
+ StrictHostKeyChecking
+ TCPKeepAlive
+ Tunnel
+ TunnelDevice
+ UpdateHostKeys
+ UsePrivilegedPort
+ User
+ UserKnownHostsFile
+ VerifyHostKeyDNS
+ VisualHostKey
+ XAuthLocation
+
+ -p port
+ Port to connect to on the remote host. This can be specified on
+ a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+
+ -Q query_option
+ Queries ssh for the algorithms supported for the specified
+ version 2. The available features are: cipher (supported
+ symmetric ciphers), cipher-auth (supported symmetric ciphers that
+ support authenticated encryption), mac (supported message
+ integrity codes), kex (key exchange algorithms), key (key types),
+ key-cert (certificate key types), key-plain (non-certificate key
+ types), and protocol-version (supported SSH protocol versions).
+
+ -q Quiet mode. Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be
+ suppressed.
+
+ -R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport
+ -R [bind_address:]port:local_socket
+ -R remote_socket:host:hostport
+ -R remote_socket:local_socket
+ Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket
+ on the remote (server) host are to be forwarded to the given host
+ and port, or Unix socket, on the local side. This works by
+ allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP port or to a Unix
+ socket on the remote side. Whenever a connection is made to this
+ port or Unix socket, the connection is forwarded over the secure
+ channel, and a connection is made to either host port hostport,
+ or local_socket, from the local machine.
+
+ Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+ Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on
+ the remote machine. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing
+ the address in square brackets.
+
+ By default, TCP listening sockets on the server will be bound to
+ the loopback interface only. This may be overridden by
+ specifying a bind_address. An empty bind_address, or the address
+ M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y, indicates that the remote socket should listen on all
+ interfaces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed
+ if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see
+ sshd_config(5)).
+
+ If the port argument is M-bM-^@M-^X0M-bM-^@M-^Y, the listen port will be dynamically
+ allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time.
+ When used together with -O forward the allocated port will be
+ printed to the standard output.
+
+ -S ctl_path
+ Specifies the location of a control socket for connection
+ sharing, or the string M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to disable connection sharing.
+ Refer to the description of ControlPath and ControlMaster in
+ ssh_config(5) for details.
+
+ -s May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote
+ system. Subsystems facilitate the use of SSH as a secure
+ transport for other applications (e.g. sftp(1)). The subsystem
+ is specified as the remote command.
+
+ -T Disable pseudo-terminal allocation.
+
+ -t Force pseudo-terminal allocation. This can be used to execute
+ arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be
+ very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services. Multiple -t
+ options force tty allocation, even if ssh has no local tty.
+
+ -V Display the version number and exit.
+
+ -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh to print debugging messages about its
+ progress. This is helpful in debugging connection,
+ authentication, and configuration problems. Multiple -v options
+ increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3.
+
+ -W host:port
+ Requests that standard input and output on the client be
+ forwarded to host on port over the secure channel. Implies -N,
+ -T, ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings, though these
+ can be overridden in the configuration file or using -o command
+ line options.
+
+ -w local_tun[:remote_tun]
+ Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified tun(4)
+ devices between the client (local_tun) and the server
+ (remote_tun).
+
+ The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
+ M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^], which uses the next available tunnel device. If
+ remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^]. See also the
+ Tunnel and TunnelDevice directives in ssh_config(5). If the
+ Tunnel directive is unset, it is set to the default tunnel mode,
+ which is M-bM-^@M-^\point-to-pointM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ -X Enables X11 forwarding. This can also be specified on a per-host
+ basis in a configuration file.
+
+ X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
+ ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
+ user's X authorization database) can access the local X11 display
+ through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able
+ to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring.
+
+ For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY
+ extension restrictions by default. Please refer to the ssh -Y
+ option and the ForwardX11Trusted directive in ssh_config(5) for
+ more information.
+
+ -x Disables X11 forwarding.
+
+ -Y Enables trusted X11 forwarding. Trusted X11 forwardings are not
+ subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls.
+
+ -y Send log information using the syslog(3) system module. By
+ default this information is sent to stderr.
+
+ ssh may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user
+ configuration file and a system-wide configuration file. The file format
+ and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5).
+
+AUTHENTICATION
+ The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocols 1 and 2. The default is to
+ use protocol 2 only, though this can be changed via the Protocol option
+ in ssh_config(5) or the -1 and -2 options (see above). Protocol 1 should
+ not be used and is only offered to support legacy devices. It suffers
+ from a number of cryptographic weaknesses and doesn't support many of the
+ advanced features available for protocol 2.
+
+ The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based
+ authentication, host-based authentication, public key authentication,
+ challenge-response authentication, and password authentication.
+ Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above, though
+ PreferredAuthentications can be used to change the default order.
+
+ Host-based authentication works as follows: If the machine the user logs
+ in from is listed in /etc/hosts.equiv or /etc/shosts.equiv on the remote
+ machine, and the user names are the same on both sides, or if the files
+ ~/.rhosts or ~/.shosts exist in the user's home directory on the remote
+ machine and contain a line containing the name of the client machine and
+ the name of the user on that machine, the user is considered for login.
+ Additionally, the server must be able to verify the client's host key
+ (see the description of /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts,
+ below) for login to be permitted. This authentication method closes
+ security holes due to IP spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing.
+ [Note to the administrator: /etc/hosts.equiv, ~/.rhosts, and the
+ rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be
+ disabled if security is desired.]
+
+ Public key authentication works as follows: The scheme is based on
+ public-key cryptography, using cryptosystems where encryption and
+ decryption are done using separate keys, and it is unfeasible to derive
+ the decryption key from the encryption key. The idea is that each user
+ creates a public/private key pair for authentication purposes. The
+ server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key.
+ ssh implements public key authentication protocol automatically, using
+ one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms. The HISTORY section of
+ ssl(8) contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms.
+
+ The file ~/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public keys that are permitted
+ for logging in. When the user logs in, the ssh program tells the server
+ which key pair it would like to use for authentication. The client
+ proves that it has access to the private key and the server checks that
+ the corresponding public key is authorized to accept the account.
+
+ The user creates his/her key pair by running ssh-keygen(1). This stores
+ the private key in ~/.ssh/identity (protocol 1), ~/.ssh/id_dsa (DSA),
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa (ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 (Ed25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+ (RSA) and stores the public key in ~/.ssh/identity.pub (protocol 1),
+ ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (DSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub (ECDSA),
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub (Ed25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (RSA) in the user's
+ home directory. The user should then copy the public key to
+ ~/.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her home directory on the remote machine.
+ The authorized_keys file corresponds to the conventional ~/.rhosts file,
+ and has one key per line, though the lines can be very long. After this,
+ the user can log in without giving the password.
+
+ A variation on public key authentication is available in the form of
+ certificate authentication: instead of a set of public/private keys,
+ signed certificates are used. This has the advantage that a single
+ trusted certification authority can be used in place of many
+ public/private keys. See the CERTIFICATES section of ssh-keygen(1) for
+ more information.
+
+ The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication
+ may be with an authentication agent. See ssh-agent(1) and (optionally)
+ the AddKeysToAgent directive in ssh_config(5) for more information.
+
+ Challenge-response authentication works as follows: The server sends an
+ arbitrary "challenge" text, and prompts for a response. Examples of
+ challenge-response authentication include BSD Authentication (see
+ login.conf(5)) and PAM (some non-OpenBSD systems).
+
+ Finally, if other authentication methods fail, ssh prompts the user for a
+ password. The password is sent to the remote host for checking; however,
+ since all communications are encrypted, the password cannot be seen by
+ someone listening on the network.
+
+ ssh automatically maintains and checks a database containing
+ identification for all hosts it has ever been used with. Host keys are
+ stored in ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory. Additionally,
+ the file /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known
+ hosts. Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. If a
+ host's identification ever changes, ssh warns about this and disables
+ password authentication to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle
+ attacks, which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. The
+ StrictHostKeyChecking option can be used to control logins to machines
+ whose host key is not known or has changed.
+
+ When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server
+ either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or, if no
+ command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives the user a
+ normal shell as an interactive session. All communication with the
+ remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
+
+ If an interactive session is requested ssh by default will only request a
+ pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive sessions when the client has one.
+ The flags -T and -t can be used to override this behaviour.
+
+ If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated the user may use the escape
+ characters noted below.
+
+ If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated, the session is transparent and
+ can be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting
+ the escape character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] will also make the session transparent
+ even if a tty is used.
+
+ The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine
+ exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed.
+
+ESCAPE CHARACTERS
+ When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, ssh supports a number of
+ functions through the use of an escape character.
+
+ A single tilde character can be sent as ~~ or by following the tilde by a
+ character other than those described below. The escape character must
+ always follow a newline to be interpreted as special. The escape
+ character can be changed in configuration files using the EscapeChar
+ configuration directive or on the command line by the -e option.
+
+ The supported escapes (assuming the default M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y) are:
+
+ ~. Disconnect.
+
+ ~^Z Background ssh.
+
+ ~# List forwarded connections.
+
+ ~& Background ssh at logout when waiting for forwarded connection /
+ X11 sessions to terminate.
+
+ ~? Display a list of escape characters.
+
+ ~B Send a BREAK to the remote system (only useful if the peer
+ supports it).
+
+ ~C Open command line. Currently this allows the addition of port
+ forwardings using the -L, -R and -D options (see above). It also
+ allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings with
+ -KL[bind_address:]port for local, -KR[bind_address:]port for
+ remote and -KD[bind_address:]port for dynamic port-forwardings.
+ !command allows the user to execute a local command if the
+ PermitLocalCommand option is enabled in ssh_config(5). Basic
+ help is available, using the -h option.
+
+ ~R Request rekeying of the connection (only useful if the peer
+ supports it).
+
+ ~V Decrease the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written
+ to stderr.
+
+ ~v Increase the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written
+ to stderr.
+
+TCP FORWARDING
+ Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over the secure channel can be
+ specified either on the command line or in a configuration file. One
+ possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a mail
+ server; another is going through firewalls.
+
+ In the example below, we look at encrypting communication between an IRC
+ client and server, even though the IRC server does not directly support
+ encrypted communications. This works as follows: the user connects to
+ the remote host using ssh, specifying a port to be used to forward
+ connections to the remote server. After that it is possible to start the
+ service which is to be encrypted on the client machine, connecting to the
+ same local port, and ssh will encrypt and forward the connection.
+
+ The following example tunnels an IRC session from client machine
+ M-bM-^@M-^\127.0.0.1M-bM-^@M-^] (localhost) to remote server M-bM-^@M-^\server.example.comM-bM-^@M-^]:
+
+ $ ssh -f -L 1234:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10
+ $ irc -c '#users' -p 1234 pinky 127.0.0.1
+
+ This tunnels a connection to IRC server M-bM-^@M-^\server.example.comM-bM-^@M-^], joining
+ channel M-bM-^@M-^\#usersM-bM-^@M-^], nickname M-bM-^@M-^\pinkyM-bM-^@M-^], using port 1234. It doesn't matter
+ which port is used, as long as it's greater than 1023 (remember, only
+ root can open sockets on privileged ports) and doesn't conflict with any
+ ports already in use. The connection is forwarded to port 6667 on the
+ remote server, since that's the standard port for IRC services.
+
+ The -f option backgrounds ssh and the remote command M-bM-^@M-^\sleep 10M-bM-^@M-^] is
+ specified to allow an amount of time (10 seconds, in the example) to
+ start the service which is to be tunnelled. If no connections are made
+ within the time specified, ssh will exit.
+
+X11 FORWARDING
+ If the ForwardX11 variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (or see the description of the
+ -X, -x, and -Y options above) and the user is using X11 (the DISPLAY
+ environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is
+ automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11
+ programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the
+ encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made
+ from the local machine. The user should not manually set DISPLAY.
+ Forwarding of X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in
+ configuration files.
+
+ The DISPLAY value set by ssh will point to the server machine, but with a
+ display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens because
+ ssh creates a M-bM-^@M-^\proxyM-bM-^@M-^] X server on the server machine for forwarding the
+ connections over the encrypted channel.
+
+ ssh will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine.
+ For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, store
+ it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded connections
+ carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when the connection
+ is opened. The real authentication cookie is never sent to the server
+ machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain).
+
+ If the ForwardAgent variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (or see the description of
+ the -A and -a options above) and the user is using an authentication
+ agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the
+ remote side.
+
+VERIFYING HOST KEYS
+ When connecting to a server for the first time, a fingerprint of the
+ server's public key is presented to the user (unless the option
+ StrictHostKeyChecking has been disabled). Fingerprints can be determined
+ using ssh-keygen(1):
+
+ $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+
+ If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched and the key can be
+ accepted or rejected. If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server
+ are available, the ssh-keygen(1) -E option may be used to downgrade the
+ fingerprint algorithm to match.
+
+ Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys just by looking at
+ fingerprint strings, there is also support to compare host keys visually,
+ using random art. By setting the VisualHostKey option to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], a small
+ ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter if the
+ session itself is interactive or not. By learning the pattern a known
+ server produces, a user can easily find out that the host key has changed
+ when a completely different pattern is displayed. Because these patterns
+ are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks similar to the pattern
+ remembered only gives a good probability that the host key is the same,
+ not guaranteed proof.
+
+ To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for all
+ known hosts, the following command line can be used:
+
+ $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+
+ If the fingerprint is unknown, an alternative method of verification is
+ available: SSH fingerprints verified by DNS. An additional resource
+ record (RR), SSHFP, is added to a zonefile and the connecting client is
+ able to match the fingerprint with that of the key presented.
+
+ In this example, we are connecting a client to a server,
+ M-bM-^@M-^\host.example.comM-bM-^@M-^]. The SSHFP resource records should first be added to
+ the zonefile for host.example.com:
+
+ $ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com.
+
+ The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile. To check that
+ the zone is answering fingerprint queries:
+
+ $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com
+
+ Finally the client connects:
+
+ $ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com
+ [...]
+ Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS.
+ Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
+
+ See the VerifyHostKeyDNS option in ssh_config(5) for more information.
+
+SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS
+ ssh contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling using
+ the tun(4) network pseudo-device, allowing two networks to be joined
+ securely. The sshd_config(5) configuration option PermitTunnel controls
+ whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer 2 or 3
+ traffic).
+
+ The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 with
+ remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection from
+ 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2, provided that the SSH server running on the gateway
+ to the remote network, at 192.168.1.15, allows it.
+
+ On the client:
+
+ # ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true
+ # ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252
+ # route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2
+
+ On the server:
+
+ # ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252
+ # route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1
+
+ Client access may be more finely tuned via the /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
+ file (see below) and the PermitRootLogin server option. The following
+ entry would permit connections on tun(4) device 1 from user M-bM-^@M-^\janeM-bM-^@M-^] and on
+ tun device 2 from user M-bM-^@M-^\johnM-bM-^@M-^], if PermitRootLogin is set to
+ M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^]:
+
+ tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane
+ tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john
+
+ Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead, it may be
+ more suited to temporary setups, such as for wireless VPNs. More
+ permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as ipsecctl(8) and
+ isakmpd(8).
+
+ENVIRONMENT
+ ssh will normally set the following environment variables:
+
+ DISPLAY The DISPLAY variable indicates the location of the
+ X11 server. It is automatically set by ssh to
+ point to a value of the form M-bM-^@M-^\hostname:nM-bM-^@M-^], where
+ M-bM-^@M-^\hostnameM-bM-^@M-^] indicates the host where the shell runs,
+ and M-bM-^@M-^XnM-bM-^@M-^Y is an integer M-bM-^IM-% 1. ssh uses this special
+ value to forward X11 connections over the secure
+ channel. The user should normally not set DISPLAY
+ explicitly, as that will render the X11 connection
+ insecure (and will require the user to manually
+ copy any required authorization cookies).
+
+ HOME Set to the path of the user's home directory.
+
+ LOGNAME Synonym for USER; set for compatibility with
+ systems that use this variable.
+
+ MAIL Set to the path of the user's mailbox.
+
+ PATH Set to the default PATH, as specified when
+ compiling ssh.
+
+ SSH_ASKPASS If ssh needs a passphrase, it will read the
+ passphrase from the current terminal if it was run
+ from a terminal. If ssh does not have a terminal
+ associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS are
+ set, it will execute the program specified by
+ SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the
+ passphrase. This is particularly useful when
+ calling ssh from a .xsession or related script.
+ (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to
+ redirect the input from /dev/null to make this
+ work.)
+
+ SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to
+ communicate with the agent.
+
+ SSH_CONNECTION Identifies the client and server ends of the
+ connection. The variable contains four space-
+ separated values: client IP address, client port
+ number, server IP address, and server port number.
+
+ SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND This variable contains the original command line if
+ a forced command is executed. It can be used to
+ extract the original arguments.
+
+ SSH_TTY This is set to the name of the tty (path to the
+ device) associated with the current shell or
+ command. If the current session has no tty, this
+ variable is not set.
+
+ TZ This variable is set to indicate the present time
+ zone if it was set when the daemon was started
+ (i.e. the daemon passes the value on to new
+ connections).
+
+ USER Set to the name of the user logging in.
+
+ Additionally, ssh reads ~/.ssh/environment, and adds lines of the format
+ M-bM-^@M-^\VARNAME=valueM-bM-^@M-^] to the environment if the file exists and users are
+ allowed to change their environment. For more information, see the
+ PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5).
+
+FILES
+ ~/.rhosts
+ This file is used for host-based authentication (see above). On
+ some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the
+ user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because sshd(8)
+ reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the
+ user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The
+ recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the
+ user, and not accessible by others.
+
+ ~/.shosts
+ This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows
+ host-based authentication without permitting login with
+ rlogin/rsh.
+
+ ~/.ssh/
+ This directory is the default location for all user-specific
+ configuration and authentication information. There is no
+ general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
+ secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute
+ for the user, and not accessible by others.
+
+ ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+ Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used
+ for logging in as this user. The format of this file is
+ described in the sshd(8) manual page. This file is not highly
+ sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the
+ user, and not accessible by others.
+
+ ~/.ssh/config
+ This is the per-user configuration file. The file format and
+ configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). Because of
+ the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
+ read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
+
+ ~/.ssh/environment
+ Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
+ ENVIRONMENT, above.
+
+ ~/.ssh/identity
+ ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+ ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+ Contains the private key for authentication. These files contain
+ sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not
+ accessible by others (read/write/execute). ssh will simply
+ ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others. It is
+ possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key which
+ will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using
+ 3DES.
+
+ ~/.ssh/identity.pub
+ ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+ ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+ Contains the public key for authentication. These files are not
+ sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone.
+
+ ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+ Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged
+ into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host
+ keys. See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this
+ file.
+
+ ~/.ssh/rc
+ Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in,
+ just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the
+ sshd(8) manual page for more information.
+
+ /etc/hosts.equiv
+ This file is for host-based authentication (see above). It
+ should only be writable by root.
+
+ /etc/shosts.equiv
+ This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but
+ allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+ rlogin/rsh.
+
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+ Systemwide configuration file. The file format and configuration
+ options are described in ssh_config(5).
+
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+ These files contain the private parts of the host keys and are
+ used for host-based authentication.
+
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+ Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared
+ by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of
+ all machines in the organization. It should be world-readable.
+ See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this file.
+
+ /etc/ssh/sshrc
+ Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in,
+ just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the
+ sshd(8) manual page for more information.
+
+EXIT STATUS
+ ssh exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an
+ error occurred.
+
+SEE ALSO
+ scp(1), sftp(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh-keyscan(1),
+ tun(4), ssh_config(5), ssh-keysign(8), sshd(8)
+
+STANDARDS
+ S. Lehtinen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned
+ Numbers, RFC 4250, January 2006.
+
+ T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture,
+ RFC 4251, January 2006.
+
+ T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol,
+ RFC 4252, January 2006.
+
+ T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
+ Protocol, RFC 4253, January 2006.
+
+ T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol, RFC
+ 4254, January 2006.
+
+ J. Schlyter and W. Griffin, Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell
+ (SSH) Key Fingerprints, RFC 4255, January 2006.
+
+ F. Cusack and M. Forssen, Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the
+ Secure Shell Protocol (SSH), RFC 4256, January 2006.
+
+ J. Galbraith and P. Remaker, The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break
+ Extension, RFC 4335, January 2006.
+
+ M. Bellare, T. Kohno, and C. Namprempre, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport
+ Layer Encryption Modes, RFC 4344, January 2006.
+
+ B. Harris, Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport
+ Layer Protocol, RFC 4345, January 2006.
+
+ M. Friedl, N. Provos, and W. Simpson, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for
+ the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006.
+
+ J. Galbraith and R. Thayer, The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File
+ Format, RFC 4716, November 2006.
+
+ D. Stebila and J. Green, Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
+ Secure Shell Transport Layer, RFC 5656, December 2009.
+
+ A. Perrig and D. Song, Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve
+ Real-World Security, 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
+ Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99).
+
+AUTHORS
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+ Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+ de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+ created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+ versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+
+OpenBSD 6.0 July 16, 2016 OpenBSD 6.0
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.1
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh.1 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.1 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1593 +0,0 @@
-.\"
-.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
-.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
-.\" All rights reserved
-.\"
-.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
-.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
-.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
-.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
-.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
-.\"
-.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
-.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
-.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
-.\"
-.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-.\" are met:
-.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-.\"
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.343 2013/12/07 11:58:46 naddy Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: December 7 2013 $
-.Dt SSH 1
-.Os
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm ssh
-.Nd OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program)
-.Sh SYNOPSIS
-.Nm ssh
-.Bk -words
-.Op Fl 1246AaCfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy
-.Op Fl b Ar bind_address
-.Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec
-.Op Fl D Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port
-.Op Fl E Ar log_file
-.Op Fl e Ar escape_char
-.Op Fl F Ar configfile
-.Op Fl I Ar pkcs11
-.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
-.Op Fl L Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port : Ns Ar host : Ns Ar hostport
-.Op Fl l Ar login_name
-.Op Fl m Ar mac_spec
-.Op Fl O Ar ctl_cmd
-.Op Fl o Ar option
-.Op Fl p Ar port
-.Op Fl Q Cm cipher | cipher-auth | mac | kex | key
-.Op Fl R Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port : Ns Ar host : Ns Ar hostport
-.Op Fl S Ar ctl_path
-.Op Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port
-.Op Fl w Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun
-.Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns Ar hostname
-.Op Ar command
-.Ek
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-.Nm
-(SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
-executing commands on a remote machine.
-It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh,
-and provide secure encrypted communications between
-two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.
-X11 connections and arbitrary TCP ports
-can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
-.Pp
-.Nm
-connects and logs into the specified
-.Ar hostname
-(with optional
-.Ar user
-name).
-The user must prove
-his/her identity to the remote machine using one of several methods
-depending on the protocol version used (see below).
-.Pp
-If
-.Ar command
-is specified,
-it is executed on the remote host instead of a login shell.
-.Pp
-The options are as follows:
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Fl 1
-Forces
-.Nm
-to try protocol version 1 only.
-.It Fl 2
-Forces
-.Nm
-to try protocol version 2 only.
-.It Fl 4
-Forces
-.Nm
-to use IPv4 addresses only.
-.It Fl 6
-Forces
-.Nm
-to use IPv6 addresses only.
-.It Fl A
-Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
-This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
-.Pp
-Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.
-Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
-(for the agent's
-.Ux Ns -domain
-socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection.
-An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent,
-however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to
-authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent.
-.It Fl a
-Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
-.It Fl b Ar bind_address
-Use
-.Ar bind_address
-on the local machine as the source address
-of the connection.
-Only useful on systems with more than one address.
-.It Fl C
-Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and
-data for forwarded X11 and TCP connections).
-The compression algorithm is the same used by
-.Xr gzip 1 ,
-and the
-.Dq level
-can be controlled by the
-.Cm CompressionLevel
-option for protocol version 1.
-Compression is desirable on modem lines and other
-slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks.
-The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the
-configuration files; see the
-.Cm Compression
-option.
-.It Fl c Ar cipher_spec
-Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session.
-.Pp
-Protocol version 1 allows specification of a single cipher.
-The supported values are
-.Dq 3des ,
-.Dq blowfish ,
-and
-.Dq des .
-.Ar 3des
-(triple-des) is an encrypt-decrypt-encrypt triple with three different keys.
-It is believed to be secure.
-.Ar blowfish
-is a fast block cipher; it appears very secure and is much faster than
-.Ar 3des .
-.Ar des
-is only supported in the
-.Nm
-client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations
-that do not support the
-.Ar 3des
-cipher.
-Its use is strongly discouraged due to cryptographic weaknesses.
-The default is
-.Dq 3des .
-.Pp
-For protocol version 2,
-.Ar cipher_spec
-is a comma-separated list of ciphers
-listed in order of preference.
-See the
-.Cm Ciphers
-keyword in
-.Xr ssh_config 5
-for more information.
-.It Fl D Xo
-.Sm off
-.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
-.Ar port
-.Sm on
-.Xc
-Specifies a local
-.Dq dynamic
-application-level port forwarding.
-This works by allocating a socket to listen to
-.Ar port
-on the local side, optionally bound to the specified
-.Ar bind_address .
-Whenever a connection is made to this port, the
-connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and the application
-protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the
-remote machine.
-Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
-.Nm
-will act as a SOCKS server.
-Only root can forward privileged ports.
-Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
-.Pp
-IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
-Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
-By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
-.Cm GatewayPorts
-setting.
-However, an explicit
-.Ar bind_address
-may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
-The
-.Ar bind_address
-of
-.Dq localhost
-indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
-empty address or
-.Sq *
-indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
-.It Fl E Ar log_file
-Append debug logs to
-.Ar log_file
-instead of standard error.
-.It Fl e Ar escape_char
-Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default:
-.Ql ~ ) .
-The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a line.
-The escape character followed by a dot
-.Pq Ql \&.
-closes the connection;
-followed by control-Z suspends the connection;
-and followed by itself sends the escape character once.
-Setting the character to
-.Dq none
-disables any escapes and makes the session fully transparent.
-.It Fl F Ar configfile
-Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file.
-If a configuration file is given on the command line,
-the system-wide configuration file
-.Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
-will be ignored.
-The default for the per-user configuration file is
-.Pa ~/.ssh/config .
-.It Fl f
-Requests
-.Nm
-to go to background just before command execution.
-This is useful if
-.Nm
-is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user
-wants it in the background.
-This implies
-.Fl n .
-The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with
-something like
-.Ic ssh -f host xterm .
-.Pp
-If the
-.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
-configuration option is set to
-.Dq yes ,
-then a client started with
-.Fl f
-will wait for all remote port forwards to be successfully established
-before placing itself in the background.
-.It Fl g
-Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports.
-.It Fl I Ar pkcs11
-Specify the PKCS#11 shared library
-.Nm
-should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's
-private RSA key.
-.It Fl i Ar identity_file
-Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for
-public key authentication is read.
-The default is
-.Pa ~/.ssh/identity
-for protocol version 1, and
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
-and
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
-for protocol version 2.
-Identity files may also be specified on
-a per-host basis in the configuration file.
-It is possible to have multiple
-.Fl i
-options (and multiple identities specified in
-configuration files).
-.Nm
-will also try to load certificate information from the filename obtained
-by appending
-.Pa -cert.pub
-to identity filenames.
-.It Fl K
-Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI
-credentials to the server.
-.It Fl k
-Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server.
-.It Fl L Xo
-.Sm off
-.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
-.Ar port : host : hostport
-.Sm on
-.Xc
-Specifies that the given port on the local (client) host is to be
-forwarded to the given host and port on the remote side.
-This works by allocating a socket to listen to
-.Ar port
-on the local side, optionally bound to the specified
-.Ar bind_address .
-Whenever a connection is made to this port, the
-connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is
-made to
-.Ar host
-port
-.Ar hostport
-from the remote machine.
-Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
-IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
-Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
-By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
-.Cm GatewayPorts
-setting.
-However, an explicit
-.Ar bind_address
-may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
-The
-.Ar bind_address
-of
-.Dq localhost
-indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
-empty address or
-.Sq *
-indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
-.It Fl l Ar login_name
-Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine.
-This also may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
-.It Fl M
-Places the
-.Nm
-client into
-.Dq master
-mode for connection sharing.
-Multiple
-.Fl M
-options places
-.Nm
-into
-.Dq master
-mode with confirmation required before slave connections are accepted.
-Refer to the description of
-.Cm ControlMaster
-in
-.Xr ssh_config 5
-for details.
-.It Fl m Ar mac_spec
-Additionally, for protocol version 2 a comma-separated list of MAC
-(message authentication code) algorithms can
-be specified in order of preference.
-See the
-.Cm MACs
-keyword for more information.
-.It Fl N
-Do not execute a remote command.
-This is useful for just forwarding ports
-(protocol version 2 only).
-.It Fl n
-Redirects stdin from
-.Pa /dev/null
-(actually, prevents reading from stdin).
-This must be used when
-.Nm
-is run in the background.
-A common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote machine.
-For example,
-.Ic ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs &
-will start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11
-connection will be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel.
-The
-.Nm
-program will be put in the background.
-(This does not work if
-.Nm
-needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the
-.Fl f
-option.)
-.It Fl O Ar ctl_cmd
-Control an active connection multiplexing master process.
-When the
-.Fl O
-option is specified, the
-.Ar ctl_cmd
-argument is interpreted and passed to the master process.
-Valid commands are:
-.Dq check
-(check that the master process is running),
-.Dq forward
-(request forwardings without command execution),
-.Dq cancel
-(cancel forwardings),
-.Dq exit
-(request the master to exit), and
-.Dq stop
-(request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing requests).
-.It Fl o Ar option
-Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file.
-This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate
-command-line flag.
-For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
-.Xr ssh_config 5 .
-.Pp
-.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact
-.It AddressFamily
-.It BatchMode
-.It BindAddress
-.It CanonicalDomains
-.It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
-.It CanonicalizeHostname
-.It CanonicalizeMaxDots
-.It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
-.It ChallengeResponseAuthentication
-.It CheckHostIP
-.It Cipher
-.It Ciphers
-.It ClearAllForwardings
-.It Compression
-.It CompressionLevel
-.It ConnectionAttempts
-.It ConnectTimeout
-.It ControlMaster
-.It ControlPath
-.It ControlPersist
-.It DynamicForward
-.It EscapeChar
-.It ExitOnForwardFailure
-.It ForwardAgent
-.It ForwardX11
-.It ForwardX11Timeout
-.It ForwardX11Trusted
-.It GatewayPorts
-.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
-.It GSSAPIAuthentication
-.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
-.It HashKnownHosts
-.It Host
-.It HostbasedAuthentication
-.It HostKeyAlgorithms
-.It HostKeyAlias
-.It HostName
-.It IdentityFile
-.It IdentitiesOnly
-.It IPQoS
-.It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
-.It KbdInteractiveDevices
-.It KexAlgorithms
-.It LocalCommand
-.It LocalForward
-.It LogLevel
-.It MACs
-.It Match
-.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
-.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
-.It PasswordAuthentication
-.It PermitLocalCommand
-.It PKCS11Provider
-.It Port
-.It PreferredAuthentications
-.It Protocol
-.It ProxyCommand
-.It ProxyUseFdpass
-.It PubkeyAuthentication
-.It RekeyLimit
-.It RemoteForward
-.It RequestTTY
-.It RhostsRSAAuthentication
-.It RSAAuthentication
-.It SendEnv
-.It ServerAliveInterval
-.It ServerAliveCountMax
-.It StrictHostKeyChecking
-.It TCPKeepAlive
-.It Tunnel
-.It TunnelDevice
-.It UsePrivilegedPort
-.It User
-.It UserKnownHostsFile
-.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
-.It VisualHostKey
-.It XAuthLocation
-.El
-.It Fl p Ar port
-Port to connect to on the remote host.
-This can be specified on a
-per-host basis in the configuration file.
-.It Fl Q Cm cipher | cipher-auth | mac | kex | key
-Queries
-.Nm
-for the algorithms supported for the specified version 2.
-The available features are:
-.Ar cipher
-(supported symmetric ciphers),
-.Ar cipher-auth
-(supported symmetric ciphers that support authenticated encryption),
-.Ar mac
-(supported message integrity codes),
-.Ar kex
-(key exchange algorithms),
-.Ar key
-(key types).
-.It Fl q
-Quiet mode.
-Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed.
-.It Fl R Xo
-.Sm off
-.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
-.Ar port : host : hostport
-.Sm on
-.Xc
-Specifies that the given port on the remote (server) host is to be
-forwarded to the given host and port on the local side.
-This works by allocating a socket to listen to
-.Ar port
-on the remote side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the
-connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is
-made to
-.Ar host
-port
-.Ar hostport
-from the local machine.
-.Pp
-Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
-Privileged ports can be forwarded only when
-logging in as root on the remote machine.
-IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
-.Pp
-By default, the listening socket on the server will be bound to the loopback
-interface only.
-This may be overridden by specifying a
-.Ar bind_address .
-An empty
-.Ar bind_address ,
-or the address
-.Ql * ,
-indicates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces.
-Specifying a remote
-.Ar bind_address
-will only succeed if the server's
-.Cm GatewayPorts
-option is enabled (see
-.Xr sshd_config 5 ) .
-.Pp
-If the
-.Ar port
-argument is
-.Ql 0 ,
-the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported
-to the client at run time.
-When used together with
-.Ic -O forward
-the allocated port will be printed to the standard output.
-.It Fl S Ar ctl_path
-Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing,
-or the string
-.Dq none
-to disable connection sharing.
-Refer to the description of
-.Cm ControlPath
-and
-.Cm ControlMaster
-in
-.Xr ssh_config 5
-for details.
-.It Fl s
-May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system.
-Subsystems are a feature of the SSH2 protocol which facilitate the use
-of SSH as a secure transport for other applications (eg.\&
-.Xr sftp 1 ) .
-The subsystem is specified as the remote command.
-.It Fl T
-Disable pseudo-tty allocation.
-.It Fl t
-Force pseudo-tty allocation.
-This can be used to execute arbitrary
-screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful,
-e.g. when implementing menu services.
-Multiple
-.Fl t
-options force tty allocation, even if
-.Nm
-has no local tty.
-.It Fl V
-Display the version number and exit.
-.It Fl v
-Verbose mode.
-Causes
-.Nm
-to print debugging messages about its progress.
-This is helpful in
-debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
-Multiple
-.Fl v
-options increase the verbosity.
-The maximum is 3.
-.It Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port
-Requests that standard input and output on the client be forwarded to
-.Ar host
-on
-.Ar port
-over the secure channel.
-Implies
-.Fl N ,
-.Fl T ,
-.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
-and
-.Cm ClearAllForwardings .
-Works with Protocol version 2 only.
-.It Fl w Xo
-.Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun
-.Xc
-Requests
-tunnel
-device forwarding with the specified
-.Xr tun 4
-devices between the client
-.Pq Ar local_tun
-and the server
-.Pq Ar remote_tun .
-.Pp
-The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
-.Dq any ,
-which uses the next available tunnel device.
-If
-.Ar remote_tun
-is not specified, it defaults to
-.Dq any .
-See also the
-.Cm Tunnel
-and
-.Cm TunnelDevice
-directives in
-.Xr ssh_config 5 .
-If the
-.Cm Tunnel
-directive is unset, it is set to the default tunnel mode, which is
-.Dq point-to-point .
-.It Fl X
-Enables X11 forwarding.
-This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
-.Pp
-X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.
-Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
-(for the user's X authorization database)
-can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection.
-An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring.
-.Pp
-For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY extension
-restrictions by default.
-Please refer to the
-.Nm
-.Fl Y
-option and the
-.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
-directive in
-.Xr ssh_config 5
-for more information.
-.It Fl x
-Disables X11 forwarding.
-.It Fl Y
-Enables trusted X11 forwarding.
-Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension
-controls.
-.It Fl y
-Send log information using the
-.Xr syslog 3
-system module.
-By default this information is sent to stderr.
-.El
-.Pp
-.Nm
-may additionally obtain configuration data from
-a per-user configuration file and a system-wide configuration file.
-The file format and configuration options are described in
-.Xr ssh_config 5 .
-.Sh AUTHENTICATION
-The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocols 1 and 2.
-The default is to use protocol 2 only,
-though this can be changed via the
-.Cm Protocol
-option in
-.Xr ssh_config 5
-or the
-.Fl 1
-and
-.Fl 2
-options (see above).
-Both protocols support similar authentication methods,
-but protocol 2 is the default since
-it provides additional mechanisms for confidentiality
-(the traffic is encrypted using AES, 3DES, Blowfish, CAST128, or Arcfour)
-and integrity (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1,
-hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512,
-umac-64, umac-128, hmac-ripemd160).
-Protocol 1 lacks a strong mechanism for ensuring the
-integrity of the connection.
-.Pp
-The methods available for authentication are:
-GSSAPI-based authentication,
-host-based authentication,
-public key authentication,
-challenge-response authentication,
-and password authentication.
-Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above,
-though protocol 2 has a configuration option to change the default order:
-.Cm PreferredAuthentications .
-.Pp
-Host-based authentication works as follows:
-If the machine the user logs in from is listed in
-.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
-or
-.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
-on the remote machine, and the user names are
-the same on both sides, or if the files
-.Pa ~/.rhosts
-or
-.Pa ~/.shosts
-exist in the user's home directory on the
-remote machine and contain a line containing the name of the client
-machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is
-considered for login.
-Additionally, the server
-.Em must
-be able to verify the client's
-host key (see the description of
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
-and
-.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts ,
-below)
-for login to be permitted.
-This authentication method closes security holes due to IP
-spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing.
-[Note to the administrator:
-.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv ,
-.Pa ~/.rhosts ,
-and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be
-disabled if security is desired.]
-.Pp
-Public key authentication works as follows:
-The scheme is based on public-key cryptography,
-using cryptosystems
-where encryption and decryption are done using separate keys,
-and it is unfeasible to derive the decryption key from the encryption key.
-The idea is that each user creates a public/private
-key pair for authentication purposes.
-The server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key.
-.Nm
-implements public key authentication protocol automatically,
-using one of the DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 or RSA algorithms.
-Protocol 1 is restricted to using only RSA keys,
-but protocol 2 may use any.
-The HISTORY section of
-.Xr ssl 8
-contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms.
-.Pp
-The file
-.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-lists the public keys that are permitted for logging in.
-When the user logs in, the
-.Nm
-program tells the server which key pair it would like to use for
-authentication.
-The client proves that it has access to the private key
-and the server checks that the corresponding public key
-is authorized to accept the account.
-.Pp
-The user creates his/her key pair by running
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
-This stores the private key in
-.Pa ~/.ssh/identity
-(protocol 1),
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
-(protocol 2 DSA),
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
-(protocol 2 ECDSA),
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
-(protocol 2 ED25519),
-or
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
-(protocol 2 RSA)
-and stores the public key in
-.Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub
-(protocol 1),
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
-(protocol 2 DSA),
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
-(protocol 2 ECDSA),
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
-(protocol 2 ED25519),
-or
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
-(protocol 2 RSA)
-in the user's home directory.
-The user should then copy the public key
-to
-.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-in his/her home directory on the remote machine.
-The
-.Pa authorized_keys
-file corresponds to the conventional
-.Pa ~/.rhosts
-file, and has one key
-per line, though the lines can be very long.
-After this, the user can log in without giving the password.
-.Pp
-A variation on public key authentication
-is available in the form of certificate authentication:
-instead of a set of public/private keys,
-signed certificates are used.
-This has the advantage that a single trusted certification authority
-can be used in place of many public/private keys.
-See the CERTIFICATES section of
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1
-for more information.
-.Pp
-The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication
-may be with an authentication agent.
-See
-.Xr ssh-agent 1
-for more information.
-.Pp
-Challenge-response authentication works as follows:
-The server sends an arbitrary
-.Qq challenge
-text, and prompts for a response.
-Protocol 2 allows multiple challenges and responses;
-protocol 1 is restricted to just one challenge/response.
-Examples of challenge-response authentication include
-.Bx
-Authentication (see
-.Xr login.conf 5 )
-and PAM (some
-.Pf non- Ox
-systems).
-.Pp
-Finally, if other authentication methods fail,
-.Nm
-prompts the user for a password.
-The password is sent to the remote
-host for checking; however, since all communications are encrypted,
-the password cannot be seen by someone listening on the network.
-.Pp
-.Nm
-automatically maintains and checks a database containing
-identification for all hosts it has ever been used with.
-Host keys are stored in
-.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
-in the user's home directory.
-Additionally, the file
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
-is automatically checked for known hosts.
-Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file.
-If a host's identification ever changes,
-.Nm
-warns about this and disables password authentication to prevent
-server spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks,
-which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption.
-The
-.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
-option can be used to control logins to machines whose
-host key is not known or has changed.
-.Pp
-When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server
-either executes the given command, or logs into the machine and gives
-the user a normal shell on the remote machine.
-All communication with
-the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
-.Pp
-If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated (normal login session), the
-user may use the escape characters noted below.
-.Pp
-If no pseudo-tty has been allocated,
-the session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary data.
-On most systems, setting the escape character to
-.Dq none
-will also make the session transparent even if a tty is used.
-.Pp
-The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote
-machine exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed.
-.Sh ESCAPE CHARACTERS
-When a pseudo-terminal has been requested,
-.Nm
-supports a number of functions through the use of an escape character.
-.Pp
-A single tilde character can be sent as
-.Ic ~~
-or by following the tilde by a character other than those described below.
-The escape character must always follow a newline to be interpreted as
-special.
-The escape character can be changed in configuration files using the
-.Cm EscapeChar
-configuration directive or on the command line by the
-.Fl e
-option.
-.Pp
-The supported escapes (assuming the default
-.Ql ~ )
-are:
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Cm ~.
-Disconnect.
-.It Cm ~^Z
-Background
-.Nm .
-.It Cm ~#
-List forwarded connections.
-.It Cm ~&
-Background
-.Nm
-at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / X11 sessions to terminate.
-.It Cm ~?
-Display a list of escape characters.
-.It Cm ~B
-Send a BREAK to the remote system
-(only useful for SSH protocol version 2 and if the peer supports it).
-.It Cm ~C
-Open command line.
-Currently this allows the addition of port forwardings using the
-.Fl L ,
-.Fl R
-and
-.Fl D
-options (see above).
-It also allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings
-with
-.Sm off
-.Fl KL Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
-.Sm on
-for local,
-.Sm off
-.Fl KR Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
-.Sm on
-for remote and
-.Sm off
-.Fl KD Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
-.Sm on
-for dynamic port-forwardings.
-.Ic !\& Ns Ar command
-allows the user to execute a local command if the
-.Ic PermitLocalCommand
-option is enabled in
-.Xr ssh_config 5 .
-Basic help is available, using the
-.Fl h
-option.
-.It Cm ~R
-Request rekeying of the connection
-(only useful for SSH protocol version 2 and if the peer supports it).
-.It Cm ~V
-Decrease the verbosity
-.Pq Ic LogLevel
-when errors are being written to stderr.
-.It Cm ~v
-Increase the verbosity
-.Pq Ic LogLevel
-when errors are being written to stderr.
-.El
-.Sh TCP FORWARDING
-Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over the secure channel can
-be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file.
-One possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a
-mail server; another is going through firewalls.
-.Pp
-In the example below, we look at encrypting communication between
-an IRC client and server, even though the IRC server does not directly
-support encrypted communications.
-This works as follows:
-the user connects to the remote host using
-.Nm ,
-specifying a port to be used to forward connections
-to the remote server.
-After that it is possible to start the service which is to be encrypted
-on the client machine,
-connecting to the same local port,
-and
-.Nm
-will encrypt and forward the connection.
-.Pp
-The following example tunnels an IRC session from client machine
-.Dq 127.0.0.1
-(localhost)
-to remote server
-.Dq server.example.com :
-.Bd -literal -offset 4n
-$ ssh -f -L 1234:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10
-$ irc -c '#users' -p 1234 pinky 127.0.0.1
-.Ed
-.Pp
-This tunnels a connection to IRC server
-.Dq server.example.com ,
-joining channel
-.Dq #users ,
-nickname
-.Dq pinky ,
-using port 1234.
-It doesn't matter which port is used,
-as long as it's greater than 1023
-(remember, only root can open sockets on privileged ports)
-and doesn't conflict with any ports already in use.
-The connection is forwarded to port 6667 on the remote server,
-since that's the standard port for IRC services.
-.Pp
-The
-.Fl f
-option backgrounds
-.Nm
-and the remote command
-.Dq sleep 10
-is specified to allow an amount of time
-(10 seconds, in the example)
-to start the service which is to be tunnelled.
-If no connections are made within the time specified,
-.Nm
-will exit.
-.Sh X11 FORWARDING
-If the
-.Cm ForwardX11
-variable is set to
-.Dq yes
-(or see the description of the
-.Fl X ,
-.Fl x ,
-and
-.Fl Y
-options above)
-and the user is using X11 (the
-.Ev DISPLAY
-environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is
-automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11
-programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the
-encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made
-from the local machine.
-The user should not manually set
-.Ev DISPLAY .
-Forwarding of X11 connections can be
-configured on the command line or in configuration files.
-.Pp
-The
-.Ev DISPLAY
-value set by
-.Nm
-will point to the server machine, but with a display number greater than zero.
-This is normal, and happens because
-.Nm
-creates a
-.Dq proxy
-X server on the server machine for forwarding the
-connections over the encrypted channel.
-.Pp
-.Nm
-will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine.
-For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie,
-store it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded
-connections carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when
-the connection is opened.
-The real authentication cookie is never
-sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain).
-.Pp
-If the
-.Cm ForwardAgent
-variable is set to
-.Dq yes
-(or see the description of the
-.Fl A
-and
-.Fl a
-options above) and
-the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent
-is automatically forwarded to the remote side.
-.Sh VERIFYING HOST KEYS
-When connecting to a server for the first time,
-a fingerprint of the server's public key is presented to the user
-(unless the option
-.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
-has been disabled).
-Fingerprints can be determined using
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1 :
-.Pp
-.Dl $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
-.Pp
-If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched
-and the key can be accepted or rejected.
-Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys
-just by looking at hex strings,
-there is also support to compare host keys visually,
-using
-.Em random art .
-By setting the
-.Cm VisualHostKey
-option to
-.Dq yes ,
-a small ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter
-if the session itself is interactive or not.
-By learning the pattern a known server produces, a user can easily
-find out that the host key has changed when a completely different pattern
-is displayed.
-Because these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks
-similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good probability that the
-host key is the same, not guaranteed proof.
-.Pp
-To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for
-all known hosts, the following command line can be used:
-.Pp
-.Dl $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts
-.Pp
-If the fingerprint is unknown,
-an alternative method of verification is available:
-SSH fingerprints verified by DNS.
-An additional resource record (RR),
-SSHFP,
-is added to a zonefile
-and the connecting client is able to match the fingerprint
-with that of the key presented.
-.Pp
-In this example, we are connecting a client to a server,
-.Dq host.example.com .
-The SSHFP resource records should first be added to the zonefile for
-host.example.com:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-$ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com.
-.Ed
-.Pp
-The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile.
-To check that the zone is answering fingerprint queries:
-.Pp
-.Dl $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com
-.Pp
-Finally the client connects:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-$ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com
-[...]
-Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS.
-Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
-.Ed
-.Pp
-See the
-.Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS
-option in
-.Xr ssh_config 5
-for more information.
-.Sh SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS
-.Nm
-contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling
-using the
-.Xr tun 4
-network pseudo-device,
-allowing two networks to be joined securely.
-The
-.Xr sshd_config 5
-configuration option
-.Cm PermitTunnel
-controls whether the server supports this,
-and at what level (layer 2 or 3 traffic).
-.Pp
-The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24
-with remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection
-from 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2,
-provided that the SSH server running on the gateway to the remote network,
-at 192.168.1.15, allows it.
-.Pp
-On the client:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-# ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true
-# ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252
-# route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2
-.Ed
-.Pp
-On the server:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-# ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252
-# route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1
-.Ed
-.Pp
-Client access may be more finely tuned via the
-.Pa /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
-file (see below) and the
-.Cm PermitRootLogin
-server option.
-The following entry would permit connections on
-.Xr tun 4
-device 1 from user
-.Dq jane
-and on tun device 2 from user
-.Dq john ,
-if
-.Cm PermitRootLogin
-is set to
-.Dq forced-commands-only :
-.Bd -literal -offset 2n
-tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane
-tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john
-.Ed
-.Pp
-Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead,
-it may be more suited to temporary setups,
-such as for wireless VPNs.
-More permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as
-.Xr ipsecctl 8
-and
-.Xr isakmpd 8 .
-.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-.Nm
-will normally set the following environment variables:
-.Bl -tag -width "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND"
-.It Ev DISPLAY
-The
-.Ev DISPLAY
-variable indicates the location of the X11 server.
-It is automatically set by
-.Nm
-to point to a value of the form
-.Dq hostname:n ,
-where
-.Dq hostname
-indicates the host where the shell runs, and
-.Sq n
-is an integer \*(Ge 1.
-.Nm
-uses this special value to forward X11 connections over the secure
-channel.
-The user should normally not set
-.Ev DISPLAY
-explicitly, as that
-will render the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to
-manually copy any required authorization cookies).
-.It Ev HOME
-Set to the path of the user's home directory.
-.It Ev LOGNAME
-Synonym for
-.Ev USER ;
-set for compatibility with systems that use this variable.
-.It Ev MAIL
-Set to the path of the user's mailbox.
-.It Ev PATH
-Set to the default
-.Ev PATH ,
-as specified when compiling
-.Nm .
-.It Ev SSH_ASKPASS
-If
-.Nm
-needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current
-terminal if it was run from a terminal.
-If
-.Nm
-does not have a terminal associated with it but
-.Ev DISPLAY
-and
-.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
-are set, it will execute the program specified by
-.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
-and open an X11 window to read the passphrase.
-This is particularly useful when calling
-.Nm
-from a
-.Pa .xsession
-or related script.
-(Note that on some machines it
-may be necessary to redirect the input from
-.Pa /dev/null
-to make this work.)
-.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
-Identifies the path of a
-.Ux Ns -domain
-socket used to communicate with the agent.
-.It Ev SSH_CONNECTION
-Identifies the client and server ends of the connection.
-The variable contains
-four space-separated values: client IP address, client port number,
-server IP address, and server port number.
-.It Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
-This variable contains the original command line if a forced command
-is executed.
-It can be used to extract the original arguments.
-.It Ev SSH_TTY
-This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated
-with the current shell or command.
-If the current session has no tty,
-this variable is not set.
-.It Ev TZ
-This variable is set to indicate the present time zone if it
-was set when the daemon was started (i.e. the daemon passes the value
-on to new connections).
-.It Ev USER
-Set to the name of the user logging in.
-.El
-.Pp
-Additionally,
-.Nm
-reads
-.Pa ~/.ssh/environment ,
-and adds lines of the format
-.Dq VARNAME=value
-to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to
-change their environment.
-For more information, see the
-.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
-option in
-.Xr sshd_config 5 .
-.Sh FILES
-.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-.It Pa ~/.rhosts
-This file is used for host-based authentication (see above).
-On some machines this file may need to be
-world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
-because
-.Xr sshd 8
-reads it as root.
-Additionally, this file must be owned by the user,
-and must not have write permissions for anyone else.
-The recommended
-permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not
-accessible by others.
-.Pp
-.It Pa ~/.shosts
-This file is used in exactly the same way as
-.Pa .rhosts ,
-but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
-rlogin/rsh.
-.Pp
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/
-This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
-and authentication information.
-There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
-secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user,
-and not accessible by others.
-.Pp
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, ED25519, RSA)
-that can be used for logging in as this user.
-The format of this file is described in the
-.Xr sshd 8
-manual page.
-This file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended
-permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
-.Pp
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/config
-This is the per-user configuration file.
-The file format and configuration options are described in
-.Xr ssh_config 5 .
-Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
-read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
-.Pp
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
-Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
-.Sx ENVIRONMENT ,
-above.
-.Pp
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
-Contains the private key for authentication.
-These files
-contain sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not
-accessible by others (read/write/execute).
-.Nm
-will simply ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others.
-It is possible to specify a passphrase when
-generating the key which will be used to encrypt the
-sensitive part of this file using 3DES.
-.Pp
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
-Contains the public key for authentication.
-These files are not
-sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone.
-.Pp
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
-Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into
-that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys.
-See
-.Xr sshd 8
-for further details of the format of this file.
-.Pp
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/rc
-Commands in this file are executed by
-.Nm
-when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is
-started.
-See the
-.Xr sshd 8
-manual page for more information.
-.Pp
-.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
-This file is for host-based authentication (see above).
-It should only be writable by root.
-.Pp
-.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
-This file is used in exactly the same way as
-.Pa hosts.equiv ,
-but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
-rlogin/rsh.
-.Pp
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
-Systemwide configuration file.
-The file format and configuration options are described in
-.Xr ssh_config 5 .
-.Pp
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
-These files contain the private parts of the host keys
-and are used for host-based authentication.
-If protocol version 1 is used,
-.Nm
-must be setuid root, since the host key is readable only by root.
-For protocol version 2,
-.Nm
-uses
-.Xr ssh-keysign 8
-to access the host keys,
-eliminating the requirement that
-.Nm
-be setuid root when host-based authentication is used.
-By default
-.Nm
-is not setuid root.
-.Pp
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
-Systemwide list of known host keys.
-This file should be prepared by the
-system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the
-organization.
-It should be world-readable.
-See
-.Xr sshd 8
-for further details of the format of this file.
-.Pp
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
-Commands in this file are executed by
-.Nm
-when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started.
-See the
-.Xr sshd 8
-manual page for more information.
-.El
-.Sh EXIT STATUS
-.Nm
-exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255
-if an error occurred.
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr scp 1 ,
-.Xr sftp 1 ,
-.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
-.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
-.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
-.Xr tun 4 ,
-.Xr hosts.equiv 5 ,
-.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
-.Xr ssh-keysign 8 ,
-.Xr sshd 8
-.Sh STANDARDS
-.Rs
-.%A S. Lehtinen
-.%A C. Lonvick
-.%D January 2006
-.%R RFC 4250
-.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers
-.Re
-.Pp
-.Rs
-.%A T. Ylonen
-.%A C. Lonvick
-.%D January 2006
-.%R RFC 4251
-.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture
-.Re
-.Pp
-.Rs
-.%A T. Ylonen
-.%A C. Lonvick
-.%D January 2006
-.%R RFC 4252
-.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol
-.Re
-.Pp
-.Rs
-.%A T. Ylonen
-.%A C. Lonvick
-.%D January 2006
-.%R RFC 4253
-.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
-.Re
-.Pp
-.Rs
-.%A T. Ylonen
-.%A C. Lonvick
-.%D January 2006
-.%R RFC 4254
-.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol
-.Re
-.Pp
-.Rs
-.%A J. Schlyter
-.%A W. Griffin
-.%D January 2006
-.%R RFC 4255
-.%T Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints
-.Re
-.Pp
-.Rs
-.%A F. Cusack
-.%A M. Forssen
-.%D January 2006
-.%R RFC 4256
-.%T Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH)
-.Re
-.Pp
-.Rs
-.%A J. Galbraith
-.%A P. Remaker
-.%D January 2006
-.%R RFC 4335
-.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension
-.Re
-.Pp
-.Rs
-.%A M. Bellare
-.%A T. Kohno
-.%A C. Namprempre
-.%D January 2006
-.%R RFC 4344
-.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes
-.Re
-.Pp
-.Rs
-.%A B. Harris
-.%D January 2006
-.%R RFC 4345
-.%T Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
-.Re
-.Pp
-.Rs
-.%A M. Friedl
-.%A N. Provos
-.%A W. Simpson
-.%D March 2006
-.%R RFC 4419
-.%T Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
-.Re
-.Pp
-.Rs
-.%A J. Galbraith
-.%A R. Thayer
-.%D November 2006
-.%R RFC 4716
-.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format
-.Re
-.Pp
-.Rs
-.%A D. Stebila
-.%A J. Green
-.%D December 2009
-.%R RFC 5656
-.%T Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer
-.Re
-.Pp
-.Rs
-.%A A. Perrig
-.%A D. Song
-.%D 1999
-.%O International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)
-.%T Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security
-.Re
-.Sh AUTHORS
-OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
-ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
-Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
-Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
-removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
-created OpenSSH.
-Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
-protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.1 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh.1)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.1 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.1 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1710 @@
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\" All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.376 2016/07/16 06:57:55 jmc Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: July 16 2016 $
+.Dt SSH 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh
+.Nd OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program)
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ssh
+.Bk -words
+.Op Fl 1246AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy
+.Op Fl b Ar bind_address
+.Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec
+.Op Fl D Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port
+.Op Fl E Ar log_file
+.Op Fl e Ar escape_char
+.Op Fl F Ar configfile
+.Op Fl I Ar pkcs11
+.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
+.Op Fl J Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns Ar host Ns Op : Ns Ar port
+.Op Fl L Ar address
+.Op Fl l Ar login_name
+.Op Fl m Ar mac_spec
+.Op Fl O Ar ctl_cmd
+.Op Fl o Ar option
+.Op Fl p Ar port
+.Op Fl Q Ar query_option
+.Op Fl R Ar address
+.Op Fl S Ar ctl_path
+.Op Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port
+.Op Fl w Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun
+.Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns Ar hostname
+.Op Ar command
+.Ek
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+(SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
+executing commands on a remote machine.
+It is intended to provide secure encrypted communications between
+two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.
+X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and
+.Ux Ns -domain
+sockets can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+connects and logs into the specified
+.Ar hostname
+(with optional
+.Ar user
+name).
+The user must prove
+his/her identity to the remote machine using one of several methods
+(see below).
+.Pp
+If
+.Ar command
+is specified,
+it is executed on the remote host instead of a login shell.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.It Fl 1
+Forces
+.Nm
+to try protocol version 1 only.
+.Pp
+.It Fl 2
+Forces
+.Nm
+to try protocol version 2 only.
+.Pp
+.It Fl 4
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv4 addresses only.
+.Pp
+.It Fl 6
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.Pp
+.It Fl A
+Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
+This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
+.Pp
+Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.
+Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
+(for the agent's
+.Ux Ns -domain
+socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection.
+An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent,
+however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to
+authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent.
+.Pp
+.It Fl a
+Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
+.Pp
+.It Fl b Ar bind_address
+Use
+.Ar bind_address
+on the local machine as the source address
+of the connection.
+Only useful on systems with more than one address.
+.Pp
+.It Fl C
+Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and
+data for forwarded X11, TCP and
+.Ux Ns -domain
+connections).
+The compression algorithm is the same used by
+.Xr gzip 1 ,
+and the
+.Dq level
+can be controlled by the
+.Cm CompressionLevel
+option for protocol version 1.
+Compression is desirable on modem lines and other
+slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks.
+The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the
+configuration files; see the
+.Cm Compression
+option.
+.Pp
+.It Fl c Ar cipher_spec
+Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session.
+.Pp
+Protocol version 1 allows specification of a single cipher.
+The supported values are
+.Dq 3des ,
+.Dq blowfish ,
+and
+.Dq des .
+For protocol version 2,
+.Ar cipher_spec
+is a comma-separated list of ciphers
+listed in order of preference.
+See the
+.Cm Ciphers
+keyword in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information.
+.Pp
+.It Fl D Xo
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
+.Ar port
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+Specifies a local
+.Dq dynamic
+application-level port forwarding.
+This works by allocating a socket to listen to
+.Ar port
+on the local side, optionally bound to the specified
+.Ar bind_address .
+Whenever a connection is made to this port, the
+connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and the application
+protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the
+remote machine.
+Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
+.Nm
+will act as a SOCKS server.
+Only root can forward privileged ports.
+Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+.Pp
+IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
+Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+setting.
+However, an explicit
+.Ar bind_address
+may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
+The
+.Ar bind_address
+of
+.Dq localhost
+indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
+empty address or
+.Sq *
+indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+.Pp
+.It Fl E Ar log_file
+Append debug logs to
+.Ar log_file
+instead of standard error.
+.Pp
+.It Fl e Ar escape_char
+Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default:
+.Ql ~ ) .
+The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a line.
+The escape character followed by a dot
+.Pq Ql \&.
+closes the connection;
+followed by control-Z suspends the connection;
+and followed by itself sends the escape character once.
+Setting the character to
+.Dq none
+disables any escapes and makes the session fully transparent.
+.Pp
+.It Fl F Ar configfile
+Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file.
+If a configuration file is given on the command line,
+the system-wide configuration file
+.Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+will be ignored.
+The default for the per-user configuration file is
+.Pa ~/.ssh/config .
+.Pp
+.It Fl f
+Requests
+.Nm
+to go to background just before command execution.
+This is useful if
+.Nm
+is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user
+wants it in the background.
+This implies
+.Fl n .
+The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with
+something like
+.Ic ssh -f host xterm .
+.Pp
+If the
+.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
+configuration option is set to
+.Dq yes ,
+then a client started with
+.Fl f
+will wait for all remote port forwards to be successfully established
+before placing itself in the background.
+.Pp
+.It Fl G
+Causes
+.Nm
+to print its configuration after evaluating
+.Cm Host
+and
+.Cm Match
+blocks and exit.
+.Pp
+.It Fl g
+Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports.
+If used on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified
+on the master process.
+.Pp
+.It Fl I Ar pkcs11
+Specify the PKCS#11 shared library
+.Nm
+should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's
+private RSA key.
+.Pp
+.It Fl i Ar identity_file
+Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for
+public key authentication is read.
+The default is
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity
+for protocol version 1, and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+for protocol version 2.
+Identity files may also be specified on
+a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+It is possible to have multiple
+.Fl i
+options (and multiple identities specified in
+configuration files).
+If no certificates have been explicitly specified by the
+.Cm CertificateFile
+directive,
+.Nm
+will also try to load certificate information from the filename obtained
+by appending
+.Pa -cert.pub
+to identity filenames.
+.Pp
+.It Fl J Xo
+.Sm off
+.Op Ar user No @
+.Ar host
+.Op : Ar port
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+Connect to the target host by first making a
+.Nm
+connection to the jump
+.Ar host
+and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from
+there.
+Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters.
+This is a shortcut to specify a
+.Cm ProxyJump
+configuration directive.
+.Pp
+.It Fl K
+Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI
+credentials to the server.
+.Pp
+.It Fl k
+Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server.
+.Pp
+.It Fl L Xo
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
+.Ar port : host : hostport
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+.It Fl L Xo
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
+.Ar port : remote_socket
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+.It Fl L Xo
+.Sm off
+.Ar local_socket : host : hostport
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+.It Fl L Xo
+.Sm off
+.Ar local_socket : remote_socket
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the local
+(client) host are to be forwarded to the given host and port, or Unix socket,
+on the remote side.
+This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP
+.Ar port
+on the local side, optionally bound to the specified
+.Ar bind_address ,
+or to a Unix socket.
+Whenever a connection is made to the local port or socket, the
+connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is
+made to either
+.Ar host
+port
+.Ar hostport ,
+or the Unix socket
+.Ar remote_socket ,
+from the remote machine.
+.Pp
+Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
+.Pp
+By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+setting.
+However, an explicit
+.Ar bind_address
+may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
+The
+.Ar bind_address
+of
+.Dq localhost
+indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
+empty address or
+.Sq *
+indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+.Pp
+.It Fl l Ar login_name
+Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine.
+This also may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+.Pp
+.It Fl M
+Places the
+.Nm
+client into
+.Dq master
+mode for connection sharing.
+Multiple
+.Fl M
+options places
+.Nm
+into
+.Dq master
+mode with confirmation required before slave connections are accepted.
+Refer to the description of
+.Cm ControlMaster
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for details.
+.Pp
+.It Fl m Ar mac_spec
+A comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code) algorithms,
+specified in order of preference.
+See the
+.Cm MACs
+keyword for more information.
+.Pp
+.It Fl N
+Do not execute a remote command.
+This is useful for just forwarding ports.
+.Pp
+.It Fl n
+Redirects stdin from
+.Pa /dev/null
+(actually, prevents reading from stdin).
+This must be used when
+.Nm
+is run in the background.
+A common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote machine.
+For example,
+.Ic ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs &
+will start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11
+connection will be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel.
+The
+.Nm
+program will be put in the background.
+(This does not work if
+.Nm
+needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the
+.Fl f
+option.)
+.Pp
+.It Fl O Ar ctl_cmd
+Control an active connection multiplexing master process.
+When the
+.Fl O
+option is specified, the
+.Ar ctl_cmd
+argument is interpreted and passed to the master process.
+Valid commands are:
+.Dq check
+(check that the master process is running),
+.Dq forward
+(request forwardings without command execution),
+.Dq cancel
+(cancel forwardings),
+.Dq exit
+(request the master to exit), and
+.Dq stop
+(request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing requests).
+.Pp
+.It Fl o Ar option
+Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file.
+This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate
+command-line flag.
+For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact
+.It AddKeysToAgent
+.It AddressFamily
+.It BatchMode
+.It BindAddress
+.It CanonicalDomains
+.It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+.It CanonicalizeHostname
+.It CanonicalizeMaxDots
+.It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+.It CertificateFile
+.It ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+.It CheckHostIP
+.It Cipher
+.It Ciphers
+.It ClearAllForwardings
+.It Compression
+.It CompressionLevel
+.It ConnectionAttempts
+.It ConnectTimeout
+.It ControlMaster
+.It ControlPath
+.It ControlPersist
+.It DynamicForward
+.It EscapeChar
+.It ExitOnForwardFailure
+.It FingerprintHash
+.It ForwardAgent
+.It ForwardX11
+.It ForwardX11Timeout
+.It ForwardX11Trusted
+.It GatewayPorts
+.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
+.It GSSAPIAuthentication
+.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+.It HashKnownHosts
+.It Host
+.It HostbasedAuthentication
+.It HostbasedKeyTypes
+.It HostKeyAlgorithms
+.It HostKeyAlias
+.It HostName
+.It IdentitiesOnly
+.It IdentityAgent
+.It IdentityFile
+.It Include
+.It IPQoS
+.It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+.It KbdInteractiveDevices
+.It KexAlgorithms
+.It LocalCommand
+.It LocalForward
+.It LogLevel
+.It MACs
+.It Match
+.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+.It PasswordAuthentication
+.It PermitLocalCommand
+.It PKCS11Provider
+.It Port
+.It PreferredAuthentications
+.It Protocol
+.It ProxyCommand
+.It ProxyJump
+.It ProxyUseFdpass
+.It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+.It PubkeyAuthentication
+.It RekeyLimit
+.It RemoteForward
+.It RequestTTY
+.It RhostsRSAAuthentication
+.It RSAAuthentication
+.It SendEnv
+.It ServerAliveInterval
+.It ServerAliveCountMax
+.It StreamLocalBindMask
+.It StreamLocalBindUnlink
+.It StrictHostKeyChecking
+.It TCPKeepAlive
+.It Tunnel
+.It TunnelDevice
+.It UpdateHostKeys
+.It UsePrivilegedPort
+.It User
+.It UserKnownHostsFile
+.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
+.It VisualHostKey
+.It XAuthLocation
+.El
+.Pp
+.It Fl p Ar port
+Port to connect to on the remote host.
+This can be specified on a
+per-host basis in the configuration file.
+.Pp
+.It Fl Q Ar query_option
+Queries
+.Nm
+for the algorithms supported for the specified version 2.
+The available features are:
+.Ar cipher
+(supported symmetric ciphers),
+.Ar cipher-auth
+(supported symmetric ciphers that support authenticated encryption),
+.Ar mac
+(supported message integrity codes),
+.Ar kex
+(key exchange algorithms),
+.Ar key
+(key types),
+.Ar key-cert
+(certificate key types),
+.Ar key-plain
+(non-certificate key types), and
+.Ar protocol-version
+(supported SSH protocol versions).
+.Pp
+.It Fl q
+Quiet mode.
+Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed.
+.Pp
+.It Fl R Xo
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
+.Ar port : host : hostport
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+.It Fl R Xo
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
+.Ar port : local_socket
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+.It Fl R Xo
+.Sm off
+.Ar remote_socket : host : hostport
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+.It Fl R Xo
+.Sm off
+.Ar remote_socket : local_socket
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the remote
+(server) host are to be forwarded to the given host and port, or Unix socket,
+on the local side.
+This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP
+.Ar port
+or to a Unix socket on the remote side.
+Whenever a connection is made to this port or Unix socket, the
+connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection
+is made to either
+.Ar host
+port
+.Ar hostport ,
+or
+.Ar local_socket ,
+from the local machine.
+.Pp
+Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+Privileged ports can be forwarded only when
+logging in as root on the remote machine.
+IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
+.Pp
+By default, TCP listening sockets on the server will be bound to the loopback
+interface only.
+This may be overridden by specifying a
+.Ar bind_address .
+An empty
+.Ar bind_address ,
+or the address
+.Ql * ,
+indicates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces.
+Specifying a remote
+.Ar bind_address
+will only succeed if the server's
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+option is enabled (see
+.Xr sshd_config 5 ) .
+.Pp
+If the
+.Ar port
+argument is
+.Ql 0 ,
+the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported
+to the client at run time.
+When used together with
+.Ic -O forward
+the allocated port will be printed to the standard output.
+.Pp
+.It Fl S Ar ctl_path
+Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing,
+or the string
+.Dq none
+to disable connection sharing.
+Refer to the description of
+.Cm ControlPath
+and
+.Cm ControlMaster
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for details.
+.Pp
+.It Fl s
+May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system.
+Subsystems facilitate the use of SSH
+as a secure transport for other applications (e.g.\&
+.Xr sftp 1 ) .
+The subsystem is specified as the remote command.
+.Pp
+.It Fl T
+Disable pseudo-terminal allocation.
+.Pp
+.It Fl t
+Force pseudo-terminal allocation.
+This can be used to execute arbitrary
+screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful,
+e.g. when implementing menu services.
+Multiple
+.Fl t
+options force tty allocation, even if
+.Nm
+has no local tty.
+.Pp
+.It Fl V
+Display the version number and exit.
+.Pp
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode.
+Causes
+.Nm
+to print debugging messages about its progress.
+This is helpful in
+debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
+Multiple
+.Fl v
+options increase the verbosity.
+The maximum is 3.
+.Pp
+.It Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port
+Requests that standard input and output on the client be forwarded to
+.Ar host
+on
+.Ar port
+over the secure channel.
+Implies
+.Fl N ,
+.Fl T ,
+.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
+and
+.Cm ClearAllForwardings ,
+though these can be overridden in the configuration file or using
+.Fl o
+command line options.
+.Pp
+.It Fl w Xo
+.Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun
+.Xc
+Requests
+tunnel
+device forwarding with the specified
+.Xr tun 4
+devices between the client
+.Pq Ar local_tun
+and the server
+.Pq Ar remote_tun .
+.Pp
+The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
+.Dq any ,
+which uses the next available tunnel device.
+If
+.Ar remote_tun
+is not specified, it defaults to
+.Dq any .
+See also the
+.Cm Tunnel
+and
+.Cm TunnelDevice
+directives in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+If the
+.Cm Tunnel
+directive is unset, it is set to the default tunnel mode, which is
+.Dq point-to-point .
+.Pp
+.It Fl X
+Enables X11 forwarding.
+This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
+.Pp
+X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.
+Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
+(for the user's X authorization database)
+can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection.
+An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring.
+.Pp
+For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY extension
+restrictions by default.
+Please refer to the
+.Nm
+.Fl Y
+option and the
+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
+directive in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information.
+.Pp
+.It Fl x
+Disables X11 forwarding.
+.Pp
+.It Fl Y
+Enables trusted X11 forwarding.
+Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension
+controls.
+.Pp
+.It Fl y
+Send log information using the
+.Xr syslog 3
+system module.
+By default this information is sent to stderr.
+.El
+.Pp
+.Nm
+may additionally obtain configuration data from
+a per-user configuration file and a system-wide configuration file.
+The file format and configuration options are described in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.Sh AUTHENTICATION
+The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocols 1 and 2.
+The default is to use protocol 2 only,
+though this can be changed via the
+.Cm Protocol
+option in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+or the
+.Fl 1
+and
+.Fl 2
+options (see above).
+Protocol 1 should not be used
+and is only offered to support legacy devices.
+It suffers from a number of cryptographic weaknesses
+and doesn't support many of the advanced features available for protocol 2.
+.Pp
+The methods available for authentication are:
+GSSAPI-based authentication,
+host-based authentication,
+public key authentication,
+challenge-response authentication,
+and password authentication.
+Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above,
+though
+.Cm PreferredAuthentications
+can be used to change the default order.
+.Pp
+Host-based authentication works as follows:
+If the machine the user logs in from is listed in
+.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+or
+.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
+on the remote machine, and the user names are
+the same on both sides, or if the files
+.Pa ~/.rhosts
+or
+.Pa ~/.shosts
+exist in the user's home directory on the
+remote machine and contain a line containing the name of the client
+machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is
+considered for login.
+Additionally, the server
+.Em must
+be able to verify the client's
+host key (see the description of
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts ,
+below)
+for login to be permitted.
+This authentication method closes security holes due to IP
+spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing.
+[Note to the administrator:
+.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv ,
+.Pa ~/.rhosts ,
+and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be
+disabled if security is desired.]
+.Pp
+Public key authentication works as follows:
+The scheme is based on public-key cryptography,
+using cryptosystems
+where encryption and decryption are done using separate keys,
+and it is unfeasible to derive the decryption key from the encryption key.
+The idea is that each user creates a public/private
+key pair for authentication purposes.
+The server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key.
+.Nm
+implements public key authentication protocol automatically,
+using one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms.
+The HISTORY section of
+.Xr ssl 8
+contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms.
+.Pp
+The file
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+lists the public keys that are permitted for logging in.
+When the user logs in, the
+.Nm
+program tells the server which key pair it would like to use for
+authentication.
+The client proves that it has access to the private key
+and the server checks that the corresponding public key
+is authorized to accept the account.
+.Pp
+The user creates his/her key pair by running
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+This stores the private key in
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity
+(protocol 1),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+(DSA),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+(ECDSA),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+(Ed25519),
+or
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+(RSA)
+and stores the public key in
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub
+(protocol 1),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+(DSA),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
+(ECDSA),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+(Ed25519),
+or
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+(RSA)
+in the user's home directory.
+The user should then copy the public key
+to
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+in his/her home directory on the remote machine.
+The
+.Pa authorized_keys
+file corresponds to the conventional
+.Pa ~/.rhosts
+file, and has one key
+per line, though the lines can be very long.
+After this, the user can log in without giving the password.
+.Pp
+A variation on public key authentication
+is available in the form of certificate authentication:
+instead of a set of public/private keys,
+signed certificates are used.
+This has the advantage that a single trusted certification authority
+can be used in place of many public/private keys.
+See the CERTIFICATES section of
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+for more information.
+.Pp
+The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication
+may be with an authentication agent.
+See
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+and (optionally) the
+.Cm AddKeysToAgent
+directive in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information.
+.Pp
+Challenge-response authentication works as follows:
+The server sends an arbitrary
+.Qq challenge
+text, and prompts for a response.
+Examples of challenge-response authentication include
+.Bx
+Authentication (see
+.Xr login.conf 5 )
+and PAM (some
+.Pf non- Ox
+systems).
+.Pp
+Finally, if other authentication methods fail,
+.Nm
+prompts the user for a password.
+The password is sent to the remote
+host for checking; however, since all communications are encrypted,
+the password cannot be seen by someone listening on the network.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+automatically maintains and checks a database containing
+identification for all hosts it has ever been used with.
+Host keys are stored in
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+in the user's home directory.
+Additionally, the file
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+is automatically checked for known hosts.
+Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file.
+If a host's identification ever changes,
+.Nm
+warns about this and disables password authentication to prevent
+server spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks,
+which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption.
+The
+.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
+option can be used to control logins to machines whose
+host key is not known or has changed.
+.Pp
+When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server
+either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or,
+if no command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives
+the user a normal shell as an interactive session.
+All communication with
+the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
+.Pp
+If an interactive session is requested
+.Nm
+by default will only request a pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive
+sessions when the client has one.
+The flags
+.Fl T
+and
+.Fl t
+can be used to override this behaviour.
+.Pp
+If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated the
+user may use the escape characters noted below.
+.Pp
+If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated,
+the session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary data.
+On most systems, setting the escape character to
+.Dq none
+will also make the session transparent even if a tty is used.
+.Pp
+The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote
+machine exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed.
+.Sh ESCAPE CHARACTERS
+When a pseudo-terminal has been requested,
+.Nm
+supports a number of functions through the use of an escape character.
+.Pp
+A single tilde character can be sent as
+.Ic ~~
+or by following the tilde by a character other than those described below.
+The escape character must always follow a newline to be interpreted as
+special.
+The escape character can be changed in configuration files using the
+.Cm EscapeChar
+configuration directive or on the command line by the
+.Fl e
+option.
+.Pp
+The supported escapes (assuming the default
+.Ql ~ )
+are:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm ~.
+Disconnect.
+.It Cm ~^Z
+Background
+.Nm .
+.It Cm ~#
+List forwarded connections.
+.It Cm ~&
+Background
+.Nm
+at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / X11 sessions to terminate.
+.It Cm ~?
+Display a list of escape characters.
+.It Cm ~B
+Send a BREAK to the remote system
+(only useful if the peer supports it).
+.It Cm ~C
+Open command line.
+Currently this allows the addition of port forwardings using the
+.Fl L ,
+.Fl R
+and
+.Fl D
+options (see above).
+It also allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings
+with
+.Sm off
+.Fl KL Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
+.Sm on
+for local,
+.Sm off
+.Fl KR Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
+.Sm on
+for remote and
+.Sm off
+.Fl KD Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
+.Sm on
+for dynamic port-forwardings.
+.Ic !\& Ns Ar command
+allows the user to execute a local command if the
+.Ic PermitLocalCommand
+option is enabled in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+Basic help is available, using the
+.Fl h
+option.
+.It Cm ~R
+Request rekeying of the connection
+(only useful if the peer supports it).
+.It Cm ~V
+Decrease the verbosity
+.Pq Ic LogLevel
+when errors are being written to stderr.
+.It Cm ~v
+Increase the verbosity
+.Pq Ic LogLevel
+when errors are being written to stderr.
+.El
+.Sh TCP FORWARDING
+Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over the secure channel can
+be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file.
+One possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a
+mail server; another is going through firewalls.
+.Pp
+In the example below, we look at encrypting communication between
+an IRC client and server, even though the IRC server does not directly
+support encrypted communications.
+This works as follows:
+the user connects to the remote host using
+.Nm ,
+specifying a port to be used to forward connections
+to the remote server.
+After that it is possible to start the service which is to be encrypted
+on the client machine,
+connecting to the same local port,
+and
+.Nm
+will encrypt and forward the connection.
+.Pp
+The following example tunnels an IRC session from client machine
+.Dq 127.0.0.1
+(localhost)
+to remote server
+.Dq server.example.com :
+.Bd -literal -offset 4n
+$ ssh -f -L 1234:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10
+$ irc -c '#users' -p 1234 pinky 127.0.0.1
+.Ed
+.Pp
+This tunnels a connection to IRC server
+.Dq server.example.com ,
+joining channel
+.Dq #users ,
+nickname
+.Dq pinky ,
+using port 1234.
+It doesn't matter which port is used,
+as long as it's greater than 1023
+(remember, only root can open sockets on privileged ports)
+and doesn't conflict with any ports already in use.
+The connection is forwarded to port 6667 on the remote server,
+since that's the standard port for IRC services.
+.Pp
+The
+.Fl f
+option backgrounds
+.Nm
+and the remote command
+.Dq sleep 10
+is specified to allow an amount of time
+(10 seconds, in the example)
+to start the service which is to be tunnelled.
+If no connections are made within the time specified,
+.Nm
+will exit.
+.Sh X11 FORWARDING
+If the
+.Cm ForwardX11
+variable is set to
+.Dq yes
+(or see the description of the
+.Fl X ,
+.Fl x ,
+and
+.Fl Y
+options above)
+and the user is using X11 (the
+.Ev DISPLAY
+environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is
+automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11
+programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the
+encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made
+from the local machine.
+The user should not manually set
+.Ev DISPLAY .
+Forwarding of X11 connections can be
+configured on the command line or in configuration files.
+.Pp
+The
+.Ev DISPLAY
+value set by
+.Nm
+will point to the server machine, but with a display number greater than zero.
+This is normal, and happens because
+.Nm
+creates a
+.Dq proxy
+X server on the server machine for forwarding the
+connections over the encrypted channel.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine.
+For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie,
+store it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded
+connections carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when
+the connection is opened.
+The real authentication cookie is never
+sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain).
+.Pp
+If the
+.Cm ForwardAgent
+variable is set to
+.Dq yes
+(or see the description of the
+.Fl A
+and
+.Fl a
+options above) and
+the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent
+is automatically forwarded to the remote side.
+.Sh VERIFYING HOST KEYS
+When connecting to a server for the first time,
+a fingerprint of the server's public key is presented to the user
+(unless the option
+.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
+has been disabled).
+Fingerprints can be determined using
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 :
+.Pp
+.Dl $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+.Pp
+If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched
+and the key can be accepted or rejected.
+If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server are available, the
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+.Fl E
+option may be used to downgrade the fingerprint algorithm to match.
+.Pp
+Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys
+just by looking at fingerprint strings,
+there is also support to compare host keys visually,
+using
+.Em random art .
+By setting the
+.Cm VisualHostKey
+option to
+.Dq yes ,
+a small ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter
+if the session itself is interactive or not.
+By learning the pattern a known server produces, a user can easily
+find out that the host key has changed when a completely different pattern
+is displayed.
+Because these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks
+similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good probability that the
+host key is the same, not guaranteed proof.
+.Pp
+To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for
+all known hosts, the following command line can be used:
+.Pp
+.Dl $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+.Pp
+If the fingerprint is unknown,
+an alternative method of verification is available:
+SSH fingerprints verified by DNS.
+An additional resource record (RR),
+SSHFP,
+is added to a zonefile
+and the connecting client is able to match the fingerprint
+with that of the key presented.
+.Pp
+In this example, we are connecting a client to a server,
+.Dq host.example.com .
+The SSHFP resource records should first be added to the zonefile for
+host.example.com:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+$ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com.
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile.
+To check that the zone is answering fingerprint queries:
+.Pp
+.Dl $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com
+.Pp
+Finally the client connects:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+$ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com
+[...]
+Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS.
+Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
+.Ed
+.Pp
+See the
+.Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS
+option in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information.
+.Sh SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS
+.Nm
+contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling
+using the
+.Xr tun 4
+network pseudo-device,
+allowing two networks to be joined securely.
+The
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+configuration option
+.Cm PermitTunnel
+controls whether the server supports this,
+and at what level (layer 2 or 3 traffic).
+.Pp
+The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24
+with remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection
+from 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2,
+provided that the SSH server running on the gateway to the remote network,
+at 192.168.1.15, allows it.
+.Pp
+On the client:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+# ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true
+# ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252
+# route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2
+.Ed
+.Pp
+On the server:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+# ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252
+# route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1
+.Ed
+.Pp
+Client access may be more finely tuned via the
+.Pa /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
+file (see below) and the
+.Cm PermitRootLogin
+server option.
+The following entry would permit connections on
+.Xr tun 4
+device 1 from user
+.Dq jane
+and on tun device 2 from user
+.Dq john ,
+if
+.Cm PermitRootLogin
+is set to
+.Dq forced-commands-only :
+.Bd -literal -offset 2n
+tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane
+tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john
+.Ed
+.Pp
+Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead,
+it may be more suited to temporary setups,
+such as for wireless VPNs.
+More permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as
+.Xr ipsecctl 8
+and
+.Xr isakmpd 8 .
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Nm
+will normally set the following environment variables:
+.Bl -tag -width "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND"
+.It Ev DISPLAY
+The
+.Ev DISPLAY
+variable indicates the location of the X11 server.
+It is automatically set by
+.Nm
+to point to a value of the form
+.Dq hostname:n ,
+where
+.Dq hostname
+indicates the host where the shell runs, and
+.Sq n
+is an integer \*(Ge 1.
+.Nm
+uses this special value to forward X11 connections over the secure
+channel.
+The user should normally not set
+.Ev DISPLAY
+explicitly, as that
+will render the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to
+manually copy any required authorization cookies).
+.It Ev HOME
+Set to the path of the user's home directory.
+.It Ev LOGNAME
+Synonym for
+.Ev USER ;
+set for compatibility with systems that use this variable.
+.It Ev MAIL
+Set to the path of the user's mailbox.
+.It Ev PATH
+Set to the default
+.Ev PATH ,
+as specified when compiling
+.Nm .
+.It Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+If
+.Nm
+needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current
+terminal if it was run from a terminal.
+If
+.Nm
+does not have a terminal associated with it but
+.Ev DISPLAY
+and
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+are set, it will execute the program specified by
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+and open an X11 window to read the passphrase.
+This is particularly useful when calling
+.Nm
+from a
+.Pa .xsession
+or related script.
+(Note that on some machines it
+may be necessary to redirect the input from
+.Pa /dev/null
+to make this work.)
+.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+Identifies the path of a
+.Ux Ns -domain
+socket used to communicate with the agent.
+.It Ev SSH_CONNECTION
+Identifies the client and server ends of the connection.
+The variable contains
+four space-separated values: client IP address, client port number,
+server IP address, and server port number.
+.It Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
+This variable contains the original command line if a forced command
+is executed.
+It can be used to extract the original arguments.
+.It Ev SSH_TTY
+This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated
+with the current shell or command.
+If the current session has no tty,
+this variable is not set.
+.It Ev TZ
+This variable is set to indicate the present time zone if it
+was set when the daemon was started (i.e. the daemon passes the value
+on to new connections).
+.It Ev USER
+Set to the name of the user logging in.
+.El
+.Pp
+Additionally,
+.Nm
+reads
+.Pa ~/.ssh/environment ,
+and adds lines of the format
+.Dq VARNAME=value
+to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to
+change their environment.
+For more information, see the
+.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
+option in
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.It Pa ~/.rhosts
+This file is used for host-based authentication (see above).
+On some machines this file may need to be
+world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
+because
+.Xr sshd 8
+reads it as root.
+Additionally, this file must be owned by the user,
+and must not have write permissions for anyone else.
+The recommended
+permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not
+accessible by others.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.shosts
+This file is used in exactly the same way as
+.Pa .rhosts ,
+but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+rlogin/rsh.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/
+This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
+and authentication information.
+There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
+secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user,
+and not accessible by others.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA)
+that can be used for logging in as this user.
+The format of this file is described in the
+.Xr sshd 8
+manual page.
+This file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended
+permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/config
+This is the per-user configuration file.
+The file format and configuration options are described in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
+read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
+Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT ,
+above.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+Contains the private key for authentication.
+These files
+contain sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not
+accessible by others (read/write/execute).
+.Nm
+will simply ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others.
+It is possible to specify a passphrase when
+generating the key which will be used to encrypt the
+sensitive part of this file using 3DES.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+Contains the public key for authentication.
+These files are not
+sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into
+that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys.
+See
+.Xr sshd 8
+for further details of the format of this file.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+Commands in this file are executed by
+.Nm
+when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is
+started.
+See the
+.Xr sshd 8
+manual page for more information.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+This file is for host-based authentication (see above).
+It should only be writable by root.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
+This file is used in exactly the same way as
+.Pa hosts.equiv ,
+but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+rlogin/rsh.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+Systemwide configuration file.
+The file format and configuration options are described in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+These files contain the private parts of the host keys
+and are used for host-based authentication.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+Systemwide list of known host keys.
+This file should be prepared by the
+system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the
+organization.
+It should be world-readable.
+See
+.Xr sshd 8
+for further details of the format of this file.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
+Commands in this file are executed by
+.Nm
+when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started.
+See the
+.Xr sshd 8
+manual page for more information.
+.El
+.Sh EXIT STATUS
+.Nm
+exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255
+if an error occurred.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr scp 1 ,
+.Xr sftp 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+.Xr tun 4 ,
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
+.Xr ssh-keysign 8 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh STANDARDS
+.Rs
+.%A S. Lehtinen
+.%A C. Lonvick
+.%D January 2006
+.%R RFC 4250
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A C. Lonvick
+.%D January 2006
+.%R RFC 4251
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A C. Lonvick
+.%D January 2006
+.%R RFC 4252
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A C. Lonvick
+.%D January 2006
+.%R RFC 4253
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A C. Lonvick
+.%D January 2006
+.%R RFC 4254
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A J. Schlyter
+.%A W. Griffin
+.%D January 2006
+.%R RFC 4255
+.%T Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A F. Cusack
+.%A M. Forssen
+.%D January 2006
+.%R RFC 4256
+.%T Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH)
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A J. Galbraith
+.%A P. Remaker
+.%D January 2006
+.%R RFC 4335
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A M. Bellare
+.%A T. Kohno
+.%A C. Namprempre
+.%D January 2006
+.%R RFC 4344
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A B. Harris
+.%D January 2006
+.%R RFC 4345
+.%T Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A M. Friedl
+.%A N. Provos
+.%A W. Simpson
+.%D March 2006
+.%R RFC 4419
+.%T Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A J. Galbraith
+.%A R. Thayer
+.%D November 2006
+.%R RFC 4716
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A D. Stebila
+.%A J. Green
+.%D December 2009
+.%R RFC 5656
+.%T Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A A. Perrig
+.%A D. Song
+.%D 1999
+.%O International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)
+.%T Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security
+.Re
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1851 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.401 2014/02/26 20:18:37 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Ssh client program. This program can be used to log into a remote machine.
- * The software supports strong authentication, encryption, and forwarding
- * of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication connections.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Modified to work with SSL by Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>
- * in Canada (German citizen).
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
-# include <sys/stat.h>
-#endif
-#include <sys/resource.h>
-#include <sys/ioctl.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-#include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stddef.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "authfd.h"
-#include "authfile.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "clientloop.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "readconf.h"
-#include "sshconnect.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "mac.h"
-#include "sshpty.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "msg.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "roaming.h"
-#include "version.h"
-
-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
-#endif
-
-extern char *__progname;
-
-/* Saves a copy of argv for setproctitle emulation */
-#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
-static char **saved_av;
-#endif
-
-/* Flag indicating whether debug mode is on. May be set on the command line. */
-int debug_flag = 0;
-
-/* Flag indicating whether a tty should be requested */
-int tty_flag = 0;
-
-/* don't exec a shell */
-int no_shell_flag = 0;
-
-/*
- * Flag indicating that nothing should be read from stdin. This can be set
- * on the command line.
- */
-int stdin_null_flag = 0;
-
-/*
- * Flag indicating that the current process should be backgrounded and
- * a new slave launched in the foreground for ControlPersist.
- */
-int need_controlpersist_detach = 0;
-
-/* Copies of flags for ControlPersist foreground slave */
-int ostdin_null_flag, ono_shell_flag, otty_flag, orequest_tty;
-
-/*
- * Flag indicating that ssh should fork after authentication. This is useful
- * so that the passphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the
- * background.
- */
-int fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
-
-/* forward stdio to remote host and port */
-char *stdio_forward_host = NULL;
-int stdio_forward_port = 0;
-
-/*
- * General data structure for command line options and options configurable
- * in configuration files. See readconf.h.
- */
-Options options;
-
-/* optional user configfile */
-char *config = NULL;
-
-/*
- * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the
- * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a
- * configuration file.
- */
-char *host;
-
-/* socket address the host resolves to */
-struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr;
-
-/* Private host keys. */
-Sensitive sensitive_data;
-
-/* Original real UID. */
-uid_t original_real_uid;
-uid_t original_effective_uid;
-
-/* command to be executed */
-Buffer command;
-
-/* Should we execute a command or invoke a subsystem? */
-int subsystem_flag = 0;
-
-/* # of replies received for global requests */
-static int remote_forward_confirms_received = 0;
-
-/* mux.c */
-extern int muxserver_sock;
-extern u_int muxclient_command;
-
-/* Prints a help message to the user. This function never returns. */
-
-static void
-usage(void)
-{
- fprintf(stderr,
-"usage: ssh [-1246AaCfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]\n"
-" [-D [bind_address:]port] [-E log_file] [-e escape_char]\n"
-" [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11] [-i identity_file]\n"
-" [-L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec]\n"
-" [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]\n"
-" [-Q cipher | cipher-auth | mac | kex | key]\n"
-" [-R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport] [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port]\n"
-" [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] [user@]hostname [command]\n"
- );
- exit(255);
-}
-
-static int ssh_session(void);
-static int ssh_session2(void);
-static void load_public_identity_files(void);
-static void main_sigchld_handler(int);
-
-/* from muxclient.c */
-void muxclient(const char *);
-void muxserver_listen(void);
-
-/* ~/ expand a list of paths. NB. assumes path[n] is heap-allocated. */
-static void
-tilde_expand_paths(char **paths, u_int num_paths)
-{
- u_int i;
- char *cp;
-
- for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) {
- cp = tilde_expand_filename(paths[i], original_real_uid);
- free(paths[i]);
- paths[i] = cp;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Attempt to resolve a host name / port to a set of addresses and
- * optionally return any CNAMEs encountered along the way.
- * Returns NULL on failure.
- * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
- */
-static struct addrinfo *
-resolve_host(const char *name, int port, int logerr, char *cname, size_t clen)
-{
- char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
- struct addrinfo hints, *res;
- int gaierr, loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
-
- if (port <= 0)
- port = default_ssh_port();
-
- snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ?
- AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- if (cname != NULL)
- hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
- if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) {
- if (logerr || (gaierr != EAI_NONAME && gaierr != EAI_NODATA))
- loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
- do_log2(loglevel, "%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s",
- __progname, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
- return NULL;
- }
- if (cname != NULL && res->ai_canonname != NULL) {
- if (strlcpy(cname, res->ai_canonname, clen) >= clen) {
- error("%s: host \"%s\" cname \"%s\" too long (max %lu)",
- __func__, name, res->ai_canonname, (u_long)clen);
- if (clen > 0)
- *cname = '\0';
- }
- }
- return res;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check whether the cname is a permitted replacement for the hostname
- * and perform the replacement if it is.
- * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
- */
-static int
-check_follow_cname(char **namep, const char *cname)
-{
- int i;
- struct allowed_cname *rule;
-
- if (*cname == '\0' || options.num_permitted_cnames == 0 ||
- strcmp(*namep, cname) == 0)
- return 0;
- if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
- return 0;
- /*
- * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by
- * a proxy unless the user specifically requests so.
- */
- if (!option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) &&
- options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)
- return 0;
- debug3("%s: check \"%s\" CNAME \"%s\"", __func__, *namep, cname);
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_permitted_cnames; i++) {
- rule = options.permitted_cnames + i;
- if (match_pattern_list(*namep, rule->source_list,
- strlen(rule->source_list), 1) != 1 ||
- match_pattern_list(cname, rule->target_list,
- strlen(rule->target_list), 1) != 1)
- continue;
- verbose("Canonicalized DNS aliased hostname "
- "\"%s\" => \"%s\"", *namep, cname);
- free(*namep);
- *namep = xstrdup(cname);
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Attempt to resolve the supplied hostname after applying the user's
- * canonicalization rules. Returns the address list for the host or NULL
- * if no name was found after canonicalization.
- * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
- */
-static struct addrinfo *
-resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port)
-{
- int i, ndots;
- char *cp, *fullhost, cname_target[NI_MAXHOST];
- struct addrinfo *addrs;
-
- if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
- return NULL;
-
- /*
- * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by
- * a proxy unless the user specifically requests so.
- */
- if (!option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) &&
- options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)
- return NULL;
-
- /* Don't apply canonicalization to sufficiently-qualified hostnames */
- ndots = 0;
- for (cp = *hostp; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
- if (*cp == '.')
- ndots++;
- }
- if (ndots > options.canonicalize_max_dots) {
- debug3("%s: not canonicalizing hostname \"%s\" (max dots %d)",
- __func__, *hostp, options.canonicalize_max_dots);
- return NULL;
- }
- /* Attempt each supplied suffix */
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_canonical_domains; i++) {
- *cname_target = '\0';
- xasprintf(&fullhost, "%s.%s.", *hostp,
- options.canonical_domains[i]);
- debug3("%s: attempting \"%s\" => \"%s\"", __func__,
- *hostp, fullhost);
- if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0,
- cname_target, sizeof(cname_target))) == NULL) {
- free(fullhost);
- continue;
- }
- /* Remove trailing '.' */
- fullhost[strlen(fullhost) - 1] = '\0';
- /* Follow CNAME if requested */
- if (!check_follow_cname(&fullhost, cname_target)) {
- debug("Canonicalized hostname \"%s\" => \"%s\"",
- *hostp, fullhost);
- }
- free(*hostp);
- *hostp = fullhost;
- return addrs;
- }
- if (!options.canonicalize_fallback_local)
- fatal("%s: Could not resolve host \"%s\"", __progname, *hostp);
- debug2("%s: host %s not found in any suffix", __func__, *hostp);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/*
- * Read per-user configuration file. Ignore the system wide config
- * file if the user specifies a config file on the command line.
- */
-static void
-process_config_files(struct passwd *pw)
-{
- char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
- int r;
-
- if (config != NULL) {
- if (strcasecmp(config, "none") != 0 &&
- !read_config_file(config, pw, host, &options,
- SSHCONF_USERCONF))
- fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: "
- "%.100s", config, strerror(errno));
- } else {
- r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
- _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
- if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
- (void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, &options,
- SSHCONF_CHECKPERM|SSHCONF_USERCONF);
-
- /* Read systemwide configuration file after user config. */
- (void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, host,
- &options, 0);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Main program for the ssh client.
- */
-int
-main(int ac, char **av)
-{
- int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog;
- char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, buf[MAXPATHLEN], *host_arg, *logfile;
- char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV];
- char cname[NI_MAXHOST];
- struct stat st;
- struct passwd *pw;
- int timeout_ms;
- extern int optind, optreset;
- extern char *optarg;
- Forward fwd;
- struct addrinfo *addrs = NULL;
-
- /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
- sanitise_stdfd();
-
- __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
- /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
- /* Save argv so it isn't clobbered by setproctitle() emulation */
- saved_av = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_av));
- for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
- saved_av[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
- saved_av[i] = NULL;
- compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
- av = saved_av;
-#endif
-
- /*
- * Discard other fds that are hanging around. These can cause problem
- * with backgrounded ssh processes started by ControlPersist.
- */
- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
-
- /*
- * Save the original real uid. It will be needed later (uid-swapping
- * may clobber the real uid).
- */
- original_real_uid = getuid();
- original_effective_uid = geteuid();
-
- /*
- * Use uid-swapping to give up root privileges for the duration of
- * option processing. We will re-instantiate the rights when we are
- * ready to create the privileged port, and will permanently drop
- * them when the port has been created (actually, when the connection
- * has been made, as we may need to create the port several times).
- */
- PRIV_END;
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
- /* If we are installed setuid root be careful to not drop core. */
- if (original_real_uid != original_effective_uid) {
- struct rlimit rlim;
- rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
- if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0)
- fatal("setrlimit failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- }
-#endif
- /* Get user data. */
- pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid);
- if (!pw) {
- logit("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)original_real_uid);
- exit(255);
- }
- /* Take a copy of the returned structure. */
- pw = pwcopy(pw);
-
- /*
- * Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created
- * with the default umask. This will make them world-readable but
- * writable only by the owner, which is ok for all files for which we
- * don't set the modes explicitly.
- */
- umask(022);
-
- /*
- * Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been
- * set.
- */
- initialize_options(&options);
-
- /* Parse command-line arguments. */
- host = NULL;
- use_syslog = 0;
- logfile = NULL;
- argv0 = av[0];
-
- again:
- while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx"
- "ACD:E:F:I:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) {
- switch (opt) {
- case '1':
- options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1;
- break;
- case '2':
- options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
- break;
- case '4':
- options.address_family = AF_INET;
- break;
- case '6':
- options.address_family = AF_INET6;
- break;
- case 'n':
- stdin_null_flag = 1;
- break;
- case 'f':
- fork_after_authentication_flag = 1;
- stdin_null_flag = 1;
- break;
- case 'x':
- options.forward_x11 = 0;
- break;
- case 'X':
- options.forward_x11 = 1;
- break;
- case 'y':
- use_syslog = 1;
- break;
- case 'E':
- logfile = xstrdup(optarg);
- break;
- case 'Y':
- options.forward_x11 = 1;
- options.forward_x11_trusted = 1;
- break;
- case 'g':
- options.gateway_ports = 1;
- break;
- case 'O':
- if (stdio_forward_host != NULL)
- fatal("Cannot specify multiplexing "
- "command with -W");
- else if (muxclient_command != 0)
- fatal("Multiplexing command already specified");
- if (strcmp(optarg, "check") == 0)
- muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK;
- else if (strcmp(optarg, "forward") == 0)
- muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD;
- else if (strcmp(optarg, "exit") == 0)
- muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE;
- else if (strcmp(optarg, "stop") == 0)
- muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP;
- else if (strcmp(optarg, "cancel") == 0)
- muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD;
- else
- fatal("Invalid multiplex command.");
- break;
- case 'P': /* deprecated */
- options.use_privileged_port = 0;
- break;
- case 'Q':
- cp = NULL;
- if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher") == 0)
- cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 0);
- else if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher-auth") == 0)
- cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 1);
- else if (strcmp(optarg, "mac") == 0)
- cp = mac_alg_list('\n');
- else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0)
- cp = kex_alg_list('\n');
- else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0)
- cp = key_alg_list(0, 0);
- else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0)
- cp = key_alg_list(1, 0);
- else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-plain") == 0)
- cp = key_alg_list(0, 1);
- if (cp == NULL)
- fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg);
- printf("%s\n", cp);
- free(cp);
- exit(0);
- break;
- case 'a':
- options.forward_agent = 0;
- break;
- case 'A':
- options.forward_agent = 1;
- break;
- case 'k':
- options.gss_deleg_creds = 0;
- break;
- case 'K':
- options.gss_authentication = 1;
- options.gss_deleg_creds = 1;
- break;
- case 'i':
- if (stat(optarg, &st) < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s "
- "not accessible: %s.\n", optarg,
- strerror(errno));
- break;
- }
- add_identity_file(&options, NULL, optarg, 1);
- break;
- case 'I':
-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- options.pkcs11_provider = xstrdup(optarg);
-#else
- fprintf(stderr, "no support for PKCS#11.\n");
-#endif
- break;
- case 't':
- if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES)
- options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_FORCE;
- else
- options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_YES;
- break;
- case 'v':
- if (debug_flag == 0) {
- debug_flag = 1;
- options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
- } else {
- if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
- options.log_level++;
- }
- break;
- case 'V':
- fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
- SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
- if (opt == 'V')
- exit(0);
- break;
- case 'w':
- if (options.tun_open == -1)
- options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT;
- options.tun_local = a2tun(optarg, &options.tun_remote);
- if (options.tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ERR) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Bad tun device '%s'\n", optarg);
- exit(255);
- }
- break;
- case 'W':
- if (stdio_forward_host != NULL)
- fatal("stdio forward already specified");
- if (muxclient_command != 0)
- fatal("Cannot specify stdio forward with -O");
- if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) {
- stdio_forward_host = fwd.listen_host;
- stdio_forward_port = fwd.listen_port;
- free(fwd.connect_host);
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Bad stdio forwarding specification '%s'\n",
- optarg);
- exit(255);
- }
- options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
- no_shell_flag = 1;
- options.clear_forwardings = 1;
- options.exit_on_forward_failure = 1;
- break;
- case 'q':
- options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
- break;
- case 'e':
- if (optarg[0] == '^' && optarg[2] == 0 &&
- (u_char) optarg[1] >= 64 &&
- (u_char) optarg[1] < 128)
- options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[1] & 31;
- else if (strlen(optarg) == 1)
- options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[0];
- else if (strcmp(optarg, "none") == 0)
- options.escape_char = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE;
- else {
- fprintf(stderr, "Bad escape character '%s'.\n",
- optarg);
- exit(255);
- }
- break;
- case 'c':
- if (ciphers_valid(optarg)) {
- /* SSH2 only */
- options.ciphers = xstrdup(optarg);
- options.cipher = SSH_CIPHER_INVALID;
- } else {
- /* SSH1 only */
- options.cipher = cipher_number(optarg);
- if (options.cipher == -1) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n",
- optarg);
- exit(255);
- }
- if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_3DES)
- options.ciphers = "3des-cbc";
- else if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH)
- options.ciphers = "blowfish-cbc";
- else
- options.ciphers = (char *)-1;
- }
- break;
- case 'm':
- if (mac_valid(optarg))
- options.macs = xstrdup(optarg);
- else {
- fprintf(stderr, "Unknown mac type '%s'\n",
- optarg);
- exit(255);
- }
- break;
- case 'M':
- if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_YES)
- options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK;
- else
- options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_YES;
- break;
- case 'p':
- options.port = a2port(optarg);
- if (options.port <= 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg);
- exit(255);
- }
- break;
- case 'l':
- options.user = optarg;
- break;
-
- case 'L':
- if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 0))
- add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
- else {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Bad local forwarding specification '%s'\n",
- optarg);
- exit(255);
- }
- break;
-
- case 'R':
- if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 1)) {
- add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd);
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Bad remote forwarding specification "
- "'%s'\n", optarg);
- exit(255);
- }
- break;
-
- case 'D':
- if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) {
- add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Bad dynamic forwarding specification "
- "'%s'\n", optarg);
- exit(255);
- }
- break;
-
- case 'C':
- options.compression = 1;
- break;
- case 'N':
- no_shell_flag = 1;
- options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
- break;
- case 'T':
- options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
- break;
- case 'o':
- line = xstrdup(optarg);
- if (process_config_line(&options, pw, host ? host : "",
- line, "command-line", 0, NULL, SSHCONF_USERCONF)
- != 0)
- exit(255);
- free(line);
- break;
- case 's':
- subsystem_flag = 1;
- break;
- case 'S':
- if (options.control_path != NULL)
- free(options.control_path);
- options.control_path = xstrdup(optarg);
- break;
- case 'b':
- options.bind_address = optarg;
- break;
- case 'F':
- config = optarg;
- break;
- default:
- usage();
- }
- }
-
- ac -= optind;
- av += optind;
-
- if (ac > 0 && !host) {
- if (strrchr(*av, '@')) {
- p = xstrdup(*av);
- cp = strrchr(p, '@');
- if (cp == NULL || cp == p)
- usage();
- options.user = p;
- *cp = '\0';
- host = xstrdup(++cp);
- } else
- host = xstrdup(*av);
- if (ac > 1) {
- optind = optreset = 1;
- goto again;
- }
- ac--, av++;
- }
-
- /* Check that we got a host name. */
- if (!host)
- usage();
-
- host_arg = xstrdup(host);
-
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- ERR_load_crypto_strings();
-
- /* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
- buffer_init(&command);
-
- /*
- * Save the command to execute on the remote host in a buffer. There
- * is no limit on the length of the command, except by the maximum
- * packet size. Also sets the tty flag if there is no command.
- */
- if (!ac) {
- /* No command specified - execute shell on a tty. */
- if (subsystem_flag) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "You must specify a subsystem to invoke.\n");
- usage();
- }
- } else {
- /* A command has been specified. Store it into the buffer. */
- for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) {
- if (i)
- buffer_append(&command, " ", 1);
- buffer_append(&command, av[i], strlen(av[i]));
- }
- }
-
- /* Cannot fork to background if no command. */
- if (fork_after_authentication_flag && buffer_len(&command) == 0 &&
- !no_shell_flag)
- fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command "
- "to execute.");
-
- /*
- * Initialize "log" output. Since we are the client all output
- * goes to stderr unless otherwise specified by -y or -E.
- */
- if (use_syslog && logfile != NULL)
- fatal("Can't specify both -y and -E");
- if (logfile != NULL) {
- log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile);
- free(logfile);
- }
- log_init(argv0,
- options.log_level == -1 ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
- SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog);
-
- if (debug_flag)
- logit("%s, %s", SSH_VERSION, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
-
- /* Parse the configuration files */
- process_config_files(pw);
-
- /* Hostname canonicalisation needs a few options filled. */
- fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(&options);
-
- /* If the user has replaced the hostname then take it into use now */
- if (options.hostname != NULL) {
- /* NB. Please keep in sync with readconf.c:match_cfg_line() */
- cp = percent_expand(options.hostname,
- "h", host, (char *)NULL);
- free(host);
- host = cp;
- }
-
- /* If canonicalization requested then try to apply it */
- lowercase(host);
- if (options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
- addrs = resolve_canonicalize(&host, options.port);
-
- /*
- * If CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs have been specified but
- * other canonicalization did not happen (by not being requested
- * or by failing with fallback) then the hostname may still be changed
- * as a result of CNAME following.
- *
- * Try to resolve the bare hostname name using the system resolver's
- * usual search rules and then apply the CNAME follow rules.
- *
- * Skip the lookup if a ProxyCommand is being used unless the user
- * has specifically requested canonicalisation for this case via
- * CanonicalizeHostname=always
- */
- if (addrs == NULL && options.num_permitted_cnames != 0 &&
- (option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) ||
- options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)) {
- if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, 1,
- cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL)
- cleanup_exit(255); /* resolve_host logs the error */
- check_follow_cname(&host, cname);
- }
-
- /*
- * If the target hostname has changed as a result of canonicalisation
- * then re-parse the configuration files as new stanzas may match.
- */
- if (strcasecmp(host_arg, host) != 0) {
- debug("Hostname has changed; re-reading configuration");
- process_config_files(pw);
- }
-
- /* Fill configuration defaults. */
- fill_default_options(&options);
-
- if (options.port == 0)
- options.port = default_ssh_port();
- channel_set_af(options.address_family);
-
- /* Tidy and check options */
- if (options.host_key_alias != NULL)
- lowercase(options.host_key_alias);
- if (options.proxy_command != NULL &&
- strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0 &&
- options.proxy_use_fdpass)
- fatal("ProxyCommand=- and ProxyUseFDPass are incompatible");
-#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
- if (original_effective_uid != 0)
- options.use_privileged_port = 0;
-#endif
-
- /* reinit */
- log_init(argv0, options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog);
-
- if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES ||
- options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE)
- tty_flag = 1;
-
- /* Allocate a tty by default if no command specified. */
- if (buffer_len(&command) == 0)
- tty_flag = options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_NO;
-
- /* Force no tty */
- if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO || muxclient_command != 0)
- tty_flag = 0;
- /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
- if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) &&
- options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) {
- if (tty_flag)
- logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because "
- "stdin is not a terminal.");
- tty_flag = 0;
- }
-
- seed_rng();
-
- if (options.user == NULL)
- options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
-
- if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
- fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
- strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost));
- shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0';
- snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", options.port);
-
- if (options.local_command != NULL) {
- debug3("expanding LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command);
- cp = options.local_command;
- options.local_command = percent_expand(cp, "d", pw->pw_dir,
- "h", host, "l", thishost, "n", host_arg, "r", options.user,
- "p", portstr, "u", pw->pw_name, "L", shorthost,
- (char *)NULL);
- debug3("expanded LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command);
- free(cp);
- }
-
- if (options.control_path != NULL) {
- cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.control_path,
- original_real_uid);
- free(options.control_path);
- options.control_path = percent_expand(cp, "h", host,
- "l", thishost, "n", host_arg, "r", options.user,
- "p", portstr, "u", pw->pw_name, "L", shorthost,
- (char *)NULL);
- free(cp);
- }
- if (muxclient_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL)
- fatal("No ControlPath specified for \"-O\" command");
- if (options.control_path != NULL)
- muxclient(options.control_path);
-
- /*
- * If hostname canonicalisation was not enabled, then we may not
- * have yet resolved the hostname. Do so now.
- */
- if (addrs == NULL && options.proxy_command == NULL) {
- if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, 1,
- cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL)
- cleanup_exit(255); /* resolve_host logs the error */
- }
-
- timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000;
-
- /* Open a connection to the remote host. */
- if (ssh_connect(host, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port,
- options.address_family, options.connection_attempts,
- &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive,
- options.use_privileged_port) != 0)
- exit(255);
-
- if (addrs != NULL)
- freeaddrinfo(addrs);
-
- packet_set_timeout(options.server_alive_interval,
- options.server_alive_count_max);
-
- if (timeout_ms > 0)
- debug3("timeout: %d ms remain after connect", timeout_ms);
-
- /*
- * If we successfully made the connection, load the host private key
- * in case we will need it later for combined rsa-rhosts
- * authentication. This must be done before releasing extra
- * privileges, because the file is only readable by root.
- * If we cannot access the private keys, load the public keys
- * instead and try to execute the ssh-keysign helper instead.
- */
- sensitive_data.nkeys = 0;
- sensitive_data.keys = NULL;
- sensitive_data.external_keysign = 0;
- if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication ||
- options.hostbased_authentication) {
- sensitive_data.nkeys = 9;
- sensitive_data.keys = xcalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys,
- sizeof(Key));
- for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++)
- sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL;
-
- PRIV_START;
- sensitive_data.keys[0] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1,
- _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
- sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_DSA,
- _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_ECDSA,
- _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
-#endif
- sensitive_data.keys[3] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_RSA,
- _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
- sensitive_data.keys[4] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_ED25519,
- _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
- sensitive_data.keys[5] = key_load_private_type(KEY_DSA,
- _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- sensitive_data.keys[6] = key_load_private_type(KEY_ECDSA,
- _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
-#endif
- sensitive_data.keys[7] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA,
- _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
- sensitive_data.keys[8] = key_load_private_type(KEY_ED25519,
- _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
- PRIV_END;
-
- if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1 &&
- sensitive_data.keys[0] == NULL &&
- sensitive_data.keys[5] == NULL &&
- sensitive_data.keys[6] == NULL &&
- sensitive_data.keys[7] == NULL &&
- sensitive_data.keys[8] == NULL) {
- sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_cert(
- _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_cert(
- _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE);
-#endif
- sensitive_data.keys[3] = key_load_cert(
- _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE);
- sensitive_data.keys[4] = key_load_cert(
- _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE);
- sensitive_data.keys[5] = key_load_public(
- _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, NULL);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- sensitive_data.keys[6] = key_load_public(
- _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, NULL);
-#endif
- sensitive_data.keys[7] = key_load_public(
- _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, NULL);
- sensitive_data.keys[8] = key_load_public(
- _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, NULL);
- sensitive_data.external_keysign = 1;
- }
- }
- /*
- * Get rid of any extra privileges that we may have. We will no
- * longer need them. Also, extra privileges could make it very hard
- * to read identity files and other non-world-readable files from the
- * user's home directory if it happens to be on a NFS volume where
- * root is mapped to nobody.
- */
- if (original_effective_uid == 0) {
- PRIV_START;
- permanently_set_uid(pw);
- }
-
- /*
- * Now that we are back to our own permissions, create ~/.ssh
- * directory if it doesn't already exist.
- */
- if (config == NULL) {
- r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir,
- strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? "/" : "", _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
- if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf) && stat(buf, &st) < 0) {
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(buf);
-#endif
- if (mkdir(buf, 0700) < 0)
- error("Could not create directory '%.200s'.",
- buf);
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(NULL);
-#endif
- }
- }
- /* load options.identity_files */
- load_public_identity_files();
-
- /* Expand ~ in known host file names. */
- tilde_expand_paths(options.system_hostfiles,
- options.num_system_hostfiles);
- tilde_expand_paths(options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles);
-
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
- signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
-
- /* Log into the remote system. Never returns if the login fails. */
- ssh_login(&sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr,
- options.port, pw, timeout_ms);
-
- if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
- verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d).", host,
- get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port());
- } else {
- verbose("Authenticated to %s (via proxy).", host);
- }
-
- /* We no longer need the private host keys. Clear them now. */
- if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) {
- for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) {
- if (sensitive_data.keys[i] != NULL) {
- /* Destroys contents safely */
- debug3("clear hostkey %d", i);
- key_free(sensitive_data.keys[i]);
- sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL;
- }
- }
- free(sensitive_data.keys);
- }
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
- free(options.identity_files[i]);
- options.identity_files[i] = NULL;
- if (options.identity_keys[i]) {
- key_free(options.identity_keys[i]);
- options.identity_keys[i] = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- exit_status = compat20 ? ssh_session2() : ssh_session();
- packet_close();
-
- if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
- unlink(options.control_path);
-
- /* Kill ProxyCommand if it is running. */
- ssh_kill_proxy_command();
-
- return exit_status;
-}
-
-static void
-control_persist_detach(void)
-{
- pid_t pid;
- int devnull;
-
- debug("%s: backgrounding master process", __func__);
-
- /*
- * master (current process) into the background, and make the
- * foreground process a client of the backgrounded master.
- */
- switch ((pid = fork())) {
- case -1:
- fatal("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- case 0:
- /* Child: master process continues mainloop */
- break;
- default:
- /* Parent: set up mux slave to connect to backgrounded master */
- debug2("%s: background process is %ld", __func__, (long)pid);
- stdin_null_flag = ostdin_null_flag;
- options.request_tty = orequest_tty;
- tty_flag = otty_flag;
- close(muxserver_sock);
- muxserver_sock = -1;
- options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
- muxclient(options.control_path);
- /* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */
- fatal("Failed to connect to new control master");
- }
- if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
- error("%s: open(\"/dev/null\"): %s", __func__,
- strerror(errno));
- } else {
- if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
- dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
- error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
- close(devnull);
- }
- daemon(1, 1);
- setproctitle("%s [mux]", options.control_path);
-}
-
-/* Do fork() after authentication. Used by "ssh -f" */
-static void
-fork_postauth(void)
-{
- if (need_controlpersist_detach)
- control_persist_detach();
- debug("forking to background");
- fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
- if (daemon(1, 1) < 0)
- fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
-}
-
-/* Callback for remote forward global requests */
-static void
-ssh_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- Forward *rfwd = (Forward *)ctxt;
-
- /* XXX verbose() on failure? */
- debug("remote forward %s for: listen %d, connect %s:%d",
- type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
- rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
- if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) {
- if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
- rfwd->allocated_port = packet_get_int();
- logit("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d",
- rfwd->allocated_port,
- rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
- channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle,
- rfwd->allocated_port);
- } else {
- channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle, -1);
- }
- }
-
- if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) {
- if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
- fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed for "
- "listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
- else
- logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed for "
- "listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
- }
- if (++remote_forward_confirms_received == options.num_remote_forwards) {
- debug("All remote forwarding requests processed");
- if (fork_after_authentication_flag)
- fork_postauth();
- }
-}
-
-static void
-client_cleanup_stdio_fwd(int id, void *arg)
-{
- debug("stdio forwarding: done");
- cleanup_exit(0);
-}
-
-static void
-ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(void)
-{
- Channel *c;
- int in, out;
-
- if (stdio_forward_host == NULL)
- return;
- if (!compat20)
- fatal("stdio forwarding require Protocol 2");
-
- debug3("%s: %s:%d", __func__, stdio_forward_host, stdio_forward_port);
-
- if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) < 0 ||
- (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) < 0)
- fatal("channel_connect_stdio_fwd: dup() in/out failed");
- if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(stdio_forward_host,
- stdio_forward_port, in, out)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed", __func__);
- channel_register_cleanup(c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0);
-}
-
-static void
-ssh_init_forwarding(void)
-{
- int success = 0;
- int i;
-
- /* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
- debug("Local connections to %.200s:%d forwarded to remote "
- "address %.200s:%d",
- (options.local_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
- (options.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
- options.local_forwards[i].listen_host,
- options.local_forwards[i].listen_port,
- options.local_forwards[i].connect_host,
- options.local_forwards[i].connect_port);
- success += channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(
- options.local_forwards[i].listen_host,
- options.local_forwards[i].listen_port,
- options.local_forwards[i].connect_host,
- options.local_forwards[i].connect_port,
- options.gateway_ports);
- }
- if (i > 0 && success != i && options.exit_on_forward_failure)
- fatal("Could not request local forwarding.");
- if (i > 0 && success == 0)
- error("Could not request local forwarding.");
-
- /* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
- debug("Remote connections from %.200s:%d forwarded to "
- "local address %.200s:%d",
- (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
- "LOCALHOST" : options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host,
- options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
- options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
- options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port);
- options.remote_forwards[i].handle =
- channel_request_remote_forwarding(
- options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host,
- options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
- options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
- options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port);
- if (options.remote_forwards[i].handle < 0) {
- if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
- fatal("Could not request remote forwarding.");
- else
- logit("Warning: Could not request remote "
- "forwarding.");
- } else {
- client_register_global_confirm(ssh_confirm_remote_forward,
- &options.remote_forwards[i]);
- }
- }
-
- /* Initiate tunnel forwarding. */
- if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
- if (client_request_tun_fwd(options.tun_open,
- options.tun_local, options.tun_remote) == -1) {
- if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
- fatal("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
- else
- error("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
- }
- }
-}
-
-static void
-check_agent_present(void)
-{
- if (options.forward_agent) {
- /* Clear agent forwarding if we don't have an agent. */
- if (!ssh_agent_present())
- options.forward_agent = 0;
- }
-}
-
-static int
-ssh_session(void)
-{
- int type;
- int interactive = 0;
- int have_tty = 0;
- struct winsize ws;
- char *cp;
- const char *display;
-
- /* Enable compression if requested. */
- if (options.compression) {
- debug("Requesting compression at level %d.",
- options.compression_level);
-
- if (options.compression_level < 1 ||
- options.compression_level > 9)
- fatal("Compression level must be from 1 (fast) to "
- "9 (slow, best).");
-
- /* Send the request. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION);
- packet_put_int(options.compression_level);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- type = packet_read();
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
- packet_start_compression(options.compression_level);
- else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- logit("Warning: Remote host refused compression.");
- else
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for "
- "compression response.");
- }
- /* Allocate a pseudo tty if appropriate. */
- if (tty_flag) {
- debug("Requesting pty.");
-
- /* Start the packet. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
-
- /* Store TERM in the packet. There is no limit on the
- length of the string. */
- cp = getenv("TERM");
- if (!cp)
- cp = "";
- packet_put_cstring(cp);
-
- /* Store window size in the packet. */
- if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
- memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
- packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
- packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
- packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
- packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
-
- /* Store tty modes in the packet. */
- tty_make_modes(fileno(stdin), NULL);
-
- /* Send the packet, and wait for it to leave. */
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Read response from the server. */
- type = packet_read();
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
- interactive = 1;
- have_tty = 1;
- } else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- logit("Warning: Remote host failed or refused to "
- "allocate a pseudo tty.");
- else
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for pty "
- "request response.");
- }
- /* Request X11 forwarding if enabled and DISPLAY is set. */
- display = getenv("DISPLAY");
- if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
- char *proto, *data;
- /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
- client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
- options.forward_x11_trusted,
- options.forward_x11_timeout,
- &proto, &data);
- /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
- debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
- "spoofing.");
- x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(0, display, proto,
- data, 0);
- /* Read response from the server. */
- type = packet_read();
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
- interactive = 1;
- } else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- logit("Warning: Remote host denied X11 forwarding.");
- } else {
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for X11 "
- "forwarding");
- }
- }
- /* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */
- packet_set_interactive(interactive,
- options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
-
- /* Request authentication agent forwarding if appropriate. */
- check_agent_present();
-
- if (options.forward_agent) {
- debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
- auth_request_forwarding();
-
- /* Read response from the server. */
- type = packet_read();
- packet_check_eom();
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
- logit("Warning: Remote host denied authentication agent forwarding.");
- }
-
- /* Initiate port forwardings. */
- ssh_init_stdio_forwarding();
- ssh_init_forwarding();
-
- /* Execute a local command */
- if (options.local_command != NULL &&
- options.permit_local_command)
- ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command);
-
- /*
- * If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote
- * forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background.
- */
- if (fork_after_authentication_flag) {
- if (options.exit_on_forward_failure &&
- options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
- debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward "
- "confirmation received");
- } else
- fork_postauth();
- }
-
- /*
- * If a command was specified on the command line, execute the
- * command now. Otherwise request the server to start a shell.
- */
- if (buffer_len(&command) > 0) {
- int len = buffer_len(&command);
- if (len > 900)
- len = 900;
- debug("Sending command: %.*s", len,
- (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&command));
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD);
- packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&command), buffer_len(&command));
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- } else {
- debug("Requesting shell.");
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- }
-
- /* Enter the interactive session. */
- return client_loop(have_tty, tty_flag ?
- options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, 0);
-}
-
-/* request pty/x11/agent/tcpfwd/shell for channel */
-static void
-ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, void *arg)
-{
- extern char **environ;
- const char *display;
- int interactive = tty_flag;
-
- if (!success)
- return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */
-
- display = getenv("DISPLAY");
- if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
- char *proto, *data;
- /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
- client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
- options.forward_x11_trusted,
- options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data);
- /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
- debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
- "spoofing.");
- x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto,
- data, 1);
- client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN);
- /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
- interactive = 1;
- }
-
- check_agent_present();
- if (options.forward_agent) {
- debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
- channel_request_start(id, "auth-agent-req at openssh.com", 0);
- packet_send();
- }
-
- /* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */
- packet_set_interactive(interactive,
- options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
-
- client_session2_setup(id, tty_flag, subsystem_flag, getenv("TERM"),
- NULL, fileno(stdin), &command, environ);
-}
-
-/* open new channel for a session */
-static int
-ssh_session2_open(void)
-{
- Channel *c;
- int window, packetmax, in, out, err;
-
- if (stdin_null_flag) {
- in = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY);
- } else {
- in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
- }
- out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
- err = dup(STDERR_FILENO);
-
- if (in < 0 || out < 0 || err < 0)
- fatal("dup() in/out/err failed");
-
- /* enable nonblocking unless tty */
- if (!isatty(in))
- set_nonblock(in);
- if (!isatty(out))
- set_nonblock(out);
- if (!isatty(err))
- set_nonblock(err);
-
- window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
- packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
- if (tty_flag) {
- window >>= 1;
- packetmax >>= 1;
- }
- c = channel_new(
- "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err,
- window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE,
- "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
-
- debug3("ssh_session2_open: channel_new: %d", c->self);
-
- channel_send_open(c->self);
- if (!no_shell_flag)
- channel_register_open_confirm(c->self,
- ssh_session2_setup, NULL);
-
- return c->self;
-}
-
-static int
-ssh_session2(void)
-{
- int id = -1;
-
- /* XXX should be pre-session */
- if (!options.control_persist)
- ssh_init_stdio_forwarding();
- ssh_init_forwarding();
-
- /* Start listening for multiplex clients */
- muxserver_listen();
-
- /*
- * If we are in control persist mode and have a working mux listen
- * socket, then prepare to background ourselves and have a foreground
- * client attach as a control slave.
- * NB. we must save copies of the flags that we override for
- * the backgrounding, since we defer attachment of the slave until
- * after the connection is fully established (in particular,
- * async rfwd replies have been received for ExitOnForwardFailure).
- */
- if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock != -1) {
- ostdin_null_flag = stdin_null_flag;
- ono_shell_flag = no_shell_flag;
- orequest_tty = options.request_tty;
- otty_flag = tty_flag;
- stdin_null_flag = 1;
- no_shell_flag = 1;
- tty_flag = 0;
- if (!fork_after_authentication_flag)
- need_controlpersist_detach = 1;
- fork_after_authentication_flag = 1;
- }
- /*
- * ControlPersist mux listen socket setup failed, attempt the
- * stdio forward setup that we skipped earlier.
- */
- if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock == -1)
- ssh_init_stdio_forwarding();
-
- if (!no_shell_flag || (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN))
- id = ssh_session2_open();
- else {
- packet_set_interactive(
- options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO,
- options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
- }
-
- /* If we don't expect to open a new session, then disallow it */
- if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO &&
- (datafellows & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH)) {
- debug("Requesting no-more-sessions at openssh.com");
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring("no-more-sessions at openssh.com");
- packet_put_char(0);
- packet_send();
- }
-
- /* Execute a local command */
- if (options.local_command != NULL &&
- options.permit_local_command)
- ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command);
-
- /*
- * If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote
- * forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background.
- */
- if (fork_after_authentication_flag) {
- if (options.exit_on_forward_failure &&
- options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
- debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward "
- "confirmation received");
- } else
- fork_postauth();
- }
-
- if (options.use_roaming)
- request_roaming();
-
- return client_loop(tty_flag, tty_flag ?
- options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id);
-}
-
-static void
-load_public_identity_files(void)
-{
- char *filename, *cp, thishost[NI_MAXHOST];
- char *pwdir = NULL, *pwname = NULL;
- int i = 0;
- Key *public;
- struct passwd *pw;
- u_int n_ids;
- char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
- Key *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- Key **keys;
- int nkeys;
-#endif /* PKCS11 */
-
- n_ids = 0;
- memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files));
- memset(identity_keys, 0, sizeof(identity_keys));
-
-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL &&
- options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
- (pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) &&
- (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL,
- &keys)) > 0) {
- for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
- if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) {
- key_free(keys[i]);
- continue;
- }
- identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i];
- identity_files[n_ids] =
- xstrdup(options.pkcs11_provider); /* XXX */
- n_ids++;
- }
- free(keys);
- }
-#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
- if ((pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid)) == NULL)
- fatal("load_public_identity_files: getpwuid failed");
- pwname = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
- pwdir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
- if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
- fatal("load_public_identity_files: gethostname: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
- if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES ||
- strcasecmp(options.identity_files[i], "none") == 0) {
- free(options.identity_files[i]);
- continue;
- }
- cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i],
- original_real_uid);
- filename = percent_expand(cp, "d", pwdir,
- "u", pwname, "l", thishost, "h", host,
- "r", options.user, (char *)NULL);
- free(cp);
- public = key_load_public(filename, NULL);
- debug("identity file %s type %d", filename,
- public ? public->type : -1);
- free(options.identity_files[i]);
- identity_files[n_ids] = filename;
- identity_keys[n_ids] = public;
-
- if (++n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
- continue;
-
- /* Try to add the certificate variant too */
- xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename);
- public = key_load_public(cp, NULL);
- debug("identity file %s type %d", cp,
- public ? public->type : -1);
- if (public == NULL) {
- free(cp);
- continue;
- }
- if (!key_is_cert(public)) {
- debug("%s: key %s type %s is not a certificate",
- __func__, cp, key_type(public));
- key_free(public);
- free(cp);
- continue;
- }
- identity_keys[n_ids] = public;
- /* point to the original path, most likely the private key */
- identity_files[n_ids] = xstrdup(filename);
- n_ids++;
- }
- options.num_identity_files = n_ids;
- memcpy(options.identity_files, identity_files, sizeof(identity_files));
- memcpy(options.identity_keys, identity_keys, sizeof(identity_keys));
-
- explicit_bzero(pwname, strlen(pwname));
- free(pwname);
- explicit_bzero(pwdir, strlen(pwdir));
- free(pwdir);
-}
-
-static void
-main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
-{
- int save_errno = errno;
- pid_t pid;
- int status;
-
- while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
- (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
- ;
-
- signal(sig, main_sigchld_handler);
- errno = save_errno;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,2185 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.445 2016/07/17 04:20:16 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Ssh client program. This program can be used to log into a remote machine.
+ * The software supports strong authentication, encryption, and forwarding
+ * of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication connections.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Modified to work with SSL by Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>
+ * in Canada (German citizen).
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <locale.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#endif
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "clientloop.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "sshconnect.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "version.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+#endif
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* Saves a copy of argv for setproctitle emulation */
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+static char **saved_av;
+#endif
+
+/* Flag indicating whether debug mode is on. May be set on the command line. */
+int debug_flag = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating whether a tty should be requested */
+int tty_flag = 0;
+
+/* don't exec a shell */
+int no_shell_flag = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Flag indicating that nothing should be read from stdin. This can be set
+ * on the command line.
+ */
+int stdin_null_flag = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Flag indicating that the current process should be backgrounded and
+ * a new slave launched in the foreground for ControlPersist.
+ */
+int need_controlpersist_detach = 0;
+
+/* Copies of flags for ControlPersist foreground slave */
+int ostdin_null_flag, ono_shell_flag, otty_flag, orequest_tty;
+
+/*
+ * Flag indicating that ssh should fork after authentication. This is useful
+ * so that the passphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the
+ * background.
+ */
+int fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
+
+/*
+ * General data structure for command line options and options configurable
+ * in configuration files. See readconf.h.
+ */
+Options options;
+
+/* optional user configfile */
+char *config = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the
+ * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a
+ * configuration file.
+ */
+char *host;
+
+/* socket address the host resolves to */
+struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr;
+
+/* Private host keys. */
+Sensitive sensitive_data;
+
+/* Original real UID. */
+uid_t original_real_uid;
+uid_t original_effective_uid;
+
+/* command to be executed */
+Buffer command;
+
+/* Should we execute a command or invoke a subsystem? */
+int subsystem_flag = 0;
+
+/* # of replies received for global requests */
+static int remote_forward_confirms_received = 0;
+
+/* mux.c */
+extern int muxserver_sock;
+extern u_int muxclient_command;
+
+/* Prints a help message to the user. This function never returns. */
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr,
+"usage: ssh [-1246AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]\n"
+" [-D [bind_address:]port] [-E log_file] [-e escape_char]\n"
+" [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11] [-i identity_file]\n"
+" [-J [user@]host[:port]] [-L address] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec]\n"
+" [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port] [-Q query_option] [-R address]\n"
+" [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port] [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]]\n"
+" [user@]hostname [command]\n"
+ );
+ exit(255);
+}
+
+static int ssh_session(void);
+static int ssh_session2(void);
+static void load_public_identity_files(void);
+static void main_sigchld_handler(int);
+
+/* from muxclient.c */
+void muxclient(const char *);
+void muxserver_listen(void);
+
+/* ~/ expand a list of paths. NB. assumes path[n] is heap-allocated. */
+static void
+tilde_expand_paths(char **paths, u_int num_paths)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ char *cp;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) {
+ cp = tilde_expand_filename(paths[i], original_real_uid);
+ free(paths[i]);
+ paths[i] = cp;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to resolve a host name / port to a set of addresses and
+ * optionally return any CNAMEs encountered along the way.
+ * Returns NULL on failure.
+ * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
+ */
+static struct addrinfo *
+resolve_host(const char *name, int port, int logerr, char *cname, size_t clen)
+{
+ char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+ struct addrinfo hints, *res;
+ int gaierr, loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+
+ if (port <= 0)
+ port = default_ssh_port();
+
+ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ?
+ AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ if (cname != NULL)
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
+ if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) {
+ if (logerr || (gaierr != EAI_NONAME && gaierr != EAI_NODATA))
+ loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
+ do_log2(loglevel, "%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s",
+ __progname, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (cname != NULL && res->ai_canonname != NULL) {
+ if (strlcpy(cname, res->ai_canonname, clen) >= clen) {
+ error("%s: host \"%s\" cname \"%s\" too long (max %lu)",
+ __func__, name, res->ai_canonname, (u_long)clen);
+ if (clen > 0)
+ *cname = '\0';
+ }
+ }
+ return res;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to resolve a numeric host address / port to a single address.
+ * Returns a canonical address string.
+ * Returns NULL on failure.
+ * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
+ */
+static struct addrinfo *
+resolve_addr(const char *name, int port, char *caddr, size_t clen)
+{
+ char addr[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+ struct addrinfo hints, *res;
+ int gaierr;
+
+ if (port <= 0)
+ port = default_ssh_port();
+ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ?
+ AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST|AI_NUMERICSERV;
+ if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) {
+ debug2("%s: could not resolve name %.100s as address: %s",
+ __func__, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (res == NULL) {
+ debug("%s: getaddrinfo %.100s returned no addresses",
+ __func__, name);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (res->ai_next != NULL) {
+ debug("%s: getaddrinfo %.100s returned multiple addresses",
+ __func__, name);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((gaierr = getnameinfo(res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen,
+ addr, sizeof(addr), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != 0) {
+ debug("%s: Could not format address for name %.100s: %s",
+ __func__, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (strlcpy(caddr, addr, clen) >= clen) {
+ error("%s: host \"%s\" addr \"%s\" too long (max %lu)",
+ __func__, name, addr, (u_long)clen);
+ if (clen > 0)
+ *caddr = '\0';
+ fail:
+ freeaddrinfo(res);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return res;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether the cname is a permitted replacement for the hostname
+ * and perform the replacement if it is.
+ * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
+ */
+static int
+check_follow_cname(int direct, char **namep, const char *cname)
+{
+ int i;
+ struct allowed_cname *rule;
+
+ if (*cname == '\0' || options.num_permitted_cnames == 0 ||
+ strcmp(*namep, cname) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by
+ * a proxy or jump host unless the user specifically requests so.
+ */
+ if (!direct &&
+ options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)
+ return 0;
+ debug3("%s: check \"%s\" CNAME \"%s\"", __func__, *namep, cname);
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_permitted_cnames; i++) {
+ rule = options.permitted_cnames + i;
+ if (match_pattern_list(*namep, rule->source_list, 1) != 1 ||
+ match_pattern_list(cname, rule->target_list, 1) != 1)
+ continue;
+ verbose("Canonicalized DNS aliased hostname "
+ "\"%s\" => \"%s\"", *namep, cname);
+ free(*namep);
+ *namep = xstrdup(cname);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to resolve the supplied hostname after applying the user's
+ * canonicalization rules. Returns the address list for the host or NULL
+ * if no name was found after canonicalization.
+ * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
+ */
+static struct addrinfo *
+resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port)
+{
+ int i, direct, ndots;
+ char *cp, *fullhost, newname[NI_MAXHOST];
+ struct addrinfo *addrs;
+
+ if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by
+ * a proxy unless the user specifically requests so.
+ */
+ direct = option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) &&
+ options.jump_host == NULL;
+ if (!direct &&
+ options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Try numeric hostnames first */
+ if ((addrs = resolve_addr(*hostp, port,
+ newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL) {
+ debug2("%s: hostname %.100s is address", __func__, *hostp);
+ if (strcasecmp(*hostp, newname) != 0) {
+ debug2("%s: canonicalised address \"%s\" => \"%s\"",
+ __func__, *hostp, newname);
+ free(*hostp);
+ *hostp = xstrdup(newname);
+ }
+ return addrs;
+ }
+
+ /* If domain name is anchored, then resolve it now */
+ if ((*hostp)[strlen(*hostp) - 1] == '.') {
+ debug3("%s: name is fully qualified", __func__);
+ fullhost = xstrdup(*hostp);
+ if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0,
+ newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL)
+ goto found;
+ free(fullhost);
+ goto notfound;
+ }
+
+ /* Don't apply canonicalization to sufficiently-qualified hostnames */
+ ndots = 0;
+ for (cp = *hostp; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
+ if (*cp == '.')
+ ndots++;
+ }
+ if (ndots > options.canonicalize_max_dots) {
+ debug3("%s: not canonicalizing hostname \"%s\" (max dots %d)",
+ __func__, *hostp, options.canonicalize_max_dots);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Attempt each supplied suffix */
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_canonical_domains; i++) {
+ *newname = '\0';
+ xasprintf(&fullhost, "%s.%s.", *hostp,
+ options.canonical_domains[i]);
+ debug3("%s: attempting \"%s\" => \"%s\"", __func__,
+ *hostp, fullhost);
+ if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0,
+ newname, sizeof(newname))) == NULL) {
+ free(fullhost);
+ continue;
+ }
+ found:
+ /* Remove trailing '.' */
+ fullhost[strlen(fullhost) - 1] = '\0';
+ /* Follow CNAME if requested */
+ if (!check_follow_cname(direct, &fullhost, newname)) {
+ debug("Canonicalized hostname \"%s\" => \"%s\"",
+ *hostp, fullhost);
+ }
+ free(*hostp);
+ *hostp = fullhost;
+ return addrs;
+ }
+ notfound:
+ if (!options.canonicalize_fallback_local)
+ fatal("%s: Could not resolve host \"%s\"", __progname, *hostp);
+ debug2("%s: host %s not found in any suffix", __func__, *hostp);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read per-user configuration file. Ignore the system wide config
+ * file if the user specifies a config file on the command line.
+ */
+static void
+process_config_files(const char *host_arg, struct passwd *pw, int post_canon)
+{
+ char buf[PATH_MAX];
+ int r;
+
+ if (config != NULL) {
+ if (strcasecmp(config, "none") != 0 &&
+ !read_config_file(config, pw, host, host_arg, &options,
+ SSHCONF_USERCONF | (post_canon ? SSHCONF_POSTCANON : 0)))
+ fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: "
+ "%.100s", config, strerror(errno));
+ } else {
+ r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
+ _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
+ if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
+ (void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_arg,
+ &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF |
+ (post_canon ? SSHCONF_POSTCANON : 0));
+
+ /* Read systemwide configuration file after user config. */
+ (void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw,
+ host, host_arg, &options,
+ post_canon ? SSHCONF_POSTCANON : 0);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Rewrite the port number in an addrinfo list of addresses */
+static void
+set_addrinfo_port(struct addrinfo *addrs, int port)
+{
+ struct addrinfo *addr;
+
+ for (addr = addrs; addr != NULL; addr = addr->ai_next) {
+ switch (addr->ai_family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ ((struct sockaddr_in *)addr->ai_addr)->
+ sin_port = htons(port);
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr->ai_addr)->
+ sin6_port = htons(port);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Main program for the ssh client.
+ */
+int
+main(int ac, char **av)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
+ int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog, direct, config_test = 0;
+ char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, buf[PATH_MAX], *host_arg, *logfile;
+ char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV];
+ char cname[NI_MAXHOST], uidstr[32], *conn_hash_hex;
+ struct stat st;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ int timeout_ms;
+ extern int optind, optreset;
+ extern char *optarg;
+ struct Forward fwd;
+ struct addrinfo *addrs = NULL;
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
+ u_char conn_hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+
+ ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
+ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+ sanitise_stdfd();
+
+ __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+ /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
+ /* Save argv so it isn't clobbered by setproctitle() emulation */
+ saved_av = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_av));
+ for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+ saved_av[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
+ saved_av[i] = NULL;
+ compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
+ av = saved_av;
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Discard other fds that are hanging around. These can cause problem
+ * with backgrounded ssh processes started by ControlPersist.
+ */
+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Save the original real uid. It will be needed later (uid-swapping
+ * may clobber the real uid).
+ */
+ original_real_uid = getuid();
+ original_effective_uid = geteuid();
+
+ /*
+ * Use uid-swapping to give up root privileges for the duration of
+ * option processing. We will re-instantiate the rights when we are
+ * ready to create the privileged port, and will permanently drop
+ * them when the port has been created (actually, when the connection
+ * has been made, as we may need to create the port several times).
+ */
+ PRIV_END;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
+ /* If we are installed setuid root be careful to not drop core. */
+ if (original_real_uid != original_effective_uid) {
+ struct rlimit rlim;
+ rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
+ if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0)
+ fatal("setrlimit failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+#endif
+ /* Get user data. */
+ pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid);
+ if (!pw) {
+ logit("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)original_real_uid);
+ exit(255);
+ }
+ /* Take a copy of the returned structure. */
+ pw = pwcopy(pw);
+
+ /*
+ * Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created
+ * with the default umask. This will make them world-readable but
+ * writable only by the owner, which is ok for all files for which we
+ * don't set the modes explicitly.
+ */
+ umask(022);
+
+ setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "");
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been
+ * set.
+ */
+ initialize_options(&options);
+
+ /* Parse command-line arguments. */
+ host = NULL;
+ use_syslog = 0;
+ logfile = NULL;
+ argv0 = av[0];
+
+ again:
+ while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx"
+ "ACD:E:F:GI:J:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) {
+ switch (opt) {
+ case '1':
+ options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1;
+ break;
+ case '2':
+ options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
+ break;
+ case '4':
+ options.address_family = AF_INET;
+ break;
+ case '6':
+ options.address_family = AF_INET6;
+ break;
+ case 'n':
+ stdin_null_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'f':
+ fork_after_authentication_flag = 1;
+ stdin_null_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'x':
+ options.forward_x11 = 0;
+ break;
+ case 'X':
+ options.forward_x11 = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'y':
+ use_syslog = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'E':
+ logfile = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'G':
+ config_test = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'Y':
+ options.forward_x11 = 1;
+ options.forward_x11_trusted = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'g':
+ options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'O':
+ if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL)
+ fatal("Cannot specify multiplexing "
+ "command with -W");
+ else if (muxclient_command != 0)
+ fatal("Multiplexing command already specified");
+ if (strcmp(optarg, "check") == 0)
+ muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK;
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "forward") == 0)
+ muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD;
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "exit") == 0)
+ muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE;
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "stop") == 0)
+ muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP;
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "cancel") == 0)
+ muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD;
+ else
+ fatal("Invalid multiplex command.");
+ break;
+ case 'P': /* deprecated */
+ options.use_privileged_port = 0;
+ break;
+ case 'Q':
+ cp = NULL;
+ if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher") == 0)
+ cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 0);
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher-auth") == 0)
+ cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 1);
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "mac") == 0)
+ cp = mac_alg_list('\n');
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0)
+ cp = kex_alg_list('\n');
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0)
+ cp = key_alg_list(0, 0);
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0)
+ cp = key_alg_list(1, 0);
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-plain") == 0)
+ cp = key_alg_list(0, 1);
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "protocol-version") == 0) {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ cp = xstrdup("1\n2");
+#else
+ cp = xstrdup("2");
+#endif
+ }
+ if (cp == NULL)
+ fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg);
+ printf("%s\n", cp);
+ free(cp);
+ exit(0);
+ break;
+ case 'a':
+ options.forward_agent = 0;
+ break;
+ case 'A':
+ options.forward_agent = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'k':
+ options.gss_deleg_creds = 0;
+ break;
+ case 'K':
+ options.gss_authentication = 1;
+ options.gss_deleg_creds = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'i':
+ p = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, original_real_uid);
+ if (stat(p, &st) < 0)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s "
+ "not accessible: %s.\n", p,
+ strerror(errno));
+ else
+ add_identity_file(&options, NULL, p, 1);
+ free(p);
+ break;
+ case 'I':
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ free(options.pkcs11_provider);
+ options.pkcs11_provider = xstrdup(optarg);
+#else
+ fprintf(stderr, "no support for PKCS#11.\n");
+#endif
+ break;
+ case 'J':
+ if (options.jump_host != NULL)
+ fatal("Only a single -J option permitted");
+ if (options.proxy_command != NULL)
+ fatal("Cannot specify -J with ProxyCommand");
+ if (parse_jump(optarg, &options, 1) == -1)
+ fatal("Invalid -J argument");
+ options.proxy_command = xstrdup("none");
+ break;
+ case 't':
+ if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES)
+ options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_FORCE;
+ else
+ options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_YES;
+ break;
+ case 'v':
+ if (debug_flag == 0) {
+ debug_flag = 1;
+ options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+ } else {
+ if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) {
+ debug_flag++;
+ options.log_level++;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'V':
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
+ SSH_RELEASE,
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)
+#else
+ "without OpenSSL"
+#endif
+ );
+ if (opt == 'V')
+ exit(0);
+ break;
+ case 'w':
+ if (options.tun_open == -1)
+ options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT;
+ options.tun_local = a2tun(optarg, &options.tun_remote);
+ if (options.tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ERR) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Bad tun device '%s'\n", optarg);
+ exit(255);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'W':
+ if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL)
+ fatal("stdio forward already specified");
+ if (muxclient_command != 0)
+ fatal("Cannot specify stdio forward with -O");
+ if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) {
+ options.stdio_forward_host = fwd.listen_host;
+ options.stdio_forward_port = fwd.listen_port;
+ free(fwd.connect_host);
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Bad stdio forwarding specification '%s'\n",
+ optarg);
+ exit(255);
+ }
+ options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
+ no_shell_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'q':
+ options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
+ break;
+ case 'e':
+ if (optarg[0] == '^' && optarg[2] == 0 &&
+ (u_char) optarg[1] >= 64 &&
+ (u_char) optarg[1] < 128)
+ options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[1] & 31;
+ else if (strlen(optarg) == 1)
+ options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[0];
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "none") == 0)
+ options.escape_char = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE;
+ else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad escape character '%s'.\n",
+ optarg);
+ exit(255);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'c':
+ if (ciphers_valid(*optarg == '+' ?
+ optarg + 1 : optarg)) {
+ /* SSH2 only */
+ free(options.ciphers);
+ options.ciphers = xstrdup(optarg);
+ options.cipher = SSH_CIPHER_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* SSH1 only */
+ options.cipher = cipher_number(optarg);
+ if (options.cipher == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n",
+ optarg);
+ exit(255);
+ }
+ if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_3DES)
+ options.ciphers = xstrdup("3des-cbc");
+ else if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH)
+ options.ciphers = xstrdup("blowfish-cbc");
+ else
+ options.ciphers = xstrdup(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT);
+ break;
+ case 'm':
+ if (mac_valid(optarg)) {
+ free(options.macs);
+ options.macs = xstrdup(optarg);
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unknown mac type '%s'\n",
+ optarg);
+ exit(255);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'M':
+ if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_YES)
+ options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK;
+ else
+ options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_YES;
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ options.port = a2port(optarg);
+ if (options.port <= 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg);
+ exit(255);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'l':
+ options.user = optarg;
+ break;
+
+ case 'L':
+ if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 0))
+ add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
+ else {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Bad local forwarding specification '%s'\n",
+ optarg);
+ exit(255);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case 'R':
+ if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 1)) {
+ add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd);
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Bad remote forwarding specification "
+ "'%s'\n", optarg);
+ exit(255);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case 'D':
+ if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) {
+ add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Bad dynamic forwarding specification "
+ "'%s'\n", optarg);
+ exit(255);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case 'C':
+ options.compression = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'N':
+ no_shell_flag = 1;
+ options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
+ break;
+ case 'T':
+ options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
+ break;
+ case 'o':
+ line = xstrdup(optarg);
+ if (process_config_line(&options, pw,
+ host ? host : "", host ? host : "", line,
+ "command-line", 0, NULL, SSHCONF_USERCONF) != 0)
+ exit(255);
+ free(line);
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ subsystem_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'S':
+ free(options.control_path);
+ options.control_path = xstrdup(optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'b':
+ options.bind_address = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'F':
+ config = optarg;
+ break;
+ default:
+ usage();
+ }
+ }
+
+ ac -= optind;
+ av += optind;
+
+ if (ac > 0 && !host) {
+ if (strrchr(*av, '@')) {
+ p = xstrdup(*av);
+ cp = strrchr(p, '@');
+ if (cp == NULL || cp == p)
+ usage();
+ options.user = p;
+ *cp = '\0';
+ host = xstrdup(++cp);
+ } else
+ host = xstrdup(*av);
+ if (ac > 1) {
+ optind = optreset = 1;
+ goto again;
+ }
+ ac--, av++;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that we got a host name. */
+ if (!host)
+ usage();
+
+ host_arg = xstrdup(host);
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+#endif
+
+ /* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
+ buffer_init(&command);
+
+ /*
+ * Save the command to execute on the remote host in a buffer. There
+ * is no limit on the length of the command, except by the maximum
+ * packet size. Also sets the tty flag if there is no command.
+ */
+ if (!ac) {
+ /* No command specified - execute shell on a tty. */
+ if (subsystem_flag) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "You must specify a subsystem to invoke.\n");
+ usage();
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* A command has been specified. Store it into the buffer. */
+ for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) {
+ if (i)
+ buffer_append(&command, " ", 1);
+ buffer_append(&command, av[i], strlen(av[i]));
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Cannot fork to background if no command. */
+ if (fork_after_authentication_flag && buffer_len(&command) == 0 &&
+ !no_shell_flag)
+ fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command "
+ "to execute.");
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize "log" output. Since we are the client all output
+ * goes to stderr unless otherwise specified by -y or -E.
+ */
+ if (use_syslog && logfile != NULL)
+ fatal("Can't specify both -y and -E");
+ if (logfile != NULL)
+ log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile);
+ log_init(argv0,
+ options.log_level == -1 ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog);
+
+ if (debug_flag)
+ logit("%s, %s", SSH_RELEASE,
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)
+#else
+ "without OpenSSL"
+#endif
+ );
+
+ /* Parse the configuration files */
+ process_config_files(host_arg, pw, 0);
+
+ /* Hostname canonicalisation needs a few options filled. */
+ fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(&options);
+
+ /* If the user has replaced the hostname then take it into use now */
+ if (options.hostname != NULL) {
+ /* NB. Please keep in sync with readconf.c:match_cfg_line() */
+ cp = percent_expand(options.hostname,
+ "h", host, (char *)NULL);
+ free(host);
+ host = cp;
+ free(options.hostname);
+ options.hostname = xstrdup(host);
+ }
+
+ /* If canonicalization requested then try to apply it */
+ lowercase(host);
+ if (options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
+ addrs = resolve_canonicalize(&host, options.port);
+
+ /*
+ * If CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs have been specified but
+ * other canonicalization did not happen (by not being requested
+ * or by failing with fallback) then the hostname may still be changed
+ * as a result of CNAME following.
+ *
+ * Try to resolve the bare hostname name using the system resolver's
+ * usual search rules and then apply the CNAME follow rules.
+ *
+ * Skip the lookup if a ProxyCommand is being used unless the user
+ * has specifically requested canonicalisation for this case via
+ * CanonicalizeHostname=always
+ */
+ direct = option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) &&
+ options.jump_host == NULL;
+ if (addrs == NULL && options.num_permitted_cnames != 0 && (direct ||
+ options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)) {
+ if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port,
+ option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command),
+ cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL) {
+ /* Don't fatal proxied host names not in the DNS */
+ if (option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command))
+ cleanup_exit(255); /* logged in resolve_host */
+ } else
+ check_follow_cname(direct, &host, cname);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If canonicalisation is enabled then re-parse the configuration
+ * files as new stanzas may match.
+ */
+ if (options.canonicalize_hostname != 0) {
+ debug("Re-reading configuration after hostname "
+ "canonicalisation");
+ free(options.hostname);
+ options.hostname = xstrdup(host);
+ process_config_files(host_arg, pw, 1);
+ /*
+ * Address resolution happens early with canonicalisation
+ * enabled and the port number may have changed since, so
+ * reset it in address list
+ */
+ if (addrs != NULL && options.port > 0)
+ set_addrinfo_port(addrs, options.port);
+ }
+
+ /* Fill configuration defaults. */
+ fill_default_options(&options);
+
+ /*
+ * If ProxyJump option specified, then construct a ProxyCommand now.
+ */
+ if (options.jump_host != NULL) {
+ char port_s[8];
+
+ /* Consistency check */
+ if (options.proxy_command != NULL)
+ fatal("inconsistent options: ProxyCommand+ProxyJump");
+ /* Never use FD passing for ProxyJump */
+ options.proxy_use_fdpass = 0;
+ snprintf(port_s, sizeof(port_s), "%d", options.jump_port);
+ xasprintf(&options.proxy_command,
+ "ssh%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%.*s -W %%h:%%p %s",
+ /* Optional "-l user" argument if jump_user set */
+ options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : " -l ",
+ options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : options.jump_user,
+ /* Optional "-p port" argument if jump_port set */
+ options.jump_port <= 0 ? "" : " -p ",
+ options.jump_port <= 0 ? "" : port_s,
+ /* Optional additional jump hosts ",..." */
+ options.jump_extra == NULL ? "" : " -J ",
+ options.jump_extra == NULL ? "" : options.jump_extra,
+ /* Optional "-F" argumment if -F specified */
+ config == NULL ? "" : " -F ",
+ config == NULL ? "" : config,
+ /* Optional "-v" arguments if -v set */
+ debug_flag ? " -" : "",
+ debug_flag, "vvv",
+ /* Mandatory hostname */
+ options.jump_host);
+ debug("Setting implicit ProxyCommand from ProxyJump: %s",
+ options.proxy_command);
+ }
+
+ if (options.port == 0)
+ options.port = default_ssh_port();
+ channel_set_af(options.address_family);
+
+ /* Tidy and check options */
+ if (options.host_key_alias != NULL)
+ lowercase(options.host_key_alias);
+ if (options.proxy_command != NULL &&
+ strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0 &&
+ options.proxy_use_fdpass)
+ fatal("ProxyCommand=- and ProxyUseFDPass are incompatible");
+ if (options.control_persist &&
+ options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) {
+ debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with ControlPersist; "
+ "disabling");
+ options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+ }
+ if (options.connection_attempts <= 0)
+ fatal("Invalid number of ConnectionAttempts");
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (original_effective_uid != 0)
+ options.use_privileged_port = 0;
+#endif
+
+ /* reinit */
+ log_init(argv0, options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog);
+
+ if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES ||
+ options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE)
+ tty_flag = 1;
+
+ /* Allocate a tty by default if no command specified. */
+ if (buffer_len(&command) == 0)
+ tty_flag = options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_NO;
+
+ /* Force no tty */
+ if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO || muxclient_command != 0)
+ tty_flag = 0;
+ /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
+ if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) &&
+ options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) {
+ if (tty_flag)
+ logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because "
+ "stdin is not a terminal.");
+ tty_flag = 0;
+ }
+
+ seed_rng();
+
+ if (options.user == NULL)
+ options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+
+ if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
+ fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
+ strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost));
+ shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0';
+ snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", options.port);
+ snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%d", pw->pw_uid);
+
+ if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL ||
+ ssh_digest_update(md, thishost, strlen(thishost)) < 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_update(md, host, strlen(host)) < 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_update(md, portstr, strlen(portstr)) < 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_update(md, options.user, strlen(options.user)) < 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_final(md, conn_hash, sizeof(conn_hash)) < 0)
+ fatal("%s: mux digest failed", __func__);
+ ssh_digest_free(md);
+ conn_hash_hex = tohex(conn_hash, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1));
+
+ if (options.local_command != NULL) {
+ debug3("expanding LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command);
+ cp = options.local_command;
+ options.local_command = percent_expand(cp,
+ "C", conn_hash_hex,
+ "L", shorthost,
+ "d", pw->pw_dir,
+ "h", host,
+ "l", thishost,
+ "n", host_arg,
+ "p", portstr,
+ "r", options.user,
+ "u", pw->pw_name,
+ (char *)NULL);
+ debug3("expanded LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command);
+ free(cp);
+ }
+
+ if (options.control_path != NULL) {
+ cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.control_path,
+ original_real_uid);
+ free(options.control_path);
+ options.control_path = percent_expand(cp,
+ "C", conn_hash_hex,
+ "L", shorthost,
+ "h", host,
+ "l", thishost,
+ "n", host_arg,
+ "p", portstr,
+ "r", options.user,
+ "u", pw->pw_name,
+ "i", uidstr,
+ (char *)NULL);
+ free(cp);
+ }
+ free(conn_hash_hex);
+
+ if (config_test) {
+ dump_client_config(&options, host);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ if (muxclient_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL)
+ fatal("No ControlPath specified for \"-O\" command");
+ if (options.control_path != NULL)
+ muxclient(options.control_path);
+
+ /*
+ * If hostname canonicalisation was not enabled, then we may not
+ * have yet resolved the hostname. Do so now.
+ */
+ if (addrs == NULL && options.proxy_command == NULL) {
+ debug2("resolving \"%s\" port %d", host, options.port);
+ if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, 1,
+ cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL)
+ cleanup_exit(255); /* resolve_host logs the error */
+ }
+
+ timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000;
+
+ /* Open a connection to the remote host. */
+ if (ssh_connect(host, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port,
+ options.address_family, options.connection_attempts,
+ &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive,
+ options.use_privileged_port) != 0)
+ exit(255);
+
+ if (addrs != NULL)
+ freeaddrinfo(addrs);
+
+ packet_set_timeout(options.server_alive_interval,
+ options.server_alive_count_max);
+
+ ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+
+ if (timeout_ms > 0)
+ debug3("timeout: %d ms remain after connect", timeout_ms);
+
+ /*
+ * If we successfully made the connection, load the host private key
+ * in case we will need it later for combined rsa-rhosts
+ * authentication. This must be done before releasing extra
+ * privileges, because the file is only readable by root.
+ * If we cannot access the private keys, load the public keys
+ * instead and try to execute the ssh-keysign helper instead.
+ */
+ sensitive_data.nkeys = 0;
+ sensitive_data.keys = NULL;
+ sensitive_data.external_keysign = 0;
+ if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication ||
+ options.hostbased_authentication) {
+ sensitive_data.nkeys = 9;
+ sensitive_data.keys = xcalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys,
+ sizeof(Key));
+ for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++)
+ sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL;
+
+ PRIV_START;
+#if WITH_SSH1
+ sensitive_data.keys[0] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1,
+ _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_ECDSA,
+ _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
+#endif
+ sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_ED25519,
+ _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
+ sensitive_data.keys[3] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_RSA,
+ _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
+ sensitive_data.keys[4] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_DSA,
+ _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ sensitive_data.keys[5] = key_load_private_type(KEY_ECDSA,
+ _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
+#endif
+ sensitive_data.keys[6] = key_load_private_type(KEY_ED25519,
+ _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
+ sensitive_data.keys[7] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA,
+ _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
+ sensitive_data.keys[8] = key_load_private_type(KEY_DSA,
+ _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
+ PRIV_END;
+
+ if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1 &&
+ sensitive_data.keys[0] == NULL &&
+ sensitive_data.keys[5] == NULL &&
+ sensitive_data.keys[6] == NULL &&
+ sensitive_data.keys[7] == NULL &&
+ sensitive_data.keys[8] == NULL) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_cert(
+ _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE);
+#endif
+ sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_cert(
+ _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE);
+ sensitive_data.keys[3] = key_load_cert(
+ _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE);
+ sensitive_data.keys[4] = key_load_cert(
+ _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ sensitive_data.keys[5] = key_load_public(
+ _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, NULL);
+#endif
+ sensitive_data.keys[6] = key_load_public(
+ _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, NULL);
+ sensitive_data.keys[7] = key_load_public(
+ _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, NULL);
+ sensitive_data.keys[8] = key_load_public(
+ _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, NULL);
+ sensitive_data.external_keysign = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Get rid of any extra privileges that we may have. We will no
+ * longer need them. Also, extra privileges could make it very hard
+ * to read identity files and other non-world-readable files from the
+ * user's home directory if it happens to be on a NFS volume where
+ * root is mapped to nobody.
+ */
+ if (original_effective_uid == 0) {
+ PRIV_START;
+ permanently_set_uid(pw);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now that we are back to our own permissions, create ~/.ssh
+ * directory if it doesn't already exist.
+ */
+ if (config == NULL) {
+ r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir,
+ strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? "/" : "", _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
+ if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf) && stat(buf, &st) < 0) {
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(buf);
+#endif
+ if (mkdir(buf, 0700) < 0)
+ error("Could not create directory '%.200s'.",
+ buf);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(NULL);
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+ /* load options.identity_files */
+ load_public_identity_files();
+
+ /* optionally set the SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME varibale */
+ if (options.identity_agent &&
+ strcmp(options.identity_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) != 0) {
+ if (strcmp(options.identity_agent, "none") == 0) {
+ unsetenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+ } else {
+ p = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_agent,
+ original_real_uid);
+ cp = percent_expand(p, "d", pw->pw_dir,
+ "u", pw->pw_name, "l", thishost, "h", host,
+ "r", options.user, (char *)NULL);
+ setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, cp, 1);
+ free(cp);
+ free(p);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Expand ~ in known host file names. */
+ tilde_expand_paths(options.system_hostfiles,
+ options.num_system_hostfiles);
+ tilde_expand_paths(options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles);
+
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
+ signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
+
+ /* Log into the remote system. Never returns if the login fails. */
+ ssh_login(&sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr,
+ options.port, pw, timeout_ms);
+
+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+ verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d).", host,
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ } else {
+ verbose("Authenticated to %s (via proxy).", host);
+ }
+
+ /* We no longer need the private host keys. Clear them now. */
+ if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) {
+ if (sensitive_data.keys[i] != NULL) {
+ /* Destroys contents safely */
+ debug3("clear hostkey %d", i);
+ key_free(sensitive_data.keys[i]);
+ sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ free(sensitive_data.keys);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
+ free(options.identity_files[i]);
+ options.identity_files[i] = NULL;
+ if (options.identity_keys[i]) {
+ key_free(options.identity_keys[i]);
+ options.identity_keys[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) {
+ free(options.certificate_files[i]);
+ options.certificate_files[i] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ exit_status = compat20 ? ssh_session2() : ssh_session();
+ packet_close();
+
+ if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
+ unlink(options.control_path);
+
+ /* Kill ProxyCommand if it is running. */
+ ssh_kill_proxy_command();
+
+ return exit_status;
+}
+
+static void
+control_persist_detach(void)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ int devnull, keep_stderr;
+
+ debug("%s: backgrounding master process", __func__);
+
+ /*
+ * master (current process) into the background, and make the
+ * foreground process a client of the backgrounded master.
+ */
+ switch ((pid = fork())) {
+ case -1:
+ fatal("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ case 0:
+ /* Child: master process continues mainloop */
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Parent: set up mux slave to connect to backgrounded master */
+ debug2("%s: background process is %ld", __func__, (long)pid);
+ stdin_null_flag = ostdin_null_flag;
+ options.request_tty = orequest_tty;
+ tty_flag = otty_flag;
+ close(muxserver_sock);
+ muxserver_sock = -1;
+ options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
+ muxclient(options.control_path);
+ /* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */
+ fatal("Failed to connect to new control master");
+ }
+ if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+ error("%s: open(\"/dev/null\"): %s", __func__,
+ strerror(errno));
+ } else {
+ keep_stderr = log_is_on_stderr() && debug_flag;
+ if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
+ dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 ||
+ (!keep_stderr && dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1))
+ error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
+ close(devnull);
+ }
+ daemon(1, 1);
+ setproctitle("%s [mux]", options.control_path);
+}
+
+/* Do fork() after authentication. Used by "ssh -f" */
+static void
+fork_postauth(void)
+{
+ if (need_controlpersist_detach)
+ control_persist_detach();
+ debug("forking to background");
+ fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
+ if (daemon(1, 1) < 0)
+ fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
+}
+
+/* Callback for remote forward global requests */
+static void
+ssh_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ struct Forward *rfwd = (struct Forward *)ctxt;
+
+ /* XXX verbose() on failure? */
+ debug("remote forward %s for: listen %s%s%d, connect %s:%d",
+ type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
+ rfwd->listen_path ? rfwd->listen_path :
+ rfwd->listen_host ? rfwd->listen_host : "",
+ (rfwd->listen_path || rfwd->listen_host) ? ":" : "",
+ rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path :
+ rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
+ if (rfwd->listen_path == NULL && rfwd->listen_port == 0) {
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
+ rfwd->allocated_port = packet_get_int();
+ logit("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d",
+ rfwd->allocated_port,
+ rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
+ channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle,
+ rfwd->allocated_port);
+ } else {
+ channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle, -1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) {
+ if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) {
+ if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL)
+ fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed "
+ "for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path);
+ else
+ fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed "
+ "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
+ } else {
+ if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL)
+ logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed "
+ "for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path);
+ else
+ logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed "
+ "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
+ }
+ }
+ if (++remote_forward_confirms_received == options.num_remote_forwards) {
+ debug("All remote forwarding requests processed");
+ if (fork_after_authentication_flag)
+ fork_postauth();
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+client_cleanup_stdio_fwd(int id, void *arg)
+{
+ debug("stdio forwarding: done");
+ cleanup_exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_stdio_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg)
+{
+ if (!success)
+ fatal("stdio forwarding failed");
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(void)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+ int in, out;
+
+ if (options.stdio_forward_host == NULL)
+ return;
+ if (!compat20)
+ fatal("stdio forwarding require Protocol 2");
+
+ debug3("%s: %s:%d", __func__, options.stdio_forward_host,
+ options.stdio_forward_port);
+
+ if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) < 0 ||
+ (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) < 0)
+ fatal("channel_connect_stdio_fwd: dup() in/out failed");
+ if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(options.stdio_forward_host,
+ options.stdio_forward_port, in, out)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed", __func__);
+ channel_register_cleanup(c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0);
+ channel_register_open_confirm(c->self, ssh_stdio_confirm, NULL);
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_init_forwarding(void)
+{
+ int success = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
+ debug("Local connections to %.200s:%d forwarded to remote "
+ "address %.200s:%d",
+ (options.local_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ?
+ options.local_forwards[i].listen_path :
+ (options.local_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
+ (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
+ options.local_forwards[i].listen_host,
+ options.local_forwards[i].listen_port,
+ (options.local_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ?
+ options.local_forwards[i].connect_path :
+ options.local_forwards[i].connect_host,
+ options.local_forwards[i].connect_port);
+ success += channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(
+ &options.local_forwards[i], &options.fwd_opts);
+ }
+ if (i > 0 && success != i && options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+ fatal("Could not request local forwarding.");
+ if (i > 0 && success == 0)
+ error("Could not request local forwarding.");
+
+ /* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+ debug("Remote connections from %.200s:%d forwarded to "
+ "local address %.200s:%d",
+ (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ?
+ options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path :
+ (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
+ "LOCALHOST" : options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host,
+ options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
+ (options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ?
+ options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path :
+ options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
+ options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port);
+ options.remote_forwards[i].handle =
+ channel_request_remote_forwarding(
+ &options.remote_forwards[i]);
+ if (options.remote_forwards[i].handle < 0) {
+ if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+ fatal("Could not request remote forwarding.");
+ else
+ logit("Warning: Could not request remote "
+ "forwarding.");
+ } else {
+ client_register_global_confirm(ssh_confirm_remote_forward,
+ &options.remote_forwards[i]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Initiate tunnel forwarding. */
+ if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
+ if (client_request_tun_fwd(options.tun_open,
+ options.tun_local, options.tun_remote) == -1) {
+ if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+ fatal("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
+ else
+ error("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+check_agent_present(void)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (options.forward_agent) {
+ /* Clear agent forwarding if we don't have an agent. */
+ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) != 0) {
+ options.forward_agent = 0;
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
+ debug("ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
+ ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_session(void)
+{
+ int type;
+ int interactive = 0;
+ int have_tty = 0;
+ struct winsize ws;
+ char *cp;
+ const char *display;
+ char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL;
+
+ /* Enable compression if requested. */
+ if (options.compression) {
+ debug("Requesting compression at level %d.",
+ options.compression_level);
+
+ if (options.compression_level < 1 ||
+ options.compression_level > 9)
+ fatal("Compression level must be from 1 (fast) to "
+ "9 (slow, best).");
+
+ /* Send the request. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION);
+ packet_put_int(options.compression_level);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ type = packet_read();
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+ packet_start_compression(options.compression_level);
+ else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ logit("Warning: Remote host refused compression.");
+ else
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for "
+ "compression response.");
+ }
+ /* Allocate a pseudo tty if appropriate. */
+ if (tty_flag) {
+ debug("Requesting pty.");
+
+ /* Start the packet. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
+
+ /* Store TERM in the packet. There is no limit on the
+ length of the string. */
+ cp = getenv("TERM");
+ if (!cp)
+ cp = "";
+ packet_put_cstring(cp);
+
+ /* Store window size in the packet. */
+ if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
+ memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
+
+ /* Store tty modes in the packet. */
+ tty_make_modes(fileno(stdin), NULL);
+
+ /* Send the packet, and wait for it to leave. */
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Read response from the server. */
+ type = packet_read();
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ interactive = 1;
+ have_tty = 1;
+ } else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ logit("Warning: Remote host failed or refused to "
+ "allocate a pseudo tty.");
+ else
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for pty "
+ "request response.");
+ }
+ /* Request X11 forwarding if enabled and DISPLAY is set. */
+ display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+ if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11)
+ debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set");
+ if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(display,
+ options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted,
+ options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) {
+ /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
+ "spoofing.");
+ x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(0, display, proto,
+ data, 0);
+ /* Read response from the server. */
+ type = packet_read();
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ interactive = 1;
+ } else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ logit("Warning: Remote host denied X11 forwarding.");
+ } else {
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for X11 "
+ "forwarding");
+ }
+ }
+ /* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */
+ packet_set_interactive(interactive,
+ options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
+
+ /* Request authentication agent forwarding if appropriate. */
+ check_agent_present();
+
+ if (options.forward_agent) {
+ debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
+ auth_request_forwarding();
+
+ /* Read response from the server. */
+ type = packet_read();
+ packet_check_eom();
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+ logit("Warning: Remote host denied authentication agent forwarding.");
+ }
+
+ /* Initiate port forwardings. */
+ ssh_init_stdio_forwarding();
+ ssh_init_forwarding();
+
+ /* Execute a local command */
+ if (options.local_command != NULL &&
+ options.permit_local_command)
+ ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command);
+
+ /*
+ * If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote
+ * forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background.
+ */
+ if (fork_after_authentication_flag) {
+ if (options.exit_on_forward_failure &&
+ options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
+ debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward "
+ "confirmation received");
+ } else
+ fork_postauth();
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If a command was specified on the command line, execute the
+ * command now. Otherwise request the server to start a shell.
+ */
+ if (buffer_len(&command) > 0) {
+ int len = buffer_len(&command);
+ if (len > 900)
+ len = 900;
+ debug("Sending command: %.*s", len,
+ (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&command));
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD);
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&command), buffer_len(&command));
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ } else {
+ debug("Requesting shell.");
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ }
+
+ /* Enter the interactive session. */
+ return client_loop(have_tty, tty_flag ?
+ options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, 0);
+}
+
+/* request pty/x11/agent/tcpfwd/shell for channel */
+static void
+ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, void *arg)
+{
+ extern char **environ;
+ const char *display;
+ int interactive = tty_flag;
+ char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL;
+
+ if (!success)
+ return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */
+
+ display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+ if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11)
+ debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set");
+ if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(display,
+ options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted,
+ options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) {
+ /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
+ "spoofing.");
+ x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto,
+ data, 1);
+ client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN);
+ /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
+ interactive = 1;
+ }
+
+ check_agent_present();
+ if (options.forward_agent) {
+ debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
+ channel_request_start(id, "auth-agent-req at openssh.com", 0);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+
+ /* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */
+ packet_set_interactive(interactive,
+ options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
+
+ client_session2_setup(id, tty_flag, subsystem_flag, getenv("TERM"),
+ NULL, fileno(stdin), &command, environ);
+}
+
+/* open new channel for a session */
+static int
+ssh_session2_open(void)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+ int window, packetmax, in, out, err;
+
+ if (stdin_null_flag) {
+ in = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY);
+ } else {
+ in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+ }
+ out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
+ err = dup(STDERR_FILENO);
+
+ if (in < 0 || out < 0 || err < 0)
+ fatal("dup() in/out/err failed");
+
+ /* enable nonblocking unless tty */
+ if (!isatty(in))
+ set_nonblock(in);
+ if (!isatty(out))
+ set_nonblock(out);
+ if (!isatty(err))
+ set_nonblock(err);
+
+ window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
+ packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
+ if (tty_flag) {
+ window >>= 1;
+ packetmax >>= 1;
+ }
+ c = channel_new(
+ "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err,
+ window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE,
+ "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
+
+ debug3("ssh_session2_open: channel_new: %d", c->self);
+
+ channel_send_open(c->self);
+ if (!no_shell_flag)
+ channel_register_open_confirm(c->self,
+ ssh_session2_setup, NULL);
+
+ return c->self;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_session2(void)
+{
+ int id = -1;
+
+ /* XXX should be pre-session */
+ if (!options.control_persist)
+ ssh_init_stdio_forwarding();
+ ssh_init_forwarding();
+
+ /* Start listening for multiplex clients */
+ muxserver_listen();
+
+ /*
+ * If we are in control persist mode and have a working mux listen
+ * socket, then prepare to background ourselves and have a foreground
+ * client attach as a control slave.
+ * NB. we must save copies of the flags that we override for
+ * the backgrounding, since we defer attachment of the slave until
+ * after the connection is fully established (in particular,
+ * async rfwd replies have been received for ExitOnForwardFailure).
+ */
+ if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock != -1) {
+ ostdin_null_flag = stdin_null_flag;
+ ono_shell_flag = no_shell_flag;
+ orequest_tty = options.request_tty;
+ otty_flag = tty_flag;
+ stdin_null_flag = 1;
+ no_shell_flag = 1;
+ tty_flag = 0;
+ if (!fork_after_authentication_flag)
+ need_controlpersist_detach = 1;
+ fork_after_authentication_flag = 1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * ControlPersist mux listen socket setup failed, attempt the
+ * stdio forward setup that we skipped earlier.
+ */
+ if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock == -1)
+ ssh_init_stdio_forwarding();
+
+ if (!no_shell_flag || (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN))
+ id = ssh_session2_open();
+ else {
+ packet_set_interactive(
+ options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO,
+ options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
+ }
+
+ /* If we don't expect to open a new session, then disallow it */
+ if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO &&
+ (datafellows & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH)) {
+ debug("Requesting no-more-sessions at openssh.com");
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring("no-more-sessions at openssh.com");
+ packet_put_char(0);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+
+ /* Execute a local command */
+ if (options.local_command != NULL &&
+ options.permit_local_command)
+ ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command);
+
+ /*
+ * If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote
+ * forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background.
+ */
+ if (fork_after_authentication_flag) {
+ if (options.exit_on_forward_failure &&
+ options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
+ debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward "
+ "confirmation received");
+ } else
+ fork_postauth();
+ }
+
+ return client_loop(tty_flag, tty_flag ?
+ options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id);
+}
+
+/* Loads all IdentityFile and CertificateFile keys */
+static void
+load_public_identity_files(void)
+{
+ char *filename, *cp, thishost[NI_MAXHOST];
+ char *pwdir = NULL, *pwname = NULL;
+ Key *public;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ int i;
+ u_int n_ids, n_certs;
+ char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
+ Key *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
+ char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
+ struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ Key **keys;
+ int nkeys;
+#endif /* PKCS11 */
+
+ n_ids = n_certs = 0;
+ memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files));
+ memset(identity_keys, 0, sizeof(identity_keys));
+ memset(certificate_files, 0, sizeof(certificate_files));
+ memset(certificates, 0, sizeof(certificates));
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL &&
+ options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
+ (pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) &&
+ (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL,
+ &keys)) > 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+ if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) {
+ key_free(keys[i]);
+ continue;
+ }
+ identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i];
+ identity_files[n_ids] =
+ xstrdup(options.pkcs11_provider); /* XXX */
+ n_ids++;
+ }
+ free(keys);
+ }
+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+ if ((pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid)) == NULL)
+ fatal("load_public_identity_files: getpwuid failed");
+ pwname = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+ pwdir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
+ if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
+ fatal("load_public_identity_files: gethostname: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
+ if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES ||
+ strcasecmp(options.identity_files[i], "none") == 0) {
+ free(options.identity_files[i]);
+ options.identity_files[i] = NULL;
+ continue;
+ }
+ cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i],
+ original_real_uid);
+ filename = percent_expand(cp, "d", pwdir,
+ "u", pwname, "l", thishost, "h", host,
+ "r", options.user, (char *)NULL);
+ free(cp);
+ public = key_load_public(filename, NULL);
+ debug("identity file %s type %d", filename,
+ public ? public->type : -1);
+ free(options.identity_files[i]);
+ identity_files[n_ids] = filename;
+ identity_keys[n_ids] = public;
+
+ if (++n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * If no certificates have been explicitly listed then try
+ * to add the default certificate variant too.
+ */
+ if (options.num_certificate_files != 0)
+ continue;
+ xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename);
+ public = key_load_public(cp, NULL);
+ debug("identity file %s type %d", cp,
+ public ? public->type : -1);
+ if (public == NULL) {
+ free(cp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!key_is_cert(public)) {
+ debug("%s: key %s type %s is not a certificate",
+ __func__, cp, key_type(public));
+ key_free(public);
+ free(cp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ identity_keys[n_ids] = public;
+ identity_files[n_ids] = cp;
+ n_ids++;
+ }
+
+ if (options.num_certificate_files > SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES)
+ fatal("%s: too many certificates", __func__);
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) {
+ cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.certificate_files[i],
+ original_real_uid);
+ filename = percent_expand(cp, "d", pwdir,
+ "u", pwname, "l", thishost, "h", host,
+ "r", options.user, (char *)NULL);
+ free(cp);
+
+ public = key_load_public(filename, NULL);
+ debug("certificate file %s type %d", filename,
+ public ? public->type : -1);
+ free(options.certificate_files[i]);
+ options.certificate_files[i] = NULL;
+ if (public == NULL) {
+ free(filename);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!key_is_cert(public)) {
+ debug("%s: key %s type %s is not a certificate",
+ __func__, filename, key_type(public));
+ key_free(public);
+ free(filename);
+ continue;
+ }
+ certificate_files[n_certs] = filename;
+ certificates[n_certs] = public;
+ ++n_certs;
+ }
+
+ options.num_identity_files = n_ids;
+ memcpy(options.identity_files, identity_files, sizeof(identity_files));
+ memcpy(options.identity_keys, identity_keys, sizeof(identity_keys));
+
+ options.num_certificate_files = n_certs;
+ memcpy(options.certificate_files,
+ certificate_files, sizeof(certificate_files));
+ memcpy(options.certificates, certificates, sizeof(certificates));
+
+ explicit_bzero(pwname, strlen(pwname));
+ free(pwname);
+ explicit_bzero(pwdir, strlen(pwdir));
+ free(pwdir);
+}
+
+static void
+main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
+{
+ int save_errno = errno;
+ pid_t pid;
+ int status;
+
+ while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
+ (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
+ ;
+
+ signal(sig, main_sigchld_handler);
+ errno = save_errno;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.79 2010/06/25 07:14:46 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-/* Cipher used for encrypting authentication files. */
-#define SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER SSH_CIPHER_3DES
-
-/* Default port number. */
-#define SSH_DEFAULT_PORT 22
-
-/*
- * Maximum number of RSA authentication identity files that can be specified
- * in configuration files or on the command line.
- */
-#define SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES 100
-
-/*
- * Maximum length of lines in authorized_keys file.
- * Current value permits 16kbit RSA and RSA1 keys and 8kbit DSA keys, with
- * some room for options and comments.
- */
-#define SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES 8192
-
-/*
- * Major protocol version. Different version indicates major incompatibility
- * that prevents communication.
- *
- * Minor protocol version. Different version indicates minor incompatibility
- * that does not prevent interoperation.
- */
-#define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 1
-#define PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 5
-
-/* We support both SSH1 and SSH2 */
-#define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 2
-#define PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 0
-
-/*
- * Name for the service. The port named by this service overrides the
- * default port if present.
- */
-#define SSH_SERVICE_NAME "ssh"
-
-/*
- * Name of the environment variable containing the process ID of the
- * authentication agent.
- */
-#define SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME "SSH_AGENT_PID"
-
-/*
- * Name of the environment variable containing the pathname of the
- * authentication socket.
- */
-#define SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME "SSH_AUTH_SOCK"
-
-/*
- * Environment variable for overwriting the default location of askpass
- */
-#define SSH_ASKPASS_ENV "SSH_ASKPASS"
-
-/*
- * Force host key length and server key length to differ by at least this
- * many bits. This is to make double encryption with rsaref work.
- */
-#define SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED 128
-
-/*
- * Length of the session key in bytes. (Specified as 256 bits in the
- * protocol.)
- */
-#define SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH 32
-
-/* Used to identify ``EscapeChar none'' */
-#define SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE -2
-
-/*
- * unprivileged user when UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes;
- * sshd will change its privileges to this user and its
- * primary group.
- */
-#ifndef SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
-#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER "sshd"
-#endif
-
-/* Minimum modulus size (n) for RSA keys. */
-#define SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE 768
-
-/* Listen backlog for sshd, ssh-agent and forwarding sockets */
-#define SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG 128
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.83 2015/12/11 03:19:09 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/* Cipher used for encrypting authentication files. */
+#define SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER SSH_CIPHER_3DES
+
+/* Default port number. */
+#define SSH_DEFAULT_PORT 22
+
+/*
+ * Maximum number of certificate files that can be specified
+ * in configuration files or on the command line.
+ */
+#define SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES 100
+
+/*
+ * Maximum number of RSA authentication identity files that can be specified
+ * in configuration files or on the command line.
+ */
+#define SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES 100
+
+/*
+ * Maximum length of lines in authorized_keys file.
+ * Current value permits 16kbit RSA and RSA1 keys and 8kbit DSA keys, with
+ * some room for options and comments.
+ */
+#define SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES 16384
+
+/*
+ * Major protocol version. Different version indicates major incompatibility
+ * that prevents communication.
+ *
+ * Minor protocol version. Different version indicates minor incompatibility
+ * that does not prevent interoperation.
+ */
+#define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 1
+#define PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 5
+
+/* We support both SSH1 and SSH2 */
+#define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 2
+#define PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 0
+
+/*
+ * Name for the service. The port named by this service overrides the
+ * default port if present.
+ */
+#define SSH_SERVICE_NAME "ssh"
+
+/*
+ * Name of the environment variable containing the process ID of the
+ * authentication agent.
+ */
+#define SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME "SSH_AGENT_PID"
+
+/*
+ * Name of the environment variable containing the pathname of the
+ * authentication socket.
+ */
+#define SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME "SSH_AUTH_SOCK"
+
+/*
+ * Environment variable for overwriting the default location of askpass
+ */
+#define SSH_ASKPASS_ENV "SSH_ASKPASS"
+
+/*
+ * Force host key length and server key length to differ by at least this
+ * many bits. This is to make double encryption with rsaref work.
+ */
+#define SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED 128
+
+/*
+ * Length of the session key in bytes. (Specified as 256 bits in the
+ * protocol.)
+ */
+#define SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH 32
+
+/* Used to identify ``EscapeChar none'' */
+#define SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE -2
+
+/*
+ * unprivileged user when UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes;
+ * sshd will change its privileges to this user and its
+ * primary group.
+ */
+#ifndef SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER "sshd"
+#endif
+
+/* Minimum modulus size (n) for RSA keys. */
+#define SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE 768
+
+/* Listen backlog for sshd, ssh-agent and forwarding sockets */
+#define SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG 128
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh1.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh1.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh1.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh1.h,v 1.6 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-/*
- * Definition of message types. New values can be added, but old values
- * should not be removed or without careful consideration of the consequences
- * for compatibility. The maximum value is 254; value 255 is reserved for
- * future extension.
- */
-/* Ranges */
-#define SSH_MSG_MIN 1
-#define SSH_MSG_MAX 254
-/* Message name */ /* msg code */ /* arguments */
-#define SSH_MSG_NONE 0 /* no message */
-#define SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* cause (string) */
-#define SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* ck,msk,srvk,hostk */
-#define SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* key (BIGNUM) */
-#define SSH_CMSG_USER 4 /* user (string) */
-#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS 5 /* user (string) */
-#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* modulus (BIGNUM) */
-#define SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* int (BIGNUM) */
-#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* int (BIGNUM) */
-#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* pass (string) */
-#define SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* TERM, tty modes */
-#define SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* row,col,xpix,ypix */
-#define SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* */
-#define SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* cmd (string) */
-#define SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* */
-#define SSH_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* */
-#define SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* data (string) */
-#define SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* data (string) */
-#define SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* data (string) */
-#define SSH_CMSG_EOF 19 /* */
-#define SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS 20 /* status (int) */
-#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* channel (int) */
-#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* channel (int) */
-#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* ch,data (int,str) */
-#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* channel (int) */
-#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* channel (int) */
-/* SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 26 OBSOLETE */
-#define SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* channel (int) */
-#define SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* p,host,hp (i,s,i) */
-#define SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* ch,h,p (i,s,i) */
-#define SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* */
-#define SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* port (int) */
-#define SSH_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* string */
-#define SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* */
-#define SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* proto,data (s,s) */
-#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* user,mod (s,mpi) */
-#define SSH_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* string */
-#define SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* level 1-9 (int) */
-#define SSH_CMSG_MAX_PACKET_SIZE 38 /* size 4k-1024k (int) */
-#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* we use this for s/key */
-#define SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* challenge (string) */
-#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* response (string) */
-#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS 42 /* (KTEXT) */
-#define SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE 43 /* (KTEXT) */
-#define SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT 44 /* credentials (s) */
-#define SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN 65 /* token (s) */
-
-/* protocol version 1.5 overloads some version 1.3 message types */
-#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_INPUT_EOF SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
-#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_CLOSE SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION
-
-/*
- * Authentication methods. New types can be added, but old types should not
- * be removed for compatibility. The maximum allowed value is 31.
- */
-#define SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS 1
-#define SSH_AUTH_RSA 2
-#define SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD 3
-#define SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 4
-#define SSH_AUTH_TIS 5
-#define SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS 6
-#define SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT 7
- /* 8 to 15 are reserved */
-#define SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN 21
-
-/* Protocol flags. These are bit masks. */
-#define SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* X11 forwarding includes screen */
-#define SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN 2 /* forwarding opens contain host */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh1.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh1.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh1.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh1.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh1.h,v 1.7 2016/05/04 14:22:33 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Definition of message types. New values can be added, but old values
+ * should not be removed or without careful consideration of the consequences
+ * for compatibility. The maximum value is 254; value 255 is reserved for
+ * future extension.
+ */
+/* Ranges */
+#define SSH_MSG_MIN 1
+#define SSH_MSG_MAX 254
+/* Message name */ /* msg code */ /* arguments */
+#define SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* cause (string) */
+#define SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* ck,msk,srvk,hostk */
+#define SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* key (BIGNUM) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_USER 4 /* user (string) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS 5 /* user (string) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* modulus (BIGNUM) */
+#define SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* int (BIGNUM) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* int (BIGNUM) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* pass (string) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* TERM, tty modes */
+#define SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* row,col,xpix,ypix */
+#define SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* */
+#define SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* cmd (string) */
+#define SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* */
+#define SSH_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* */
+#define SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* data (string) */
+#define SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* data (string) */
+#define SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* data (string) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_EOF 19 /* */
+#define SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS 20 /* status (int) */
+#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* channel (int) */
+#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* channel (int) */
+#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* ch,data (int,str) */
+#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* channel (int) */
+#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* channel (int) */
+/* SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 26 OBSOLETE */
+#define SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* channel (int) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* p,host,hp (i,s,i) */
+#define SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* ch,h,p (i,s,i) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* */
+#define SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* port (int) */
+#define SSH_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* string */
+#define SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* */
+#define SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* proto,data (s,s) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* user,mod (s,mpi) */
+#define SSH_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* string */
+#define SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* level 1-9 (int) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_MAX_PACKET_SIZE 38 /* size 4k-1024k (int) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* we use this for s/key */
+#define SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* challenge (string) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* response (string) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS 42 /* (KTEXT) */
+#define SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE 43 /* (KTEXT) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT 44 /* credentials (s) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN 65 /* token (s) */
+
+/* protocol version 1.5 overloads some version 1.3 message types */
+#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_INPUT_EOF SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
+#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_CLOSE SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION
+
+/*
+ * Authentication methods. New types can be added, but old types should not
+ * be removed for compatibility. The maximum allowed value is 31.
+ */
+#define SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS 1
+#define SSH_AUTH_RSA 2
+#define SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD 3
+#define SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 4
+#define SSH_AUTH_TIS 5
+#define SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS 6
+#define SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT 7
+ /* 8 to 15 are reserved */
+#define SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN 21
+
+/* Protocol flags. These are bit masks. */
+#define SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* X11 forwarding includes screen */
+#define SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN 2 /* forwarding opens contain host */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh2.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh2.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh2.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.15 2014/01/29 06:18:35 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-/*
- * draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-05.txt
- *
- * Transport layer protocol:
- *
- * 1-19 Transport layer generic (e.g. disconnect, ignore, debug,
- * etc)
- * 20-29 Algorithm negotiation
- * 30-49 Key exchange method specific (numbers can be reused for
- * different authentication methods)
- *
- * User authentication protocol:
- *
- * 50-59 User authentication generic
- * 60-79 User authentication method specific (numbers can be reused
- * for different authentication methods)
- *
- * Connection protocol:
- *
- * 80-89 Connection protocol generic
- * 90-127 Channel related messages
- *
- * Reserved for client protocols:
- *
- * 128-191 Reserved
- *
- * Local extensions:
- *
- * 192-255 Local extensions
- */
-
-/* ranges */
-
-#define SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN 1
-#define SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX 49
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN 50
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX 79
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN 60
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX
-#define SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MIN 80
-#define SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MAX 127
-#define SSH2_MSG_RESERVED_MIN 128
-#define SSH2_MSG_RESERVED_MAX 191
-#define SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN 192
-#define SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MAX 255
-#define SSH2_MSG_MIN 1
-#define SSH2_MSG_MAX 255
-
-/* transport layer: generic */
-
-#define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1
-#define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2
-#define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3
-#define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4
-#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5
-#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6
-
-/* transport layer: alg negotiation */
-
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20
-#define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21
-
-/* transport layer: kex specific messages, can be reused */
-
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31
-
-/* dh-group-exchange */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD 30
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 34
-
-/* ecdh */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT 30
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY 31
-
-/* user authentication: generic */
-
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53
-
-/* user authentication: method specific, can be reused */
-
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61
-
-/* connection protocol: generic */
-
-#define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80
-#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81
-#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82
-
-/* channel related messages */
-
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100
-
-/* disconnect reason code */
-
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_RESERVED 4
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15
-
-/* misc */
-
-#define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1
-#define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2
-#define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3
-#define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4
-
-#define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1
-
-/* kex messages for resume at appgate.com */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_RESUME 30
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_AUTH_REQUIRED 31
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_AUTH 32
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_AUTH_OK 33
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_AUTH_FAIL 34
-
-/* Certificate types for OpenSSH certificate keys extension */
-#define SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER 1
-#define SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST 2
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh2.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh2.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh2.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh2.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.18 2016/05/04 14:22:33 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-05.txt
+ *
+ * Transport layer protocol:
+ *
+ * 1-19 Transport layer generic (e.g. disconnect, ignore, debug,
+ * etc)
+ * 20-29 Algorithm negotiation
+ * 30-49 Key exchange method specific (numbers can be reused for
+ * different authentication methods)
+ *
+ * User authentication protocol:
+ *
+ * 50-59 User authentication generic
+ * 60-79 User authentication method specific (numbers can be reused
+ * for different authentication methods)
+ *
+ * Connection protocol:
+ *
+ * 80-89 Connection protocol generic
+ * 90-127 Channel related messages
+ *
+ * Reserved for client protocols:
+ *
+ * 128-191 Reserved
+ *
+ * Local extensions:
+ *
+ * 192-255 Local extensions
+ */
+
+/* special marker for no message */
+
+#define SSH_MSG_NONE 0
+
+/* ranges */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN 1
+#define SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX 49
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN 50
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX 79
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN 60
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX
+#define SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MIN 80
+#define SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MAX 127
+#define SSH2_MSG_RESERVED_MIN 128
+#define SSH2_MSG_RESERVED_MAX 191
+#define SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN 192
+#define SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MAX 255
+#define SSH2_MSG_MIN 1
+#define SSH2_MSG_MAX 255
+
+/* transport layer: generic */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1
+#define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2
+#define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3
+#define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4
+#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5
+#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6
+#define SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO 7
+
+/* transport layer: alg negotiation */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20
+#define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21
+
+/* transport layer: kex specific messages, can be reused */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31
+
+/* dh-group-exchange */
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD 30
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 34
+
+/* ecdh */
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT 30
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY 31
+
+/* user authentication: generic */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53
+
+/* user authentication: method specific, can be reused */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61
+
+/* connection protocol: generic */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80
+#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81
+#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82
+
+/* channel related messages */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100
+
+/* disconnect reason code */
+
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_RESERVED 4
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15
+
+/* misc */
+
+#define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1
+#define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2
+#define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3
+#define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4
+
+#define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1
+
+/* Certificate types for OpenSSH certificate keys extension */
+#define SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER 1
+#define SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST 2
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_api.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh_api.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_api.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_api.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,541 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.c,v 1.7 2016/05/04 14:22:33 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include "ssh_api.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "version.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+int _ssh_exchange_banner(struct ssh *);
+int _ssh_send_banner(struct ssh *, char **);
+int _ssh_read_banner(struct ssh *, char **);
+int _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(struct ssh *);
+int _ssh_verify_host_key(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *);
+struct sshkey *_ssh_host_public_key(int, int, struct ssh *);
+struct sshkey *_ssh_host_private_key(int, int, struct ssh *);
+int _ssh_host_key_sign(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
+ u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
+
+/*
+ * stubs for the server side implementation of kex.
+ * disable privsep so our stubs will never be called.
+ */
+int use_privsep = 0;
+int mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, u_int *,
+ u_char *, u_int, char *, u_int);
+DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+
+/* Define these two variables here so that they are part of the library */
+u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
+u_int session_id2_len = 0;
+
+int
+mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+ u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *alg, u_int compat)
+{
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+DH *
+mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max)
+{
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+/* API */
+
+int
+ssh_init(struct ssh **sshp, int is_server, struct kex_params *kex_params)
+{
+ char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+ struct ssh *ssh;
+ char **proposal;
+ static int called;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!called) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ called = 1;
+ }
+
+ if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if (is_server)
+ ssh_packet_set_server(ssh);
+
+ /* Initialize key exchange */
+ proposal = kex_params ? kex_params->proposal : myproposal;
+ if ((r = kex_new(ssh, proposal, &ssh->kex)) != 0) {
+ ssh_free(ssh);
+ return r;
+ }
+ ssh->kex->server = is_server;
+ if (is_server) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_server;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
+# endif
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
+ ssh->kex->load_host_public_key=&_ssh_host_public_key;
+ ssh->kex->load_host_private_key=&_ssh_host_private_key;
+ ssh->kex->sign=&_ssh_host_key_sign;
+ } else {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
+# endif
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
+ ssh->kex->verify_host_key =&_ssh_verify_host_key;
+ }
+ *sshp = ssh;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_free(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct key_entry *k;
+
+ ssh_packet_close(ssh);
+ /*
+ * we've only created the public keys variants in case we
+ * are a acting as a server.
+ */
+ while ((k = TAILQ_FIRST(&ssh->public_keys)) != NULL) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&ssh->public_keys, k, next);
+ if (ssh->kex && ssh->kex->server)
+ sshkey_free(k->key);
+ free(k);
+ }
+ while ((k = TAILQ_FIRST(&ssh->private_keys)) != NULL) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&ssh->private_keys, k, next);
+ free(k);
+ }
+ if (ssh->kex)
+ kex_free(ssh->kex);
+ free(ssh);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_set_app_data(struct ssh *ssh, void *app_data)
+{
+ ssh->app_data = app_data;
+}
+
+void *
+ssh_get_app_data(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ return ssh->app_data;
+}
+
+/* Returns < 0 on error, 0 otherwise */
+int
+ssh_add_hostkey(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key)
+{
+ struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL;
+ struct key_entry *k = NULL, *k_prv = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (ssh->kex->server) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &pubkey)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((k = malloc(sizeof(*k))) == NULL ||
+ (k_prv = malloc(sizeof(*k_prv))) == NULL) {
+ free(k);
+ sshkey_free(pubkey);
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ k_prv->key = key;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->private_keys, k_prv, next);
+
+ /* add the public key, too */
+ k->key = pubkey;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->public_keys, k, next);
+ r = 0;
+ } else {
+ if ((k = malloc(sizeof(*k))) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ k->key = key;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->public_keys, k, next);
+ r = 0;
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(struct ssh *ssh,
+ int (*cb)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *))
+{
+ if (cb == NULL || ssh->kex == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ ssh->kex->verify_host_key = cb;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_input_append(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, size_t len)
+{
+ return sshbuf_put(ssh_packet_get_input(ssh), data, len);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_next(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep)
+{
+ int r;
+ u_int32_t seqnr;
+ u_char type;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to read a packet. Return SSH_MSG_NONE if no packet or not
+ * enough data.
+ */
+ *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
+ if (ssh->kex->client_version_string == NULL ||
+ ssh->kex->server_version_string == NULL)
+ return _ssh_exchange_banner(ssh);
+ /*
+ * If we enough data and a dispatch function then
+ * call the function and get the next packet.
+ * Otherwise return the packet type to the caller so it
+ * can decide how to go on.
+ *
+ * We will only call the dispatch function for:
+ * 20-29 Algorithm negotiation
+ * 30-49 Key exchange method specific (numbers can be reused for
+ * different authentication methods)
+ */
+ for (;;) {
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, &type, &seqnr)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (type > 0 && type < DISPATCH_MAX &&
+ type >= SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT && type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX &&
+ ssh->dispatch[type] != NULL) {
+ if ((r = (*ssh->dispatch[type])(type, seqnr, ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ } else {
+ *typep = type;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+const u_char *
+ssh_packet_payload(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp)
+{
+ return sshpkt_ptr(ssh, lenp);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_put(struct ssh *ssh, int type, const u_char *data, size_t len)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put(ssh, data, len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+const u_char *
+ssh_output_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *len)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *output = ssh_packet_get_output(ssh);
+
+ *len = sshbuf_len(output);
+ return sshbuf_ptr(output);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_output_consume(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len)
+{
+ return sshbuf_consume(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), len);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_output_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len)
+{
+ return (0 == sshbuf_check_reserve(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), len));
+}
+
+int
+ssh_input_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len)
+{
+ return (0 == sshbuf_check_reserve(ssh_packet_get_input(ssh), len));
+}
+
+/* Read other side's version identification. */
+int
+_ssh_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, char **bannerp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *input;
+ const char *s;
+ char buf[256], remote_version[256]; /* must be same size! */
+ const char *mismatch = "Protocol mismatch.\r\n";
+ int r, remote_major, remote_minor;
+ size_t i, n, j, len;
+
+ *bannerp = NULL;
+ input = ssh_packet_get_input(ssh);
+ len = sshbuf_len(input);
+ s = (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(input);
+ for (j = n = 0;;) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
+ if (j >= len)
+ return (0);
+ buf[i] = s[j++];
+ if (buf[i] == '\r') {
+ buf[i] = '\n';
+ buf[i + 1] = 0;
+ continue; /**XXX wait for \n */
+ }
+ if (buf[i] == '\n') {
+ buf[i + 1] = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
+ if (strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0)
+ break;
+ debug("ssh_exchange_identification: %s", buf);
+ if (ssh->kex->server || ++n > 65536) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh),
+ mismatch, strlen(mismatch))) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, j)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
+ * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
+ */
+ if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
+ &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s",
+ remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
+
+ ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version);
+ if (remote_major == 1 && remote_minor == 99) {
+ remote_major = 2;
+ remote_minor = 0;
+ }
+ if (remote_major != 2)
+ return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH;
+ enable_compat20();
+ chop(buf);
+ debug("Remote version string %.100s", buf);
+ if ((*bannerp = strdup(buf)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Send our own protocol version identification. */
+int
+_ssh_send_banner(struct ssh *ssh, char **bannerp)
+{
+ char buf[256];
+ int r;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-2.0-%.100s\r\n", SSH_VERSION);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), buf, strlen(buf))) != 0)
+ return r;
+ chop(buf);
+ debug("Local version string %.100s", buf);
+ if ((*bannerp = strdup(buf)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+_ssh_exchange_banner(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ int r;
+
+ /*
+ * if _ssh_read_banner() cannot parse a full version string
+ * it will return NULL and we end up calling it again.
+ */
+
+ r = 0;
+ if (kex->server) {
+ if (kex->server_version_string == NULL)
+ r = _ssh_send_banner(ssh, &kex->server_version_string);
+ if (r == 0 &&
+ kex->server_version_string != NULL &&
+ kex->client_version_string == NULL)
+ r = _ssh_read_banner(ssh, &kex->client_version_string);
+ } else {
+ if (kex->server_version_string == NULL)
+ r = _ssh_read_banner(ssh, &kex->server_version_string);
+ if (r == 0 &&
+ kex->server_version_string != NULL &&
+ kex->client_version_string == NULL)
+ r = _ssh_send_banner(ssh, &kex->client_version_string);
+ }
+ if (r != 0)
+ return r;
+ /* start initial kex as soon as we have exchanged the banners */
+ if (kex->server_version_string != NULL &&
+ kex->client_version_string != NULL) {
+ if ((r = _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(ssh)) != 0 ||
+ (r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct sshkey *
+_ssh_host_public_key(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct key_entry *k;
+
+ debug3("%s: need %d", __func__, type);
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) {
+ debug3("%s: check %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k->key));
+ if (k->key->type == type &&
+ (type != KEY_ECDSA || k->key->ecdsa_nid == nid))
+ return (k->key);
+ }
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+struct sshkey *
+_ssh_host_private_key(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct key_entry *k;
+
+ debug3("%s: need %d", __func__, type);
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->private_keys, next) {
+ debug3("%s: check %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k->key));
+ if (k->key->type == type &&
+ (type != KEY_ECDSA || k->key->ecdsa_nid == nid))
+ return (k->key);
+ }
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+int
+_ssh_verify_host_key(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct key_entry *k;
+
+ debug3("%s: need %s", __func__, sshkey_type(hostkey));
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) {
+ debug3("%s: check %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k->key));
+ if (sshkey_equal_public(hostkey, k->key))
+ return (0); /* ok */
+ }
+ return (-1); /* failed */
+}
+
+/* offer hostkey algorithms in kexinit depending on registered keys */
+int
+_ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct key_entry *k;
+ char *orig, *avail, *oavail = NULL, *alg, *replace = NULL;
+ char **proposal;
+ size_t maxlen;
+ int ktype, r;
+
+ /* XXX we de-serialize ssh->kex->my, modify it, and change it */
+ if ((r = kex_buf2prop(ssh->kex->my, NULL, &proposal)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ orig = proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+ if ((oavail = avail = strdup(orig)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
+ if ((replace = calloc(1, maxlen)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *replace = '\0';
+ while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') {
+ if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
+ continue;
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) {
+ if (k->key->type == ktype ||
+ (sshkey_is_cert(k->key) && k->key->type ==
+ sshkey_type_plain(ktype))) {
+ if (*replace != '\0')
+ strlcat(replace, ",", maxlen);
+ strlcat(replace, alg, maxlen);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (*replace != '\0') {
+ debug2("%s: orig/%d %s", __func__, ssh->kex->server, orig);
+ debug2("%s: replace/%d %s", __func__, ssh->kex->server, replace);
+ free(orig);
+ proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = replace;
+ replace = NULL; /* owned by proposal */
+ r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, proposal);
+ }
+ out:
+ free(oavail);
+ free(replace);
+ kex_prop_free(proposal);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+_ssh_host_key_sign(struct sshkey *privkey, struct sshkey *pubkey,
+ u_char **signature, size_t *slen, const u_char *data, size_t dlen,
+ const char *alg, u_int compat)
+{
+ return sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slen, data, dlen, alg, compat);
+}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_api.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh_api.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_api.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_api.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.h,v 1.1 2015/01/19 20:30:23 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef API_H
+#define API_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+
+struct kex_params {
+ char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
+};
+
+/* public SSH API functions */
+
+/*
+ * ssh_init() create a ssh connection object with given (optional)
+ * key exchange parameters.
+ */
+int ssh_init(struct ssh **, int is_server, struct kex_params *kex_params);
+
+/*
+ * release ssh connection state.
+ */
+void ssh_free(struct ssh *);
+
+/*
+ * attach application specific data to the connection state
+ */
+void ssh_set_app_data(struct ssh *, void *);
+void *ssh_get_app_data(struct ssh *);
+
+/*
+ * ssh_add_hostkey() registers a private/public hostkey for an ssh
+ * connection.
+ * ssh_add_hostkey() needs to be called before a key exchange is
+ * initiated with ssh_packet_next().
+ * private hostkeys are required if we need to act as a server.
+ * public hostkeys are used to verify the servers hostkey.
+ */
+int ssh_add_hostkey(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key);
+
+/*
+ * ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback() registers a callback function
+ * which should be called instead of the default verification. The
+ * function given must return 0 if the hostkey is ok, -1 if the
+ * verification has failed.
+ */
+int ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(struct ssh *ssh,
+ int (*cb)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *));
+
+/*
+ * ssh_packet_next() advances to the next input packet and returns
+ * the packet type in typep.
+ * ssh_packet_next() works by processing an input byte-stream,
+ * decrypting the received data and hiding the key-exchange from
+ * the caller.
+ * ssh_packet_next() sets typep if there is no new packet available.
+ * in this case the caller must fill the input byte-stream by passing
+ * the data received over network to ssh_input_append().
+ * additinally, the caller needs to send the resulting output
+ * byte-stream back over the network. otherwise the key exchange
+ * would not proceed. the output byte-stream is accessed through
+ * ssh_output_ptr().
+ */
+int ssh_packet_next(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep);
+
+/*
+ * ssh_packet_payload() returns a pointer to the raw payload data of
+ * the current input packet and the length of this payload.
+ * the payload is accessible until ssh_packet_next() is called again.
+ */
+const u_char *ssh_packet_payload(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp);
+
+/*
+ * ssh_packet_put() creates an encrypted packet with the given type
+ * and payload.
+ * the encrypted packet is appended to the output byte-stream.
+ */
+int ssh_packet_put(struct ssh *ssh, int type, const u_char *data,
+ size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * ssh_input_space() checks if 'len' bytes can be appended to the
+ * input byte-stream.
+ */
+int ssh_input_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * ssh_input_append() appends data to the input byte-stream.
+ */
+int ssh_input_append(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * ssh_output_space() checks if 'len' bytes can be appended to the
+ * output byte-stream. XXX
+ */
+int ssh_output_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * ssh_output_ptr() retrieves both a pointer and the length of the
+ * current output byte-stream. the bytes need to be sent over the
+ * network. the number of bytes that have been successfully sent can
+ * be removed from the output byte-stream with ssh_output_consume().
+ */
+const u_char *ssh_output_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *len);
+
+/*
+ * ssh_output_consume() removes the given number of bytes from
+ * the output byte-stream.
+ */
+int ssh_output_consume(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len);
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_config
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh_config 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_config 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.28 2013/09/16 11:35:43 sthen Exp $
-
-# This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file. See
-# ssh_config(5) for more information. This file provides defaults for
-# users, and the values can be changed in per-user configuration files
-# or on the command line.
-
-# Configuration data is parsed as follows:
-# 1. command line options
-# 2. user-specific file
-# 3. system-wide file
-# Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
-# Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
-# configuration file, and defaults at the end.
-
-# Site-wide defaults for some commonly used options. For a comprehensive
-# list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
-# ssh_config(5) man page.
-
-# Host *
-# ForwardAgent no
-# ForwardX11 no
-# RhostsRSAAuthentication no
-# RSAAuthentication yes
-# PasswordAuthentication yes
-# HostbasedAuthentication no
-# GSSAPIAuthentication no
-# GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
-# BatchMode no
-# CheckHostIP yes
-# AddressFamily any
-# ConnectTimeout 0
-# StrictHostKeyChecking ask
-# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity
-# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa
-# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa
-# Port 22
-# Protocol 2,1
-# Cipher 3des
-# Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc
-# MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64 at openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160
-# EscapeChar ~
-# Tunnel no
-# TunnelDevice any:any
-# PermitLocalCommand no
-# VisualHostKey no
-# ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
-# RekeyLimit 1G 1h
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_config (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh_config)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_config (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_config 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+# $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.30 2016/02/20 23:06:23 sobrado Exp $
+
+# This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file. See
+# ssh_config(5) for more information. This file provides defaults for
+# users, and the values can be changed in per-user configuration files
+# or on the command line.
+
+# Configuration data is parsed as follows:
+# 1. command line options
+# 2. user-specific file
+# 3. system-wide file
+# Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
+# Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
+# configuration file, and defaults at the end.
+
+# Site-wide defaults for some commonly used options. For a comprehensive
+# list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
+# ssh_config(5) man page.
+
+# Host *
+# ForwardAgent no
+# ForwardX11 no
+# RhostsRSAAuthentication no
+# RSAAuthentication yes
+# PasswordAuthentication yes
+# HostbasedAuthentication no
+# GSSAPIAuthentication no
+# GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
+# BatchMode no
+# CheckHostIP yes
+# AddressFamily any
+# ConnectTimeout 0
+# StrictHostKeyChecking ask
+# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity
+# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+# Port 22
+# Protocol 2
+# Cipher 3des
+# Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc
+# MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64 at openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160
+# EscapeChar ~
+# Tunnel no
+# TunnelDevice any:any
+# PermitLocalCommand no
+# VisualHostKey no
+# ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
+# RekeyLimit 1G 1h
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_config.0
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh_config.0 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_config.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,889 +0,0 @@
-SSH_CONFIG(5) OpenBSD Programmer's Manual SSH_CONFIG(5)
-
-NAME
- ssh_config - OpenSSH SSH client configuration files
-
-SYNOPSIS
- ~/.ssh/config
- /etc/ssh/ssh_config
-
-DESCRIPTION
- ssh(1) obtains configuration data from the following sources in the
- following order:
-
- 1. command-line options
- 2. user's configuration file (~/.ssh/config)
- 3. system-wide configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config)
-
- For each parameter, the first obtained value will be used. The
- configuration files contain sections separated by ``Host''
- specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that match one
- of the patterns given in the specification. The matched host name is the
- one given on the command line.
-
- Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more host-
- specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the file, and
- general defaults at the end.
-
- The configuration file has the following format:
-
- Empty lines and lines starting with `#' are comments. Otherwise a line
- is of the format ``keyword arguments''. Configuration options may be
- separated by whitespace or optional whitespace and exactly one `='; the
- latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace when
- specifying configuration options using the ssh, scp, and sftp -o option.
- Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes (") in order to
- represent arguments containing spaces.
-
- The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
- keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
-
- Host Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host or
- Match keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the
- patterns given after the keyword. If more than one pattern is
- provided, they should be separated by whitespace. A single `*'
- as a pattern can be used to provide global defaults for all
- hosts. The host is the hostname argument given on the command
- line (i.e. the name is not converted to a canonicalized host name
- before matching).
-
- A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an
- exclamation mark (`!'). If a negated entry is matched, then the
- Host entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns
- on the line match. Negated matches are therefore useful to
- provide exceptions for wildcard matches.
-
- See PATTERNS for more information on patterns.
-
- Match Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host or
- Match keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the
- Match keyword are satisfied. Match conditions are specified
- using one or more keyword/criteria pairs or the single token all
- which matches all criteria. The available keywords are: exec,
- host, originalhost, user, and localuser.
-
- The exec keyword executes the specified command under the user's
- shell. If the command returns a zero exit status then the
- condition is considered true. Commands containing whitespace
- characters must be quoted. The following character sequences in
- the command will be expanded prior to execution: `%L' will be
- substituted by the first component of the local host name, `%l'
- will be substituted by the local host name (including any domain
- name), `%h' will be substituted by the target host name, `%n'
- will be substituted by the original target host name specified on
- the command-line, `%p' the destination port, `%r' by the remote
- login username, and `%u' by the username of the user running
- ssh(1).
-
- The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma-
- separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators
- described in the PATTERNS section. The criteria for the host
- keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any
- substitution by the Hostname option. The originalhost keyword
- matches against the hostname as it was specified on the command-
- line. The user keyword matches against the target username on
- the remote host. The localuser keyword matches against the name
- of the local user running ssh(1) (this keyword may be useful in
- system-wide ssh_config files).
-
- AddressFamily
- Specifies which address family to use when connecting. Valid
- arguments are ``any'', ``inet'' (use IPv4 only), or ``inet6''
- (use IPv6 only).
-
- BatchMode
- If set to ``yes'', passphrase/password querying will be disabled.
- This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no
- user is present to supply the password. The argument must be
- ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''.
-
- BindAddress
- Use the specified address on the local machine as the source
- address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than
- one address. Note that this option does not work if
- UsePrivilegedPort is set to ``yes''.
-
- CanonicalDomains
- When CanonicalizeHostname is enabled, this option specifies the
- list of domain suffixes in which to search for the specified
- destination host.
-
- CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
- Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname
- canonicalization fails. The default, ``yes'', will attempt to
- look up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's
- search rules. A value of ``no'' will cause ssh(1) to fail
- instantly if CanonicalizeHostname is enabled and the target
- hostname cannot be found in any of the domains specified by
- CanonicalDomains.
-
- CanonicalizeHostname
- Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed.
- The default, ``no'', is not to perform any name rewriting and let
- the system resolver handle all hostname lookups. If set to
- ``yes'' then, for connections that do not use a ProxyCommand,
- ssh(1) will attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the
- command line using the CanonicalDomains suffixes and
- CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs rules. If CanonicalizeHostname is
- set to ``always'', then canonicalization is applied to proxied
- connections too.
-
- If this option is enabled and canonicalisation results in the
- target hostname changing, then the configuration files are
- processed again using the new target name to pick up any new
- configuration in matching Host stanzas.
-
- CanonicalizeMaxDots
- Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname
- before canonicalization is disabled. The default, ``1'', allows
- a single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain).
-
- CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
- Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed
- when canonicalizing hostnames. The rules consist of one or more
- arguments of source_domain_list:target_domain_list, where
- source_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that may follow
- CNAMEs in canonicalization, and target_domain_list is a pattern-
- list of domains that they may resolve to.
-
- For example, ``*.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.com''
- will allow hostnames matching ``*.a.example.com'' to be
- canonicalized to names in the ``*.b.example.com'' or
- ``*.c.example.com'' domains.
-
- ChallengeResponseAuthentication
- Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication. The
- argument to this keyword must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default
- is ``yes''.
-
- CheckHostIP
- If this flag is set to ``yes'', ssh(1) will additionally check
- the host IP address in the known_hosts file. This allows ssh to
- detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing. If the option
- is set to ``no'', the check will not be executed. The default is
- ``yes''.
-
- Cipher Specifies the cipher to use for encrypting the session in
- protocol version 1. Currently, ``blowfish'', ``3des'', and
- ``des'' are supported. des is only supported in the ssh(1)
- client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1
- implementations that do not support the 3des cipher. Its use is
- strongly discouraged due to cryptographic weaknesses. The
- default is ``3des''.
-
- Ciphers
- Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2 in order of
- preference. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. The
- supported ciphers are:
-
- ``3des-cbc'', ``aes128-cbc'', ``aes192-cbc'', ``aes256-cbc'',
- ``aes128-ctr'', ``aes192-ctr'', ``aes256-ctr'',
- ``aes128-gcm at openssh.com'', ``aes256-gcm at openssh.com'',
- ``arcfour128'', ``arcfour256'', ``arcfour'', ``blowfish-cbc'',
- ``cast128-cbc'', and ``chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com''.
-
- The default is:
-
- aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,
- aes128-gcm at openssh.com,aes256-gcm at openssh.com,
- chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com,
- aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,aes192-cbc,
- aes256-cbc,arcfour
-
- The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using the -Q
- option of ssh(1).
-
- ClearAllForwardings
- Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings
- specified in the configuration files or on the command line be
- cleared. This option is primarily useful when used from the
- ssh(1) command line to clear port forwardings set in
- configuration files, and is automatically set by scp(1) and
- sftp(1). The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is
- ``no''.
-
- Compression
- Specifies whether to use compression. The argument must be
- ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''.
-
- CompressionLevel
- Specifies the compression level to use if compression is enabled.
- The argument must be an integer from 1 (fast) to 9 (slow, best).
- The default level is 6, which is good for most applications. The
- meaning of the values is the same as in gzip(1). Note that this
- option applies to protocol version 1 only.
-
- ConnectionAttempts
- Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before
- exiting. The argument must be an integer. This may be useful in
- scripts if the connection sometimes fails. The default is 1.
-
- ConnectTimeout
- Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the
- SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout.
- This value is used only when the target is down or really
- unreachable, not when it refuses the connection.
-
- ControlMaster
- Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network
- connection. When set to ``yes'', ssh(1) will listen for
- connections on a control socket specified using the ControlPath
- argument. Additional sessions can connect to this socket using
- the same ControlPath with ControlMaster set to ``no'' (the
- default). These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's
- network connection rather than initiating new ones, but will fall
- back to connecting normally if the control socket does not exist,
- or is not listening.
-
- Setting this to ``ask'' will cause ssh to listen for control
- connections, but require confirmation using the SSH_ASKPASS
- program before they are accepted (see ssh-add(1) for details).
- If the ControlPath cannot be opened, ssh will continue without
- connecting to a master instance.
-
- X11 and ssh-agent(1) forwarding is supported over these
- multiplexed connections, however the display and agent forwarded
- will be the one belonging to the master connection i.e. it is not
- possible to forward multiple displays or agents.
-
- Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try
- to use a master connection but fall back to creating a new one if
- one does not already exist. These options are: ``auto'' and
- ``autoask''. The latter requires confirmation like the ``ask''
- option.
-
- ControlPath
- Specify the path to the control socket used for connection
- sharing as described in the ControlMaster section above or the
- string ``none'' to disable connection sharing. In the path, `%L'
- will be substituted by the first component of the local host
- name, `%l' will be substituted by the local host name (including
- any domain name), `%h' will be substituted by the target host
- name, `%n' will be substituted by the original target host name
- specified on the command line, `%p' the destination port, `%r' by
- the remote login username, and `%u' by the username of the user
- running ssh(1). It is recommended that any ControlPath used for
- opportunistic connection sharing include at least %h, %p, and %r.
- This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified.
-
- ControlPersist
- When used in conjunction with ControlMaster, specifies that the
- master connection should remain open in the background (waiting
- for future client connections) after the initial client
- connection has been closed. If set to ``no'', then the master
- connection will not be placed into the background, and will close
- as soon as the initial client connection is closed. If set to
- ``yes'', then the master connection will remain in the background
- indefinitely (until killed or closed via a mechanism such as the
- ssh(1) ``-O exit'' option). If set to a time in seconds, or a
- time in any of the formats documented in sshd_config(5), then the
- backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate after
- it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the
- specified time.
-
- DynamicForward
- Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over
- the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to
- determine where to connect to from the remote machine.
-
- The argument must be [bind_address:]port. IPv6 addresses can be
- specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. By default,
- the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts
- setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind
- the connection to a specific address. The bind_address of
- ``localhost'' indicates that the listening port be bound for
- local use only, while an empty address or `*' indicates that the
- port should be available from all interfaces.
-
- Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
- ssh(1) will act as a SOCKS server. Multiple forwardings may be
- specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command
- line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
-
- EnableSSHKeysign
- Setting this option to ``yes'' in the global client configuration
- file /etc/ssh/ssh_config enables the use of the helper program
- ssh-keysign(8) during HostbasedAuthentication. The argument must
- be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''. This option should
- be placed in the non-hostspecific section. See ssh-keysign(8)
- for more information.
-
- EscapeChar
- Sets the escape character (default: `~'). The escape character
- can also be set on the command line. The argument should be a
- single character, `^' followed by a letter, or ``none'' to
- disable the escape character entirely (making the connection
- transparent for binary data).
-
- ExitOnForwardFailure
- Specifies whether ssh(1) should terminate the connection if it
- cannot set up all requested dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote
- port forwardings. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The
- default is ``no''.
-
- ForwardAgent
- Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if
- any) will be forwarded to the remote machine. The argument must
- be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''.
-
- Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
- ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
- agent's Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through
- the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material
- from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys
- that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into
- the agent.
-
- ForwardX11
- Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically
- redirected over the secure channel and DISPLAY set. The argument
- must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''.
-
- X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
- ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
- user's X11 authorization database) can access the local X11
- display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then
- be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring if the
- ForwardX11Trusted option is also enabled.
-
- ForwardX11Timeout
- Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding using the format
- described in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). X11
- connections received by ssh(1) after this time will be refused.
- The default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty
- minutes has elapsed.
-
- ForwardX11Trusted
- If this option is set to ``yes'', remote X11 clients will have
- full access to the original X11 display.
-
- If this option is set to ``no'', remote X11 clients will be
- considered untrusted and prevented from stealing or tampering
- with data belonging to trusted X11 clients. Furthermore, the
- xauth(1) token used for the session will be set to expire after
- 20 minutes. Remote clients will be refused access after this
- time.
-
- The default is ``no''.
-
- See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on
- the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients.
-
- GatewayPorts
- Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local
- forwarded ports. By default, ssh(1) binds local port forwardings
- to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from
- connecting to forwarded ports. GatewayPorts can be used to
- specify that ssh should bind local port forwardings to the
- wildcard address, thus allowing remote hosts to connect to
- forwarded ports. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The
- default is ``no''.
-
- GlobalKnownHostsFile
- Specifies one or more files to use for the global host key
- database, separated by whitespace. The default is
- /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts, /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2.
-
- GSSAPIAuthentication
- Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
- The default is ``no''. Note that this option applies to protocol
- version 2 only.
-
- GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
- Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. The default is
- ``no''. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2
- only.
-
- HashKnownHosts
- Indicates that ssh(1) should hash host names and addresses when
- they are added to ~/.ssh/known_hosts. These hashed names may be
- used normally by ssh(1) and sshd(8), but they do not reveal
- identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed.
- The default is ``no''. Note that existing names and addresses in
- known hosts files will not be converted automatically, but may be
- manually hashed using ssh-keygen(1).
-
- HostbasedAuthentication
- Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public
- key authentication. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The
- default is ``no''. This option applies to protocol version 2
- only and is similar to RhostsRSAAuthentication.
-
- HostKeyAlgorithms
- Specifies the protocol version 2 host key algorithms that the
- client wants to use in order of preference. The default for this
- option is:
-
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
- ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
- ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
- ssh-rsa-cert-v00 at openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v00 at openssh.com,
- ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
- ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
-
- If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default
- is modified to prefer their algorithms.
-
- HostKeyAlias
- Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the real host
- name when looking up or saving the host key in the host key
- database files. This option is useful for tunneling SSH
- connections or for multiple servers running on a single host.
-
- HostName
- Specifies the real host name to log into. This can be used to
- specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts. If the hostname
- contains the character sequence `%h', then this will be replaced
- with the host name specified on the command line (this is useful
- for manipulating unqualified names). The default is the name
- given on the command line. Numeric IP addresses are also
- permitted (both on the command line and in HostName
- specifications).
-
- IdentitiesOnly
- Specifies that ssh(1) should only use the authentication identity
- files configured in the ssh_config files, even if ssh-agent(1) or
- a PKCS11Provider offers more identities. The argument to this
- keyword must be ``yes'' or ``no''. This option is intended for
- situations where ssh-agent offers many different identities. The
- default is ``no''.
-
- IdentityFile
- Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 or RSA
- authentication identity is read. The default is ~/.ssh/identity
- for protocol version 1, and ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa,
- ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and ~/.ssh/id_rsa for protocol version 2.
- Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication
- agent will be used for authentication unless IdentitiesOnly is
- set. ssh(1) will try to load certificate information from the
- filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to the path of a
- specified IdentityFile.
-
- The file name may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home
- directory or one of the following escape characters: `%d' (local
- user's home directory), `%u' (local user name), `%l' (local host
- name), `%h' (remote host name) or `%r' (remote user name).
-
- It is possible to have multiple identity files specified in
- configuration files; all these identities will be tried in
- sequence. Multiple IdentityFile directives will add to the list
- of identities tried (this behaviour differs from that of other
- configuration directives).
-
- IdentityFile may be used in conjunction with IdentitiesOnly to
- select which identities in an agent are offered during
- authentication.
-
- IgnoreUnknown
- Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they
- are encountered in configuration parsing. This may be used to
- suppress errors if ssh_config contains options that are
- unrecognised by ssh(1). It is recommended that IgnoreUnknown be
- listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied
- to unknown options that appear before it.
-
- IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections.
- Accepted values are ``af11'', ``af12'', ``af13'', ``af21'',
- ``af22'', ``af23'', ``af31'', ``af32'', ``af33'', ``af41'',
- ``af42'', ``af43'', ``cs0'', ``cs1'', ``cs2'', ``cs3'', ``cs4'',
- ``cs5'', ``cs6'', ``cs7'', ``ef'', ``lowdelay'', ``throughput'',
- ``reliability'', or a numeric value. This option may take one or
- two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument is
- specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If
- two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for
- interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions.
- The default is ``lowdelay'' for interactive sessions and
- ``throughput'' for non-interactive sessions.
-
- KbdInteractiveAuthentication
- Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication.
- The argument to this keyword must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The
- default is ``yes''.
-
- KbdInteractiveDevices
- Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive
- authentication. Multiple method names must be comma-separated.
- The default is to use the server specified list. The methods
- available vary depending on what the server supports. For an
- OpenSSH server, it may be zero or more of: ``bsdauth'', ``pam'',
- and ``skey''.
-
- KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple
- algorithms must be comma-separated. The default is:
-
- curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org,
- ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
- diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
- diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,
- diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,
- diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
-
- LocalCommand
- Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after
- successfully connecting to the server. The command string
- extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's
- shell. The following escape character substitutions will be
- performed: `%d' (local user's home directory), `%h' (remote host
- name), `%l' (local host name), `%n' (host name as provided on the
- command line), `%p' (remote port), `%r' (remote user name) or
- `%u' (local user name).
-
- The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the
- session of the ssh(1) that spawned it. It should not be used for
- interactive commands.
-
- This directive is ignored unless PermitLocalCommand has been
- enabled.
-
- LocalForward
- Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over
- the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote
- machine. The first argument must be [bind_address:]port and the
- second argument must be host:hostport. IPv6 addresses can be
- specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple
- forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be
- given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward
- privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in
- accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit
- bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific
- address. The bind_address of ``localhost'' indicates that the
- listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty
- address or `*' indicates that the port should be available from
- all interfaces.
-
- LogLevel
- Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
- ssh(1). The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO,
- VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO.
- DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify
- higher levels of verbose output.
-
- MACs Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms in
- order of preference. The MAC algorithm is used in protocol
- version 2 for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms
- must be comma-separated. The algorithms that contain ``-etm''
- calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are
- considered safer and their use recommended. The default is:
-
- hmac-md5-etm at openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm at openssh.com,
- umac-64-etm at openssh.com,umac-128-etm at openssh.com,
- hmac-sha2-256-etm at openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm at openssh.com,
- hmac-ripemd160-etm at openssh.com,hmac-sha1-96-etm at openssh.com,
- hmac-md5-96-etm at openssh.com,
- hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64 at openssh.com,umac-128 at openssh.com,
- hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-ripemd160,
- hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96
-
- NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
- This option can be used if the home directory is shared across
- machines. In this case localhost will refer to a different
- machine on each of the machines and the user will get many
- warnings about changed host keys. However, this option disables
- host authentication for localhost. The argument to this keyword
- must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is to check the host key
- for localhost.
-
- NumberOfPasswordPrompts
- Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up. The
- argument to this keyword must be an integer. The default is 3.
-
- PasswordAuthentication
- Specifies whether to use password authentication. The argument
- to this keyword must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is
- ``yes''.
-
- PermitLocalCommand
- Allow local command execution via the LocalCommand option or
- using the !command escape sequence in ssh(1). The argument must
- be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''.
-
- PKCS11Provider
- Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use. The argument to this
- keyword is the PKCS#11 shared library ssh(1) should use to
- communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's private RSA
- key.
-
- Port Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host. The
- default is 22.
-
- PreferredAuthentications
- Specifies the order in which the client should try protocol 2
- authentication methods. This allows a client to prefer one
- method (e.g. keyboard-interactive) over another method (e.g.
- password). The default is:
-
- gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey,
- keyboard-interactive,password
-
- Protocol
- Specifies the protocol versions ssh(1) should support in order of
- preference. The possible values are `1' and `2'. Multiple
- versions must be comma-separated. When this option is set to
- ``2,1'' ssh will try version 2 and fall back to version 1 if
- version 2 is not available. The default is `2'.
-
- ProxyCommand
- Specifies the command to use to connect to the server. The
- command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed
- with the user's shell. In the command string, any occurrence of
- `%h' will be substituted by the host name to connect, `%p' by the
- port, and `%r' by the remote user name. The command can be
- basically anything, and should read from its standard input and
- write to its standard output. It should eventually connect an
- sshd(8) server running on some machine, or execute sshd -i
- somewhere. Host key management will be done using the HostName
- of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by the
- user). Setting the command to ``none'' disables this option
- entirely. Note that CheckHostIP is not available for connects
- with a proxy command.
-
- This directive is useful in conjunction with nc(1) and its proxy
- support. For example, the following directive would connect via
- an HTTP proxy at 192.0.2.0:
-
- ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p
-
- ProxyUseFdpass
- Specifies that ProxyCommand will pass a connected file descriptor
- back to ssh(1) instead of continuing to execute and pass data.
- The default is ``no''.
-
- PubkeyAuthentication
- Specifies whether to try public key authentication. The argument
- to this keyword must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is
- ``yes''. This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-
- RekeyLimit
- Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted
- before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a
- maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is
- renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may
- have a suffix of `K', `M', or `G' to indicate Kilobytes,
- Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between
- `1G' and `4G', depending on the cipher. The optional second
- value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units
- documented in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). The
- default value for RekeyLimit is ``default none'', which means
- that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of
- data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is
- done. This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-
- RemoteForward
- Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over
- the secure channel to the specified host and port from the local
- machine. The first argument must be [bind_address:]port and the
- second argument must be host:hostport. IPv6 addresses can be
- specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple
- forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be
- given on the command line. Privileged ports can be forwarded
- only when logging in as root on the remote machine.
-
- If the port argument is `0', the listen port will be dynamically
- allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time.
-
- If the bind_address is not specified, the default is to only bind
- to loopback addresses. If the bind_address is `*' or an empty
- string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all
- interfaces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed
- if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see
- sshd_config(5)).
-
- RequestTTY
- Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session. The
- argument may be one of: ``no'' (never request a TTY), ``yes''
- (always request a TTY when standard input is a TTY), ``force''
- (always request a TTY) or ``auto'' (request a TTY when opening a
- login session). This option mirrors the -t and -T flags for
- ssh(1).
-
- RhostsRSAAuthentication
- Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with RSA
- host authentication. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''.
- The default is ``no''. This option applies to protocol version 1
- only and requires ssh(1) to be setuid root.
-
- RSAAuthentication
- Specifies whether to try RSA authentication. The argument to
- this keyword must be ``yes'' or ``no''. RSA authentication will
- only be attempted if the identity file exists, or an
- authentication agent is running. The default is ``yes''. Note
- that this option applies to protocol version 1 only.
-
- SendEnv
- Specifies what variables from the local environ(7) should be sent
- to the server. Note that environment passing is only supported
- for protocol 2. The server must also support it, and the server
- must be configured to accept these environment variables. Refer
- to AcceptEnv in sshd_config(5) for how to configure the server.
- Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard
- characters. Multiple environment variables may be separated by
- whitespace or spread across multiple SendEnv directives. The
- default is not to send any environment variables.
-
- See PATTERNS for more information on patterns.
-
- ServerAliveCountMax
- Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be
- sent without ssh(1) receiving any messages back from the server.
- If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are
- being sent, ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the
- session. It is important to note that the use of server alive
- messages is very different from TCPKeepAlive (below). The server
- alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and
- therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option
- enabled by TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The server alive mechanism
- is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a
- connection has become inactive.
-
- The default value is 3. If, for example, ServerAliveInterval
- (see below) is set to 15 and ServerAliveCountMax is left at the
- default, if the server becomes unresponsive, ssh will disconnect
- after approximately 45 seconds. This option applies to protocol
- version 2 only.
-
- ServerAliveInterval
- Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has
- been received from the server, ssh(1) will send a message through
- the encrypted channel to request a response from the server. The
- default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to
- the server. This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-
- StrictHostKeyChecking
- If this flag is set to ``yes'', ssh(1) will never automatically
- add host keys to the ~/.ssh/known_hosts file, and refuses to
- connect to hosts whose host key has changed. This provides
- maximum protection against trojan horse attacks, though it can be
- annoying when the /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts file is poorly
- maintained or when connections to new hosts are frequently made.
- This option forces the user to manually add all new hosts. If
- this flag is set to ``no'', ssh will automatically add new host
- keys to the user known hosts files. If this flag is set to
- ``ask'', new host keys will be added to the user known host files
- only after the user has confirmed that is what they really want
- to do, and ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has
- changed. The host keys of known hosts will be verified
- automatically in all cases. The argument must be ``yes'',
- ``no'', or ``ask''. The default is ``ask''.
-
- TCPKeepAlive
- Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
- to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or
- crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However,
- this means that connections will die if the route is down
- temporarily, and some people find it annoying.
-
- The default is ``yes'' (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the
- client will notice if the network goes down or the remote host
- dies. This is important in scripts, and many users want it too.
-
- To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
- ``no''.
-
- Tunnel Request tun(4) device forwarding between the client and the
- server. The argument must be ``yes'', ``point-to-point'' (layer
- 3), ``ethernet'' (layer 2), or ``no''. Specifying ``yes''
- requests the default tunnel mode, which is ``point-to-point''.
- The default is ``no''.
-
- TunnelDevice
- Specifies the tun(4) devices to open on the client (local_tun)
- and the server (remote_tun).
-
- The argument must be local_tun[:remote_tun]. The devices may be
- specified by numerical ID or the keyword ``any'', which uses the
- next available tunnel device. If remote_tun is not specified, it
- defaults to ``any''. The default is ``any:any''.
-
- UsePrivilegedPort
- Specifies whether to use a privileged port for outgoing
- connections. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The
- default is ``no''. If set to ``yes'', ssh(1) must be setuid
- root. Note that this option must be set to ``yes'' for
- RhostsRSAAuthentication with older servers.
-
- User Specifies the user to log in as. This can be useful when a
- different user name is used on different machines. This saves
- the trouble of having to remember to give the user name on the
- command line.
-
- UserKnownHostsFile
- Specifies one or more files to use for the user host key
- database, separated by whitespace. The default is
- ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ~/.ssh/known_hosts2.
-
- VerifyHostKeyDNS
- Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP
- resource records. If this option is set to ``yes'', the client
- will implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint from
- DNS. Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was
- set to ``ask''. If this option is set to ``ask'', information on
- fingerprint match will be displayed, but the user will still need
- to confirm new host keys according to the StrictHostKeyChecking
- option. The argument must be ``yes'', ``no'', or ``ask''. The
- default is ``no''. Note that this option applies to protocol
- version 2 only.
-
- See also VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1).
-
- VisualHostKey
- If this flag is set to ``yes'', an ASCII art representation of
- the remote host key fingerprint is printed in addition to the hex
- fingerprint string at login and for unknown host keys. If this
- flag is set to ``no'', no fingerprint strings are printed at
- login and only the hex fingerprint string will be printed for
- unknown host keys. The default is ``no''.
-
- XAuthLocation
- Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program. The default
- is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth.
-
-PATTERNS
- A pattern consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters, `*' (a
- wildcard that matches zero or more characters), or `?' (a wildcard that
- matches exactly one character). For example, to specify a set of
- declarations for any host in the ``.co.uk'' set of domains, the following
- pattern could be used:
-
- Host *.co.uk
-
- The following pattern would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network
- range:
-
- Host 192.168.0.?
-
- A pattern-list is a comma-separated list of patterns. Patterns within
- pattern-lists may be negated by preceding them with an exclamation mark
- (`!'). For example, to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an
- organization except from the ``dialup'' pool, the following entry (in
- authorized_keys) could be used:
-
- from="!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com"
-
-FILES
- ~/.ssh/config
- This is the per-user configuration file. The format of this file
- is described above. This file is used by the SSH client.
- Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict
- permissions: read/write for the user, and not accessible by
- others.
-
- /etc/ssh/ssh_config
- Systemwide configuration file. This file provides defaults for
- those values that are not specified in the user's configuration
- file, and for those users who do not have a configuration file.
- This file must be world-readable.
-
-SEE ALSO
- ssh(1)
-
-AUTHORS
- OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
- Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
- de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
- created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
- versions 1.5 and 2.0.
-
-OpenBSD 5.5 February 23, 2014 OpenBSD 5.5
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_config.0 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh_config.0)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_config.0 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_config.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1090 @@
+SSH_CONFIG(5) File Formats Manual SSH_CONFIG(5)
+
+NAME
+ ssh_config M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SSH client configuration files
+
+SYNOPSIS
+ ~/.ssh/config
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+
+DESCRIPTION
+ ssh(1) obtains configuration data from the following sources in the
+ following order:
+
+ 1. command-line options
+ 2. user's configuration file (~/.ssh/config)
+ 3. system-wide configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config)
+
+ For each parameter, the first obtained value will be used. The
+ configuration files contain sections separated by M-bM-^@M-^\HostM-bM-^@M-^] specifications,
+ and that section is only applied for hosts that match one of the patterns
+ given in the specification. The matched host name is usually the one
+ given on the command line (see the CanonicalizeHostname option for
+ exceptions.)
+
+ Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more host-
+ specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the file, and
+ general defaults at the end.
+
+ The configuration file has the following format:
+
+ Empty lines and lines starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are comments. Otherwise a line
+ is of the format M-bM-^@M-^\keyword argumentsM-bM-^@M-^]. Configuration options may be
+ separated by whitespace or optional whitespace and exactly one M-bM-^@M-^X=M-bM-^@M-^Y; the
+ latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace when
+ specifying configuration options using the ssh, scp, and sftp -o option.
+ Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes (") in order to
+ represent arguments containing spaces.
+
+ The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
+ keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
+
+ Host Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host or
+ Match keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the
+ patterns given after the keyword. If more than one pattern is
+ provided, they should be separated by whitespace. A single M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y
+ as a pattern can be used to provide global defaults for all
+ hosts. The host is usually the hostname argument given on the
+ command line (see the CanonicalizeHostname option for
+ exceptions.)
+
+ A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an
+ exclamation mark (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y). If a negated entry is matched, then the
+ Host entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns
+ on the line match. Negated matches are therefore useful to
+ provide exceptions for wildcard matches.
+
+ See PATTERNS for more information on patterns.
+
+ Match Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host or
+ Match keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the
+ Match keyword are satisfied. Match conditions are specified
+ using one or more criteria or the single token all which always
+ matches. The available criteria keywords are: canonical, exec,
+ host, originalhost, user, and localuser. The all criteria must
+ appear alone or immediately after canonical. Other criteria may
+ be combined arbitrarily. All criteria but all and canonical
+ require an argument. Criteria may be negated by prepending an
+ exclamation mark (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y).
+
+ The canonical keyword matches only when the configuration file is
+ being re-parsed after hostname canonicalization (see the
+ CanonicalizeHostname option.) This may be useful to specify
+ conditions that work with canonical host names only. The exec
+ keyword executes the specified command under the user's shell.
+ If the command returns a zero exit status then the condition is
+ considered true. Commands containing whitespace characters must
+ be quoted. The following character sequences in the command will
+ be expanded prior to execution: M-bM-^@M-^X%LM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted by the
+ first component of the local host name, M-bM-^@M-^X%lM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted
+ by the local host name (including any domain name), M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y will be
+ substituted by the target host name, M-bM-^@M-^X%nM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted by
+ the original target host name specified on the command-line, M-bM-^@M-^X%pM-bM-^@M-^Y
+ the destination port, M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y by the remote login username, and M-bM-^@M-^X%uM-bM-^@M-^Y
+ by the username of the user running ssh(1).
+
+ The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma-
+ separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators
+ described in the PATTERNS section. The criteria for the host
+ keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any
+ substitution by the Hostname or CanonicalizeHostname options.
+ The originalhost keyword matches against the hostname as it was
+ specified on the command-line. The user keyword matches against
+ the target username on the remote host. The localuser keyword
+ matches against the name of the local user running ssh(1) (this
+ keyword may be useful in system-wide ssh_config files).
+
+ AddKeysToAgent
+ Specifies whether keys should be automatically added to a running
+ ssh-agent(1). If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] and a key is loaded
+ from a file, the key and its passphrase are added to the agent
+ with the default lifetime, as if by ssh-add(1). If this option
+ is set to M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^], ssh will require confirmation using the
+ SSH_ASKPASS program before adding a key (see ssh-add(1) for
+ details). If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\confirmM-bM-^@M-^], each use of the
+ key must be confirmed, as if the -c option was specified to
+ ssh-add(1). If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], no keys are added to
+ the agent. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\confirmM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^], or
+ M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ AddressFamily
+ Specifies which address family to use when connecting. Valid
+ arguments are M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\inetM-bM-^@M-^] (use IPv4 only), or M-bM-^@M-^\inet6M-bM-^@M-^] (use IPv6
+ only). The default is M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ BatchMode
+ If set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], passphrase/password querying will be disabled.
+ This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no
+ user is present to supply the password. The argument must be
+ M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ BindAddress
+ Use the specified address on the local machine as the source
+ address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than
+ one address. Note that this option does not work if
+ UsePrivilegedPort is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ CanonicalDomains
+ When CanonicalizeHostname is enabled, this option specifies the
+ list of domain suffixes in which to search for the specified
+ destination host.
+
+ CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+ Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname
+ canonicalization fails. The default, M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], will attempt to look
+ up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's search
+ rules. A value of M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] will cause ssh(1) to fail instantly if
+ CanonicalizeHostname is enabled and the target hostname cannot be
+ found in any of the domains specified by CanonicalDomains.
+
+ CanonicalizeHostname
+ Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed.
+ The default, M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], is not to perform any name rewriting and let
+ the system resolver handle all hostname lookups. If set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]
+ then, for connections that do not use a ProxyCommand, ssh(1) will
+ attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the command
+ line using the CanonicalDomains suffixes and
+ CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs rules. If CanonicalizeHostname is
+ set to M-bM-^@M-^\alwaysM-bM-^@M-^], then canonicalization is applied to proxied
+ connections too.
+
+ If this option is enabled, then the configuration files are
+ processed again using the new target name to pick up any new
+ configuration in matching Host and Match stanzas.
+
+ CanonicalizeMaxDots
+ Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname
+ before canonicalization is disabled. The default, M-bM-^@M-^\1M-bM-^@M-^], allows a
+ single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain).
+
+ CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+ Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed
+ when canonicalizing hostnames. The rules consist of one or more
+ arguments of source_domain_list:target_domain_list, where
+ source_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that may follow
+ CNAMEs in canonicalization, and target_domain_list is a pattern-
+ list of domains that they may resolve to.
+
+ For example, M-bM-^@M-^\*.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.comM-bM-^@M-^]
+ will allow hostnames matching M-bM-^@M-^\*.a.example.comM-bM-^@M-^] to be
+ canonicalized to names in the M-bM-^@M-^\*.b.example.comM-bM-^@M-^] or
+ M-bM-^@M-^\*.c.example.comM-bM-^@M-^] domains.
+
+ CertificateFile
+ Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read. A
+ corresponding private key must be provided separately in order to
+ use this certificate either from an IdentityFile directive or -i
+ flag to ssh(1), via ssh-agent(1), or via a PKCS11Provider.
+
+ The file name may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home
+ directory or one of the following escape characters: M-bM-^@M-^X%dM-bM-^@M-^Y (local
+ user's home directory), M-bM-^@M-^X%uM-bM-^@M-^Y (local user name), M-bM-^@M-^X%lM-bM-^@M-^Y (local host
+ name), M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote host name) or M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote user name).
+
+ It is possible to have multiple certificate files specified in
+ configuration files; these certificates will be tried in
+ sequence. Multiple CertificateFile directives will add to the
+ list of certificates used for authentication.
+
+ ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+ Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication. The
+ argument to this keyword must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is
+ M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ CheckHostIP
+ If this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], ssh(1) will additionally check the
+ host IP address in the known_hosts file. This allows ssh to
+ detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing and will add
+ addresses of destination hosts to ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the
+ process, regardless of the setting of StrictHostKeyChecking. If
+ the option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], the check will not be executed. The
+ default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ Cipher Specifies the cipher to use for encrypting the session in
+ protocol version 1. Currently, M-bM-^@M-^\blowfishM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\3desM-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\desM-bM-^@M-^] are
+ supported. des is only supported in the ssh(1) client for
+ interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations that do
+ not support the 3des cipher. Its use is strongly discouraged due
+ to cryptographic weaknesses. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\3desM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ Ciphers
+ Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2 in order of
+ preference. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. If the
+ specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified
+ ciphers will be appended to the default set instead of replacing
+ them.
+
+ The supported ciphers are:
+
+ 3des-cbc
+ aes128-cbc
+ aes192-cbc
+ aes256-cbc
+ aes128-ctr
+ aes192-ctr
+ aes256-ctr
+ aes128-gcm at openssh.com
+ aes256-gcm at openssh.com
+ arcfour
+ arcfour128
+ arcfour256
+ blowfish-cbc
+ cast128-cbc
+ chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com
+
+ The default is:
+
+ chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com,
+ aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
+ aes128-gcm at openssh.com,aes256-gcm at openssh.com,
+ aes128-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,3des-cbc
+
+ The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using the -Q
+ option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\cipherM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ ClearAllForwardings
+ Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings
+ specified in the configuration files or on the command line be
+ cleared. This option is primarily useful when used from the
+ ssh(1) command line to clear port forwardings set in
+ configuration files, and is automatically set by scp(1) and
+ sftp(1). The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is
+ M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ Compression
+ Specifies whether to use compression. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]
+ or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ CompressionLevel
+ Specifies the compression level to use if compression is enabled.
+ The argument must be an integer from 1 (fast) to 9 (slow, best).
+ The default level is 6, which is good for most applications. The
+ meaning of the values is the same as in gzip(1). Note that this
+ option applies to protocol version 1 only.
+
+ ConnectionAttempts
+ Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before
+ exiting. The argument must be an integer. This may be useful in
+ scripts if the connection sometimes fails. The default is 1.
+
+ ConnectTimeout
+ Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the
+ SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout.
+ This value is used only when the target is down or really
+ unreachable, not when it refuses the connection.
+
+ ControlMaster
+ Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network
+ connection. When set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], ssh(1) will listen for
+ connections on a control socket specified using the ControlPath
+ argument. Additional sessions can connect to this socket using
+ the same ControlPath with ControlMaster set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] (the
+ default). These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's
+ network connection rather than initiating new ones, but will fall
+ back to connecting normally if the control socket does not exist,
+ or is not listening.
+
+ Setting this to M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^] will cause ssh to listen for control
+ connections, but require confirmation using ssh-askpass(1). If
+ the ControlPath cannot be opened, ssh will continue without
+ connecting to a master instance.
+
+ X11 and ssh-agent(1) forwarding is supported over these
+ multiplexed connections, however the display and agent forwarded
+ will be the one belonging to the master connection i.e. it is not
+ possible to forward multiple displays or agents.
+
+ Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try
+ to use a master connection but fall back to creating a new one if
+ one does not already exist. These options are: M-bM-^@M-^\autoM-bM-^@M-^] and
+ M-bM-^@M-^\autoaskM-bM-^@M-^]. The latter requires confirmation like the M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^]
+ option.
+
+ ControlPath
+ Specify the path to the control socket used for connection
+ sharing as described in the ControlMaster section above or the
+ string M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to disable connection sharing. In the path, M-bM-^@M-^X%LM-bM-^@M-^Y
+ will be substituted by the first component of the local host
+ name, M-bM-^@M-^X%lM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted by the local host name (including
+ any domain name), M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted by the target host
+ name, M-bM-^@M-^X%nM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted by the original target host name
+ specified on the command line, M-bM-^@M-^X%pM-bM-^@M-^Y the destination port, M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y by
+ the remote login username, M-bM-^@M-^X%uM-bM-^@M-^Y by the username and M-bM-^@M-^X%iM-bM-^@M-^Y by the
+ numeric user ID (uid) of the user running ssh(1), and M-bM-^@M-^X%CM-bM-^@M-^Y by a
+ hash of the concatenation: %l%h%p%r. It is recommended that any
+ ControlPath used for opportunistic connection sharing include at
+ least %h, %p, and %r (or alternatively %C) and be placed in a
+ directory that is not writable by other users. This ensures that
+ shared connections are uniquely identified.
+
+ ControlPersist
+ When used in conjunction with ControlMaster, specifies that the
+ master connection should remain open in the background (waiting
+ for future client connections) after the initial client
+ connection has been closed. If set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], then the master
+ connection will not be placed into the background, and will close
+ as soon as the initial client connection is closed. If set to
+ M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\0M-bM-^@M-^], then the master connection will remain in the
+ background indefinitely (until killed or closed via a mechanism
+ such as the ssh(1) M-bM-^@M-^\-O exitM-bM-^@M-^] option). If set to a time in
+ seconds, or a time in any of the formats documented in
+ sshd_config(5), then the backgrounded master connection will
+ automatically terminate after it has remained idle (with no
+ client connections) for the specified time.
+
+ DynamicForward
+ Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over
+ the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to
+ determine where to connect to from the remote machine.
+
+ The argument must be [bind_address:]port. IPv6 addresses can be
+ specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. By default,
+ the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts
+ setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind
+ the connection to a specific address. The bind_address of
+ M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be bound for local
+ use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates that the port
+ should be available from all interfaces.
+
+ Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
+ ssh(1) will act as a SOCKS server. Multiple forwardings may be
+ specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command
+ line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+
+ EnableSSHKeysign
+ Setting this option to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] in the global client configuration
+ file /etc/ssh/ssh_config enables the use of the helper program
+ ssh-keysign(8) during HostbasedAuthentication. The argument must
+ be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. This option should be
+ placed in the non-hostspecific section. See ssh-keysign(8) for
+ more information.
+
+ EscapeChar
+ Sets the escape character (default: M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y). The escape character
+ can also be set on the command line. The argument should be a
+ single character, M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y followed by a letter, or M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to disable
+ the escape character entirely (making the connection transparent
+ for binary data).
+
+ ExitOnForwardFailure
+ Specifies whether ssh(1) should terminate the connection if it
+ cannot set up all requested dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote
+ port forwardings, (e.g. if either end is unable to bind and
+ listen on a specified port). Note that ExitOnForwardFailure does
+ not apply to connections made over port forwardings and will not,
+ for example, cause ssh(1) to exit if TCP connections to the
+ ultimate forwarding destination fail. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]
+ or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ FingerprintHash
+ Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key
+ fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The
+ default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ ForwardAgent
+ Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if
+ any) will be forwarded to the remote machine. The argument must
+ be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
+ ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
+ agent's Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through
+ the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material
+ from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys
+ that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into
+ the agent.
+
+ ForwardX11
+ Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically
+ redirected over the secure channel and DISPLAY set. The argument
+ must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
+ ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
+ user's X11 authorization database) can access the local X11
+ display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then
+ be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring if the
+ ForwardX11Trusted option is also enabled.
+
+ ForwardX11Timeout
+ Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding using the format
+ described in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). X11
+ connections received by ssh(1) after this time will be refused.
+ The default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty
+ minutes has elapsed.
+
+ ForwardX11Trusted
+ If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], remote X11 clients will have full
+ access to the original X11 display.
+
+ If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], remote X11 clients will be
+ considered untrusted and prevented from stealing or tampering
+ with data belonging to trusted X11 clients. Furthermore, the
+ xauth(1) token used for the session will be set to expire after
+ 20 minutes. Remote clients will be refused access after this
+ time.
+
+ The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on
+ the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients.
+
+ GatewayPorts
+ Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local
+ forwarded ports. By default, ssh(1) binds local port forwardings
+ to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from
+ connecting to forwarded ports. GatewayPorts can be used to
+ specify that ssh should bind local port forwardings to the
+ wildcard address, thus allowing remote hosts to connect to
+ forwarded ports. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The
+ default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ GlobalKnownHostsFile
+ Specifies one or more files to use for the global host key
+ database, separated by whitespace. The default is
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts, /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2.
+
+ GSSAPIAuthentication
+ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+ The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. The default is
+ M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that ssh(1) should hash host names and addresses when
+ they are added to ~/.ssh/known_hosts. These hashed names may be
+ used normally by ssh(1) and sshd(8), but they do not reveal
+ identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed.
+ The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that existing names and addresses in
+ known hosts files will not be converted automatically, but may be
+ manually hashed using ssh-keygen(1).
+
+ HostbasedAuthentication
+ Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public
+ key authentication. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The
+ default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ HostbasedKeyTypes
+ Specifies the key types that will be used for hostbased
+ authentication as a comma-separated pattern list. Alternately if
+ the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
+ specified key types will be appended to the default set instead
+ of replacing them. The default for this option is:
+
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+ ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
+
+ The -Q option of ssh(1) may be used to list supported key types.
+
+ HostKeyAlgorithms
+ Specifies the host key algorithms that the client wants to use in
+ order of preference. Alternately if the specified value begins
+ with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types will be
+ appended to the default set instead of replacing them. The
+ default for this option is:
+
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+ ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
+
+ If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default
+ is modified to prefer their algorithms.
+
+ The list of available key types may also be obtained using the -Q
+ option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\keyM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ HostKeyAlias
+ Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the real host
+ name when looking up or saving the host key in the host key
+ database files. This option is useful for tunneling SSH
+ connections or for multiple servers running on a single host.
+
+ HostName
+ Specifies the real host name to log into. This can be used to
+ specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts. If the hostname
+ contains the character sequence M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y, then this will be replaced
+ with the host name specified on the command line (this is useful
+ for manipulating unqualified names). The character sequence M-bM-^@M-^X%%M-bM-^@M-^Y
+ will be replaced by a single M-bM-^@M-^X%M-bM-^@M-^Y character, which may be used
+ when specifying IPv6 link-local addresses.
+
+ The default is the name given on the command line. Numeric IP
+ addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in
+ HostName specifications).
+
+ IdentitiesOnly
+ Specifies that ssh(1) should only use the authentication identity
+ and certificate files explicitly configured in the ssh_config
+ files or passed on the ssh(1) command-line, even if ssh-agent(1)
+ or a PKCS11Provider offers more identities. The argument to this
+ keyword must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. This option is intended for
+ situations where ssh-agent offers many different identities. The
+ default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ IdentityAgent
+ Specifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with the
+ authentication agent.
+
+ This option overrides the M-bM-^@M-^\SSH_AUTH_SOCKM-bM-^@M-^] environment variable
+ and can be used to select a specific agent. Setting the socket
+ name to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] disables the use of an authentication agent. If
+ the string M-bM-^@M-^\SSH_AUTH_SOCKM-bM-^@M-^] is specified, the location of the
+ socket will be read from the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable.
+
+ The socket name may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's
+ home directory or one of the following escape characters: M-bM-^@M-^X%dM-bM-^@M-^Y
+ (local user's home directory), M-bM-^@M-^X%uM-bM-^@M-^Y (local user name), M-bM-^@M-^X%lM-bM-^@M-^Y
+ (local host name), M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote host name) or M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote user
+ name).
+
+ IdentityFile
+ Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA
+ authentication identity is read. The default is ~/.ssh/identity
+ for protocol version 1, and ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa,
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and ~/.ssh/id_rsa for protocol version 2.
+ Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication
+ agent will be used for authentication unless IdentitiesOnly is
+ set. If no certificates have been explicitly specified by
+ CertificateFile, ssh(1) will try to load certificate information
+ from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to the path of
+ a specified IdentityFile.
+
+ The file name may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home
+ directory or one of the following escape characters: M-bM-^@M-^X%dM-bM-^@M-^Y (local
+ user's home directory), M-bM-^@M-^X%uM-bM-^@M-^Y (local user name), M-bM-^@M-^X%lM-bM-^@M-^Y (local host
+ name), M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote host name) or M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote user name).
+
+ It is possible to have multiple identity files specified in
+ configuration files; all these identities will be tried in
+ sequence. Multiple IdentityFile directives will add to the list
+ of identities tried (this behaviour differs from that of other
+ configuration directives).
+
+ IdentityFile may be used in conjunction with IdentitiesOnly to
+ select which identities in an agent are offered during
+ authentication. IdentityFile may also be used in conjunction
+ with CertificateFile in order to provide any certificate also
+ needed for authentication with the identity.
+
+ IgnoreUnknown
+ Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they
+ are encountered in configuration parsing. This may be used to
+ suppress errors if ssh_config contains options that are
+ unrecognised by ssh(1). It is recommended that IgnoreUnknown be
+ listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied
+ to unknown options that appear before it.
+
+ Include
+ Include the specified configuration file(s). Multiple pathnames
+ may be specified and each pathname may contain glob(3) wildcards
+ and, for user configurations, shell-like M-bM-^@M-^\~M-bM-^@M-^] references to user
+ home directories. Files without absolute paths are assumed to be
+ in ~/.ssh if included in a user configuration file or /etc/ssh if
+ included from the system configuration file. Include directive
+ may appear inside a Match or Host block to perform conditional
+ inclusion.
+
+ IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections.
+ Accepted values are M-bM-^@M-^\af11M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af12M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af13M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af21M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af22M-bM-^@M-^],
+ M-bM-^@M-^\af23M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af31M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af32M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af33M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af41M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af42M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af43M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs0M-bM-^@M-^],
+ M-bM-^@M-^\cs1M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs2M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs3M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs4M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs5M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs6M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs7M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\efM-bM-^@M-^],
+ M-bM-^@M-^\lowdelayM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\throughputM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\reliabilityM-bM-^@M-^], or a numeric value.
+ This option may take one or two arguments, separated by
+ whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the
+ packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the
+ first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the
+ second for non-interactive sessions. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\lowdelayM-bM-^@M-^]
+ for interactive sessions and M-bM-^@M-^\throughputM-bM-^@M-^] for non-interactive
+ sessions.
+
+ KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+ Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication.
+ The argument to this keyword must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default
+ is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ KbdInteractiveDevices
+ Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive
+ authentication. Multiple method names must be comma-separated.
+ The default is to use the server specified list. The methods
+ available vary depending on what the server supports. For an
+ OpenSSH server, it may be zero or more of: M-bM-^@M-^\bsdauthM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\pamM-bM-^@M-^], and
+ M-bM-^@M-^\skeyM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ KexAlgorithms
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple
+ algorithms must be comma-separated. Alternately if the specified
+ value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods
+ will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them.
+ The default is:
+
+ curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org,
+ ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,
+ diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
+
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be
+ obtained using the -Q option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\kexM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ LocalCommand
+ Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after
+ successfully connecting to the server. The command string
+ extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's
+ shell. The following escape character substitutions will be
+ performed: M-bM-^@M-^X%dM-bM-^@M-^Y (local user's home directory), M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote host
+ name), M-bM-^@M-^X%lM-bM-^@M-^Y (local host name), M-bM-^@M-^X%nM-bM-^@M-^Y (host name as provided on the
+ command line), M-bM-^@M-^X%pM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote port), M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote user name) or
+ M-bM-^@M-^X%uM-bM-^@M-^Y (local user name) or M-bM-^@M-^X%CM-bM-^@M-^Y by a hash of the concatenation:
+ %l%h%p%r.
+
+ The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the
+ session of the ssh(1) that spawned it. It should not be used for
+ interactive commands.
+
+ This directive is ignored unless PermitLocalCommand has been
+ enabled.
+
+ LocalForward
+ Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over
+ the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote
+ machine. The first argument must be [bind_address:]port and the
+ second argument must be host:hostport. IPv6 addresses can be
+ specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple
+ forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be
+ given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward
+ privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in
+ accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit
+ bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific
+ address. The bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the
+ listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty
+ address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates that the port should be available from
+ all interfaces.
+
+ LogLevel
+ Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
+ ssh(1). The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO,
+ VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO.
+ DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify
+ higher levels of verbose output.
+
+ MACs Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms in
+ order of preference. The MAC algorithm is used for data
+ integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-
+ separated. If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
+ then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+ instead of replacing them.
+
+ The algorithms that contain M-bM-^@M-^\-etmM-bM-^@M-^] calculate the MAC after
+ encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and
+ their use recommended.
+
+ The default is:
+
+ umac-64-etm at openssh.com,umac-128-etm at openssh.com,
+ hmac-sha2-256-etm at openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm at openssh.com,
+ hmac-sha1-etm at openssh.com,
+ umac-64 at openssh.com,umac-128 at openssh.com,
+ hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
+
+ The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
+ the -Q option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\macM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+ This option can be used if the home directory is shared across
+ machines. In this case localhost will refer to a different
+ machine on each of the machines and the user will get many
+ warnings about changed host keys. However, this option disables
+ host authentication for localhost. The argument to this keyword
+ must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is to check the host key for
+ localhost.
+
+ NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+ Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up. The
+ argument to this keyword must be an integer. The default is 3.
+
+ PasswordAuthentication
+ Specifies whether to use password authentication. The argument
+ to this keyword must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ PermitLocalCommand
+ Allow local command execution via the LocalCommand option or
+ using the !command escape sequence in ssh(1). The argument must
+ be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ PKCS11Provider
+ Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use. The argument to this
+ keyword is the PKCS#11 shared library ssh(1) should use to
+ communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's private RSA
+ key.
+
+ Port Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host. The
+ default is 22.
+
+ PreferredAuthentications
+ Specifies the order in which the client should try authentication
+ methods. This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.
+ keyboard-interactive) over another method (e.g. password). The
+ default is:
+
+ gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey,
+ keyboard-interactive,password
+
+ Protocol
+ Specifies the protocol versions ssh(1) should support in order of
+ preference. The possible values are M-bM-^@M-^X1M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X2M-bM-^@M-^Y. Multiple
+ versions must be comma-separated. When this option is set to
+ M-bM-^@M-^\2,1M-bM-^@M-^] ssh will try version 2 and fall back to version 1 if
+ version 2 is not available. The default is M-bM-^@M-^X2M-bM-^@M-^Y. Protocol 1
+ suffers from a number of cryptographic weaknesses and should not
+ be used. It is only offered to support legacy devices.
+
+ ProxyCommand
+ Specifies the command to use to connect to the server. The
+ command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed
+ using the user's shell M-bM-^@M-^XexecM-bM-^@M-^Y directive to avoid a lingering
+ shell process.
+
+ In the command string, any occurrence of M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted
+ by the host name to connect, M-bM-^@M-^X%pM-bM-^@M-^Y by the port, and M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y by the
+ remote user name. The command can be basically anything, and
+ should read from its standard input and write to its standard
+ output. It should eventually connect an sshd(8) server running
+ on some machine, or execute sshd -i somewhere. Host key
+ management will be done using the HostName of the host being
+ connected (defaulting to the name typed by the user). Setting
+ the command to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] disables this option entirely. Note that
+ CheckHostIP is not available for connects with a proxy command.
+
+ This directive is useful in conjunction with nc(1) and its proxy
+ support. For example, the following directive would connect via
+ an HTTP proxy at 192.0.2.0:
+
+ ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p
+
+ ProxyJump
+ Specifies one or more jump proxies as [user@]host[:port].
+ Multiple proxies may be separated by comma characters and will be
+ visited sequentially. Setting this option will cause ssh(1) to
+ connect to the target host by first making a ssh(1) connection to
+ the specified ProxyJump host and then establishing a TCP
+ forwarding to the ultimate target from there.
+
+ Note that this option will compete with the ProxyCommand option -
+ whichever is specified first will prevent later instances of the
+ other from taking effect.
+
+ ProxyUseFdpass
+ Specifies that ProxyCommand will pass a connected file descriptor
+ back to ssh(1) instead of continuing to execute and pass data.
+ The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+ Specifies the key types that will be used for public key
+ authentication as a comma-separated pattern list. Alternately if
+ the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the key
+ types after it will be appended to the default instead of
+ replacing it. The default for this option is:
+
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+ ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
+
+ The -Q option of ssh(1) may be used to list supported key types.
+
+ PubkeyAuthentication
+ Specifies whether to try public key authentication. The argument
+ to this keyword must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ RekeyLimit
+ Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted
+ before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a
+ maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is
+ renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may
+ have a suffix of M-bM-^@M-^XKM-bM-^@M-^Y, M-bM-^@M-^XMM-bM-^@M-^Y, or M-bM-^@M-^XGM-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate Kilobytes,
+ Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between
+ M-bM-^@M-^X1GM-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X4GM-bM-^@M-^Y, depending on the cipher. The optional second
+ value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units
+ documented in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). The
+ default value for RekeyLimit is M-bM-^@M-^\default noneM-bM-^@M-^], which means that
+ rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data
+ has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
+
+ RemoteForward
+ Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over
+ the secure channel to the specified host and port from the local
+ machine. The first argument must be [bind_address:]port and the
+ second argument must be host:hostport. IPv6 addresses can be
+ specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple
+ forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be
+ given on the command line. Privileged ports can be forwarded
+ only when logging in as root on the remote machine.
+
+ If the port argument is M-bM-^@M-^X0M-bM-^@M-^Y, the listen port will be dynamically
+ allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time.
+
+ If the bind_address is not specified, the default is to only bind
+ to loopback addresses. If the bind_address is M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y or an empty
+ string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all
+ interfaces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed
+ if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see
+ sshd_config(5)).
+
+ RequestTTY
+ Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session. The
+ argument may be one of: M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] (never request a TTY), M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (always
+ request a TTY when standard input is a TTY), M-bM-^@M-^\forceM-bM-^@M-^] (always
+ request a TTY) or M-bM-^@M-^\autoM-bM-^@M-^] (request a TTY when opening a login
+ session). This option mirrors the -t and -T flags for ssh(1).
+
+ RevokedHostKeys
+ Specifies revoked host public keys. Keys listed in this file
+ will be refused for host authentication. Note that if this file
+ does not exist or is not readable, then host authentication will
+ be refused for all hosts. Keys may be specified as a text file,
+ listing one public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation
+ List (KRL) as generated by ssh-keygen(1). For more information
+ on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in ssh-keygen(1).
+
+ RhostsRSAAuthentication
+ Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with RSA
+ host authentication. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The
+ default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. This option applies to protocol version 1 only
+ and requires ssh(1) to be setuid root.
+
+ RSAAuthentication
+ Specifies whether to try RSA authentication. The argument to
+ this keyword must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. RSA authentication will only
+ be attempted if the identity file exists, or an authentication
+ agent is running. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that this option
+ applies to protocol version 1 only.
+
+ SendEnv
+ Specifies what variables from the local environ(7) should be sent
+ to the server. The server must also support it, and the server
+ must be configured to accept these environment variables. Note
+ that the TERM environment variable is always sent whenever a
+ pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol.
+ Refer to AcceptEnv in sshd_config(5) for how to configure the
+ server. Variables are specified by name, which may contain
+ wildcard characters. Multiple environment variables may be
+ separated by whitespace or spread across multiple SendEnv
+ directives. The default is not to send any environment
+ variables.
+
+ See PATTERNS for more information on patterns.
+
+ ServerAliveCountMax
+ Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be
+ sent without ssh(1) receiving any messages back from the server.
+ If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are
+ being sent, ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the
+ session. It is important to note that the use of server alive
+ messages is very different from TCPKeepAlive (below). The server
+ alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and
+ therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option
+ enabled by TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The server alive mechanism
+ is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a
+ connection has become inactive.
+
+ The default value is 3. If, for example, ServerAliveInterval
+ (see below) is set to 15 and ServerAliveCountMax is left at the
+ default, if the server becomes unresponsive, ssh will disconnect
+ after approximately 45 seconds.
+
+ ServerAliveInterval
+ Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has
+ been received from the server, ssh(1) will send a message through
+ the encrypted channel to request a response from the server. The
+ default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to
+ the server.
+
+ StreamLocalBindMask
+ Sets the octal file creation mode mask (umask) used when creating
+ a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding.
+ This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain
+ socket file.
+
+ The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket
+ file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that
+ not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain
+ socket files.
+
+ StreamLocalBindUnlink
+ Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file
+ for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one.
+ If the socket file already exists and StreamLocalBindUnlink is
+ not enabled, ssh will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-
+ domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding
+ to a Unix-domain socket file.
+
+ The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ StrictHostKeyChecking
+ If this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], ssh(1) will never automatically add
+ host keys to the ~/.ssh/known_hosts file, and refuses to connect
+ to hosts whose host key has changed. This provides maximum
+ protection against trojan horse attacks, though it can be
+ annoying when the /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts file is poorly
+ maintained or when connections to new hosts are frequently made.
+ This option forces the user to manually add all new hosts. If
+ this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], ssh will automatically add new host
+ keys to the user known hosts files. If this flag is set to
+ M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^], new host keys will be added to the user known host files
+ only after the user has confirmed that is what they really want
+ to do, and ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has
+ changed. The host keys of known hosts will be verified
+ automatically in all cases. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], or
+ M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ TCPKeepAlive
+ Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
+ to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or
+ crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However,
+ this means that connections will die if the route is down
+ temporarily, and some people find it annoying.
+
+ The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the
+ client will notice if the network goes down or the remote host
+ dies. This is important in scripts, and many users want it too.
+
+ To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
+ M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ Tunnel Request tun(4) device forwarding between the client and the
+ server. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\point-to-pointM-bM-^@M-^] (layer 3),
+ M-bM-^@M-^\ethernetM-bM-^@M-^] (layer 2), or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. Specifying M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] requests the
+ default tunnel mode, which is M-bM-^@M-^\point-to-pointM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is
+ M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ TunnelDevice
+ Specifies the tun(4) devices to open on the client (local_tun)
+ and the server (remote_tun).
+
+ The argument must be local_tun[:remote_tun]. The devices may be
+ specified by numerical ID or the keyword M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^], which uses the
+ next available tunnel device. If remote_tun is not specified, it
+ defaults to M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\any:anyM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ UpdateHostKeys
+ Specifies whether ssh(1) should accept notifications of
+ additional hostkeys from the server sent after authentication has
+ completed and add them to UserKnownHostsFile. The argument must
+ be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] (the default) or M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^]. Enabling this option
+ allows learning alternate hostkeys for a server and supports
+ graceful key rotation by allowing a server to send replacement
+ public keys before old ones are removed. Additional hostkeys are
+ only accepted if the key used to authenticate the host was
+ already trusted or explicitly accepted by the user. If
+ UpdateHostKeys is set to M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^], then the user is asked to confirm
+ the modifications to the known_hosts file. Confirmation is
+ currently incompatible with ControlPersist, and will be disabled
+ if it is enabled.
+
+ Presently, only sshd(8) from OpenSSH 6.8 and greater support the
+ M-bM-^@M-^\hostkeys at openssh.comM-bM-^@M-^] protocol extension used to inform the
+ client of all the server's hostkeys.
+
+ UsePrivilegedPort
+ Specifies whether to use a privileged port for outgoing
+ connections. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is
+ M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. If set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], ssh(1) must be setuid root. Note that
+ this option must be set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] for RhostsRSAAuthentication with
+ older servers.
+
+ User Specifies the user to log in as. This can be useful when a
+ different user name is used on different machines. This saves
+ the trouble of having to remember to give the user name on the
+ command line.
+
+ UserKnownHostsFile
+ Specifies one or more files to use for the user host key
+ database, separated by whitespace. The default is
+ ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ~/.ssh/known_hosts2.
+
+ VerifyHostKeyDNS
+ Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP
+ resource records. If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], the client
+ will implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint from
+ DNS. Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was
+ set to M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^]. If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^], information on
+ fingerprint match will be displayed, but the user will still need
+ to confirm new host keys according to the StrictHostKeyChecking
+ option. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^]. The default
+ is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ See also VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1).
+
+ VisualHostKey
+ If this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], an ASCII art representation of the
+ remote host key fingerprint is printed in addition to the
+ fingerprint string at login and for unknown host keys. If this
+ flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], no fingerprint strings are printed at login
+ and only the fingerprint string will be printed for unknown host
+ keys. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ XAuthLocation
+ Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program. The default
+ is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth.
+
+PATTERNS
+ A pattern consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters, M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y (a
+ wildcard that matches zero or more characters), or M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y (a wildcard that
+ matches exactly one character). For example, to specify a set of
+ declarations for any host in the M-bM-^@M-^\.co.ukM-bM-^@M-^] set of domains, the following
+ pattern could be used:
+
+ Host *.co.uk
+
+ The following pattern would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network
+ range:
+
+ Host 192.168.0.?
+
+ A pattern-list is a comma-separated list of patterns. Patterns within
+ pattern-lists may be negated by preceding them with an exclamation mark
+ (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y). For example, to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an
+ organization except from the M-bM-^@M-^\dialupM-bM-^@M-^] pool, the following entry (in
+ authorized_keys) could be used:
+
+ from="!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com"
+
+FILES
+ ~/.ssh/config
+ This is the per-user configuration file. The format of this file
+ is described above. This file is used by the SSH client.
+ Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict
+ permissions: read/write for the user, and not accessible by
+ others.
+
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+ Systemwide configuration file. This file provides defaults for
+ those values that are not specified in the user's configuration
+ file, and for those users who do not have a configuration file.
+ This file must be world-readable.
+
+SEE ALSO
+ ssh(1)
+
+AUTHORS
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+ Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+ de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+ created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+ versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+
+OpenBSD 6.0 July 22, 2016 OpenBSD 6.0
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_config.5
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh_config.5 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_config.5 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1497 +0,0 @@
-.\"
-.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
-.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
-.\" All rights reserved
-.\"
-.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
-.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
-.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
-.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
-.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
-.\"
-.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
-.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
-.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
-.\"
-.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-.\" are met:
-.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-.\"
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.185 2014/02/23 20:11:36 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: February 23 2014 $
-.Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
-.Os
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm ssh_config
-.Nd OpenSSH SSH client configuration files
-.Sh SYNOPSIS
-.Nm ~/.ssh/config
-.Nm /etc/ssh/ssh_config
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-.Xr ssh 1
-obtains configuration data from the following sources in
-the following order:
-.Pp
-.Bl -enum -offset indent -compact
-.It
-command-line options
-.It
-user's configuration file
-.Pq Pa ~/.ssh/config
-.It
-system-wide configuration file
-.Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
-.El
-.Pp
-For each parameter, the first obtained value
-will be used.
-The configuration files contain sections separated by
-.Dq Host
-specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that
-match one of the patterns given in the specification.
-The matched host name is the one given on the command line.
-.Pp
-Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more
-host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the
-file, and general defaults at the end.
-.Pp
-The configuration file has the following format:
-.Pp
-Empty lines and lines starting with
-.Ql #
-are comments.
-Otherwise a line is of the format
-.Dq keyword arguments .
-Configuration options may be separated by whitespace or
-optional whitespace and exactly one
-.Ql = ;
-the latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace
-when specifying configuration options using the
-.Nm ssh ,
-.Nm scp ,
-and
-.Nm sftp
-.Fl o
-option.
-Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
-.Pq \&"
-in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
-.Pp
-The possible
-keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
-keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Cm Host
-Restricts the following declarations (up to the next
-.Cm Host
-or
-.Cm Match
-keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns
-given after the keyword.
-If more than one pattern is provided, they should be separated by whitespace.
-A single
-.Ql *
-as a pattern can be used to provide global
-defaults for all hosts.
-The host is the
-.Ar hostname
-argument given on the command line (i.e. the name is not converted to
-a canonicalized host name before matching).
-.Pp
-A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an exclamation mark
-.Pq Sq !\& .
-If a negated entry is matched, then the
-.Cm Host
-entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns on the line
-match.
-Negated matches are therefore useful to provide exceptions for wildcard
-matches.
-.Pp
-See
-.Sx PATTERNS
-for more information on patterns.
-.It Cm Match
-Restricts the following declarations (up to the next
-.Cm Host
-or
-.Cm Match
-keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the
-.Cm Match
-keyword are satisfied.
-Match conditions are specified using one or more keyword/criteria pairs
-or the single token
-.Cm all
-which matches all criteria.
-The available keywords are:
-.Cm exec ,
-.Cm host ,
-.Cm originalhost ,
-.Cm user ,
-and
-.Cm localuser .
-.Pp
-The
-.Cm exec
-keyword executes the specified command under the user's shell.
-If the command returns a zero exit status then the condition is considered true.
-Commands containing whitespace characters must be quoted.
-The following character sequences in the command will be expanded prior to
-execution:
-.Ql %L
-will be substituted by the first component of the local host name,
-.Ql %l
-will be substituted by the local host name (including any domain name),
-.Ql %h
-will be substituted by the target host name,
-.Ql %n
-will be substituted by the original target host name
-specified on the command-line,
-.Ql %p
-the destination port,
-.Ql %r
-by the remote login username, and
-.Ql %u
-by the username of the user running
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-.Pp
-The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma-separated
-lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the
-.Sx PATTERNS
-section.
-The criteria for the
-.Cm host
-keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any substitution
-by the
-.Cm Hostname
-option.
-The
-.Cm originalhost
-keyword matches against the hostname as it was specified on the command-line.
-The
-.Cm user
-keyword matches against the target username on the remote host.
-The
-.Cm localuser
-keyword matches against the name of the local user running
-.Xr ssh 1
-(this keyword may be useful in system-wide
-.Nm
-files).
-.It Cm AddressFamily
-Specifies which address family to use when connecting.
-Valid arguments are
-.Dq any ,
-.Dq inet
-(use IPv4 only), or
-.Dq inet6
-(use IPv6 only).
-.It Cm BatchMode
-If set to
-.Dq yes ,
-passphrase/password querying will be disabled.
-This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user
-is present to supply the password.
-The argument must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm BindAddress
-Use the specified address on the local machine as the source address of
-the connection.
-Only useful on systems with more than one address.
-Note that this option does not work if
-.Cm UsePrivilegedPort
-is set to
-.Dq yes .
-.It Cm CanonicalDomains
-When
-.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
-is enabled, this option specifies the list of domain suffixes in which to
-search for the specified destination host.
-.It Cm CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
-Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname canonicalization fails.
-The default,
-.Dq yes ,
-will attempt to look up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's
-search rules.
-A value of
-.Dq no
-will cause
-.Xr ssh 1
-to fail instantly if
-.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
-is enabled and the target hostname cannot be found in any of the domains
-specified by
-.Cm CanonicalDomains .
-.It Cm CanonicalizeHostname
-Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed.
-The default,
-.Dq no ,
-is not to perform any name rewriting and let the system resolver handle all
-hostname lookups.
-If set to
-.Dq yes
-then, for connections that do not use a
-.Cm ProxyCommand ,
-.Xr ssh 1
-will attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the command line
-using the
-.Cm CanonicalDomains
-suffixes and
-.Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
-rules.
-If
-.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
-is set to
-.Dq always ,
-then canonicalization is applied to proxied connections too.
-.Pp
-If this option is enabled and canonicalisation results in the target hostname
-changing, then the configuration files are processed again using the new
-target name to pick up any new configuration in matching
-.Cm Host
-stanzas.
-.It Cm CanonicalizeMaxDots
-Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname before
-canonicalization is disabled.
-The default,
-.Dq 1 ,
-allows a single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain).
-.It Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
-Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed when
-canonicalizing hostnames.
-The rules consist of one or more arguments of
-.Ar source_domain_list : Ns Ar target_domain_list ,
-where
-.Ar source_domain_list
-is a pattern-list of domains that may follow CNAMEs in canonicalization,
-and
-.Ar target_domain_list
-is a pattern-list of domains that they may resolve to.
-.Pp
-For example,
-.Dq *.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.com
-will allow hostnames matching
-.Dq *.a.example.com
-to be canonicalized to names in the
-.Dq *.b.example.com
-or
-.Dq *.c.example.com
-domains.
-.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
-Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication.
-The argument to this keyword must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-.It Cm CheckHostIP
-If this flag is set to
-.Dq yes ,
-.Xr ssh 1
-will additionally check the host IP address in the
-.Pa known_hosts
-file.
-This allows ssh to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing.
-If the option is set to
-.Dq no ,
-the check will not be executed.
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-.It Cm Cipher
-Specifies the cipher to use for encrypting the session
-in protocol version 1.
-Currently,
-.Dq blowfish ,
-.Dq 3des ,
-and
-.Dq des
-are supported.
-.Ar des
-is only supported in the
-.Xr ssh 1
-client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations
-that do not support the
-.Ar 3des
-cipher.
-Its use is strongly discouraged due to cryptographic weaknesses.
-The default is
-.Dq 3des .
-.It Cm Ciphers
-Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2
-in order of preference.
-Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
-The supported ciphers are:
-.Pp
-.Dq 3des-cbc ,
-.Dq aes128-cbc ,
-.Dq aes192-cbc ,
-.Dq aes256-cbc ,
-.Dq aes128-ctr ,
-.Dq aes192-ctr ,
-.Dq aes256-ctr ,
-.Dq aes128-gcm at openssh.com ,
-.Dq aes256-gcm at openssh.com ,
-.Dq arcfour128 ,
-.Dq arcfour256 ,
-.Dq arcfour ,
-.Dq blowfish-cbc ,
-.Dq cast128-cbc ,
-and
-.Dq chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com .
-.Pp
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,
-aes128-gcm at openssh.com,aes256-gcm at openssh.com,
-chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com,
-aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,aes192-cbc,
-aes256-cbc,arcfour
-.Ed
-.Pp
-The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using the
-.Fl Q
-option of
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-.It Cm ClearAllForwardings
-Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings
-specified in the configuration files or on the command line be
-cleared.
-This option is primarily useful when used from the
-.Xr ssh 1
-command line to clear port forwardings set in
-configuration files, and is automatically set by
-.Xr scp 1
-and
-.Xr sftp 1 .
-The argument must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm Compression
-Specifies whether to use compression.
-The argument must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm CompressionLevel
-Specifies the compression level to use if compression is enabled.
-The argument must be an integer from 1 (fast) to 9 (slow, best).
-The default level is 6, which is good for most applications.
-The meaning of the values is the same as in
-.Xr gzip 1 .
-Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only.
-.It Cm ConnectionAttempts
-Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before exiting.
-The argument must be an integer.
-This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails.
-The default is 1.
-.It Cm ConnectTimeout
-Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the
-SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout.
-This value is used only when the target is down or really unreachable,
-not when it refuses the connection.
-.It Cm ControlMaster
-Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network connection.
-When set to
-.Dq yes ,
-.Xr ssh 1
-will listen for connections on a control socket specified using the
-.Cm ControlPath
-argument.
-Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the same
-.Cm ControlPath
-with
-.Cm ControlMaster
-set to
-.Dq no
-(the default).
-These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network connection
-rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to connecting normally
-if the control socket does not exist, or is not listening.
-.Pp
-Setting this to
-.Dq ask
-will cause ssh
-to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using the
-.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
-program before they are accepted (see
-.Xr ssh-add 1
-for details).
-If the
-.Cm ControlPath
-cannot be opened,
-ssh will continue without connecting to a master instance.
-.Pp
-X11 and
-.Xr ssh-agent 1
-forwarding is supported over these multiplexed connections, however the
-display and agent forwarded will be the one belonging to the master
-connection i.e. it is not possible to forward multiple displays or agents.
-.Pp
-Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try to use a
-master connection but fall back to creating a new one if one does not already
-exist.
-These options are:
-.Dq auto
-and
-.Dq autoask .
-The latter requires confirmation like the
-.Dq ask
-option.
-.It Cm ControlPath
-Specify the path to the control socket used for connection sharing as described
-in the
-.Cm ControlMaster
-section above or the string
-.Dq none
-to disable connection sharing.
-In the path,
-.Ql %L
-will be substituted by the first component of the local host name,
-.Ql %l
-will be substituted by the local host name (including any domain name),
-.Ql %h
-will be substituted by the target host name,
-.Ql %n
-will be substituted by the original target host name
-specified on the command line,
-.Ql %p
-the destination port,
-.Ql %r
-by the remote login username, and
-.Ql %u
-by the username of the user running
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-It is recommended that any
-.Cm ControlPath
-used for opportunistic connection sharing include
-at least %h, %p, and %r.
-This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified.
-.It Cm ControlPersist
-When used in conjunction with
-.Cm ControlMaster ,
-specifies that the master connection should remain open
-in the background (waiting for future client connections)
-after the initial client connection has been closed.
-If set to
-.Dq no ,
-then the master connection will not be placed into the background,
-and will close as soon as the initial client connection is closed.
-If set to
-.Dq yes ,
-then the master connection will remain in the background indefinitely
-(until killed or closed via a mechanism such as the
-.Xr ssh 1
-.Dq Fl O No exit
-option).
-If set to a time in seconds, or a time in any of the formats documented in
-.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
-then the backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate
-after it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the
-specified time.
-.It Cm DynamicForward
-Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded
-over the secure channel, and the application
-protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the
-remote machine.
-.Pp
-The argument must be
-.Sm off
-.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .
-.Sm on
-IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.
-By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
-.Cm GatewayPorts
-setting.
-However, an explicit
-.Ar bind_address
-may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
-The
-.Ar bind_address
-of
-.Dq localhost
-indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
-empty address or
-.Sq *
-indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
-.Pp
-Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
-.Xr ssh 1
-will act as a SOCKS server.
-Multiple forwardings may be specified, and
-additional forwardings can be given on the command line.
-Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
-.It Cm EnableSSHKeysign
-Setting this option to
-.Dq yes
-in the global client configuration file
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
-enables the use of the helper program
-.Xr ssh-keysign 8
-during
-.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
-The argument must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section.
-See
-.Xr ssh-keysign 8
-for more information.
-.It Cm EscapeChar
-Sets the escape character (default:
-.Ql ~ ) .
-The escape character can also
-be set on the command line.
-The argument should be a single character,
-.Ql ^
-followed by a letter, or
-.Dq none
-to disable the escape
-character entirely (making the connection transparent for binary
-data).
-.It Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
-Specifies whether
-.Xr ssh 1
-should terminate the connection if it cannot set up all requested
-dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote port forwardings.
-The argument must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm ForwardAgent
-Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any)
-will be forwarded to the remote machine.
-The argument must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.Pp
-Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.
-Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
-(for the agent's Unix-domain socket)
-can access the local agent through the forwarded connection.
-An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent,
-however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to
-authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent.
-.It Cm ForwardX11
-Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically redirected
-over the secure channel and
-.Ev DISPLAY
-set.
-The argument must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.Pp
-X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.
-Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
-(for the user's X11 authorization database)
-can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection.
-An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring
-if the
-.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
-option is also enabled.
-.It Cm ForwardX11Timeout
-Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding
-using the format described in the
-TIME FORMATS section of
-.Xr sshd_config 5 .
-X11 connections received by
-.Xr ssh 1
-after this time will be refused.
-The default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty minutes has
-elapsed.
-.It Cm ForwardX11Trusted
-If this option is set to
-.Dq yes ,
-remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display.
-.Pp
-If this option is set to
-.Dq no ,
-remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented
-from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11
-clients.
-Furthermore, the
-.Xr xauth 1
-token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes.
-Remote clients will be refused access after this time.
-.Pp
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.Pp
-See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on
-the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients.
-.It Cm GatewayPorts
-Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local
-forwarded ports.
-By default,
-.Xr ssh 1
-binds local port forwardings to the loopback address.
-This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
-.Cm GatewayPorts
-can be used to specify that ssh
-should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard address,
-thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports.
-The argument must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile
-Specifies one or more files to use for the global
-host key database, separated by whitespace.
-The default is
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts ,
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2 .
-.It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
-Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-.It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
-Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-.It Cm HashKnownHosts
-Indicates that
-.Xr ssh 1
-should hash host names and addresses when they are added to
-.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
-These hashed names may be used normally by
-.Xr ssh 1
-and
-.Xr sshd 8 ,
-but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents
-be disclosed.
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files
-will not be converted automatically,
-but may be manually hashed using
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
-.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
-Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
-authentication.
-The argument must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-This option applies to protocol version 2 only and
-is similar to
-.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication .
-.It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
-Specifies the protocol version 2 host key algorithms
-that the client wants to use in order of preference.
-The default for this option is:
-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
-ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
-ssh-rsa-cert-v00 at openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v00 at openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
-.Ed
-.Pp
-If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified
-to prefer their algorithms.
-.It Cm HostKeyAlias
-Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
-real host name when looking up or saving the host key
-in the host key database files.
-This option is useful for tunneling SSH connections
-or for multiple servers running on a single host.
-.It Cm HostName
-Specifies the real host name to log into.
-This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts.
-If the hostname contains the character sequence
-.Ql %h ,
-then this will be replaced with the host name specified on the command line
-(this is useful for manipulating unqualified names).
-The default is the name given on the command line.
-Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in
-.Cm HostName
-specifications).
-.It Cm IdentitiesOnly
-Specifies that
-.Xr ssh 1
-should only use the authentication identity files configured in the
-.Nm
-files,
-even if
-.Xr ssh-agent 1
-or a
-.Cm PKCS11Provider
-offers more identities.
-The argument to this keyword must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent
-offers many different identities.
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm IdentityFile
-Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 or RSA authentication
-identity is read.
-The default is
-.Pa ~/.ssh/identity
-for protocol version 1, and
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
-and
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
-for protocol version 2.
-Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent
-will be used for authentication unless
-.Cm IdentitiesOnly
-is set.
-.Xr ssh 1
-will try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by
-appending
-.Pa -cert.pub
-to the path of a specified
-.Cm IdentityFile .
-.Pp
-The file name may use the tilde
-syntax to refer to a user's home directory or one of the following
-escape characters:
-.Ql %d
-(local user's home directory),
-.Ql %u
-(local user name),
-.Ql %l
-(local host name),
-.Ql %h
-(remote host name) or
-.Ql %r
-(remote user name).
-.Pp
-It is possible to have
-multiple identity files specified in configuration files; all these
-identities will be tried in sequence.
-Multiple
-.Cm IdentityFile
-directives will add to the list of identities tried (this behaviour
-differs from that of other configuration directives).
-.Pp
-.Cm IdentityFile
-may be used in conjunction with
-.Cm IdentitiesOnly
-to select which identities in an agent are offered during authentication.
-.It Cm IgnoreUnknown
-Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are
-encountered in configuration parsing.
-This may be used to suppress errors if
-.Nm
-contains options that are unrecognised by
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-It is recommended that
-.Cm IgnoreUnknown
-be listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied
-to unknown options that appear before it.
-.It Cm IPQoS
-Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections.
-Accepted values are
-.Dq af11 ,
-.Dq af12 ,
-.Dq af13 ,
-.Dq af21 ,
-.Dq af22 ,
-.Dq af23 ,
-.Dq af31 ,
-.Dq af32 ,
-.Dq af33 ,
-.Dq af41 ,
-.Dq af42 ,
-.Dq af43 ,
-.Dq cs0 ,
-.Dq cs1 ,
-.Dq cs2 ,
-.Dq cs3 ,
-.Dq cs4 ,
-.Dq cs5 ,
-.Dq cs6 ,
-.Dq cs7 ,
-.Dq ef ,
-.Dq lowdelay ,
-.Dq throughput ,
-.Dq reliability ,
-or a numeric value.
-This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace.
-If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally.
-If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for
-interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions.
-The default is
-.Dq lowdelay
-for interactive sessions and
-.Dq throughput
-for non-interactive sessions.
-.It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication
-Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication.
-The argument to this keyword must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-.It Cm KbdInteractiveDevices
-Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive authentication.
-Multiple method names must be comma-separated.
-The default is to use the server specified list.
-The methods available vary depending on what the server supports.
-For an OpenSSH server,
-it may be zero or more of:
-.Dq bsdauth ,
-.Dq pam ,
-and
-.Dq skey .
-.It Cm KexAlgorithms
-Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
-Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org,
-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,
-diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,
-diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
-.Ed
-.It Cm LocalCommand
-Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully
-connecting to the server.
-The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with
-the user's shell.
-The following escape character substitutions will be performed:
-.Ql %d
-(local user's home directory),
-.Ql %h
-(remote host name),
-.Ql %l
-(local host name),
-.Ql %n
-(host name as provided on the command line),
-.Ql %p
-(remote port),
-.Ql %r
-(remote user name) or
-.Ql %u
-(local user name).
-.Pp
-The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the
-session of the
-.Xr ssh 1
-that spawned it.
-It should not be used for interactive commands.
-.Pp
-This directive is ignored unless
-.Cm PermitLocalCommand
-has been enabled.
-.It Cm LocalForward
-Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over
-the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote machine.
-The first argument must be
-.Sm off
-.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
-.Sm on
-and the second argument must be
-.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport .
-IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.
-Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be
-given on the command line.
-Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
-By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
-.Cm GatewayPorts
-setting.
-However, an explicit
-.Ar bind_address
-may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
-The
-.Ar bind_address
-of
-.Dq localhost
-indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
-empty address or
-.Sq *
-indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
-.It Cm LogLevel
-Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-The possible values are:
-QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
-The default is INFO.
-DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
-DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
-.It Cm MACs
-Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
-in order of preference.
-The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2
-for data integrity protection.
-Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-The algorithms that contain
-.Dq -etm
-calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
-These are considered safer and their use recommended.
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-hmac-md5-etm at openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm at openssh.com,
-umac-64-etm at openssh.com,umac-128-etm at openssh.com,
-hmac-sha2-256-etm at openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm at openssh.com,
-hmac-ripemd160-etm at openssh.com,hmac-sha1-96-etm at openssh.com,
-hmac-md5-96-etm at openssh.com,
-hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64 at openssh.com,umac-128 at openssh.com,
-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-ripemd160,
-hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96
-.Ed
-.It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
-This option can be used if the home directory is shared across machines.
-In this case localhost will refer to a different machine on each of
-the machines and the user will get many warnings about changed host keys.
-However, this option disables host authentication for localhost.
-The argument to this keyword must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is to check the host key for localhost.
-.It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts
-Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up.
-The argument to this keyword must be an integer.
-The default is 3.
-.It Cm PasswordAuthentication
-Specifies whether to use password authentication.
-The argument to this keyword must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-.It Cm PermitLocalCommand
-Allow local command execution via the
-.Ic LocalCommand
-option or using the
-.Ic !\& Ns Ar command
-escape sequence in
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-The argument must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm PKCS11Provider
-Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use.
-The argument to this keyword is the PKCS#11 shared library
-.Xr ssh 1
-should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's
-private RSA key.
-.It Cm Port
-Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host.
-The default is 22.
-.It Cm PreferredAuthentications
-Specifies the order in which the client should try protocol 2
-authentication methods.
-This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.\&
-.Cm keyboard-interactive )
-over another method (e.g.\&
-.Cm password ) .
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey,
-keyboard-interactive,password
-.Ed
-.It Cm Protocol
-Specifies the protocol versions
-.Xr ssh 1
-should support in order of preference.
-The possible values are
-.Sq 1
-and
-.Sq 2 .
-Multiple versions must be comma-separated.
-When this option is set to
-.Dq 2,1
-.Nm ssh
-will try version 2 and fall back to version 1
-if version 2 is not available.
-The default is
-.Sq 2 .
-.It Cm ProxyCommand
-Specifies the command to use to connect to the server.
-The command
-string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with
-the user's shell.
-In the command string, any occurrence of
-.Ql %h
-will be substituted by the host name to
-connect,
-.Ql %p
-by the port, and
-.Ql %r
-by the remote user name.
-The command can be basically anything,
-and should read from its standard input and write to its standard output.
-It should eventually connect an
-.Xr sshd 8
-server running on some machine, or execute
-.Ic sshd -i
-somewhere.
-Host key management will be done using the
-HostName of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by
-the user).
-Setting the command to
-.Dq none
-disables this option entirely.
-Note that
-.Cm CheckHostIP
-is not available for connects with a proxy command.
-.Pp
-This directive is useful in conjunction with
-.Xr nc 1
-and its proxy support.
-For example, the following directive would connect via an HTTP proxy at
-192.0.2.0:
-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p
-.Ed
-.It Cm ProxyUseFdpass
-Specifies that
-.Cm ProxyCommand
-will pass a connected file descriptor back to
-.Xr ssh 1
-instead of continuing to execute and pass data.
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
-Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
-The argument to this keyword must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-.It Cm RekeyLimit
-Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the
-session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of
-time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated.
-The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of
-.Sq K ,
-.Sq M ,
-or
-.Sq G
-to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively.
-The default is between
-.Sq 1G
-and
-.Sq 4G ,
-depending on the cipher.
-The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the
-units documented in the
-TIME FORMATS section of
-.Xr sshd_config 5 .
-The default value for
-.Cm RekeyLimit
-is
-.Dq default none ,
-which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount
-of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
-This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-.It Cm RemoteForward
-Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over
-the secure channel to the specified host and port from the local machine.
-The first argument must be
-.Sm off
-.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
-.Sm on
-and the second argument must be
-.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport .
-IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.
-Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional
-forwardings can be given on the command line.
-Privileged ports can be forwarded only when
-logging in as root on the remote machine.
-.Pp
-If the
-.Ar port
-argument is
-.Ql 0 ,
-the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported
-to the client at run time.
-.Pp
-If the
-.Ar bind_address
-is not specified, the default is to only bind to loopback addresses.
-If the
-.Ar bind_address
-is
-.Ql *
-or an empty string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all
-interfaces.
-Specifying a remote
-.Ar bind_address
-will only succeed if the server's
-.Cm GatewayPorts
-option is enabled (see
-.Xr sshd_config 5 ) .
-.It Cm RequestTTY
-Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session.
-The argument may be one of:
-.Dq no
-(never request a TTY),
-.Dq yes
-(always request a TTY when standard input is a TTY),
-.Dq force
-(always request a TTY) or
-.Dq auto
-(request a TTY when opening a login session).
-This option mirrors the
-.Fl t
-and
-.Fl T
-flags for
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-.It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
-Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with RSA host
-authentication.
-The argument must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-This option applies to protocol version 1 only and requires
-.Xr ssh 1
-to be setuid root.
-.It Cm RSAAuthentication
-Specifies whether to try RSA authentication.
-The argument to this keyword must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-RSA authentication will only be
-attempted if the identity file exists, or an authentication agent is
-running.
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only.
-.It Cm SendEnv
-Specifies what variables from the local
-.Xr environ 7
-should be sent to the server.
-Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2.
-The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to
-accept these environment variables.
-Refer to
-.Cm AcceptEnv
-in
-.Xr sshd_config 5
-for how to configure the server.
-Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard characters.
-Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread
-across multiple
-.Cm SendEnv
-directives.
-The default is not to send any environment variables.
-.Pp
-See
-.Sx PATTERNS
-for more information on patterns.
-.It Cm ServerAliveCountMax
-Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be
-sent without
-.Xr ssh 1
-receiving any messages back from the server.
-If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are being sent,
-ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the session.
-It is important to note that the use of server alive messages is very
-different from
-.Cm TCPKeepAlive
-(below).
-The server alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel
-and therefore will not be spoofable.
-The TCP keepalive option enabled by
-.Cm TCPKeepAlive
-is spoofable.
-The server alive mechanism is valuable when the client or
-server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive.
-.Pp
-The default value is 3.
-If, for example,
-.Cm ServerAliveInterval
-(see below) is set to 15 and
-.Cm ServerAliveCountMax
-is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive,
-ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds.
-This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-.It Cm ServerAliveInterval
-Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
-from the server,
-.Xr ssh 1
-will send a message through the encrypted
-channel to request a response from the server.
-The default
-is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server.
-This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-.It Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
-If this flag is set to
-.Dq yes ,
-.Xr ssh 1
-will never automatically add host keys to the
-.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
-file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
-This provides maximum protection against trojan horse attacks,
-though it can be annoying when the
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
-file is poorly maintained or when connections to new hosts are
-frequently made.
-This option forces the user to manually
-add all new hosts.
-If this flag is set to
-.Dq no ,
-ssh will automatically add new host keys to the
-user known hosts files.
-If this flag is set to
-.Dq ask ,
-new host keys
-will be added to the user known host files only after the user
-has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and
-ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
-The host keys of
-known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases.
-The argument must be
-.Dq yes ,
-.Dq no ,
-or
-.Dq ask .
-The default is
-.Dq ask .
-.It Cm TCPKeepAlive
-Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
-other side.
-If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
-of the machines will be properly noticed.
-However, this means that
-connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
-find it annoying.
-.Pp
-The default is
-.Dq yes
-(to send TCP keepalive messages), and the client will notice
-if the network goes down or the remote host dies.
-This is important in scripts, and many users want it too.
-.Pp
-To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm Tunnel
-Request
-.Xr tun 4
-device forwarding between the client and the server.
-The argument must be
-.Dq yes ,
-.Dq point-to-point
-(layer 3),
-.Dq ethernet
-(layer 2),
-or
-.Dq no .
-Specifying
-.Dq yes
-requests the default tunnel mode, which is
-.Dq point-to-point .
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm TunnelDevice
-Specifies the
-.Xr tun 4
-devices to open on the client
-.Pq Ar local_tun
-and the server
-.Pq Ar remote_tun .
-.Pp
-The argument must be
-.Sm off
-.Ar local_tun Op : Ar remote_tun .
-.Sm on
-The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
-.Dq any ,
-which uses the next available tunnel device.
-If
-.Ar remote_tun
-is not specified, it defaults to
-.Dq any .
-The default is
-.Dq any:any .
-.It Cm UsePrivilegedPort
-Specifies whether to use a privileged port for outgoing connections.
-The argument must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-If set to
-.Dq yes ,
-.Xr ssh 1
-must be setuid root.
-Note that this option must be set to
-.Dq yes
-for
-.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
-with older servers.
-.It Cm User
-Specifies the user to log in as.
-This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines.
-This saves the trouble of
-having to remember to give the user name on the command line.
-.It Cm UserKnownHostsFile
-Specifies one or more files to use for the user
-host key database, separated by whitespace.
-The default is
-.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts2 .
-.It Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS
-Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP resource
-records.
-If this option is set to
-.Dq yes ,
-the client will implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint
-from DNS.
-Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was set to
-.Dq ask .
-If this option is set to
-.Dq ask ,
-information on fingerprint match will be displayed, but the user will still
-need to confirm new host keys according to the
-.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
-option.
-The argument must be
-.Dq yes ,
-.Dq no ,
-or
-.Dq ask .
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-.Pp
-See also VERIFYING HOST KEYS in
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-.It Cm VisualHostKey
-If this flag is set to
-.Dq yes ,
-an ASCII art representation of the remote host key fingerprint is
-printed in addition to the hex fingerprint string at login and
-for unknown host keys.
-If this flag is set to
-.Dq no ,
-no fingerprint strings are printed at login and
-only the hex fingerprint string will be printed for unknown host keys.
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm XAuthLocation
-Specifies the full pathname of the
-.Xr xauth 1
-program.
-The default is
-.Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth .
-.El
-.Sh PATTERNS
-A
-.Em pattern
-consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters,
-.Sq *
-(a wildcard that matches zero or more characters),
-or
-.Sq ?\&
-(a wildcard that matches exactly one character).
-For example, to specify a set of declarations for any host in the
-.Dq .co.uk
-set of domains,
-the following pattern could be used:
-.Pp
-.Dl Host *.co.uk
-.Pp
-The following pattern
-would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network range:
-.Pp
-.Dl Host 192.168.0.?
-.Pp
-A
-.Em pattern-list
-is a comma-separated list of patterns.
-Patterns within pattern-lists may be negated
-by preceding them with an exclamation mark
-.Pq Sq !\& .
-For example,
-to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an organization
-except from the
-.Dq dialup
-pool,
-the following entry (in authorized_keys) could be used:
-.Pp
-.Dl from=\&"!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com\&"
-.Sh FILES
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/config
-This is the per-user configuration file.
-The format of this file is described above.
-This file is used by the SSH client.
-Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
-read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
-Systemwide configuration file.
-This file provides defaults for those
-values that are not specified in the user's configuration file, and
-for those users who do not have a configuration file.
-This file must be world-readable.
-.El
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr ssh 1
-.Sh AUTHORS
-OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
-ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
-Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
-Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
-removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
-created OpenSSH.
-Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
-protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_config.5 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh_config.5)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_config.5 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssh_config.5 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1874 @@
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\" All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.236 2016/07/22 07:00:46 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: July 22 2016 $
+.Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh_config
+.Nd OpenSSH SSH client configuration files
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ~/.ssh/config
+.Nm /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Xr ssh 1
+obtains configuration data from the following sources in
+the following order:
+.Pp
+.Bl -enum -offset indent -compact
+.It
+command-line options
+.It
+user's configuration file
+.Pq Pa ~/.ssh/config
+.It
+system-wide configuration file
+.Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+.El
+.Pp
+For each parameter, the first obtained value
+will be used.
+The configuration files contain sections separated by
+.Dq Host
+specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that
+match one of the patterns given in the specification.
+The matched host name is usually the one given on the command line
+(see the
+.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
+option for exceptions.)
+.Pp
+Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more
+host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the
+file, and general defaults at the end.
+.Pp
+The configuration file has the following format:
+.Pp
+Empty lines and lines starting with
+.Ql #
+are comments.
+Otherwise a line is of the format
+.Dq keyword arguments .
+Configuration options may be separated by whitespace or
+optional whitespace and exactly one
+.Ql = ;
+the latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace
+when specifying configuration options using the
+.Nm ssh ,
+.Nm scp ,
+and
+.Nm sftp
+.Fl o
+option.
+Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
+.Pq \&"
+in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
+.Pp
+The possible
+keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
+keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm Host
+Restricts the following declarations (up to the next
+.Cm Host
+or
+.Cm Match
+keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns
+given after the keyword.
+If more than one pattern is provided, they should be separated by whitespace.
+A single
+.Ql *
+as a pattern can be used to provide global
+defaults for all hosts.
+The host is usually the
+.Ar hostname
+argument given on the command line
+(see the
+.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
+option for exceptions.)
+.Pp
+A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an exclamation mark
+.Pq Sq !\& .
+If a negated entry is matched, then the
+.Cm Host
+entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns on the line
+match.
+Negated matches are therefore useful to provide exceptions for wildcard
+matches.
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm Match
+Restricts the following declarations (up to the next
+.Cm Host
+or
+.Cm Match
+keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the
+.Cm Match
+keyword are satisfied.
+Match conditions are specified using one or more criteria
+or the single token
+.Cm all
+which always matches.
+The available criteria keywords are:
+.Cm canonical ,
+.Cm exec ,
+.Cm host ,
+.Cm originalhost ,
+.Cm user ,
+and
+.Cm localuser .
+The
+.Cm all
+criteria must appear alone or immediately after
+.Cm canonical .
+Other criteria may be combined arbitrarily.
+All criteria but
+.Cm all
+and
+.Cm canonical
+require an argument.
+Criteria may be negated by prepending an exclamation mark
+.Pq Sq !\& .
+.Pp
+The
+.Cm canonical
+keyword matches only when the configuration file is being re-parsed
+after hostname canonicalization (see the
+.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
+option.)
+This may be useful to specify conditions that work with canonical host
+names only.
+The
+.Cm exec
+keyword executes the specified command under the user's shell.
+If the command returns a zero exit status then the condition is considered true.
+Commands containing whitespace characters must be quoted.
+The following character sequences in the command will be expanded prior to
+execution:
+.Ql %L
+will be substituted by the first component of the local host name,
+.Ql %l
+will be substituted by the local host name (including any domain name),
+.Ql %h
+will be substituted by the target host name,
+.Ql %n
+will be substituted by the original target host name
+specified on the command-line,
+.Ql %p
+the destination port,
+.Ql %r
+by the remote login username, and
+.Ql %u
+by the username of the user running
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.Pp
+The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma-separated
+lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the
+.Sx PATTERNS
+section.
+The criteria for the
+.Cm host
+keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any substitution
+by the
+.Cm Hostname
+or
+.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
+options.
+The
+.Cm originalhost
+keyword matches against the hostname as it was specified on the command-line.
+The
+.Cm user
+keyword matches against the target username on the remote host.
+The
+.Cm localuser
+keyword matches against the name of the local user running
+.Xr ssh 1
+(this keyword may be useful in system-wide
+.Nm
+files).
+.It Cm AddKeysToAgent
+Specifies whether keys should be automatically added to a running
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+If this option is set to
+.Dq yes
+and a key is loaded from a file, the key and its passphrase are added to
+the agent with the default lifetime, as if by
+.Xr ssh-add 1 .
+If this option is set to
+.Dq ask ,
+.Nm ssh
+will require confirmation using the
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+program before adding a key (see
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+for details).
+If this option is set to
+.Dq confirm ,
+each use of the key must be confirmed, as if the
+.Fl c
+option was specified to
+.Xr ssh-add 1 .
+If this option is set to
+.Dq no ,
+no keys are added to the agent.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes ,
+.Dq confirm ,
+.Dq ask ,
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm AddressFamily
+Specifies which address family to use when connecting.
+Valid arguments are
+.Dq any ,
+.Dq inet
+(use IPv4 only), or
+.Dq inet6
+(use IPv6 only).
+The default is
+.Dq any .
+.It Cm BatchMode
+If set to
+.Dq yes ,
+passphrase/password querying will be disabled.
+This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user
+is present to supply the password.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm BindAddress
+Use the specified address on the local machine as the source address of
+the connection.
+Only useful on systems with more than one address.
+Note that this option does not work if
+.Cm UsePrivilegedPort
+is set to
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm CanonicalDomains
+When
+.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
+is enabled, this option specifies the list of domain suffixes in which to
+search for the specified destination host.
+.It Cm CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname canonicalization fails.
+The default,
+.Dq yes ,
+will attempt to look up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's
+search rules.
+A value of
+.Dq no
+will cause
+.Xr ssh 1
+to fail instantly if
+.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
+is enabled and the target hostname cannot be found in any of the domains
+specified by
+.Cm CanonicalDomains .
+.It Cm CanonicalizeHostname
+Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed.
+The default,
+.Dq no ,
+is not to perform any name rewriting and let the system resolver handle all
+hostname lookups.
+If set to
+.Dq yes
+then, for connections that do not use a
+.Cm ProxyCommand ,
+.Xr ssh 1
+will attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the command line
+using the
+.Cm CanonicalDomains
+suffixes and
+.Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+rules.
+If
+.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
+is set to
+.Dq always ,
+then canonicalization is applied to proxied connections too.
+.Pp
+If this option is enabled, then the configuration files are processed
+again using the new target name to pick up any new configuration in matching
+.Cm Host
+and
+.Cm Match
+stanzas.
+.It Cm CanonicalizeMaxDots
+Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname before
+canonicalization is disabled.
+The default,
+.Dq 1 ,
+allows a single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain).
+.It Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed when
+canonicalizing hostnames.
+The rules consist of one or more arguments of
+.Ar source_domain_list : Ns Ar target_domain_list ,
+where
+.Ar source_domain_list
+is a pattern-list of domains that may follow CNAMEs in canonicalization,
+and
+.Ar target_domain_list
+is a pattern-list of domains that they may resolve to.
+.Pp
+For example,
+.Dq *.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.com
+will allow hostnames matching
+.Dq *.a.example.com
+to be canonicalized to names in the
+.Dq *.b.example.com
+or
+.Dq *.c.example.com
+domains.
+.It Cm CertificateFile
+Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read.
+A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order
+to use this certificate either
+from an
+.Cm IdentityFile
+directive or
+.Fl i
+flag to
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+via
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+or via a
+.Cm PKCS11Provider .
+.Pp
+The file name may use the tilde
+syntax to refer to a user's home directory or one of the following
+escape characters:
+.Ql %d
+(local user's home directory),
+.Ql %u
+(local user name),
+.Ql %l
+(local host name),
+.Ql %h
+(remote host name) or
+.Ql %r
+(remote user name).
+.Pp
+It is possible to have multiple certificate files specified in
+configuration files; these certificates will be tried in sequence.
+Multiple
+.Cm CertificateFile
+directives will add to the list of certificates used for
+authentication.
+.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm CheckHostIP
+If this flag is set to
+.Dq yes ,
+.Xr ssh 1
+will additionally check the host IP address in the
+.Pa known_hosts
+file.
+This allows ssh to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing
+and will add addresses of destination hosts to
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+in the process, regardless of the setting of
+.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking .
+If the option is set to
+.Dq no ,
+the check will not be executed.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm Cipher
+Specifies the cipher to use for encrypting the session
+in protocol version 1.
+Currently,
+.Dq blowfish ,
+.Dq 3des ,
+and
+.Dq des
+are supported.
+.Ar des
+is only supported in the
+.Xr ssh 1
+client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations
+that do not support the
+.Ar 3des
+cipher.
+Its use is strongly discouraged due to cryptographic weaknesses.
+The default is
+.Dq 3des .
+.It Cm Ciphers
+Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2
+in order of preference.
+Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
+instead of replacing them.
+.Pp
+The supported ciphers are:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
+.It
+3des-cbc
+.It
+aes128-cbc
+.It
+aes192-cbc
+.It
+aes256-cbc
+.It
+aes128-ctr
+.It
+aes192-ctr
+.It
+aes256-ctr
+.It
+aes128-gcm at openssh.com
+.It
+aes256-gcm at openssh.com
+.It
+arcfour
+.It
+arcfour128
+.It
+arcfour256
+.It
+blowfish-cbc
+.It
+cast128-cbc
+.It
+chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com
+.El
+.Pp
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com,
+aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
+aes128-gcm at openssh.com,aes256-gcm at openssh.com,
+aes128-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,3des-cbc
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using the
+.Fl Q
+option of
+.Xr ssh 1
+with an argument of
+.Dq cipher .
+.It Cm ClearAllForwardings
+Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings
+specified in the configuration files or on the command line be
+cleared.
+This option is primarily useful when used from the
+.Xr ssh 1
+command line to clear port forwardings set in
+configuration files, and is automatically set by
+.Xr scp 1
+and
+.Xr sftp 1 .
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm Compression
+Specifies whether to use compression.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm CompressionLevel
+Specifies the compression level to use if compression is enabled.
+The argument must be an integer from 1 (fast) to 9 (slow, best).
+The default level is 6, which is good for most applications.
+The meaning of the values is the same as in
+.Xr gzip 1 .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only.
+.It Cm ConnectionAttempts
+Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before exiting.
+The argument must be an integer.
+This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails.
+The default is 1.
+.It Cm ConnectTimeout
+Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the
+SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout.
+This value is used only when the target is down or really unreachable,
+not when it refuses the connection.
+.It Cm ControlMaster
+Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network connection.
+When set to
+.Dq yes ,
+.Xr ssh 1
+will listen for connections on a control socket specified using the
+.Cm ControlPath
+argument.
+Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the same
+.Cm ControlPath
+with
+.Cm ControlMaster
+set to
+.Dq no
+(the default).
+These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network connection
+rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to connecting normally
+if the control socket does not exist, or is not listening.
+.Pp
+Setting this to
+.Dq ask
+will cause ssh
+to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using
+.Xr ssh-askpass 1 .
+If the
+.Cm ControlPath
+cannot be opened,
+ssh will continue without connecting to a master instance.
+.Pp
+X11 and
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+forwarding is supported over these multiplexed connections, however the
+display and agent forwarded will be the one belonging to the master
+connection i.e. it is not possible to forward multiple displays or agents.
+.Pp
+Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try to use a
+master connection but fall back to creating a new one if one does not already
+exist.
+These options are:
+.Dq auto
+and
+.Dq autoask .
+The latter requires confirmation like the
+.Dq ask
+option.
+.It Cm ControlPath
+Specify the path to the control socket used for connection sharing as described
+in the
+.Cm ControlMaster
+section above or the string
+.Dq none
+to disable connection sharing.
+In the path,
+.Ql %L
+will be substituted by the first component of the local host name,
+.Ql %l
+will be substituted by the local host name (including any domain name),
+.Ql %h
+will be substituted by the target host name,
+.Ql %n
+will be substituted by the original target host name
+specified on the command line,
+.Ql %p
+the destination port,
+.Ql %r
+by the remote login username,
+.Ql %u
+by the username and
+.Ql %i
+by the numeric user ID (uid) of the user running
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+and
+.Ql \&%C
+by a hash of the concatenation: %l%h%p%r.
+It is recommended that any
+.Cm ControlPath
+used for opportunistic connection sharing include
+at least %h, %p, and %r (or alternatively %C) and be placed in a directory
+that is not writable by other users.
+This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified.
+.It Cm ControlPersist
+When used in conjunction with
+.Cm ControlMaster ,
+specifies that the master connection should remain open
+in the background (waiting for future client connections)
+after the initial client connection has been closed.
+If set to
+.Dq no ,
+then the master connection will not be placed into the background,
+and will close as soon as the initial client connection is closed.
+If set to
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq 0 ,
+then the master connection will remain in the background indefinitely
+(until killed or closed via a mechanism such as the
+.Xr ssh 1
+.Dq Fl O No exit
+option).
+If set to a time in seconds, or a time in any of the formats documented in
+.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
+then the backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate
+after it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the
+specified time.
+.It Cm DynamicForward
+Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded
+over the secure channel, and the application
+protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the
+remote machine.
+.Pp
+The argument must be
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .
+.Sm on
+IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.
+By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+setting.
+However, an explicit
+.Ar bind_address
+may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
+The
+.Ar bind_address
+of
+.Dq localhost
+indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
+empty address or
+.Sq *
+indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+.Pp
+Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
+.Xr ssh 1
+will act as a SOCKS server.
+Multiple forwardings may be specified, and
+additional forwardings can be given on the command line.
+Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+.It Cm EnableSSHKeysign
+Setting this option to
+.Dq yes
+in the global client configuration file
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+enables the use of the helper program
+.Xr ssh-keysign 8
+during
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section.
+See
+.Xr ssh-keysign 8
+for more information.
+.It Cm EscapeChar
+Sets the escape character (default:
+.Ql ~ ) .
+The escape character can also
+be set on the command line.
+The argument should be a single character,
+.Ql ^
+followed by a letter, or
+.Dq none
+to disable the escape
+character entirely (making the connection transparent for binary
+data).
+.It Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
+Specifies whether
+.Xr ssh 1
+should terminate the connection if it cannot set up all requested
+dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote port forwardings, (e.g.\&
+if either end is unable to bind and listen on a specified port).
+Note that
+.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
+does not apply to connections made over port forwardings and will not,
+for example, cause
+.Xr ssh 1
+to exit if TCP connections to the ultimate forwarding destination fail.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm FingerprintHash
+Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
+Valid options are:
+.Dq md5
+and
+.Dq sha256 .
+The default is
+.Dq sha256 .
+.It Cm ForwardAgent
+Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any)
+will be forwarded to the remote machine.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.Pp
+Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.
+Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
+(for the agent's Unix-domain socket)
+can access the local agent through the forwarded connection.
+An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent,
+however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to
+authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent.
+.It Cm ForwardX11
+Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically redirected
+over the secure channel and
+.Ev DISPLAY
+set.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.Pp
+X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.
+Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
+(for the user's X11 authorization database)
+can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection.
+An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring
+if the
+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
+option is also enabled.
+.It Cm ForwardX11Timeout
+Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding
+using the format described in the
+TIME FORMATS section of
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+X11 connections received by
+.Xr ssh 1
+after this time will be refused.
+The default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty minutes has
+elapsed.
+.It Cm ForwardX11Trusted
+If this option is set to
+.Dq yes ,
+remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display.
+.Pp
+If this option is set to
+.Dq no ,
+remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented
+from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11
+clients.
+Furthermore, the
+.Xr xauth 1
+token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes.
+Remote clients will be refused access after this time.
+.Pp
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.Pp
+See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on
+the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients.
+.It Cm GatewayPorts
+Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local
+forwarded ports.
+By default,
+.Xr ssh 1
+binds local port forwardings to the loopback address.
+This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+can be used to specify that ssh
+should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard address,
+thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile
+Specifies one or more files to use for the global
+host key database, separated by whitespace.
+The default is
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts ,
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2 .
+.It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
+Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm HashKnownHosts
+Indicates that
+.Xr ssh 1
+should hash host names and addresses when they are added to
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
+These hashed names may be used normally by
+.Xr ssh 1
+and
+.Xr sshd 8 ,
+but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents
+be disclosed.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files
+will not be converted automatically,
+but may be manually hashed using
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
+authentication.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm HostbasedKeyTypes
+Specifies the key types that will be used for hostbased authentication
+as a comma-separated pattern list.
+Alternately if the specified value begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
+instead of replacing them.
+The default for this option is:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The
+.Fl Q
+option of
+.Xr ssh 1
+may be used to list supported key types.
+.It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+Specifies the host key algorithms
+that the client wants to use in order of preference.
+Alternately if the specified value begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
+instead of replacing them.
+The default for this option is:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
+.Ed
+.Pp
+If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified
+to prefer their algorithms.
+.Pp
+The list of available key types may also be obtained using the
+.Fl Q
+option of
+.Xr ssh 1
+with an argument of
+.Dq key .
+.It Cm HostKeyAlias
+Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
+real host name when looking up or saving the host key
+in the host key database files.
+This option is useful for tunneling SSH connections
+or for multiple servers running on a single host.
+.It Cm HostName
+Specifies the real host name to log into.
+This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts.
+If the hostname contains the character sequence
+.Ql %h ,
+then this will be replaced with the host name specified on the command line
+(this is useful for manipulating unqualified names).
+The character sequence
+.Ql %%
+will be replaced by a single
+.Ql %
+character, which may be used when specifying IPv6 link-local addresses.
+.Pp
+The default is the name given on the command line.
+Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in
+.Cm HostName
+specifications).
+.It Cm IdentitiesOnly
+Specifies that
+.Xr ssh 1
+should only use the authentication identity and certificate files explicitly
+configured in the
+.Nm
+files
+or passed on the
+.Xr ssh 1
+command-line,
+even if
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+or a
+.Cm PKCS11Provider
+offers more identities.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent
+offers many different identities.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm IdentityAgent
+Specifies the
+.Ux Ns -domain
+socket used to communicate with the authentication agent.
+.Pp
+This option overrides the
+.Dq SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+environment variable and can be used to select a specific agent.
+Setting the socket name to
+.Dq none
+disables the use of an authentication agent.
+If the string
+.Dq SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the
+.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+environment variable.
+.Pp
+The socket name may use the tilde
+syntax to refer to a user's home directory or one of the following
+escape characters:
+.Ql %d
+(local user's home directory),
+.Ql %u
+(local user name),
+.Ql %l
+(local host name),
+.Ql %h
+(remote host name) or
+.Ql %r
+(remote user name).
+.It Cm IdentityFile
+Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA authentication
+identity is read.
+The default is
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity
+for protocol version 1, and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+for protocol version 2.
+Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent
+will be used for authentication unless
+.Cm IdentitiesOnly
+is set.
+If no certificates have been explicitly specified by
+.Cm CertificateFile ,
+.Xr ssh 1
+will try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by
+appending
+.Pa -cert.pub
+to the path of a specified
+.Cm IdentityFile .
+.Pp
+The file name may use the tilde
+syntax to refer to a user's home directory or one of the following
+escape characters:
+.Ql %d
+(local user's home directory),
+.Ql %u
+(local user name),
+.Ql %l
+(local host name),
+.Ql %h
+(remote host name) or
+.Ql %r
+(remote user name).
+.Pp
+It is possible to have
+multiple identity files specified in configuration files; all these
+identities will be tried in sequence.
+Multiple
+.Cm IdentityFile
+directives will add to the list of identities tried (this behaviour
+differs from that of other configuration directives).
+.Pp
+.Cm IdentityFile
+may be used in conjunction with
+.Cm IdentitiesOnly
+to select which identities in an agent are offered during authentication.
+.Cm IdentityFile
+may also be used in conjunction with
+.Cm CertificateFile
+in order to provide any certificate also needed for authentication with
+the identity.
+.It Cm IgnoreUnknown
+Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are
+encountered in configuration parsing.
+This may be used to suppress errors if
+.Nm
+contains options that are unrecognised by
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+It is recommended that
+.Cm IgnoreUnknown
+be listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied
+to unknown options that appear before it.
+.It Cm Include
+Include the specified configuration file(s).
+Multiple pathnames may be specified and each pathname may contain
+.Xr glob 3
+wildcards and, for user configurations, shell-like
+.Dq ~
+references to user home directories.
+Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in
+.Pa ~/.ssh
+if included in a user configuration file or
+.Pa /etc/ssh
+if included from the system configuration file.
+.Cm Include
+directive may appear inside a
+.Cm Match
+or
+.Cm Host
+block
+to perform conditional inclusion.
+.It Cm IPQoS
+Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections.
+Accepted values are
+.Dq af11 ,
+.Dq af12 ,
+.Dq af13 ,
+.Dq af21 ,
+.Dq af22 ,
+.Dq af23 ,
+.Dq af31 ,
+.Dq af32 ,
+.Dq af33 ,
+.Dq af41 ,
+.Dq af42 ,
+.Dq af43 ,
+.Dq cs0 ,
+.Dq cs1 ,
+.Dq cs2 ,
+.Dq cs3 ,
+.Dq cs4 ,
+.Dq cs5 ,
+.Dq cs6 ,
+.Dq cs7 ,
+.Dq ef ,
+.Dq lowdelay ,
+.Dq throughput ,
+.Dq reliability ,
+or a numeric value.
+This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace.
+If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally.
+If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for
+interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions.
+The default is
+.Dq lowdelay
+for interactive sessions and
+.Dq throughput
+for non-interactive sessions.
+.It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm KbdInteractiveDevices
+Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive authentication.
+Multiple method names must be comma-separated.
+The default is to use the server specified list.
+The methods available vary depending on what the server supports.
+For an OpenSSH server,
+it may be zero or more of:
+.Dq bsdauth ,
+.Dq pam ,
+and
+.Dq skey .
+.It Cm KexAlgorithms
+Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+Alternately if the specified value begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
+instead of replacing them.
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org,
+ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,
+diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using the
+.Fl Q
+option of
+.Xr ssh 1
+with an argument of
+.Dq kex .
+.It Cm LocalCommand
+Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully
+connecting to the server.
+The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with
+the user's shell.
+The following escape character substitutions will be performed:
+.Ql %d
+(local user's home directory),
+.Ql %h
+(remote host name),
+.Ql %l
+(local host name),
+.Ql %n
+(host name as provided on the command line),
+.Ql %p
+(remote port),
+.Ql %r
+(remote user name) or
+.Ql %u
+(local user name) or
+.Ql \&%C
+by a hash of the concatenation: %l%h%p%r.
+.Pp
+The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the
+session of the
+.Xr ssh 1
+that spawned it.
+It should not be used for interactive commands.
+.Pp
+This directive is ignored unless
+.Cm PermitLocalCommand
+has been enabled.
+.It Cm LocalForward
+Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over
+the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote machine.
+The first argument must be
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
+.Sm on
+and the second argument must be
+.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport .
+IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.
+Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be
+given on the command line.
+Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+setting.
+However, an explicit
+.Ar bind_address
+may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
+The
+.Ar bind_address
+of
+.Dq localhost
+indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
+empty address or
+.Sq *
+indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+.It Cm LogLevel
+Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+The possible values are:
+QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
+The default is INFO.
+DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
+.It Cm MACs
+Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
+in order of preference.
+The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
+Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+instead of replacing them.
+.Pp
+The algorithms that contain
+.Dq -etm
+calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
+These are considered safer and their use recommended.
+.Pp
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+umac-64-etm at openssh.com,umac-128-etm at openssh.com,
+hmac-sha2-256-etm at openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm at openssh.com,
+hmac-sha1-etm at openssh.com,
+umac-64 at openssh.com,umac-128 at openssh.com,
+hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using the
+.Fl Q
+option of
+.Xr ssh 1
+with an argument of
+.Dq mac .
+.It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+This option can be used if the home directory is shared across machines.
+In this case localhost will refer to a different machine on each of
+the machines and the user will get many warnings about changed host keys.
+However, this option disables host authentication for localhost.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is to check the host key for localhost.
+.It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up.
+The argument to this keyword must be an integer.
+The default is 3.
+.It Cm PasswordAuthentication
+Specifies whether to use password authentication.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm PermitLocalCommand
+Allow local command execution via the
+.Ic LocalCommand
+option or using the
+.Ic !\& Ns Ar command
+escape sequence in
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm PKCS11Provider
+Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use.
+The argument to this keyword is the PKCS#11 shared library
+.Xr ssh 1
+should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's
+private RSA key.
+.It Cm Port
+Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host.
+The default is 22.
+.It Cm PreferredAuthentications
+Specifies the order in which the client should try authentication methods.
+This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.\&
+.Cm keyboard-interactive )
+over another method (e.g.\&
+.Cm password ) .
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey,
+keyboard-interactive,password
+.Ed
+.It Cm Protocol
+Specifies the protocol versions
+.Xr ssh 1
+should support in order of preference.
+The possible values are
+.Sq 1
+and
+.Sq 2 .
+Multiple versions must be comma-separated.
+When this option is set to
+.Dq 2,1
+.Nm ssh
+will try version 2 and fall back to version 1
+if version 2 is not available.
+The default is
+.Sq 2 .
+Protocol 1 suffers from a number of cryptographic weaknesses and should
+not be used.
+It is only offered to support legacy devices.
+.It Cm ProxyCommand
+Specifies the command to use to connect to the server.
+The command
+string extends to the end of the line, and is executed
+using the user's shell
+.Ql exec
+directive to avoid a lingering shell process.
+.Pp
+In the command string, any occurrence of
+.Ql %h
+will be substituted by the host name to
+connect,
+.Ql %p
+by the port, and
+.Ql %r
+by the remote user name.
+The command can be basically anything,
+and should read from its standard input and write to its standard output.
+It should eventually connect an
+.Xr sshd 8
+server running on some machine, or execute
+.Ic sshd -i
+somewhere.
+Host key management will be done using the
+HostName of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by
+the user).
+Setting the command to
+.Dq none
+disables this option entirely.
+Note that
+.Cm CheckHostIP
+is not available for connects with a proxy command.
+.Pp
+This directive is useful in conjunction with
+.Xr nc 1
+and its proxy support.
+For example, the following directive would connect via an HTTP proxy at
+192.0.2.0:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p
+.Ed
+.It Cm ProxyJump
+Specifies one or more jump proxies as
+.Xo
+.Sm off
+.Op Ar user No @
+.Ar host
+.Op : Ns Ar port
+.Sm on
+.Xc .
+Multiple proxies may be separated by comma characters and will be visited
+sequentially.
+Setting this option will cause
+.Xr ssh 1
+to connect to the target host by first making a
+.Xr ssh 1
+connection to the specified
+.Cm ProxyJump
+host and then establishing a
+TCP forwarding to the ultimate target from there.
+.Pp
+Note that this option will compete with the
+.Cm ProxyCommand
+option - whichever is specified first will prevent later instances of the
+other from taking effect.
+.It Cm ProxyUseFdpass
+Specifies that
+.Cm ProxyCommand
+will pass a connected file descriptor back to
+.Xr ssh 1
+instead of continuing to execute and pass data.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+Specifies the key types that will be used for public key authentication
+as a comma-separated pattern list.
+Alternately if the specified value begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
+instead of replacing it.
+The default for this option is:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The
+.Fl Q
+option of
+.Xr ssh 1
+may be used to list supported key types.
+.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
+Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm RekeyLimit
+Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the
+session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of
+time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated.
+The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of
+.Sq K ,
+.Sq M ,
+or
+.Sq G
+to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively.
+The default is between
+.Sq 1G
+and
+.Sq 4G ,
+depending on the cipher.
+The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the
+units documented in the
+TIME FORMATS section of
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+The default value for
+.Cm RekeyLimit
+is
+.Dq default none ,
+which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount
+of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
+.It Cm RemoteForward
+Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over
+the secure channel to the specified host and port from the local machine.
+The first argument must be
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
+.Sm on
+and the second argument must be
+.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport .
+IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.
+Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional
+forwardings can be given on the command line.
+Privileged ports can be forwarded only when
+logging in as root on the remote machine.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Ar port
+argument is
+.Ql 0 ,
+the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported
+to the client at run time.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Ar bind_address
+is not specified, the default is to only bind to loopback addresses.
+If the
+.Ar bind_address
+is
+.Ql *
+or an empty string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all
+interfaces.
+Specifying a remote
+.Ar bind_address
+will only succeed if the server's
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+option is enabled (see
+.Xr sshd_config 5 ) .
+.It Cm RequestTTY
+Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session.
+The argument may be one of:
+.Dq no
+(never request a TTY),
+.Dq yes
+(always request a TTY when standard input is a TTY),
+.Dq force
+(always request a TTY) or
+.Dq auto
+(request a TTY when opening a login session).
+This option mirrors the
+.Fl t
+and
+.Fl T
+flags for
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Cm RevokedHostKeys
+Specifies revoked host public keys.
+Keys listed in this file will be refused for host authentication.
+Note that if this file does not exist or is not readable,
+then host authentication will be refused for all hosts.
+Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as
+an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+.It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with RSA host
+authentication.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+This option applies to protocol version 1 only and requires
+.Xr ssh 1
+to be setuid root.
+.It Cm RSAAuthentication
+Specifies whether to try RSA authentication.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+RSA authentication will only be
+attempted if the identity file exists, or an authentication agent is
+running.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only.
+.It Cm SendEnv
+Specifies what variables from the local
+.Xr environ 7
+should be sent to the server.
+The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to
+accept these environment variables.
+Note that the
+.Ev TERM
+environment variable is always sent whenever a
+pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol.
+Refer to
+.Cm AcceptEnv
+in
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+for how to configure the server.
+Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard characters.
+Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread
+across multiple
+.Cm SendEnv
+directives.
+The default is not to send any environment variables.
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm ServerAliveCountMax
+Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be
+sent without
+.Xr ssh 1
+receiving any messages back from the server.
+If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are being sent,
+ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the session.
+It is important to note that the use of server alive messages is very
+different from
+.Cm TCPKeepAlive
+(below).
+The server alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel
+and therefore will not be spoofable.
+The TCP keepalive option enabled by
+.Cm TCPKeepAlive
+is spoofable.
+The server alive mechanism is valuable when the client or
+server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive.
+.Pp
+The default value is 3.
+If, for example,
+.Cm ServerAliveInterval
+(see below) is set to 15 and
+.Cm ServerAliveCountMax
+is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive,
+ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds.
+.It Cm ServerAliveInterval
+Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
+from the server,
+.Xr ssh 1
+will send a message through the encrypted
+channel to request a response from the server.
+The default
+is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server.
+.It Cm StreamLocalBindMask
+Sets the octal file creation mode mask
+.Pq umask
+used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote
+port forwarding.
+This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file.
+.Pp
+The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is
+readable and writable only by the owner.
+Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain
+socket files.
+.It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink
+Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local
+or remote port forwarding before creating a new one.
+If the socket file already exists and
+.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink
+is not enabled,
+.Nm ssh
+will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file.
+This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file.
+.Pp
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
+If this flag is set to
+.Dq yes ,
+.Xr ssh 1
+will never automatically add host keys to the
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
+This provides maximum protection against trojan horse attacks,
+though it can be annoying when the
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+file is poorly maintained or when connections to new hosts are
+frequently made.
+This option forces the user to manually
+add all new hosts.
+If this flag is set to
+.Dq no ,
+ssh will automatically add new host keys to the
+user known hosts files.
+If this flag is set to
+.Dq ask ,
+new host keys
+will be added to the user known host files only after the user
+has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and
+ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
+The host keys of
+known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes ,
+.Dq no ,
+or
+.Dq ask .
+The default is
+.Dq ask .
+.It Cm TCPKeepAlive
+Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
+other side.
+If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
+of the machines will be properly noticed.
+However, this means that
+connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
+find it annoying.
+.Pp
+The default is
+.Dq yes
+(to send TCP keepalive messages), and the client will notice
+if the network goes down or the remote host dies.
+This is important in scripts, and many users want it too.
+.Pp
+To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm Tunnel
+Request
+.Xr tun 4
+device forwarding between the client and the server.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes ,
+.Dq point-to-point
+(layer 3),
+.Dq ethernet
+(layer 2),
+or
+.Dq no .
+Specifying
+.Dq yes
+requests the default tunnel mode, which is
+.Dq point-to-point .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm TunnelDevice
+Specifies the
+.Xr tun 4
+devices to open on the client
+.Pq Ar local_tun
+and the server
+.Pq Ar remote_tun .
+.Pp
+The argument must be
+.Sm off
+.Ar local_tun Op : Ar remote_tun .
+.Sm on
+The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
+.Dq any ,
+which uses the next available tunnel device.
+If
+.Ar remote_tun
+is not specified, it defaults to
+.Dq any .
+The default is
+.Dq any:any .
+.It Cm UpdateHostKeys
+Specifies whether
+.Xr ssh 1
+should accept notifications of additional hostkeys from the server sent
+after authentication has completed and add them to
+.Cm UserKnownHostsFile .
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes ,
+.Dq no
+(the default) or
+.Dq ask .
+Enabling this option allows learning alternate hostkeys for a server
+and supports graceful key rotation by allowing a server to send replacement
+public keys before old ones are removed.
+Additional hostkeys are only accepted if the key used to authenticate the
+host was already trusted or explicitly accepted by the user.
+If
+.Cm UpdateHostKeys
+is set to
+.Dq ask ,
+then the user is asked to confirm the modifications to the known_hosts file.
+Confirmation is currently incompatible with
+.Cm ControlPersist ,
+and will be disabled if it is enabled.
+.Pp
+Presently, only
+.Xr sshd 8
+from OpenSSH 6.8 and greater support the
+.Dq hostkeys at openssh.com
+protocol extension used to inform the client of all the server's hostkeys.
+.It Cm UsePrivilegedPort
+Specifies whether to use a privileged port for outgoing connections.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+If set to
+.Dq yes ,
+.Xr ssh 1
+must be setuid root.
+Note that this option must be set to
+.Dq yes
+for
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+with older servers.
+.It Cm User
+Specifies the user to log in as.
+This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines.
+This saves the trouble of
+having to remember to give the user name on the command line.
+.It Cm UserKnownHostsFile
+Specifies one or more files to use for the user
+host key database, separated by whitespace.
+The default is
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts2 .
+.It Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS
+Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP resource
+records.
+If this option is set to
+.Dq yes ,
+the client will implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint
+from DNS.
+Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was set to
+.Dq ask .
+If this option is set to
+.Dq ask ,
+information on fingerprint match will be displayed, but the user will still
+need to confirm new host keys according to the
+.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
+option.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes ,
+.Dq no ,
+or
+.Dq ask .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.Pp
+See also VERIFYING HOST KEYS in
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Cm VisualHostKey
+If this flag is set to
+.Dq yes ,
+an ASCII art representation of the remote host key fingerprint is
+printed in addition to the fingerprint string at login and
+for unknown host keys.
+If this flag is set to
+.Dq no ,
+no fingerprint strings are printed at login and
+only the fingerprint string will be printed for unknown host keys.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm XAuthLocation
+Specifies the full pathname of the
+.Xr xauth 1
+program.
+The default is
+.Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth .
+.El
+.Sh PATTERNS
+A
+.Em pattern
+consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters,
+.Sq *
+(a wildcard that matches zero or more characters),
+or
+.Sq ?\&
+(a wildcard that matches exactly one character).
+For example, to specify a set of declarations for any host in the
+.Dq .co.uk
+set of domains,
+the following pattern could be used:
+.Pp
+.Dl Host *.co.uk
+.Pp
+The following pattern
+would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network range:
+.Pp
+.Dl Host 192.168.0.?
+.Pp
+A
+.Em pattern-list
+is a comma-separated list of patterns.
+Patterns within pattern-lists may be negated
+by preceding them with an exclamation mark
+.Pq Sq !\& .
+For example,
+to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an organization
+except from the
+.Dq dialup
+pool,
+the following entry (in authorized_keys) could be used:
+.Pp
+.Dl from=\&"!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com\&"
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/config
+This is the per-user configuration file.
+The format of this file is described above.
+This file is used by the SSH client.
+Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
+read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+Systemwide configuration file.
+This file provides defaults for those
+values that are not specified in the user's configuration file, and
+for those users who do not have a configuration file.
+This file must be world-readable.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshbuf-getput-basic.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,464 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-basic.c,v 1.6 2016/06/16 11:00:17 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+int
+sshbuf_get(struct sshbuf *buf, void *v, size_t len)
+{
+ const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, len)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (v != NULL && len != 0)
+ memcpy(v, p, len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t *valp)
+{
+ const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 8)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (valp != NULL)
+ *valp = PEEK_U64(p);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t *valp)
+{
+ const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 4)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (valp != NULL)
+ *valp = PEEK_U32(p);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t *valp)
+{
+ const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 2)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (valp != NULL)
+ *valp = PEEK_U16(p);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char *valp)
+{
+ const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 1)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (valp != NULL)
+ *valp = (u_int8_t)*p;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_string(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+ const u_char *val;
+ size_t len;
+ int r;
+
+ if (valp != NULL)
+ *valp = NULL;
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = 0;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &val, &len)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (valp != NULL) {
+ if ((*valp = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL"));
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ if (len != 0)
+ memcpy(*valp, val, len);
+ (*valp)[len] = '\0';
+ }
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_string_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ const u_char *p;
+ int r;
+
+ if (valp != NULL)
+ *valp = NULL;
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = 0;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (valp != NULL)
+ *valp = p;
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = len;
+ if (sshbuf_consume(buf, len + 4) != 0) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
+ SSHBUF_ABORT();
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_peek_string_direct(const struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp,
+ size_t *lenp)
+{
+ u_int32_t len;
+ const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+
+ if (valp != NULL)
+ *valp = NULL;
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = 0;
+ if (sshbuf_len(buf) < 4) {
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE"));
+ return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ }
+ len = PEEK_U32(p);
+ if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 4) {
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE"));
+ return SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(buf) - 4 < len) {
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE"));
+ return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ }
+ if (valp != NULL)
+ *valp = p + 4;
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, char **valp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ const u_char *p, *z;
+ int r;
+
+ if (valp != NULL)
+ *valp = NULL;
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = 0;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ /* Allow a \0 only at the end of the string */
+ if (len > 0 &&
+ (z = memchr(p , '\0', len)) != NULL && z < p + len - 1) {
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT"));
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (valp != NULL) {
+ if ((*valp = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL"));
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ if (len != 0)
+ memcpy(*valp, p, len);
+ (*valp)[len] = '\0';
+ }
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = (size_t)len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf *v)
+{
+ u_int32_t len;
+ u_char *p;
+ int r;
+
+ /*
+ * Use sshbuf_peek_string_direct() to figure out if there is
+ * a complete string in 'buf' and copy the string directly
+ * into 'v'.
+ */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_reserve(v, len, &p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get(buf, p, len)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len)
+{
+ u_char *p;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len, &p)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (len != 0)
+ memcpy(p, v, len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_putb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v)
+{
+ return sshbuf_put(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v));
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_putf(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ int r;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ r = sshbuf_putfv(buf, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_putfv(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+{
+ va_list ap2;
+ int r, len;
+ u_char *p;
+
+ VA_COPY(ap2, ap);
+ if ((len = vsnprintf(NULL, 0, fmt, ap2)) < 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (len == 0) {
+ r = 0;
+ goto out; /* Nothing to do */
+ }
+ va_end(ap2);
+ VA_COPY(ap2, ap);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, (size_t)len + 1, &p)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = vsnprintf((char *)p, len + 1, fmt, ap2)) != len) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out; /* Shouldn't happen */
+ }
+ /* Consume terminating \0 */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(buf, 1)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ va_end(ap2);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t val)
+{
+ u_char *p;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 8, &p)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ POKE_U64(p, val);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t val)
+{
+ u_char *p;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 4, &p)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ POKE_U32(p, val);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t val)
+{
+ u_char *p;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 2, &p)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ POKE_U16(p, val);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char val)
+{
+ u_char *p;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 1, &p)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ p[0] = val;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_string(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len)
+{
+ u_char *d;
+ int r;
+
+ if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 4) {
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE"));
+ return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len + 4, &d)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ POKE_U32(d, len);
+ if (len != 0)
+ memcpy(d + 4, v, len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *v)
+{
+ return sshbuf_put_string(buf, (u_char *)v, v == NULL ? 0 : strlen(v));
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v)
+{
+ return sshbuf_put_string(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v));
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf **bufp)
+{
+ const u_char *p;
+ size_t len;
+ struct sshbuf *ret;
+ int r;
+
+ if (buf == NULL || bufp == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ *bufp = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_from(p, len)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, len + 4)) != 0 || /* Shouldn't happen */
+ (r = sshbuf_set_parent(ret, buf)) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(ret);
+ return r;
+ }
+ *bufp = ret;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len)
+{
+ u_char *d;
+ const u_char *s = (const u_char *)v;
+ int r, prepend;
+
+ if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 5) {
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE"));
+ return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
+ }
+ /* Skip leading zero bytes */
+ for (; len > 0 && *s == 0; len--, s++)
+ ;
+ /*
+ * If most significant bit is set then prepend a zero byte to
+ * avoid interpretation as a negative number.
+ */
+ prepend = len > 0 && (s[0] & 0x80) != 0;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len + 4 + prepend, &d)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ POKE_U32(d, len + prepend);
+ if (prepend)
+ d[4] = 0;
+ if (len != 0)
+ memcpy(d + 4 + prepend, s, len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(struct sshbuf *buf,
+ const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+ const u_char *d;
+ size_t len, olen;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &olen)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ len = olen;
+ /* Refuse negative (MSB set) bignums */
+ if ((len != 0 && (*d & 0x80) != 0))
+ return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE;
+ /* Refuse overlong bignums, allow prepended \0 to avoid MSB set */
+ if (len > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 ||
+ (len == SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 && *d != 0))
+ return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE;
+ /* Trim leading zeros */
+ while (len > 0 && *d == 0x00) {
+ d++;
+ len--;
+ }
+ if (valp != NULL)
+ *valp = d;
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = len;
+ if (sshbuf_consume(buf, olen + 4) != 0) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
+ SSHBUF_ABORT();
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-crypto.c,v 1.5 2016/01/12 23:42:54 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM *v)
+{
+ const u_char *d;
+ size_t len;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(buf, &d, &len)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (v != NULL && BN_bin2bn(d, len, v) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_bignum1(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM *v)
+{
+ const u_char *d = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+ u_int16_t len_bits;
+ size_t len_bytes;
+
+ /* Length in bits */
+ if (sshbuf_len(buf) < 2)
+ return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ len_bits = PEEK_U16(d);
+ len_bytes = (len_bits + 7) >> 3;
+ if (len_bytes > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
+ return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE;
+ if (sshbuf_len(buf) < 2 + len_bytes)
+ return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ if (v != NULL && BN_bin2bn(d + 2, len_bytes, v) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if (sshbuf_consume(buf, 2 + len_bytes) != 0) {
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
+ SSHBUF_ABORT();
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+static int
+get_ec(const u_char *d, size_t len, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
+{
+ /* Refuse overlong bignums */
+ if (len == 0 || len > SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT)
+ return SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE;
+ /* Only handle uncompressed points */
+ if (*d != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ if (v != NULL && EC_POINT_oct2point(g, v, d, len, NULL) != 1)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX assumption */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
+{
+ const u_char *d;
+ size_t len;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &len)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((r = get_ec(d, len, v, g)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ /* Skip string */
+ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
+ SSHBUF_ABORT();
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_KEY *v)
+{
+ EC_POINT *pt = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(v));
+ int r;
+ const u_char *d;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (pt == NULL) {
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL"));
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &len)) < 0) {
+ EC_POINT_free(pt);
+ return r;
+ }
+ if ((r = get_ec(d, len, pt, EC_KEY_get0_group(v))) != 0) {
+ EC_POINT_free(pt);
+ return r;
+ }
+ if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(v, pt) != 1) {
+ EC_POINT_free(pt);
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* XXX assumption */
+ }
+ EC_POINT_free(pt);
+ /* Skip string */
+ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
+ SSHBUF_ABORT();
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v)
+{
+ u_char d[SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1];
+ int len = BN_num_bytes(v), prepend = 0, r;
+
+ if (len < 0 || len > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ *d = '\0';
+ if (BN_bn2bin(v, d + 1) != len)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Shouldn't happen */
+ /* If MSB is set, prepend a \0 */
+ if (len > 0 && (d[1] & 0x80) != 0)
+ prepend = 1;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, d + 1 - prepend, len + prepend)) < 0) {
+ explicit_bzero(d, sizeof(d));
+ return r;
+ }
+ explicit_bzero(d, sizeof(d));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_bignum1(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v)
+{
+ int r, len_bits = BN_num_bits(v);
+ size_t len_bytes = (len_bits + 7) / 8;
+ u_char d[SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM], *dp;
+
+ if (len_bits < 0 || len_bytes > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (BN_bn2bin(v, d) != (int)len_bytes)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Shouldn't happen */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len_bytes + 2, &dp)) < 0) {
+ explicit_bzero(d, sizeof(d));
+ return r;
+ }
+ POKE_U16(dp, len_bits);
+ if (len_bytes != 0)
+ memcpy(dp + 2, d, len_bytes);
+ explicit_bzero(d, sizeof(d));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+int
+sshbuf_put_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
+{
+ u_char d[SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT];
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+ size_t len;
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((len = EC_POINT_point2oct(g, v, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ NULL, 0, bn_ctx)) > SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT) {
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_point2oct(g, v, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ d, len, bn_ctx) != len) {
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Shouldn't happen */
+ }
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ ret = sshbuf_put_string(buf, d, len);
+ explicit_bzero(d, len);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_KEY *v)
+{
+ return sshbuf_put_ec(buf, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(v),
+ EC_KEY_get0_group(v));
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshbuf-misc.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshbuf-misc.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshbuf-misc.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshbuf-misc.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-misc.c,v 1.6 2016/05/02 08:49:03 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+void
+sshbuf_dump_data(const void *s, size_t len, FILE *f)
+{
+ size_t i, j;
+ const u_char *p = (const u_char *)s;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) {
+ fprintf(f, "%.4zu: ", i);
+ for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) {
+ if (j < len)
+ fprintf(f, "%02x ", p[j]);
+ else
+ fprintf(f, " ");
+ }
+ fprintf(f, " ");
+ for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) {
+ if (j < len) {
+ if (isascii(p[j]) && isprint(p[j]))
+ fprintf(f, "%c", p[j]);
+ else
+ fprintf(f, ".");
+ }
+ }
+ fprintf(f, "\n");
+ }
+}
+
+void
+sshbuf_dump(struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f)
+{
+ fprintf(f, "buffer %p len = %zu\n", buf, sshbuf_len(buf));
+ sshbuf_dump_data(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), f);
+}
+
+char *
+sshbuf_dtob16(struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+ size_t i, j, len = sshbuf_len(buf);
+ const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+ char *ret;
+ const char hex[] = "0123456789abcdef";
+
+ if (len == 0)
+ return strdup("");
+ if (SIZE_MAX / 2 <= len || (ret = malloc(len * 2 + 1)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ for (i = j = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ ret[j++] = hex[(p[i] >> 4) & 0xf];
+ ret[j++] = hex[p[i] & 0xf];
+ }
+ ret[j] = '\0';
+ return ret;
+}
+
+char *
+sshbuf_dtob64(struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+ size_t len = sshbuf_len(buf), plen;
+ const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+ char *ret;
+ int r;
+
+ if (len == 0)
+ return strdup("");
+ plen = ((len + 2) / 3) * 4 + 1;
+ if (SIZE_MAX / 2 <= len || (ret = malloc(plen)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if ((r = b64_ntop(p, len, ret, plen)) == -1) {
+ explicit_bzero(ret, plen);
+ free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_b64tod(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *b64)
+{
+ size_t plen = strlen(b64);
+ int nlen, r;
+ u_char *p;
+
+ if (plen == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if ((p = malloc(plen)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((nlen = b64_pton(b64, p, plen)) < 0) {
+ explicit_bzero(p, plen);
+ free(p);
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, p, nlen)) < 0) {
+ explicit_bzero(p, plen);
+ free(p);
+ return r;
+ }
+ explicit_bzero(p, plen);
+ free(p);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+char *
+sshbuf_dup_string(struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+ const u_char *p = NULL, *s = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+ size_t l = sshbuf_len(buf);
+ char *r;
+
+ if (s == NULL || l > SIZE_MAX)
+ return NULL;
+ /* accept a nul only as the last character in the buffer */
+ if (l > 0 && (p = memchr(s, '\0', l)) != NULL) {
+ if (p != s + l - 1)
+ return NULL;
+ l--; /* the nul is put back below */
+ }
+ if ((r = malloc(l + 1)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (l > 0)
+ memcpy(r, s, l);
+ r[l] = '\0';
+ return r;
+}
+
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshbuf.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshbuf.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshbuf.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshbuf.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,404 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.c,v 1.6 2016/01/12 23:42:54 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h> /* roundup */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+static inline int
+sshbuf_check_sanity(const struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+ SSHBUF_TELL("sanity");
+ if (__predict_false(buf == NULL ||
+ (!buf->readonly && buf->d != buf->cd) ||
+ buf->refcount < 1 || buf->refcount > SSHBUF_REFS_MAX ||
+ buf->cd == NULL ||
+ (buf->dont_free && (buf->readonly || buf->parent != NULL)) ||
+ buf->max_size > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX ||
+ buf->alloc > buf->max_size ||
+ buf->size > buf->alloc ||
+ buf->off > buf->size)) {
+ /* Do not try to recover from corrupted buffer internals */
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
+ signal(SIGSEGV, SIG_DFL);
+ raise(SIGSEGV);
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+sshbuf_maybe_pack(struct sshbuf *buf, int force)
+{
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("force %d", force));
+ SSHBUF_TELL("pre-pack");
+ if (buf->off == 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1)
+ return;
+ if (force ||
+ (buf->off >= SSHBUF_PACK_MIN && buf->off >= buf->size / 2)) {
+ memmove(buf->d, buf->d + buf->off, buf->size - buf->off);
+ buf->size -= buf->off;
+ buf->off = 0;
+ SSHBUF_TELL("packed");
+ }
+}
+
+struct sshbuf *
+sshbuf_new(void)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *ret;
+
+ if ((ret = calloc(sizeof(*ret), 1)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ ret->alloc = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT;
+ ret->max_size = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX;
+ ret->readonly = 0;
+ ret->refcount = 1;
+ ret->parent = NULL;
+ if ((ret->cd = ret->d = calloc(1, ret->alloc)) == NULL) {
+ free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+struct sshbuf *
+sshbuf_from(const void *blob, size_t len)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *ret;
+
+ if (blob == NULL || len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX ||
+ (ret = calloc(sizeof(*ret), 1)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ ret->alloc = ret->size = ret->max_size = len;
+ ret->readonly = 1;
+ ret->refcount = 1;
+ ret->parent = NULL;
+ ret->cd = blob;
+ ret->d = NULL;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_set_parent(struct sshbuf *child, struct sshbuf *parent)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(child)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_check_sanity(parent)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ child->parent = parent;
+ child->parent->refcount++;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct sshbuf *
+sshbuf_fromb(struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *ret;
+
+ if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0)
+ return NULL;
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_from(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf))) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (sshbuf_set_parent(ret, buf) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void
+sshbuf_init(struct sshbuf *ret)
+{
+ explicit_bzero(ret, sizeof(*ret));
+ ret->alloc = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT;
+ ret->max_size = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX;
+ ret->readonly = 0;
+ ret->dont_free = 1;
+ ret->refcount = 1;
+ if ((ret->cd = ret->d = calloc(1, ret->alloc)) == NULL)
+ ret->alloc = 0;
+}
+
+void
+sshbuf_free(struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+ int dont_free = 0;
+
+ if (buf == NULL)
+ return;
+ /*
+ * The following will leak on insane buffers, but this is the safest
+ * course of action - an invalid pointer or already-freed pointer may
+ * have been passed to us and continuing to scribble over memory would
+ * be bad.
+ */
+ if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0)
+ return;
+ /*
+ * If we are a child, the free our parent to decrement its reference
+ * count and possibly free it.
+ */
+ sshbuf_free(buf->parent);
+ buf->parent = NULL;
+ /*
+ * If we are a parent with still-extant children, then don't free just
+ * yet. The last child's call to sshbuf_free should decrement our
+ * refcount to 0 and trigger the actual free.
+ */
+ buf->refcount--;
+ if (buf->refcount > 0)
+ return;
+ dont_free = buf->dont_free;
+ if (!buf->readonly) {
+ explicit_bzero(buf->d, buf->alloc);
+ free(buf->d);
+ }
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(*buf));
+ if (!dont_free)
+ free(buf);
+}
+
+void
+sshbuf_reset(struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+ u_char *d;
+
+ if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) {
+ /* Nonsensical. Just make buffer appear empty */
+ buf->off = buf->size;
+ return;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) == 0)
+ explicit_bzero(buf->d, buf->alloc);
+ buf->off = buf->size = 0;
+ if (buf->alloc != SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT) {
+ if ((d = realloc(buf->d, SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT)) != NULL) {
+ buf->cd = buf->d = d;
+ buf->alloc = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+size_t
+sshbuf_max_size(const struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+ return buf->max_size;
+}
+
+size_t
+sshbuf_alloc(const struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+ return buf->alloc;
+}
+
+const struct sshbuf *
+sshbuf_parent(const struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+ return buf->parent;
+}
+
+u_int
+sshbuf_refcount(const struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+ return buf->refcount;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_set_max_size(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t max_size)
+{
+ size_t rlen;
+ u_char *dp;
+ int r;
+
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("set max buf = %p len = %zu", buf, max_size));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (max_size == buf->max_size)
+ return 0;
+ if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1)
+ return SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY;
+ if (max_size > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX)
+ return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
+ /* pack and realloc if necessary */
+ sshbuf_maybe_pack(buf, max_size < buf->size);
+ if (max_size < buf->alloc && max_size > buf->size) {
+ if (buf->size < SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT)
+ rlen = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT;
+ else
+ rlen = roundup(buf->size, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC);
+ if (rlen > max_size)
+ rlen = max_size;
+ explicit_bzero(buf->d + buf->size, buf->alloc - buf->size);
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("new alloc = %zu", rlen));
+ if ((dp = realloc(buf->d, rlen)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ buf->cd = buf->d = dp;
+ buf->alloc = rlen;
+ }
+ SSHBUF_TELL("new-max");
+ if (max_size < buf->alloc)
+ return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
+ buf->max_size = max_size;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+size_t
+sshbuf_len(const struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+ if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ return buf->size - buf->off;
+}
+
+size_t
+sshbuf_avail(const struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+ if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1)
+ return 0;
+ return buf->max_size - (buf->size - buf->off);
+}
+
+const u_char *
+sshbuf_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+ if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0)
+ return NULL;
+ return buf->cd + buf->off;
+}
+
+u_char *
+sshbuf_mutable_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+ if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1)
+ return NULL;
+ return buf->d + buf->off;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1)
+ return SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY;
+ SSHBUF_TELL("check");
+ /* Check that len is reasonable and that max_size + available < len */
+ if (len > buf->max_size || buf->max_size - len < buf->size - buf->off)
+ return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp)
+{
+ size_t rlen, need;
+ u_char *dp;
+ int r;
+
+ if (dpp != NULL)
+ *dpp = NULL;
+
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("reserve buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ /*
+ * If the requested allocation appended would push us past max_size
+ * then pack the buffer, zeroing buf->off.
+ */
+ sshbuf_maybe_pack(buf, buf->size + len > buf->max_size);
+ SSHBUF_TELL("reserve");
+ if (len + buf->size > buf->alloc) {
+ /*
+ * Prefer to alloc in SSHBUF_SIZE_INC units, but
+ * allocate less if doing so would overflow max_size.
+ */
+ need = len + buf->size - buf->alloc;
+ rlen = roundup(buf->alloc + need, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC);
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("need %zu initial rlen %zu", need, rlen));
+ if (rlen > buf->max_size)
+ rlen = buf->alloc + need;
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("adjusted rlen %zu", rlen));
+ if ((dp = realloc(buf->d, rlen)) == NULL) {
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("realloc fail"));
+ if (dpp != NULL)
+ *dpp = NULL;
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ buf->alloc = rlen;
+ buf->cd = buf->d = dp;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) < 0) {
+ /* shouldn't fail */
+ if (dpp != NULL)
+ *dpp = NULL;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+ dp = buf->d + buf->size;
+ buf->size += len;
+ SSHBUF_TELL("done");
+ if (dpp != NULL)
+ *dpp = dp;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("len = %zu", len));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (len > sshbuf_len(buf))
+ return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ buf->off += len;
+ SSHBUF_TELL("done");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_consume_end(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("len = %zu", len));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (len > sshbuf_len(buf))
+ return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ buf->size -= len;
+ SSHBUF_TELL("done");
+ return 0;
+}
+
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshbuf.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshbuf.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshbuf.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshbuf.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,348 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.7 2016/05/02 08:49:03 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SSHBUF_H
+#define _SSHBUF_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#define SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX 0x8000000 /* Hard maximum size */
+#define SSHBUF_REFS_MAX 0x100000 /* Max child buffers */
+#define SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM (16384 / 8) /* Max bignum *bytes* */
+#define SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT ((528 * 2 / 8) + 1) /* Max EC point *bytes* */
+
+/*
+ * NB. do not depend on the internals of this. It will be made opaque
+ * one day.
+ */
+struct sshbuf {
+ u_char *d; /* Data */
+ const u_char *cd; /* Const data */
+ size_t off; /* First available byte is buf->d + buf->off */
+ size_t size; /* Last byte is buf->d + buf->size - 1 */
+ size_t max_size; /* Maximum size of buffer */
+ size_t alloc; /* Total bytes allocated to buf->d */
+ int readonly; /* Refers to external, const data */
+ int dont_free; /* Kludge to support sshbuf_init */
+ u_int refcount; /* Tracks self and number of child buffers */
+ struct sshbuf *parent; /* If child, pointer to parent */
+};
+
+#ifndef SSHBUF_NO_DEPREACTED
+/*
+ * NB. Please do not use sshbuf_init() in new code. Please use sshbuf_new()
+ * instead. sshbuf_init() is deprectated and will go away soon (it is
+ * only included to allow compat with buffer_* in OpenSSH)
+ */
+void sshbuf_init(struct sshbuf *buf);
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Create a new sshbuf buffer.
+ * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
+ */
+struct sshbuf *sshbuf_new(void);
+
+/*
+ * Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from existing data.
+ * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
+ */
+struct sshbuf *sshbuf_from(const void *blob, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from the contents of an existing
+ * buffer. The contents of "buf" must not change in the lifetime of the
+ * resultant buffer.
+ * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
+ */
+struct sshbuf *sshbuf_fromb(struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/*
+ * Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from the contents of a string in
+ * an existing buffer (the string is consumed in the process).
+ * The contents of "buf" must not change in the lifetime of the resultant
+ * buffer.
+ * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
+ */
+int sshbuf_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf **bufp);
+
+/*
+ * Clear and free buf
+ */
+void sshbuf_free(struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/*
+ * Reset buf, clearing its contents. NB. max_size is preserved.
+ */
+void sshbuf_reset(struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/*
+ * Return the maximum size of buf
+ */
+size_t sshbuf_max_size(const struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/*
+ * Set the maximum size of buf
+ * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ */
+int sshbuf_set_max_size(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t max_size);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of data in buf
+ */
+size_t sshbuf_len(const struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/*
+ * Returns number of bytes left in buffer before hitting max_size.
+ */
+size_t sshbuf_avail(const struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/*
+ * Returns a read-only pointer to the start of the data in buf
+ */
+const u_char *sshbuf_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/*
+ * Returns a mutable pointer to the start of the data in buf, or
+ * NULL if the buffer is read-only.
+ */
+u_char *sshbuf_mutable_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/*
+ * Check whether a reservation of size len will succeed in buf
+ * Safer to use than direct comparisons again sshbuf_avail as it copes
+ * with unsigned overflows correctly.
+ * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ */
+int sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Reserve len bytes in buf.
+ * Returns 0 on success and a pointer to the first reserved byte via the
+ * optional dpp parameter or a negative * SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ */
+int sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp);
+
+/*
+ * Consume len bytes from the start of buf
+ * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ */
+int sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Consume len bytes from the end of buf
+ * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ */
+int sshbuf_consume_end(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
+
+/* Extract or deposit some bytes */
+int sshbuf_get(struct sshbuf *buf, void *v, size_t len);
+int sshbuf_put(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len);
+int sshbuf_putb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v);
+
+/* Append using a printf(3) format */
+int sshbuf_putf(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, ...)
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+int sshbuf_putfv(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, va_list ap);
+
+/* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */
+int sshbuf_get_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t *valp);
+int sshbuf_get_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t *valp);
+int sshbuf_get_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t *valp);
+int sshbuf_get_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char *valp);
+int sshbuf_put_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t val);
+int sshbuf_put_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t val);
+int sshbuf_put_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t val);
+int sshbuf_put_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char val);
+
+/*
+ * Functions to extract or store SSH wire encoded strings (u32 len || data)
+ * The "cstring" variants admit no \0 characters in the string contents.
+ * Caller must free *valp.
+ */
+int sshbuf_get_string(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp);
+int sshbuf_get_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, char **valp, size_t *lenp);
+int sshbuf_get_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf *v);
+int sshbuf_put_string(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len);
+int sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *v);
+int sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v);
+
+/*
+ * "Direct" variant of sshbuf_get_string, returns pointer into the sshbuf to
+ * avoid an malloc+memcpy. The pointer is guaranteed to be valid until the
+ * next sshbuf-modifying function call. Caller does not free.
+ */
+int sshbuf_get_string_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp,
+ size_t *lenp);
+
+/* Skip past a string */
+#define sshbuf_skip_string(buf) sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)
+
+/* Another variant: "peeks" into the buffer without modifying it */
+int sshbuf_peek_string_direct(const struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp,
+ size_t *lenp);
+
+/*
+ * Functions to extract or store SSH wire encoded bignums and elliptic
+ * curve points.
+ */
+int sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len);
+int sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(struct sshbuf *buf,
+ const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp);
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+int sshbuf_get_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM *v);
+int sshbuf_get_bignum1(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM *v);
+int sshbuf_put_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v);
+int sshbuf_put_bignum1(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v);
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+int sshbuf_get_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g);
+int sshbuf_get_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_KEY *v);
+int sshbuf_put_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g);
+int sshbuf_put_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_KEY *v);
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+/* Dump the contents of the buffer in a human-readable format */
+void sshbuf_dump(struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f);
+
+/* Dump specified memory in a human-readable format */
+void sshbuf_dump_data(const void *s, size_t len, FILE *f);
+
+/* Return the hexadecimal representation of the contents of the buffer */
+char *sshbuf_dtob16(struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/* Encode the contents of the buffer as base64 */
+char *sshbuf_dtob64(struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/* Decode base64 data and append it to the buffer */
+int sshbuf_b64tod(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *b64);
+
+/*
+ * Duplicate the contents of a buffer to a string (caller to free).
+ * Returns NULL on buffer error, or if the buffer contains a premature
+ * nul character.
+ */
+char *sshbuf_dup_string(struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/* Macros for decoding/encoding integers */
+#define PEEK_U64(p) \
+ (((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 56) | \
+ ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1]) << 48) | \
+ ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[2]) << 40) | \
+ ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[3]) << 32) | \
+ ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[4]) << 24) | \
+ ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[5]) << 16) | \
+ ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[6]) << 8) | \
+ (u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[7]))
+#define PEEK_U32(p) \
+ (((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 24) | \
+ ((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1]) << 16) | \
+ ((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[2]) << 8) | \
+ (u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[3]))
+#define PEEK_U16(p) \
+ (((u_int16_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 8) | \
+ (u_int16_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1]))
+
+#define POKE_U64(p, v) \
+ do { \
+ const u_int64_t __v = (v); \
+ ((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 56) & 0xff; \
+ ((u_char *)(p))[1] = (__v >> 48) & 0xff; \
+ ((u_char *)(p))[2] = (__v >> 40) & 0xff; \
+ ((u_char *)(p))[3] = (__v >> 32) & 0xff; \
+ ((u_char *)(p))[4] = (__v >> 24) & 0xff; \
+ ((u_char *)(p))[5] = (__v >> 16) & 0xff; \
+ ((u_char *)(p))[6] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \
+ ((u_char *)(p))[7] = __v & 0xff; \
+ } while (0)
+#define POKE_U32(p, v) \
+ do { \
+ const u_int32_t __v = (v); \
+ ((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 24) & 0xff; \
+ ((u_char *)(p))[1] = (__v >> 16) & 0xff; \
+ ((u_char *)(p))[2] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \
+ ((u_char *)(p))[3] = __v & 0xff; \
+ } while (0)
+#define POKE_U16(p, v) \
+ do { \
+ const u_int16_t __v = (v); \
+ ((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \
+ ((u_char *)(p))[1] = __v & 0xff; \
+ } while (0)
+
+/* Internal definitions follow. Exposed for regress tests */
+#ifdef SSHBUF_INTERNAL
+
+/*
+ * Return the allocation size of buf
+ */
+size_t sshbuf_alloc(const struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/*
+ * Increment the reference count of buf.
+ */
+int sshbuf_set_parent(struct sshbuf *child, struct sshbuf *parent);
+
+/*
+ * Return the parent buffer of buf, or NULL if it has no parent.
+ */
+const struct sshbuf *sshbuf_parent(const struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/*
+ * Return the reference count of buf
+ */
+u_int sshbuf_refcount(const struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+# define SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT 256 /* Initial allocation */
+# define SSHBUF_SIZE_INC 256 /* Preferred increment length */
+# define SSHBUF_PACK_MIN 8192 /* Minimim packable offset */
+
+/* # define SSHBUF_ABORT abort */
+/* # define SSHBUF_DEBUG */
+
+# ifndef SSHBUF_ABORT
+# define SSHBUF_ABORT()
+# endif
+
+# ifdef SSHBUF_DEBUG
+# define SSHBUF_TELL(what) do { \
+ printf("%s:%d %s: %s size %zu alloc %zu off %zu max %zu\n", \
+ __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__, what, \
+ buf->size, buf->alloc, buf->off, buf->max_size); \
+ fflush(stdout); \
+ } while (0)
+# define SSHBUF_DBG(x) do { \
+ printf("%s:%d %s: ", __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__); \
+ printf x; \
+ printf("\n"); \
+ fflush(stdout); \
+ } while (0)
+# else
+# define SSHBUF_TELL(what)
+# define SSHBUF_DBG(x)
+# endif
+#endif /* SSHBUF_INTERNAL */
+
+#endif /* _SSHBUF_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshconnect.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1405 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.246 2014/02/06 22:21:01 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the
- * login (authentication) dialog.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-#include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "sshconnect.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "readconf.h"
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "dns.h"
-#include "roaming.h"
-#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "version.h"
-
-char *client_version_string = NULL;
-char *server_version_string = NULL;
-
-static int matching_host_key_dns = 0;
-
-static pid_t proxy_command_pid = 0;
-
-/* import */
-extern Options options;
-extern char *__progname;
-extern uid_t original_real_uid;
-extern uid_t original_effective_uid;
-
-static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *, Key *);
-static void warn_changed_key(Key *);
-
-/* Expand a proxy command */
-static char *
-expand_proxy_command(const char *proxy_command, const char *user,
- const char *host, int port)
-{
- char *tmp, *ret, strport[NI_MAXSERV];
-
- snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
- xasprintf(&tmp, "exec %s", proxy_command);
- ret = percent_expand(tmp, "h", host, "p", strport,
- "r", options.user, (char *)NULL);
- free(tmp);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command that passes a
- * a connected fd back to us.
- */
-static int
-ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(const char *host, u_short port,
- const char *proxy_command)
-{
- char *command_string;
- int sp[2], sock;
- pid_t pid;
- char *shell;
-
- if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL)
- shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
-
- if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sp) < 0)
- fatal("Could not create socketpair to communicate with "
- "proxy dialer: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-
- command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user,
- host, port);
- debug("Executing proxy dialer command: %.500s", command_string);
-
- /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */
- if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
- char *argv[10];
-
- /* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */
- permanently_drop_suid(original_real_uid);
-
- close(sp[1]);
- /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */
- if (sp[0] != 0) {
- if (dup2(sp[0], 0) < 0)
- perror("dup2 stdin");
- }
- if (sp[0] != 1) {
- if (dup2(sp[0], 1) < 0)
- perror("dup2 stdout");
- }
- if (sp[0] >= 2)
- close(sp[0]);
-
- /*
- * Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get
- * printed on the user's terminal.
- */
- argv[0] = shell;
- argv[1] = "-c";
- argv[2] = command_string;
- argv[3] = NULL;
-
- /*
- * Execute the proxy command.
- * Note that we gave up any extra privileges above.
- */
- execv(argv[0], argv);
- perror(argv[0]);
- exit(1);
- }
- /* Parent. */
- if (pid < 0)
- fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- close(sp[0]);
- free(command_string);
-
- if ((sock = mm_receive_fd(sp[1])) == -1)
- fatal("proxy dialer did not pass back a connection");
-
- while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1)
- if (errno != EINTR)
- fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
-
- /* Set the connection file descriptors. */
- packet_set_connection(sock, sock);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command.
- */
-static int
-ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
-{
- char *command_string;
- int pin[2], pout[2];
- pid_t pid;
- char *shell;
-
- if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0')
- shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
-
- /* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */
- if (pipe(pin) < 0 || pipe(pout) < 0)
- fatal("Could not create pipes to communicate with the proxy: %.100s",
- strerror(errno));
-
- command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user,
- host, port);
- debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string);
-
- /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */
- if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
- char *argv[10];
-
- /* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */
- permanently_drop_suid(original_real_uid);
-
- /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */
- close(pin[1]);
- if (pin[0] != 0) {
- if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0)
- perror("dup2 stdin");
- close(pin[0]);
- }
- close(pout[0]);
- if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0)
- perror("dup2 stdout");
- /* Cannot be 1 because pin allocated two descriptors. */
- close(pout[1]);
-
- /* Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get
- printed on the user's terminal. */
- argv[0] = shell;
- argv[1] = "-c";
- argv[2] = command_string;
- argv[3] = NULL;
-
- /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any
- extra privileges above. */
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
- execv(argv[0], argv);
- perror(argv[0]);
- exit(1);
- }
- /* Parent. */
- if (pid < 0)
- fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- else
- proxy_command_pid = pid; /* save pid to clean up later */
-
- /* Close child side of the descriptors. */
- close(pin[0]);
- close(pout[1]);
-
- /* Free the command name. */
- free(command_string);
-
- /* Set the connection file descriptors. */
- packet_set_connection(pout[0], pin[1]);
-
- /* Indicate OK return */
- return 0;
-}
-
-void
-ssh_kill_proxy_command(void)
-{
- /*
- * Send SIGHUP to proxy command if used. We don't wait() in
- * case it hangs and instead rely on init to reap the child
- */
- if (proxy_command_pid > 1)
- kill(proxy_command_pid, SIGHUP);
-}
-
-/*
- * Creates a (possibly privileged) socket for use as the ssh connection.
- */
-static int
-ssh_create_socket(int privileged, struct addrinfo *ai)
-{
- int sock, r, gaierr;
- struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL;
-
- sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
- if (sock < 0) {
- error("socket: %s", strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
-
- /* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */
- if (options.bind_address == NULL && !privileged)
- return sock;
-
- if (options.bind_address) {
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = ai->ai_family;
- hints.ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype;
- hints.ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol;
- hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
- gaierr = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, NULL, &hints, &res);
- if (gaierr) {
- error("getaddrinfo: %s: %s", options.bind_address,
- ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
- close(sock);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- /*
- * If we are running as root and want to connect to a privileged
- * port, bind our own socket to a privileged port.
- */
- if (privileged) {
- PRIV_START;
- r = bindresvport_sa(sock, res ? res->ai_addr : NULL);
- PRIV_END;
- if (r < 0) {
- error("bindresvport_sa: af=%d %s", ai->ai_family,
- strerror(errno));
- goto fail;
- }
- } else {
- if (bind(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
- error("bind: %s: %s", options.bind_address,
- strerror(errno));
- fail:
- close(sock);
- freeaddrinfo(res);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- if (res != NULL)
- freeaddrinfo(res);
- return sock;
-}
-
-static int
-timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr,
- socklen_t addrlen, int *timeoutp)
-{
- fd_set *fdset;
- struct timeval tv, t_start;
- socklen_t optlen;
- int optval, rc, result = -1;
-
- gettimeofday(&t_start, NULL);
-
- if (*timeoutp <= 0) {
- result = connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen);
- goto done;
- }
-
- set_nonblock(sockfd);
- rc = connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen);
- if (rc == 0) {
- unset_nonblock(sockfd);
- result = 0;
- goto done;
- }
- if (errno != EINPROGRESS) {
- result = -1;
- goto done;
- }
-
- fdset = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(sockfd + 1, NFDBITS),
- sizeof(fd_mask));
- FD_SET(sockfd, fdset);
- ms_to_timeval(&tv, *timeoutp);
-
- for (;;) {
- rc = select(sockfd + 1, NULL, fdset, NULL, &tv);
- if (rc != -1 || errno != EINTR)
- break;
- }
-
- switch (rc) {
- case 0:
- /* Timed out */
- errno = ETIMEDOUT;
- break;
- case -1:
- /* Select error */
- debug("select: %s", strerror(errno));
- break;
- case 1:
- /* Completed or failed */
- optval = 0;
- optlen = sizeof(optval);
- if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval,
- &optlen) == -1) {
- debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno));
- break;
- }
- if (optval != 0) {
- errno = optval;
- break;
- }
- result = 0;
- unset_nonblock(sockfd);
- break;
- default:
- /* Should not occur */
- fatal("Bogus return (%d) from select()", rc);
- }
-
- free(fdset);
-
- done:
- if (result == 0 && *timeoutp > 0) {
- ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, timeoutp);
- if (*timeoutp <= 0) {
- errno = ETIMEDOUT;
- result = -1;
- }
- }
-
- return (result);
-}
-
-/*
- * Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host.
- * The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr.
- * If port is 0, the default port will be used. If needpriv is true,
- * a privileged port will be allocated to make the connection.
- * This requires super-user privileges if needpriv is true.
- * Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per
- * second). If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h
- * and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact
- * the daemon.
- */
-static int
-ssh_connect_direct(const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop,
- struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family,
- int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive, int needpriv)
-{
- int on = 1;
- int sock = -1, attempt;
- char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
- struct addrinfo *ai;
-
- debug2("ssh_connect: needpriv %d", needpriv);
-
- for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) {
- if (attempt > 0) {
- /* Sleep a moment before retrying. */
- sleep(1);
- debug("Trying again...");
- }
- /*
- * Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in
- * sequence until the connection succeeds.
- */
- for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET &&
- ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
- continue;
- if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
- ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
- NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
- error("ssh_connect: getnameinfo failed");
- continue;
- }
- debug("Connecting to %.200s [%.100s] port %s.",
- host, ntop, strport);
-
- /* Create a socket for connecting. */
- sock = ssh_create_socket(needpriv, ai);
- if (sock < 0)
- /* Any error is already output */
- continue;
-
- if (timeout_connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
- timeout_ms) >= 0) {
- /* Successful connection. */
- memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
- break;
- } else {
- debug("connect to address %s port %s: %s",
- ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
- close(sock);
- sock = -1;
- }
- }
- if (sock != -1)
- break; /* Successful connection. */
- }
-
- /* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */
- if (sock == -1) {
- error("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s",
- host, strport, strerror(errno));
- return (-1);
- }
-
- debug("Connection established.");
-
- /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
- if (want_keepalive &&
- setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on,
- sizeof(on)) < 0)
- error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-
- /* Set the connection. */
- packet_set_connection(sock, sock);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-ssh_connect(const char *host, struct addrinfo *addrs,
- struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family,
- int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive, int needpriv)
-{
- if (options.proxy_command == NULL) {
- return ssh_connect_direct(host, addrs, hostaddr, port, family,
- connection_attempts, timeout_ms, want_keepalive, needpriv);
- } else if (strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0) {
- packet_set_connection(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
- return 0; /* Always succeeds */
- } else if (options.proxy_use_fdpass) {
- return ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(host, port,
- options.proxy_command);
- }
- return ssh_proxy_connect(host, port, options.proxy_command);
-}
-
-static void
-send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1)
-{
- /* Send our own protocol version identification. */
- if (compat20) {
- xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n",
- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION);
- } else {
- xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n",
- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_VERSION);
- }
- if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string,
- strlen(client_version_string)) != strlen(client_version_string))
- fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- chop(client_version_string);
- debug("Local version string %.100s", client_version_string);
-}
-
-/*
- * Waits for the server identification string, and sends our own
- * identification string.
- */
-void
-ssh_exchange_identification(int timeout_ms)
-{
- char buf[256], remote_version[256]; /* must be same size! */
- int remote_major, remote_minor, mismatch;
- int connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
- int connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
- int minor1 = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1, client_banner_sent = 0;
- u_int i, n;
- size_t len;
- int fdsetsz, remaining, rc;
- struct timeval t_start, t_remaining;
- fd_set *fdset;
-
- fdsetsz = howmany(connection_in + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
- fdset = xcalloc(1, fdsetsz);
-
- /*
- * If we are SSH2-only then we can send the banner immediately and
- * save a round-trip.
- */
- if (options.protocol == SSH_PROTO_2) {
- enable_compat20();
- send_client_banner(connection_out, 0);
- client_banner_sent = 1;
- }
-
- /* Read other side's version identification. */
- remaining = timeout_ms;
- for (n = 0;;) {
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
- if (timeout_ms > 0) {
- gettimeofday(&t_start, NULL);
- ms_to_timeval(&t_remaining, remaining);
- FD_SET(connection_in, fdset);
- rc = select(connection_in + 1, fdset, NULL,
- fdset, &t_remaining);
- ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, &remaining);
- if (rc == 0 || remaining <= 0)
- fatal("Connection timed out during "
- "banner exchange");
- if (rc == -1) {
- if (errno == EINTR)
- continue;
- fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
- "select: %s", strerror(errno));
- }
- }
-
- len = roaming_atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1);
-
- if (len != 1 && errno == EPIPE)
- fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
- "Connection closed by remote host");
- else if (len != 1)
- fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
- "read: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- if (buf[i] == '\r') {
- buf[i] = '\n';
- buf[i + 1] = 0;
- continue; /**XXX wait for \n */
- }
- if (buf[i] == '\n') {
- buf[i + 1] = 0;
- break;
- }
- if (++n > 65536)
- fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
- "No banner received");
- }
- buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
- if (strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0)
- break;
- debug("ssh_exchange_identification: %s", buf);
- }
- server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
- free(fdset);
-
- /*
- * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
- * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
- */
- if (sscanf(server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
- &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3)
- fatal("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'", buf);
- debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s",
- remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
-
- compat_datafellows(remote_version);
- mismatch = 0;
-
- switch (remote_major) {
- case 1:
- if (remote_minor == 99 &&
- (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) &&
- !(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED)) {
- enable_compat20();
- break;
- }
- if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) {
- mismatch = 1;
- break;
- }
- if (remote_minor < 3) {
- fatal("Remote machine has too old SSH software version.");
- } else if (remote_minor == 3 || remote_minor == 4) {
- /* We speak 1.3, too. */
- enable_compat13();
- minor1 = 3;
- if (options.forward_agent) {
- logit("Agent forwarding disabled for protocol 1.3");
- options.forward_agent = 0;
- }
- }
- break;
- case 2:
- if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
- enable_compat20();
- break;
- }
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- default:
- mismatch = 1;
- break;
- }
- if (mismatch)
- fatal("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d",
- (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1,
- remote_major);
- if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY) != 0)
- fatal("Server version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe key agreement; "
- "refusing connection", remote_version);
- if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
- logit("Server version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature "
- "scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version);
- if (!client_banner_sent)
- send_client_banner(connection_out, minor1);
- chop(server_version_string);
-}
-
-/* defaults to 'no' */
-static int
-confirm(const char *prompt)
-{
- const char *msg, *again = "Please type 'yes' or 'no': ";
- char *p;
- int ret = -1;
-
- if (options.batch_mode)
- return 0;
- for (msg = prompt;;msg = again) {
- p = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ECHO);
- if (p == NULL ||
- (p[0] == '\0') || (p[0] == '\n') ||
- strncasecmp(p, "no", 2) == 0)
- ret = 0;
- if (p && strncasecmp(p, "yes", 3) == 0)
- ret = 1;
- free(p);
- if (ret != -1)
- return ret;
- }
-}
-
-static int
-check_host_cert(const char *host, const Key *host_key)
-{
- const char *reason;
-
- if (key_cert_check_authority(host_key, 1, 0, host, &reason) != 0) {
- error("%s", reason);
- return 0;
- }
- if (buffer_len(&host_key->cert->critical) != 0) {
- error("Certificate for %s contains unsupported "
- "critical options(s)", host);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int
-sockaddr_is_local(struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
-{
- switch (hostaddr->sa_family) {
- case AF_INET:
- return (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)->
- sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET;
- case AF_INET6:
- return IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(
- &(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr));
- default:
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Prepare the hostname and ip address strings that are used to lookup
- * host keys in known_hosts files. These may have a port number appended.
- */
-void
-get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr,
- u_short port, char **hostfile_hostname, char **hostfile_ipaddr)
-{
- char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
- socklen_t addrlen;
-
- switch (hostaddr == NULL ? -1 : hostaddr->sa_family) {
- case -1:
- addrlen = 0;
- break;
- case AF_INET:
- addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
- break;
- case AF_INET6:
- addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
- break;
- default:
- addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr);
- break;
- }
-
- /*
- * We don't have the remote ip-address for connections
- * using a proxy command
- */
- if (hostfile_ipaddr != NULL) {
- if (options.proxy_command == NULL) {
- if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, addrlen,
- ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
- fatal("check_host_key: getnameinfo failed");
- *hostfile_ipaddr = put_host_port(ntop, port);
- } else {
- *hostfile_ipaddr = xstrdup("<no hostip for proxy "
- "command>");
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Allow the user to record the key under a different name or
- * differentiate a non-standard port. This is useful for ssh
- * tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run multiple
- * sshd's on different ports on the same machine.
- */
- if (hostfile_hostname != NULL) {
- if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) {
- *hostfile_hostname = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias);
- debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", *hostfile_hostname);
- } else {
- *hostfile_hostname = put_host_port(hostname, port);
- }
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key
- * is not valid. user_hostfile[0] will not be updated if 'readonly' is true.
- */
-#define RDRW 0
-#define RDONLY 1
-#define ROQUIET 2
-static int
-check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
- Key *host_key, int readonly,
- char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles,
- char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles)
-{
- HostStatus host_status;
- HostStatus ip_status;
- Key *raw_key = NULL;
- char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL;
- char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp, *ra;
- char msg[1024];
- const char *type;
- const struct hostkey_entry *host_found, *ip_found;
- int len, cancelled_forwarding = 0;
- int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr);
- int r, want_cert = key_is_cert(host_key), host_ip_differ = 0;
- struct hostkeys *host_hostkeys, *ip_hostkeys;
- u_int i;
-
- /*
- * Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The
- * problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple
- * machines, localhost will refer to a different machine in each of
- * them, and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED warnings. This
- * essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however,
- * this is probably not a real problem.
- */
- if (options.no_host_authentication_for_localhost == 1 && local &&
- options.host_key_alias == NULL) {
- debug("Forcing accepting of host key for "
- "loopback/localhost.");
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * Prepare the hostname and address strings used for hostkey lookup.
- * In some cases, these will have a port number appended.
- */
- get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(hostname, hostaddr, port, &host, &ip);
-
- /*
- * Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy
- * command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with
- */
- if (options.check_host_ip && (local ||
- strcmp(hostname, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL))
- options.check_host_ip = 0;
-
- host_hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
- for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++)
- load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, user_hostfiles[i]);
- for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++)
- load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, system_hostfiles[i]);
-
- ip_hostkeys = NULL;
- if (!want_cert && options.check_host_ip) {
- ip_hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
- for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++)
- load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, user_hostfiles[i]);
- for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++)
- load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, system_hostfiles[i]);
- }
-
- retry:
- /* Reload these as they may have changed on cert->key downgrade */
- want_cert = key_is_cert(host_key);
- type = key_type(host_key);
-
- /*
- * Check if the host key is present in the user's list of known
- * hosts or in the systemwide list.
- */
- host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host_key,
- &host_found);
-
- /*
- * Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are
- * localhost, looking for a certificate, or the hostname was an ip
- * address to begin with.
- */
- if (!want_cert && ip_hostkeys != NULL) {
- ip_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, host_key,
- &ip_found);
- if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED &&
- (ip_status != HOST_CHANGED ||
- (ip_found != NULL &&
- !key_equal(ip_found->key, host_found->key))))
- host_ip_differ = 1;
- } else
- ip_status = host_status;
-
- switch (host_status) {
- case HOST_OK:
- /* The host is known and the key matches. */
- debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host %s.",
- host, type, want_cert ? "certificate" : "key");
- debug("Found %s in %s:%lu", want_cert ? "CA key" : "key",
- host_found->file, host_found->line);
- if (want_cert && !check_host_cert(hostname, host_key))
- goto fail;
- if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
- if (readonly || want_cert)
- logit("%s host key for IP address "
- "'%.128s' not in list of known hosts.",
- type, ip);
- else if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip,
- host_key, options.hash_known_hosts))
- logit("Failed to add the %s host key for IP "
- "address '%.128s' to the list of known "
- "hosts (%.30s).", type, ip,
- user_hostfiles[0]);
- else
- logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host "
- "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
- "of known hosts.", type, ip);
- } else if (options.visual_host_key) {
- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
- SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s\n", fp, ra);
- free(ra);
- free(fp);
- }
- break;
- case HOST_NEW:
- if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 &&
- port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) {
- debug("checking without port identifier");
- if (check_host_key(hostname, hostaddr, 0, host_key,
- ROQUIET, user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles,
- system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles) == 0) {
- debug("found matching key w/out port");
- break;
- }
- }
- if (readonly || want_cert)
- goto fail;
- /* The host is new. */
- if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) {
- /*
- * User has requested strict host key checking. We
- * will not add the host key automatically. The only
- * alternative left is to abort.
- */
- error("No %s host key is known for %.200s and you "
- "have requested strict checking.", type, host);
- goto fail;
- } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) {
- char msg1[1024], msg2[1024];
-
- if (show_other_keys(host_hostkeys, host_key))
- snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1),
- "\nbut keys of different type are already"
- " known for this host.");
- else
- snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
- /* The default */
- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
- SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- msg2[0] = '\0';
- if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
- if (matching_host_key_dns)
- snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
- "Matching host key fingerprint"
- " found in DNS.\n");
- else
- snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
- "No matching host key fingerprint"
- " found in DNS.\n");
- }
- snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
- "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
- "established%s\n"
- "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s"
- "Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
- "(yes/no)? ",
- host, ip, msg1, type, fp,
- options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
- options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
- msg2);
- free(ra);
- free(fp);
- if (!confirm(msg))
- goto fail;
- }
- /*
- * If not in strict mode, add the key automatically to the
- * local known_hosts file.
- */
- if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
- snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip);
- hostp = hostline;
- if (options.hash_known_hosts) {
- /* Add hash of host and IP separately */
- r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0],
- host, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts) &&
- add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip,
- host_key, options.hash_known_hosts);
- } else {
- /* Add unhashed "host,ip" */
- r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0],
- hostline, host_key,
- options.hash_known_hosts);
- }
- } else {
- r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], host,
- host_key, options.hash_known_hosts);
- hostp = host;
- }
-
- if (!r)
- logit("Failed to add the host to the list of known "
- "hosts (%.500s).", user_hostfiles[0]);
- else
- logit("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the "
- "list of known hosts.", hostp, type);
- break;
- case HOST_REVOKED:
- error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- error("@ WARNING: REVOKED HOST KEY DETECTED! @");
- error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- error("The %s host key for %s is marked as revoked.", type, host);
- error("This could mean that a stolen key is being used to");
- error("impersonate this host.");
-
- /*
- * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
- * to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
- */
- if (options.strict_host_key_checking) {
- error("%s host key for %.200s was revoked and you have "
- "requested strict checking.", type, host);
- goto fail;
- }
- goto continue_unsafe;
-
- case HOST_CHANGED:
- if (want_cert) {
- /*
- * This is only a debug() since it is valid to have
- * CAs with wildcard DNS matches that don't match
- * all hosts that one might visit.
- */
- debug("Host certificate authority does not "
- "match %s in %s:%lu", CA_MARKER,
- host_found->file, host_found->line);
- goto fail;
- }
- if (readonly == ROQUIET)
- goto fail;
- if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) {
- char *key_msg;
- if (ip_status == HOST_NEW)
- key_msg = "is unknown";
- else if (ip_status == HOST_OK)
- key_msg = "is unchanged";
- else
- key_msg = "has a different value";
- error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @");
- error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host);
- error("and the key for the corresponding IP address %s", ip);
- error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg);
- error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
- error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
- if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
- error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu",
- ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
- }
- /* The host key has changed. */
- warn_changed_key(host_key);
- error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.",
- user_hostfiles[0]);
- error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key),
- host_found->file, host_found->line);
-
- /*
- * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
- * to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
- */
- if (options.strict_host_key_checking) {
- error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have "
- "requested strict checking.", type, host);
- goto fail;
- }
-
- continue_unsafe:
- /*
- * If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow
- * the connection but without MITM-able authentication or
- * forwarding.
- */
- if (options.password_authentication) {
- error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid "
- "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
- options.password_authentication = 0;
- cancelled_forwarding = 1;
- }
- if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) {
- error("Keyboard-interactive authentication is disabled"
- " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
- options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
- options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
- cancelled_forwarding = 1;
- }
- if (options.challenge_response_authentication) {
- error("Challenge/response authentication is disabled"
- " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
- options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
- cancelled_forwarding = 1;
- }
- if (options.forward_agent) {
- error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid "
- "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
- options.forward_agent = 0;
- cancelled_forwarding = 1;
- }
- if (options.forward_x11) {
- error("X11 forwarding is disabled to avoid "
- "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
- options.forward_x11 = 0;
- cancelled_forwarding = 1;
- }
- if (options.num_local_forwards > 0 ||
- options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
- error("Port forwarding is disabled to avoid "
- "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
- options.num_local_forwards =
- options.num_remote_forwards = 0;
- cancelled_forwarding = 1;
- }
- if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
- error("Tunnel forwarding is disabled to avoid "
- "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
- options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
- cancelled_forwarding = 1;
- }
- if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && cancelled_forwarding)
- fatal("Error: forwarding disabled due to host key "
- "check failure");
-
- /*
- * XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id.
- * This could be done by converting the host key to an
- * identifying sentence, tell that the host identifies itself
- * by that sentence, and ask the user if he/she wishes to
- * accept the authentication.
- */
- break;
- case HOST_FOUND:
- fatal("internal error");
- break;
- }
-
- if (options.check_host_ip && host_status != HOST_CHANGED &&
- ip_status == HOST_CHANGED) {
- snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
- "Warning: the %s host key for '%.200s' "
- "differs from the key for the IP address '%.128s'"
- "\nOffending key for IP in %s:%lu",
- type, host, ip, ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
- if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
- len = strlen(msg);
- snprintf(msg + len, sizeof(msg) - len,
- "\nMatching host key in %s:%lu",
- host_found->file, host_found->line);
- }
- if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) {
- logit("%s", msg);
- error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking.");
- goto fail;
- } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) {
- strlcat(msg, "\nAre you sure you want "
- "to continue connecting (yes/no)? ", sizeof(msg));
- if (!confirm(msg))
- goto fail;
- } else {
- logit("%s", msg);
- }
- }
-
- free(ip);
- free(host);
- if (host_hostkeys != NULL)
- free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys);
- if (ip_hostkeys != NULL)
- free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys);
- return 0;
-
-fail:
- if (want_cert && host_status != HOST_REVOKED) {
- /*
- * No matching certificate. Downgrade cert to raw key and
- * search normally.
- */
- debug("No matching CA found. Retry with plain key");
- raw_key = key_from_private(host_key);
- if (key_drop_cert(raw_key) != 0)
- fatal("Couldn't drop certificate");
- host_key = raw_key;
- goto retry;
- }
- if (raw_key != NULL)
- key_free(raw_key);
- free(ip);
- free(host);
- if (host_hostkeys != NULL)
- free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys);
- if (ip_hostkeys != NULL)
- free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys);
- return -1;
-}
-
-/* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */
-int
-verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
-{
- int flags = 0;
- char *fp;
-
- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- debug("Server host key: %s %s", key_type(host_key), fp);
- free(fp);
-
- /* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */
- if (!key_is_cert(host_key) && options.verify_host_key_dns &&
- verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key, &flags) == 0) {
- if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) {
-
- if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 &&
- flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH &&
- flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE)
- return 0;
-
- if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) {
- matching_host_key_dns = 1;
- } else {
- warn_changed_key(host_key);
- error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS with the new "
- "host key to get rid of this message.");
- }
- }
- }
-
- return check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW,
- options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles,
- options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles);
-}
-
-/*
- * Starts a dialog with the server, and authenticates the current user on the
- * server. This does not need any extra privileges. The basic connection
- * to the server must already have been established before this is called.
- * If login fails, this function prints an error and never returns.
- * This function does not require super-user privileges.
- */
-void
-ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
- struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms)
-{
- char *host;
- char *server_user, *local_user;
-
- local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
- server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user;
-
- /* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */
- host = xstrdup(orighost);
- lowercase(host);
-
- /* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */
- ssh_exchange_identification(timeout_ms);
-
- /* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */
- packet_set_nonblocking();
-
- /* key exchange */
- /* authenticate user */
- if (compat20) {
- ssh_kex2(host, hostaddr, port);
- ssh_userauth2(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive);
- } else {
- ssh_kex(host, hostaddr);
- ssh_userauth1(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive);
- }
- free(local_user);
-}
-
-void
-ssh_put_password(char *password)
-{
- int size;
- char *padded;
-
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD) {
- packet_put_cstring(password);
- return;
- }
- size = roundup(strlen(password) + 1, 32);
- padded = xcalloc(1, size);
- strlcpy(padded, password, size);
- packet_put_string(padded, size);
- explicit_bzero(padded, size);
- free(padded);
-}
-
-/* print all known host keys for a given host, but skip keys of given type */
-static int
-show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *key)
-{
- int type[] = {
- KEY_RSA1,
- KEY_RSA,
- KEY_DSA,
- KEY_ECDSA,
- KEY_ED25519,
- -1
- };
- int i, ret = 0;
- char *fp, *ra;
- const struct hostkey_entry *found;
-
- for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) {
- if (type[i] == key->type)
- continue;
- if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found))
- continue;
- fp = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- ra = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
- "in %s:%lu\n"
- "%s key fingerprint %s.",
- key_type(found->key),
- found->host, found->file, found->line,
- key_type(found->key), fp);
- if (options.visual_host_key)
- logit("%s", ra);
- free(ra);
- free(fp);
- ret = 1;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-static void
-warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
-{
- char *fp;
-
- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-
- error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @");
- error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
- error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
- error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.");
- error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
- key_type(host_key), fp);
- error("Please contact your system administrator.");
-
- free(fp);
-}
-
-/*
- * Execute a local command
- */
-int
-ssh_local_cmd(const char *args)
-{
- char *shell;
- pid_t pid;
- int status;
- void (*osighand)(int);
-
- if (!options.permit_local_command ||
- args == NULL || !*args)
- return (1);
-
- if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0')
- shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
-
- osighand = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
- pid = fork();
- if (pid == 0) {
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
- debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
- execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
- error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s",
- shell, args, strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- } else if (pid == -1)
- fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
- if (errno != EINTR)
- fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
- signal(SIGCHLD, osighand);
-
- if (!WIFEXITED(status))
- return (1);
-
- return (WEXITSTATUS(status));
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshconnect.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1544 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.271 2016/01/14 22:56:56 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the
+ * login (authentication) dialog.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h> /* roundup */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "sshconnect.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "dns.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "version.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+
+char *client_version_string = NULL;
+char *server_version_string = NULL;
+Key *previous_host_key = NULL;
+
+static int matching_host_key_dns = 0;
+
+static pid_t proxy_command_pid = 0;
+
+/* import */
+extern Options options;
+extern char *__progname;
+extern uid_t original_real_uid;
+extern uid_t original_effective_uid;
+
+static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *, Key *);
+static void warn_changed_key(Key *);
+
+/* Expand a proxy command */
+static char *
+expand_proxy_command(const char *proxy_command, const char *user,
+ const char *host, int port)
+{
+ char *tmp, *ret, strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+
+ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+ xasprintf(&tmp, "exec %s", proxy_command);
+ ret = percent_expand(tmp, "h", host, "p", strport,
+ "r", options.user, (char *)NULL);
+ free(tmp);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command that passes a
+ * a connected fd back to us.
+ */
+static int
+ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(const char *host, u_short port,
+ const char *proxy_command)
+{
+ char *command_string;
+ int sp[2], sock;
+ pid_t pid;
+ char *shell;
+
+ if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL)
+ shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
+
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sp) < 0)
+ fatal("Could not create socketpair to communicate with "
+ "proxy dialer: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user,
+ host, port);
+ debug("Executing proxy dialer command: %.500s", command_string);
+
+ /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */
+ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
+ char *argv[10];
+
+ /* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */
+ permanently_drop_suid(original_real_uid);
+
+ close(sp[1]);
+ /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */
+ if (sp[0] != 0) {
+ if (dup2(sp[0], 0) < 0)
+ perror("dup2 stdin");
+ }
+ if (sp[0] != 1) {
+ if (dup2(sp[0], 1) < 0)
+ perror("dup2 stdout");
+ }
+ if (sp[0] >= 2)
+ close(sp[0]);
+
+ /*
+ * Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get
+ * printed on the user's terminal.
+ */
+ argv[0] = shell;
+ argv[1] = "-c";
+ argv[2] = command_string;
+ argv[3] = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Execute the proxy command.
+ * Note that we gave up any extra privileges above.
+ */
+ execv(argv[0], argv);
+ perror(argv[0]);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Parent. */
+ if (pid < 0)
+ fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ close(sp[0]);
+ free(command_string);
+
+ if ((sock = mm_receive_fd(sp[1])) == -1)
+ fatal("proxy dialer did not pass back a connection");
+ close(sp[1]);
+
+ while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1)
+ if (errno != EINTR)
+ fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Set the connection file descriptors. */
+ packet_set_connection(sock, sock);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command.
+ */
+static int
+ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
+{
+ char *command_string;
+ int pin[2], pout[2];
+ pid_t pid;
+ char *shell;
+
+ if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0')
+ shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
+
+ /* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */
+ if (pipe(pin) < 0 || pipe(pout) < 0)
+ fatal("Could not create pipes to communicate with the proxy: %.100s",
+ strerror(errno));
+
+ command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user,
+ host, port);
+ debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string);
+
+ /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */
+ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
+ char *argv[10];
+
+ /* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */
+ permanently_drop_suid(original_real_uid);
+
+ /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */
+ close(pin[1]);
+ if (pin[0] != 0) {
+ if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0)
+ perror("dup2 stdin");
+ close(pin[0]);
+ }
+ close(pout[0]);
+ if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0)
+ perror("dup2 stdout");
+ /* Cannot be 1 because pin allocated two descriptors. */
+ close(pout[1]);
+
+ /* Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get
+ printed on the user's terminal. */
+ argv[0] = shell;
+ argv[1] = "-c";
+ argv[2] = command_string;
+ argv[3] = NULL;
+
+ /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any
+ extra privileges above. */
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+ execv(argv[0], argv);
+ perror(argv[0]);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Parent. */
+ if (pid < 0)
+ fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ else
+ proxy_command_pid = pid; /* save pid to clean up later */
+
+ /* Close child side of the descriptors. */
+ close(pin[0]);
+ close(pout[1]);
+
+ /* Free the command name. */
+ free(command_string);
+
+ /* Set the connection file descriptors. */
+ packet_set_connection(pout[0], pin[1]);
+
+ /* Indicate OK return */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_kill_proxy_command(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Send SIGHUP to proxy command if used. We don't wait() in
+ * case it hangs and instead rely on init to reap the child
+ */
+ if (proxy_command_pid > 1)
+ kill(proxy_command_pid, SIGHUP);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Creates a (possibly privileged) socket for use as the ssh connection.
+ */
+static int
+ssh_create_socket(int privileged, struct addrinfo *ai)
+{
+ int sock, r, gaierr;
+ struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL;
+
+ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+ if (sock < 0) {
+ error("socket: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+
+ /* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */
+ if (options.bind_address == NULL && !privileged)
+ return sock;
+
+ if (options.bind_address) {
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = ai->ai_family;
+ hints.ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype;
+ hints.ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol;
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+ gaierr = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, NULL, &hints, &res);
+ if (gaierr) {
+ error("getaddrinfo: %s: %s", options.bind_address,
+ ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+ close(sock);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we are running as root and want to connect to a privileged
+ * port, bind our own socket to a privileged port.
+ */
+ if (privileged) {
+ PRIV_START;
+ r = bindresvport_sa(sock, res ? res->ai_addr : NULL);
+ PRIV_END;
+ if (r < 0) {
+ error("bindresvport_sa: af=%d %s", ai->ai_family,
+ strerror(errno));
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (bind(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ error("bind: %s: %s", options.bind_address,
+ strerror(errno));
+ fail:
+ close(sock);
+ freeaddrinfo(res);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (res != NULL)
+ freeaddrinfo(res);
+ return sock;
+}
+
+static int
+timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr,
+ socklen_t addrlen, int *timeoutp)
+{
+ fd_set *fdset;
+ struct timeval tv, t_start;
+ socklen_t optlen;
+ int optval, rc, result = -1;
+
+ gettimeofday(&t_start, NULL);
+
+ if (*timeoutp <= 0) {
+ result = connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ set_nonblock(sockfd);
+ rc = connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ unset_nonblock(sockfd);
+ result = 0;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (errno != EINPROGRESS) {
+ result = -1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ fdset = xcalloc(howmany(sockfd + 1, NFDBITS),
+ sizeof(fd_mask));
+ FD_SET(sockfd, fdset);
+ ms_to_timeval(&tv, *timeoutp);
+
+ for (;;) {
+ rc = select(sockfd + 1, NULL, fdset, NULL, &tv);
+ if (rc != -1 || errno != EINTR)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch (rc) {
+ case 0:
+ /* Timed out */
+ errno = ETIMEDOUT;
+ break;
+ case -1:
+ /* Select error */
+ debug("select: %s", strerror(errno));
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ /* Completed or failed */
+ optval = 0;
+ optlen = sizeof(optval);
+ if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval,
+ &optlen) == -1) {
+ debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno));
+ break;
+ }
+ if (optval != 0) {
+ errno = optval;
+ break;
+ }
+ result = 0;
+ unset_nonblock(sockfd);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Should not occur */
+ fatal("Bogus return (%d) from select()", rc);
+ }
+
+ free(fdset);
+
+ done:
+ if (result == 0 && *timeoutp > 0) {
+ ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, timeoutp);
+ if (*timeoutp <= 0) {
+ errno = ETIMEDOUT;
+ result = -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (result);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host.
+ * The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr.
+ * If port is 0, the default port will be used. If needpriv is true,
+ * a privileged port will be allocated to make the connection.
+ * This requires super-user privileges if needpriv is true.
+ * Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per
+ * second). If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h
+ * and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact
+ * the daemon.
+ */
+static int
+ssh_connect_direct(const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop,
+ struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family,
+ int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive, int needpriv)
+{
+ int on = 1;
+ int sock = -1, attempt;
+ char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+ struct addrinfo *ai;
+
+ debug2("%s: needpriv %d", __func__, needpriv);
+ memset(ntop, 0, sizeof(ntop));
+ memset(strport, 0, sizeof(strport));
+
+ for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) {
+ if (attempt > 0) {
+ /* Sleep a moment before retrying. */
+ sleep(1);
+ debug("Trying again...");
+ }
+ /*
+ * Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in
+ * sequence until the connection succeeds.
+ */
+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET &&
+ ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+ continue;
+ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+ ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+ NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
+ error("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__);
+ continue;
+ }
+ debug("Connecting to %.200s [%.100s] port %s.",
+ host, ntop, strport);
+
+ /* Create a socket for connecting. */
+ sock = ssh_create_socket(needpriv, ai);
+ if (sock < 0)
+ /* Any error is already output */
+ continue;
+
+ if (timeout_connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+ timeout_ms) >= 0) {
+ /* Successful connection. */
+ memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
+ break;
+ } else {
+ debug("connect to address %s port %s: %s",
+ ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
+ close(sock);
+ sock = -1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (sock != -1)
+ break; /* Successful connection. */
+ }
+
+ /* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */
+ if (sock == -1) {
+ error("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s",
+ host, strport, strerror(errno));
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ debug("Connection established.");
+
+ /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
+ if (want_keepalive &&
+ setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on,
+ sizeof(on)) < 0)
+ error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Set the connection. */
+ packet_set_connection(sock, sock);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_connect(const char *host, struct addrinfo *addrs,
+ struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family,
+ int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive, int needpriv)
+{
+ if (options.proxy_command == NULL) {
+ return ssh_connect_direct(host, addrs, hostaddr, port, family,
+ connection_attempts, timeout_ms, want_keepalive, needpriv);
+ } else if (strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0) {
+ packet_set_connection(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
+ return 0; /* Always succeeds */
+ } else if (options.proxy_use_fdpass) {
+ return ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(host, port,
+ options.proxy_command);
+ }
+ return ssh_proxy_connect(host, port, options.proxy_command);
+}
+
+static void
+send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1)
+{
+ /* Send our own protocol version identification. */
+ if (compat20) {
+ xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n",
+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION);
+ } else {
+ xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n",
+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_VERSION);
+ }
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string,
+ strlen(client_version_string)) != strlen(client_version_string))
+ fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ chop(client_version_string);
+ debug("Local version string %.100s", client_version_string);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Waits for the server identification string, and sends our own
+ * identification string.
+ */
+void
+ssh_exchange_identification(int timeout_ms)
+{
+ char buf[256], remote_version[256]; /* must be same size! */
+ int remote_major, remote_minor, mismatch;
+ int connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
+ int connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
+ int minor1 = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1, client_banner_sent = 0;
+ u_int i, n;
+ size_t len;
+ int fdsetsz, remaining, rc;
+ struct timeval t_start, t_remaining;
+ fd_set *fdset;
+
+ fdsetsz = howmany(connection_in + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
+ fdset = xcalloc(1, fdsetsz);
+
+ /*
+ * If we are SSH2-only then we can send the banner immediately and
+ * save a round-trip.
+ */
+ if (options.protocol == SSH_PROTO_2) {
+ enable_compat20();
+ send_client_banner(connection_out, 0);
+ client_banner_sent = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Read other side's version identification. */
+ remaining = timeout_ms;
+ for (n = 0;;) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
+ if (timeout_ms > 0) {
+ gettimeofday(&t_start, NULL);
+ ms_to_timeval(&t_remaining, remaining);
+ FD_SET(connection_in, fdset);
+ rc = select(connection_in + 1, fdset, NULL,
+ fdset, &t_remaining);
+ ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, &remaining);
+ if (rc == 0 || remaining <= 0)
+ fatal("Connection timed out during "
+ "banner exchange");
+ if (rc == -1) {
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
+ "select: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+
+ len = atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1);
+
+ if (len != 1 && errno == EPIPE)
+ fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
+ "Connection closed by remote host");
+ else if (len != 1)
+ fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
+ "read: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ if (buf[i] == '\r') {
+ buf[i] = '\n';
+ buf[i + 1] = 0;
+ continue; /**XXX wait for \n */
+ }
+ if (buf[i] == '\n') {
+ buf[i + 1] = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (++n > 65536)
+ fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
+ "No banner received");
+ }
+ buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
+ if (strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0)
+ break;
+ debug("ssh_exchange_identification: %s", buf);
+ }
+ server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
+ free(fdset);
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
+ * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
+ */
+ if (sscanf(server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
+ &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3)
+ fatal("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'", buf);
+ debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s",
+ remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
+
+ active_state->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version);
+ mismatch = 0;
+
+ switch (remote_major) {
+ case 1:
+ if (remote_minor == 99 &&
+ (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) &&
+ !(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED)) {
+ enable_compat20();
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) {
+ mismatch = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (remote_minor < 3) {
+ fatal("Remote machine has too old SSH software version.");
+ } else if (remote_minor == 3 || remote_minor == 4) {
+ /* We speak 1.3, too. */
+ enable_compat13();
+ minor1 = 3;
+ if (options.forward_agent) {
+ logit("Agent forwarding disabled for protocol 1.3");
+ options.forward_agent = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
+ enable_compat20();
+ break;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ mismatch = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (mismatch)
+ fatal("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d",
+ (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1,
+ remote_major);
+ if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY) != 0)
+ fatal("Server version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe key agreement; "
+ "refusing connection", remote_version);
+ if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
+ logit("Server version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature "
+ "scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version);
+ if (!client_banner_sent)
+ send_client_banner(connection_out, minor1);
+ chop(server_version_string);
+}
+
+/* defaults to 'no' */
+static int
+confirm(const char *prompt)
+{
+ const char *msg, *again = "Please type 'yes' or 'no': ";
+ char *p;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (options.batch_mode)
+ return 0;
+ for (msg = prompt;;msg = again) {
+ p = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ECHO);
+ if (p == NULL ||
+ (p[0] == '\0') || (p[0] == '\n') ||
+ strncasecmp(p, "no", 2) == 0)
+ ret = 0;
+ if (p && strncasecmp(p, "yes", 3) == 0)
+ ret = 1;
+ free(p);
+ if (ret != -1)
+ return ret;
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+check_host_cert(const char *host, const Key *host_key)
+{
+ const char *reason;
+
+ if (key_cert_check_authority(host_key, 1, 0, host, &reason) != 0) {
+ error("%s", reason);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (buffer_len(host_key->cert->critical) != 0) {
+ error("Certificate for %s contains unsupported "
+ "critical options(s)", host);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+sockaddr_is_local(struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
+{
+ switch (hostaddr->sa_family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ return (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)->
+ sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ return IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(
+ &(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr));
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prepare the hostname and ip address strings that are used to lookup
+ * host keys in known_hosts files. These may have a port number appended.
+ */
+void
+get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr,
+ u_short port, char **hostfile_hostname, char **hostfile_ipaddr)
+{
+ char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
+ socklen_t addrlen;
+
+ switch (hostaddr == NULL ? -1 : hostaddr->sa_family) {
+ case -1:
+ addrlen = 0;
+ break;
+ case AF_INET:
+ addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+ break;
+ default:
+ addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We don't have the remote ip-address for connections
+ * using a proxy command
+ */
+ if (hostfile_ipaddr != NULL) {
+ if (options.proxy_command == NULL) {
+ if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, addrlen,
+ ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__);
+ *hostfile_ipaddr = put_host_port(ntop, port);
+ } else {
+ *hostfile_ipaddr = xstrdup("<no hostip for proxy "
+ "command>");
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Allow the user to record the key under a different name or
+ * differentiate a non-standard port. This is useful for ssh
+ * tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run multiple
+ * sshd's on different ports on the same machine.
+ */
+ if (hostfile_hostname != NULL) {
+ if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) {
+ *hostfile_hostname = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias);
+ debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", *hostfile_hostname);
+ } else {
+ *hostfile_hostname = put_host_port(hostname, port);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key
+ * is not valid. user_hostfile[0] will not be updated if 'readonly' is true.
+ */
+#define RDRW 0
+#define RDONLY 1
+#define ROQUIET 2
+static int
+check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ Key *host_key, int readonly,
+ char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles,
+ char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles)
+{
+ HostStatus host_status;
+ HostStatus ip_status;
+ Key *raw_key = NULL;
+ char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL;
+ char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp, *ra;
+ char msg[1024];
+ const char *type;
+ const struct hostkey_entry *host_found, *ip_found;
+ int len, cancelled_forwarding = 0;
+ int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr);
+ int r, want_cert = key_is_cert(host_key), host_ip_differ = 0;
+ int hostkey_trusted = 0; /* Known or explicitly accepted by user */
+ struct hostkeys *host_hostkeys, *ip_hostkeys;
+ u_int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The
+ * problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple
+ * machines, localhost will refer to a different machine in each of
+ * them, and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED warnings. This
+ * essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however,
+ * this is probably not a real problem.
+ */
+ if (options.no_host_authentication_for_localhost == 1 && local &&
+ options.host_key_alias == NULL) {
+ debug("Forcing accepting of host key for "
+ "loopback/localhost.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Prepare the hostname and address strings used for hostkey lookup.
+ * In some cases, these will have a port number appended.
+ */
+ get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(hostname, hostaddr, port, &host, &ip);
+
+ /*
+ * Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy
+ * command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with
+ */
+ if (options.check_host_ip && (local ||
+ strcmp(hostname, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL))
+ options.check_host_ip = 0;
+
+ host_hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
+ for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++)
+ load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, user_hostfiles[i]);
+ for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++)
+ load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, system_hostfiles[i]);
+
+ ip_hostkeys = NULL;
+ if (!want_cert && options.check_host_ip) {
+ ip_hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
+ for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++)
+ load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, user_hostfiles[i]);
+ for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++)
+ load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, system_hostfiles[i]);
+ }
+
+ retry:
+ /* Reload these as they may have changed on cert->key downgrade */
+ want_cert = key_is_cert(host_key);
+ type = key_type(host_key);
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the host key is present in the user's list of known
+ * hosts or in the systemwide list.
+ */
+ host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host_key,
+ &host_found);
+
+ /*
+ * Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are
+ * localhost, looking for a certificate, or the hostname was an ip
+ * address to begin with.
+ */
+ if (!want_cert && ip_hostkeys != NULL) {
+ ip_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, host_key,
+ &ip_found);
+ if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED &&
+ (ip_status != HOST_CHANGED ||
+ (ip_found != NULL &&
+ !key_equal(ip_found->key, host_found->key))))
+ host_ip_differ = 1;
+ } else
+ ip_status = host_status;
+
+ switch (host_status) {
+ case HOST_OK:
+ /* The host is known and the key matches. */
+ debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host %s.",
+ host, type, want_cert ? "certificate" : "key");
+ debug("Found %s in %s:%lu", want_cert ? "CA key" : "key",
+ host_found->file, host_found->line);
+ if (want_cert && !check_host_cert(hostname, host_key))
+ goto fail;
+ if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
+ if (readonly || want_cert)
+ logit("%s host key for IP address "
+ "'%.128s' not in list of known hosts.",
+ type, ip);
+ else if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip,
+ host_key, options.hash_known_hosts))
+ logit("Failed to add the %s host key for IP "
+ "address '%.128s' to the list of known "
+ "hosts (%.500s).", type, ip,
+ user_hostfiles[0]);
+ else
+ logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host "
+ "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
+ "of known hosts.", type, ip);
+ } else if (options.visual_host_key) {
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+ options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+ options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s", fp, ra);
+ free(ra);
+ free(fp);
+ }
+ hostkey_trusted = 1;
+ break;
+ case HOST_NEW:
+ if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 &&
+ port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) {
+ debug("checking without port identifier");
+ if (check_host_key(hostname, hostaddr, 0, host_key,
+ ROQUIET, user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles,
+ system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles) == 0) {
+ debug("found matching key w/out port");
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (readonly || want_cert)
+ goto fail;
+ /* The host is new. */
+ if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) {
+ /*
+ * User has requested strict host key checking. We
+ * will not add the host key automatically. The only
+ * alternative left is to abort.
+ */
+ error("No %s host key is known for %.200s and you "
+ "have requested strict checking.", type, host);
+ goto fail;
+ } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) {
+ char msg1[1024], msg2[1024];
+
+ if (show_other_keys(host_hostkeys, host_key))
+ snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1),
+ "\nbut keys of different type are already"
+ " known for this host.");
+ else
+ snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
+ /* The default */
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+ options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+ options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ msg2[0] = '\0';
+ if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
+ if (matching_host_key_dns)
+ snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
+ "Matching host key fingerprint"
+ " found in DNS.\n");
+ else
+ snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
+ "No matching host key fingerprint"
+ " found in DNS.\n");
+ }
+ snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
+ "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
+ "established%s\n"
+ "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s"
+ "Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
+ "(yes/no)? ",
+ host, ip, msg1, type, fp,
+ options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
+ options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
+ msg2);
+ free(ra);
+ free(fp);
+ if (!confirm(msg))
+ goto fail;
+ hostkey_trusted = 1; /* user explicitly confirmed */
+ }
+ /*
+ * If not in strict mode, add the key automatically to the
+ * local known_hosts file.
+ */
+ if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
+ snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip);
+ hostp = hostline;
+ if (options.hash_known_hosts) {
+ /* Add hash of host and IP separately */
+ r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0],
+ host, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts) &&
+ add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip,
+ host_key, options.hash_known_hosts);
+ } else {
+ /* Add unhashed "host,ip" */
+ r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0],
+ hostline, host_key,
+ options.hash_known_hosts);
+ }
+ } else {
+ r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], host,
+ host_key, options.hash_known_hosts);
+ hostp = host;
+ }
+
+ if (!r)
+ logit("Failed to add the host to the list of known "
+ "hosts (%.500s).", user_hostfiles[0]);
+ else
+ logit("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the "
+ "list of known hosts.", hostp, type);
+ break;
+ case HOST_REVOKED:
+ error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ error("@ WARNING: REVOKED HOST KEY DETECTED! @");
+ error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ error("The %s host key for %s is marked as revoked.", type, host);
+ error("This could mean that a stolen key is being used to");
+ error("impersonate this host.");
+
+ /*
+ * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
+ * to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
+ */
+ if (options.strict_host_key_checking) {
+ error("%s host key for %.200s was revoked and you have "
+ "requested strict checking.", type, host);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ goto continue_unsafe;
+
+ case HOST_CHANGED:
+ if (want_cert) {
+ /*
+ * This is only a debug() since it is valid to have
+ * CAs with wildcard DNS matches that don't match
+ * all hosts that one might visit.
+ */
+ debug("Host certificate authority does not "
+ "match %s in %s:%lu", CA_MARKER,
+ host_found->file, host_found->line);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (readonly == ROQUIET)
+ goto fail;
+ if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) {
+ char *key_msg;
+ if (ip_status == HOST_NEW)
+ key_msg = "is unknown";
+ else if (ip_status == HOST_OK)
+ key_msg = "is unchanged";
+ else
+ key_msg = "has a different value";
+ error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @");
+ error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host);
+ error("and the key for the corresponding IP address %s", ip);
+ error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg);
+ error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
+ error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
+ if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
+ error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu",
+ ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
+ }
+ /* The host key has changed. */
+ warn_changed_key(host_key);
+ error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.",
+ user_hostfiles[0]);
+ error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key),
+ host_found->file, host_found->line);
+
+ /*
+ * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
+ * to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
+ */
+ if (options.strict_host_key_checking) {
+ error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have "
+ "requested strict checking.", type, host);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ continue_unsafe:
+ /*
+ * If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow
+ * the connection but without MITM-able authentication or
+ * forwarding.
+ */
+ if (options.password_authentication) {
+ error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid "
+ "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+ options.password_authentication = 0;
+ cancelled_forwarding = 1;
+ }
+ if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) {
+ error("Keyboard-interactive authentication is disabled"
+ " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+ options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
+ options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
+ cancelled_forwarding = 1;
+ }
+ if (options.challenge_response_authentication) {
+ error("Challenge/response authentication is disabled"
+ " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+ options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
+ cancelled_forwarding = 1;
+ }
+ if (options.forward_agent) {
+ error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid "
+ "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+ options.forward_agent = 0;
+ cancelled_forwarding = 1;
+ }
+ if (options.forward_x11) {
+ error("X11 forwarding is disabled to avoid "
+ "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+ options.forward_x11 = 0;
+ cancelled_forwarding = 1;
+ }
+ if (options.num_local_forwards > 0 ||
+ options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
+ error("Port forwarding is disabled to avoid "
+ "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+ options.num_local_forwards =
+ options.num_remote_forwards = 0;
+ cancelled_forwarding = 1;
+ }
+ if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
+ error("Tunnel forwarding is disabled to avoid "
+ "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+ options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
+ cancelled_forwarding = 1;
+ }
+ if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && cancelled_forwarding)
+ fatal("Error: forwarding disabled due to host key "
+ "check failure");
+
+ /*
+ * XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id.
+ * This could be done by converting the host key to an
+ * identifying sentence, tell that the host identifies itself
+ * by that sentence, and ask the user if he/she wishes to
+ * accept the authentication.
+ */
+ break;
+ case HOST_FOUND:
+ fatal("internal error");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (options.check_host_ip && host_status != HOST_CHANGED &&
+ ip_status == HOST_CHANGED) {
+ snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
+ "Warning: the %s host key for '%.200s' "
+ "differs from the key for the IP address '%.128s'"
+ "\nOffending key for IP in %s:%lu",
+ type, host, ip, ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
+ if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
+ len = strlen(msg);
+ snprintf(msg + len, sizeof(msg) - len,
+ "\nMatching host key in %s:%lu",
+ host_found->file, host_found->line);
+ }
+ if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) {
+ logit("%s", msg);
+ error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking.");
+ goto fail;
+ } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) {
+ strlcat(msg, "\nAre you sure you want "
+ "to continue connecting (yes/no)? ", sizeof(msg));
+ if (!confirm(msg))
+ goto fail;
+ } else {
+ logit("%s", msg);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!hostkey_trusted && options.update_hostkeys) {
+ debug("%s: hostkey not known or explicitly trusted: "
+ "disabling UpdateHostkeys", __func__);
+ options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+ }
+
+ free(ip);
+ free(host);
+ if (host_hostkeys != NULL)
+ free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys);
+ if (ip_hostkeys != NULL)
+ free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys);
+ return 0;
+
+fail:
+ if (want_cert && host_status != HOST_REVOKED) {
+ /*
+ * No matching certificate. Downgrade cert to raw key and
+ * search normally.
+ */
+ debug("No matching CA found. Retry with plain key");
+ raw_key = key_from_private(host_key);
+ if (key_drop_cert(raw_key) != 0)
+ fatal("Couldn't drop certificate");
+ host_key = raw_key;
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (raw_key != NULL)
+ key_free(raw_key);
+ free(ip);
+ free(host);
+ if (host_hostkeys != NULL)
+ free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys);
+ if (ip_hostkeys != NULL)
+ free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */
+int
+verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ int r = -1, flags = 0;
+ char valid[64], *fp = NULL, *cafp = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *plain = NULL;
+
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+ options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: fingerprint host key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ r = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(host_key)) {
+ if ((cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key->cert->signature_key,
+ options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: fingerprint CA key: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ r = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sshkey_format_cert_validity(host_key->cert,
+ valid, sizeof(valid));
+ debug("Server host certificate: %s %s, serial %llu "
+ "ID \"%s\" CA %s %s valid %s",
+ sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), fp,
+ (unsigned long long)host_key->cert->serial,
+ host_key->cert->key_id,
+ sshkey_ssh_name(host_key->cert->signature_key), cafp,
+ valid);
+ for (i = 0; i < host_key->cert->nprincipals; i++) {
+ debug2("Server host certificate hostname: %s",
+ host_key->cert->principals[i]);
+ }
+ } else {
+ debug("Server host key: %s %s", compat20 ?
+ sshkey_ssh_name(host_key) : sshkey_type(host_key), fp);
+ }
+
+ if (sshkey_equal(previous_host_key, host_key)) {
+ debug2("%s: server host key %s %s matches cached key",
+ __func__, sshkey_type(host_key), fp);
+ r = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Check in RevokedHostKeys file if specified */
+ if (options.revoked_host_keys != NULL) {
+ r = sshkey_check_revoked(host_key, options.revoked_host_keys);
+ switch (r) {
+ case 0:
+ break; /* not revoked */
+ case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED:
+ error("Host key %s %s revoked by file %s",
+ sshkey_type(host_key), fp,
+ options.revoked_host_keys);
+ r = -1;
+ goto out;
+ default:
+ error("Error checking host key %s %s in "
+ "revoked keys file %s: %s", sshkey_type(host_key),
+ fp, options.revoked_host_keys, ssh_err(r));
+ r = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
+ /*
+ * XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS, so downgrade
+ * them and try the plain key.
+ */
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &plain)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(plain))
+ sshkey_drop_cert(plain);
+ if (verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, plain, &flags) == 0) {
+ if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) {
+ if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 &&
+ flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH &&
+ flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) {
+ r = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) {
+ matching_host_key_dns = 1;
+ } else {
+ warn_changed_key(plain);
+ error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS "
+ "with the new host key to get rid "
+ "of this message.");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ r = check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW,
+ options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles,
+ options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles);
+
+out:
+ sshkey_free(plain);
+ free(fp);
+ free(cafp);
+ if (r == 0 && host_key != NULL) {
+ key_free(previous_host_key);
+ previous_host_key = key_from_private(host_key);
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Starts a dialog with the server, and authenticates the current user on the
+ * server. This does not need any extra privileges. The basic connection
+ * to the server must already have been established before this is called.
+ * If login fails, this function prints an error and never returns.
+ * This function does not require super-user privileges.
+ */
+void
+ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
+ struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms)
+{
+ char *host;
+ char *server_user, *local_user;
+
+ local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+ server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user;
+
+ /* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */
+ host = xstrdup(orighost);
+ lowercase(host);
+
+ /* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */
+ ssh_exchange_identification(timeout_ms);
+
+ /* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */
+ packet_set_nonblocking();
+
+ /* key exchange */
+ /* authenticate user */
+ debug("Authenticating to %s:%d as '%s'", host, port, server_user);
+ if (compat20) {
+ ssh_kex2(host, hostaddr, port);
+ ssh_userauth2(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive);
+ } else {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ ssh_kex(host, hostaddr);
+ ssh_userauth1(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive);
+#else
+ fatal("ssh1 is not supported");
+#endif
+ }
+ free(local_user);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_put_password(char *password)
+{
+ int size;
+ char *padded;
+
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD) {
+ packet_put_cstring(password);
+ return;
+ }
+ size = roundup(strlen(password) + 1, 32);
+ padded = xcalloc(1, size);
+ strlcpy(padded, password, size);
+ packet_put_string(padded, size);
+ explicit_bzero(padded, size);
+ free(padded);
+}
+
+/* print all known host keys for a given host, but skip keys of given type */
+static int
+show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *key)
+{
+ int type[] = {
+ KEY_RSA1,
+ KEY_RSA,
+ KEY_DSA,
+ KEY_ECDSA,
+ KEY_ED25519,
+ -1
+ };
+ int i, ret = 0;
+ char *fp, *ra;
+ const struct hostkey_entry *found;
+
+ for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) {
+ if (type[i] == key->type)
+ continue;
+ if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found))
+ continue;
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key,
+ options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ ra = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key,
+ options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
+ "in %s:%lu\n"
+ "%s key fingerprint %s.",
+ key_type(found->key),
+ found->host, found->file, found->line,
+ key_type(found->key), fp);
+ if (options.visual_host_key)
+ logit("%s", ra);
+ free(ra);
+ free(fp);
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
+{
+ char *fp;
+
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ if (fp == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+
+ error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @");
+ error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
+ error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
+ error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.");
+ error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
+ key_type(host_key), fp);
+ error("Please contact your system administrator.");
+
+ free(fp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Execute a local command
+ */
+int
+ssh_local_cmd(const char *args)
+{
+ char *shell;
+ pid_t pid;
+ int status;
+ void (*osighand)(int);
+
+ if (!options.permit_local_command ||
+ args == NULL || !*args)
+ return (1);
+
+ if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0')
+ shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
+
+ osighand = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ pid = fork();
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+ debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
+ execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
+ error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s",
+ shell, args, strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ } else if (pid == -1)
+ fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+ if (errno != EINTR)
+ fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
+ signal(SIGCHLD, osighand);
+
+ if (!WIFEXITED(status))
+ return (1);
+
+ return (WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+void
+maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *authfile, Key *private, char *comment,
+ char *passphrase)
+{
+ int auth_sock = -1, r;
+
+ if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 0)
+ return;
+
+ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) {
+ debug3("no authentication agent, not adding key");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 2 &&
+ !ask_permission("Add key %s (%s) to agent?", authfile, comment)) {
+ debug3("user denied adding this key");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth_sock, private, comment, 0,
+ (options.add_keys_to_agent == 3))) == 0)
+ debug("identity added to agent: %s", authfile);
+ else
+ debug("could not add identity to agent: %s (%d)", authfile, r);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshconnect.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.28 2013/10/16 02:31:47 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-typedef struct Sensitive Sensitive;
-struct Sensitive {
- Key **keys;
- int nkeys;
- int external_keysign;
-};
-
-struct addrinfo;
-int ssh_connect(const char *, struct addrinfo *, struct sockaddr_storage *,
- u_short, int, int, int *, int, int);
-void ssh_kill_proxy_command(void);
-
-void ssh_login(Sensitive *, const char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short,
- struct passwd *, int);
-
-void ssh_exchange_identification(int);
-
-int verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, Key *);
-
-void get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short,
- char **, char **);
-
-void ssh_kex(char *, struct sockaddr *);
-void ssh_kex2(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short);
-
-void ssh_userauth1(const char *, const char *, char *, Sensitive *);
-void ssh_userauth2(const char *, const char *, char *, Sensitive *);
-
-void ssh_put_password(char *);
-int ssh_local_cmd(const char *);
-
-/*
- * Macros to raise/lower permissions.
- */
-#define PRIV_START do { \
- int save_errno = errno; \
- if (seteuid(original_effective_uid) != 0) \
- fatal("PRIV_START: seteuid: %s", \
- strerror(errno)); \
- errno = save_errno; \
-} while (0)
-
-#define PRIV_END do { \
- int save_errno = errno; \
- if (seteuid(original_real_uid) != 0) \
- fatal("PRIV_END: seteuid: %s", \
- strerror(errno)); \
- errno = save_errno; \
-} while (0)
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshconnect.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.29 2015/11/15 22:26:49 jcs Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+typedef struct Sensitive Sensitive;
+struct Sensitive {
+ Key **keys;
+ int nkeys;
+ int external_keysign;
+};
+
+struct addrinfo;
+int ssh_connect(const char *, struct addrinfo *, struct sockaddr_storage *,
+ u_short, int, int, int *, int, int);
+void ssh_kill_proxy_command(void);
+
+void ssh_login(Sensitive *, const char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short,
+ struct passwd *, int);
+
+void ssh_exchange_identification(int);
+
+int verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, Key *);
+
+void get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short,
+ char **, char **);
+
+void ssh_kex(char *, struct sockaddr *);
+void ssh_kex2(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short);
+
+void ssh_userauth1(const char *, const char *, char *, Sensitive *);
+void ssh_userauth2(const char *, const char *, char *, Sensitive *);
+
+void ssh_put_password(char *);
+int ssh_local_cmd(const char *);
+
+void maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *, Key *, char *, char *);
+
+/*
+ * Macros to raise/lower permissions.
+ */
+#define PRIV_START do { \
+ int save_errno = errno; \
+ if (seteuid(original_effective_uid) != 0) \
+ fatal("PRIV_START: seteuid: %s", \
+ strerror(errno)); \
+ errno = save_errno; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define PRIV_END do { \
+ int save_errno = errno; \
+ if (seteuid(original_real_uid) != 0) \
+ fatal("PRIV_END: seteuid: %s", \
+ strerror(errno)); \
+ errno = save_errno; \
+} while (0)
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect1.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshconnect1.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect1.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,755 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.74 2014/02/02 03:44:32 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the
- * login (authentication) dialog.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "readconf.h"
-#include "authfd.h"
-#include "sshconnect.h"
-#include "authfile.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-
-/* Session id for the current session. */
-u_char session_id[16];
-u_int supported_authentications = 0;
-
-extern Options options;
-extern char *__progname;
-
-/*
- * Checks if the user has an authentication agent, and if so, tries to
- * authenticate using the agent.
- */
-static int
-try_agent_authentication(void)
-{
- int type;
- char *comment;
- AuthenticationConnection *auth;
- u_char response[16];
- u_int i;
- Key *key;
- BIGNUM *challenge;
-
- /* Get connection to the agent. */
- auth = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
- if (!auth)
- return 0;
-
- if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("try_agent_authentication: BN_new failed");
- /* Loop through identities served by the agent. */
- for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(auth, &comment, 1);
- key != NULL;
- key = ssh_get_next_identity(auth, &comment, 1)) {
-
- /* Try this identity. */
- debug("Trying RSA authentication via agent with '%.100s'", comment);
- free(comment);
-
- /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
- packet_put_bignum(key->rsa->n);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Wait for server's response. */
- type = packet_read();
-
- /* The server sends failure if it doesn't like our key or
- does not support RSA authentication. */
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- debug("Server refused our key.");
- key_free(key);
- continue;
- }
- /* Otherwise it should have sent a challenge. */
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d",
- type);
-
- packet_get_bignum(challenge);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- debug("Received RSA challenge from server.");
-
- /* Ask the agent to decrypt the challenge. */
- if (!ssh_decrypt_challenge(auth, key, challenge, session_id, 1, response)) {
- /*
- * The agent failed to authenticate this identifier
- * although it advertised it supports this. Just
- * return a wrong value.
- */
- logit("Authentication agent failed to decrypt challenge.");
- explicit_bzero(response, sizeof(response));
- }
- key_free(key);
- debug("Sending response to RSA challenge.");
-
- /* Send the decrypted challenge back to the server. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- packet_put_char(response[i]);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Wait for response from the server. */
- type = packet_read();
-
- /* The server returns success if it accepted the authentication. */
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
- ssh_close_authentication_connection(auth);
- BN_clear_free(challenge);
- debug("RSA authentication accepted by server.");
- return 1;
- }
- /* Otherwise it should return failure. */
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d",
- type);
- }
- ssh_close_authentication_connection(auth);
- BN_clear_free(challenge);
- debug("RSA authentication using agent refused.");
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Computes the proper response to a RSA challenge, and sends the response to
- * the server.
- */
-static void
-respond_to_rsa_challenge(BIGNUM * challenge, RSA * prv)
-{
- u_char buf[32], response[16];
- struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
- int i, len;
-
- /* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */
- /* XXX think about Bleichenbacher, too */
- if (rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, prv) <= 0)
- packet_disconnect(
- "respond_to_rsa_challenge: rsa_private_decrypt failed");
-
- /* Compute the response. */
- /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
- len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
- if (len <= 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(buf))
- packet_disconnect(
- "respond_to_rsa_challenge: bad challenge length %d", len);
-
- memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
- BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + sizeof(buf) - len);
- if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
- ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 ||
- ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 ||
- ssh_digest_final(md, response, sizeof(response)) < 0)
- fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
- ssh_digest_free(md);
-
- debug("Sending response to host key RSA challenge.");
-
- /* Send the response back to the server. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- packet_put_char(response[i]);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
- explicit_bzero(response, sizeof(response));
- explicit_bzero(&md, sizeof(md));
-}
-
-/*
- * Checks if the user has authentication file, and if so, tries to authenticate
- * the user using it.
- */
-static int
-try_rsa_authentication(int idx)
-{
- BIGNUM *challenge;
- Key *public, *private;
- char buf[300], *passphrase, *comment, *authfile;
- int i, perm_ok = 1, type, quit;
-
- public = options.identity_keys[idx];
- authfile = options.identity_files[idx];
- comment = xstrdup(authfile);
-
- debug("Trying RSA authentication with key '%.100s'", comment);
-
- /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
- packet_put_bignum(public->rsa->n);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Wait for server's response. */
- type = packet_read();
-
- /*
- * The server responds with failure if it doesn't like our key or
- * doesn't support RSA authentication.
- */
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- debug("Server refused our key.");
- free(comment);
- return 0;
- }
- /* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type);
-
- /* Get the challenge from the packet. */
- if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("try_rsa_authentication: BN_new failed");
- packet_get_bignum(challenge);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- debug("Received RSA challenge from server.");
-
- /*
- * If the key is not stored in external hardware, we have to
- * load the private key. Try first with empty passphrase; if it
- * fails, ask for a passphrase.
- */
- if (public->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT)
- private = public;
- else
- private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, authfile, "", NULL,
- &perm_ok);
- if (private == NULL && !options.batch_mode && perm_ok) {
- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
- "Enter passphrase for RSA key '%.100s': ", comment);
- for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
- passphrase = read_passphrase(buf, 0);
- if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) {
- private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1,
- authfile, passphrase, NULL, NULL);
- quit = 0;
- } else {
- debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
- quit = 1;
- }
- explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
- free(passphrase);
- if (private != NULL || quit)
- break;
- debug2("bad passphrase given, try again...");
- }
- }
- /* We no longer need the comment. */
- free(comment);
-
- if (private == NULL) {
- if (!options.batch_mode && perm_ok)
- error("Bad passphrase.");
-
- /* Send a dummy response packet to avoid protocol error. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- packet_put_char(0);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Expect the server to reject it... */
- packet_read_expect(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
- BN_clear_free(challenge);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Compute and send a response to the challenge. */
- respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, private->rsa);
-
- /* Destroy the private key unless it in external hardware. */
- if (!(private->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT))
- key_free(private);
-
- /* We no longer need the challenge. */
- BN_clear_free(challenge);
-
- /* Wait for response from the server. */
- type = packet_read();
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
- debug("RSA authentication accepted by server.");
- return 1;
- }
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type);
- debug("RSA authentication refused.");
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Tries to authenticate the user using combined rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv
- * authentication and RSA host authentication.
- */
-static int
-try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(const char *local_user, Key * host_key)
-{
- int type;
- BIGNUM *challenge;
-
- debug("Trying rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication.");
-
- /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
- packet_put_cstring(local_user);
- packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n));
- packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->e);
- packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->n);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Wait for server's response. */
- type = packet_read();
-
- /* The server responds with failure if it doesn't admit our
- .rhosts authentication or doesn't know our host key. */
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- debug("Server refused our rhosts authentication or host key.");
- return 0;
- }
- /* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type);
-
- /* Get the challenge from the packet. */
- if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("try_rhosts_rsa_authentication: BN_new failed");
- packet_get_bignum(challenge);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- debug("Received RSA challenge for host key from server.");
-
- /* Compute a response to the challenge. */
- respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, host_key->rsa);
-
- /* We no longer need the challenge. */
- BN_clear_free(challenge);
-
- /* Wait for response from the server. */
- type = packet_read();
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
- debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication accepted by server.");
- return 1;
- }
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type);
- debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication refused.");
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Tries to authenticate with any string-based challenge/response system.
- * Note that the client code is not tied to s/key or TIS.
- */
-static int
-try_challenge_response_authentication(void)
-{
- int type, i;
- u_int clen;
- char prompt[1024];
- char *challenge, *response;
-
- debug("Doing challenge response authentication.");
-
- for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
- /* request a challenge */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- type = packet_read();
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE &&
- type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response "
- "to SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS", type);
- }
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
- debug("No challenge.");
- return 0;
- }
- challenge = packet_get_string(&clen);
- packet_check_eom();
- snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt, "%s%s", challenge,
- strchr(challenge, '\n') ? "" : "\nResponse: ");
- free(challenge);
- if (i != 0)
- error("Permission denied, please try again.");
- if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
- logit("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! "
- "Response will be transmitted in clear text.");
- response = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
- if (strcmp(response, "") == 0) {
- free(response);
- break;
- }
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE);
- ssh_put_password(response);
- explicit_bzero(response, strlen(response));
- free(response);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- type = packet_read();
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
- return 1;
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response "
- "to SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE", type);
- }
- /* failure */
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Tries to authenticate with plain passwd authentication.
- */
-static int
-try_password_authentication(char *prompt)
-{
- int type, i;
- char *password;
-
- debug("Doing password authentication.");
- if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
- logit("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Password will be transmitted in clear text.");
- for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
- if (i != 0)
- error("Permission denied, please try again.");
- password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD);
- ssh_put_password(password);
- explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password));
- free(password);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- type = packet_read();
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
- return 1;
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to passwd auth", type);
- }
- /* failure */
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * SSH1 key exchange
- */
-void
-ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
-{
- int i;
- BIGNUM *key;
- Key *host_key, *server_key;
- int bits, rbits;
- int ssh_cipher_default = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
- u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
- u_char cookie[8];
- u_int supported_ciphers;
- u_int server_flags, client_flags;
- u_int32_t rnd = 0;
-
- debug("Waiting for server public key.");
-
- /* Wait for a public key packet from the server. */
- packet_read_expect(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
-
- /* Get cookie from the packet. */
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
- cookie[i] = packet_get_char();
-
- /* Get the public key. */
- server_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
- bits = packet_get_int();
- packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->e);
- packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->n);
-
- rbits = BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n);
- if (bits != rbits) {
- logit("Warning: Server lies about size of server public key: "
- "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits);
- logit("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
- }
- /* Get the host key. */
- host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
- bits = packet_get_int();
- packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->e);
- packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->n);
-
- rbits = BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n);
- if (bits != rbits) {
- logit("Warning: Server lies about size of server host key: "
- "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits);
- logit("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
- }
-
- /* Get protocol flags. */
- server_flags = packet_get_int();
- packet_set_protocol_flags(server_flags);
-
- supported_ciphers = packet_get_int();
- supported_authentications = packet_get_int();
- packet_check_eom();
-
- debug("Received server public key (%d bits) and host key (%d bits).",
- BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n));
-
- if (verify_host_key(host, hostaddr, host_key) == -1)
- fatal("Host key verification failed.");
-
- client_flags = SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER | SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN;
-
- derive_ssh1_session_id(host_key->rsa->n, server_key->rsa->n, cookie, session_id);
-
- /*
- * Generate an encryption key for the session. The key is a 256 bit
- * random number, interpreted as a 32-byte key, with the least
- * significant 8 bits being the first byte of the key.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
- if (i % 4 == 0)
- rnd = arc4random();
- session_key[i] = rnd & 0xff;
- rnd >>= 8;
- }
-
- /*
- * According to the protocol spec, the first byte of the session key
- * is the highest byte of the integer. The session key is xored with
- * the first 16 bytes of the session id.
- */
- if ((key = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("ssh_kex: BN_new failed");
- if (BN_set_word(key, 0) == 0)
- fatal("ssh_kex: BN_set_word failed");
- for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) {
- if (BN_lshift(key, key, 8) == 0)
- fatal("ssh_kex: BN_lshift failed");
- if (i < 16) {
- if (BN_add_word(key, session_key[i] ^ session_id[i])
- == 0)
- fatal("ssh_kex: BN_add_word failed");
- } else {
- if (BN_add_word(key, session_key[i]) == 0)
- fatal("ssh_kex: BN_add_word failed");
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Encrypt the integer using the public key and host key of the
- * server (key with smaller modulus first).
- */
- if (BN_cmp(server_key->rsa->n, host_key->rsa->n) < 0) {
- /* Public key has smaller modulus. */
- if (BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n) <
- BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
- fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: host_key %d < server_key %d + "
- "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
- BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n),
- BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n),
- SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
- }
- rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, server_key->rsa);
- rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key->rsa);
- } else {
- /* Host key has smaller modulus (or they are equal). */
- if (BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n) <
- BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
- fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: server_key %d < host_key %d + "
- "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
- BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n),
- BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n),
- SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
- }
- rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key->rsa);
- rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, server_key->rsa);
- }
-
- /* Destroy the public keys since we no longer need them. */
- key_free(server_key);
- key_free(host_key);
-
- if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET) {
- if (cipher_mask_ssh1(1) & supported_ciphers & (1 << ssh_cipher_default))
- options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default;
- } else if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_INVALID ||
- !(cipher_mask_ssh1(1) & (1 << options.cipher))) {
- logit("No valid SSH1 cipher, using %.100s instead.",
- cipher_name(ssh_cipher_default));
- options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default;
- }
- /* Check that the selected cipher is supported. */
- if (!(supported_ciphers & (1 << options.cipher)))
- fatal("Selected cipher type %.100s not supported by server.",
- cipher_name(options.cipher));
-
- debug("Encryption type: %.100s", cipher_name(options.cipher));
-
- /* Send the encrypted session key to the server. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
- packet_put_char(options.cipher);
-
- /* Send the cookie back to the server. */
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
- packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
-
- /* Send and destroy the encrypted encryption key integer. */
- packet_put_bignum(key);
- BN_clear_free(key);
-
- /* Send protocol flags. */
- packet_put_int(client_flags);
-
- /* Send the packet now. */
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- debug("Sent encrypted session key.");
-
- /* Set the encryption key. */
- packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, options.cipher);
-
- /*
- * We will no longer need the session key here.
- * Destroy any extra copies.
- */
- explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key));
-
- /*
- * Expect a success message from the server. Note that this message
- * will be received in encrypted form.
- */
- packet_read_expect(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
-
- debug("Received encrypted confirmation.");
-}
-
-/*
- * Authenticate user
- */
-void
-ssh_userauth1(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
- Sensitive *sensitive)
-{
- int i, type;
-
- if (supported_authentications == 0)
- fatal("ssh_userauth1: server supports no auth methods");
-
- /* Send the name of the user to log in as on the server. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_USER);
- packet_put_cstring(server_user);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /*
- * The server should respond with success if no authentication is
- * needed (the user has no password). Otherwise the server responds
- * with failure.
- */
- type = packet_read();
-
- /* check whether the connection was accepted without authentication. */
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
- goto success;
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to SSH_CMSG_USER", type);
-
- /*
- * Try .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication with RSA host
- * authentication.
- */
- if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA)) &&
- options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) {
- for (i = 0; i < sensitive->nkeys; i++) {
- if (sensitive->keys[i] != NULL &&
- sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 &&
- try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(local_user,
- sensitive->keys[i]))
- goto success;
- }
- }
- /* Try RSA authentication if the server supports it. */
- if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA)) &&
- options.rsa_authentication) {
- /*
- * Try RSA authentication using the authentication agent. The
- * agent is tried first because no passphrase is needed for
- * it, whereas identity files may require passphrases.
- */
- if (try_agent_authentication())
- goto success;
-
- /* Try RSA authentication for each identity. */
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++)
- if (options.identity_keys[i] != NULL &&
- options.identity_keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 &&
- try_rsa_authentication(i))
- goto success;
- }
- /* Try challenge response authentication if the server supports it. */
- if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS)) &&
- options.challenge_response_authentication && !options.batch_mode) {
- if (try_challenge_response_authentication())
- goto success;
- }
- /* Try password authentication if the server supports it. */
- if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD)) &&
- options.password_authentication && !options.batch_mode) {
- char prompt[80];
-
- snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password: ",
- server_user, host);
- if (try_password_authentication(prompt))
- goto success;
- }
- /* All authentication methods have failed. Exit with an error message. */
- fatal("Permission denied.");
- /* NOTREACHED */
-
- success:
- return; /* need statement after label */
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect1.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshconnect1.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect1.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect1.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,778 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.78 2015/11/15 22:26:49 jcs Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the
+ * login (authentication) dialog.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "sshconnect.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+/* Session id for the current session. */
+u_char session_id[16];
+u_int supported_authentications = 0;
+
+extern Options options;
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/*
+ * Checks if the user has an authentication agent, and if so, tries to
+ * authenticate using the agent.
+ */
+static int
+try_agent_authentication(void)
+{
+ int r, type, agent_fd, ret = 0;
+ u_char response[16];
+ size_t i;
+ BIGNUM *challenge;
+ struct ssh_identitylist *idlist = NULL;
+
+ /* Get connection to the agent. */
+ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) {
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
+ debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("try_agent_authentication: BN_new failed");
+
+ /* Loop through identities served by the agent. */
+ if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, 1, &idlist)) != 0) {
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
+ debug("%s: ssh_fetch_identitylist: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) {
+ /* Try this identity. */
+ debug("Trying RSA authentication via agent with '%.100s'",
+ idlist->comments[i]);
+
+ /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
+ packet_put_bignum(idlist->keys[i]->rsa->n);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Wait for server's response. */
+ type = packet_read();
+
+ /* The server sends failure if it doesn't like our key or
+ does not support RSA authentication. */
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ debug("Server refused our key.");
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Otherwise it should have sent a challenge. */
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d",
+ type);
+
+ packet_get_bignum(challenge);
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ debug("Received RSA challenge from server.");
+
+ /* Ask the agent to decrypt the challenge. */
+ if ((r = ssh_decrypt_challenge(agent_fd, idlist->keys[i],
+ challenge, session_id, response)) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * The agent failed to authenticate this identifier
+ * although it advertised it supports this. Just
+ * return a wrong value.
+ */
+ logit("Authentication agent failed to decrypt "
+ "challenge: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ explicit_bzero(response, sizeof(response));
+ }
+ debug("Sending response to RSA challenge.");
+
+ /* Send the decrypted challenge back to the server. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ packet_put_char(response[i]);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Wait for response from the server. */
+ type = packet_read();
+
+ /*
+ * The server returns success if it accepted the
+ * authentication.
+ */
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ debug("RSA authentication accepted by server.");
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ } else if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth "
+ "response: %d", type);
+ }
+ if (ret != 1)
+ debug("RSA authentication using agent refused.");
+ out:
+ ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
+ ssh_close_authentication_socket(agent_fd);
+ BN_clear_free(challenge);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Computes the proper response to a RSA challenge, and sends the response to
+ * the server.
+ */
+static void
+respond_to_rsa_challenge(BIGNUM * challenge, RSA * prv)
+{
+ u_char buf[32], response[16];
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
+ int i, len;
+
+ /* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */
+ /* XXX think about Bleichenbacher, too */
+ if (rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, prv) != 0)
+ packet_disconnect(
+ "respond_to_rsa_challenge: rsa_private_decrypt failed");
+
+ /* Compute the response. */
+ /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
+ len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
+ if (len <= 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(buf))
+ packet_disconnect(
+ "respond_to_rsa_challenge: bad challenge length %d", len);
+
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + sizeof(buf) - len);
+ if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
+ ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_final(md, response, sizeof(response)) < 0)
+ fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
+ ssh_digest_free(md);
+
+ debug("Sending response to host key RSA challenge.");
+
+ /* Send the response back to the server. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ packet_put_char(response[i]);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ explicit_bzero(response, sizeof(response));
+ explicit_bzero(&md, sizeof(md));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks if the user has authentication file, and if so, tries to authenticate
+ * the user using it.
+ */
+static int
+try_rsa_authentication(int idx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *challenge;
+ Key *public, *private;
+ char buf[300], *passphrase = NULL, *comment, *authfile;
+ int i, perm_ok = 1, type, quit;
+
+ public = options.identity_keys[idx];
+ authfile = options.identity_files[idx];
+ comment = xstrdup(authfile);
+
+ debug("Trying RSA authentication with key '%.100s'", comment);
+
+ /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
+ packet_put_bignum(public->rsa->n);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Wait for server's response. */
+ type = packet_read();
+
+ /*
+ * The server responds with failure if it doesn't like our key or
+ * doesn't support RSA authentication.
+ */
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ debug("Server refused our key.");
+ free(comment);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type);
+
+ /* Get the challenge from the packet. */
+ if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("try_rsa_authentication: BN_new failed");
+ packet_get_bignum(challenge);
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ debug("Received RSA challenge from server.");
+
+ /*
+ * If the key is not stored in external hardware, we have to
+ * load the private key. Try first with empty passphrase; if it
+ * fails, ask for a passphrase.
+ */
+ if (public->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT)
+ private = public;
+ else
+ private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, authfile, "", NULL,
+ &perm_ok);
+ if (private == NULL && !options.batch_mode && perm_ok) {
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+ "Enter passphrase for RSA key '%.100s': ", comment);
+ for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
+ passphrase = read_passphrase(buf, 0);
+ if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) {
+ private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1,
+ authfile, passphrase, NULL, NULL);
+ quit = 0;
+ } else {
+ debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
+ quit = 1;
+ }
+ if (private != NULL || quit)
+ break;
+ debug2("bad passphrase given, try again...");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (private != NULL)
+ maybe_add_key_to_agent(authfile, private, comment, passphrase);
+
+ if (passphrase != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ free(passphrase);
+ }
+
+ /* We no longer need the comment. */
+ free(comment);
+
+ if (private == NULL) {
+ if (!options.batch_mode && perm_ok)
+ error("Bad passphrase.");
+
+ /* Send a dummy response packet to avoid protocol error. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ packet_put_char(0);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Expect the server to reject it... */
+ packet_read_expect(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
+ BN_clear_free(challenge);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute and send a response to the challenge. */
+ respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, private->rsa);
+
+ /* Destroy the private key unless it in external hardware. */
+ if (!(private->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT))
+ key_free(private);
+
+ /* We no longer need the challenge. */
+ BN_clear_free(challenge);
+
+ /* Wait for response from the server. */
+ type = packet_read();
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ debug("RSA authentication accepted by server.");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type);
+ debug("RSA authentication refused.");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to authenticate the user using combined rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv
+ * authentication and RSA host authentication.
+ */
+static int
+try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(const char *local_user, Key * host_key)
+{
+ int type;
+ BIGNUM *challenge;
+
+ debug("Trying rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication.");
+
+ /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
+ packet_put_cstring(local_user);
+ packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n));
+ packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->e);
+ packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->n);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Wait for server's response. */
+ type = packet_read();
+
+ /* The server responds with failure if it doesn't admit our
+ .rhosts authentication or doesn't know our host key. */
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ debug("Server refused our rhosts authentication or host key.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type);
+
+ /* Get the challenge from the packet. */
+ if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("try_rhosts_rsa_authentication: BN_new failed");
+ packet_get_bignum(challenge);
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ debug("Received RSA challenge for host key from server.");
+
+ /* Compute a response to the challenge. */
+ respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, host_key->rsa);
+
+ /* We no longer need the challenge. */
+ BN_clear_free(challenge);
+
+ /* Wait for response from the server. */
+ type = packet_read();
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication accepted by server.");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type);
+ debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication refused.");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to authenticate with any string-based challenge/response system.
+ * Note that the client code is not tied to s/key or TIS.
+ */
+static int
+try_challenge_response_authentication(void)
+{
+ int type, i;
+ u_int clen;
+ char prompt[1024];
+ char *challenge, *response;
+
+ debug("Doing challenge response authentication.");
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
+ /* request a challenge */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ type = packet_read();
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE &&
+ type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response "
+ "to SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS", type);
+ }
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
+ debug("No challenge.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ challenge = packet_get_string(&clen);
+ packet_check_eom();
+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt, "%s%s", challenge,
+ strchr(challenge, '\n') ? "" : "\nResponse: ");
+ free(challenge);
+ if (i != 0)
+ error("Permission denied, please try again.");
+ if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
+ logit("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! "
+ "Response will be transmitted in clear text.");
+ response = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+ if (strcmp(response, "") == 0) {
+ free(response);
+ break;
+ }
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE);
+ ssh_put_password(response);
+ explicit_bzero(response, strlen(response));
+ free(response);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ type = packet_read();
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+ return 1;
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response "
+ "to SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE", type);
+ }
+ /* failure */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to authenticate with plain passwd authentication.
+ */
+static int
+try_password_authentication(char *prompt)
+{
+ int type, i;
+ char *password;
+
+ debug("Doing password authentication.");
+ if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
+ logit("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Password will be transmitted in clear text.");
+ for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
+ if (i != 0)
+ error("Permission denied, please try again.");
+ password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD);
+ ssh_put_password(password);
+ explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password));
+ free(password);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ type = packet_read();
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+ return 1;
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to passwd auth", type);
+ }
+ /* failure */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSH1 key exchange
+ */
+void
+ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
+{
+ int i;
+ BIGNUM *key;
+ Key *host_key, *server_key;
+ int bits, rbits;
+ int ssh_cipher_default = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
+ u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
+ u_char cookie[8];
+ u_int supported_ciphers;
+ u_int server_flags, client_flags;
+ u_int32_t rnd = 0;
+
+ debug("Waiting for server public key.");
+
+ /* Wait for a public key packet from the server. */
+ packet_read_expect(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
+
+ /* Get cookie from the packet. */
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ cookie[i] = packet_get_char();
+
+ /* Get the public key. */
+ server_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+ bits = packet_get_int();
+ packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->e);
+ packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->n);
+
+ rbits = BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n);
+ if (bits != rbits) {
+ logit("Warning: Server lies about size of server public key: "
+ "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits);
+ logit("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
+ }
+ /* Get the host key. */
+ host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+ bits = packet_get_int();
+ packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->e);
+ packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->n);
+
+ rbits = BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n);
+ if (bits != rbits) {
+ logit("Warning: Server lies about size of server host key: "
+ "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits);
+ logit("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
+ }
+
+ /* Get protocol flags. */
+ server_flags = packet_get_int();
+ packet_set_protocol_flags(server_flags);
+
+ supported_ciphers = packet_get_int();
+ supported_authentications = packet_get_int();
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ debug("Received server public key (%d bits) and host key (%d bits).",
+ BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n));
+
+ if (verify_host_key(host, hostaddr, host_key) == -1)
+ fatal("Host key verification failed.");
+
+ client_flags = SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER | SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN;
+
+ derive_ssh1_session_id(host_key->rsa->n, server_key->rsa->n, cookie, session_id);
+
+ /*
+ * Generate an encryption key for the session. The key is a 256 bit
+ * random number, interpreted as a 32-byte key, with the least
+ * significant 8 bits being the first byte of the key.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ if (i % 4 == 0)
+ rnd = arc4random();
+ session_key[i] = rnd & 0xff;
+ rnd >>= 8;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * According to the protocol spec, the first byte of the session key
+ * is the highest byte of the integer. The session key is xored with
+ * the first 16 bytes of the session id.
+ */
+ if ((key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("ssh_kex: BN_new failed");
+ if (BN_set_word(key, 0) == 0)
+ fatal("ssh_kex: BN_set_word failed");
+ for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) {
+ if (BN_lshift(key, key, 8) == 0)
+ fatal("ssh_kex: BN_lshift failed");
+ if (i < 16) {
+ if (BN_add_word(key, session_key[i] ^ session_id[i])
+ == 0)
+ fatal("ssh_kex: BN_add_word failed");
+ } else {
+ if (BN_add_word(key, session_key[i]) == 0)
+ fatal("ssh_kex: BN_add_word failed");
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Encrypt the integer using the public key and host key of the
+ * server (key with smaller modulus first).
+ */
+ if (BN_cmp(server_key->rsa->n, host_key->rsa->n) < 0) {
+ /* Public key has smaller modulus. */
+ if (BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n) <
+ BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+ fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: host_key %d < server_key %d + "
+ "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+ BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n),
+ BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n),
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
+ }
+ if (rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, server_key->rsa) != 0 ||
+ rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key->rsa) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt failed", __func__);
+ } else {
+ /* Host key has smaller modulus (or they are equal). */
+ if (BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n) <
+ BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+ fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: server_key %d < host_key %d + "
+ "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+ BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n),
+ BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n),
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
+ }
+ if (rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key->rsa) != 0 ||
+ rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, server_key->rsa) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt failed", __func__);
+ }
+
+ /* Destroy the public keys since we no longer need them. */
+ key_free(server_key);
+ key_free(host_key);
+
+ if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET) {
+ if (cipher_mask_ssh1(1) & supported_ciphers & (1 << ssh_cipher_default))
+ options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default;
+ } else if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_INVALID ||
+ !(cipher_mask_ssh1(1) & (1 << options.cipher))) {
+ logit("No valid SSH1 cipher, using %.100s instead.",
+ cipher_name(ssh_cipher_default));
+ options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default;
+ }
+ /* Check that the selected cipher is supported. */
+ if (!(supported_ciphers & (1 << options.cipher)))
+ fatal("Selected cipher type %.100s not supported by server.",
+ cipher_name(options.cipher));
+
+ debug("Encryption type: %.100s", cipher_name(options.cipher));
+
+ /* Send the encrypted session key to the server. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
+ packet_put_char(options.cipher);
+
+ /* Send the cookie back to the server. */
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
+
+ /* Send and destroy the encrypted encryption key integer. */
+ packet_put_bignum(key);
+ BN_clear_free(key);
+
+ /* Send protocol flags. */
+ packet_put_int(client_flags);
+
+ /* Send the packet now. */
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ debug("Sent encrypted session key.");
+
+ /* Set the encryption key. */
+ packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, options.cipher);
+
+ /*
+ * We will no longer need the session key here.
+ * Destroy any extra copies.
+ */
+ explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key));
+
+ /*
+ * Expect a success message from the server. Note that this message
+ * will be received in encrypted form.
+ */
+ packet_read_expect(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
+
+ debug("Received encrypted confirmation.");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authenticate user
+ */
+void
+ssh_userauth1(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
+ Sensitive *sensitive)
+{
+ int i, type;
+
+ if (supported_authentications == 0)
+ fatal("ssh_userauth1: server supports no auth methods");
+
+ /* Send the name of the user to log in as on the server. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_USER);
+ packet_put_cstring(server_user);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /*
+ * The server should respond with success if no authentication is
+ * needed (the user has no password). Otherwise the server responds
+ * with failure.
+ */
+ type = packet_read();
+
+ /* check whether the connection was accepted without authentication. */
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+ goto success;
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to SSH_CMSG_USER", type);
+
+ /*
+ * Try .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication with RSA host
+ * authentication.
+ */
+ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA)) &&
+ options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sensitive->nkeys; i++) {
+ if (sensitive->keys[i] != NULL &&
+ sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 &&
+ try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(local_user,
+ sensitive->keys[i]))
+ goto success;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Try RSA authentication if the server supports it. */
+ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA)) &&
+ options.rsa_authentication) {
+ /*
+ * Try RSA authentication using the authentication agent. The
+ * agent is tried first because no passphrase is needed for
+ * it, whereas identity files may require passphrases.
+ */
+ if (try_agent_authentication())
+ goto success;
+
+ /* Try RSA authentication for each identity. */
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++)
+ if (options.identity_keys[i] != NULL &&
+ options.identity_keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 &&
+ try_rsa_authentication(i))
+ goto success;
+ }
+ /* Try challenge response authentication if the server supports it. */
+ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS)) &&
+ options.challenge_response_authentication && !options.batch_mode) {
+ if (try_challenge_response_authentication())
+ goto success;
+ }
+ /* Try password authentication if the server supports it. */
+ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD)) &&
+ options.password_authentication && !options.batch_mode) {
+ char prompt[80];
+
+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password: ",
+ server_user, host);
+ if (try_password_authentication(prompt))
+ goto success;
+ }
+ /* All authentication methods have failed. Exit with an error message. */
+ fatal("Permission denied.");
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+
+ success:
+ return; /* need statement after label */
+}
+
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect2.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshconnect2.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect2.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1670 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.204 2014/02/02 03:44:32 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
-#include <vis.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "myproposal.h"
-#include "sshconnect.h"
-#include "authfile.h"
-#include "dh.h"
-#include "authfd.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "readconf.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "msg.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-
-/* import */
-extern char *client_version_string;
-extern char *server_version_string;
-extern Options options;
-
-/*
- * SSH2 key exchange
- */
-
-u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
-u_int session_id2_len = 0;
-
-char *xxx_host;
-struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr;
-
-Kex *xxx_kex = NULL;
-
-static int
-verify_host_key_callback(Key *hostkey)
-{
- if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey) == -1)
- fatal("Host key verification failed.");
- return 0;
-}
-
-static char *
-order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
-{
- char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret;
- size_t maxlen;
- struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
- int ktype;
- u_int i;
-
- /* Find all hostkeys for this hostname */
- get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host, hostaddr, port, &hostname, NULL);
- hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++)
- load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.user_hostfiles[i]);
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++)
- load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]);
-
- oavail = avail = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
- maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
- first = xmalloc(maxlen);
- last = xmalloc(maxlen);
- *first = *last = '\0';
-
-#define ALG_APPEND(to, from) \
- do { \
- if (*to != '\0') \
- strlcat(to, ",", maxlen); \
- strlcat(to, from, maxlen); \
- } while (0)
-
- while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') {
- if ((ktype = key_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
- fatal("%s: unknown alg %s", __func__, alg);
- if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
- key_type_plain(ktype), NULL))
- ALG_APPEND(first, alg);
- else
- ALG_APPEND(last, alg);
- }
-#undef ALG_APPEND
- xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", first, *first == '\0' ? "" : ",", last);
- if (*first != '\0')
- debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first);
-
- free(first);
- free(last);
- free(hostname);
- free(oavail);
- free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-void
-ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
-{
- Kex *kex;
-
- xxx_host = host;
- xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
-
- if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
- logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
- options.ciphers = NULL;
- }
- if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
- }
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
- compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]);
- if (options.compression) {
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "zlib at openssh.com,zlib,none";
- } else {
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib at openssh.com,zlib";
- }
- if (options.macs != NULL) {
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
- }
- if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL)
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
- compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
- else {
- /* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
- compat_pkalg_proposal(
- order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
- }
- if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
-
- if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
- packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
- (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
-
- /* start key exchange */
- kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
- kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
- kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
- kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
-
- xxx_kex = kex;
-
- dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
-
- if (options.use_roaming && !kex->roaming) {
- debug("Roaming not allowed by server");
- options.use_roaming = 0;
- }
-
- session_id2 = kex->session_id;
- session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
- packet_put_cstring("markus");
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * Authenticate user
- */
-
-typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt;
-typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod;
-typedef struct identity Identity;
-typedef struct idlist Idlist;
-
-struct identity {
- TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
- AuthenticationConnection *ac; /* set if agent supports key */
- Key *key; /* public/private key */
- char *filename; /* comment for agent-only keys */
- int tried;
- int isprivate; /* key points to the private key */
- int userprovided;
-};
-TAILQ_HEAD(idlist, identity);
-
-struct Authctxt {
- const char *server_user;
- const char *local_user;
- const char *host;
- const char *service;
- Authmethod *method;
- sig_atomic_t success;
- char *authlist;
- /* pubkey */
- Idlist keys;
- AuthenticationConnection *agent;
- /* hostbased */
- Sensitive *sensitive;
- /* kbd-interactive */
- int info_req_seen;
- /* generic */
- void *methoddata;
-};
-struct Authmethod {
- char *name; /* string to compare against server's list */
- int (*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt);
- void (*cleanup)(Authctxt *authctxt);
- int *enabled; /* flag in option struct that enables method */
- int *batch_flag; /* flag in option struct that disables method */
-};
-
-void input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void input_userauth_success_unexpected(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void input_userauth_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-
-int userauth_none(Authctxt *);
-int userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *);
-int userauth_passwd(Authctxt *);
-int userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *);
-int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *);
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-int userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt);
-void input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
-void input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
-void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
-void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-#endif
-
-void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
-
-static int sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *, Identity *);
-static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *);
-static void pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *);
-static Key *load_identity_file(char *, int);
-
-static Authmethod *authmethod_get(char *authlist);
-static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *name);
-static char *authmethods_get(void);
-
-Authmethod authmethods[] = {
-#ifdef GSSAPI
- {"gssapi-with-mic",
- userauth_gssapi,
- NULL,
- &options.gss_authentication,
- NULL},
-#endif
- {"hostbased",
- userauth_hostbased,
- NULL,
- &options.hostbased_authentication,
- NULL},
- {"publickey",
- userauth_pubkey,
- NULL,
- &options.pubkey_authentication,
- NULL},
- {"keyboard-interactive",
- userauth_kbdint,
- NULL,
- &options.kbd_interactive_authentication,
- &options.batch_mode},
- {"password",
- userauth_passwd,
- NULL,
- &options.password_authentication,
- &options.batch_mode},
- {"none",
- userauth_none,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL},
- {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}
-};
-
-void
-ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
- Sensitive *sensitive)
-{
- Authctxt authctxt;
- int type;
-
- if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
- options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
-
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring("ssh-userauth");
- packet_send();
- debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST sent");
- packet_write_wait();
- type = packet_read();
- if (type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)
- fatal("Server denied authentication request: %d", type);
- if (packet_remaining() > 0) {
- char *reply = packet_get_string(NULL);
- debug2("service_accept: %s", reply);
- free(reply);
- } else {
- debug2("buggy server: service_accept w/o service");
- }
- packet_check_eom();
- debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT received");
-
- if (options.preferred_authentications == NULL)
- options.preferred_authentications = authmethods_get();
-
- /* setup authentication context */
- memset(&authctxt, 0, sizeof(authctxt));
- pubkey_prepare(&authctxt);
- authctxt.server_user = server_user;
- authctxt.local_user = local_user;
- authctxt.host = host;
- authctxt.service = "ssh-connection"; /* service name */
- authctxt.success = 0;
- authctxt.method = authmethod_lookup("none");
- authctxt.authlist = NULL;
- authctxt.methoddata = NULL;
- authctxt.sensitive = sensitive;
- authctxt.info_req_seen = 0;
- if (authctxt.method == NULL)
- fatal("ssh_userauth2: internal error: cannot send userauth none request");
-
- /* initial userauth request */
- userauth_none(&authctxt);
-
- dispatch_init(&input_userauth_error);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, &input_userauth_success);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, &input_userauth_failure);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER, &input_userauth_banner);
- dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success, &authctxt); /* loop until success */
-
- pubkey_cleanup(&authctxt);
- dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX, NULL);
-
- debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name);
-}
-
-void
-userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist)
-{
- if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL)
- authctxt->method->cleanup(authctxt);
-
- free(authctxt->methoddata);
- authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
- if (authlist == NULL) {
- authlist = authctxt->authlist;
- } else {
- free(authctxt->authlist);
- authctxt->authlist = authlist;
- }
- for (;;) {
- Authmethod *method = authmethod_get(authlist);
- if (method == NULL)
- fatal("Permission denied (%s).", authlist);
- authctxt->method = method;
-
- /* reset the per method handler */
- dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN,
- SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX, NULL);
-
- /* and try new method */
- if (method->userauth(authctxt) != 0) {
- debug2("we sent a %s packet, wait for reply", method->name);
- break;
- } else {
- debug2("we did not send a packet, disable method");
- method->enabled = NULL;
- }
- }
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- fatal("input_userauth_error: bad message during authentication: "
- "type %d", type);
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- char *msg, *raw, *lang;
- u_int len;
-
- debug3("input_userauth_banner");
- raw = packet_get_string(&len);
- lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
- if (len > 0 && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) {
- if (len > 65536)
- len = 65536;
- msg = xmalloc(len * 4 + 1); /* max expansion from strnvis() */
- strnvis(msg, raw, len * 4 + 1, VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL|VIS_NOSLASH);
- fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg);
- free(msg);
- }
- free(raw);
- free(lang);
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
-
- if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_userauth_success: no authentication context");
- free(authctxt->authlist);
- authctxt->authlist = NULL;
- if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL)
- authctxt->method->cleanup(authctxt);
- free(authctxt->methoddata);
- authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
- authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */
-}
-
-void
-input_userauth_success_unexpected(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
-
- if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no authentication context", __func__);
-
- fatal("Unexpected authentication success during %s.",
- authctxt->method->name);
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- char *authlist = NULL;
- int partial;
-
- if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_userauth_failure: no authentication context");
-
- authlist = packet_get_string(NULL);
- partial = packet_get_char();
- packet_check_eom();
-
- if (partial != 0) {
- logit("Authenticated with partial success.");
- /* reset state */
- pubkey_cleanup(authctxt);
- pubkey_prepare(authctxt);
- }
- debug("Authentications that can continue: %s", authlist);
-
- userauth(authctxt, authlist);
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- Key *key = NULL;
- Identity *id = NULL;
- Buffer b;
- int pktype, sent = 0;
- u_int alen, blen;
- char *pkalg, *fp;
- u_char *pkblob;
-
- if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_userauth_pk_ok: no authentication context");
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKOK) {
- /* this is similar to SSH_BUG_PKAUTH */
- debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: SSH_BUG_PKOK");
- pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
- pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
- buffer_free(&b);
- } else {
- pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
- pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
- }
- packet_check_eom();
-
- debug("Server accepts key: pkalg %s blen %u", pkalg, blen);
-
- if ((pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) {
- debug("unknown pkalg %s", pkalg);
- goto done;
- }
- if ((key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen)) == NULL) {
- debug("no key from blob. pkalg %s", pkalg);
- goto done;
- }
- if (key->type != pktype) {
- error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch "
- "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)",
- key->type, pktype);
- goto done;
- }
- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
- free(fp);
-
- /*
- * search keys in the reverse order, because last candidate has been
- * moved to the end of the queue. this also avoids confusion by
- * duplicate keys
- */
- TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(id, &authctxt->keys, idlist, next) {
- if (key_equal(key, id->key)) {
- sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, id);
- break;
- }
- }
-done:
- if (key != NULL)
- key_free(key);
- free(pkalg);
- free(pkblob);
-
- /* try another method if we did not send a packet */
- if (sent == 0)
- userauth(authctxt, NULL);
-}
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-int
-userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- Gssctxt *gssctxt = NULL;
- static gss_OID_set gss_supported = NULL;
- static u_int mech = 0;
- OM_uint32 min;
- int ok = 0;
-
- /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
- * once. */
-
- if (gss_supported == NULL)
- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
-
- /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
- while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
- /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
- if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
- ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
- ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
- } else {
- mech++;
- }
- }
-
- if (!ok)
- return 0;
-
- authctxt->methoddata=(void *)gssctxt;
-
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
-
- packet_put_int(1);
-
- packet_put_int((gss_supported->elements[mech].length) + 2);
- packet_put_char(SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE);
- packet_put_char(gss_supported->elements[mech].length);
- packet_put_raw(gss_supported->elements[mech].elements,
- gss_supported->elements[mech].length);
-
- packet_send();
-
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE, &input_gssapi_response);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR, &input_gssapi_error);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok);
-
- mech++; /* Move along to next candidate */
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static OM_uint32
-process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buffer_t recv_tok)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- Gssctxt *gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
- gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
- OM_uint32 status, ms, flags;
- Buffer b;
-
- status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds,
- recv_tok, &send_tok, &flags);
-
- if (send_tok.length > 0) {
- if (GSS_ERROR(status))
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK);
- else
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
-
- packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
- packet_send();
- gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
- }
-
- if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- /* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */
- if (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE);
- packet_send();
- } else {
- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user,
- authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic");
-
- gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
- gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-
- status = ssh_gssapi_sign(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic);
-
- if (!GSS_ERROR(status)) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC);
- packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
-
- packet_send();
- }
-
- buffer_free(&b);
- gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
- }
- }
-
- return status;
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- Gssctxt *gssctxt;
- int oidlen;
- char *oidv;
-
- if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
- gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
-
- /* Setup our OID */
- oidv = packet_get_string(&oidlen);
-
- if (oidlen <= 2 ||
- oidv[0] != SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE ||
- oidv[1] != oidlen - 2) {
- free(oidv);
- debug("Badly encoded mechanism OID received");
- userauth(authctxt, NULL);
- return;
- }
-
- if (!ssh_gssapi_check_oid(gssctxt, oidv + 2, oidlen - 2))
- fatal("Server returned different OID than expected");
-
- packet_check_eom();
-
- free(oidv);
-
- if (GSS_ERROR(process_gssapi_token(ctxt, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER))) {
- /* Start again with next method on list */
- debug("Trying to start again");
- userauth(authctxt, NULL);
- return;
- }
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
- OM_uint32 status;
- u_int slen;
-
- if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
-
- recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
- recv_tok.length = slen; /* safe typecast */
-
- packet_check_eom();
-
- status = process_gssapi_token(ctxt, &recv_tok);
-
- free(recv_tok.value);
-
- if (GSS_ERROR(status)) {
- /* Start again with the next method in the list */
- userauth(authctxt, NULL);
- return;
- }
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- Gssctxt *gssctxt;
- gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
- OM_uint32 ms;
- u_int len;
-
- if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
- gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
-
- recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&len);
- recv_tok.length = len;
-
- packet_check_eom();
-
- /* Stick it into GSSAPI and see what it says */
- (void)ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds,
- &recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL);
-
- free(recv_tok.value);
- gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
-
- /* Server will be returning a failed packet after this one */
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
-{
- char *msg;
- char *lang;
-
- /* maj */(void)packet_get_int();
- /* min */(void)packet_get_int();
- msg=packet_get_string(NULL);
- lang=packet_get_string(NULL);
-
- packet_check_eom();
-
- debug("Server GSSAPI Error:\n%s", msg);
- free(msg);
- free(lang);
-}
-#endif /* GSSAPI */
-
-int
-userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- /* initial userauth request */
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
- packet_send();
- return 1;
-}
-
-int
-userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- static int attempt = 0;
- char prompt[150];
- char *password;
- const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias :
- authctxt->host;
-
- if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
- return 0;
-
- if (attempt != 1)
- error("Permission denied, please try again.");
-
- snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password: ",
- authctxt->server_user, host);
- password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
- packet_put_char(0);
- packet_put_cstring(password);
- explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password));
- free(password);
- packet_add_padding(64);
- packet_send();
-
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ,
- &input_userauth_passwd_changereq);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * parse PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, prompt user and send SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
- */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-void
-input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- char *info, *lang, *password = NULL, *retype = NULL;
- char prompt[150];
- const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias :
- authctxt->host;
-
- debug2("input_userauth_passwd_changereq");
-
- if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_userauth_passwd_changereq: "
- "no authentication context");
-
- info = packet_get_string(NULL);
- lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
- if (strlen(info) > 0)
- logit("%s", info);
- free(info);
- free(lang);
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
- packet_put_char(1); /* additional info */
- snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
- "Enter %.30s@%.128s's old password: ",
- authctxt->server_user, host);
- password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
- packet_put_cstring(password);
- explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password));
- free(password);
- password = NULL;
- while (password == NULL) {
- snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
- "Enter %.30s@%.128s's new password: ",
- authctxt->server_user, host);
- password = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF);
- if (password == NULL) {
- /* bail out */
- return;
- }
- snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
- "Retype %.30s@%.128s's new password: ",
- authctxt->server_user, host);
- retype = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
- if (strcmp(password, retype) != 0) {
- explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password));
- free(password);
- logit("Mismatch; try again, EOF to quit.");
- password = NULL;
- }
- explicit_bzero(retype, strlen(retype));
- free(retype);
- }
- packet_put_cstring(password);
- explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password));
- free(password);
- packet_add_padding(64);
- packet_send();
-
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ,
- &input_userauth_passwd_changereq);
-}
-
-static int
-identity_sign(Identity *id, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
- u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
- Key *prv;
- int ret;
-
- /* the agent supports this key */
- if (id->ac)
- return (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, sigp, lenp,
- data, datalen));
- /*
- * we have already loaded the private key or
- * the private key is stored in external hardware
- */
- if (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT))
- return (key_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen));
- /* load the private key from the file */
- if ((prv = load_identity_file(id->filename, id->userprovided)) == NULL)
- return (-1);
- ret = key_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
- key_free(prv);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int
-sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
-{
- Buffer b;
- u_char *blob, *signature;
- u_int bloblen, slen;
- u_int skip = 0;
- int ret = -1;
- int have_sig = 1;
- char *fp;
-
- fp = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp);
- free(fp);
-
- if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
- /* we cannot handle this key */
- debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: cannot handle key");
- return 0;
- }
- /* data to be signed */
- buffer_init(&b);
- if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
- buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
- skip = session_id2_len;
- } else {
- buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
- skip = buffer_len(&b);
- }
- buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b,
- datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
- "ssh-userauth" :
- authctxt->service);
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
- buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
- } else {
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name);
- buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(id->key));
- }
- buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen);
-
- /* generate signature */
- ret = identity_sign(id, &signature, &slen,
- buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
- if (ret == -1) {
- free(blob);
- buffer_free(&b);
- return 0;
- }
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
- buffer_dump(&b);
-#endif
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE) {
- buffer_clear(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
- skip = session_id2_len;
- buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->service);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name);
- buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
- if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH))
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(id->key));
- buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen);
- }
- free(blob);
-
- /* append signature */
- buffer_put_string(&b, signature, slen);
- free(signature);
-
- /* skip session id and packet type */
- if (buffer_len(&b) < skip + 1)
- fatal("userauth_pubkey: internal error");
- buffer_consume(&b, skip + 1);
-
- /* put remaining data from buffer into packet */
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
- buffer_free(&b);
- packet_send();
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int
-send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
-{
- u_char *blob;
- u_int bloblen, have_sig = 0;
-
- debug3("send_pubkey_test");
-
- if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
- /* we cannot handle this key */
- debug3("send_pubkey_test: cannot handle key");
- return 0;
- }
- /* register callback for USERAUTH_PK_OK message */
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, &input_userauth_pk_ok);
-
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
- packet_put_char(have_sig);
- if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH))
- packet_put_cstring(key_ssh_name(id->key));
- packet_put_string(blob, bloblen);
- free(blob);
- packet_send();
- return 1;
-}
-
-static Key *
-load_identity_file(char *filename, int userprovided)
-{
- Key *private;
- char prompt[300], *passphrase;
- int perm_ok = 0, quit, i;
- struct stat st;
-
- if (stat(filename, &st) < 0) {
- (userprovided ? logit : debug3)("no such identity: %s: %s",
- filename, strerror(errno));
- return NULL;
- }
- private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, "", NULL, &perm_ok);
- if (!perm_ok) {
- if (private != NULL)
- key_free(private);
- return NULL;
- }
- if (private == NULL) {
- if (options.batch_mode)
- return NULL;
- snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt,
- "Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", filename);
- for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
- passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
- if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) {
- private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC,
- filename, passphrase, NULL, NULL);
- quit = 0;
- } else {
- debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
- quit = 1;
- }
- explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
- free(passphrase);
- if (private != NULL || quit)
- break;
- debug2("bad passphrase given, try again...");
- }
- }
- return private;
-}
-
-/*
- * try keys in the following order:
- * 1. agent keys that are found in the config file
- * 2. other agent keys
- * 3. keys that are only listed in the config file
- */
-static void
-pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- Identity *id, *id2, *tmp;
- Idlist agent, files, *preferred;
- Key *key;
- AuthenticationConnection *ac;
- char *comment;
- int i, found;
-
- TAILQ_INIT(&agent); /* keys from the agent */
- TAILQ_INIT(&files); /* keys from the config file */
- preferred = &authctxt->keys;
- TAILQ_INIT(preferred); /* preferred order of keys */
-
- /* list of keys stored in the filesystem and PKCS#11 */
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
- key = options.identity_keys[i];
- if (key && key->type == KEY_RSA1)
- continue;
- if (key && key->cert && key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER)
- continue;
- options.identity_keys[i] = NULL;
- id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
- id->key = key;
- id->filename = xstrdup(options.identity_files[i]);
- id->userprovided = options.identity_file_userprovided[i];
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&files, id, next);
- }
- /* Prefer PKCS11 keys that are explicitly listed */
- TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, &files, next, tmp) {
- if (id->key == NULL || (id->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0)
- continue;
- found = 0;
- TAILQ_FOREACH(id2, &files, next) {
- if (id2->key == NULL ||
- (id2->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0)
- continue;
- if (key_equal(id->key, id2->key)) {
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
- found = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- /* If IdentitiesOnly set and key not found then don't use it */
- if (!found && options.identities_only) {
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
- explicit_bzero(id, sizeof(*id));
- free(id);
- }
- }
- /* list of keys supported by the agent */
- if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection())) {
- for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2);
- key != NULL;
- key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) {
- found = 0;
- TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) {
- /* agent keys from the config file are preferred */
- if (key_equal(key, id->key)) {
- key_free(key);
- free(comment);
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
- id->ac = ac;
- found = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!found && !options.identities_only) {
- id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
- id->key = key;
- id->filename = comment;
- id->ac = ac;
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&agent, id, next);
- }
- }
- /* append remaining agent keys */
- for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent)) {
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&agent, id, next);
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
- }
- authctxt->agent = ac;
- }
- /* append remaining keys from the config file */
- for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files)) {
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
- }
- TAILQ_FOREACH(id, preferred, next) {
- debug2("key: %s (%p),%s", id->filename, id->key,
- id->userprovided ? " explicit" : "");
- }
-}
-
-static void
-pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- Identity *id;
-
- if (authctxt->agent != NULL)
- ssh_close_authentication_connection(authctxt->agent);
- for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys); id;
- id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys)) {
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
- if (id->key)
- key_free(id->key);
- free(id->filename);
- free(id);
- }
-}
-
-int
-userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- Identity *id;
- int sent = 0;
-
- while ((id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys))) {
- if (id->tried++)
- return (0);
- /* move key to the end of the queue */
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
- /*
- * send a test message if we have the public key. for
- * encrypted keys we cannot do this and have to load the
- * private key instead
- */
- if (id->key != NULL) {
- if (key_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
- (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
- debug("Skipped %s key %s for RSA/MD5 server",
- key_type(id->key), id->filename);
- } else if (id->key->type != KEY_RSA1) {
- debug("Offering %s public key: %s",
- key_type(id->key), id->filename);
- sent = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, id);
- }
- } else {
- debug("Trying private key: %s", id->filename);
- id->key = load_identity_file(id->filename,
- id->userprovided);
- if (id->key != NULL) {
- id->isprivate = 1;
- if (key_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
- (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
- debug("Skipped %s key %s for RSA/MD5 "
- "server", key_type(id->key),
- id->filename);
- } else {
- sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(
- authctxt, id);
- }
- key_free(id->key);
- id->key = NULL;
- }
- }
- if (sent)
- return (sent);
- }
- return (0);
-}
-
-/*
- * Send userauth request message specifying keyboard-interactive method.
- */
-int
-userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- static int attempt = 0;
-
- if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
- return 0;
- /* disable if no SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST has been seen */
- if (attempt > 1 && !authctxt->info_req_seen) {
- debug3("userauth_kbdint: disable: no info_req_seen");
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, NULL);
- return 0;
- }
-
- debug2("userauth_kbdint");
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
- packet_put_cstring(""); /* lang */
- packet_put_cstring(options.kbd_interactive_devices ?
- options.kbd_interactive_devices : "");
- packet_send();
-
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, &input_userauth_info_req);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * parse INFO_REQUEST, prompt user and send INFO_RESPONSE
- */
-void
-input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- char *name, *inst, *lang, *prompt, *response;
- u_int num_prompts, i;
- int echo = 0;
-
- debug2("input_userauth_info_req");
-
- if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_userauth_info_req: no authentication context");
-
- authctxt->info_req_seen = 1;
-
- name = packet_get_string(NULL);
- inst = packet_get_string(NULL);
- lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
- if (strlen(name) > 0)
- logit("%s", name);
- if (strlen(inst) > 0)
- logit("%s", inst);
- free(name);
- free(inst);
- free(lang);
-
- num_prompts = packet_get_int();
- /*
- * Begin to build info response packet based on prompts requested.
- * We commit to providing the correct number of responses, so if
- * further on we run into a problem that prevents this, we have to
- * be sure and clean this up and send a correct error response.
- */
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE);
- packet_put_int(num_prompts);
-
- debug2("input_userauth_info_req: num_prompts %d", num_prompts);
- for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++) {
- prompt = packet_get_string(NULL);
- echo = packet_get_char();
-
- response = read_passphrase(prompt, echo ? RP_ECHO : 0);
-
- packet_put_cstring(response);
- explicit_bzero(response, strlen(response));
- free(response);
- free(prompt);
- }
- packet_check_eom(); /* done with parsing incoming message. */
-
- packet_add_padding(64);
- packet_send();
-}
-
-static int
-ssh_keysign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
- u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
- Buffer b;
- struct stat st;
- pid_t pid;
- int to[2], from[2], status, version = 2;
-
- debug2("ssh_keysign called");
-
- if (stat(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, &st) < 0) {
- error("ssh_keysign: not installed: %s", strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- if (fflush(stdout) != 0)
- error("ssh_keysign: fflush: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (pipe(to) < 0) {
- error("ssh_keysign: pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- if (pipe(from) < 0) {
- error("ssh_keysign: pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- if ((pid = fork()) < 0) {
- error("ssh_keysign: fork: %s", strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- if (pid == 0) {
- /* keep the socket on exec */
- fcntl(packet_get_connection_in(), F_SETFD, 0);
- permanently_drop_suid(getuid());
- close(from[0]);
- if (dup2(from[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
- fatal("ssh_keysign: dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
- close(to[1]);
- if (dup2(to[0], STDIN_FILENO) < 0)
- fatal("ssh_keysign: dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
- close(from[1]);
- close(to[0]);
- execl(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, (char *) 0);
- fatal("ssh_keysign: exec(%s): %s", _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN,
- strerror(errno));
- }
- close(from[1]);
- close(to[0]);
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_put_int(&b, packet_get_connection_in()); /* send # of socket */
- buffer_put_string(&b, data, datalen);
- if (ssh_msg_send(to[1], version, &b) == -1)
- fatal("ssh_keysign: couldn't send request");
-
- if (ssh_msg_recv(from[0], &b) < 0) {
- error("ssh_keysign: no reply");
- buffer_free(&b);
- return -1;
- }
- close(from[0]);
- close(to[1]);
-
- while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
- if (errno != EINTR)
- break;
-
- if (buffer_get_char(&b) != version) {
- error("ssh_keysign: bad version");
- buffer_free(&b);
- return -1;
- }
- *sigp = buffer_get_string(&b, lenp);
- buffer_free(&b);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- Key *private = NULL;
- Sensitive *sensitive = authctxt->sensitive;
- Buffer b;
- u_char *signature, *blob;
- char *chost, *pkalg, *p;
- const char *service;
- u_int blen, slen;
- int ok, i, found = 0;
-
- /* check for a useful key */
- for (i = 0; i < sensitive->nkeys; i++) {
- private = sensitive->keys[i];
- if (private && private->type != KEY_RSA1) {
- found = 1;
- /* we take and free the key */
- sensitive->keys[i] = NULL;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!found) {
- debug("No more client hostkeys for hostbased authentication.");
- return 0;
- }
- if (key_to_blob(private, &blob, &blen) == 0) {
- key_free(private);
- return 0;
- }
- /* figure out a name for the client host */
- p = get_local_name(packet_get_connection_in());
- if (p == NULL) {
- error("userauth_hostbased: cannot get local ipaddr/name");
- key_free(private);
- free(blob);
- return 0;
- }
- xasprintf(&chost, "%s.", p);
- debug2("userauth_hostbased: chost %s", chost);
- free(p);
-
- service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" :
- authctxt->service;
- pkalg = xstrdup(key_ssh_name(private));
- buffer_init(&b);
- /* construct data */
- buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
- buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, service);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
- buffer_put_string(&b, blob, blen);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, chost);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->local_user);
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
- buffer_dump(&b);
-#endif
- if (sensitive->external_keysign)
- ok = ssh_keysign(private, &signature, &slen,
- buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
- else
- ok = key_sign(private, &signature, &slen,
- buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
- key_free(private);
- buffer_free(&b);
- if (ok != 0) {
- error("key_sign failed");
- free(chost);
- free(pkalg);
- free(blob);
- return 0;
- }
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
- packet_put_cstring(pkalg);
- packet_put_string(blob, blen);
- packet_put_cstring(chost);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->local_user);
- packet_put_string(signature, slen);
- explicit_bzero(signature, slen);
- free(signature);
- free(chost);
- free(pkalg);
- free(blob);
-
- packet_send();
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* find auth method */
-
-/*
- * given auth method name, if configurable options permit this method fill
- * in auth_ident field and return true, otherwise return false.
- */
-static int
-authmethod_is_enabled(Authmethod *method)
-{
- if (method == NULL)
- return 0;
- /* return false if options indicate this method is disabled */
- if (method->enabled == NULL || *method->enabled == 0)
- return 0;
- /* return false if batch mode is enabled but method needs interactive mode */
- if (method->batch_flag != NULL && *method->batch_flag != 0)
- return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static Authmethod *
-authmethod_lookup(const char *name)
-{
- Authmethod *method = NULL;
- if (name != NULL)
- for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++)
- if (strcmp(name, method->name) == 0)
- return method;
- debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name ? name : "NULL");
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/* XXX internal state */
-static Authmethod *current = NULL;
-static char *supported = NULL;
-static char *preferred = NULL;
-
-/*
- * Given the authentication method list sent by the server, return the
- * next method we should try. If the server initially sends a nil list,
- * use a built-in default list.
- */
-static Authmethod *
-authmethod_get(char *authlist)
-{
- char *name = NULL;
- u_int next;
-
- /* Use a suitable default if we're passed a nil list. */
- if (authlist == NULL || strlen(authlist) == 0)
- authlist = options.preferred_authentications;
-
- if (supported == NULL || strcmp(authlist, supported) != 0) {
- debug3("start over, passed a different list %s", authlist);
- free(supported);
- supported = xstrdup(authlist);
- preferred = options.preferred_authentications;
- debug3("preferred %s", preferred);
- current = NULL;
- } else if (current != NULL && authmethod_is_enabled(current))
- return current;
-
- for (;;) {
- if ((name = match_list(preferred, supported, &next)) == NULL) {
- debug("No more authentication methods to try.");
- current = NULL;
- return NULL;
- }
- preferred += next;
- debug3("authmethod_lookup %s", name);
- debug3("remaining preferred: %s", preferred);
- if ((current = authmethod_lookup(name)) != NULL &&
- authmethod_is_enabled(current)) {
- debug3("authmethod_is_enabled %s", name);
- debug("Next authentication method: %s", name);
- free(name);
- return current;
- }
- free(name);
- }
-}
-
-static char *
-authmethods_get(void)
-{
- Authmethod *method = NULL;
- Buffer b;
- char *list;
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) {
- if (authmethod_is_enabled(method)) {
- if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
- buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
- buffer_append(&b, method->name, strlen(method->name));
- }
- }
- buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
- list = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
- buffer_free(&b);
- return list;
-}
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect2.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshconnect2.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect2.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshconnect2.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1924 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.247 2016/07/22 05:46:11 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+#include <vis.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "sshconnect.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "utf8.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+
+/* import */
+extern char *client_version_string;
+extern char *server_version_string;
+extern Options options;
+
+/*
+ * SSH2 key exchange
+ */
+
+u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
+u_int session_id2_len = 0;
+
+char *xxx_host;
+struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr;
+
+static int
+verify_host_key_callback(Key *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey) == -1)
+ fatal("Host key verification failed.");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static char *
+order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+{
+ char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret;
+ size_t maxlen;
+ struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
+ int ktype;
+ u_int i;
+
+ /* Find all hostkeys for this hostname */
+ get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host, hostaddr, port, &hostname, NULL);
+ hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++)
+ load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.user_hostfiles[i]);
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++)
+ load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]);
+
+ oavail = avail = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
+ maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
+ first = xmalloc(maxlen);
+ last = xmalloc(maxlen);
+ *first = *last = '\0';
+
+#define ALG_APPEND(to, from) \
+ do { \
+ if (*to != '\0') \
+ strlcat(to, ",", maxlen); \
+ strlcat(to, from, maxlen); \
+ } while (0)
+
+ while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') {
+ if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
+ fatal("%s: unknown alg %s", __func__, alg);
+ if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
+ sshkey_type_plain(ktype), NULL))
+ ALG_APPEND(first, alg);
+ else
+ ALG_APPEND(last, alg);
+ }
+#undef ALG_APPEND
+ xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", first,
+ (*first == '\0' || *last == '\0') ? "" : ",", last);
+ if (*first != '\0')
+ debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first);
+
+ free(first);
+ free(last);
+ free(hostname);
+ free(oavail);
+ free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+{
+ char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+ char *s;
+ struct kex *kex;
+ int r;
+
+ xxx_host = host;
+ xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+
+ if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__);
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s);
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers);
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
+ compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers);
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = options.compression ?
+ "zlib at openssh.com,zlib,none" : "none,zlib at openssh.com,zlib";
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
+ if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) {
+ if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG,
+ &options.hostkeyalgorithms) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: kex_assemble_namelist", __func__);
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
+ compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+ } else {
+ /* Enforce default */
+ options.hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
+ /* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
+ compat_pkalg_proposal(
+ order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
+ }
+
+ if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
+ packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
+ (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
+
+ /* start key exchange */
+ if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
+ fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ kex = active_state->kex;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
+# endif
+#endif
+ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
+ kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+ kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+
+ dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state);
+
+ /* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
+ compat_kex_proposal(options.kex_algorithms);
+ if ((r = kex_prop2buf(kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
+ fatal("kex_prop2buf: %s", ssh_err(r));
+
+ session_id2 = kex->session_id;
+ session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
+ packet_put_cstring("markus");
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authenticate user
+ */
+
+typedef struct cauthctxt Authctxt;
+typedef struct cauthmethod Authmethod;
+typedef struct identity Identity;
+typedef struct idlist Idlist;
+
+struct identity {
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
+ int agent_fd; /* >=0 if agent supports key */
+ struct sshkey *key; /* public/private key */
+ char *filename; /* comment for agent-only keys */
+ int tried;
+ int isprivate; /* key points to the private key */
+ int userprovided;
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(idlist, identity);
+
+struct cauthctxt {
+ const char *server_user;
+ const char *local_user;
+ const char *host;
+ const char *service;
+ struct cauthmethod *method;
+ sig_atomic_t success;
+ char *authlist;
+ int attempt;
+ /* pubkey */
+ struct idlist keys;
+ int agent_fd;
+ /* hostbased */
+ Sensitive *sensitive;
+ char *oktypes, *ktypes;
+ const char *active_ktype;
+ /* kbd-interactive */
+ int info_req_seen;
+ /* generic */
+ void *methoddata;
+};
+
+struct cauthmethod {
+ char *name; /* string to compare against server's list */
+ int (*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt);
+ void (*cleanup)(Authctxt *authctxt);
+ int *enabled; /* flag in option struct that enables method */
+ int *batch_flag; /* flag in option struct that disables method */
+};
+
+int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int input_userauth_success_unexpected(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int input_userauth_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+int userauth_none(Authctxt *);
+int userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *);
+int userauth_passwd(Authctxt *);
+int userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *);
+int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *);
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+int userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt);
+int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+int input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+#endif
+
+void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
+
+static int sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *, Identity *);
+static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *);
+static void pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *);
+static Key *load_identity_file(Identity *);
+
+static Authmethod *authmethod_get(char *authlist);
+static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *name);
+static char *authmethods_get(void);
+
+Authmethod authmethods[] = {
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ {"gssapi-with-mic",
+ userauth_gssapi,
+ NULL,
+ &options.gss_authentication,
+ NULL},
+#endif
+ {"hostbased",
+ userauth_hostbased,
+ NULL,
+ &options.hostbased_authentication,
+ NULL},
+ {"publickey",
+ userauth_pubkey,
+ NULL,
+ &options.pubkey_authentication,
+ NULL},
+ {"keyboard-interactive",
+ userauth_kbdint,
+ NULL,
+ &options.kbd_interactive_authentication,
+ &options.batch_mode},
+ {"password",
+ userauth_passwd,
+ NULL,
+ &options.password_authentication,
+ &options.batch_mode},
+ {"none",
+ userauth_none,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL},
+ {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}
+};
+
+void
+ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
+ Sensitive *sensitive)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state;
+ Authctxt authctxt;
+ int r;
+
+ if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
+ options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
+ if (options.preferred_authentications == NULL)
+ options.preferred_authentications = authmethods_get();
+
+ /* setup authentication context */
+ memset(&authctxt, 0, sizeof(authctxt));
+ pubkey_prepare(&authctxt);
+ authctxt.server_user = server_user;
+ authctxt.local_user = local_user;
+ authctxt.host = host;
+ authctxt.service = "ssh-connection"; /* service name */
+ authctxt.success = 0;
+ authctxt.method = authmethod_lookup("none");
+ authctxt.authlist = NULL;
+ authctxt.methoddata = NULL;
+ authctxt.sensitive = sensitive;
+ authctxt.active_ktype = authctxt.oktypes = authctxt.ktypes = NULL;
+ authctxt.info_req_seen = 0;
+ authctxt.agent_fd = -1;
+ if (authctxt.method == NULL)
+ fatal("ssh_userauth2: internal error: cannot send userauth none request");
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "ssh-userauth")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept);
+ ssh_dispatch_run(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success, &authctxt); /* loop until success */
+
+ pubkey_cleanup(&authctxt);
+ ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX, NULL);
+
+ debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state;
+ int r;
+
+ if (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
+ char *reply;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &reply, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ debug2("service_accept: %s", reply);
+ free(reply);
+ } else {
+ debug2("buggy server: service_accept w/o service");
+ }
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT received");
+
+ /* initial userauth request */
+ userauth_none(authctxt);
+
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_error);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, &input_userauth_success);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, &input_userauth_failure);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER, &input_userauth_banner);
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
+{
+ return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, active_state);
+}
+
+void
+userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist)
+{
+ if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL)
+ authctxt->method->cleanup(authctxt);
+
+ free(authctxt->methoddata);
+ authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
+ if (authlist == NULL) {
+ authlist = authctxt->authlist;
+ } else {
+ free(authctxt->authlist);
+ authctxt->authlist = authlist;
+ }
+ for (;;) {
+ Authmethod *method = authmethod_get(authlist);
+ if (method == NULL)
+ fatal("Permission denied (%s).", authlist);
+ authctxt->method = method;
+
+ /* reset the per method handler */
+ dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN,
+ SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX, NULL);
+
+ /* and try new method */
+ if (method->userauth(authctxt) != 0) {
+ debug2("we sent a %s packet, wait for reply", method->name);
+ break;
+ } else {
+ debug2("we did not send a packet, disable method");
+ method->enabled = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ fatal("input_userauth_error: bad message during authentication: "
+ "type %d", type);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ char *msg, *lang;
+ u_int len;
+
+ debug3("%s", __func__);
+ msg = packet_get_string(&len);
+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ if (len > 0 && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
+ fmprintf(stderr, "%s", msg);
+ free(msg);
+ free(lang);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_userauth_success: no authentication context");
+ free(authctxt->authlist);
+ authctxt->authlist = NULL;
+ if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL)
+ authctxt->method->cleanup(authctxt);
+ free(authctxt->methoddata);
+ authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
+ authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+input_userauth_success_unexpected(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: no authentication context", __func__);
+
+ fatal("Unexpected authentication success during %s.",
+ authctxt->method->name);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ char *authlist = NULL;
+ int partial;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_userauth_failure: no authentication context");
+
+ authlist = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ partial = packet_get_char();
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ if (partial != 0) {
+ verbose("Authenticated with partial success.");
+ /* reset state */
+ pubkey_cleanup(authctxt);
+ pubkey_prepare(authctxt);
+ }
+ debug("Authentications that can continue: %s", authlist);
+
+ userauth(authctxt, authlist);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ Key *key = NULL;
+ Identity *id = NULL;
+ Buffer b;
+ int pktype, sent = 0;
+ u_int alen, blen;
+ char *pkalg, *fp;
+ u_char *pkblob;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_userauth_pk_ok: no authentication context");
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKOK) {
+ /* this is similar to SSH_BUG_PKAUTH */
+ debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: SSH_BUG_PKOK");
+ pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
+ pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ } else {
+ pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
+ pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
+ }
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ debug("Server accepts key: pkalg %s blen %u", pkalg, blen);
+
+ if ((pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+ debug("unknown pkalg %s", pkalg);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen)) == NULL) {
+ debug("no key from blob. pkalg %s", pkalg);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (key->type != pktype) {
+ error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch "
+ "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)",
+ key->type, pktype);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ goto done;
+ debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
+ free(fp);
+
+ /*
+ * search keys in the reverse order, because last candidate has been
+ * moved to the end of the queue. this also avoids confusion by
+ * duplicate keys
+ */
+ TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(id, &authctxt->keys, idlist, next) {
+ if (key_equal(key, id->key)) {
+ sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, id);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+done:
+ if (key != NULL)
+ key_free(key);
+ free(pkalg);
+ free(pkblob);
+
+ /* try another method if we did not send a packet */
+ if (sent == 0)
+ userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+int
+userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt = NULL;
+ static gss_OID_set gss_supported = NULL;
+ static u_int mech = 0;
+ OM_uint32 min;
+ int ok = 0;
+
+ /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+ * once. */
+
+ if (gss_supported == NULL)
+ gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
+
+ /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
+ while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
+ /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+ if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
+ &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
+ ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+ } else {
+ mech++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return 0;
+
+ authctxt->methoddata=(void *)gssctxt;
+
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+
+ packet_put_int(1);
+
+ packet_put_int((gss_supported->elements[mech].length) + 2);
+ packet_put_char(SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE);
+ packet_put_char(gss_supported->elements[mech].length);
+ packet_put_raw(gss_supported->elements[mech].elements,
+ gss_supported->elements[mech].length);
+
+ packet_send();
+
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE, &input_gssapi_response);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR, &input_gssapi_error);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok);
+
+ mech++; /* Move along to next candidate */
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buffer_t recv_tok)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+ OM_uint32 status, ms, flags;
+ Buffer b;
+
+ status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds,
+ recv_tok, &send_tok, &flags);
+
+ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
+ if (GSS_ERROR(status))
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK);
+ else
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
+
+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+ packet_send();
+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
+ }
+
+ if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ /* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */
+ if (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE);
+ packet_send();
+ } else {
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user,
+ authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic");
+
+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+
+ status = ssh_gssapi_sign(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic);
+
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(status)) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC);
+ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
+
+ packet_send();
+ }
+
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+ int oidlen;
+ char *oidv;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+ gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+
+ /* Setup our OID */
+ oidv = packet_get_string(&oidlen);
+
+ if (oidlen <= 2 ||
+ oidv[0] != SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE ||
+ oidv[1] != oidlen - 2) {
+ free(oidv);
+ debug("Badly encoded mechanism OID received");
+ userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssh_gssapi_check_oid(gssctxt, oidv + 2, oidlen - 2))
+ fatal("Server returned different OID than expected");
+
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ free(oidv);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(process_gssapi_token(ctxt, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER))) {
+ /* Start again with next method on list */
+ debug("Trying to start again");
+ userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
+ OM_uint32 status;
+ u_int slen;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+
+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
+ recv_tok.length = slen; /* safe typecast */
+
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ status = process_gssapi_token(ctxt, &recv_tok);
+
+ free(recv_tok.value);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(status)) {
+ /* Start again with the next method in the list */
+ userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
+ OM_uint32 ms;
+ u_int len;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+ gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+
+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&len);
+ recv_tok.length = len;
+
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ /* Stick it into GSSAPI and see what it says */
+ (void)ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds,
+ &recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL);
+
+ free(recv_tok.value);
+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
+
+ /* Server will be returning a failed packet after this one */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ char *msg;
+ char *lang;
+
+ /* maj */(void)packet_get_int();
+ /* min */(void)packet_get_int();
+ msg=packet_get_string(NULL);
+ lang=packet_get_string(NULL);
+
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ debug("Server GSSAPI Error:\n%s", msg);
+ free(msg);
+ free(lang);
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+int
+userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ /* initial userauth request */
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+ packet_send();
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int
+userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ static int attempt = 0;
+ char prompt[150];
+ char *password;
+ const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias :
+ authctxt->host;
+
+ if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (attempt != 1)
+ error("Permission denied, please try again.");
+
+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password: ",
+ authctxt->server_user, host);
+ password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+ packet_put_char(0);
+ packet_put_cstring(password);
+ explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password));
+ free(password);
+ packet_add_padding(64);
+ packet_send();
+
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ,
+ &input_userauth_passwd_changereq);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * parse PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, prompt user and send SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ char *info, *lang, *password = NULL, *retype = NULL;
+ char prompt[150];
+ const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias :
+ authctxt->host;
+
+ debug2("input_userauth_passwd_changereq");
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_userauth_passwd_changereq: "
+ "no authentication context");
+
+ info = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ if (strlen(info) > 0)
+ logit("%s", info);
+ free(info);
+ free(lang);
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+ packet_put_char(1); /* additional info */
+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
+ "Enter %.30s@%.128s's old password: ",
+ authctxt->server_user, host);
+ password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+ packet_put_cstring(password);
+ explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password));
+ free(password);
+ password = NULL;
+ while (password == NULL) {
+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
+ "Enter %.30s@%.128s's new password: ",
+ authctxt->server_user, host);
+ password = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF);
+ if (password == NULL) {
+ /* bail out */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
+ "Retype %.30s@%.128s's new password: ",
+ authctxt->server_user, host);
+ retype = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+ if (strcmp(password, retype) != 0) {
+ explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password));
+ free(password);
+ logit("Mismatch; try again, EOF to quit.");
+ password = NULL;
+ }
+ explicit_bzero(retype, strlen(retype));
+ free(retype);
+ }
+ packet_put_cstring(password);
+ explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password));
+ free(password);
+ packet_add_padding(64);
+ packet_send();
+
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ,
+ &input_userauth_passwd_changereq);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const char *
+identity_sign_encode(struct identity *id)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state;
+
+ if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA) {
+ switch (ssh->kex->rsa_sha2) {
+ case 256:
+ return "rsa-sha2-256";
+ case 512:
+ return "rsa-sha2-512";
+ }
+ }
+ return key_ssh_name(id->key);
+}
+
+static int
+identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+{
+ Key *prv;
+ int ret;
+ const char *alg;
+
+ alg = identity_sign_encode(id);
+
+ /* the agent supports this key */
+ if (id->agent_fd != -1)
+ return ssh_agent_sign(id->agent_fd, id->key, sigp, lenp,
+ data, datalen, alg, compat);
+
+ /*
+ * we have already loaded the private key or
+ * the private key is stored in external hardware
+ */
+ if (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT))
+ return (sshkey_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg,
+ compat));
+ /* load the private key from the file */
+ if ((prv = load_identity_file(id)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+ ret = sshkey_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, compat);
+ sshkey_free(prv);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int
+sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ Identity *private_id;
+ u_char *blob, *signature;
+ size_t slen;
+ u_int bloblen, skip = 0;
+ int matched, ret = -1, have_sig = 1;
+ char *fp;
+
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ debug3("%s: %s %s", __func__, key_type(id->key), fp);
+ free(fp);
+
+ if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
+ /* we cannot handle this key */
+ debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: cannot handle key");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* data to be signed */
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
+ buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+ skip = session_id2_len;
+ } else {
+ buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+ skip = buffer_len(&b);
+ }
+ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b,
+ datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
+ "ssh-userauth" :
+ authctxt->service);
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
+ buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
+ } else {
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name);
+ buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, identity_sign_encode(id));
+ }
+ buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen);
+
+ /*
+ * If the key is an certificate, try to find a matching private key
+ * and use it to complete the signature.
+ * If no such private key exists, fall back to trying the certificate
+ * key itself in case it has a private half already loaded.
+ */
+ if (key_is_cert(id->key)) {
+ matched = 0;
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) {
+ if (sshkey_equal_public(id->key, private_id->key) &&
+ id->key->type != private_id->key->type) {
+ id = private_id;
+ matched = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (matched) {
+ debug2("%s: using private key \"%s\"%s for "
+ "certificate", __func__, id->filename,
+ id->agent_fd != -1 ? " from agent" : "");
+ } else {
+ debug("%s: no separate private key for certificate "
+ "\"%s\"", __func__, id->filename);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* generate signature */
+ ret = identity_sign(id, &signature, &slen,
+ buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), datafellows);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ if (ret != SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
+ error("%s: signing failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+ free(blob);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ buffer_dump(&b);
+#endif
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE) {
+ buffer_clear(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+ skip = session_id2_len;
+ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->service);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name);
+ buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH))
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(id->key));
+ buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen);
+ }
+ free(blob);
+
+ /* append signature */
+ buffer_put_string(&b, signature, slen);
+ free(signature);
+
+ /* skip session id and packet type */
+ if (buffer_len(&b) < skip + 1)
+ fatal("userauth_pubkey: internal error");
+ buffer_consume(&b, skip + 1);
+
+ /* put remaining data from buffer into packet */
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ packet_send();
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
+{
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int bloblen, have_sig = 0;
+
+ debug3("send_pubkey_test");
+
+ if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
+ /* we cannot handle this key */
+ debug3("send_pubkey_test: cannot handle key");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* register callback for USERAUTH_PK_OK message */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, &input_userauth_pk_ok);
+
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+ packet_put_char(have_sig);
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH))
+ packet_put_cstring(identity_sign_encode(id));
+ packet_put_string(blob, bloblen);
+ free(blob);
+ packet_send();
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static Key *
+load_identity_file(Identity *id)
+{
+ Key *private = NULL;
+ char prompt[300], *passphrase, *comment;
+ int r, perm_ok = 0, quit = 0, i;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (stat(id->filename, &st) < 0) {
+ (id->userprovided ? logit : debug3)("no such identity: %s: %s",
+ id->filename, strerror(errno));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt,
+ "Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", id->filename);
+ for (i = 0; i <= options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
+ if (i == 0)
+ passphrase = "";
+ else {
+ passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+ if (*passphrase == '\0') {
+ debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
+ free(passphrase);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ switch ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, id->filename,
+ passphrase, &private, &comment, &perm_ok))) {
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE:
+ if (options.batch_mode) {
+ quit = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i != 0)
+ debug2("bad passphrase given, try again...");
+ break;
+ case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
+ if (errno == ENOENT) {
+ debug2("Load key \"%s\": %s",
+ id->filename, ssh_err(r));
+ quit = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ error("Load key \"%s\": %s", id->filename, ssh_err(r));
+ quit = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!quit && private != NULL && id->agent_fd == -1 &&
+ !(id->key && id->isprivate))
+ maybe_add_key_to_agent(id->filename, private, comment,
+ passphrase);
+ if (i > 0) {
+ explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ free(passphrase);
+ }
+ free(comment);
+ if (private != NULL || quit)
+ break;
+ }
+ return private;
+}
+
+/*
+ * try keys in the following order:
+ * 1. certificates listed in the config file
+ * 2. other input certificates
+ * 3. agent keys that are found in the config file
+ * 4. other agent keys
+ * 5. keys that are only listed in the config file
+ */
+static void
+pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ struct identity *id, *id2, *tmp;
+ struct idlist agent, files, *preferred;
+ struct sshkey *key;
+ int agent_fd = -1, i, r, found;
+ size_t j;
+ struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
+
+ TAILQ_INIT(&agent); /* keys from the agent */
+ TAILQ_INIT(&files); /* keys from the config file */
+ preferred = &authctxt->keys;
+ TAILQ_INIT(preferred); /* preferred order of keys */
+
+ /* list of keys stored in the filesystem and PKCS#11 */
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
+ key = options.identity_keys[i];
+ if (key && key->type == KEY_RSA1)
+ continue;
+ if (key && key->cert && key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER)
+ continue;
+ options.identity_keys[i] = NULL;
+ id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
+ id->agent_fd = -1;
+ id->key = key;
+ id->filename = xstrdup(options.identity_files[i]);
+ id->userprovided = options.identity_file_userprovided[i];
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&files, id, next);
+ }
+ /* list of certificates specified by user */
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) {
+ key = options.certificates[i];
+ if (!key_is_cert(key) || key->cert == NULL ||
+ key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER)
+ continue;
+ id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
+ id->agent_fd = -1;
+ id->key = key;
+ id->filename = xstrdup(options.certificate_files[i]);
+ id->userprovided = options.certificate_file_userprovided[i];
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
+ }
+ /* list of keys supported by the agent */
+ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) {
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
+ debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ } else if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, 2, &idlist)) != 0) {
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
+ debug("%s: ssh_fetch_identitylist: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ close(agent_fd);
+ } else {
+ for (j = 0; j < idlist->nkeys; j++) {
+ found = 0;
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) {
+ /*
+ * agent keys from the config file are
+ * preferred
+ */
+ if (sshkey_equal(idlist->keys[j], id->key)) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
+ id->agent_fd = agent_fd;
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found && !options.identities_only) {
+ id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
+ /* XXX "steals" key/comment from idlist */
+ id->key = idlist->keys[j];
+ id->filename = idlist->comments[j];
+ idlist->keys[j] = NULL;
+ idlist->comments[j] = NULL;
+ id->agent_fd = agent_fd;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&agent, id, next);
+ }
+ }
+ ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
+ /* append remaining agent keys */
+ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent)) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&agent, id, next);
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
+ }
+ authctxt->agent_fd = agent_fd;
+ }
+ /* Prefer PKCS11 keys that are explicitly listed */
+ TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, &files, next, tmp) {
+ if (id->key == NULL || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0)
+ continue;
+ found = 0;
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(id2, &files, next) {
+ if (id2->key == NULL ||
+ (id2->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0)
+ continue;
+ if (sshkey_equal(id->key, id2->key)) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ /* If IdentitiesOnly set and key not found then don't use it */
+ if (!found && options.identities_only) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
+ explicit_bzero(id, sizeof(*id));
+ free(id);
+ }
+ }
+ /* append remaining keys from the config file */
+ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files)) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
+ }
+ /* finally, filter by PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes */
+ TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, preferred, next, id2) {
+ if (id->key != NULL &&
+ match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(id->key),
+ options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) {
+ debug("Skipping %s key %s - "
+ "not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes",
+ sshkey_ssh_name(id->key), id->filename);
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(preferred, id, next);
+ sshkey_free(id->key);
+ free(id->filename);
+ memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id));
+ continue;
+ }
+ debug2("key: %s (%p)%s%s", id->filename, id->key,
+ id->userprovided ? ", explicit" : "",
+ id->agent_fd != -1 ? ", agent" : "");
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ Identity *id;
+
+ if (authctxt->agent_fd != -1)
+ ssh_close_authentication_socket(authctxt->agent_fd);
+ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys); id;
+ id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys)) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
+ sshkey_free(id->key);
+ free(id->filename);
+ free(id);
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+try_identity(Identity *id)
+{
+ if (!id->key)
+ return (0);
+ if (key_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
+ (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
+ debug("Skipped %s key %s for RSA/MD5 server",
+ key_type(id->key), id->filename);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (id->key->type != KEY_RSA1);
+}
+
+int
+userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ Identity *id;
+ int sent = 0;
+
+ while ((id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys))) {
+ if (id->tried++)
+ return (0);
+ /* move key to the end of the queue */
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
+ /*
+ * send a test message if we have the public key. for
+ * encrypted keys we cannot do this and have to load the
+ * private key instead
+ */
+ if (id->key != NULL) {
+ if (try_identity(id)) {
+ debug("Offering %s public key: %s",
+ key_type(id->key), id->filename);
+ sent = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, id);
+ }
+ } else {
+ debug("Trying private key: %s", id->filename);
+ id->key = load_identity_file(id);
+ if (id->key != NULL) {
+ if (try_identity(id)) {
+ id->isprivate = 1;
+ sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(
+ authctxt, id);
+ }
+ key_free(id->key);
+ id->key = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (sent)
+ return (sent);
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send userauth request message specifying keyboard-interactive method.
+ */
+int
+userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ static int attempt = 0;
+
+ if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
+ return 0;
+ /* disable if no SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST has been seen */
+ if (attempt > 1 && !authctxt->info_req_seen) {
+ debug3("userauth_kbdint: disable: no info_req_seen");
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, NULL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ debug2("userauth_kbdint");
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+ packet_put_cstring(""); /* lang */
+ packet_put_cstring(options.kbd_interactive_devices ?
+ options.kbd_interactive_devices : "");
+ packet_send();
+
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, &input_userauth_info_req);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * parse INFO_REQUEST, prompt user and send INFO_RESPONSE
+ */
+int
+input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ char *name, *inst, *lang, *prompt, *response;
+ u_int num_prompts, i;
+ int echo = 0;
+
+ debug2("input_userauth_info_req");
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_userauth_info_req: no authentication context");
+
+ authctxt->info_req_seen = 1;
+
+ name = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ inst = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ if (strlen(name) > 0)
+ logit("%s", name);
+ if (strlen(inst) > 0)
+ logit("%s", inst);
+ free(name);
+ free(inst);
+ free(lang);
+
+ num_prompts = packet_get_int();
+ /*
+ * Begin to build info response packet based on prompts requested.
+ * We commit to providing the correct number of responses, so if
+ * further on we run into a problem that prevents this, we have to
+ * be sure and clean this up and send a correct error response.
+ */
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE);
+ packet_put_int(num_prompts);
+
+ debug2("input_userauth_info_req: num_prompts %d", num_prompts);
+ for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++) {
+ prompt = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ echo = packet_get_char();
+
+ response = read_passphrase(prompt, echo ? RP_ECHO : 0);
+
+ packet_put_cstring(response);
+ explicit_bzero(response, strlen(response));
+ free(response);
+ free(prompt);
+ }
+ packet_check_eom(); /* done with parsing incoming message. */
+
+ packet_add_padding(64);
+ packet_send();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_keysign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ struct stat st;
+ pid_t pid;
+ int i, r, to[2], from[2], status, sock = packet_get_connection_in();
+ u_char rversion = 0, version = 2;
+ void (*osigchld)(int);
+
+ *sigp = NULL;
+ *lenp = 0;
+
+ if (stat(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, &st) < 0) {
+ error("%s: not installed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (fflush(stdout) != 0) {
+ error("%s: fflush: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (pipe(to) < 0) {
+ error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (pipe(from) < 0) {
+ error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ((pid = fork()) < 0) {
+ error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ /* keep the socket on exec */
+ fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 0);
+ permanently_drop_suid(getuid());
+ close(from[0]);
+ if (dup2(from[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
+ fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ close(to[1]);
+ if (dup2(to[0], STDIN_FILENO) < 0)
+ fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ close(from[1]);
+ close(to[0]);
+ /* Close everything but stdio and the socket */
+ for (i = STDERR_FILENO + 1; i < sock; i++)
+ close(i);
+ closefrom(sock + 1);
+ debug3("%s: [child] pid=%ld, exec %s",
+ __func__, (long)getpid(), _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN);
+ execl(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, (char *)NULL);
+ fatal("%s: exec(%s): %s", __func__, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN,
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ close(from[1]);
+ close(to[0]);
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ /* send # of sock, data to be signed */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sock) != 0) ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, data, datalen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (ssh_msg_send(to[1], version, b) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: couldn't send request", __func__);
+ sshbuf_reset(b);
+ r = ssh_msg_recv(from[0], b);
+ close(from[0]);
+ close(to[1]);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ error("%s: no reply", __func__);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ errno = 0;
+ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) {
+ if (errno != EINTR) {
+ error("%s: waitpid %ld: %s",
+ __func__, (long)pid, strerror(errno));
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
+ error("%s: exited abnormally", __func__);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+ error("%s: exited with status %d",
+ __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &rversion)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (rversion != version) {
+ error("%s: bad version", __func__);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, sigp, lenp)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fail:
+ signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state;
+ struct sshkey *private = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ const char *service;
+ u_char *sig = NULL, *keyblob = NULL;
+ char *fp = NULL, *chost = NULL, *lname = NULL;
+ size_t siglen = 0, keylen = 0;
+ int i, r, success = 0;
+
+ if (authctxt->ktypes == NULL) {
+ authctxt->oktypes = xstrdup(options.hostbased_key_types);
+ authctxt->ktypes = authctxt->oktypes;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Work through each listed type pattern in HostbasedKeyTypes,
+ * trying each hostkey that matches the type in turn.
+ */
+ for (;;) {
+ if (authctxt->active_ktype == NULL)
+ authctxt->active_ktype = strsep(&authctxt->ktypes, ",");
+ if (authctxt->active_ktype == NULL ||
+ *authctxt->active_ktype == '\0')
+ break;
+ debug3("%s: trying key type %s", __func__,
+ authctxt->active_ktype);
+
+ /* check for a useful key */
+ private = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < authctxt->sensitive->nkeys; i++) {
+ if (authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] == NULL ||
+ authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 ||
+ authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
+ continue;
+ if (match_pattern_list(
+ sshkey_ssh_name(authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]),
+ authctxt->active_ktype, 0) != 1)
+ continue;
+ /* we take and free the key */
+ private = authctxt->sensitive->keys[i];
+ authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Found one */
+ if (private != NULL)
+ break;
+ /* No more keys of this type; advance */
+ authctxt->active_ktype = NULL;
+ }
+ if (private == NULL) {
+ free(authctxt->oktypes);
+ authctxt->oktypes = authctxt->ktypes = NULL;
+ authctxt->active_ktype = NULL;
+ debug("No more client hostkeys for hostbased authentication.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(private, options.fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ debug("%s: trying hostkey %s %s",
+ __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp);
+
+ /* figure out a name for the client host */
+ if ((lname = get_local_name(packet_get_connection_in())) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: cannot get local ipaddr/name", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX sshbuf_put_stringf? */
+ xasprintf(&chost, "%s.", lname);
+ debug2("%s: chost %s", __func__, chost);
+
+ service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" :
+ authctxt->service;
+
+ /* construct data */
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(private, &keyblob, &keylen)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, service)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key_ssh_name(private))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->local_user)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
+#endif
+ if (authctxt->sensitive->external_keysign)
+ r = ssh_keysign(private, &sig, &siglen,
+ sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b));
+ else if ((r = sshkey_sign(private, &sig, &siglen,
+ sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, datafellows)) != 0)
+ debug("%s: sshkey_sign: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (r != 0) {
+ error("sign using hostkey %s %s failed",
+ sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, key_ssh_name(private))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, chost)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->local_user)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sig, siglen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ success = 1;
+
+ out:
+ if (sig != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(sig, siglen);
+ free(sig);
+ }
+ free(keyblob);
+ free(lname);
+ free(fp);
+ free(chost);
+ sshkey_free(private);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+
+ return success;
+}
+
+/* find auth method */
+
+/*
+ * given auth method name, if configurable options permit this method fill
+ * in auth_ident field and return true, otherwise return false.
+ */
+static int
+authmethod_is_enabled(Authmethod *method)
+{
+ if (method == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ /* return false if options indicate this method is disabled */
+ if (method->enabled == NULL || *method->enabled == 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* return false if batch mode is enabled but method needs interactive mode */
+ if (method->batch_flag != NULL && *method->batch_flag != 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static Authmethod *
+authmethod_lookup(const char *name)
+{
+ Authmethod *method = NULL;
+ if (name != NULL)
+ for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++)
+ if (strcmp(name, method->name) == 0)
+ return method;
+ debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name ? name : "NULL");
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* XXX internal state */
+static Authmethod *current = NULL;
+static char *supported = NULL;
+static char *preferred = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Given the authentication method list sent by the server, return the
+ * next method we should try. If the server initially sends a nil list,
+ * use a built-in default list.
+ */
+static Authmethod *
+authmethod_get(char *authlist)
+{
+ char *name = NULL;
+ u_int next;
+
+ /* Use a suitable default if we're passed a nil list. */
+ if (authlist == NULL || strlen(authlist) == 0)
+ authlist = options.preferred_authentications;
+
+ if (supported == NULL || strcmp(authlist, supported) != 0) {
+ debug3("start over, passed a different list %s", authlist);
+ free(supported);
+ supported = xstrdup(authlist);
+ preferred = options.preferred_authentications;
+ debug3("preferred %s", preferred);
+ current = NULL;
+ } else if (current != NULL && authmethod_is_enabled(current))
+ return current;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if ((name = match_list(preferred, supported, &next)) == NULL) {
+ debug("No more authentication methods to try.");
+ current = NULL;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ preferred += next;
+ debug3("authmethod_lookup %s", name);
+ debug3("remaining preferred: %s", preferred);
+ if ((current = authmethod_lookup(name)) != NULL &&
+ authmethod_is_enabled(current)) {
+ debug3("authmethod_is_enabled %s", name);
+ debug("Next authentication method: %s", name);
+ free(name);
+ return current;
+ }
+ free(name);
+ }
+}
+
+static char *
+authmethods_get(void)
+{
+ Authmethod *method = NULL;
+ Buffer b;
+ char *list;
+
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) {
+ if (authmethod_is_enabled(method)) {
+ if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
+ buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
+ buffer_append(&b, method->name, strlen(method->name));
+ }
+ }
+ if ((list = sshbuf_dup_string(&b)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ return list;
+}
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd.0
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd.0 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,643 +0,0 @@
-SSHD(8) OpenBSD System Manager's Manual SSHD(8)
-
-NAME
- sshd - OpenSSH SSH daemon
-
-SYNOPSIS
- sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-b bits] [-C connection_spec]
- [-c host_certificate_file] [-E log_file] [-f config_file]
- [-g login_grace_time] [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time]
- [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]
-
-DESCRIPTION
- sshd (OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for ssh(1). Together these
- programs replace rlogin(1) and rsh(1), and provide secure encrypted
- communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.
-
- sshd listens for connections from clients. It is normally started at
- boot from /etc/rc. It forks a new daemon for each incoming connection.
- The forked daemons handle key exchange, encryption, authentication,
- command execution, and data exchange.
-
- sshd can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file
- (by default sshd_config(5)); command-line options override values
- specified in the configuration file. sshd rereads its configuration file
- when it receives a hangup signal, SIGHUP, by executing itself with the
- name and options it was started with, e.g. /usr/sbin/sshd.
-
- The options are as follows:
-
- -4 Forces sshd to use IPv4 addresses only.
-
- -6 Forces sshd to use IPv6 addresses only.
-
- -b bits
- Specifies the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1
- server key (default 1024).
-
- -C connection_spec
- Specify the connection parameters to use for the -T extended test
- mode. If provided, any Match directives in the configuration
- file that would apply to the specified user, host, and address
- will be set before the configuration is written to standard
- output. The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value
- pairs. The keywords are ``user'', ``host'', ``laddr'',
- ``lport'', and ``addr''. All are required and may be supplied in
- any order, either with multiple -C options or as a comma-
- separated list.
-
- -c host_certificate_file
- Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify sshd during
- key exchange. The certificate file must match a host key file
- specified using the -h option or the HostKey configuration
- directive.
-
- -D When this option is specified, sshd will not detach and does not
- become a daemon. This allows easy monitoring of sshd.
-
- -d Debug mode. The server sends verbose debug output to standard
- error, and does not put itself in the background. The server
- also will not fork and will only process one connection. This
- option is only intended for debugging for the server. Multiple
- -d options increase the debugging level. Maximum is 3.
-
- -E log_file
- Append debug logs to log_file instead of the system log.
-
- -e Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log.
-
- -f config_file
- Specifies the name of the configuration file. The default is
- /etc/ssh/sshd_config. sshd refuses to start if there is no
- configuration file.
-
- -g login_grace_time
- Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves
- (default 120 seconds). If the client fails to authenticate the
- user within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits.
- A value of zero indicates no limit.
-
- -h host_key_file
- Specifies a file from which a host key is read. This option must
- be given if sshd is not run as root (as the normal host key files
- are normally not readable by anyone but root). The default is
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key for protocol version 1, and
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key for
- protocol version 2. It is possible to have multiple host key
- files for the different protocol versions and host key
- algorithms.
-
- -i Specifies that sshd is being run from inetd(8). sshd is normally
- not run from inetd because it needs to generate the server key
- before it can respond to the client, and this may take tens of
- seconds. Clients would have to wait too long if the key was
- regenerated every time. However, with small key sizes (e.g. 512)
- using sshd from inetd may be feasible.
-
- -k key_gen_time
- Specifies how often the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key
- is regenerated (default 3600 seconds, or one hour). The
- motivation for regenerating the key fairly often is that the key
- is not stored anywhere, and after about an hour it becomes
- impossible to recover the key for decrypting intercepted
- communications even if the machine is cracked into or physically
- seized. A value of zero indicates that the key will never be
- regenerated.
-
- -o option
- Can be used to give options in the format used in the
- configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for
- which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details
- of the options, and their values, see sshd_config(5).
-
- -p port
- Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections
- (default 22). Multiple port options are permitted. Ports
- specified in the configuration file with the Port option are
- ignored when a command-line port is specified. Ports specified
- using the ListenAddress option override command-line ports.
-
- -q Quiet mode. Nothing is sent to the system log. Normally the
- beginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is
- logged.
-
- -T Extended test mode. Check the validity of the configuration
- file, output the effective configuration to stdout and then exit.
- Optionally, Match rules may be applied by specifying the
- connection parameters using one or more -C options.
-
- -t Test mode. Only check the validity of the configuration file and
- sanity of the keys. This is useful for updating sshd reliably as
- configuration options may change.
-
- -u len This option is used to specify the size of the field in the utmp
- structure that holds the remote host name. If the resolved host
- name is longer than len, the dotted decimal value will be used
- instead. This allows hosts with very long host names that
- overflow this field to still be uniquely identified. Specifying
- -u0 indicates that only dotted decimal addresses should be put
- into the utmp file. -u0 may also be used to prevent sshd from
- making DNS requests unless the authentication mechanism or
- configuration requires it. Authentication mechanisms that may
- require DNS include RhostsRSAAuthentication,
- HostbasedAuthentication, and using a from="pattern-list" option
- in a key file. Configuration options that require DNS include
- using a USER at HOST pattern in AllowUsers or DenyUsers.
-
-AUTHENTICATION
- The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocols 1 and 2. The default is to
- use protocol 2 only, though this can be changed via the Protocol option
- in sshd_config(5). Protocol 2 supports DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 and RSA keys;
- protocol 1 only supports RSA keys. For both protocols, each host has a
- host-specific key, normally 2048 bits, used to identify the host.
-
- Forward security for protocol 1 is provided through an additional server
- key, normally 768 bits, generated when the server starts. This key is
- normally regenerated every hour if it has been used, and is never stored
- on disk. Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public
- host and server keys. The client compares the RSA host key against its
- own database to verify that it has not changed. The client then
- generates a 256-bit random number. It encrypts this random number using
- both the host key and the server key, and sends the encrypted number to
- the server. Both sides then use this random number as a session key
- which is used to encrypt all further communications in the session. The
- rest of the session is encrypted using a conventional cipher, currently
- Blowfish or 3DES, with 3DES being used by default. The client selects
- the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server.
-
- For protocol 2, forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key
- agreement. This key agreement results in a shared session key. The rest
- of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently 128-bit
- AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192-bit AES, or 256-bit AES. The
- client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the
- server. Additionally, session integrity is provided through a
- cryptographic message authentication code (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64,
- umac-128, hmac-ripemd160, hmac-sha2-256 or hmac-sha2-512).
-
- Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. The
- client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication,
- public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, or password
- authentication.
-
- Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to ensure
- that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is locked,
- listed in DenyUsers or its group is listed in DenyGroups . The
- definition of a locked account is system dependant. Some platforms have
- their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field (
- `*LK*' on Solaris and UnixWare, `*' on HP-UX, containing `Nologin' on
- Tru64, a leading `*LOCKED*' on FreeBSD and a leading `!' on most
- Linuxes). If there is a requirement to disable password authentication
- for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field
- should be set to something other than these values (eg `NP' or `*NP*' ).
-
- If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for preparing
- the session is entered. At this time the client may request things like
- allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP
- connections, or forwarding the authentication agent connection over the
- secure channel.
-
- After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command.
- The sides then enter session mode. In this mode, either side may send
- data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or command
- on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side.
-
- When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other
- connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to the
- client, and both sides exit.
-
-LOGIN PROCESS
- When a user successfully logs in, sshd does the following:
-
- 1. If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified,
- prints last login time and /etc/motd (unless prevented in the
- configuration file or by ~/.hushlogin; see the FILES section).
-
- 2. If the login is on a tty, records login time.
-
- 3. Checks /etc/nologin; if it exists, prints contents and quits
- (unless root).
-
- 4. Changes to run with normal user privileges.
-
- 5. Sets up basic environment.
-
- 6. Reads the file ~/.ssh/environment, if it exists, and users are
- allowed to change their environment. See the
- PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5).
-
- 7. Changes to user's home directory.
-
- 8. If ~/.ssh/rc exists, runs it; else if /etc/ssh/sshrc exists,
- runs it; otherwise runs xauth. The ``rc'' files are given the
- X11 authentication protocol and cookie in standard input. See
- SSHRC, below.
-
- 9. Runs user's shell or command.
-
-SSHRC
- If the file ~/.ssh/rc exists, sh(1) runs it after reading the environment
- files but before starting the user's shell or command. It must not
- produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used instead. If X11
- forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in its
- standard input (and DISPLAY in its environment). The script must call
- xauth(1) because sshd will not run xauth automatically to add X11
- cookies.
-
- The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines
- which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes accessible;
- AFS is a particular example of such an environment.
-
- This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by
- something similar to:
-
- if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then
- if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then
- # X11UseLocalhost=yes
- echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY |
- cut -c11-` $proto $cookie
- else
- # X11UseLocalhost=no
- echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie
- fi | xauth -q -
- fi
-
- If this file does not exist, /etc/ssh/sshrc is run, and if that does not
- exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie.
-
-AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
- AuthorizedKeysFile specifies the files containing public keys for public
- key authentication; if none is specified, the default is
- ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2. Each line of the
- file contains one key (empty lines and lines starting with a `#' are
- ignored as comments). Protocol 1 public keys consist of the following
- space-separated fields: options, bits, exponent, modulus, comment.
- Protocol 2 public key consist of: options, keytype, base64-encoded key,
- comment. The options field is optional; its presence is determined by
- whether the line starts with a number or not (the options field never
- starts with a number). The bits, exponent, modulus, and comment fields
- give the RSA key for protocol version 1; the comment field is not used
- for anything (but may be convenient for the user to identify the key).
- For protocol version 2 the keytype is ``ecdsa-sha2-nistp256'',
- ``ecdsa-sha2-nistp384'', ``ecdsa-sha2-nistp521'', ``ssh-ed25519'',
- ``ssh-dss'' or ``ssh-rsa''.
-
- Note that lines in this file are usually several hundred bytes long
- (because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of 8
- kilobytes, which permits DSA keys up to 8 kilobits and RSA keys up to 16
- kilobits. You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the
- identity.pub, id_dsa.pub, id_ecdsa.pub, id_ed25519.pub, or the id_rsa.pub
- file and edit it.
-
- sshd enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size for protocol 1 and protocol
- 2 keys of 768 bits.
-
- The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option
- specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
- The following option specifications are supported (note that option
- keywords are case-insensitive):
-
- cert-authority
- Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA)
- that is trusted to validate signed certificates for user
- authentication.
-
- Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key
- options. If both certificate restrictions and key options are
- present, the most restrictive union of the two is applied.
-
- command="command"
- Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used
- for authentication. The command supplied by the user (if any) is
- ignored. The command is run on a pty if the client requests a
- pty; otherwise it is run without a tty. If an 8-bit clean
- channel is required, one must not request a pty or should specify
- no-pty. A quote may be included in the command by quoting it
- with a backslash. This option might be useful to restrict
- certain public keys to perform just a specific operation. An
- example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing
- else. Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11 forwarding
- unless they are explicitly prohibited. The command originally
- supplied by the client is available in the SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
- environment variable. Note that this option applies to shell,
- command or subsystem execution. Also note that this command may
- be superseded by either a sshd_config(5) ForceCommand directive
- or a command embedded in a certificate.
-
- environment="NAME=value"
- Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when
- logging in using this key. Environment variables set this way
- override other default environment values. Multiple options of
- this type are permitted. Environment processing is disabled by
- default and is controlled via the PermitUserEnvironment option.
- This option is automatically disabled if UseLogin is enabled.
-
- from="pattern-list"
- Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either
- the canonical name of the remote host or its IP address must be
- present in the comma-separated list of patterns. See PATTERNS in
- ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
-
- In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to
- hostnames or addresses, a from stanza may match IP addresses
- using CIDR address/masklen notation.
-
- The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security:
- public key authentication by itself does not trust the network or
- name servers or anything (but the key); however, if somebody
- somehow steals the key, the key permits an intruder to log in
- from anywhere in the world. This additional option makes using a
- stolen key more difficult (name servers and/or routers would have
- to be compromised in addition to just the key).
-
- no-agent-forwarding
- Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for
- authentication.
-
- no-port-forwarding
- Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
- Any port forward requests by the client will return an error.
- This might be used, e.g. in connection with the command option.
-
- no-pty Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail).
-
- no-user-rc
- Disables execution of ~/.ssh/rc.
-
- no-X11-forwarding
- Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
- Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error.
-
- permitopen="host:port"
- Limit local ``ssh -L'' port forwarding such that it may only
- connect to the specified host and port. IPv6 addresses can be
- specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Multiple
- permitopen options may be applied separated by commas. No
- pattern matching is performed on the specified hostnames, they
- must be literal domains or addresses. A port specification of *
- matches any port.
-
- principals="principals"
- On a cert-authority line, specifies allowed principals for
- certificate authentication as a comma-separated list. At least
- one name from the list must appear in the certificate's list of
- principals for the certificate to be accepted. This option is
- ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate
- signers using the cert-authority option.
-
- tunnel="n"
- Force a tun(4) device on the server. Without this option, the
- next available device will be used if the client requests a
- tunnel.
-
- An example authorized_keys file:
-
- # Comments allowed at start of line
- ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk== user at example.net
- from="*.sales.example.net,!pc.sales.example.net" ssh-rsa
- AAAAB2...19Q== john at example.net
- command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-dss
- AAAAC3...51R== example.net
- permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-dss
- AAAAB5...21S==
- tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...==
- jane at example.net
-
-SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
- The /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts files contain host
- public keys for all known hosts. The global file should be prepared by
- the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is maintained
- automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host, its key
- is added to the per-user file.
-
- Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers
- (optional), hostnames, bits, exponent, modulus, comment. The fields are
- separated by spaces.
-
- The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of
- ``@cert-authority'', to indicate that the line contains a certification
- authority (CA) key, or ``@revoked'', to indicate that the key contained
- on the line is revoked and must not ever be accepted. Only one marker
- should be used on a key line.
-
- Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns (`*' and `?' act as
- wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the canonical host
- name (when authenticating a client) or against the user-supplied name
- (when authenticating a server). A pattern may also be preceded by `!' to
- indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated pattern, it is not
- accepted (by that line) even if it matched another pattern on the line.
- A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within `[' and `]'
- brackets then followed by `:' and a non-standard port number.
-
- Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host
- names and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed. Hashed
- hostnames start with a `|' character. Only one hashed hostname may
- appear on a single line and none of the above negation or wildcard
- operators may be applied.
-
- Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the RSA host key;
- they can be obtained, for example, from /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub. The
- optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used.
-
- Lines starting with `#' and empty lines are ignored as comments.
-
- When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any
- matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or, if
- the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key of the
- certification authority that signed the certificate. For a key to be
- trusted as a certification authority, it must use the ``@cert-authority''
- marker described above.
-
- The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked,
- for example when it is known that the associated private key has been
- stolen. Revoked keys are specified by including the ``@revoked'' marker
- at the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for
- authentication or as certification authorities, but instead will produce
- a warning from ssh(1) when they are encountered.
-
- It is permissible (but not recommended) to have several lines or
- different host keys for the same names. This will inevitably happen when
- short forms of host names from different domains are put in the file. It
- is possible that the files contain conflicting information;
- authentication is accepted if valid information can be found from either
- file.
-
- Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters
- long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand.
- Rather, generate them by a script, ssh-keyscan(1) or by taking
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub and adding the host names at the front.
- ssh-keygen(1) also offers some basic automated editing for
- ~/.ssh/known_hosts including removing hosts matching a host name and
- converting all host names to their hashed representations.
-
- An example ssh_known_hosts file:
-
- # Comments allowed at start of line
- closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net
- cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....=
- # A hashed hostname
- |1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa
- AAAA1234.....=
- # A revoked key
- @revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
- # A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org
- @cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
-
-FILES
- ~/.hushlogin
- This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and
- /etc/motd, if PrintLastLog and PrintMotd, respectively, are
- enabled. It does not suppress printing of the banner specified
- by Banner.
-
- ~/.rhosts
- This file is used for host-based authentication (see ssh(1) for
- more information). On some machines this file may need to be
- world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS
- partition, because sshd reads it as root. Additionally, this
- file must be owned by the user, and must not have write
- permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most
- machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by
- others.
-
- ~/.shosts
- This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows
- host-based authentication without permitting login with
- rlogin/rsh.
-
- ~/.ssh/
- This directory is the default location for all user-specific
- configuration and authentication information. There is no
- general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
- secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute
- for the user, and not accessible by others.
-
- ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
- Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, ED25519, RSA) that can be used
- for logging in as this user. The format of this file is
- described above. The content of the file is not highly
- sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the
- user, and not accessible by others.
-
- If this file, the ~/.ssh directory, or the user's home directory
- are writable by other users, then the file could be modified or
- replaced by unauthorized users. In this case, sshd will not
- allow it to be used unless the StrictModes option has been set to
- ``no''.
-
- ~/.ssh/environment
- This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).
- It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with
- `#'), and assignment lines of the form name=value. The file
- should be writable only by the user; it need not be readable by
- anyone else. Environment processing is disabled by default and
- is controlled via the PermitUserEnvironment option.
-
- ~/.ssh/known_hosts
- Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged
- into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host
- keys. The format of this file is described above. This file
- should be writable only by root/the owner and can, but need not
- be, world-readable.
-
- ~/.ssh/rc
- Contains initialization routines to be run before the user's home
- directory becomes accessible. This file should be writable only
- by the user, and need not be readable by anyone else.
-
- /etc/hosts.allow
- /etc/hosts.deny
- Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are
- defined here. Further details are described in hosts_access(5).
-
- /etc/hosts.equiv
- This file is for host-based authentication (see ssh(1)). It
- should only be writable by root.
-
- /etc/moduli
- Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group
- Exchange". The file format is described in moduli(5).
-
- /etc/motd
- See motd(5).
-
- /etc/nologin
- If this file exists, sshd refuses to let anyone except root log
- in. The contents of the file are displayed to anyone trying to
- log in, and non-root connections are refused. The file should be
- world-readable.
-
- /etc/shosts.equiv
- This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but
- allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
- rlogin/rsh.
-
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
- These files contain the private parts of the host keys. These
- files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and
- not accessible to others. Note that sshd does not start if these
- files are group/world-accessible.
-
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
- These files contain the public parts of the host keys. These
- files should be world-readable but writable only by root. Their
- contents should match the respective private parts. These files
- are not really used for anything; they are provided for the
- convenience of the user so their contents can be copied to known
- hosts files. These files are created using ssh-keygen(1).
-
- /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
- Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared
- by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of
- all machines in the organization. The format of this file is
- described above. This file should be writable only by root/the
- owner and should be world-readable.
-
- /etc/ssh/sshd_config
- Contains configuration data for sshd. The file format and
- configuration options are described in sshd_config(5).
-
- /etc/ssh/sshrc
- Similar to ~/.ssh/rc, it can be used to specify machine-specific
- login-time initializations globally. This file should be
- writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
-
- /var/empty
- chroot(2) directory used by sshd during privilege separation in
- the pre-authentication phase. The directory should not contain
- any files and must be owned by root and not group or world-
- writable.
-
- /var/run/sshd.pid
- Contains the process ID of the sshd listening for connections (if
- there are several daemons running concurrently for different
- ports, this contains the process ID of the one started last).
- The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-
- readable.
-
-SEE ALSO
- scp(1), sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1),
- ssh-keyscan(1), chroot(2), hosts_access(5), login.conf(5), moduli(5),
- sshd_config(5), inetd(8), sftp-server(8)
-
-AUTHORS
- OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
- Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
- de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
- created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
- versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
- for privilege separation.
-
-CAVEATS
- System security is not improved unless rshd, rlogind, and rexecd are
- disabled (thus completely disabling rlogin and rsh into the machine).
-
-OpenBSD 5.5 December 7, 2013 OpenBSD 5.5
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd.0 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd.0)
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--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd.0 (rev 0)
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+SSHD(8) System Manager's Manual SSHD(8)
+
+NAME
+ sshd M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SSH daemon
+
+SYNOPSIS
+ sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-b bits] [-C connection_spec]
+ [-c host_certificate_file] [-E log_file] [-f config_file]
+ [-g login_grace_time] [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time]
+ [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]
+
+DESCRIPTION
+ sshd (OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for ssh(1). Together these
+ programs replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted
+ communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.
+
+ sshd listens for connections from clients. It is normally started at
+ boot from /etc/rc. It forks a new daemon for each incoming connection.
+ The forked daemons handle key exchange, encryption, authentication,
+ command execution, and data exchange.
+
+ sshd can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file
+ (by default sshd_config(5)); command-line options override values
+ specified in the configuration file. sshd rereads its configuration file
+ when it receives a hangup signal, SIGHUP, by executing itself with the
+ name and options it was started with, e.g. /usr/sbin/sshd.
+
+ The options are as follows:
+
+ -4 Forces sshd to use IPv4 addresses only.
+
+ -6 Forces sshd to use IPv6 addresses only.
+
+ -b bits
+ Specifies the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1
+ server key (default 1024).
+
+ -C connection_spec
+ Specify the connection parameters to use for the -T extended test
+ mode. If provided, any Match directives in the configuration
+ file that would apply to the specified user, host, and address
+ will be set before the configuration is written to standard
+ output. The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value
+ pairs. The keywords are M-bM-^@M-^\userM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\hostM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\laddrM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\lportM-bM-^@M-^], and
+ M-bM-^@M-^\addrM-bM-^@M-^]. All are required and may be supplied in any order,
+ either with multiple -C options or as a comma-separated list.
+
+ -c host_certificate_file
+ Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify sshd during
+ key exchange. The certificate file must match a host key file
+ specified using the -h option or the HostKey configuration
+ directive.
+
+ -D When this option is specified, sshd will not detach and does not
+ become a daemon. This allows easy monitoring of sshd.
+
+ -d Debug mode. The server sends verbose debug output to standard
+ error, and does not put itself in the background. The server
+ also will not fork and will only process one connection. This
+ option is only intended for debugging for the server. Multiple
+ -d options increase the debugging level. Maximum is 3.
+
+ -E log_file
+ Append debug logs to log_file instead of the system log.
+
+ -e Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log.
+
+ -f config_file
+ Specifies the name of the configuration file. The default is
+ /etc/ssh/sshd_config. sshd refuses to start if there is no
+ configuration file.
+
+ -g login_grace_time
+ Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves
+ (default 120 seconds). If the client fails to authenticate the
+ user within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits.
+ A value of zero indicates no limit.
+
+ -h host_key_file
+ Specifies a file from which a host key is read. This option must
+ be given if sshd is not run as root (as the normal host key files
+ are normally not readable by anyone but root). The default is
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key for protocol version 1, and
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key for
+ protocol version 2. It is possible to have multiple host key
+ files for the different protocol versions and host key
+ algorithms.
+
+ -i Specifies that sshd is being run from inetd(8). If SSH protocol
+ 1 is enabled, sshd should not normally be run from inetd because
+ it needs to generate the server key before it can respond to the
+ client, and this may take some time. Clients may have to wait
+ too long if the key was regenerated every time.
+
+ -k key_gen_time
+ Specifies how often the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key
+ is regenerated (default 3600 seconds, or one hour). The
+ motivation for regenerating the key fairly often is that the key
+ is not stored anywhere, and after about an hour it becomes
+ impossible to recover the key for decrypting intercepted
+ communications even if the machine is cracked into or physically
+ seized. A value of zero indicates that the key will never be
+ regenerated.
+
+ -o option
+ Can be used to give options in the format used in the
+ configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for
+ which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details
+ of the options, and their values, see sshd_config(5).
+
+ -p port
+ Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections
+ (default 22). Multiple port options are permitted. Ports
+ specified in the configuration file with the Port option are
+ ignored when a command-line port is specified. Ports specified
+ using the ListenAddress option override command-line ports.
+
+ -q Quiet mode. Nothing is sent to the system log. Normally the
+ beginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is
+ logged.
+
+ -T Extended test mode. Check the validity of the configuration
+ file, output the effective configuration to stdout and then exit.
+ Optionally, Match rules may be applied by specifying the
+ connection parameters using one or more -C options.
+
+ -t Test mode. Only check the validity of the configuration file and
+ sanity of the keys. This is useful for updating sshd reliably as
+ configuration options may change.
+
+ -u len This option is used to specify the size of the field in the utmp
+ structure that holds the remote host name. If the resolved host
+ name is longer than len, the dotted decimal value will be used
+ instead. This allows hosts with very long host names that
+ overflow this field to still be uniquely identified. Specifying
+ -u0 indicates that only dotted decimal addresses should be put
+ into the utmp file. -u0 may also be used to prevent sshd from
+ making DNS requests unless the authentication mechanism or
+ configuration requires it. Authentication mechanisms that may
+ require DNS include RhostsRSAAuthentication,
+ HostbasedAuthentication, and using a from="pattern-list" option
+ in a key file. Configuration options that require DNS include
+ using a USER at HOST pattern in AllowUsers or DenyUsers.
+
+AUTHENTICATION
+ The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocols 1 and 2. The default is to
+ use protocol 2 only, though this can be changed via the Protocol option
+ in sshd_config(5). Protocol 1 should not be used and is only offered to
+ support legacy devices.
+
+ Each host has a host-specific key, used to identify the host. Partial
+ forward security for protocol 1 is provided through an additional server
+ key, normally 1024 bits, generated when the server starts. This key is
+ normally regenerated every hour if it has been used, and is never stored
+ on disk. Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public
+ host and server keys. The client compares the RSA host key against its
+ own database to verify that it has not changed. The client then
+ generates a 256-bit random number. It encrypts this random number using
+ both the host key and the server key, and sends the encrypted number to
+ the server. Both sides then use this random number as a session key
+ which is used to encrypt all further communications in the session. The
+ rest of the session is encrypted using a conventional cipher, currently
+ Blowfish or 3DES, with 3DES being used by default. The client selects
+ the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server.
+
+ For protocol 2, forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key
+ agreement. This key agreement results in a shared session key. The rest
+ of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently 128-bit
+ AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192-bit AES, or 256-bit AES. The
+ client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the
+ server. Additionally, session integrity is provided through a
+ cryptographic message authentication code (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64,
+ umac-128, hmac-ripemd160, hmac-sha2-256 or hmac-sha2-512).
+
+ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. The
+ client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication,
+ public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, or password
+ authentication.
+
+ Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to ensure
+ that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is locked,
+ listed in DenyUsers or its group is listed in DenyGroups . The
+ definition of a locked account is system dependant. Some platforms have
+ their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field (
+ M-bM-^@M-^X*LK*M-bM-^@M-^Y on Solaris and UnixWare, M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y on HP-UX, containing M-bM-^@M-^XNologinM-bM-^@M-^Y on
+ Tru64, a leading M-bM-^@M-^X*LOCKED*M-bM-^@M-^Y on FreeBSD and a leading M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y on most
+ Linuxes). If there is a requirement to disable password authentication
+ for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field
+ should be set to something other than these values (eg M-bM-^@M-^XNPM-bM-^@M-^Y or M-bM-^@M-^X*NP*M-bM-^@M-^Y ).
+
+ If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for preparing
+ the session is entered. At this time the client may request things like
+ allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP
+ connections, or forwarding the authentication agent connection over the
+ secure channel.
+
+ After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command.
+ The sides then enter session mode. In this mode, either side may send
+ data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or command
+ on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side.
+
+ When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other
+ connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to the
+ client, and both sides exit.
+
+LOGIN PROCESS
+ When a user successfully logs in, sshd does the following:
+
+ 1. If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified,
+ prints last login time and /etc/motd (unless prevented in the
+ configuration file or by ~/.hushlogin; see the FILES section).
+
+ 2. If the login is on a tty, records login time.
+
+ 3. Checks /etc/nologin; if it exists, prints contents and quits
+ (unless root).
+
+ 4. Changes to run with normal user privileges.
+
+ 5. Sets up basic environment.
+
+ 6. Reads the file ~/.ssh/environment, if it exists, and users are
+ allowed to change their environment. See the
+ PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5).
+
+ 7. Changes to user's home directory.
+
+ 8. If ~/.ssh/rc exists and the sshd_config(5) PermitUserRC option
+ is set, runs it; else if /etc/ssh/sshrc exists, runs it;
+ otherwise runs xauth. The M-bM-^@M-^\rcM-bM-^@M-^] files are given the X11
+ authentication protocol and cookie in standard input. See
+ SSHRC, below.
+
+ 9. Runs user's shell or command. All commands are run under the
+ user's login shell as specified in the system password
+ database.
+
+SSHRC
+ If the file ~/.ssh/rc exists, sh(1) runs it after reading the environment
+ files but before starting the user's shell or command. It must not
+ produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used instead. If X11
+ forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in its
+ standard input (and DISPLAY in its environment). The script must call
+ xauth(1) because sshd will not run xauth automatically to add X11
+ cookies.
+
+ The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines
+ which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes accessible;
+ AFS is a particular example of such an environment.
+
+ This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by
+ something similar to:
+
+ if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then
+ if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then
+ # X11UseLocalhost=yes
+ echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY |
+ cut -c11-` $proto $cookie
+ else
+ # X11UseLocalhost=no
+ echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie
+ fi | xauth -q -
+ fi
+
+ If this file does not exist, /etc/ssh/sshrc is run, and if that does not
+ exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie.
+
+AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
+ AuthorizedKeysFile specifies the files containing public keys for public
+ key authentication; if this option is not specified, the default is
+ ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2. Each line of the
+ file contains one key (empty lines and lines starting with a M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are
+ ignored as comments). Protocol 1 public keys consist of the following
+ space-separated fields: options, bits, exponent, modulus, comment.
+ Protocol 2 public key consist of: options, keytype, base64-encoded key,
+ comment. The options field is optional; its presence is determined by
+ whether the line starts with a number or not (the options field never
+ starts with a number). The bits, exponent, modulus, and comment fields
+ give the RSA key for protocol version 1; the comment field is not used
+ for anything (but may be convenient for the user to identify the key).
+ For protocol version 2 the keytype is M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-sha2-nistp256M-bM-^@M-^],
+ M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-sha2-nistp384M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-sha2-nistp521M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-dssM-bM-^@M-^] or
+ M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-rsaM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ Note that lines in this file are usually several hundred bytes long
+ (because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of 8
+ kilobytes, which permits DSA keys up to 8 kilobits and RSA keys up to 16
+ kilobits. You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the
+ identity.pub, id_dsa.pub, id_ecdsa.pub, id_ed25519.pub, or the id_rsa.pub
+ file and edit it.
+
+ sshd enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size for protocol 1 and protocol
+ 2 keys of 768 bits.
+
+ The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option
+ specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
+ The following option specifications are supported (note that option
+ keywords are case-insensitive):
+
+ agent-forwarding
+ Enable authentication agent forwarding previously disabled by the
+ restrict option.
+
+ cert-authority
+ Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA)
+ that is trusted to validate signed certificates for user
+ authentication.
+
+ Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key
+ options. If both certificate restrictions and key options are
+ present, the most restrictive union of the two is applied.
+
+ command="command"
+ Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used
+ for authentication. The command supplied by the user (if any) is
+ ignored. The command is run on a pty if the client requests a
+ pty; otherwise it is run without a tty. If an 8-bit clean
+ channel is required, one must not request a pty or should specify
+ no-pty. A quote may be included in the command by quoting it
+ with a backslash. This option might be useful to restrict
+ certain public keys to perform just a specific operation. An
+ example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing
+ else. Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11 forwarding
+ unless they are explicitly prohibited. The command originally
+ supplied by the client is available in the SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
+ environment variable. Note that this option applies to shell,
+ command or subsystem execution. Also note that this command may
+ be superseded by either a sshd_config(5) ForceCommand directive
+ or a command embedded in a certificate.
+
+ environment="NAME=value"
+ Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when
+ logging in using this key. Environment variables set this way
+ override other default environment values. Multiple options of
+ this type are permitted. Environment processing is disabled by
+ default and is controlled via the PermitUserEnvironment option.
+ This option is automatically disabled if UseLogin is enabled.
+
+ from="pattern-list"
+ Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either
+ the canonical name of the remote host or its IP address must be
+ present in the comma-separated list of patterns. See PATTERNS in
+ ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
+
+ In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to
+ hostnames or addresses, a from stanza may match IP addresses
+ using CIDR address/masklen notation.
+
+ The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security:
+ public key authentication by itself does not trust the network or
+ name servers or anything (but the key); however, if somebody
+ somehow steals the key, the key permits an intruder to log in
+ from anywhere in the world. This additional option makes using a
+ stolen key more difficult (name servers and/or routers would have
+ to be compromised in addition to just the key).
+
+ no-agent-forwarding
+ Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for
+ authentication.
+
+ no-port-forwarding
+ Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
+ Any port forward requests by the client will return an error.
+ This might be used, e.g. in connection with the command option.
+
+ no-pty Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail).
+
+ no-user-rc
+ Disables execution of ~/.ssh/rc.
+
+ no-X11-forwarding
+ Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
+ Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error.
+
+ permitopen="host:port"
+ Limit local port forwarding with ssh(1) -L such that it may only
+ connect to the specified host and port. IPv6 addresses can be
+ specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Multiple
+ permitopen options may be applied separated by commas. No
+ pattern matching is performed on the specified hostnames, they
+ must be literal domains or addresses. A port specification of *
+ matches any port.
+
+ port-forwarding
+ Enable port forwarding previously disabled by the restrict
+
+ principals="principals"
+ On a cert-authority line, specifies allowed principals for
+ certificate authentication as a comma-separated list. At least
+ one name from the list must appear in the certificate's list of
+ principals for the certificate to be accepted. This option is
+ ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate
+ signers using the cert-authority option.
+
+ pty Permits tty allocation previously disabled by the restrict
+ option.
+
+ restrict
+ Enable all restrictions, i.e. disable port, agent and X11
+ forwarding, as well as disabling PTY allocation and execution of
+ ~/.ssh/rc. If any future restriction capabilities are added to
+ authorized_keys files they will be included in this set.
+
+ tunnel="n"
+ Force a tun(4) device on the server. Without this option, the
+ next available device will be used if the client requests a
+ tunnel.
+
+ user-rc
+ Enables execution of ~/.ssh/rc previously disabled by the
+ restrict option.
+
+ X11-forwarding
+ Permits X11 forwarding previously disabled by the restrict
+ option.
+
+ An example authorized_keys file:
+
+ # Comments allowed at start of line
+ ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk== user at example.net
+ from="*.sales.example.net,!pc.sales.example.net" ssh-rsa
+ AAAAB2...19Q== john at example.net
+ command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-dss
+ AAAAC3...51R== example.net
+ permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-dss
+ AAAAB5...21S==
+ tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...==
+ jane at example.net
+ restrict,command="uptime" ssh-rsa AAAA1C8...32Tv==
+ user at example.net
+ restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-rsa AAAA1f8...IrrC5==
+ user at example.net
+
+SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
+ The /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts files contain host
+ public keys for all known hosts. The global file should be prepared by
+ the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is maintained
+ automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host, its key
+ is added to the per-user file.
+
+ Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers
+ (optional), hostnames, bits, exponent, modulus, comment. The fields are
+ separated by spaces.
+
+ The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of
+ M-bM-^@M-^\@cert-authorityM-bM-^@M-^], to indicate that the line contains a certification
+ authority (CA) key, or M-bM-^@M-^\@revokedM-bM-^@M-^], to indicate that the key contained on
+ the line is revoked and must not ever be accepted. Only one marker
+ should be used on a key line.
+
+ Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns (M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y act as
+ wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the canonical host
+ name (when authenticating a client) or against the user-supplied name
+ (when authenticating a server). A pattern may also be preceded by M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y to
+ indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated pattern, it is not
+ accepted (by that line) even if it matched another pattern on the line.
+ A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within M-bM-^@M-^X[M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X]M-bM-^@M-^Y
+ brackets then followed by M-bM-^@M-^X:M-bM-^@M-^Y and a non-standard port number.
+
+ Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host
+ names and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed. Hashed
+ hostnames start with a M-bM-^@M-^X|M-bM-^@M-^Y character. Only one hashed hostname may
+ appear on a single line and none of the above negation or wildcard
+ operators may be applied.
+
+ Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the RSA host key;
+ they can be obtained, for example, from /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub. The
+ optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used.
+
+ Lines starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y and empty lines are ignored as comments.
+
+ When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any
+ matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or, if
+ the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key of the
+ certification authority that signed the certificate. For a key to be
+ trusted as a certification authority, it must use the M-bM-^@M-^\@cert-authorityM-bM-^@M-^]
+ marker described above.
+
+ The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked,
+ for example when it is known that the associated private key has been
+ stolen. Revoked keys are specified by including the M-bM-^@M-^\@revokedM-bM-^@M-^] marker at
+ the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for authentication
+ or as certification authorities, but instead will produce a warning from
+ ssh(1) when they are encountered.
+
+ It is permissible (but not recommended) to have several lines or
+ different host keys for the same names. This will inevitably happen when
+ short forms of host names from different domains are put in the file. It
+ is possible that the files contain conflicting information;
+ authentication is accepted if valid information can be found from either
+ file.
+
+ Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters
+ long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand.
+ Rather, generate them by a script, ssh-keyscan(1) or by taking
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub and adding the host names at the front.
+ ssh-keygen(1) also offers some basic automated editing for
+ ~/.ssh/known_hosts including removing hosts matching a host name and
+ converting all host names to their hashed representations.
+
+ An example ssh_known_hosts file:
+
+ # Comments allowed at start of line
+ closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net
+ cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....=
+ # A hashed hostname
+ |1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa
+ AAAA1234.....=
+ # A revoked key
+ @revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
+ # A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org
+ @cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
+
+FILES
+ ~/.hushlogin
+ This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and
+ /etc/motd, if PrintLastLog and PrintMotd, respectively, are
+ enabled. It does not suppress printing of the banner specified
+ by Banner.
+
+ ~/.rhosts
+ This file is used for host-based authentication (see ssh(1) for
+ more information). On some machines this file may need to be
+ world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS
+ partition, because sshd reads it as root. Additionally, this
+ file must be owned by the user, and must not have write
+ permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most
+ machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by
+ others.
+
+ ~/.shosts
+ This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows
+ host-based authentication without permitting login with
+ rlogin/rsh.
+
+ ~/.ssh/
+ This directory is the default location for all user-specific
+ configuration and authentication information. There is no
+ general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
+ secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute
+ for the user, and not accessible by others.
+
+ ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+ Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used
+ for logging in as this user. The format of this file is
+ described above. The content of the file is not highly
+ sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the
+ user, and not accessible by others.
+
+ If this file, the ~/.ssh directory, or the user's home directory
+ are writable by other users, then the file could be modified or
+ replaced by unauthorized users. In this case, sshd will not
+ allow it to be used unless the StrictModes option has been set to
+ M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ ~/.ssh/environment
+ This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).
+ It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with
+ M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y), and assignment lines of the form name=value. The file
+ should be writable only by the user; it need not be readable by
+ anyone else. Environment processing is disabled by default and
+ is controlled via the PermitUserEnvironment option.
+
+ ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+ Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged
+ into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host
+ keys. The format of this file is described above. This file
+ should be writable only by root/the owner and can, but need not
+ be, world-readable.
+
+ ~/.ssh/rc
+ Contains initialization routines to be run before the user's home
+ directory becomes accessible. This file should be writable only
+ by the user, and need not be readable by anyone else.
+
+ /etc/hosts.equiv
+ This file is for host-based authentication (see ssh(1)). It
+ should only be writable by root.
+
+ /etc/moduli
+ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group
+ Exchange" key exchange method. The file format is described in
+ moduli(5). If no usable groups are found in this file then fixed
+ internal groups will be used.
+
+ /etc/motd
+ See motd(5).
+
+ /etc/nologin
+ If this file exists, sshd refuses to let anyone except root log
+ in. The contents of the file are displayed to anyone trying to
+ log in, and non-root connections are refused. The file should be
+ world-readable.
+
+ /etc/shosts.equiv
+ This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but
+ allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+ rlogin/rsh.
+
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+ These files contain the private parts of the host keys. These
+ files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and
+ not accessible to others. Note that sshd does not start if these
+ files are group/world-accessible.
+
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
+ These files contain the public parts of the host keys. These
+ files should be world-readable but writable only by root. Their
+ contents should match the respective private parts. These files
+ are not really used for anything; they are provided for the
+ convenience of the user so their contents can be copied to known
+ hosts files. These files are created using ssh-keygen(1).
+
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+ Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared
+ by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of
+ all machines in the organization. The format of this file is
+ described above. This file should be writable only by root/the
+ owner and should be world-readable.
+
+ /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+ Contains configuration data for sshd. The file format and
+ configuration options are described in sshd_config(5).
+
+ /etc/ssh/sshrc
+ Similar to ~/.ssh/rc, it can be used to specify machine-specific
+ login-time initializations globally. This file should be
+ writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
+
+ /var/empty
+ chroot(2) directory used by sshd during privilege separation in
+ the pre-authentication phase. The directory should not contain
+ any files and must be owned by root and not group or world-
+ writable.
+
+ /var/run/sshd.pid
+ Contains the process ID of the sshd listening for connections (if
+ there are several daemons running concurrently for different
+ ports, this contains the process ID of the one started last).
+ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-
+ readable.
+
+SEE ALSO
+ scp(1), sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1),
+ ssh-keyscan(1), chroot(2), login.conf(5), moduli(5), sshd_config(5),
+ inetd(8), sftp-server(8)
+
+AUTHORS
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+ Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+ de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+ created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+ versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
+ for privilege separation.
+
+OpenBSD 6.0 February 17, 2016 OpenBSD 6.0
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd.8
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd.8 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd.8 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,990 +0,0 @@
-.\"
-.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
-.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
-.\" All rights reserved
-.\"
-.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
-.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
-.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
-.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
-.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
-.\"
-.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
-.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
-.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
-.\"
-.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-.\" are met:
-.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-.\"
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.273 2013/12/07 11:58:46 naddy Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: December 7 2013 $
-.Dt SSHD 8
-.Os
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm sshd
-.Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon
-.Sh SYNOPSIS
-.Nm sshd
-.Bk -words
-.Op Fl 46DdeiqTt
-.Op Fl b Ar bits
-.Op Fl C Ar connection_spec
-.Op Fl c Ar host_certificate_file
-.Op Fl E Ar log_file
-.Op Fl f Ar config_file
-.Op Fl g Ar login_grace_time
-.Op Fl h Ar host_key_file
-.Op Fl k Ar key_gen_time
-.Op Fl o Ar option
-.Op Fl p Ar port
-.Op Fl u Ar len
-.Ek
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-.Nm
-(OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-Together these programs replace
-.Xr rlogin 1
-and
-.Xr rsh 1 ,
-and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts
-over an insecure network.
-.Pp
-.Nm
-listens for connections from clients.
-It is normally started at boot from
-.Pa /etc/rc .
-It forks a new
-daemon for each incoming connection.
-The forked daemons handle
-key exchange, encryption, authentication, command execution,
-and data exchange.
-.Pp
-.Nm
-can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file
-(by default
-.Xr sshd_config 5 ) ;
-command-line options override values specified in the
-configuration file.
-.Nm
-rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal,
-.Dv SIGHUP ,
-by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g.\&
-.Pa /usr/sbin/sshd .
-.Pp
-The options are as follows:
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Fl 4
-Forces
-.Nm
-to use IPv4 addresses only.
-.It Fl 6
-Forces
-.Nm
-to use IPv6 addresses only.
-.It Fl b Ar bits
-Specifies the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1
-server key (default 1024).
-.It Fl C Ar connection_spec
-Specify the connection parameters to use for the
-.Fl T
-extended test mode.
-If provided, any
-.Cm Match
-directives in the configuration file
-that would apply to the specified user, host, and address will be set before
-the configuration is written to standard output.
-The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs.
-The keywords are
-.Dq user ,
-.Dq host ,
-.Dq laddr ,
-.Dq lport ,
-and
-.Dq addr .
-All are required and may be supplied in any order, either with multiple
-.Fl C
-options or as a comma-separated list.
-.It Fl c Ar host_certificate_file
-Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify
-.Nm
-during key exchange.
-The certificate file must match a host key file specified using the
-.Fl h
-option or the
-.Cm HostKey
-configuration directive.
-.It Fl D
-When this option is specified,
-.Nm
-will not detach and does not become a daemon.
-This allows easy monitoring of
-.Nm sshd .
-.It Fl d
-Debug mode.
-The server sends verbose debug output to standard error,
-and does not put itself in the background.
-The server also will not fork and will only process one connection.
-This option is only intended for debugging for the server.
-Multiple
-.Fl d
-options increase the debugging level.
-Maximum is 3.
-.It Fl E Ar log_file
-Append debug logs to
-.Ar log_file
-instead of the system log.
-.It Fl e
-Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log.
-.It Fl f Ar config_file
-Specifies the name of the configuration file.
-The default is
-.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config .
-.Nm
-refuses to start if there is no configuration file.
-.It Fl g Ar login_grace_time
-Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (default
-120 seconds).
-If the client fails to authenticate the user within
-this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits.
-A value of zero indicates no limit.
-.It Fl h Ar host_key_file
-Specifies a file from which a host key is read.
-This option must be given if
-.Nm
-is not run as root (as the normal
-host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root).
-The default is
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
-for protocol version 1, and
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key ,
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key .
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
-and
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
-for protocol version 2.
-It is possible to have multiple host key files for
-the different protocol versions and host key algorithms.
-.It Fl i
-Specifies that
-.Nm
-is being run from
-.Xr inetd 8 .
-.Nm
-is normally not run
-from inetd because it needs to generate the server key before it can
-respond to the client, and this may take tens of seconds.
-Clients would have to wait too long if the key was regenerated every time.
-However, with small key sizes (e.g. 512) using
-.Nm
-from inetd may
-be feasible.
-.It Fl k Ar key_gen_time
-Specifies how often the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key is
-regenerated (default 3600 seconds, or one hour).
-The motivation for regenerating the key fairly
-often is that the key is not stored anywhere, and after about an hour
-it becomes impossible to recover the key for decrypting intercepted
-communications even if the machine is cracked into or physically
-seized.
-A value of zero indicates that the key will never be regenerated.
-.It Fl o Ar option
-Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file.
-This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate
-command-line flag.
-For full details of the options, and their values, see
-.Xr sshd_config 5 .
-.It Fl p Ar port
-Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections
-(default 22).
-Multiple port options are permitted.
-Ports specified in the configuration file with the
-.Cm Port
-option are ignored when a command-line port is specified.
-Ports specified using the
-.Cm ListenAddress
-option override command-line ports.
-.It Fl q
-Quiet mode.
-Nothing is sent to the system log.
-Normally the beginning,
-authentication, and termination of each connection is logged.
-.It Fl T
-Extended test mode.
-Check the validity of the configuration file, output the effective configuration
-to stdout and then exit.
-Optionally,
-.Cm Match
-rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more
-.Fl C
-options.
-.It Fl t
-Test mode.
-Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys.
-This is useful for updating
-.Nm
-reliably as configuration options may change.
-.It Fl u Ar len
-This option is used to specify the size of the field
-in the
-.Li utmp
-structure that holds the remote host name.
-If the resolved host name is longer than
-.Ar len ,
-the dotted decimal value will be used instead.
-This allows hosts with very long host names that
-overflow this field to still be uniquely identified.
-Specifying
-.Fl u0
-indicates that only dotted decimal addresses
-should be put into the
-.Pa utmp
-file.
-.Fl u0
-may also be used to prevent
-.Nm
-from making DNS requests unless the authentication
-mechanism or configuration requires it.
-Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS include
-.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication ,
-.Cm HostbasedAuthentication ,
-and using a
-.Cm from="pattern-list"
-option in a key file.
-Configuration options that require DNS include using a
-USER at HOST pattern in
-.Cm AllowUsers
-or
-.Cm DenyUsers .
-.El
-.Sh AUTHENTICATION
-The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocols 1 and 2.
-The default is to use protocol 2 only,
-though this can be changed via the
-.Cm Protocol
-option in
-.Xr sshd_config 5 .
-Protocol 2 supports DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 and RSA keys;
-protocol 1 only supports RSA keys.
-For both protocols,
-each host has a host-specific key,
-normally 2048 bits,
-used to identify the host.
-.Pp
-Forward security for protocol 1 is provided through
-an additional server key,
-normally 768 bits,
-generated when the server starts.
-This key is normally regenerated every hour if it has been used, and
-is never stored on disk.
-Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public
-host and server keys.
-The client compares the
-RSA host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed.
-The client then generates a 256-bit random number.
-It encrypts this
-random number using both the host key and the server key, and sends
-the encrypted number to the server.
-Both sides then use this
-random number as a session key which is used to encrypt all further
-communications in the session.
-The rest of the session is encrypted
-using a conventional cipher, currently Blowfish or 3DES, with 3DES
-being used by default.
-The client selects the encryption algorithm
-to use from those offered by the server.
-.Pp
-For protocol 2,
-forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
-This key agreement results in a shared session key.
-The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently
-128-bit AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192-bit AES, or 256-bit AES.
-The client selects the encryption algorithm
-to use from those offered by the server.
-Additionally, session integrity is provided
-through a cryptographic message authentication code
-(hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, umac-128, hmac-ripemd160,
-hmac-sha2-256 or hmac-sha2-512).
-.Pp
-Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
-The client tries to authenticate itself using
-host-based authentication,
-public key authentication,
-challenge-response authentication,
-or password authentication.
-.Pp
-Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to
-ensure that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is
-locked, listed in
-.Cm DenyUsers
-or its group is listed in
-.Cm DenyGroups
-\&. The definition of a locked account is system dependant. Some platforms
-have their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field (
-.Ql \&*LK\&*
-on Solaris and UnixWare,
-.Ql \&*
-on HP-UX, containing
-.Ql Nologin
-on Tru64,
-a leading
-.Ql \&*LOCKED\&*
-on FreeBSD and a leading
-.Ql \&!
-on most Linuxes).
-If there is a requirement to disable password authentication
-for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field
-should be set to something other than these values (eg
-.Ql NP
-or
-.Ql \&*NP\&*
-).
-.Pp
-If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for
-preparing the session is entered.
-At this time the client may request
-things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections,
-forwarding TCP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent
-connection over the secure channel.
-.Pp
-After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command.
-The sides then enter session mode.
-In this mode, either side may send
-data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or
-command on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side.
-.Pp
-When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other
-connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to
-the client, and both sides exit.
-.Sh LOGIN PROCESS
-When a user successfully logs in,
-.Nm
-does the following:
-.Bl -enum -offset indent
-.It
-If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified,
-prints last login time and
-.Pa /etc/motd
-(unless prevented in the configuration file or by
-.Pa ~/.hushlogin ;
-see the
-.Sx FILES
-section).
-.It
-If the login is on a tty, records login time.
-.It
-Checks
-.Pa /etc/nologin ;
-if it exists, prints contents and quits
-(unless root).
-.It
-Changes to run with normal user privileges.
-.It
-Sets up basic environment.
-.It
-Reads the file
-.Pa ~/.ssh/environment ,
-if it exists, and users are allowed to change their environment.
-See the
-.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
-option in
-.Xr sshd_config 5 .
-.It
-Changes to user's home directory.
-.It
-If
-.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
-exists, runs it; else if
-.Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
-exists, runs
-it; otherwise runs xauth.
-The
-.Dq rc
-files are given the X11
-authentication protocol and cookie in standard input.
-See
-.Sx SSHRC ,
-below.
-.It
-Runs user's shell or command.
-.El
-.Sh SSHRC
-If the file
-.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
-exists,
-.Xr sh 1
-runs it after reading the
-environment files but before starting the user's shell or command.
-It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used
-instead.
-If X11 forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in
-its standard input (and
-.Ev DISPLAY
-in its environment).
-The script must call
-.Xr xauth 1
-because
-.Nm
-will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies.
-.Pp
-The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines
-which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes
-accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment.
-.Pp
-This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by
-something similar to:
-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then
- if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then
- # X11UseLocalhost=yes
- echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY |
- cut -c11-` $proto $cookie
- else
- # X11UseLocalhost=no
- echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie
- fi | xauth -q -
-fi
-.Ed
-.Pp
-If this file does not exist,
-.Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
-is run, and if that
-does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie.
-.Sh AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
-.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
-specifies the files containing public keys for
-public key authentication;
-if none is specified, the default is
-.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-and
-.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 .
-Each line of the file contains one
-key (empty lines and lines starting with a
-.Ql #
-are ignored as
-comments).
-Protocol 1 public keys consist of the following space-separated fields:
-options, bits, exponent, modulus, comment.
-Protocol 2 public key consist of:
-options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment.
-The options field is optional;
-its presence is determined by whether the line starts
-with a number or not (the options field never starts with a number).
-The bits, exponent, modulus, and comment fields give the RSA key for
-protocol version 1; the
-comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the
-user to identify the key).
-For protocol version 2 the keytype is
-.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 ,
-.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 ,
-.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 ,
-.Dq ssh-ed25519 ,
-.Dq ssh-dss
-or
-.Dq ssh-rsa .
-.Pp
-Note that lines in this file are usually several hundred bytes long
-(because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of
-8 kilobytes, which permits DSA keys up to 8 kilobits and RSA
-keys up to 16 kilobits.
-You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the
-.Pa identity.pub ,
-.Pa id_dsa.pub ,
-.Pa id_ecdsa.pub ,
-.Pa id_ed25519.pub ,
-or the
-.Pa id_rsa.pub
-file and edit it.
-.Pp
-.Nm
-enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size for protocol 1
-and protocol 2 keys of 768 bits.
-.Pp
-The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option
-specifications.
-No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
-The following option specifications are supported (note
-that option keywords are case-insensitive):
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Cm cert-authority
-Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA) that is
-trusted to validate signed certificates for user authentication.
-.Pp
-Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key options.
-If both certificate restrictions and key options are present, the most
-restrictive union of the two is applied.
-.It Cm command="command"
-Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for
-authentication.
-The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored.
-The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty;
-otherwise it is run without a tty.
-If an 8-bit clean channel is required,
-one must not request a pty or should specify
-.Cm no-pty .
-A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash.
-This option might be useful
-to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation.
-An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else.
-Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11
-forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited.
-The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
-.Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
-environment variable.
-Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution.
-Also note that this command may be superseded by either a
-.Xr sshd_config 5
-.Cm ForceCommand
-directive or a command embedded in a certificate.
-.It Cm environment="NAME=value"
-Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when
-logging in using this key.
-Environment variables set this way
-override other default environment values.
-Multiple options of this type are permitted.
-Environment processing is disabled by default and is
-controlled via the
-.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
-option.
-This option is automatically disabled if
-.Cm UseLogin
-is enabled.
-.It Cm from="pattern-list"
-Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical
-name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the
-comma-separated list of patterns.
-See PATTERNS in
-.Xr ssh_config 5
-for more information on patterns.
-.Pp
-In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to hostnames or
-addresses, a
-.Cm from
-stanza may match IP addresses using CIDR address/masklen notation.
-.Pp
-The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security: public key
-authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or
-anything (but the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key
-permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world.
-This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name
-servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to
-just the key).
-.It Cm no-agent-forwarding
-Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for
-authentication.
-.It Cm no-port-forwarding
-Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
-Any port forward requests by the client will return an error.
-This might be used, e.g. in connection with the
-.Cm command
-option.
-.It Cm no-pty
-Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail).
-.It Cm no-user-rc
-Disables execution of
-.Pa ~/.ssh/rc .
-.It Cm no-X11-forwarding
-Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
-Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error.
-.It Cm permitopen="host:port"
-Limit local
-.Li ``ssh -L''
-port forwarding such that it may only connect to the specified host and
-port.
-IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
-Multiple
-.Cm permitopen
-options may be applied separated by commas.
-No pattern matching is performed on the specified hostnames,
-they must be literal domains or addresses.
-A port specification of
-.Cm *
-matches any port.
-.It Cm principals="principals"
-On a
-.Cm cert-authority
-line, specifies allowed principals for certificate authentication as a
-comma-separated list.
-At least one name from the list must appear in the certificate's
-list of principals for the certificate to be accepted.
-This option is ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate
-signers using the
-.Cm cert-authority
-option.
-.It Cm tunnel="n"
-Force a
-.Xr tun 4
-device on the server.
-Without this option, the next available device will be used if
-the client requests a tunnel.
-.El
-.Pp
-An example authorized_keys file:
-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-# Comments allowed at start of line
-ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk== user at example.net
-from="*.sales.example.net,!pc.sales.example.net" ssh-rsa
-AAAAB2...19Q== john at example.net
-command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-dss
-AAAAC3...51R== example.net
-permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-dss
-AAAAB5...21S==
-tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...==
-jane at example.net
-.Ed
-.Sh SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
-The
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
-and
-.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
-files contain host public keys for all known hosts.
-The global file should
-be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is
-maintained automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host,
-its key is added to the per-user file.
-.Pp
-Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers (optional),
-hostnames, bits, exponent, modulus, comment.
-The fields are separated by spaces.
-.Pp
-The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of
-.Dq @cert-authority ,
-to indicate that the line contains a certification authority (CA) key,
-or
-.Dq @revoked ,
-to indicate that the key contained on the line is revoked and must not ever
-be accepted.
-Only one marker should be used on a key line.
-.Pp
-Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns
-.Pf ( Ql *
-and
-.Ql \&?
-act as
-wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the canonical host
-name (when authenticating a client) or against the user-supplied
-name (when authenticating a server).
-A pattern may also be preceded by
-.Ql \&!
-to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated
-pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another
-pattern on the line.
-A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within
-.Ql \&[
-and
-.Ql \&]
-brackets then followed by
-.Ql \&:
-and a non-standard port number.
-.Pp
-Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names
-and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed.
-Hashed hostnames start with a
-.Ql |
-character.
-Only one hashed hostname may appear on a single line and none of the above
-negation or wildcard operators may be applied.
-.Pp
-Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the RSA host key; they
-can be obtained, for example, from
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub .
-The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used.
-.Pp
-Lines starting with
-.Ql #
-and empty lines are ignored as comments.
-.Pp
-When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any
-matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or,
-if the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key
-of the certification authority that signed the certificate.
-For a key to be trusted as a certification authority, it must use the
-.Dq @cert-authority
-marker described above.
-.Pp
-The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked,
-for example when it is known that the associated private key has been
-stolen.
-Revoked keys are specified by including the
-.Dq @revoked
-marker at the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for
-authentication or as certification authorities, but instead will
-produce a warning from
-.Xr ssh 1
-when they are encountered.
-.Pp
-It is permissible (but not
-recommended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same
-names.
-This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names
-from different domains are put in the file.
-It is possible
-that the files contain conflicting information; authentication is
-accepted if valid information can be found from either file.
-.Pp
-Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters
-long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand.
-Rather, generate them by a script,
-.Xr ssh-keyscan 1
-or by taking
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
-and adding the host names at the front.
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1
-also offers some basic automated editing for
-.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
-including removing hosts matching a host name and converting all host
-names to their hashed representations.
-.Pp
-An example ssh_known_hosts file:
-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-# Comments allowed at start of line
-closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net
-cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....=
-# A hashed hostname
-|1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa
-AAAA1234.....=
-# A revoked key
- at revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
-# A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org
- at cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
-.Ed
-.Sh FILES
-.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-.It Pa ~/.hushlogin
-This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and
-.Pa /etc/motd ,
-if
-.Cm PrintLastLog
-and
-.Cm PrintMotd ,
-respectively,
-are enabled.
-It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by
-.Cm Banner .
-.Pp
-.It Pa ~/.rhosts
-This file is used for host-based authentication (see
-.Xr ssh 1
-for more information).
-On some machines this file may need to be
-world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
-because
-.Nm
-reads it as root.
-Additionally, this file must be owned by the user,
-and must not have write permissions for anyone else.
-The recommended
-permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not
-accessible by others.
-.Pp
-.It Pa ~/.shosts
-This file is used in exactly the same way as
-.Pa .rhosts ,
-but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
-rlogin/rsh.
-.Pp
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/
-This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
-and authentication information.
-There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
-secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user,
-and not accessible by others.
-.Pp
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, ED25519, RSA)
-that can be used for logging in as this user.
-The format of this file is described above.
-The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended
-permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
-.Pp
-If this file, the
-.Pa ~/.ssh
-directory, or the user's home directory are writable
-by other users, then the file could be modified or replaced by unauthorized
-users.
-In this case,
-.Nm
-will not allow it to be used unless the
-.Cm StrictModes
-option has been set to
-.Dq no .
-.Pp
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
-This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).
-It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with
-.Ql # ) ,
-and assignment lines of the form name=value.
-The file should be writable
-only by the user; it need not be readable by anyone else.
-Environment processing is disabled by default and is
-controlled via the
-.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
-option.
-.Pp
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
-Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into
-that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys.
-The format of this file is described above.
-This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
-can, but need not be, world-readable.
-.Pp
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/rc
-Contains initialization routines to be run before
-the user's home directory becomes accessible.
-This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
-readable by anyone else.
-.Pp
-.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow
-.It Pa /etc/hosts.deny
-Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
-Further details are described in
-.Xr hosts_access 5 .
-.Pp
-.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
-This file is for host-based authentication (see
-.Xr ssh 1 ) .
-It should only be writable by root.
-.Pp
-.It Pa /etc/moduli
-Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange".
-The file format is described in
-.Xr moduli 5 .
-.Pp
-.It Pa /etc/motd
-See
-.Xr motd 5 .
-.Pp
-.It Pa /etc/nologin
-If this file exists,
-.Nm
-refuses to let anyone except root log in.
-The contents of the file
-are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are
-refused.
-The file should be world-readable.
-.Pp
-.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
-This file is used in exactly the same way as
-.Pa hosts.equiv ,
-but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
-rlogin/rsh.
-.Pp
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
-These files contain the private parts of the host keys.
-These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
-accessible to others.
-Note that
-.Nm
-does not start if these files are group/world-accessible.
-.Pp
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
-These files contain the public parts of the host keys.
-These files should be world-readable but writable only by
-root.
-Their contents should match the respective private parts.
-These files are not
-really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of
-the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files.
-These files are created using
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
-.Pp
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
-Systemwide list of known host keys.
-This file should be prepared by the
-system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the
-organization.
-The format of this file is described above.
-This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
-should be world-readable.
-.Pp
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
-Contains configuration data for
-.Nm sshd .
-The file format and configuration options are described in
-.Xr sshd_config 5 .
-.Pp
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
-Similar to
-.Pa ~/.ssh/rc ,
-it can be used to specify
-machine-specific login-time initializations globally.
-This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
-.Pp
-.It Pa /var/empty
-.Xr chroot 2
-directory used by
-.Nm
-during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase.
-The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root
-and not group or world-writable.
-.Pp
-.It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid
-Contains the process ID of the
-.Nm
-listening for connections (if there are several daemons running
-concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
-started last).
-The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
-.El
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr scp 1 ,
-.Xr sftp 1 ,
-.Xr ssh 1 ,
-.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
-.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
-.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
-.Xr chroot 2 ,
-.Xr hosts_access 5 ,
-.Xr login.conf 5 ,
-.Xr moduli 5 ,
-.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
-.Xr inetd 8 ,
-.Xr sftp-server 8
-.Sh AUTHORS
-OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
-ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
-Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
-Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
-removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
-created OpenSSH.
-Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
-protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
-Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
-for privilege separation.
-.Sh CAVEATS
-System security is not improved unless
-.Nm rshd ,
-.Nm rlogind ,
-and
-.Nm rexecd
-are disabled (thus completely disabling
-.Xr rlogin
-and
-.Xr rsh
-into the machine).
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd.8 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd.8)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd.8 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd.8 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1004 @@
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\" All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.284 2016/02/17 07:38:19 jmc Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: February 17 2016 $
+.Dt SSHD 8
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm sshd
+.Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm sshd
+.Bk -words
+.Op Fl 46DdeiqTt
+.Op Fl b Ar bits
+.Op Fl C Ar connection_spec
+.Op Fl c Ar host_certificate_file
+.Op Fl E Ar log_file
+.Op Fl f Ar config_file
+.Op Fl g Ar login_grace_time
+.Op Fl h Ar host_key_file
+.Op Fl k Ar key_gen_time
+.Op Fl o Ar option
+.Op Fl p Ar port
+.Op Fl u Ar len
+.Ek
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+(OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+Together these programs replace rlogin and rsh,
+and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts
+over an insecure network.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+listens for connections from clients.
+It is normally started at boot from
+.Pa /etc/rc .
+It forks a new
+daemon for each incoming connection.
+The forked daemons handle
+key exchange, encryption, authentication, command execution,
+and data exchange.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file
+(by default
+.Xr sshd_config 5 ) ;
+command-line options override values specified in the
+configuration file.
+.Nm
+rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal,
+.Dv SIGHUP ,
+by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g.\&
+.Pa /usr/sbin/sshd .
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl 4
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv4 addresses only.
+.It Fl 6
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.It Fl b Ar bits
+Specifies the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1
+server key (default 1024).
+.It Fl C Ar connection_spec
+Specify the connection parameters to use for the
+.Fl T
+extended test mode.
+If provided, any
+.Cm Match
+directives in the configuration file
+that would apply to the specified user, host, and address will be set before
+the configuration is written to standard output.
+The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs.
+The keywords are
+.Dq user ,
+.Dq host ,
+.Dq laddr ,
+.Dq lport ,
+and
+.Dq addr .
+All are required and may be supplied in any order, either with multiple
+.Fl C
+options or as a comma-separated list.
+.It Fl c Ar host_certificate_file
+Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify
+.Nm
+during key exchange.
+The certificate file must match a host key file specified using the
+.Fl h
+option or the
+.Cm HostKey
+configuration directive.
+.It Fl D
+When this option is specified,
+.Nm
+will not detach and does not become a daemon.
+This allows easy monitoring of
+.Nm sshd .
+.It Fl d
+Debug mode.
+The server sends verbose debug output to standard error,
+and does not put itself in the background.
+The server also will not fork and will only process one connection.
+This option is only intended for debugging for the server.
+Multiple
+.Fl d
+options increase the debugging level.
+Maximum is 3.
+.It Fl E Ar log_file
+Append debug logs to
+.Ar log_file
+instead of the system log.
+.It Fl e
+Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log.
+.It Fl f Ar config_file
+Specifies the name of the configuration file.
+The default is
+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config .
+.Nm
+refuses to start if there is no configuration file.
+.It Fl g Ar login_grace_time
+Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (default
+120 seconds).
+If the client fails to authenticate the user within
+this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits.
+A value of zero indicates no limit.
+.It Fl h Ar host_key_file
+Specifies a file from which a host key is read.
+This option must be given if
+.Nm
+is not run as root (as the normal
+host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root).
+The default is
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+for protocol version 1, and
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key ,
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key .
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+and
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+for protocol version 2.
+It is possible to have multiple host key files for
+the different protocol versions and host key algorithms.
+.It Fl i
+Specifies that
+.Nm
+is being run from
+.Xr inetd 8 .
+If SSH protocol 1 is enabled,
+.Nm
+should not normally be run
+from inetd because it needs to generate the server key before it can
+respond to the client, and this may take some time.
+Clients may have to wait too long if the key was regenerated every time.
+.It Fl k Ar key_gen_time
+Specifies how often the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key is
+regenerated (default 3600 seconds, or one hour).
+The motivation for regenerating the key fairly
+often is that the key is not stored anywhere, and after about an hour
+it becomes impossible to recover the key for decrypting intercepted
+communications even if the machine is cracked into or physically
+seized.
+A value of zero indicates that the key will never be regenerated.
+.It Fl o Ar option
+Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file.
+This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate
+command-line flag.
+For full details of the options, and their values, see
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.It Fl p Ar port
+Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections
+(default 22).
+Multiple port options are permitted.
+Ports specified in the configuration file with the
+.Cm Port
+option are ignored when a command-line port is specified.
+Ports specified using the
+.Cm ListenAddress
+option override command-line ports.
+.It Fl q
+Quiet mode.
+Nothing is sent to the system log.
+Normally the beginning,
+authentication, and termination of each connection is logged.
+.It Fl T
+Extended test mode.
+Check the validity of the configuration file, output the effective configuration
+to stdout and then exit.
+Optionally,
+.Cm Match
+rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more
+.Fl C
+options.
+.It Fl t
+Test mode.
+Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys.
+This is useful for updating
+.Nm
+reliably as configuration options may change.
+.It Fl u Ar len
+This option is used to specify the size of the field
+in the
+.Li utmp
+structure that holds the remote host name.
+If the resolved host name is longer than
+.Ar len ,
+the dotted decimal value will be used instead.
+This allows hosts with very long host names that
+overflow this field to still be uniquely identified.
+Specifying
+.Fl u0
+indicates that only dotted decimal addresses
+should be put into the
+.Pa utmp
+file.
+.Fl u0
+may also be used to prevent
+.Nm
+from making DNS requests unless the authentication
+mechanism or configuration requires it.
+Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS include
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication ,
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication ,
+and using a
+.Cm from="pattern-list"
+option in a key file.
+Configuration options that require DNS include using a
+USER at HOST pattern in
+.Cm AllowUsers
+or
+.Cm DenyUsers .
+.El
+.Sh AUTHENTICATION
+The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocols 1 and 2.
+The default is to use protocol 2 only,
+though this can be changed via the
+.Cm Protocol
+option in
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+Protocol 1 should not be used
+and is only offered to support legacy devices.
+.Pp
+Each host has a host-specific key,
+used to identify the host.
+Partial forward security for protocol 1 is provided through
+an additional server key,
+normally 1024 bits,
+generated when the server starts.
+This key is normally regenerated every hour if it has been used, and
+is never stored on disk.
+Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public
+host and server keys.
+The client compares the
+RSA host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed.
+The client then generates a 256-bit random number.
+It encrypts this
+random number using both the host key and the server key, and sends
+the encrypted number to the server.
+Both sides then use this
+random number as a session key which is used to encrypt all further
+communications in the session.
+The rest of the session is encrypted
+using a conventional cipher, currently Blowfish or 3DES, with 3DES
+being used by default.
+The client selects the encryption algorithm
+to use from those offered by the server.
+.Pp
+For protocol 2,
+forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
+This key agreement results in a shared session key.
+The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently
+128-bit AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192-bit AES, or 256-bit AES.
+The client selects the encryption algorithm
+to use from those offered by the server.
+Additionally, session integrity is provided
+through a cryptographic message authentication code
+(hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, umac-128, hmac-ripemd160,
+hmac-sha2-256 or hmac-sha2-512).
+.Pp
+Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
+The client tries to authenticate itself using
+host-based authentication,
+public key authentication,
+challenge-response authentication,
+or password authentication.
+.Pp
+Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to
+ensure that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is
+locked, listed in
+.Cm DenyUsers
+or its group is listed in
+.Cm DenyGroups
+\&. The definition of a locked account is system dependant. Some platforms
+have their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field (
+.Ql \&*LK\&*
+on Solaris and UnixWare,
+.Ql \&*
+on HP-UX, containing
+.Ql Nologin
+on Tru64,
+a leading
+.Ql \&*LOCKED\&*
+on FreeBSD and a leading
+.Ql \&!
+on most Linuxes).
+If there is a requirement to disable password authentication
+for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field
+should be set to something other than these values (eg
+.Ql NP
+or
+.Ql \&*NP\&*
+).
+.Pp
+If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for
+preparing the session is entered.
+At this time the client may request
+things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections,
+forwarding TCP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent
+connection over the secure channel.
+.Pp
+After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command.
+The sides then enter session mode.
+In this mode, either side may send
+data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or
+command on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side.
+.Pp
+When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other
+connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to
+the client, and both sides exit.
+.Sh LOGIN PROCESS
+When a user successfully logs in,
+.Nm
+does the following:
+.Bl -enum -offset indent
+.It
+If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified,
+prints last login time and
+.Pa /etc/motd
+(unless prevented in the configuration file or by
+.Pa ~/.hushlogin ;
+see the
+.Sx FILES
+section).
+.It
+If the login is on a tty, records login time.
+.It
+Checks
+.Pa /etc/nologin ;
+if it exists, prints contents and quits
+(unless root).
+.It
+Changes to run with normal user privileges.
+.It
+Sets up basic environment.
+.It
+Reads the file
+.Pa ~/.ssh/environment ,
+if it exists, and users are allowed to change their environment.
+See the
+.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
+option in
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.It
+Changes to user's home directory.
+.It
+If
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+exists and the
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+.Cm PermitUserRC
+option is set, runs it; else if
+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
+exists, runs
+it; otherwise runs xauth.
+The
+.Dq rc
+files are given the X11
+authentication protocol and cookie in standard input.
+See
+.Sx SSHRC ,
+below.
+.It
+Runs user's shell or command.
+All commands are run under the user's login shell as specified in the
+system password database.
+.El
+.Sh SSHRC
+If the file
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+exists,
+.Xr sh 1
+runs it after reading the
+environment files but before starting the user's shell or command.
+It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used
+instead.
+If X11 forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in
+its standard input (and
+.Ev DISPLAY
+in its environment).
+The script must call
+.Xr xauth 1
+because
+.Nm
+will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies.
+.Pp
+The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines
+which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes
+accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment.
+.Pp
+This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by
+something similar to:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then
+ if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then
+ # X11UseLocalhost=yes
+ echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY |
+ cut -c11-` $proto $cookie
+ else
+ # X11UseLocalhost=no
+ echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie
+ fi | xauth -q -
+fi
+.Ed
+.Pp
+If this file does not exist,
+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
+is run, and if that
+does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie.
+.Sh AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+specifies the files containing public keys for
+public key authentication;
+if this option is not specified, the default is
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 .
+Each line of the file contains one
+key (empty lines and lines starting with a
+.Ql #
+are ignored as
+comments).
+Protocol 1 public keys consist of the following space-separated fields:
+options, bits, exponent, modulus, comment.
+Protocol 2 public key consist of:
+options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment.
+The options field is optional;
+its presence is determined by whether the line starts
+with a number or not (the options field never starts with a number).
+The bits, exponent, modulus, and comment fields give the RSA key for
+protocol version 1; the
+comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the
+user to identify the key).
+For protocol version 2 the keytype is
+.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 ,
+.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 ,
+.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 ,
+.Dq ssh-ed25519 ,
+.Dq ssh-dss
+or
+.Dq ssh-rsa .
+.Pp
+Note that lines in this file are usually several hundred bytes long
+(because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of
+8 kilobytes, which permits DSA keys up to 8 kilobits and RSA
+keys up to 16 kilobits.
+You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the
+.Pa identity.pub ,
+.Pa id_dsa.pub ,
+.Pa id_ecdsa.pub ,
+.Pa id_ed25519.pub ,
+or the
+.Pa id_rsa.pub
+file and edit it.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size for protocol 1
+and protocol 2 keys of 768 bits.
+.Pp
+The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option
+specifications.
+No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
+The following option specifications are supported (note
+that option keywords are case-insensitive):
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm agent-forwarding
+Enable authentication agent forwarding previously disabled by the
+.Cm restrict
+option.
+.It Cm cert-authority
+Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA) that is
+trusted to validate signed certificates for user authentication.
+.Pp
+Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key options.
+If both certificate restrictions and key options are present, the most
+restrictive union of the two is applied.
+.It Cm command="command"
+Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for
+authentication.
+The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored.
+The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty;
+otherwise it is run without a tty.
+If an 8-bit clean channel is required,
+one must not request a pty or should specify
+.Cm no-pty .
+A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash.
+This option might be useful
+to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation.
+An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else.
+Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11
+forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited.
+The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
+.Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
+environment variable.
+Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution.
+Also note that this command may be superseded by either a
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+.Cm ForceCommand
+directive or a command embedded in a certificate.
+.It Cm environment="NAME=value"
+Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when
+logging in using this key.
+Environment variables set this way
+override other default environment values.
+Multiple options of this type are permitted.
+Environment processing is disabled by default and is
+controlled via the
+.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
+option.
+This option is automatically disabled if
+.Cm UseLogin
+is enabled.
+.It Cm from="pattern-list"
+Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical
+name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the
+comma-separated list of patterns.
+See PATTERNS in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
+.Pp
+In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to hostnames or
+addresses, a
+.Cm from
+stanza may match IP addresses using CIDR address/masklen notation.
+.Pp
+The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security: public key
+authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or
+anything (but the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key
+permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world.
+This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name
+servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to
+just the key).
+.It Cm no-agent-forwarding
+Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for
+authentication.
+.It Cm no-port-forwarding
+Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
+Any port forward requests by the client will return an error.
+This might be used, e.g. in connection with the
+.Cm command
+option.
+.It Cm no-pty
+Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail).
+.It Cm no-user-rc
+Disables execution of
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc .
+.It Cm no-X11-forwarding
+Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
+Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error.
+.It Cm permitopen="host:port"
+Limit local port forwarding with
+.Xr ssh 1
+.Fl L
+such that it may only connect to the specified host and port.
+IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
+Multiple
+.Cm permitopen
+options may be applied separated by commas.
+No pattern matching is performed on the specified hostnames,
+they must be literal domains or addresses.
+A port specification of
+.Cm *
+matches any port.
+.It Cm port-forwarding
+Enable port forwarding previously disabled by the
+.Cm restrict
+.It Cm principals="principals"
+On a
+.Cm cert-authority
+line, specifies allowed principals for certificate authentication as a
+comma-separated list.
+At least one name from the list must appear in the certificate's
+list of principals for the certificate to be accepted.
+This option is ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate
+signers using the
+.Cm cert-authority
+option.
+.It Cm pty
+Permits tty allocation previously disabled by the
+.Cm restrict
+option.
+.It Cm restrict
+Enable all restrictions, i.e. disable port, agent and X11 forwarding,
+as well as disabling PTY allocation
+and execution of
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc .
+If any future restriction capabilities are added to authorized_keys files
+they will be included in this set.
+.It Cm tunnel="n"
+Force a
+.Xr tun 4
+device on the server.
+Without this option, the next available device will be used if
+the client requests a tunnel.
+.It Cm user-rc
+Enables execution of
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+previously disabled by the
+.Cm restrict
+option.
+.It Cm X11-forwarding
+Permits X11 forwarding previously disabled by the
+.Cm restrict
+option.
+.El
+.Pp
+An example authorized_keys file:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+# Comments allowed at start of line
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk== user at example.net
+from="*.sales.example.net,!pc.sales.example.net" ssh-rsa
+AAAAB2...19Q== john at example.net
+command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-dss
+AAAAC3...51R== example.net
+permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-dss
+AAAAB5...21S==
+tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...==
+jane at example.net
+restrict,command="uptime" ssh-rsa AAAA1C8...32Tv==
+user at example.net
+restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-rsa AAAA1f8...IrrC5==
+user at example.net
+.Ed
+.Sh SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
+The
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+files contain host public keys for all known hosts.
+The global file should
+be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is
+maintained automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host,
+its key is added to the per-user file.
+.Pp
+Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers (optional),
+hostnames, bits, exponent, modulus, comment.
+The fields are separated by spaces.
+.Pp
+The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of
+.Dq @cert-authority ,
+to indicate that the line contains a certification authority (CA) key,
+or
+.Dq @revoked ,
+to indicate that the key contained on the line is revoked and must not ever
+be accepted.
+Only one marker should be used on a key line.
+.Pp
+Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns
+.Pf ( Ql *
+and
+.Ql \&?
+act as
+wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the canonical host
+name (when authenticating a client) or against the user-supplied
+name (when authenticating a server).
+A pattern may also be preceded by
+.Ql \&!
+to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated
+pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another
+pattern on the line.
+A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within
+.Ql \&[
+and
+.Ql \&]
+brackets then followed by
+.Ql \&:
+and a non-standard port number.
+.Pp
+Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names
+and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed.
+Hashed hostnames start with a
+.Ql |
+character.
+Only one hashed hostname may appear on a single line and none of the above
+negation or wildcard operators may be applied.
+.Pp
+Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the RSA host key; they
+can be obtained, for example, from
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub .
+The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used.
+.Pp
+Lines starting with
+.Ql #
+and empty lines are ignored as comments.
+.Pp
+When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any
+matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or,
+if the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key
+of the certification authority that signed the certificate.
+For a key to be trusted as a certification authority, it must use the
+.Dq @cert-authority
+marker described above.
+.Pp
+The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked,
+for example when it is known that the associated private key has been
+stolen.
+Revoked keys are specified by including the
+.Dq @revoked
+marker at the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for
+authentication or as certification authorities, but instead will
+produce a warning from
+.Xr ssh 1
+when they are encountered.
+.Pp
+It is permissible (but not
+recommended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same
+names.
+This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names
+from different domains are put in the file.
+It is possible
+that the files contain conflicting information; authentication is
+accepted if valid information can be found from either file.
+.Pp
+Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters
+long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand.
+Rather, generate them by a script,
+.Xr ssh-keyscan 1
+or by taking
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
+and adding the host names at the front.
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+also offers some basic automated editing for
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+including removing hosts matching a host name and converting all host
+names to their hashed representations.
+.Pp
+An example ssh_known_hosts file:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+# Comments allowed at start of line
+closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net
+cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....=
+# A hashed hostname
+|1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa
+AAAA1234.....=
+# A revoked key
+ at revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
+# A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org
+ at cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
+.Ed
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.It Pa ~/.hushlogin
+This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and
+.Pa /etc/motd ,
+if
+.Cm PrintLastLog
+and
+.Cm PrintMotd ,
+respectively,
+are enabled.
+It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by
+.Cm Banner .
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.rhosts
+This file is used for host-based authentication (see
+.Xr ssh 1
+for more information).
+On some machines this file may need to be
+world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
+because
+.Nm
+reads it as root.
+Additionally, this file must be owned by the user,
+and must not have write permissions for anyone else.
+The recommended
+permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not
+accessible by others.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.shosts
+This file is used in exactly the same way as
+.Pa .rhosts ,
+but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+rlogin/rsh.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/
+This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
+and authentication information.
+There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
+secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user,
+and not accessible by others.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA)
+that can be used for logging in as this user.
+The format of this file is described above.
+The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended
+permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
+.Pp
+If this file, the
+.Pa ~/.ssh
+directory, or the user's home directory are writable
+by other users, then the file could be modified or replaced by unauthorized
+users.
+In this case,
+.Nm
+will not allow it to be used unless the
+.Cm StrictModes
+option has been set to
+.Dq no .
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
+This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).
+It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with
+.Ql # ) ,
+and assignment lines of the form name=value.
+The file should be writable
+only by the user; it need not be readable by anyone else.
+Environment processing is disabled by default and is
+controlled via the
+.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
+option.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into
+that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys.
+The format of this file is described above.
+This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
+can, but need not be, world-readable.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+Contains initialization routines to be run before
+the user's home directory becomes accessible.
+This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
+readable by anyone else.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+This file is for host-based authentication (see
+.Xr ssh 1 ) .
+It should only be writable by root.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/moduli
+Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange"
+key exchange method.
+The file format is described in
+.Xr moduli 5 .
+If no usable groups are found in this file then fixed internal groups will
+be used.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/motd
+See
+.Xr motd 5 .
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/nologin
+If this file exists,
+.Nm
+refuses to let anyone except root log in.
+The contents of the file
+are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are
+refused.
+The file should be world-readable.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
+This file is used in exactly the same way as
+.Pa hosts.equiv ,
+but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+rlogin/rsh.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+These files contain the private parts of the host keys.
+These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
+accessible to others.
+Note that
+.Nm
+does not start if these files are group/world-accessible.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
+These files contain the public parts of the host keys.
+These files should be world-readable but writable only by
+root.
+Their contents should match the respective private parts.
+These files are not
+really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of
+the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files.
+These files are created using
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+Systemwide list of known host keys.
+This file should be prepared by the
+system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the
+organization.
+The format of this file is described above.
+This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
+should be world-readable.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+Contains configuration data for
+.Nm sshd .
+The file format and configuration options are described in
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
+Similar to
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc ,
+it can be used to specify
+machine-specific login-time initializations globally.
+This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /var/empty
+.Xr chroot 2
+directory used by
+.Nm
+during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase.
+The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root
+and not group or world-writable.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid
+Contains the process ID of the
+.Nm
+listening for connections (if there are several daemons running
+concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
+started last).
+The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr scp 1 ,
+.Xr sftp 1 ,
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+.Xr chroot 2 ,
+.Xr login.conf 5 ,
+.Xr moduli 5 ,
+.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
+.Xr inetd 8 ,
+.Xr sftp-server 8
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
+for privilege separation.
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,2525 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.420 2014/02/26 21:53:37 markus Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients,
- * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards
- * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted
- * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and
- * authentication agent connections.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- * SSH2 implementation:
- * Privilege Separation:
- *
- * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/ioctl.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
-# include <sys/stat.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-#include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#include <grp.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
-#include <sys/security.h>
-#include <prot.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "sshpty.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "dh.h"
-#include "myproposal.h"
-#include "authfile.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "authfd.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "msg.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "session.h"
-#include "monitor_mm.h"
-#include "monitor.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "roaming.h"
-#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
-#include "version.h"
-
-#ifdef LIBWRAP
-#include <tcpd.h>
-#include <syslog.h>
-int allow_severity;
-int deny_severity;
-#endif /* LIBWRAP */
-
-#ifndef O_NOCTTY
-#define O_NOCTTY 0
-#endif
-
-/* Re-exec fds */
-#define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
-#define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
-#define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3)
-#define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4)
-
-extern char *__progname;
-
-/* Server configuration options. */
-ServerOptions options;
-
-/* Name of the server configuration file. */
-char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
-
-/*
- * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
- * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
- * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
- * the first connection.
- */
-int debug_flag = 0;
-
-/* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */
-int test_flag = 0;
-
-/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
-int inetd_flag = 0;
-
-/* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
-int no_daemon_flag = 0;
-
-/* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
-int log_stderr = 0;
-
-/* Saved arguments to main(). */
-char **saved_argv;
-int saved_argc;
-
-/* re-exec */
-int rexeced_flag = 0;
-int rexec_flag = 1;
-int rexec_argc = 0;
-char **rexec_argv;
-
-/*
- * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP
- * signal handler.
- */
-#define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16
-int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS];
-int num_listen_socks = 0;
-
-/*
- * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL,
- * sshd will skip the version-number exchange
- */
-char *client_version_string = NULL;
-char *server_version_string = NULL;
-
-/* for rekeying XXX fixme */
-Kex *xxx_kex;
-
-/* Daemon's agent connection */
-AuthenticationConnection *auth_conn = NULL;
-int have_agent = 0;
-
-/*
- * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
- * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
- * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some
- * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle)
- * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is
- * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
- */
-struct {
- Key *server_key; /* ephemeral server key */
- Key *ssh1_host_key; /* ssh1 host key */
- Key **host_keys; /* all private host keys */
- Key **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */
- Key **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */
- int have_ssh1_key;
- int have_ssh2_key;
- u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
-} sensitive_data;
-
-/*
- * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
- * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
- */
-static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
-
-/* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
-static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
-static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
-
-/* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */
-u_char session_id[16];
-
-/* same for ssh2 */
-u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
-u_int session_id2_len = 0;
-
-/* record remote hostname or ip */
-u_int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN;
-
-/* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */
-int *startup_pipes = NULL;
-int startup_pipe; /* in child */
-
-/* variables used for privilege separation */
-int use_privsep = -1;
-struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
-int privsep_is_preauth = 1;
-
-/* global authentication context */
-Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
-
-/* sshd_config buffer */
-Buffer cfg;
-
-/* message to be displayed after login */
-Buffer loginmsg;
-
-/* Unprivileged user */
-struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
-
-/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
-void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
-void demote_sensitive_data(void);
-
-static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
-static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
-
-/*
- * Close all listening sockets
- */
-static void
-close_listen_socks(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
- close(listen_socks[i]);
- num_listen_socks = -1;
-}
-
-static void
-close_startup_pipes(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (startup_pipes)
- for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
- if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
- close(startup_pipes[i]);
-}
-
-/*
- * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP;
- * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
- * the server key).
- */
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static void
-sighup_handler(int sig)
-{
- int save_errno = errno;
-
- received_sighup = 1;
- signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
- errno = save_errno;
-}
-
-/*
- * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
- * Restarts the server.
- */
-static void
-sighup_restart(void)
-{
- logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
- platform_pre_restart();
- close_listen_socks();
- close_startup_pipes();
- alarm(0); /* alarm timer persists across exec */
- signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* will be restored after exec */
- execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
- logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
- strerror(errno));
- exit(1);
-}
-
-/*
- * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
- */
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static void
-sigterm_handler(int sig)
-{
- received_sigterm = sig;
-}
-
-/*
- * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then
- * reap any zombies left by exited children.
- */
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static void
-main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
-{
- int save_errno = errno;
- pid_t pid;
- int status;
-
- while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
- (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
- ;
-
- signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
- errno = save_errno;
-}
-
-/*
- * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
- */
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static void
-grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
-{
- if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0)
- kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM);
-
- /*
- * Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized
- * keys command helpers.
- */
- if (getpgid(0) == getpid()) {
- signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN);
- kill(0, SIGTERM);
- }
-
- /* Log error and exit. */
- sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
-}
-
-/*
- * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this
- * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not
- * do anything with the private key or random state before forking.
- * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution
- * problems.
- */
-static void
-generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
-{
- verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.",
- sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits);
- if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
- key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
- sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1,
- options.server_key_bits);
- verbose("RSA key generation complete.");
-
- arc4random_buf(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static void
-key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
-{
- int save_errno = errno;
-
- signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
- errno = save_errno;
- key_do_regen = 1;
-}
-
-static void
-sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
-{
- u_int i;
- int mismatch;
- int remote_major, remote_minor;
- int major, minor;
- char *s, *newline = "\n";
- char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */
- char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
-
- if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
- (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) {
- major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
- minor = 99;
- } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
- major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2;
- minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2;
- newline = "\r\n";
- } else {
- major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
- minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
- }
-
- xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
- major, minor, SSH_VERSION,
- *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
- options.version_addendum, newline);
-
- /* Send our protocol version identification. */
- if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
- strlen(server_version_string))
- != strlen(server_version_string)) {
- logit("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
-
- /* Read other sides version identification. */
- memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
- if (roaming_atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
- logit("Did not receive identification string from %s",
- get_remote_ipaddr());
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- if (buf[i] == '\r') {
- buf[i] = 0;
- /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */
- if (i == 12 &&
- strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0)
- break;
- continue;
- }
- if (buf[i] == '\n') {
- buf[i] = 0;
- break;
- }
- }
- buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
- client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
-
- /*
- * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
- * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
- */
- if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
- &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
- s = "Protocol mismatch.\n";
- (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
- logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' "
- "from %s port %d", client_version_string,
- get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port());
- close(sock_in);
- close(sock_out);
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s",
- remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
-
- compat_datafellows(remote_version);
-
- if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_PROBE) != 0) {
- logit("probed from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
- get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) != 0) {
- logit("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
- get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
- logit("Client version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature "
- "scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version);
- }
- if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY) != 0) {
- fatal("Client version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe key agreement; "
- "refusing connection", remote_version);
- }
-
- mismatch = 0;
- switch (remote_major) {
- case 1:
- if (remote_minor == 99) {
- if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)
- enable_compat20();
- else
- mismatch = 1;
- break;
- }
- if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) {
- mismatch = 1;
- break;
- }
- if (remote_minor < 3) {
- packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and "
- "is no longer supported. Please install a newer version.");
- } else if (remote_minor == 3) {
- /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */
- enable_compat13();
- }
- break;
- case 2:
- if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
- enable_compat20();
- break;
- }
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- default:
- mismatch = 1;
- break;
- }
- chop(server_version_string);
- debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string);
-
- if (mismatch) {
- s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n";
- (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
- close(sock_in);
- close(sock_out);
- logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s",
- get_remote_ipaddr(),
- server_version_string, client_version_string);
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
-}
-
-/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
-void
-destroy_sensitive_data(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
- key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
- sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
- key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
- sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
- }
- if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
- key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
- sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
- }
- }
- sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
- explicit_bzero(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
-}
-
-/* Demote private to public keys for network child */
-void
-demote_sensitive_data(void)
-{
- Key *tmp;
- int i;
-
- if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
- tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key);
- key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
- sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
- tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
- key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
- sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
- if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
- sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
- }
- /* Certs do not need demotion */
- }
-
- /* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */
-}
-
-static void
-privsep_preauth_child(void)
-{
- u_int32_t rnd[256];
- gid_t gidset[1];
-
- /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
- privsep_challenge_enable();
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
- /* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */
- if (options.gss_authentication)
- ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
-#endif
-
- arc4random_stir();
- arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
- RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
- explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
-
- /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
- demote_sensitive_data();
-
- /* Change our root directory */
- if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
- fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
- strerror(errno));
- if (chdir("/") == -1)
- fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
-
- /* Drop our privileges */
- debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid,
- (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid);
-#if 0
- /* XXX not ready, too heavy after chroot */
- do_setusercontext(privsep_pw);
-#else
- gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid;
- if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0)
- fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw);
-#endif
-}
-
-static int
-privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- int status;
- pid_t pid;
- struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL;
-
- /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
- pmonitor = monitor_init();
- /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
- pmonitor->m_pkex = &xxx_kex;
-
- if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON)
- box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
- pid = fork();
- if (pid == -1) {
- fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
- } else if (pid != 0) {
- debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
-
- pmonitor->m_pid = pid;
- if (have_agent)
- auth_conn = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
- if (box != NULL)
- ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid);
- monitor_child_preauth(authctxt, pmonitor);
-
- /* Sync memory */
- monitor_sync(pmonitor);
-
- /* Wait for the child's exit status */
- while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) {
- if (errno == EINTR)
- continue;
- pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
- fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- }
- privsep_is_preauth = 0;
- pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
- if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
- if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
- fatal("%s: preauth child exited with status %d",
- __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status));
- } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
- fatal("%s: preauth child terminated by signal %d",
- __func__, WTERMSIG(status));
- if (box != NULL)
- ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(box);
- return 1;
- } else {
- /* child */
- close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
- close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
-
- /* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */
- set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
-
- /* Demote the child */
- if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
- privsep_preauth_child();
- setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
- if (box != NULL)
- ssh_sandbox_child(box);
-
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
-static void
-privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- u_int32_t rnd[256];
-
-#ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
- if (1) {
-#else
- if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) {
-#endif
- /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
- use_privsep = 0;
- goto skip;
- }
-
- /* New socket pair */
- monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
-
- pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
- if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
- fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
- else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
- verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
- buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
- monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
-
- /* NEVERREACHED */
- exit(0);
- }
-
- /* child */
-
- close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
- pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
-
- /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
- demote_sensitive_data();
-
- arc4random_stir();
- arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
- RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
- explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
-
- /* Drop privileges */
- do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
-
- skip:
- /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
- monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
-
- /*
- * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since
- * this information is not part of the key state.
- */
- packet_set_authenticated();
-}
-
-static char *
-list_hostkey_types(void)
-{
- Buffer b;
- const char *p;
- char *ret;
- int i;
- Key *key;
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
- if (key == NULL)
- key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
- if (key == NULL)
- continue;
- switch (key->type) {
- case KEY_RSA:
- case KEY_DSA:
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- case KEY_ED25519:
- if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
- buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
- p = key_ssh_name(key);
- buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p));
- break;
- }
- /* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */
- key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
- if (key == NULL)
- continue;
- switch (key->type) {
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
- buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
- p = key_ssh_name(key);
- buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p));
- break;
- }
- }
- buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
- ret = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
- buffer_free(&b);
- debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", ret);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static Key *
-get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int need_private)
-{
- int i;
- Key *key;
-
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- switch (type) {
- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
- break;
- default:
- key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
- if (key == NULL && !need_private)
- key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
- break;
- }
- if (key != NULL && key->type == type)
- return need_private ?
- sensitive_data.host_keys[i] : key;
- }
- return NULL;
-}
-
-Key *
-get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type)
-{
- return get_hostkey_by_type(type, 0);
-}
-
-Key *
-get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type)
-{
- return get_hostkey_by_type(type, 1);
-}
-
-Key *
-get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
-{
- if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
- return (NULL);
- return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]);
-}
-
-Key *
-get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind)
-{
- if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
- return (NULL);
- return (sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[ind]);
-}
-
-int
-get_hostkey_index(Key *key)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- if (key_is_cert(key)) {
- if (key == sensitive_data.host_certificates[i])
- return (i);
- } else {
- if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i])
- return (i);
- if (key == sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i])
- return (i);
- }
- }
- return (-1);
-}
-
-/*
- * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
- * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
- * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until
- * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups
- */
-static int
-drop_connection(int startups)
-{
- int p, r;
-
- if (startups < options.max_startups_begin)
- return 0;
- if (startups >= options.max_startups)
- return 1;
- if (options.max_startups_rate == 100)
- return 1;
-
- p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate;
- p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
- p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin;
- p += options.max_startups_rate;
- r = arc4random_uniform(100);
-
- debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r);
- return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
-}
-
-static void
-usage(void)
-{
- fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
- SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
- fprintf(stderr,
-"usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-b bits] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n"
-" [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
-" [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port]\n"
-" [-u len]\n"
- );
- exit(1);
-}
-
-static void
-send_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
-{
- Buffer m;
-
- debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %d", __func__, fd,
- buffer_len(conf));
-
- /*
- * Protocol from reexec master to child:
- * string configuration
- * u_int ephemeral_key_follows
- * bignum e (only if ephemeral_key_follows == 1)
- * bignum n "
- * bignum d "
- * bignum iqmp "
- * bignum p "
- * bignum q "
- * string rngseed (only if OpenSSL is not self-seeded)
- */
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, buffer_ptr(conf));
-
- if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL &&
- sensitive_data.server_key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
- buffer_put_int(&m, 1);
- buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
- buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
- buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d);
- buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp);
- buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p);
- buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q);
- } else
- buffer_put_int(&m, 0);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
- rexec_send_rng_seed(&m);
-#endif
-
- if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, &m) == -1)
- fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);
-
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- debug3("%s: done", __func__);
-}
-
-static void
-recv_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
-{
- Buffer m;
- char *cp;
- u_int len;
-
- debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
-
- if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, &m) == -1)
- fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__);
- if (buffer_get_char(&m) != 0)
- fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__);
-
- cp = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
- if (conf != NULL)
- buffer_append(conf, cp, len + 1);
- free(cp);
-
- if (buffer_get_int(&m)) {
- if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
- key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
- sensitive_data.server_key = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
- buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
- buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
- buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d);
- buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp);
- buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p);
- buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q);
- rsa_generate_additional_parameters(
- sensitive_data.server_key->rsa);
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
- rexec_recv_rng_seed(&m);
-#endif
-
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- debug3("%s: done", __func__);
-}
-
-/* Accept a connection from inetd */
-static void
-server_accept_inetd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out)
-{
- int fd;
-
- startup_pipe = -1;
- if (rexeced_flag) {
- close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
- *sock_in = *sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
- if (!debug_flag) {
- startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
- close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
- }
- } else {
- *sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
- *sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
- }
- /*
- * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
- * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if
- * ttyfd happens to be one of those.
- */
- if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
- dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
- dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
- if (!log_stderr)
- dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
- if (fd > (log_stderr ? STDERR_FILENO : STDOUT_FILENO))
- close(fd);
- }
- debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", *sock_in, *sock_out);
-}
-
-/*
- * Listen for TCP connections
- */
-static void
-server_listen(void)
-{
- int ret, listen_sock, on = 1;
- struct addrinfo *ai;
- char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
-
- for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
- continue;
- if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
- fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
- "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
- if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
- ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
- NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
- error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
- ssh_gai_strerror(ret));
- continue;
- }
- /* Create socket for listening. */
- listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
- ai->ai_protocol);
- if (listen_sock < 0) {
- /* kernel may not support ipv6 */
- verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- continue;
- }
- if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) {
- close(listen_sock);
- continue;
- }
- /*
- * Set socket options.
- * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
- */
- if (setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
- &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
- error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno));
-
- /* Only communicate in IPv6 over AF_INET6 sockets. */
- if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
- sock_set_v6only(listen_sock);
-
- debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
-
- /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
- if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
- error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
- strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
- close(listen_sock);
- continue;
- }
- listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
- num_listen_socks++;
-
- /* Start listening on the port. */
- if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0)
- fatal("listen on [%s]:%s: %.100s",
- ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
- logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
- }
- freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs);
-
- if (!num_listen_socks)
- fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
-}
-
-/*
- * The main TCP accept loop. Note that, for the non-debug case, returns
- * from this function are in a forked subprocess.
- */
-static void
-server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
-{
- fd_set *fdset;
- int i, j, ret, maxfd;
- int key_used = 0, startups = 0;
- int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 };
- struct sockaddr_storage from;
- socklen_t fromlen;
- pid_t pid;
- u_char rnd[256];
-
- /* setup fd set for accept */
- fdset = NULL;
- maxfd = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
- if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd)
- maxfd = listen_socks[i];
- /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */
- startup_pipes = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int));
- for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
- startup_pipes[i] = -1;
-
- /*
- * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
- * the daemon is killed with a signal.
- */
- for (;;) {
- if (received_sighup)
- sighup_restart();
- if (fdset != NULL)
- free(fdset);
- fdset = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(maxfd + 1, NFDBITS),
- sizeof(fd_mask));
-
- for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
- FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset);
- for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
- if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
- FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset);
-
- /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
- ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
- error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- if (received_sigterm) {
- logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
- (int) received_sigterm);
- close_listen_socks();
- unlink(options.pid_file);
- exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255);
- }
- if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
- generate_ephemeral_server_key();
- key_used = 0;
- key_do_regen = 0;
- }
- if (ret < 0)
- continue;
-
- for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
- if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 &&
- FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) {
- /*
- * the read end of the pipe is ready
- * if the child has closed the pipe
- * after successful authentication
- * or if the child has died
- */
- close(startup_pipes[i]);
- startup_pipes[i] = -1;
- startups--;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) {
- if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset))
- continue;
- fromlen = sizeof(from);
- *newsock = accept(listen_socks[i],
- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen);
- if (*newsock < 0) {
- if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK &&
- errno != ECONNABORTED && errno != EAGAIN)
- error("accept: %.100s",
- strerror(errno));
- if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
- usleep(100 * 1000);
- continue;
- }
- if (unset_nonblock(*newsock) == -1) {
- close(*newsock);
- continue;
- }
- if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
- debug("drop connection #%d", startups);
- close(*newsock);
- continue;
- }
- if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) {
- close(*newsock);
- continue;
- }
-
- if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX,
- SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) {
- error("reexec socketpair: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- close(*newsock);
- close(startup_p[0]);
- close(startup_p[1]);
- continue;
- }
-
- for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
- if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
- startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
- if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
- maxfd = startup_p[0];
- startups++;
- break;
- }
-
- /*
- * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless
- * we are in debugging mode.
- */
- if (debug_flag) {
- /*
- * In debugging mode. Close the listening
- * socket, and start processing the
- * connection without forking.
- */
- debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
- close_listen_socks();
- *sock_in = *newsock;
- *sock_out = *newsock;
- close(startup_p[0]);
- close(startup_p[1]);
- startup_pipe = -1;
- pid = getpid();
- if (rexec_flag) {
- send_rexec_state(config_s[0],
- &cfg);
- close(config_s[0]);
- }
- break;
- }
-
- /*
- * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have
- * the child process the connection. The
- * parent continues listening.
- */
- platform_pre_fork();
- if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
- /*
- * Child. Close the listening and
- * max_startup sockets. Start using
- * the accepted socket. Reinitialize
- * logging (since our pid has changed).
- * We break out of the loop to handle
- * the connection.
- */
- platform_post_fork_child();
- startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
- close_startup_pipes();
- close_listen_socks();
- *sock_in = *newsock;
- *sock_out = *newsock;
- log_init(__progname,
- options.log_level,
- options.log_facility,
- log_stderr);
- if (rexec_flag)
- close(config_s[0]);
- break;
- }
-
- /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */
- platform_post_fork_parent(pid);
- if (pid < 0)
- error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- else
- debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
-
- close(startup_p[1]);
-
- if (rexec_flag) {
- send_rexec_state(config_s[0], &cfg);
- close(config_s[0]);
- close(config_s[1]);
- }
-
- /*
- * Mark that the key has been used (it
- * was "given" to the child).
- */
- if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
- key_used == 0) {
- /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
- signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
- alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
- key_used = 1;
- }
-
- close(*newsock);
-
- /*
- * Ensure that our random state differs
- * from that of the child
- */
- arc4random_stir();
- arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
- RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
- explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
- }
-
- /* child process check (or debug mode) */
- if (num_listen_socks < 0)
- break;
- }
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Main program for the daemon.
- */
-int
-main(int ac, char **av)
-{
- extern char *optarg;
- extern int optind;
- int opt, i, j, on = 1;
- int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1;
- const char *remote_ip;
- int remote_port;
- char *line, *logfile = NULL;
- int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
- u_int n;
- u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
- mode_t new_umask;
- Key *key;
- Key *pubkey;
- int keytype;
- Authctxt *authctxt;
- struct connection_info *connection_info = get_connection_info(0, 0);
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
- (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
-#endif
- __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
-
- /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
- saved_argc = ac;
- rexec_argc = ac;
- saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv));
- for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
- saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
- saved_argv[i] = NULL;
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
- /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
- compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
- av = saved_argv;
-#endif
-
- if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
- debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno));
-
- /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
- sanitise_stdfd();
-
- /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
- initialize_server_options(&options);
-
- /* Parse command-line arguments. */
- while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:u:o:C:dDeE:iqrtQRT46")) != -1) {
- switch (opt) {
- case '4':
- options.address_family = AF_INET;
- break;
- case '6':
- options.address_family = AF_INET6;
- break;
- case 'f':
- config_file_name = optarg;
- break;
- case 'c':
- if (options.num_host_cert_files >= MAX_HOSTCERTS) {
- fprintf(stderr, "too many host certificates.\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- options.host_cert_files[options.num_host_cert_files++] =
- derelativise_path(optarg);
- break;
- case 'd':
- if (debug_flag == 0) {
- debug_flag = 1;
- options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
- } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
- options.log_level++;
- break;
- case 'D':
- no_daemon_flag = 1;
- break;
- case 'E':
- logfile = xstrdup(optarg);
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case 'e':
- log_stderr = 1;
- break;
- case 'i':
- inetd_flag = 1;
- break;
- case 'r':
- rexec_flag = 0;
- break;
- case 'R':
- rexeced_flag = 1;
- inetd_flag = 1;
- break;
- case 'Q':
- /* ignored */
- break;
- case 'q':
- options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
- break;
- case 'b':
- options.server_key_bits = (int)strtonum(optarg, 256,
- 32768, NULL);
- break;
- case 'p':
- options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
- if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) {
- fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg);
- if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] <= 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- break;
- case 'g':
- if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- break;
- case 'k':
- if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- break;
- case 'h':
- if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) {
- fprintf(stderr, "too many host keys.\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] =
- derelativise_path(optarg);
- break;
- case 't':
- test_flag = 1;
- break;
- case 'T':
- test_flag = 2;
- break;
- case 'C':
- if (parse_server_match_testspec(connection_info,
- optarg) == -1)
- exit(1);
- break;
- case 'u':
- utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, MAXHOSTNAMELEN+1, NULL);
- if (utmp_len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- break;
- case 'o':
- line = xstrdup(optarg);
- if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
- "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL) != 0)
- exit(1);
- free(line);
- break;
- case '?':
- default:
- usage();
- break;
- }
- }
- if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag)
- rexec_flag = 0;
- if (!test_flag && (rexec_flag && (av[0] == NULL || *av[0] != '/')))
- fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path");
- if (rexeced_flag)
- closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD);
- else
- closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
-
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
-
- /* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */
- if (logfile != NULL) {
- log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile);
- free(logfile);
- }
- /*
- * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
- * key (unless started from inetd)
- */
- log_init(__progname,
- options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
- SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
- options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
- SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
- log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
-
- /*
- * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
- * root's environment
- */
- if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL)
- (void) unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
-
-#ifdef _UNICOS
- /* Cray can define user privs drop all privs now!
- * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems!
- */
- drop_cray_privs();
-#endif
-
- sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
- sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
- sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0;
- sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
-
- /*
- * If we're doing an extended config test, make sure we have all of
- * the parameters we need. If we're not doing an extended test,
- * do not silently ignore connection test params.
- */
- if (test_flag >= 2 && server_match_spec_complete(connection_info) == 0)
- fatal("user, host and addr are all required when testing "
- "Match configs");
- if (test_flag < 2 && server_match_spec_complete(connection_info) >= 0)
- fatal("Config test connection parameter (-C) provided without "
- "test mode (-T)");
-
- /* Fetch our configuration */
- buffer_init(&cfg);
- if (rexeced_flag)
- recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, &cfg);
- else
- load_server_config(config_file_name, &cfg);
-
- parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
- &cfg, NULL);
-
- seed_rng();
-
- /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
- fill_default_server_options(&options);
-
- /* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */
- if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
- options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
-
- /* Check that options are sensible */
- if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL &&
- (options.authorized_keys_command != NULL &&
- strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_command, "none") != 0))
- fatal("AuthorizedKeysCommand set without "
- "AuthorizedKeysCommandUser");
-
- /*
- * Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods.
- * Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this generally before
- * daemonisation in the presence of Match block, but this catches
- * and warns for trivial misconfigurations that could break login.
- */
- if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
- if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1))
- fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with "
- "SSH protocol 1");
- for (n = 0; n < options.num_auth_methods; n++) {
- if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[n],
- 1) == 0)
- break;
- }
- if (n >= options.num_auth_methods)
- fatal("AuthenticationMethods cannot be satisfied by "
- "enabled authentication methods");
- }
-
- /* set default channel AF */
- channel_set_af(options.address_family);
-
- /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
- if (optind < ac) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
- exit(1);
- }
-
- debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION,
- SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
-
- /* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */
- if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) {
- if (use_privsep || options.kerberos_authentication)
- fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
- } else {
- explicit_bzero(privsep_pw->pw_passwd,
- strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd));
- privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw);
- free(privsep_pw->pw_passwd);
- privsep_pw->pw_passwd = xstrdup("*");
- }
- endpwent();
-
- /* load host keys */
- sensitive_data.host_keys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
- sizeof(Key *));
- sensitive_data.host_pubkeys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
- sizeof(Key *));
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
- sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = NULL;
- }
-
- if (options.host_key_agent) {
- if (strcmp(options.host_key_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
- setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
- options.host_key_agent, 1);
- have_agent = ssh_agent_present();
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL);
- pubkey = key_load_public(options.host_key_files[i], NULL);
- sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
- sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey;
-
- if (key == NULL && pubkey != NULL && pubkey->type != KEY_RSA1 &&
- have_agent) {
- debug("will rely on agent for hostkey %s",
- options.host_key_files[i]);
- keytype = pubkey->type;
- } else if (key != NULL) {
- keytype = key->type;
- } else {
- error("Could not load host key: %s",
- options.host_key_files[i]);
- sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
- sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = NULL;
- continue;
- }
-
- switch (keytype) {
- case KEY_RSA1:
- sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key;
- sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1;
- break;
- case KEY_RSA:
- case KEY_DSA:
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- case KEY_ED25519:
- sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1;
- break;
- }
- debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, keytype,
- key_type(key ? key : pubkey));
- }
- if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
- logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
- options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
- }
- if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
- logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
- options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
- }
- if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
- logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
- exit(1);
- }
-
- /*
- * Load certificates. They are stored in an array at identical
- * indices to the public keys that they relate to.
- */
- sensitive_data.host_certificates = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
- sizeof(Key *));
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
- sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
-
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_cert_files; i++) {
- key = key_load_public(options.host_cert_files[i], NULL);
- if (key == NULL) {
- error("Could not load host certificate: %s",
- options.host_cert_files[i]);
- continue;
- }
- if (!key_is_cert(key)) {
- error("Certificate file is not a certificate: %s",
- options.host_cert_files[i]);
- key_free(key);
- continue;
- }
- /* Find matching private key */
- for (j = 0; j < options.num_host_key_files; j++) {
- if (key_equal_public(key,
- sensitive_data.host_keys[j])) {
- sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (j >= options.num_host_key_files) {
- error("No matching private key for certificate: %s",
- options.host_cert_files[i]);
- key_free(key);
- continue;
- }
- sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key;
- debug("host certificate: #%d type %d %s", j, key->type,
- key_type(key));
- }
- /* Check certain values for sanity. */
- if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
- if (options.server_key_bits < 512 ||
- options.server_key_bits > 32768) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- /*
- * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This
- * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I
- * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels
- */
- if (options.server_key_bits >
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) -
- SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && options.server_key_bits <
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
- SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
- options.server_key_bits =
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
- SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
- debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.",
- options.server_key_bits);
- }
- }
-
- if (use_privsep) {
- struct stat st;
-
- if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) ||
- (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
- fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
- _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
-
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) &&
- (st.st_uid != getuid () ||
- (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0))
-#else
- if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
-#endif
- fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or "
- "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
- }
-
- if (test_flag > 1) {
- if (server_match_spec_complete(connection_info) == 1)
- parse_server_match_config(&options, connection_info);
- dump_config(&options);
- }
-
- /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
- if (test_flag)
- exit(0);
-
- /*
- * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This
- * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the
- * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM
- * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every
- * module which might be used).
- */
- if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
- debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
-
- if (rexec_flag) {
- rexec_argv = xcalloc(rexec_argc + 2, sizeof(char *));
- for (i = 0; i < rexec_argc; i++) {
- debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]);
- rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i];
- }
- rexec_argv[rexec_argc] = "-R";
- rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL;
- }
-
- /* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */
- new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022;
- (void) umask(new_umask);
-
- /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
- if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag))
- log_stderr = 1;
- log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
-
- /*
- * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect
- * from the controlling terminal, and fork. The original process
- * exits.
- */
- if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) {
-#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
- int fd;
-#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
- if (daemon(0, 0) < 0)
- fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
-
- /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */
-#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
- fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
- if (fd >= 0) {
- (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
- close(fd);
- }
-#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
- }
- /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
- log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
-
- /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
- unmounted if desired. */
- if (chdir("/") == -1)
- error("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
-
- /* ignore SIGPIPE */
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-
- /* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */
- if (inetd_flag) {
- server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out);
- } else {
- platform_pre_listen();
- server_listen();
-
- if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
- generate_ephemeral_server_key();
-
- signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
- signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
- signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
- signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
-
- /*
- * Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler
- * is setup and the listen sockets are bound
- */
- if (!debug_flag) {
- FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w");
-
- if (f == NULL) {
- error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
- options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
- } else {
- fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
- fclose(f);
- }
- }
-
- /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
- server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
- &newsock, config_s);
- }
-
- /* This is the child processing a new connection. */
- setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]");
-
- /*
- * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
- * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't
- * want the child to be able to affect the parent.
- */
-#if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
- /*
- * If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a
- * controlling terminal which will result in "could not set
- * controlling tty" errors.
- */
- if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0)
- error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-#endif
-
- if (rexec_flag) {
- int fd;
-
- debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
- sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
- dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO);
- dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
- if (startup_pipe == -1)
- close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
- else if (startup_pipe != REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD) {
- dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
- close(startup_pipe);
- startup_pipe = REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD;
- }
-
- dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
- close(config_s[1]);
-
- execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv);
-
- /* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */
- error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno));
- recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, NULL);
- log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
- options.log_facility, log_stderr);
-
- /* Clean up fds */
- close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
- newsock = sock_out = sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
- if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
- dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
- dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
- if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
- close(fd);
- }
- debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
- sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
- }
-
- /* Executed child processes don't need these. */
- fcntl(sock_out, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
- fcntl(sock_in, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
-
- /*
- * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the
- * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We
- * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense.
- */
- alarm(0);
- signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
- signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
- signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
- signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
- signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
- signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
-
- /*
- * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
- * not have a key.
- */
- packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out);
- packet_set_server();
-
- /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
- if (options.tcp_keep_alive && packet_connection_is_on_socket() &&
- setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
- error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-
- if ((remote_port = get_remote_port()) < 0) {
- debug("get_remote_port failed");
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
-
- /*
- * We use get_canonical_hostname with usedns = 0 instead of
- * get_remote_ipaddr here so IP options will be checked.
- */
- (void) get_canonical_hostname(0);
- /*
- * The rest of the code depends on the fact that
- * get_remote_ipaddr() caches the remote ip, even if
- * the socket goes away.
- */
- remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
-
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
-#endif
-#ifdef LIBWRAP
- allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO;
- deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING;
- /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
- if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
- struct request_info req;
-
- request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
- fromhost(&req);
-
- if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
- debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
- refuse(&req);
- /* NOTREACHED */
- fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
- }
- }
-#endif /* LIBWRAP */
-
- /* Log the connection. */
- verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d",
- remote_ip, remote_port,
- get_local_ipaddr(sock_in), get_local_port());
-
- /*
- * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
- * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
- * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero
- * indicates no limit. Note that we don't set the alarm in debugging
- * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
- * are about to discover the bug.
- */
- signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
- if (!debug_flag)
- alarm(options.login_grace_time);
-
- sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
-
- /* In inetd mode, generate ephemeral key only for proto 1 connections */
- if (!compat20 && inetd_flag && sensitive_data.server_key == NULL)
- generate_ephemeral_server_key();
-
- packet_set_nonblocking();
-
- /* allocate authentication context */
- authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt));
-
- authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
-
- /* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
- the_authctxt = authctxt;
-
- /* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
- buffer_init(&loginmsg);
- auth_debug_reset();
-
- if (use_privsep) {
- if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1)
- goto authenticated;
- } else if (compat20 && have_agent)
- auth_conn = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
-
- /* perform the key exchange */
- /* authenticate user and start session */
- if (compat20) {
- do_ssh2_kex();
- do_authentication2(authctxt);
- } else {
- do_ssh1_kex();
- do_authentication(authctxt);
- }
- /*
- * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
- * the current keystate and exits
- */
- if (use_privsep) {
- mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
- exit(0);
- }
-
- authenticated:
- /*
- * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
- * authentication.
- */
- alarm(0);
- signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
- authctxt->authenticated = 1;
- if (startup_pipe != -1) {
- close(startup_pipe);
- startup_pipe = -1;
- }
-
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
- if (options.gss_authentication) {
- temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
- ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
- restore_uid();
- }
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam) {
- do_pam_setcred(1);
- do_pam_session();
- }
-#endif
-
- /*
- * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
- * file descriptor passing.
- */
- if (use_privsep) {
- privsep_postauth(authctxt);
- /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
- if (!compat20)
- destroy_sensitive_data();
- }
-
- packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval,
- options.client_alive_count_max);
-
- /* Start session. */
- do_authenticated(authctxt);
-
- /* The connection has been terminated. */
- packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);
- packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);
- verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
- (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
-
- verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
- finish_pam();
-#endif /* USE_PAM */
-
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE));
-#endif
-
- packet_close();
-
- if (use_privsep)
- mm_terminate();
-
- exit(0);
-}
-
-/*
- * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key
- * (key with larger modulus first).
- */
-int
-ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
-{
- int rsafail = 0;
-
- if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
- sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
- /* Server key has bigger modulus. */
- if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
- SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
- fatal("do_connection: %s: "
- "server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
- get_remote_ipaddr(),
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
- SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
- }
- if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
- sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0)
- rsafail++;
- if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
- sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0)
- rsafail++;
- } else {
- /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
- if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) +
- SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
- fatal("do_connection: %s: "
- "host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
- get_remote_ipaddr(),
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
- SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
- }
- if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
- sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0)
- rsafail++;
- if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
- sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0)
- rsafail++;
- }
- return (rsafail);
-}
-/*
- * SSH1 key exchange
- */
-static void
-do_ssh1_kex(void)
-{
- int i, len;
- int rsafail = 0;
- BIGNUM *session_key_int;
- u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
- u_char cookie[8];
- u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags;
-
- /*
- * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
- * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip
- * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody
- * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local
- * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random
- * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one
- * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure.
- */
- arc4random_buf(cookie, sizeof(cookie));
-
- /*
- * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random
- * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP
- * spoofing.
- */
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
- packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
-
- /* Store our public server RSA key. */
- packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n));
- packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
- packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
-
- /* Store our public host RSA key. */
- packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
- packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e);
- packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n);
-
- /* Put protocol flags. */
- packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN);
-
- /* Declare which ciphers we support. */
- packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0));
-
- /* Declare supported authentication types. */
- auth_mask = 0;
- if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication)
- auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA;
- if (options.rsa_authentication)
- auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA;
- if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1)
- auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS;
- if (options.password_authentication)
- auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD;
- packet_put_int(auth_mask);
-
- /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.",
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
-
- /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */
- packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
-
- /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */
- cipher_type = packet_get_char();
-
- if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type)))
- packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher.");
-
- /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we
- sent earlier with the public key packet. */
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
- if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
- packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
-
- debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
-
- /* Get the encrypted integer. */
- if ((session_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
- packet_get_bignum(session_key_int);
-
- protocol_flags = packet_get_int();
- packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- /* Decrypt session_key_int using host/server keys */
- rsafail = PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(session_key_int));
-
- /*
- * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the
- * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the
- * key is in the highest bits.
- */
- if (!rsafail) {
- (void) BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
- len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
- if (len < 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(session_key)) {
- error("do_ssh1_kex: bad session key len from %s: "
- "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu",
- get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
- rsafail++;
- } else {
- explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key));
- BN_bn2bin(session_key_int,
- session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len);
-
- derive_ssh1_session_id(
- sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n,
- sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
- cookie, session_id);
- /*
- * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the
- * session id.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- session_key[i] ^= session_id[i];
- }
- }
- if (rsafail) {
- int bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
- u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes);
- struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
-
- logit("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key");
- BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, buf);
- if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
- ssh_digest_update(md, buf, bytes) < 0 ||
- ssh_digest_update(md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie,
- SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH) < 0 ||
- ssh_digest_final(md, session_key, sizeof(session_key)) < 0)
- fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
- ssh_digest_free(md);
- if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
- ssh_digest_update(md, session_key, 16) < 0 ||
- ssh_digest_update(md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie,
- SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH) < 0 ||
- ssh_digest_final(md, session_key + 16,
- sizeof(session_key) - 16) < 0)
- fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
- ssh_digest_free(md);
- explicit_bzero(buf, bytes);
- free(buf);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
- }
- /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
- destroy_sensitive_data();
-
- if (use_privsep)
- mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
-
- /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */
- BN_clear_free(session_key_int);
-
- /* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */
- packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type);
-
- /* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */
- explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key));
-
- debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
-
- /* Send an acknowledgment packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-}
-
-void
-sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *privkey, Key *pubkey, u_char **signature, u_int *slen,
- u_char *data, u_int dlen)
-{
- if (privkey) {
- if (PRIVSEP(key_sign(privkey, signature, slen, data, dlen) < 0))
- fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__);
- } else if (use_privsep) {
- if (mm_key_sign(pubkey, signature, slen, data, dlen) < 0)
- fatal("%s: pubkey_sign failed", __func__);
- } else {
- if (ssh_agent_sign(auth_conn, pubkey, signature, slen, data,
- dlen))
- fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed", __func__);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * SSH2 key exchange: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
- */
-static void
-do_ssh2_kex(void)
-{
- Kex *kex;
-
- if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
- }
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
- compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]);
-
- if (options.macs != NULL) {
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
- }
- if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
- } else if (options.compression == COMP_DELAYED) {
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib at openssh.com";
- }
- if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
-
- if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
- packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
- (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
-
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
- list_hostkey_types());
-
- /* start key exchange */
- kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
- kex->server = 1;
- kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
- kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
- kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
- kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
- kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
- kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
-
- xxx_kex = kex;
-
- dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
-
- session_id2 = kex->session_id;
- session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
- packet_put_cstring("markus");
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-#endif
- debug("KEX done");
-}
-
-/* server specific fatal cleanup */
-void
-cleanup_exit(int i)
-{
- if (the_authctxt) {
- do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
- if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) {
- debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid);
- if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
- errno != ESRCH)
- error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__,
- pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
- }
- }
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
- if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
- audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
-#endif
- _exit(i);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,2695 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.470 2016/05/24 04:43:45 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients,
+ * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards
+ * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted
+ * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and
+ * authentication agent connections.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 implementation:
+ * Privilege Separation:
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+#include <sys/security.h>
+#include <prot.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "monitor_mm.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+#include "version.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+#ifndef O_NOCTTY
+#define O_NOCTTY 0
+#endif
+
+/* Re-exec fds */
+#define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
+#define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
+#define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3)
+#define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4)
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* Server configuration options. */
+ServerOptions options;
+
+/* Name of the server configuration file. */
+char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
+
+/*
+ * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
+ * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
+ * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
+ * the first connection.
+ */
+int debug_flag = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */
+int test_flag = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
+int inetd_flag = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
+int no_daemon_flag = 0;
+
+/* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
+int log_stderr = 0;
+
+/* Saved arguments to main(). */
+char **saved_argv;
+int saved_argc;
+
+/* re-exec */
+int rexeced_flag = 0;
+int rexec_flag = 1;
+int rexec_argc = 0;
+char **rexec_argv;
+
+/*
+ * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP
+ * signal handler.
+ */
+#define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16
+int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS];
+int num_listen_socks = 0;
+
+/*
+ * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL,
+ * sshd will skip the version-number exchange
+ */
+char *client_version_string = NULL;
+char *server_version_string = NULL;
+
+/* Daemon's agent connection */
+int auth_sock = -1;
+int have_agent = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
+ * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
+ * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some
+ * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle)
+ * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is
+ * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
+ */
+struct {
+ Key *server_key; /* ephemeral server key */
+ Key *ssh1_host_key; /* ssh1 host key */
+ Key **host_keys; /* all private host keys */
+ Key **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */
+ Key **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */
+ int have_ssh1_key;
+ int have_ssh2_key;
+ u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
+} sensitive_data;
+
+/*
+ * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
+ * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
+ */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
+
+/* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
+static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
+
+/* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */
+u_char session_id[16];
+
+/* same for ssh2 */
+u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
+u_int session_id2_len = 0;
+
+/* record remote hostname or ip */
+u_int utmp_len = HOST_NAME_MAX+1;
+
+/* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */
+int *startup_pipes = NULL;
+int startup_pipe; /* in child */
+
+/* variables used for privilege separation */
+int use_privsep = -1;
+struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
+int privsep_is_preauth = 1;
+
+/* global authentication context */
+Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
+
+/* sshd_config buffer */
+Buffer cfg;
+
+/* message to be displayed after login */
+Buffer loginmsg;
+
+/* Unprivileged user */
+struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
+
+/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
+void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+void demote_sensitive_data(void);
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
+#endif
+static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
+
+/*
+ * Close all listening sockets
+ */
+static void
+close_listen_socks(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
+ close(listen_socks[i]);
+ num_listen_socks = -1;
+}
+
+static void
+close_startup_pipes(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (startup_pipes)
+ for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+ if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
+ close(startup_pipes[i]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP;
+ * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
+ * the server key).
+ */
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+sighup_handler(int sig)
+{
+ int save_errno = errno;
+
+ received_sighup = 1;
+ signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
+ errno = save_errno;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
+ * Restarts the server.
+ */
+static void
+sighup_restart(void)
+{
+ logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
+ platform_pre_restart();
+ close_listen_socks();
+ close_startup_pipes();
+ alarm(0); /* alarm timer persists across exec */
+ signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* will be restored after exec */
+ execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
+ logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
+ strerror(errno));
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
+ */
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+sigterm_handler(int sig)
+{
+ received_sigterm = sig;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then
+ * reap any zombies left by exited children.
+ */
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
+{
+ int save_errno = errno;
+ pid_t pid;
+ int status;
+
+ while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
+ (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
+ ;
+
+ signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
+ errno = save_errno;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
+ */
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
+{
+ if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0)
+ kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM);
+
+ /*
+ * Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized
+ * keys command helpers.
+ */
+ if (getpgid(0) == getpid()) {
+ signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN);
+ kill(0, SIGTERM);
+ }
+
+ /* Log error and exit. */
+ sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s port %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), ssh_remote_port(active_state));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this
+ * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not
+ * do anything with the private key or random state before forking.
+ * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution
+ * problems.
+ */
+static void
+generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
+{
+ verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.",
+ sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits);
+ if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
+ key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
+ sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1,
+ options.server_key_bits);
+ verbose("RSA key generation complete.");
+
+ arc4random_buf(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
+{
+ int save_errno = errno;
+
+ signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+ errno = save_errno;
+ key_do_regen = 1;
+}
+
+static void
+sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ int mismatch;
+ int remote_major, remote_minor;
+ int major, minor;
+ char *s, *newline = "\n";
+ char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */
+ char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
+
+ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
+ (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) {
+ major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
+ minor = 99;
+ } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
+ major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2;
+ minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2;
+ newline = "\r\n";
+ } else {
+ major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
+ minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
+ }
+
+ xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
+ major, minor, SSH_VERSION,
+ *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
+ options.version_addendum, newline);
+
+ /* Send our protocol version identification. */
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
+ strlen(server_version_string))
+ != strlen(server_version_string)) {
+ logit("Could not write ident string to %s port %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+
+ /* Read other sides version identification. */
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
+ if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
+ logit("Did not receive identification string "
+ "from %s port %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+ if (buf[i] == '\r') {
+ buf[i] = 0;
+ /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */
+ if (i == 12 &&
+ strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0)
+ break;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (buf[i] == '\n') {
+ buf[i] = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
+ client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
+ * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
+ */
+ if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
+ &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
+ s = "Protocol mismatch.\n";
+ (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
+ logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' "
+ "from %s port %d", client_version_string,
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ close(sock_in);
+ close(sock_out);
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+ debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s",
+ remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
+
+ ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version);
+
+ if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PROBE) != 0) {
+ logit("probed from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ client_version_string);
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+ if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) != 0) {
+ logit("scanned from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ client_version_string);
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+ if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
+ logit("Client version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature "
+ "scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version);
+ }
+ if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY) != 0) {
+ fatal("Client version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe key agreement; "
+ "refusing connection", remote_version);
+ }
+
+ mismatch = 0;
+ switch (remote_major) {
+ case 1:
+ if (remote_minor == 99) {
+ if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)
+ enable_compat20();
+ else
+ mismatch = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) {
+ mismatch = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (remote_minor < 3) {
+ packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and "
+ "is no longer supported. Please install a newer version.");
+ } else if (remote_minor == 3) {
+ /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */
+ enable_compat13();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
+ enable_compat20();
+ break;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ mismatch = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ chop(server_version_string);
+ debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string);
+
+ if (mismatch) {
+ s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n";
+ (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
+ close(sock_in);
+ close(sock_out);
+ logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s port %d: "
+ "%.200s vs. %.200s",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ server_version_string, client_version_string);
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
+void
+destroy_sensitive_data(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
+ key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
+ sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
+ key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
+ key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
+ sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
+ explicit_bzero(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
+}
+
+/* Demote private to public keys for network child */
+void
+demote_sensitive_data(void)
+{
+ Key *tmp;
+ int i;
+
+ if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
+ tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key);
+ key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
+ sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
+ tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+ key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
+ if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
+ }
+ /* Certs do not need demotion */
+ }
+
+ /* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */
+}
+
+static void
+privsep_preauth_child(void)
+{
+ u_int32_t rnd[256];
+ gid_t gidset[1];
+
+ /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
+ privsep_challenge_enable();
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ /* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */
+ if (options.gss_authentication)
+ ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
+#endif
+
+ arc4random_stir();
+ arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+ if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1)
+ fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__);
+#endif
+ explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+
+ /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ demote_sensitive_data();
+
+ /* Demote the child */
+ if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
+ /* Change our root directory */
+ if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
+ fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
+ strerror(errno));
+ if (chdir("/") == -1)
+ fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Drop our privileges */
+ debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid,
+ (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid);
+ gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid;
+ if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0)
+ fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw);
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ int status, r;
+ pid_t pid;
+ struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL;
+
+ /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
+ pmonitor = monitor_init();
+ /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
+ pmonitor->m_pkex = &active_state->kex;
+
+ if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON)
+ box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
+ pid = fork();
+ if (pid == -1) {
+ fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
+ } else if (pid != 0) {
+ debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
+
+ pmonitor->m_pid = pid;
+ if (have_agent) {
+ r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock);
+ if (r != 0) {
+ error("Could not get agent socket: %s",
+ ssh_err(r));
+ have_agent = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (box != NULL)
+ ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid);
+ monitor_child_preauth(authctxt, pmonitor);
+
+ /* Sync memory */
+ monitor_sync(pmonitor);
+
+ /* Wait for the child's exit status */
+ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
+ fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ privsep_is_preauth = 0;
+ pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
+ if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
+ if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: preauth child exited with status %d",
+ __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
+ fatal("%s: preauth child terminated by signal %d",
+ __func__, WTERMSIG(status));
+ if (box != NULL)
+ ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(box);
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ /* child */
+ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+ close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
+
+ /* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */
+ set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
+
+ privsep_preauth_child();
+ setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
+ if (box != NULL)
+ ssh_sandbox_child(box);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ u_int32_t rnd[256];
+
+#ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
+ if (1) {
+#else
+ if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) {
+#endif
+ /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
+ use_privsep = 0;
+ goto skip;
+ }
+
+ /* New socket pair */
+ monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
+
+ pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
+ if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
+ fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
+ else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
+ verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
+ buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+ monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
+
+ /* NEVERREACHED */
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ /* child */
+
+ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+ pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
+
+ /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ demote_sensitive_data();
+
+ arc4random_stir();
+ arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+ if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1)
+ fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__);
+#endif
+ explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+
+ /* Drop privileges */
+ do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
+
+ skip:
+ /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
+ monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
+
+ /*
+ * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since
+ * this information is not part of the key state.
+ */
+ packet_set_authenticated();
+}
+
+static char *
+list_hostkey_types(void)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ const char *p;
+ char *ret;
+ int i;
+ Key *key;
+
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
+ if (key == NULL)
+ key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
+ if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_RSA1)
+ continue;
+ /* Check that the key is accepted in HostkeyAlgorithms */
+ if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+ options.hostkeyalgorithms, 0) != 1) {
+ debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms",
+ __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+ continue;
+ }
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
+ buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
+ p = key_ssh_name(key);
+ buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p));
+
+ /* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
+ if (key->type == KEY_RSA) {
+ p = ",rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256";
+ buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p));
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ /* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */
+ key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
+ if (key == NULL)
+ continue;
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
+ buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
+ p = key_ssh_name(key);
+ buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(&b)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static Key *
+get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int nid, int need_private, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ int i;
+ Key *key;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
+ break;
+ default:
+ key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
+ if (key == NULL && !need_private)
+ key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ if (key != NULL && key->type == type &&
+ (key->type != KEY_ECDSA || key->ecdsa_nid == nid))
+ return need_private ?
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i] : key;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+Key *
+get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 0, ssh);
+}
+
+Key *
+get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 1, ssh);
+}
+
+Key *
+get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
+{
+ if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
+ return (NULL);
+ return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]);
+}
+
+Key *
+get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
+ return (NULL);
+ return (sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[ind]);
+}
+
+int
+get_hostkey_index(Key *key, int compare, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ if (key_is_cert(key)) {
+ if (key == sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] ||
+ (compare && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] &&
+ sshkey_equal(key,
+ sensitive_data.host_certificates[i])))
+ return (i);
+ } else {
+ if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i] ||
+ (compare && sensitive_data.host_keys[i] &&
+ sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_keys[i])))
+ return (i);
+ if (key == sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] ||
+ (compare && sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] &&
+ sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i])))
+ return (i);
+ }
+ }
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+/* Inform the client of all hostkeys */
+static void
+notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *buf;
+ struct sshkey *key;
+ int i, nkeys, r;
+ char *fp;
+
+ /* Some clients cannot cope with the hostkeys message, skip those. */
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS)
+ return;
+
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ for (i = nkeys = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(i, ssh);
+ if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC ||
+ key->type == KEY_RSA1 || sshkey_is_cert(key))
+ continue;
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ debug3("%s: key %d: %s %s", __func__, i,
+ sshkey_ssh_name(key), fp);
+ free(fp);
+ if (nkeys == 0) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring("hostkeys-00 at openssh.com");
+ packet_put_char(0); /* want-reply */
+ }
+ sshbuf_reset(buf);
+ if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, buf)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: couldn't put hostkey %d: %s",
+ __func__, i, ssh_err(r));
+ packet_put_string(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+ nkeys++;
+ }
+ debug3("%s: sent %d hostkeys", __func__, nkeys);
+ if (nkeys == 0)
+ fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
+ packet_send();
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+}
+
+/*
+ * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
+ * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
+ * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until
+ * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups
+ */
+static int
+drop_connection(int startups)
+{
+ int p, r;
+
+ if (startups < options.max_startups_begin)
+ return 0;
+ if (startups >= options.max_startups)
+ return 1;
+ if (options.max_startups_rate == 100)
+ return 1;
+
+ p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate;
+ p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
+ p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin;
+ p += options.max_startups_rate;
+ r = arc4random_uniform(100);
+
+ debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r);
+ return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
+ SSH_RELEASE,
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)
+#else
+ "without OpenSSL"
+#endif
+ );
+ fprintf(stderr,
+"usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-b bits] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n"
+" [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
+" [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port]\n"
+" [-u len]\n"
+ );
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+static void
+send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *m;
+ int r;
+
+ debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %zu", __func__, fd,
+ sshbuf_len(conf));
+
+ /*
+ * Protocol from reexec master to child:
+ * string configuration
+ * u_int ephemeral_key_follows
+ * bignum e (only if ephemeral_key_follows == 1)
+ * bignum n "
+ * bignum d "
+ * bignum iqmp "
+ * bignum p "
+ * bignum q "
+ * string rngseed (only if OpenSSL is not self-seeded)
+ */
+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL &&
+ sensitive_data.server_key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
+ sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
+ sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
+ sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
+ sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
+ sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
+ sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ } else
+#endif
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
+ rexec_send_rng_seed(m);
+#endif
+
+ if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, m) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);
+
+ sshbuf_free(m);
+
+ debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+}
+
+static void
+recv_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ char *cp;
+ u_int len;
+
+ debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+
+ if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, &m) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__);
+ if (buffer_get_char(&m) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__);
+
+ cp = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
+ if (conf != NULL)
+ buffer_append(conf, cp, len);
+ free(cp);
+
+ if (buffer_get_int(&m)) {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
+ key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
+ sensitive_data.server_key = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q);
+ if (rsa_generate_additional_parameters(
+ sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: rsa_generate_additional_parameters "
+ "error", __func__);
+#endif
+ }
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
+ rexec_recv_rng_seed(&m);
+#endif
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+}
+
+/* Accept a connection from inetd */
+static void
+server_accept_inetd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out)
+{
+ int fd;
+
+ startup_pipe = -1;
+ if (rexeced_flag) {
+ close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
+ *sock_in = *sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+ if (!debug_flag) {
+ startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+ close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+ }
+ } else {
+ *sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+ *sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
+ }
+ /*
+ * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
+ * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if
+ * ttyfd happens to be one of those.
+ */
+ if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
+ dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
+ dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
+ if (!log_stderr)
+ dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
+ if (fd > (log_stderr ? STDERR_FILENO : STDOUT_FILENO))
+ close(fd);
+ }
+ debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", *sock_in, *sock_out);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Listen for TCP connections
+ */
+static void
+server_listen(void)
+{
+ int ret, listen_sock, on = 1;
+ struct addrinfo *ai;
+ char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+
+ for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+ continue;
+ if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
+ fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
+ "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
+ if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+ ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+ NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
+ error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
+ ssh_gai_strerror(ret));
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Create socket for listening. */
+ listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
+ ai->ai_protocol);
+ if (listen_sock < 0) {
+ /* kernel may not support ipv6 */
+ verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) {
+ close(listen_sock);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Set socket options.
+ * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
+ */
+ if (setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
+ &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
+ error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Only communicate in IPv6 over AF_INET6 sockets. */
+ if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
+ sock_set_v6only(listen_sock);
+
+ debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
+
+ /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
+ if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
+ strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
+ close(listen_sock);
+ continue;
+ }
+ listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
+ num_listen_socks++;
+
+ /* Start listening on the port. */
+ if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0)
+ fatal("listen on [%s]:%s: %.100s",
+ ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
+ logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs);
+
+ if (!num_listen_socks)
+ fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
+}
+
+/*
+ * The main TCP accept loop. Note that, for the non-debug case, returns
+ * from this function are in a forked subprocess.
+ */
+static void
+server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
+{
+ fd_set *fdset;
+ int i, j, ret, maxfd;
+ int key_used = 0, startups = 0;
+ int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 };
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ socklen_t fromlen;
+ pid_t pid;
+ u_char rnd[256];
+
+ /* setup fd set for accept */
+ fdset = NULL;
+ maxfd = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
+ if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd)
+ maxfd = listen_socks[i];
+ /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */
+ startup_pipes = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int));
+ for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+ startup_pipes[i] = -1;
+
+ /*
+ * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
+ * the daemon is killed with a signal.
+ */
+ for (;;) {
+ if (received_sighup)
+ sighup_restart();
+ free(fdset);
+ fdset = xcalloc(howmany(maxfd + 1, NFDBITS),
+ sizeof(fd_mask));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
+ FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset);
+ for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+ if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
+ FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset);
+
+ /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
+ ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
+ error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ if (received_sigterm) {
+ logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
+ (int) received_sigterm);
+ close_listen_socks();
+ if (options.pid_file != NULL)
+ unlink(options.pid_file);
+ exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255);
+ }
+ if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
+ generate_ephemeral_server_key();
+ key_used = 0;
+ key_do_regen = 0;
+ }
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+ if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 &&
+ FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) {
+ /*
+ * the read end of the pipe is ready
+ * if the child has closed the pipe
+ * after successful authentication
+ * or if the child has died
+ */
+ close(startup_pipes[i]);
+ startup_pipes[i] = -1;
+ startups--;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) {
+ if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset))
+ continue;
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ *newsock = accept(listen_socks[i],
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen);
+ if (*newsock < 0) {
+ if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK &&
+ errno != ECONNABORTED && errno != EAGAIN)
+ error("accept: %.100s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
+ usleep(100 * 1000);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (unset_nonblock(*newsock) == -1) {
+ close(*newsock);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
+ debug("drop connection #%d", startups);
+ close(*newsock);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) {
+ close(*newsock);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX,
+ SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) {
+ error("reexec socketpair: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ close(*newsock);
+ close(startup_p[0]);
+ close(startup_p[1]);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
+ if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
+ startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
+ if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
+ maxfd = startup_p[0];
+ startups++;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless
+ * we are in debugging mode.
+ */
+ if (debug_flag) {
+ /*
+ * In debugging mode. Close the listening
+ * socket, and start processing the
+ * connection without forking.
+ */
+ debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
+ close_listen_socks();
+ *sock_in = *newsock;
+ *sock_out = *newsock;
+ close(startup_p[0]);
+ close(startup_p[1]);
+ startup_pipe = -1;
+ pid = getpid();
+ if (rexec_flag) {
+ send_rexec_state(config_s[0],
+ &cfg);
+ close(config_s[0]);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have
+ * the child process the connection. The
+ * parent continues listening.
+ */
+ platform_pre_fork();
+ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Child. Close the listening and
+ * max_startup sockets. Start using
+ * the accepted socket. Reinitialize
+ * logging (since our pid has changed).
+ * We break out of the loop to handle
+ * the connection.
+ */
+ platform_post_fork_child();
+ startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
+ close_startup_pipes();
+ close_listen_socks();
+ *sock_in = *newsock;
+ *sock_out = *newsock;
+ log_init(__progname,
+ options.log_level,
+ options.log_facility,
+ log_stderr);
+ if (rexec_flag)
+ close(config_s[0]);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */
+ platform_post_fork_parent(pid);
+ if (pid < 0)
+ error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ else
+ debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
+
+ close(startup_p[1]);
+
+ if (rexec_flag) {
+ send_rexec_state(config_s[0], &cfg);
+ close(config_s[0]);
+ close(config_s[1]);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Mark that the key has been used (it
+ * was "given" to the child).
+ */
+ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
+ key_used == 0) {
+ /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
+ signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
+ alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
+ key_used = 1;
+ }
+
+ close(*newsock);
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure that our random state differs
+ * from that of the child
+ */
+ arc4random_stir();
+ arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+ if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1)
+ fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__);
+#endif
+ explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+ }
+
+ /* child process check (or debug mode) */
+ if (num_listen_socks < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and
+ * return an error if any are found). Basically we are worried about
+ * source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody
+ * (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable"
+ * under certain circumstances, but rhosts autentication is useless
+ * if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped
+ * source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do
+ * rest of the interaction and could still bypass security. So we
+ * exit here if we detect any IP options.
+ */
+static void
+check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+#ifdef IP_OPTIONS
+ int sock_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ socklen_t option_size, i, fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ u_char opts[200];
+ char text[sizeof(opts) * 3 + 1];
+
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ if (getpeername(sock_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
+ &fromlen) < 0)
+ return;
+ if (from.ss_family != AF_INET)
+ return;
+ /* XXX IPv6 options? */
+
+ if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
+ &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
+ text[0] = '\0';
+ for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
+ snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
+ " %2.2x", opts[i]);
+ fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
+ }
+ return;
+#endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Main program for the daemon.
+ */
+int
+main(int ac, char **av)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
+ extern char *optarg;
+ extern int optind;
+ int r, opt, i, j, on = 1;
+ int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1;
+ const char *remote_ip;
+ int remote_port;
+ char *fp, *line, *laddr, *logfile = NULL;
+ int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
+ u_int n;
+ u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
+ mode_t new_umask;
+ Key *key;
+ Key *pubkey;
+ int keytype;
+ Authctxt *authctxt;
+ struct connection_info *connection_info = get_connection_info(0, 0);
+
+ ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+ (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
+#endif
+ __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+
+ /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
+ saved_argc = ac;
+ rexec_argc = ac;
+ saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv));
+ for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+ saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
+ saved_argv[i] = NULL;
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+ /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
+ compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
+ av = saved_argv;
+#endif
+
+ if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
+ debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+ sanitise_stdfd();
+
+ /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
+ initialize_server_options(&options);
+
+ /* Parse command-line arguments. */
+ while ((opt = getopt(ac, av,
+ "C:E:b:c:f:g:h:k:o:p:u:46DQRTdeiqrt")) != -1) {
+ switch (opt) {
+ case '4':
+ options.address_family = AF_INET;
+ break;
+ case '6':
+ options.address_family = AF_INET6;
+ break;
+ case 'f':
+ config_file_name = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'c':
+ if (options.num_host_cert_files >= MAX_HOSTCERTS) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "too many host certificates.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ options.host_cert_files[options.num_host_cert_files++] =
+ derelativise_path(optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'd':
+ if (debug_flag == 0) {
+ debug_flag = 1;
+ options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+ } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+ options.log_level++;
+ break;
+ case 'D':
+ no_daemon_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'E':
+ logfile = optarg;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case 'e':
+ log_stderr = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'i':
+ inetd_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'r':
+ rexec_flag = 0;
+ break;
+ case 'R':
+ rexeced_flag = 1;
+ inetd_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'Q':
+ /* ignored */
+ break;
+ case 'q':
+ options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
+ break;
+ case 'b':
+ options.server_key_bits = (int)strtonum(optarg, 256,
+ 32768, NULL);
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
+ if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg);
+ if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] <= 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'g':
+ if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'k':
+ if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'h':
+ if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "too many host keys.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] =
+ derelativise_path(optarg);
+ break;
+ case 't':
+ test_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'T':
+ test_flag = 2;
+ break;
+ case 'C':
+ if (parse_server_match_testspec(connection_info,
+ optarg) == -1)
+ exit(1);
+ break;
+ case 'u':
+ utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, HOST_NAME_MAX+1+1, NULL);
+ if (utmp_len > HOST_NAME_MAX+1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'o':
+ line = xstrdup(optarg);
+ if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
+ "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL) != 0)
+ exit(1);
+ free(line);
+ break;
+ case '?':
+ default:
+ usage();
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag)
+ rexec_flag = 0;
+ if (!test_flag && (rexec_flag && (av[0] == NULL || *av[0] != '/')))
+ fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path");
+ if (rexeced_flag)
+ closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD);
+ else
+ closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+#endif
+
+ /* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */
+ if (logfile != NULL)
+ log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile);
+ /*
+ * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
+ * key (unless started from inetd)
+ */
+ log_init(__progname,
+ options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
+ options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
+ log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
+
+ /*
+ * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
+ * root's environment
+ */
+ if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL)
+ (void) unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
+
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+ /* Cray can define user privs drop all privs now!
+ * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems!
+ */
+ drop_cray_privs();
+#endif
+
+ sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
+ sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0;
+ sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If we're doing an extended config test, make sure we have all of
+ * the parameters we need. If we're not doing an extended test,
+ * do not silently ignore connection test params.
+ */
+ if (test_flag >= 2 && server_match_spec_complete(connection_info) == 0)
+ fatal("user, host and addr are all required when testing "
+ "Match configs");
+ if (test_flag < 2 && server_match_spec_complete(connection_info) >= 0)
+ fatal("Config test connection parameter (-C) provided without "
+ "test mode (-T)");
+
+ /* Fetch our configuration */
+ buffer_init(&cfg);
+ if (rexeced_flag)
+ recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, &cfg);
+ else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
+ load_server_config(config_file_name, &cfg);
+
+ parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
+ &cfg, NULL);
+
+ seed_rng();
+
+ /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
+ fill_default_server_options(&options);
+
+ /* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */
+ if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
+ options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
+
+ /* Check that options are sensible */
+ if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL &&
+ (options.authorized_keys_command != NULL &&
+ strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_command, "none") != 0))
+ fatal("AuthorizedKeysCommand set without "
+ "AuthorizedKeysCommandUser");
+ if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL &&
+ (options.authorized_principals_command != NULL &&
+ strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_command, "none") != 0))
+ fatal("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand set without "
+ "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser");
+
+ /*
+ * Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods.
+ * Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this generally before
+ * daemonisation in the presence of Match block, but this catches
+ * and warns for trivial misconfigurations that could break login.
+ */
+ if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
+ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1))
+ fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with "
+ "SSH protocol 1");
+ for (n = 0; n < options.num_auth_methods; n++) {
+ if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[n],
+ 1) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (n >= options.num_auth_methods)
+ fatal("AuthenticationMethods cannot be satisfied by "
+ "enabled authentication methods");
+ }
+
+ /* set default channel AF */
+ channel_set_af(options.address_family);
+
+ /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
+ if (optind < ac) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION,
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)
+#else
+ "without OpenSSL"
+#endif
+ );
+
+ /* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */
+ if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) {
+ if (use_privsep || options.kerberos_authentication)
+ fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
+ } else {
+ explicit_bzero(privsep_pw->pw_passwd,
+ strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd));
+ privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw);
+ free(privsep_pw->pw_passwd);
+ privsep_pw->pw_passwd = xstrdup("*");
+ }
+ endpwent();
+
+ /* load host keys */
+ sensitive_data.host_keys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
+ sizeof(Key *));
+ sensitive_data.host_pubkeys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
+ sizeof(Key *));
+
+ if (options.host_key_agent) {
+ if (strcmp(options.host_key_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
+ setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
+ options.host_key_agent, 1);
+ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) == 0)
+ have_agent = 1;
+ else
+ error("Could not connect to agent \"%s\": %s",
+ options.host_key_agent, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ if (options.host_key_files[i] == NULL)
+ continue;
+ key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL);
+ pubkey = key_load_public(options.host_key_files[i], NULL);
+ if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL)
+ pubkey = key_demote(key);
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
+ sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey;
+
+ if (key == NULL && pubkey != NULL && pubkey->type != KEY_RSA1 &&
+ have_agent) {
+ debug("will rely on agent for hostkey %s",
+ options.host_key_files[i]);
+ keytype = pubkey->type;
+ } else if (key != NULL) {
+ keytype = key->type;
+ } else {
+ error("Could not load host key: %s",
+ options.host_key_files[i]);
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
+ sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = NULL;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ switch (keytype) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key;
+ sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1;
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ if (have_agent || key != NULL)
+ sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(pubkey, options.fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ debug("%s host key #%d: %s %s",
+ key ? "private" : "agent", i, keytype == KEY_RSA1 ?
+ sshkey_type(pubkey) : sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp);
+ free(fp);
+ }
+ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
+ logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
+ options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
+ }
+ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
+ logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
+ options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
+ }
+ if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
+ logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Load certificates. They are stored in an array at identical
+ * indices to the public keys that they relate to.
+ */
+ sensitive_data.host_certificates = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
+ sizeof(Key *));
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
+ sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_cert_files; i++) {
+ if (options.host_cert_files[i] == NULL)
+ continue;
+ key = key_load_public(options.host_cert_files[i], NULL);
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ error("Could not load host certificate: %s",
+ options.host_cert_files[i]);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!key_is_cert(key)) {
+ error("Certificate file is not a certificate: %s",
+ options.host_cert_files[i]);
+ key_free(key);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Find matching private key */
+ for (j = 0; j < options.num_host_key_files; j++) {
+ if (key_equal_public(key,
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[j])) {
+ sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (j >= options.num_host_key_files) {
+ error("No matching private key for certificate: %s",
+ options.host_cert_files[i]);
+ key_free(key);
+ continue;
+ }
+ sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key;
+ debug("host certificate: #%d type %d %s", j, key->type,
+ key_type(key));
+ }
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ /* Check certain values for sanity. */
+ if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
+ if (options.server_key_bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
+ options.server_key_bits > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This
+ * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I
+ * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels
+ */
+ if (options.server_key_bits >
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) -
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && options.server_key_bits <
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+ options.server_key_bits =
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
+ debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.",
+ options.server_key_bits);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (use_privsep) {
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) ||
+ (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
+ fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
+ _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) &&
+ (st.st_uid != getuid () ||
+ (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0))
+#else
+ if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
+#endif
+ fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or "
+ "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
+ }
+
+ if (test_flag > 1) {
+ if (server_match_spec_complete(connection_info) == 1)
+ parse_server_match_config(&options, connection_info);
+ dump_config(&options);
+ }
+
+ /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
+ if (test_flag)
+ exit(0);
+
+ /*
+ * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This
+ * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the
+ * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM
+ * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every
+ * module which might be used).
+ */
+ if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
+ debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
+
+ if (rexec_flag) {
+ rexec_argv = xcalloc(rexec_argc + 2, sizeof(char *));
+ for (i = 0; i < rexec_argc; i++) {
+ debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]);
+ rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i];
+ }
+ rexec_argv[rexec_argc] = "-R";
+ rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */
+ new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022;
+ (void) umask(new_umask);
+
+ /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
+ if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag))
+ log_stderr = 1;
+ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+ /*
+ * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect
+ * from the controlling terminal, and fork. The original process
+ * exits.
+ */
+ if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) {
+#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
+ int fd;
+#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
+ if (daemon(0, 0) < 0)
+ fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */
+#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
+ fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
+ close(fd);
+ }
+#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
+ }
+ /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
+ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+ /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+ unmounted if desired. */
+ if (chdir("/") == -1)
+ error("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* ignore SIGPIPE */
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
+ /* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */
+ if (inetd_flag) {
+ server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out);
+ } else {
+ platform_pre_listen();
+ server_listen();
+
+ if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
+ generate_ephemeral_server_key();
+
+ signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
+ signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
+ signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
+ signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
+
+ /*
+ * Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler
+ * is setup and the listen sockets are bound
+ */
+ if (options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) {
+ FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w");
+
+ if (f == NULL) {
+ error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
+ options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
+ } else {
+ fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
+ server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
+ &newsock, config_s);
+ }
+
+ /* This is the child processing a new connection. */
+ setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]");
+
+ /*
+ * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
+ * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't
+ * want the child to be able to affect the parent.
+ */
+#if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
+ /*
+ * If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a
+ * controlling terminal which will result in "could not set
+ * controlling tty" errors.
+ */
+ if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0)
+ error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#endif
+
+ if (rexec_flag) {
+ int fd;
+
+ debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
+ sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
+ dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO);
+ dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
+ if (startup_pipe == -1)
+ close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+ else if (startup_pipe != REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD) {
+ dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+ close(startup_pipe);
+ startup_pipe = REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD;
+ }
+
+ dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
+ close(config_s[1]);
+
+ execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv);
+
+ /* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */
+ error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno));
+ recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, NULL);
+ log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
+ options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+ /* Clean up fds */
+ close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
+ newsock = sock_out = sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+ if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
+ dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
+ dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
+ if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
+ close(fd);
+ }
+ debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
+ sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
+ }
+
+ /* Executed child processes don't need these. */
+ fcntl(sock_out, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+ fcntl(sock_in, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+
+ /*
+ * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the
+ * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We
+ * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense.
+ */
+ alarm(0);
+ signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+ signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
+ signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
+ signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
+ signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
+
+ /*
+ * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
+ * not have a key.
+ */
+ packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out);
+ packet_set_server();
+ ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ check_ip_options(ssh);
+
+ /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
+ if (options.tcp_keep_alive && packet_connection_is_on_socket() &&
+ setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+ error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ if ((remote_port = ssh_remote_port(ssh)) < 0) {
+ debug("ssh_remote_port failed");
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The rest of the code depends on the fact that
+ * ssh_remote_ipaddr() caches the remote ip, even if
+ * the socket goes away.
+ */
+ remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
+#endif
+
+ /* Log the connection. */
+ laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
+ verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d",
+ remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
+ free(laddr);
+
+ /*
+ * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
+ * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
+ * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero
+ * indicates no limit. Note that we don't set the alarm in debugging
+ * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
+ * are about to discover the bug.
+ */
+ signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
+ if (!debug_flag)
+ alarm(options.login_grace_time);
+
+ sshd_exchange_identification(ssh, sock_in, sock_out);
+
+ /* In inetd mode, generate ephemeral key only for proto 1 connections */
+ if (!compat20 && inetd_flag && sensitive_data.server_key == NULL)
+ generate_ephemeral_server_key();
+
+ packet_set_nonblocking();
+
+ /* allocate authentication context */
+ authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt));
+
+ authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
+
+ /* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
+ the_authctxt = authctxt;
+
+ /* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
+ buffer_init(&loginmsg);
+ auth_debug_reset();
+
+ if (use_privsep) {
+ if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1)
+ goto authenticated;
+ } else if (compat20 && have_agent) {
+ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) {
+ error("Unable to get agent socket: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ have_agent = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* perform the key exchange */
+ /* authenticate user and start session */
+ if (compat20) {
+ do_ssh2_kex();
+ do_authentication2(authctxt);
+ } else {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ do_ssh1_kex();
+ do_authentication(authctxt);
+#else
+ fatal("ssh1 not supported");
+#endif
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
+ * the current keystate and exits
+ */
+ if (use_privsep) {
+ mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ authenticated:
+ /*
+ * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
+ * authentication.
+ */
+ alarm(0);
+ signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+ authctxt->authenticated = 1;
+ if (startup_pipe != -1) {
+ close(startup_pipe);
+ startup_pipe = -1;
+ }
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ if (options.gss_authentication) {
+ temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+ ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
+ restore_uid();
+ }
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam) {
+ do_pam_setcred(1);
+ do_pam_session();
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
+ * file descriptor passing.
+ */
+ if (use_privsep) {
+ privsep_postauth(authctxt);
+ /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
+ if (!compat20)
+ destroy_sensitive_data();
+ }
+
+ packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval,
+ options.client_alive_count_max);
+
+ /* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */
+ if (compat20)
+ notify_hostkeys(active_state);
+
+ /* Start session. */
+ do_authenticated(authctxt);
+
+ /* The connection has been terminated. */
+ packet_get_bytes(&ibytes, &obytes);
+ verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
+ (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
+
+ verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+ finish_pam();
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE));
+#endif
+
+ packet_close();
+
+ if (use_privsep)
+ mm_terminate();
+
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+/*
+ * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key
+ * (key with larger modulus first).
+ */
+int
+ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ int rsafail = 0;
+
+ if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
+ /* Server key has bigger modulus. */
+ if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+ fatal("do_connection: %s port %d: "
+ "server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
+ }
+ if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+ sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0)
+ rsafail++;
+ if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) != 0)
+ rsafail++;
+ } else {
+ /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
+ if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) +
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+ fatal("do_connection: %s port %d: "
+ "host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
+ }
+ if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) != 0)
+ rsafail++;
+ if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+ sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0)
+ rsafail++;
+ }
+ return (rsafail);
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSH1 key exchange
+ */
+static void
+do_ssh1_kex(void)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ int i, len;
+ int rsafail = 0;
+ BIGNUM *session_key_int, *fake_key_int, *real_key_int;
+ u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
+ u_char fake_key_bytes[4096 / 8];
+ size_t fake_key_len;
+ u_char cookie[8];
+ u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags;
+
+ /*
+ * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
+ * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip
+ * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody
+ * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local
+ * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random
+ * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one
+ * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure.
+ */
+ arc4random_buf(cookie, sizeof(cookie));
+
+ /*
+ * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random
+ * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP
+ * spoofing.
+ */
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
+
+ /* Store our public server RSA key. */
+ packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n));
+ packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
+ packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
+
+ /* Store our public host RSA key. */
+ packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
+ packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e);
+ packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n);
+
+ /* Put protocol flags. */
+ packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN);
+
+ /* Declare which ciphers we support. */
+ packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0));
+
+ /* Declare supported authentication types. */
+ auth_mask = 0;
+ if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication)
+ auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA;
+ if (options.rsa_authentication)
+ auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA;
+ if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1)
+ auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS;
+ if (options.password_authentication)
+ auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD;
+ packet_put_int(auth_mask);
+
+ /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.",
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
+
+ /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */
+ packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
+
+ /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */
+ cipher_type = packet_get_char();
+
+ if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type)))
+ packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher.");
+
+ /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we
+ sent earlier with the public key packet. */
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
+ packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
+
+ debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
+
+ /* Get the encrypted integer. */
+ if ((real_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
+ packet_get_bignum(real_key_int);
+
+ protocol_flags = packet_get_int();
+ packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags);
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ /* Setup a fake key in case RSA decryption fails */
+ if ((fake_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
+ fake_key_len = BN_num_bytes(real_key_int);
+ if (fake_key_len > sizeof(fake_key_bytes))
+ fake_key_len = sizeof(fake_key_bytes);
+ arc4random_buf(fake_key_bytes, fake_key_len);
+ if (BN_bin2bn(fake_key_bytes, fake_key_len, fake_key_int) == NULL)
+ fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_bin2bn failed");
+
+ /* Decrypt real_key_int using host/server keys */
+ rsafail = PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(real_key_int));
+ /* If decryption failed, use the fake key. Else, the real key. */
+ if (rsafail)
+ session_key_int = fake_key_int;
+ else
+ session_key_int = real_key_int;
+
+ /*
+ * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the
+ * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the
+ * key is in the highest bits.
+ */
+ (void) BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
+ len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
+ if (len < 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(session_key)) {
+ error("%s: bad session key len from %s port %d: "
+ "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu", __func__,
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
+ rsafail++;
+ } else {
+ explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key));
+ BN_bn2bin(session_key_int,
+ session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len);
+
+ derive_ssh1_session_id(
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n,
+ sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
+ cookie, session_id);
+ /*
+ * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the
+ * session id.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ session_key[i] ^= session_id[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
+ destroy_sensitive_data();
+
+ if (use_privsep)
+ mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
+
+ /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */
+ BN_clear_free(real_key_int);
+ BN_clear_free(fake_key_int);
+
+ /* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */
+ packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type);
+
+ /* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */
+ explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key));
+
+ debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
+
+ /* Send an acknowledgment packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *privkey, Key *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slen,
+ const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int flag)
+{
+ int r;
+ u_int xxx_slen, xxx_dlen = dlen;
+
+ if (privkey) {
+ if (PRIVSEP(key_sign(privkey, signature, &xxx_slen, data, xxx_dlen,
+ alg) < 0))
+ fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__);
+ if (slen)
+ *slen = xxx_slen;
+ } else if (use_privsep) {
+ if (mm_key_sign(pubkey, signature, &xxx_slen, data, xxx_dlen,
+ alg) < 0)
+ fatal("%s: pubkey_sign failed", __func__);
+ if (slen)
+ *slen = xxx_slen;
+ } else {
+ if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, pubkey, signature, slen,
+ data, dlen, alg, datafellows)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* SSH2 key exchange */
+static void
+do_ssh2_kex(void)
+{
+ char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
+ struct kex *kex;
+ int r;
+
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
+ options.kex_algorithms);
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(
+ options.ciphers);
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(
+ options.ciphers);
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
+
+ if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
+ } else if (options.compression == COMP_DELAYED) {
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] =
+ "none,zlib at openssh.com";
+ }
+
+ if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
+ packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit,
+ (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
+
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
+ list_hostkey_types());
+
+ /* start key exchange */
+ if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
+ fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ kex = active_state->kex;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
+# endif
+#endif
+ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
+ kex->server = 1;
+ kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+ kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
+ kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
+ kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
+ kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
+
+ dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state);
+
+ session_id2 = kex->session_id;
+ session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
+ packet_put_cstring("markus");
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+#endif
+ debug("KEX done");
+}
+
+/* server specific fatal cleanup */
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+ if (the_authctxt) {
+ do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
+ if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth &&
+ pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) {
+ debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid);
+ if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
+ errno != ESRCH)
+ error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__,
+ pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
+ if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+ audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
+#endif
+ _exit(i);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd_config
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd_config 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd_config 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.93 2014/01/10 05:59:19 djm Exp $
-
-# This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See
-# sshd_config(5) for more information.
-
-# This sshd was compiled with PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin
-
-# The strategy used for options in the default sshd_config shipped with
-# OpenSSH is to specify options with their default value where
-# possible, but leave them commented. Uncommented options override the
-# default value.
-
-#Port 22
-#AddressFamily any
-#ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
-#ListenAddress ::
-
-# The default requires explicit activation of protocol 1
-#Protocol 2
-
-# HostKey for protocol version 1
-#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
-# HostKeys for protocol version 2
-#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
-#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
-#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
-#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
-
-# Lifetime and size of ephemeral version 1 server key
-#KeyRegenerationInterval 1h
-#ServerKeyBits 1024
-
-# Ciphers and keying
-#RekeyLimit default none
-
-# Logging
-# obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
-#SyslogFacility AUTH
-#LogLevel INFO
-
-# Authentication:
-
-#LoginGraceTime 2m
-#PermitRootLogin yes
-#StrictModes yes
-#MaxAuthTries 6
-#MaxSessions 10
-
-#RSAAuthentication yes
-#PubkeyAuthentication yes
-
-# The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2
-# but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys
-AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
-
-#AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none
-
-#AuthorizedKeysCommand none
-#AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody
-
-# For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
-#RhostsRSAAuthentication no
-# similar for protocol version 2
-#HostbasedAuthentication no
-# Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for
-# RhostsRSAAuthentication and HostbasedAuthentication
-#IgnoreUserKnownHosts no
-# Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
-#IgnoreRhosts yes
-
-# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
-#PasswordAuthentication yes
-#PermitEmptyPasswords no
-
-# Change to no to disable s/key passwords
-#ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
-
-# Kerberos options
-#KerberosAuthentication no
-#KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
-#KerberosTicketCleanup yes
-#KerberosGetAFSToken no
-
-# GSSAPI options
-#GSSAPIAuthentication no
-#GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
-
-# Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
-# and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
-# be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and
-# PasswordAuthentication. Depending on your PAM configuration,
-# PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass
-# the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password".
-# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
-# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
-# and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
-#UsePAM no
-
-#AllowAgentForwarding yes
-#AllowTcpForwarding yes
-#GatewayPorts no
-#X11Forwarding no
-#X11DisplayOffset 10
-#X11UseLocalhost yes
-#PermitTTY yes
-#PrintMotd yes
-#PrintLastLog yes
-#TCPKeepAlive yes
-#UseLogin no
-UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox # Default for new installations.
-#PermitUserEnvironment no
-#Compression delayed
-#ClientAliveInterval 0
-#ClientAliveCountMax 3
-#UseDNS yes
-#PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
-#MaxStartups 10:30:100
-#PermitTunnel no
-#ChrootDirectory none
-#VersionAddendum none
-
-# no default banner path
-#Banner none
-
-# override default of no subsystems
-Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server
-
-# Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
-#Match User anoncvs
-# X11Forwarding no
-# AllowTcpForwarding no
-# PermitTTY no
-# ForceCommand cvs server
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd_config (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd_config)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd_config (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd_config 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.99 2016/07/11 03:19:44 tedu Exp $
+
+# This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See
+# sshd_config(5) for more information.
+
+# This sshd was compiled with PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin
+
+# The strategy used for options in the default sshd_config shipped with
+# OpenSSH is to specify options with their default value where
+# possible, but leave them commented. Uncommented options override the
+# default value.
+
+#Port 22
+#AddressFamily any
+#ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
+#ListenAddress ::
+
+# The default requires explicit activation of protocol 1
+#Protocol 2
+
+# HostKey for protocol version 1
+#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+# HostKeys for protocol version 2
+#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+
+# Lifetime and size of ephemeral version 1 server key
+#KeyRegenerationInterval 1h
+#ServerKeyBits 1024
+
+# Ciphers and keying
+#RekeyLimit default none
+
+# Logging
+#SyslogFacility AUTH
+#LogLevel INFO
+
+# Authentication:
+
+#LoginGraceTime 2m
+#PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
+#StrictModes yes
+#MaxAuthTries 6
+#MaxSessions 10
+
+#RSAAuthentication yes
+#PubkeyAuthentication yes
+
+# The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2
+# but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys
+AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
+
+#AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none
+
+#AuthorizedKeysCommand none
+#AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody
+
+# For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+#RhostsRSAAuthentication no
+# similar for protocol version 2
+#HostbasedAuthentication no
+# Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for
+# RhostsRSAAuthentication and HostbasedAuthentication
+#IgnoreUserKnownHosts no
+# Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
+#IgnoreRhosts yes
+
+# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
+#PasswordAuthentication yes
+#PermitEmptyPasswords no
+
+# Change to no to disable s/key passwords
+#ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
+
+# Kerberos options
+#KerberosAuthentication no
+#KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
+#KerberosTicketCleanup yes
+#KerberosGetAFSToken no
+
+# GSSAPI options
+#GSSAPIAuthentication no
+#GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+
+# Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+# and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+# be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and
+# PasswordAuthentication. Depending on your PAM configuration,
+# PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass
+# the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password".
+# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+# and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
+#UsePAM no
+
+#AllowAgentForwarding yes
+#AllowTcpForwarding yes
+#GatewayPorts no
+#X11Forwarding no
+#X11DisplayOffset 10
+#X11UseLocalhost yes
+#PermitTTY yes
+#PrintMotd yes
+#PrintLastLog yes
+#TCPKeepAlive yes
+#UseLogin no
+#UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox
+#PermitUserEnvironment no
+#Compression delayed
+#ClientAliveInterval 0
+#ClientAliveCountMax 3
+#UseDNS no
+#PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
+#MaxStartups 10:30:100
+#PermitTunnel no
+#ChrootDirectory none
+#VersionAddendum none
+
+# no default banner path
+#Banner none
+
+# override default of no subsystems
+Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server
+
+# Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
+#Match User anoncvs
+# X11Forwarding no
+# AllowTcpForwarding no
+# PermitTTY no
+# ForceCommand cvs server
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd_config.0
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd_config.0 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd_config.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,835 +0,0 @@
-SSHD_CONFIG(5) OpenBSD Programmer's Manual SSHD_CONFIG(5)
-
-NAME
- sshd_config - OpenSSH SSH daemon configuration file
-
-SYNOPSIS
- /etc/ssh/sshd_config
-
-DESCRIPTION
- sshd(8) reads configuration data from /etc/ssh/sshd_config (or the file
- specified with -f on the command line). The file contains keyword-
- argument pairs, one per line. Lines starting with `#' and empty lines
- are interpreted as comments. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in
- double quotes (") in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
-
- The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
- keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
-
- AcceptEnv
- Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be
- copied into the session's environ(7). See SendEnv in
- ssh_config(5) for how to configure the client. Note that
- environment passing is only supported for protocol 2. Variables
- are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters
- `*' and `?'. Multiple environment variables may be separated by
- whitespace or spread across multiple AcceptEnv directives. Be
- warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass
- restricted user environments. For this reason, care should be
- taken in the use of this directive. The default is not to accept
- any environment variables.
-
- AddressFamily
- Specifies which address family should be used by sshd(8). Valid
- arguments are ``any'', ``inet'' (use IPv4 only), or ``inet6''
- (use IPv6 only). The default is ``any''.
-
- AllowAgentForwarding
- Specifies whether ssh-agent(1) forwarding is permitted. The
- default is ``yes''. Note that disabling agent forwarding does
- not improve security unless users are also denied shell access,
- as they can always install their own forwarders.
-
- AllowGroups
- This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns,
- separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for
- users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one
- of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group
- ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all
- groups. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following
- order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally
- AllowGroups.
-
- See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
-
- AllowTcpForwarding
- Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted. The available
- options are ``yes'' or ``all'' to allow TCP forwarding, ``no'' to
- prevent all TCP forwarding, ``local'' to allow local (from the
- perspective of ssh(1)) forwarding only or ``remote'' to allow
- remote forwarding only. The default is ``yes''. Note that
- disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless users
- are also denied shell access, as they can always install their
- own forwarders.
-
- AllowUsers
- This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns,
- separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for
- user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are
- valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login
- is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form
- USER at HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting
- logins to particular users from particular hosts. The allow/deny
- directives are processed in the following order: DenyUsers,
- AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally AllowGroups.
-
- See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
-
- AuthenticationMethods
- Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully
- completed for a user to be granted access. This option must be
- followed by one or more comma-separated lists of authentication
- method names. Successful authentication requires completion of
- every method in at least one of these lists.
-
- For example, an argument of ``publickey,password
- publickey,keyboard-interactive'' would require the user to
- complete public key authentication, followed by either password
- or keyboard interactive authentication. Only methods that are
- next in one or more lists are offered at each stage, so for this
- example, it would not be possible to attempt password or
- keyboard-interactive authentication before public key.
-
- For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to
- restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a colon
- followed by the device identifier ``bsdauth'', ``pam'', or
- ``skey'', depending on the server configuration. For example,
- ``keyboard-interactive:bsdauth'' would restrict keyboard
- interactive authentication to the ``bsdauth'' device.
-
- This option is only available for SSH protocol 2 and will yield a
- fatal error if enabled if protocol 1 is also enabled. Note that
- each authentication method listed should also be explicitly
- enabled in the configuration. The default is not to require
- multiple authentication; successful completion of a single
- authentication method is sufficient.
-
- AuthorizedKeysCommand
- Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys.
- The program must be owned by root and not writable by group or
- others. It will be invoked with a single argument of the
- username being authenticated, and should produce on standard
- output zero or more lines of authorized_keys output (see
- AUTHORIZED_KEYS in sshd(8)). If a key supplied by
- AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate and
- authorize the user then public key authentication continues using
- the usual AuthorizedKeysFile files. By default, no
- AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
-
- AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
- Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand
- is run. It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no
- other role on the host than running authorized keys commands.
-
- AuthorizedKeysFile
- Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
- for user authentication. The format is described in the
- AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT section of sshd(8).
- AuthorizedKeysFile may contain tokens of the form %T which are
- substituted during connection setup. The following tokens are
- defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the
- home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is
- replaced by the username of that user. After expansion,
- AuthorizedKeysFile is taken to be an absolute path or one
- relative to the user's home directory. Multiple files may be
- listed, separated by whitespace. The default is
- ``.ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2''.
-
- AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
- Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for
- certificate authentication. When using certificates signed by a
- key listed in TrustedUserCAKeys, this file lists names, one of
- which must appear in the certificate for it to be accepted for
- authentication. Names are listed one per line preceded by key
- options (as described in AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT in sshd(8)).
- Empty lines and comments starting with `#' are ignored.
-
- AuthorizedPrincipalsFile may contain tokens of the form %T which
- are substituted during connection setup. The following tokens
- are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by
- the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is
- replaced by the username of that user. After expansion,
- AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is taken to be an absolute path or one
- relative to the user's home directory.
-
- The default is ``none'', i.e. not to use a principals file - in
- this case, the username of the user must appear in a
- certificate's principals list for it to be accepted. Note that
- AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is only used when authentication
- proceeds using a CA listed in TrustedUserCAKeys and is not
- consulted for certification authorities trusted via
- ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, though the principals= key option offers
- a similar facility (see sshd(8) for details).
-
- Banner The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user
- before authentication is allowed. If the argument is ``none''
- then no banner is displayed. This option is only available for
- protocol version 2. By default, no banner is displayed.
-
- ChallengeResponseAuthentication
- Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed
- (e.g. via PAM or though authentication styles supported in
- login.conf(5)) The default is ``yes''.
-
- ChrootDirectory
- Specifies the pathname of a directory to chroot(2) to after
- authentication. All components of the pathname must be root-
- owned directories that are not writable by any other user or
- group. After the chroot, sshd(8) changes the working directory
- to the user's home directory.
-
- The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded
- at runtime once the connecting user has been authenticated: %% is
- replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the home directory
- of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the
- username of that user.
-
- The ChrootDirectory must contain the necessary files and
- directories to support the user's session. For an interactive
- session this requires at least a shell, typically sh(1), and
- basic /dev nodes such as null(4), zero(4), stdin(4), stdout(4),
- stderr(4), arandom(4) and tty(4) devices. For file transfer
- sessions using ``sftp'', no additional configuration of the
- environment is necessary if the in-process sftp server is used,
- though sessions which use logging do require /dev/log inside the
- chroot directory (see sftp-server(8) for details).
-
- The default is not to chroot(2).
-
- Ciphers
- Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2. Multiple
- ciphers must be comma-separated. The supported ciphers are:
-
- ``3des-cbc'', ``aes128-cbc'', ``aes192-cbc'', ``aes256-cbc'',
- ``aes128-ctr'', ``aes192-ctr'', ``aes256-ctr'',
- ``aes128-gcm at openssh.com'', ``aes256-gcm at openssh.com'',
- ``arcfour128'', ``arcfour256'', ``arcfour'', ``blowfish-cbc'',
- ``cast128-cbc'', and ``chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com''.
-
- The default is:
-
- aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,
- aes128-gcm at openssh.com,aes256-gcm at openssh.com,
- chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com,
- aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,aes192-cbc,
- aes256-cbc,arcfour
-
- The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using the -Q
- option of ssh(1).
-
- ClientAliveCountMax
- Sets the number of client alive messages (see below) which may be
- sent without sshd(8) receiving any messages back from the client.
- If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are
- being sent, sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the
- session. It is important to note that the use of client alive
- messages is very different from TCPKeepAlive (below). The client
- alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and
- therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option
- enabled by TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The client alive mechanism
- is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a
- connection has become inactive.
-
- The default value is 3. If ClientAliveInterval (see below) is
- set to 15, and ClientAliveCountMax is left at the default,
- unresponsive SSH clients will be disconnected after approximately
- 45 seconds. This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-
- ClientAliveInterval
- Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has
- been received from the client, sshd(8) will send a message
- through the encrypted channel to request a response from the
- client. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will
- not be sent to the client. This option applies to protocol
- version 2 only.
-
- Compression
- Specifies whether compression is allowed, or delayed until the
- user has authenticated successfully. The argument must be
- ``yes'', ``delayed'', or ``no''. The default is ``delayed''.
-
- DenyGroups
- This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns,
- separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for users whose primary
- group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns.
- Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not
- recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The
- allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
- DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally AllowGroups.
-
- See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
-
- DenyUsers
- This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns,
- separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for user names that
- match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a
- numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is
- allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER at HOST
- then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to
- particular users from particular hosts. The allow/deny
- directives are processed in the following order: DenyUsers,
- AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally AllowGroups.
-
- See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
-
- ForceCommand
- Forces the execution of the command specified by ForceCommand,
- ignoring any command supplied by the client and ~/.ssh/rc if
- present. The command is invoked by using the user's login shell
- with the -c option. This applies to shell, command, or subsystem
- execution. It is most useful inside a Match block. The command
- originally supplied by the client is available in the
- SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Specifying a command
- of ``internal-sftp'' will force the use of an in-process sftp
- server that requires no support files when used with
- ChrootDirectory.
-
- GatewayPorts
- Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports
- forwarded for the client. By default, sshd(8) binds remote port
- forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote
- hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. GatewayPorts can be
- used to specify that sshd should allow remote port forwardings to
- bind to non-loopback addresses, thus allowing other hosts to
- connect. The argument may be ``no'' to force remote port
- forwardings to be available to the local host only, ``yes'' to
- force remote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or
- ``clientspecified'' to allow the client to select the address to
- which the forwarding is bound. The default is ``no''.
-
- GSSAPIAuthentication
- Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
- The default is ``no''. Note that this option applies to protocol
- version 2 only.
-
- GSSAPICleanupCredentials
- Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials
- cache on logout. The default is ``yes''. Note that this option
- applies to protocol version 2 only.
-
- HostbasedAuthentication
- Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication
- together with successful public key client host authentication is
- allowed (host-based authentication). This option is similar to
- RhostsRSAAuthentication and applies to protocol version 2 only.
- The default is ``no''.
-
- HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly
- Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a
- reverse name lookup when matching the name in the ~/.shosts,
- ~/.rhosts, and /etc/hosts.equiv files during
- HostbasedAuthentication. A setting of ``yes'' means that sshd(8)
- uses the name supplied by the client rather than attempting to
- resolve the name from the TCP connection itself. The default is
- ``no''.
-
- HostCertificate
- Specifies a file containing a public host certificate. The
- certificate's public key must match a private host key already
- specified by HostKey. The default behaviour of sshd(8) is not to
- load any certificates.
-
- HostKey
- Specifies a file containing a private host key used by SSH. The
- default is /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key for protocol version 1, and
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key,
- /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key for
- protocol version 2. Note that sshd(8) will refuse to use a file
- if it is group/world-accessible. It is possible to have multiple
- host key files. ``rsa1'' keys are used for version 1 and
- ``dsa'', ``ecdsa'', ``ed25519'' or ``rsa'' are used for version 2
- of the SSH protocol. It is also possible to specify public host
- key files instead. In this case operations on the private key
- will be delegated to an ssh-agent(1).
-
- HostKeyAgent
- Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with an
- agent that has access to the private host keys. If
- ``SSH_AUTH_SOCK'' is specified, the location of the socket will
- be read from the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable.
-
- IgnoreRhosts
- Specifies that .rhosts and .shosts files will not be used in
- RhostsRSAAuthentication or HostbasedAuthentication.
-
- /etc/hosts.equiv and /etc/shosts.equiv are still used. The
- default is ``yes''.
-
- IgnoreUserKnownHosts
- Specifies whether sshd(8) should ignore the user's
- ~/.ssh/known_hosts during RhostsRSAAuthentication or
- HostbasedAuthentication. The default is ``no''.
-
- IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the
- connection. Accepted values are ``af11'', ``af12'', ``af13'',
- ``af21'', ``af22'', ``af23'', ``af31'', ``af32'', ``af33'',
- ``af41'', ``af42'', ``af43'', ``cs0'', ``cs1'', ``cs2'', ``cs3'',
- ``cs4'', ``cs5'', ``cs6'', ``cs7'', ``ef'', ``lowdelay'',
- ``throughput'', ``reliability'', or a numeric value. This option
- may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one
- argument is specified, it is used as the packet class
- unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is
- automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second
- for non-interactive sessions. The default is ``lowdelay'' for
- interactive sessions and ``throughput'' for non-interactive
- sessions.
-
- KbdInteractiveAuthentication
- Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication.
- The argument to this keyword must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The
- default is to use whatever value ChallengeResponseAuthentication
- is set to (by default ``yes'').
-
- KerberosAuthentication
- Specifies whether the password provided by the user for
- PasswordAuthentication will be validated through the Kerberos
- KDC. To use this option, the server needs a Kerberos servtab
- which allows the verification of the KDC's identity. The default
- is ``no''.
-
- KerberosGetAFSToken
- If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to
- acquire an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory.
- The default is ``no''.
-
- KerberosOrLocalPasswd
- If password authentication through Kerberos fails then the
- password will be validated via any additional local mechanism
- such as /etc/passwd. The default is ``yes''.
-
- KerberosTicketCleanup
- Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket
- cache file on logout. The default is ``yes''.
-
- KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple
- algorithms must be comma-separated. The default is
-
- curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org,
- ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
- diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
- diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,
- diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,
- diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
-
- KeyRegenerationInterval
- In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically
- regenerated after this many seconds (if it has been used). The
- purpose of regeneration is to prevent decrypting captured
- sessions by later breaking into the machine and stealing the
- keys. The key is never stored anywhere. If the value is 0, the
- key is never regenerated. The default is 3600 (seconds).
-
- ListenAddress
- Specifies the local addresses sshd(8) should listen on. The
- following forms may be used:
-
- ListenAddress host|IPv4_addr|IPv6_addr
- ListenAddress host|IPv4_addr:port
- ListenAddress [host|IPv6_addr]:port
-
- If port is not specified, sshd will listen on the address and all
- prior Port options specified. The default is to listen on all
- local addresses. Multiple ListenAddress options are permitted.
- Additionally, any Port options must precede this option for non-
- port qualified addresses.
-
- LoginGraceTime
- The server disconnects after this time if the user has not
- successfully logged in. If the value is 0, there is no time
- limit. The default is 120 seconds.
-
- LogLevel
- Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
- sshd(8). The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO,
- VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO.
- DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify
- higher levels of debugging output. Logging with a DEBUG level
- violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
-
- MACs Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code)
- algorithms. The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2 for
- data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-
- separated. The algorithms that contain ``-etm'' calculate the
- MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered
- safer and their use recommended. The default is:
-
- hmac-md5-etm at openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm at openssh.com,
- umac-64-etm at openssh.com,umac-128-etm at openssh.com,
- hmac-sha2-256-etm at openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm at openssh.com,
- hmac-ripemd160-etm at openssh.com,hmac-sha1-96-etm at openssh.com,
- hmac-md5-96-etm at openssh.com,
- hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64 at openssh.com,umac-128 at openssh.com,
- hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-ripemd160,
- hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96
-
- Match Introduces a conditional block. If all of the criteria on the
- Match line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines
- override those set in the global section of the config file,
- until either another Match line or the end of the file. If a
- keyword appears in multiple Match blocks that are satisified,
- only the first instance of the keyword is applied.
-
- The arguments to Match are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or
- the single token All which matches all criteria. The available
- criteria are User, Group, Host, LocalAddress, LocalPort, and
- Address. The match patterns may consist of single entries or
- comma-separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation
- operators described in the PATTERNS section of ssh_config(5).
-
- The patterns in an Address criteria may additionally contain
- addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format, e.g.
- ``192.0.2.0/24'' or ``3ffe:ffff::/32''. Note that the mask
- length provided must be consistent with the address - it is an
- error to specify a mask length that is too long for the address
- or one with bits set in this host portion of the address. For
- example, ``192.0.2.0/33'' and ``192.0.2.0/8'' respectively.
-
- Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a
- Match keyword. Available keywords are AcceptEnv,
- AllowAgentForwarding, AllowGroups, AllowTcpForwarding,
- AllowUsers, AuthenticationMethods, AuthorizedKeysCommand,
- AuthorizedKeysCommandUser, AuthorizedKeysFile,
- AuthorizedPrincipalsFile, Banner, ChrootDirectory, DenyGroups,
- DenyUsers, ForceCommand, GatewayPorts, GSSAPIAuthentication,
- HostbasedAuthentication, HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly,
- KbdInteractiveAuthentication, KerberosAuthentication,
- MaxAuthTries, MaxSessions, PasswordAuthentication,
- PermitEmptyPasswords, PermitOpen, PermitRootLogin, PermitTTY,
- PermitTunnel, PubkeyAuthentication, RekeyLimit,
- RhostsRSAAuthentication, RSAAuthentication, X11DisplayOffset,
- X11Forwarding and X11UseLocalHost.
-
- MaxAuthTries
- Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted
- per connection. Once the number of failures reaches half this
- value, additional failures are logged. The default is 6.
-
- MaxSessions
- Specifies the maximum number of open sessions permitted per
- network connection. The default is 10.
-
- MaxStartups
- Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated
- connections to the SSH daemon. Additional connections will be
- dropped until authentication succeeds or the LoginGraceTime
- expires for a connection. The default is 10:30:100.
-
- Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying the
- three colon separated values ``start:rate:full'' (e.g.
- "10:30:60"). sshd(8) will refuse connection attempts with a
- probability of ``rate/100'' (30%) if there are currently
- ``start'' (10) unauthenticated connections. The probability
- increases linearly and all connection attempts are refused if the
- number of unauthenticated connections reaches ``full'' (60).
-
- PasswordAuthentication
- Specifies whether password authentication is allowed. The
- default is ``yes''.
-
- PermitEmptyPasswords
- When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
- server allows login to accounts with empty password strings. The
- default is ``no''.
-
- PermitOpen
- Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is
- permitted. The forwarding specification must be one of the
- following forms:
-
- PermitOpen host:port
- PermitOpen IPv4_addr:port
- PermitOpen [IPv6_addr]:port
-
- Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with
- whitespace. An argument of ``any'' can be used to remove all
- restrictions and permit any forwarding requests. An argument of
- ``none'' can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests. By
- default all port forwarding requests are permitted.
-
- PermitRootLogin
- Specifies whether root can log in using ssh(1). The argument
- must be ``yes'', ``without-password'', ``forced-commands-only'',
- or ``no''. The default is ``yes''.
-
- If this option is set to ``without-password'', password
- authentication is disabled for root.
-
- If this option is set to ``forced-commands-only'', root login
- with public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the
- command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking
- remote backups even if root login is normally not allowed). All
- other authentication methods are disabled for root.
-
- If this option is set to ``no'', root is not allowed to log in.
-
- PermitTunnel
- Specifies whether tun(4) device forwarding is allowed. The
- argument must be ``yes'', ``point-to-point'' (layer 3),
- ``ethernet'' (layer 2), or ``no''. Specifying ``yes'' permits
- both ``point-to-point'' and ``ethernet''. The default is ``no''.
-
- PermitTTY
- Specifies whether pty(4) allocation is permitted. The default is
- ``yes''.
-
- PermitUserEnvironment
- Specifies whether ~/.ssh/environment and environment= options in
- ~/.ssh/authorized_keys are processed by sshd(8). The default is
- ``no''. Enabling environment processing may enable users to
- bypass access restrictions in some configurations using
- mechanisms such as LD_PRELOAD.
-
- PidFile
- Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the SSH
- daemon. The default is /var/run/sshd.pid.
-
- Port Specifies the port number that sshd(8) listens on. The default
- is 22. Multiple options of this type are permitted. See also
- ListenAddress.
-
- PrintLastLog
- Specifies whether sshd(8) should print the date and time of the
- last user login when a user logs in interactively. The default
- is ``yes''.
-
- PrintMotd
- Specifies whether sshd(8) should print /etc/motd when a user logs
- in interactively. (On some systems it is also printed by the
- shell, /etc/profile, or equivalent.) The default is ``yes''.
-
- Protocol
- Specifies the protocol versions sshd(8) supports. The possible
- values are `1' and `2'. Multiple versions must be comma-
- separated. The default is `2'. Note that the order of the
- protocol list does not indicate preference, because the client
- selects among multiple protocol versions offered by the server.
- Specifying ``2,1'' is identical to ``1,2''.
-
- PubkeyAuthentication
- Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed. The
- default is ``yes''. Note that this option applies to protocol
- version 2 only.
-
- RekeyLimit
- Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted
- before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a
- maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is
- renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may
- have a suffix of `K', `M', or `G' to indicate Kilobytes,
- Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between
- `1G' and `4G', depending on the cipher. The optional second
- value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units
- documented in the TIME FORMATS section. The default value for
- RekeyLimit is ``default none'', which means that rekeying is
- performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent
- or received and no time based rekeying is done. This option
- applies to protocol version 2 only.
-
- RevokedKeys
- Specifies revoked public keys. Keys listed in this file will be
- refused for public key authentication. Note that if this file is
- not readable, then public key authentication will be refused for
- all users. Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one
- public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL)
- as generated by ssh-keygen(1). For more information on KRLs, see
- the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in ssh-keygen(1).
-
- RhostsRSAAuthentication
- Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication
- together with successful RSA host authentication is allowed. The
- default is ``no''. This option applies to protocol version 1
- only.
-
- RSAAuthentication
- Specifies whether pure RSA authentication is allowed. The
- default is ``yes''. This option applies to protocol version 1
- only.
-
- ServerKeyBits
- Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1
- server key. The minimum value is 512, and the default is 1024.
-
- StrictModes
- Specifies whether sshd(8) should check file modes and ownership
- of the user's files and home directory before accepting login.
- This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally
- leave their directory or files world-writable. The default is
- ``yes''. Note that this does not apply to ChrootDirectory, whose
- permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally.
-
- Subsystem
- Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon).
- Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional
- arguments) to execute upon subsystem request.
-
- The command sftp-server(8) implements the ``sftp'' file transfer
- subsystem.
-
- Alternately the name ``internal-sftp'' implements an in-process
- ``sftp'' server. This may simplify configurations using
- ChrootDirectory to force a different filesystem root on clients.
-
- By default no subsystems are defined. Note that this option
- applies to protocol version 2 only.
-
- SyslogFacility
- Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
- sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
- LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The
- default is AUTH.
-
- TCPKeepAlive
- Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
- to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or
- crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However,
- this means that connections will die if the route is down
- temporarily, and some people find it annoying. On the other
- hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent, sessions may hang
- indefinitely on the server, leaving ``ghost'' users and consuming
- server resources.
-
- The default is ``yes'' (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the
- server will notice if the network goes down or the client host
- crashes. This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
-
- To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
- ``no''.
-
- TrustedUserCAKeys
- Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate
- authorities that are trusted to sign user certificates for
- authentication. Keys are listed one per line; empty lines and
- comments starting with `#' are allowed. If a certificate is
- presented for authentication and has its signing CA key listed in
- this file, then it may be used for authentication for any user
- listed in the certificate's principals list. Note that
- certificates that lack a list of principals will not be permitted
- for authentication using TrustedUserCAKeys. For more details on
- certificates, see the CERTIFICATES section in ssh-keygen(1).
-
- UseDNS Specifies whether sshd(8) should look up the remote host name and
- check that the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps
- back to the very same IP address. The default is ``yes''.
-
- UseLogin
- Specifies whether login(1) is used for interactive login
- sessions. The default is ``no''. Note that login(1) is never
- used for remote command execution. Note also, that if this is
- enabled, X11Forwarding will be disabled because login(1) does not
- know how to handle xauth(1) cookies. If UsePrivilegeSeparation
- is specified, it will be disabled after authentication.
-
- UsePAM Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface. If set to
- ``yes'' this will enable PAM authentication using
- ChallengeResponseAuthentication and PasswordAuthentication in
- addition to PAM account and session module processing for all
- authentication types.
-
- Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an
- equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable
- either PasswordAuthentication or ChallengeResponseAuthentication.
-
- If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a
- non-root user. The default is ``no''.
-
- UsePrivilegeSeparation
- Specifies whether sshd(8) separates privileges by creating an
- unprivileged child process to deal with incoming network traffic.
- After successful authentication, another process will be created
- that has the privilege of the authenticated user. The goal of
- privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by
- containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes. The
- default is ``yes''. If UsePrivilegeSeparation is set to
- ``sandbox'' then the pre-authentication unprivileged process is
- subject to additional restrictions.
-
- VersionAddendum
- Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH
- protocol banner sent by the server upon connection. The default
- is ``none''.
-
- X11DisplayOffset
- Specifies the first display number available for sshd(8)'s X11
- forwarding. This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11
- servers. The default is 10.
-
- X11Forwarding
- Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. The argument must
- be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''.
-
- When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure
- to the server and to client displays if the sshd(8) proxy display
- is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see
- X11UseLocalhost below), though this is not the default.
- Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data
- verification and substitution occur on the client side. The
- security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11
- display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client
- requests forwarding (see the warnings for ForwardX11 in
- ssh_config(5)). A system administrator may have a stance in
- which they want to protect clients that may expose themselves to
- attack by unwittingly requesting X11 forwarding, which can
- warrant a ``no'' setting.
-
- Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from
- forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own
- forwarders. X11 forwarding is automatically disabled if UseLogin
- is enabled.
-
- X11UseLocalhost
- Specifies whether sshd(8) should bind the X11 forwarding server
- to the loopback address or to the wildcard address. By default,
- sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets
- the hostname part of the DISPLAY environment variable to
- ``localhost''. This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the
- proxy display. However, some older X11 clients may not function
- with this configuration. X11UseLocalhost may be set to ``no'' to
- specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the
- wildcard address. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The
- default is ``yes''.
-
- XAuthLocation
- Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program. The default
- is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth.
-
-TIME FORMATS
- sshd(8) command-line arguments and configuration file options that
- specify time may be expressed using a sequence of the form:
- time[qualifier], where time is a positive integer value and qualifier is
- one of the following:
-
- <none> seconds
- s | S seconds
- m | M minutes
- h | H hours
- d | D days
- w | W weeks
-
- Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate the total time
- value.
-
- Time format examples:
-
- 600 600 seconds (10 minutes)
- 10m 10 minutes
- 1h30m 1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes)
-
-FILES
- /etc/ssh/sshd_config
- Contains configuration data for sshd(8). This file should be
- writable by root only, but it is recommended (though not
- necessary) that it be world-readable.
-
-SEE ALSO
- sshd(8)
-
-AUTHORS
- OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
- Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
- de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
- created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
- versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
- for privilege separation.
-
-OpenBSD 5.5 February 27, 2014 OpenBSD 5.5
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd_config.0 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd_config.0)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd_config.0 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd_config.0 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1063 @@
+SSHD_CONFIG(5) File Formats Manual SSHD_CONFIG(5)
+
+NAME
+ sshd_config M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SSH daemon configuration file
+
+SYNOPSIS
+ /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+
+DESCRIPTION
+ sshd(8) reads configuration data from /etc/ssh/sshd_config (or the file
+ specified with -f on the command line). The file contains keyword-
+ argument pairs, one per line. Lines starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y and empty lines
+ are interpreted as comments. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in
+ double quotes (") in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
+
+ The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
+ keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
+
+ AcceptEnv
+ Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be
+ copied into the session's environ(7). See SendEnv in
+ ssh_config(5) for how to configure the client. The TERM
+ environment variable is always sent whenever the client requests
+ a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol. Variables
+ are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters
+ M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y. Multiple environment variables may be separated by
+ whitespace or spread across multiple AcceptEnv directives. Be
+ warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass
+ restricted user environments. For this reason, care should be
+ taken in the use of this directive. The default is not to accept
+ any environment variables.
+
+ AddressFamily
+ Specifies which address family should be used by sshd(8). Valid
+ arguments are M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\inetM-bM-^@M-^] (use IPv4 only), or M-bM-^@M-^\inet6M-bM-^@M-^] (use IPv6
+ only). The default is M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ AllowAgentForwarding
+ Specifies whether ssh-agent(1) forwarding is permitted. The
+ default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that disabling agent forwarding does not
+ improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as
+ they can always install their own forwarders.
+
+ AllowGroups
+ This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns,
+ separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for
+ users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one
+ of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group
+ ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all
+ groups. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following
+ order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally
+ AllowGroups.
+
+ See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
+
+ AllowTcpForwarding
+ Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted. The available
+ options are M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\allM-bM-^@M-^] to allow TCP forwarding, M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] to
+ prevent all TCP forwarding, M-bM-^@M-^\localM-bM-^@M-^] to allow local (from the
+ perspective of ssh(1)) forwarding only or M-bM-^@M-^\remoteM-bM-^@M-^] to allow
+ remote forwarding only. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that
+ disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless users
+ are also denied shell access, as they can always install their
+ own forwarders.
+
+ AllowStreamLocalForwarding
+ Specifies whether StreamLocal (Unix-domain socket) forwarding is
+ permitted. The available options are M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\allM-bM-^@M-^] to allow
+ StreamLocal forwarding, M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] to prevent all StreamLocal
+ forwarding, M-bM-^@M-^\localM-bM-^@M-^] to allow local (from the perspective of
+ ssh(1)) forwarding only or M-bM-^@M-^\remoteM-bM-^@M-^] to allow remote forwarding
+ only. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that disabling StreamLocal
+ forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied
+ shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders.
+
+ AllowUsers
+ This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns,
+ separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for
+ user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are
+ valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login
+ is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form
+ USER at HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting
+ logins to particular users from particular hosts. HOST criteria
+ may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR
+ address/masklen format. The allow/deny directives are processed
+ in the following order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and
+ finally AllowGroups.
+
+ See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
+
+ AuthenticationMethods
+ Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully
+ completed for a user to be granted access. This option must be
+ followed by one or more comma-separated lists of authentication
+ method names, or by the single string M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^] to indicate the
+ default behaviour of accepting any single authentication method.
+ if the default is overridden, then successful authentication
+ requires completion of every method in at least one of these
+ lists.
+
+ For example, an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\publickey,password
+ publickey,keyboard-interactiveM-bM-^@M-^] would require the user to
+ complete public key authentication, followed by either password
+ or keyboard interactive authentication. Only methods that are
+ next in one or more lists are offered at each stage, so for this
+ example, it would not be possible to attempt password or
+ keyboard-interactive authentication before public key.
+
+ For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to
+ restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a colon
+ followed by the device identifier M-bM-^@M-^\bsdauthM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\pamM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\skeyM-bM-^@M-^],
+ depending on the server configuration. For example,
+ M-bM-^@M-^\keyboard-interactive:bsdauthM-bM-^@M-^] would restrict keyboard
+ interactive authentication to the M-bM-^@M-^\bsdauthM-bM-^@M-^] device.
+
+ If the M-bM-^@M-^\publickeyM-bM-^@M-^] method is listed more than once, sshd(8)
+ verifies that keys that have been used successfully are not
+ reused for subsequent authentications. For example, an
+ AuthenticationMethods of M-bM-^@M-^\publickey,publickeyM-bM-^@M-^] will require
+ successful authentication using two different public keys.
+
+ This option will yield a fatal error if enabled if protocol 1 is
+ also enabled. Note that each authentication method listed should
+ also be explicitly enabled in the configuration. The default
+ M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^] is not to require multiple authentication; successful
+ completion of a single authentication method is sufficient.
+
+ AuthorizedKeysCommand
+ Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys.
+ The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or
+ others and specified by an absolute path.
+
+ Arguments to AuthorizedKeysCommand may be provided using the
+ following tokens, which will be expanded at runtime: %% is
+ replaced by a literal '%', %u is replaced by the username being
+ authenticated, %h is replaced by the home directory of the user
+ being authenticated, %t is replaced with the key type offered for
+ authentication, %f is replaced with the fingerprint of the key,
+ and %k is replaced with the key being offered for authentication.
+ If no arguments are specified then the username of the target
+ user will be supplied.
+
+ The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines
+ of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in sshd(8)). If a
+ key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully
+ authenticate and authorize the user then public key
+ authentication continues using the usual AuthorizedKeysFile
+ files. By default, no AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
+
+ AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
+ Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand
+ is run. It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no
+ other role on the host than running authorized keys commands. If
+ AuthorizedKeysCommand is specified but AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
+ is not, then sshd(8) will refuse to start.
+
+ AuthorizedKeysFile
+ Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
+ for user authentication. The format is described in the
+ AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT section of sshd(8).
+ AuthorizedKeysFile may contain tokens of the form %T which are
+ substituted during connection setup. The following tokens are
+ defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the
+ home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is
+ replaced by the username of that user. After expansion,
+ AuthorizedKeysFile is taken to be an absolute path or one
+ relative to the user's home directory. Multiple files may be
+ listed, separated by whitespace. Alternately this option may be
+ set to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to skip checking for user keys in files. The
+ default is M-bM-^@M-^\.ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+ Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed
+ certificate principals as per AuthorizedPrincipalsFile. The
+ program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others
+ and specified by an absolute path.
+
+ Arguments to AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand may be provided using
+ the following tokens, which will be expanded at runtime: %% is
+ replaced by a literal '%', %u is replaced by the username being
+ authenticated and %h is replaced by the home directory of the
+ user being authenticated.
+
+ The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines
+ of AuthorizedPrincipalsFile output. If either
+ AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand or AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is
+ specified, then certificates offered by the client for
+ authentication must contain a principal that is listed. By
+ default, no AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run.
+
+ AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser
+ Specifies the user under whose account the
+ AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. It is recommended to use a
+ dedicated user that has no other role on the host than running
+ authorized principals commands. If AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+ is specified but AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser is not, then
+ sshd(8) will refuse to start.
+
+ AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+ Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for
+ certificate authentication. When using certificates signed by a
+ key listed in TrustedUserCAKeys, this file lists names, one of
+ which must appear in the certificate for it to be accepted for
+ authentication. Names are listed one per line preceded by key
+ options (as described in AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT in sshd(8)).
+ Empty lines and comments starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are ignored.
+
+ AuthorizedPrincipalsFile may contain tokens of the form %T which
+ are substituted during connection setup. The following tokens
+ are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by
+ the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is
+ replaced by the username of that user. After expansion,
+ AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is taken to be an absolute path or one
+ relative to the user's home directory.
+
+ The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^], i.e. not to use a principals file M-bM-^@M-^S in
+ this case, the username of the user must appear in a
+ certificate's principals list for it to be accepted. Note that
+ AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is only used when authentication
+ proceeds using a CA listed in TrustedUserCAKeys and is not
+ consulted for certification authorities trusted via
+ ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, though the principals= key option offers
+ a similar facility (see sshd(8) for details).
+
+ Banner The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user
+ before authentication is allowed. If the argument is M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] then
+ no banner is displayed. By default, no banner is displayed.
+
+ ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+ Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed
+ (e.g. via PAM or through authentication styles supported in
+ login.conf(5)) The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ ChrootDirectory
+ Specifies the pathname of a directory to chroot(2) to after
+ authentication. At session startup sshd(8) checks that all
+ components of the pathname are root-owned directories which are
+ not writable by any other user or group. After the chroot,
+ sshd(8) changes the working directory to the user's home
+ directory.
+
+ The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded
+ at runtime once the connecting user has been authenticated: %% is
+ replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the home directory
+ of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the
+ username of that user.
+
+ The ChrootDirectory must contain the necessary files and
+ directories to support the user's session. For an interactive
+ session this requires at least a shell, typically sh(1), and
+ basic /dev nodes such as null(4), zero(4), stdin(4), stdout(4),
+ stderr(4), and tty(4) devices. For file transfer sessions using
+ M-bM-^@M-^\sftpM-bM-^@M-^], no additional configuration of the environment is
+ necessary if the in-process sftp server is used, though sessions
+ which use logging may require /dev/log inside the chroot
+ directory on some operating systems (see sftp-server(8) for
+ details).
+
+ For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be
+ prevented from modification by other processes on the system
+ (especially those outside the jail). Misconfiguration can lead
+ to unsafe environments which sshd(8) cannot detect.
+
+ The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^], indicating not to chroot(2).
+
+ Ciphers
+ Specifies the ciphers allowed. Multiple ciphers must be comma-
+ separated. If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
+ then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
+ instead of replacing them.
+
+ The supported ciphers are:
+
+ 3des-cbc
+ aes128-cbc
+ aes192-cbc
+ aes256-cbc
+ aes128-ctr
+ aes192-ctr
+ aes256-ctr
+ aes128-gcm at openssh.com
+ aes256-gcm at openssh.com
+ arcfour
+ arcfour128
+ arcfour256
+ blowfish-cbc
+ cast128-cbc
+ chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com
+
+ The default is:
+
+ chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com,
+ aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
+ aes128-gcm at openssh.com,aes256-gcm at openssh.com
+
+ The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using the -Q
+ option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\cipherM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ ClientAliveCountMax
+ Sets the number of client alive messages (see below) which may be
+ sent without sshd(8) receiving any messages back from the client.
+ If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are
+ being sent, sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the
+ session. It is important to note that the use of client alive
+ messages is very different from TCPKeepAlive (below). The client
+ alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and
+ therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option
+ enabled by TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The client alive mechanism
+ is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a
+ connection has become inactive.
+
+ The default value is 3. If ClientAliveInterval (see below) is
+ set to 15, and ClientAliveCountMax is left at the default,
+ unresponsive SSH clients will be disconnected after approximately
+ 45 seconds.
+
+ ClientAliveInterval
+ Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has
+ been received from the client, sshd(8) will send a message
+ through the encrypted channel to request a response from the
+ client. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will
+ not be sent to the client.
+
+ Compression
+ Specifies whether compression is allowed, or delayed until the
+ user has authenticated successfully. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^],
+ M-bM-^@M-^\delayedM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\delayedM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ DenyGroups
+ This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns,
+ separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for users whose primary
+ group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns.
+ Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not
+ recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The
+ allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+ DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally AllowGroups.
+
+ See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
+
+ DenyUsers
+ This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns,
+ separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for user names that
+ match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a
+ numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is
+ allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER at HOST
+ then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to
+ particular users from particular hosts. HOST criteria may
+ additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen
+ format. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following
+ order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally
+ AllowGroups.
+
+ See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
+
+ FingerprintHash
+ Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints.
+ Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ ForceCommand
+ Forces the execution of the command specified by ForceCommand,
+ ignoring any command supplied by the client and ~/.ssh/rc if
+ present. The command is invoked by using the user's login shell
+ with the -c option. This applies to shell, command, or subsystem
+ execution. It is most useful inside a Match block. The command
+ originally supplied by the client is available in the
+ SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Specifying a command
+ of M-bM-^@M-^\internal-sftpM-bM-^@M-^] will force the use of an in-process sftp
+ server that requires no support files when used with
+ ChrootDirectory. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ GatewayPorts
+ Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports
+ forwarded for the client. By default, sshd(8) binds remote port
+ forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote
+ hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. GatewayPorts can be
+ used to specify that sshd should allow remote port forwardings to
+ bind to non-loopback addresses, thus allowing other hosts to
+ connect. The argument may be M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] to force remote port
+ forwardings to be available to the local host only, M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] to
+ force remote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or
+ M-bM-^@M-^\clientspecifiedM-bM-^@M-^] to allow the client to select the address to
+ which the forwarding is bound. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ GSSAPIAuthentication
+ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+ The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ GSSAPICleanupCredentials
+ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials
+ cache on logout. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
+ Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI
+ acceptor a client authenticates against. If set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] then
+ the client must authenticate against the host service on the
+ current hostname. If set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] then the client may
+ authenticate against any service key stored in the machine's
+ default store. This facility is provided to assist with
+ operation on multi homed machines. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
+ Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased
+ authentication as a comma-separated pattern list. Alternately if
+ the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
+ specified key types will be appended to the default set instead
+ of replacing them. The default for this option is:
+
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+ ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
+
+ The -Q option of ssh(1) may be used to list supported key types.
+
+ HostbasedAuthentication
+ Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication
+ together with successful public key client host authentication is
+ allowed (host-based authentication). The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly
+ Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a
+ reverse name lookup when matching the name in the ~/.shosts,
+ ~/.rhosts, and /etc/hosts.equiv files during
+ HostbasedAuthentication. A setting of M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] means that sshd(8)
+ uses the name supplied by the client rather than attempting to
+ resolve the name from the TCP connection itself. The default is
+ M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ HostCertificate
+ Specifies a file containing a public host certificate. The
+ certificate's public key must match a private host key already
+ specified by HostKey. The default behaviour of sshd(8) is not to
+ load any certificates.
+
+ HostKey
+ Specifies a file containing a private host key used by SSH. The
+ default is /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key for protocol version 1, and
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key,
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key for
+ protocol version 2.
+
+ Note that sshd(8) will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-
+ accessible and that the HostKeyAlgorithms option restricts which
+ of the keys are actually used by sshd(8).
+
+ It is possible to have multiple host key files. M-bM-^@M-^\rsa1M-bM-^@M-^] keys are
+ used for version 1 and M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^] are
+ used for version 2 of the SSH protocol. It is also possible to
+ specify public host key files instead. In this case operations
+ on the private key will be delegated to an ssh-agent(1).
+
+ HostKeyAgent
+ Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with an
+ agent that has access to the private host keys. If the string
+ M-bM-^@M-^\SSH_AUTH_SOCKM-bM-^@M-^] is specified, the location of the socket will be
+ read from the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable.
+
+ HostKeyAlgorithms
+ Specifies the host key algorithms that the server offers. The
+ default for this option is:
+
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+ ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
+
+ The list of available key types may also be obtained using the -Q
+ option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\keyM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ IgnoreRhosts
+ Specifies that .rhosts and .shosts files will not be used in
+ RhostsRSAAuthentication or HostbasedAuthentication.
+
+ /etc/hosts.equiv and /etc/shosts.equiv are still used. The
+ default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ IgnoreUserKnownHosts
+ Specifies whether sshd(8) should ignore the user's
+ ~/.ssh/known_hosts during RhostsRSAAuthentication or
+ HostbasedAuthentication. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the
+ connection. Accepted values are M-bM-^@M-^\af11M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af12M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af13M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af21M-bM-^@M-^],
+ M-bM-^@M-^\af22M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af23M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af31M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af32M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af33M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af41M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af42M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af43M-bM-^@M-^],
+ M-bM-^@M-^\cs0M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs1M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs2M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs3M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs4M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs5M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs6M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs7M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\efM-bM-^@M-^],
+ M-bM-^@M-^\lowdelayM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\throughputM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\reliabilityM-bM-^@M-^], or a numeric value.
+ This option may take one or two arguments, separated by
+ whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the
+ packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the
+ first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the
+ second for non-interactive sessions. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\lowdelayM-bM-^@M-^]
+ for interactive sessions and M-bM-^@M-^\throughputM-bM-^@M-^] for non-interactive
+ sessions.
+
+ KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+ Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication.
+ The argument to this keyword must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default
+ is to use whatever value ChallengeResponseAuthentication is set
+ to (by default M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]).
+
+ KerberosAuthentication
+ Specifies whether the password provided by the user for
+ PasswordAuthentication will be validated through the Kerberos
+ KDC. To use this option, the server needs a Kerberos servtab
+ which allows the verification of the KDC's identity. The default
+ is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ KerberosGetAFSToken
+ If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to
+ acquire an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory.
+ The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ KerberosOrLocalPasswd
+ If password authentication through Kerberos fails then the
+ password will be validated via any additional local mechanism
+ such as /etc/passwd. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ KerberosTicketCleanup
+ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket
+ cache file on logout. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ KexAlgorithms
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple
+ algorithms must be comma-separated. Alternately if the specified
+ value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods
+ will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them.
+ The supported algorithms are:
+
+ curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org
+ diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
+ diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
+ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
+ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
+ ecdh-sha2-nistp256
+ ecdh-sha2-nistp384
+ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
+
+ The default is:
+
+ curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org,
+ ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+ diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
+
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be
+ obtained using the -Q option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\kexM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ KeyRegenerationInterval
+ In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically
+ regenerated after this many seconds (if it has been used). The
+ purpose of regeneration is to prevent decrypting captured
+ sessions by later breaking into the machine and stealing the
+ keys. The key is never stored anywhere. If the value is 0, the
+ key is never regenerated. The default is 3600 (seconds).
+
+ ListenAddress
+ Specifies the local addresses sshd(8) should listen on. The
+ following forms may be used:
+
+ ListenAddress host|IPv4_addr|IPv6_addr
+ ListenAddress host|IPv4_addr:port
+ ListenAddress [host|IPv6_addr]:port
+
+ If port is not specified, sshd will listen on the address and all
+ Port options specified. The default is to listen on all local
+ addresses. Multiple ListenAddress options are permitted.
+
+ LoginGraceTime
+ The server disconnects after this time if the user has not
+ successfully logged in. If the value is 0, there is no time
+ limit. The default is 120 seconds.
+
+ LogLevel
+ Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
+ sshd(8). The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO,
+ VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO.
+ DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify
+ higher levels of debugging output. Logging with a DEBUG level
+ violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
+
+ MACs Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code)
+ algorithms. The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity
+ protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. If the
+ specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified
+ algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of
+ replacing them.
+
+ The algorithms that contain M-bM-^@M-^\-etmM-bM-^@M-^] calculate the MAC after
+ encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and
+ their use recommended. The supported MACs are:
+
+ hmac-md5
+ hmac-md5-96
+ hmac-ripemd160
+ hmac-sha1
+ hmac-sha1-96
+ hmac-sha2-256
+ hmac-sha2-512
+ umac-64 at openssh.com
+ umac-128 at openssh.com
+ hmac-md5-etm at openssh.com
+ hmac-md5-96-etm at openssh.com
+ hmac-ripemd160-etm at openssh.com
+ hmac-sha1-etm at openssh.com
+ hmac-sha1-96-etm at openssh.com
+ hmac-sha2-256-etm at openssh.com
+ hmac-sha2-512-etm at openssh.com
+ umac-64-etm at openssh.com
+ umac-128-etm at openssh.com
+
+ The default is:
+
+ umac-64-etm at openssh.com,umac-128-etm at openssh.com,
+ hmac-sha2-256-etm at openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm at openssh.com,
+ hmac-sha1-etm at openssh.com,
+ umac-64 at openssh.com,umac-128 at openssh.com,
+ hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
+
+ The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
+ the -Q option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\macM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ Match Introduces a conditional block. If all of the criteria on the
+ Match line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines
+ override those set in the global section of the config file,
+ until either another Match line or the end of the file. If a
+ keyword appears in multiple Match blocks that are satisfied, only
+ the first instance of the keyword is applied.
+
+ The arguments to Match are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or
+ the single token All which matches all criteria. The available
+ criteria are User, Group, Host, LocalAddress, LocalPort, and
+ Address. The match patterns may consist of single entries or
+ comma-separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation
+ operators described in the PATTERNS section of ssh_config(5).
+
+ The patterns in an Address criteria may additionally contain
+ addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format, e.g.
+ M-bM-^@M-^\192.0.2.0/24M-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\3ffe:ffff::/32M-bM-^@M-^]. Note that the mask length
+ provided must be consistent with the address - it is an error to
+ specify a mask length that is too long for the address or one
+ with bits set in this host portion of the address. For example,
+ M-bM-^@M-^\192.0.2.0/33M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\192.0.2.0/8M-bM-^@M-^] respectively.
+
+ Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a
+ Match keyword. Available keywords are AcceptEnv,
+ AllowAgentForwarding, AllowGroups, AllowStreamLocalForwarding,
+ AllowTcpForwarding, AllowUsers, AuthenticationMethods,
+ AuthorizedKeysCommand, AuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
+ AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand,
+ AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
+ Banner, ChrootDirectory, DenyGroups, DenyUsers, ForceCommand,
+ GatewayPorts, GSSAPIAuthentication, HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
+ HostbasedAuthentication, HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, IPQoS,
+ KbdInteractiveAuthentication, KerberosAuthentication,
+ MaxAuthTries, MaxSessions, PasswordAuthentication,
+ PermitEmptyPasswords, PermitOpen, PermitRootLogin, PermitTTY,
+ PermitTunnel, PermitUserRC, PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes,
+ PubkeyAuthentication, RekeyLimit, RevokedKeys,
+ RhostsRSAAuthentication, RSAAuthentication, StreamLocalBindMask,
+ StreamLocalBindUnlink, TrustedUserCAKeys, X11DisplayOffset,
+ X11Forwarding and X11UseLocalHost.
+
+ MaxAuthTries
+ Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted
+ per connection. Once the number of failures reaches half this
+ value, additional failures are logged. The default is 6.
+
+ MaxSessions
+ Specifies the maximum number of open shell, login or subsystem
+ (e.g. sftp) sessions permitted per network connection. Multiple
+ sessions may be established by clients that support connection
+ multiplexing. Setting MaxSessions to 1 will effectively disable
+ session multiplexing, whereas setting it to 0 will prevent all
+ shell, login and subsystem sessions while still permitting
+ forwarding. The default is 10.
+
+ MaxStartups
+ Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated
+ connections to the SSH daemon. Additional connections will be
+ dropped until authentication succeeds or the LoginGraceTime
+ expires for a connection. The default is 10:30:100.
+
+ Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying the
+ three colon separated values M-bM-^@M-^\start:rate:fullM-bM-^@M-^] (e.g. "10:30:60").
+ sshd(8) will refuse connection attempts with a probability of
+ M-bM-^@M-^\rate/100M-bM-^@M-^] (30%) if there are currently M-bM-^@M-^\startM-bM-^@M-^] (10)
+ unauthenticated connections. The probability increases linearly
+ and all connection attempts are refused if the number of
+ unauthenticated connections reaches M-bM-^@M-^\fullM-bM-^@M-^] (60).
+
+ PasswordAuthentication
+ Specifies whether password authentication is allowed. The
+ default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ PermitEmptyPasswords
+ When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
+ server allows login to accounts with empty password strings. The
+ default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ PermitOpen
+ Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is
+ permitted. The forwarding specification must be one of the
+ following forms:
+
+ PermitOpen host:port
+ PermitOpen IPv4_addr:port
+ PermitOpen [IPv6_addr]:port
+
+ Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with
+ whitespace. An argument of M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^] can be used to remove all
+ restrictions and permit any forwarding requests. An argument of
+ M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests. The
+ wildcard M-bM-^@M-^\*M-bM-^@M-^] can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or
+ ports, respectively. By default all port forwarding requests are
+ permitted.
+
+ PermitRootLogin
+ Specifies whether root can log in using ssh(1). The argument
+ must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\prohibit-passwordM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\without-passwordM-bM-^@M-^],
+ M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is
+ M-bM-^@M-^\prohibit-passwordM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\prohibit-passwordM-bM-^@M-^] or
+ M-bM-^@M-^\without-passwordM-bM-^@M-^], password and keyboard-interactive
+ authentication are disabled for root.
+
+ If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^], root login with
+ public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the
+ command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking
+ remote backups even if root login is normally not allowed). All
+ other authentication methods are disabled for root.
+
+ If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], root is not allowed to log in.
+
+ PermitTunnel
+ Specifies whether tun(4) device forwarding is allowed. The
+ argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\point-to-pointM-bM-^@M-^] (layer 3), M-bM-^@M-^\ethernetM-bM-^@M-^]
+ (layer 2), or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. Specifying M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] permits both
+ M-bM-^@M-^\point-to-pointM-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\ethernetM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ Independent of this setting, the permissions of the selected
+ tun(4) device must allow access to the user.
+
+ PermitTTY
+ Specifies whether pty(4) allocation is permitted. The default is
+ M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ PermitUserEnvironment
+ Specifies whether ~/.ssh/environment and environment= options in
+ ~/.ssh/authorized_keys are processed by sshd(8). The default is
+ M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. Enabling environment processing may enable users to bypass
+ access restrictions in some configurations using mechanisms such
+ as LD_PRELOAD.
+
+ PermitUserRC
+ Specifies whether any ~/.ssh/rc file is executed. The default is
+ M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ PidFile
+ Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the SSH
+ daemon, or M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to not write one. The default is
+ /var/run/sshd.pid.
+
+ Port Specifies the port number that sshd(8) listens on. The default
+ is 22. Multiple options of this type are permitted. See also
+ ListenAddress.
+
+ PrintLastLog
+ Specifies whether sshd(8) should print the date and time of the
+ last user login when a user logs in interactively. The default
+ is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ PrintMotd
+ Specifies whether sshd(8) should print /etc/motd when a user logs
+ in interactively. (On some systems it is also printed by the
+ shell, /etc/profile, or equivalent.) The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ Protocol
+ Specifies the protocol versions sshd(8) supports. The possible
+ values are M-bM-^@M-^X1M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X2M-bM-^@M-^Y. Multiple versions must be comma-
+ separated. The default is M-bM-^@M-^X2M-bM-^@M-^Y. Protocol 1 suffers from a number
+ of cryptographic weaknesses and should not be used. It is only
+ offered to support legacy devices.
+
+ Note that the order of the protocol list does not indicate
+ preference, because the client selects among multiple protocol
+ versions offered by the server. Specifying M-bM-^@M-^\2,1M-bM-^@M-^] is identical to
+ M-bM-^@M-^\1,2M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+ Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key
+ authentication as a comma-separated pattern list. Alternately if
+ the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
+ specified key types will be appended to the default set instead
+ of replacing them. The default for this option is:
+
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+ ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
+
+ The -Q option of ssh(1) may be used to list supported key types.
+
+ PubkeyAuthentication
+ Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed. The
+ default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ RekeyLimit
+ Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted
+ before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a
+ maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is
+ renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may
+ have a suffix of M-bM-^@M-^XKM-bM-^@M-^Y, M-bM-^@M-^XMM-bM-^@M-^Y, or M-bM-^@M-^XGM-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate Kilobytes,
+ Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between
+ M-bM-^@M-^X1GM-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X4GM-bM-^@M-^Y, depending on the cipher. The optional second
+ value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units
+ documented in the TIME FORMATS section. The default value for
+ RekeyLimit is M-bM-^@M-^\default noneM-bM-^@M-^], which means that rekeying is
+ performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent
+ or received and no time based rekeying is done.
+
+ RevokedKeys
+ Specifies revoked public keys file, or M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to not use one.
+ Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key
+ authentication. Note that if this file is not readable, then
+ public key authentication will be refused for all users. Keys
+ may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line,
+ or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by
+ ssh-keygen(1). For more information on KRLs, see the KEY
+ REVOCATION LISTS section in ssh-keygen(1).
+
+ RhostsRSAAuthentication
+ Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication
+ together with successful RSA host authentication is allowed. The
+ default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. This option applies to protocol version 1 only.
+
+ RSAAuthentication
+ Specifies whether pure RSA authentication is allowed. The
+ default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. This option applies to protocol version 1
+ only.
+
+ ServerKeyBits
+ Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1
+ server key. The default and minimum value is 1024.
+
+ StreamLocalBindMask
+ Sets the octal file creation mode mask (umask) used when creating
+ a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding.
+ This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain
+ socket file.
+
+ The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket
+ file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that
+ not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain
+ socket files.
+
+ StreamLocalBindUnlink
+ Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file
+ for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one.
+ If the socket file already exists and StreamLocalBindUnlink is
+ not enabled, sshd will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-
+ domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding
+ to a Unix-domain socket file.
+
+ The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ StrictModes
+ Specifies whether sshd(8) should check file modes and ownership
+ of the user's files and home directory before accepting login.
+ This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally
+ leave their directory or files world-writable. The default is
+ M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that this does not apply to ChrootDirectory, whose
+ permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally.
+
+ Subsystem
+ Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon).
+ Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional
+ arguments) to execute upon subsystem request.
+
+ The command sftp-server(8) implements the M-bM-^@M-^\sftpM-bM-^@M-^] file transfer
+ subsystem.
+
+ Alternately the name M-bM-^@M-^\internal-sftpM-bM-^@M-^] implements an in-process
+ M-bM-^@M-^\sftpM-bM-^@M-^] server. This may simplify configurations using
+ ChrootDirectory to force a different filesystem root on clients.
+
+ By default no subsystems are defined.
+
+ SyslogFacility
+ Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+ sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
+ LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The
+ default is AUTH.
+
+ TCPKeepAlive
+ Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
+ to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or
+ crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However,
+ this means that connections will die if the route is down
+ temporarily, and some people find it annoying. On the other
+ hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent, sessions may hang
+ indefinitely on the server, leaving M-bM-^@M-^\ghostM-bM-^@M-^] users and consuming
+ server resources.
+
+ The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the
+ server will notice if the network goes down or the client host
+ crashes. This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
+
+ To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
+ M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ TrustedUserCAKeys
+ Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate
+ authorities that are trusted to sign user certificates for
+ authentication, or M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to not use one. Keys are listed one
+ per line; empty lines and comments starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are allowed.
+ If a certificate is presented for authentication and has its
+ signing CA key listed in this file, then it may be used for
+ authentication for any user listed in the certificate's
+ principals list. Note that certificates that lack a list of
+ principals will not be permitted for authentication using
+ TrustedUserCAKeys. For more details on certificates, see the
+ CERTIFICATES section in ssh-keygen(1).
+
+ UseDNS Specifies whether sshd(8) should look up the remote host name,
+ and to check that the resolved host name for the remote IP
+ address maps back to the very same IP address.
+
+ If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] (the default) then only addresses
+ and not host names may be used in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys from and
+ sshd_config Match Host directives.
+
+ UseLogin
+ Specifies whether login(1) is used for interactive login
+ sessions. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that login(1) is never used
+ for remote command execution. Note also, that if this is
+ enabled, X11Forwarding will be disabled because login(1) does not
+ know how to handle xauth(1) cookies. If UsePrivilegeSeparation
+ is specified, it will be disabled after authentication.
+
+ UsePAM Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface. If set to
+ M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] this will enable PAM authentication using
+ ChallengeResponseAuthentication and PasswordAuthentication in
+ addition to PAM account and session module processing for all
+ authentication types.
+
+ Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an
+ equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable
+ either PasswordAuthentication or ChallengeResponseAuthentication.
+
+ If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a
+ non-root user. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ UsePrivilegeSeparation
+ Specifies whether sshd(8) separates privileges by creating an
+ unprivileged child process to deal with incoming network traffic.
+ After successful authentication, another process will be created
+ that has the privilege of the authenticated user. The goal of
+ privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by
+ containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes. The
+ argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\sandboxM-bM-^@M-^]. If
+ UsePrivilegeSeparation is set to M-bM-^@M-^\sandboxM-bM-^@M-^] then the pre-
+ authentication unprivileged process is subject to additional
+ restrictions. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\sandboxM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ VersionAddendum
+ Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH
+ protocol banner sent by the server upon connection. The default
+ is M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ X11DisplayOffset
+ Specifies the first display number available for sshd(8)'s X11
+ forwarding. This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11
+ servers. The default is 10.
+
+ X11Forwarding
+ Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. The argument must
+ be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure
+ to the server and to client displays if the sshd(8) proxy display
+ is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see
+ X11UseLocalhost below), though this is not the default.
+ Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data
+ verification and substitution occur on the client side. The
+ security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11
+ display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client
+ requests forwarding (see the warnings for ForwardX11 in
+ ssh_config(5)). A system administrator may have a stance in
+ which they want to protect clients that may expose themselves to
+ attack by unwittingly requesting X11 forwarding, which can
+ warrant a M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] setting.
+
+ Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from
+ forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own
+ forwarders. X11 forwarding is automatically disabled if UseLogin
+ is enabled.
+
+ X11UseLocalhost
+ Specifies whether sshd(8) should bind the X11 forwarding server
+ to the loopback address or to the wildcard address. By default,
+ sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets
+ the hostname part of the DISPLAY environment variable to
+ M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^]. This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the
+ proxy display. However, some older X11 clients may not function
+ with this configuration. X11UseLocalhost may be set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] to
+ specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the
+ wildcard address. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The
+ default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ XAuthLocation
+ Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program, or M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to
+ not use one. The default is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth.
+
+TIME FORMATS
+ sshd(8) command-line arguments and configuration file options that
+ specify time may be expressed using a sequence of the form:
+ time[qualifier], where time is a positive integer value and qualifier is
+ one of the following:
+
+ M-bM-^_M-(noneM-bM-^_M-) seconds
+ s | S seconds
+ m | M minutes
+ h | H hours
+ d | D days
+ w | W weeks
+
+ Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate the total time
+ value.
+
+ Time format examples:
+
+ 600 600 seconds (10 minutes)
+ 10m 10 minutes
+ 1h30m 1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes)
+
+FILES
+ /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+ Contains configuration data for sshd(8). This file should be
+ writable by root only, but it is recommended (though not
+ necessary) that it be world-readable.
+
+SEE ALSO
+ sshd(8)
+
+AUTHORS
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+ Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+ de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+ created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+ versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
+ for privilege separation.
+
+OpenBSD 6.0 July 19, 2016 OpenBSD 6.0
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd_config.5
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd_config.5 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd_config.5 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1378 +0,0 @@
-.\"
-.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
-.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
-.\" All rights reserved
-.\"
-.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
-.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
-.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
-.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
-.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
-.\"
-.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
-.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
-.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
-.\"
-.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-.\" are met:
-.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-.\"
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.172 2014/02/27 22:47:07 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: February 27 2014 $
-.Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
-.Os
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm sshd_config
-.Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon configuration file
-.Sh SYNOPSIS
-.Nm /etc/ssh/sshd_config
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-.Xr sshd 8
-reads configuration data from
-.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
-(or the file specified with
-.Fl f
-on the command line).
-The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line.
-Lines starting with
-.Ql #
-and empty lines are interpreted as comments.
-Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
-.Pq \&"
-in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
-.Pp
-The possible
-keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
-keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Cm AcceptEnv
-Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be copied into
-the session's
-.Xr environ 7 .
-See
-.Cm SendEnv
-in
-.Xr ssh_config 5
-for how to configure the client.
-Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2.
-Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters
-.Ql *
-and
-.Ql \&? .
-Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread
-across multiple
-.Cm AcceptEnv
-directives.
-Be warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass restricted
-user environments.
-For this reason, care should be taken in the use of this directive.
-The default is not to accept any environment variables.
-.It Cm AddressFamily
-Specifies which address family should be used by
-.Xr sshd 8 .
-Valid arguments are
-.Dq any ,
-.Dq inet
-(use IPv4 only), or
-.Dq inet6
-(use IPv6 only).
-The default is
-.Dq any .
-.It Cm AllowAgentForwarding
-Specifies whether
-.Xr ssh-agent 1
-forwarding is permitted.
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-Note that disabling agent forwarding does not improve security
-unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install
-their own forwarders.
-.It Cm AllowGroups
-This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
-by spaces.
-If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary
-group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns.
-Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
-By default, login is allowed for all groups.
-The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
-.Cm DenyUsers ,
-.Cm AllowUsers ,
-.Cm DenyGroups ,
-and finally
-.Cm AllowGroups .
-.Pp
-See PATTERNS in
-.Xr ssh_config 5
-for more information on patterns.
-.It Cm AllowTcpForwarding
-Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted.
-The available options are
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq all
-to allow TCP forwarding,
-.Dq no
-to prevent all TCP forwarding,
-.Dq local
-to allow local (from the perspective of
-.Xr ssh 1 )
-forwarding only or
-.Dq remote
-to allow remote forwarding only.
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless
-users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their
-own forwarders.
-.It Cm AllowUsers
-This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated
-by spaces.
-If specified, login is allowed only for user names that
-match one of the patterns.
-Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
-By default, login is allowed for all users.
-If the pattern takes the form USER at HOST then USER and HOST
-are separately checked, restricting logins to particular
-users from particular hosts.
-The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
-.Cm DenyUsers ,
-.Cm AllowUsers ,
-.Cm DenyGroups ,
-and finally
-.Cm AllowGroups .
-.Pp
-See PATTERNS in
-.Xr ssh_config 5
-for more information on patterns.
-.It Cm AuthenticationMethods
-Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully completed
-for a user to be granted access.
-This option must be followed by one or more comma-separated lists of
-authentication method names.
-Successful authentication requires completion of every method in at least
-one of these lists.
-.Pp
-For example, an argument of
-.Dq publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive
-would require the user to complete public key authentication, followed by
-either password or keyboard interactive authentication.
-Only methods that are next in one or more lists are offered at each stage,
-so for this example, it would not be possible to attempt password or
-keyboard-interactive authentication before public key.
-.Pp
-For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to
-restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a
-colon followed by the device identifier
-.Dq bsdauth ,
-.Dq pam ,
-or
-.Dq skey ,
-depending on the server configuration.
-For example,
-.Dq keyboard-interactive:bsdauth
-would restrict keyboard interactive authentication to the
-.Dq bsdauth
-device.
-.Pp
-This option is only available for SSH protocol 2 and will yield a fatal
-error if enabled if protocol 1 is also enabled.
-Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled
-in the configuration.
-The default is not to require multiple authentication; successful completion
-of a single authentication method is sufficient.
-.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
-Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys.
-The program must be owned by root and not writable by group or others.
-It will be invoked with a single argument of the username
-being authenticated, and should produce on standard output zero or
-more lines of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in
-.Xr sshd 8 ) .
-If a key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate
-and authorize the user then public key authentication continues using the usual
-.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
-files.
-By default, no AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
-.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
-Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
-It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host
-than running authorized keys commands.
-.It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
-Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
-for user authentication.
-The format is described in the
-AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
-section of
-.Xr sshd 8 .
-.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
-may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection
-setup.
-The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%',
-%h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and
-%u is replaced by the username of that user.
-After expansion,
-.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
-is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home
-directory.
-Multiple files may be listed, separated by whitespace.
-The default is
-.Dq .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2 .
-.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
-Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for
-certificate authentication.
-When using certificates signed by a key listed in
-.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
-this file lists names, one of which must appear in the certificate for it
-to be accepted for authentication.
-Names are listed one per line preceded by key options (as described
-in AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT in
-.Xr sshd 8 ) .
-Empty lines and comments starting with
-.Ql #
-are ignored.
-.Pp
-.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
-may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection
-setup.
-The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%',
-%h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and
-%u is replaced by the username of that user.
-After expansion,
-.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
-is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home
-directory.
-.Pp
-The default is
-.Dq none ,
-i.e. not to use a principals file \(en in this case, the username
-of the user must appear in a certificate's principals list for it to be
-accepted.
-Note that
-.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
-is only used when authentication proceeds using a CA listed in
-.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
-and is not consulted for certification authorities trusted via
-.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ,
-though the
-.Cm principals=
-key option offers a similar facility (see
-.Xr sshd 8
-for details).
-.It Cm Banner
-The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before
-authentication is allowed.
-If the argument is
-.Dq none
-then no banner is displayed.
-This option is only available for protocol version 2.
-By default, no banner is displayed.
-.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
-Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
-PAM or though authentication styles supported in
-.Xr login.conf 5 )
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-.It Cm ChrootDirectory
-Specifies the pathname of a directory to
-.Xr chroot 2
-to after authentication.
-All components of the pathname must be root-owned directories that are
-not writable by any other user or group.
-After the chroot,
-.Xr sshd 8
-changes the working directory to the user's home directory.
-.Pp
-The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime once
-the connecting user has been authenticated: %% is replaced by a literal '%',
-%h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and
-%u is replaced by the username of that user.
-.Pp
-The
-.Cm ChrootDirectory
-must contain the necessary files and directories to support the
-user's session.
-For an interactive session this requires at least a shell, typically
-.Xr sh 1 ,
-and basic
-.Pa /dev
-nodes such as
-.Xr null 4 ,
-.Xr zero 4 ,
-.Xr stdin 4 ,
-.Xr stdout 4 ,
-.Xr stderr 4 ,
-.Xr arandom 4
-and
-.Xr tty 4
-devices.
-For file transfer sessions using
-.Dq sftp ,
-no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the
-in-process sftp server is used,
-though sessions which use logging do require
-.Pa /dev/log
-inside the chroot directory (see
-.Xr sftp-server 8
-for details).
-.Pp
-The default is not to
-.Xr chroot 2 .
-.It Cm Ciphers
-Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2.
-Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
-The supported ciphers are:
-.Pp
-.Dq 3des-cbc ,
-.Dq aes128-cbc ,
-.Dq aes192-cbc ,
-.Dq aes256-cbc ,
-.Dq aes128-ctr ,
-.Dq aes192-ctr ,
-.Dq aes256-ctr ,
-.Dq aes128-gcm at openssh.com ,
-.Dq aes256-gcm at openssh.com ,
-.Dq arcfour128 ,
-.Dq arcfour256 ,
-.Dq arcfour ,
-.Dq blowfish-cbc ,
-.Dq cast128-cbc ,
-and
-.Dq chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com .
-.Pp
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,
-aes128-gcm at openssh.com,aes256-gcm at openssh.com,
-chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com,
-aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,aes192-cbc,
-aes256-cbc,arcfour
-.Ed
-.Pp
-The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using the
-.Fl Q
-option of
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-.It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-Sets the number of client alive messages (see below) which may be
-sent without
-.Xr sshd 8
-receiving any messages back from the client.
-If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being sent,
-sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session.
-It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is very
-different from
-.Cm TCPKeepAlive
-(below).
-The client alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel
-and therefore will not be spoofable.
-The TCP keepalive option enabled by
-.Cm TCPKeepAlive
-is spoofable.
-The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or
-server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive.
-.Pp
-The default value is 3.
-If
-.Cm ClientAliveInterval
-(see below) is set to 15, and
-.Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients
-will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds.
-This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-.It Cm ClientAliveInterval
-Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
-from the client,
-.Xr sshd 8
-will send a message through the encrypted
-channel to request a response from the client.
-The default
-is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client.
-This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-.It Cm Compression
-Specifies whether compression is allowed, or delayed until
-the user has authenticated successfully.
-The argument must be
-.Dq yes ,
-.Dq delayed ,
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is
-.Dq delayed .
-.It Cm DenyGroups
-This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
-by spaces.
-Login is disallowed for users whose primary group or supplementary
-group list matches one of the patterns.
-Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
-By default, login is allowed for all groups.
-The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
-.Cm DenyUsers ,
-.Cm AllowUsers ,
-.Cm DenyGroups ,
-and finally
-.Cm AllowGroups .
-.Pp
-See PATTERNS in
-.Xr ssh_config 5
-for more information on patterns.
-.It Cm DenyUsers
-This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated
-by spaces.
-Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns.
-Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
-By default, login is allowed for all users.
-If the pattern takes the form USER at HOST then USER and HOST
-are separately checked, restricting logins to particular
-users from particular hosts.
-The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
-.Cm DenyUsers ,
-.Cm AllowUsers ,
-.Cm DenyGroups ,
-and finally
-.Cm AllowGroups .
-.Pp
-See PATTERNS in
-.Xr ssh_config 5
-for more information on patterns.
-.It Cm ForceCommand
-Forces the execution of the command specified by
-.Cm ForceCommand ,
-ignoring any command supplied by the client and
-.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
-if present.
-The command is invoked by using the user's login shell with the -c option.
-This applies to shell, command, or subsystem execution.
-It is most useful inside a
-.Cm Match
-block.
-The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
-.Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
-environment variable.
-Specifying a command of
-.Dq internal-sftp
-will force the use of an in-process sftp server that requires no support
-files when used with
-.Cm ChrootDirectory .
-.It Cm GatewayPorts
-Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports
-forwarded for the client.
-By default,
-.Xr sshd 8
-binds remote port forwardings to the loopback address.
-This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
-.Cm GatewayPorts
-can be used to specify that sshd
-should allow remote port forwardings to bind to non-loopback addresses, thus
-allowing other hosts to connect.
-The argument may be
-.Dq no
-to force remote port forwardings to be available to the local host only,
-.Dq yes
-to force remote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or
-.Dq clientspecified
-to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound.
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
-Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-.It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
-Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
-on logout.
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
-Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
-with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
-(host-based authentication).
-This option is similar to
-.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
-and applies to protocol version 2 only.
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly
-Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a reverse
-name lookup when matching the name in the
-.Pa ~/.shosts ,
-.Pa ~/.rhosts ,
-and
-.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
-files during
-.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
-A setting of
-.Dq yes
-means that
-.Xr sshd 8
-uses the name supplied by the client rather than
-attempting to resolve the name from the TCP connection itself.
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm HostCertificate
-Specifies a file containing a public host certificate.
-The certificate's public key must match a private host key already specified
-by
-.Cm HostKey .
-The default behaviour of
-.Xr sshd 8
-is not to load any certificates.
-.It Cm HostKey
-Specifies a file containing a private host key
-used by SSH.
-The default is
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
-for protocol version 1, and
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key ,
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ,
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
-and
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
-for protocol version 2.
-Note that
-.Xr sshd 8
-will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessible.
-It is possible to have multiple host key files.
-.Dq rsa1
-keys are used for version 1 and
-.Dq dsa ,
-.Dq ecdsa ,
-.Dq ed25519
-or
-.Dq rsa
-are used for version 2 of the SSH protocol.
-It is also possible to specify public host key files instead.
-In this case operations on the private key will be delegated
-to an
-.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
-.It Cm HostKeyAgent
-Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate
-with an agent that has access to the private host keys.
-If
-.Dq SSH_AUTH_SOCK
-is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the
-.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
-environment variable.
-.It Cm IgnoreRhosts
-Specifies that
-.Pa .rhosts
-and
-.Pa .shosts
-files will not be used in
-.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
-or
-.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
-.Pp
-.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
-and
-.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
-are still used.
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-.It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts
-Specifies whether
-.Xr sshd 8
-should ignore the user's
-.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
-during
-.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
-or
-.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm IPQoS
-Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection.
-Accepted values are
-.Dq af11 ,
-.Dq af12 ,
-.Dq af13 ,
-.Dq af21 ,
-.Dq af22 ,
-.Dq af23 ,
-.Dq af31 ,
-.Dq af32 ,
-.Dq af33 ,
-.Dq af41 ,
-.Dq af42 ,
-.Dq af43 ,
-.Dq cs0 ,
-.Dq cs1 ,
-.Dq cs2 ,
-.Dq cs3 ,
-.Dq cs4 ,
-.Dq cs5 ,
-.Dq cs6 ,
-.Dq cs7 ,
-.Dq ef ,
-.Dq lowdelay ,
-.Dq throughput ,
-.Dq reliability ,
-or a numeric value.
-This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace.
-If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally.
-If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for
-interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions.
-The default is
-.Dq lowdelay
-for interactive sessions and
-.Dq throughput
-for non-interactive sessions.
-.It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication
-Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication.
-The argument to this keyword must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is to use whatever value
-.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
-is set to
-(by default
-.Dq yes ) .
-.It Cm KerberosAuthentication
-Specifies whether the password provided by the user for
-.Cm PasswordAuthentication
-will be validated through the Kerberos KDC.
-To use this option, the server needs a
-Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity.
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm KerberosGetAFSToken
-If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to acquire
-an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory.
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm KerberosOrLocalPasswd
-If password authentication through Kerberos fails then
-the password will be validated via any additional local mechanism
-such as
-.Pa /etc/passwd .
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-.It Cm KerberosTicketCleanup
-Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
-file on logout.
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-.It Cm KexAlgorithms
-Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
-Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-The default is
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org,
-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,
-diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,
-diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
-.Ed
-.It Cm KeyRegenerationInterval
-In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically regenerated
-after this many seconds (if it has been used).
-The purpose of regeneration is to prevent
-decrypting captured sessions by later breaking into the machine and
-stealing the keys.
-The key is never stored anywhere.
-If the value is 0, the key is never regenerated.
-The default is 3600 (seconds).
-.It Cm ListenAddress
-Specifies the local addresses
-.Xr sshd 8
-should listen on.
-The following forms may be used:
-.Pp
-.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
-.It
-.Cm ListenAddress
-.Sm off
-.Ar host No | Ar IPv4_addr No | Ar IPv6_addr
-.Sm on
-.It
-.Cm ListenAddress
-.Sm off
-.Ar host No | Ar IPv4_addr No : Ar port
-.Sm on
-.It
-.Cm ListenAddress
-.Sm off
-.Oo
-.Ar host No | Ar IPv6_addr Oc : Ar port
-.Sm on
-.El
-.Pp
-If
-.Ar port
-is not specified,
-sshd will listen on the address and all prior
-.Cm Port
-options specified.
-The default is to listen on all local addresses.
-Multiple
-.Cm ListenAddress
-options are permitted.
-Additionally, any
-.Cm Port
-options must precede this option for non-port qualified addresses.
-.It Cm LoginGraceTime
-The server disconnects after this time if the user has not
-successfully logged in.
-If the value is 0, there is no time limit.
-The default is 120 seconds.
-.It Cm LogLevel
-Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
-.Xr sshd 8 .
-The possible values are:
-QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
-The default is INFO.
-DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
-DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
-Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
-.It Cm MACs
-Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
-The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2
-for data integrity protection.
-Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-The algorithms that contain
-.Dq -etm
-calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
-These are considered safer and their use recommended.
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-hmac-md5-etm at openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm at openssh.com,
-umac-64-etm at openssh.com,umac-128-etm at openssh.com,
-hmac-sha2-256-etm at openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm at openssh.com,
-hmac-ripemd160-etm at openssh.com,hmac-sha1-96-etm at openssh.com,
-hmac-md5-96-etm at openssh.com,
-hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64 at openssh.com,umac-128 at openssh.com,
-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-ripemd160,
-hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96
-.Ed
-.It Cm Match
-Introduces a conditional block.
-If all of the criteria on the
-.Cm Match
-line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines override those
-set in the global section of the config file, until either another
-.Cm Match
-line or the end of the file.
-If a keyword appears in multiple
-.Cm Match
-blocks that are satisified, only the first instance of the keyword is
-applied.
-.Pp
-The arguments to
-.Cm Match
-are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or the single token
-.Cm All
-which matches all criteria.
-The available criteria are
-.Cm User ,
-.Cm Group ,
-.Cm Host ,
-.Cm LocalAddress ,
-.Cm LocalPort ,
-and
-.Cm Address .
-The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma-separated
-lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the
-PATTERNS section of
-.Xr ssh_config 5 .
-.Pp
-The patterns in an
-.Cm Address
-criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR
-address/masklen format, e.g.\&
-.Dq 192.0.2.0/24
-or
-.Dq 3ffe:ffff::/32 .
-Note that the mask length provided must be consistent with the address -
-it is an error to specify a mask length that is too long for the address
-or one with bits set in this host portion of the address.
-For example,
-.Dq 192.0.2.0/33
-and
-.Dq 192.0.2.0/8
-respectively.
-.Pp
-Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a
-.Cm Match
-keyword.
-Available keywords are
-.Cm AcceptEnv ,
-.Cm AllowAgentForwarding ,
-.Cm AllowGroups ,
-.Cm AllowTcpForwarding ,
-.Cm AllowUsers ,
-.Cm AuthenticationMethods ,
-.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand ,
-.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ,
-.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile ,
-.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile ,
-.Cm Banner ,
-.Cm ChrootDirectory ,
-.Cm DenyGroups ,
-.Cm DenyUsers ,
-.Cm ForceCommand ,
-.Cm GatewayPorts ,
-.Cm GSSAPIAuthentication ,
-.Cm HostbasedAuthentication ,
-.Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly ,
-.Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
-.Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
-.Cm MaxAuthTries ,
-.Cm MaxSessions ,
-.Cm PasswordAuthentication ,
-.Cm PermitEmptyPasswords ,
-.Cm PermitOpen ,
-.Cm PermitRootLogin ,
-.Cm PermitTTY ,
-.Cm PermitTunnel ,
-.Cm PubkeyAuthentication ,
-.Cm RekeyLimit ,
-.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication ,
-.Cm RSAAuthentication ,
-.Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
-.Cm X11Forwarding
-and
-.Cm X11UseLocalHost .
-.It Cm MaxAuthTries
-Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted per
-connection.
-Once the number of failures reaches half this value,
-additional failures are logged.
-The default is 6.
-.It Cm MaxSessions
-Specifies the maximum number of open sessions permitted per network connection.
-The default is 10.
-.It Cm MaxStartups
-Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the
-SSH daemon.
-Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the
-.Cm LoginGraceTime
-expires for a connection.
-The default is 10:30:100.
-.Pp
-Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying
-the three colon separated values
-.Dq start:rate:full
-(e.g. "10:30:60").
-.Xr sshd 8
-will refuse connection attempts with a probability of
-.Dq rate/100
-(30%)
-if there are currently
-.Dq start
-(10)
-unauthenticated connections.
-The probability increases linearly and all connection attempts
-are refused if the number of unauthenticated connections reaches
-.Dq full
-(60).
-.It Cm PasswordAuthentication
-Specifies whether password authentication is allowed.
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-.It Cm PermitEmptyPasswords
-When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
-server allows login to accounts with empty password strings.
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm PermitOpen
-Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is permitted.
-The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms:
-.Pp
-.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
-.It
-.Cm PermitOpen
-.Sm off
-.Ar host : port
-.Sm on
-.It
-.Cm PermitOpen
-.Sm off
-.Ar IPv4_addr : port
-.Sm on
-.It
-.Cm PermitOpen
-.Sm off
-.Ar \&[ IPv6_addr \&] : port
-.Sm on
-.El
-.Pp
-Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace.
-An argument of
-.Dq any
-can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests.
-An argument of
-.Dq none
-can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests.
-By default all port forwarding requests are permitted.
-.It Cm PermitRootLogin
-Specifies whether root can log in using
-.Xr ssh 1 .
-The argument must be
-.Dq yes ,
-.Dq without-password ,
-.Dq forced-commands-only ,
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-.Pp
-If this option is set to
-.Dq without-password ,
-password authentication is disabled for root.
-.Pp
-If this option is set to
-.Dq forced-commands-only ,
-root login with public key authentication will be allowed,
-but only if the
-.Ar command
-option has been specified
-(which may be useful for taking remote backups even if root login is
-normally not allowed).
-All other authentication methods are disabled for root.
-.Pp
-If this option is set to
-.Dq no ,
-root is not allowed to log in.
-.It Cm PermitTunnel
-Specifies whether
-.Xr tun 4
-device forwarding is allowed.
-The argument must be
-.Dq yes ,
-.Dq point-to-point
-(layer 3),
-.Dq ethernet
-(layer 2), or
-.Dq no .
-Specifying
-.Dq yes
-permits both
-.Dq point-to-point
-and
-.Dq ethernet .
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm PermitTTY
-Specifies whether
-.Xr pty 4
-allocation is permitted.
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-.It Cm PermitUserEnvironment
-Specifies whether
-.Pa ~/.ssh/environment
-and
-.Cm environment=
-options in
-.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-are processed by
-.Xr sshd 8 .
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-Enabling environment processing may enable users to bypass access
-restrictions in some configurations using mechanisms such as
-.Ev LD_PRELOAD .
-.It Cm PidFile
-Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the
-SSH daemon.
-The default is
-.Pa /var/run/sshd.pid .
-.It Cm Port
-Specifies the port number that
-.Xr sshd 8
-listens on.
-The default is 22.
-Multiple options of this type are permitted.
-See also
-.Cm ListenAddress .
-.It Cm PrintLastLog
-Specifies whether
-.Xr sshd 8
-should print the date and time of the last user login when a user logs
-in interactively.
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-.It Cm PrintMotd
-Specifies whether
-.Xr sshd 8
-should print
-.Pa /etc/motd
-when a user logs in interactively.
-(On some systems it is also printed by the shell,
-.Pa /etc/profile ,
-or equivalent.)
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-.It Cm Protocol
-Specifies the protocol versions
-.Xr sshd 8
-supports.
-The possible values are
-.Sq 1
-and
-.Sq 2 .
-Multiple versions must be comma-separated.
-The default is
-.Sq 2 .
-Note that the order of the protocol list does not indicate preference,
-because the client selects among multiple protocol versions offered
-by the server.
-Specifying
-.Dq 2,1
-is identical to
-.Dq 1,2 .
-.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
-Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed.
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-.It Cm RekeyLimit
-Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the
-session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of
-time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated.
-The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of
-.Sq K ,
-.Sq M ,
-or
-.Sq G
-to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively.
-The default is between
-.Sq 1G
-and
-.Sq 4G ,
-depending on the cipher.
-The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the
-units documented in the
-.Sx TIME FORMATS
-section.
-The default value for
-.Cm RekeyLimit
-is
-.Dq default none ,
-which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount
-of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
-This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-.It Cm RevokedKeys
-Specifies revoked public keys.
-Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key authentication.
-Note that if this file is not readable, then public key authentication will
-be refused for all users.
-Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as
-an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
-For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
-.It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
-Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
-with successful RSA host authentication is allowed.
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-This option applies to protocol version 1 only.
-.It Cm RSAAuthentication
-Specifies whether pure RSA authentication is allowed.
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-This option applies to protocol version 1 only.
-.It Cm ServerKeyBits
-Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key.
-The minimum value is 512, and the default is 1024.
-.It Cm StrictModes
-Specifies whether
-.Xr sshd 8
-should check file modes and ownership of the
-user's files and home directory before accepting login.
-This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally leave their
-directory or files world-writable.
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-Note that this does not apply to
-.Cm ChrootDirectory ,
-whose permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally.
-.It Cm Subsystem
-Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon).
-Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional arguments)
-to execute upon subsystem request.
-.Pp
-The command
-.Xr sftp-server 8
-implements the
-.Dq sftp
-file transfer subsystem.
-.Pp
-Alternately the name
-.Dq internal-sftp
-implements an in-process
-.Dq sftp
-server.
-This may simplify configurations using
-.Cm ChrootDirectory
-to force a different filesystem root on clients.
-.Pp
-By default no subsystems are defined.
-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-.It Cm SyslogFacility
-Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
-.Xr sshd 8 .
-The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
-LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
-The default is AUTH.
-.It Cm TCPKeepAlive
-Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
-other side.
-If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
-of the machines will be properly noticed.
-However, this means that
-connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
-find it annoying.
-On the other hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent,
-sessions may hang indefinitely on the server, leaving
-.Dq ghost
-users and consuming server resources.
-.Pp
-The default is
-.Dq yes
-(to send TCP keepalive messages), and the server will notice
-if the network goes down or the client host crashes.
-This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
-.Pp
-To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
-Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are
-trusted to sign user certificates for authentication.
-Keys are listed one per line; empty lines and comments starting with
-.Ql #
-are allowed.
-If a certificate is presented for authentication and has its signing CA key
-listed in this file, then it may be used for authentication for any user
-listed in the certificate's principals list.
-Note that certificates that lack a list of principals will not be permitted
-for authentication using
-.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys .
-For more details on certificates, see the CERTIFICATES section in
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
-.It Cm UseDNS
-Specifies whether
-.Xr sshd 8
-should look up the remote host name and check that
-the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the
-very same IP address.
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-.It Cm UseLogin
-Specifies whether
-.Xr login 1
-is used for interactive login sessions.
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-Note that
-.Xr login 1
-is never used for remote command execution.
-Note also, that if this is enabled,
-.Cm X11Forwarding
-will be disabled because
-.Xr login 1
-does not know how to handle
-.Xr xauth 1
-cookies.
-If
-.Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
-is specified, it will be disabled after authentication.
-.It Cm UsePAM
-Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface.
-If set to
-.Dq yes
-this will enable PAM authentication using
-.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
-and
-.Cm PasswordAuthentication
-in addition to PAM account and session module processing for all
-authentication types.
-.Pp
-Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an equivalent
-role to password authentication, you should disable either
-.Cm PasswordAuthentication
-or
-.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication.
-.Pp
-If
-.Cm UsePAM
-is enabled, you will not be able to run
-.Xr sshd 8
-as a non-root user.
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.It Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
-Specifies whether
-.Xr sshd 8
-separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process
-to deal with incoming network traffic.
-After successful authentication, another process will be created that has
-the privilege of the authenticated user.
-The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege
-escalation by containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes.
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-If
-.Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
-is set to
-.Dq sandbox
-then the pre-authentication unprivileged process is subject to additional
-restrictions.
-.It Cm VersionAddendum
-Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner
-sent by the server upon connection.
-The default is
-.Dq none .
-.It Cm X11DisplayOffset
-Specifies the first display number available for
-.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
-X11 forwarding.
-This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
-The default is 10.
-.It Cm X11Forwarding
-Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
-The argument must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-.Pp
-When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to
-the server and to client displays if the
-.Xr sshd 8
-proxy display is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see
-.Cm X11UseLocalhost
-below), though this is not the default.
-Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data
-verification and substitution occur on the client side.
-The security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11
-display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests
-forwarding (see the warnings for
-.Cm ForwardX11
-in
-.Xr ssh_config 5 ) .
-A system administrator may have a stance in which they want to
-protect clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly
-requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a
-.Dq no
-setting.
-.Pp
-Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from
-forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own forwarders.
-X11 forwarding is automatically disabled if
-.Cm UseLogin
-is enabled.
-.It Cm X11UseLocalhost
-Specifies whether
-.Xr sshd 8
-should bind the X11 forwarding server to the loopback address or to
-the wildcard address.
-By default,
-sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the
-hostname part of the
-.Ev DISPLAY
-environment variable to
-.Dq localhost .
-This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display.
-However, some older X11 clients may not function with this
-configuration.
-.Cm X11UseLocalhost
-may be set to
-.Dq no
-to specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the wildcard
-address.
-The argument must be
-.Dq yes
-or
-.Dq no .
-The default is
-.Dq yes .
-.It Cm XAuthLocation
-Specifies the full pathname of the
-.Xr xauth 1
-program.
-The default is
-.Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth .
-.El
-.Sh TIME FORMATS
-.Xr sshd 8
-command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time
-may be expressed using a sequence of the form:
-.Sm off
-.Ar time Op Ar qualifier ,
-.Sm on
-where
-.Ar time
-is a positive integer value and
-.Ar qualifier
-is one of the following:
-.Pp
-.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent
-.It Aq Cm none
-seconds
-.It Cm s | Cm S
-seconds
-.It Cm m | Cm M
-minutes
-.It Cm h | Cm H
-hours
-.It Cm d | Cm D
-days
-.It Cm w | Cm W
-weeks
-.El
-.Pp
-Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate
-the total time value.
-.Pp
-Time format examples:
-.Pp
-.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent
-.It 600
-600 seconds (10 minutes)
-.It 10m
-10 minutes
-.It 1h30m
-1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes)
-.El
-.Sh FILES
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
-Contains configuration data for
-.Xr sshd 8 .
-This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended
-(though not necessary) that it be world-readable.
-.El
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr sshd 8
-.Sh AUTHORS
-OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
-ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
-Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
-Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
-removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
-created OpenSSH.
-Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
-protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
-Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
-for privilege separation.
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd_config.5 (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd_config.5)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd_config.5 (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshd_config.5 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1761 @@
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\" All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.227 2016/07/19 12:59:16 jmc Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: July 19 2016 $
+.Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm sshd_config
+.Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon configuration file
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Xr sshd 8
+reads configuration data from
+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+(or the file specified with
+.Fl f
+on the command line).
+The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line.
+Lines starting with
+.Ql #
+and empty lines are interpreted as comments.
+Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
+.Pq \&"
+in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
+.Pp
+The possible
+keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
+keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm AcceptEnv
+Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be copied into
+the session's
+.Xr environ 7 .
+See
+.Cm SendEnv
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for how to configure the client.
+The
+.Ev TERM
+environment variable is always sent whenever the client
+requests a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol.
+Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters
+.Ql *
+and
+.Ql \&? .
+Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread
+across multiple
+.Cm AcceptEnv
+directives.
+Be warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass restricted
+user environments.
+For this reason, care should be taken in the use of this directive.
+The default is not to accept any environment variables.
+.It Cm AddressFamily
+Specifies which address family should be used by
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+Valid arguments are
+.Dq any ,
+.Dq inet
+(use IPv4 only), or
+.Dq inet6
+(use IPv6 only).
+The default is
+.Dq any .
+.It Cm AllowAgentForwarding
+Specifies whether
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+forwarding is permitted.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+Note that disabling agent forwarding does not improve security
+unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install
+their own forwarders.
+.It Cm AllowGroups
+This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
+by spaces.
+If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary
+group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns.
+Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
+By default, login is allowed for all groups.
+The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+.Cm DenyUsers ,
+.Cm AllowUsers ,
+.Cm DenyGroups ,
+and finally
+.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Pp
+See PATTERNS in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm AllowTcpForwarding
+Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted.
+The available options are
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq all
+to allow TCP forwarding,
+.Dq no
+to prevent all TCP forwarding,
+.Dq local
+to allow local (from the perspective of
+.Xr ssh 1 )
+forwarding only or
+.Dq remote
+to allow remote forwarding only.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless
+users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their
+own forwarders.
+.It Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding
+Specifies whether StreamLocal (Unix-domain socket) forwarding is permitted.
+The available options are
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq all
+to allow StreamLocal forwarding,
+.Dq no
+to prevent all StreamLocal forwarding,
+.Dq local
+to allow local (from the perspective of
+.Xr ssh 1 )
+forwarding only or
+.Dq remote
+to allow remote forwarding only.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+Note that disabling StreamLocal forwarding does not improve security unless
+users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their
+own forwarders.
+.It Cm AllowUsers
+This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated
+by spaces.
+If specified, login is allowed only for user names that
+match one of the patterns.
+Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
+By default, login is allowed for all users.
+If the pattern takes the form USER at HOST then USER and HOST
+are separately checked, restricting logins to particular
+users from particular hosts.
+HOST criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR
+address/masklen format.
+The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+.Cm DenyUsers ,
+.Cm AllowUsers ,
+.Cm DenyGroups ,
+and finally
+.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Pp
+See PATTERNS in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm AuthenticationMethods
+Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully completed
+for a user to be granted access.
+This option must be followed by one or more comma-separated lists of
+authentication method names, or by the single string
+.Dq any
+to indicate the default behaviour of accepting any single authentication
+method.
+if the default is overridden, then successful authentication requires
+completion of every method in at least one of these lists.
+.Pp
+For example, an argument of
+.Dq publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive
+would require the user to complete public key authentication, followed by
+either password or keyboard interactive authentication.
+Only methods that are next in one or more lists are offered at each stage,
+so for this example, it would not be possible to attempt password or
+keyboard-interactive authentication before public key.
+.Pp
+For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to
+restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a
+colon followed by the device identifier
+.Dq bsdauth ,
+.Dq pam ,
+or
+.Dq skey ,
+depending on the server configuration.
+For example,
+.Dq keyboard-interactive:bsdauth
+would restrict keyboard interactive authentication to the
+.Dq bsdauth
+device.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Dq publickey
+method is listed more than once,
+.Xr sshd 8
+verifies that keys that have been used successfully are not reused for
+subsequent authentications.
+For example, an
+.Cm AuthenticationMethods
+of
+.Dq publickey,publickey
+will require successful authentication using two different public keys.
+.Pp
+This option will yield a fatal
+error if enabled if protocol 1 is also enabled.
+Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled
+in the configuration.
+The default
+.Dq any
+is not to require multiple authentication; successful completion
+of a single authentication method is sufficient.
+.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
+Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys.
+The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and
+specified by an absolute path.
+.Pp
+Arguments to
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
+may be provided using the following tokens, which will be expanded
+at runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %u is replaced by the
+username being authenticated, %h is replaced by the home directory
+of the user being authenticated, %t is replaced with the key type
+offered for authentication, %f is replaced with the fingerprint of
+the key, and %k is replaced with the key being offered for authentication.
+If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user
+will be supplied.
+.Pp
+The program should produce on standard output zero or
+more lines of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in
+.Xr sshd 8 ) .
+If a key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate
+and authorize the user then public key authentication continues using the usual
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+files.
+By default, no AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
+.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
+Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
+It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host
+than running authorized keys commands.
+If
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
+is specified but
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
+is not, then
+.Xr sshd 8
+will refuse to start.
+.It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
+for user authentication.
+The format is described in the
+AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
+section of
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection
+setup.
+The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%',
+%h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and
+%u is replaced by the username of that user.
+After expansion,
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home
+directory.
+Multiple files may be listed, separated by whitespace.
+Alternately this option may be set to
+.Dq none
+to skip checking for user keys in files.
+The default is
+.Dq .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2 .
+.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed
+certificate principals as per
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile .
+The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and
+specified by an absolute path.
+.Pp
+Arguments to
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+may be provided using the following tokens, which will be expanded
+at runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %u is replaced by the
+username being authenticated and %h is replaced by the home directory
+of the user being authenticated.
+.Pp
+The program should produce on standard output zero or
+more lines of
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+output.
+If either
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+or
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+is specified, then certificates offered by the client for authentication
+must contain a principal that is listed.
+By default, no AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run.
+.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser
+Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run.
+It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host
+than running authorized principals commands.
+If
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+is specified but
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser
+is not, then
+.Xr sshd 8
+will refuse to start.
+.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for
+certificate authentication.
+When using certificates signed by a key listed in
+.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
+this file lists names, one of which must appear in the certificate for it
+to be accepted for authentication.
+Names are listed one per line preceded by key options (as described
+in AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT in
+.Xr sshd 8 ) .
+Empty lines and comments starting with
+.Ql #
+are ignored.
+.Pp
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection
+setup.
+The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%',
+%h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and
+%u is replaced by the username of that user.
+After expansion,
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home
+directory.
+.Pp
+The default is
+.Dq none ,
+i.e. not to use a principals file \(en in this case, the username
+of the user must appear in a certificate's principals list for it to be
+accepted.
+Note that
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+is only used when authentication proceeds using a CA listed in
+.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
+and is not consulted for certification authorities trusted via
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ,
+though the
+.Cm principals=
+key option offers a similar facility (see
+.Xr sshd 8
+for details).
+.It Cm Banner
+The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before
+authentication is allowed.
+If the argument is
+.Dq none
+then no banner is displayed.
+By default, no banner is displayed.
+.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
+PAM or through authentication styles supported in
+.Xr login.conf 5 )
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm ChrootDirectory
+Specifies the pathname of a directory to
+.Xr chroot 2
+to after authentication.
+At session startup
+.Xr sshd 8
+checks that all components of the pathname are root-owned directories
+which are not writable by any other user or group.
+After the chroot,
+.Xr sshd 8
+changes the working directory to the user's home directory.
+.Pp
+The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime once
+the connecting user has been authenticated: %% is replaced by a literal '%',
+%h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and
+%u is replaced by the username of that user.
+.Pp
+The
+.Cm ChrootDirectory
+must contain the necessary files and directories to support the
+user's session.
+For an interactive session this requires at least a shell, typically
+.Xr sh 1 ,
+and basic
+.Pa /dev
+nodes such as
+.Xr null 4 ,
+.Xr zero 4 ,
+.Xr stdin 4 ,
+.Xr stdout 4 ,
+.Xr stderr 4 ,
+and
+.Xr tty 4
+devices.
+For file transfer sessions using
+.Dq sftp ,
+no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the
+in-process sftp server is used,
+though sessions which use logging may require
+.Pa /dev/log
+inside the chroot directory on some operating systems (see
+.Xr sftp-server 8
+for details).
+.Pp
+For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be
+prevented from modification by other processes on the system (especially
+those outside the jail).
+Misconfiguration can lead to unsafe environments which
+.Xr sshd 8
+cannot detect.
+.Pp
+The default is
+.Dq none ,
+indicating not to
+.Xr chroot 2 .
+.It Cm Ciphers
+Specifies the ciphers allowed.
+Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
+instead of replacing them.
+.Pp
+The supported ciphers are:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
+.It
+3des-cbc
+.It
+aes128-cbc
+.It
+aes192-cbc
+.It
+aes256-cbc
+.It
+aes128-ctr
+.It
+aes192-ctr
+.It
+aes256-ctr
+.It
+aes128-gcm at openssh.com
+.It
+aes256-gcm at openssh.com
+.It
+arcfour
+.It
+arcfour128
+.It
+arcfour256
+.It
+blowfish-cbc
+.It
+cast128-cbc
+.It
+chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com
+.El
+.Pp
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com,
+aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
+aes128-gcm at openssh.com,aes256-gcm at openssh.com
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using the
+.Fl Q
+option of
+.Xr ssh 1
+with an argument of
+.Dq cipher .
+.It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
+Sets the number of client alive messages (see below) which may be
+sent without
+.Xr sshd 8
+receiving any messages back from the client.
+If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being sent,
+sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session.
+It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is very
+different from
+.Cm TCPKeepAlive
+(below).
+The client alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel
+and therefore will not be spoofable.
+The TCP keepalive option enabled by
+.Cm TCPKeepAlive
+is spoofable.
+The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or
+server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive.
+.Pp
+The default value is 3.
+If
+.Cm ClientAliveInterval
+(see below) is set to 15, and
+.Cm ClientAliveCountMax
+is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients
+will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds.
+.It Cm ClientAliveInterval
+Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
+from the client,
+.Xr sshd 8
+will send a message through the encrypted
+channel to request a response from the client.
+The default
+is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client.
+.It Cm Compression
+Specifies whether compression is allowed, or delayed until
+the user has authenticated successfully.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes ,
+.Dq delayed ,
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq delayed .
+.It Cm DenyGroups
+This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
+by spaces.
+Login is disallowed for users whose primary group or supplementary
+group list matches one of the patterns.
+Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
+By default, login is allowed for all groups.
+The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+.Cm DenyUsers ,
+.Cm AllowUsers ,
+.Cm DenyGroups ,
+and finally
+.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Pp
+See PATTERNS in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm DenyUsers
+This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated
+by spaces.
+Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns.
+Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
+By default, login is allowed for all users.
+If the pattern takes the form USER at HOST then USER and HOST
+are separately checked, restricting logins to particular
+users from particular hosts.
+HOST criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR
+address/masklen format.
+The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+.Cm DenyUsers ,
+.Cm AllowUsers ,
+.Cm DenyGroups ,
+and finally
+.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Pp
+See PATTERNS in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm FingerprintHash
+Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints.
+Valid options are:
+.Dq md5
+and
+.Dq sha256 .
+The default is
+.Dq sha256 .
+.It Cm ForceCommand
+Forces the execution of the command specified by
+.Cm ForceCommand ,
+ignoring any command supplied by the client and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+if present.
+The command is invoked by using the user's login shell with the -c option.
+This applies to shell, command, or subsystem execution.
+It is most useful inside a
+.Cm Match
+block.
+The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
+.Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
+environment variable.
+Specifying a command of
+.Dq internal-sftp
+will force the use of an in-process sftp server that requires no support
+files when used with
+.Cm ChrootDirectory .
+The default is
+.Dq none .
+.It Cm GatewayPorts
+Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports
+forwarded for the client.
+By default,
+.Xr sshd 8
+binds remote port forwardings to the loopback address.
+This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+can be used to specify that sshd
+should allow remote port forwardings to bind to non-loopback addresses, thus
+allowing other hosts to connect.
+The argument may be
+.Dq no
+to force remote port forwardings to be available to the local host only,
+.Dq yes
+to force remote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or
+.Dq clientspecified
+to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
+Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
+Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+on logout.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
+Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
+a client authenticates against.
+If set to
+.Dq yes
+then the client must authenticate against the
+.Pa host
+service on the current hostname.
+If set to
+.Dq no
+then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the
+machine's default store.
+This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
+Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
+as a comma-separated pattern list.
+Alternately if the specified value begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
+instead of replacing them.
+The default for this option is:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The
+.Fl Q
+option of
+.Xr ssh 1
+may be used to list supported key types.
+.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
+with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
+(host-based authentication).
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly
+Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a reverse
+name lookup when matching the name in the
+.Pa ~/.shosts ,
+.Pa ~/.rhosts ,
+and
+.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+files during
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
+A setting of
+.Dq yes
+means that
+.Xr sshd 8
+uses the name supplied by the client rather than
+attempting to resolve the name from the TCP connection itself.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm HostCertificate
+Specifies a file containing a public host certificate.
+The certificate's public key must match a private host key already specified
+by
+.Cm HostKey .
+The default behaviour of
+.Xr sshd 8
+is not to load any certificates.
+.It Cm HostKey
+Specifies a file containing a private host key
+used by SSH.
+The default is
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+for protocol version 1, and
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key ,
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ,
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+and
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+for protocol version 2.
+.Pp
+Note that
+.Xr sshd 8
+will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessible
+and that the
+.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+option restricts which of the keys are actually used by
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+.Pp
+It is possible to have multiple host key files.
+.Dq rsa1
+keys are used for version 1 and
+.Dq dsa ,
+.Dq ecdsa ,
+.Dq ed25519
+or
+.Dq rsa
+are used for version 2 of the SSH protocol.
+It is also possible to specify public host key files instead.
+In this case operations on the private key will be delegated
+to an
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+.It Cm HostKeyAgent
+Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate
+with an agent that has access to the private host keys.
+If the string
+.Dq SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the
+.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+environment variable.
+.It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+Specifies the host key algorithms
+that the server offers.
+The default for this option is:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The list of available key types may also be obtained using the
+.Fl Q
+option of
+.Xr ssh 1
+with an argument of
+.Dq key .
+.It Cm IgnoreRhosts
+Specifies that
+.Pa .rhosts
+and
+.Pa .shosts
+files will not be used in
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+or
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
+.Pp
+.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+and
+.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
+are still used.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts
+Specifies whether
+.Xr sshd 8
+should ignore the user's
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+during
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+or
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm IPQoS
+Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection.
+Accepted values are
+.Dq af11 ,
+.Dq af12 ,
+.Dq af13 ,
+.Dq af21 ,
+.Dq af22 ,
+.Dq af23 ,
+.Dq af31 ,
+.Dq af32 ,
+.Dq af33 ,
+.Dq af41 ,
+.Dq af42 ,
+.Dq af43 ,
+.Dq cs0 ,
+.Dq cs1 ,
+.Dq cs2 ,
+.Dq cs3 ,
+.Dq cs4 ,
+.Dq cs5 ,
+.Dq cs6 ,
+.Dq cs7 ,
+.Dq ef ,
+.Dq lowdelay ,
+.Dq throughput ,
+.Dq reliability ,
+or a numeric value.
+This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace.
+If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally.
+If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for
+interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions.
+The default is
+.Dq lowdelay
+for interactive sessions and
+.Dq throughput
+for non-interactive sessions.
+.It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is to use whatever value
+.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+is set to
+(by default
+.Dq yes ) .
+.It Cm KerberosAuthentication
+Specifies whether the password provided by the user for
+.Cm PasswordAuthentication
+will be validated through the Kerberos KDC.
+To use this option, the server needs a
+Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm KerberosGetAFSToken
+If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to acquire
+an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm KerberosOrLocalPasswd
+If password authentication through Kerberos fails then
+the password will be validated via any additional local mechanism
+such as
+.Pa /etc/passwd .
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm KerberosTicketCleanup
+Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
+file on logout.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm KexAlgorithms
+Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+Alternately if the specified value begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
+instead of replacing them.
+The supported algorithms are:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
+.It
+curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org
+.It
+diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
+.It
+diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
+.It
+diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
+.It
+diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
+.It
+ecdh-sha2-nistp256
+.It
+ecdh-sha2-nistp384
+.It
+ecdh-sha2-nistp521
+.El
+.Pp
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org,
+ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using the
+.Fl Q
+option of
+.Xr ssh 1
+with an argument of
+.Dq kex .
+.It Cm KeyRegenerationInterval
+In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically regenerated
+after this many seconds (if it has been used).
+The purpose of regeneration is to prevent
+decrypting captured sessions by later breaking into the machine and
+stealing the keys.
+The key is never stored anywhere.
+If the value is 0, the key is never regenerated.
+The default is 3600 (seconds).
+.It Cm ListenAddress
+Specifies the local addresses
+.Xr sshd 8
+should listen on.
+The following forms may be used:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
+.It
+.Cm ListenAddress
+.Sm off
+.Ar host | Ar IPv4_addr | Ar IPv6_addr
+.Sm on
+.It
+.Cm ListenAddress
+.Sm off
+.Ar host | Ar IPv4_addr : Ar port
+.Sm on
+.It
+.Cm ListenAddress
+.Sm off
+.Oo
+.Ar host | Ar IPv6_addr Oc : Ar port
+.Sm on
+.El
+.Pp
+If
+.Ar port
+is not specified,
+sshd will listen on the address and all
+.Cm Port
+options specified.
+The default is to listen on all local addresses.
+Multiple
+.Cm ListenAddress
+options are permitted.
+.It Cm LoginGraceTime
+The server disconnects after this time if the user has not
+successfully logged in.
+If the value is 0, there is no time limit.
+The default is 120 seconds.
+.It Cm LogLevel
+Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+The possible values are:
+QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
+The default is INFO.
+DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
+Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
+.It Cm MACs
+Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
+The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
+Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+instead of replacing them.
+.Pp
+The algorithms that contain
+.Dq -etm
+calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
+These are considered safer and their use recommended.
+The supported MACs are:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
+.It
+hmac-md5
+.It
+hmac-md5-96
+.It
+hmac-ripemd160
+.It
+hmac-sha1
+.It
+hmac-sha1-96
+.It
+hmac-sha2-256
+.It
+hmac-sha2-512
+.It
+umac-64 at openssh.com
+.It
+umac-128 at openssh.com
+.It
+hmac-md5-etm at openssh.com
+.It
+hmac-md5-96-etm at openssh.com
+.It
+hmac-ripemd160-etm at openssh.com
+.It
+hmac-sha1-etm at openssh.com
+.It
+hmac-sha1-96-etm at openssh.com
+.It
+hmac-sha2-256-etm at openssh.com
+.It
+hmac-sha2-512-etm at openssh.com
+.It
+umac-64-etm at openssh.com
+.It
+umac-128-etm at openssh.com
+.El
+.Pp
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+umac-64-etm at openssh.com,umac-128-etm at openssh.com,
+hmac-sha2-256-etm at openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm at openssh.com,
+hmac-sha1-etm at openssh.com,
+umac-64 at openssh.com,umac-128 at openssh.com,
+hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using the
+.Fl Q
+option of
+.Xr ssh 1
+with an argument of
+.Dq mac .
+.It Cm Match
+Introduces a conditional block.
+If all of the criteria on the
+.Cm Match
+line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines override those
+set in the global section of the config file, until either another
+.Cm Match
+line or the end of the file.
+If a keyword appears in multiple
+.Cm Match
+blocks that are satisfied, only the first instance of the keyword is
+applied.
+.Pp
+The arguments to
+.Cm Match
+are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or the single token
+.Cm All
+which matches all criteria.
+The available criteria are
+.Cm User ,
+.Cm Group ,
+.Cm Host ,
+.Cm LocalAddress ,
+.Cm LocalPort ,
+and
+.Cm Address .
+The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma-separated
+lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the
+PATTERNS section of
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.Pp
+The patterns in an
+.Cm Address
+criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR
+address/masklen format, e.g.\&
+.Dq 192.0.2.0/24
+or
+.Dq 3ffe:ffff::/32 .
+Note that the mask length provided must be consistent with the address -
+it is an error to specify a mask length that is too long for the address
+or one with bits set in this host portion of the address.
+For example,
+.Dq 192.0.2.0/33
+and
+.Dq 192.0.2.0/8
+respectively.
+.Pp
+Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a
+.Cm Match
+keyword.
+Available keywords are
+.Cm AcceptEnv ,
+.Cm AllowAgentForwarding ,
+.Cm AllowGroups ,
+.Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding ,
+.Cm AllowTcpForwarding ,
+.Cm AllowUsers ,
+.Cm AuthenticationMethods ,
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand ,
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ,
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile ,
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand ,
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser ,
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile ,
+.Cm Banner ,
+.Cm ChrootDirectory ,
+.Cm DenyGroups ,
+.Cm DenyUsers ,
+.Cm ForceCommand ,
+.Cm GatewayPorts ,
+.Cm GSSAPIAuthentication ,
+.Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes ,
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication ,
+.Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly ,
+.Cm IPQoS ,
+.Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
+.Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
+.Cm MaxAuthTries ,
+.Cm MaxSessions ,
+.Cm PasswordAuthentication ,
+.Cm PermitEmptyPasswords ,
+.Cm PermitOpen ,
+.Cm PermitRootLogin ,
+.Cm PermitTTY ,
+.Cm PermitTunnel ,
+.Cm PermitUserRC ,
+.Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ,
+.Cm PubkeyAuthentication ,
+.Cm RekeyLimit ,
+.Cm RevokedKeys ,
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication ,
+.Cm RSAAuthentication ,
+.Cm StreamLocalBindMask ,
+.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink ,
+.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
+.Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
+.Cm X11Forwarding
+and
+.Cm X11UseLocalHost .
+.It Cm MaxAuthTries
+Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted per
+connection.
+Once the number of failures reaches half this value,
+additional failures are logged.
+The default is 6.
+.It Cm MaxSessions
+Specifies the maximum number of open shell, login or subsystem (e.g. sftp)
+sessions permitted per network connection.
+Multiple sessions may be established by clients that support connection
+multiplexing.
+Setting
+.Cm MaxSessions
+to 1 will effectively disable session multiplexing, whereas setting it to 0
+will prevent all shell, login and subsystem sessions while still permitting
+forwarding.
+The default is 10.
+.It Cm MaxStartups
+Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the
+SSH daemon.
+Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the
+.Cm LoginGraceTime
+expires for a connection.
+The default is 10:30:100.
+.Pp
+Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying
+the three colon separated values
+.Dq start:rate:full
+(e.g. "10:30:60").
+.Xr sshd 8
+will refuse connection attempts with a probability of
+.Dq rate/100
+(30%)
+if there are currently
+.Dq start
+(10)
+unauthenticated connections.
+The probability increases linearly and all connection attempts
+are refused if the number of unauthenticated connections reaches
+.Dq full
+(60).
+.It Cm PasswordAuthentication
+Specifies whether password authentication is allowed.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm PermitEmptyPasswords
+When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
+server allows login to accounts with empty password strings.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm PermitOpen
+Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is permitted.
+The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
+.It
+.Cm PermitOpen
+.Sm off
+.Ar host : port
+.Sm on
+.It
+.Cm PermitOpen
+.Sm off
+.Ar IPv4_addr : port
+.Sm on
+.It
+.Cm PermitOpen
+.Sm off
+.Ar \&[ IPv6_addr \&] : port
+.Sm on
+.El
+.Pp
+Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace.
+An argument of
+.Dq any
+can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests.
+An argument of
+.Dq none
+can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests.
+The wildcard
+.Dq *
+can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or ports, respectively.
+By default all port forwarding requests are permitted.
+.It Cm PermitRootLogin
+Specifies whether root can log in using
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes ,
+.Dq prohibit-password ,
+.Dq without-password ,
+.Dq forced-commands-only ,
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq prohibit-password .
+.Pp
+If this option is set to
+.Dq prohibit-password
+or
+.Dq without-password ,
+password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for root.
+.Pp
+If this option is set to
+.Dq forced-commands-only ,
+root login with public key authentication will be allowed,
+but only if the
+.Ar command
+option has been specified
+(which may be useful for taking remote backups even if root login is
+normally not allowed).
+All other authentication methods are disabled for root.
+.Pp
+If this option is set to
+.Dq no ,
+root is not allowed to log in.
+.It Cm PermitTunnel
+Specifies whether
+.Xr tun 4
+device forwarding is allowed.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes ,
+.Dq point-to-point
+(layer 3),
+.Dq ethernet
+(layer 2), or
+.Dq no .
+Specifying
+.Dq yes
+permits both
+.Dq point-to-point
+and
+.Dq ethernet .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.Pp
+Independent of this setting, the permissions of the selected
+.Xr tun 4
+device must allow access to the user.
+.It Cm PermitTTY
+Specifies whether
+.Xr pty 4
+allocation is permitted.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm PermitUserEnvironment
+Specifies whether
+.Pa ~/.ssh/environment
+and
+.Cm environment=
+options in
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+are processed by
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Enabling environment processing may enable users to bypass access
+restrictions in some configurations using mechanisms such as
+.Ev LD_PRELOAD .
+.It Cm PermitUserRC
+Specifies whether any
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+file is executed.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm PidFile
+Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the
+SSH daemon, or
+.Dq none
+to not write one.
+The default is
+.Pa /var/run/sshd.pid .
+.It Cm Port
+Specifies the port number that
+.Xr sshd 8
+listens on.
+The default is 22.
+Multiple options of this type are permitted.
+See also
+.Cm ListenAddress .
+.It Cm PrintLastLog
+Specifies whether
+.Xr sshd 8
+should print the date and time of the last user login when a user logs
+in interactively.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm PrintMotd
+Specifies whether
+.Xr sshd 8
+should print
+.Pa /etc/motd
+when a user logs in interactively.
+(On some systems it is also printed by the shell,
+.Pa /etc/profile ,
+or equivalent.)
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm Protocol
+Specifies the protocol versions
+.Xr sshd 8
+supports.
+The possible values are
+.Sq 1
+and
+.Sq 2 .
+Multiple versions must be comma-separated.
+The default is
+.Sq 2 .
+Protocol 1 suffers from a number of cryptographic weaknesses and should
+not be used.
+It is only offered to support legacy devices.
+.Pp
+Note that the order of the protocol list does not indicate preference,
+because the client selects among multiple protocol versions offered
+by the server.
+Specifying
+.Dq 2,1
+is identical to
+.Dq 1,2 .
+.It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication
+as a comma-separated pattern list.
+Alternately if the specified value begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
+instead of replacing them.
+The default for this option is:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The
+.Fl Q
+option of
+.Xr ssh 1
+may be used to list supported key types.
+.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
+Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm RekeyLimit
+Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the
+session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of
+time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated.
+The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of
+.Sq K ,
+.Sq M ,
+or
+.Sq G
+to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively.
+The default is between
+.Sq 1G
+and
+.Sq 4G ,
+depending on the cipher.
+The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the
+units documented in the
+.Sx TIME FORMATS
+section.
+The default value for
+.Cm RekeyLimit
+is
+.Dq default none ,
+which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount
+of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
+.It Cm RevokedKeys
+Specifies revoked public keys file, or
+.Dq none
+to not use one.
+Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key authentication.
+Note that if this file is not readable, then public key authentication will
+be refused for all users.
+Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as
+an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+.It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
+with successful RSA host authentication is allowed.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+This option applies to protocol version 1 only.
+.It Cm RSAAuthentication
+Specifies whether pure RSA authentication is allowed.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+This option applies to protocol version 1 only.
+.It Cm ServerKeyBits
+Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key.
+The default and minimum value is 1024.
+.It Cm StreamLocalBindMask
+Sets the octal file creation mode mask
+.Pq umask
+used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote
+port forwarding.
+This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file.
+.Pp
+The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is
+readable and writable only by the owner.
+Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain
+socket files.
+.It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink
+Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local
+or remote port forwarding before creating a new one.
+If the socket file already exists and
+.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink
+is not enabled,
+.Nm sshd
+will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file.
+This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file.
+.Pp
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm StrictModes
+Specifies whether
+.Xr sshd 8
+should check file modes and ownership of the
+user's files and home directory before accepting login.
+This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally leave their
+directory or files world-writable.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+Note that this does not apply to
+.Cm ChrootDirectory ,
+whose permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally.
+.It Cm Subsystem
+Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon).
+Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional arguments)
+to execute upon subsystem request.
+.Pp
+The command
+.Xr sftp-server 8
+implements the
+.Dq sftp
+file transfer subsystem.
+.Pp
+Alternately the name
+.Dq internal-sftp
+implements an in-process
+.Dq sftp
+server.
+This may simplify configurations using
+.Cm ChrootDirectory
+to force a different filesystem root on clients.
+.Pp
+By default no subsystems are defined.
+.It Cm SyslogFacility
+Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+The default is AUTH.
+.It Cm TCPKeepAlive
+Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
+other side.
+If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
+of the machines will be properly noticed.
+However, this means that
+connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
+find it annoying.
+On the other hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent,
+sessions may hang indefinitely on the server, leaving
+.Dq ghost
+users and consuming server resources.
+.Pp
+The default is
+.Dq yes
+(to send TCP keepalive messages), and the server will notice
+if the network goes down or the client host crashes.
+This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
+.Pp
+To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
+Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are
+trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or
+.Dq none
+to not use one.
+Keys are listed one per line; empty lines and comments starting with
+.Ql #
+are allowed.
+If a certificate is presented for authentication and has its signing CA key
+listed in this file, then it may be used for authentication for any user
+listed in the certificate's principals list.
+Note that certificates that lack a list of principals will not be permitted
+for authentication using
+.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys .
+For more details on certificates, see the CERTIFICATES section in
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+.It Cm UseDNS
+Specifies whether
+.Xr sshd 8
+should look up the remote host name, and to check that
+the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the
+very same IP address.
+.Pp
+If this option is set to
+.Dq no
+(the default) then only addresses and not host names may be used in
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+.Cm from
+and
+.Nm
+.Cm Match
+.Cm Host
+directives.
+.It Cm UseLogin
+Specifies whether
+.Xr login 1
+is used for interactive login sessions.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Note that
+.Xr login 1
+is never used for remote command execution.
+Note also, that if this is enabled,
+.Cm X11Forwarding
+will be disabled because
+.Xr login 1
+does not know how to handle
+.Xr xauth 1
+cookies.
+If
+.Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
+is specified, it will be disabled after authentication.
+.It Cm UsePAM
+Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface.
+If set to
+.Dq yes
+this will enable PAM authentication using
+.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+and
+.Cm PasswordAuthentication
+in addition to PAM account and session module processing for all
+authentication types.
+.Pp
+Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an equivalent
+role to password authentication, you should disable either
+.Cm PasswordAuthentication
+or
+.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication.
+.Pp
+If
+.Cm UsePAM
+is enabled, you will not be able to run
+.Xr sshd 8
+as a non-root user.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
+Specifies whether
+.Xr sshd 8
+separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process
+to deal with incoming network traffic.
+After successful authentication, another process will be created that has
+the privilege of the authenticated user.
+The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege
+escalation by containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes ,
+.Dq no ,
+or
+.Dq sandbox .
+If
+.Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
+is set to
+.Dq sandbox
+then the pre-authentication unprivileged process is subject to additional
+restrictions.
+The default is
+.Dq sandbox .
+.It Cm VersionAddendum
+Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner
+sent by the server upon connection.
+The default is
+.Dq none .
+.It Cm X11DisplayOffset
+Specifies the first display number available for
+.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
+X11 forwarding.
+This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
+The default is 10.
+.It Cm X11Forwarding
+Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.Pp
+When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to
+the server and to client displays if the
+.Xr sshd 8
+proxy display is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see
+.Cm X11UseLocalhost
+below), though this is not the default.
+Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data
+verification and substitution occur on the client side.
+The security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11
+display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests
+forwarding (see the warnings for
+.Cm ForwardX11
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ) .
+A system administrator may have a stance in which they want to
+protect clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly
+requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a
+.Dq no
+setting.
+.Pp
+Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from
+forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own forwarders.
+X11 forwarding is automatically disabled if
+.Cm UseLogin
+is enabled.
+.It Cm X11UseLocalhost
+Specifies whether
+.Xr sshd 8
+should bind the X11 forwarding server to the loopback address or to
+the wildcard address.
+By default,
+sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the
+hostname part of the
+.Ev DISPLAY
+environment variable to
+.Dq localhost .
+This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display.
+However, some older X11 clients may not function with this
+configuration.
+.Cm X11UseLocalhost
+may be set to
+.Dq no
+to specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the wildcard
+address.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm XAuthLocation
+Specifies the full pathname of the
+.Xr xauth 1
+program, or
+.Dq none
+to not use one.
+The default is
+.Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth .
+.El
+.Sh TIME FORMATS
+.Xr sshd 8
+command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time
+may be expressed using a sequence of the form:
+.Sm off
+.Ar time Op Ar qualifier ,
+.Sm on
+where
+.Ar time
+is a positive integer value and
+.Ar qualifier
+is one of the following:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent
+.It Aq Cm none
+seconds
+.It Cm s | Cm S
+seconds
+.It Cm m | Cm M
+minutes
+.It Cm h | Cm H
+hours
+.It Cm d | Cm D
+days
+.It Cm w | Cm W
+weeks
+.El
+.Pp
+Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate
+the total time value.
+.Pp
+Time format examples:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent
+.It 600
+600 seconds (10 minutes)
+.It 10m
+10 minutes
+.It 1h30m
+1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes)
+.El
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+Contains configuration data for
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended
+(though not necessary) that it be world-readable.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
+for privilege separation.
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssherr.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssherr.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssherr.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssherr.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.c,v 1.5 2015/09/13 14:39:16 tim Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+const char *
+ssh_err(int n)
+{
+ switch (n) {
+ case SSH_ERR_SUCCESS:
+ return "success";
+ case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+ return "unexpected internal error";
+ case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL:
+ return "memory allocation failed";
+ case SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE:
+ return "incomplete message";
+ case SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT:
+ return "invalid format";
+ case SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE:
+ return "bignum is negative";
+ case SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE:
+ return "string is too large";
+ case SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE:
+ return "bignum is too large";
+ case SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE:
+ return "elliptic curve point is too large";
+ case SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE:
+ return "insufficient buffer space";
+ case SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:
+ return "invalid argument";
+ case SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH:
+ return "key bits do not match";
+ case SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID:
+ return "invalid elliptic curve";
+ case SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH:
+ return "key type does not match";
+ case SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN:
+ return "unknown or unsupported key type";
+ case SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH:
+ return "elliptic curve does not match";
+ case SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT:
+ return "plain key provided where certificate required";
+ case SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB:
+ return "key lacks certificate data";
+ case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE:
+ return "unknown/unsupported certificate type";
+ case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY:
+ return "invalid certificate signing key";
+ case SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE:
+ return "invalid elliptic curve value";
+ case SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID:
+ return "incorrect signature";
+ case SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR:
+ return "error in libcrypto"; /* XXX fetch and return */
+ case SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA:
+ return "unexpected bytes remain after decoding";
+ case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
+ return strerror(errno);
+ case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID:
+ return "invalid certificate";
+ case SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION:
+ return "communication with agent failed";
+ case SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE:
+ return "agent refused operation";
+ case SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE:
+ return "DH GEX group out of range";
+ case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
+ return "disconnected";
+ case SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID:
+ return "message authentication code incorrect";
+ case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH:
+ return "no matching cipher found";
+ case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH:
+ return "no matching MAC found";
+ case SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH:
+ return "no matching compression method found";
+ case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH:
+ return "no matching key exchange method found";
+ case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH:
+ return "no matching host key type found";
+ case SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH:
+ return "protocol version mismatch";
+ case SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
+ return "could not read protocol version";
+ case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED:
+ return "could not load host key";
+ case SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY:
+ return "rekeying not supported by peer";
+ case SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT:
+ return "passphrase is too short (minimum five characters)";
+ case SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED:
+ return "file changed while reading";
+ case SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER:
+ return "key encrypted using unsupported cipher";
+ case SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE:
+ return "incorrect passphrase supplied to decrypt private key";
+ case SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS:
+ return "bad permissions";
+ case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH:
+ return "certificate does not match key";
+ case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND:
+ return "key not found";
+ case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT:
+ return "agent not present";
+ case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES:
+ return "agent contains no identities";
+ case SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY:
+ return "internal error: buffer is read-only";
+ case SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC:
+ return "KRL file has invalid magic number";
+ case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED:
+ return "Key is revoked";
+ case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
+ return "Connection closed";
+ case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
+ return "Connection timed out";
+ case SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT:
+ return "Connection corrupted";
+ case SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR:
+ return "Protocol error";
+ default:
+ return "unknown error";
+ }
+}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssherr.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssherr.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssherr.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ssherr.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.h,v 1.3 2015/01/30 01:13:33 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SSHERR_H
+#define _SSHERR_H
+
+/* XXX are these too granular? not granular enough? I can't decide - djm */
+
+/* Error codes */
+#define SSH_ERR_SUCCESS 0
+#define SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR -1
+#define SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL -2
+#define SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE -3
+#define SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT -4
+#define SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE -5
+#define SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE -6
+#define SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE -7
+#define SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE -8
+#define SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE -9
+#define SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT -10
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH -11
+#define SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID -12
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH -13
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN -14 /* XXX UNSUPPORTED? */
+#define SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH -15
+#define SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT -16
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB -17
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE -18
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY -19
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE -20
+#define SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID -21
+#define SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR -22
+#define SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA -23
+#define SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR -24
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID -25
+#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION -26
+#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE -27
+#define SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE -28
+#define SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED -29
+#define SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID -30
+#define SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH -31
+#define SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH -32
+#define SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH -33
+#define SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH -34
+#define SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH -35
+#define SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED -36
+#define SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH -37
+#define SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION -38
+#define SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY -39
+#define SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT -40
+#define SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED -41
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER -42
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE -43
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS -44
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH -45
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND -46
+#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT -47
+#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES -48
+#define SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY -49
+#define SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC -50
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED -51
+#define SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED -52
+#define SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT -53
+#define SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT -54
+#define SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR -55
+
+/* Translate a numeric error code to a human-readable error string */
+const char *ssh_err(int n);
+
+#endif /* _SSHERR_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshkey.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshkey.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshkey.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshkey.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,3917 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.35 2016/06/19 07:48:02 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010,2011 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h> /* MIN MAX */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+#include <util.h>
+#endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */
+
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "match.h"
+
+/* openssh private key file format */
+#define MARK_BEGIN "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+#define MARK_END "-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+#define MARK_BEGIN_LEN (sizeof(MARK_BEGIN) - 1)
+#define MARK_END_LEN (sizeof(MARK_END) - 1)
+#define KDFNAME "bcrypt"
+#define AUTH_MAGIC "openssh-key-v1"
+#define SALT_LEN 16
+#define DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME "aes256-cbc"
+#define DEFAULT_ROUNDS 16
+
+/* Version identification string for SSH v1 identity files. */
+#define LEGACY_BEGIN "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE FORMAT 1.1\n"
+
+static int sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *buf,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, int allow_cert);
+
+/* Supported key types */
+struct keytype {
+ const char *name;
+ const char *shortname;
+ int type;
+ int nid;
+ int cert;
+ int sigonly;
+};
+static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
+ { "ssh-ed25519", "ED25519", KEY_ED25519, 0, 0, 0 },
+ { "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com", "ED25519-CERT",
+ KEY_ED25519_CERT, 0, 1, 0 },
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ { NULL, "RSA1", KEY_RSA1, 0, 0, 0 },
+ { "ssh-rsa", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 0 },
+ { "rsa-sha2-256", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 },
+ { "rsa-sha2-512", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 },
+ { "ssh-dss", "DSA", KEY_DSA, 0, 0, 0 },
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "ECDSA", KEY_ECDSA, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 0, 0 },
+ { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384", "ECDSA", KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp384r1, 0, 0 },
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+ { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521", "ECDSA", KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp521r1, 0, 0 },
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+ { "ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com", "RSA-CERT", KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1, 0 },
+ { "ssh-dss-cert-v01 at openssh.com", "DSA-CERT", KEY_DSA_CERT, 0, 1, 0 },
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT",
+ KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1, 0 },
+ { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT",
+ KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp384r1, 1, 0 },
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+ { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT",
+ KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp521r1, 1, 0 },
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 }
+};
+
+const char *
+sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ const struct keytype *kt;
+
+ for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
+ if (kt->type == k->type)
+ return kt->shortname;
+ }
+ return "unknown";
+}
+
+static const char *
+sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(int type, int nid)
+{
+ const struct keytype *kt;
+
+ for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
+ if (kt->type == type && (kt->nid == 0 || kt->nid == nid))
+ return kt->name;
+ }
+ return "ssh-unknown";
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_type_is_cert(int type)
+{
+ const struct keytype *kt;
+
+ for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
+ if (kt->type == type)
+ return kt->cert;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+const char *
+sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(k->type, k->ecdsa_nid);
+}
+
+const char *
+sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(sshkey_type_plain(k->type),
+ k->ecdsa_nid);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_type_from_name(const char *name)
+{
+ const struct keytype *kt;
+
+ for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
+ /* Only allow shortname matches for plain key types */
+ if ((kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0) ||
+ (!kt->cert && strcasecmp(kt->shortname, name) == 0))
+ return kt->type;
+ }
+ return KEY_UNSPEC;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *name)
+{
+ const struct keytype *kt;
+
+ for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
+ if (kt->type != KEY_ECDSA && kt->type != KEY_ECDSA_CERT)
+ continue;
+ if (kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0)
+ return kt->nid;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+char *
+key_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only)
+{
+ char *tmp, *ret = NULL;
+ size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
+ const struct keytype *kt;
+
+ for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
+ if (kt->name == NULL || kt->sigonly)
+ continue;
+ if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert))
+ continue;
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ ret[rlen++] = '\n';
+ nlen = strlen(kt->name);
+ if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
+ free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret = tmp;
+ memcpy(ret + rlen, kt->name, nlen + 1);
+ rlen += nlen;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_names_valid2(const char *names, int allow_wildcard)
+{
+ char *s, *cp, *p;
+ const struct keytype *kt;
+ int type;
+
+ if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ type = sshkey_type_from_name(p);
+ if (type == KEY_RSA1) {
+ free(s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+ if (allow_wildcard) {
+ /*
+ * Try matching key types against the string.
+ * If any has a positive or negative match then
+ * the component is accepted.
+ */
+ for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
+ if (kt->type == KEY_RSA1)
+ continue;
+ if (match_pattern_list(kt->name,
+ p, 0) != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (kt->type != -1)
+ continue;
+ }
+ free(s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ free(s);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+u_int
+sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ switch (k->type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n);
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p);
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ return sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(k->ecdsa_nid);
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ return 256; /* XXX */
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ if (k == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type);
+}
+
+/* Return the cert-less equivalent to a certified key type */
+int
+sshkey_type_plain(int type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ return KEY_RSA;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ return KEY_DSA;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ return KEY_ECDSA;
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ return KEY_ED25519;
+ default:
+ return type;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+/* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
+int
+sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
+{
+ if (strcmp(name, "nistp256") == 0)
+ return NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+ else if (strcmp(name, "nistp384") == 0)
+ return NID_secp384r1;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+ else if (strcmp(name, "nistp521") == 0)
+ return NID_secp521r1;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+ else
+ return -1;
+}
+
+u_int
+sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int nid)
+{
+ switch (nid) {
+ case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
+ return 256;
+ case NID_secp384r1:
+ return 384;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+ case NID_secp521r1:
+ return 521;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int bits)
+{
+ switch (bits) {
+ case 256:
+ return NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+ case 384:
+ return NID_secp384r1;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+ case 521:
+ return NID_secp521r1;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+const char *
+sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int nid)
+{
+ switch (nid) {
+ case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
+ return "nistp256";
+ case NID_secp384r1:
+ return "nistp384";
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+ case NID_secp521r1:
+ return "nistp521";
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid)
+{
+ int kbits = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid);
+
+ if (kbits <= 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* RFC5656 section 6.2.1 */
+ if (kbits <= 256)
+ return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
+ else if (kbits <= 384)
+ return SSH_DIGEST_SHA384;
+ else
+ return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+static void
+cert_free(struct sshkey_cert *cert)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ if (cert == NULL)
+ return;
+ sshbuf_free(cert->certblob);
+ sshbuf_free(cert->critical);
+ sshbuf_free(cert->extensions);
+ free(cert->key_id);
+ for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++)
+ free(cert->principals[i]);
+ free(cert->principals);
+ sshkey_free(cert->signature_key);
+ explicit_bzero(cert, sizeof(*cert));
+ free(cert);
+}
+
+static struct sshkey_cert *
+cert_new(void)
+{
+ struct sshkey_cert *cert;
+
+ if ((cert = calloc(1, sizeof(*cert))) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if ((cert->certblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (cert->critical = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (cert->extensions = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ cert_free(cert);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ cert->key_id = NULL;
+ cert->principals = NULL;
+ cert->signature_key = NULL;
+ return cert;
+}
+
+struct sshkey *
+sshkey_new(int type)
+{
+ struct sshkey *k;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ RSA *rsa;
+ DSA *dsa;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+ if ((k = calloc(1, sizeof(*k))) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ k->type = type;
+ k->ecdsa = NULL;
+ k->ecdsa_nid = -1;
+ k->dsa = NULL;
+ k->rsa = NULL;
+ k->cert = NULL;
+ k->ed25519_sk = NULL;
+ k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
+ switch (k->type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL ||
+ (rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ if (rsa != NULL)
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ free(k);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ k->rsa = rsa;
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL ||
+ (dsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (dsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (dsa->g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (dsa->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ if (dsa != NULL)
+ DSA_free(dsa);
+ free(k);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ k->dsa = dsa;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ /* Cannot do anything until we know the group */
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ /* no need to prealloc */
+ break;
+ case KEY_UNSPEC:
+ break;
+ default:
+ free(k);
+ return NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) {
+ if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL) {
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return k;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_add_private(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ switch (k->type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+#define bn_maybe_alloc_failed(p) (p == NULL && (p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ if (bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->d) ||
+ bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->iqmp) ||
+ bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->q) ||
+ bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->p) ||
+ bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->dmq1) ||
+ bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->dmp1))
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ if (bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->dsa->priv_key))
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ break;
+#undef bn_maybe_alloc_failed
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ /* Cannot do anything until we know the group */
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ /* no need to prealloc */
+ break;
+ case KEY_UNSPEC:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct sshkey *
+sshkey_new_private(int type)
+{
+ struct sshkey *k = sshkey_new(type);
+
+ if (k == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (sshkey_add_private(k) != 0) {
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return k;
+}
+
+void
+sshkey_free(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ if (k == NULL)
+ return;
+ switch (k->type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ if (k->rsa != NULL)
+ RSA_free(k->rsa);
+ k->rsa = NULL;
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ if (k->dsa != NULL)
+ DSA_free(k->dsa);
+ k->dsa = NULL;
+ break;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ if (k->ecdsa != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(k->ecdsa);
+ k->ecdsa = NULL;
+ break;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ if (k->ed25519_pk) {
+ explicit_bzero(k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
+ free(k->ed25519_pk);
+ k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
+ }
+ if (k->ed25519_sk) {
+ explicit_bzero(k->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ);
+ free(k->ed25519_sk);
+ k->ed25519_sk = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+ case KEY_UNSPEC:
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(k))
+ cert_free(k->cert);
+ explicit_bzero(k, sizeof(*k));
+ free(k);
+}
+
+static int
+cert_compare(struct sshkey_cert *a, struct sshkey_cert *b)
+{
+ if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (sshbuf_len(a->certblob) != sshbuf_len(b->certblob))
+ return 0;
+ if (timingsafe_bcmp(sshbuf_ptr(a->certblob), sshbuf_ptr(b->certblob),
+ sshbuf_len(a->certblob)) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare public portions of key only, allowing comparisons between
+ * certificates and plain keys too.
+ */
+int
+sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
+{
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+ BN_CTX *bnctx;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
+ if (a == NULL || b == NULL ||
+ sshkey_type_plain(a->type) != sshkey_type_plain(b->type))
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (a->type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ return a->rsa != NULL && b->rsa != NULL &&
+ BN_cmp(a->rsa->e, b->rsa->e) == 0 &&
+ BN_cmp(a->rsa->n, b->rsa->n) == 0;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ return a->dsa != NULL && b->dsa != NULL &&
+ BN_cmp(a->dsa->p, b->dsa->p) == 0 &&
+ BN_cmp(a->dsa->q, b->dsa->q) == 0 &&
+ BN_cmp(a->dsa->g, b->dsa->g) == 0 &&
+ BN_cmp(a->dsa->pub_key, b->dsa->pub_key) == 0;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ if (a->ecdsa == NULL || b->ecdsa == NULL ||
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa) == NULL ||
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (EC_GROUP_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa),
+ EC_KEY_get0_group(b->ecdsa), bnctx) != 0 ||
+ EC_POINT_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa),
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa),
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa), bnctx) != 0) {
+ BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ return 1;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ return a->ed25519_pk != NULL && b->ed25519_pk != NULL &&
+ memcmp(a->ed25519_pk, b->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ) == 0;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
+{
+ if (a == NULL || b == NULL || a->type != b->type)
+ return 0;
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(a)) {
+ if (!cert_compare(a->cert, b->cert))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return sshkey_equal_public(a, b);
+}
+
+static int
+to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, int force_plain)
+{
+ int type, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ const char *typename;
+
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+ if (key->cert == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT;
+ if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB;
+ }
+ type = force_plain ? sshkey_type_plain(key->type) : key->type;
+ typename = sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid);
+
+ switch (type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ /* Use the existing blob */
+ /* XXX modified flag? */
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+ break;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ if (key->dsa == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+ break;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ if (key->ecdsa == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b,
+ sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+ break;
+# endif
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ if (key->rsa == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ if (key->ed25519_pk == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b,
+ key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+ return to_blob_buf(key, b, 0);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *tmp;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((tmp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ r = to_blob_buf(key, tmp, 0);
+ if (r == 0)
+ r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, tmp);
+ sshbuf_free(tmp);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_putb_plain(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+ return to_blob_buf(key, b, 1);
+}
+
+static int
+to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp, int force_plain)
+{
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ size_t len;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = 0;
+ if (blobp != NULL)
+ *blobp = NULL;
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((ret = to_blob_buf(key, b, force_plain)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ len = sshbuf_len(b);
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = len;
+ if (blobp != NULL) {
+ if ((*blobp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(*blobp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+ return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 0);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+ return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 1);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg,
+ u_char **retp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+ u_char *blob = NULL, *ret = NULL;
+ size_t blob_len = 0;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (retp != NULL)
+ *retp = NULL;
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = 0;
+ if (ssh_digest_bytes(dgst_alg) == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (k->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ int nlen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->n);
+ int elen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->e);
+
+ blob_len = nlen + elen;
+ if (nlen >= INT_MAX - elen ||
+ (blob = malloc(blob_len)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->n, blob);
+ BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->e, blob + nlen);
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ } else if ((r = to_blob(k, &blob, &blob_len, 1)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((ret = calloc(1, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(dgst_alg, blob, blob_len,
+ ret, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* success */
+ if (retp != NULL) {
+ *retp = ret;
+ ret = NULL;
+ }
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = ssh_digest_bytes(dgst_alg);
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ free(ret);
+ if (blob != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(blob, blob_len);
+ free(blob);
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+static char *
+fingerprint_b64(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len)
+{
+ char *ret;
+ size_t plen = strlen(alg) + 1;
+ size_t rlen = ((dgst_raw_len + 2) / 3) * 4 + plen + 1;
+ int r;
+
+ if (dgst_raw_len > 65536 || (ret = calloc(1, rlen)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ strlcpy(ret, alg, rlen);
+ strlcat(ret, ":", rlen);
+ if (dgst_raw_len == 0)
+ return ret;
+ if ((r = b64_ntop(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len,
+ ret + plen, rlen - plen)) == -1) {
+ explicit_bzero(ret, rlen);
+ free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Trim padding characters from end */
+ ret[strcspn(ret, "=")] = '\0';
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static char *
+fingerprint_hex(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len)
+{
+ char *retval, hex[5];
+ size_t i, rlen = dgst_raw_len * 3 + strlen(alg) + 2;
+
+ if (dgst_raw_len > 65536 || (retval = calloc(1, rlen)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ strlcpy(retval, alg, rlen);
+ strlcat(retval, ":", rlen);
+ for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
+ snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%s%02x",
+ i > 0 ? ":" : "", dgst_raw[i]);
+ strlcat(retval, hex, rlen);
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+static char *
+fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len)
+{
+ char vowels[] = { 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o', 'u', 'y' };
+ char consonants[] = { 'b', 'c', 'd', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'k', 'l', 'm',
+ 'n', 'p', 'r', 's', 't', 'v', 'z', 'x' };
+ u_int i, j = 0, rounds, seed = 1;
+ char *retval;
+
+ rounds = (dgst_raw_len / 2) + 1;
+ if ((retval = calloc(rounds, 6)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ retval[j++] = 'x';
+ for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
+ u_int idx0, idx1, idx2, idx3, idx4;
+ if ((i + 1 < rounds) || (dgst_raw_len % 2 != 0)) {
+ idx0 = (((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 6) & 3) +
+ seed) % 6;
+ idx1 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 2) & 15;
+ idx2 = ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) & 3) +
+ (seed / 6)) % 6;
+ retval[j++] = vowels[idx0];
+ retval[j++] = consonants[idx1];
+ retval[j++] = vowels[idx2];
+ if ((i + 1) < rounds) {
+ idx3 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])) >> 4) & 15;
+ idx4 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1]))) & 15;
+ retval[j++] = consonants[idx3];
+ retval[j++] = '-';
+ retval[j++] = consonants[idx4];
+ seed = ((seed * 5) +
+ ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) * 7) +
+ ((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])))) % 36;
+ }
+ } else {
+ idx0 = seed % 6;
+ idx1 = 16;
+ idx2 = seed / 6;
+ retval[j++] = vowels[idx0];
+ retval[j++] = consonants[idx1];
+ retval[j++] = vowels[idx2];
+ }
+ }
+ retval[j++] = 'x';
+ retval[j++] = '\0';
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Draw an ASCII-Art representing the fingerprint so human brain can
+ * profit from its built-in pattern recognition ability.
+ * This technique is called "random art" and can be found in some
+ * scientific publications like this original paper:
+ *
+ * "Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security",
+ * Perrig A. and Song D., 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
+ * Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)
+ * sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/validation/validation.pdf
+ *
+ * The subject came up in a talk by Dan Kaminsky, too.
+ *
+ * If you see the picture is different, the key is different.
+ * If the picture looks the same, you still know nothing.
+ *
+ * The algorithm used here is a worm crawling over a discrete plane,
+ * leaving a trace (augmenting the field) everywhere it goes.
+ * Movement is taken from dgst_raw 2bit-wise. Bumping into walls
+ * makes the respective movement vector be ignored for this turn.
+ * Graphs are not unambiguous, because circles in graphs can be
+ * walked in either direction.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Field sizes for the random art. Have to be odd, so the starting point
+ * can be in the exact middle of the picture, and FLDBASE should be >=8 .
+ * Else pictures would be too dense, and drawing the frame would
+ * fail, too, because the key type would not fit in anymore.
+ */
+#define FLDBASE 8
+#define FLDSIZE_Y (FLDBASE + 1)
+#define FLDSIZE_X (FLDBASE * 2 + 1)
+static char *
+fingerprint_randomart(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len,
+ const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ /*
+ * Chars to be used after each other every time the worm
+ * intersects with itself. Matter of taste.
+ */
+ char *augmentation_string = " .o+=*BOX@%&#/^SE";
+ char *retval, *p, title[FLDSIZE_X], hash[FLDSIZE_X];
+ u_char field[FLDSIZE_X][FLDSIZE_Y];
+ size_t i, tlen, hlen;
+ u_int b;
+ int x, y, r;
+ size_t len = strlen(augmentation_string) - 1;
+
+ if ((retval = calloc((FLDSIZE_X + 3), (FLDSIZE_Y + 2))) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* initialize field */
+ memset(field, 0, FLDSIZE_X * FLDSIZE_Y * sizeof(char));
+ x = FLDSIZE_X / 2;
+ y = FLDSIZE_Y / 2;
+
+ /* process raw key */
+ for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
+ int input;
+ /* each byte conveys four 2-bit move commands */
+ input = dgst_raw[i];
+ for (b = 0; b < 4; b++) {
+ /* evaluate 2 bit, rest is shifted later */
+ x += (input & 0x1) ? 1 : -1;
+ y += (input & 0x2) ? 1 : -1;
+
+ /* assure we are still in bounds */
+ x = MAX(x, 0);
+ y = MAX(y, 0);
+ x = MIN(x, FLDSIZE_X - 1);
+ y = MIN(y, FLDSIZE_Y - 1);
+
+ /* augment the field */
+ if (field[x][y] < len - 2)
+ field[x][y]++;
+ input = input >> 2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* mark starting point and end point*/
+ field[FLDSIZE_X / 2][FLDSIZE_Y / 2] = len - 1;
+ field[x][y] = len;
+
+ /* assemble title */
+ r = snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s %u]",
+ sshkey_type(k), sshkey_size(k));
+ /* If [type size] won't fit, then try [type]; fits "[ED25519-CERT]" */
+ if (r < 0 || r > (int)sizeof(title))
+ r = snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s]", sshkey_type(k));
+ tlen = (r <= 0) ? 0 : strlen(title);
+
+ /* assemble hash ID. */
+ r = snprintf(hash, sizeof(hash), "[%s]", alg);
+ hlen = (r <= 0) ? 0 : strlen(hash);
+
+ /* output upper border */
+ p = retval;
+ *p++ = '+';
+ for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - tlen) / 2; i++)
+ *p++ = '-';
+ memcpy(p, title, tlen);
+ p += tlen;
+ for (i += tlen; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
+ *p++ = '-';
+ *p++ = '+';
+ *p++ = '\n';
+
+ /* output content */
+ for (y = 0; y < FLDSIZE_Y; y++) {
+ *p++ = '|';
+ for (x = 0; x < FLDSIZE_X; x++)
+ *p++ = augmentation_string[MIN(field[x][y], len)];
+ *p++ = '|';
+ *p++ = '\n';
+ }
+
+ /* output lower border */
+ *p++ = '+';
+ for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - hlen) / 2; i++)
+ *p++ = '-';
+ memcpy(p, hash, hlen);
+ p += hlen;
+ for (i += hlen; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
+ *p++ = '-';
+ *p++ = '+';
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+char *
+sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg,
+ enum sshkey_fp_rep dgst_rep)
+{
+ char *retval = NULL;
+ u_char *dgst_raw;
+ size_t dgst_raw_len;
+
+ if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(k, dgst_alg, &dgst_raw, &dgst_raw_len) != 0)
+ return NULL;
+ switch (dgst_rep) {
+ case SSH_FP_DEFAULT:
+ if (dgst_alg == SSH_DIGEST_MD5) {
+ retval = fingerprint_hex(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
+ dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+ } else {
+ retval = fingerprint_b64(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
+ dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSH_FP_HEX:
+ retval = fingerprint_hex(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
+ dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+ break;
+ case SSH_FP_BASE64:
+ retval = fingerprint_b64(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
+ dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+ break;
+ case SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE:
+ retval = fingerprint_bubblebabble(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+ break;
+ case SSH_FP_RANDOMART:
+ retval = fingerprint_randomart(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
+ dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, k);
+ break;
+ default:
+ explicit_bzero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+ free(dgst_raw);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ explicit_bzero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+ free(dgst_raw);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+/*
+ * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances
+ * the pointer. The integer must already be initialized. This function is
+ * permitted to modify the buffer. This leaves *cpp to point just beyond the
+ * last processed character.
+ */
+static int
+read_decimal_bignum(char **cpp, BIGNUM *v)
+{
+ char *cp;
+ size_t e;
+ int skip = 1; /* skip white space */
+
+ cp = *cpp;
+ while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t')
+ cp++;
+ e = strspn(cp, "0123456789");
+ if (e == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ if (e > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 3)
+ return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE;
+ if (cp[e] == '\0')
+ skip = 0;
+ else if (strchr(" \t\r\n", cp[e]) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ cp[e] = '\0';
+ if (BN_dec2bn(&v, cp) <= 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ *cpp = cp + e + skip;
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+
+/* returns 0 ok, and < 0 error */
+int
+sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
+{
+ struct sshkey *k;
+ int retval = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ char *ep, *cp, *space;
+ int r, type, curve_nid = -1;
+ struct sshbuf *blob;
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ u_long bits;
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+
+ cp = *cpp;
+
+ switch (ret->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ /* Get number of bits. */
+ bits = strtoul(cp, &ep, 10);
+ if (*cp == '\0' || strchr(" \t\r\n", *ep) == NULL ||
+ bits == 0 || bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* Bad bit count... */
+ /* Get public exponent, public modulus. */
+ if ((r = read_decimal_bignum(&ep, ret->rsa->e)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((r = read_decimal_bignum(&ep, ret->rsa->n)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ /* validate the claimed number of bits */
+ if (BN_num_bits(ret->rsa->n) != (int)bits)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH;
+ *cpp = ep;
+ retval = 0;
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+ break;
+ case KEY_UNSPEC:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ space = strchr(cp, ' ');
+ if (space == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ *space = '\0';
+ type = sshkey_type_from_name(cp);
+ if (sshkey_type_plain(type) == KEY_ECDSA &&
+ (curve_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(cp)) == -1)
+ return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID;
+ *space = ' ';
+ if (type == KEY_UNSPEC)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ cp = space+1;
+ if (*cp == '\0')
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ if (ret->type != KEY_UNSPEC && ret->type != type)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ if ((blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ /* trim comment */
+ space = strchr(cp, ' ');
+ if (space) {
+ /* advance 'space': skip whitespace */
+ *space++ = '\0';
+ while (*space == ' ' || *space == '\t')
+ space++;
+ ep = space;
+ } else
+ ep = cp + strlen(cp);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(blob, cp)) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(blob);
+ return r;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(blob),
+ sshbuf_len(blob), &k)) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(blob);
+ return r;
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(blob);
+ if (k->type != type) {
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ if (sshkey_type_plain(type) == KEY_ECDSA &&
+ curve_nid != k->ecdsa_nid) {
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ ret->type = type;
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(ret)) {
+ if (!sshkey_is_cert(k)) {
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT;
+ }
+ if (ret->cert != NULL)
+ cert_free(ret->cert);
+ ret->cert = k->cert;
+ k->cert = NULL;
+ }
+ switch (sshkey_type_plain(ret->type)) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ if (ret->rsa != NULL)
+ RSA_free(ret->rsa);
+ ret->rsa = k->rsa;
+ k->rsa = NULL;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ RSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->rsa, 8);
+#endif
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ if (ret->dsa != NULL)
+ DSA_free(ret->dsa);
+ ret->dsa = k->dsa;
+ k->dsa = NULL;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ DSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->dsa, 8);
+#endif
+ break;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ if (ret->ecdsa != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdsa);
+ ret->ecdsa = k->ecdsa;
+ ret->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid;
+ k->ecdsa = NULL;
+ k->ecdsa_nid = -1;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ sshkey_dump_ec_key(ret->ecdsa);
+#endif
+ break;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ free(ret->ed25519_pk);
+ ret->ed25519_pk = k->ed25519_pk;
+ k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ /* XXX */
+#endif
+ break;
+ }
+ *cpp = ep;
+ retval = 0;
+/*XXXX*/
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ if (retval != 0)
+ break;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *key, char **b64p)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ char *uu = NULL;
+
+ if (b64p != NULL)
+ *b64p = NULL;
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, b)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((uu = sshbuf_dtob64(b)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Success */
+ if (b64p != NULL) {
+ *b64p = uu;
+ uu = NULL;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ free(uu);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sshkey_format_rsa1(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ u_int bits = 0;
+ char *dec_e = NULL, *dec_n = NULL;
+
+ if (key->rsa == NULL || key->rsa->e == NULL ||
+ key->rsa->n == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((dec_e = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->e)) == NULL ||
+ (dec_n = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->n)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* size of modulus 'n' */
+ if ((bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) <= 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%u %s %s", bits, dec_e, dec_n)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ if (dec_e != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(dec_e);
+ if (dec_n != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(dec_n);
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sshkey_format_text(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ char *uu = NULL;
+
+ if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_format_rsa1(key, b)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ /* Unsupported key types handled in sshkey_to_base64() */
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &uu)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s %s",
+ sshkey_ssh_name(key), uu)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ free(uu);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshkey_format_text(key, b)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), 1, f) != 1) {
+ if (feof(f))
+ errno = EPIPE;
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+}
+
+const char *
+sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ switch (k->cert->type) {
+ case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER:
+ return "user";
+ case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST:
+ return "host";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+static int
+rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA **rsap)
+{
+ RSA *private = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *f4 = NULL;
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (rsap == NULL ||
+ bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
+ bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ *rsap = NULL;
+ if ((private = RSA_new()) == NULL || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
+ !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *rsap = private;
+ private = NULL;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ if (private != NULL)
+ RSA_free(private);
+ if (f4 != NULL)
+ BN_free(f4);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+dsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, DSA **dsap)
+{
+ DSA *private;
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (dsap == NULL || bits != 1024)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((private = DSA_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *dsap = NULL;
+ if (!DSA_generate_parameters_ex(private, bits, NULL, 0, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL) || !DSA_generate_key(private)) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *dsap = private;
+ private = NULL;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ if (private != NULL)
+ DSA_free(private);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+int
+sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *k)
+{
+ EC_GROUP *eg;
+ int nids[] = {
+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
+ NID_secp384r1,
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+ NID_secp521r1,
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+ -1
+ };
+ int nid;
+ u_int i;
+ BN_CTX *bnctx;
+ const EC_GROUP *g = EC_KEY_get0_group(k);
+
+ /*
+ * The group may be stored in a ASN.1 encoded private key in one of two
+ * ways: as a "named group", which is reconstituted by ASN.1 object ID
+ * or explicit group parameters encoded into the key blob. Only the
+ * "named group" case sets the group NID for us, but we can figure
+ * it out for the other case by comparing against all the groups that
+ * are supported.
+ */
+ if ((nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(g)) > 0)
+ return nid;
+ if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ for (i = 0; nids[i] != -1; i++) {
+ if ((eg = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nids[i])) == NULL) {
+ BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (EC_GROUP_cmp(g, eg, bnctx) == 0)
+ break;
+ EC_GROUP_free(eg);
+ }
+ BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ if (nids[i] != -1) {
+ /* Use the group with the NID attached */
+ EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(eg, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
+ if (EC_KEY_set_group(k, eg) != 1) {
+ EC_GROUP_free(eg);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ return nids[i];
+}
+
+static int
+ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, int *nid, EC_KEY **ecdsap)
+{
+ EC_KEY *private;
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (nid == NULL || ecdsap == NULL ||
+ (*nid = sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ *ecdsap = NULL;
+ if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(*nid)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(private, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
+ *ecdsap = private;
+ private = NULL;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ if (private != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(private);
+ return ret;
+}
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+int
+sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+ struct sshkey *k;
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (keyp == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if ((k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ if ((k->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL ||
+ (k->ed25519_sk = malloc(ED25519_SK_SZ)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ break;
+ }
+ crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(k->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_sk);
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ ret = dsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->dsa);
+ break;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ ret = ecdsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->ecdsa_nid,
+ &k->ecdsa);
+ break;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ ret = rsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->rsa);
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ default:
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ k->type = type;
+ *keyp = k;
+ } else
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *from_key, struct sshkey *to_key)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ const struct sshkey_cert *from;
+ struct sshkey_cert *to;
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (to_key->cert != NULL) {
+ cert_free(to_key->cert);
+ to_key->cert = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if ((from = from_key->cert) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ if ((to = to_key->cert = cert_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(to->certblob, from->certblob)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_putb(to->critical, from->critical)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_putb(to->extensions, from->extensions)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ to->serial = from->serial;
+ to->type = from->type;
+ if (from->key_id == NULL)
+ to->key_id = NULL;
+ else if ((to->key_id = strdup(from->key_id)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ to->valid_after = from->valid_after;
+ to->valid_before = from->valid_before;
+ if (from->signature_key == NULL)
+ to->signature_key = NULL;
+ else if ((ret = sshkey_from_private(from->signature_key,
+ &to->signature_key)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (from->nprincipals > SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (from->nprincipals > 0) {
+ if ((to->principals = calloc(from->nprincipals,
+ sizeof(*to->principals))) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ for (i = 0; i < from->nprincipals; i++) {
+ to->principals[i] = strdup(from->principals[i]);
+ if (to->principals[i] == NULL) {
+ to->nprincipals = i;
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ to->nprincipals = from->nprincipals;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey **pkp)
+{
+ struct sshkey *n = NULL;
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ *pkp = NULL;
+ switch (k->type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((BN_copy(n->dsa->p, k->dsa->p) == NULL) ||
+ (BN_copy(n->dsa->q, k->dsa->q) == NULL) ||
+ (BN_copy(n->dsa->g, k->dsa->g) == NULL) ||
+ (BN_copy(n->dsa->pub_key, k->dsa->pub_key) == NULL)) {
+ sshkey_free(n);
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ break;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ n->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid;
+ n->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid);
+ if (n->ecdsa == NULL) {
+ sshkey_free(n);
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(n->ecdsa,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 1) {
+ sshkey_free(n);
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ }
+ break;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n) == NULL) ||
+ (BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e) == NULL)) {
+ sshkey_free(n);
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if (k->ed25519_pk != NULL) {
+ if ((n->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL) {
+ sshkey_free(n);
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ memcpy(n->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) {
+ if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, n)) != 0) {
+ sshkey_free(n);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+ *pkp = n;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+cert_parse(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *certbuf)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *principals = NULL, *crit = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *exts = NULL, *ca = NULL;
+ u_char *sig = NULL;
+ size_t signed_len = 0, slen = 0, kidlen = 0;
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ /* Copy the entire key blob for verification and later serialisation */
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->certblob, certbuf)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Parse body of certificate up to signature */
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->serial)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &key->cert->type)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &key->cert->key_id, &kidlen)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &principals)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_after)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_before)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &crit)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &exts)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &ca)) != 0) {
+ /* XXX debug print error for ret */
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Signature is left in the buffer so we can calculate this length */
+ signed_len = sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) - sshbuf_len(b);
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &sig, &slen)) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER &&
+ key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Parse principals section */
+ while (sshbuf_len(principals) > 0) {
+ char *principal = NULL;
+ char **oprincipals = NULL;
+
+ if (key->cert->nprincipals >= SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(principals, &principal,
+ NULL)) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ oprincipals = key->cert->principals;
+ key->cert->principals = reallocarray(key->cert->principals,
+ key->cert->nprincipals + 1, sizeof(*key->cert->principals));
+ if (key->cert->principals == NULL) {
+ free(principal);
+ key->cert->principals = oprincipals;
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ key->cert->principals[key->cert->nprincipals++] = principal;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Stash a copies of the critical options and extensions sections
+ * for later use.
+ */
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->critical, crit)) != 0 ||
+ (exts != NULL &&
+ (ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->extensions, exts)) != 0))
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * Validate critical options and extensions sections format.
+ */
+ while (sshbuf_len(crit) != 0) {
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(crit, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(crit, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_reset(key->cert->critical);
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ while (exts != NULL && sshbuf_len(exts) != 0) {
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(exts, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(exts, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_reset(key->cert->extensions);
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Parse CA key and check signature */
+ if (sshkey_from_blob_internal(ca, &key->cert->signature_key, 0) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(key->cert->signature_key->type)) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ret = sshkey_verify(key->cert->signature_key, sig, slen,
+ sshbuf_ptr(key->cert->certblob), signed_len, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Success */
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(ca);
+ sshbuf_free(crit);
+ sshbuf_free(exts);
+ sshbuf_free(principals);
+ free(sig);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp,
+ int allow_cert)
+{
+ int type, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ char *ktype = NULL, *curve = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ size_t len;
+ u_char *pk = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *copy;
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+ EC_POINT *q = NULL;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK /* XXX */
+ sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
+#endif
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(b)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ type = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype);
+ if (!allow_cert && sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ switch (type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ /* Skip nonce */
+ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8);
+#endif
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ /* Skip nonce */
+ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8);
+#endif
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ /* Skip nonce */
+ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ key->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(ktype);
+ if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &curve, NULL) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (key->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (key->ecdsa != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(key->ecdsa);
+ if ((key->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(key->ecdsa_nid))
+ == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((q = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_get_ec(b, q, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa)) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa),
+ q) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(key->ecdsa, q) != 1) {
+ /* XXX assume it is a allocation error */
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), q);
+#endif
+ break;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ /* Skip nonce */
+ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pk, &len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (len != ED25519_PK_SZ) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ key->ed25519_pk = pk;
+ pk = NULL;
+ break;
+ case KEY_UNSPEC:
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Parse certificate potion */
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && (ret = cert_parse(b, key, copy)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (key != NULL && sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+ if (keyp != NULL) {
+ *keyp = key;
+ key = NULL;
+ }
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(copy);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ free(ktype);
+ free(curve);
+ free(pk);
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+ if (q != NULL)
+ EC_POINT_free(q);
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *blob, size_t blen, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(blob, blen)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ r = sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+ return sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &b)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ r = sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_sign(const struct sshkey *key,
+ u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat)
+{
+ if (sigp != NULL)
+ *sigp = NULL;
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = 0;
+ if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ switch (key->type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ return ssh_dss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat);
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ return ssh_ecdsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat);
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ return ssh_rsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg);
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ return ssh_ed25519_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat);
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssh_key_verify returns 0 for a correct signature and < 0 on error.
+ */
+int
+sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const u_char *data, size_t dlen, u_int compat)
+{
+ if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ switch (key->type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ return ssh_dss_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat);
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ return ssh_ecdsa_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat);
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ return ssh_rsa_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen);
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ return ssh_ed25519_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat);
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Converts a private to a public key */
+int
+sshkey_demote(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey **dkp)
+{
+ struct sshkey *pk;
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ *dkp = NULL;
+ if ((pk = calloc(1, sizeof(*pk))) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ pk->type = k->type;
+ pk->flags = k->flags;
+ pk->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid;
+ pk->dsa = NULL;
+ pk->ecdsa = NULL;
+ pk->rsa = NULL;
+ pk->ed25519_pk = NULL;
+ pk->ed25519_sk = NULL;
+
+ switch (k->type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, pk)) != 0)
+ goto fail;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ if ((pk->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL ||
+ (pk->rsa->e = BN_dup(k->rsa->e)) == NULL ||
+ (pk->rsa->n = BN_dup(k->rsa->n)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, pk)) != 0)
+ goto fail;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ if ((pk->dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL ||
+ (pk->dsa->p = BN_dup(k->dsa->p)) == NULL ||
+ (pk->dsa->q = BN_dup(k->dsa->q)) == NULL ||
+ (pk->dsa->g = BN_dup(k->dsa->g)) == NULL ||
+ (pk->dsa->pub_key = BN_dup(k->dsa->pub_key)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, pk)) != 0)
+ goto fail;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ pk->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(pk->ecdsa_nid);
+ if (pk->ecdsa == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(pk->ecdsa,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ break;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, pk)) != 0)
+ goto fail;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ if (k->ed25519_pk != NULL) {
+ if ((pk->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ memcpy(pk->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ fail:
+ sshkey_free(pk);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ *dkp = pk;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Convert a plain key to their _CERT equivalent */
+int
+sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ int newtype;
+
+ switch (k->type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ newtype = KEY_RSA_CERT;
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ newtype = KEY_DSA_CERT;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ newtype = KEY_ECDSA_CERT;
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ newtype = KEY_ED25519_CERT;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ k->type = newtype;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Convert a certificate to its raw key equivalent */
+int
+sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ if (!sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type))
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ cert_free(k->cert);
+ k->cert = NULL;
+ k->type = sshkey_type_plain(k->type);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Sign a certified key, (re-)generating the signed certblob. */
+int
+sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *principals = NULL;
+ u_char *ca_blob = NULL, *sig_blob = NULL, nonce[32];
+ size_t i, ca_len, sig_len;
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *cert;
+
+ if (k == NULL || k->cert == NULL ||
+ k->cert->certblob == NULL || ca == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (!sshkey_is_cert(k))
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(ca->type))
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
+
+ if ((ret = sshkey_to_blob(ca, &ca_blob, &ca_len)) != 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
+
+ cert = k->cert->certblob; /* for readability */
+ sshbuf_reset(cert);
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, sshkey_ssh_name(k))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* -v01 certs put nonce first */
+ arc4random_buf(&nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, nonce, sizeof(nonce))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* XXX this substantially duplicates to_blob(); refactor */
+ switch (k->type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->p)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->q)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->g)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->pub_key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert,
+ sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(k->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_ec(cert,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa),
+ EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->rsa->n)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert,
+ k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->serial)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_u32(cert, k->cert->type)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, k->cert->key_id)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((principals = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) {
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(principals,
+ k->cert->principals[i])) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, principals)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_after)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_before)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->critical)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->extensions)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* Reserved */
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, ca_blob, ca_len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Sign the whole mess */
+ if ((ret = sshkey_sign(ca, &sig_blob, &sig_len, sshbuf_ptr(cert),
+ sshbuf_len(cert), alg, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Append signature and we are done */
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, sig_blob, sig_len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ if (ret != 0)
+ sshbuf_reset(cert);
+ free(sig_blob);
+ free(ca_blob);
+ sshbuf_free(principals);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *k,
+ int want_host, int require_principal,
+ const char *name, const char **reason)
+{
+ u_int i, principal_matches;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+
+ if (reason != NULL)
+ *reason = NULL;
+
+ if (want_host) {
+ if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) {
+ *reason = "Certificate invalid: not a host certificate";
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) {
+ *reason = "Certificate invalid: not a user certificate";
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
+ }
+ if (now < 0) {
+ /* yikes - system clock before epoch! */
+ *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid";
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
+ if ((u_int64_t)now < k->cert->valid_after) {
+ *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid";
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
+ if ((u_int64_t)now >= k->cert->valid_before) {
+ *reason = "Certificate invalid: expired";
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
+ if (k->cert->nprincipals == 0) {
+ if (require_principal) {
+ *reason = "Certificate lacks principal list";
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
+ } else if (name != NULL) {
+ principal_matches = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(name, k->cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
+ principal_matches = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!principal_matches) {
+ *reason = "Certificate invalid: name is not a listed "
+ "principal";
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+size_t
+sshkey_format_cert_validity(const struct sshkey_cert *cert, char *s, size_t l)
+{
+ char from[32], to[32], ret[64];
+ time_t tt;
+ struct tm *tm;
+
+ *from = *to = '\0';
+ if (cert->valid_after == 0 &&
+ cert->valid_before == 0xffffffffffffffffULL)
+ return strlcpy(s, "forever", l);
+
+ if (cert->valid_after != 0) {
+ /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */
+ tt = cert->valid_after > INT_MAX ?
+ INT_MAX : cert->valid_after;
+ tm = localtime(&tt);
+ strftime(from, sizeof(from), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm);
+ }
+ if (cert->valid_before != 0xffffffffffffffffULL) {
+ /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */
+ tt = cert->valid_before > INT_MAX ?
+ INT_MAX : cert->valid_before;
+ tm = localtime(&tt);
+ strftime(to, sizeof(to), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm);
+ }
+
+ if (cert->valid_after == 0)
+ snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "before %s", to);
+ else if (cert->valid_before == 0xffffffffffffffffULL)
+ snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "after %s", from);
+ else
+ snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "from %s to %s", from, to);
+
+ return strlcpy(s, ret, l);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_private_serialize(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ switch (key->type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b,
+ sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b,
+ EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b,
+ EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk,
+ ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk,
+ ED25519_SK_SZ)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk,
+ ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk,
+ ED25519_SK_SZ)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ default:
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp)
+{
+ char *tname = NULL, *curve = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+ size_t pklen = 0, sklen = 0;
+ int type, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ u_char *ed25519_pk = NULL, *ed25519_sk = NULL;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ BIGNUM *exponent = NULL;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+ if (kp != NULL)
+ *kp = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &tname, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname);
+ switch (type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ if ((k = sshkey_new_private(type)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->q)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->g)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->pub_key)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->priv_key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->priv_key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ if ((k = sshkey_new_private(type)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((k->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(tname)) == -1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &curve, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (k->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ k->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid);
+ if (k->ecdsa == NULL || (exponent = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_eckey(buf, k->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, exponent)))
+ goto out;
+ if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa),
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ if ((exponent = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, exponent)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa),
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ if ((k = sshkey_new_private(type)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->q)) != 0 ||
+ (r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->q)) != 0 ||
+ (r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ if ((k = sshkey_new_private(type)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_sk, &sklen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ || sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk;
+ k->ed25519_sk = ed25519_sk;
+ ed25519_pk = ed25519_sk = NULL;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_sk, &sklen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ || sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk;
+ k->ed25519_sk = ed25519_sk;
+ ed25519_pk = ed25519_sk = NULL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ /* enable blinding */
+ switch (k->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ if (kp != NULL) {
+ *kp = k;
+ k = NULL;
+ }
+ out:
+ free(tname);
+ free(curve);
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ if (exponent != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(exponent);
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ if (ed25519_pk != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(ed25519_pk, pklen);
+ free(ed25519_pk);
+ }
+ if (ed25519_sk != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(ed25519_sk, sklen);
+ free(ed25519_sk);
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+int
+sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public)
+{
+ BN_CTX *bnctx;
+ EC_POINT *nq = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *order, *x, *y, *tmp;
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
+
+ if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ BN_CTX_start(bnctx);
+
+ /*
+ * We shouldn't ever hit this case because bignum_get_ecpoint()
+ * refuses to load GF2m points.
+ */
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
+ NID_X9_62_prime_field)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Q != infinity */
+ if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, public))
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((x = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
+ (y = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
+ (order = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
+ (tmp = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* log2(x) > log2(order)/2, log2(y) > log2(order)/2 */
+ if (EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, bnctx) != 1 ||
+ EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, public,
+ x, y, bnctx) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (BN_num_bits(x) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2 ||
+ BN_num_bits(y) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* nQ == infinity (n == order of subgroup) */
+ if ((nq = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_mul(group, nq, NULL, public, order, bnctx) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, nq) != 1)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* x < order - 1, y < order - 1 */
+ if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (BN_cmp(x, tmp) >= 0 || BN_cmp(y, tmp) >= 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ if (nq != NULL)
+ EC_POINT_free(nq);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ BN_CTX *bnctx;
+ BIGNUM *order, *tmp;
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
+
+ if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ BN_CTX_start(bnctx);
+
+ if ((order = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
+ (tmp = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* log2(private) > log2(order)/2 */
+ if (EC_GROUP_get_order(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), order, bnctx) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (BN_num_bits(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) <=
+ BN_num_bits(order) / 2)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* private < order - 1 */
+ if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (BN_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key), tmp) >= 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void
+sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point)
+{
+ BIGNUM *x, *y;
+ BN_CTX *bnctx;
+
+ if (point == NULL) {
+ fputs("point=(NULL)\n", stderr);
+ return;
+ }
+ if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: BN_CTX_new failed\n", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+ BN_CTX_start(bnctx);
+ if ((x = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
+ (y = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: BN_CTX_get failed\n", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
+ NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: group is not a prime field\n", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y,
+ bnctx) != 1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp\n",
+ __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+ fputs("x=", stderr);
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, x);
+ fputs("\ny=", stderr);
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, y);
+ fputs("\n", stderr);
+ BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+}
+
+void
+sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ const BIGNUM *exponent;
+
+ sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key),
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key));
+ fputs("exponent=", stderr);
+ if ((exponent = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) == NULL)
+ fputs("(NULL)", stderr);
+ else
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key));
+ fputs("\n", stderr);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
+static int
+sshkey_private_to_blob2(const struct sshkey *prv, struct sshbuf *blob,
+ const char *passphrase, const char *comment, const char *ciphername,
+ int rounds)
+{
+ u_char *cp, *key = NULL, *pubkeyblob = NULL;
+ u_char salt[SALT_LEN];
+ char *b64 = NULL;
+ size_t i, pubkeylen, keylen, ivlen, blocksize, authlen;
+ u_int check;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext;
+ const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+ const char *kdfname = KDFNAME;
+ struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *encrypted = NULL, *kdf = NULL;
+
+ memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext));
+
+ if (rounds <= 0)
+ rounds = DEFAULT_ROUNDS;
+ if (passphrase == NULL || !strlen(passphrase)) {
+ ciphername = "none";
+ kdfname = "none";
+ } else if (ciphername == NULL)
+ ciphername = DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME;
+ else if (cipher_number(ciphername) != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((kdf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (encrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher);
+ keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
+ ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher);
+ authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher);
+ if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) {
+ arc4random_buf(salt, SALT_LEN);
+ if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase),
+ salt, SALT_LEN, key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(kdf, salt, SALT_LEN)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(kdf, rounds)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ } else if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0) {
+ /* Unsupported KDF type */
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
+ key + keylen, ivlen, 1)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(encoded, AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, ciphername)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, kdfname)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(encoded, kdf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, 1)) != 0 || /* number of keys */
+ (r = sshkey_to_blob(prv, &pubkeyblob, &pubkeylen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(encoded, pubkeyblob, pubkeylen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* set up the buffer that will be encrypted */
+
+ /* Random check bytes */
+ check = arc4random();
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* append private key and comment*/
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(prv, encrypted)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encrypted, comment)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* padding */
+ i = 0;
+ while (sshbuf_len(encrypted) % blocksize) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encrypted, ++i & 0xff)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* length in destination buffer */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, sshbuf_len(encrypted))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* encrypt */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encoded,
+ sshbuf_len(encrypted) + authlen, &cp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp,
+ sshbuf_ptr(encrypted), sshbuf_len(encrypted), 0, authlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* uuencode */
+ if ((b64 = sshbuf_dtob64(encoded)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ sshbuf_reset(blob);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ for (i = 0; i < strlen(b64); i++) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(blob, b64[i])) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* insert line breaks */
+ if (i % 70 == 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(blob, '\n')) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (i % 70 != 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(blob, '\n')) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(kdf);
+ sshbuf_free(encoded);
+ sshbuf_free(encrypted);
+ cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
+ explicit_bzero(salt, sizeof(salt));
+ if (key != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen);
+ free(key);
+ }
+ if (pubkeyblob != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(pubkeyblob, pubkeylen);
+ free(pubkeyblob);
+ }
+ if (b64 != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(b64, strlen(b64));
+ free(b64);
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+ char *comment = NULL, *ciphername = NULL, *kdfname = NULL;
+ const struct sshcipher *cipher = NULL;
+ const u_char *cp;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ size_t encoded_len;
+ size_t i, keylen = 0, ivlen = 0, authlen = 0, slen = 0;
+ struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *decoded = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *kdf = NULL, *decrypted = NULL;
+ struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext;
+ struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+ u_char *key = NULL, *salt = NULL, *dp, pad, last;
+ u_int blocksize, rounds, nkeys, encrypted_len, check1, check2;
+
+ memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext));
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if (commentp != NULL)
+ *commentp = NULL;
+
+ if ((encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (decoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* check preamble */
+ cp = sshbuf_ptr(blob);
+ encoded_len = sshbuf_len(blob);
+ if (encoded_len < (MARK_BEGIN_LEN + MARK_END_LEN) ||
+ memcmp(cp, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ cp += MARK_BEGIN_LEN;
+ encoded_len -= MARK_BEGIN_LEN;
+
+ /* Look for end marker, removing whitespace as we go */
+ while (encoded_len > 0) {
+ if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, *cp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ last = *cp;
+ encoded_len--;
+ cp++;
+ if (last == '\n') {
+ if (encoded_len >= MARK_END_LEN &&
+ memcmp(cp, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN) == 0) {
+ /* \0 terminate */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (encoded_len == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* decode base64 */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(decoded, (char *)sshbuf_ptr(encoded))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* check magic */
+ if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC) ||
+ memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(decoded), AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* parse public portion of key */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &ciphername, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &kdfname, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_froms(decoded, &kdf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &nkeys)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_skip_string(decoded)) != 0 || /* pubkey */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &encrypted_len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((passphrase == NULL || strlen(passphrase) == 0) &&
+ strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) {
+ /* passphrase required */
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0 && strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(kdfname, "none") && strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (nkeys != 1) {
+ /* XXX only one key supported */
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* check size of encrypted key blob */
+ blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher);
+ if (encrypted_len < blocksize || (encrypted_len % blocksize) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* setup key */
+ keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
+ ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher);
+ authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher);
+ if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(kdf, &salt, &slen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(kdf, &rounds)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), salt, slen,
+ key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* check that an appropriate amount of auth data is present */
+ if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < encrypted_len + authlen) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* decrypt private portion of key */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, encrypted_len, &dp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
+ key + keylen, ivlen, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(decoded),
+ encrypted_len, 0, authlen)) != 0) {
+ /* an integrity error here indicates an incorrect passphrase */
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, encrypted_len + authlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* there should be no trailing data */
+ if (sshbuf_len(decoded) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* check check bytes */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check2)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (check1 != check2) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Load the private key and comment */
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(decrypted, &k)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decrypted, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Check deterministic padding */
+ i = 0;
+ while (sshbuf_len(decrypted)) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(decrypted, &pad)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (pad != (++i & 0xff)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* XXX decode pubkey and check against private */
+
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ if (keyp != NULL) {
+ *keyp = k;
+ k = NULL;
+ }
+ if (commentp != NULL) {
+ *commentp = comment;
+ comment = NULL;
+ }
+ out:
+ pad = 0;
+ cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
+ free(ciphername);
+ free(kdfname);
+ free(comment);
+ if (salt != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(salt, slen);
+ free(salt);
+ }
+ if (key != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen);
+ free(key);
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(encoded);
+ sshbuf_free(decoded);
+ sshbuf_free(kdf);
+ sshbuf_free(decrypted);
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ return r;
+}
+
+#if WITH_SSH1
+/*
+ * Serialises the authentication (private) key to a blob, encrypting it with
+ * passphrase. The identification of the blob (lowest 64 bits of n) will
+ * precede the key to provide identification of the key without needing a
+ * passphrase.
+ */
+static int
+sshkey_private_rsa1_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
+ const char *passphrase, const char *comment)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL, *encrypted = NULL;
+ u_char buf[8];
+ int r, cipher_num;
+ struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext;
+ const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+ u_char *cp;
+
+ /*
+ * If the passphrase is empty, use SSH_CIPHER_NONE to ease converting
+ * to another cipher; otherwise use SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER.
+ */
+ cipher_num = (strcmp(passphrase, "") == 0) ?
+ SSH_CIPHER_NONE : SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
+ if ((cipher = cipher_by_number(cipher_num)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ /* This buffer is used to build the secret part of the private key. */
+ if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+ /* Put checkbytes for checking passphrase validity. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buffer, 4, &cp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ arc4random_buf(cp, 2);
+ memcpy(cp + 2, cp, 2);
+
+ /*
+ * Store the private key (n and e will not be stored because they
+ * will be stored in plain text, and storing them also in encrypted
+ * format would just give known plaintext).
+ * Note: q and p are stored in reverse order to SSL.
+ */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->q)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->p)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Pad the part to be encrypted to a size that is a multiple of 8. */
+ explicit_bzero(buf, 8);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buffer, buf, 8 - (sshbuf_len(buffer) % 8))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* This buffer will be used to contain the data in the file. */
+ if ((encrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* First store keyfile id string. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(encrypted, LEGACY_BEGIN,
+ sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Store cipher type and "reserved" field. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encrypted, cipher_num)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Store public key. This will be in plain text. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(encrypted, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(encrypted, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encrypted, comment)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Allocate space for the private part of the key in the buffer. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encrypted, sshbuf_len(buffer), &cp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
+ CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp,
+ sshbuf_ptr(buffer), sshbuf_len(buffer), 0, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = sshbuf_putb(blob, encrypted);
+
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(&ciphercontext, sizeof(ciphercontext));
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ sshbuf_free(buffer);
+ sshbuf_free(encrypted);
+
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+/* convert SSH v2 key in OpenSSL PEM format */
+static int
+sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
+ const char *_passphrase, const char *comment)
+{
+ int success, r;
+ int blen, len = strlen(_passphrase);
+ u_char *passphrase = (len > 0) ? (u_char *)_passphrase : NULL;
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L)
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_des_ede3_cbc() : NULL;
+#else
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_aes_128_cbc() : NULL;
+#endif
+ const u_char *bptr;
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+
+ if (len > 0 && len <= 4)
+ return SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT;
+ if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa,
+ cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+ break;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa,
+ cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa,
+ cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+ break;
+ default:
+ success = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (success == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((blen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &bptr)) <= 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, bptr, blen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+/* Serialise "key" to buffer "blob" */
+int
+sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
+ const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
+ int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds)
+{
+ switch (key->type) {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ return sshkey_private_rsa1_to_blob(key, blob,
+ passphrase, comment);
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ if (force_new_format) {
+ return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
+ comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds);
+ }
+ return sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(key, blob,
+ passphrase, comment);
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
+ comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds);
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+/*
+ * Parse the public, unencrypted portion of a RSA1 key.
+ */
+int
+sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *copy = NULL;
+
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if (commentp != NULL)
+ *commentp = NULL;
+
+ /* Check that it is at least big enough to contain the ID string. */
+ if (sshbuf_len(blob) < sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN))
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure it begins with the id string. Consume the id string
+ * from the buffer.
+ */
+ if (memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(blob), LEGACY_BEGIN, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN)) != 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ /* Make a working copy of the keyblob and skip past the magic */
+ if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(blob)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Skip cipher type, reserved data and key bits. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, NULL)) != 0 || /* cipher type */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0) /* key bits */
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Read the public key from the buffer. */
+ if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, pub->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, pub->rsa->e)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Finally, the comment */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(copy, (u_char**)commentp, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* The encrypted private part is not parsed by this function. */
+
+ r = 0;
+ if (keyp != NULL) {
+ *keyp = pub;
+ pub = NULL;
+ }
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(copy);
+ sshkey_free(pub);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+ int r;
+ u_int16_t check1, check2;
+ u_int8_t cipher_type;
+ struct sshbuf *decrypted = NULL, *copy = NULL;
+ u_char *cp;
+ char *comment = NULL;
+ struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext;
+ const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+ struct sshkey *prv = NULL;
+
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if (commentp != NULL)
+ *commentp = NULL;
+
+ /* Check that it is at least big enough to contain the ID string. */
+ if (sshbuf_len(blob) < sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN))
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure it begins with the id string. Consume the id string
+ * from the buffer.
+ */
+ if (memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(blob), LEGACY_BEGIN, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN)) != 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+
+ if ((prv = sshkey_new_private(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(blob)) == NULL ||
+ (decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Read cipher type. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &cipher_type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0) /* reserved */
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Read the public key and comment from the buffer. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0 || /* key bits */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, prv->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, prv->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Check that it is a supported cipher. */
+ cipher = cipher_by_number(cipher_type);
+ if (cipher == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Initialize space for decrypted data. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, sshbuf_len(copy), &cp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Rest of the buffer is encrypted. Decrypt it using the passphrase. */
+ if ((r = cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
+ CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp,
+ sshbuf_ptr(copy), sshbuf_len(copy), 0, 0)) != 0) {
+ cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u16(decrypted, &check1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u16(decrypted, &check2)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (check1 != check2) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Read the rest of the private key. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->q)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->p)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* calculate p-1 and q-1 */
+ if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(prv->rsa)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* enable blinding */
+ if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+ if (keyp != NULL) {
+ *keyp = prv;
+ prv = NULL;
+ }
+ if (commentp != NULL) {
+ *commentp = comment;
+ comment = NULL;
+ }
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(&ciphercontext, sizeof(ciphercontext));
+ free(comment);
+ sshkey_free(prv);
+ sshbuf_free(copy);
+ sshbuf_free(decrypted);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+static int
+sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
+ const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *prv = NULL;
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+
+ if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL || sshbuf_len(blob) > INT_MAX)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if (BIO_write(bio, sshbuf_ptr(blob), sshbuf_len(blob)) !=
+ (int)sshbuf_len(blob)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL,
+ (char *)passphrase)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA &&
+ (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_RSA)) {
+ if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ prv->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pk);
+ prv->type = KEY_RSA;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ RSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->rsa, 8);
+#endif
+ if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA &&
+ (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_DSA)) {
+ if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ prv->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pk);
+ prv->type = KEY_DSA;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ DSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->dsa, 8);
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_EC &&
+ (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_ECDSA)) {
+ if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ prv->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pk);
+ prv->type = KEY_ECDSA;
+ prv->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(prv->ecdsa);
+ if (prv->ecdsa_nid == -1 ||
+ sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(prv->ecdsa_nid) == NULL ||
+ sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(prv->ecdsa),
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(prv->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
+ sshkey_ec_validate_private(prv->ecdsa) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+# ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ if (prv != NULL && prv->ecdsa != NULL)
+ sshkey_dump_ec_key(prv->ecdsa);
+# endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+ } else {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+ if (keyp != NULL) {
+ *keyp = prv;
+ prv = NULL;
+ }
+ out:
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ if (pk != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+ sshkey_free(prv);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+int
+sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
+ const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if (commentp != NULL)
+ *commentp = NULL;
+
+ switch (type) {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ return sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(blob, passphrase,
+ keyp, commentp);
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type,
+ passphrase, keyp);
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ return sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase,
+ keyp, commentp);
+ case KEY_UNSPEC:
+ if (sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, keyp,
+ commentp) == 0)
+ return 0;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type,
+ passphrase, keyp);
+#else
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer, const char *passphrase,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if (commentp != NULL)
+ *commentp = NULL;
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ /* it's a SSH v1 key if the public key part is readable */
+ if (sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(buffer, NULL, NULL) == 0) {
+ return sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_RSA1,
+ passphrase, keyp, commentp);
+ }
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+ return sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_UNSPEC,
+ passphrase, keyp, commentp);
+}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshkey.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshkey.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshkey.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshkey.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.13 2016/05/02 09:36:42 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef SSHKEY_H
+#define SSHKEY_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+# else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+# define EC_KEY void
+# define EC_GROUP void
+# define EC_POINT void
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+# define RSA void
+# define DSA void
+# define EC_KEY void
+# define EC_GROUP void
+# define EC_POINT void
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#define SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE 768
+#define SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE (1 << 20)
+
+struct sshbuf;
+
+/* Key types */
+enum sshkey_types {
+ KEY_RSA1,
+ KEY_RSA,
+ KEY_DSA,
+ KEY_ECDSA,
+ KEY_ED25519,
+ KEY_RSA_CERT,
+ KEY_DSA_CERT,
+ KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
+ KEY_ED25519_CERT,
+ KEY_UNSPEC
+};
+
+/* Default fingerprint hash */
+#define SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT SSH_DIGEST_SHA256
+
+/* Fingerprint representation formats */
+enum sshkey_fp_rep {
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT = 0,
+ SSH_FP_HEX,
+ SSH_FP_BASE64,
+ SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE,
+ SSH_FP_RANDOMART
+};
+
+/* key is stored in external hardware */
+#define SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT 0x0001
+
+#define SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS 256
+/* XXX opaquify? */
+struct sshkey_cert {
+ struct sshbuf *certblob; /* Kept around for use on wire */
+ u_int type; /* SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER or SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST */
+ u_int64_t serial;
+ char *key_id;
+ u_int nprincipals;
+ char **principals;
+ u_int64_t valid_after, valid_before;
+ struct sshbuf *critical;
+ struct sshbuf *extensions;
+ struct sshkey *signature_key;
+};
+
+/* XXX opaquify? */
+struct sshkey {
+ int type;
+ int flags;
+ RSA *rsa;
+ DSA *dsa;
+ int ecdsa_nid; /* NID of curve */
+ EC_KEY *ecdsa;
+ u_char *ed25519_sk;
+ u_char *ed25519_pk;
+ struct sshkey_cert *cert;
+};
+
+#define ED25519_SK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES
+#define ED25519_PK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES
+
+struct sshkey *sshkey_new(int);
+int sshkey_add_private(struct sshkey *);
+struct sshkey *sshkey_new_private(int);
+void sshkey_free(struct sshkey *);
+int sshkey_demote(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **);
+int sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *,
+ const struct sshkey *);
+int sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *);
+char *sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *,
+ int, enum sshkey_fp_rep);
+int sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k,
+ int, u_char **retp, size_t *lenp);
+const char *sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *);
+const char *sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *);
+int sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *);
+int sshkey_read(struct sshkey *, char **);
+u_int sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *);
+
+int sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp);
+int sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **);
+int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *);
+int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *);
+int sshkey_type_is_cert(int);
+int sshkey_type_plain(int);
+int sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *);
+int sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *);
+int sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, const char *);
+int sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *);
+int sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *, int, int,
+ const char *, const char **);
+size_t sshkey_format_cert_validity(const struct sshkey_cert *,
+ char *, size_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__, 2, 3)));
+
+int sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *);
+int sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *);
+const char * sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int);
+u_int sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int);
+int sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int);
+int sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *);
+int sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid);
+int sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
+int sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *);
+const char *sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
+const char *sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
+int sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
+char *key_alg_list(int, int);
+
+int sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
+int sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
+int sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
+int sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *);
+int sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *, char **);
+int sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
+int sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
+int sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *);
+int sshkey_putb_plain(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
+
+int sshkey_sign(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
+int sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
+ const u_char *, size_t, u_int);
+
+/* for debug */
+void sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
+void sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *);
+
+/* private key parsing and serialisation */
+int sshkey_private_serialize(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf);
+int sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp);
+
+/* private key file format parsing and serialisation */
+int sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
+ const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
+ int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds);
+int sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
+int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer,
+ const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
+int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
+ const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
+
+#ifdef SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+int ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key,
+ u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+ const char *ident);
+int ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen);
+int ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
+int ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
+int ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
+int ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
+int ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
+int ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+# undef RSA
+# undef DSA
+# undef EC_KEY
+# undef EC_GROUP
+# undef EC_POINT
+#elif !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+# undef EC_KEY
+# undef EC_GROUP
+# undef EC_POINT
+#endif
+
+#endif /* SSHKEY_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshlogin.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshlogin.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshlogin.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.28 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * This file performs some of the things login(1) normally does. We cannot
- * easily use something like login -p -h host -f user, because there are
- * several different logins around, and it is hard to determined what kind of
- * login the current system has. Also, we want to be able to execute commands
- * on a tty.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 1999 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "loginrec.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-
-extern Buffer loginmsg;
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-/*
- * Returns the time when the user last logged in. Returns 0 if the
- * information is not available. This must be called before record_login.
- * The host the user logged in from will be returned in buf.
- */
-time_t
-get_last_login_time(uid_t uid, const char *logname,
- char *buf, size_t bufsize)
-{
- struct logininfo li;
-
- login_get_lastlog(&li, uid);
- strlcpy(buf, li.hostname, bufsize);
- return (time_t)li.tv_sec;
-}
-
-/*
- * Generate and store last login message. This must be done before
- * login_login() is called and lastlog is updated.
- */
-static void
-store_lastlog_message(const char *user, uid_t uid)
-{
-#ifndef NO_SSH_LASTLOG
- char *time_string, hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN] = "", buf[512];
- time_t last_login_time;
-
- if (!options.print_lastlog)
- return;
-
-# ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG
- time_string = sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(user, uid);
- if (time_string != NULL) {
- buffer_append(&loginmsg, time_string, strlen(time_string));
- free(time_string);
- }
-# else
- last_login_time = get_last_login_time(uid, user, hostname,
- sizeof(hostname));
-
- if (last_login_time != 0) {
- time_string = ctime(&last_login_time);
- time_string[strcspn(time_string, "\n")] = '\0';
- if (strcmp(hostname, "") == 0)
- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Last login: %s\r\n",
- time_string);
- else
- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Last login: %s from %s\r\n",
- time_string, hostname);
- buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
- }
-# endif /* CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG */
-#endif /* NO_SSH_LASTLOG */
-}
-
-/*
- * Records that the user has logged in. I wish these parts of operating
- * systems were more standardized.
- */
-void
-record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user, uid_t uid,
- const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen)
-{
- struct logininfo *li;
-
- /* save previous login details before writing new */
- store_lastlog_message(user, uid);
-
- li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, tty);
- login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen);
- login_login(li);
- login_free_entry(li);
-}
-
-#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
-void
-record_utmp_only(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user,
- const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen)
-{
- struct logininfo *li;
-
- li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, ttyname);
- login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen);
- login_utmp_only(li);
- login_free_entry(li);
-}
-#endif
-
-/* Records that the user has logged out. */
-void
-record_logout(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user)
-{
- struct logininfo *li;
-
- li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, NULL, tty);
- login_logout(li);
- login_free_entry(li);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshlogin.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshlogin.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshlogin.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshlogin.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.32 2015/12/26 20:51:35 guenther Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * This file performs some of the things login(1) normally does. We cannot
+ * easily use something like login -p -h host -f user, because there are
+ * several different logins around, and it is hard to determined what kind of
+ * login the current system has. Also, we want to be able to execute commands
+ * on a tty.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "loginrec.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+/*
+ * Returns the time when the user last logged in. Returns 0 if the
+ * information is not available. This must be called before record_login.
+ * The host the user logged in from will be returned in buf.
+ */
+time_t
+get_last_login_time(uid_t uid, const char *logname,
+ char *buf, size_t bufsize)
+{
+ struct logininfo li;
+
+ login_get_lastlog(&li, uid);
+ strlcpy(buf, li.hostname, bufsize);
+ return (time_t)li.tv_sec;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate and store last login message. This must be done before
+ * login_login() is called and lastlog is updated.
+ */
+static void
+store_lastlog_message(const char *user, uid_t uid)
+{
+#ifndef NO_SSH_LASTLOG
+ char *time_string, hostname[HOST_NAME_MAX+1] = "", buf[512];
+ time_t last_login_time;
+
+ if (!options.print_lastlog)
+ return;
+
+# ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG
+ time_string = sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(user, uid);
+ if (time_string != NULL) {
+ buffer_append(&loginmsg, time_string, strlen(time_string));
+ free(time_string);
+ }
+# else
+ last_login_time = get_last_login_time(uid, user, hostname,
+ sizeof(hostname));
+
+ if (last_login_time != 0) {
+ time_string = ctime(&last_login_time);
+ time_string[strcspn(time_string, "\n")] = '\0';
+ if (strcmp(hostname, "") == 0)
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Last login: %s\r\n",
+ time_string);
+ else
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Last login: %s from %s\r\n",
+ time_string, hostname);
+ buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
+ }
+# endif /* CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG */
+#endif /* NO_SSH_LASTLOG */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Records that the user has logged in. I wish these parts of operating
+ * systems were more standardized.
+ */
+void
+record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user, uid_t uid,
+ const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen)
+{
+ struct logininfo *li;
+
+ /* save previous login details before writing new */
+ store_lastlog_message(user, uid);
+
+ li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, tty);
+ login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen);
+ login_login(li);
+ login_free_entry(li);
+}
+
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+void
+record_utmp_only(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user,
+ const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen)
+{
+ struct logininfo *li;
+
+ li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, ttyname);
+ login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen);
+ login_utmp_only(li);
+ login_free_entry(li);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Records that the user has logged out. */
+void
+record_logout(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user)
+{
+ struct logininfo *li;
+
+ li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, NULL, tty);
+ login_logout(li);
+ login_free_entry(li);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshpty.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshpty.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshpty.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,258 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.28 2007/09/11 23:49:09 stevesk Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Allocating a pseudo-terminal, and making it the controlling tty.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/ioctl.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <grp.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <termios.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
-# include <util.h>
-#endif
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "sshpty.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-
-#ifdef HAVE_PTY_H
-# include <pty.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifndef O_NOCTTY
-#define O_NOCTTY 0
-#endif
-
-#ifdef __APPLE__
-# include <AvailabilityMacros.h>
-# if (MAC_OS_X_VERSION_MAX_ALLOWED >= MAC_OS_X_VERSION_10_5)
-# define __APPLE_PRIVPTY__
-# endif
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Allocates and opens a pty. Returns 0 if no pty could be allocated, or
- * nonzero if a pty was successfully allocated. On success, open file
- * descriptors for the pty and tty sides and the name of the tty side are
- * returned (the buffer must be able to hold at least 64 characters).
- */
-
-int
-pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen)
-{
- /* openpty(3) exists in OSF/1 and some other os'es */
- char *name;
- int i;
-
- i = openpty(ptyfd, ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- if (i < 0) {
- error("openpty: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- return 0;
- }
- name = ttyname(*ttyfd);
- if (!name)
- fatal("openpty returns device for which ttyname fails.");
-
- strlcpy(namebuf, name, namebuflen); /* possible truncation */
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* Releases the tty. Its ownership is returned to root, and permissions to 0666. */
-
-void
-pty_release(const char *tty)
-{
-#ifndef __APPLE_PRIVPTY__
- if (chown(tty, (uid_t) 0, (gid_t) 0) < 0)
- error("chown %.100s 0 0 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
- if (chmod(tty, (mode_t) 0666) < 0)
- error("chmod %.100s 0666 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
-#endif /* __APPLE_PRIVPTY__ */
-}
-
-/* Makes the tty the process's controlling tty and sets it to sane modes. */
-
-void
-pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *tty)
-{
- int fd;
-#ifdef USE_VHANGUP
- void *old;
-#endif /* USE_VHANGUP */
-
-#ifdef _UNICOS
- if (setsid() < 0)
- error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-
- fd = open(tty, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY);
- if (fd != -1) {
- signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN);
- ioctl(fd, TCVHUP, (char *)NULL);
- signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
- setpgid(0, 0);
- close(fd);
- } else {
- error("Failed to disconnect from controlling tty.");
- }
-
- debug("Setting controlling tty using TCSETCTTY.");
- ioctl(*ttyfd, TCSETCTTY, NULL);
- fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR);
- if (fd < 0)
- error("%.100s: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
- close(*ttyfd);
- *ttyfd = fd;
-#else /* _UNICOS */
-
- /* First disconnect from the old controlling tty. */
-#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
- fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
- if (fd >= 0) {
- (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
- close(fd);
- }
-#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
- if (setsid() < 0)
- error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-
- /*
- * Verify that we are successfully disconnected from the controlling
- * tty.
- */
- fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
- if (fd >= 0) {
- error("Failed to disconnect from controlling tty.");
- close(fd);
- }
- /* Make it our controlling tty. */
-#ifdef TIOCSCTTY
- debug("Setting controlling tty using TIOCSCTTY.");
- if (ioctl(*ttyfd, TIOCSCTTY, NULL) < 0)
- error("ioctl(TIOCSCTTY): %.100s", strerror(errno));
-#endif /* TIOCSCTTY */
-#ifdef NEED_SETPGRP
- if (setpgrp(0,0) < 0)
- error("SETPGRP %s",strerror(errno));
-#endif /* NEED_SETPGRP */
-#ifdef USE_VHANGUP
- old = signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN);
- vhangup();
- signal(SIGHUP, old);
-#endif /* USE_VHANGUP */
- fd = open(tty, O_RDWR);
- if (fd < 0) {
- error("%.100s: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
- } else {
-#ifdef USE_VHANGUP
- close(*ttyfd);
- *ttyfd = fd;
-#else /* USE_VHANGUP */
- close(fd);
-#endif /* USE_VHANGUP */
- }
- /* Verify that we now have a controlling tty. */
- fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_WRONLY);
- if (fd < 0)
- error("open /dev/tty failed - could not set controlling tty: %.100s",
- strerror(errno));
- else
- close(fd);
-#endif /* _UNICOS */
-}
-
-/* Changes the window size associated with the pty. */
-
-void
-pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, u_int row, u_int col,
- u_int xpixel, u_int ypixel)
-{
- struct winsize w;
-
- /* may truncate u_int -> u_short */
- w.ws_row = row;
- w.ws_col = col;
- w.ws_xpixel = xpixel;
- w.ws_ypixel = ypixel;
- (void) ioctl(ptyfd, TIOCSWINSZ, &w);
-}
-
-void
-pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
-{
- struct group *grp;
- gid_t gid;
- mode_t mode;
- struct stat st;
-
- /* Determine the group to make the owner of the tty. */
- grp = getgrnam("tty");
- if (grp) {
- gid = grp->gr_gid;
- mode = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP;
- } else {
- gid = pw->pw_gid;
- mode = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH;
- }
-
- /*
- * Change owner and mode of the tty as required.
- * Warn but continue if filesystem is read-only and the uids match/
- * tty is owned by root.
- */
- if (stat(tty, &st))
- fatal("stat(%.100s) failed: %.100s", tty,
- strerror(errno));
-
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty);
-#endif
-
- if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) {
- if (chown(tty, pw->pw_uid, gid) < 0) {
- if (errno == EROFS &&
- (st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0))
- debug("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s",
- tty, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid,
- strerror(errno));
- else
- fatal("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s",
- tty, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid,
- strerror(errno));
- }
- }
-
- if ((st.st_mode & (S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)) != mode) {
- if (chmod(tty, mode) < 0) {
- if (errno == EROFS &&
- (st.st_mode & (S_IRGRP | S_IROTH)) == 0)
- debug("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s",
- tty, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno));
- else
- fatal("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s",
- tty, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno));
- }
- }
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshpty.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshpty.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshpty.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/sshpty.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.30 2015/07/30 23:09:15 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Allocating a pseudo-terminal, and making it the controlling tty.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PTY_H
+# include <pty.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef O_NOCTTY
+#define O_NOCTTY 0
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __APPLE__
+# include <AvailabilityMacros.h>
+# if (MAC_OS_X_VERSION_MAX_ALLOWED >= MAC_OS_X_VERSION_10_5)
+# define __APPLE_PRIVPTY__
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Allocates and opens a pty. Returns 0 if no pty could be allocated, or
+ * nonzero if a pty was successfully allocated. On success, open file
+ * descriptors for the pty and tty sides and the name of the tty side are
+ * returned (the buffer must be able to hold at least 64 characters).
+ */
+
+int
+pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen)
+{
+ /* openpty(3) exists in OSF/1 and some other os'es */
+ char *name;
+ int i;
+
+ i = openpty(ptyfd, ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ error("openpty: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ name = ttyname(*ttyfd);
+ if (!name)
+ fatal("openpty returns device for which ttyname fails.");
+
+ strlcpy(namebuf, name, namebuflen); /* possible truncation */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Releases the tty. Its ownership is returned to root, and permissions to 0666. */
+
+void
+pty_release(const char *tty)
+{
+#if !defined(__APPLE_PRIVPTY__) && !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY)
+ if (chown(tty, (uid_t) 0, (gid_t) 0) < 0)
+ error("chown %.100s 0 0 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
+ if (chmod(tty, (mode_t) 0666) < 0)
+ error("chmod %.100s 0666 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
+#endif /* !__APPLE_PRIVPTY__ && !HAVE_OPENPTY */
+}
+
+/* Makes the tty the process's controlling tty and sets it to sane modes. */
+
+void
+pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *tty)
+{
+ int fd;
+
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+ if (setsid() < 0)
+ error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ fd = open(tty, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY);
+ if (fd != -1) {
+ signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN);
+ ioctl(fd, TCVHUP, (char *)NULL);
+ signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
+ setpgid(0, 0);
+ close(fd);
+ } else {
+ error("Failed to disconnect from controlling tty.");
+ }
+
+ debug("Setting controlling tty using TCSETCTTY.");
+ ioctl(*ttyfd, TCSETCTTY, NULL);
+ fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ error("%.100s: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
+ close(*ttyfd);
+ *ttyfd = fd;
+#else /* _UNICOS */
+
+ /* First disconnect from the old controlling tty. */
+#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
+ fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
+ close(fd);
+ }
+#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
+ if (setsid() < 0)
+ error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that we are successfully disconnected from the controlling
+ * tty.
+ */
+ fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ error("Failed to disconnect from controlling tty.");
+ close(fd);
+ }
+ /* Make it our controlling tty. */
+#ifdef TIOCSCTTY
+ debug("Setting controlling tty using TIOCSCTTY.");
+ if (ioctl(*ttyfd, TIOCSCTTY, NULL) < 0)
+ error("ioctl(TIOCSCTTY): %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#endif /* TIOCSCTTY */
+#ifdef NEED_SETPGRP
+ if (setpgrp(0,0) < 0)
+ error("SETPGRP %s",strerror(errno));
+#endif /* NEED_SETPGRP */
+ fd = open(tty, O_RDWR);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ error("%.100s: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
+ } else {
+ close(fd);
+ }
+ /* Verify that we now have a controlling tty. */
+ fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_WRONLY);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ error("open /dev/tty failed - could not set controlling tty: %.100s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ else
+ close(fd);
+#endif /* _UNICOS */
+}
+
+/* Changes the window size associated with the pty. */
+
+void
+pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, u_int row, u_int col,
+ u_int xpixel, u_int ypixel)
+{
+ struct winsize w;
+
+ /* may truncate u_int -> u_short */
+ w.ws_row = row;
+ w.ws_col = col;
+ w.ws_xpixel = xpixel;
+ w.ws_ypixel = ypixel;
+ (void) ioctl(ptyfd, TIOCSWINSZ, &w);
+}
+
+void
+pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
+{
+ struct group *grp;
+ gid_t gid;
+ mode_t mode;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ /* Determine the group to make the owner of the tty. */
+ grp = getgrnam("tty");
+ gid = (grp != NULL) ? grp->gr_gid : pw->pw_gid;
+ mode = (grp != NULL) ? 0620 : 0600;
+
+ /*
+ * Change owner and mode of the tty as required.
+ * Warn but continue if filesystem is read-only and the uids match/
+ * tty is owned by root.
+ */
+ if (stat(tty, &st))
+ fatal("stat(%.100s) failed: %.100s", tty,
+ strerror(errno));
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty);
+#endif
+
+ if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) {
+ if (chown(tty, pw->pw_uid, gid) < 0) {
+ if (errno == EROFS &&
+ (st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0))
+ debug("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s",
+ tty, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid,
+ strerror(errno));
+ else
+ fatal("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s",
+ tty, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid,
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((st.st_mode & (S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)) != mode) {
+ if (chmod(tty, mode) < 0) {
+ if (errno == EROFS &&
+ (st.st_mode & (S_IRGRP | S_IROTH)) == 0)
+ debug("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s",
+ tty, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno));
+ else
+ fatal("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s",
+ tty, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ttymodes.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ttymodes.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ttymodes.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,490 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ttymodes.c,v 1.29 2008/11/02 00:16:16 stevesk Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-/*
- * SSH2 tty modes support by Kevin Steves.
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-/*
- * Encoding and decoding of terminal modes in a portable way.
- * Much of the format is defined in ttymodes.h; it is included multiple times
- * into this file with the appropriate macro definitions to generate the
- * suitable code.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <termios.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-
-#define TTY_OP_END 0
-/*
- * uint32 (u_int) follows speed in SSH1 and SSH2
- */
-#define TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO1 192
-#define TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO1 193
-#define TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO2 128
-#define TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO2 129
-
-/*
- * Converts POSIX speed_t to a baud rate. The values of the
- * constants for speed_t are not themselves portable.
- */
-static int
-speed_to_baud(speed_t speed)
-{
- switch (speed) {
- case B0:
- return 0;
- case B50:
- return 50;
- case B75:
- return 75;
- case B110:
- return 110;
- case B134:
- return 134;
- case B150:
- return 150;
- case B200:
- return 200;
- case B300:
- return 300;
- case B600:
- return 600;
- case B1200:
- return 1200;
- case B1800:
- return 1800;
- case B2400:
- return 2400;
- case B4800:
- return 4800;
- case B9600:
- return 9600;
-
-#ifdef B19200
- case B19200:
- return 19200;
-#else /* B19200 */
-#ifdef EXTA
- case EXTA:
- return 19200;
-#endif /* EXTA */
-#endif /* B19200 */
-
-#ifdef B38400
- case B38400:
- return 38400;
-#else /* B38400 */
-#ifdef EXTB
- case EXTB:
- return 38400;
-#endif /* EXTB */
-#endif /* B38400 */
-
-#ifdef B7200
- case B7200:
- return 7200;
-#endif /* B7200 */
-#ifdef B14400
- case B14400:
- return 14400;
-#endif /* B14400 */
-#ifdef B28800
- case B28800:
- return 28800;
-#endif /* B28800 */
-#ifdef B57600
- case B57600:
- return 57600;
-#endif /* B57600 */
-#ifdef B76800
- case B76800:
- return 76800;
-#endif /* B76800 */
-#ifdef B115200
- case B115200:
- return 115200;
-#endif /* B115200 */
-#ifdef B230400
- case B230400:
- return 230400;
-#endif /* B230400 */
- default:
- return 9600;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Converts a numeric baud rate to a POSIX speed_t.
- */
-static speed_t
-baud_to_speed(int baud)
-{
- switch (baud) {
- case 0:
- return B0;
- case 50:
- return B50;
- case 75:
- return B75;
- case 110:
- return B110;
- case 134:
- return B134;
- case 150:
- return B150;
- case 200:
- return B200;
- case 300:
- return B300;
- case 600:
- return B600;
- case 1200:
- return B1200;
- case 1800:
- return B1800;
- case 2400:
- return B2400;
- case 4800:
- return B4800;
- case 9600:
- return B9600;
-
-#ifdef B19200
- case 19200:
- return B19200;
-#else /* B19200 */
-#ifdef EXTA
- case 19200:
- return EXTA;
-#endif /* EXTA */
-#endif /* B19200 */
-
-#ifdef B38400
- case 38400:
- return B38400;
-#else /* B38400 */
-#ifdef EXTB
- case 38400:
- return EXTB;
-#endif /* EXTB */
-#endif /* B38400 */
-
-#ifdef B7200
- case 7200:
- return B7200;
-#endif /* B7200 */
-#ifdef B14400
- case 14400:
- return B14400;
-#endif /* B14400 */
-#ifdef B28800
- case 28800:
- return B28800;
-#endif /* B28800 */
-#ifdef B57600
- case 57600:
- return B57600;
-#endif /* B57600 */
-#ifdef B76800
- case 76800:
- return B76800;
-#endif /* B76800 */
-#ifdef B115200
- case 115200:
- return B115200;
-#endif /* B115200 */
-#ifdef B230400
- case 230400:
- return B230400;
-#endif /* B230400 */
- default:
- return B9600;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Encode a special character into SSH line format.
- */
-static u_int
-special_char_encode(cc_t c)
-{
-#ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE
- if (c == _POSIX_VDISABLE)
- return 255;
-#endif /* _POSIX_VDISABLE */
- return c;
-}
-
-/*
- * Decode a special character from SSH line format.
- */
-static cc_t
-special_char_decode(u_int c)
-{
-#ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE
- if (c == 255)
- return _POSIX_VDISABLE;
-#endif /* _POSIX_VDISABLE */
- return c;
-}
-
-/*
- * Encodes terminal modes for the terminal referenced by fd
- * or tiop in a portable manner, and appends the modes to a packet
- * being constructed.
- */
-void
-tty_make_modes(int fd, struct termios *tiop)
-{
- struct termios tio;
- int baud;
- Buffer buf;
- int tty_op_ospeed, tty_op_ispeed;
- void (*put_arg)(Buffer *, u_int);
-
- buffer_init(&buf);
- if (compat20) {
- tty_op_ospeed = TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO2;
- tty_op_ispeed = TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO2;
- put_arg = buffer_put_int;
- } else {
- tty_op_ospeed = TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO1;
- tty_op_ispeed = TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO1;
- put_arg = (void (*)(Buffer *, u_int)) buffer_put_char;
- }
-
- if (tiop == NULL) {
- if (fd == -1) {
- debug("tty_make_modes: no fd or tio");
- goto end;
- }
- if (tcgetattr(fd, &tio) == -1) {
- logit("tcgetattr: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- goto end;
- }
- } else
- tio = *tiop;
-
- /* Store input and output baud rates. */
- baud = speed_to_baud(cfgetospeed(&tio));
- buffer_put_char(&buf, tty_op_ospeed);
- buffer_put_int(&buf, baud);
- baud = speed_to_baud(cfgetispeed(&tio));
- buffer_put_char(&buf, tty_op_ispeed);
- buffer_put_int(&buf, baud);
-
- /* Store values of mode flags. */
-#define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \
- buffer_put_char(&buf, OP); \
- put_arg(&buf, special_char_encode(tio.c_cc[NAME]));
-
-#define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \
- buffer_put_char(&buf, OP); \
- put_arg(&buf, ((tio.FIELD & NAME) != 0));
-
-#include "ttymodes.h"
-
-#undef TTYCHAR
-#undef TTYMODE
-
-end:
- /* Mark end of mode data. */
- buffer_put_char(&buf, TTY_OP_END);
- if (compat20)
- packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&buf), buffer_len(&buf));
- else
- packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&buf), buffer_len(&buf));
- buffer_free(&buf);
-}
-
-/*
- * Decodes terminal modes for the terminal referenced by fd in a portable
- * manner from a packet being read.
- */
-void
-tty_parse_modes(int fd, int *n_bytes_ptr)
-{
- struct termios tio;
- int opcode, baud;
- int n_bytes = 0;
- int failure = 0;
- u_int (*get_arg)(void);
- int arg_size;
-
- if (compat20) {
- *n_bytes_ptr = packet_get_int();
- if (*n_bytes_ptr == 0)
- return;
- get_arg = packet_get_int;
- arg_size = 4;
- } else {
- get_arg = packet_get_char;
- arg_size = 1;
- }
-
- /*
- * Get old attributes for the terminal. We will modify these
- * flags. I am hoping that if there are any machine-specific
- * modes, they will initially have reasonable values.
- */
- if (tcgetattr(fd, &tio) == -1) {
- logit("tcgetattr: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- failure = -1;
- }
-
- for (;;) {
- n_bytes += 1;
- opcode = packet_get_char();
- switch (opcode) {
- case TTY_OP_END:
- goto set;
-
- /* XXX: future conflict possible */
- case TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO1:
- case TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO2:
- n_bytes += 4;
- baud = packet_get_int();
- if (failure != -1 &&
- cfsetispeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1)
- error("cfsetispeed failed for %d", baud);
- break;
-
- /* XXX: future conflict possible */
- case TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO1:
- case TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO2:
- n_bytes += 4;
- baud = packet_get_int();
- if (failure != -1 &&
- cfsetospeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1)
- error("cfsetospeed failed for %d", baud);
- break;
-
-#define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \
- case OP: \
- n_bytes += arg_size; \
- tio.c_cc[NAME] = special_char_decode(get_arg()); \
- break;
-#define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \
- case OP: \
- n_bytes += arg_size; \
- if (get_arg()) \
- tio.FIELD |= NAME; \
- else \
- tio.FIELD &= ~NAME; \
- break;
-
-#include "ttymodes.h"
-
-#undef TTYCHAR
-#undef TTYMODE
-
- default:
- debug("Ignoring unsupported tty mode opcode %d (0x%x)",
- opcode, opcode);
- if (!compat20) {
- /*
- * SSH1:
- * Opcodes 1 to 127 are defined to have
- * a one-byte argument.
- * Opcodes 128 to 159 are defined to have
- * an integer argument.
- */
- if (opcode > 0 && opcode < 128) {
- n_bytes += 1;
- (void) packet_get_char();
- break;
- } else if (opcode >= 128 && opcode < 160) {
- n_bytes += 4;
- (void) packet_get_int();
- break;
- } else {
- /*
- * It is a truly undefined opcode (160 to 255).
- * We have no idea about its arguments. So we
- * must stop parsing. Note that some data
- * may be left in the packet; hopefully there
- * is nothing more coming after the mode data.
- */
- logit("parse_tty_modes: unknown opcode %d",
- opcode);
- goto set;
- }
- } else {
- /*
- * SSH2:
- * Opcodes 1 to 159 are defined to have
- * a uint32 argument.
- * Opcodes 160 to 255 are undefined and
- * cause parsing to stop.
- */
- if (opcode > 0 && opcode < 160) {
- n_bytes += 4;
- (void) packet_get_int();
- break;
- } else {
- logit("parse_tty_modes: unknown opcode %d",
- opcode);
- goto set;
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
-set:
- if (*n_bytes_ptr != n_bytes) {
- *n_bytes_ptr = n_bytes;
- logit("parse_tty_modes: n_bytes_ptr != n_bytes: %d %d",
- *n_bytes_ptr, n_bytes);
- return; /* Don't process bytes passed */
- }
- if (failure == -1)
- return; /* Packet parsed ok but tcgetattr() failed */
-
- /* Set the new modes for the terminal. */
- if (tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, &tio) == -1)
- logit("Setting tty modes failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ttymodes.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ttymodes.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ttymodes.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ttymodes.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,489 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ttymodes.c,v 1.30 2016/05/04 14:22:33 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/*
+ * SSH2 tty modes support by Kevin Steves.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Encoding and decoding of terminal modes in a portable way.
+ * Much of the format is defined in ttymodes.h; it is included multiple times
+ * into this file with the appropriate macro definitions to generate the
+ * suitable code.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+
+#define TTY_OP_END 0
+/*
+ * uint32 (u_int) follows speed in SSH1 and SSH2
+ */
+#define TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO1 192
+#define TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO1 193
+#define TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO2 128
+#define TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO2 129
+
+/*
+ * Converts POSIX speed_t to a baud rate. The values of the
+ * constants for speed_t are not themselves portable.
+ */
+static int
+speed_to_baud(speed_t speed)
+{
+ switch (speed) {
+ case B0:
+ return 0;
+ case B50:
+ return 50;
+ case B75:
+ return 75;
+ case B110:
+ return 110;
+ case B134:
+ return 134;
+ case B150:
+ return 150;
+ case B200:
+ return 200;
+ case B300:
+ return 300;
+ case B600:
+ return 600;
+ case B1200:
+ return 1200;
+ case B1800:
+ return 1800;
+ case B2400:
+ return 2400;
+ case B4800:
+ return 4800;
+ case B9600:
+ return 9600;
+
+#ifdef B19200
+ case B19200:
+ return 19200;
+#else /* B19200 */
+#ifdef EXTA
+ case EXTA:
+ return 19200;
+#endif /* EXTA */
+#endif /* B19200 */
+
+#ifdef B38400
+ case B38400:
+ return 38400;
+#else /* B38400 */
+#ifdef EXTB
+ case EXTB:
+ return 38400;
+#endif /* EXTB */
+#endif /* B38400 */
+
+#ifdef B7200
+ case B7200:
+ return 7200;
+#endif /* B7200 */
+#ifdef B14400
+ case B14400:
+ return 14400;
+#endif /* B14400 */
+#ifdef B28800
+ case B28800:
+ return 28800;
+#endif /* B28800 */
+#ifdef B57600
+ case B57600:
+ return 57600;
+#endif /* B57600 */
+#ifdef B76800
+ case B76800:
+ return 76800;
+#endif /* B76800 */
+#ifdef B115200
+ case B115200:
+ return 115200;
+#endif /* B115200 */
+#ifdef B230400
+ case B230400:
+ return 230400;
+#endif /* B230400 */
+ default:
+ return 9600;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Converts a numeric baud rate to a POSIX speed_t.
+ */
+static speed_t
+baud_to_speed(int baud)
+{
+ switch (baud) {
+ case 0:
+ return B0;
+ case 50:
+ return B50;
+ case 75:
+ return B75;
+ case 110:
+ return B110;
+ case 134:
+ return B134;
+ case 150:
+ return B150;
+ case 200:
+ return B200;
+ case 300:
+ return B300;
+ case 600:
+ return B600;
+ case 1200:
+ return B1200;
+ case 1800:
+ return B1800;
+ case 2400:
+ return B2400;
+ case 4800:
+ return B4800;
+ case 9600:
+ return B9600;
+
+#ifdef B19200
+ case 19200:
+ return B19200;
+#else /* B19200 */
+#ifdef EXTA
+ case 19200:
+ return EXTA;
+#endif /* EXTA */
+#endif /* B19200 */
+
+#ifdef B38400
+ case 38400:
+ return B38400;
+#else /* B38400 */
+#ifdef EXTB
+ case 38400:
+ return EXTB;
+#endif /* EXTB */
+#endif /* B38400 */
+
+#ifdef B7200
+ case 7200:
+ return B7200;
+#endif /* B7200 */
+#ifdef B14400
+ case 14400:
+ return B14400;
+#endif /* B14400 */
+#ifdef B28800
+ case 28800:
+ return B28800;
+#endif /* B28800 */
+#ifdef B57600
+ case 57600:
+ return B57600;
+#endif /* B57600 */
+#ifdef B76800
+ case 76800:
+ return B76800;
+#endif /* B76800 */
+#ifdef B115200
+ case 115200:
+ return B115200;
+#endif /* B115200 */
+#ifdef B230400
+ case 230400:
+ return B230400;
+#endif /* B230400 */
+ default:
+ return B9600;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encode a special character into SSH line format.
+ */
+static u_int
+special_char_encode(cc_t c)
+{
+#ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE
+ if (c == _POSIX_VDISABLE)
+ return 255;
+#endif /* _POSIX_VDISABLE */
+ return c;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode a special character from SSH line format.
+ */
+static cc_t
+special_char_decode(u_int c)
+{
+#ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE
+ if (c == 255)
+ return _POSIX_VDISABLE;
+#endif /* _POSIX_VDISABLE */
+ return c;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encodes terminal modes for the terminal referenced by fd
+ * or tiop in a portable manner, and appends the modes to a packet
+ * being constructed.
+ */
+void
+tty_make_modes(int fd, struct termios *tiop)
+{
+ struct termios tio;
+ int baud;
+ Buffer buf;
+ int tty_op_ospeed, tty_op_ispeed;
+ void (*put_arg)(Buffer *, u_int);
+
+ buffer_init(&buf);
+ if (compat20) {
+ tty_op_ospeed = TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO2;
+ tty_op_ispeed = TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO2;
+ put_arg = buffer_put_int;
+ } else {
+ tty_op_ospeed = TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO1;
+ tty_op_ispeed = TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO1;
+ put_arg = (void (*)(Buffer *, u_int)) buffer_put_char;
+ }
+
+ if (tiop == NULL) {
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ debug("tty_make_modes: no fd or tio");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (tcgetattr(fd, &tio) == -1) {
+ logit("tcgetattr: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ goto end;
+ }
+ } else
+ tio = *tiop;
+
+ /* Store input and output baud rates. */
+ baud = speed_to_baud(cfgetospeed(&tio));
+ buffer_put_char(&buf, tty_op_ospeed);
+ buffer_put_int(&buf, baud);
+ baud = speed_to_baud(cfgetispeed(&tio));
+ buffer_put_char(&buf, tty_op_ispeed);
+ buffer_put_int(&buf, baud);
+
+ /* Store values of mode flags. */
+#define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \
+ buffer_put_char(&buf, OP); \
+ put_arg(&buf, special_char_encode(tio.c_cc[NAME]));
+
+#define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \
+ buffer_put_char(&buf, OP); \
+ put_arg(&buf, ((tio.FIELD & NAME) != 0));
+
+#include "ttymodes.h"
+
+#undef TTYCHAR
+#undef TTYMODE
+
+end:
+ /* Mark end of mode data. */
+ buffer_put_char(&buf, TTY_OP_END);
+ if (compat20)
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&buf), buffer_len(&buf));
+ else
+ packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&buf), buffer_len(&buf));
+ buffer_free(&buf);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decodes terminal modes for the terminal referenced by fd in a portable
+ * manner from a packet being read.
+ */
+void
+tty_parse_modes(int fd, int *n_bytes_ptr)
+{
+ struct termios tio;
+ int opcode, baud;
+ int n_bytes = 0;
+ int failure = 0;
+ u_int (*get_arg)(void);
+ int arg_size;
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ *n_bytes_ptr = packet_get_int();
+ if (*n_bytes_ptr == 0)
+ return;
+ get_arg = packet_get_int;
+ arg_size = 4;
+ } else {
+ get_arg = packet_get_char;
+ arg_size = 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get old attributes for the terminal. We will modify these
+ * flags. I am hoping that if there are any machine-specific
+ * modes, they will initially have reasonable values.
+ */
+ if (tcgetattr(fd, &tio) == -1) {
+ logit("tcgetattr: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ failure = -1;
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ n_bytes += 1;
+ opcode = packet_get_char();
+ switch (opcode) {
+ case TTY_OP_END:
+ goto set;
+
+ /* XXX: future conflict possible */
+ case TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO1:
+ case TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO2:
+ n_bytes += 4;
+ baud = packet_get_int();
+ if (failure != -1 &&
+ cfsetispeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1)
+ error("cfsetispeed failed for %d", baud);
+ break;
+
+ /* XXX: future conflict possible */
+ case TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO1:
+ case TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO2:
+ n_bytes += 4;
+ baud = packet_get_int();
+ if (failure != -1 &&
+ cfsetospeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1)
+ error("cfsetospeed failed for %d", baud);
+ break;
+
+#define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \
+ case OP: \
+ n_bytes += arg_size; \
+ tio.c_cc[NAME] = special_char_decode(get_arg()); \
+ break;
+#define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \
+ case OP: \
+ n_bytes += arg_size; \
+ if (get_arg()) \
+ tio.FIELD |= NAME; \
+ else \
+ tio.FIELD &= ~NAME; \
+ break;
+
+#include "ttymodes.h"
+
+#undef TTYCHAR
+#undef TTYMODE
+
+ default:
+ debug("Ignoring unsupported tty mode opcode %d (0x%x)",
+ opcode, opcode);
+ if (!compat20) {
+ /*
+ * SSH1:
+ * Opcodes 1 to 127 are defined to have
+ * a one-byte argument.
+ * Opcodes 128 to 159 are defined to have
+ * an integer argument.
+ */
+ if (opcode > 0 && opcode < 128) {
+ n_bytes += 1;
+ (void) packet_get_char();
+ break;
+ } else if (opcode >= 128 && opcode < 160) {
+ n_bytes += 4;
+ (void) packet_get_int();
+ break;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * It is a truly undefined opcode (160 to 255).
+ * We have no idea about its arguments. So we
+ * must stop parsing. Note that some data
+ * may be left in the packet; hopefully there
+ * is nothing more coming after the mode data.
+ */
+ logit("parse_tty_modes: unknown opcode %d",
+ opcode);
+ goto set;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * SSH2:
+ * Opcodes 1 to 159 are defined to have
+ * a uint32 argument.
+ * Opcodes 160 to 255 are undefined and
+ * cause parsing to stop.
+ */
+ if (opcode > 0 && opcode < 160) {
+ n_bytes += 4;
+ (void) packet_get_int();
+ break;
+ } else {
+ logit("parse_tty_modes: unknown opcode %d",
+ opcode);
+ goto set;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+set:
+ if (*n_bytes_ptr != n_bytes) {
+ *n_bytes_ptr = n_bytes;
+ logit("parse_tty_modes: n_bytes_ptr != n_bytes: %d %d",
+ *n_bytes_ptr, n_bytes);
+ return; /* Don't process bytes passed */
+ }
+ if (failure == -1)
+ return; /* Packet parsed ok but tcgetattr() failed */
+
+ /* Set the new modes for the terminal. */
+ if (tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, &tio) == -1)
+ logit("Setting tty modes failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ttymodes.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ttymodes.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ttymodes.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ttymodes.h,v 1.14 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-/*
- * SSH2 tty modes support by Kevin Steves.
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-/*
- * SSH1:
- * The tty mode description is a stream of bytes. The stream consists of
- * opcode-arguments pairs. It is terminated by opcode TTY_OP_END (0).
- * Opcodes 1-127 have one-byte arguments. Opcodes 128-159 have integer
- * arguments. Opcodes 160-255 are not yet defined, and cause parsing to
- * stop (they should only be used after any other data).
- *
- * SSH2:
- * Differences between SSH1 and SSH2 terminal mode encoding include:
- * 1. Encoded terminal modes are represented as a string, and a stream
- * of bytes within that string.
- * 2. Opcode arguments are uint32 (1-159); 160-255 remain undefined.
- * 3. The values for TTY_OP_ISPEED and TTY_OP_OSPEED are different;
- * 128 and 129 vs. 192 and 193 respectively.
- *
- * The client puts in the stream any modes it knows about, and the
- * server ignores any modes it does not know about. This allows some degree
- * of machine-independence, at least between systems that use a posix-like
- * tty interface. The protocol can support other systems as well, but might
- * require reimplementing as mode names would likely be different.
- */
-
-/*
- * Some constants and prototypes are defined in packet.h; this file
- * is only intended for including from ttymodes.c.
- */
-
-/* termios macro */
-/* name, op */
-TTYCHAR(VINTR, 1)
-TTYCHAR(VQUIT, 2)
-TTYCHAR(VERASE, 3)
-#if defined(VKILL)
-TTYCHAR(VKILL, 4)
-#endif /* VKILL */
-TTYCHAR(VEOF, 5)
-#if defined(VEOL)
-TTYCHAR(VEOL, 6)
-#endif /* VEOL */
-#ifdef VEOL2
-TTYCHAR(VEOL2, 7)
-#endif /* VEOL2 */
-TTYCHAR(VSTART, 8)
-TTYCHAR(VSTOP, 9)
-#if defined(VSUSP)
-TTYCHAR(VSUSP, 10)
-#endif /* VSUSP */
-#if defined(VDSUSP)
-TTYCHAR(VDSUSP, 11)
-#endif /* VDSUSP */
-#if defined(VREPRINT)
-TTYCHAR(VREPRINT, 12)
-#endif /* VREPRINT */
-#if defined(VWERASE)
-TTYCHAR(VWERASE, 13)
-#endif /* VWERASE */
-#if defined(VLNEXT)
-TTYCHAR(VLNEXT, 14)
-#endif /* VLNEXT */
-#if defined(VFLUSH)
-TTYCHAR(VFLUSH, 15)
-#endif /* VFLUSH */
-#ifdef VSWTCH
-TTYCHAR(VSWTCH, 16)
-#endif /* VSWTCH */
-#if defined(VSTATUS)
-TTYCHAR(VSTATUS, 17)
-#endif /* VSTATUS */
-#ifdef VDISCARD
-TTYCHAR(VDISCARD, 18)
-#endif /* VDISCARD */
-
-/* name, field, op */
-TTYMODE(IGNPAR, c_iflag, 30)
-TTYMODE(PARMRK, c_iflag, 31)
-TTYMODE(INPCK, c_iflag, 32)
-TTYMODE(ISTRIP, c_iflag, 33)
-TTYMODE(INLCR, c_iflag, 34)
-TTYMODE(IGNCR, c_iflag, 35)
-TTYMODE(ICRNL, c_iflag, 36)
-#if defined(IUCLC)
-TTYMODE(IUCLC, c_iflag, 37)
-#endif
-TTYMODE(IXON, c_iflag, 38)
-TTYMODE(IXANY, c_iflag, 39)
-TTYMODE(IXOFF, c_iflag, 40)
-#ifdef IMAXBEL
-TTYMODE(IMAXBEL,c_iflag, 41)
-#endif /* IMAXBEL */
-
-TTYMODE(ISIG, c_lflag, 50)
-TTYMODE(ICANON, c_lflag, 51)
-#ifdef XCASE
-TTYMODE(XCASE, c_lflag, 52)
-#endif
-TTYMODE(ECHO, c_lflag, 53)
-TTYMODE(ECHOE, c_lflag, 54)
-TTYMODE(ECHOK, c_lflag, 55)
-TTYMODE(ECHONL, c_lflag, 56)
-TTYMODE(NOFLSH, c_lflag, 57)
-TTYMODE(TOSTOP, c_lflag, 58)
-#ifdef IEXTEN
-TTYMODE(IEXTEN, c_lflag, 59)
-#endif /* IEXTEN */
-#if defined(ECHOCTL)
-TTYMODE(ECHOCTL,c_lflag, 60)
-#endif /* ECHOCTL */
-#ifdef ECHOKE
-TTYMODE(ECHOKE, c_lflag, 61)
-#endif /* ECHOKE */
-#if defined(PENDIN)
-TTYMODE(PENDIN, c_lflag, 62)
-#endif /* PENDIN */
-
-TTYMODE(OPOST, c_oflag, 70)
-#if defined(OLCUC)
-TTYMODE(OLCUC, c_oflag, 71)
-#endif
-#ifdef ONLCR
-TTYMODE(ONLCR, c_oflag, 72)
-#endif
-#ifdef OCRNL
-TTYMODE(OCRNL, c_oflag, 73)
-#endif
-#ifdef ONOCR
-TTYMODE(ONOCR, c_oflag, 74)
-#endif
-#ifdef ONLRET
-TTYMODE(ONLRET, c_oflag, 75)
-#endif
-
-TTYMODE(CS7, c_cflag, 90)
-TTYMODE(CS8, c_cflag, 91)
-TTYMODE(PARENB, c_cflag, 92)
-TTYMODE(PARODD, c_cflag, 93)
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ttymodes.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ttymodes.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ttymodes.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/ttymodes.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ttymodes.h,v 1.15 2016/05/03 09:03:49 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/*
+ * SSH2 tty modes support by Kevin Steves.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * SSH1:
+ * The tty mode description is a stream of bytes. The stream consists of
+ * opcode-arguments pairs. It is terminated by opcode TTY_OP_END (0).
+ * Opcodes 1-127 have one-byte arguments. Opcodes 128-159 have integer
+ * arguments. Opcodes 160-255 are not yet defined, and cause parsing to
+ * stop (they should only be used after any other data).
+ *
+ * SSH2:
+ * Differences between SSH1 and SSH2 terminal mode encoding include:
+ * 1. Encoded terminal modes are represented as a string, and a stream
+ * of bytes within that string.
+ * 2. Opcode arguments are uint32 (1-159); 160-255 remain undefined.
+ * 3. The values for TTY_OP_ISPEED and TTY_OP_OSPEED are different;
+ * 128 and 129 vs. 192 and 193 respectively.
+ *
+ * The client puts in the stream any modes it knows about, and the
+ * server ignores any modes it does not know about. This allows some degree
+ * of machine-independence, at least between systems that use a posix-like
+ * tty interface. The protocol can support other systems as well, but might
+ * require reimplementing as mode names would likely be different.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Some constants and prototypes are defined in packet.h; this file
+ * is only intended for including from ttymodes.c.
+ */
+
+/* termios macro */
+/* name, op */
+TTYCHAR(VINTR, 1)
+TTYCHAR(VQUIT, 2)
+TTYCHAR(VERASE, 3)
+#if defined(VKILL)
+TTYCHAR(VKILL, 4)
+#endif /* VKILL */
+TTYCHAR(VEOF, 5)
+#if defined(VEOL)
+TTYCHAR(VEOL, 6)
+#endif /* VEOL */
+#ifdef VEOL2
+TTYCHAR(VEOL2, 7)
+#endif /* VEOL2 */
+TTYCHAR(VSTART, 8)
+TTYCHAR(VSTOP, 9)
+#if defined(VSUSP)
+TTYCHAR(VSUSP, 10)
+#endif /* VSUSP */
+#if defined(VDSUSP)
+TTYCHAR(VDSUSP, 11)
+#endif /* VDSUSP */
+#if defined(VREPRINT)
+TTYCHAR(VREPRINT, 12)
+#endif /* VREPRINT */
+#if defined(VWERASE)
+TTYCHAR(VWERASE, 13)
+#endif /* VWERASE */
+#if defined(VLNEXT)
+TTYCHAR(VLNEXT, 14)
+#endif /* VLNEXT */
+#if defined(VFLUSH)
+TTYCHAR(VFLUSH, 15)
+#endif /* VFLUSH */
+#ifdef VSWTCH
+TTYCHAR(VSWTCH, 16)
+#endif /* VSWTCH */
+#if defined(VSTATUS)
+TTYCHAR(VSTATUS, 17)
+#endif /* VSTATUS */
+#ifdef VDISCARD
+TTYCHAR(VDISCARD, 18)
+#endif /* VDISCARD */
+
+/* name, field, op */
+TTYMODE(IGNPAR, c_iflag, 30)
+TTYMODE(PARMRK, c_iflag, 31)
+TTYMODE(INPCK, c_iflag, 32)
+TTYMODE(ISTRIP, c_iflag, 33)
+TTYMODE(INLCR, c_iflag, 34)
+TTYMODE(IGNCR, c_iflag, 35)
+TTYMODE(ICRNL, c_iflag, 36)
+#if defined(IUCLC)
+TTYMODE(IUCLC, c_iflag, 37)
+#endif
+TTYMODE(IXON, c_iflag, 38)
+TTYMODE(IXANY, c_iflag, 39)
+TTYMODE(IXOFF, c_iflag, 40)
+#ifdef IMAXBEL
+TTYMODE(IMAXBEL,c_iflag, 41)
+#endif /* IMAXBEL */
+#ifdef IUTF8
+TTYMODE(IUTF8, c_iflag, 42)
+#endif /* IUTF8 */
+
+TTYMODE(ISIG, c_lflag, 50)
+TTYMODE(ICANON, c_lflag, 51)
+#ifdef XCASE
+TTYMODE(XCASE, c_lflag, 52)
+#endif
+TTYMODE(ECHO, c_lflag, 53)
+TTYMODE(ECHOE, c_lflag, 54)
+TTYMODE(ECHOK, c_lflag, 55)
+TTYMODE(ECHONL, c_lflag, 56)
+TTYMODE(NOFLSH, c_lflag, 57)
+TTYMODE(TOSTOP, c_lflag, 58)
+#ifdef IEXTEN
+TTYMODE(IEXTEN, c_lflag, 59)
+#endif /* IEXTEN */
+#if defined(ECHOCTL)
+TTYMODE(ECHOCTL,c_lflag, 60)
+#endif /* ECHOCTL */
+#ifdef ECHOKE
+TTYMODE(ECHOKE, c_lflag, 61)
+#endif /* ECHOKE */
+#if defined(PENDIN)
+TTYMODE(PENDIN, c_lflag, 62)
+#endif /* PENDIN */
+
+TTYMODE(OPOST, c_oflag, 70)
+#if defined(OLCUC)
+TTYMODE(OLCUC, c_oflag, 71)
+#endif
+#ifdef ONLCR
+TTYMODE(ONLCR, c_oflag, 72)
+#endif
+#ifdef OCRNL
+TTYMODE(OCRNL, c_oflag, 73)
+#endif
+#ifdef ONOCR
+TTYMODE(ONOCR, c_oflag, 74)
+#endif
+#ifdef ONLRET
+TTYMODE(ONLRET, c_oflag, 75)
+#endif
+
+TTYMODE(CS7, c_cflag, 90)
+TTYMODE(CS8, c_cflag, 91)
+TTYMODE(PARENB, c_cflag, 92)
+TTYMODE(PARODD, c_cflag, 93)
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/uidswap.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/uidswap.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/uidswap.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: uidswap.c,v 1.36 2013/11/08 11:15:19 dtucker Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Code for uid-swapping.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-
-#include <grp.h>
-
-#include "log.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-
-/*
- * Note: all these functions must work in all of the following cases:
- * 1. euid=0, ruid=0
- * 2. euid=0, ruid!=0
- * 3. euid!=0, ruid!=0
- * Additionally, they must work regardless of whether the system has
- * POSIX saved uids or not.
- */
-
-#if defined(_POSIX_SAVED_IDS) && !defined(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS)
-/* Lets assume that posix saved ids also work with seteuid, even though that
- is not part of the posix specification. */
-#define SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
-/* Saved effective uid. */
-static uid_t saved_euid = 0;
-static gid_t saved_egid = 0;
-#endif
-
-/* Saved effective uid. */
-static int privileged = 0;
-static int temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0;
-static gid_t *saved_egroups = NULL, *user_groups = NULL;
-static int saved_egroupslen = -1, user_groupslen = -1;
-
-/*
- * Temporarily changes to the given uid. If the effective user
- * id is not root, this does nothing. This call cannot be nested.
- */
-void
-temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *pw)
-{
- /* Save the current euid, and egroups. */
-#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
- saved_euid = geteuid();
- saved_egid = getegid();
- debug("temporarily_use_uid: %u/%u (e=%u/%u)",
- (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
- (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid);
-#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
- if (saved_euid != 0) {
- privileged = 0;
- return;
- }
-#endif
-#else
- if (geteuid() != 0) {
- privileged = 0;
- return;
- }
-#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
-
- privileged = 1;
- temporarily_use_uid_effective = 1;
-
- saved_egroupslen = getgroups(0, NULL);
- if (saved_egroupslen < 0)
- fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- if (saved_egroupslen > 0) {
- saved_egroups = xrealloc(saved_egroups,
- saved_egroupslen, sizeof(gid_t));
- if (getgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) < 0)
- fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- } else { /* saved_egroupslen == 0 */
- free(saved_egroups);
- }
-
- /* set and save the user's groups */
- if (user_groupslen == -1) {
- if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0)
- fatal("initgroups: %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name,
- strerror(errno));
-
- user_groupslen = getgroups(0, NULL);
- if (user_groupslen < 0)
- fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- if (user_groupslen > 0) {
- user_groups = xrealloc(user_groups,
- user_groupslen, sizeof(gid_t));
- if (getgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) < 0)
- fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- } else { /* user_groupslen == 0 */
- free(user_groups);
- }
- }
- /* Set the effective uid to the given (unprivileged) uid. */
- if (setgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) < 0)
- fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-#ifndef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
- /* Propagate the privileged gid to all of our gids. */
- if (setgid(getegid()) < 0)
- debug("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int) getegid(), strerror(errno));
- /* Propagate the privileged uid to all of our uids. */
- if (setuid(geteuid()) < 0)
- debug("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int) geteuid(), strerror(errno));
-#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
- if (setegid(pw->pw_gid) < 0)
- fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
- strerror(errno));
- if (seteuid(pw->pw_uid) == -1)
- fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
- strerror(errno));
-}
-
-void
-permanently_drop_suid(uid_t uid)
-{
-#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
- uid_t old_uid = getuid();
-#endif
-
- debug("permanently_drop_suid: %u", (u_int)uid);
- if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0)
- fatal("setresuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)uid, strerror(errno));
-
-#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
- /* Try restoration of UID if changed (test clearing of saved uid) */
- if (old_uid != uid &&
- (setuid(old_uid) != -1 || seteuid(old_uid) != -1))
- fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]uid", __func__);
-#endif
-
- /* Verify UID drop was successful */
- if (getuid() != uid || geteuid() != uid) {
- fatal("%s: euid incorrect uid:%u euid:%u (should be %u)",
- __func__, (u_int)getuid(), (u_int)geteuid(), (u_int)uid);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Restores to the original (privileged) uid.
- */
-void
-restore_uid(void)
-{
- /* it's a no-op unless privileged */
- if (!privileged) {
- debug("restore_uid: (unprivileged)");
- return;
- }
- if (!temporarily_use_uid_effective)
- fatal("restore_uid: temporarily_use_uid not effective");
-
-#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
- debug("restore_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid);
- /* Set the effective uid back to the saved privileged uid. */
- if (seteuid(saved_euid) < 0)
- fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_euid, strerror(errno));
- if (setegid(saved_egid) < 0)
- fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_egid, strerror(errno));
-#else /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
- /*
- * We are unable to restore the real uid to its unprivileged value.
- * Propagate the real uid (usually more privileged) to effective uid
- * as well.
- */
- setuid(getuid());
- setgid(getgid());
-#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
-
- if (setgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) < 0)
- fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Permanently sets all uids to the given uid. This cannot be
- * called while temporarily_use_uid is effective.
- */
-void
-permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *pw)
-{
-#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
- uid_t old_uid = getuid();
- gid_t old_gid = getgid();
-#endif
-
- if (pw == NULL)
- fatal("permanently_set_uid: no user given");
- if (temporarily_use_uid_effective)
- fatal("permanently_set_uid: temporarily_use_uid effective");
- debug("permanently_set_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
- (u_int)pw->pw_gid);
-
- if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) < 0)
- fatal("setresgid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
-
-#ifdef __APPLE__
- /*
- * OS X requires initgroups after setgid to opt back into
- * memberd support for >16 supplemental groups.
- */
- if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0)
- fatal("initgroups %.100s %u: %.100s",
- pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
-#endif
-
- if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) < 0)
- fatal("setresuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno));
-
-#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
- /* Try restoration of GID if changed (test clearing of saved gid) */
- if (old_gid != pw->pw_gid && pw->pw_uid != 0 &&
- (setgid(old_gid) != -1 || setegid(old_gid) != -1))
- fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]gid", __func__);
-#endif
-
- /* Verify GID drop was successful */
- if (getgid() != pw->pw_gid || getegid() != pw->pw_gid) {
- fatal("%s: egid incorrect gid:%u egid:%u (should be %u)",
- __func__, (u_int)getgid(), (u_int)getegid(),
- (u_int)pw->pw_gid);
- }
-
-#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
- /* Try restoration of UID if changed (test clearing of saved uid) */
- if (old_uid != pw->pw_uid &&
- (setuid(old_uid) != -1 || seteuid(old_uid) != -1))
- fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]uid", __func__);
-#endif
-
- /* Verify UID drop was successful */
- if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) {
- fatal("%s: euid incorrect uid:%u euid:%u (should be %u)",
- __func__, (u_int)getuid(), (u_int)geteuid(),
- (u_int)pw->pw_uid);
- }
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/uidswap.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/uidswap.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/uidswap.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/uidswap.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: uidswap.c,v 1.39 2015/06/24 01:49:19 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Code for uid-swapping.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include <grp.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+/*
+ * Note: all these functions must work in all of the following cases:
+ * 1. euid=0, ruid=0
+ * 2. euid=0, ruid!=0
+ * 3. euid!=0, ruid!=0
+ * Additionally, they must work regardless of whether the system has
+ * POSIX saved uids or not.
+ */
+
+#if defined(_POSIX_SAVED_IDS) && !defined(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS)
+/* Lets assume that posix saved ids also work with seteuid, even though that
+ is not part of the posix specification. */
+#define SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+/* Saved effective uid. */
+static uid_t saved_euid = 0;
+static gid_t saved_egid = 0;
+#endif
+
+/* Saved effective uid. */
+static int privileged = 0;
+static int temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0;
+static gid_t *saved_egroups = NULL, *user_groups = NULL;
+static int saved_egroupslen = -1, user_groupslen = -1;
+
+/*
+ * Temporarily changes to the given uid. If the effective user
+ * id is not root, this does nothing. This call cannot be nested.
+ */
+void
+temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ /* Save the current euid, and egroups. */
+#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+ saved_euid = geteuid();
+ saved_egid = getegid();
+ debug("temporarily_use_uid: %u/%u (e=%u/%u)",
+ (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
+ (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid);
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (saved_euid != 0) {
+ privileged = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+#else
+ if (geteuid() != 0) {
+ privileged = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+
+ privileged = 1;
+ temporarily_use_uid_effective = 1;
+
+ saved_egroupslen = getgroups(0, NULL);
+ if (saved_egroupslen < 0)
+ fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ if (saved_egroupslen > 0) {
+ saved_egroups = xreallocarray(saved_egroups,
+ saved_egroupslen, sizeof(gid_t));
+ if (getgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) < 0)
+ fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ } else { /* saved_egroupslen == 0 */
+ free(saved_egroups);
+ }
+
+ /* set and save the user's groups */
+ if (user_groupslen == -1) {
+ if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0)
+ fatal("initgroups: %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name,
+ strerror(errno));
+
+ user_groupslen = getgroups(0, NULL);
+ if (user_groupslen < 0)
+ fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ if (user_groupslen > 0) {
+ user_groups = xreallocarray(user_groups,
+ user_groupslen, sizeof(gid_t));
+ if (getgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) < 0)
+ fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ } else { /* user_groupslen == 0 */
+ free(user_groups);
+ }
+ }
+ /* Set the effective uid to the given (unprivileged) uid. */
+ if (setgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) < 0)
+ fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#ifndef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+ /* Propagate the privileged gid to all of our gids. */
+ if (setgid(getegid()) < 0)
+ debug("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int) getegid(), strerror(errno));
+ /* Propagate the privileged uid to all of our uids. */
+ if (setuid(geteuid()) < 0)
+ debug("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int) geteuid(), strerror(errno));
+#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+ if (setegid(pw->pw_gid) < 0)
+ fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
+ strerror(errno));
+ if (seteuid(pw->pw_uid) == -1)
+ fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
+ strerror(errno));
+}
+
+void
+permanently_drop_suid(uid_t uid)
+{
+#ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST
+ uid_t old_uid = getuid();
+#endif
+
+ debug("permanently_drop_suid: %u", (u_int)uid);
+ if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0)
+ fatal("setresuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)uid, strerror(errno));
+
+#ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST
+ /*
+ * Try restoration of UID if changed (test clearing of saved uid).
+ *
+ * Note that we don't do this on Cygwin, or on Solaris-based platforms
+ * where fine-grained privileges are available (the user might be
+ * deliberately allowed the right to setuid back to root).
+ */
+ if (old_uid != uid &&
+ (setuid(old_uid) != -1 || seteuid(old_uid) != -1))
+ fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]uid", __func__);
+#endif
+
+ /* Verify UID drop was successful */
+ if (getuid() != uid || geteuid() != uid) {
+ fatal("%s: euid incorrect uid:%u euid:%u (should be %u)",
+ __func__, (u_int)getuid(), (u_int)geteuid(), (u_int)uid);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restores to the original (privileged) uid.
+ */
+void
+restore_uid(void)
+{
+ /* it's a no-op unless privileged */
+ if (!privileged) {
+ debug("restore_uid: (unprivileged)");
+ return;
+ }
+ if (!temporarily_use_uid_effective)
+ fatal("restore_uid: temporarily_use_uid not effective");
+
+#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+ debug("restore_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid);
+ /* Set the effective uid back to the saved privileged uid. */
+ if (seteuid(saved_euid) < 0)
+ fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_euid, strerror(errno));
+ if (setegid(saved_egid) < 0)
+ fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_egid, strerror(errno));
+#else /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+ /*
+ * We are unable to restore the real uid to its unprivileged value.
+ * Propagate the real uid (usually more privileged) to effective uid
+ * as well.
+ */
+ setuid(getuid());
+ setgid(getgid());
+#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+
+ if (setgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) < 0)
+ fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Permanently sets all uids to the given uid. This cannot be
+ * called while temporarily_use_uid is effective.
+ */
+void
+permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+#ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST
+ uid_t old_uid = getuid();
+ gid_t old_gid = getgid();
+#endif
+
+ if (pw == NULL)
+ fatal("permanently_set_uid: no user given");
+ if (temporarily_use_uid_effective)
+ fatal("permanently_set_uid: temporarily_use_uid effective");
+ debug("permanently_set_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
+ (u_int)pw->pw_gid);
+
+ if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) < 0)
+ fatal("setresgid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
+
+#ifdef __APPLE__
+ /*
+ * OS X requires initgroups after setgid to opt back into
+ * memberd support for >16 supplemental groups.
+ */
+ if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0)
+ fatal("initgroups %.100s %u: %.100s",
+ pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
+#endif
+
+ if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) < 0)
+ fatal("setresuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno));
+
+#ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST
+ /* Try restoration of GID if changed (test clearing of saved gid) */
+ if (old_gid != pw->pw_gid && pw->pw_uid != 0 &&
+ (setgid(old_gid) != -1 || setegid(old_gid) != -1))
+ fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]gid", __func__);
+#endif
+
+ /* Verify GID drop was successful */
+ if (getgid() != pw->pw_gid || getegid() != pw->pw_gid) {
+ fatal("%s: egid incorrect gid:%u egid:%u (should be %u)",
+ __func__, (u_int)getgid(), (u_int)getegid(),
+ (u_int)pw->pw_gid);
+ }
+
+#ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST
+ /* Try restoration of UID if changed (test clearing of saved uid) */
+ if (old_uid != pw->pw_uid &&
+ (setuid(old_uid) != -1 || seteuid(old_uid) != -1))
+ fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]uid", __func__);
+#endif
+
+ /* Verify UID drop was successful */
+ if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) {
+ fatal("%s: euid incorrect uid:%u euid:%u (should be %u)",
+ __func__, (u_int)getuid(), (u_int)geteuid(),
+ (u_int)pw->pw_uid);
+ }
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/umac.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/umac.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/umac.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,1287 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.8 2013/11/08 00:39:15 djm Exp $ */
-/* -----------------------------------------------------------------------
- *
- * umac.c -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication
- *
- * Version 0.93b of rfc4418.txt -- 2006 July 18
- *
- * For a full description of UMAC message authentication see the UMAC
- * world-wide-web page at http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/umac
- * Please report bugs and suggestions to the UMAC webpage.
- *
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Ted Krovetz
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and
- * its documentation for any purpose and with or without fee, is hereby
- * granted provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies
- * and in supporting documentation, and that the name of the copyright
- * holder not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining to
- * distribution of the software without specific, written prior permission.
- *
- * Comments should be directed to Ted Krovetz (tdk at acm.org)
- *
- * ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
- /* ////////////////////// IMPORTANT NOTES /////////////////////////////////
- *
- * 1) This version does not work properly on messages larger than 16MB
- *
- * 2) If you set the switch to use SSE2, then all data must be 16-byte
- * aligned
- *
- * 3) When calling the function umac(), it is assumed that msg is in
- * a writable buffer of length divisible by 32 bytes. The message itself
- * does not have to fill the entire buffer, but bytes beyond msg may be
- * zeroed.
- *
- * 4) Three free AES implementations are supported by this implementation of
- * UMAC. Paulo Barreto's version is in the public domain and can be found
- * at http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/ (search for
- * "Barreto"). The only two files needed are rijndael-alg-fst.c and
- * rijndael-alg-fst.h. Brian Gladman's version is distributed with the GNU
- * Public lisence at http://fp.gladman.plus.com/AES/index.htm. It
- * includes a fast IA-32 assembly version. The OpenSSL crypo library is
- * the third.
- *
- * 5) With FORCE_C_ONLY flags set to 0, incorrect results are sometimes
- * produced under gcc with optimizations set -O3 or higher. Dunno why.
- *
- /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// */
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* --- User Switches ---------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-#ifndef UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN
-#define UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN 8 /* Alowable: 4, 8, 12, 16 */
-#endif
-
-#if UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 4 && UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 8 && \
- UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 12 && UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 16
-# error UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN must be defined to 4, 8, 12 or 16
-#endif
-
-/* #define FORCE_C_ONLY 1 ANSI C and 64-bit integers req'd */
-/* #define AES_IMPLEMENTAION 1 1 = OpenSSL, 2 = Barreto, 3 = Gladman */
-/* #define SSE2 0 Is SSE2 is available? */
-/* #define RUN_TESTS 0 Run basic correctness/speed tests */
-/* #define UMAC_AE_SUPPORT 0 Enable auhthenticated encrytion */
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* -- Global Includes --------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "umac.h"
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stddef.h>
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* --- Primitive Data Types --- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-/* The following assumptions may need change on your system */
-typedef u_int8_t UINT8; /* 1 byte */
-typedef u_int16_t UINT16; /* 2 byte */
-typedef u_int32_t UINT32; /* 4 byte */
-typedef u_int64_t UINT64; /* 8 bytes */
-typedef unsigned int UWORD; /* Register */
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* --- Constants -------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-#define UMAC_KEY_LEN 16 /* UMAC takes 16 bytes of external key */
-
-/* Message "words" are read from memory in an endian-specific manner. */
-/* For this implementation to behave correctly, __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ must */
-/* be set true if the host computer is little-endian. */
-
-#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
-#define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 1
-#else
-#define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 0
-#endif
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ----- Architecture Specific ------------------------------------------ */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ----- Primitive Routines --------------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* --- 32-bit by 32-bit to 64-bit Multiplication ------------------------ */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-#define MUL64(a,b) ((UINT64)((UINT64)(UINT32)(a) * (UINT64)(UINT32)(b)))
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* --- Endian Conversion --- Forcing assembly on some platforms */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-#if HAVE_SWAP32
-#define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p) (swap32(*(const UINT32 *)(p)))
-#define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v) (*(UINT32 *)(p) = swap32(v))
-#else /* HAVE_SWAP32 */
-
-static UINT32 LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(const void *ptr)
-{
- UINT32 temp = *(const UINT32 *)ptr;
- temp = (temp >> 24) | ((temp & 0x00FF0000) >> 8 )
- | ((temp & 0x0000FF00) << 8 ) | (temp << 24);
- return (UINT32)temp;
-}
-
-# if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
-static void STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(void *ptr, UINT32 x)
-{
- UINT32 i = (UINT32)x;
- *(UINT32 *)ptr = (i >> 24) | ((i & 0x00FF0000) >> 8 )
- | ((i & 0x0000FF00) << 8 ) | (i << 24);
-}
-# endif /* __LITTLE_ENDIAN */
-#endif /* HAVE_SWAP32 */
-
-/* The following definitions use the above reversal-primitives to do the right
- * thing on endian specific load and stores.
- */
-
-#if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
-#define LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(ptr) (*(const UINT32 *)(ptr))
-#define STORE_UINT32_BIG(ptr,x) STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(ptr,x)
-#else
-#define LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(ptr) LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(ptr)
-#define STORE_UINT32_BIG(ptr,x) (*(UINT32 *)(ptr) = (UINT32)(x))
-#endif
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ----- Begin KDF & PDF Section ---------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-/* UMAC uses AES with 16 byte block and key lengths */
-#define AES_BLOCK_LEN 16
-
-/* OpenSSL's AES */
-#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-#ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
-# include <openssl/aes.h>
-#endif
-typedef AES_KEY aes_int_key[1];
-#define aes_encryption(in,out,int_key) \
- AES_encrypt((u_char *)(in),(u_char *)(out),(AES_KEY *)int_key)
-#define aes_key_setup(key,int_key) \
- AES_set_encrypt_key((const u_char *)(key),UMAC_KEY_LEN*8,int_key)
-
-/* The user-supplied UMAC key is stretched using AES in a counter
- * mode to supply all random bits needed by UMAC. The kdf function takes
- * an AES internal key representation 'key' and writes a stream of
- * 'nbytes' bytes to the memory pointed at by 'bufp'. Each distinct
- * 'ndx' causes a distinct byte stream.
- */
-static void kdf(void *bufp, aes_int_key key, UINT8 ndx, int nbytes)
-{
- UINT8 in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN] = {0};
- UINT8 out_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN];
- UINT8 *dst_buf = (UINT8 *)bufp;
- int i;
-
- /* Setup the initial value */
- in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-9] = ndx;
- in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = i = 1;
-
- while (nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_LEN) {
- aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key);
- memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,AES_BLOCK_LEN);
- in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = ++i;
- nbytes -= AES_BLOCK_LEN;
- dst_buf += AES_BLOCK_LEN;
- }
- if (nbytes) {
- aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key);
- memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,nbytes);
- }
-}
-
-/* The final UHASH result is XOR'd with the output of a pseudorandom
- * function. Here, we use AES to generate random output and
- * xor the appropriate bytes depending on the last bits of nonce.
- * This scheme is optimized for sequential, increasing big-endian nonces.
- */
-
-typedef struct {
- UINT8 cache[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; /* Previous AES output is saved */
- UINT8 nonce[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; /* The AES input making above cache */
- aes_int_key prf_key; /* Expanded AES key for PDF */
-} pdf_ctx;
-
-static void pdf_init(pdf_ctx *pc, aes_int_key prf_key)
-{
- UINT8 buf[UMAC_KEY_LEN];
-
- kdf(buf, prf_key, 0, UMAC_KEY_LEN);
- aes_key_setup(buf, pc->prf_key);
-
- /* Initialize pdf and cache */
- memset(pc->nonce, 0, sizeof(pc->nonce));
- aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key);
-}
-
-static void pdf_gen_xor(pdf_ctx *pc, const UINT8 nonce[8], UINT8 buf[8])
-{
- /* 'ndx' indicates that we'll be using the 0th or 1st eight bytes
- * of the AES output. If last time around we returned the ndx-1st
- * element, then we may have the result in the cache already.
- */
-
-#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4)
-#define LOW_BIT_MASK 3
-#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8)
-#define LOW_BIT_MASK 1
-#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN > 8)
-#define LOW_BIT_MASK 0
-#endif
- union {
- UINT8 tmp_nonce_lo[4];
- UINT32 align;
- } t;
-#if LOW_BIT_MASK != 0
- int ndx = nonce[7] & LOW_BIT_MASK;
-#endif
- *(UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo = ((const UINT32 *)nonce)[1];
- t.tmp_nonce_lo[3] &= ~LOW_BIT_MASK; /* zero last bit */
-
- if ( (((UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1]) ||
- (((const UINT32 *)nonce)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0]) )
- {
- ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0] = ((const UINT32 *)nonce)[0];
- ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1] = ((UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo)[0];
- aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key);
- }
-
-#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4)
- *((UINT32 *)buf) ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[ndx];
-#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8)
- *((UINT64 *)buf) ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[ndx];
-#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12)
- ((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0];
- ((UINT32 *)buf)[2] ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[2];
-#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
- ((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0];
- ((UINT64 *)buf)[1] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[1];
-#endif
-}
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ----- Begin NH Hash Section ------------------------------------------ */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-/* The NH-based hash functions used in UMAC are described in the UMAC paper
- * and specification, both of which can be found at the UMAC website.
- * The interface to this implementation has two
- * versions, one expects the entire message being hashed to be passed
- * in a single buffer and returns the hash result immediately. The second
- * allows the message to be passed in a sequence of buffers. In the
- * muliple-buffer interface, the client calls the routine nh_update() as
- * many times as necessary. When there is no more data to be fed to the
- * hash, the client calls nh_final() which calculates the hash output.
- * Before beginning another hash calculation the nh_reset() routine
- * must be called. The single-buffer routine, nh(), is equivalent to
- * the sequence of calls nh_update() and nh_final(); however it is
- * optimized and should be prefered whenever the multiple-buffer interface
- * is not necessary. When using either interface, it is the client's
- * responsability to pass no more than L1_KEY_LEN bytes per hash result.
- *
- * The routine nh_init() initializes the nh_ctx data structure and
- * must be called once, before any other PDF routine.
- */
-
- /* The "nh_aux" routines do the actual NH hashing work. They
- * expect buffers to be multiples of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. These routines
- * produce output for all STREAMS NH iterations in one call,
- * allowing the parallel implementation of the streams.
- */
-
-#define STREAMS (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN / 4) /* Number of times hash is applied */
-#define L1_KEY_LEN 1024 /* Internal key bytes */
-#define L1_KEY_SHIFT 16 /* Toeplitz key shift between streams */
-#define L1_PAD_BOUNDARY 32 /* pad message to boundary multiple */
-#define ALLOC_BOUNDARY 16 /* Keep buffers aligned to this */
-#define HASH_BUF_BYTES 64 /* nh_aux_hb buffer multiple */
-
-typedef struct {
- UINT8 nh_key [L1_KEY_LEN + L1_KEY_SHIFT * (STREAMS - 1)]; /* NH Key */
- UINT8 data [HASH_BUF_BYTES]; /* Incoming data buffer */
- int next_data_empty; /* Bookeeping variable for data buffer. */
- int bytes_hashed; /* Bytes (out of L1_KEY_LEN) incorperated. */
- UINT64 state[STREAMS]; /* on-line state */
-} nh_ctx;
-
-
-#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4)
-
-static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
-/* NH hashing primitive. Previous (partial) hash result is loaded and
-* then stored via hp pointer. The length of the data pointed at by "dp",
-* "dlen", is guaranteed to be divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY (32). Key
-* is expected to be endian compensated in memory at key setup.
-*/
-{
- UINT64 h;
- UWORD c = dlen / 32;
- UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
- const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp;
- UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
- UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7;
-
- h = *((UINT64 *)hp);
- do {
- d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
- d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
- d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
- d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
- k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
- k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
- h += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
- h += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
- h += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
- h += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
-
- d += 8;
- k += 8;
- } while (--c);
- *((UINT64 *)hp) = h;
-}
-
-#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8)
-
-static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
-/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass,
- * reading and writing 16 bytes of hash-state per call.
- */
-{
- UINT64 h1,h2;
- UWORD c = dlen / 32;
- UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
- const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp;
- UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
- UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7,
- k8,k9,k10,k11;
-
- h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp);
- h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1);
- k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
- do {
- d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
- d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
- d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
- d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
- k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
- k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11);
-
- h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
- h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4));
-
- h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
- h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5));
-
- h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
- h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6));
-
- h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
- h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7));
-
- k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11;
-
- d += 8;
- k += 8;
- } while (--c);
- ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1;
- ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2;
-}
-
-#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12)
-
-static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
-/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass,
- * reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call.
-*/
-{
- UINT64 h1,h2,h3;
- UWORD c = dlen / 32;
- UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
- const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp;
- UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
- UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7,
- k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15;
-
- h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp);
- h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1);
- h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2);
- k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
- k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
- do {
- d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
- d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
- d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
- d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
- k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11);
- k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15);
-
- h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
- h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4));
- h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4));
-
- h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
- h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5));
- h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5));
-
- h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
- h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6));
- h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6));
-
- h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
- h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7));
- h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7));
-
- k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11;
- k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15;
-
- d += 8;
- k += 8;
- } while (--c);
- ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1;
- ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2;
- ((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3;
-}
-
-#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
-
-static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
-/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass,
- * reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call.
-*/
-{
- UINT64 h1,h2,h3,h4;
- UWORD c = dlen / 32;
- UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
- const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp;
- UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
- UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7,
- k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15,
- k16,k17,k18,k19;
-
- h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp);
- h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1);
- h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2);
- h4 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 3);
- k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
- k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
- do {
- d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
- d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
- d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
- d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
- k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11);
- k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15);
- k16 = *(k+16); k17 = *(k+17); k18 = *(k+18); k19 = *(k+19);
-
- h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
- h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4));
- h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4));
- h4 += MUL64((k12 + d0), (k16 + d4));
-
- h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
- h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5));
- h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5));
- h4 += MUL64((k13 + d1), (k17 + d5));
-
- h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
- h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6));
- h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6));
- h4 += MUL64((k14 + d2), (k18 + d6));
-
- h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
- h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7));
- h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7));
- h4 += MUL64((k15 + d3), (k19 + d7));
-
- k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11;
- k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15;
- k8 = k16; k9 = k17; k10 = k18; k11 = k19;
-
- d += 8;
- k += 8;
- } while (--c);
- ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1;
- ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2;
- ((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3;
- ((UINT64 *)hp)[3] = h4;
-}
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-#endif /* UMAC_OUTPUT_LENGTH */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-static void nh_transform(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes)
-/* This function is a wrapper for the primitive NH hash functions. It takes
- * as argument "hc" the current hash context and a buffer which must be a
- * multiple of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. The key passed to nh_aux is offset
- * appropriately according to how much message has been hashed already.
- */
-{
- UINT8 *key;
-
- key = hc->nh_key + hc->bytes_hashed;
- nh_aux(key, buf, hc->state, nbytes);
-}
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-#if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
-static void endian_convert(void *buf, UWORD bpw, UINT32 num_bytes)
-/* We endian convert the keys on little-endian computers to */
-/* compensate for the lack of big-endian memory reads during hashing. */
-{
- UWORD iters = num_bytes / bpw;
- if (bpw == 4) {
- UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf;
- do {
- *p = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p);
- p++;
- } while (--iters);
- } else if (bpw == 8) {
- UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf;
- UINT32 t;
- do {
- t = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p+1);
- p[1] = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p);
- p[0] = t;
- p += 2;
- } while (--iters);
- }
-}
-#define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) endian_convert((x),(y),(z))
-#else
-#define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) do{}while(0) /* Do nothing */
-#endif
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-static void nh_reset(nh_ctx *hc)
-/* Reset nh_ctx to ready for hashing of new data */
-{
- hc->bytes_hashed = 0;
- hc->next_data_empty = 0;
- hc->state[0] = 0;
-#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
- hc->state[1] = 0;
-#endif
-#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
- hc->state[2] = 0;
-#endif
-#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
- hc->state[3] = 0;
-#endif
-
-}
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-static void nh_init(nh_ctx *hc, aes_int_key prf_key)
-/* Generate nh_key, endian convert and reset to be ready for hashing. */
-{
- kdf(hc->nh_key, prf_key, 1, sizeof(hc->nh_key));
- endian_convert_if_le(hc->nh_key, 4, sizeof(hc->nh_key));
- nh_reset(hc);
-}
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-static void nh_update(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes)
-/* Incorporate nbytes of data into a nh_ctx, buffer whatever is not an */
-/* even multiple of HASH_BUF_BYTES. */
-{
- UINT32 i,j;
-
- j = hc->next_data_empty;
- if ((j + nbytes) >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) {
- if (j) {
- i = HASH_BUF_BYTES - j;
- memcpy(hc->data+j, buf, i);
- nh_transform(hc,hc->data,HASH_BUF_BYTES);
- nbytes -= i;
- buf += i;
- hc->bytes_hashed += HASH_BUF_BYTES;
- }
- if (nbytes >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) {
- i = nbytes & ~(HASH_BUF_BYTES - 1);
- nh_transform(hc, buf, i);
- nbytes -= i;
- buf += i;
- hc->bytes_hashed += i;
- }
- j = 0;
- }
- memcpy(hc->data + j, buf, nbytes);
- hc->next_data_empty = j + nbytes;
-}
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-static void zero_pad(UINT8 *p, int nbytes)
-{
-/* Write "nbytes" of zeroes, beginning at "p" */
- if (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) {
- while ((ptrdiff_t)p % sizeof(UWORD)) {
- *p = 0;
- nbytes--;
- p++;
- }
- while (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) {
- *(UWORD *)p = 0;
- nbytes -= sizeof(UWORD);
- p += sizeof(UWORD);
- }
- }
- while (nbytes) {
- *p = 0;
- nbytes--;
- p++;
- }
-}
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-static void nh_final(nh_ctx *hc, UINT8 *result)
-/* After passing some number of data buffers to nh_update() for integration
- * into an NH context, nh_final is called to produce a hash result. If any
- * bytes are in the buffer hc->data, incorporate them into the
- * NH context. Finally, add into the NH accumulation "state" the total number
- * of bits hashed. The resulting numbers are written to the buffer "result".
- * If nh_update was never called, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY zeroes are incorporated.
- */
-{
- int nh_len, nbits;
-
- if (hc->next_data_empty != 0) {
- nh_len = ((hc->next_data_empty + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) &
- ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1));
- zero_pad(hc->data + hc->next_data_empty,
- nh_len - hc->next_data_empty);
- nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len);
- hc->bytes_hashed += hc->next_data_empty;
- } else if (hc->bytes_hashed == 0) {
- nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY;
- zero_pad(hc->data, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY);
- nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len);
- }
-
- nbits = (hc->bytes_hashed << 3);
- ((UINT64 *)result)[0] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[0] + nbits;
-#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
- ((UINT64 *)result)[1] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[1] + nbits;
-#endif
-#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
- ((UINT64 *)result)[2] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[2] + nbits;
-#endif
-#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
- ((UINT64 *)result)[3] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[3] + nbits;
-#endif
- nh_reset(hc);
-}
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-static void nh(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 padded_len,
- UINT32 unpadded_len, UINT8 *result)
-/* All-in-one nh_update() and nh_final() equivalent.
- * Assumes that padded_len is divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY and result is
- * well aligned
- */
-{
- UINT32 nbits;
-
- /* Initialize the hash state */
- nbits = (unpadded_len << 3);
-
- ((UINT64 *)result)[0] = nbits;
-#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
- ((UINT64 *)result)[1] = nbits;
-#endif
-#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
- ((UINT64 *)result)[2] = nbits;
-#endif
-#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
- ((UINT64 *)result)[3] = nbits;
-#endif
-
- nh_aux(hc->nh_key, buf, result, padded_len);
-}
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ----- Begin UHASH Section -------------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-/* UHASH is a multi-layered algorithm. Data presented to UHASH is first
- * hashed by NH. The NH output is then hashed by a polynomial-hash layer
- * unless the initial data to be hashed is short. After the polynomial-
- * layer, an inner-product hash is used to produce the final UHASH output.
- *
- * UHASH provides two interfaces, one all-at-once and another where data
- * buffers are presented sequentially. In the sequential interface, the
- * UHASH client calls the routine uhash_update() as many times as necessary.
- * When there is no more data to be fed to UHASH, the client calls
- * uhash_final() which
- * calculates the UHASH output. Before beginning another UHASH calculation
- * the uhash_reset() routine must be called. The all-at-once UHASH routine,
- * uhash(), is equivalent to the sequence of calls uhash_update() and
- * uhash_final(); however it is optimized and should be
- * used whenever the sequential interface is not necessary.
- *
- * The routine uhash_init() initializes the uhash_ctx data structure and
- * must be called once, before any other UHASH routine.
- */
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ----- Constants and uhash_ctx ---------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ----- Poly hash and Inner-Product hash Constants --------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-/* Primes and masks */
-#define p36 ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFBull) /* 2^36 - 5 */
-#define p64 ((UINT64)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC5ull) /* 2^64 - 59 */
-#define m36 ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFFull) /* The low 36 of 64 bits */
-
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-typedef struct uhash_ctx {
- nh_ctx hash; /* Hash context for L1 NH hash */
- UINT64 poly_key_8[STREAMS]; /* p64 poly keys */
- UINT64 poly_accum[STREAMS]; /* poly hash result */
- UINT64 ip_keys[STREAMS*4]; /* Inner-product keys */
- UINT32 ip_trans[STREAMS]; /* Inner-product translation */
- UINT32 msg_len; /* Total length of data passed */
- /* to uhash */
-} uhash_ctx;
-typedef struct uhash_ctx *uhash_ctx_t;
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-
-/* The polynomial hashes use Horner's rule to evaluate a polynomial one
- * word at a time. As described in the specification, poly32 and poly64
- * require keys from special domains. The following implementations exploit
- * the special domains to avoid overflow. The results are not guaranteed to
- * be within Z_p32 and Z_p64, but the Inner-Product hash implementation
- * patches any errant values.
- */
-
-static UINT64 poly64(UINT64 cur, UINT64 key, UINT64 data)
-{
- UINT32 key_hi = (UINT32)(key >> 32),
- key_lo = (UINT32)key,
- cur_hi = (UINT32)(cur >> 32),
- cur_lo = (UINT32)cur,
- x_lo,
- x_hi;
- UINT64 X,T,res;
-
- X = MUL64(key_hi, cur_lo) + MUL64(cur_hi, key_lo);
- x_lo = (UINT32)X;
- x_hi = (UINT32)(X >> 32);
-
- res = (MUL64(key_hi, cur_hi) + x_hi) * 59 + MUL64(key_lo, cur_lo);
-
- T = ((UINT64)x_lo << 32);
- res += T;
- if (res < T)
- res += 59;
-
- res += data;
- if (res < data)
- res += 59;
-
- return res;
-}
-
-
-/* Although UMAC is specified to use a ramped polynomial hash scheme, this
- * implementation does not handle all ramp levels. Because we don't handle
- * the ramp up to p128 modulus in this implementation, we are limited to
- * 2^14 poly_hash() invocations per stream (for a total capacity of 2^24
- * bytes input to UMAC per tag, ie. 16MB).
- */
-static void poly_hash(uhash_ctx_t hc, UINT32 data_in[])
-{
- int i;
- UINT64 *data=(UINT64*)data_in;
-
- for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) {
- if ((UINT32)(data[i] >> 32) == 0xfffffffful) {
- hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i],
- hc->poly_key_8[i], p64 - 1);
- hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i],
- hc->poly_key_8[i], (data[i] - 59));
- } else {
- hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i],
- hc->poly_key_8[i], data[i]);
- }
- }
-}
-
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-
-/* The final step in UHASH is an inner-product hash. The poly hash
- * produces a result not neccesarily WORD_LEN bytes long. The inner-
- * product hash breaks the polyhash output into 16-bit chunks and
- * multiplies each with a 36 bit key.
- */
-
-static UINT64 ip_aux(UINT64 t, UINT64 *ipkp, UINT64 data)
-{
- t = t + ipkp[0] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 48);
- t = t + ipkp[1] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 32);
- t = t + ipkp[2] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 16);
- t = t + ipkp[3] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data);
-
- return t;
-}
-
-static UINT32 ip_reduce_p36(UINT64 t)
-{
-/* Divisionless modular reduction */
- UINT64 ret;
-
- ret = (t & m36) + 5 * (t >> 36);
- if (ret >= p36)
- ret -= p36;
-
- /* return least significant 32 bits */
- return (UINT32)(ret);
-}
-
-
-/* If the data being hashed by UHASH is no longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then
- * the polyhash stage is skipped and ip_short is applied directly to the
- * NH output.
- */
-static void ip_short(uhash_ctx_t ahc, UINT8 *nh_res, u_char *res)
-{
- UINT64 t;
- UINT64 *nhp = (UINT64 *)nh_res;
-
- t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys, nhp[0]);
- STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+0, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[0]);
-#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
- t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+4, nhp[1]);
- STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+1, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[1]);
-#endif
-#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
- t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+8, nhp[2]);
- STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+2, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[2]);
-#endif
-#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
- t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+12, nhp[3]);
- STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+3, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[3]);
-#endif
-}
-
-/* If the data being hashed by UHASH is longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then
- * the polyhash stage is not skipped and ip_long is applied to the
- * polyhash output.
- */
-static void ip_long(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *res)
-{
- int i;
- UINT64 t;
-
- for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) {
- /* fix polyhash output not in Z_p64 */
- if (ahc->poly_accum[i] >= p64)
- ahc->poly_accum[i] -= p64;
- t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+(i*4), ahc->poly_accum[i]);
- STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+i,
- ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[i]);
- }
-}
-
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-/* Reset uhash context for next hash session */
-static int uhash_reset(uhash_ctx_t pc)
-{
- nh_reset(&pc->hash);
- pc->msg_len = 0;
- pc->poly_accum[0] = 1;
-#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
- pc->poly_accum[1] = 1;
-#endif
-#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
- pc->poly_accum[2] = 1;
-#endif
-#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
- pc->poly_accum[3] = 1;
-#endif
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-/* Given a pointer to the internal key needed by kdf() and a uhash context,
- * initialize the NH context and generate keys needed for poly and inner-
- * product hashing. All keys are endian adjusted in memory so that native
- * loads cause correct keys to be in registers during calculation.
- */
-static void uhash_init(uhash_ctx_t ahc, aes_int_key prf_key)
-{
- int i;
- UINT8 buf[(8*STREAMS+4)*sizeof(UINT64)];
-
- /* Zero the entire uhash context */
- memset(ahc, 0, sizeof(uhash_ctx));
-
- /* Initialize the L1 hash */
- nh_init(&ahc->hash, prf_key);
-
- /* Setup L2 hash variables */
- kdf(buf, prf_key, 2, sizeof(buf)); /* Fill buffer with index 1 key */
- for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) {
- /* Fill keys from the buffer, skipping bytes in the buffer not
- * used by this implementation. Endian reverse the keys if on a
- * little-endian computer.
- */
- memcpy(ahc->poly_key_8+i, buf+24*i, 8);
- endian_convert_if_le(ahc->poly_key_8+i, 8, 8);
- /* Mask the 64-bit keys to their special domain */
- ahc->poly_key_8[i] &= ((UINT64)0x01ffffffu << 32) + 0x01ffffffu;
- ahc->poly_accum[i] = 1; /* Our polyhash prepends a non-zero word */
- }
-
- /* Setup L3-1 hash variables */
- kdf(buf, prf_key, 3, sizeof(buf)); /* Fill buffer with index 2 key */
- for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++)
- memcpy(ahc->ip_keys+4*i, buf+(8*i+4)*sizeof(UINT64),
- 4*sizeof(UINT64));
- endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_keys, sizeof(UINT64),
- sizeof(ahc->ip_keys));
- for (i = 0; i < STREAMS*4; i++)
- ahc->ip_keys[i] %= p36; /* Bring into Z_p36 */
-
- /* Setup L3-2 hash variables */
- /* Fill buffer with index 4 key */
- kdf(ahc->ip_trans, prf_key, 4, STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32));
- endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_trans, sizeof(UINT32),
- STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32));
-}
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-#if 0
-static uhash_ctx_t uhash_alloc(u_char key[])
-{
-/* Allocate memory and force to a 16-byte boundary. */
- uhash_ctx_t ctx;
- u_char bytes_to_add;
- aes_int_key prf_key;
-
- ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)malloc(sizeof(uhash_ctx)+ALLOC_BOUNDARY);
- if (ctx) {
- if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) {
- bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY -
- ((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY -1));
- ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add);
- *((u_char *)ctx - 1) = bytes_to_add;
- }
- aes_key_setup(key,prf_key);
- uhash_init(ctx, prf_key);
- }
- return (ctx);
-}
-#endif
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-#if 0
-static int uhash_free(uhash_ctx_t ctx)
-{
-/* Free memory allocated by uhash_alloc */
- u_char bytes_to_sub;
-
- if (ctx) {
- if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) {
- bytes_to_sub = *((u_char *)ctx - 1);
- ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx - bytes_to_sub);
- }
- free(ctx);
- }
- return (1);
-}
-#endif
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-static int uhash_update(uhash_ctx_t ctx, const u_char *input, long len)
-/* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and
- * hash each one with NH, calling the polyhash on each NH output.
- */
-{
- UWORD bytes_hashed, bytes_remaining;
- UINT64 result_buf[STREAMS];
- UINT8 *nh_result = (UINT8 *)&result_buf;
-
- if (ctx->msg_len + len <= L1_KEY_LEN) {
- nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, len);
- ctx->msg_len += len;
- } else {
-
- bytes_hashed = ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN;
- if (ctx->msg_len == L1_KEY_LEN)
- bytes_hashed = L1_KEY_LEN;
-
- if (bytes_hashed + len >= L1_KEY_LEN) {
-
- /* If some bytes have been passed to the hash function */
- /* then we want to pass at most (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed) */
- /* bytes to complete the current nh_block. */
- if (bytes_hashed) {
- bytes_remaining = (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed);
- nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, bytes_remaining);
- nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result);
- ctx->msg_len += bytes_remaining;
- poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
- len -= bytes_remaining;
- input += bytes_remaining;
- }
-
- /* Hash directly from input stream if enough bytes */
- while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN) {
- nh(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, L1_KEY_LEN,
- L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result);
- ctx->msg_len += L1_KEY_LEN;
- len -= L1_KEY_LEN;
- input += L1_KEY_LEN;
- poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
- }
- }
-
- /* pass remaining < L1_KEY_LEN bytes of input data to NH */
- if (len) {
- nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, len);
- ctx->msg_len += len;
- }
- }
-
- return (1);
-}
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-static int uhash_final(uhash_ctx_t ctx, u_char *res)
-/* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */
-{
- UINT64 result_buf[STREAMS];
- UINT8 *nh_result = (UINT8 *)&result_buf;
-
- if (ctx->msg_len > L1_KEY_LEN) {
- if (ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN) {
- nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result);
- poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
- }
- ip_long(ctx, res);
- } else {
- nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result);
- ip_short(ctx,nh_result, res);
- }
- uhash_reset(ctx);
- return (1);
-}
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-#if 0
-static int uhash(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *msg, long len, u_char *res)
-/* assumes that msg is in a writable buffer of length divisible by */
-/* L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. Bytes beyond msg[len] may be zeroed. */
-{
- UINT8 nh_result[STREAMS*sizeof(UINT64)];
- UINT32 nh_len;
- int extra_zeroes_needed;
-
- /* If the message to be hashed is no longer than L1_HASH_LEN, we skip
- * the polyhash.
- */
- if (len <= L1_KEY_LEN) {
- if (len == 0) /* If zero length messages will not */
- nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY; /* be seen, comment out this case */
- else
- nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1));
- extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len;
- zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed);
- nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result);
- ip_short(ahc,nh_result, res);
- } else {
- /* Otherwise, we hash each L1_KEY_LEN chunk with NH, passing the NH
- * output to poly_hash().
- */
- do {
- nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, L1_KEY_LEN, L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result);
- poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
- len -= L1_KEY_LEN;
- msg += L1_KEY_LEN;
- } while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN);
- if (len) {
- nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1));
- extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len;
- zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed);
- nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result);
- poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
- }
-
- ip_long(ahc, res);
- }
-
- uhash_reset(ahc);
- return 1;
-}
-#endif
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ----- Begin UMAC Section --------------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-/* The UMAC interface has two interfaces, an all-at-once interface where
- * the entire message to be authenticated is passed to UMAC in one buffer,
- * and a sequential interface where the message is presented a little at a
- * time. The all-at-once is more optimaized than the sequential version and
- * should be preferred when the sequential interface is not required.
- */
-struct umac_ctx {
- uhash_ctx hash; /* Hash function for message compression */
- pdf_ctx pdf; /* PDF for hashed output */
- void *free_ptr; /* Address to free this struct via */
-} umac_ctx;
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-#if 0
-int umac_reset(struct umac_ctx *ctx)
-/* Reset the hash function to begin a new authentication. */
-{
- uhash_reset(&ctx->hash);
- return (1);
-}
-#endif
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-int umac_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx)
-/* Deallocate the ctx structure */
-{
- if (ctx) {
- if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY)
- ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)ctx->free_ptr;
- free(ctx);
- }
- return (1);
-}
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-struct umac_ctx *umac_new(const u_char key[])
-/* Dynamically allocate a umac_ctx struct, initialize variables,
- * generate subkeys from key. Align to 16-byte boundary.
- */
-{
- struct umac_ctx *ctx, *octx;
- size_t bytes_to_add;
- aes_int_key prf_key;
-
- octx = ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx) + ALLOC_BOUNDARY);
- if (ctx) {
- if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) {
- bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY -
- ((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY - 1));
- ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add);
- }
- ctx->free_ptr = octx;
- aes_key_setup(key, prf_key);
- pdf_init(&ctx->pdf, prf_key);
- uhash_init(&ctx->hash, prf_key);
- }
-
- return (ctx);
-}
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-int umac_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], const u_char nonce[8])
-/* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */
-{
- uhash_final(&ctx->hash, (u_char *)tag);
- pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (const UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag);
-
- return (1);
-}
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-int umac_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, const u_char *input, long len)
-/* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and */
-/* hash each one, calling the PDF on the hashed output whenever the hash- */
-/* output buffer is full. */
-{
- uhash_update(&ctx->hash, input, len);
- return (1);
-}
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-#if 0
-int umac(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input,
- long len, u_char tag[],
- u_char nonce[8])
-/* All-in-one version simply calls umac_update() and umac_final(). */
-{
- uhash(&ctx->hash, input, len, (u_char *)tag);
- pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag);
-
- return (1);
-}
-#endif
-
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ----- End UMAC Section ----------------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/umac.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/umac.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/umac.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/umac.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,1276 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.11 2014/07/22 07:13:42 guenther Exp $ */
+/* -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * umac.c -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication
+ *
+ * Version 0.93b of rfc4418.txt -- 2006 July 18
+ *
+ * For a full description of UMAC message authentication see the UMAC
+ * world-wide-web page at http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/umac
+ * Please report bugs and suggestions to the UMAC webpage.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Ted Krovetz
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and
+ * its documentation for any purpose and with or without fee, is hereby
+ * granted provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies
+ * and in supporting documentation, and that the name of the copyright
+ * holder not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining to
+ * distribution of the software without specific, written prior permission.
+ *
+ * Comments should be directed to Ted Krovetz (tdk at acm.org)
+ *
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+ /* ////////////////////// IMPORTANT NOTES /////////////////////////////////
+ *
+ * 1) This version does not work properly on messages larger than 16MB
+ *
+ * 2) If you set the switch to use SSE2, then all data must be 16-byte
+ * aligned
+ *
+ * 3) When calling the function umac(), it is assumed that msg is in
+ * a writable buffer of length divisible by 32 bytes. The message itself
+ * does not have to fill the entire buffer, but bytes beyond msg may be
+ * zeroed.
+ *
+ * 4) Three free AES implementations are supported by this implementation of
+ * UMAC. Paulo Barreto's version is in the public domain and can be found
+ * at http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/ (search for
+ * "Barreto"). The only two files needed are rijndael-alg-fst.c and
+ * rijndael-alg-fst.h. Brian Gladman's version is distributed with the GNU
+ * Public lisence at http://fp.gladman.plus.com/AES/index.htm. It
+ * includes a fast IA-32 assembly version. The OpenSSL crypo library is
+ * the third.
+ *
+ * 5) With FORCE_C_ONLY flags set to 0, incorrect results are sometimes
+ * produced under gcc with optimizations set -O3 or higher. Dunno why.
+ *
+ /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* --- User Switches ---------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#ifndef UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN
+#define UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN 8 /* Alowable: 4, 8, 12, 16 */
+#endif
+
+#if UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 4 && UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 8 && \
+ UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 12 && UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 16
+# error UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN must be defined to 4, 8, 12 or 16
+#endif
+
+/* #define FORCE_C_ONLY 1 ANSI C and 64-bit integers req'd */
+/* #define AES_IMPLEMENTAION 1 1 = OpenSSL, 2 = Barreto, 3 = Gladman */
+/* #define SSE2 0 Is SSE2 is available? */
+/* #define RUN_TESTS 0 Run basic correctness/speed tests */
+/* #define UMAC_AE_SUPPORT 0 Enable auhthenticated encrytion */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* -- Global Includes --------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "umac.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* --- Primitive Data Types --- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* The following assumptions may need change on your system */
+typedef u_int8_t UINT8; /* 1 byte */
+typedef u_int16_t UINT16; /* 2 byte */
+typedef u_int32_t UINT32; /* 4 byte */
+typedef u_int64_t UINT64; /* 8 bytes */
+typedef unsigned int UWORD; /* Register */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* --- Constants -------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#define UMAC_KEY_LEN 16 /* UMAC takes 16 bytes of external key */
+
+/* Message "words" are read from memory in an endian-specific manner. */
+/* For this implementation to behave correctly, __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ must */
+/* be set true if the host computer is little-endian. */
+
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 1
+#else
+#define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 0
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Architecture Specific ------------------------------------------ */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Primitive Routines --------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* --- 32-bit by 32-bit to 64-bit Multiplication ------------------------ */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#define MUL64(a,b) ((UINT64)((UINT64)(UINT32)(a) * (UINT64)(UINT32)(b)))
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* --- Endian Conversion --- Forcing assembly on some platforms */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
+#define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p) get_u32(p)
+#define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v) put_u32(p,v)
+#else
+#define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p) get_u32_le(p)
+#define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v) put_u32_le(p,v)
+#endif
+
+#define LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(p) (get_u32_le(p))
+#define STORE_UINT32_BIG(p,v) put_u32(p, v)
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Begin KDF & PDF Section ---------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* UMAC uses AES with 16 byte block and key lengths */
+#define AES_BLOCK_LEN 16
+
+/* OpenSSL's AES */
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
+# include <openssl/aes.h>
+#endif
+typedef AES_KEY aes_int_key[1];
+#define aes_encryption(in,out,int_key) \
+ AES_encrypt((u_char *)(in),(u_char *)(out),(AES_KEY *)int_key)
+#define aes_key_setup(key,int_key) \
+ AES_set_encrypt_key((const u_char *)(key),UMAC_KEY_LEN*8,int_key)
+#else
+#include "rijndael.h"
+#define AES_ROUNDS ((UMAC_KEY_LEN / 4) + 6)
+typedef UINT8 aes_int_key[AES_ROUNDS+1][4][4]; /* AES internal */
+#define aes_encryption(in,out,int_key) \
+ rijndaelEncrypt((u32 *)(int_key), AES_ROUNDS, (u8 *)(in), (u8 *)(out))
+#define aes_key_setup(key,int_key) \
+ rijndaelKeySetupEnc((u32 *)(int_key), (const unsigned char *)(key), \
+ UMAC_KEY_LEN*8)
+#endif
+
+/* The user-supplied UMAC key is stretched using AES in a counter
+ * mode to supply all random bits needed by UMAC. The kdf function takes
+ * an AES internal key representation 'key' and writes a stream of
+ * 'nbytes' bytes to the memory pointed at by 'bufp'. Each distinct
+ * 'ndx' causes a distinct byte stream.
+ */
+static void kdf(void *bufp, aes_int_key key, UINT8 ndx, int nbytes)
+{
+ UINT8 in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN] = {0};
+ UINT8 out_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN];
+ UINT8 *dst_buf = (UINT8 *)bufp;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Setup the initial value */
+ in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-9] = ndx;
+ in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = i = 1;
+
+ while (nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_LEN) {
+ aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key);
+ memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,AES_BLOCK_LEN);
+ in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = ++i;
+ nbytes -= AES_BLOCK_LEN;
+ dst_buf += AES_BLOCK_LEN;
+ }
+ if (nbytes) {
+ aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key);
+ memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,nbytes);
+ }
+}
+
+/* The final UHASH result is XOR'd with the output of a pseudorandom
+ * function. Here, we use AES to generate random output and
+ * xor the appropriate bytes depending on the last bits of nonce.
+ * This scheme is optimized for sequential, increasing big-endian nonces.
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+ UINT8 cache[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; /* Previous AES output is saved */
+ UINT8 nonce[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; /* The AES input making above cache */
+ aes_int_key prf_key; /* Expanded AES key for PDF */
+} pdf_ctx;
+
+static void pdf_init(pdf_ctx *pc, aes_int_key prf_key)
+{
+ UINT8 buf[UMAC_KEY_LEN];
+
+ kdf(buf, prf_key, 0, UMAC_KEY_LEN);
+ aes_key_setup(buf, pc->prf_key);
+
+ /* Initialize pdf and cache */
+ memset(pc->nonce, 0, sizeof(pc->nonce));
+ aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key);
+}
+
+static void pdf_gen_xor(pdf_ctx *pc, const UINT8 nonce[8], UINT8 buf[8])
+{
+ /* 'ndx' indicates that we'll be using the 0th or 1st eight bytes
+ * of the AES output. If last time around we returned the ndx-1st
+ * element, then we may have the result in the cache already.
+ */
+
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4)
+#define LOW_BIT_MASK 3
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8)
+#define LOW_BIT_MASK 1
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN > 8)
+#define LOW_BIT_MASK 0
+#endif
+ union {
+ UINT8 tmp_nonce_lo[4];
+ UINT32 align;
+ } t;
+#if LOW_BIT_MASK != 0
+ int ndx = nonce[7] & LOW_BIT_MASK;
+#endif
+ *(UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo = ((const UINT32 *)nonce)[1];
+ t.tmp_nonce_lo[3] &= ~LOW_BIT_MASK; /* zero last bit */
+
+ if ( (((UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1]) ||
+ (((const UINT32 *)nonce)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0]) )
+ {
+ ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0] = ((const UINT32 *)nonce)[0];
+ ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1] = ((UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo)[0];
+ aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key);
+ }
+
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4)
+ *((UINT32 *)buf) ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[ndx];
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8)
+ *((UINT64 *)buf) ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[ndx];
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12)
+ ((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0];
+ ((UINT32 *)buf)[2] ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[2];
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+ ((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0];
+ ((UINT64 *)buf)[1] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[1];
+#endif
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Begin NH Hash Section ------------------------------------------ */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* The NH-based hash functions used in UMAC are described in the UMAC paper
+ * and specification, both of which can be found at the UMAC website.
+ * The interface to this implementation has two
+ * versions, one expects the entire message being hashed to be passed
+ * in a single buffer and returns the hash result immediately. The second
+ * allows the message to be passed in a sequence of buffers. In the
+ * muliple-buffer interface, the client calls the routine nh_update() as
+ * many times as necessary. When there is no more data to be fed to the
+ * hash, the client calls nh_final() which calculates the hash output.
+ * Before beginning another hash calculation the nh_reset() routine
+ * must be called. The single-buffer routine, nh(), is equivalent to
+ * the sequence of calls nh_update() and nh_final(); however it is
+ * optimized and should be prefered whenever the multiple-buffer interface
+ * is not necessary. When using either interface, it is the client's
+ * responsability to pass no more than L1_KEY_LEN bytes per hash result.
+ *
+ * The routine nh_init() initializes the nh_ctx data structure and
+ * must be called once, before any other PDF routine.
+ */
+
+ /* The "nh_aux" routines do the actual NH hashing work. They
+ * expect buffers to be multiples of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. These routines
+ * produce output for all STREAMS NH iterations in one call,
+ * allowing the parallel implementation of the streams.
+ */
+
+#define STREAMS (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN / 4) /* Number of times hash is applied */
+#define L1_KEY_LEN 1024 /* Internal key bytes */
+#define L1_KEY_SHIFT 16 /* Toeplitz key shift between streams */
+#define L1_PAD_BOUNDARY 32 /* pad message to boundary multiple */
+#define ALLOC_BOUNDARY 16 /* Keep buffers aligned to this */
+#define HASH_BUF_BYTES 64 /* nh_aux_hb buffer multiple */
+
+typedef struct {
+ UINT8 nh_key [L1_KEY_LEN + L1_KEY_SHIFT * (STREAMS - 1)]; /* NH Key */
+ UINT8 data [HASH_BUF_BYTES]; /* Incoming data buffer */
+ int next_data_empty; /* Bookeeping variable for data buffer. */
+ int bytes_hashed; /* Bytes (out of L1_KEY_LEN) incorperated. */
+ UINT64 state[STREAMS]; /* on-line state */
+} nh_ctx;
+
+
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4)
+
+static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
+/* NH hashing primitive. Previous (partial) hash result is loaded and
+* then stored via hp pointer. The length of the data pointed at by "dp",
+* "dlen", is guaranteed to be divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY (32). Key
+* is expected to be endian compensated in memory at key setup.
+*/
+{
+ UINT64 h;
+ UWORD c = dlen / 32;
+ UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
+ const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp;
+ UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
+ UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7;
+
+ h = *((UINT64 *)hp);
+ do {
+ d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
+ d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
+ d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
+ d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
+ k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
+ k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
+ h += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
+ h += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
+ h += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
+ h += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
+
+ d += 8;
+ k += 8;
+ } while (--c);
+ *((UINT64 *)hp) = h;
+}
+
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8)
+
+static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
+/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass,
+ * reading and writing 16 bytes of hash-state per call.
+ */
+{
+ UINT64 h1,h2;
+ UWORD c = dlen / 32;
+ UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
+ const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp;
+ UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
+ UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7,
+ k8,k9,k10,k11;
+
+ h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp);
+ h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1);
+ k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
+ do {
+ d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
+ d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
+ d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
+ d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
+ k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
+ k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11);
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
+ h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4));
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
+ h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5));
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
+ h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6));
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
+ h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7));
+
+ k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11;
+
+ d += 8;
+ k += 8;
+ } while (--c);
+ ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1;
+ ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2;
+}
+
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12)
+
+static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
+/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass,
+ * reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call.
+*/
+{
+ UINT64 h1,h2,h3;
+ UWORD c = dlen / 32;
+ UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
+ const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp;
+ UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
+ UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7,
+ k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15;
+
+ h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp);
+ h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1);
+ h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2);
+ k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
+ k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
+ do {
+ d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
+ d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
+ d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
+ d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
+ k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11);
+ k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15);
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
+ h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4));
+ h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4));
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
+ h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5));
+ h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5));
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
+ h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6));
+ h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6));
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
+ h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7));
+ h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7));
+
+ k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11;
+ k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15;
+
+ d += 8;
+ k += 8;
+ } while (--c);
+ ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1;
+ ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2;
+ ((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3;
+}
+
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+
+static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
+/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass,
+ * reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call.
+*/
+{
+ UINT64 h1,h2,h3,h4;
+ UWORD c = dlen / 32;
+ UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
+ const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp;
+ UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
+ UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7,
+ k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15,
+ k16,k17,k18,k19;
+
+ h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp);
+ h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1);
+ h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2);
+ h4 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 3);
+ k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
+ k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
+ do {
+ d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
+ d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
+ d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
+ d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
+ k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11);
+ k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15);
+ k16 = *(k+16); k17 = *(k+17); k18 = *(k+18); k19 = *(k+19);
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
+ h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4));
+ h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4));
+ h4 += MUL64((k12 + d0), (k16 + d4));
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
+ h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5));
+ h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5));
+ h4 += MUL64((k13 + d1), (k17 + d5));
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
+ h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6));
+ h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6));
+ h4 += MUL64((k14 + d2), (k18 + d6));
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
+ h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7));
+ h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7));
+ h4 += MUL64((k15 + d3), (k19 + d7));
+
+ k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11;
+ k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15;
+ k8 = k16; k9 = k17; k10 = k18; k11 = k19;
+
+ d += 8;
+ k += 8;
+ } while (--c);
+ ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1;
+ ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2;
+ ((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3;
+ ((UINT64 *)hp)[3] = h4;
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+#endif /* UMAC_OUTPUT_LENGTH */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh_transform(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes)
+/* This function is a wrapper for the primitive NH hash functions. It takes
+ * as argument "hc" the current hash context and a buffer which must be a
+ * multiple of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. The key passed to nh_aux is offset
+ * appropriately according to how much message has been hashed already.
+ */
+{
+ UINT8 *key;
+
+ key = hc->nh_key + hc->bytes_hashed;
+ nh_aux(key, buf, hc->state, nbytes);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
+static void endian_convert(void *buf, UWORD bpw, UINT32 num_bytes)
+/* We endian convert the keys on little-endian computers to */
+/* compensate for the lack of big-endian memory reads during hashing. */
+{
+ UWORD iters = num_bytes / bpw;
+ if (bpw == 4) {
+ UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf;
+ do {
+ *p = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p);
+ p++;
+ } while (--iters);
+ } else if (bpw == 8) {
+ UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf;
+ UINT32 t;
+ do {
+ t = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p+1);
+ p[1] = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p);
+ p[0] = t;
+ p += 2;
+ } while (--iters);
+ }
+}
+#define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) endian_convert((x),(y),(z))
+#else
+#define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) do{}while(0) /* Do nothing */
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh_reset(nh_ctx *hc)
+/* Reset nh_ctx to ready for hashing of new data */
+{
+ hc->bytes_hashed = 0;
+ hc->next_data_empty = 0;
+ hc->state[0] = 0;
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
+ hc->state[1] = 0;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
+ hc->state[2] = 0;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+ hc->state[3] = 0;
+#endif
+
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh_init(nh_ctx *hc, aes_int_key prf_key)
+/* Generate nh_key, endian convert and reset to be ready for hashing. */
+{
+ kdf(hc->nh_key, prf_key, 1, sizeof(hc->nh_key));
+ endian_convert_if_le(hc->nh_key, 4, sizeof(hc->nh_key));
+ nh_reset(hc);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh_update(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes)
+/* Incorporate nbytes of data into a nh_ctx, buffer whatever is not an */
+/* even multiple of HASH_BUF_BYTES. */
+{
+ UINT32 i,j;
+
+ j = hc->next_data_empty;
+ if ((j + nbytes) >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) {
+ if (j) {
+ i = HASH_BUF_BYTES - j;
+ memcpy(hc->data+j, buf, i);
+ nh_transform(hc,hc->data,HASH_BUF_BYTES);
+ nbytes -= i;
+ buf += i;
+ hc->bytes_hashed += HASH_BUF_BYTES;
+ }
+ if (nbytes >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) {
+ i = nbytes & ~(HASH_BUF_BYTES - 1);
+ nh_transform(hc, buf, i);
+ nbytes -= i;
+ buf += i;
+ hc->bytes_hashed += i;
+ }
+ j = 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(hc->data + j, buf, nbytes);
+ hc->next_data_empty = j + nbytes;
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void zero_pad(UINT8 *p, int nbytes)
+{
+/* Write "nbytes" of zeroes, beginning at "p" */
+ if (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) {
+ while ((ptrdiff_t)p % sizeof(UWORD)) {
+ *p = 0;
+ nbytes--;
+ p++;
+ }
+ while (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) {
+ *(UWORD *)p = 0;
+ nbytes -= sizeof(UWORD);
+ p += sizeof(UWORD);
+ }
+ }
+ while (nbytes) {
+ *p = 0;
+ nbytes--;
+ p++;
+ }
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh_final(nh_ctx *hc, UINT8 *result)
+/* After passing some number of data buffers to nh_update() for integration
+ * into an NH context, nh_final is called to produce a hash result. If any
+ * bytes are in the buffer hc->data, incorporate them into the
+ * NH context. Finally, add into the NH accumulation "state" the total number
+ * of bits hashed. The resulting numbers are written to the buffer "result".
+ * If nh_update was never called, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY zeroes are incorporated.
+ */
+{
+ int nh_len, nbits;
+
+ if (hc->next_data_empty != 0) {
+ nh_len = ((hc->next_data_empty + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) &
+ ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1));
+ zero_pad(hc->data + hc->next_data_empty,
+ nh_len - hc->next_data_empty);
+ nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len);
+ hc->bytes_hashed += hc->next_data_empty;
+ } else if (hc->bytes_hashed == 0) {
+ nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY;
+ zero_pad(hc->data, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY);
+ nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len);
+ }
+
+ nbits = (hc->bytes_hashed << 3);
+ ((UINT64 *)result)[0] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[0] + nbits;
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
+ ((UINT64 *)result)[1] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[1] + nbits;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
+ ((UINT64 *)result)[2] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[2] + nbits;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+ ((UINT64 *)result)[3] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[3] + nbits;
+#endif
+ nh_reset(hc);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 padded_len,
+ UINT32 unpadded_len, UINT8 *result)
+/* All-in-one nh_update() and nh_final() equivalent.
+ * Assumes that padded_len is divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY and result is
+ * well aligned
+ */
+{
+ UINT32 nbits;
+
+ /* Initialize the hash state */
+ nbits = (unpadded_len << 3);
+
+ ((UINT64 *)result)[0] = nbits;
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
+ ((UINT64 *)result)[1] = nbits;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
+ ((UINT64 *)result)[2] = nbits;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+ ((UINT64 *)result)[3] = nbits;
+#endif
+
+ nh_aux(hc->nh_key, buf, result, padded_len);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Begin UHASH Section -------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* UHASH is a multi-layered algorithm. Data presented to UHASH is first
+ * hashed by NH. The NH output is then hashed by a polynomial-hash layer
+ * unless the initial data to be hashed is short. After the polynomial-
+ * layer, an inner-product hash is used to produce the final UHASH output.
+ *
+ * UHASH provides two interfaces, one all-at-once and another where data
+ * buffers are presented sequentially. In the sequential interface, the
+ * UHASH client calls the routine uhash_update() as many times as necessary.
+ * When there is no more data to be fed to UHASH, the client calls
+ * uhash_final() which
+ * calculates the UHASH output. Before beginning another UHASH calculation
+ * the uhash_reset() routine must be called. The all-at-once UHASH routine,
+ * uhash(), is equivalent to the sequence of calls uhash_update() and
+ * uhash_final(); however it is optimized and should be
+ * used whenever the sequential interface is not necessary.
+ *
+ * The routine uhash_init() initializes the uhash_ctx data structure and
+ * must be called once, before any other UHASH routine.
+ */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Constants and uhash_ctx ---------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Poly hash and Inner-Product hash Constants --------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* Primes and masks */
+#define p36 ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFBull) /* 2^36 - 5 */
+#define p64 ((UINT64)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC5ull) /* 2^64 - 59 */
+#define m36 ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFFull) /* The low 36 of 64 bits */
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+typedef struct uhash_ctx {
+ nh_ctx hash; /* Hash context for L1 NH hash */
+ UINT64 poly_key_8[STREAMS]; /* p64 poly keys */
+ UINT64 poly_accum[STREAMS]; /* poly hash result */
+ UINT64 ip_keys[STREAMS*4]; /* Inner-product keys */
+ UINT32 ip_trans[STREAMS]; /* Inner-product translation */
+ UINT32 msg_len; /* Total length of data passed */
+ /* to uhash */
+} uhash_ctx;
+typedef struct uhash_ctx *uhash_ctx_t;
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+
+/* The polynomial hashes use Horner's rule to evaluate a polynomial one
+ * word at a time. As described in the specification, poly32 and poly64
+ * require keys from special domains. The following implementations exploit
+ * the special domains to avoid overflow. The results are not guaranteed to
+ * be within Z_p32 and Z_p64, but the Inner-Product hash implementation
+ * patches any errant values.
+ */
+
+static UINT64 poly64(UINT64 cur, UINT64 key, UINT64 data)
+{
+ UINT32 key_hi = (UINT32)(key >> 32),
+ key_lo = (UINT32)key,
+ cur_hi = (UINT32)(cur >> 32),
+ cur_lo = (UINT32)cur,
+ x_lo,
+ x_hi;
+ UINT64 X,T,res;
+
+ X = MUL64(key_hi, cur_lo) + MUL64(cur_hi, key_lo);
+ x_lo = (UINT32)X;
+ x_hi = (UINT32)(X >> 32);
+
+ res = (MUL64(key_hi, cur_hi) + x_hi) * 59 + MUL64(key_lo, cur_lo);
+
+ T = ((UINT64)x_lo << 32);
+ res += T;
+ if (res < T)
+ res += 59;
+
+ res += data;
+ if (res < data)
+ res += 59;
+
+ return res;
+}
+
+
+/* Although UMAC is specified to use a ramped polynomial hash scheme, this
+ * implementation does not handle all ramp levels. Because we don't handle
+ * the ramp up to p128 modulus in this implementation, we are limited to
+ * 2^14 poly_hash() invocations per stream (for a total capacity of 2^24
+ * bytes input to UMAC per tag, ie. 16MB).
+ */
+static void poly_hash(uhash_ctx_t hc, UINT32 data_in[])
+{
+ int i;
+ UINT64 *data=(UINT64*)data_in;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) {
+ if ((UINT32)(data[i] >> 32) == 0xfffffffful) {
+ hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i],
+ hc->poly_key_8[i], p64 - 1);
+ hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i],
+ hc->poly_key_8[i], (data[i] - 59));
+ } else {
+ hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i],
+ hc->poly_key_8[i], data[i]);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+
+/* The final step in UHASH is an inner-product hash. The poly hash
+ * produces a result not neccesarily WORD_LEN bytes long. The inner-
+ * product hash breaks the polyhash output into 16-bit chunks and
+ * multiplies each with a 36 bit key.
+ */
+
+static UINT64 ip_aux(UINT64 t, UINT64 *ipkp, UINT64 data)
+{
+ t = t + ipkp[0] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 48);
+ t = t + ipkp[1] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 32);
+ t = t + ipkp[2] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 16);
+ t = t + ipkp[3] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data);
+
+ return t;
+}
+
+static UINT32 ip_reduce_p36(UINT64 t)
+{
+/* Divisionless modular reduction */
+ UINT64 ret;
+
+ ret = (t & m36) + 5 * (t >> 36);
+ if (ret >= p36)
+ ret -= p36;
+
+ /* return least significant 32 bits */
+ return (UINT32)(ret);
+}
+
+
+/* If the data being hashed by UHASH is no longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then
+ * the polyhash stage is skipped and ip_short is applied directly to the
+ * NH output.
+ */
+static void ip_short(uhash_ctx_t ahc, UINT8 *nh_res, u_char *res)
+{
+ UINT64 t;
+ UINT64 *nhp = (UINT64 *)nh_res;
+
+ t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys, nhp[0]);
+ STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+0, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[0]);
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
+ t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+4, nhp[1]);
+ STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+1, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[1]);
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
+ t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+8, nhp[2]);
+ STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+2, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[2]);
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+ t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+12, nhp[3]);
+ STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+3, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[3]);
+#endif
+}
+
+/* If the data being hashed by UHASH is longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then
+ * the polyhash stage is not skipped and ip_long is applied to the
+ * polyhash output.
+ */
+static void ip_long(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *res)
+{
+ int i;
+ UINT64 t;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) {
+ /* fix polyhash output not in Z_p64 */
+ if (ahc->poly_accum[i] >= p64)
+ ahc->poly_accum[i] -= p64;
+ t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+(i*4), ahc->poly_accum[i]);
+ STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+i,
+ ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* Reset uhash context for next hash session */
+static int uhash_reset(uhash_ctx_t pc)
+{
+ nh_reset(&pc->hash);
+ pc->msg_len = 0;
+ pc->poly_accum[0] = 1;
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
+ pc->poly_accum[1] = 1;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
+ pc->poly_accum[2] = 1;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+ pc->poly_accum[3] = 1;
+#endif
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* Given a pointer to the internal key needed by kdf() and a uhash context,
+ * initialize the NH context and generate keys needed for poly and inner-
+ * product hashing. All keys are endian adjusted in memory so that native
+ * loads cause correct keys to be in registers during calculation.
+ */
+static void uhash_init(uhash_ctx_t ahc, aes_int_key prf_key)
+{
+ int i;
+ UINT8 buf[(8*STREAMS+4)*sizeof(UINT64)];
+
+ /* Zero the entire uhash context */
+ memset(ahc, 0, sizeof(uhash_ctx));
+
+ /* Initialize the L1 hash */
+ nh_init(&ahc->hash, prf_key);
+
+ /* Setup L2 hash variables */
+ kdf(buf, prf_key, 2, sizeof(buf)); /* Fill buffer with index 1 key */
+ for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) {
+ /* Fill keys from the buffer, skipping bytes in the buffer not
+ * used by this implementation. Endian reverse the keys if on a
+ * little-endian computer.
+ */
+ memcpy(ahc->poly_key_8+i, buf+24*i, 8);
+ endian_convert_if_le(ahc->poly_key_8+i, 8, 8);
+ /* Mask the 64-bit keys to their special domain */
+ ahc->poly_key_8[i] &= ((UINT64)0x01ffffffu << 32) + 0x01ffffffu;
+ ahc->poly_accum[i] = 1; /* Our polyhash prepends a non-zero word */
+ }
+
+ /* Setup L3-1 hash variables */
+ kdf(buf, prf_key, 3, sizeof(buf)); /* Fill buffer with index 2 key */
+ for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++)
+ memcpy(ahc->ip_keys+4*i, buf+(8*i+4)*sizeof(UINT64),
+ 4*sizeof(UINT64));
+ endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_keys, sizeof(UINT64),
+ sizeof(ahc->ip_keys));
+ for (i = 0; i < STREAMS*4; i++)
+ ahc->ip_keys[i] %= p36; /* Bring into Z_p36 */
+
+ /* Setup L3-2 hash variables */
+ /* Fill buffer with index 4 key */
+ kdf(ahc->ip_trans, prf_key, 4, STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32));
+ endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_trans, sizeof(UINT32),
+ STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32));
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if 0
+static uhash_ctx_t uhash_alloc(u_char key[])
+{
+/* Allocate memory and force to a 16-byte boundary. */
+ uhash_ctx_t ctx;
+ u_char bytes_to_add;
+ aes_int_key prf_key;
+
+ ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)malloc(sizeof(uhash_ctx)+ALLOC_BOUNDARY);
+ if (ctx) {
+ if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) {
+ bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY -
+ ((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY -1));
+ ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add);
+ *((u_char *)ctx - 1) = bytes_to_add;
+ }
+ aes_key_setup(key,prf_key);
+ uhash_init(ctx, prf_key);
+ }
+ return (ctx);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if 0
+static int uhash_free(uhash_ctx_t ctx)
+{
+/* Free memory allocated by uhash_alloc */
+ u_char bytes_to_sub;
+
+ if (ctx) {
+ if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) {
+ bytes_to_sub = *((u_char *)ctx - 1);
+ ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx - bytes_to_sub);
+ }
+ free(ctx);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+#endif
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static int uhash_update(uhash_ctx_t ctx, const u_char *input, long len)
+/* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and
+ * hash each one with NH, calling the polyhash on each NH output.
+ */
+{
+ UWORD bytes_hashed, bytes_remaining;
+ UINT64 result_buf[STREAMS];
+ UINT8 *nh_result = (UINT8 *)&result_buf;
+
+ if (ctx->msg_len + len <= L1_KEY_LEN) {
+ nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, len);
+ ctx->msg_len += len;
+ } else {
+
+ bytes_hashed = ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN;
+ if (ctx->msg_len == L1_KEY_LEN)
+ bytes_hashed = L1_KEY_LEN;
+
+ if (bytes_hashed + len >= L1_KEY_LEN) {
+
+ /* If some bytes have been passed to the hash function */
+ /* then we want to pass at most (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed) */
+ /* bytes to complete the current nh_block. */
+ if (bytes_hashed) {
+ bytes_remaining = (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed);
+ nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, bytes_remaining);
+ nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result);
+ ctx->msg_len += bytes_remaining;
+ poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
+ len -= bytes_remaining;
+ input += bytes_remaining;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash directly from input stream if enough bytes */
+ while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN) {
+ nh(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, L1_KEY_LEN,
+ L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result);
+ ctx->msg_len += L1_KEY_LEN;
+ len -= L1_KEY_LEN;
+ input += L1_KEY_LEN;
+ poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* pass remaining < L1_KEY_LEN bytes of input data to NH */
+ if (len) {
+ nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, len);
+ ctx->msg_len += len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static int uhash_final(uhash_ctx_t ctx, u_char *res)
+/* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */
+{
+ UINT64 result_buf[STREAMS];
+ UINT8 *nh_result = (UINT8 *)&result_buf;
+
+ if (ctx->msg_len > L1_KEY_LEN) {
+ if (ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN) {
+ nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result);
+ poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
+ }
+ ip_long(ctx, res);
+ } else {
+ nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result);
+ ip_short(ctx,nh_result, res);
+ }
+ uhash_reset(ctx);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if 0
+static int uhash(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *msg, long len, u_char *res)
+/* assumes that msg is in a writable buffer of length divisible by */
+/* L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. Bytes beyond msg[len] may be zeroed. */
+{
+ UINT8 nh_result[STREAMS*sizeof(UINT64)];
+ UINT32 nh_len;
+ int extra_zeroes_needed;
+
+ /* If the message to be hashed is no longer than L1_HASH_LEN, we skip
+ * the polyhash.
+ */
+ if (len <= L1_KEY_LEN) {
+ if (len == 0) /* If zero length messages will not */
+ nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY; /* be seen, comment out this case */
+ else
+ nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1));
+ extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len;
+ zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed);
+ nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result);
+ ip_short(ahc,nh_result, res);
+ } else {
+ /* Otherwise, we hash each L1_KEY_LEN chunk with NH, passing the NH
+ * output to poly_hash().
+ */
+ do {
+ nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, L1_KEY_LEN, L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result);
+ poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
+ len -= L1_KEY_LEN;
+ msg += L1_KEY_LEN;
+ } while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN);
+ if (len) {
+ nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1));
+ extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len;
+ zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed);
+ nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result);
+ poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
+ }
+
+ ip_long(ahc, res);
+ }
+
+ uhash_reset(ahc);
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Begin UMAC Section --------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* The UMAC interface has two interfaces, an all-at-once interface where
+ * the entire message to be authenticated is passed to UMAC in one buffer,
+ * and a sequential interface where the message is presented a little at a
+ * time. The all-at-once is more optimaized than the sequential version and
+ * should be preferred when the sequential interface is not required.
+ */
+struct umac_ctx {
+ uhash_ctx hash; /* Hash function for message compression */
+ pdf_ctx pdf; /* PDF for hashed output */
+ void *free_ptr; /* Address to free this struct via */
+} umac_ctx;
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if 0
+int umac_reset(struct umac_ctx *ctx)
+/* Reset the hash function to begin a new authentication. */
+{
+ uhash_reset(&ctx->hash);
+ return (1);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+int umac_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx)
+/* Deallocate the ctx structure */
+{
+ if (ctx) {
+ if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY)
+ ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)ctx->free_ptr;
+ free(ctx);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+struct umac_ctx *umac_new(const u_char key[])
+/* Dynamically allocate a umac_ctx struct, initialize variables,
+ * generate subkeys from key. Align to 16-byte boundary.
+ */
+{
+ struct umac_ctx *ctx, *octx;
+ size_t bytes_to_add;
+ aes_int_key prf_key;
+
+ octx = ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx) + ALLOC_BOUNDARY);
+ if (ctx) {
+ if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) {
+ bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY -
+ ((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY - 1));
+ ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add);
+ }
+ ctx->free_ptr = octx;
+ aes_key_setup(key, prf_key);
+ pdf_init(&ctx->pdf, prf_key);
+ uhash_init(&ctx->hash, prf_key);
+ }
+
+ return (ctx);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+int umac_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], const u_char nonce[8])
+/* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */
+{
+ uhash_final(&ctx->hash, (u_char *)tag);
+ pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (const UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag);
+
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+int umac_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, const u_char *input, long len)
+/* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and */
+/* hash each one, calling the PDF on the hashed output whenever the hash- */
+/* output buffer is full. */
+{
+ uhash_update(&ctx->hash, input, len);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if 0
+int umac(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input,
+ long len, u_char tag[],
+ u_char nonce[8])
+/* All-in-one version simply calls umac_update() and umac_final(). */
+{
+ uhash(&ctx->hash, input, len, (u_char *)tag);
+ pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag);
+
+ return (1);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- End UMAC Section ----------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/utf8.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/utf8.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/utf8.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/utf8.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: utf8.c,v 1.3 2016/05/30 12:57:21 schwarze Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Ingo Schwarze <schwarze at openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Utility functions for multibyte-character handling,
+ * in particular to sanitize untrusted strings for terminal output.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LANGINFO_H
+# include <langinfo.h>
+#endif
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+# include <vis.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_WCHAR_H
+# include <wchar.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "utf8.h"
+
+static int dangerous_locale(void);
+static int grow_dst(char **, size_t *, size_t, char **, size_t);
+static int vasnmprintf(char **, size_t, int *, const char *, va_list);
+
+
+/*
+ * For US-ASCII and UTF-8 encodings, we can safely recover from
+ * encoding errors and from non-printable characters. For any
+ * other encodings, err to the side of caution and abort parsing:
+ * For state-dependent encodings, recovery is impossible.
+ * For arbitrary encodings, replacement of non-printable
+ * characters would be non-trivial and too fragile.
+ */
+
+static int
+dangerous_locale(void) {
+ char *loc;
+
+ loc = nl_langinfo(CODESET);
+ return strcmp(loc, "US-ASCII") && strcmp(loc, "UTF-8");
+}
+
+static int
+grow_dst(char **dst, size_t *sz, size_t maxsz, char **dp, size_t need)
+{
+ char *tp;
+ size_t tsz;
+
+ if (*dp + need < *dst + *sz)
+ return 0;
+ tsz = *sz + 128;
+ if (tsz > maxsz)
+ tsz = maxsz;
+ if ((tp = realloc(*dst, tsz)) == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ *dp = tp + (*dp - *dst);
+ *dst = tp;
+ *sz = tsz;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following two functions limit the number of bytes written,
+ * including the terminating '\0', to sz. Unless wp is NULL,
+ * they limit the number of display columns occupied to *wp.
+ * Whichever is reached first terminates the output string.
+ * To stay close to the standard interfaces, they return the number of
+ * non-NUL bytes that would have been written if both were unlimited.
+ * If wp is NULL, newline, carriage return, and tab are allowed;
+ * otherwise, the actual number of columns occupied by what was
+ * written is returned in *wp.
+ */
+
+static int
+vasnmprintf(char **str, size_t maxsz, int *wp, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+{
+ char *src; /* Source string returned from vasprintf. */
+ char *sp; /* Pointer into src. */
+ char *dst; /* Destination string to be returned. */
+ char *dp; /* Pointer into dst. */
+ char *tp; /* Temporary pointer for dst. */
+ size_t sz; /* Number of bytes allocated for dst. */
+ wchar_t wc; /* Wide character at sp. */
+ int len; /* Number of bytes in the character at sp. */
+ int ret; /* Number of bytes needed to format src. */
+ int width; /* Display width of the character wc. */
+ int total_width, max_width, print;
+
+ src = NULL;
+ if ((ret = vasprintf(&src, fmt, ap)) <= 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ sz = strlen(src) + 1;
+ if ((dst = malloc(sz)) == NULL) {
+ free(src);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (maxsz > INT_MAX)
+ maxsz = INT_MAX;
+
+ sp = src;
+ dp = dst;
+ ret = 0;
+ print = 1;
+ total_width = 0;
+ max_width = wp == NULL ? INT_MAX : *wp;
+ while (*sp != '\0') {
+ if ((len = mbtowc(&wc, sp, MB_CUR_MAX)) == -1) {
+ (void)mbtowc(NULL, NULL, MB_CUR_MAX);
+ if (dangerous_locale()) {
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ len = 1;
+ width = -1;
+ } else if (wp == NULL &&
+ (wc == L'\n' || wc == L'\r' || wc == L'\t')) {
+ /*
+ * Don't use width uninitialized; the actual
+ * value doesn't matter because total_width
+ * is only returned for wp != NULL.
+ */
+ width = 0;
+ } else if ((width = wcwidth(wc)) == -1 &&
+ dangerous_locale()) {
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Valid, printable character. */
+
+ if (width >= 0) {
+ if (print && (dp - dst >= (int)maxsz - len ||
+ total_width > max_width - width))
+ print = 0;
+ if (print) {
+ if (grow_dst(&dst, &sz, maxsz,
+ &dp, len) == -1) {
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ total_width += width;
+ memcpy(dp, sp, len);
+ dp += len;
+ }
+ sp += len;
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ ret += len;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Escaping required. */
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ if (print && (dp - dst >= (int)maxsz - 4 ||
+ total_width > max_width - 4))
+ print = 0;
+ if (print) {
+ if (grow_dst(&dst, &sz, maxsz,
+ &dp, 4) == -1) {
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ tp = vis(dp, *sp, VIS_OCTAL | VIS_ALL, 0);
+ width = tp - dp;
+ total_width += width;
+ dp = tp;
+ } else
+ width = 4;
+ len--;
+ sp++;
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ ret += width;
+ }
+ if (len > 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ free(src);
+ *dp = '\0';
+ *str = dst;
+ if (wp != NULL)
+ *wp = total_width;
+
+ /*
+ * If the string was truncated by the width limit but
+ * would have fit into the size limit, the only sane way
+ * to report the problem is using the return value, such
+ * that the usual idiom "if (ret < 0 || ret >= sz) error"
+ * works as expected.
+ */
+
+ if (ret < (int)maxsz && !print)
+ ret = -1;
+ return ret;
+
+fail:
+ if (wp != NULL)
+ *wp = 0;
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ *str = src;
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ *str = NULL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+int
+snmprintf(char *str, size_t sz, int *wp, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ char *cp;
+ int ret;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ ret = vasnmprintf(&cp, sz, wp, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ if (cp != NULL) {
+ (void)strlcpy(str, cp, sz);
+ free(cp);
+ } else
+ *str = '\0';
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * To stay close to the standard interfaces, the following functions
+ * return the number of non-NUL bytes written.
+ */
+
+int
+vfmprintf(FILE *stream, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+{
+ char *str;
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret = vasnmprintf(&str, INT_MAX, NULL, fmt, ap)) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (fputs(str, stream) == EOF)
+ ret = -1;
+ free(str);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+fmprintf(FILE *stream, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ int ret;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ ret = vfmprintf(stream, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+mprintf(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ int ret;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ ret = vfmprintf(stdout, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ return ret;
+}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/utf8.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/utf8.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/utf8.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/utf8.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: utf8.h,v 1.1 2016/05/25 23:48:45 schwarze Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Ingo Schwarze <schwarze at openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+int mprintf(const char *, ...)
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+int fmprintf(FILE *, const char *, ...)
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+int vfmprintf(FILE *, const char *, va_list);
+int snmprintf(char *, size_t, int *, const char *, ...)
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5)));
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/uuencode.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/uuencode.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/uuencode.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.c,v 1.27 2013/05/17 00:13:14 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <resolv.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "uuencode.h"
-
-/*
- * Encode binary 'src' of length 'srclength', writing base64-encoded text
- * to 'target' of size 'targsize'. Will always nul-terminate 'target'.
- * Returns the number of bytes stored in 'target' or -1 on error (inc.
- * 'targsize' too small).
- */
-int
-uuencode(const u_char *src, u_int srclength,
- char *target, size_t targsize)
-{
- return __b64_ntop(src, srclength, target, targsize);
-}
-
-/*
- * Decode base64-encoded 'src' into buffer 'target' of 'targsize' bytes.
- * Will skip leading and trailing whitespace. Returns the number of bytes
- * stored in 'target' or -1 on error (inc. targsize too small).
- */
-int
-uudecode(const char *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize)
-{
- int len;
- char *encoded, *p;
-
- /* copy the 'readonly' source */
- encoded = xstrdup(src);
- /* skip whitespace and data */
- for (p = encoded; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; p++)
- ;
- for (; *p != '\0' && *p != ' ' && *p != '\t'; p++)
- ;
- /* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */
- *p = '\0';
- len = __b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize);
- free(encoded);
- return len;
-}
-
-void
-dump_base64(FILE *fp, const u_char *data, u_int len)
-{
- char *buf;
- int i, n;
-
- if (len > 65536) {
- fprintf(fp, "dump_base64: len > 65536\n");
- return;
- }
- buf = xmalloc(2*len);
- n = uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len);
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]);
- if (i % 70 == 69)
- fprintf(fp, "\n");
- }
- if (i % 70 != 69)
- fprintf(fp, "\n");
- free(buf);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/uuencode.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/uuencode.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/uuencode.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/uuencode.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.c,v 1.28 2015/04/24 01:36:24 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "uuencode.h"
+
+/*
+ * Encode binary 'src' of length 'srclength', writing base64-encoded text
+ * to 'target' of size 'targsize'. Will always nul-terminate 'target'.
+ * Returns the number of bytes stored in 'target' or -1 on error (inc.
+ * 'targsize' too small).
+ */
+int
+uuencode(const u_char *src, u_int srclength,
+ char *target, size_t targsize)
+{
+ return __b64_ntop(src, srclength, target, targsize);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode base64-encoded 'src' into buffer 'target' of 'targsize' bytes.
+ * Will skip leading and trailing whitespace. Returns the number of bytes
+ * stored in 'target' or -1 on error (inc. targsize too small).
+ */
+int
+uudecode(const char *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize)
+{
+ int len;
+ char *encoded, *p;
+
+ /* copy the 'readonly' source */
+ encoded = xstrdup(src);
+ /* skip whitespace and data */
+ for (p = encoded; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; p++)
+ ;
+ for (; *p != '\0' && *p != ' ' && *p != '\t'; p++)
+ ;
+ /* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */
+ *p = '\0';
+ len = __b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize);
+ free(encoded);
+ return len;
+}
+
+void
+dump_base64(FILE *fp, const u_char *data, u_int len)
+{
+ char *buf;
+ int i, n;
+
+ if (len > 65536) {
+ fprintf(fp, "dump_base64: len > 65536\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ buf = xreallocarray(NULL, 2, len);
+ n = uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len);
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]);
+ if (i % 70 == 69)
+ fprintf(fp, "\n");
+ }
+ if (i % 70 != 69)
+ fprintf(fp, "\n");
+ free(buf);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/version.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/version.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/version.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.70 2014/02/27 22:57:40 djm Exp $ */
-
-#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_6.6"
-
-#define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
-#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/version.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/version.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/version.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/version.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.77 2016/07/24 11:45:36 djm Exp $ */
+
+#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_7.3"
+
+#define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
+#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/xmalloc.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/xmalloc.c 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/xmalloc.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.29 2014/01/04 17:50:55 tedu Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return
- * failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error).
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-void *
-xmalloc(size_t size)
-{
- void *ptr;
-
- if (size == 0)
- fatal("xmalloc: zero size");
- ptr = malloc(size);
- if (ptr == NULL)
- fatal("xmalloc: out of memory (allocating %zu bytes)", size);
- return ptr;
-}
-
-void *
-xcalloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size)
-{
- void *ptr;
-
- if (size == 0 || nmemb == 0)
- fatal("xcalloc: zero size");
- if (SIZE_T_MAX / nmemb < size)
- fatal("xcalloc: nmemb * size > SIZE_T_MAX");
- ptr = calloc(nmemb, size);
- if (ptr == NULL)
- fatal("xcalloc: out of memory (allocating %zu bytes)",
- size * nmemb);
- return ptr;
-}
-
-void *
-xrealloc(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
-{
- void *new_ptr;
- size_t new_size = nmemb * size;
-
- if (new_size == 0)
- fatal("xrealloc: zero size");
- if (SIZE_T_MAX / nmemb < size)
- fatal("xrealloc: nmemb * size > SIZE_T_MAX");
- if (ptr == NULL)
- new_ptr = malloc(new_size);
- else
- new_ptr = realloc(ptr, new_size);
- if (new_ptr == NULL)
- fatal("xrealloc: out of memory (new_size %zu bytes)",
- new_size);
- return new_ptr;
-}
-
-char *
-xstrdup(const char *str)
-{
- size_t len;
- char *cp;
-
- len = strlen(str) + 1;
- cp = xmalloc(len);
- strlcpy(cp, str, len);
- return cp;
-}
-
-int
-xasprintf(char **ret, const char *fmt, ...)
-{
- va_list ap;
- int i;
-
- va_start(ap, fmt);
- i = vasprintf(ret, fmt, ap);
- va_end(ap);
-
- if (i < 0 || *ret == NULL)
- fatal("xasprintf: could not allocate memory");
-
- return (i);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/xmalloc.c (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/xmalloc.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/xmalloc.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/xmalloc.c 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.33 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return
+ * failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error).
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+void
+ssh_malloc_init(void)
+{
+#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
+ extern char *malloc_options;
+
+ malloc_options = "S";
+#endif /* __OpenBSD__ */
+}
+
+void *
+xmalloc(size_t size)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+
+ if (size == 0)
+ fatal("xmalloc: zero size");
+ ptr = malloc(size);
+ if (ptr == NULL)
+ fatal("xmalloc: out of memory (allocating %zu bytes)", size);
+ return ptr;
+}
+
+void *
+xcalloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+
+ if (size == 0 || nmemb == 0)
+ fatal("xcalloc: zero size");
+ if (SIZE_MAX / nmemb < size)
+ fatal("xcalloc: nmemb * size > SIZE_MAX");
+ ptr = calloc(nmemb, size);
+ if (ptr == NULL)
+ fatal("xcalloc: out of memory (allocating %zu bytes)",
+ size * nmemb);
+ return ptr;
+}
+
+void *
+xreallocarray(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
+{
+ void *new_ptr;
+
+ new_ptr = reallocarray(ptr, nmemb, size);
+ if (new_ptr == NULL)
+ fatal("xreallocarray: out of memory (%zu elements of %zu bytes)",
+ nmemb, size);
+ return new_ptr;
+}
+
+char *
+xstrdup(const char *str)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ char *cp;
+
+ len = strlen(str) + 1;
+ cp = xmalloc(len);
+ strlcpy(cp, str, len);
+ return cp;
+}
+
+int
+xasprintf(char **ret, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ int i;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ i = vasprintf(ret, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ if (i < 0 || *ret == NULL)
+ fatal("xasprintf: could not allocate memory");
+
+ return (i);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/xmalloc.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/xmalloc.h 2016-11-05 17:20:01 UTC (rev 9218)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/xmalloc.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.14 2013/05/17 00:13:14 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Created: Mon Mar 20 22:09:17 1995 ylo
- *
- * Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return
- * failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error).
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-void *xmalloc(size_t);
-void *xcalloc(size_t, size_t);
-void *xrealloc(void *, size_t, size_t);
-char *xstrdup(const char *);
-int xasprintf(char **, const char *, ...)
- __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)))
- __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/xmalloc.h (from rev 9221, vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/xmalloc.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/xmalloc.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssh/7.3p1/xmalloc.h 2016-11-05 20:33:10 UTC (rev 9222)
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.16 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Created: Mon Mar 20 22:09:17 1995 ylo
+ *
+ * Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return
+ * failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error).
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+void ssh_malloc_init(void);
+void *xmalloc(size_t);
+void *xcalloc(size_t, size_t);
+void *xreallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t);
+char *xstrdup(const char *);
+int xasprintf(char **, const char *, ...)
+ __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)))
+ __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
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